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PN-OR-0005	[ "U.S. District Court District of Oregon (Portland (3)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:20-cv-01188-SB\n\nPaul v. Trump et al Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman Cause: 42:1986 Neglect of Duty\n\nDate Filed: 07/21/2020 Date Terminated: 10/21/2020 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question\n\nPlaintiff Jeff Paul\n\nrepresented by Michael R. Fuller OlsenDaines US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., Suite 3150 Portland, OR 97204 503-222-2000 Fax: 503-362-1375 Email: Michael@UnderdogLawyer.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJane L. Moisan People's Law Project 818 S.W. 3rd Avenue #221-3789 Portland, OR 97204 971-258-1292 Fax: 971-258-1292 Email: peopleslawproject@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nKelly D. Jones Kelly D. Jones, Attorney at Law 819 SE Morrison St. Suite 255 Portland, OR 97214 503-847-4329 Fax: 503-715-0524 Email: kellydonovanjones@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\n\fV. Defendant Donald Trump\nDefendant Chad Wolf\nDefendant John Does 1-100\n\nDate Filed\n\n# Docket Text\n\n07/21/2020\n\n1 Complaint. Filing fee in the amount of $400 collected. Agency Tracking ID: AORDC-7015059 Jury Trial Requested: Yes. Filed by Jeff Paul against All Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Proposed Summons, # 3 Proposed Summons). (Fuller, Michael) (Entered: 07/21/2020)\n\n07/23/2020 2\n\nNotice of Case Assignment to Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman and Discovery and Pretrial Scheduling Order. NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve the summonses and all documents issued by the Clerk at the time of filing upon all named parties in accordance with Local Rule 3-5. Discovery is to be completed by 11/20/2020. Joint Alternate Dispute Resolution Report is due by 12/21/2020. Pretrial Order is due by 12/21/2020. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman. (jtj) (Entered: 07/23/2020)\n\n07/23/2020\n\n3 Summons Issued Electronically as to Donald Trump, Chad Wolf. NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve the summonses and all documents issued by the Clerk at the time of filing upon all named parties in accordance with Local Rule 3-5. (jtj) (Entered: 07/23/2020)\n\n10/21/2020\n\n4 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Filed by Jeff Paul. (Fuller, Michael) (Entered: 10/21/2020)\n\nPACER Service Center Transaction Receipt\n12/31/2020 12:19:50\n\n\fPACER Login:\n\nCRClearinghouse\n\nClient Code:\n\nDescription: Docket Report\n\nSearch Criteria:\n\nBillable Pages:\n\n2\n\nCost:\n\n3:20-cv-01188-SB Start date: 1/1/1971 End date: 12/31/2020\n0.20\n\n\f", "Case 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 1 of 17\n\nMichael Fuller, OSB No. 09357 OlsenDaines US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., Suite 3150 Portland, Oregon 97204 michael@underdoglawyer.com Direct 503-222-2000\nKelly D. Jones, OSB No. 074217 Law Office of Kelly D. Jones kellydonovanjones@gmail.com Direct 503-847-4329\nJane Moisan, OSB No. 181864 People’s Law Project peopleslawproject@gmail.com Direct 971-258-1292\nPro Bono Attorneys for Mr. Paul\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION\n\nJEFF PAUL\nPlaintiff\nvs\nDONALD TRUMP CHAD WOLF JOHN DOES 1-100\nDefendants\n\nCase No. 3:20-cv-1188\nCOMPLAINT FOR CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION\nDemand for Jury Trial\n\nCOMPLAINT – Page 1 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 2 of 17\n1. INTRODUCTION “President Trump, in pushing a law-and-order message for his reelection campaign, has embraced a dark vision of Portland as a lawless place filled with people who ‘hate our country.’ His administration’s crackdown has brought armed officers from a wide variety of federal agencies to the streets, where they have been firing tear gas and pulling protesters into unmarked vans.” – The New York Times, July 21, 2020\n2. On Saturday, July 18, 2020, Mr. Paul stood alongside retired military veterans, moms, nurses, Black Lives Matter advocates, legal observers, and other peaceful civil rights activists protesting police brutality outside the Justice Center in downtown Portland. Without warning, federal agents, acting under the orders of President Trump and Secretary Wolf, stormed the streets of Portland and began mercilessly attacking peaceful protesters with military weapons.\n3. Using a baton, federal agents viciously beat and mutilated Mr. Paul about the body and face, without provocation, sending Mr. Paul to the emergency room, where he stayed overnight receiving treatment.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 2 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 3 of 17\n4. JURISDICTION AND THE PARTIES This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this complaint presents federal questions and alleges violations of the U.S. Constitution. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Mr. Paul was beaten and mutilated in downtown Portland.\n5. Plaintiff Mr. Paul is an American citizen and a peaceful civil rights activist. Mr. Paul is a special education paraprofessional employed by Seattle Public Schools, working to create learning environments more inclusive to people of all backgrounds and abilities. He is also a Recreation Leader with Seattle Parks and Recreation, working to develop programs that promote equity and opportunity. Since George Floyd’s murder in Minneapolis, Mr. Paul has been actively involved in civil rights protests, mostly in Seattle where he lives. Mr. Paul believes it is fundamentally important for citizens to protest the treatment of Black lives – racist treatment that has been systemic and generational. Mr. Paul decided to come to Portland to protest with the thousands of other peaceful people who have flooded the streets. Mr. Paul traveled to Portland to have his voice heard, and to engage in peaceful protest with the rest of the people in Portland, as the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 3 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 4 of 17\n6. Defendant Donald Trump is the President of the United States.\n7. Defendant Chad Wolf is the acting Homeland Security Secretary of the United States. Wolf’s predecessor, Kevin McAleenan, departed the office in part over concerns that the messaging and tone of the department had become too political.\n8. John Does 1-100 are unidentified federal agents, senior White House officials, and other co-conspirators who aided and abetted President Trump and Chad Wolf in the politically-motivated violations of the U.S. Constitution as alleged in this complaint, or who participated in the unprovoked attack on Mr. Paul.\n9. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS This complaint’s allegations are based on personal knowledge as to Mr. Paul’s behavior and made on information and belief as to the behavior of others.\n10. In May of 2020, hundreds of thousands of American civil rights activists began protesting the murder of George Floyd, a Black man killed by police officers in Minneapolis, Minnesota.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 4 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 5 of 17\n11. President Trump has repeatedly advocated the use of force against Black demonstrators and civil rights activists protesting the murder of George Floyd.\n12. President Trump posted on social media about the protests, stating that “when the looting starts, the shooting starts,” which is a racist slogan used by former Miami police chief Walter Headley in 1967 to advocate for police brutality and discriminatory practices targeting African Americans. President Trump later tweeted, “These people are ANARCHISTS. Call in our National Guard NOW” and “This isn’t going to stop until the good guys are willing to use overwhelming force against the bad guys”.\n13. President Trump personally called on governors to “dominate your city and your state” and warned that he was prepared to “do something people haven’t seen before” when referring to the protests. During remarks in the White House Rose Garden, President Trump said that if “a city or a state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them.”\nCOMPLAINT – Page 5 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 6 of 17\n14. President Trump’s statements about Black demonstrators and civil rights protesters were different from his statements about other demonstrators. President Trump has routinely been sympathetic to demonstrators who share his own political agenda.\n15. For example, President Trump expressed support when heavily armed and predominantly white demonstrators threatened lawmakers and stormed statehouses to object to coronavirus stay-at-home rules. In response to the 2017 white nationalist Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, President Trump said, “You had very fine people, on both sides”.\n16. In July of 2020, Secretary Wolf and senior DHS officials, acting under the orders of President Trump, took to the airwaves and social media to amplify President Trump’s political message of law and order, using Portland, where protests over racial inequality and police brutality persisted, as an example.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 6 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 7 of 17\n17. DHS law enforcement officers from Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, two of the department’s immigration agencies, were deployed to Portland. According to Oregon’s governor, Secretary Wolf was “on a mission to provoke confrontation for political purposes.” “The Trump administration needs to stop playing politics with people’s lives.”\n18. “Demonstrators in Portland have been protesting racial inequality and police brutality for the last 50 nights, US Attorney Billy J. Williams said in a statement. Federal authorities have protected the Mark O. Hatfield US Courthouse and, at times, interaction between protesters and law enforcement has gotten violent. Last weekend, one protester was seriously injured after the man was shot in the head with impact munition.” – CNN, July 20, 2020\n19. As of the date of this complaint, the U.S. Attorney for the Oregon District has requested an investigation into DHS and its treatment of protesters in Portland.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 7 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 8 of 17\n20. According to U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley, “Authoritarian governments, not democratic republics, send unmarked authorities after protesters. These Trump/Barr tactics designed to eliminate any accountability are absolutely unacceptable in America, and must end.”\n21. Secretary Wolf recently told Fox News, ““I offered DHS support to help them locally address the situation that’s going on in Portland, and their only response was: please pack up and go home. That’s just not going to happen on my watch.”\n22. On July 18, 2020, Mr. Paul and other peaceful protesters were exercising their First Amendment right to assemble, speak, and petition the government in downtown Portland. Mr. Paul and others were engaging in political speech to address, through the exercise of their constitutional rights, the infection of overt and systemic racism in the American criminal justice system.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 8 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 9 of 17\n23. Black people are arrested at twice the rate of their population, detained pretrial at a rate three-and-a-half times higher than white people, and imprisoned at a rate of almost six times that of white people. Black people are three times more likely to be killed by the police than white people. On July 18, 2020, Mr. Paul was exercising his First Amendment right to protest and to change these systematic issues.\n24. As alleged in this complaint, in order to silence Mr. Paul and to stop him from peacefully exercising his First Amendment rights, federal agents, at the direction of Secretary Wolf, in order to carry out the political agenda of President Trump, beat and mutilated Mr. Paul so badly that he had to spend the night in the emergency room. The beating and mutilation of Mr. Paul by federal agents was under the direction of President Trump and other senior White House officials.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 9 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 10 of 17\n25. On July 20, 2020, DHS Deputy Secretary Ken Cuccinelli tweeted videos and images of Portland, falsely labeling the unfolding situation as “terrorism” and projecting President Trump’s political message of instability. Secretary Wolf said in a Fox News interview that the department will intervene as it sees fit.\n26. “It’s not the first time DHS – the largest federal law enforcement organization – has found itself acting upon Trump’s long-held feuds against Democratic-run cities. Earlier this year, the department barred New York residents from applying to some Trusted Traveler Programs, like Global Entry, over legislation passed in the state relating to undocumented immigrants. Before then, the administration weighed retaliatory measures against so-called sanctuary cities.” – CNN, July 20, 2020\nCOMPLAINT – Page 10 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 11 of 17\n27. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF –– Claim One against Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 –– First Amendment Violation As alleged in this complaint, defendants violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by depriving Mr. Paul of his right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government. Defendants deliberately violated well-established limitations on the exercise of speech in and assembly in public places, and did so for political reasons. Defendants’ actions were based on the viewpoint being expressed by the peaceful protesters, including Mr. Paul. Defendants’ violent actions were not a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of Mr. Paul’s First Amendment protected activity. These actions were not justified by a compelling—or even substantial—government interest justifying the infringement of Mr. Paul’s First Amendment rights. Even if there were a compelling government interest in beating and mutilating peaceful protesters outside the Justice Center, defendants’ actions were not narrowly tailored to serve any government interest in a lawful manner. Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 are jointly and severally liable to Mr. Paul under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, (1971), for this violation of his rights.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 11 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 12 of 17\n28. –– Claim Two against Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 ––\nFourth Amendment Violation As alleged in this complaint, defendants violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by using excessive physical force, including chemical agents, frightening loud munitions, batons and shields, and a physical charge at peaceful protesters including Mr. Paul, in order to forcibly remove or force them to move from the area outside the Justice Center, without a warrant or probable cause to arrest them—and the actions of Secretary Wolf in ordering such uses of force, violated Mr. Paul’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to be free from unreasonable seizures. Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 are jointly and severally liable to Mr. Paul under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, (1971), for this violation of his rights.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 12 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 13 of 17\n29. –– Claim Three against all Defendants –– First Amendment Threatened Violation Defendants’ practice of deploying physical force against peaceful protesters to remove them from places in which they have gathered with others to express their political opinions, as manifest by their actions against Mr. Paul outside the Justice Center on July 18, 2020, by their repeated threats to deploy violence against protestors demonstrating against racial injustice generally and in Portland specifically, and by President Trump’s statements as alleged in this complaint, threatens Mr. Paul with violations of his First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and assembly when he carries out his stated intention to return to the Justice Center when it is open to the public to express his political views. By depriving Mr. Paul of the opportunity to express his views on such future occasions, defendants will impose irreparable harm on Mr. Paul.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 13 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 14 of 17\n30. –– Claim Four against all Defendants –– Fourth Amendment Threatened Violation Defendants’ practice of deploying excessive physical force without provocation, warning, or legal grounds to do so, against peaceful protesters to force them to halt or to move, as manifest by their actions against Mr. Paul and others outside the Justice Center on July 18, 2020, by their repeated threats to deploy violence against protestors demonstrating against racial injustice generally and in Portland specifically, and by President Trump’s statements as alleged in this complaint, threatens Mr. Paul with violations of his Fourth Amendment rights when he carries out his stated intention to return to the Justice Center when it is open to the public to express his political views. By subjecting Mr. Paul to such unreasonable seizures, defendants will impose irreparable harm on Mr. Paul.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 14 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 15 of 17\n31. –– Claim Five against Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 ––\nConspiracy to Deprive Rights As alleged in this complaint, Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 conspired together to deprive Mr. Paul of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The conspiracy included those involved with law enforcement actions outside the Justice Center on July 18, 2020 between 6:00 pm and 7:00 pm including President Trump, Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100. The conspirators engaged in overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including the use of excessive violent force against civil rights activists outside the Justice Center. The conspiracy targeted Black people and their supporters. Both groups are protected classes under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). President Trump, Secretary Wolf and others directed the conspiracy to take these actions because of their adverse effects on an identifiable group—namely, civil rights activists. The conspiracy targeted protected rights of Mr. Paul, who is a civil rights activist. The conspiracy targeted Mr. Paul’s protected First Amendment activities because defendants held animus towards Mr. Paul’s viewpoints. The violent actions of the conspirators directly and unlawfully interfered with Mr. Paul’s First Amendment activities. The conspiracy violently interfered with Mr. Paul’s right to demonstrate outside the Justice Center, a place of public accommodation.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 15 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 16 of 17\n32. –– Claim Six against Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 ––\nFailure to Prevent a Conspiracy to Deprive Rights As alleged in this complaint, Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986 by failing to meet their duty to prevent or aid in preventing conspiracies to deprive civil rights. Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 knew that a Section 1985 violation was about to occur or was occurring, had the power to prevent or aid in preventing it, and neglected or refused to prevent or aid in preventing it. Law enforcement’s failure to stop unlawful violence by a Section 1985(3) conspiracy when they know it is about to occur is a quintessential Section 1986 violation. As alleged in this complaint, the Section 1985 conspiracy consisted of using violence against peaceful civil rights activists. Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 knew that such violence was planned and could have taken actions to stop or limit that violence. Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 willfully or negligently took no such action. Secretary Wolf and John Does 1-100 could and should have refused to comply with unlawful orders, refused to use excessive force when clearing the area outside the Justice Center, or attempted to appeal to superiors to take a different course of action. As a result of defendants’ failure to prevent or aid in preventing the Section 1985 conspiracy, Mr. Paul was injured and his rights were violated.\nCOMPLAINT – Page 16 of 17\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 1 Filed 07/21/20 Page 17 of 17\n\n33. JURY TRIAL REQUEST Mr. Paul requests trial by jury.\n34. PRAYER FOR RELIEF Mr. Paul respectfully requests a judgment declaring that the acts of defendants described in this complaint violate the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986, an injunction ordering defendants to cease engaging in the unlawful acts described in this complaint, fair compensation for damages sustained by Mr. Paul as alleged in this complaint, attorney fees, costs, and any other relief that the Court may deem appropriate.\n\nJuly 21, 2020\n\nRESPECTFULLY FILED,\ns/ Michael Fuller Michael Fuller, OSB No. 09357 Of Pro Bono Attorneys for Plaintiff OlsenDaines US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., Suite 3150 Portland, Oregon 97204 michael@underdoglawyer.com Direct 503-222-2000\n\nCOMPLAINT – Page 17 of 17\n\n\f", "Case 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 4 Filed 10/21/20 Page 1 of 2\n\nMichael Fuller, OSB No. 09357 OlsenDaines US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., Suite 3150 Portland, Oregon 97204 michael@underdoglawyer.com Direct 503-222-2000\nKelly D. Jones, OSB No. 074217 Law Office of Kelly D. Jones kellydonovanjones@gmail.com Direct 503-847-4329\nJane Moisan, OSB No. 181864 People’s Law Project peopleslawproject@gmail.com Direct 971-258-1292\nPro Bono Attorneys for Mr. Paul\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION\n\nJEFF PAUL\nPlaintiff\nvs\nDONALD TRUMP CHAD WOLF JOHN DOES 1-100\nDefendants\n\nCase No. 3:20-cv-01188-SB NOTICE\n\nNOTICE – Page 1 of 2\n\n\fCase 3:20-cv-01188-SB Document 4 Filed 10/21/20 Page 2 of 2\n\nNOTICE This action is dismissed without prejudice.\n\nOctober 21, 2020\n\nRESPECTFULLY FILED,\ns/ Michael Fuller Michael Fuller, OSB No. 09357 Of Pro Bono Attorneys for Plaintiff OlsenDaines US Bancorp Tower 111 SW 5th Ave., Suite 3150 Portland, Oregon 97204 michael@underdoglawyer.com Direct 503-222-2000\n\nNOTICE – Page 2 of 2\n\n\f" ]	This case was filed on July 21, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The lawsuit was brought by a single private individual against President Donald Trump, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, and John Does 1-100, all of whom were unnamed federal agents. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel and attorneys from People's Law Project. The complaint alleged that the unnamed federal agents, at the direction of defendant Wolf, beat the plaintiff while they were peacefully protesting to carry out defendant Trump's political agenda. The lawsuit argued that the defendants were in violation of the U.S. Constitution and federal civil rights law. The complaint first alleged violations, both actual and threatened, of the plaintiff's First Amendment to free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition the government. The complaint also alleged violations, actual and threatened, of the Fourth Amendment, specifically through the use of excessive force. The complaint alleged that defendants employed chemical agents, batons, and shields to remove protesters. Finally, the complaint alleged that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 for conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights. The plaintiff requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages, in addition to attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman. For the next few months, there was no activity in the case until the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on October 21, 2020. The Clearinghouse does not have access to why the plaintiff dismissed the claim. This case is closed	This case deals with President Trump's deployment of federal law enforcement officers to Portland, Oregon in response to the protests that took place there after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint was filed on July 21, 2020, and alleged that the federal officers used excessive force against protesters and violated the protesters First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government. It also alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985 and 1986. The plaintiff, a private individual, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. For the next few months, there was no activity in the case until the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on October 21, 2020. The Clearinghouse does not have access to why the plaintiff dismissed the claim. This case is closed The case is ongoing as of August 6, 2020.	@jlmoisan from People's Law Project represents a plaintiff who was beaten and arrested by federal agents while protesting in Portland. They are suing @realDonaldTrump and @DHS_Wolf for violations of 1A and 4A rights and federal civil rights law.
IM-MD-0007	[ "11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nU.S. District Court District of Maryland (Baltimore) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:17-cv-02969-TDC\n\nAPPEAL\n\nZakzok et al v. Trump et al Assigned to: Judge Theodore D. Chuang Case in other court: USCA, 17-02233 Cause: 28:2201 Declaration Judgement (aliens and nationality)\n\nDate Filed: 10/06/2017 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant\n\nPlaintiff Eblal Zakzok\n\nrepresented by Andrew J. Ehrlich Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019 212-373-3000 Fax: 212-757-3990 Email: aehrlich@paulweiss.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nFaiza Patel Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 120 Broadway Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 646-292-8325 Fax: 212-463-7308 Email: patelf@brennan.law.nyu.edu PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nGadeir I. Abbas CAIR 453 New Jersey Ave., SE Washington, DC 20003 2027426420 Fax: 2024880833 Email: gabbas@cair.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\nJethro Mark Eisenstein Profeta & Eisenstein 45 Broadway Suite 2200 New York, NY 10006 212-577-6500 Fax: 212-577-6702 Email: jethro19@gmail.com\n1/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLena F. Masri CAIR 453 New Jersey Ave., SE Washington, DC 20003 202-742-6420 Fax: 202-488-0833 Email: lmasri@cair.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLiza Velazquez Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and Garrison LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 12123733000 Fax: 12124920096 Email: lvelazquez@paulweiss.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMichael William Price Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 120 Broadway Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 646-292-8335 Fax: 212-463-7308 Email: michael.price@nyu.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nRobert A Atkins Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and Garrison LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10011 2123733183 Fax: 2124920183 Email: ratkins@paulweiss.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\nSteven C. Herzog Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019 212-373-3000 Fax: 212-757-3990 Email: sherzog@paulweiss.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n2/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\n\nPlaintiff Sumaya Hamadmad\n\nCharles E Davidow Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and Garrison LLP 2001 K St., NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20006-1047 12022237380 Fax: 12022047380 Email: cdavidow@paulweiss.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Andrew J. Ehrlich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nFaiza Patel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nGadeir I. Abbas (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nJethro Mark Eisenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nLena F. Masri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nLiza Velazquez (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nMichael William Price (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nRobert A Atkins (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nCharles E Davidow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n3/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\nPlaintiff Fahed Muqbil\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nrepresented by Andrew J. Ehrlich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nFaiza Patel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nGadeir I. Abbas (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJethro Mark Eisenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLena F. Masri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLiza Velazquez (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMichael William Price (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nRobert A Atkins (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nPlaintiff John Doe #1\n\nCharles E Davidow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Andrew J. Ehrlich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nFaiza Patel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nGadeir I. Abbas\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n4/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\n(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJethro Mark Eisenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLena F. Masri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLiza Velazquez (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMichael William Price (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nRobert A Atkins (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nPlaintiff Jane Doe #2\n\nCharles E Davidow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Andrew J. Ehrlich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nFaiza Patel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nGadeir I. Abbas (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJethro Mark Eisenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\nLena F. Masri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n5/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\n\nLiza Velazquez (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMichael William Price (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nRobert A Atkins (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nPlaintiff Jane Doe #3\n\nCharles E Davidow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Andrew J. Ehrlich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nFaiza Patel (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nGadeir I. Abbas (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJethro Mark Eisenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLena F. Masri (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLiza Velazquez (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMichael William Price (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\nRobert A Atkins (See above for address)\n6/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nPRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nCharles E Davidow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nV. Defendant Donald Trump in his ofﬁcial capacity as President of the United States\nDefendant U.S. Department of Homeland Security\nDefendant U.S. Department of State\nDefendant Elaine Duke In her ofﬁcial capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security\nDefendant Rex W. Tillerson In his ofﬁcial capacity as Secretary of State\n\nrepresented by Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei United States Department of Justice 20 Massachusetts Ave NW Room 6145 Washington, DC 20001 2023058693 Fax: 2026168470 Email: daniel.s.schwei@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nSteven C. Herzog (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDate Filed # Docket Text\n\n10/06/2017\n\n1 COMPLAINT against Elaine Duke, Rex W. Tillerson, Donald Trump, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0416-\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n7/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\n6932959.), ﬁled by Jane Doe #3, Fahed Muqbil, Sumaya Hamadmad, John Doe #1, Eblal Zakzok, Jane Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons, # 5 Summons, # 6 Civil Cover Sheet)(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/06/2017)\n\n10/06/2017\n\n2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/06/2017)\n\n10/06/2017\n\n3 NOTICE by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok Letter re: Motion for Preliminary Injunction / Request to File Memorandum (Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/06/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\nCase Reassigned to Judge Theodore D. Chuang. Judge George Levi Russell, III no longer assigned to the case. (aos, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n4 ORDER granting Plaintiff's leave to ﬁle the Motion for Preliminary Injunction; directing that a Supplement is due October 10, 2017 at 12:00 noon; directing that the Zakzok Plaintiff's will be permitted to ﬁle a Reply by October 14, 2017 at 12:00 noon. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 10/10/2017. (aos, Deputy Clerk) Modiﬁed on 10/10/2017 (aos, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n5 QC NOTICE: 1 Complaint, ﬁled by Sumaya Hamadmad, Jane Doe #2, Eblal Zakzok, John Doe #1, Fahed Muqbil, Jane Doe #3 was ﬁled incorrectly.*Please ﬁle a proposed summons for the U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland and The Attorney General of the United States. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n6 Memorandum in support of 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction ﬁled by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Fahed Muqbil, # 2 Declaration of Eblal Zakzok, # 3 Declaration of Sumaya Hamadmad, # 4 Declaration of John Doe #1, # 5 Declaration of Jane Doe #2, # 6 Declaration of Jane Doe #3) (Davidow, Charles) Modiﬁed on 10/11/2017 (tds, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n7 NOTICE by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok re 5 QC Notice - Miscellaneous, 1 Complaint, Request of Issuance of Summonses for Acting U.S. Attorney Stephen Schenning and Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III (Attachments: # 1 Summons)(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n8 MOTION for Permission for Certain Plaintiffs to Proceed under Pseudonyms and to Omit Individual Plaintiffs' Home Addresses from Caption by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n9 NOTICE rescheduling the Hearing on the Motions for Preliminary Injunction for October 16, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. at the United States Courthouse at 6500 Cherrywood Lane in Greenbelt, Maryland. (signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang 10/10/2017). (tds, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n10 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Robert A. Atkins (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6935673.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017\n\n11 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Andrew J. Ehrlich (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6935675.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n\n10/10/2017 12 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Liza Velazquez (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6935677.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n8/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n10/10/2017 10/11/2017 10/11/2017 10/11/2017 10/11/2017 10/11/2017 10/12/2017 10/12/2017 10/13/2017 10/13/2017\n10/13/2017\n10/13/2017\n10/13/2017\n10/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nMuqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n13 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Steven C. Herzog (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6935678.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/10/2017)\n14 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Faiza Patel (Filing fee $100, receipt number 04166936961.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/11/2017)\n15 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Jethro Mark Eisenstein (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6936974.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/11/2017)\n16 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Lena F. Masri (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6936982.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/11/2017)\n17 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Michael William Price (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6936992.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/11/2017)\n18 Summons Issued 60 days as to Elaine Duke, Rex W. Tillerson, Donald Trump, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General. (tds, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/11/2017)\n19 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei on behalf of All Defendants (Schwei, Daniel) (Entered: 10/12/2017)\n20 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction ﬁled by Elaine Duke, Rex W. Tillerson, Donald Trump, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State.(Schwei, Daniel) (Entered: 10/12/2017)\n21 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Gadeir I. Abbas (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6941425.) by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n22 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 10 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Robert A Atkins. Directing attorney Robert A Atkins to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n23 [FILED IN ERROR] PAPERLESS ORDER granting 11 Directing attorney to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) Modiﬁed on 10/13/2017 (kns, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n24 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 12 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Liza Velazquez. Directing attorney Liza Velazquez to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n25 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 13 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Steven C. Herzog. Directing attorney Steven C. Herzog to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n26 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 14 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Faiza Patel. Directing attorney Faiza Patel to register online for CM/ECF at\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n9/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n10/13/2017 10/13/2017 10/13/2017 10/13/2017\n10/13/2017 10/13/2017 10/14/2017\n10/16/2017 10/17/2017\n10/17/2017 10/17/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nhttp://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n27 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 15 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Jethro Mark Eisenstein. Directing attorney Jethro Mark Eisenstein to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n28 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 16 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Lena F. Masri. Directing attorney Lena F. Masri to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n29 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 11 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Andrew J. Ehrlich. Directing attorney Andrew J. Ehrlich to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n30 [FILED IN ERROR] SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jane Doe #3, Fahed Muqbil, Sumaya Hamadmad, John Doe #1, Eblal Zakzok, Jane Doe #2. Elaine Duke served on 10/12/2017, answer due 12/11/2017; Rex W. Tillerson served on 10/12/2017, answer due 12/11/2017; Donald Trump served on 10/12/2017, answer due 12/11/2017; U.S. Department of Homeland Security served on 10/12/2017, answer due 12/11/2017; U.S. Department of State served on 10/12/2017, answer due 12/11/2017.(Davidow, Charles) Modiﬁed on 10/17/2017 (tds, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n31 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 17 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Michael William Price. Directing attorney Michael William Price to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n32 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 21 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Gadeir I. Abbas. Directing attorney Gadeir I. Abbas to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-case-ﬁling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 10/13/2017. (cs3, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2017)\n33 REPLY to Response to Motion re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction ﬁled by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Steven C. Herzog, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit 14)(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/14/2017)\n34 Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on 10/16/2017 before Judge Theodore D. Chuang. (Court Reporter: Lisa Bankins - 4C) (klss, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/16/2017)\n35 QC NOTICE: 30 Summons Returned Executed as to USA, ﬁled by Sumaya Hamadmad, Jane Doe #2, Eblal Zakzok, John Doe #1, Fahed Muqbil, Jane Doe #3 was ﬁled incorrectly. Please re-ﬁle the documents that pertain only to Summonses that were returned executed. Documents titled \"Afﬁdavits of Service by Certiﬁed Mail\" were ﬁled but they do not constitute actual service of the Summonses. ECF No. 30 has been noted as FILED IN ERROR, and the document link has been disabled. (tds, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/17/2017)\n36 MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 10/17/2017. (kns, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/18/2017)\n37 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n10/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n10/19/2017 10/19/2017\n10/20/2017 10/20/2017 10/20/2017 10/20/2017 10/23/2017 10/31/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nby Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 10/17/2017. (kns, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/18/2017)\n38 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Jane Doe #3, Fahed Muqbil, Sumaya Hamadmad, John Doe #1, Eblal Zakzok, Jane Doe #2. (Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/19/2017)\n39 AFFIDAVIT of Service by Certiﬁed Mail for Summons, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Civil Cover Sheet, Letter dated October 6, 2017 Addressed to Judge Theodore D. Chuang, Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Text of the Proposed Order Granting the Motion, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Declaration of Fahed Muqbil, Declaration of Eblal Zakzok, Declaration of Sumaya Hamadmad, Declaration of John Doe #1, Declaration of Jane Doe #2, Declaration of Jane Doe #3, Plaintiffs' Motion for Permission for Certain Plaintiffs to Proceed Under Pseudonyms and to Omit Individual Plaintiffs' Home Address from Caption, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Permission for Certain Plaintiffs to Proceed Under Pseudonyms and to Omit Individual Plaintiffs' Home Addresses from Caption, Text of Proposed Order Granting the Motion served on Donald J. Trump, Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State, The Honorable Elaine C. Duke, The Honorable Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson on October 11, 2017, ﬁled by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok.(Davidow, Charles) Modiﬁed on 10/23/2017 (kw2s, Deputy Clerk). Modiﬁed on 10/23/2017 (tds, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 10/19/2017)\n40 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 36 Memorandum Opinion, 37 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Elaine Duke, Rex W. Tillerson, Donald Trump, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State. (Schwei, Daniel) (Entered: 10/20/2017)\n41 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 40 Notice of Appeal. IMPORTANT NOTICE: To access forms which you are required to ﬁle with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit please go to http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov and click on Forms & Notices.(kns, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2017)\n42 USCA Case Number 17-2233 for 40 Notice of Appeal ﬁled by Rex W. Tillerson, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Donald Trump, Elaine Duke. Case Manager - RJ Warren.(kns, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2017)\n43 ORDER of USCA consolidating Case No. 17-2231(L) with Case No. 17-2232 and Case No. 17-2233 as to 40 Notice of Appeal ﬁled by Rex W. Tillerson, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Donald Trump, Elaine Duke. (kns, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2017)\n44 [FILED IN ERROR] QC NOTICE: 39 Afﬁdavit of Service, ﬁled by Sumaya Hamadmad, Jane Doe #2, Eblal Zakzok, John Doe #1, Fahed Muqbil, Jane Doe #3 was ﬁled incorrectly. *Please re-ﬁle documents by selecting Serviceof Process> Summons Returned Executed. It has been noted as FILED IN ERROR, and the document link has been disabled. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) Modiﬁed on 10/23/2017 (tds, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 10/23/2017)\n45 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Civil Cover Sheet, Letter dated October 6, 2017 Addressed to Judge Theodore D. Chuang, Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Text of the Proposed Order Granting the Motion, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Declaration of Fahed Muqbil, Declaration of Eblal Zakzok, Declaration of Sumaya Hamadmad, Declaration of John Doe #1, Declaration of Jane Doe #2, Declaration of Jane Doe #3, Plaintiffs' Motion for Permission for Certain Plaintiffs to Proceed Under Pseudonyms and to Omit Individual Plaintiffs' Home Address from Caption, Plaintiffs'\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n11/12\n\n\f11/13/2017\n\nDistrict of Maryland (CM/ECF Live 6.1)\nMemorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Permission for Certain Plaintiffs to Proceed Under Pseudonyms and to Omit Individual Plaintiffs' Home Addresses from Caption, Text of Proposed Order Granting the Motion served on Rex W. Tillerson and U.S. Department of State on 10/30/17, ﬁled by John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok.(Davidow, Charles) (Entered: 10/31/2017)\n\nPACER Service Center\nTransaction Receipt\n\n11/13/2017 18:19:08\n\nPACER Login:\n\nhs0328:2563377:0 Client Code:\n\nDescription: Docket Report\n\nSearch Criteria:\n\nBillable Pages: 12\n\nCost:\n\n1:17-cv-02969TDC\n1.20\n\nhttps://ecf.mdd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?857100088940201-L_1_0-1\n\n12/12\n\n\f", "Case 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 1 of 30\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND SOUTHERN DIVISION\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, SUMAYA HAMADMAD, FAHED MUQBIL, JOHN DOE #1, and JANE DOES #2-3\nPlaintiffs,\n\nCivil Action No.:\n\nv.\nDONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20035\n\nCOMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Serve on: Elaine Duke Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Washington, D.C. 20528;\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Serve on: Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State 2201 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20520;\n\nELAINE DUKE In her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Washington, D.C. 20528;\n\nREX W. TILLERSON In his official capacity as Secretary of State 2201 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20520\n\nDefendants.\n\n1\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 2 of 30\nINTRODUCTION 1. This case is a challenge to President Donald Trump’s third attempt at banning Muslims\nfrom the United States. On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued a proclamation titled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.” Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (“Proclamation”). The Proclamation, inter alia, indefinitely banned virtually all travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries. Plaintiffs are citizens or permanent residents of the United States who will not be able to reunite with their family members or will otherwise be injured as a direct result of the Proclamation. 2. The President previously attempted to halt the entry of Muslims to the United States on two occasions. One week after taking office, fulfilling a campaign pledge to effectuate a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,”1 President Trump issued an executive order titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (“EO-1”). The order suspended travel from seven majority-Muslim countries for 90 days and banned all refugees from those countries. EO-1 contained an exception for “minority faiths,” making explicit its discriminatory intent, and the order was quickly enjoined by federal courts. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam).\n1 Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States,’ N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslimsentering-the-united-states/.\n2\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 3 of 30\n3. On March 27, 2017, the President issued what he described as a “watered down” version of EO-1,2 also called “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (“EO-2”). It too was enjoined by several federal courts as unconstitutional and in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 207, 212(f), Pub. L. No. 89-236, 66 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f)). Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court consolidated the Hawaii and Maryland cases, granted certiorari, and narrowed the preliminary injunctions entered by the lower courts. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086-87 (2017) (per curiam).\n4. Like the previous two iterations, President Trump’s September 2017 attempt at instituting a Muslim ban invokes national security concerns. In defending EO-2, the government argued that a suspension on travel was necessary to protect the country from the threat of terrorist attacks from nationals of the targeted countries. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, noting that there had been “no finding that present vetting standards are inadequate, and no finding that absent the improved vetting procedures there likely will be harm to our national interests.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 771.\n5. The government now offers a new – and equally unsupported – rationale. According to the Proclamation, between July 9, 2017 and September 15, 2017, the Departments of State and Homeland Security carried out a “worldwide review” of visa procedures in\n2 Jacob Pramuk, Trump May Have Just Dealt a Blow to His Own Executive Order, CNBC, Mar. 15, 2017, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/15/trump-may-have-just-dealt-a-blow-to-his-ownexecutive-order.html.\n3\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 4 of 30\norder to determine which countries were “inadequate” based on an analysis of their “identity-management protocols, information-sharing practices, and risk factors.” Proclamation at §1(e). This contrived process identified 47 countries as “inadequate” or “at risk” of becoming “inadequate.” Id. In the end, however, the administration acted on the same religious animus that animated the first two unlawful orders and imposed indefinite wholesale ban on citizens of five of the same countries that were the subject of EO-1 and EO-2: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Another Muslim majority country, Chad, was also added to the list. Finally, North Korean nationals, as well as certain Venezuelan government officials and their families, were also banned. 6. Throughout, President Trump’s objective has remained constant: to keep Muslims out of the United States. The visa “review” is a pretext. Adding North Koreans and small group of Venezuelan government officials to the mix does not change this, but rather is a transparent attempt to add a fig leaf of religious neutrality to the order. The primary effect of the Proclamation is to exclude the nationals of several Muslim countries without adequate justification as to why or how this would protect the homeland. 7. The Proclamation imposes concrete harms on American Muslim citizens and permanent residents whose family members are barred from traveling to the United States. Like its predecessors, EO-1 and EO-2, the Proclamation violates the fundamental constitutional guarantee that the government may not establish or favor one religion over another. Like the President’s earlier orders, it also violates the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race, nationality or country of origin contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, and exceeds the President’s authority under that law to identify classes of aliens who are not eligible for entry to the United States.\n4\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 5 of 30\nJURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action\narises under the U.S. Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. §706, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 207, 212(f), Pub. L. No. 89-236, 66 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f)). 9. This Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2) and (e)(1). Defendants are officers or employees of the United States acting in their official capacities, and agencies of the United States. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 resides in this District. No real property is involved in this action.\nPARTIES 11. Plaintiff Eblal Zakzok, PhD, is a native of Syria and a lawful permanent resident of the\nUnited States, who currently resides in Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Zakzok teaches Surveying, Remote Sensing and Geographical Information Systems at the Ohio State University. He was tortured in Aleppo by the Syrian regime and granted asylum in the United States in 2014. Dr. Zakzok’s wife and three of his children were granted asylee benefits in 2016 and came to the U.S. to join him. But Dr. Zakzok’s eldest daughter was forced to remain in Turkey, as she was over 21 at the time and thus not eligible for derivative asylum benefits. On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff Zakzok filed a Petition for Alien Relative, Form I130, seeking approval for his daughter, Turkie, to immigrate to the United States. The Petition is currently still pending with USCIS.\n5\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 6 of 30\n12. Plaintiff Sumaya Hamadmad is an American citizen of Syrian descent who currently resides in Ohio. Plaintiff Hamadmad’s sister is a Syrian national, currently residing in Amman, Jordan, who is trying to visit Hamadmad and her other relatives in the United States. She also plans to participate in an academic project with American researchers and applied for a B1/B2 visa on October 3, 2017. Plaintiff Hamadmad’s father-in-law is a Syrian national, living in Syria. Hamadmad’s husband filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of his father. The Petition is currently still pending with USCIS.\n13. Plaintiff Fahed Muqbil is an American citizen of Yemeni descent who currently resides in Mississippi. In 2012, Muqbil married his wife, a Yemeni national. They have two daughters together, one of whom has a serious birth defect and is currently receiving medical treatment in the United States. Plaintiff Muqbil seeks to bring his wife, who now resides in Egypt, to the United States as an immigrant on the basis of their marriage. In June 2017, Muqbil submitted an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of his wife, which was subsequently approved on August 17, 2017. Plaintiff Muqbil and his wife have an appointment for a visa interview in Egypt scheduled for October 10, 2017.\n14. John Doe #1 is a United States citizen residing in New Jersey. In 2017, he married a Syrian national in the United States. John Doe #1 seeks to bring his wife, who now resides in Portugal, back to the United States as an immigrant on the basis of their marriage.\n15. Jane Doe #2 is an American citizen of Syrian descent who currently resides in Maryland with her mother, her husband, and her child. Earlier this year, Jane Doe #2 submitted an I-130 Petition on behalf of her father, a Syrian national living in a Gulf nation, who seeks\n6\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 7 of 30\nto immigrate to the United States and be reunited with his family. USCIS approved the petition, but her father has not yet been interviewed for his visa application. 16. Jane Doe #3 is an American citizen residing in Minnesota. She is engaged to a Somali foreign national residing in Malaysia, who seeks to immigrate to the United States and marry Jane Doe #3. She has submitted an I-129F petition on behalf of her fiancé, which USCIS has approved. However, the fiancé’s visa application is still pending. 17. Defendant Donald J. Trump is the President of the United States. He issued the original January 27, 2017, Executive Order (EO-1), the second March 6, 2017, Executive Order (EO-2), and most recently, the September 24, 2017, Proclamation that is the subject of this Complaint. 18. Defendant U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is a federal cabinet agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the INA and the Proclamation that is the subject of this Complaint. DHS is a Department of the Executive Branch of the United States Government, and is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 522(f). The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is a component of DHS that is responsible for adjudicating requests for immigration benefits for individuals located within the United States. 19. Defendant U.S. Department of State is a federal cabinet agency responsible for implementing the Proclamation that is the subject of this Complaint. It is a department of the Executive Branch of the United States Government, and it is an agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 522(f).\n7\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 8 of 30\n20. Defendant Elaine Duke is the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. Acting Secretary Duke has responsibility for overseeing enforcement and implementation of the Proclamation by all DHS staff. She is sued in her official capacity.\n21. Defendant Rex Tillerson is the Secretary of State and has responsibility for overseeing enforcement and implementation of the Proclamation by all State Department staff. He is sued in his official capacity. STATEMENT OF FACTS President Trump’s Statements on Muslims and Islam\n22. Defendant Trump has made frequent, explicitly bigoted statements about Islam and Muslims in print, on television, via official statements, and on Twitter. EO-1, EO-2, and the Proclamation are the manifestations of that religious animus.\n23. On or about March 10, 2016, in an interview aired on CNN, Defendant Trump declared “Islam hates us.”3\n24. On December 13, 2015, during a Fox News interview, Defendant Trump was asked if his campaign promise to implement a Muslim Ban would apply to a Canadian businessman who is Muslim. His response equated Islam to a disease and said that its followers were sick, disease-ridden people. Specifically, Defendant Trump stated: “There’s a sickness. They’re [Muslims are] sick people. There’s a sickness going. There’s a group of people that is very sick.”4\n3 Theodore Schleifer, Donald Trump: ‘I think Islam hates us,’ CNN, Mar. 10, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/. 4 Dan Friedman, Trump cites ‘sickness’ in defense of Muslim immigration ban proposal, Washington Examiner, Dec. 13, 2015, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-citessickness-in-defense-of-muslim-immigration-ban-proposal/article/2578269.\n8\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 9 of 30\n25. Defendant Trump’s campaign statements regarding Islam and Muslims reveal that the intent of the Proclamation, like EO-1 and EO-2 before it, is to disfavor Islam and stigmatize Muslims.\n26. After winning the Republican nomination, Defendant Trump began using more neutral language to describe his Muslim Ban pledge.\n27. On or about July 24, 2016, however, Defendant Trump conceded that the neutral language was simply a veneer intended to subdue the public controversy generated by his discriminatory plan. In an interview on NBC, Defendant Trump explained: “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim…And I’m OK with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”5 EO-1\n28. On January 27, 2017, Defendant Trump issued EO-1. Section 3(c) suspended entry of immigrant and nonimmigrant nationals of seven Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.\n29. Although EO-1 did not use the words Islam or Muslim, the pretext was apparent from the beginning. A close Trump advisor, Rudolph Giuliani, boasted on national television that he had been asked to “show [Donald Trump] the right way to do [the Muslim Ban] legally.” Giuliani said he had formed a commission to find a way to achieve the Muslim Ban’s scope without mentioning Islam or Muslims.6\n5 Carrie Dann, Donald Trump: I’m Running Against Hillary Clinton, Not ‘Rest of the World,’ NBC News, July 24, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-conventions/trump-i-mrunning-against-hillary-not-rest-world-n615581. 6 Amy Wang, Trump asked for a ‘Muslim ban,’ Giuliani says – and ordered a commission to do it ‘legally,’ Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 2017, http://wapo.st/2khcw0t?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.ab2db76b30de.\n9\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 10 of 30\n30. Indeed, EO-1 contained explicit preferences for “religious minorities” in the seven Muslim-majority countries targeted by the ban. Sections 5(b) and 5(e) established special benefits only available to persons who were not Muslim. Section 5(b) authorized the Secretary of State “to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution … provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” Since the countries that were the subject of the ban were overwhelmingly Muslim, these religious minorities were by definition non-Muslim people. Section 5(e) contained a similar explicit preference for persons who were not Muslim from the seven banned countries.\n31. EO-1 also contained a reference to “honor killings,” a term that is commonly used to portray domestic violence in the Muslim community as sanctioned by Islam. It suggested that the threat of admitting persons who engaged in “honor killings” was what, in part, justified the categorical visa ban on seven Muslim-majority countries.\n32. Defendant Trump emphasized EO-1’s religious preference. He explained during an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network that his order was “going to help [persecuted Christians]” as opposed to Muslims. His answer made clear that the intent of EO-1 was to treat foreign nationals in the seven identified countries differently based on their faith.7\n33. EO-1 was immediately challenged in several courts and its operative provisions were enjoined, including by a nationwide injunction issued on February 3, 2017. See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017)\n7 Carol Morello, Trump Signs Order Temporarily Halting Admission of Refugees, Promises Priority for Christians, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 2017, http://wapo.st/2kbZl05?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.816cd900dc2d.\n10\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 11 of 30\n(enjoining sections 3(c), 5(a)-(c), and 5(e) of EO-1); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 CV 480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (prohibiting the government from removing individuals pursuant to EO-1); Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17 CV 116, 2017 WL 580855 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017) (granting preliminary injunction of portions of EO-1 on Establishment Clause grounds). 34. On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a unanimous decision upholding a temporary restraining order issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington enjoining and restraining Sections 3(c) and 5(a)-(c) of the First Muslim Ban. See Washington, 847 F.3d 1151. 35. Defendant Trump revoked EO-1 via a subsequent order, Exec. Order No. 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States” (EO-2).\nEO-2 36. Defendant Trump signed EO-2 on March 6, 2017, which was a clear continuation of\nDefendant Trump’s attempt to discriminate against Muslims and broadcast a message of disfavor against Islam. 37. Aside from a new “Policy and Purpose” section, EO-2 is largely the same as EO-1. Indeed, EO-2 contains entire sections of EO-1’s text, including EO-1’s Section 5(g), Section 6, Section 8, and Section 10. 38. EO-2 established the same mechanism as EO-1 to extend the 90-day ban applicable to foreign nationals from six of the seven banned countries. EO-2 §2. And it adopted the same mechanism to review information from foreign countries to determine whether additional countries should be added. Id.\n11\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 12 of 30\n39. EO-2 excluded Iraq from its scope and exempted lawful permanent residents and current visa holders, but it kept the 120-day refugee ban and reduced the refugee cap to 50,000. EO-2 also maintained EO-1’s reference to “honor killings” associated with Muslims.\n40. A senior advisor to Defendant Trump, Stephen Miller, explained that the goal of EO-2’s revisions was “to be responsive to the judicial ruling” and that the changes in EO-2 were to be “mostly minor, technical differences. Fundamentally, you are still going to have the same, basic policy outcome for the country.”8\n41. The national security claims underlying EO-2 were obviously pretextual. The Department of Homeland Security had conducted an assessment concluding that national origin was an “unlikely indicator” of terrorist threats to the US, and that the countries affected by EO-1 and EO-2 were not the top countries of origin for immigrants who actually committed acts of terrorism inside the United States.9\n42. On March 15, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii issued a nationwide injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing or implementing sections 2 and 6 of EO2. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017). On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the injunction. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 756.\n43. On March 16, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland also issued a nationwide injunction against parts of EO-2, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 539 (D. Md. 2017), which was upheld in relevant part by the Fourth Circuit on May 25, 2017. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 544.\n8 Miller: New Order Will Be Responsive to the Judicial Ruling, Fox News (Feb. 21, 2017), http://video.foxnews.com/v/5331823544001/?#sp=show-clips. 9 Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States, Dept. of Homeland Sec., https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730/DHS-intelligencedocument-on-President-Donald.pdf (draft report obtained and released by Associated Press on Feb. 24, 2017).\n12\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 13 of 30\n44. The Defendants in Hawaii and Int’l Refugee Assistance Project petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and applied for a stay of the injunctions pending appeal. On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, consolidated the two cases, and partially stayed the preliminary injunctions, allowing the Second Muslim Ban to become effective, except as to foreign nationals with a “bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” See Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088.\n45. The Court stayed the Hawaii injunction with respect to “foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States,” but reaffirmed that sections 2(c), 6(a), and 6(b) of EO-2 “may not be enforced against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Id. at 2088. The Court’s order specifically protected foreign nationals with a “close familial relationship” with a person in the United States. Id.\n46. Following the Court’s ruling, the Department of Homeland Security adopted a narrow interpretation of “close familial relationship” designed to exclude as many Muslims as possible from the United States. DHS’s definition of “close familial relationship” excluded grandparents and aunts but allowed mothers-in-law and siblings. This definition was challenged and, on July 13, 2017, the Hawaii district court modified its preliminary injunction to prohibit Defendants from applying the Second Muslim Ban to grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States. The court concluded that such individuals have sufficiently “close family relationship” to fall within the ambit of the preliminary injunction, as modified by the Supreme Court. Hawaii v. Trump, No. CV 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 2989048 (D. Haw. July 13, 2017).\n13\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 14 of 30\n47. Defendants provided no rationale for their narrow definition of “close familial relationship” and no security-based rationale exists for allowing siblings but not grandparents of U.S. persons to travel to the United States. The only explanation for such an irrational definition is a desire to keep as many Muslims as possible out of the United States.\n48. On July 19, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion seeking clarification of the Court’s June 26, 2017 order, thereby leaving the Hawaii court’s July 13, 2017 modified injunction in place. See Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540, 2017 WL 3045234, 86 U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S. July 19, 2017).\n49. Under the terms of EO-2 and a subsequent Presidential Memorandum, the entry ban on national of the six countries without such bona fide relationship remained in effect until September 24, 2017,10 the day the President signed the Proclamation at issue in this case.\n50. The Supreme Court had scheduled oral argument in the Int’l Refugee Assistance Project and Hawaii cases for October 10, 2017. But following the Proclamation, the Court removed the oral argument from its calendar and ordered additional briefing from the parties on whether the Proclamation renders the cases moot. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 2405595 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2017). The Proclamation\n51. On September 24, 2017, the day EO-2 was set to expire, Defendant Trump signed the latest iteration of the Muslim ban, the Proclamation at issue in this case. The Proclamation, inter alia, permanently bans people from most of the Muslim countries\n10 See Memorandum of June 14, 2017 on Effective Date in Executive Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,965 (June 19, 2017).\n14\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 15 of 30\ntargeted in EO-1 and EO-2: Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. It also includes a ban on people from Chad, another Muslim-majority country. 52. The Proclamation also bans travel from North Korea (from which a negligible number of people come to the United States) as well as some government officials from Venezuela. The impact of the Proclamation, however, is overwhelmingly on Muslims. 53. The Proclamation is an outgrowth of EO-2, which directed the Departments of State and Homeland Security to conduct a “worldwide review” to determine whether additional information would be required from some countries to properly adjudicate visa applications.11 This review found 47 countries to be “inadequate” or “at risk” of becoming “inadequate.” Proclamation at § 1(e). But the end product was just a permanent iteration of EO-1 and EO-2, establishing indefinite wholesale bans on five of the same Muslim countries, based on the same religious animus. 54. On September 27, 2017, Defendant Trump was asked why Sudan was removed from the ban list. Defendant Trump provided no explanation for this action. 55. The addition of North Korea and a small number of Venezuelan government officials to the travel blacklist is a transparent attempt to disguise the Proclamation’s anti-Muslim intent. Only a tiny number of travelers would be affected (just 109 visas were issued to North Korean nationals in 2016, for example),12 and neither country has a history of sponsoring terrorism in the United States.\n11 This review was required by EO-2 § 2. It was temporarily enjoined by a federal court as part of the travel ban litigation, but allowed to go forward in June 2017. Hawaii v. Trump, No. 1700050-DKW-KSC at 23 (D. Haw. Mar. 23, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d at 741. 12 Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, Table XVIII: Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by Nationality (Including Border Crossing Cards) Fiscal Year 2007-2016, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/Non-ImmigrantStatistics/NIVDetailTables/FY16%20NIV%20Detail%20Table.pdf (last accessed Oct. 4, 2017)\n15\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 16 of 30\n56. Overall, the Proclamation bars approximately 138 million Muslim nationals from six\nMuslim-majority nations, which is more than 85% of the people affected by the Proclamation.13\n57. The practical effects of the Proclamation also bear a striking resemblance to EO-2. Using\n2016 data as a baseline, the current policy would ban 76% of nonimmigrant visa applicants and 91% of immigrant visa applicants affected by the previous order.14 The\noverlap is substantial despite the inclusion of Chad and North Korea, which together only\nhad 1,049 total visas issued in 2016 of the kind affected by the Proclamation – tourist,\nbusiness, and immigrant visas for Chad (940), and all visas for North Korea (109).\nLikewise, the addition of Venezuela does not meaningfully change the calculus because\nthe restrictions apply only to government officials and their families, not to ordinary visa\napplicants.\n58. In effect, the Proclamation makes permanent many of the temporary restrictions imposed\nby EO-1 and EO-2. For example, whereas EO-2 temporarily banned Iranian nationals\n(100 nonimmigrant visas issued); Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, Table XIV: Immigrant Visas Issued at Foreign Service Posts (by Foreign State Chargeability) (All Categories) Fiscal Years 2007-2016, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2016AnnualReport/FY16 AnnualReport-TableXIV.pdf (last accessed Oct. 4, 2017) (9 immigrant visas issued). 13 See Pew Research Ctr., The Global Religious Landscape 45–50 (2012). 14 Harsha Panduranga, Faiza Patel, & Michael Price, Extreme Vetting & the Muslim Ban 14 (2017). For State Department figures on total nonimmigrant U.S. visa types issued to foreign states, see Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, FY 2016 Nonimmigrant Visas Issued, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/Non-ImmigrantStatistics/NIVDetailTables/FY16%20NIV%20Detail%20Table.pdf (last accessed September 26, 2017). For State Department figures on U.S. immigrant visas issued to foreign states, see Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, Table XIV: Immigrant Visas Issued at Foreign Service Posts (by Foreign State Chargeability) (All Categories) Fiscal Years 20072016, supra. Data from the tables above were used in combination with the visa issuance types exempted from Executive Order 13780 and Proclamation 9645 to calculate the total number of individuals in the new policy banned from entry in Panduranga, Patel, & Price, supra, at 14.\n16\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 17 of 30\nfrom obtaining any visas, the Proclamation permanently bans Iranian nationals from obtaining most kinds of visas. For the few visas still available to Iranian nationals, those visas are now subjected to a different process. 59. Like EO-2, the Proclamation makes it impossible for nationals from Syria, Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Iran to obtain immigrant visas. Like EO-2, the Proclamation makes it impossible for Syrian nationals to obtain any non-immigrant visas and prohibits nationals from Libya, Yemen, and Iran from obtaining many kinds of non-immigrant visas. And like EO-2, the Proclamation is rooted in religious animus, not reasonably related to legitimate national security concerns.\nFacts Relating to the Claims of the Plaintiffs Eblal Zakzok\n60. Plaintiff Eblal Zakzok (“Zakzok”) is a native of Syria and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.\n61. Zakzok attended graduate school at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom. In 2008, after obtaining his PhD, he returned to Syria and was employed as a full-time assistant professor at Aleppo University until the beginning of 2014, when Syrian regime security forces detained, beat and tortured him for two weeks.\n62. In September 2014, Zakzok and his family fled from Syria to Turkey, to escape the horrific civil war, and to escape further persecution and torture.\n63. While his wife and children temporarily remained in Turkey, Plaintiff Zakzok came to the United States on September 30, 2014 to present a paper at an international conference in Michigan and requested asylum.\n17\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 18 of 30\n64. He was granted asylum on December 17, 2014 and was assisted by The Scholar Rescue Fund of the Institute of International Education in obtaining a fellowship at the Ohio State University where he teaches Surveying, Remote Sensing and Geographical Information Systems.\n65. Following his successful asylum application, Plaintiff Zakzok’s wife and three of his children were granted asylee benefits on January 25, 2016. Shortly thereafter, they traveled to the United States to be reunited with Plaintiff Zakzok.\n66. Plaintiff Zakzok’s remaining daughter, Turkie Zakzok, was forced to remain in Turkey because she was over 21 at the time he was granted asylum and thus did not qualify for derivative asylum benefits.\n67. On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff Zakzok filed a Petition for Alien Relative, Form I-130, seeking approval for his daughter, Turkie, to immigrate to the United States. The Petition is currently still pending with USCIS.\n68. On September 24, 2107, President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation which bars all Syrians from entering the US on either immigrant or non-immigrant visas after October 18, 2017.\n69. The Proclamation will bar Plaintiff Zakzok’s daughter from obtaining the immigrant visa she has applied for and will prevent her from immigrating to the United States to be reunited with her father, mother and other siblings.\n70. Plaintiff Zakzok’s daughter cannot obtain permanent legal residence in Turkey, and is therefore at risk of being returned to Syria, where she could face torture and or death.\n71. If allowed to go into effect, the Proclamation will deny Plaintiff Zakzok and his family the ability to be a regular and immediate part of each other’s lives. Additionally, Plaintiff\n18\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 19 of 30\nZakzok and his daughter will be forced to continue to live with the fear that his daughter will be targeted by the many criminals in Turkey who specifically target Syrian women.\nSumaya Hamadmad 72. Plaintiff Sumaya Hamadmad (“Hamadmad”), a native of Syria, is a U.S. citizen residing\nin Ohio. 73. On October 3, 2017, Hamadmad’s sister, a Syrian national currently residing in Amman,\nJordan, applied for a B1/B2 visa to enter the United States in order to visit her siblings and other relatives and to participate in an academic project with American researchers. 74. Hamadmad’s sister’s research is for a collaborative project that involves the epigenetics of transgenerational trauma of Syrian refugees. She has been the team leader for data collection of this project in Jordan since 2016 while affiliated with a professor at a university in Jordan. Specifically, she has been in charge of identifying, recruiting, and collecting DNA samples and interview data from all of the families in the study. 75. A U.S. university has invited Hamadmad’s sister to provide input on the specifics regarding the collection of the swab samples and analyses. 76. The Proclamation will prevent Hamadmad’s sister from being able to obtain the required non-immigrant visa and will thus bar her from traveling to the United States for any reason. This ban applies to her even though she was born in Jordan and has never been inside of Syria. 77. Additionally, Hamadmad’s husband has filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative seeking approval for his father, who is currently residing in Syria and is a Syrian national, to immigrate to the United States. Due to the current dangerous situation in Syria, it is urgent that Hamadmad’s father-in-law’s application be processed and approved as soon\n19\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 20 of 30\nas possible. The Proclamation, however, will also prevent Hamadmad’s father-in-law from having his application for an immigrant visa approved.\nFahed Muqbil 78. Plaintiff Fahed Muqbil is a United States citizen of Yemeni origin. He grew up in\nLouisiana and currently resides in Mississippi. In 2012, Muqbil met and married his wife, a Yemeni national. They have two daughters. The youngest daughter was born in Yemen in 2016 with a very serious birth defect and its co-morbid conditions – meningomyelocele (spina bifida), hydrocephalus with VP shunt, Chiari II malformation, neurogenic bladder, hydro nephrosis, infantile spasms, an epilepsy that is very difficult to contract, dysphasia, and worsening vision. 79. After her birth, Muqbil travelled from Yemen to Egypt to seek immediate, emergency treatment for her birth defect. During this time, her head size increased markedly and her vision begin to worsen. 80. In May 2017, Muqbil left his wife overseas in Egypt in order to bring his baby daughter to the United States. She was immediately hospitalized at a Children’s hospital. The hospital began treating her worsening hydrocephalus, the urinary tract infection, and her seizure disorder. After three weeks, she was discharged to her father and his family. Two weeks later, she was hospitalized again for increasing seizure activity. Currently, she is under the care of a neurologist and is on constant medication. According to her doctors, this type of epilepsy carries a poor neurodevelopmental outcome and that she will have to be closely monitored for the rest of her life. 81. Since her time in the United States, the baby has undergone many life-threatening surgeries. Her doctors predict more surgeries may be needed. The mother, Muqbil’s\n20\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 21 of 30\nwife, has not seen her baby for nearly five months. She was not able to be with her daughter nor could she provide her with care during this time. 82. Muqbil submitted an I-130 petition for his wife in June 2017, and the petition was approved on August 17, 2017. Muqbil and his wife are currently in Egypt in preparation for a visa interview scheduled for October 10, 2017. Their daughter is with his family in Mississippi while they navigate the visa process. The baby has multiple appointments, medications, and possible emergency room visits. 83. Unless Muqbil’s wife’s immigrant visa is issued prior to October 18, 2017, she will be indefinitely banned from caring for her baby and reuniting with Muqbil and her family. For the welfare of her baby and family, Muqbil’s wife is needed in the United States.\nJohn Doe #1 84. John Doe #1 is a United States citizen residing in New Jersey. 85. In August 2017, John Doe #1 married a Syrian national in the United States. John Doe\n#1’s spouse then left the country while he worked to set up their home together and apply for her to come to the United States as an immigrant on the basis of their marriage. 86. John Doe #1’s spouse now resides in Portugal. 87. John Doe #1 intends to bring his wife to the United States but, in light of the Proclamation, it would be futile for him to file an I-130 petition seeking approval for her to immigrate to the United States, as there is no chance such a petition would be adjudicated and a visa issued prior to the Proclamation’s categorical immigrant visa ban which comes into effect on October 18, 2017.\nJane Doe #2 88. Jane Doe #2 is a United States citizen, originally from Syria, and a resident of Maryland.\n21\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 22 of 30\n89. Jane Doe #2’s mother entered the United States in June 2016 and became a lawful permanent resident a year later in June 2017. Jane Doe #2’s mother now resides in Maryland with Jane Doe, her husband, and their child.\n90. Since Jane Doe #2’s mother left for the United States, her father has lived and worked in a Gulf nation. Because of work obligations, Jane Doe #2’s father was not ready to come to the United States permanently at the time when his wife, Jane Doe #2’s mother, entered the United States and later became a lawful permanent resident.\n91. Though living and working abroad, Jane Doe #2’s father has entered the United States on a tourist visa multiple times without incident.\n92. Jane Doe #2 is now pregnant with her second child, and her father has decided to join his wife, daughter, and grandchildren in the United States permanently.\n93. Earlier this year, Jane Doe #2 submitted an I-130 petition seeking approval for her father to immigrate to the United States.\n94. USCIS approved the petition submitted by Jane Doe #2 on her father’s behalf. 95. Upon receiving that approval, Jane Doe #2’s father began his visa application, though he\nhas not yet been interviewed. 96. Because he is seeking an immigrant visa and is a Syrian national, the Proclamation will\nbar Jane Doe #2’s father from entering the United States. Jane Doe #3\n97. Jane Doe #3 is a US citizen residing in Minnesota. 98. Jane Doe #3 is engaged to a Somali foreign national residing in Malaysia, where he has\nlived since 2008.\n22\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 23 of 30\n\n99. In late 2016, Jane Doe #3 filed an I-129F Petition with USCIS seeking a K-1 visa for her\n\nfiancé. The K-1 visa would permit her fiancé to enter the United States, get married, and\n\npursue permanent residence in the United States.\n\n100.\n\nUSCIS approved Jane Doe #3’s I-129F in March 2017, which then allowed her\n\nfiancé to apply to the Department of State for his visa.\n\n101.\n\nJane Doe #3’s fiancé has been interviewed by a consular official in Malaysia, has\n\nsubmitted all requested information, and is now eligible for the visa for which he applied.\n\n102.\n\nHowever, Section 2(h)(ii) of the Proclamation provides that the entry into the\n\nUnited States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants is suspended. Because the visa\n\nsought is an immigrant visa, Jane Doe #3’s fiancé will be prohibited from obtaining a\n\nvisa because of the Proclamation.\n\nCAUSES OF ACTION\n\nCOUNT I\n\n(First Amendment – Establishment Clause) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs)\n\n103.\n\nThe foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth\n\nherein.\n\n104.\n\nThe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the federal\n\ngovernment from officially preferring one religion over another, including actions\n\nintended to disfavor a religion.\n\n105.\n\nSection 2 of the Proclamation and Defendants’ actions to implement it are\n\nintended to disfavor Islam, and have the effect of disfavoring Islam.\n\n23\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 24 of 30\n\n106.\n\nSection 2 of the Proclamation and Defendants’ actions to implement it violate the\n\nEstablishment Clause by singling out Muslims for disfavored treatment that is neither\n\njustified by, nor closely fitted to, any compelling governmental interest.\n\n107.\n\nDefendants’ violation of the Establishment Clause is causing ongoing and\n\nimmediate harm to Plaintiffs.\n\nCOUNT II\n\n(Immigration and Nationality Act & Administrative Procedure Act) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs)\n\n108.\n\nThe foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth\n\nherein.\n\n109.\n\nThe Immigration and Nationality Act provides, with certain exceptions not\n\napplicable here, that “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be\n\ndiscriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race,\n\nsex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n110.\n\nPlaintiff Zakzok’s daughter has applied for an immigrant visa, but pursuant to\n\nSection 2 of the Proclamation, her application will be categorically denied after October\n\n18, 2017. The Proclamation requires denial because of her Syrian nationality, in violation\n\nof 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n111.\n\nPlaintiff Hamadmad’s father-in-law has applied for an immigrant visa, but\n\npursuant to Section 2 of the Proclamation, his application will be categorically denied\n\nafter October 18, 2017. The Proclamation requires denial because of his Syrian\n\nnationality, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n112.\n\nPlaintiff Fahed Muqbil’s wife has applied for an immigrant visa, but pursuant to\n\nSection 2 of the Proclamation, her application will be categorically denied after October\n\n24\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 25 of 30\n\n18, 2017. The Proclamation requires denial because of her Yemeni nationality, in\n\nviolation of 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n113.\n\nPlaintiff John Doe #1’s wife plans to apply applied for an immigrant visa, but\n\npursuant to Section 2 of the Proclamation, her application will be categorically denied\n\nafter October 18, 2017. The Proclamation requires denial because of her Syrian\n\nnationality, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n114.\n\nPlaintiff Jane Doe #2’s father has applied for an immigrant visa, but pursuant to\n\nSection 2 of the Proclamation, his application will be categorically denied after October\n\n18, 2017. The Proclamation requires denial because of his Syrian nationality, in violation\n\nof 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n115.\n\nPlaintiff Jane Doe #3’s fiancé has a pending immigrant visa based on her\n\nengagement with her fiancé. Pursuant to Section 2 of the Proclamation, his application\n\nwill be categorically denied after October 18, 2017. The Proclamation requires such\n\ndenial because of his Somali nationality, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n116.\n\nSection 2 of the Proclamation explicitly mandates discrimination against\n\nimmigrant visa applicants because of their nationality, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §\n\n1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n117.\n\nThe actions of Defendants, as set forth above, are arbitrary, capricious, and an\n\nabuse of discretion, or are otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to\n\nconstitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction,\n\nauthority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; and without observance of procedure\n\nrequired by law, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-\n\n(D).\n\n25\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 26 of 30\n\nCOUNT III\n\n(Substantive Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act through Violations of the Constitution, Immigration and Nationality Act, and Arbitrary and Capricious Action)\n(On behalf of all Plaintiffs)\n\n118.\n\nThe foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth\n\nherein.\n\n119.\n\nThe APA requires courts to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action that is\n\n“arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”;\n\n“contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity”; “or “in excess of\n\nstatutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. §\n\n706(2)(A)-(C).\n\n120.\n\nIn issuing and implementing the Proclamation, Defendants have acted contrary to\n\nthe Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.\n\n121.\n\nIn issuing and implementing the Proclamation, Defendants have acted contrary to\n\nthe INA.\n\n122.\n\nDefendants have engaged in nationality-based discrimination, contrary to 8\n\nU.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\n\n123.\n\nDefendants have violated the INA by establishing an ultra vires regime for\n\nprocessing nonimmigrant visa applications. Defendants have upended the extensive and\n\ncomplex vetting scheme crafted by Congress and replaced them with a blunt new regime\n\nof bans, requirements, exceptions, and waivers.\n\n124.\n\nDefendants are attempting to set their own standard for admission to the United\n\nStates. Proclamation at §§ 2(c), 6(a). They also seek to erase a carefully calibrated\n\ncongressional scheme for vetting visa applicants, including a comprehensive “terrorism\n\n26\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 27 of 30\n\nbar,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B); detailed vetting rules, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1202(b)-(d), 1361; and\n\nexclusions from the Visa Waiver Program, 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12). In short, Defendants\n\nseek to permanently replace an extensive, congressionally-crafted system with its own\n\nwarren of waivers and exceptions, imposing burdens on the applicant that are in conflict\n\nwith the provisions of the INA. Proclamation at §§ 3(a)-(c).\n\n125.\n\nPlaintiff Hamadmad’s sister has been invited to be a researcher at a top American\n\nuniversity and would otherwise be eligible for a B1/B2 (nonimmigrant) visa, but pursuant\n\nto Section 2 of the Proclamation, her application will be categorically denied after\n\nOctober 18, 2017.\n\n126.\n\nPlaintiff Jane Doe #3’s fiancé has applied for a fiancée visa and would otherwise\n\nbe eligible to receive it, but pursuant to Section 2 of the Proclamation, his application will\n\nbe categorically denied after October 18, 2017.\n\n127.\n\nIn issuing and implementing the Proclamation, Defendants have acted arbitrarily\n\nand capriciously. While Defendants have sought to portray as objective and considered\n\nthe process that led to selecting eight countries for sanctions, it is evident that this is not\n\nthe case. EO-1 required the Departments of State and Homeland Security to review\n\n“identity-management and information-sharing capabilities, protocols, and practices,” but\n\nthe decisions on which countries to exclude relied to an unspecified extent on other, less\n\nobjective concerns such as a broad-ranging “risk assessment.” Even with that subjectivity\n\nbuilt into the process, the Proclamation acknowledges that it did not follow the\n\nconclusions of the review. Iraq was found to have failed the State Department’s baseline\n\nstandards, but left off the blacklist. Somalia, on the other hand met the standards, but was\n\nnevertheless included. The issuance of all immigrant visas was stopped, even though the\n\n27\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 28 of 30\n\nindividuals applying for them have the strongest connections to the United States and\n\nundergo extraordinary vetting prior to approval. Nor does the Proclamation provide any\n\nrationale for why certain categories of visas (primarily tourist and business) are excluded\n\nwhile others (such as students) are permitted. More broadly, the Proclamation purports to\n\nprotect the country from terrorism, but affects millions of people who have absolutely no\n\nconnection to terrorism. Through their actions described in this Complaint, Defendants\n\nhave violated the substantive requirements of the APA. Defendants’ violation inflicts\n\nongoing and immediate harm on Plaintiffs.\n\nCOUNT IV\n\n(Procedural Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act) (On behalf of all Plaintiffs)\n\n128.\n\nThe foregoing allegations are repeated and incorporated as though fully set forth\n\nherein.\n\n129.\n\nThe APA requires courts to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action taken\n\n“without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).\n\n130.\n\nThe Departments of State and Homeland Security are “agencies” under the APA.\n\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).\n\n131.\n\nThe APA requires that agencies follow rulemaking procedures before engaging in\n\naction that impacts substantive rights. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.\n\n132.\n\nIn implementing the Proclamation, federal agencies have changed the substantive\n\ncriteria by which individuals from the targeted countries may enter the United States.\n\nThis change, among other actions by Defendants, impacts substantive rights.\n\n133.\n\nDefendants did not follow the rulemaking procedures required by the APA in\n\nenacting and implementing the Executive Order.\n\n28\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 29 of 30\n\n134.\n\nDefendants have violated the procedural requirements of the APA. This violation\n\ninflicts ongoing and immediate harm upon Plaintiffs.\n\nPRAYER FOR RELIEF\n\nWHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court:\n\nA. Declare that Section 2 of the Proclamation is unauthorized by, and contrary to, the\n\nConstitution and laws of the United States;\n\nB. Enjoin the Defendants from implementing or enforcing Section 2 of the\n\nProclamation across the nation;\n\nC. Award any other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.\n\nDated: October 6, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Charles E. Davidow\n\nCharles E. Davidow (Bar # 06516) PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006-1047 Tel.: (202) 223-7300 Fax: (202) 223-7420 cdavidow@paulweiss.com\n\nRobert A. Atkins† Liza Velazquez† Andrew J. Ehrlich† Steven C. Herzog†\nPAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 (212) 373-3000 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\n\n29\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-GLR Document 1 Filed 10/06/17 Page 30 of 30\nLena F. Masri† Gadeir Abbas†\nCouncil on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lfmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nFaiza Patel† Michael Price†\nBrennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\nJethro Eisenstein† Profeta & Eisenstein 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\nCounsel for Plaintiffs\n†Pro hac vice applications forthcoming Licensed in VA; not in DC. Practice limited to federal matters\n30\n\n\f", "Case 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 2 Filed 10/06/17 Page 1 of 3\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\nSOUTHERN DIVISION\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, SUMAYA HAMADMAD, FAHED MUQBIL, JOHN DOE #1, and JANE DOES #2-3,\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.,\nDefendants.\n\nCivil Action No.:\n\nPLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiffs hereby move for a preliminary injunction for the reasons set forth in (i) the accompanying complaint, filed on October 6, 2017, in the above-captioned action; (ii) the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and supporting exhibits, filed on October 6, 2017, in Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-02921-TDC; (iii) the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, filed on October 6, 2017, in Int’l Refugee Assist. Project v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361; and, if given leave to file by the Court,1 (iv) the supplemental memorandum to be filed by Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action on October 10, 2017, setting forth the particular factual circumstances entitling Plaintiffs to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Plaintiffs seek to restrain and enjoin Defendants from enforcing or implementing the proclamation entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting\n\n1 Plaintiffs are filing, contemporaneously with this Motion, a letter to the Court requesting such supplemental briefing.\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 2 Filed 10/06/17 Page 2 of 3\nAttempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats” (the\n“Proclamation”). As demonstrated in the complaint and memoranda of law referenced\nabove, the Proclamation and Defendants’ implementation of the Proclamation violate the\nImmigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations, the Administrative\nProcedure Act, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs\nwill suffer tangible and irreparable harm if the Proclamation is implemented, as detailed\nin the accompanying complaint and the forthcoming supplemental memorandum\nreferenced above.\nFor the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant their\nMotion for a Preliminary Injunction.\nA proposed Order is attached.\nDated: October 6, 2017\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Charles E. Davidow\nCharles E. Davidow (Bar # 06516) PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006-1047 Tel.: (202) 223-7300 Fax: (202) 223-7420 cdavidow@paulweiss.com\nRobert A. Atkins† Liza Velazquez† Andrew J. Ehrlich† Steven C. Herzog†\nPAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 (212) 373-3000 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 2 Filed 10/06/17 Page 3 of 3\nratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\nLena F. Masri† Gadeir Abbas†\nCouncil on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lfmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nFaiza Patel† Michael Price†\nBrennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\nJethro Eisenstein† Profeta & Eisenstein 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\n†Pro hac vice applications forthcoming Licensed in VA; not in DC. Practice limited to federal matters\n\n\f", "Case 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 1 of 13\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\nSOUTHERN DIVISION\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et. al.,\n\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.,\nDefendants.\n\nCivil Action No.: 17-cv-02969-TDC\n\nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 2 of 13\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT The six Plaintiffs in this case, American citizens and lawful permanent residents, demonstrate the human tragedy that would be inflicted by the third iteration of President Trump’s unlawful attempt to impose a sweeping travel ban targeting majority-Muslim nations and make good on his promise to impose a shutdown on Muslims entering the United States. The ban, now indefinite, cruelly divides families scattered across the globe at moments when being together is paramount. It separates a mother from her critically ill child, an American citizen receiving medical care in the United States. It divides husbands and wives. It separates a couple engaged to be married. It prevents an 81-year-old relative of American citizens from entering the country to receive cancer treatment. It blocks the sister of an American citizen from accepting offers of academic collaboration in the United States. It leaves family members alone and endangered in war-torn nations—illogically so. Indeed, the sister of one Plaintiff would be barred from entering the United States from Jordan simply because she is a Syrian national, despite never having set foot in Syria. The litany of harms that just these six plaintiffs would suffer makes manifest the irreparable injury that this latest ban would cause them—and countless others similarly situated—and the urgency that calls for this Court to enjoin its enforcement. Plaintiffs thus seek to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of Section 2 of the Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (the “Proclamation”). The unconstitutional and illegal nature of the Proclamation is amply demonstrated by the motions for preliminary injunction filed in two other cases pending before\n1\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 3 of 13\nthe Court.1 Plaintiffs submit this brief to set forth the reasons why they have standing and to demonstrate the irreparable harm that they—and countless others similarly situated—will suffer if the Proclamation is allowed to take effect on October 18, 2017.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND Each Plaintiff is an American citizen or lawful resident of the Muslim faith who will suffer substantial and irreparable harm if the Proclamation is not enjoined. Eblal Zakzok. Eblal Zakzok is a native of Syria, and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. (Zakzok Decl. ¶ 1.) Dr. Zakzok is married with five children and currently is an assistant professor of civil engineering at the Ohio State University. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 11.) After receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Manchester in 2007, Dr. Zakzok accepted a position as an assistant professor at Aleppo University in Syria. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.) He and his family soon found themselves caught up in Syria’s political deterioration and descent into civil war. (Id. ¶¶ 5–8.) By 2014, Dr. Zakzok’s commute—ordinarily 45 minutes—could take as long as six hours, as he was forced to traverse various Syrian regime and rebel checkpoints along the way. (Id. ¶ 5.) In February 2014, Dr. Zakzok was detained by the Syrian regime and held for two weeks in an approximately 30-square-meter cell—sometimes filled with so many people that it was impossible to move—and subjected to beatings and torture. (Id. ¶ 6.) Upon his release, Dr. Zakzok and his family fled to Istanbul, Turkey. (Id. ¶ 9.) Shortly thereafter, upon arriving in the United States for an academic conference, Dr. Zakzok sought and was granted asylum. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) Dr. Zakzok thereafter sought derivative asylum benefits for his family members left\n1 Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference the memoranda in support of the motions for a preliminary injunction filed on October 6, 2017 in Int’l Refugee Assist. Project v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361 (“IRAP”), and Iranian Alliances Across Borders, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et. al., No. 17-CV-2921 (“IAAB”).\n2\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 4 of 13\nbehind in Turkey. That application was granted for Dr. Zakzok’s wife and four of his children. (Id. ¶ 12–13.) One child, however, was not eligible for derivative benefits. Dr. Zakzok’s eldest daughter did not qualify because she was more than 21 years old when Mr. Zakzok was granted asylum. Therefore, Dr. Zakzok has filed a Petition for Alien Relative, Form I-130, seeking approval for his daughter to immigrate to the United States. (Id. ¶ 14.) The petition is currently pending. (Id.)\nShould the Proclamation be implemented, Dr. Zakzok’s daughter would be barred from obtaining a visa to enter the United States. Dr. Zakzok and his family are distraught at the prospect of being indefinitely separated from his eldest daughter. (Id. ¶ 16.) Dr. Zakzok fears for his daughter’s safety because she is living alone in Istanbul, where Syrian women are often targeted by criminals. (Id.) He also is concerned that his daughter—who is ineligible for permanent residency status in Turkey—may be required to return to Syria where she would risk the same horrific treatment experienced by Dr. Zakzok. (Id.) Further, if his daughter is indefinitely barred from entry into the United States, her ability to continue her education—she was accepted to the Ohio State University—and contribute to her family’s income will be undermined. (Id. ¶ 17.) Dr. Zakzok currently supports his daughter financially and will need to continue to do so while she remains stranded in Turkey. (Id.)\nFahed Muqbil. Fahed Muqbil is a United States citizen of Yemeni descent. (Muqbil Decl. ¶ 1.) Mr. Muqbil and his wife, a Yemeni national, have two daughters, both of whom are United States citizens. (Id. ¶ 2.) One of Mr. Muqbil’s daughters suffers from spina bifida—a debilitating birth defect. (Id. ¶ 4.) Unable to find adequate medical care for his daughter in Yemen as a result of ongoing civil war, Mr. Muqbil and his wife took their daughter to Egypt to seek treatment in November 2016. (Id. ¶ 5.) When his daughter’s condition continued to\n3\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 5 of 13\nworsen, Mr. Muqbil brought his daughter to the United States to seek medical care. (Id. ¶ 6.) His wife and older daughter stayed behind in Egypt. (Id.) Even after extensive treatment in United States hospitals, his daughter remains too ill to travel. (Id. ¶ 9.)\nIn June 2017, Mr. Muqbil filed an I-130 petition on behalf of his wife, seeking to have her join him in the United States while he cares for their daughter. (Id. ¶ 13.) That petition was approved on August 17, 2017, but Mr. Muqbil’s wife cannot enter the United States until her visa is approved following an interview. (Id.) She has not seen her infant daughter, who has undergone multiple surgeries, for five months. If her immigrant visa is not approved prior to the time the Proclamation becomes effective, Mr. Muqbil’s wife will be indefinitely barred from the United States. Mr. Muqbil thus must face the impossible choice between seeing his wife and eldest daughter in Egypt or caring for his sick daughter in the United States. Moreover, because of his extensive responsibilities in caring for his sick daughter, Mr. Muqbil is unable to work in the United States or otherwise better his financial situation while his wife remains abroad. (Id. ¶ 12.) Mr. Muqbil’s life will remain on hold if his wife cannot join him in the United States, and their infant daughter will continue to be without her mother at this critical time.\nSumaya Hamadmad. Sumaya Hamadmad is a United States citizen of Syrian descent, who received her Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of Iowa in 2006 and received a postdoctoral fellowship from Yale University. (Hamadmad Decl. ¶¶ 1–2.) Dr. Hamadmad lives in the United States with her husband and three children. (Id. ¶ 1.) Her sister and father-in-law currently are abroad and will be barred from entry into the United States by the Proclamation. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 9.)\nDr. Hamadmad’s sister, in fact, has never been inside Syria. (Id. ¶ 8.) She was born and raised in Jordan, where, after recently graduating from Jordan University of Science and\n4\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 6 of 13\nTechnology, she has continued her research into the impact of trauma on Syrian refugees. (Id. ¶ 4.) Dr. Hamadmad’s sister has been invited to continue her research at Yale University and the University of Florida. (Id. ¶ 5.) In October 2017, Dr. Hamadmad’s sister applied for a B1/B2 visa in order to visit her siblings and participate in that academic project. (Id. ¶ 6.) No visa has yet been issued. (Id.) Yet the Proclamation will bar her entry into the United States— despite her complete lack of connection to Syria—solely because of her Syrian ancestry.\nDr. Hamadmad’s 81-year-old father-in-law currently resides in Syria and has been diagnosed with skin and prostate cancer. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) Dr. Hamadmad’s husband filed an I-130 petition for his father seeking approval for him to immigrate to the United States in order to see his only grandchildren and seek medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 10.) That petition remains pending. (Id.)\nDr. Hamadmad will thus be blocked by the Proclamation from seeing her sister and father-in-law in the United States, enjoying their interactions with her children, experiencing her sister further her academic career and critical research, and facilitating her father-in-law’s medical treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 13–15.)\nJohn Doe #1. John Doe #1 is a United States citizen who married a Syrian national in August 2017. (John Doe #1 Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) John Doe #1’s wife left the United States while John Doe #1 prepared to apply for her to immigrate to the United States on the basis of their recent marriage and ready himself for the arrival of his new family. (Id. ¶ 5.) John Doe #1 now realizes that he may never be joined by his wife in the United States or be afforded the opportunity to create the family he envisioned. (Id. ¶ 9.) It would be futile for John Doe #1 to file an I-130 petition on behalf of his wife, as there is no chance such a petition would be adjudicated and a visa issued prior to October 18, 2017. (Id. ¶ 8.)\n5\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 7 of 13\nJohn Doe #1 also feels discriminated against as a practicing Muslim. He believes that the Proclamation “single[s] out” his and his wife’s country of origin in order to target Muslims on the basis of “bigotry and hatred.” (Id. ¶ 12.)\nJane Doe #2. Jane Doe #2 is a United States citizen of Syrian descent. (Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 1–2.) Jane Doe #2 is married with one son, and currently is expecting her second child. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Following the birth of her first child, Jane Doe #2’s mother, a Syrian national, joined her in the United States in June 2016. (Id. ¶ 9.) Her father, however, remained in Kuwait, where he continued to work in order to support the family. (Id. ¶ 10.) Now, as Jane Doe #2’s father approaches retirement, he plans to join his daughter, wife, and grandchildren in the United States. (Id. ¶ 11.) The United States has seen fit to previously authorize Jane Doe #2’s father to enter the United States on tourist visas on multiple occasions; yet now he shall be swept up in this indiscriminate ban. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.)\nEarlier this year, Jane Doe #2 submitted an I-130 petition seeking approval for her father to immigrate to the United States. (Id. ¶ 12.) That petition was approved, but no visa has yet been issued. (Id.) The implementation of the Proclamation would bar Jane Doe #2’s father from entering the United States—purportedly because of conditions in Syria—even though he has not been inside Syria in more than 20 years.\nJane Doe #2’s continued separation from her father causes her tremendous anguish. Apart from the anxiety created by the fragmentation of her family, Jane Doe #2 fears for her father’s safety. (Id. ¶ 21.) Jane Doe #2 and her husband are politically active members of the Syrian American Council—an organization that advocates for a free and democratic Syria. (Id. ¶ 16.) As Jane Doe #2’s father nears retirement, he may be forced to leave Kuwait, where he must continue to work to retain his immigration status. (Id. ¶ 19.) If her father is unable to join his\n6\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 8 of 13\nfamily, he may well be forced to return to Syria, where he would face grave personal risk as a result of Jane Doe #2’s political activities. (Id. ¶ 21.)\nJane Doe #2 also believes that the Proclamation—and the executive orders that preceded it—discriminate against her as a Muslim. (Id. ¶ 23.) She was naturalized as an American citizen and understood that the Constitution protects the rights of minorities. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 23.) The targeting of Muslim-majority countries for exclusion from the United States by the Proclamation does not accord with what she was led to believe about her adopted country.\nJane Doe #3. Jane Doe #3 is a United States citizen who immigrated to the United States as a Somalian refugee in 2006, after fleeing the wars that consumed her country of birth. (Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 1.) She has been engaged to a Somali national since April 2016. (Id. ¶ 3.) Jane Doe #3’s fiancé currently is studying in Malaysia, where he has lived for the last 9 years. (Id.) In December 2016, Jane Doe #3 filed an I-129F petition seeking a K-1 visa that would permit her fiancé to enter the United States, get married, and pursue permanent residence. (Id. ¶ 5.) The I129F petition for Jane Doe #3’s fiancé was approved in March 2017. (Id.) No visa has yet been issued. (Id.) Jane Doe #3’s isolation from her fiancé—and the prospect of separation for an indeterminate length—not only takes a significant emotional toll, but also raises the prospect that Jane Doe #3 could be deprived of her fiancé’s skills, labor, and finances. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6–8.)\nJane Doe #3 came to the United States legally, passed the citizenship test, and was granted American citizenship in 2012. (Id. ¶ 9.) Despite being entitled to the same rights and legal protections as any other United States citizen, the Proclamation makes her feel like a “second class citizen,” who is stigmatized on the basis of her Muslim faith. (Id.)\nARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Assert Their Claims.\nPlaintiffs easily clear the requirements to establish standing. Indeed, this Court and the\n7\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 9 of 13\nFourth Circuit have found standing on nearly identical facts. Plaintiffs are Muslim U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents seeking visas for their\nbarred family members. They have asserted two distinct injuries: the prolonged separation from their loved ones that would result should the Proclamation become effective, see supra at 2–7, and the exclusion and marginalization that flows from the Proclamation’s targeting of Plaintiffs’ religion and nationalities for exclusion from the United States, see id.\nThe Proclamation will indefinitely block the issuance of visas for the close relatives of five Plaintiffs whose applications are pending and already has rendered it futile for John Doe #1 to petition for a visa on behalf of his new wife of two months. This executive action not only delays Plaintiffs’ reunification with their family members but cuts off the Plaintiffs from relatives who, among other things, suffer from cancer (Hamadmad Decl. ¶ 11), are unable to reach the United States to care for a sick child (Muqbil Decl. ¶ 13), and risk being returned to dangerous countries embroiled in war and political strife (Zakzok Decl. ¶ 16; Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶ 21). Moreover, Plaintiffs are personally injured by the Proclamation’s message of discrimination and exclusion.2 For example, Jane Doe #3 feels that the Proclamation is “motivated by a desire to stigmatize Muslims” and makes her feel like a “second class citizen.” (Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 9.) John Doe #1 similarly believes the Proclamation is the product of “bigotry and hatred.” (John Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 12.)\nEach of those injuries is independently sufficient to establish the injury-in-fact necessary to confer standing. See Int’l Refugee Assist. Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2017) (“IRAP II”) (holding that “prolonged family separation” and “official action\n2 Each Plaintiff is a Muslim who feels marginalized and excluded by the Proclamation’s hostility toward their faith and its discriminatory targeting of Muslim-majority countries. (See Zakzok Decl. ¶ 18; Muqbil Decl. ¶ 15; Hamadmad Decl. ¶ 18; John Doe #1 Decl. ¶ 12; Jane Doe #2 Decl. ¶¶ 22–23; Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶ 9.)\n8\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 10 of 13\npreferring or disfavoring a particular religion” are imminent and concrete harms that establish injury for standing purposes); Int’l Refugee Assist. Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 550, 552 (D. Md. 2017) (same). The Ninth Circuit similarly concluded that standing will lie where executive action created “a barrier to reunification” with relatives as a result of a “stalled visa process.” Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 763 (9th Cir. 2017). The same result should obtain here.3 II. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent Injunctive Relief.\nThe same injuries that establish Plaintiffs’ standing also constitute irreparable harm. The First Amendment violations that Plaintiffs allege necessarily constitute irreparable harm. As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, the “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” IRAP II, 857 F.3d at 602 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)). “[B]ecause of the inchoate, one-way nature of Establishment Clause violations, they create the same type of immediate, irreparable injury as do other types of First Amendment violations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[W]here a movant alleges a violation of the Establishment Clause, this is sufficient, without more, to satisfy the irreparable harm prong for purposes of the preliminary injunction determination.”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding irreparable harm in an Establishment Clause case and stating that the “harm is irreparable as well as substantial because an erosion of 3 The two standing requirements other than injury-in-fact—traceability and redressability— cannot credibly be contested in this case. See IRAP II, 857 F.3d at 581. Indeed, the government did not dispute the traceability or redressability prongs of the standing inquiry in litigation over the President’s prior executive orders limiting Muslim immigration. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 763. In any event, Plaintiffs’ injuries—the forced separation from their relatives and stigma from being among the religious group targeted by the Proclamation—are directly caused by the Proclamation and would be alleviated by enjoining its implementation.\n9\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 11 of 13\nreligious liberties cannot be deterred by awarding damages to the victims of such erosion”). Plaintiffs also suffer irreparable harm on the second, independent ground that the\nProclamation would prolong their separation from family and loved ones. Dr. Zakzok is confronted with the painful knowledge that his eldest daughter—the only member of his immediate family who will not be permitted inside the United States—is alone in a new country without any prospect of reuniting with her family absent an injunction. Dr. Hamadmad finds herself separated from her sister. Even though her sister has spent no time in Syria, the Proclamation will bar their reunion simply because Dr. Hamadmad’s sister was born to Syrian parents. John Doe #1 was married only two months ago, but has no idea when he might his see his new wife again. Each of the Plaintiffs suffers similar circumstances. See supra at 2–7.\nThe “prolonged separation from family members” faced by each of the Plaintiffs here constitutes irreparable harm. Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 782; see Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing “separated families” as a “substantial injur[y]” and “irreparable harm[]”); cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1997) (“[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”). Like the individual plaintiff in Hawaii, who sought to “reunite his mother-in-law with his family,” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 763, Plaintiffs—who seek to bring one or more of their loved ones to the United States— are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” id. at 783.\nCONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the IRAP and IAAB plaintiffs’ memoranda of law, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction should be granted.\n10\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 12 of 13\n\nDated: October 10, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Charles E. Davidow Charles E. Davidow (Bar # 06516)\nPAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006-1047 Tel.: (202) 223-7300 Fax: (202) 223-7420 cdavidow@paulweiss.com\nRobert A. Atkins† Liza Velazquez† Andrew J. Ehrlich† Steven C. Herzog†\nPAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 (212) 373-3000 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\nLena F. Masri† Gadeir Abbas†\nCouncil on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lfmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nFaiza Patel† Michael Price†\nBrennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335\n\n11\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 6 Filed 10/10/17 Page 13 of 13 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\nJethro Eisenstein† Profeta & Eisenstein 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\nCounsel for Plaintiffs †Pro hac vice applications forthcoming\n12\n\n\f", "Case 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 1 of 49\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\n\nSOUTHERN DIVISION ____________________________________\n\n)\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE\n\n)\n\nASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nv.\n\n)\n\nNo. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC\n\n)\n\nDONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity )\n\nas President of the United States, et al., ) )\n\nDefendants.\n\n)\n\n____________________________________)\n\n)\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS\n\n)\n\nBORDERS, et al.,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nv.\n\n)\n\nNo. 8:17-cv-02921-TDC\n\n)\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official\n\n)\n\ncapacity as President of the United\n\n)\n\nStates, et al.,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nDefendants.\n\n)\n\n____________________________________)\n\n)\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al.,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nv.\n\n)\n\nNo. 1:17-cv-02969-TDC\n\n)\n\nDONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity )\n\nas President of the United States, et al., ) )\n\nDefendants.\n\n)\n\n____________________________________)\n\nDEFENDANTS’ COMBINED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 2 of 49\nTABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ ii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 4 I. Legal Framework ................................................................................................................ 4 II. Executive Order No. 13,780 ............................................................................................... 4 III. The President’s Proclamation ............................................................................................. 5\nA. DHS’s Worldwide Review and Recommendations ................................................ 6 B. The President’s Findings and Suspensions of Entry ............................................... 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 9 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 9 I. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Proclamation Are Not Justiciable .......................................... 9 A. The Denial of Entry to an Alien Abroad is Reviewable Only for Violation\nof a U.S. Citizen’s Own Constitutional Rights ....................................................... 9 1. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Challenges Are Not Reviewable................................. 9 2. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Not Reviewable Because\nPlaintiffs Do Not Assert Any Constitutional Rights of Their Own........... 14 B. Plaintiffs Otherwise Fail to Satisfy Article III Requirements ............................... 17 II. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Likely to Succeed on the Merits ............................. 18 A. The Proclamation Fits Well Within the President’s Broad Constitutional and\nStatutory Authority to Suspend Entry of Aliens Abroad....................................... 18 1. The President Has Extremely Broad Discretion to Suspend Entry of\nAliens Abroad ........................................................................................... 19 2. Under Any Standard, the Proclamation is Adequately Justified By\nthe President’s National Security and Foreign Affairs Judgments............ 22 3. Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Limit the President’s Authority are Incorrect ....... 26 B. The Proclamation Does Not Conflict With the Overall INA Scheme .................. 27\n-ii-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 3 of 49\n1. Congressional Amendments to the INA Do Not Limit the President’s Pre-Existing Statutory Authority............................................................... 27\n2. The Proclamation Comports with the Provisions Plaintiffs Cite .............. 29 C. The Proclamation Does Not Run Afoul of Section 1152(a)(1)............................. 31\n1. Success On This Claim Would Not Support the Requested Injunction .................................................................................................. 31\n2. There Is No Conflict Between the Non-Discrimination Provision and the President’s Suspension Authorities .............................................. 32\n3. In the Event of a Conflict, the President’s Suspension Authorities Would Prevail............................................................................................ 33\nIII. The Proclamation Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause ........................................ 35 A. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel .............................................. 35 B. The Proclamation is Valid Under Domestic Establishment Clause Precedent ............................................................................................................................... 39\nIV. The Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors Weigh Against Relief ............................ 44 V. A Global Injunction Would Be Inappropriate ................................................................... 45 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 45\n-iii-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 4 of 49\nINTRODUCTION Over the past several months, the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Department of State and Director of National Intelligence, conducted a worldwide review of foreign governments’ information-sharing practices and risk factors, evaluated each country according to a set of religion-neutral criteria, and identified countries with inadequate informationsharing practices. The Secretary of State then engaged countries diplomatically to encourage them to improve their performance. The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security reported the results of her review to the President, recommending that the President impose entry restrictions on nationals from eight countries whose information-sharing practices continued to be inadequate or that otherwise presented special risk factors. After reviewing the Acting Secretary’s recommendations, and further consultations within the Executive Branch, the President crafted “country-specific restrictions” that, in his judgment, “would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and that would, at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Pursuant to broad constitutional and statutory authority to suspend or restrict the entry of aliens abroad when he deems it in the Nation’s interest, on September 24, 2017, the President issued a Proclamation describing those restrictions and the particular country-conditions justifying them. See Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). Plaintiffs have now shown that, no matter how thorough the Government’s process, they will continue to allege that the President’s actions are motivated by animus. Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin the Proclamation worldwide, nullifying a formal national-security and foreignpolicy directive of the President based on the extensive investigations and recommendations of several Cabinet Secretaries. Their request threatens the ability of this or any future President to\n-1-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 5 of 49\ntake steps that are necessary to protect the Nation. To support their extraordinary request, Plaintiffs principally rely on the earlier decisions of\nthis Court and the Fourth Circuit enjoining the temporary entry suspension in Executive Order No. 13,780. But the Supreme Court has now vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and directed that the prior challenge be dismissed as moot. See Trump v. IRAP, No. 16-1436, --- S. Ct. ----, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017). Accordingly, this Court is free to reconsider the issues and correct the errors in those preliminary decisions. Moreover, those decisions are inapposite even on their own terms, because the alleged flaws in the prior entry suspension do not apply to the Proclamation here, which was issued after a worldwide review employing neutral criteria.\nThe Proclamation here is amply justified by the President’s authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). The President determined that, for countries with inadequate information-sharing practices or presenting other special circumstances, it would be detrimental to the Nation’s interests to allow certain foreign nationals of those countries to enter the United States, because “the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States,” and because the entry restrictions “are also needed to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments[.]” Procl. § 1(h)(i). The President’s determination is consistent with the broad discretion afforded him by §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). Nor does the President’s determination run afoul of any other Congressional enactment, which establish a minimum set of restrictions that an alien must meet before gaining entry to the country, but do not impliedly repeal the President’s authority to impose additional restrictions when he deems it appropriate pursuant to §§ 1182(f) or 1185(a)(1). Thus, Plaintiffs’ statutory challenges should be rejected.\nLikewise, Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim is governed by, and fails under,\n-2-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 6 of 49\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), which requires upholding the Executive’s decision to exclude aliens abroad so long as that decision rests on a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” Id. at 770. The Proclamation’s entry restrictions rest squarely on national-security and foreignpolicy determinations by the President that are legitimate on their face and supported by extensive findings. Mandel precludes “look[ing] behind” the President’s rationale. Id.\nPlaintiffs’ claim also fails without regard to Mandel. The Proclamation has nothing to do with religion on its face or in its operation, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Proclamation—the product of a review by multiple agencies—was motivated by religious animus. It was based on a thorough, worldwide review and engagement process that resulted in tailored, country-specific restrictions. Plaintiffs’ theory would require this Court to impugn the motives of the numerous Cabinet Secretaries and other government officials who participated in the worldwide review that culminated in the Acting Secretary’s recommendations to the President.\nAccordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits. Equally importantly, though, those claims are not justiciable at all, because the Proclamation has not produced final agency action on the visa applications filed by the aliens abroad identified by Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs’ challenges in any event are foreclosed by the general rule that federal courts may not second-guess the political branches’ decisions to exclude aliens abroad. That principle plainly forecloses review of Plaintiffs’ statutory challenges, because Congress has not authorized review of those claims. And although the Supreme Court has permitted limited review where a U.S. citizen contends that exclusion of an alien violates the citizen’s own constitutional rights, Plaintiffs here do not assert a cognizable violation of their own rights under the Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses. Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction should therefore be denied.\n-3-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 7 of 49\nBACKGROUND I. Legal Framework\n“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty” that both is an aspect of the “legislative power” and also “is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).\nUnder the INA, admission to the United States normally requires a valid visa or other valid travel document. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) and (B)(i)(II), 1203. Applying for a visa typically requires an in-person interview and results in a decision by a Department of State consular officer. Id. §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202(h), 1204; 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.102, 42.62. Although a visa generally is necessary for admission, it does not guarantee admission; the alien still must be found admissible upon arriving at a port of entry. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(h), 1225(a). Congress has enabled certain nationals of certain countries to seek temporary admission without a visa under the Visa Waiver Program. Id. §§ 1182, 1187.\nBuilding upon the President’s inherent authority to exclude aliens, see Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542, Congress has likewise accorded the President broad discretion to restrict the entry of aliens. Section 1182(f ) of Title 8 authorizes the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” “for such period as he shall deem necessary” whenever he finds that such entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Section 1185(a)(1) further empowers the President to adopt “reasonable rules, regulations,” “orders,” and “limitations and exceptions” on the entry of aliens. Pursuant to these authorities, President Reagan suspended entry of all Cuban nationals in 1986, and President Carter denied and revoked visas to Iranian nationals in 1979. II. Executive Order No. 13,780\nOn March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017) [hereafter “EO-2”]. Among other things, EO-2 directed the Secretary of Homeland\n-4-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 8 of 49\nSecurity to conduct a global review to determine whether foreign governments provide adequate information about their nationals seeking U.S. visas. See EO-2 § 2(a). EO-2 directed the Secretary to report his findings to the President, after which nations identified as deficient would have time to alter their practices, prior to the Secretary recommending entry restrictions on nations that remained inadequate or presented other special circumstances. See id. §§ 2(d)-(f).\nDuring that review, EO-2 imposed a temporary, 90-day suspension on the entry of certain foreign nationals from six countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—all of which had been identified by Congress or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in connection with the Visa Waiver Program as presenting heighted terrorism-related concerns. See id. § 2(c). That 90-day suspension was challenged in multiple courts, and was preliminarily enjoined by this Court and one other district court. See IRAP v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017). Those injunctions were affirmed in relevant part by the respective courts of appeals. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\nThe Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and partially stayed the injunctions pending its review. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). After EO-2’s temporary entry suspension expired, the Supreme Court vacated the IRAP injunction as moot. See Trump v. IRAP, 2017 WL 4518553. III. The President’s Proclamation\nOn September 24, 2017, following completion of the review and engagement processes required by Section 2 of EO-2, the President signed Proclamation No. 9645. The Proclamation was based on a worldwide review of the nation’s vetting procedures, reflects the recommendations of the Acting Secretary of DHS, and was issued in consultation with the Acting Secretary, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General. See Procl. § 1(h)(i).\n-5-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 9 of 49\n\nA. DHS’s Worldwide Review and Recommendations\nThe Proclamation describes the elaborate review process conducted pursuant to Section 2\nof EO-2. First, DHS, in consultation with the Department of State and the Director of National\nIntelligence, determined the information needed from foreign governments to enable the United\nStates to assess its ability to make informed decisions about foreign nationals applying for visas.\nThat information “baseline” has three components:\n(1) identity-management information, to assess “whether the country issues electronic passports embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity, reports lost and stolen passports to appropriate entities, and makes available upon request identity-related information not included in its passports”;\n(2) national-security and public-safety information, to determine “whether the country makes available . . . known or suspected terrorist and criminal-history information upon request, whether the country provides passport and nationalidentity document exemplars, and whether the country impedes the United States Government’s receipt of information”; and\n(3) a national-security and public-safety risk assessment, including such factors as “whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven, whether it is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program . . . that meets all of [the program’s] requirements, and whether it regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.”1\nIn conjunction with developing these criteria, DHS, in coordination with the Department\nof State, collected data on, and evaluated, every foreign country according to the criteria. Out of\nthe nearly 200 countries evaluated, the Acting Secretary of DHS identified the information-sharing\npractices and risk factors of 16 countries as “inadequate.” See Procl. § 1(e). Another 31 countries\nwere classified as “at risk” of becoming “inadequate.” See id. These preliminary results were\n\n1 Procl. § 1(c); see also DHS, Fact Sheet: The President’s Proclamation on Enhancing\n\nVetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by\n\nTerrorists\n\nor\n\nOther\n\nPublic-Safety\n\nThreats\n\n(Sept.\n\n24,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/24/fact-sheet-president-s-proclamation-enhancing-vetting-\n\ncapabilities-and-processes.\n\n-6-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 10 of 49\nsubmitted to the President on July 9. See id. § 1(c). The Department of State then conducted a 50-day engagement period to encourage all foreign governments to improve their performance. These diplomatic efforts yielded significant gains.2\nAfter the engagement period ended, the Acting Secretary of DHS submitted a report to the President recommending tailored entry restrictions on certain nationals from seven countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen) that continue to be “inadequate” with respect to providing information to the United States and risk factors. See id. § 1(h)(ii). The Acting Secretary also recommended entry restrictions on nationals of Somalia. Although Somalia generally satisfied the information-sharing criteria, the Acting Secretary found that the Somali government’s inability to effectively and consistently cooperate, as well as the terrorist threat that emanates from its territory, present special circumstances warranting limitations on entry. See id. § 1(i). The Acting Secretary also determined that an eighth country (Iraq) did not meet the United States’ information-sharing requirements, but in lieu of entry restrictions, recommended additional scrutiny of Iraqi nationals seeking entry because of the United States’ close cooperative relationship with Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combatting ISIS. See id. § 1(g).\nB. The President’s Findings and Suspensions of Entry On September 24, 2017, after considering the Acting Secretary’s recommendations and “consult[ing] with appropriate Assistants to the President and members of the Cabinet,” Procl. § 1(h)(i), the President issued the Proclamation pursuant to his inherent and statutory authority, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). The President considered “several factors, including each country’s capacity, ability, and willingness to cooperate with our identity-management and\n2 For example, 29 countries produced travel-document exemplars to combat fraud, and 11 countries agreed to share information on known or suspected terrorists. See Procl. § 1(f).\n-7-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 11 of 49\ninformation-sharing policies and each country’s risk factors,” as well as “foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.” Id. With those factors and goals in mind, the President sought to “craft[] those country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and that would, at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id.\nAccordingly, for countries that refuse to cooperate regularly with the United States (Iran, North Korea, and Syria), the Proclamation suspends entry of nationals seeking both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas; all classes of nonimmigrant visas are suspended for North Korea and Syria, and all are suspended for Iran except student (F and M) and exchange visitor (J) visas. See id. §§ 2(b)(ii), (d)(ii), (e)(ii). For countries that are valuable counter-terrorism partners but nonetheless have information-sharing deficiencies (Chad, Libya, and Yemen), the Proclamation suspends entry only of persons seeking immigrant visas and business, tourist, and business/tourist nonimmigrant (B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2) visas. Id. §§ 2(a)(ii), (c)(ii), (g)(ii). For Somalia, the Proclamation suspends entry of persons seeking immigrant visas, and requires additional scrutiny of nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas. Id. § 2(h)(ii). And for Venezuela, the Proclamation suspends entry of “officials of government agencies of Venezuela involved in screening and vetting procedures” and “their immediate family members” on nonimmigrant business and tourist visas. Id. § 2(f)(ii). For each country, the Proclamation summarizes some of the particular country conditions and inadequacies warranting the restrictions. See generally id. § 2. The Proclamation also provides for case-by-case waivers to the entry restrictions. Id. § 3(c).\nThe restrictions imposed on each country are “to encourage cooperation” and to “protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id. § 1(h)(i); see also Procl. pmbl. To that end, the Proclamation requires an ongoing review process to determine whether the limitations\n-8-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 12 of 49\nimposed should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented. Id. § 4. If at any time the Secretary of DHS determines that certain restrictions “are no longer necessary for the security or welfare of the United States, the Secretary . . . may recommend to the President the removal or modification of any or all such restrictions and limitations.” Id. § 4(c).\nThe suspensions on entry were effective immediately for foreign nationals previously restricted under EO-2 and the Supreme Court’s stay order. Id. § 7(a). The entry restrictions will be effective at 12:01 a.m. EDT on October 18, 2017 for all other covered persons. Id. § 7(b).\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW Plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that [the relief] is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).\nARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Proclamation Are Not Justiciable\nIt is a fundamental separation-of-powers principle that the political branches’ decisions to exclude aliens abroad generally are not judicially reviewable. That principle bars any review of Plaintiffs’ statutory claims. The Supreme Court has permitted limited review only when a U.S. citizen asserts a claim that exclusion of an alien abroad infringes the citizen’s own constitutional rights. Here, although Plaintiffs invoke the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, they assert no cognizable violation of their own constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are not reviewable. Plaintiffs also do not otherwise meet Article III requirements.\nA. The Denial of Entry to an Alien Abroad is Reviewable Only for Violation of a U.S. Citizen’s Own Constitutional Rights 1. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Challenges Are Not Reviewable\n-9-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 13 of 49\na. The Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized the power to . . . exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). “[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.” Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543. Absent such affirmative authorization, however, judicial review of exclusion of aliens outside the United States is ordinarily unavailable.\nCourts have distilled from these fundamental and longstanding principles of nonreviewability the rule that the denial or revocation of a visa for an alien abroad “is not subject to judicial review . . . unless Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Courts have referred to that rule as “the doctrine of consular nonreviewability,” id., but the short-hand label merely reflects the context in which the principle most often arises—i.e., challenges to decisions by consular officers adjudicating visa applications. The principle underlying that doctrine applies regardless of the manner in which the Executive denies entry to an alien abroad. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, see IRAP Br. at 23, it would make no sense to bar review of consular officers’ case-specific determinations while permitting review of decisions by the Head of the Executive Branch that are grounded in sensitive foreign-affairs and national-security determinations. See Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159-60.\nCongress has declined to provide for judicial review of decisions to exclude aliens abroad. It has not authorized any judicial review of visa denials—even by the alien affected, much less by third parties like Plaintiffs here. E.g., 6 U.S.C. § 236(f ); see id. § 236(b)(1), (c)(1). Congress also has forbidden “judicial review” of visa revocations (subject to a narrow exception inapplicable to aliens abroad). 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). This longstanding bar on judicial review of the political\n-10-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 14 of 49\nbranches’ exclusion of aliens abroad forecloses Plaintiffs’ statutory challenges to the Proclamation. b. Plaintiffs erroneously assert that Congress has authorized judicial review of their\nstatutory claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See IRAP Br. at 23. The APA does not apply “to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), which “is determined not only from [a statute’s] express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). Moreover, § 702 itself contains a “qualifying clause” that preserves “other limitations on judicial review” that predated the APA. Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1158 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)). Here, the conclusion is “unmistakable” from history that “the immigration laws ‘preclude judicial review’ of []consular visa decisions.” Id. at 1160. At a minimum, the general rule of “nonreviewability . . . represents one of the ‘limitations on judicial review’ unaffected by § 702’s opening clause[.]” Id.\nIndeed, when the Supreme Court held that aliens physically present in the United States— but not aliens abroad—could seek review of their exclusion orders under the APA, see Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 184-86 (1956), Congress responded by abrogating that ruling. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 651-653; Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1157-62 (recounting history). The House Report accompanying the abrogating statute explained that APA suits would “give recognition to a fallacious doctrine that an alien has a ‘right’ to enter this country which he may litigate in the courts of the United States against the U.S. Government as a defendant.” H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 33 (1961). Because an alien present in the United States cannot invoke the APA to obtain review—as Congress prescribed in 1961— then a fortiori, neither can aliens abroad or U.S. citizens acting at their behest. And given that Congress generally foreclosed “judicial review” of visa revocations, 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i), it is\n-11-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 15 of 49\nimplausible that Congress would allow review of visa denials in the first instance. c. Plaintiffs assert that Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), in which\nthe Court reviewed a challenge by aliens abroad to measures returning them to their home country, shows that Plaintiffs’ statutory claims are reviewable. See IRAP Br. at 22. In that case, however, the Court did not address reviewability because it rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. Moreover, the aliens in Sale alleged that the INA and a treaty gave them a judicially enforceable right. Here, Plaintiffs have no such colorable claim, as discussed below.3\nd. Even if the general rule of nonreviewability did not foreclose judicial review of Plaintiffs’ statutory claims, review still would be unavailable for three reasons. First, the APA provides for judicial review only of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The President’s Proclamation is not “agency action” at all, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992); Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 801 F. Supp. 2d 383, 40304 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012), and there has been no final decision denying a visa based on the Proclamation to any of the aliens abroad identified by Plaintiffs. In general, they appear either to be awaiting a visa interview, or have had an interview and not been issued a visa, presumably meaning that the visa has been refused subject to further review for reasons\n3 Plaintiffs also incorrectly argue that Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986), holds that statutory challenges to the exclusion of aliens abroad can be considered where constitutional claims also are asserted, due to the canon of constitutional avoidance. IRAP Br. at 24. But, as the D.C. Circuit subsequently recognized in Saavedra Bruno, Abourezk’s reviewability holding critically relied on a statute that has since been amended to eliminate such review. See Saavedra Bruno 197 F.3d at 1162, 1164. Moreover, the principle that courts should “‘not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of,’” applies only if a non-constitutional ground is “ ‘present.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009). The constitutionalavoidance principle does not rehabilitate unreviewable statutory claims. See Doe, 486 U.S. at 600605 (constitutional claims reviewable but statutory claims not reviewable under APA).\n-12-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 16 of 49\nunrelated to the Proclamation. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a), 42.81(a); see also IRAP Br. at 9; IAAB Br. at 2-4; Zakzok Br. at 2-7. Those aliens, moreover, if otherwise found eligible for a visa, will have an opportunity to seek a waiver as provided by the Proclamation. Even if judicial review were ultimately available, therefore, it would not lie until a consular officer has made a final decision to deny a visa, which could be based on a ground unrelated to the Proclamation. Even in Mandel and Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), courts did not consider the constitutional claims until after the aliens had been denied visas.4\nSecond, Plaintiffs lack a statutory right to enforce. Nothing in the INA gives Plaintiffs a direct right to judicial review. See, e.g., Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1050; Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir. 1992). And the APA’s “general cause of action” exists only for “persons ‘adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.’ ” Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. at 345. None of the statutes here provides Plaintiffs any rights to invoke. The provisions empowering the President to restrict entry of aliens, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f ), 1185(a)(1), and prohibiting nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, id. § 1152(a)(1)(A), do not confer any rights on third parties like Plaintiffs here— i.e., U.S. organizations or persons seeking entry of aliens abroad.5\nFinally, the APA also does not apply “to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Here, the relevant statutes commit these matters\n4 Contrary to the Zakzok plaintiffs’ assumptions, see Zakzok Br. at 8, nothing in the Proclamation will suspend processing or consideration of I-130 petitions even after October 18.\n5 Even when the INA permits a U.S. person to file a petition for a foreign family member’s classification as a relative for immigrant status, any interest the U.S. person has “terminate[s]” “[w]hen [his] petition [i]s granted.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1164. Nothing in the INA authorizes a sponsoring citizen to challenge the later denial of a visa to his relative.\n-13-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 17 of 49\nto the President’s unreviewable discretion. See Part II.A.1, infra.6\n2. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Not Reviewable Because Plaintiffs Do Not Assert Any Constitutional Rights of Their Own\nThe Supreme Court has twice engaged in limited judicial review of constitutional claims, but only when a U.S. citizen contended that the exclusion of an alien abroad violated the citizen’s own constitutional rights. In Mandel, the Court reviewed a claim that the denial of a waiver of visa-ineligibility to a Belgian national violated U.S. citizens’ own First Amendment right to receive information. 408 U.S. at 756-59, 762-70. As the Court explained, the alien himself could not seek review because he “had no constitutional right of entry to this country.” Id. at 762. The Court addressed (and rejected on the merits) only the claim of U.S. citizens that the alien’s exclusion violated their own constitutional rights. Id. at 770. And in Din, the Court considered but denied a claim by a U.S. citizen that the refusal of a visa to her husband violated her own due-process rights. 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (opinion of Scalia, J.); id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Limited review was available in each case only because the plaintiffs asserted violations of their own constitutional rights as U.S. citizens.\nPlaintiffs allege that they are injured by the Proclamation because it will prevent or delay their family members’ entry into the United States and thereby prolong their separation. See IRAP Br. 9-10; IAAB Br. 4-5; Zakzok Br. 8. But putting aside that no visa has yet been denied based on the Proclamation and this claim is therefore not ripe, that claimed injury is not cognizable in any event because it does not stem from an alleged infringement of Plaintiffs’ own constitutional rights.\n6 Plaintiffs briefly assert that judicial review is available through equity. IRAP Br. at 23 (citing Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384-85 (2015)). But the “judgemade remedy” that Armstrong addressed does not permit Plaintiffs to sidestep “express and implied statutory limitations” on judicial review, such as under the APA. 135 S. Ct. at 1384-85. A contrary rule would eviscerate the APA’s limits on review. Indeed, a suit for equitable relief challenging agency action is specifically contemplated as one under the APA itself, 5 U.S.C. § 703, not outside of it. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).\n-14-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 18 of 49\nIn McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Supreme Court held that individuals who are indirectly injured by alleged religious discrimination against others generally may not sue, because they have not suffered violations of their own. Id. at 429-30. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs, employees of a store subject to a State’s Sunday-closing law, lacked standing to challenge that law on free-exercise grounds because they “d[id] not allege any infringement of their own religious freedoms.” Id. at 429. Likewise here, in challenging the application of the Proclamation to family members (or to family members of the organizational plaintiffs’ clients), Plaintiffs are not asserting violations of their own constitutional rights. They instead are seeking to advance the interests of third parties whose entry is suspended and who themselves have no constitutional rights. Plaintiffs thus cannot seek the limited review afforded in Mandel and Din.7\nPlaintiffs also claim that the Proclamation injures them by sending a “message” that condemns their Islamic faith. See IRAP Br. at 8-9; IAAB Br. at 5-6; Zakzok Br. at 8. This “message” injury is not cognizable either because it likewise does not result from a violation of Plaintiffs’ own constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has “ma[de] clear” that “the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial [or other invidious] discrimination . . . accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). The same rule applies to Establishment Clause claims: “the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees” is not the type of “personal injury” that supports standing to sue, “even\n7 McGowan held that the plaintiffs could assert an Establishment Clause challenge to the state law only because they suffered “direct . . . injury, allegedly due to the imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian religion”: they were subjected to (indeed, prosecuted under) a Sundayclosing law, which regulated their own conduct. 366 U.S. at 422, 430-31; see Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 583 n.1, 585-86 (1961) (reviewing challenge to Sunday-closing law where business sought to prevent application of the law to business itself). That contrasts with the indirect injury from alleged discrimination here against aliens abroad.\n-15-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 19 of 49\nthough the disagreement is phrased in [Establishment Clause] terms.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 85-86 (1982).\nTo be sure, a plaintiff may suffer a “spiritual” injury from the violation of his own Establishment Clause rights where he himself has been “subjected to unwelcome religious exercises” or “forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486487 n.22. But neither is true here. The Proclamation does not expose Plaintiffs to a religious message: it says nothing about religion, and does not subject them to any religious exercise. And the Proclamation applies only to certain aliens abroad and is not targeted at Plaintiffs.\nThe D.C. Circuit correctly has rejected the notion that a putative Establishment Clause plaintiff may “re-characterize[]” an abstract injury flowing from “government action” directed against others as a personal injury from “a governmental message [concerning] religion” directed at the plaintiff. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J.), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167 (2009). If that were permissible, the D.C. Circuit explained, it would “eviscerate well-settled standing limitations.” Id. The challengers in Valley Forge and other cases “could have obtained standing to sue simply by targeting not the government’s action, but rather the government’s alleged ‘message’ of religious preference communicated through that action.” Id. Plaintiffs’ theory that a neutral regulation of conduct can be recast as sending an implicit religious message would render Valley Forge’s rule an empty pleading requirement.\nIndeed, even the Fourth Circuit declined to hold that the IRAP plaintiffs’ “message” injury was sufficient to support their Establishment Clause claim, instead relying on the combination of EO-2’s purported message and its adverse effect on one plaintiff in delaying the entry of his spouse. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 583-86 & n.11. But again, the Fourth Circuit erred because it confused the question whether an individual has suffered an injury-in-fact from an alleged violation of the\n-16-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 20 of 49\nEstablishment Clause with the question whether that violation was of the individual’s own Establishment Clause rights. See id. at 586. The Supreme Court has never conflated the two. Regardless of injury-in-fact, a plaintiff still must allege a violation of his own constitutional rights to invoke the limited review afforded by Mandel and Din. Because Plaintiffs have not done so, their constitutional claims are not reviewable.\nB. Plaintiffs Otherwise Fail to Satisfy Article III Requirements 1. Even if Plaintiffs’ claims are reviewable, they are premature. If any plaintiff’s relative is denied both a visa and a waiver, then that plaintiff can bring suit and the Court can consider the challenge in a concrete dispute. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’”); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). Two organizational plaintiffs—MESA and IAAB—claim injury associated with the Proclamation’s alleged interference with their conferences featuring international students and scholars. See IRAP Br. at 10 (MESA); IAAB Br. at 6 (IAAB). But neither MESA nor IAAB identifies any specific scholar or student who has concrete plans to attend an event but would be prohibited from doing so by the Proclamation. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009). Plaintiffs also make no effort to explain how their conferences will be harmed notwithstanding the fact that the entry of Iranian nationals on student (F and M) and exchange visitor (J) visas, including visas for short-term scholars, has not been suspended. See generally 22 C.F.R. § 62.21. As it stands now, none of the individual or organizational plaintiffs has adequately established claims that satisfy Article III’s requirements for review. 2. The organizational plaintiffs also claim injury based on alleged diversion of resources in response to the Proclamation. See IRAP Br. at 10 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)). But Havens Realty involved a narrow type of injury, in which the plaintiff\n-17-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 21 of 49\norganization itself had a statutory right to truthful housing information, see 455 U.S. at 373, and the defendants’ “racially discriminatory steering practices” made it impossible for the organization to fulfill its mission. Id. at 379. By its own terms, Havens Realty does not provide Article III injury-in-fact any time there is “a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests[.]” Id.\nHere, the organizations’ alleged harms—diversion of resources “to counsel clients and respond to questions” about the Proclamation, and individuals from the affected countries no longer seeking the organization’s “immigration services,” IRAP Br. at 10—are exactly the type of abstract injuries that do not support standing under Havens Realty. See Lane v. Holder, 703 F.3d 668, 675 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting standing for “an organization that decides to spend its money on educating members, responding to member inquiries, or undertaking litigation in response to legislation”). And an entity that provides legal services to aliens and other clients is not within the zone of interests of the immigration statutes. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 524-525 (1991).\n3. Finally, the plaintiff organizations claim third-party standing to represent the interests of their clients. See IRAP Br. at 10. As Plaintiffs note, however, third-party standing requires both the third party and the litigant itself to have suffered an injury in fact. Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991)). Because the organizations have not been injured and they have not identified any client with an Article III injury, the organizations also lack third-party standing. II. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Likely to Succeed on the Merits\nA. The Proclamation Fits Well Within the President’s Broad Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Suspend Entry of Aliens Abroad\nThe President’s Proclamation was issued pursuant to his Article II constitutional authority, and the broad statutory authority vested in him by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). The plain\n-18-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 22 of 49\ntext of those statutes confirms the expansive discretion afforded to the President, and historical\npractice likewise confirms that the President need not offer detailed justifications for his entry\nsuspensions. Judicial review of the President’s determinations would therefore be inappropriate.\nRegardless, the Proclamation here satisfies any standard that could plausibly apply, including the\nstandard erroneously adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii.\n1. The President Has Extremely Broad Discretion to Suspend Entry of Aliens Abroad\na. As relevant here, Section 1182(f) provides the following:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). By its terms, this provision grants the President broad authority and confirms\nhis discretion at every turn. Indeed, at least four courts of appeals have recognized that § 1182(f)\nprovides the President with broad power to suspend the entry of aliens. See Abourezk, 785 F.2d\nat 1049 n.2; Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1507 (11th Cir. 1992); Allende v.\nShultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1117-1118 (1st Cir. 1988); Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 744\nn.9 (9th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court itself has deemed it “perfectly clear that [Section] 1182(f )\n. . . grants the President ample power to establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 187.8\n8 Notably, when the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was being drafted and debated, opponents criticized § 1182(f ) as “giv[ing] the President the power to suspend all immigration whenever he feels it is in the national interest to do so,” 98 Cong. Rec. 4249 (1952) (letter from Rhoads Murphey, Friends Comm. on National Legislation), and as a “very, very broad provision,” id. at 4304-4305, 4423, 5114 (statements of Reps. Celler and Multer and Sen. Lehman); see also S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2, at 4 (1952) (minority views). The legislators supporting the provision did not disagree or suggest otherwise. See S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 14 (1952); H. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 53 (1952).\n-19-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 23 of 49\nIn addition to § 1182(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) further provides: Unless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful . . . for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe[.] 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1). This statutory text likewise confirms the breadth of the President’s authority. This section does not require any predicate findings whatsoever, but simply gives the President the authority to restrict entry to the United States according to “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” Id.; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297 (1981) (construing similar language in §1185(b) as “le[aving] the power to make exceptions exclusively in the hands of the Executive”); Allende, 845 F.2d at 1118 & n.13.9 b. Based on those statutes’ plain text, they provide no basis for judicial second-guessing of the President’s determinations about what restrictions to “prescribe” or what restrictions are necessary to avoid “detriment[] to the interests of the United States.” Congress specifically committed those matters to the President’s judgment and discretion. Indeed, because the statutes “fairly exude[] deference to the [President]” and “appear[] . . . to foreclose the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review,” it would be inappropriate for this Court to second-guess the nature of the President’s restrictions or their basis. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (“The Executive should not have to disclose its ‘real’ reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat—or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country\n9 The history of § 1185(a) also confirms the expansive discretion provided to the President. It originated in 1918 as a wartime measure authorizing restrictions “if the President shall find that the public safety requires” them. 40 Stat. 559 (1918). In 1978, Congress broadened the statute by removing the wartime requirement, and by removing any predicate finding from the statute. See Pub. L. No. 95-426, sec. 707(a), 92 Stat. 963, 992-93 (1978).\n-20-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 24 of 49\nby focusing on that country’s nationals—and even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.”) [hereafter AAADC]. Thus, the President’s determinations are “not subject to review,” United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940), and holding otherwise could severely limit the Executive Branch’s ability to respond quickly to urgent threats or international crises.10\nc. Historical practice likewise confirms the breadth of and deference owed to the President’s authority. For decades Presidents have restricted entry pursuant to §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) without detailed public justifications or findings; some have discussed the President’s rationale in one or two sentences that broadly declare the Nation’s interests.11 Indeed, Executive Order No. 12,807—the Presidential action at issue in Sale—contained only a single sentence justifying its measures. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, pmbl. pt. 4 (1992) (“There continues to be a serious problem of persons attempting to come to the United States by sea without necessary documentation and otherwise illegally.”). But the Supreme Court expressed no concerns about the adequacy of that finding, and instead remarked on the “ample power” given to the President, noting that “[w]hether the President’s chosen method” made sense from a policy perspective was “irrelevant to the scope of his authority” under the statute. Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88.\nSimilarly, in 1979 when President Carter invoked § 1185(a)(1) to restrict Iranian nationals, the Executive Order made no findings whatsoever and delegated the authority to prescribe\n10 Plaintiffs assert that § 1185(a)(1) “requires that any conditions on entry be ‘reasonable,’” IRAP Br. at 14 n.7. But the word “reasonable” does not appear in the operative grant of authority in that subsection—“subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe”— and, regardless, § 1182(f) does not even arguably contain such a requirement. In any event, the Proclamation’s conditions are plainly reasonable, as explained infra in Part II.A.2.\n11 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8693 (July 27, 2011); Proclamation No. 8342 (Jan. 22, 2009); Proclamation No. 6958 (Nov. 26, 1996); Proclamation No. 5887 (Oct. 26, 1988); Proclamation No. 5829 (June 14, 1988).\n-21-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 25 of 49\nrestrictions to lower Executive Branch officials. See Exec. Order No. 12,172, § 1-101 (Nov. 26, 1979). Courts saw no impediment to upholding those actions, despite the complete absence of Presidential findings regarding the necessity of any particular restrictions. See Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1982); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980).\n2. Under Any Standard, the Proclamation is Adequately Justified By the President’s National Security and Foreign Affairs Judgments\na. Even assuming some limited form of judicial review were appropriate, the Proclamation here would readily be sustained. The President provided far more detail and explanation for his findings than exists in other Presidential suspensions under §§ 1182(f) or 1185(a). Specifically, the President imposed the entry restrictions after reviewing the recommendations of the Acting Secretary of DHS, and her recommendations were created following a worldwide review that evaluated every country according to neutral criteria. The Acting Secretary recommended entry restrictions on eight countries, each of which was identified as “inadequate” in its informationsharing practices or as presenting other special circumstances. See Procl. §§ 1(c)-(g), (i). Moreover, the entry restrictions for each country are tailored to the country’s particular circumstances and conditions. See id. §§ 1(h)(1), 2(a)-(h).\nThe President’s entry restrictions serve two purposes. First, the restrictions are “necessary to prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States.” Id. § 1(h)(i); see also id. § 1(a)-(b) (discussing the importance of foreign countries’ information-sharing to the overall security vetting process). Second, the restrictions place pressure on foreign governments “to work with the United States to address those inadequacies and risks so that the restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation may be relaxed or removed as soon as possible.” Id. § 1(h). The utility of the entry restrictions as a foreign-policy tool is confirmed by the history of\n-22-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 26 of 49\nthe Proclamation’s development—during the diplomatic engagement period, the prospect of entry restrictions yielded significant improvements in foreign countries’ information-sharing practices. Id. §§ 1(e)-(g). Iraq similarly improved its information-sharing following the January 27, 2017 Executive Order, and thus was removed from EO-2’s entry suspension. See EO-2 § 1(g). The Proclamation amply survives review in light of these dual purposes of security and foreignrelations, the latter of which is an independent rationale that Plaintiffs wholly ignore.\nb. Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation fails for the same reasons EO-2 failed before the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii and before Judge Keenan in IRAP. See IRAP Br. at 17-19 (citing Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 770-74; IRAP, 857 F.3d at 609-11 (Keenan, J., concurring)). But the Proclamation would indeed satisfy even the standards (erroneously) applied in those opinions.\nFirst, the Ninth Circuit held that EO-2 made “no finding that nationality alone renders entry of this broad class of individuals a heightened security risk to the United States.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 772 (citing IRAP, 857 F.3d at 610 (Keenan, J., concurring)). But the Proclamation here contains such findings. Regarding security threats, the Proclamation explains that “[s]creening and vetting protocols” play “a critical role” in protecting United States citizens “from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats,” Procl. § 1(a); that “[i]nformation-sharing and identitymanagement protocols and practices of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of th[os]e screening and vetting protocols,” id. § 1(b); that each of the eight countries was determined to have “inadequate” practices under DHS’s baseline criteria or to present other special circumstances, id. § 1(g); and therefore the Proclamation’s restrictions are “necessary to prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States,” id. § 1(h)(i). These findings necessarily apply on the basis of nationality, because it is the inadequacy of the foreign\n-23-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 27 of 49\ngovernments’ practices that creates the risk inherent in those persons’ entry. See id. § 1(b). Similarly, with respect to foreign relations, the Proclamation explains that the entry\nrestrictions are intended to “elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments” going forward. Procl. § 1(h)(i); see id. § 1(b). When trying to influence the behavior of a foreign government, it makes eminent sense to distinguish, at least in part, on the basis of nationality. The Ninth Circuit itself acknowledged the rationality of distinguishing among “classes of aliens on the basis of nationality” when necessary “as retaliatory diplomatic measures responsive to government conduct directed at the United States.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 772 n.13. And the Fourth Circuit has similarly upheld nationalitybased restrictions in such circumstances. See Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding restrictions against Iranian nationals because “[t]he United States is not bound to treat the nationals of unfriendly powers with the same courtesy and consideration it extends to nationals of friendly powers”); see also, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585-88 (1952). Thus, the Proclamation contains ample findings justifying restrictions on the basis of nationality.12\nSecond, the Ninth Circuit faulted EO-2’s use of nationality because it was over-inclusive, suspending entry even for “nationals without significant ties to the six designated countries[.]” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 773. As the Proclamation explains, however, “the “practices of foreign\n12 The Ninth Circuit also faulted EO-2 because it did not “tie these nationals” to “terrorist organizations,” “identify these nationals as contributors to active conflict,” or show a “link between an individual’s nationality and their propensity to commit terrorism.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 772. To the extent the Ninth Circuit was implying that the President must make an individualized risk determination as to each particular national excluded, that would plainly conflict with the statutes here, which permit the President to make his determinations on a categorical basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (authorizing the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens”), § 1185(a)(1) (prohibiting “any alien” from entering except pursuant to “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe”) (emphases added).\n-24-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 28 of 49\ngovernments are important for the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States,” because the governments “manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals,” and “also control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments, including information about known or suspected terrorists and criminal-history information.” Procl. § 1(b). Those risks—regarding adequate information-sharing practices and identity-management protocols—apply regardless of the degree of a foreign national’s connection to his or her country of citizenship.\nThird, the Ninth Circuit noted that EO-2 did not “make[] any finding that the current screening processes are inadequate.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 773; see also IRAP, 859 F.3d at 611 (Keenan, J., concurring). But the Proclamation expressly contains such a finding; the Acting Secretary’s worldwide review was designed “to identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country . . . in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat,” Procl. § 1(c), and after being evaluated under that standard each of the eight countries here was found to have inadequate information-sharing practices or to present other particular risks, id. §§ 1(g), (i). Thus, the President (and Acting Secretary) indeed found that current procedures are inadequate with respect to the eight countries—i.e., the United States does not have enough information under current procedures “to determine that the individual is not a security or publicsafety threat,” or to “assess the risks they pose to the United States[.]” Id. § 1(c), (h)(i); see also Procl. pmbl. Furthermore, the President found that the status quo was inadequate to encourage greater cooperation from the eight nations. See id. § 1(h)(i) (“These restrictions and limitations are also needed to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments[.]” (emphasis added)). Thus, the President found the current\n-25-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 29 of 49\nprocedures to be inadequate for purposes of vetting nationals from these eight countries and encouraging greater cooperation from these eight countries’ governments.13\nFourth and finally, Judge Keenan faulted EO-2’s temporary suspension because it was issued prior to DHS completing its review of whether foreign nationals’ entry would harm the United States. See 857 F.3d at 611. Of course, the Acting Secretary’s comprehensive review has now been completed, and the results of that review are the foundation for the Proclamation’s entry restrictions. See Procl. §§ 1(c)-(h). The completion of that review is itself a “changed circumstance” justifying imposition of the Proclamation’s tailored restrictions. IRAP Br. at 17.\nIn sum, because the Proclamation thoroughly explains its findings and the bases for its conclusions, it should be upheld under any standard of review—including under the type of scrutiny employed by the Ninth Circuit and by Judge Keenan.\n3. Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Limit the President’s Authority are Incorrect Finally, Plaintiffs suggest two ways in which the President’s statutory authority should be limited such that (in their view) the Proclamation is invalid. Neither argument is persuasive. a. Plaintiffs first suggest that the President’s authority under §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a) should be construed narrowly in light of the non-delegation doctrine. See IRAP Br. at 12-13. But this argument is squarely foreclosed by Knauff, which rejected a non-delegation challenge to the predecessor version of § 1185(a)(1) because the exclusion of aliens also “implement[s] an inherent executive power.” 338 U.S. at 542. b. Plaintiffs also argue that §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a) may be used only to respond to “a\n13 Plaintiffs fault the Proclamation for not citing “a single vetting error of any kind for the banned countries[.]” IRAP Br. at 17. But this retrospective standard—requiring a past mistake in order to justify a prospective change in policy—ignores that national-security judgments are (and must be) predictive and preventive. Cf. Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, the President need not await a tragic event to act prophylactically.\n-26-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 30 of 49\ndiplomatic event Congress did not and could not practicably address,” or “a threat to U.S. interests to which Congress ha[s] not already responded.” IRAP Br. at 13. But this limitation finds no basis in the statutes’ text, history, or practice. Plaintiffs offer two examples as support, but neither helps them. First, Plaintiffs rely on President Reagan’s suspension of Cuban immigrants in August 1986. See Proclamation No. 5517 (Aug. 26, 1986). But that Proclamation was issued in response to an event fifteen months earlier, in May 1985. See id., pmbl. Thus, the Proclamation can hardly be described as a response to “a diplomatic event Congress . . . could not practicably address.” Id. The same is true for the Haitian refugee crisis at issue in Sale. That situation first prompted Presidential action in 1981, and it continued through the Supreme Court’s decision in June 1993 (with a particularly urgent crisis beginning 21 months earlier in September 1991). See Sale, 509 U.S. at 159-65. Again, that lengthy situation does not support Plaintiffs’ narrow interpretation.14\nB. The Proclamation Does Not Conflict With the Overall INA Scheme Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation “contradicts multiple policy judgments Congress has enacted into law,” and thus “exceed[s] the President’s authority under § 1182(f).” IRAP Br. at 14.\n1. Congressional Amendments to the INA Do Not Limit the President’s Pre-Existing Statutory Authority\na. Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that, every time Congress alters a provision of the INA, it is impliedly repealing the President’s authority under §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) to act on the same subject. That is contrary to well-settled principles of statutory construction. “[R]epeals by\n14 Other examples likewise undermine Plaintiffs’ theory. For instance, President Carter’s 1979 Executive Order responded to the Iranian hostage crisis, which lasted from November 1979 to January 1981. Congress legislated on that subject at least once during that time period, see Hostage Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-449, 94 Stat. 1967 (1980), but no court held that Congressional action eliminated the President’s authority to impose restrictions on Iranian nationals. More recently, Presidents have continued to use § 1182(f) not solely to address exigencies, but rather as a tool to encourage foreign nations’ cooperation with the United States’ objectives. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,662 (Mar. 24, 2014); Proclamation No. 7524 (Feb. 26, 2002); Proclamation No. 6730 (Oct. 5, 1994).\n-27-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 31 of 49\nimplication are not favored,” and “will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’” Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003). Here, there is no conflict: Congress has set the minimum requirements for an alien to gain entry, but has also granted the President authority to impose additional restrictions when he deems appropriate. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 541-42, 545-47 (holding that, although excluded alien would normally have been entitled to a statutory hearing on her exclusion, alien could be excluded without a hearing based on President’s Proclamation under the predecessor to § 1185(a)(1) and implementing regulations).\nUnder Plaintiffs’ theory, numerous Presidential exercises of §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) would be held unlawful. As Plaintiffs note, the INA contains a “long list” of grounds for inadmissibility, many of which implicate security, terrorism, or foreign policy. IRAP Br. at 19. Given the breadth and variety of those grounds, many exercises of the President’s § 1182(f ) authority could be characterized as supplanting a Congressional judgment embodied in one of those provisions. Plaintiffs’ argument would severely circumscribe the President’s authority, effectively reading §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) out of the INA entirely.\nb. Plaintiffs’ statutory theory is particularly ill-suited to the arena of national security and foreign affairs, which involve delicate balancing in the face of ever-changing circumstances, such that the Executive must be permitted to act quickly and flexibly. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (discussing the “changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations”); see also Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005). In this setting, courts typically apply the opposite presumption: courts will not assume Congress’s intent to foreclose the President’s authority over national security and foreign affairs unless Congress has specifically expressed that intent. See, e.g., Jama, 543 U.S. at 348 (“To infer an absolute rule . . .\n-28-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 32 of 49\nwhere Congress has not clearly set it forth would run counter to our customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs.”); Egan, 484 U.S. at 530 (“[U]nless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”).\n2. The Proclamation Comports with the Provisions Plaintiffs Cite The specific provisions of the INA relied upon by Plaintiffs do not demonstrate any conflict with the Proclamation. Citing Congress’s recent changes to the Visa Waiver Program, Plaintiffs assert that Congress already “considered the same problems” and enacted its solution. IRAP Br. at 15. But it is clearly permissible for the President and Acting Secretary to rely on factors similar to those considered by Congress; in doing so, they ensured that their actions are consistent with the INA’s principles, as Plaintiffs suggest they should. IRAP Br. at 13. Moreover, Plaintiffs misinterpret the meaning of Congress’s amendments to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The amendments sought to address vulnerabilities associated with individuals eligible to travel under the VWP—for example, European nationals who have “gone to Syria, Iraq, and other countries of concern in order to train and fight alongside ISIS,” and who can then use “their VWP country passports” to “board a plane bound for the U.S.” and “reach U.S. shores with relative ease.” 161 Cong. Rec. H9050-51 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Goodlatte). Because none of the Proclamation’s eight countries are VWP participants, however, the VWP amendments have no effect on the vast majority of those foreign nationals. Thus, the VWP amendments can hardly be construed, as Plaintiffs suggest, to represent a Congressional judgment about the appropriate level of screening for every alien worldwide, including the approximately 160 countries that do not participate in the VWP—which is the broader set of risks the Executive sought to address through the worldwide review that preceded the Proclamation. And as the legislative history confirms, Congress understood the VWP improvements to be only one piece of the puzzle,\n-29-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 33 of 49\nand that additional measures may still be necessary to address risks in the immigration system.15 Plaintiffs also argue that “Congress has repeatedly tightened visa screening protocols in\nrecent years.” IRAP Br. at 19. It is true that, since September 11, 2001, Congress has enacted laws giving the Executive Branch better tools to detect terrorist entry. Like the Visa Waiver Program amendments, however, those statutes do not suggest that Congress concluded that the existing vetting system is sufficient and that the President may not act within his own authority to improve it or pressure other nations to provide the information needed to vet their nationals.\nPlaintiffs next assert that the Proclamation “impermissibly alters the visa-processing standards Congress has chosen,” by requiring an applicant to establish that denying entry would cause “undue hardship,” and that their entry “would not pose a threat to the national security or public safety of the United States” and would “be in the national interest.” IRAP Br. at 19-20 (quoting Procl. § 3(c)(i)(A)-(C)). But those “requirements” are part of the Proclamation’s waiver provision that permit exempting certain foreign nationals from the Proclamation’s restrictions. See Procl. § 3(c). Plaintiffs cannot use the waiver provision in § 3(c) to attack the validity of the entry restrictions in § 2. If the President has the greater authority to impose the entry suspensions in § 2 (and he does), that necessarily includes the lesser authority to provide for case-by-case exceptions. Indeed, waiver provisions are routinely included in Presidential entry restrictions. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8693, § 4; Proclamation No. 8342, § 2; Proclamation No. 6958, § 2.\n15 See, e.g., 161 Cong. Rec. H9050 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Miller) (“I believe that the bill that we are considering today is the first of many, quite frankly, aimed at improving our security protocols.”); id. at H9056 (Rep. Hoyer) (“The reforms in this bill are an excellent start.”); id. at H9057 (Rep. Schiff) (“In the wake of the recent terror attacks, we must continue to review our existing security efforts to ensure we are doing all we can to protect the country.”); id. at H9057 (Rep. King) (“We all know that it takes a lot of pieces of legislation to fill some of the holes that exist[.]”); id. at H9060 (Rep. Goodlatte) (“[T]his bill is just one of many, many things with regard to our immigration system that need to be examined.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(5)(A)(i)(V).\n-30-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 34 of 49\nFinally, Plaintiffs assert that accepting the Government’s interpretation of §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) would mean there is “no limit to what parts of the INA the President can cancel or revise”—for example, “ban[ning] all entry on employment-based visas” based on a finding that immigrant workers are detrimental. IRAP Br. at 12. Whatever outer limits may exist on the President’s authority under §§ 1182(f ) and 1185(a), however, they are not implicated by the Proclamation here, which addresses core concerns of national security, foreign relations, and public safety. The Proclamation does not seek to subvert the INA by reinstituting a quota system, or by suspending an entire class of visas such as employment-based visas. To the contrary, the Proclamation seeks to further the INA by ensuring that the Government has the information needed to determine whether aliens present national-security or safety risks.\nC. The Proclamation Does Not Run Afoul of Section 1152(a)(1) Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation violates the non-discrimination provision of § 1152(a)(1)(A). IRAP Br. at 20-22. Plaintiffs’ argument is wrong for several reasons, including because it would lead to the absurd result that the President could not invoke his authority to restrict entry of nationals from a country with which the United States is at the brink of war.\n1. Success On This Claim Would Not Support the Requested Injunction As an initial matter, Plaintiffs do not dispute that, under the immigration laws, “entry” is a distinct act from obtaining a visa. Both this Court and the Fourth Circuit have previously recognized this distinction. See IRAP, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 554; IRAP, 857 F.3d at 580-81; see also id. at 608 (Keenan, J., concurring). And this distinction is important because 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) allow the President to restrict entry, whereas § 1152(a)(1)(A) prohibits nationalitybased discrimination in the issuance of visas. Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs were correct that the Government was violating § 1152(a)(1)(A) by denying immigrant visas on the basis of nationality, the remedy would be to\n-31-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 35 of 49\nenjoin the Government from refusing to issue visas on the basis of the Proclamation. But in no event would the remedy extend to an injunction compelling the Government to grant individuals entry into the United States. Plaintiffs’ success on this claim—whatever its effect on issuance of visas—would therefore not support invalidating the Proclamation’s entry suspensions.\n2. There Is No Conflict Between the Non-Discrimination Provision and the President’s Suspension Authorities\nIn any event, the non-discrimination provision does not conflict with the President’s suspension authorities because the statutes operate in two different spheres. “[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard each as effective.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (citation omitted). Here, there is an easy way to harmonize the statutes: §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) limit the universe of individuals eligible to receive visas, and § 1152(a)(1)(A) prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality within that universe of eligible individuals.\nThe legislative history shows that Congress also understood the INA to operate in this manner. The 1965 amendments (of which § 1152(a)(1)(A) was a part) were designed to eliminate the country-quota system previously in effect, not to limit any of the pre-existing provisions like §§ 1182(f) or 1185(a)(1) addressing entry or protecting security. See H. Rep. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (1965) (“It should be emphasized that there has been no relaxing of the qualitative criteria for admissibility to the United States and that no relaxation of the mental, health, moral, economic, and security criteria is proposed. The bill is not a comprehensive overhaul of the immigration laws.”); S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (1965) (similar). The history expressly states that the new immigrant-selection system (now codified in § 1152) was intended to operate only as to those otherwise eligible for visas. See H. Rep. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 12 (1965) (Under this [new] system, selection from among those eligible to be immigrants . . .\n-32-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 36 of 49\nwill be based upon the existence of a close family relationship to U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens and not on the existing basis of birthplace or ancestry.” (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (1965) (similar). There is thus no conflict between the statutes: §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) limit the universe of potentially eligible immigrants, and § 1152(a)(1) prohibits discrimination within that universe of eligible immigrants.\nHistorical practice also confirms this interpretation. First, with respect to § 1185(a), in 1979 President Carter directed the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to adopt “limitations and exceptions” regarding “entry” of “Iranians holding nonimmigrant visas.” Exec. Order No. 12,172 (Nov. 26, 1979); see also Immigration Laws and Iranian Students, 4A Op. O.L.C. 133, 140 (1979). President Carter subsequently amended that directive to make it applicable to all Iranians. See Exec. Order No. 12,206 (Apr. 7, 1980). Although President Carter’s Order itself did not deny or revoke visas to Iranian nationals by its terms, that is how the State Department implemented it. See 45 Fed. Reg. 24,436 (Apr. 9, 1980). Similarly, President Reagan invoked § 1182(f) to suspend immigrant entry of “all Cuban nationals,” subject to exceptions. Proclamation No. 5517. And the Supreme Court in Sale deemed it “perfectly clear” that § 1182(f ) would authorize a “naval blockade” against illegal migrants from a particular country. 509 U.S. at 187.\n3. In the Event of a Conflict, the President’s Suspension Authorities Would Prevail\nInterpreting § 1152(a)(1)(A) as limiting §§ 1182(f) or 1185 would require concluding that § 1152(a)(1)(A) impliedly repealed those provisions, because nationality-based restrictions would otherwise naturally fall within their plain terms. But implied repeals are disfavored, and in the event of a conflict between the statutes, the suspension authorities would prevail.\nPlaintiffs assert that § 1152(a)(1)(A) is later-enacted and thus should prevail. IRAP Br. at 22. While § 1152(a)(1)(A) was later-enacted with respect to § 1182(f), that is not true for\n-33-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 37 of 49\n\n§ 1185(a)(1), which was modified to its current form in 1978. See Foreign Relations Authorization\n\nAct, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 707(a), 92 Stat. 992-993 (1978). Even under\n\nPlaintiffs’ approach, then, § 1185(a)(1) would prevail over § 1152(a)(1)(A). Plaintiffs also assert\n\nthat § 1152(a)(1)(A) is “more specific” on the issue of nationality-based discrimination. But there\n\nis no indication that Congress intended a default rule governing non-discrimination in the visa-\n\nissuance context to supersede the President’s authority to suspend entry. Section 1182(f ) confers\n\nspecial power on the President to suspend entry of aliens, and that unique grant of authority to the\n\nPresident himself is more specific and should supersede § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s general rule governing\n\nvisa issuance.16\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIf this Court accepted Plaintiffs’ request to interpret §§ 1182(f) and 1152(a)(1)(A) as\n\nconstraints on the President’s constitutional powers—by requiring the President, before\n\nsuspending the entry of any alien, to articulate a detailed factual basis akin to APA-style judicial\n\nreview, and by prohibiting the President from ever suspending the entry of nationals from a\n\nparticular country, even in response to an urgent crisis (e.g., the brink of war with that country)—\n\nthen the statutes would raise grave constitutional questions. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’\n\ninterpretations for that reason alone.\n\n16 Even if Plaintiffs were correct that § 1152(a)(1)(A) prevails and would otherwise forbid withholding visas from aliens whose entry was suspended, § 1152(a)(1)(B) confirms that the State Department’s procedure of implementing § 1182(f) suspensions by denying visas to excluded individuals does not violate § 1152(a)(1)(A). Section 1152(a)(1)(B) makes clear that § 1152(a)(1)(A) does not “limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications.” See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 828, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 248 (1996) (“This section amends [§ 1152(a)(1)] to clarify that the Secretary of State has non-reviewable authority to establish procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications and the locations where visas will be processed.” (emphasis added)).\n-34-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 38 of 49\nIII. The Proclamation Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause Under Supreme Court precedent, the President’s national-security and foreign-policy\ndeterminations set forth in the Proclamation provide “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the Proclamation’s exclusion of aliens. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. That ends the Establishment Clause inquiry. But even if the Court were to disregard Mandel’s deferential standard and look instead to inapposite domestic Establishment Clause cases, the Proclamation is still valid. The Proclamation’s entry restrictions are the result of worldwide review and diplomatic engagement processes designed to protect national security and improve nations’ information-sharing practices. Plaintiffs’ evidence relates almost entirely to campaign statements about a suggested policy that was never adopted in any form, and they have not shown that the Proclamation was issued for a religious purpose. Instead, Plaintiffs have simply shown that, no matter the deliberativeness and thoroughness of the government’s process, they will continue to allege that the President’s actions to protect national security are all motivated by animus.\nA. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel 1. The Fourth Circuit’s now-vacated ruling acknowledged that Mandel’s test applies to constitutional challenges to the exclusion of aliens abroad. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 588. Under that test, when the Executive gives “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for excluding an alien, “courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the” asserted constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. This rule reflects that Constitution “exclusively” allocates power over the admission of aliens to the “political branches,” id. at 765 (citation omitted), and that aliens abroad have no constitutional rights at all regarding entry into the country. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792-96 (applying Mandel’s test to equal-protection challenge to statute). Mandel compels rejecting Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. The Proclamation’s\n-35-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 39 of 49\nentry restrictions rest on facially legitimate reasons: protecting national security and enhancing the government’s leverage in persuading foreign governments to share information needed to screen their nationals. See Procl. § 1. The Proclamation also sets forth a bona fide basis for these reasons: after the worldwide review and diplomatic engagement required by EO-2, the nations to which entry restrictions apply continued to have inadequate information-sharing practices or otherwise presented heightened risk factors. The Proclamation describes the global review process undertaken by DHS, in consultation with other agencies; the neutral criteria against which all nations were assessed; the subsequent diplomatic engagement process during which the Department of State encouraged nations to improve their performance; and the resulting recommendations of the Acting Secretary of DHS. See id. § 1(a)-(f), 1(i). It further explains that, based on the Acting Secretary’s recommendations and after consulting with members of the Cabinet, the President “craft[ed] . . . country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and that would, at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” See id. § 1(h). These facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for the Proclamation’s entry restrictions readily satisfy Mandel’s test. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim fails.\nIn reviewing the constitutionality of EO-2, the Fourth Circuit erroneously determined that Mandel’s “bona fide” requirement permits courts to examine whether the Government’s stated reasons were given “in good faith.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590-91. The court’s error is made clear by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017), the Supreme Court described Mandel’s standard as “minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review).” Rational-basis review is objective and does not permit probing government officials’ subjective intentions or second-guessing the Executive’s national-security and foreign-policy\n-36-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 40 of 49\ndeterminations. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981) (rational-basis standard does not ask “whether in fact [a] provision will accomplish its objectives,” but whether the government “rationally could have believed” that it would do so); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (if “there are plausible reasons for” the challenged action, the rational-basis “inquiry is at an end”). The Fourth Circuit’s now-vacated understanding of Mandel cannot be squared with Morales-Santana.\nIndeed, Mandel’s objective rational-basis standard has particular force here, as courts are generally “ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of the Executive’s “reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat.” AAADC, 525 U.S. at 491. And courts similarly must be “wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs” because of the impact it could have on the United States’ foreign relations. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 695 (2004).17\nBecause the face of the Proclamation provides an ample basis for its restrictions, the Court’s inquiry is at an end. The Court cannot look behind the stated reasons in an effort to determine for itself whether the President’s national-security and foreign-policy justifications were given in good faith.\n2. In any event, Plaintiffs do not and cannot show that the Proclamation’s stated national-\n17 The Fourth Circuit based its approach on a reference to “bad faith” in the concurrence in Din. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590-91. But the concurrence did not propose an enormous loophole in Mandel, especially with respect to a formal national-security and foreign-policy determination of the President. It merely hypothesized that, if the government had not identified a factual basis for the consular officers’ decision at issue, the plaintiff might have been able to seek “additional factual details” about the basis of the consular officer’s decision (provided the information is not classified). Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). In contrast, when the government does identify a factual basis—as it did in Mandel and Din by citing a statutory provision that itself included sufficient factual predicates, and also has done here through the Proclamation’s text—that is the end of the analysis.\n-37-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 41 of 49\nsecurity and foreign-policy rationales are a pretext for a purported motive of banning Muslims. See IRAP Br. at 24-25. Plaintiffs rely solely on the Fourth Circuit’s prior conclusion in its vacated decision, which is not controlling law, that EO-2 was issued in bad faith. See id. at 25. But the allegations against EO-2 cannot justify a similar determination against a different government action—the Proclamation. Indeed, as the IRAP plaintiffs previously acknowledged, future presidential actions should be judged on their own terms. See, e.g., Tr. of Hearing for TRO at 10, IRAP v. Trump (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2017) (arguing that invalidation of EO-2 would not “tie[] the hands of the Government going forward” because in future challenges the court would “take into account what’s changed, what’s different, both in the order itself or the law itself and in the conditions on the ground”); IRAP Reply Br. (ECF No. 130) at 11-12 n.15.\nNearly all of the evidence on which the Fourth Circuit relied predates the Proclamation by more than a year. And the Proclamation is the result of worldwide review and diplomatic engagement processes that took place after EO-2’s issuance. These processes combined the efforts of multiple government agencies and resulted in recommendations from the Acting Secretary of DHS to the President as to what entry restrictions were necessary to address the inadequacies identified by the agencies during their review and to encourage countries to cooperate with the United States to address those inadequacies. The processes and the resulting entry restrictions are more tailored and relate to a different set of countries than those in EO-2.\nPlaintiffs cannot plausibly maintain that the numerous government officials involved in the global review and engagement processes were acting in bad faith or harbored anti-Muslim animus, and Plaintiffs have made no such allegations. Plaintiffs’ theory also would require the Court to conclude that the Government’s diplomatic efforts—which resulted in numerous countries providing travel document exemplars and agreeing to share information on suspected terrorists—\n-38-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 42 of 49\nwere a charade. Plaintiffs again provide no basis for such an assertion. B. The Proclamation is Valid Under Domestic Establishment Clause Precedent Even in the domestic context, a court deciding whether official action violates the\nEstablishment Clause because of an improper religious purpose looks only to “the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act.” McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). The court is not to engage in “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” Id. Searching for purpose outside the operative terms of governmental action makes no sense in the Establishment Clause context, because it is only an “official objective” of favoring or disfavoring religion that implicates the Clause. Id.\nThere is no basis for invalidating the Proclamation under that standard. The Proclamation’s text does not refer to or draw any distinction based on religion. And the Proclamation’s “operation,” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993), confirms that it is religion-neutral: it applies tailored restrictions to eight countries based on detailed findings regarding the national-security and foreign-policy interests of the United States that were reached after a thorough, worldwide review and extensive consultation, and the entry restrictions apply to certain nationals of those countries without regard to their religion.\nPlaintiffs assert that an anti-Muslim purpose can be inferred from the Proclamation’s inclusion of six majority Muslim countries. But the Proclamation omits the overwhelming number of majority-Muslim countries, including Sudan and Iraq, both of which were included in prior entry suspensions under EO-2 or Executive Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereafter “EO-1”]. It is neither surprising nor pernicious that the six majority Muslim countries are included, as five of them were previously identified by Congress and DHS as countries presenting terrorism-related concerns. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12). In addition, the Proclamation applies entry restrictions to two countries that do not have majority Muslim populations (North\n-39-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 43 of 49\nKorea and Venezuela), and a third country that has a substantial (approximately 48 percent) nonMuslim population (Chad). See CIA, The World Factbook: Africa: Chad, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html.\nPlaintiffs’ assertion also ignores that the entry restrictions in the Proclamation are customized for each nation, with the aim of balancing the Government’s national-security and foreign-policy goals. See Procl. § 1(h). Thus, nationals of some designated countries can enter the United States for certain purposes.18 The Proclamation also provides for case-by-case waivers of the entry restrictions in a variety of circumstances. See id. § 3(c). And it requires periodic reviews so that entry restrictions can be removed or relaxed if countries improve their informationsharing practices. See id. § 4. Neither the Proclamation’s text nor its operation evidence an intent to exclude Muslims.\nPlaintiffs rely almost exclusively on the Fourth Circuit’s now-vacated conclusion that EO2 was motivated primarily by religion to argue that the Proclamation was similarly motivated. See IRAP Br. at 26-29. Thus, Plaintiffs’ purported evidence of improper purpose is largely a rehashing of campaign-trail statements and informal remarks of the President’s aides about EO-1 and EO-2. See id. Even if those statements could be considered in the search for official purpose at all (and they cannot, as the Government previously argued), they do not demonstrate that the Proclamation’s purpose is religious.\n“[P]ast actions” cannot “forever taint” future government efforts. McCreary, 545 U.S. at\n18 For example, the entry suspensions do not apply to Iranian nationals seeking to enter on student (F and M) and exchange visitor (J) visas, which, in FY 2016, totaled 4,368 individuals. See U.S. Department of State, Nonimmigrant Visas Issued, FY 2016, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2016AnnualReport/FY16 AnnualReport-TableXVII.pdf. Similarly, Yemeni nationals may enter on most types of nonimmigrant visas; in FY 2016, 1,271 individuals entered the United States on such visas. See id.\n-40-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 44 of 49\n874. Nearly all of the statements on which Plaintiffs rely were made more than a year before the President issued the Proclamation. See IRAP Br. at 26, 29. In addition, none of the statements address the Proclamation; rather, they are about campaign-trail suggestions that were never adopted, EO-1, or EO-2. Past statements that are not connected to the Proclamation are not relevant to the Government’s purpose.\nFinally, the specific sequence of events leading to the issuance of the Proclamation severs any connection between EO-2’s supposed religious purpose and the Proclamation. Cf. Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848, 863 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “curative efforts” can “neutralize” a previously religious message); Books v. City of Elkhart, Ind., 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that “subsequent history” can “transform[] [a] religious purpose”). The global review and diplomatic engagement processes that led to the Proclamation—which entailed participation of numerous Executive Branch agencies, employed religion-neutral criteria to assess the risks posed by all nations, and provided for a period of diplomatic engagement in an effort to reduce or eliminate the need for any entry restrictions—demonstrate that the Proclamation has a distinct foundation. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445 (stating that original religious purpose of Sunday closing laws did not preclude legislature from achieving secular goals by prescribing Sunday as a day of rest); Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1088-89, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding statutory amendment that provided religious exemption even though prior version was invalidated on Establishment Clause grounds).19\n19 Plaintiffs assert that EO-2’s purported religious purpose infects the Proclamation because the global review and engagement processes were required by certain sections of EO-2. See IRAP Br. at 29. This Court, however, did not enjoin those sections of EO-2 precisely because it did not find that they were motivated by a religious purpose. See IRAP, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 565; see also IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2089 (explaining that Court’s partial stay of EO-2 injunctions would “permit the Executive to conclude its internal work and provide adequate notice to foreign governments”). Moreover, EO-2 did not dictate the results of the comprehensive review it required.\n-41-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 45 of 49\nCiting McCreary, Plaintiffs contend that the differences between EO-2 and the Proclamation amount to “little more than the kind of ‘litigating position’ that reasonable observers easily see through.” IRAP Br. at 27. That allegation disregards that the Proclamation was based on recommendations of the Acting Secretary of DHS after an extensive, multi-agency process. See United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14 (1926) (describing the “presumption of regularity” that attaches to all federal officials’ actions). In any event, comparing the Proclamation to the third in a series of Ten Commandments displays at issue in McCreary demonstrates that the Proclamation does not embody a religious purpose.\nFirst, McCreary involved displays with explicitly religious content, and the issue was whether the displays had a secular purpose that rendered them permissible under the Establishment Clause. Here, the Proclamation has no reference to religion in its terms or its operation.\nSecond, although the counties in McCreary offered new statements of a secular purpose for the third display in litigation, those statements were not supported by any “authorizing action by the Counties’ governing boards.” 545 U.S. 871. The display also contained “no context that might have indicated an object beyond the religious character of the text.” Id. at 868. In contrast, the Proclamation does not mention religion, and explains its secular purposes—to protect national security and enhance the Government’s leverage in persuading nations to supply information needed to screen their nationals. The context in which the Proclamation was issued—after multiagency review and consultation—highlights its national-security and foreign-policy objectives.\nThird, unlike the third display in McCreary, which “quoted more of the purely religious language of the Commandments than the first two displays had done,” 545 U.S. at 872, the Proclamation materially differs from EO-2 in ways that eliminate—rather than add to—any supposed religious message. The Proclamation is supported by new and different national-security\n-42-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 46 of 49\nfindings, reached after thorough, worldwide review and engagement processes, and based on recommendations of the Acting Secretary of DHS. It applies to a different set of countries than EO-1 or EO-2: majority Muslim countries like Sudan and Iraq have been removed, while nonmajority Muslim countries like North Korea and Venezuela have been added. And the Proclamation imposes more tailored entry restrictions than EO-1 or EO-2, which allow nationals from some designated countries to enter for certain purposes.\nLastly, the counties in McCreary never “repudiated” the resolutions authorizing the prior Ten Commandments displays, which contained “extraordinary” references to religion. 545 U.S. at 871. Here, in contrast, since EO-2’s issuance, the President has, in an official address, praised Islam as “one of the world’s great faiths,” decried “the murder of innocent Muslims,” and emphasized that the fight against terrorism “is not a battle between different faiths, different sects, or different civilizations,” but one “between barbaric criminals who seek to obliterate human life and decent people” of all religions who “want to protect life.” Washington Post Staff, President Trump’s full speech from Saudi Arabia on global terrorism, Wash. Post, May 21, 2017, https://goo.gl/viJRg2. Thus, the Proclamation represents a “genuine change[] in constitutionally significant conditions.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874.\nIn sum, by arguing that the campaign and other statements that preceded EO-2 continue to taint the Proclamation notwithstanding all of the procedural and substantive differences between the two, Plaintiffs effectively contend that President Trump is forever disabled from regulating immigration from majority-Muslim countries. No case supports that dangerous approach, McCreary and others refute it, and this Court should reject it too.20\n20 Plaintiffs argue in a single paragraph that the Proclamation discriminates based on religion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See IRAP Br. at 30-31. That claim fails for the same reasons as Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792-96.\n-43-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 47 of 49\nIV. The Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors Weigh Against Relief Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that “irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an\ninjunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. The closest Plaintiffs come to alleging concrete harm is their assertion that the Proclamation will prevent their foreign-national family members from entering the United States while the Court considers the case on the merits. But delay in entry alone does not amount to irreparable harm. Visa processing times vary widely, and until the aliens abroad meet the otherwise-applicable visa requirements and seek and are denied a waiver, they have not received final agency action and their claimed harms are too “remote” and “speculative” to merit injunctive relief. Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991).\nOn the other side of the scales, an injunction would cause direct, irreparable injury to the government and public interest. “[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). A fortiori, the same principle applies to a national-security and foreign-policy judgment of the President. “[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” Agee, 453 U.S. at 307, and “the President has unique responsibility” in this area, Sale, 509 U.S. at 188. Courts, moreover, have recognized the danger of “impinging on the discretion of the [President] in managing foreign affairs.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 695. The Department has formally recommended entry restrictions to address ongoing “threats . . . to the security and welfare of the United States,” and the President likewise exercised his judgment to craft country-specific entry restrictions that will “be most likely to encourage cooperation” while at the same time “protect[ing] the United States.” Procl. § 1(h). The Court should not interfere with, or second-guess, those judgments.\n-44-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 48 of 49\nV. A Global Injunction Would Be Inappropriate Constitutional and equitable principles require that any injunctive relief be limited to\nredressing a plaintiff’s own cognizable injuries. Article III requires that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing . . . for each form of relief that is sought.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017). “The remedy” sought therefore must “be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996). Equitable principles independently require that injunctions “be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).\nIn light of these principles, any injunction the Court enters should be limited to relieving the specific injury of only those Plaintiffs whom the Court determines have a cognizable and meritorious claim and who will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. The injunction should not extend beyond those Plaintiffs’ identified family members, clients, or members. The injunction also should not extend beyond Section 2 of the Proclamation; nor should it cover the specific provisions of Section 2 that Plaintiffs do not challenge, like the entry restrictions for Chad, Libya, North Korea, and Venezuela. See IRAP, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 565.\nThe Proclamation’s severability clause compels the same approach. Section 8(a) provides that, if “the application of any provision to any person or circumstance[] is held to be invalid,” then “the application of [the Proclamation’s] other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.” Such tailored relief would pose far less interference than enjoining the President’s directive wholesale based on alleged injuries to a few plaintiffs.\nCONCLUSION The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.\n-45-\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 20 Filed 10/12/17 Page 49 of 49\n\nDated: October 12, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nCHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nJENNIFER D. RICKETTS Director, Federal Programs Branch\nJOHN R. TYLER Assistant Director, Federal Programs Branch\n/s/ Daniel Schwei DANIEL SCHWEI (Bar No. 96100) MICHELLE R. BENNETT (Bar No. 806456) ARJUN GARG (Bar No. 806537) Senior Trial Counsel / Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20530 Tel: (202) 305-8693 Fax: (202) 616-8470 E-mail: daniel.s.schwei@usdoj.gov\n\n-46-\n\n\f", "Case 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 1 of 13\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\nSOUTHERN DIVISION\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al.,\n\nPlaintiffs,\nv. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al.,\nDefendants.\n\nCase No. 17-cv-02969-TDC\n\nREPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 2 of 13\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT In four days, the Plaintiffs in this case will be indefinitely separated from their loved ones abroad—a father-in-law who suffers from cancer, a daughter at risk of return to a regime that tortured her father, and a mother separated from a critically ill child—by virtue of a Proclamation that follows on the heels of the President’s repeated calls to ban Muslims from the United States. The Proclamation, like the two predecessor orders that were enjoined by courts across the country, seeks to effectuate the President’s threat. The government argues the Proclamation is different. It points to a purported “worldwide review” of countries’ information-sharing and identity-management practices against “baseline criteria.” On this basis, the government asserts that the Proclamation should not be reviewed by this Court. But history and precedent compel searching judicial review. The Proclamation is undeniably the product of the executive orders that came before it: it indefinitely suspends most travel from six Muslim-majority countries—five of which were subject to the prior orders. Although this new ban applies to North Korea and Venezuela, in view of the President’s two prior failed efforts to discriminate against Muslims, it is plain that North Korea and Venezuela are mere window dressing. Only a handful of North Koreans apply for U.S. visas and the ban only applies to a select list of Venezuelan government officials; their inclusion is just a cynical attempt to distinguish the Proclamation from its predecessors. As the Fourth Circuit recognized in its review of EO-2, where plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the stated rationale for government action is merely a bad faith attempt to mask a religious purpose, the court should look behind the stated purpose to assess its bona fides. Similarly, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in reviewing EO-2, Constitutional precedent requires that the Proclamation be reviewed because it effectively supplants the detailed statutory scheme\n1\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 3 of 13\nof the Immigration and Nationality Act and is thus incompatible with the expressed will of Congress. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).\nIn addition to the tactical and pointless inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela, the Proclamation’s facially irrational application betrays the religious animus from which it originated: it bans countries that met its criteria and spares many that did not; it applies illdefined “mitigating” factors to exempt certain countries even when banned countries are similarly situated; and it affords exceptions that cannot be reconciled with its stated aims. Moreover, out of purported concern that the banned countries do not provide sufficient information for the United States to assess the risk that their nationals pose, the Proclamation imposes an indiscriminate and senseless ban that includes individuals who have no meaningful ties to those countries. The Proclamation would exclude, for example (among many others), the sister of Plaintiff Hamadmad—an academic who has never set foot in Syria—simply because she was born to Syrian parents.1\nARGUMENT Contrary to the government’s position, the “national-security and foreign-policy determinations” on the face of the Proclamation do not foreclose this Court’s Establishment Clause inquiry. (Opp. at 35.) Indeed, to accept the government’s argument would require this Court to conclude that two Courts of Appeals—including the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc— erred in finding, on similar facts, that the government was not entitled to such deference. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot and remanded, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (“IRAP”); Washington v. Trump, 847\n1 Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference the reply memoranda in support of the motions for a preliminary injunction filed in Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 8:17cv-00361 (“IRAP”), and Iranian Alliances Across Borders, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., No. 8:17-cv-2921 (“IAAB”). 2\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 4 of 13\nF.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017).2 Instead, as the Fourth Circuit has held, the Court must look behind the “stated reason for the challenged action” where, as here, plaintiffs have “seriously called into question whether the stated reason for the challenged action was provided in good faith.” See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 591 (citing Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).\nPlaintiffs have alleged facts which are equally compelling as those that the Fourth Circuit previously concluded were sufficient to give rise to an inference of bad faith.3 Specifically, the litany of historical evidence presented by the plaintiffs demonstrating religious animus (as discussed by the IRAP plaintiffs), balanced against the “weak evidence” proffered by the government that the Proclamation is “meant to address national security interests,” id. at 592 (as discussed below), compels the conclusion that the government’s justification for the Proclamation was not offered in good faith, but instead as a mere pretext to effectuate the President’s promise to ban Muslims from the United States.\nThe Court therefore must examine “evidence of purpose beyond the face of the challenged law,” including “the historical background of the decision and statements by decisionmakers,” in order to determine whether the Proclamation is in fact the product of its stated aims, or whether it instead is motivated by an impermissible purpose. Washington, 847\n2 The case relied upon by the government to urge this Court to depart from this precedent, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, is inapposite. (See Opp. at 36.) Morales-Santana did not concern the Establishment Clause, let alone analyze its application to a sweeping change in immigration policy effected following myriad statements by the President touting his goal to bar Muslims. See 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). In relying on Morales-Santana, the government is merely recycling arguments it previously made—and lost—before the Fourth Circuit.\n3 As in cases challenging the President’s prior executive orders, Plaintiffs allege that Proclamation is the product of the President’s numerous “statements expressing animus towards the Islamic faith” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 591, and ongoing efforts “to find a way to ban Muslims in a legal way,” id. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 2–3, 6–7, 22–32, 36, 40–41, 55–59.) 3\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 5 of 13\nF.3d at 1167–68; see IRAP, 857 F. 3d at 593. An assessment of the process, reasoning, and evidence that purportedly gave rise to the challenged government action is commonplace when courts evaluate constitutionality. See, e.g., McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (“[S]crutinizing purpose does make practical sense, as in Establishment Clause analysis, where an understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact . . . .”); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438– 39 (2002) (stating that the evidence must “fairly support” the government’s rationale for a challenged ordinance). I. The Stated Rationale Is Not A Good Faith Justification For The Proclamation.\nOn its face, the “review” on which the Proclamation purportedly is based is a tactic, not substance; it is a pretext, not policymaking. While the so-called “baseline criteria” and “mitigation factors” sound like the analytic tools of legitimate Executive action, their nonsensical application and irrational outcomes demonstrate that, like the President’s prior efforts, the Proclamation’s purported justifications are just an effort to disguise an improper religious-based motive. The only coherent and consistent explanation for the Proclamation, given the government’s incoherent and inconsistent justification for it, is that it aims to achieve the same improper purpose as the prior executive orders. The Proclamation cannot be “divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 601. As demonstrated below, the Proclamation’s purported national security justification, like that of EO2, is “secondary to its primary religious purpose and [is] offered as more of a ‘litigating position’ than as the actual purpose.” Id. at 596.\nThe baseline criteria were not actually applied. The Proclamation itself concedes that its “baseline criteria” were, in fact, ignored in banning immigrants from countries that met the criteria, and in sparing immigrants from countries that did not. Somalia (a majority-Muslim\n4\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 6 of 13\ncountry) was banned, even though it satisfied the criteria. (Proclamation § 2(h).) Iraq was not\nbanned, even though it failed to meet the criteria. (Id. § 1(g).)\nThe Proclamation ignores numerous countries that failed the baseline criteria. The\ngovernment chose to permit immigration from scores of countries that do not satisfy the baseline\ncriteria and, in particular, do not supply the “information needed from foreign governments to\nenable the United States to assess its ability to make informed decisions about foreign nationals\napplying for visas.” (Opp. at 6 (emphasis added).) For example:\n• The “national security and public-safety” risk assessment purportedly considered whether the country “regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.” (Proclamation § 1(c)(iii).) Immigration and Customs Enforcement found 12 countries failed this requirement—four of which were actually sanctioned as a result: Eritrea, Cambodia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. (Ex. 1.) None of these sanctioned countries is subject to the ban. (Ex. 2.) And of the countries that are banned, only one (Iran) failed to satisfy this supposed “national security” test.\n• Ten countries identified by the State Department as terrorist safe havens are not subject to the ban. (Ex. 3.) However, Chad is banned even though it is not a terrorist safe haven according to the State Department, and actively partners with the United States against terrorism. (Id.)\n• More than 80 countries fail to “issue electronic passports embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity.” (Proclamation § 1(c)(i); See Ex. 4.) Yet four countries that do satisfy this “baseline” requirement—Iran, Libya, Somalia, and Venezuela—are banned. (Id.; see also Ex. 3.)\n• At least 17 countries do not share information on “lost and stolen passports to appropriate entities.” (Proclamation § 1(c)(i); Ex. 5.) Yet at least the majority of these countries are not banned.\nThe Proclamation’s mitigating factors were haphazardly applied. The Proclamation\nspares certain countries, such as Iraq, from the ban based on “certain mitigating factors,”\n(Proclamation § 1(h)(iii)), but applies them in no logical or coherent fashion, other than to\nimpose a ban on Muslim-majority countries. Chad meets every one of the mitigating factors—\nmore than even Iraq (which met only four of five). (Ex. 3; see also Ex. 6.) Three other countries\n5\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 7 of 13\nsubject to the Proclamation meet four of the five mitigating factors—the same number as Iraq. (Ex. 3.)\nThe Proclamation purports to solve a non-existent problem. Taken at face value, the alleged purpose of the Proclamation—controlling immigration from countries with deficient information-sharing practices—is already addressed by the current immigration system. “As the law stands, a visa applicant bears the burden of showing that the applicant is eligible to receive a visa,” and “[t]he Government already can exclude individuals who do not meet that burden.” Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1361). The Proclamation, like EO-2, offers no “reason explaining how this individualized adjudication process is flawed.” Id. If the information necessary to determine whether a particular visa applicant is a terrorist or criminal is unavailable due to deficiencies in information gathering or sharing, then he or she can be denied entry by immigration officers. The Proclamation itself offers no evidence that consular officers have inappropriately approved visas for nationals from banned countries without sufficient information to assess the risks they may pose.4 To the contrary, the evidence shows that four out of ten visa applications from those countries already are denied. (Ex. 7 at 9– 10.)\nIn any event, a categorical ban based on nationality would not accomplish the Proclamation’s supposed goal of addressing “terrorism-related” risks. The Department of Homeland Security itself has determined that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable\n4 Moreover, the law contains robust mechanisms for identifying and excluding aliens who may sympathize with terrorist groups. In particular, the PATRIOT Act provides that those who “endorse[] or espouse[] terrorist activity or persuade[] others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization” can be barred from the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII); see Ex. 8 at 26–27. As part of the visa process, would-be visitors are asked a number of questions aimed at surfacing links to violent behavior or terrorism. (See, e.g., Ex. 9; Ex. 10.) 6\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 8 of 13\nindicator of potential terrorist activity.” (Ex. 11 at 1.) The few foreigners who do commit terrorist acts in the United States do so years after coming to the country, so basing decisions to exclude on nationality is unlikely to identify threats. (Ex. 12 at 2.) Not a single American has died in a terrorist attack in the U.S. at the hand of citizens of Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, or Somalia in the past 40 years. (Ex. 13 at 1.)\nThe Proclamation’s aims are contradicted by its own exceptions. The government’s assertion that “it would be detrimental to the Nation’s interests to allow certain foreign nationals of those countries to enter the United States” because it “lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose,” (Opp. at 2), cannot be squared with the fact that the Proclamation permits foreign nationals from nearly every banned country to enter on a wide variety of nonimmigrant visas—documents for which applicants receive less vetting than immigrant visas. (See Proclamation § 2(a)–(c), (g)–(h).) There is no good faith explanation for why it would be detrimental to the national interest to admit aliens as business travelers or tourists but not as students, crewmembers, or exchange visitors. Rather, the facially inconsistent and contradictory terms of the Proclamation reveal that its true purpose, like the earlier versions from which it came to be, is to ban Muslims based on their religious faith. II. The Harm Suffered By Plaintiffs Cannot Be Squared With The Proclamation’s\nAlleged Rationale. The real and immediate harms that will be suffered by Plaintiffs in this case alone—not to mention countless others who face similar circumstances—demonstrate that the Proclamation’s consequences are wholly unconnected from its supposed aims. The Proclamation is substantially overbroad with respect to its asserted rationale. The United States does not need information from a foreign government in order to confirm that an individual who never set foot in that country is not a terrorist, that a six-year old child presents no risk of criminal activity, or\n7\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 9 of 13\nthat a refugee fleeing torture or war should be permitted entry. Nor is it plausible that the banned countries would even have meaningful information about aliens “who left as children” or “whose nationality is based on parentage alone.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 773. The Proclamation’s focus on nationality yields “the paradoxical effect of barring entry by a Syrian national who has lived in Switzerland for decades, but not a Swiss national who has immigrated to Syria during its civil war.” Id.\nIt is precisely that injustice—and others—that the Proclamation will work in this specific case. Plaintiff Sumaya Hamadmad’s sister, Dima, an academic who has been invited to collaborate on her research by Yale University and the University of Florida, will be stranded in Jordan by the Proclamation. (Hamadmad Decl. ¶¶ 3–7.) Dima will be barred from the United States solely because she was born to Syrian parents; she has lived in Jordan her entire life and has never visited Syria. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 8.) While the Proclamation cites the conditions in Syria as the exclusive rationale for banning travel by Syrian nationals, it ensnares Dima—and others like her—simply because of her heritage. The government attempts to justify this outcome by asserting that the risks purportedly addressed by the Proclamation—information-sharing and identity-management-protocols—“apply regardless of the degree of a foreign national’s connection to his or her country of citizenship.” (Opp. at 25.) But there is no information about Dima in Syria to manage, since she has lived her entire life in Jordan. Dima is not required by current immigration law to supply any information from the Syrian government in order to visit the United States. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Ex. 14.) The Proclamation would permit Dima to enter the United States if her countries of ancestry and residence were reversed: a Jordanian citizen who immigrated to Syria during the civil war would not be denied entry into the United States by the Proclamation.\n8\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 10 of 13\nThe Proclamation also would indefinitely separate Plaintiff Jane Doe #3 from her fiancé, who has not been to Somalia in nearly a decade. (Jane Doe #3 Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6.) Jane Doe #3’s fiancé has lived in Malaysia for the past nine years, where he is studying to obtain his Master’s degree in finance. (Id. ¶ 3.) The Proclamation justifies this outcome by contending that there is a “persistent terrorist threat . . . emanat[ing] from Somalia’s territory,” and that Somalia does not sufficiently prevent “terrorist groups [from] plan[ning] and mount[ing] attacks from its territory.” (Proclamation § 2(h)(i).) The Proclamation is silent, because there is nothing to say, as to why its effect should be to exclude a graduate student in Malaysia.\nPlaintiff Eblal Zakzok similarly suffers the Proclamation’s arbitrary consequences. After the Syrian regime subjected Dr. Zakzok to detention and torture, he fled to Turkey and subsequently sought and was granted asylum in the United States. (Zakzok Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9– 11.) Only his eldest daughter—who happened to be older than 21 when Dr. Zakzok sought asylum—was not eligible for the derivative asylum benefits that his wife and four other children obtained. (Id. ¶¶ 12–14.) Her immigration application remains pending. (Id. ¶ 14.) Although she has not been to Syria in over three years and fled Syria on account of the regime’s threat to her family, the Proclamation will ban Dr. Zakzok’s daughter from the United States indefinitely, apparently on the basis of the same connection to Syria shared by the rest of her family—each of whom the United States already saw fit to approve for permanent legal residency in the United States.\nCONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the plaintiffs’ opening briefs, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction should be granted.\n9\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 11 of 13\n\nDated: October 14, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Charles E. Davidow Charles E. Davidow (Bar # 06516)\nPAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006-1047 Tel.: (202) 223-7300 Fax: (202) 223-7420 cdavidow@paulweiss.com\nRobert A. Atkins† Liza Velazquez† Andrew J. Ehrlich† Steven C. Herzog†\nPAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 (212) 373-3000 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\nLena F. Masri† Gadeir Abbas†\nCouncil on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lfmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nFaiza Patel† Michael Price†\nBrennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335\n10\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 12 of 13 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\nJethro Eisenstein† Profeta & Eisenstein 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\nCounsel for Plaintiffs †Admitted Pro Hac Vice\n11\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 33 Filed 10/14/17 Page 13 of 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on October 14, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which will serve all counsel of record. Dated: October 14, 2017 PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP By: /s/ Charles Davidow Charles E. Davidow (Bar # 06516) PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 2001 K Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20006-1047 (202) 223-7300\n12\n\n\f", "Case 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 37 Filed 10/17/17 Page 1 of 3\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\nPlaintiffs, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants.\n\nCivil Action No. TDC-17-0361\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK CHAPTER, et al.,\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,\nDefendants.\n\nCivil Action No. TDC-17-2921\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, etal., Defendants.\n\nCivil Action No. TDC-17-2969\n\nORDER For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this civil action and have established that they are likely\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 37 Filed 10/17/17 Page 2 of 3\nto succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, and that the balance of the equities and the public interest favor an injunction.\nAccordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs' Motions for a Preliminary Injunction, TDC-17-0361 ECF No. 205,\nTDC-17-2921 ECF No. 26, TDC-17-2969 ECF No.2, are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 2. The Motions are GRANTED as to Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 (\"Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats\"). All Defendants with the exception of the President of the United States; all officers, agents, and employees of the Executive Branch of the United States government; and anyone acting under their authorization or direction, are ENJOINED from enforcing Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 except with regard to: a. Sections 2(d) and 2(f) of the Proclamation; b. Individuals lacking a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a\nperson or entity in the United States, as dermed in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion. 3. This Preliminary Injunction is granted on a nationwide basis and prohibits the enforcement of Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 in all places, including the United States, at all United States borders and ports of entry, and in the issuance of visas, with the above exceptions, pending further orders from this Court.\n2\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 37 Filed 10/17/17 Page 3 of 3\n4. The Motion is DENIED as to the President of the United States and as to all other provisions of Presidential Proclamation 9645.\n5. Plaintiffs are not required to pay a security deposit. 6. The Court declines to stay this ruling or hold it in abeyance should an emergency\nappeal of this Order be filed.\n\nDate: October 17,2017\n\nTHEODORED. CH United States Distri\n\n3\n\n\f", "FILED: October 20, 2017\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n___________________\nNo. 17-2231 (L) (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ___________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nand\nALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO\nPlaintiffs\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence\nDefendants - Appellants\n\n\f___________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ___________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customes and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States\nDefendants - Appellants\n___________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ___________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States;\n\n\fUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, In her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, In his official capacity as Secretary of State\nDefendants - Appellants\n___________________\nO R D E R ___________________ The court consolidates Case No. 17-2231(L) with Case No. 17-2232 and\nCase No. 17-2233. Entry of appearance forms and disclosure statements filed by\ncounsel and parties to the lead case are deemed filed in the secondary case.\nFor the Court--By Direction\n/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233 (Consolidated)\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES # 1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself\nand its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE DUKE in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State;\nDANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2231 (L) (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\n\nMOTION OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS FOR AN EMERGENCY STAY PENDING EXPEDITED APPEAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAY\n\nNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\n\nCHAD A. READLER\nActing Assistant Attorney General STEPHEN M. SCHENNING\nActing United States Attorney HASHIM M. MOOPPAN\nDeputy Assistant Attorney General DOUGLAS N. LETTER SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff\nCivil Division, Room 7241\nU.S. Department of Justice\n950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW\nWashington, DC 20530\n(202) 353-2689\n\n\fIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE #6, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official\ncapacity as Acting Commission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON;\nJEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC)\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\nELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC)\n\n\fINTRODUCTION The district court enjoined worldwide a Proclamation issued by the President of the United States pursuant to his broad constitutional and statutory authority to suspend or restrict the entry of aliens abroad when he deems it in the Nation’s interest. The Proclamation—“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017)—was issued after a global review by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State of foreign governments’ information-sharing practices and risk factors, culminating in a recommendation that the President restrict entry of certain nationals of eight countries that have inadequate practices or otherwise present heightened risks. The Proclamation imposes country-specific restrictions that, in the President’s judgment, would most effectively “encourage cooperation” in information sharing and “protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id. at 45,164. The district court nevertheless ruled that, despite this thorough review process and tailored substantive measures, the Proclamation is motivated by religious animus and constitutes nationality discrimination under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). That ruling threatens the ability of this and future Presidents to address national security threats. It is also wrong: the alleged flaws in the prior entry suspension do not apply to the Proclamation, which was issued after a worldwide, religion-neutral review by\n\n\fmultiple Cabinet officials whose good faith has never been questioned, and which imposes only tailored restrictions on Muslim-majority as well as non-Muslim majority nations. The district court’s conclusion that this is insufficient to refute religious discrimination threatens to disable the President permanently from addressing immigration-related national-security risks in countries that pose the greatest concern. Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibit the President from imposing nationality-specific restrictions on entry to the United States, as past Presidents have also done. In any event, plaintiffs’ challenge to the exclusion of aliens abroad is not justiciable.\nThe remaining stay factors support staying the injunction pending expedited appeal. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The balance of harms tips sharply in favor of a stay: Barring effectuation of the President’s judgment that restricting entry for certain nationals of eight countries is warranted to protect the Nation’s safety threatens the interests of the government and the public (which merge, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). By contrast, plaintiffs have not identified any cognizable and irreparable injury that they personally would incur if the restrictions on entry take effect, especially during the brief period of an expedited appeal. Nor do the equities support the district court’s worldwide injunction. This Court should stay the injunction pending final disposition of the appeal of its validity and scope, and grant an administrative stay until it rules on this request.\n\n\fBACKGROUND 1. On March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017) (“EO-2”). EO-2 directed the Secretary of DHS to conduct a global review of whether foreign governments provide adequate information about their nationals seeking U.S. visas. EO-2 § 2(a). EO-2 directed the Secretary to report findings to the President, after which nations identified as deficient would be encouraged to alter their practices, prior to the Secretary recommending appropriate entry restrictions on any nations that remained inadequate or presented other special circumstances. Id. § 2(d)-(f). During that review, EO-2 temporarily suspended the entry of foreign nationals from six countries that had been identified by Congress or the Executive as presenting terrorism-related concerns. See id. § 2(c). The district court below, and another district court, preliminarily enjoined that entry suspension, IRAP v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017), and were affirmed in relevant part, IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and partially stayed the injunctions pending review, Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). After EO-2’s entry suspension expired, the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s ruling as moot. Trump v. IRAP, 2017 WL 4518553.\n\n\f2. On September 24, 2017, the President issued the Proclamation, which is the product of a comprehensive review of vetting and screening procedures. First, the Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, identified the information needed from foreign governments to enable the United States to make informed decisions about foreign nationals applying for visas. Procl. § 1(c). DHS, in coordination with the Department of State, collected data on, and evaluated, nearly 200 countries, and identified each country’s information-sharing practices and risk factors. Id. § 1(d). The Department of State engaged with foreign governments to encourage them to improve their performance, which yielded significant gains. Id. § 1(f). The Secretary of DHS then recommended that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from eight countries; after further Executive Branch consultation, the President acted in accordance with that recommendation. Id. § 1(h), (i).\nFor countries that refuse to cooperate regularly with the United States (Iran, North Korea, and Syria), the Proclamation suspends entry of all nationals, except for Iranian nationals seeking non-immigrant student (F and M) and exchange-visitor (J) visas. Procl. §§ 2(b)(ii), (d)(ii), (e)(ii). For countries that are valuable counterterrorism partners but have information-sharing deficiencies (Chad, Libya, and Yemen), the Proclamation suspends entry only of nationals seeking immigrant visas and non-immigrant business, tourist, and business/tourist (B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2) visas.\n\n\fId. §§ 2(a)(ii), (c)(ii), (g)(ii). For Somalia, which has significant identitymanagement deficiencies and is unable to effectively control all of its territory, the Proclamation suspends entry of nationals seeking immigrant visas and requires additional scrutiny of nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas. Id. § 2(h)(ii). And for Venezuela, which refuses to cooperate in information-sharing but for which alternative means of obtaining information are available, the Proclamation suspends entry of government officials “involved in screening and vetting procedures,” and “their immediate family members,” on nonimmigrant business or tourist visas. Id. § 2(f)(ii). The Proclamation provides for case-by-case waivers, id. § 3(c), and ongoing review to determine whether restrictions should remain in place. Id. § 4.\n3. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of Section 2’s restrictions against any alien with a bona fide relationship to a U.S. person or entity, except nationals of Venezuela and North Korea. Order. Although agreeing with the government that the Proclamation falls within the President’s broad authority to restrict the entry of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), the district court concluded that the entry restrictions likely violate the Establishment Clause, and that the immigrant entry restrictions likely violate 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)’s ban on nationality discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. Opinion 52-85, 42-48.\n\n\fARGUMENT I. The Balance Of Harms Weighs Strongly In Favor Of A Stay\nA. The District Court’s Injunction Imposes Serious, Irreparable Harm On The Government And The Public\n1. The district court’s injunction barring enforcement of the Proclamation’s entry restrictions undermines the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to safeguard the Nation’s security and intrudes on the political branches’ constitutional prerogatives. “[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981), and “the Government’s interest in combatting terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order,” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) . The President’s defense of these interests warrants the utmost deference, particularly where, as here, he acts based on a “[p]redictive judgment” regarding specific national-security risks. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988); see HLP, 561 U.S. at 33-35.\nThe injunction also causes irreparable injury by invalidating an action taken at the height of the President’s authority. “[T]he President has unique responsibility” over “foreign and military affairs.” Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993). Rules “concerning the admissibility of aliens” also “implement[] an inherent executive power.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). And because “the President act[ed] pursuant to an express * \n\n\fauthorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84 (2015).\nThe district court’s injunction overriding the President’s judgment thus necessarily imposes irreparable harm. Even a single State “suffers a form of irreparable injury” “[a]ny time [it] is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); see, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 2002). A fortiori, this injunction imposes irreparable injury on the President and the public given “the singular importance of [his] duties” to the entire Nation. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982).\nB. A Brief Stay Pending Expedited Appeal Would Not Impose Any Substantial Harm On Plaintiffs\nPlaintiffs, by contrast, would suffer no cognizable harm, much less irreparable injury, from a stay. The only concrete, cognizable harm plaintiffs allege is that the Proclamation will prevent family members from entering the United States. But delay in entry alone does not amount to irreparable harm, particularly for the brief period while the Court considers the appeal on the merits. Moreover, visa processing times vary widely, and until the aliens abroad meet otherwise-applicable visa requirements and seek and are denied a waiver, they have not received final agency\n\n\faction, and plaintiffs’ claimed harms are too “remote” and “speculative” to merit injunctive relief. Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1992). II. The Government Is Likely To Prevail On The Merits\nA. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable 1. It is a bedrock separation-of-powers principle that “the power to exclude or expel aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). “[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.” Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543. Courts have distilled from this deeply rooted principle of nonreviewability the rule that the denial or revocation of a visa for an alien abroad “is not subject to judicial review * * unless Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Congress has not provided for judicial review of decisions to exclude aliens abroad, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 236(f ), and has forbidden “judicial review” of visa revocations (subject to a narrow exception inapplicable to aliens abroad), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). Furthermore, the conclusion is “unmistakable” from history that “the immigration laws ‘preclude judicial review’ of []consular visa decisions.” Saavedra\n\n\fBruno, 197 F.3d at 1160. The lone time the Supreme Court held that certain aliens (only those physically present in the United States) could seek review of exclusion orders under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Congress abrogated the ruling and limited those aliens to the habeas remedy. See id. at 1157-62. Because even an alien present in the United States cannot invoke the APA to obtain review, a fortiori neither can aliens abroad nor U.S. citizens acting at their behest. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), 702(1).\nIn holding to the contrary, the district court invoked Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). Opinion 38-39. As the D.C. Circuit subsequently recognized in Saavedra Bruno, however, Abourezk “rested in large measure” on an INA provision that was subsequently amended to “make[] clear that district courts do not have general jurisdiction over claims arising under the immigration laws and that their jurisdiction extends only to actions brought by the government.” 197 F.3d at 1164.1\nThe district court also stated that the principle of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens applies only to a challenge to “individual visa decisions by consular officers,” not to a Presidential proclamation restricting entry of nationals from eight countries. Opinion 36-37. Although the principle is applied most\n1 The district court also invoked Sale, supra, but the Supreme Court there rejected plaintiffs’ claims on the merits without addressing reviewability.\n\n\ffrequently to challenges to decisions by consular officers adjudicating visa applications, it makes no sense to limit review in that context while permitting review of the President’s decision to restrict entry of classes of aliens. Consular nonreviewability is grounded in the “firmly established principle” that the power to exclude aliens is “inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country,” and to “be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1158-59. Those considerations apply with greater force to broad policy decisions made by the President as compared to individualized decisions by a consular official. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 584-91 (1952) (relying on these considerations in rejecting broad challenges to immigration statute).\n2. Although Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review of Executive decisions to exclude aliens abroad, it has not “clear[ly]” “preclude[d] judicial review” for persons asserting violations of their own constitutional rights. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988). The exclusion of aliens typically raises no constitutional questions because aliens abroad lack any constitutional rights regarding entry. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. However, the Supreme Court has twice engaged in limited judicial review when a U.S. citizen contended that the denial of a visa to an alien abroad violated the citizen’s own constitutional rights. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (alleged First Amendment right to\n\n\freceive information); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (alleged due process right to reunite with spouse).\nBut plaintiffs here lack standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to the exclusion of aliens abroad. Putting aside that plaintiffs have identified no visa application that has yet been denied based on the Proclamation, plaintiffs’ claimed injury resulting from the exclusion of aliens is not cognizable because it does not stem from an alleged infringement of their own constitutional rights.\nIn McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Supreme Court held that individuals who are indirectly injured by alleged religious discrimination against others generally may not sue, because they have not suffered violations of their own rights. Id. at 429-30. The plaintiffs, employees of a store subject to a Sunday-closing law, lacked standing to challenge the law on free-exercise grounds because they “d[id] not allege any infringement of their own religious freedoms,” id. at 429, and had standing for an Establishment Clause challenge only because they suffered “direct * * * injury, allegedly due to the [law’s] imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian religion,” id. at 430-31. Here, plaintiffs are not directly subject to the Proclamation and thus are not asserting violations of their own constitutional rights. They instead allege indirect injuries from the Proclamation’s application to others— the individual plaintiffs’ family members and the organizational plaintiffs’ clients— who themselves have no constitutional rights. Contrary to the district court’s\n\n\fconclusion, Opinion 32, plaintiffs’ alleged third-party injuries are insufficient to invoke the limited review for first-party constitutional claims afforded in Mandel and Din.\nThe district court also reasoned that the Proclamation injures plaintiffs by sending a message of “hostility to Muslims.” Opinion 33. This “message” injury is not cognizable either; the Supreme Court has “ma[de] clear” that “the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial [or other invidious] discrimination * * * accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). The same rule applies to Establishment Clause claims. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982). To be sure, a plaintiff may suffer a cognizable injury where he himself has been “subjected to unwelcome religious exercises” or “forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.” Id. at 486-487 n.22. But the Proclamation says nothing about religion and does not subject plaintiffs to any religious exercise.\nThe D.C. Circuit correctly has rejected the notion that a putative Establishment Clause plaintiff may “re-characterize[]” an abstract injury flowing from “government action” directed against others as a personal injury from “a governmental message [concerning] religion” directed at the plaintiff. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J.), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167\n\n\f(2009). Permitting that approach would “eviscerate well-settled standing limitations” in cases like Valley Forge. Id.\nIn its now-vacated ruling addressing EO-2, this Court relied on the combination of EO-2’s purported message and its adverse effect on one plaintiff in delaying the entry of his spouse to find standing. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 583-86 & n.11. That reasoning, however, erroneously conflated the question whether an individual has suffered an injury-in-fact from an alleged Establishment Clause violation with the question whether the violation was of the individual’s own Establishment Clause rights. Under the Supreme Court’s decisions, a plaintiff must allege a violation of his own constitutional rights to invoke the limited review afforded by Mandel. Because plaintiffs have not done so, their constitutional claims are not reviewable.\nB. The Proclamation Does Not Violate 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) or the Establishment Clause\nThe government is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal because the district court erred in holding that the Proclamation’s entry-restrictions likely contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) and the Establishment Clause.\n1. The President’s Proclamation was issued pursuant to his inherent Article II authority to exclude aliens, see Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543, and his broad statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). Section 1182(f) authorizes the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or\n\n\fnonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate,” whenever he finds that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Section 1185(a) similarly authorizes the President to restrict the entry of aliens into the United States, or to set “such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders,” and “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” By their plain terms, these provisions confirm the expansive discretion afforded to the President to restrict entry of aliens. See Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2; Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1117-1118 & n.13 (1st Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has deemed it “perfectly clear that [Section] 1182(f ) * * * grants the President ample power to establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 187.\nHistorical practice likewise confirms the breadth of, and deference owed to, the President’s exercise of authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). For decades, Presidents have restricted entry pursuant to those statutes based on nationality. See Opinion 45-46 (discussing President Carter’s 1979 exclusion of Iranians in response to the Iran Hostage Crisis and President Reagan’s 1986 decision to bar entry to Cuban nationals in retaliation for Cuba’s suspension of an immigration agreement and facilitation of illegal migration to the United States). Courts found no impediment to upholding these actions. See, e.g., Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1982); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th\n\n\fCir. 1980). Here, the President acted within his authority under Sections 1182(f) and\n1185(a) by restricting the entry of aliens from eight countries that share information inadequately or present other risk factors, both to improve information-sharing and to protect against the risks of insufficient information until such improvements occur.\n2. The district court nevertheless held that the entry restrictions violate 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality in the “issuance of an immigrant visa.” But as the district court itself previously (and correctly) recognized, “barring entry to the United States based on nationality pursuant to the President's authority under § 1182(f) does not appear to run afoul of the provision in § 1152(a) barring discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas.” IRAP, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 554 (emphasis added). Rather than reading Section 1152(a) to conflict with Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a), the provisions should be read in harmony, Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976). The statutory provisions operate in different spheres: Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) limit the universe of individuals eligible to receive visas, and Section 1152(a) prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality within that universe of eligible individuals. Reading them to conflict would render invalid prior proclamations by President Reagan and President Carter.\n\n\fHarmonizing the statutes is particularly appropriate where the President is imposing restrictions on the entry of aliens to influence foreign governments’ behavior. As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in Hawaii, the President may permissibly distinguish among “classes of aliens on the basis of nationality” when warranted “as retaliatory diplomatic measures responsive to government conduct directed at the United States.” 859 F.3d at 772 n.13. This Court has upheld nationality-based restrictions in similar circumstances. See Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981). Construing Section 1152(a)(1) to disable the President from taking action against the nationals of a foreign state for foreign affairs or nationality-security reasons would also raise serious constitutional concerns.\nThe district court itself acknowledged that Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) empower the President to deny entry based on nationality, Opinion 58-60, and further that such denial is permissible in some circumstances notwithstanding Section 1152(a)(1). Opinion 45. It distinguished past Presidential actions on the ground that they were of “limited duration, such as during a specific urgent national crisis or public health emergency.” Opinion 45-46 (discussing President Reagan’s Cuban entry restriction and President Carter’s Iranian entry restriction). That distinction, however, has no textual basis in Section 1152(a). Nor is it supported by the underlying facts; if anything, those prior suspensions were more indefinite in scope than the Proclamation. President Reagan directed that the suspension of entry\n\n\fof Cuban immigrants under Section 1182(f) “shall remain in effect until the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, determines that normal migration procedures with Cuba have been restored.” 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470, 30,471 (Aug. 22, 1986). Although President Carter’s Order in response to the Iranian hostage crisis did not itself deny or revoke visas, he explained upon its issuance that the State Department would “invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens” and would not reissue visas or issue new visas “except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires.” Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against Iran: Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33233; see also See 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (Nov. 26, 1979). The Proclamation, by contrast, requires periodic review of the continuing need for the restrictions and establishes a process for recommending that they be terminated if the countries “have improved their identity-management and information-sharing protocols and procedures” or the interests of the United States no longer require the suspensions and restrictions on entry. Procl. § 4.\n3. The district court also erred in holding that the Proclamation’s entry restrictions violate the Establishment Clause. The Proclamation is constitutional regardless of whether the Court applies Mandel’s limited standard of review that there need only be a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for excluding aliens abroad, 408 U.S. at 770, or the primary “secular purpose” standard applicable in the\n\n\fdomestic context under Establishment Clause precedent, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). Both the process by which the Proclamation was issued, and its substance, foreclose any suggestion that it was the product of bad faith or religious animus.\nThe Proclamation is the result of a months-long worldwide review and process of diplomatic engagement combining the efforts of multiple government agencies and recommendations from the Secretary of DHS to the President regarding whether and what entry restrictions were necessary to address the inadequacies identified and to encourage countries to cooperate with the United States to address those inadequacies. The President acted in accordance with these recommendations. Neither plaintiffs nor the district court have even suggested, let alone demonstrated, that the Cabinet secretaries and numerous other government officials involved in the review process that culminated in those recommendations were acting in bad faith or harbored anti-Muslim animus.\nFurthermore, the Proclamation neither mentions nor draws any distinction based on religion, and its “operation,” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993), confirms that it is religion-neutral. The Proclamation establishes entry restrictions that are tailored to the particular information-sharing deficiencies and terrorism risks in each nation. Of the seven countries from which EO-2 and its predecessor suspended entry, the Proclamation\n\n\fomits two Muslim-majority countries (Sudan and Iraq). The President concluded that Sudan met the Secretary of DHS’s baseline and that, although Iraq fell below the baseline, entry restrictions were not warranted in light of “the close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).” Procl. § 1(g). The Proclamation added entry restrictions for three new countries, two of which are non-Muslim-majority (Venezuela and North Korea) and the third of which has an approximately 48% non-Muslim population (Chad). See CIA, The World Factbook: Africa: Chad, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html. The five other Muslim-majority countries included were all previously identified by Congress or the Executive Branch as posing terrorism-related concerns. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12).\nMoreover, the Proclamation tailors the entry restrictions to the particular country, allowing students and exchange visitors from Iran, while restricting only business and tourist non-immigrant entry for nationals of Libya, Yemen, and Chad, and imposing no exclusions on non-immigrant entry for Somali nationals. This particular selection of countries and restrictions is nonsensical as a supposed “Muslim ban,” but is readily explicable as a tailored means of encouraging\n\n\findividual countries to improve inadequate information-sharing and of protecting against security risks in the interim.\nThe district court nevertheless reasoned that the process preceding the Proclamation could not “cure[] any taint from EO-2” because “the outcome of the DHS Review was at least partially pre-ordained.” Opinion 76. That conclusion is fundamentally at odds with EO-2’s provisions governing that review, which direct the Secretary of DHS to establish the criteria by which to identify “whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country,” EO-2 § 2(a) (emphasis added), and to provide a list of any “countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested,” id. § 2(e) (emphasis added). Nothing in those provisions cabined the independent judgment of the Secretary of DHS—whose good-faith has never been called into question—in deciding whether and which countries to recommend for appropriate entry restrictions.\nThe district court also inferred anti-Muslim bias because the Proclamation supposedly treats countries with similar deficiencies differently, in a manner that is asserted to have “a disproportionate impact on majority-Muslim nations” and to manifest animus rather than “flow from the objective factors considered in the review.” Opinion 78. But the seemingly different treatment is instead explained by\n\n\fdifferent circumstances, as outlined in the Proclamation. For example, although Somalia generally satisfies the information-sharing baseline, it not only “has significant identity-management deficiencies” but “stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory.” Procl. § 2(h). Likewise, although Venezuela’s “government is uncooperative in verifying whether its citizens pose national security or public-safety threats,” it “has adopted many of the baseline standards identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security” and the United States has “alternative sources for obtaining information to verify the citizenship and identify of nationals from Venezuela.” Id. § 2(f). These country-specific differences, rather than animus, are the self-evident basis for the differing treatment.\nThe district court also stated that the country-based entry restrictions in the Proclamation are “unprecedented,” distinguishing prior country-based entry bans on the basis that they applied to “a single nation” “in response to a specific diplomatic dispute.” Opinion 79. But the President determined that each of the eight countries presented specific risks requiring nationality-based entry restrictions, just as the Iran and Cuba restrictions were the result of specific problems relating to those countries. The fact that particular countries refuse to share adequate information to enable consular officials to discover if their nationals justifies nationality-based restrictions that are commensurate with the problem.\n\n\fFinally, the district court held that the President’s prior campaign statements bear on the Proclamation because the President has never repudiated them. Opinion 81. But neither McCreary nor the other cases relied on by the district court hold that religiously neutral government action must remain subject to the taint of prior conduct or statements absent an affirmative statement of disavowal. To the contrary, in McGowan, the Supreme Court held that a Sunday closing law’s secular exemptions were sufficient to prove that the law no longer was motivated by its traditional religious purpose of observing the Sabbath, even though the law still contained expressly religious references. 366 U.S. at 445. Here, the process of review and recommendation by government officials whose motives have never been questioned, and the limited restrictions and express exclusions for Muslimmajority nations, make clear that the Proclamation implements a good-faith, secular national-security objective. Yet under the district court’s approach, until the President issues a disavowal of sufficient (and unknowable) sincerity and force, he is unable to regulate immigration from Muslim-majority countries despite known and identified risks to our national security. That is not, and should not be, the law.\nC. The Global Injunction Is Improper At a minimum, the district court erred because Article III and equitable principles require that the injunction be limited to redressing plaintiffs’ own cognizable, irreparable injuries. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996); Madsen\n\n\fv. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). The global injunction is overbroad, notwithstanding the district court’s exclusion of “[i]ndividuals lacking a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Order 2. Although the Supreme Court so narrowed the injunctions against EO-2, see Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088-89, the Court did not conclude that similar relief was required in all circumstances, and carefully tailored its stay to the equities in the case. This case is very different for the reasons described, and the equitable balancing requires following the ordinary rule of plaintiff-specific relief.\nCONCLUSION For these reasons, defendants respectfully request that, pending final disposition of the appeal, this Court stay the preliminary injunction, in whole or at least as to all aliens except those identified aliens whose exclusion would impose a cognizable, irreparable injury on plaintiffs. In addition, defendants respectfully request that, pending a ruling on a stay pending appeal, the Court grant an immediate administrative stay.\n\n\fNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\nOCTOBER 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nCHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nDOUGLAS N. LETTER /s/ Sharon Swingle SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLAINCE I hereby certify that this motion complies with the type-face requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(2)(A). This motion contains 5,196 words, excluding the parts of the motion excluded by Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(2) and 32(f).\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 20, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing motion with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\f", "FILED: October 23, 2017\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n___________________\nNo. 17-2231 (L) (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ___________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nand\nALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO\nPlaintiffs\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence\nDefendants - Appellants\n\n\f___________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ___________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customes and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States\nDefendants - Appellants\n___________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ___________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States;\n\n\fUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, In her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, In his official capacity as Secretary of State\nDefendants - Appellants\n___________________\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ___________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients\nPlaintiffs - Appellants\nand\nPAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO\nPlaintiffs v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence\nDefendants - Appellees\n\n\f___________________ O R D E R\n___________________ The court consolidates Case No. 17-2231(L) and Case No. 17-2240 as cross appeals. The appellants in Case No. 17-2231(L) shall be considered the appellants for purposes of the consolidated appeals and shall proceed first at briefing and at oral argument. Entry of appearance forms and disclosure statements filed by counsel and parties to the lead case are deemed filed in the secondary case.\nFor the Court--By Direction /s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 1 of 37\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L); 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nIn the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\n\nInternational Refugee Assistance Project, a Project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; HIAS, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; John Does #1 & 3; Jane Doe #2; Middle East Studies Ass’n of North America, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Members; Muhammed Meteab; Paul Harrison; Ibrahim Ahmed Mohomed; Arab American Ass’n of New York, on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees, and Allan Hakky; Samaneh Takaloo, v. Plaintiffs, Donald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; U.S. Dep’t of State; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Elaine C. Duke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; Rex Tillerson, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State; Daniel R. Coats, in His Official Capacity as Director of National Intelligence,\nDefendants-Appellants (cont’d)\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\n\nBRIEF FOR THE STATES OF TEXAS, ALABAMA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND WEST VIRGINIA AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF A STAY PENDING APPEAL\n\nKen Paxton Attorney General of Texas\n\nScott A. Keller Solicitor General\n\nJeffrey C. Mateer First Assistant Attorney General\n\nJ. Campbell Barker Deputy Solicitor General\n\nOffice of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-2697 scott.keller@oag.texas.gov\n\nAri Cuenin Assistant Solicitor General\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 2 of 37\n\nNo. 17-2232 Iranian Alliances Across Borders; Jane Doe #1; Jane Doe #2;\nJane Doe #3; Jane Doe #4; Jane Doe #5; Jane Doe #6, v. Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nDonald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; Elaine C. Duke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of\nHomeland Security; Kevin K. McAleenan, in His Official Capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; James\nMcCament, in His Official Capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; Rex Tillerson;\nJefferson B. Sessions III, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants-Appellants\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\nNo. 17-2233 Eblal Zakzok; Sumaya Hamadmad; Fahed Muqbil; John Doe #1;\nJohn Doe #2; John Doe #3, v. Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nDonald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; U.S. Dep’t of State; Elaine C.\nDuke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; Rex Tillerson, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State,\nDefendants-Appellants (cont’d)\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 3 of 37\n\nNo. 17-2240 International Refugee Assistance Project, a Project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; HIAS, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; John Does #1 & 3; Jane Doe #2; Middle East Studies Ass’n of North America, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Members; Muhammed Meteab; Arab American Ass’n of New York, on\nBehalf of Itself and Its Clients, Plaintiffs-Appellants,\nand Paul Harrison; Ibrahim Ahmed Mohomed; Allan Hakky;\nSamaneh Takaloo, v. Plaintiffs,\nDonald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; Dep’t of State; Office of the\nDirector of National Intelligence, Elaine C. Duke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; Rex Tillerson, in\nHis Official Capacity as Secretary of State; Daniel R. Coats, in His Official Capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants-Appellees.\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 4 of 37\n\nTable of Contents\n\nPage(s)\n\nInterest of amici curiae............................................................................................. 1\nSummary of the argument........................................................................................ 2\nArgument ................................................................................................................. 5\nI. Plaintiffs cannot overcome the exacting standard that applies to discriminatory-purpose challenges to facially neutral government actions. ....................................................................................................... 5\nA. An exacting standard insulates government action from being deemed a discriminatory pretext absent clear proof overcoming the presumptions of constitutionality and good faith. ..................................................................................................... 6\nB. There is nothing close to clear proof that the Proclamation here, which classifies aliens by nationality and reflects national-security concerns, is a pretext for a religious test. .................. 9\nII. The Proclamation complies with the INA, so it also receives “the strongest of presumptions” of validity because it is within Youngstown’s first category as executive action pursuant to power delegated expressly by Congress................................................................11\nIII. The constitutional provisions invoked by plaintiffs do not extend extraterritorially, nonresident aliens abroad possess no constitutional rights regarding entry into this country, and the Proclamation provides all process that could possibly be due....................19\nConclusion ............................................................................................................. 26\nCertificate of service .............................................................................................. 27\nCertificate of compliance ....................................................................................... 28\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 5 of 37\n\nTable of Authorities\n\nPage(s)\n\nCases\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ..........................................................................16\nAm. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) ............................................................................................ 22\nArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)........................................................................................ 1, 17\nAzizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1990)............................................................................. 22\nBoumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) .................................................................................6, 10, 20\nCity of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) ............................................................................................. 7\nCrosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) ...........................................................................................17\nDames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) .......................................................................................11, 17\nDe Avilia v. Civiletti, 643 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) .............................................................................. 22\nDemore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) .......................................................................................... 23\nFlemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)............................................................................................. 8\nFletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810) .......................................................................................... 7, 8\nHaitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987)......................................................................13, 20\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) .......................................................................................... 10\nHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)............................................................................................... 14\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 6 of 37\n\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)...............................................................15\nJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) ........................................................................................... 20\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) ..................................................................................18, 25\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)..................................................................................... passim\nKnoetze v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 634 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1981).............................................................................. 23\nLamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991)............................................................................... 21\nLandon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)..................................................................................19, 23, 24\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997).......................................................................... 22\nLouhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2017) .................................................................. 22\nMathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. (1976) ............................................................................................. 10-11\nMcCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) ............................................................................................. 7\nMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) ........................................................................................ 2, 8\nMiller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) ............................................................................................. 6\nPers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)........................................................................................ 8, 11\nReno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) .............................................................................6, 10, 13, 14\nRepublican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) ........................................................................................... 11\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 7 of 37\n\nSale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) ............................................................................. 3, 13, 15, 19\nShaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)........................................................................................... 12\nSmith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) .............................................................................................. 8\nSunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350 (1918) ............................................................................................. 6\nSwarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (per curiam) ...................................................................... 22\nTenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).............................................................................................. 8\nTexas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015)...............................................................................17\nTrump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam) ................................................................ 4, 7\nU.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) ......................................................................................... 5, 6\nUnited States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926)................................................................................................. 6\nUnited States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) .......................................................................................... 20\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ........................................................................................... 18\nVill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)......................................................................................... 7, 8\nWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) ............................................................................................ 8\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).......................................22, 23, 24, 25 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 7, 11\nYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ........................................................................................... 20\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 8 of 37\n\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ............................................................................. 3, 11, 12, 17\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)........................................................................................... 20\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) ................................................................................... 17-18\nConstitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules\nU.S. Const. amend. I.....................................................................................3, 20, 21\nU.S. Const. amend. V ...................................................................................... passim\nImmigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq................................ passim § 1101(a)(4)........................................................................................................15 § 1101(a)(13)(A).................................................................................................15 § 1101(a)(15)-(16) .............................................................................................. 14 § 1101(a)(42) ..................................................................................................... 24 § 1151(a)-(b) ...................................................................................................... 14 § 1152(a)(1)(A)............................................................................................. 14, 15 § 1157(a)............................................................................................................ 24 § 1157(a)(3) ....................................................................................................... 21 § 1157 note ........................................................................................................ 21 § 1158 ................................................................................................................ 24 § 1158(a)............................................................................................................ 24 § 1158(a)(1) ....................................................................................................... 24 § 1158(c)(1) ....................................................................................................... 24 § 1181 .................................................................................................................15 § 1181(a)............................................................................................................ 14 § 1181(c)............................................................................................................ 24 § 1182(a) ...................................................................................................... 15, 16 § 1182(f) ...................................................................................................... passim § 1184.................................................................................................................15 § 1185(a)(1) ....................................................................................................... 12 § 1187(a)(12) ....................................................................................................... 9 § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)(III) ....................................................................................... 9 § 1201(h)............................................................................................................15 § 1201(h)-(i) ...................................................................................................... 23 § 1201(i) ............................................................................................ 12, 13, 15, 24 § 1231 note ........................................................................................................ 25\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 9 of 37\n\n50 U.S.C. § 1541 note............................................................................................. 10\n22 C.F.R. § 41.122..............................................................................................................15 § 42.82 ...............................................................................................................15\nAuthorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)........................................................... 10\nDepartment of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. K, 129 Stat. 2705 (2015) ............................................ 21\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 .................................................................. 24\nMiscellaneous\nExecutive Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) ....................................................................... 23\nPresidential Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (Oct. 10, 1985) ...................................................................16\nPresidential Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (Aug. 26, 1986) ..................................................................15\nPresidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ........................................................... passim\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 10 of 37\n\nInterest of Amici Curiae\nAmici curiae are the States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and West Virginia.1 The States have a significant interest in protecting their residents’ safety. But the States and their elected officials must generally rely on the federal Executive Branch to restrict or set the terms of aliens’ entry into the States for public-safety and national-security reasons, pursuant to the laws of Congress. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409-10 (2012). And the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) gives the Executive significant authority to suspend aliens’ entry into the country. Amici therefore have a substantial interest in the alleged existence of restrictions on the President’s ability to suspend the entry of aliens as he determines is in the national interest.\n\n1 By separate motion, amici request leave to file this brief, to which appellants/cross-appellees consent and on which appellees/cross-appellants and appellees take no position.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 11 of 37\n\nSummary of the Argument\nThe court below issued yet another remarkable injunction of the President’s Proclamation suspending the entry of specified classes of nonresident aliens. The injunction denies the federal government—under a statutory regime crafted by the people’s representatives in Congress—the latitude necessary to make national-security, foreign-affairs, and immigration-policy judgments inherent in this country’s nature as a sovereign. The injunction is contrary to law because it issued despite multiple longstanding doctrines limiting the availability of judicial remedies for disagreement with policy decisions like the Proclamation here.\nFirst, the injunction cannot be justified by a discriminatory-purpose challenge to the Proclamation based on purported religious animus. The Supreme Court accords facially neutral government actions a presumption of validity and good faith, so those actions can be invalidated under a discriminatory-purpose analysis only if there is clear proof of pretext to overcome these presumptions. This longstanding, exacting standard for judicial scrutiny of government motives has been recognized in multiple types of constitutional challenges. See infra Part I.A. This limit respects institutional roles by precluding “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). And no grounds here satisfy the exacting standards for showing that the Proclamation is pretext masking a religious classification. The Proclamation classifies aliens according to nationality based on concerns about the government’s ability to adequately vet and manage nationals of eight covered countries. That result is the culmination of months of review and input from\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 12 of 37\n\nnumerous federal officials. Not only that, but several countries covered by the Proclamation were previously identified by Congress and the Obama Administration, under the visa-waiver program, as national-security “countries of concern.” The Proclamation is therefore valid, as it provides a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for exercising the President’s 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) national-security and foreign-affairs powers to restrict entry. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).\nSecond, the President had statutory authority to issue the Proclamation. The Proclamation comports with Congress’s scheme granting the President sweeping power, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), to restrict alien entry into the United States. Thus, in addition to the presumptions of constitutionality and good faith, the Proclamation must also be further accorded “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,” because it is in Youngstown’s first zone of executive action pursuant to congressionally delegated power. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).\nThird, the injunction cannot be justified under a procedural-due-process theory turning on whether a nonresident alien abroad has a sufficient connection to the United States. The Constitution does not apply extraterritorially to nonresident aliens abroad seeking entry. So neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Establishment Clause extend to the aliens covered by the Proclamation. Indeed, this Court has specifically recognized that there is no “judicial remedy” to override the Executive’s use of its delegated 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) power to deny classes of nonresident aliens entry into this country. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993).\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 13 of 37\n\nBut even assuming the Constitution applies to nonresident aliens abroad seeking entry, the Proclamation fully complies with any possible due-process requirements. The Proclamation publicly sets forth facially valid, bona fide national-security grounds for restricting entry to classes of nonresident aliens abroad. At a minimum, constitutional rights do not extend extraterritorially to “foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States at all.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (per curiam) (IRAP).\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 14 of 37\n\nArgument I. Plaintiffs Cannot Overcome the Exacting Standard that Applies to\nDiscriminatory-Purpose Challenges to Facially Neutral Government Actions.\nAs the Supreme Court has recognized for years and in many different contexts, a discriminatory-purpose challenge to facially neutral government action faces an exacting standard. The central principle in this well-established body of case law is that a facially neutral government action can be invalidated as pretext only upon a clear showing. See infra pp. 7-8. This high standard for overriding government action by discerning a discriminatory purpose respects the “heavy presumption of constitutionality to which a carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government is entitled.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThat heavy presumption cannot be overcome by plaintiffs’ arguments here, especially given the Proclamation’s detailed national-security findings, the resonance of those findings in determinations of numerous federal officials, and the judicial deference owed to executive decisions in this context. See Presidential Proclamation No. 9645 § 1(c)-(j), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,162-65 (Sept. 24, 2017). Arguments deeming the Proclamation pretext for a religious test discount those weighty considerations, and undermine the sound reasons for the exacting standard required to invalidate facially neutral government action based on an alleged discriminatory purpose.\n\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 15 of 37\n\nA. An exacting standard insulates government action from being deemed a discriminatory pretext absent clear proof overcoming the presumptions of constitutionality and good faith.\nA discriminatory-purpose challenge to facially neutral government action faces an exacting standard under Supreme Court precedent: it requires clear proof of pretext.\n1. This exacting standard for discriminatory-purpose challenges is just one application of the Supreme Court’s general recognition that government action is presumed valid, e.g., Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918); that government actors are presumed to act in good faith, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); and that a “presumption of regularity” attaches to official government action, United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). These doctrines create a “heavy presumption of constitutionality.” Triplett, 494 U.S. at 721.\nAnd this presumption of constitutionality applies with particular force to the foreign-affairs and national-security determinations at issue here. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999) (AADC). After all, “[u]nlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of th[e Supreme] Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008). Indeed, “the Government’s interest in enforcing” the Proclamation’s travel restrictions “and the Executive’s authority to do so” extend from the government’s “interest in preserving national security[, which] is an urgent objective of the highest order,” particularly “when there is no\n\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 16 of 37\n\ntie between the foreign national and the United States.” IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (quotation marks omitted).\n2. Consequently, the Supreme Court “has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, [6 Cranch 87, 130-31 (1810),] that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977); see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court has therefore permitted a discriminatory-purpose analysis of government action in only a “very limited and well-defined class of cases.” City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377 n.6 (1991).\nEven when it has permitted a discriminatory-purpose analysis of government action, this Court has concomitantly stated that any such analysis proceeds under an exacting standard. As Chief Justice Marshall explained for the Supreme Court over two centuries ago in Fletcher, government action can be declared unconstitutional only upon a “clear and strong” showing. 6 Cranch at 128.\nThe Supreme Court has thus repeatedly explained, in various contexts, that courts can override facially neutral government actions as pretext only upon clear proof. For example:\n When there are “legitimate reasons” for government action, courts “will not infer a discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 29899 (1987) (rejecting equal-protection claim).\n\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 17 of 37\n\n A law’s impact does not permit “the inference that the statute is but a pretext” when the classification drawn by a law “has always been neutral” as to a protected status, and the law is “not a law that can plausibly be explained only as a [suspect class]-based classification.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 275 (1979) (rejecting equal-protection claim); see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269-71; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976).\n Only the “clearest proof” will suffice to override the stated intent of government action, to which courts “defer.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (rejecting ex-post-facto claim); see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (citing Fletcher, 6 Cranch at 128).\n “[Unless] an understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts,” judicial inquiry into purpose may make little “practical sense.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 862.\nThis exacting standard for a discriminatory-purpose challenge to facially neutral\ngovernment action exists for good reason. It ensures that a purpose inquiry will re-\nmain judicial in nature, safeguarding against a devolution into policy-based reasoning\nthat elevates views about a perceived lack of policy merit into findings of illicit pur-\npose. Even when an official adopts a different policy after criticism of an earlier pro-\nposal, critics can be quick to perceive an illicit purpose when they disagree with the\nfinal policy issued. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (“In times of\npolitical passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed . . . and as\nreadily believed.”). The clearest-proof standard helps keep the Judiciary above that\npolitical fray.\n\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 18 of 37\n\nB. There is nothing close to clear proof that the Proclamation here, which classifies aliens by nationality and reflects nationalsecurity concerns, is a pretext for a religious test.\nThe Proclamation’s travel restrictions classify aliens by nationality—not religion. The Proclamation’s suspension of entry by certain nationals from eight countries neither mentions any religion nor depends on whether affected aliens are Muslim. See Proclamation No. 9645 §§ 2, 3.\nThe Proclamation therefore is emphatically not a “Muslim ban.” The Proclamation includes two non-majority-Muslim countries (North Korea and Venezuela), and excludes two majority-Muslim countries (Iraq and Sudan) that were covered by the President’s previous entry suspensions. Data from the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project indicates that the countries covered by the Proclamation contain fewer than 9% of the world’s Muslims. Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia are identified as “Countries of Identified Concern,” from which entry is suspended or limited as “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Proclamation pmbl., § 2. Six of these countries were already included in the list of seven countries under 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) was created by Congress and the Obama Administration, in administering the visa-waiver program, upon finding each to be a national-security “country or area of concern.” 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)(III).\nThe manifestly legitimate rationale for suspending entry for certain nationals (see Proclamation §§ 1-2) includes “each country’s capacity, ability, and willingness to cooperate with [U.S.] identity-management and information-sharing policies and\n\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 19 of 37\n\neach country’s risk factors,” and “foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.” Proclamation § 1(h)(i). The proclamation reflects the “country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and that would, at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id.\nMoreover, before the current Administration took office, numerous federal officials—including the FBI Director, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division—expressed concerns about the country’s current ability to vet alien entry. According to the House Homeland Security Committee, ISIS and other terrorists “are determined” to abuse refugee programs, and “groups like ISIS may seek to exploit the current refugee flows.” The national-security interests implicated by the ongoing War on Terror against radical Islamic terrorists have been recognized since the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).\nGiven this national-security grounding, a challenge to the Proclamation as a pretext for religious discrimination must fail. Ample reason exists for courts to leave undisturbed the delicate policy judgments inherent in the Proclamation. These decisions account for sensitive border-security factors indicating a heightened nationalsecurity risk that courts are not well situated to evaluate. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797; AADC, 525 U.S. at 491. When it comes to deciding the best way to use a sovereign’s power over its borders to manage risk, courts have long recognized that the political branches are uniquely well situated. E.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89, 591 (1952).\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 20 of 37\n\nComments the President made during his campaign for office cannot overcome the combination of (1) the Proclamation’s detailed explanation of its national-security basis, (2) the legitimate basis for that reasoning in conclusions of numerous federal officials, see supra p. 10, and (3) the exacting standard for deeming facially neutral government action pretext for a discriminatory purpose, see supra Part I.A. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the limited significance of campaign statements made before candidates assume the responsibilities of office. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002); see also Washington, 858 F.3d at 1172-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). And comments made by nongovernment officials are irrelevant for determining whether the Executive Branch took action as a pretext for a prohibited, discriminatory purpose. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.\nII. The Proclamation Complies with the INA, so It Also Receives “the Strongest of Presumptions” of Validity Because It Is Within Youngstown’s First Category as Executive Action Pursuant to Power Delegated Expressly by Congress.\nThe Proclamation also complies with Congress’s statutory delegation of Executive power, so no purported INA violation would justify the injunction. In fact, the President’s action here is accorded “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981). That is because the Proclamation is within Youngstown’s first zone of executive action: Congress expressly delegated to the President the authority he exercised here. The burden of\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 21 of 37\n\npersuasion for plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges will therefore “rest heavily upon” plaintiffs, as the parties challenging the President’s Youngstown-zone-one action. Id.\nA. The Proclamation suspends the entry into the United States of several classes of aliens comprising certain nationals of eight listed countries, subject to certain exceptions. Proclamation §§ 2, 3, 6. This Proclamation exercises authority that Congress expressly delegated.\n1. “Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). Congress too has recognized this sovereign power to exclude aliens, giving the President broad discretion to suspend the entry of any class of aliens:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (emphases added). It is unlawful for an alien to enter the country in violation of “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” Id. § 1185(a)(1). In addition to the President’s broad § 1182(f) power to suspend the entry of aliens, Congress also provided that the Executive “may at any time, in [its] discretion,” revoke a visa. Id. § 1201(i). Such a discretionary visa revocation is judicially\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 22 of 37\n\nunreviewable except in one narrow circumstance: in a removal proceeding (as opposed to an entry denial), if the “revocation provides the sole ground for removal.” Id.\n2. Any challenge to congressional authorization for the Proclamation’s nationality-based suspension of entry under § 1182(f) founders on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88. Sale held—in terms equally applicable here— that no “judicial remedy” exists to override the Executive’s use of its § 1182(f) power to deny entry to specified classes of nonresident aliens. Id. at 188 (quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).\nSale is fatal to any claim that the Proclamation here is unauthorized by the INA. Sale held it “perfectly clear that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) . . . grants the President ample power to establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.” Id. at 187. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that a later-enacted statutory provision limits the President’s power under § 1182(f) to suspend aliens’ entry into the United States, reasoning that it “would have been extraordinary for Congress to make such an important change in the law without any mention of that possible effect.” Id. at 176.\nLikewise here. The Proclamation cannot be enjoined on the basis that there is no sufficient finding that the entry of the excluded classes would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The President need not even disclose his “reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat,” AADC, 525 U.S. at 491, let alone to a court’s satisfaction. Even when the President does disclose his\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 23 of 37\n\nreasons for deeming certain nationals to present a national-security risk, courts are “ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.” Id.\nIn all events, the Proclamation provides extensive findings supporting the need for a suspension of entry for several failed states, governments that are state sponsors of terrorism, or governments otherwise unwilling or unable to respond to adequate vetting or other terrorism-related concerns. Proclamation §§ 1(g)-(j), 2(a)-(h). “[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences” regarding determinations such as these, “the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked, and respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010).\n3. Nor is Congress’s broad delegation of authority to suspend the entry of classes of aliens undermined by 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which makes no mention of § 1182(f). Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not address the entry of aliens into the country at all. Instead, it is part of a set of restrictions on the issuance of immigrant visas— that is, permission for aliens to seek admission for permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)-(16), 1151(a)-(b), 1181(a). Added in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished an earlier nationality-based quota system for allocating immigrant visas, § 1152(a)(1)(A) provides:\nExcept as specifically provided [elsewhere in the INA], no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.\n\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 24 of 37\n\nSection 1152(a)(1)(A) does not conflict with § 1182(f) or impliedly restrict nationality-based denials of entry under § 1182(f). See Sale, 509 U.S. at 176. An alien’s entry into this country is a different and much more consequential event than the preliminary step of receiving a visa, which merely entitles the alien to apply for admission into the country. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(4), 1181, 1182(a), 1184. Visa possession does not control or guarantee entry; the INA provides several ways in which visa-holding aliens can be denied entry. E.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13)(A), 1182(a), (f), 1201(h), (i); 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.122, 42.82. One of them is the President’s express authority under § 1182(f) to suspend the entry of classes of aliens.\nThis design of the INA has been repeatedly recognized in past practice. For example, over 30 years ago, the President suspended the entry of Cuban nationals as immigrants, subject to certain exceptions. Presidential Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (Aug. 26, 1986); see also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 648 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citing additional examples), vacated as moot, __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017). Plaintiffs point to no instance in which the government has read § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s visa-allocation provisions as prohibiting nationality-based suspensions of entry under § 1182(f). See U.S.Stay.Mot.18-19.\nFinally, § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to immigrant visas, and does not cover other prospective entrants, such as those seeking nonimmigrant visas. So, even on plaintiffs’ view, this section cannot possibly establish that § 2 of the Proclamation is statutorily unauthorized as applied to aliens seeking entry as nonimmigrants.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 25 of 37\n\n4. The President’s § 1182(f) authority to suspend aliens’ entry is not limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), which also makes no mention of § 1182(f). In § 1182(a), Congress enumerated no fewer than seventy grounds that make an alien automatically inadmissible to this country, unless an exception applies. Congress did not provide that these are the only grounds on which the Executive can deny aliens entry. Instead, Congress in § 1182(f) separately enabled the President to impose additional entry restrictions.\nAs the D.C. Circuit correctly recognized in Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), § 1182(f) permits the Executive to deny aliens entry even if the aliens are not within one of the enumerated § 1182(a) categories that automatically make aliens inadmissible: “The President’s sweeping proclamation power [in § 1182(f)] thus provides a safeguard against the danger posed by any particular case or class of cases that is not covered by one of the categories in section 1182(a).” Id. at 1049 n.2. The Abourezk court even noted an example of this understanding in a nationality-based § 1182(f) proclamation issued by President Reagan, which suspended entry for “officers or employees of the Cuban government or the Cuban Communist Party.” Id. (citing Presidential Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (Oct. 10, 1985)).2\n2 Nor are the Proclamation’s travel restrictions contrary to other INA provisions that plaintiffs cite. For example, the visa waiver program does not contradict the Proclamation (P.I.Mot.15 (Dkt.No.205)) because it merely sets minimum standards for visaless entry of aliens. U.S.Resp.29-30 (Dkt.No.212). The Proclamation’s restrictions similarly do not contradict Congress’s visa-processing scheme for similar reasons. Id.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 26 of 37\n\nB. Because the Proclamation is an exercise of power delegated by Congress in the INA, it is executive action in the first Youngstown zone. The Proclamation is therefore also “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674. Overcoming this strongest presumption for any claim challenging the Proclamation is a burden that rests “heavily” on plaintiffs. Id.\nPlaintiffs’ significant burden is well-founded here, not only because of the explicit congressional grant of authority to deny entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), but also because of the INA’s complementary approach to allowing entry. Specifically, Congress enacted “extensive and complex” provisions detailing how over forty different classes of nonimmigrants, refugees, and other aliens can attain lawful presence in the country. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395; see Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 179 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). But while Congress imposed these detailed criteria to significantly restrict the Executive’s ability to unilaterally allow aliens to be lawfully present in the country, Congress simultaneously provided the Executive broad authority to exclude aliens from the country, under § 1182(f).\nThe President’s authority in this context therefore “includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000), and Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 27 of 37\n\n84 (2015). The injunction here is thus remarkable for interfering with a decision authorized by two branches of government in a particularly sensitive area. The admission of aliens into this country is a federal prerogative “inherent in sovereignty” that must “be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government.” Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765 (quotation marks omitted); accord United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).\nPlaintiffs’ claim that the Proclamation is pretext for a religious classification thus fails for this additional reason that the Proclamation is within Youngstown’s first zone. And the Proclamation is already accorded the heavy presumption that facially neutral government action is valid and taken in good faith. See supra Part I.A.\nEspecially with those presumptions in mind, the Executive provided a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for exercising 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) national-security and foreign-affairs powers to restrict entry. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770; see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140-41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (federal government official informing alien of visa denial based expressly on statutory provision is a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason under Mandel). Courts therefore must “neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against” plaintiffs’ asserted constitutional rights. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 28 of 37\n\nIII. The Constitutional Provisions Invoked by Plaintiffs Do Not Extend Extraterritorially, Nonresident Aliens Abroad Possess No Constitutional Rights Regarding Entry into this Country, and the Proclamation Provides All Process that Could Possibly Be Due.\nFinally, the Proclamation cannot be enjoined on a procedural-due-process theory. Any such theory, turning on whether a nonresident alien abroad has a sufficient connection to the United States, cannot prevail. That is because the constitutional provisions on which plaintiffs rely do not apply extraterritorially. And even if they do, the Proclamation provides all process that is possibly due by giving facially neutral, bona fide national-security grounds for its restrictions.\nA. The constitutional claims here are fundamentally untenable because the constitutional provisions that plaintiffs invoke are inapplicable to the nonresident aliens abroad covered by the Proclamation.\n1. Nonresident aliens outside territory under clear United States control possess no constitutional rights regarding the terms on which they may enter the country: It is “clear” that “an unadmitted and nonresident alien” “ha[s] no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.” Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762. The “power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative,” and aliens seeking admission to the United States request a “privilege.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).\nConsequently, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides no “judicial remedy” to override the President’s 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) power to deny classes of nonresident aliens entry. Sale, 509 U.S. at 188; see id. (“agree[ing] with the conclu-\n\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 29 of 37\n\nsion expressed in Judge Edwards’ concurring opinion” regarding statutory and constitutional challenges in Gracey, 809 F.2d at 841: “‘there is no solution to be found in a judicial remedy’” overriding the Executive’s exercise of § 1182(f) authority (emphasis added)).\nThe Supreme Court has long “rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)). Rather, the Due Process Clause applies only “within the territorial jurisdiction.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).\nThe Constitution does not regulate immigration policy regarding foreign nationals who are neither resident nor present in United States territory. The Court has therefore recognized a key distinction between aliens inside versus outside the United States, according the former certain constitutional rights while not extending those rights to the latter. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754 (involving (1) lengthy detention, rather than entry denial, at (2) Guantanamo Bay, where the United States had “plenary control, or practical sovereignty”).\n2. Plaintiffs’ challenges fare no better if framed as claims that the Proclamation violates rights against religious discrimination under the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and under the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs’ theory is the same as to both Clauses—that the Proclamation is a\n\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 30 of 37\n\npretext for discrimination on account of religion. But that theory fails because nonresident aliens seeking to enter the country lack constitutional rights regarding entry in the first place. See supra p. 19.\nWhat is more, Congress has repeatedly designated members of certain religious groups—such as Soviet Jews, Evangelical Christians, and members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—as presenting “special humanitarian concern to the United States” for immigration purposes. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) & note; see Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. K, § 7034(k)(8)(A), 129 Stat. 2705, 2765 (2015) (reauthorizing this designation). That accepted practice underscores the inapplicability in this context of the religious-nondiscrimination rights invoked by plaintiffs.\nPlaintiffs cannot make an end-run around the territorial limits on constitutional rights by relying on the alleged stigmatizing effect on individuals within the United States of a challenged decision about whether nonresident aliens outside this country are admitted. To hold otherwise would allow bootstrapping a constitutional claim based on government action regulating only aliens beyond constitutional protection. Amici are aware of no instance, outside the present context, in which a U.S. citizen or alien resident in this country prevailed on an Establishment Clause claim based on the stigma allegedly perceived by how the government treated other persons who possessed no constitutional rights regarding entry. Cf. Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 827, 843 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing an Establishment Clause claim to proceed based on the unique taxpayer-standing doctrine in a challenge to the expenditure of government funds in foreign countries).\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 31 of 37\n\nB. Even if the constitutional provisions at issue could somehow apply extraterritorially, there is still no constitutional violation from the Proclamation’s limits on the entry of nonresident aliens abroad. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim would thus fail for this reason as well.\n1. There can be no Fifth Amendment violation if one is not deprived of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property. E.g., Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). And nonresident aliens abroad have no constitutionally protected interest in entering the United States. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762. Even apart from the issue of entry into the United States, “[t]here is no constitutionally protected interest in either obtaining or continuing to possess a visa.” Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2017). Similarly, multiple courts of appeals have rejected due-process claims regarding visa issuance or processing. See, e.g., Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1990); De Avilia v. Civiletti, 643 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1981). Thus, plaintiffs lack support for the notion that aliens have due-process claims to advance.\n2. In Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), a panel of the Ninth Circuit posited that several categories of aliens, other than lawful permanent residents, may have “potential” claims to constitutional protections regarding travel and entry. Id. at 1166. That suggestion was incorrect because the four categories of aliens cited by the Ninth Circuit lack valid constitutional claims.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 32 of 37\n\nFirst, there are no constitutional rights regarding prospective entry for aliens who are in the United States “unlawfully.” Id. The INA provides that visas issued to aliens seeking admission to the country confer no entitlement to be admitted, and that visas can be revoked at any time in the Executive’s discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h)-(i). Even as to an alien who was admitted into the country under a visa, “revocation of an entry visa issued to an alien already within our country has no effect upon the alien’s liberty or property interests,” and thus cannot support a dueprocess challenge. Knoetze v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 634 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1981).\nIf removal proceedings—which involve the distinct situation of potential detention and forcible removal—were instituted against an alien who is in this country and whose visa was revoked, that alien would have certain due-process protections under the Fifth Amendment. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (noting that it is “well established” that aliens have due-process rights in deportation hearings). But the Supreme Court has never held that the Fifth Amendment is violated when restrictions are placed on nonresident aliens abroad seeking to enter the country. Cf. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.\nSecond, this Proclamation does not cover any nonresident alien visa holders who travelled internationally and are attempting to reenter the country. The Proclamation applies only to aliens who were outside the United States on the effective date of the Proclamation, who did not have a valid visa on the effective date of the Proclamation, and who did not have a visa that was canceled or revoked under Executive Order 13,769 of January 27, 2017. Proclamation §§ 3(a), 6(d). Regardless, Landon does not establish that “non-immigrant visaholders” have due-process rights when\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 33 of 37\n\nseeking to return from abroad. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166 (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 33-34). Landon involved a resident alien, and suggested that any process due must account for the circumstances of an alien’s ties to this country. See 459 U.S. at 32-34. Those ties are significantly less in the case of a nonresident alien who was temporarily admitted on a nonimmigrant visa. In any event, Landon was decided before Congress changed the nature of an alien’s interest in visa possession by amending the INA, in 2004, to provide that “[t]here shall be no means of judicial review . . . of a revocation” of a visa, “except in the context of a removal proceeding if such revocation pro-vides the sole ground for removal under” the INA. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5304(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3736 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i)).\nThird, there are no viable due-process claims for aliens abroad seeking refugee status. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166. That argument morphs statutory protections for those seeking asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158, into constitutional protections for refugees. Asylum and refugee admission are not the same thing. The INA’s asylum protection can be sought by individuals who are already “physically present in the United States or who arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). Only an alien outside the United States may apply to be admitted as a refugee. See id. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157(a), 1158(a), (c)(1), 1181(c). Hence, § 1182(f) independently permits the Executive to deny refugee applicants entry into the United States. Similarly, statutory provisions under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) provide that certain aliens may not be returned to a country in which they fear torture, “regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.”\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 34 of 37\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1231 note. The CAT provisions, however, merely limit the possible countries to which an alien can be returned and say nothing about overriding the President’s statutory authority to restrict alien entry into the United States. See id. § 1182(f).\nFourth, plaintiffs lack viable due-process arguments based on visa applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident or institution. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166 (citing Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762–65. Din did not hold that such due-process rights exist. To the contrary, the narrowest opinion concurring in the judgment in Din expressly did not decide whether a U.S. citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of her alien spouse, such that she was entitled to notice of the reason for the application’s denial. See 135 S. Ct. at 2139-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In fact, the concurrence reasoned that, even if due process applied in this context, the only process possibly required was that the Executive give a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying a visa to an alien abroad. Id. at 2141.\nAnd the Din concurrence’s standard is plainly met here by the Proclamation’s lengthy recitation of national-security reasons. See Proclamation §§ 1-2. The Proclamation therefore already provides whatever process may be due, as it publicly announces the “facially legitimate and bona fide” invocation of the President’s 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) national-security and foreign-affairs powers to restrict entry. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 35 of 37\n\nConclusion\nThe Court should grant defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal.\n\nSteve Marshall Attorney General of Alabama\nMark Brnovich Attorney General of Arizona\nLeslie Rutledge Attorney General of Arkansas\nPamela Jo Bondi Attorney General of Florida\nJeff Landry Attorney General of Louisiana\nMichael DeWine Attorney General of Ohio\nMike Hunter Attorney General of Oklahoma\nAlan Wilson Attorney General of South Carolina\nPatrick Morrisey Attorney General of West Virginia\n\nRespectfully submitted.\nKen Paxton Attorney General of Texas\nJeffrey C. Mateer First Assistant Attorney General\ns/ Scott A. Keller Scott A. Keller Solicitor General\nJ. Campbell Barker Deputy Solicitor General\nAri Cuenin Assistant Solicitor General\nOffice of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-2697 scott.keller@oag.texas.gov\n\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 36 of 37\n\nCertificate of Service\nI hereby certify that on October 24, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\ns/ Scott A. Keller Scott A. Keller\n\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-1\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 37 of 37\n\nCertificate of Compliance\nThis brief complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it is prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface in Microsoft Word using 14-point Equity typeface and with the type-volume limitation because it contains under 6,500 words.\ns/ Scott A. Keller Scott A. Keller\n\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-2\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Effective 12/01/2016\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_____ Caption: _In__t'l_R__e_f_u_g_e_e__A_s_s_is_t_a_n_c_e__P_r_o_j._e__t _a_l._v_._T__ru_m__p__e_t_a_l_. _____\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT Type-Volume Limit, Typeface Requirements, and Type-Style Requirements\n\nType-Volume Limit for Briefs: Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellee’s Response Brief, and Appellant’s Response/Reply Brief may not exceed 13,000 words or 1,300 lines. Appellee’s Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 15,300 words or 1,500 lines. A Reply or Amicus Brief may not exceed 6,500 words or 650 lines. Amicus Brief in support of an Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 7,650 words. Amicus Brief filed during consideration of petition for rehearing may not exceed 2,600 words. Counsel may rely on the word or line count of the word processing program used to prepare the document. The word-processing program must be set to include headings, footnotes, and quotes in the count. Line count is used only with monospaced type. See Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(e), 29(a)(5), 32(a)(7)(B) & 32(f).\n\nType-Volume Limit for Other Documents if Produced Using a Computer: Petition for permission to appeal and a motion or response thereto may not exceed 5,200 words. Reply to a motion may not exceed 2,600 words. Petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or other extraordinary writ may not exceed 7,800 words. Petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc may not exceed 3,900 words. Fed. R. App. P. 5(c)(1), 21(d), 27(d)(2), 35(b)(2) & 40(b)(1).\n\nTypeface and Type Style Requirements: A proportionally spaced typeface (such as Times New Roman) must include serifs and must be 14-point or larger. A monospaced typeface (such as Courier New) must be 12-point or larger (at least 10½ characters per inch). Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5), 32(a)(6).\n\nThis brief or other document complies with type-volume limits because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. R. 32(f) (cover page, disclosure statement, table of contents, table of citations, statement regarding oral argument, signature block, certificates of counsel, addendum, attachments):\n[✔] this brief or other document contains 6208 [state number of] words\n\n[ ] this brief uses monospaced type and contains\n\n[state number of] lines\n\nThis brief or other document complies with the typeface and type style requirements because:\n\n[✔] this brief or other document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using\n\nMicrosoft Word\n\n[identify word processing program] in\n\nEquity 14-point\n\n[identify font size and type style]; or\n\n[ ] this brief or other document has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [identify word processing program] in [identify font size and type style].\n\n(s) Scott A. Keller\n\nParty Name State of Texas et al.\n\nDated: Oct. 24, 2017\n\n11/14/2016 SCC\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 15-3\n\nFiled: 10/24/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_,_1__7_-2_2__3_2_,_1_7_-_2_2_3_3______ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [✔]Government COUNSEL FOR: _S_t_a_te__o_f_T_e__x_a_s_, _e_t_a_l_____________________________________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/__S_c_o_t_t_A_.__K_e_ll_e_r______________________ (signature)\n\n_S_c_o__tt_A__. _K_e_l_le_r___________________________ Name (printed or typed)\n_A__tt_o_rn__e_y_G__e_n_e_r_a_l _o_f_T_e_x_a__s________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_(_5_1_2_)_9_3_6_-_1_7_0_0__ Voice Phone\n_(_5_1_2_)_4_7_4__-2_6_9__7_ Fax Number\n\n_P__. _O_._B__o_x_1_2__5_4_8_,_M__C__-0_5__9________________\n_A__u_s_ti_n_,_T_X___7_8_7_1_1_-_2_5_4_8___________________ Address\n\n_s_c_o_t_t._k_e_ll_e_r@__o__a_g_.t_e_x_a_s_._g_o_v_________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_0_/2_4_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/__S_c_o_t_t_A__. _K_e__ll_e_r____________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n______O__c_t_o_b_e_r__2_4_,_2_0__1_7______ Date\n\n\f", "DJ # 145-1-2979\n\nU.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Staff\n950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Rm. 7250 Washington, DC 20530\nTel: (202) 353-2689\n\nOctober 27, 2017\nMs. Patricia S. Connor Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Lewis F. Powell Jr. Courthouse & Annex 1100 East Main Street, Suite 501 Richmond, VA 23219\nRE: IRAP v. Trump, Nos. 17-2231, 17-2240 IAAB v. Trump, No. 17-2232 Zakzok v. Trump, No. 17-2233\nDear Ms. Connor:\nFor the reasons explained below, the Government writes to respectfully request that this Court consider scheduling oral argument for the above-captioned consolidated cross-appeals on December 8, 2017, immediately after the currently scheduled oral argument sitting.\nThis matter involves a district court’s preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorist or other Public-Safety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017). In a pending motion, the Government has moved to expedite the merits briefing schedule in this matter, with all briefs filed by November 29, 2017, to allow this Court to hear argument during its regularly scheduled December 5-7, 2017 oral argument sitting. See Corrected Motion by Federal Defendants-Appellants to Expedite Merits Briefing Schedule at 4 (filed Oct. 24, 2017) (Dkt. No. 28).\nIn Hawaii v. Trump (9th Cir. No. 17-17168), the Government has appealed another district court’s preliminary injunction that also bars enforcement of Section\n\n\f2 of the Presidential Proclamation. Yesterday, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit scheduled oral argument in that case for December 6, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. PST in Seattle, Washington. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s oral argument schedule, and the potential need for government counsel to travel between Seattle and Richmond, the Government respectfully requests that this Court consider holding oral argument in these consolidated cases on December 8, 2017, immediately following the currently scheduled sitting on December 5-7, 2017.\nRespectfully,\n/s/ Sharon Swingle\nSharon Swingle Attorney for Appellants-Defendants\ncc: All counsel via CM/ECF\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2232, 17-2233\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, JANE DOE #1, JANE DOE #2, JANE DOE #3, JANE DOE #4, JANE DOE #5, JOHN DOE #6, IRANIAN STUDENTS’ FOUNDATION Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, KEVIN K.\nMCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General\nof the United States, Defendants-Appellants.\n______________________________________________________________________________ EBLAL ZAKZOK, SUMAYA HAMADMAD, FAHED MUQBIL, JOHN DOE #1, JANE DOE #2, AND JANE DOE #3, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\nHOMELAND SECURITY, AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE Defendants-Appellants.\n\nOn Appeal From The United States District Court For The District Of Maryland Hon. Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge (Nos. 8:17-cv-02921-TDC, 1:17-cv-02969-TDC)\n\nIAAB AND ZAKZOK PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR AN EMERGENCY STAY PENDING EXPEDITED APPEAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE\nSTAY\n\nJohnathan Smith Sirine Shebaya MUSLIM ADVOCATES P.O. Box 66408 Washington, DC 20035\n\nMark H. Lynch Mark W. Mosier Herbert L. Fenster José E. Arvelo John W. Sorrenti\n\n\f(202) 897-2622 Richard B. Katskee Eric Rothschild Andrew L. Nellis AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1310 L St. NW, Ste. 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 466-3234\n\nKathryn E. Cahoy Rebecca G. Van Tassell Karun Tilak COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One CityCenter 850 Tenth Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 662-6000\n\nCounsel for IAAB Plaintiffs-Appellees\n\nFaiza Patel Michael Price BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 (646) 292-8355\nLena F. Masri Gadeir Abbas COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, DC (212) 488-8787\n\nCharles E. Davidow Robert A. Atkins Andrew J. Ehrlich Liza Velazquez Steven C. Herzog PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 (212) 273-3000\nJethro Eisenstein PROFETA & EISENSTEIN 45 Broadway New York, NY 10006 (212) 577-6500\n\nCounsel for Zakzok Plaintiffs-Appellees\n\nOctober 27, 2017\n\n\fINTRODUCTION This Court upheld a preliminary injunction against the second version of the President’s travel ban (“EO-2”) because EO-2 “drip[ped] with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination” against Muslims. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (“IRAP”).1 The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Establishment Clause claim, because they “made a substantial and affirmative showing that the government’s national security purpose was proffered in bad faith,” and they had presented “a compelling case that EO-2’s primary purpose is religious.” Id. at 603. The IRAP decision persuasively demonstrates why the Government’s motion to stay the injunction of the third version of the President’s travel ban (the “Proclamation”) should be denied. The motion relies heavily on the same arguments that this Court squarely rejected five months ago. None of the Government’s arguments is any stronger now, and many of them are weaker. EO-2 contemplated a 90-day suspension of entry by individuals from the targeted Muslim-majority countries, and this Court held that this delay caused a cognizable injury because it would result in the plaintiffs’ prolonged separation from their family members. 1 This Court’s IRAP decision is no longer binding, but the parties agree that it remains persuasive authority. Op. 13 n.1 (ECF No. 46). “ECF No.” refers to the district court docket in IAAB v. Trump, No. 17-2921.\n1\n\n\fIRAP, 857 F.3d at 607. The Proclamation causes even greater injury because it has no end date, which means that individual Plaintiffs would be separated indefinitely from their family members and organizational Plaintiffs face indefinite interference with their core activities.\nThe Government’s sole new theory is that the Proclamation withstands constitutional scrutiny because it is based on a “worldwide review” of data-sharing practices conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). But as the district court correctly recognized, the Proclamation and DHS’s review cannot be viewed in isolation. They must be analyzed in the context of the President’s repeated promises to impose a Muslim ban and his two previous failed attempts to impose that ban. When viewed in context, the evidence shows that the Proclamation is another attempt by the President to deliver on his campaign promise to ban Muslims from entering the United States.\nThe district court acted well within its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Like the executive orders before it, the Proclamation likely violates the Establishment Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and enforcement of the Proclamation would cause substantial and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs. The Government’s motion for a stay should be denied.\n2\n\n\fARGUMENT The Government bears a heavy burden in establishing that a stay is justified. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The Government must show that it will suffer irreparable harm if the district court’s injunction is not stayed during this Court’s review. The standard for this showing is high; a mere “possibility of irreparable injury” to the government is insufficient. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). The Government must also make a “strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits” of its appeal. Id. at 426. Even if the Government establishes these two factors, the Court must also consider the harm to the Plaintiffs and to the public interest that would result from staying the district court’s injunction. None of these elements supports a stay pending appeal. I. The Balance of Harms Does Not Favor A Stay. A. The Government Has Not Shown That It Will Be Irreparably\nHarmed Absent A Stay. The district court’s preliminary injunction will not irreparably harm the Government. The injunction does little more than preserve the status quo that existed prior to the Proclamation. After this Court and the Ninth Circuit upheld preliminary injunctions against EO-2, the Supreme Court declined to stay the injunctions with respect to foreign nationals who had a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or organization in the United States. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017). The district court followed that approach, limiting\n3\n\n\fits injunction to foreign nationals with a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. Op. 88. The Government offers no credible reason why it would be irreparably harmed by an injunction that is already limited in the way that the Supreme Court concluded was adequate to protect the Government on nearly identical facts.\nThe Government also does not contend that a stay is necessary to protect against any specific threat to national security. Rather, it simply invokes general principles about the weight given to national-security interests. Mot. 8.2 This “rote invocation of harm to ‘national security interests’” is not a “silver bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 603. Here, the Government cannot argue that the injunction creates an immediate threat to national security. Just as it has done for decades, the Government may continue to make case-bycase determinations of whether visa applicants have satisfied their burden to prove that they are eligible for visas and are not inadmissible on national-security or any other grounds established by Congress. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1361. The Government fails to explain how it could be irreparably harmed while this expedited appeal is pending, when it can continue to make individualized determinations of whether a particular visa application poses a security threat.\n2 Because the Government did not include page numbers in its motion, we cite to the page numbers provided in the ECF header.\n4\n\n\fThe record also refutes the Government’s claimed need for urgency in implementing the Proclamation. By its terms, the Proclamation would not take effect until 24 days after it was issued. See 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,171. The Government has not offered any evidence to suggest that a national-security threat would arise in the next few months if the Proclamation does not take effect. In contrast, Plaintiffs have submitted substantial, unrebutted evidence that the Proclamation will not make the nation safer. See, e.g., Joint Dec’l of Former Nat’l Sec. Officials, J.R. 770 (ECF No. 54, Ex. 14) (declaration of 49 former government officials concluding that the Proclamation is “unnecessary” “[a]s a national security measure”). This evidence is entirely consistent with an assessment of the President’s first travel ban conducted by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, which concluded that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity.” Id. 771 ¶ 10.\nRather than citing specific national-security concerns, the Government contends that it will be irreparably harmed without a stay pending appeal because the preliminary injunction will delay the President’s exercise of his constitutional and statutory authority. Mot. 8. If such an abstract, institutional concern were sufficient to establish irreparable harm, the government could obtain a stay whenever the other factors for a preliminary injunction were satisfied. Courts have repeatedly rejected this view, holding instead that these types of institutional interests may\n5\n\n\fbe vindicated “in the full course of this litigation.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017); Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is the resolution of the case on the merits, not whether the injunction is stayed pending appeal, that will affect [separation-of-powers] principles.”).\nThe Government’s argument also fails because it assumes that the President is acting within his authority, despite the district court’s holding that he is not. This Court has repeatedly held that the Government is “in no way harmed by issuance of a preliminary injunction which prevents [it] from enforcing restrictions likely to be found unconstitutional.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2013); see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 603. Because the Proclamation is likely to be found unconstitutional, see Part II infra, the government’s purported institutional injury does not support a stay pending appeal.\nB. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Substantial, Irreparable Harm If The Preliminary Injunction Is Stayed.\nUnlike the Government, Plaintiffs will suffer immediate and irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is stayed. A stay would harm the individual Plaintiffs by preventing them from reuniting with their family members. Although the Government attempts to diminish this injury, Mot. 8, the evidence shows that the harm would be severe.\nIAAB Plaintiff Jane Doe #5 provides a good example. She is a 79-year-old Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States. She resides in Maryland with her\n6\n\n\foldest son, who is a U.S. citizen, and her 90-year-old husband, who is also a Lawful Permanent Resident. See Jane Doe Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6 (ECF No. 26-7). In 2010, she began the process of sponsoring her youngest son’s immigration from Iran to the United States. Id. ¶ 4. He has now completed his consular interview and is awaiting final approval for an immigrant visa. Id. ¶ 5. Given her and her husband’s age and their serious health issues, see id. ¶ 6, Jane Doe #5 reasonably fears that she will never see her youngest son again if the Proclamation takes effect. Id. at ¶ 7.\nThe Zakzok Plaintiffs similarly face severe and irreparable harm if the injunction were stayed. As one example, Fahed Muqbil is an American citizen of Yemeni descent. Muqbil Decl. ¶ 1 (Zakzok ECF No. 6-1). His daughter, an American citizen who was born with spina bifida, is currently receiving medical treatment in American hospitals for several critical medical conditions, and is expected to undergo further surgery. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. Should the Proclamation take effect, Fahed Muqbil’s wife, who has completed her consular interview and is awaiting the issuance of a visa, will be indefinitely barred from the United States and prevented from seeing her daughter, and her husband will be forced to care for his daughter without his wife. The harm to these individual plaintiffs is both concrete and irreparable.3\n3 This Court should again reject the Government’s suggestion (at 9) that Plaintiffs are not harmed until their family members are denied a waiver. See IRAP, 857\n(continued…)\n7\n\n\fThe organizational Plaintiffs also face significant and irreparable harm. The Proclamation would “prevent Iranian nationals from attending IAAB’s International Conference on the Iranian Diaspora, scheduled for April 2018 in New York, at which scholars, students, journalists, artists, and community leaders gather to exchange ideas on issues affecting the worldwide Iranian community.” Op. 27. Members of Plaintiff Iranian Students’ Foundation would be injured because their families would not be able to obtain visas to attend graduation ceremonies. See Pashai Decl. ¶ 11 (ECF No. 38-3). As University of Maryland President Wallace Loh explained, “[t]he banning of a student’s family from his or her college graduation ceremony is a type of harm that is irreparable not just because of the absence of the family participation in one of the great milestones in that student’s life, but also because of the stigmatization and isolation of that student from the full experience of and participation in the ceremonies as experienced by his or her classmates.” Loh Decl. ¶ 15 (ECF No. 38-4).\nPlaintiffs also suffer irreparable injury because the Proclamation deprives them of their rights under the Establishment Clause. The “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes F.3d at 587 (“Plaintiffs will suffer undue hardship . . . were we to require their family members to attempt to secure a waiver before permitting Plaintiffs to challenge” the travel ban); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 372 (4th Cir. 2014) (“denial of equal treatment from imposition” of discriminatory barrier constituted injury).\n8\n\n\firreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 601-02 (concluding that Establishment Clause violations create “immediate, irreparable injury”).\nJohn Doe #6 explained that the Proclamation makes him feel “personally attacked, targeted, and disparaged” because it “show[s] hostility to Iranians generally and to Muslims in particular.” John Doe #6 Decl. ¶ 9 (ECF No. 26-8). Plaintiff Sumaya Hamadmad likewise believes that the Proclamation is “an attack on [her] Islamic faith and all Muslims.” Hamadmad Decl. ¶ 18 (Zakzok ECF No. 6-3). This Court has held that “[f]eelings of marginalization and exclusion are cognizable forms of injury” under the Establishment Clause. Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012); see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 584-85 (plaintiffs are injured by EO-2’s “state sanctioned message that foreign born Muslims . . . are ‘outsiders’”). The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs had demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable injury if the Proclamation took effect. Op. 84-85.\nC. The Public Interest Will Be Harmed If The Injunction Is Stayed. The public interest also weighs in favor of upholding the preliminary injunction, because “upholding constitutional rights surely serves the public interest.” Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2002). The district court’s injunction not only upholds the Constitution, but it also furthers the public\n9\n\n\finterest “in free flow of travel, in avoiding separation of families, and in freedom from discrimination.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169.\nGiven the Government’s failure to show that the preliminary injunction would undermine any vital national-security interests, and the unrebutted record evidence demonstrating that the Proclamation will separate families on a discriminatory basis and impede the free flow of travel and ideas from the affected countries, the public interest tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. II. The Government Is Unlikely To Succeed On The Merits.\nA. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Justiciable. The Government presents the same justiciability arguments that have been rejected time and again in the travel-ban litigation. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587-88; Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 768-69 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017). Without identifying any intervening change of law, the Government boldly predicts that this Court will reach a different result on the same legal arguments that it rejected just five months ago. The Court correctly rejected these arguments in IRAP, and it is likely to do so again here. 1. The Government again relies on Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999), to argue that the doctrine of consular non-reviewability bars Plaintiffs’ claims. Mot. 10. But this Court has already explained why Saavedra Bruno does not help the Government: There, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged “that\n10\n\n\fjudicial review was proper in cases involving claims by United States citizens rather than by aliens . . . and statutory claims that are accompanied by constitutional ones.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587. The Supreme Court has never applied the broad non-reviewability doctrine that the Government advances here, despite many cases in which the Government’s theory would have precluded review. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187-88 (1993); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). Because Plaintiffs seek review of the Proclamation, not individual consular visa decisions, the Court should again hold that the claims are reviewable. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 857.\n2. The Government again contends that Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims are not reviewable because Plaintiffs do not allege that their own rights are violated. Mot. 11. That is incorrect. Plaintiffs allege that the Proclamation violates their own rights and that it directly injures them in at least two ways. First, Plaintiffs’ “‘personal contact’ with the alleged establishment of religion” will injure them by “prolong[ing] their separation” from family members. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 583. In other words, the plaintiffs will be indefinitely separated from their family members because of their Muslim faith. For example, Jane Doe #5 reasonably fears that, if the Proclamation takes effect, she may never see her son again on account of their religion. Jane Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 6-7 (ECF No. 26-7). Second, the\n11\n\n\fProclamation “sends a state-sanctioned message condemning [Plaintiffs’] religion and causing [them] to feel excluded and marginalized in [their] community.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 583; see also Moss, 683 F.3d at 607. Numerous Plaintiffs provided declarations demonstrating that they have suffered this type of injury as a result of the Proclamation. See, e.g., John Doe #6 Decl. ¶ 9 (ECF No. 26-8); Zakzok Decl. ¶ 18 (Zakzok ECF No. 6-2); Muqbil Decl. ¶ 15 (Zakzok ECF No. 61).\nThe Government contends that the Court is likely to hold that Plaintiffs’ claims are unreviewable based on Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), and In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Mot. 14-15. But those are the same cases on which the Government relied in the prior appeal, and this Court explained why the travel-ban litigation “bears little resemblance to” those cases. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 585. Far from “roam[ing] the country in search of governmental wrongdoing,” Plaintiffs “feel[] the direct, painful effects of” the Proclamation— “both its alleged message of religious condemnation and the prolonged separation it causes between” Plaintiffs and their loved ones. Id.\nB. The Proclamation Violates The Establishment Clause. “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456\n12\n\n\fU.S. 228, 244 (1982). This Court held that EO-2 likely violated the Establishment Clause because it “cannot be divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it,” and because “the reasonable observer would conclude that EO-2’s primary purpose is to exclude persons from the United States on the basis of their religious beliefs.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 601. The district court held that the latest version of the travel ban is also based on anti-Muslim animus. Op. 83. The Government has failed to show that this Court is likely to reverse that decision.\nThe Government contends that the Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause because, unlike the prior executive orders, the Proclamation’s alleged national-security purpose is supported by a “worldwide review” of datasharing practices and engagement with foreign countries. Mot. 18.\nThe Proclamation cannot be divorced from the context in which it arose. The district court explained that “[b]ecause ‘reasonable observers have reasonable memories,’ past Establishment Clause violations are relevant to the assessment of present government actions.” Op. 71 (quoting McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866, 876 (2005)). The district court acknowledged that “past actions do not ‘forever taint’ present ones,” but when an Establishment Clause violation is found, subsequent efforts to achieve a similar goal must include “curative actions” that “‘disassociate the [government action] from its previous religious effect.’” Op. 72 (quoting Felix v. City of Bloomfield,\n13\n\n\f841 F.3d 848, 863 (10th Cir. 2016)). These curative actions are important to show that the government’s purpose has truly changed, and that the “new statements of purpose” are not merely “a litigating position.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 871.\nThe district court correctly found that the Proclamation is a continuation of the President’s attempt to fulfill his campaign promise to ban Muslims from entering the country. The President expressly stated that he would impose a Muslim ban by “looking at territories” because “people were so upset when [he] used the word Muslim.” J.R. 220 (ECF No. 54, Ex. 11). The President has never disavowed his earlier statements. He has instead repeatedly confirmed them by expressing his preference for the original version of the travel ban—the version adopted without consulting the relevant national-security agencies and intended to give preference to Christian refugees. See J.R. 652-53, 664, 705 (ECF No. 54, Ex. 13). Following this Court’s IRAP ruling, the President complained that “[t]he Justice Dept. should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the watered down, politically correct version they submitted to [the Supreme Court].” Op. 14. He also instructed people to “[s]tudy” an apocryphal story of General John J. Pershing massacring Muslims with bullets dipped in pigs’ blood as a way to treat “terrorists when caught.” Id. at 14-15. And just last month, the President again insisted that “the travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specif-\n14\n\n\fic – but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!” Id. at 15.4 It is hard to imagine a clearer indication that the Proclamation’s supposedly new purpose is only a “litigating position.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 871-72.\nThe district court also correctly found that “the outcome of the DHS Review was at least partially pre-ordained.” Op. 76. The DHS review was performed based on a directive by the President in EO-2. Id. That directive “telegraphed the expected recommendations” by instructing the Secretary of Homeland Security to “submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals.” Id. And DHS conducted a review that produced those expected recommendations. When the President issued the executive orders, he relied on the fact that the targeted countries had been “previously identified” under the Visa Waiver Program, 8 U.S.C. § 1187, as “warrant[ing] additional scrutiny in connection with our immigration policies because the conditions in these countries present heightened threats.” EO-2 § 1(d). Although the DHS review is purportedly based on a new “baseline” test, this new test relies on the same criteria used for the Visa Waiver Program. Compare Proclamation § 1(c), with 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)(III), (c)(2)(B)-(E). By adopting a test that incorporated the Vi-\n4 The White House has stated that President Trump’s tweets are “official statements by the president of the United States.” Op. 14.\n15\n\n\fsa Waiver Program criteria, DHS ensured that many of the countries subject to the EO-2 travel ban would also fail the baseline test.\nThe Government’s claim that the Proclamation is unrelated to the prior executive orders is also undermined by its unwillingness to accept the results of the baseline test. Rather than implementing the baseline-test results, the Acting DHS Secretary accepted results that were consistent with the EO-2 ban, and ignored those that were not. For example, Somalia passed the baseline test. But it was included in the EO-2 ban, and so it remained in the Proclamation’s ban. See Proclamation § 2(g). In contrast, Iraq failed the baseline test. But it was excluded from the EO-2 ban, and so it remained out of the Proclamation’s ban. Id. § 1(g). The President also made the Proclamation more consistent with EO-2 by departing from the baseline-test results for Venezuela. Id. § 2(f)(i). Venezuela failed the baseline test, but (with the narrow exception of certain government officials) the President chose not to impose any restrictions on Venezuela—a country with few Muslims that was not included in the EO-2 ban.5\nIn sum, the Proclamation and DHS review do not provide a different or better rationale for the ban against nationals from the targeted Muslim-majority 5 The President did not impose travel restrictions on Venezuelans because he asserted (but did not identify) “alternative sources for obtaining information” about them. Proclamation § 2(f). The President gave no explanation for why Venezuelans received such favorable treatment while nationals from other countries did not.\n16\n\n\fcountries. They do not eliminate the bad faith that has infected the entire effort to ban Muslims from entering the United States, and they do not shield the Proclamation from constitutional scrutiny. The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Establishment Clause claim, and the Government has not shown that this Court is likely to reach a different result.\nC. The Proclamation Violates The INA. The Government also has failed to show it is likely to succeed on the merits of Plaintiffs’ statutory claims. 1. The district court held that the Proclamation violates § 1152(a) of the INA, which prohibits discrimination “in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Congress enacted this provision contemporaneously with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate the “national origins system as the basis for the selection of immigrants to the United States.” H.R. Rep. No. 89-745, at 8 (1965). “Congress could not have used more explicit language in unambiguously direct[ing] that no nationality-based discrimination shall occur.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 777. Yet, as the district court concluded, the Proclamation effectively bans the issuance of visas for certain people based solely on their nationality, and thus violates § 1152(a). Op. 48.\n17\n\n\fThe Government seeks to avoid this anti-discrimination provision by claiming that the Proclamation bans “entry,” whereas § 1152(a) prohibits discrimination only in the “issuance of an immigrant visa.” Mot. 15. Put another way, so long as the Government does not discriminate in issuing visas, the President is free to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or national origin in deciding whether to honor the visa and allow the noncitizen to enter the country. The district court correctly rejected this argument, holding—as the Ninth Circuit did—that “‘Congress could not have intended to permit the President to flout § 1152(a) so easily.’” Op. 45 (quoting Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 777).\nThe Government’s contention that the Proclamation is limited to regulating entry is incorrect. The Proclamation also bars the issuance of visas to groups of people based on their nationality. See Proclamation § 3(c)(iii) (specifying that nationals of the targeted countries must obtain a waiver from agency officials in order to secure the “issuance of a visa”). In fact, the Proclamation specifically allows individuals with preexisting valid visas to enter the United States, making even clearer that it functions as a ban on visa issuance, and not on entry of individuals who already have visas.\n2. The Proclamation also exceeds the authority delegated to the President under § 1182(f). The district court acknowledged that “Plaintiffs are correct that there must be some limit on § 1182 authority,” Op. 60, and that “[i]f there is an ex-\n18\n\n\fample of a § 1182(f) order, past or present, that exceeds the authority of that statute, it would be this one,” id. at 59. But because a “line” limiting § 1182(f) authority “has yet to be drawn,” the court concluded that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on this claim. Id. at 61.\nThis Court should draw that line and hold that the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority under § 1182(f). The Constitution vests the legislative power, including the power to make “[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens[,] . . . exclusively to Congress.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). The Supreme Court repeatedly has read immigration statutes narrowly, refusing to “impute to Congress . . . a purpose to give [executive officials] unbridled discretion.” Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958); see also United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1957) (holding that Attorney General’s apparently “unbounded authority to require whatever information he deems desirable of aliens” authorized only those demands consistent with the “purpose of the legislative scheme”).\nThe Proclamation exceeds the President’s statutory authorization to suspend entry of a “class of aliens” for a particular “period” of time. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). No President has ever before invoked § 1182(f) to impose a categorical bar on entry based on a generalized assertion that entry by some members of the barred class might be detrimental to the interests of the United States. But here the Proclama-\n19\n\n\ftion indefinitely bans entry of more than 157 million individuals, including all nationals from six Muslim-majority countries who seek to come to the United States as immigrants, without any showing that their entry would be detrimental to the United States. In enacting the INA and in repeatedly amending it, Congress has created a detailed statutory scheme with precise rules for determining visa eligibility and identifying certain classes of noncitizens as inadmissible. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Given the historical practice and Congress’s detailed legislation in this area, § 1182(f) cannot be read to authorize the President to replace Congress’s immigration system with a nationality-based immigration system of his own.\n3. The Government is also unlikely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, because the President did not make the requisite finding to invoke his authority under § 1182(f). Congress granted the President authority to act under § 1182(f) only upon a “find[ing] that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens . . . would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (emphasis added). Although the district court found this argument unpersuasive, another district court has enjoined the Proclamation on this ground. See Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 WL 4639560, at 12 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017).\nThe Ninth Circuit held that EO-2 exceeded the President’s § 1182(f) authority because it made “no finding that nationality alone renders entry of this broad\n20\n\n\fclass of individuals a heightened security risk to the United States,” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 772. EO-2 also lacked a sufficient factual finding because it failed to “tie these nationals in any way to terrorist organizations within the . . . designated countries” or to “provide any link between an individual’s nationality and their propensity to commit terrorism.” Id. The Proclamation fails for the same reason. There still has been no finding that nationality alone can demonstrate that a person is a security risk; indeed, a DHS report refutes that claim. J.R. 771 ¶ 10. (ECF No. 54, Ex. 14). III. The Preliminary Injunction Should Not Be Limited To Plaintiffs.\nThe Government contends that the preliminary injunction is overbroad because it is not limited to Plaintiffs and their family members. Mot. 25. The Government made the same argument in challenging the EO-2 injunction, and both this Court and the Supreme Court rejected it. The Supreme Court refused to stay the EO-2 injunction as to anyone who had “a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088. The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering an injunction that applies to similarly situated individuals.\n“It is well-established that ‘district courts have broad discretion when fashioning injunctive relief.’” Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 288 (4th Cir. 2010). In upholding the EO-2 injunction, this Court explained that “nationwide\n21\n\n\finjunctions are especially appropriate in the immigration context, as Congress has made clear that ‘the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly.’” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 604 (quoting Texas, 809 F.3d at 187). And “enjoining it only as to Plaintiffs would not cure the constitutional deficiency” because EO-2’s “continued enforcement against similarly situated individuals would only serve to reinforce the message that Plaintiffs are outsiders, not full members of the political community.” Id.\nThe district court acted well within its discretion by not limiting the preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs. The court carefully balanced the equities of this case and applied the injunction nationwide to all individuals from Libya, Chad, Iran, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria with a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Op. 88. This Court’s reasons for upholding the nationwide EO-2 injunction apply equally here.\n\nDated: October 27, 2017\nJohnathan Smith Sirine Shebaya MUSLIM ADVOCATES P.O. Box 66408 Washington, D.C. 20035 Tel: (202) 897-2622 Fax: (415) 765-1774 johnathan@muslimadvocates.org\n\nRespectfully submitted,\ns/ Mark W. Mosier Mark H. Lynch Mark W. Mosier Herbert L. Fenster José E. Arvelo John W. Sorrenti Kathryn E. Cahoy Rebecca G. Van Tassell Karun Tilak COVINGTON & BURLING LLP\n22\n\n\fsirine@muslimadvocates.org\nRichard B. Katskee Eric Rothschild Andrew L. Nellis^ AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1310 L St. NW, Ste. 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 466-3234 Fax: (202) 466-3353 katskee@au.org rothschild@au.org nellis@au.org\n\nOne City Center 850 10th Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: (202) 662-6000 Fax: (202) 662-6302 mlynch@cov.com mmosier@cov.com hfenster@cov.com jarvelo@cov.com jsorrenti@cov.com ktilak@cov.com\nCounsel for IAAB Plaintiffs-Appellees\n\nCharles E. Davidow Robert A. Atkins Liza Velazquez Andrew J. Ehrlich Steven C. Herzog PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 (212) 373-3000 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\nFaiza Patel Michael Price BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU\n\nLena F. Masri Gadeir Abbas COUNCIL ON AMERICANISLAMIC RELATIONS 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lfmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nJethro Eisenstein† PROFETA & EISENSTEIN 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 23\n\n\fSCHOOL OF LAW 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\n\nTel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\nCounsel for Zakzok PlaintiffsAppellees\n\n^ Admitted only in New York; supervised by Richard B. Katskee, a member of the D.C. Bar.\n\n24\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this motion complies with the type-face requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-volume limitations of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(d)(2)(A). This motion contains 5,172 words, excluding the parts of the motion excluded by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 27(d)(2) and 32(f).\ns/ Mark W. Mosier Mark W. Mosier\n25\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 27th day of October, 2017, I filed the foregoing motion by use of the Fourth Circuit’s CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\ns/ Mark W. Mosier Mark W. Mosier\n26\n\n\f", "IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Cross-Appellants,\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2240, 17-2232, 17-2233\n\nv.\nDONALD TRUMP, et al.,\nDefendants-Appellants.\n______________________________\n\nIRAP PLAINTIFFS-CROSSAPPELLANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR AN EMERGENCY STAY PENDING APPEAL\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al.,\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nv.\n\nDONALD TRUMP, et al.,\n\nDefendants-Appellants.\n______________________________\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al.,\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nv.\n\nDONALD TRUMP, et al.,\n\nDefendants-Appellants.\n\n\fTABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 3\nI. The Government Identifies No Harm Warranting a Stay. ................... 3 II. The Government Is Unlikely to Prevail on the Merits. ........................ 7\nA. EO-3 Violates the Establishment Clause. ....................................... 7 B. EO-3 Violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. ................... 13 III.The Plaintiffs and the Public Interest Would Be Harmed by a Stay.. 20 CONCLUSION............................................................................................. 23\ni\n\n\fINTRODUCTION In the government’s prior appeal in this case, the en banc court concluded that “the Government’s asserted national security interest” was “a post hoc, secondary justification for an executive action rooted in religious animus and intended to bar Muslims from this country.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 603 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), as amended (May 31, 2017), as amended (June 15, 2017), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017). That executive action—Executive Order 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (“EO–2”)—“injure[d] Plaintiffs and in the process permeate[d] and ripple[d] across entire religious groups, communities, and society at large.” Id. at 604. The district court has now found the ban provision of Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (“EO-3”) likewise unconstitutional. It issued a preliminary injunction preventing the government from applying EO-3’s ban to persons with bona fide relationships with individuals or entities in the United States.1 Op. 88-89. The government’s motion asks this Court to stay the preliminary injunction so that the government can ban persons with meaningful ties to persons and institutions in the United States—even though the government has lost on 1 The district court did not enjoin the ban as applied to North Koreans and the set of Venezuelan nationals barred by EO-3. Op. 89.\n1\n\n\fthe merits as to EO-3 in the district courts in Maryland and Hawai‘i and even though it has been continually prohibited from applying any iteration of its ban to such persons.\nThe government’s motion recycles the same argument that it has made time and again without success: that its abstract interests warrant a stay, regardless of the harms its ban would impose on the plaintiffs and many others. Once again, the government asks for an emergency stay without demonstrating any actual urgency, and despite acting in ways that demonstrate the opposite. Once again, the government asks the Court to allow it to enforce an order that would rewrite the Immigration and Nationality Act and implement the President’s promise to ban Muslims. And once again, the government trivializes the concrete irreparable harms that the ban would cause the plaintiffs.\nA stay is even less appropriate now than it was at previous points in this litigation, when this Court and the Supreme Court denied similar requests. The severity of the new ban is greater; EO-3 would indefinitely separate the plaintiffs’ families and harm the organizational plaintiffs. And this time, a vacated but highly persuasive en banc decision of this Court strongly supports the district court’s judgment.\n2\n\n\fIt is the government’s burden to justify the extraordinary remedy of a stay pending appeal. The government cannot meet that heavy burden, and the Court should deny the motion.\nARGUMENT The government “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify” a stay pending appeal. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). The Court considers the traditional factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted). A stay is warranted “only in those extraordinary cases where the applicant is able to rebut the presumption that the decisions below—both on the merits and on the proper interim disposition of the case—are correct.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). I. The Government Identifies No Harm Warranting a Stay. The government has presented no evidence to justify a stay; instead, as before, it has presented only abstract interests and conclusory assertions. The government has not acted with the level of urgency claimed in its papers.\n3\n\n\fAnd EO-3’s own waiver provisions confirm that individualized visa vetting procedures are sufficient to protect national security.\n1. The government’s interest in immediately enforcing the ban does not justify a stay while the appeal is expeditiously litigated on the merits. Since EO-1 was issued, nearly nine months have elapsed without any ban being enforced against the individuals who are protected by the preliminary injunction. In significant part, that is because the Supreme Court refused to stay the EO-2 injunction with respect to individuals with credible claims of bona fide relationships with U.S. persons or entities. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam); see App. Stay, No. 16A1190 at 1, 3-4, 33-37 (U.S. filed June 1, 2017); see also Mot. Stay, No. 17-1351, Doc. 35 at 2-10 (4th Cir filed Mar. 24, 2017); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 606 (denying stay). That is the same class of persons protected by the injunction at issue here. The government has pointed to no new harms that would now justify the extraordinary remedy of a stay.\n2. The government primarily argues that the preliminary injunction “undermines” the President’s authority and “intrudes” on his “prerogatives.” Stay Mot. 8. But the en banc Court previously rejected “the notion that the President, because he or she represents the entire nation, suffers irreparable harm whenever an executive action is enjoined.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 603.\n4\n\n\fNor was EO-3 issued “at the height of the President’s authority.” Stay Mot. 8. As explained below, the President’s power in this case is at its “lowest ebb,” because it both exceeds his statutory authority and conflicts with Congress’s non-discrimination mandate. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).\n3. The government’s stay application fails to identify any concrete injury to the government that would occur in the absence of a stay. But in seeking a stay, the government cannot simply offer ipse dixit. See, e.g., IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (recognizing that harms to plaintiffs and those like them were “sufficiently weighty and immediate to outweigh the Government’s interest in enforcing” the prior ban); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 603 (“We are . . . unmoved by the Government’s rote invocation of harm to ‘national security interests’ as the silver bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries”).2\nAnd the record evidence indicates that no such harm exists. A bipartisan group of forty-nine former national security officials concluded that “[i]ssuing a new preliminary injunction against Travel Ban 3.0 would\n2 The government relied in the district court on a new foreign relations rationale for the ban as an “independent” reason that it would be harmed by an injunction. Response Br. 23, D. Ct. Doc. No. 212; see also id. at 44. But the stay motion (correctly) does not assert that the government is irreparably harmed on that basis. Mot. 8-9.\n5\n\n\fnot jeopardize national security.” Joint Declaration of Former National Security Officials ¶ 14, D. Ct. J.R. 774, Doc. No. 205-1. Similarly, a DHS report concluded that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity.” Id. ¶ 10, D. Ct. J.R. 771, Doc. No. 205-1 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\nIn fact, the evidence that does exist indicates that EO-3 “would undermine the national security of the United States” by disrupting national security partnerships with other nations, endangering intelligence sources, causing humanitarian harm, and supporting the recruitment narrative of terrorist organizations. Id. ¶¶ 13-15, D. Ct. J.R. 773-74, Doc. No. 205-1.\nAnd EO-3 itself demonstrates that allowing individuals from the banned countries to enter the United States on visas does not pose an unacceptable security risk. Under EO-3’s own terms, many such persons would be allowed to enter. See EO-3 § 3(a)(ii) (holders of visas issued before effective date); id. § 3(b)(iv) (dual nationals). The Order’s waiver provision likewise confirms that the government is already capable of determining whether an individual’s “entry would [] pose a threat to national security.” Id. § 3(c)(i)(B); see also Op. 54, 86.\n4. The government also has not acted with the kind of urgency typical of a party that claims to be suffering irreparable harm. See Quince Orchard\n6\n\n\fValley Citizens Ass’n, Inc. v. Hodel, 872 F.2d 75, 80 (4th Cir. 1989) (movant’s delay negates irreparable harm). EO-3 itself delayed implementation of the ban for 24 days with respect to persons covered by the preliminary injunction, from its issuance on September 24 to October 18. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161. Moreover, according to the schedule set forth in EO-2, the government could have issued EO-3 as early as August 28, see Hawai‘i v. Trump, Order Granting Consent Motion to Issue Mandate, No. 17-15589, Doc. No. 316 (9th Cir. Filed June 19, 2017); EO-2 § 2(b) (20 days allowed for first report), 2(d) (50 days allowed for second report), but instead waited until the very last day of the 90-day EO-2 ban period to do so. And in the litigation over EO-2, the government proposed a briefing schedule to the Supreme Court that would leave the merits of the case unresolved for at least four months, knowing that the injunction of the prior ban might remain in place during that time. App. Stay, No. 16A1190 at 40 (U.S. filed June 1, 2017). This lack of dispatch undercuts the government’s claim that it needs a stay while this case is expeditiously briefed.\nII. The Government Is Unlikely to Prevail on the Merits. A. EO-3 Violates the Establishment Clause. This Court, sitting en banc, concluded that EO-2 spoke “with vague\nwords of national security, but in context drip[ped] with religious intolerance,\n7\n\n\fanimus, and discrimination.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 572 (emphasis added). The relevant context—including the President’s and his advisors’ statements before and after his election calling for a Muslim ban in the guise of nationality restrictions, the ban’s disproportionate impact on Muslims, the explicit religious discrimination in the first version of the ban, and the weak, historically anomalous, and post hoc justifications offered for it— demonstrated that the primary purpose of the ban was to make good on the President’s promise to ban Muslims from the United States. Id. at 591-92, 594.\nThe district court applied this same analysis and concluded that the newest iteration was “the inextricable re-animation of the twice-enjoined Muslim ban.” Op. 83. The government has failed to meet its heavy burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits of this appeal.\nThe government’s principal contention is that “the process by which the Proclamation was issued”—namely a review yielding a report and recommendation from DHS—“foreclose[s] any suggestion that it was the product of bad faith or religious animus.” Mot. 20. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected that kind of reasoning. “[T]he world is not,” after all, “made brand new every morning.” McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (citing Santa Fe Independent School District v.\n8\n\n\fDoe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). So, as the district court observed, “[w]hen faced with allegations of a successive Establishment Clause violation, a court must . . . not lapse into the role of ‘an absentminded objective observer,’ but must instead remain ‘familiar with the history of the government’s action and competent to learn what history has to show.’” Op. 71-72 (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866).\nThe district court’s injunction rests on a careful assessment of that history. As the court found, the “underlying architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same.” Op. 75. Far from abandoning the promise of a ban on entry from Muslim-majority countries, EO-3 “doubles down on it” by making the ban potentially permanent. Op. 76. And, as the court observed, many of the “specific findings about banned countries” from EO-2 are recycled as support for EO3. Op. 77. As with EO-2, “[n]umerous distinguished former national security officials have attested to the unique nature of this travel ban and the lack of a discernible national security rationale for it . . . .” Op. 77-79. Ultimately, “where EO-1 and EO-2 were each likely to violate the Establishment Clause, and the third iteration, the Proclamation, was issued close on their heels—within nine and six months, respectively—it is ‘common sense’ that the Proclamation stands in their shadow.” Op. 72\n9\n\n\f(citing McCreary, 545 U.S. at 855, 869-72, 874); see also McCreary, 545\nU.S. at 866 (warning against looking only to “the latest news about the last\nin a series of governmental actions”).\nGiven this history and context, the district court correctly found that\nthe fact that a DHS report apparently recommended some travel restrictions\non the countries banned in EO-3 cannot “foreclose” the courts from finding\na constitutional violation, especially when EO-2 required DHS to\nrecommend a country-based ban. See Op. 76 (“the outcome of the DHS\nReview was at least partially pre-ordained”); EO-2 § 2(e) (ordering that the\nSecretary “shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended for\ninclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of\nappropriate categories of foreign nationals”) (emphases added). And if that\nwere not clear enough, the President again and again underlined what he\nexpected, calling for further bans before EO-2’s review process was even underway. Op. 82.3\n3 There are also troubling indications that White House pressure may have warped the agency recommendations. Reports indicate that the parallel process for reaching a recommendation regarding the new annual cap on refugees—which both EO-1 and EO-2 addressed—was “purely political” and “corrupt.” Jonathan Blitzer, How Stephen Miller Single-Handedly Got the U.S. to Accept Fewer Refugees, The New Yorker (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-stephen-miller-singlehandedly -got-the-us-to-accept-fewer-refugees; see also D. Ct. J.R. 123-25, Doc. No. 95-10; id. at 607, 615, Doc. No. 205-1.\n10\n\n\fMoreover, even by the government’s account, it was the President— who this Court held acted in bad faith with regard to EO-2—who “crafted” EO-3’s ban provisions “in his judgment.” Response Br., D. Ct. Doc. No. 212 at 1, 8. The ban does not even say what DHS recommended or how it chose and applied its criteria, and the government has refused to disclose publicly any part of the report or recommendations. All a reasonable observer knows is that some type of “restrictions and limitations” on the banned countries (and perhaps others) were recommended. EO-3 § 1(g). And, whatever the recommendations were, EO-3 admits a disconnect between the agency findings and EO-3 itself: Even though Somalia (which is more than 99 percent Muslim) satisfies the government’s baseline criteria, for example, it was banned anyway; even though Venezuela (whose population is less than half a percent Muslim) fails to meet the baseline, it was effectively exempted. EO-3 §§ 2(f), 2(h); Op. 77-79.\nThe government’s other objections to the district court’s conclusions are similarly baseless. It argues that the ban operates in a facially neutral way, Mot. 20, but this Court previously concluded that facial neutrality is “not dispositive,” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 595. The inclusion of two non-Muslim countries this time around is little more than a “litigating position,” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 871: The narrow ban on Venezuela, and the near-\n11\n\n\ftotal lack of visa applicants from North Korea, 4 mean those bans will have “little practical consequence,” Op. 74. And the fact that the ban operates differently as to different banned countries does not demonstrate that the ban’s primary purpose is secular. Mot. 21-22. Notably, individuals with immigrant visas—who on entry become lawful permanent residents—are banned from all the Muslim-majority countries (but not from Venezuela).\nUltimately, the government resorts—as in the prior appeal—to alarm about other actions and other Presidents. Mot. 4, 24. But the Establishment Clause requires just the kind of common sense the district court applied. This President repeatedly promised a Muslim ban using nationality as a proxy, never repudiated that promise, and has signed three historically unprecedented orders banning hundreds of millions of people, overwhelmingly Muslim, based on nationality this year. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961) (holding that religious purpose from “centuries ago” had abated). The district court was right to look at the context of the President’s action, and to conclude that the third ban shares the purpose of the two earlier bans to which it is explicitly and inextricably connected. See Op. 80.\n4 See Op. at 74 (noting that “the ban on North Korea will, according to Department of State statistics, affect fewer than 100 people”).\n12\n\n\fB. EO-3 Violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. EO-3 also violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, both for the specific reason found by the district court—that it violates the INA’s prohibition on nationality discrimination in 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)—and because it exceeds the President’s authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a). 1. The district court correctly held that EO-3 violates the INA’s core anti-discrimination mandate. That mandate, enacted in the original Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, ended the national-origins quota system, which had been designed to favor some ethnic groups and disfavor others. President Johnson, in his signing statement, declared that “for over four decades the immigration policy of the United States has been twisted and has been distorted by the harsh injustice of the national origins quota system.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill (Oct. 3, 1965). The INA therefore provides that “no person shall . . . be discriminated in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s . . . nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). EO-3 resurrects the discriminatory national-origins quota system that Congress abolished in 1965. It provides that nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia may not come to the United States “as\n13\n\n\fimmigrants”—i.e., future lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens— indefinitely, solely because of their nationality. EO-3 § 2(a)-(h); see id. § 1(h)(ii) (explaining that the Order “distinguish[es] between the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants” and bars the use of immigrant visas). The breadth of this nationality-based ban has no post-1965 parallel. It squarely violates § 1152(a)(1)(A). See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 635-38 (Thacker, J., concurring); Hawai‘i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 776-79 (2017).\nAs the district court correctly held, it is irrelevant that EO-3 claims to bar only “entry” using immigrant visas, not the issuance of those visas. Op. 44-45. First, the claim is wrong: The government has repeatedly admitted that it will implement EO-3 “by denying visas.” Br. for the Petitioners, IRAP v. Trump, Nos. 16-1436 & 16-1540, at 51-52.5 Second, banning entry to immigrant visa holders achieves the same effect as banning issuance of the visas themselves, because a visa is effectively nullified if its holder is categorically barred from entering the country. An indefinite immigrantvisa entry ban therefore achieves the precise result that § 1152(a) forbids. The government’s response is a substanceless assertion that § 1182(f) allows the President to “limit the universe of individuals eligible to receive [immigrant] visas” on the basis of nationality, which is somehow distinct 5 The State Department itself describes EO-3 as a “Presidential Proclamation on Visas.” D. Ct. J.R. 506, Doc. No. 205-1.\n14\n\n\ffrom discriminating in visa issuance on the basis of nationality. Stay Mot. 17. The INA’s hard-won non-discrimination principle is not so easily evaded.\nThere is no conflict between § 1152(a) and § 1182(f); as explained below, the latter does not empower the President to override Congress’s enacted policy judgments. But if there were, § 1152(a) would control. It is later-enacted and more specific, in that it specifically addresses nationality discrimination in the issuance of visas, while § 1182(f) is silent as to visa issuance in general and discrimination in particular. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 & n.7 (1976).\n2. More generally, EO-3 exceeds the President’s suspension authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Although the district court declined to enjoin EO3 on this ground, it is nonetheless an alternative basis for this Court to affirm the injunction, which plaintiffs will brief more fully at the merits stage.\nThe government claims that § 1182(f) allows the President to override Congress’s own enacted policy judgments—indeed, to rewrite any part of the INA with the mere recitation of the statutory words themselves. But that is contrary to our constitutional structure: The President may not “enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes,” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998), nor has Congress permitted him to do so. See Carlson v. Landon,\n15\n\n\f342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952) (holding that a delegation of immigration authority was only permissible where “the executive judgment is limited by adequate standards”); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). The President must therefore exercise his delegated authority consistent with the “declared policy of Congress.” Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924).\nEO-3 upends numerous congressional policy choices. As discussed above, it violates Congress’s prohibition against nationality-based visa discrimination. It also formally rejects (while implicitly acknowledging the efficacy of) the individualized visa vetting process Congress has designed. EO-3 claims that its unprecedented bans are necessary to deny visas to foreigners about whom the government “lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States,” EO-3 § 1(h)(i), but does not even acknowledge that existing law—the system Congress designed— already requires consular officers to deny visas whenever they lack sufficient information to negate any of the terrorism or public-safety grounds of inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (individual applicant’s burden to negate inadmissibility); id. § 1182(a)(2) (criminal bars), (a)(3)(A)-(C), (F) (terrorism bars); 22 C.F.R. § 40.6(a) (applicant’s burden). EO-3’s waiver provisions only underscore the value of that system. See EO-3 § 3(c). Those provisions employ consular officials to make individual decisions, as\n16\n\n\fCongress did in the INA; they just replace the substantive standards that Congress prescribed with those of the President’s choosing.\nRelatedly, EO-3 rejects Congress’s method for encouraging countries to share information, issue secure passports, and engage in other practices. Since the 1980s, Congress has used the Visa Waiver Program—under which certain foreign nationals can travel to the United States for certain short-term nonimmigrant visits without applying for a visa—to spur other countries to meet a list of conditions for participation in the program. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187. EO-3 imposes a fundamentally different sanction: If a country fails to meet virtually the exact same criteria, see EO-3 § 1(c)(i)-(iii), its nationals are banned from receiving most visas, including (for the Muslim-majority countries) immigrant visas.\nFinally, EO-3 overrides Congress’s conclusions about how to address safety concerns relating to the very countries it bans. Congress considered that issue in 2015 and decided that the appropriate response to those concerns was to bar from the Visa Waiver Program individuals who had visited or were dual nationals of the countries in question. See Pub. L. 114113, div. O, tit. II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)); see also 4 Cong. Rec. H9051 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Miller) (explaining that Congress would now require the individuals in question “to\n17\n\n\fapply for a visa and go through the formal visa screening process” in “an abundance of caution”). Notably, Congress rejected a proposal to ban individuals from these countries. E.g., S. 2302, 114th Cong., introduced Nov. 18, 2015. EO-3’s basic premise is that Congress got this wrong. Based on the same security concerns for the same countries, it imposes the far more drastic remedy that Congress expressly rejected.\nNo other President has used § 1182(f) to override Congress’s enacted policy judgments, or suggested that it authorized such action. Rather, past Presidents have invoked the statute to address detriments to the national interest that Congress had not itself already addressed. For example, President Reagan’s 1986 suspension covering certain Cuban nationals responded to a fast-developing diplomatic event that Congress had not passed any statute to resolve. Proclamation No. 5,517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (Aug. 22, 1986). President Bush’s 1992 suspension of unauthorized entry by sea likewise responded to an influx of unauthorized migrants for which Congress had not provided a statutory solution. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (May 24, 1992). Other § 1182(f) suspensions have been far narrower, reaching only a handful of individuals who had contributed to specific and recent harmful situations abroad, none of which Congress had\n18\n\n\faddressed. See generally Kate M. Manuel, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens, 6-10, Cong. Res. Serv., Jan. 23, 2017 (listing § 1182(f) suspensions).\n3. Finally, the government is wrong that its entry ban is immune from statutory review. Stay Mot. 10-12. Both this Court and the Ninth Circuit have already rejected the government’s troubling claim of unreviewable authority. Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 768-69; IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587-88. The Supreme Court itself reviewed a statutory claim against a § 1182(f) suspension on the merits in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 163-66 (1993), despite the government’s lengthy argument—just like in this case—that § 1182(f) suspensions were unreviewable, and that therefore the Court was barred from even considering the merits. See U.S. Br. 13-18 & n.9, 55-57, 1992 WL 541276, Reply Br. 1-4, 1993 WL 290141, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. (No. 92-344).\nThe government invokes the doctrine of consular non-reviewability, Stay Mot. 11-12, but as multiple Circuits have held, that doctrine applies only to “a particular determination in a particular case,” not a “general” policy. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); accord Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999)\n19\n\n\f(describing doctrine as applying to “a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa” (emphases added)); id. at 1160, 1162.\nThose cases, along with Sale, belie the government’s invocation of a broader “principle” of non-reviewability. Stay Mot. 11-12. The government does not cite a single case recognizing any such principle, only a series of cases reviewing admissions policies deferentially on the merits. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-99 (1977); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 583 & n.4 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544-47 (1950) (reviewing two statutory claims against regulations promulgated under a presidential proclamation). As the en banc Court explained, the notion that “this Court lacks the authority to review high-level government policy of the sort here” is “a dangerous idea,” and the Supreme Court “has not countenanced judicial abdication, especially where constitutional rights, values, and principles are at stake.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587.\nIII. The Plaintiffs and the Public Interest Would Be Harmed by a Stay.\nA stay would cause immediate irreparable harm to both the organizational and individual plaintiffs. See Op. 84-85. As the district court correctly found, EO-3 would harm the plaintiffs by separating them from family members and denigrating their religion. The district court’s findings\n20\n\n\fof harm and tailoring of relief are entitled to significant deference. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procedures, 409 U.S. 1207, 1218 (1972). In any event, both this Court and the Supreme Court have rejected the government’s argument that the plaintiffs are somehow not irreparably harmed by a ban that condemns their religion and prolongs the separation from their families. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 602; id. at 611-12 (Keenan, J., concurring); IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087-88.\n1. Each day, each hour the ban is in effect, plaintiffs are told by the highest levels of their government that they are less than full members of our national community, and that they, their family members, and their colleagues and friends are suspect because of their religion. Such a “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 602.\n2. Likewise, the indefinite separation of the individual plaintiffs and the organizational plaintiffs’ clients and members from their loved ones would inflict grave irreparable harm. There is no damages remedy that can compensate for one’s separation from a loved one being unlawfully prolonged. The government’s blithe assertion, without citation, that delay in\n21\n\n\freunification “does not amount to irreparable harm,” Mot. 9, is self-evidently wrong.\nThe impacts on plaintiffs here are severe. For example, Ms. Khazaeli’s husband has terminal cancer, and her sister will likely never see him again if EO-3 takes effect. Khazaeli Decl. ¶ 12, D. Ct. J.R. 465, Doc. No. 205-1. AAANY has clients whose parents are stranded in dangerous circumstances in Yemen and Syria, Issa-Ibrahim Decl. ¶ 21-22, D. Ct. J.R. 442, Doc. No. 205-1, and a client whose husband has not yet seen his newborn son, id. ¶ 19, D. Ct. J.R. 441, Doc. No. 205-1. John Doe #4 finds life without his wife “excruciatingly difficult,” and is unable to start a family while they are separated. Doe #4 Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, D. Ct. J.R. 461, Doc. No. 205-1. John Doe #5’s mother fled Yemen and is stranded in Jordan, where she cares for her mother, who has Alzheimer’s disease; the ban will prevent her from obtaining medical care in the United States. Doe #5 Decl. ¶ 4, D. Ct. J.R. 446-47, Doc. No. 205-1.\n3. Finally, the Court should reject the government’s request to partially stay the preliminary injunction by limiting it to the plaintiffs. While the government expresses alarm at a “worldwide” or “global” injunction, Mot. 3, 25, the Supreme Court approved of an injunction with the same scope as the one at issue here. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088. This Court\n22\n\n\flikewise rejected the contention that the previous preliminary injunction\n\nshould be limited in this way. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 602.\n\n“[T]he scope of . . . relief rests within [the district court’s] sound\n\ndiscretion.” Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 710 (4th Cir. 2002). The\n\ndistrict court’s decision to enjoin EO-3 nationwide was correct. As this\n\nCourt previously held, the nature of EO-3’s constitutional violations means\n\nthat “enjoining it only as to Plaintiffs would not cure the constitutional\n\ndeficiency,” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 605, because the unmistakable message of\n\ngovernmental condemnation would remain. Moreover, the organizational\n\nplaintiffs have employees, clients, and members located across the country,\n\nmaking more limited relief impractical. Id. And because EO-3 exceeds the\n\nPresident’s statutory authority, its bans “are invalid” as a categorical matter.\n\nUtil. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014); see also\n\nHarmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining\n\nthat when courts hold government action unlawful, “the ordinary result”\n\nunder the APA “is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the\n\nindividual petitioners is proscribed”).\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThe Court should deny the motion for a stay pending appeal.\n\nDated: October 27, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n23\n\n\fKaren C. Tumlin Nicholas Espíritu Melissa S. Keaney Esther Sung National Immigration Law Center 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600 Los Angeles, CA 90010 Tel: (213) 639-3900 Fax: (213) 639-3911 tumlin@nilc.org espiritu@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org sung@nilc.org\nJustin B. Cox National Immigration Law Center PO Box 170208 Atlanta, GA 30317 Tel: (678) 279-5441 Fax: (213) 639-3911 cox@nilc.org\nKathryn Claire Meyer Mariko Hirose International Refugee Assistance Project 40 Rector Street, 9th Floor New York, New York 10006 Tel: (646) 459-3044 Fax: (212) 533-4598 kmeyer@refugeerights.org mhirose@refugeerights.org\nDavid Rocah Deborah A. Jeon Sonia Kumar Nicholas Taichi Steiner American Civil Liberties Union\n\n/s/ Omar C. Jadwat Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Hina Shamsi Hugh Handeyside Sarah L. Mehta David Hausman American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 549-2600 Fax: (212) 549-2654 ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org hshamsi@aclu.org hhandeyside@aclu.org smehta@aclu.org dhausman@aclu.org\nCecillia D. Wang Cody H. Wofsy Spencer E. Amdur American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 343-0770 Fax: (415) 395-0950 cwang@aclu.org cwofsy@aclu.org samdur@aclu.org\nDavid Cole Daniel Mach Heather L. Weaver American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 915 15th Street NW Washington, DC 20005\n\n24\n\n\fFoundation of Maryland 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 Tel: (410) 889-8555 Fax: (410) 366-7838 jeon@aclu-md.org rocah@aclu-md.org kumar@aclu-md.org steiner@aclu-md.org\n\nTel: (202) 675-2330 Fax: (202) 457-0805 dcole@aclu.org dmach@aclu.org hweaver@aclu.org\n\n25\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI hereby certify that on this 27th day of October, 2017, I caused a\n\nPDF version of the foregoing document to be electronically transmitted to\n\nthe Clerk of the Court, using the CM/ECF System for filing and for\n\ntransmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to all CM/ECF registrants.\n\nDated: October 27, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Omar Jadwat Omar C. Jadwat\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nPursuant to FRAP 32(g)(1), I hereby certify that the foregoing motion\n\ncomplies with the type-volume limitation in FRAP 27(d)(2)(A). According to\n\nMicrosoft Word, the motion contains 5,110 words and has been prepared in a\n\nproportionally spaced typeface using Times New Roman in 14 point size.\n\nDated: October 27, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Omar Jadwat Omar C. Jadwat\n\n\f", "2017 WL 4674314 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.\nUnited States District Court, D. Maryland.\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs, v.\nDonald J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al., Defendants. Iranian Alliances Across Borders, et al., Plaintiffs,\nv. Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al., Defendants.\nEblal Zakzok, et al., Plaintiffs, v.\nDonald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al., Defendants.\nCivil Action No. TDC–17–0361, Civil Action No. TDC–17–2921, Civil Action No. TDC–17–2969\n\| Signed 10/17/2017\nSynopsis Background: Individuals and organizations brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief against President of the United States and Executive Branch officials and agencies, challenging under the Establishment Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) a Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad). Plaintiffs filed motion for preliminary injunction.\n\n[3] plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on merits of claim that Proclamation conflicted with Congress’s detailed system governing issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas; and\n[4] challengers were likely to succeed on merits of Establishment Clause claim.\nMotion granted in part and denied in part.\n\nWest Headnotes (71)\n\n[1]\n\nCourts\n\nOperation and effect in general\n\nA judgment of the Court of Appeals, which is vacated as moot, is stripped of its binding effect.\n\nCases that cite this headnote\n\n[2] Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest\nTo invoke the judicial power of the federal courts under Article III, a litigant must have standing. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n\nHoldings: The District Court, Theodore D. Chuang, J., held that:\n[1] plaintiffs were likely to succeed on merits of claim that Proclamation violated INA’s prohibition of national origin discrimination in issuing immigrant visas;\n[2] plaintiffs were likely to succeed on merits of claim that Proclamation’s findings regarding detriment to national interest were insufficient to invoke President’s delegated authority under INA to suspend entry of aliens or a class of aliens;\n\n[3] Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest\nFederal Civil Procedure Causation; redressability\nA plaintiff establishes Article III standing by demonstrating: (1) a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent; (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\n1\n\n\fCases that cite this headnote\n[4] Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest\nTo have statutory standing, the plaintiff must have interests that fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[5] Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest\nArticle III standing must be established for each claim. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[6] Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest\nFederal Courts Case or Controversy Requirement\nThe presence of one plaintiff with Article III standing renders a claim justiciable. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[7] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nDeclaratory Judgment Subjects of relief in general\nUnited States citizens and lawful permanent residents satisfied injury-in-fact element for Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by\n\nnationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; plaintiffs had immediate family members who were nationals of the designated countries and who were currently in the process of securing a visa to come to U.S. as immigrants, and plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by prolonged separation from those immediate family members who were unable to travel to U.S. under Proclamation’s terms. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[8] Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest\nA threat of an injury that is real and immediate can support Article III standing. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[9] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nFor an organization’s claim of Article III standing, the court conducts the same inquiry as in the case of an individual. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[10] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nAn organization suffers an injury-in-fact, as\n2\n\n\felement for Article III standing, when a defendant’s actions impede its efforts to carry out its mission. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[11] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nAn injury to an organization that is sufficient to support Article III standing generally does not arise from a decision to expend resources on member education or litigation in response to legislation. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[12] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nDeclaratory Judgment Subjects of relief in general\nInjuries alleged to proprietary and organizational interests of plaintiff organizations were sufficient to satisfy injury-in-fact element for Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; organizations alleged that Proclamation would disrupt their upcoming conferences and events in U.S. by preventing individuals from designated countries from attending, and by disrupting organizations’ ability to raise money, to train their staff, and to convene programs on topics of significance to their mission of fostering the free flow of ideas. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\n\nCases that cite this headnote\n[13] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nDeclaratory Judgment Subjects of relief in general\nPlaintiff organizations, which engaged in exchanges of ideas with foreign nationals who visited the United States or which focused on refugee resettlement, fell within zone of interests protected by INA, as required for statutory standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; organizations that engaged in exchanges of ideas had substantial interest in effective operation of INA’s provisions for admitting foreign scholars and other foreign nationals to U.S. as nonimmigrants to attend educational conferences, and refugee resettlement organization needed to engage foreign-national employees familiar with parts of the world with refugee populations and needed periodically to have those employees travel to and from U.S. for planning, direction, and training. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[14] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nTo establish associational standing, an organization must establish that: (1) its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires\n3\n\n\fthe participation of individual members in the lawsuit.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[15] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nTo establish associational standing, an organization must make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member has suffered or will suffer harm.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[16] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nDeclaratory Judgment Subjects of relief in general\nTwo organizations satisfied the requirement of identifying at least one individual member who would have standing to sue in member’s own right, as element for organizations’ associational standing under Article III to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; identified individual members were United States citizens or lawful permanent residents seeking to secure an immigrant visa for a close relative in one of the designated countries. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n\n[17] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nDeclaratory Judgment Subjects of relief in general\nTwo organizations satisfied the requirement that their claims on behalf of individual members were germane to organizations’ purposes, as element for organizations’ associational standing under Article III to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; one organization had purpose of fostering greater understanding and dialogue with Middle East nations, including one or more of the designated countries, and other organization had purpose of helping Yemeni American business owners navigate immigration issues they faced. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[18] Constitutional Law Freedom of Religion and Conscience\nTo have Article III standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim, a plaintiff must meet the same elements as for any other claim: (1) a cognizable injury; (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) there is a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[19] Constitutional Law\n4\n\n\fFreedom of Religion and Conscience\nTo show an injury, as element for Article III standing in the context of the Establishment Clause, the plaintiff must have personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion resulting in a personal injury, and the injury can take the form of noneconomic, intangible harm to spiritual beliefs, such as feelings of marginalization and exclusion, because one of the core objectives of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the State from sending a message to non-adherents of a particular religion that they are outsiders who are not full members of the political community. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[20] Civil Rights Injury and Causation\nDeclaratory Judgment Subjects of relief in general\nIndividual plaintiffs sufficiently alleged their personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion, as required for Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that the Proclamation violated the Establishment Clause; plaintiffs alleged personal injuries through prolonged separation from close relatives who would be barred from entry to United States under the Proclamation, and several plaintiffs alleged specific intangible injuries, such as feeling attacked, targeted, and disparaged by Proclamation’s hostility to Muslims and fearing for their safety as a result, and feeling like a “second-class citizen.” U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(f); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n\n[21] Associations Actions by or Against Associations\nDeclaratory Judgment Subjects of relief in general\nTwo organizations satisfied requirement that their Establishment Clause claims on behalf of individual members were germane to organizations’ purposes, as element for organizations’ associational standing under Article III to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad); one organization had the purpose of fostering understanding of the Middle East, in which there were many predominantly Muslim nations, and other organization was founded in part to oppose what its members perceived to be a Muslim ban arising from an earlier Executive Order. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(f); Executive Order No. 13,769, Jan. 27, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 2017 WL 412752; Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[22] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nCivil Rights Preliminary Injunction\nDeclaratory Judgment Federal officers and boards\nClaims of individual plaintiffs, whose family members were already in process of seeking visas, satisfied ripeness requirement for justiciability, in action for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that\n5\n\n\fProclamation violated Establishment Clause and exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; while family members had not been denied both a visa and a waiver from Proclamation’s restrictions, denial of visas was generally mandated based on Proclamation’s plain language, and waiver process itself presented additional hurdle not faced by other visa applicants and that would delay family reunification, thus creating a harm not contingent on future events. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[23] Federal Courts Nature of dispute; concreteness\nA claim is generally not ripe, and therefore is not justiciable, if it is based on contingent future events.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[24] Federal Courts Fitness and hardship\nIn assessing ripeness, as required for justiciability, courts are to consider the fitness of the issues for decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial consideration.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[25] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nCivil Rights Preliminary Injunction\nDeclaratory Judgment\n\nFederal officers and boards\nFitness of issues for decision and hardship to parties of withholding judicial consideration weighed in favor of finding ripeness, as required for justiciability of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation violated Establishment Clause and exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; Proclamation was in final form, case was not dependent on facts that might derive from visa application process or process to obtain waiver from Proclamation’s restrictions, and withholding judicial consideration until waivers were adjudicated would cause undue hardship to individual plaintiffs through prolonged separation from family members. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[26] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nDeclaratory Judgment Federal officers and boards\nDoctrine of consular nonreviewability was not applicable as a bar to justiciability of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation violated Establishment Clause and exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; plaintiffs were not challenging individual visa decisions by consular officers, and instead were challenging Proclamation’s overarching travel ban policy. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential\n6\n\n\fProclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[27] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Right of review or intervention; standing\nUnited States Review of presidential actions\nIndividuals and organizations were adversely affected or aggrieved, as required for standing under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to seek judicial review of Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; plaintiffs were within INA’s zone of interests and were injured by denial of immigrant or nonimmigrant visas for family members or for expected conference attendees. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n\nwho would implement the Proclamation, and against whom injunctive relief was sought. 5 U.S.C.A. § 704; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[29] United States Review of presidential actions\nJudicial review of the legality of a Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President’s directive.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[30] Administrative Law and Procedure Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions\nThere is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.\nCases that cite this headnote\n\n[28] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Decisions reviewable\nAgency action existed, for purposes of final agency action requirement for judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), which was challenged based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA, though President, as a defendant, was not the head of a federal department or agency, where other defendants were federal agency officials\n\n[31] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Decisions reviewable\nFinality existed, for purposes of final agency action requirement for judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), which was challenged based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; Proclamation was already in effect as to certain individuals and was being enforced by federal agencies. 5 U.S.C.A. § 704; Immigration and\n7\n\n\fNationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[32] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Jurisdiction and venue\nA matter committed to agency discretion by law, which would not be subject to judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), was not presented in action challenging Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), which challenge was based on allegations that Proclamation exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA to suspend entry by aliens and classes of aliens based on finding of detriment to national interest; a manageable standard existed for evaluating President’s exercise of discretion under INA. 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(2); Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[33] Injunction Grounds in general; multiple factors\nTo obtain a preliminary injunction, moving parties must establish that: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.\nCases that cite this headnote\n\n[34] Injunction Extraordinary or unusual nature of remedy\nInjunction Clear showing or proof\nBecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, it may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[35] Constitutional Law Necessity of Determination\nCourts should be extremely careful not to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[36] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Power to regulate in general\nThe formulation of immigration policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[37] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Immigrant Visas\nAliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Grounds for Denial of Admission or\nExclusion\nPresident’s delegated authority under INA, to suspend entry by aliens and classes of aliens based on finding of detriment to national interest, is limited by INA’s bar on national origin discrimination in issuing immigrant visas. Immigration and Nationality Act §§\n8\n\n\f202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f).\nCases that cite this headnote\n[38] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Immigrant Visas\nAliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Grounds for Denial of Admission or\nExclusion United States\nReview of presidential actions\nINA’s prohibition of national origin discrimination in issuing immigrant visas provided a basis for challenging Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), though suspension of entry was not literally a suspension of issuance of immigrant visas; visa issuance and entry usually went hand-in-hand because an immigrant could not seek entry without first obtaining an immigrant visa and because receiving an immigrant visa was meaningless without later receiving permission to enter, and the Proclamation made clear that its intended effect was to deny the issuance of immigrant visas. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[39] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nChallengers were likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary injunction, as to claim that Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad) violated INA’s prohibition of national origin discrimination in issuing immigrant visas;\n\nProclamation made clear that its intended effect was to deny the issuance of immigrant visas based on nationality. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[40] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Immigrant Visas\nAliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Visa Proceedings\nAliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Grounds for Denial of Admission or\nExclusion United States\nReview of presidential actions\nINA, by stating that nothing in its prohibition of national origin discrimination in issuing immigrant visas was to be construed as limiting Secretary of State’s authority to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications, did not provide basis for upholding an allegedly discriminatory Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad); that statement applied only to Secretary of State, and Proclamation’s imposition of indefinite travel ban based on nationality, after a 90-day pause in earlier Executive Order, could not be fairly construed as a change in procedures. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A, B), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A, B), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Executive Order No. 13,780, § 2(c), March 6, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 2017 WL 875616; Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n9\n\n\f[41] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nChallengers were likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary injunction, as to claim that findings of detriment to national interest, in Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), were insufficient to invoke President’s delegated authority under INA to suspend entry of aliens or a class of aliens; Proclamation did not provide examples of vetting failures involving nationals from designated countries that resulted in entry of terrorists or others who should not have been admitted, Proclamation’s choices to include or exclude countries in the designations were questionable, and Proclamation appeared to be overbroad with regard to its purported goals. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[42] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Decisions reviewable\nUnited States Review of presidential actions\nCourt would not be improperly second-guessing a decision that was appropriately committed to the President by exercising judicial review for claim that Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad) exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA to exclude aliens or a class of aliens based on finding of detriment to national interest; judicial review of whether executive action exceeded statutory authority was plainly within the purview of the courts. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(f); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\n\nCases that cite this headnote\n[43] United States Review of presidential actions\nJudicial review of whether executive action by the President exceeds statutory authority is within the purview of the courts.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[44] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nChallengers were not likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary injunction, as to claim that Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad) exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA to suspend entry by aliens and classes of aliens based on finding of detriment to national interest, by allegedly conflicting with Congress’s detailed system governing issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and by allegedly conflicting with Congress’s policy judgments when addressing the problem of information-sharing by foreign governments, such as enactment of and amendments to Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(f), 217(a)(1, 3, 12), (c)(2), 291, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(f), 1187(a)(1, 3, 12), (c)(2), 1361; Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[45] Constitutional Law Advancement, endorsement, or sponsorship\nof religion; favoring or preferring religion\nThe core harm of a violation of the\n10\n\n\fEstablishment Clause is the dissemination of a public message that the Government has adopted an official policy of favoring one religion. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[46] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Immigrant Visas\nAliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Judicial review and intervention\nA consular officer’s denial of a consular visa, which is challenged as being in violation of constitutional rights, is “bona fide,” on judicial review to determine whether there is a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the denial, if there has been no affirmative showing of bad faith by the officer.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[47] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Judicial review and intervention\nOn judicial review to determine whether there is a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for a consular officer’s denial of a consular visa, which denial is challenged as being in violation of constitutional rights, if there is a particularized showing of bad faith, a court should then look behind the officer’s action to evaluate its justification.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[48] Civil Rights Preliminary Injunction\nChallengers were likely to succeed on merits, as element for preliminary injunction, as to Establishment Clause claim that facially legitimate reason, i.e., national security, that was proffered for Presidential Proclamation\n\nindefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad) was not bona fide and instead was pretext for anti-Muslim bias; challengers offered substantial direct evidence, including statements from the President and his advisors during the campaign, after the election, and after the President took office, that the Proclamation was motivated by a desire to ban Muslims as a group from entering the United States, and implementation and enforcement of two earlier Executive Orders, which had fundamentally the same underlying architecture as the Proclamation and which had been issued within the past nine months, had been preliminarily enjoined based on likely success of Establishment Clause challenges. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Executive Order No. 13,769, Jan. 27, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 2017 WL 412752; Executive Order No. 13,780, § 2(c), March 6, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 2017 WL 875616; Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[49] Constitutional Law Neutrality\nThe Establishment Clause mandates governmental neutrality between religions, and between religion and nonreligion. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[50] Constitutional Law Establishment of Religion\nUnder the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge: (1) an act must have a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster an excessive government entanglement with\n11\n\n\freligion. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[51] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nIn Establishment Clause cases, purpose matters, and thus, when determining whether an act has a secular purpose, as element of Lemon v. Kurtzman test for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge, the purpose element is not satisfied by the identification of any secular purpose, given the ease of finding some secular purpose for almost any government action. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[52] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nWhile governmental statements of purpose generally receive deference when applying the secular purpose element of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge, an identified secular purpose must be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[53] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nIf a religious purpose for the government action is the predominant or primary purpose, and the secular purpose is secondary, the secular purpose element of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge has not been satisfied. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\n\nCases that cite this headnote\n[54] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nAn assessment of the purpose of an action, when applying the secular purpose element of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge, is a common task for courts, and an understanding of official objective can emerge from readily discoverable fact without any judicial psychoanalysis of the decisionmaker. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[55] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nIn determining purpose, when applying the secular purpose element of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge, a court acts as an objective observer who considers the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute or comparable official act. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[56] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nWhen applying the secular purpose element of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge, because the world is not made brand new every morning, the court must consider the historical context of a challenged action and the specific sequence of events leading up to it. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n12\n\n\f[57] Constitutional Law Establishment of Religion\nBecause reasonable observers have reasonable memories, past Establishment Clause violations are relevant to the assessment of present government actions. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[58] Constitutional Law Establishment of Religion\nWhen faced with allegations of a successive Establishment Clause violation, a court must not lapse into the role of an absentminded objective observer, but must instead remain familiar with the history of the government’s action and remain competent to learn what history has to show. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[59] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nIn determining purpose, when applying the secular purpose element of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge, past actions do not forever taint present ones, and while courts should reject an implausible claim that governmental purpose has changed, they should also take account of genuine changes in constitutionally significant conditions. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[60] Constitutional Law Establishment of Religion\n\nIt is possible that a government may begin with an impermissible purpose, or create an unconstitutional effect, but later take affirmative actions to neutralize the Establishment Clause violation, and in assessing whether curative effects are sufficient to overcome an objective observer’s impression of an impermissible Establishment Clause violation, governmental curative actions would need to not only persuasively present a primary nonreligious effect, but also disassociate the government action from its previous religious effect, and specifically, the governmental cure should be: (1) purposeful; (2) public; and (3) at least as persuasive as the initial Establishment Clause violation. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[61] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Grounds for Denial of Admission or\nExclusion Constitutional Law\nParticular Issues and Applications\nEstablishment Clause inquiry, for Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), did not end with fact that, within the four corners of the Proclamation, there was no explicit distinction among countries based on religion; Establishment Clause violation could arise from facially neutral government action, a simple check on the demographics of the geographic area affected by the Proclamation, with a combined population that was predominantly Muslim, revealed that its impact closely aligned with religious affiliation, and inclusion of two non-majority-Muslim nations, North Korea and Venezuela, did not persuasively show a lack of religious purpose behind the Proclamation. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n13\n\n\f[62] Constitutional Law Secular purpose\nIn Establishment Clause cases, it is the opinion of the reasonable observer that controls, and secular purposes that can be discerned only if one burrows into a difficult-to-access record do little to assure the public that the government is not endorsing a religious view. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[63] Civil Rights Preliminary Injunction\nLikelihood of irreparable harm from the alleged Establishment Clause violation existed, as element for preliminary injunction, in action challenging Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad); any Establishment Clause violation occurred the moment government action took place. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[64] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nLikelihood of irreparable harm, from President allegedly exceeding his delegated authority under INA, existed, as element for preliminary injunction, in action challenging Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad); plaintiffs seeking immigrant visas\n\nfor family members had a threatened injury from delayed family reunification that could not be compensated by money damages at a later trial. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[65] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nCivil Rights Preliminary Injunction\nBalancing of equities favored preliminary injunction, extending only to individuals with bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States, with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), which allegedly violated the Establishment Clause and exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; plaintiffs faced significant, irreparable harm from prolonged separation from family members and from alleged Establishment Clause violation, Executive Branch officials and agencies would not be directly harmed by preliminary injunction preventing them from enforcing a Proclamation likely to be found unconstitutional, and officials and agencies had not shown that national security could not be maintained without an unprecedented multicountry travel ban. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[66] Civil Rights\n14\n\n\fPreliminary Injunction\nPreventing an Establishment Clause violation provides a significant public benefit, for purposes of public interest factor for granting a preliminary injunction. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[67] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nThe public interest was a factor favoring preliminary injunction with respect to Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad), which allegedly exceeded President’s delegated authority under the INA; the INA represented a judgment by Congress that immigration policy should not discriminate on basis of nationality, and the significant public interest in national security was not paramount. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[68] Injunction Discretion as to scope of relief\nA federal district court has wide discretion to fashion appropriate injunctive relief in a particular case.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[69] Injunction Specificity, vagueness, overbreadth, and\nnarrowly-tailored relief\n\nInjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[70] Injunction Geographical scope of relief\nNationwide injunctions are appropriate if necessary to afford relief to the prevailing party.\nCases that cite this headnote\n[71] Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship Injunction\nCivil Rights Preliminary Injunction\nNationwide preliminary injunction was warranted, in action by individuals and organizations, alleging that Presidential Proclamation indefinitely barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad) violated the Establishment Clause and exceeded President’s delegated authority under INA; the individual and organizational plaintiffs were located in different parts of the United States, an Establishment Clause violation would have impacts beyond the personal interests of individual parties, and a fragmented approach would run afoul of constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform immigration law and policy. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 212(f), 215(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152(a)(1)(A), 1182(f), 1185(a)(1); Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, § 2(a, b, c, e, g, h), Sept. 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 2017 WL 4231190.\nCases that cite this headnote\n15\n\n\fAttorneys and Law Firms\nDavid Robert Rocah, Deborah A. Jeon, Nicholas Taichi Steiner, Sonia Kumar, ACLU of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, Justin B. Cox, Atlanta, GA, Cecillia D. Wang, Cody Wofsy, American Civil Liberties Union San Francisco, CA, Daniel Mach, David D. Cole, Heather Lynn Weaver, ACLU Foundation, Washington, DC, David Hausman, Hina Shamsi, Hugh Handeyside, Lee Gelernt, Omar C. Jadwat, Sarah L. Mehta, Spencer E. Amdur, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, Esther Sung, Karen C. Tumlin, Melissa S. Keaney, Nicholas Espiritu, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.\nArjun Garg, Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei, Michelle Bennett, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.\nMEMORANDUM OPINION\nTHEODORE D. CHUANG, United States District Judge\n1 For the third time this year, President Donald J. Trump has issued an order banning the entry into the United States, with some exceptions, of nationals of multiple predominantly Muslim nations. At issue is whether this latest travel ban should be enjoined by this Court because it is the latest incarnation of the “Muslim ban” originally promised by President Trump as a candidate for the presidency, and thus violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or because the issuance of the travel ban exceeds the President’s delegated authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to suspend the entry into the United States of classes of immigrants and nonimmigrants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that a preliminary injunction is warranted.\nINTRODUCTION\nOn January 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (“EO–1”), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), which barred the entry into the United States of nationals of seven predominantly Muslim countries for a 90–day period. On February 7, 2017,\n\nPlaintiffs International Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”), HIAS, Inc., and seven individuals (collectively, “the IRAP Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint in this Court alleging that EO–1 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. I; the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V; the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012); the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4 (2012); the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–1524 (2012); and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).\nOn March 6, 2017, after EO–1 was enjoined by other federal courts, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,780 (“EO–2”), which bears the same title as EO–1 and was scheduled to go into effect and supplant EO–1 on March 16, 2017. 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017). Section 2(c) of EO–2 suspended for 90 days the entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. On March 10, 2017, the IRAP Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to seek the invalidation of EO–2, alleging the same causes of action pleaded in their original Complaint. The IRAP Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of EO–2, on Establishment Clause and INA grounds. On March 15, 2017, this Court enjoined enforcement of Section 2(c) after finding that the IRAP Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that EO–2 violated the Establishment Clause. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump (“IRAP” ), 241 F.Supp.3d 539 (D. Md. 2017). This Court’s Order was then appealed to and in substantial part affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump (“IRAP” ), 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). In light of the expiration of EO– 2, the Fourth Circuit’s judgment has since been vacated as moot by the United States Supreme Court. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16-1436, ––– U.S. ––––, –––S.Ct. ––––, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017).\n2 On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public–Safety Threats” (“Proclamation”), which will bar indefinitely the entry into the United States of some or all nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017).\nOn October 3, 2017, Iranian Alliances Across Borders (“IAAB”) and Doe Plaintiffs 1–6 (collectively, the “IAAB Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint in this Court asserting that\n16\n\n\fthe Proclamation violates the INA, the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and the equal protection and procedural due process components of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On October 5, 2017, the IRAP Plaintiffs, now consisting of IRAP, HIAS, Middle East Studies Association (“MESA”), Arab–American Association of New York (“AAANY”), Yemeni–American Merchants Association (“YAMA”), John Does No. 1 and 3–5, Jane Doe No. 2, Muhammed Meteab, Mohamad Mashta, Grannaz Amirjamshidi, Fakhri Ziaolhagh, Shapour Shirani, and Afsaneh Khazaeli, filed a Second Amended Complaint in which they repeated their prior causes of action and extended them to the Proclamation, added a second claim under the INA alleging that the Proclamation exceeded the President’s statutory authority, and added a claim that the Proclamation violated the procedural due process protections of the Fifth Amendment. On October 6, 2017, in a separate case, Eblal Zakzok, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, John Doe No. 1, and Jane Does No. 2–3 (collectively, “the Zakzok Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint stating causes of action under the Establishment Clause, the INA, and the APA. On October 12, 2017, the IAAB Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to add the Iranian Students’ Foundation (“ISF”), an affiliate of IAAB at the University of Maryland College Park, as a Plaintiff. The IAAB Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for Leave, which the Court has since granted, seeking to file declarations from representatives of ISF in support of the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.\nEach of these three separate cases name some or all of the following as Defendants: President Trump; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; the U.S. Department of State; Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State; Dan Coats, Director of National Intelligence; Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, III, Attorney General; Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; James McCament, Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. All of the Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief.\nOn October 6, 2017, the IRAP Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in which they ask this Court to enjoin the Proclamation in its entirety before it takes effect. The IAAB and Zakzok Plaintiffs have also each filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and have joined in the arguments of the IRAP Plaintiffs. Defendants filed a consolidated brief in opposition to the Motions on October 12, 2017, and Plaintiffs filed separate reply briefs on October 14, 2017. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on October 16, 2017. With the matter fully briefed and argued, the Court now issues its\n\nfindings of fact and conclusions of law.\nFINDINGS OF FACT\nI. Public Statements 3 On December 7, 2015, then-presidential candidate Donald J. Trump posted a “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” on his campaign website in which he “call[ed] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our representatives can figure out what is going on.” Joint Record (“J.R.”) 85. Trump promoted the Statement on Twitter that same day, stating that he had “[j]ust put out a very important policy statement on the extraordinary influx of hatred & danger coming into our country. We must be vigilant!” J.R. 209. In a March 9, 2016 interview with CNN, Trump stated his belief that “Islam hates us,” and that the United States had “allowed this propaganda to spread all through the country that [Islam] is a religion of peace.” J.R. 255–57. Then, in a March 22, 2016 Fox Business interview, Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslim immigration, asserting that his call for the ban had gotten “tremendous support” and that “we’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” J.R. 261.\nIn a May 11, 2016 appearance on On the Record, Trump stated that he would ask former New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani to lead a group to “look at the Muslim ban or temporary ban,” that there “has to be something,” and that he had “[g]reat Muslim friends who are telling me you are so right. ... [T]here is something going on that we have to get to the bottom of.” J.R. 513. In a June 13, 2016 speech, Trump stated that “[w]e have to control the amount of future immigration into this country to prevent large pockets of radicalization from forming inside America,” noting that “[e]ach year, the United States permanently admits more than 100,000 immigrants from the Middle East, and many more from Muslim countries outside the Middle East.” J.R. 528.\nIn a July 24, 2016 interview on Meet the Press soon after he accepted the Republican nomination, Trump was asked about the “Muslim ban.” J.R. 219. Trump responded that immigration should be “immediately suspended” “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism until such time as proven vetting mechanisms have been put in place.” J.R. 219. When questioned whether this formulation was a “rollback” of his December 2015 call for a “Muslim ban,” Trump disagreed, stating “I don’t think it’s a rollback. In fact, you could say it’s an\n17\n\n\fexpansion. I’m looking now at territories.” J.R. 220. He explained that “[p]eople were so upset when I used the word Muslim,” so he was instead “talking territory instead of Muslim.” Id. During the October 9, 2016 Presidential Debate, when asked by the moderator about his proposed “Muslim ban,” he explained that the “Muslim ban” had “morphed into an extreme vetting from certain areas of the world.” J.R. 591.\nOn December 21, 2016, when asked whether a recent attack in Germany affected his proposed Muslim ban, President–Elect Trump replied, “You know my plans. All along, I’ve proven to be right. 100% correct.” J.R. 245. In a written statement about the events, he lamented the attack on people “prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday” by “ISIS and other Islamic terrorists [who] continually slaughter Christians in their communities and places of worship as part of their global jihad.” J.R. 245.\nII. Executive Order 13,769 On January 27, 2017, a week after his inauguration, President Trump issued EO–1 in which, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), the President suspended for 90 days the entry into the United States of immigrant and nonimmigrants who were nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, based on his finding that such entry was “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” EO–1 § 3(c). Each of these countries has a predominantly Muslim population, including Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, which are more than 99 percent Muslim. The provision allowed for exceptions on a “case-by-case basis” when such an exception was “in the national interest.” EO–1 § 3(g). EO–1 also required changes to the refugee screening process “to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” EO–1 § 5(b). It further provided that during this 90–day period, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”), was to initiate a review process beginning with “a review to determine the information needed from any country” to assess whether an individual from that country applying for a “visa, admission, or other benefit ... is not a security or public-safety threat,” the generation of a list of countries that do not provide adequate information of this nature, and a consultation process to request such information from those countries. EO–1 § 3(a)-(d). At the end of this review process, the Secretary of Homeland Security was required to “submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion on a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit entry of foreign\n\nnationals ... from countries that do not provide the information requested.” EO–1 § 3(e).\n4 When preparing to sign EO–1, President Trump remarked, “This is the ‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ We all know what that means.” J.R. 142. That same day, President Trump stated in an interview on the Christian Broadcasting Network that EO–1 would give preference in refugee applications to Christians. Referring to Syria, President Trump stated that “[i]f you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible,” a situation that he thought was “very, very unfair.” J.R. 201. The day after EO–1 was issued, President Trump assured reporters that implementation of EO–1 was “working out very nicely and we’re going to have a very, very strict ban.” J.R. 123. That same day, Mayor Giuliani appeared on Fox News and asserted that President Trump told him he wanted a Muslim ban and asked Giuliani to “[s]how me the right way to do it legally.” J.R. 247. Giuliani, in consultation with others, proposed that the action be “focused on, instead of religion ... the areas of the world that create danger for us,” specifically “places where there are [sic] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country.” J.R. 247–248.\nEO–1 prompted several legal challenges, including an action filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington based on the Due Process, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution that resulted in a nationwide temporary restraining order (“TRO”) issued on February 3, 2017 against several sections of EO–1. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, C17–0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). On February 9, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, construing the order as a preliminary injunction, upheld the entry of the injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1165– 66 (9th Cir. 2017). Although it did not reach the Establishment Clause claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that the asserted claim raised “serious allegations” and presented “significant constitutional questions.” Id. at 1168. On February 13, 2017, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found a likelihood of success on the merits of an Establishment Clause claim and issued an injunction against enforcement of Section 3(c) of EO–1 as to Virginia residents or students enrolled a Virginia state educational institution. Aziz v. Trump, 234 F.Supp.3d 724, 739 (E.D. Va. 2017).\nIn response to the injunctions against EO–1, President Trump maintained at a February 16, 2017 news conference that EO–1 was lawful but that a new Order\n18\n\n\fwould be issued. J.R. 91. Stephen Miller, Senior Policy Advisor to the President, described the changes being made to the Order as “mostly minor technical differences,” emphasizing that the “basic policies are still going to be in effect.” J.R. 319. White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated that “[t]he principles of the [second] executive order remain the same” and described EO–1 as a legal exercise of the President’s power “to suspend immigration.” J.R. 78, 118. As of February 12, 2017, Trump’s Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration remained on his campaign website. J.R. 207.\nIII. Executive Order 13,780 On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued EO–2, which was scheduled to go into effect and supplant EO–1 on March 16, 2017. Section 2(c) of EO–2 reiterated the 90– day ban on entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, but removed Iraq from the list. EO–2 applied only to individuals outside the United States who did not have a valid visa as of the issuance of EO–1 and who had not obtained one prior to the effective date of EO–2. In addition, the travel ban expressly exempted lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”), dual citizens traveling under a passport issued by a country not on the banned list, asylees, and refugees already admitted to the United States, and it provided a list of specific scenarios under which a case-by-case waiver could be granted.\nTo justify its restrictions on entry by nationals of the listed countries, EO–2 stated that “the conditions in these countries present heightened threats” because each country is “a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones.” EO–2 § 1(d) (citing information from the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 ). EO–2 stated that, as a result, the governments of the listed countries were less willing or able to provide necessary information for the visa or refugee vetting process, such that there was a heightened chance that individuals from these countries would be “terrorist operatives or sympathizers.” EO–2 § 1(d). EO–2 therefore concluded that the risk of admitting individuals from these countries was “unacceptably high” because the United States was unable “to rely on normal decisionmaking procedures” about their travel. EO–2 § 1(b)(ii), (f). EO–2 disavowed that EO–1 was motivated by religious animus.\n5 EO–2 also stated that “Since 2001, hundreds of persons born abroad have been convicted of terrorismrelated crimes in the United States” and referenced two Iraqi refugees who were convicted of terrorism-related\n\noffenses and a naturalized U.S. citizen who came to the United States from Somalia as a child refugee and had been convicted of a plot to detonate a bomb at a Christmas tree lighting ceremony. EO–2 § 1(h). It did not identify any instances of individuals who came from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen engaging in terrorist activity in the United States.\nLike EO–1, EO–2 instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the DNI, to conduct a worldwide review to determine whether additional information from foreign governments was needed to enable the United States to determine whether a foreign national applying for a visa or for admission was a security or public safety threat. The Secretary of Homeland Security was then required to submit a report within 20 days providing the results of the review, including listing countries that do not provide adequate information and identifying the needed information. The Secretary of State was then required to request that the listed countries begin providing the needed information within 50 days. At the end of the 50– day period, the Secretary of Homeland Security was to “submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested until they do so or until the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the country has an adequate plan to do so, or has adequately shared information through other means.” EO–2 § 2(f). The Secretary of Homeland Security could also identify other countries for other restrictions or limitations that would be appropriate.\nThe same day that EO–2 was issued, Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III and Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly submitted a letter to the President recommending a temporary suspension on the entry to the United States of nationals of certain countries so as to facilitate a review of security risks in the immigration system. Upon the issuance of EO–2, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson described it as “a vital measure for strengthening our national security.” J.R. 115. In a March 7, 2017 interview, Secretary of Homeland Security Kelly stated that the Order was not a Muslim ban but instead was focused on countries with “questionable vetting procedures,” but noted that there were 13 or 14 countries with questionable vetting procedures, “not all of them Muslim countries and not all of them in the Middle East.” J.R. 150. Other White House officials, noting that EO–2’s provisions were temporary, stated that the ban might be extended past 90 days and to additional countries. J.R. 116.\n19\n\n\fIV. Litigation on EO–2 On March 10, 2017, the IRAP Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to seek the invalidation of EO–2, alleging the same causes of action pleaded in their original Complaint. The IRAP Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of EO–2, on Establishment Clause and INA grounds. On March 15, 2017, this Court enjoined enforcement of Section 2(c) after finding that the IRAP Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that EO–2 violated the Establishment Clause. IRAP, 241 F.Supp.3d at 566. The same day, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii issued a TRO, later converted to a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of Sections 2 and 6 of EO–2. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119, 1140 (D. Haw. 2017).\n6 This Court’s Order was appealed to and in substantial part affirmed by the Fourth Circuit on May 25, 2017. IRAP, 857 F.3d 554, 606 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit described EO–2 as one that “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.” Id. at 572. After finding that an individual plaintiff had standing to challenge the ban and concluding that upon a showing of bad faith it could “look behind” a proffered “facially legitimate” reason for the action, the court applied standard Establishment Clause analysis to conclude that because EO–2 “cannot be divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it ... the reasonable observer would likely conclude that [EO–2’s] primary purpose is to exclude persons from the United States on the basis of their religious beliefs.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 586, 590–92, 601.\nMeanwhile, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in substantial part the preliminary injunction ordered by the District of Hawaii on the grounds that EO–2 exceeded the President’s authority under the INA, primarily in that it did not contain a sufficient finding of detrimental interest as required by the statute and that it violated the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2017). The Government sought review of both the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit decisions by the United States Supreme Court, which consolidated the cases for argument. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project and Trump v. Hawaii, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2086, 198 L.Ed.2d 643 (2017) (granting writ of certiorari). Pending resolution of those appeals, the Supreme Court declined the Government’s request to stay the injunctions of EO–2 in their entirety, but ordered a partial stay of the injunctions to permit their\n\nenforcement against only foreign nationals who lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or organization within the United States. Id. at 2087.\n[1]In light of the expiration of EO–2, the Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing on whether the case relating to EO–2 is now moot. Trump v. IRAP, No. 161436, ––– U.S. ––––, ––– S.Ct. ––––, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2017 WL 2405595 (Sept. 25, 2017). On October 10, 2017, after that supplemental briefing, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to EO–2. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits.1 Trump v. IRAP, No. 16-1436, –––U.S. ––––, ––– S.Ct. –– ––, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017).\nV. Public Statements Since EO–2 At a March 16, 2017 rally, President Trump reported to the audience that EO–2 had been enjoined and described it as a “watered down version of the first one” that had been “tailor[ed]” by lawyers in response to prior legal challenges. J.R. 652–53. He emphasized that “we ought to go back to the first one and go all the way, which is what I wanted to do in the first place.” J.R. 653.\nOn May 21, 2017, President Trump delivered a speech in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Arab and Muslim leaders as part of the Arab Islamic American Summit. Speaking as “a representative of the American people” delivering “a message of friendship and hope,” he decried terrorism, but cautioned that “the nations of the Middle East cannot wait for American power to crush this enemy for them,” but instead “have to decide what kind of future they want for themselves.” President Trump’s full speech from Saudi Arabia on global terrorism, Wash. Post (May 21, 2017), https://goo.gl/viJRg2. They had to “honestly confront” the “crisis of Islamic extremism and the Islamists and Islamic terror of all kinds.” Id.\n7 In a June 3, 2017 tweet, President Trump emphasized the “need to be smart vigilant and tough,” and asserted, “We need the Travel Ban as an extra level of safety!” J.R. 662. In a series of tweets on June 5, 2017 referencing the court decisions relating to EO–1 and EO–2, President Trump stated, “[t]he lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!” J.R. 664. He reiterated that “[t]he Justice Dept. should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the watered down, politically correct version they submitted to [the Supreme Court],” and advised the Justice Department to “ask for an expedited hearing of the watered down Travel Ban before the Supreme Court—& seek much tougher version!” Id. The\n20\n\n\ffollowing day, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated that President Trump’s tweets should be “considered official statements by the president of the United States.” J.R. 667.\nIn an August 17, 2017 tweet, Trump endorsed what appears to be an apocryphal story involving General John J. Pershing and a purported massacre of Muslims with bullets dipped in a pig’s blood, advising people to “[s]tudy what General Pershing ... did to terrorists when caught. There was no more Radical Islamic Terror for 35 years!” J.R. 679. In a September 15, 2017 tweet, President Trump again insisted that “the travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specific-but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!” J.R. 705.\nVI. Presidential Proclamation 9645 On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, which immediately supplanted EO–2 as to foreign nationals who lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or organization within the United States, and which is slated to go into effect on October 18, 2017 for all other individuals covered by its terms. The Proclamation stated that in a July 9, 2017 report issued pursuant to the requirements of EO–2, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the DNI, had selected baseline criteria for assessing the sufficiency of the information provided by foreign governments to permit the United States to confirm the identities of individuals seeking to enter the country and make a security assessment about them.\nThree categories of information were identified. The first is “identity-management information,” consisting of information necessary to confirm that individuals are who they claim to be. Criteria for assessing the sufficiency of information provided include whether a foreign government employs electronic passports embedded with data on the holder’s identity, reports lost or stolen passports, and provides other identity-related information not contained in passports. The second category is “national security and public-safety information,” relating to whether individuals seeking to enter the United States pose a national security or public safety risk, the criteria for which include whether a foreign government provides information on known or suspected terrorists and individuals’ criminal histories, shares exemplars of its passports and national identity documents, or impedes the transfer of information about passengers and crew traveling to the United States. The third category is “national security and public-safety risk assessment,” relating to risk indicators about the country itself, the\n\ncriteria for which include whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven, whether it is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program, and whether it regularly refuses to accept its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.\nAccording to the Proclamation, pursuant to the process set forth in EO–2, nearly 200 countries were evaluated based on these criteria. Of those, 16 nations were found to be “inadequate” and 31 were found to be at risk of becoming so. In accordance with Section 2(d) of EO–2, those nations were given 50 days to bring their informationsharing practices into compliance with United States expectations. At the end of that 50–day period, eight countries were determined to have continued inadequate information-sharing practices: Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. In a September 15, 2017 report to the President (“the DHS Report”), the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended that entry restrictions be imposed on all of those countries with the exception of Iraq. Although Somalia’s information-sharing practices were found to be adequate, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended that Somalia also be subjected to entry restrictions.\n8 As a result, the Proclamation states that “absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States” of nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (the “Designated Countries”) “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Procl. pmbl. Specifically, the Proclamation suspends the entry of all immigrants from seven of the eight Designated Countries, excepting only Venezuela. The ban on entry by nonimmigrants is “more tailored,” with a narrower ban imposed on countries with mitigating circumstances such as a willingness to play a substantial role in combatting terrorism. Procl. § 1(h)(iii).\nAs to specific countries previously subject to EO–2’s travel ban, the Proclamation suspends entirely the entry of Iranian nationals on both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, with an exception for individuals traveling on nonimmigrant, student (“F” and “M”) and exchange visitor (“J”) visas. However, Iranians traveling on F, M, and J visas are to be subjected to enhanced screening and vetting. As justification, the Proclamation asserts that Iran is a source of significant terrorist threats and a designated state sponsor of terrorism, and that it fails adequately to cooperate with the United States to identify security risks, has at least one unspecified national security risk factor, and refuses to accept its nationals slated for deportation.\nThe Proclamation suspends entry of all Libyan nationals\n21\n\n\fas immigrants, as well as entry of nonimmigrants using business (“B–1”), tourist (“B–2”), or business/tourist (“B– 1/B–2”) visas. These restrictions are based on the conclusions that Libya does not provide adequate public safety or terrorism-related information, has deficiencies in its identity-management protocols, has at least one unspecified national security risk factor, and does not reliably accept its nationals slated for deportation.\nThe entry of nationals from Somalia traveling on immigrant visas is suspended entirely, and adjudications for all nonimmigrant visas are to be subjected to additional scrutiny. According to the Proclamation, these restrictions are justified by the facts that the United States does not recognize the Somali electronic passport, Somalia has been designated a terrorist safe haven, and large parts of Somalia are outside the control of the central government such that its ability to share information about criminal and terrorist risks is compromised.\nRegarding Syria, the Proclamation suspends entirely the entry of all Syrian nationals, both immigrants and nonimmigrants, on the basis that Syria does not cooperate with the United States in identifying security risks, is a source of significant terrorist threats and has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism, does not provide adequate public safety or terrorism-related information, has deficiencies in its identity-management protocols, and has at least one unspecified national security risk factor.\nThe Proclamation suspends entirely the entry of Yemeni nationals as immigrants, as well as entry of Yemeni nonimmigrants traveling under B–1, B–2, and B–1/B–2 nonimmigrant visas. As justification, the Proclamation notes that Yemen does not provide adequate public safety or terrorism-related information, has deficiencies in its identity-management protocols, has at least one national security risk factor, and has a terrorist presence.\nAs for countries identified for the first time in the Proclamation, entry of Chad nationals as immigrants is suspended entirely, as is entry of nonimmigrants using B– 1, B–2, or B–1/B–2 visas. In support of this determination, the Proclamation asserts that Chad fails to provide adequate public safety and terrorism-related information, and that the nation has at least one unspecified national security risk factor.\n9 All entry of North Korean visa holders, immigrant or nonimmigrant, is entirely suspended, because North Korea has reportedly failed in any way to cooperate or engage in information sharing with the United States.\nVenezuela is the only designated country for which entry\n\nof immigrants is not suspended. Limitations on the entry of Venezuelan nationals are confined to barring entry of specific government officials and their immediate family members, who are suspended from traveling to the United States on B–1, B–2, and B–1/B–2 visas. All other Venezuelan nationals are to be subjected to enhanced screening and vetting procedures but are not otherwise banned from entry. The Proclamation reasons that although Venezuela fails to provide adequate terrorismrelated or public safety information, has at least one unspecified national security risk factor, and does not reliably receive its nationals slated for deportation, there are other, unspecified sources available for verifying the identities of Venezuelan nationals.\nThese suspensions apply to foreign nationals of the Designated Countries who (1) are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of the Proclamation; (2) do not have a valid visa as of the applicable effective date of the Proclamation; and (3) are not among those entitled to receive a new visa or other travel document because their visas were revoked or canceled pursuant to EO–1. Excepted from the suspensions are a number of other individuals, including LPRs; dual nationals if traveling on a passport issued by a non-designated country; and foreign nationals who have been granted asylum status or who have been already admitted to the United States as refugees.\nIn addition to these delineated exceptions, the Proclamation provides for waivers, to be granted on a case-by-case basis by either a State Department consular officer or an official of United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), based on criteria to be developed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security. Any waiver granted by a consular officer would allow both the issuance of a visa and subsequent entry to the United States on that visa. The Proclamation expressly provides that waivers may be granted only upon a showing that (1) denying entry would cause the foreign national undue hardship, (2) allowing entry would not pose a national security or public safety threat, and (3) entry would be in the national interest.\nThe Proclamation charges the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to devise a process for determining whether the suspensions should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented. At 180–day intervals, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the DNI, and any other appropriate agency heads, is to submit a report and recommendations to the President on whether any such changes should be made, including whether similar suspensions should be imposed on additional countries. In\n22\n\n\faddition, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consulting with these same officials, may recommend modifications to the list of suspended countries at any time.\n10 As noted, the Proclamation is already in effect as to foreign nationals currently barred by EO–2. For all other covered foreign nationals, it becomes effective on October 18, 2017.\nIn a joint declaration, 49 former national security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials who served in the White House, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Senate, and as ambassadors in Republican and Democratic Administrations, some of whom were aware of the available intelligence relating to potential terrorist threats to the United States as of January 19, 2017, state that “[a]s a national security measure,” the Proclamation is “unnecessary” and is of “unprecedented scope.” J.R. 770. Excluding North Korea and Venezuela, the Proclamation blocks over 150 million people from entering the United States on the basis of their nationality, despite the fact that “concrete evidence” has shown that “country-based bans are ineffective.” J.R. 771. The officials note that the Proclamation has internal inconsistencies, such as its uneven application to nonimmigrant visas, which are the most frequently used visas from the banned nations, and its failure to block individuals from non-Muslim majority countries with “widely-documented” problems with information sharing, such as Belgium. J.R. 773. On this score, the officials note that no terrorist acts have been committed on U.S. soil by nationals of the Designated Countries in the last 40 years, and that no intelligence as of January 19, 2017 suggested any such potential threat. Nor, the former officials assert, is there any rationale for the abrupt shift from individualized vetting to group bans, particularly in light of the fact that the present system of individualized vetting places the burden of proving identity and eligibility for travel on the person seeking a visa.\nVII. The Plaintiffs Plaintiffs, a combination of 23 individuals (“the Individual Plaintiffs”) and seven organizations (“the Organizational Plaintiffs”), assert that they will suffer harm from the implementation of the Proclamation in the form of prolonged separation of family members located in the Designated Countries and stigmatizing injuries arising from the anti-Muslim animus of the travel ban. Of the Individual Plaintiffs, nine are U.S. citizens or LPRs who have an approved visa petition on behalf of an Iranian-national parent, child, or sibling, consisting of\n\nIRAP Plaintiffs John Doe No. 4, Shapour Shirani, Fakhri Ziaolhagh, and Afsaneh Khazaeli; and IAAB Doe Plaintiffs Nos. 1–5. Two Plaintiffs, IAAB Doe Plaintiff No. 6 and Grannaz Amirjamshidi seek nonimmigrant visas for their Iranian-national mother or mother-in-law to visit the United States. Four Plaintiffs are U.S. citizens or LPRs with an approved visa petition for their Syriannational family members, consisting of Mohamad Mashta,2 IRAP Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2, and Zakzok Plaintiffs Jane Does No. 1–2. Zakzok Plaintiff Eblal Zakzok, an LPR, has submitted an immigrant visa petition for his Syrian-national daughter but it has not been approved, and Zakzok Plaintiff Sumaya Hamadmad has a sister, a Syrian national, who has applied for a nonimmigrant visa to visit the United States for an academic project. IRAP Plaintiffs John Doe No. 5 and Fahed Muqbil are U.S. citizens who have approved immigrant visa petitions for their Yemeni-national wife and mother, respectively. Zakzok Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 3 is a U.S. citizen who has a pending immigrant visa petition for her Somali fiancée. Three of the Individual Plaintiffs, specifically Mohammed Meteab, and IRAP John Does Nos. 1 and 3, are LPRs of Iranian or Iraqi descent who do not have immediate family members from one of the Designated Countries seeking an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.\n11 Of the Organizational Plaintiffs, three primarily provide services to clients. IRAP provides legal services to its clients, displaced persons around the world seeking to come to the United States, to help them navigate the refugee or immigrant application process. HIAS provides a variety of services to refugees, including assisting their clients with refugee resettlement in the United States. AAANY primarily serves the Arab–American and Arab immigrant community in New York City by providing legal and other services to its clients.\nThe remaining Organizational Plaintiffs convene events on issues relating to the Middle East or advocate on behalf of their members. MESA consists of over 2,400 graduate students and faculty around the world focused on the field of Middle Eastern studies. YAMA, a membership organization of Yemeni American merchants, seeks to protect its members from harassment and to assist them with immigration issues. IAAB organizes youth camps, educational events, and international conferences for the Iranian diaspora, including inviting prominent scholars from outside the country to speak at events. ISF is an affiliate of IAAB and organizes events and fundraisers for its members, approximately 30 Iranian American students at the University of Maryland. Additional facts relating to certain Organizational Plaintiffs are contained in the Court’s discussion of standing. See infra part I.A.\n23\n\n\fCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\nIn this Motion, Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction based on their claims that the Proclamation violates (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act, (2) the Establishment Clause, and (3) the Equal Protection Clause.\nI. Justiciability Defendants raise several arguments that Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable. Specifically, they assert that Plaintiffs lack standing, the claims are not ripe, the claims are barred by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, and the statutory claims are not reviewable under the APA.\nA. Standing [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. To invoke this power, a litigant must have standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2661, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013). A plaintiff establishes standing by demonstrating (1) a “concrete and particularized” injury that is “actual or imminent,” (2) “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct,” (3) and “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.; Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2007). For claims involving a statutory cause of action, a plaintiff must also have interests that fall within the “zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1388, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014). Standing must be established for each claim. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). The presence of one plaintiff with standing renders a claim justiciable. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2014).\n1. Immigration and Nationality Act\nThe various Individual Plaintiffs assert standing based on the allegation that they are harmed by the prolonged separation from close family members who are unable to travel to the United States under the terms of the Proclamation. The Supreme Court has reviewed the\n\nmerits of cases brought by U.S. residents with a specific interest in the entry of a foreigner challenging the application of the immigration laws to that foreign individual. See Kerry v. Din, –––U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2131, 2138–42, 192 L.Ed.2d 183 (2015) (considering an action brought by a U.S. citizen challenging the denial of her husband’s visa); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 762–65, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) (considering the merits of a claim brought by American plaintiffs challenging the denial of a visa to a Belgian journalist whom they had invited to speak in various academic forums in the United States); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (stating that because standing relates to a court’s power to hear and adjudicate a case, it is normally “considered a threshold question that must be resolved in [the litigant’s] favor before proceeding to the merits”); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Presumably, had the Court harbored doubts concerning federal court subject matter jurisdiction in Mandel, it would have raised the issue on its own motion.”). Other courts have done the same. See Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering an action by a United States citizen challenging the denial of her husband’s visa and holding that the citizen had a procedural due process right to a “limited judicial inquiry regarding the reason for the decision”); Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (evaluating the merits of a claim brought by scholars and leaders who extended invitations to a foreign national challenging the denial of her visa).\n12 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has found that U.S. citizens and residents have standing to challenge the denial of visas to individuals in whose entry to the United States they have an interest. See Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1050 (finding that U.S. citizens and residents had standing to challenge the denial of visas to foreigners whom they had invited to “attend meetings or address audiences” in the United States); Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 45 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1, 117 S.Ct. 378, 136 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (“LAVAS”). In LAVAS, the court held that U.S. resident sponsors had standing to assert that the State Department’s failure to process visa applications of Vietnamese citizens in Hong Kong violated one of the same provisions at issue here, 8 U.S.C. § 1152, based on the cognizable injury of prolonged “separation of immediate family members” resulting from the State Department’s inaction. Id. at 471. And in a related case, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual plaintiff had standing to challenge EO–2 where the plaintiff’s mother-in-law was a Syrian national with a\n24\n\n\fpending immigration visa application, because the “prolonged separation” from her constituted a sufficient injury-in-fact. Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 763.\n[7] [8]Here, several Individual Plaintiffs, specifically IRAP Plaintiffs John Doe No. 4, John Doe No. 5, Jane Doe No. 2, Shapour Shirani, and Fakhri Ziaolhagh; IAAB Plaintiffs Doe Plaintiff No. 1, Doe Plaintiff No. 3, Doe Plaintiff No. 4, and Doe Plaintiff. No. 5; and Zakzok Plaintiffs Eblal Zakzok, John Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe No. 2 have standing to assert their claims that the Proclamation violates the INA. Each of these Plaintiffs are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who have immediate family members who are nationals of the Designated Countries and currently in the process of securing a visa to come to the United States as immigrants. As one illustrative example, John Doe No. 4 is a U.S. citizen whose wife is an Iranian national seeking an immigrant visa to join him in the United States. Other Plaintiffs, including IRAP Plaintiff Grannaz Amirjamshidi, IAAB Plaintiff Doe Plaintiff No. 6, and Zakzok Plaintiff Sumaya Hamadmad have standing as U.S. citizens who are separated from close family members who are nationals of Designated Countries seeking nonimmigrant visas to travel to the United States. The Proclamation’s indefinite ban on the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas for nationals of the Designated Countries has imposed an actual, imminent injury on these Plaintiffs by prolonging their separation from their family members. See LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 471; Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 763. Because a “threat” of an injury that is “real and immediate” can support standing, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000), it is not necessary that the family member’s visa application already be denied. Where the Proclamation halts issuance of visas to nationals of the Designated Countries indefinitely, the threat is quite real.\nThis injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged practice in that the implementation of the travel ban imposed by the Proclamation would cause the prolonged separation, and an injunction against the Proclamation would likely redress that injury. See Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2661. The Court therefore finds that these Individual Plaintiffs have standing to assert the claim that the Proclamation violates the INA.\n[9] [10] [11]The Organizational Plaintiffs assert standing for the INA claim in their own right and on behalf of their members. For an organization’s claim of standing, the Court conducts the same inquiry as in the case of an individual. Lane v. Holder, 703 F.3d 668, 674 (4th Cir. 2012). An organization suffers an injury-in-fact when “a defendant’s actions impede its efforts to carry out its\n\nmission.” Lane, 703 F.3d at 674; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (“Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources— constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”). However, an injury to an organization generally does not arise from a decision to expend resources on member education or litigation in response to legislation. See Lane, 703 F.3d at 675.\n13 [12]Here, several organizations have asserted sufficient injury to their proprietary and organizational interests to constitute an injury-in-fact for standing purposes. Both MESA and IAAB argue that the Proclamation will disrupt upcoming conferences and events in the United States by preventing individuals from the Designated Countries from attending. Specifically, the Proclamation would bar scholars from some of the Designated Countries from MESA’s annual meeting in November, including one prospective attendee from Iran, which would harm MESA financially because approximately half of MESA’s budget is derived from the annual meeting. The inability of scholars to travel to the annual meeting would also hinder the exchange of ideas among scholars and thus adversely impact MESA’s mission of “fostering study and public understanding of the Middle East.” J.R. 430–31. Likewise, the Proclamation will prevent Iranian nationals from attending IAAB’s International Conference on the Iranian Diaspora, scheduled for April 2018 in New York, at which scholars, students, journalists, artists, and community leaders gather to exchange ideas on issues affecting the worldwide Iranian community. Where approximately half of the invited speakers for this event typically come from Iran, the inability of Iranian nationals to travel to the United States would hinder IAAB’s mission of “address[ing] issues affecting the Iranian Diaspora community.” Kharazzi Aff. ¶ 17, IAAB Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 1, ECF No. 26–3. Although the Proclamation excepts Iranian nationals traveling on a student (F and M) or exchange visitor (J) visa, such visas typically are for individuals enrolling in an academic or vocational program or in a specific exchange visitor program such as an au pair, summer camp, or summer work travel program. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.61–41.62 (2017); U.S. Dep’t of State, 9 Foreign Affairs Manual §§ 402.5–5–402.5–6. Attendees at educational, professional, or business conferences would generally use a B–1 visa, which is now unavailable to Iranian nationals. See 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 402.2–5(B)(5) (stating that one of the permitted activities on a B–1 visa is to “participate in scientific, educational, professional, or business conventions, conferences, or seminars”). The Proclamation also impacts IRAP’s ability to bring one of\n25\n\n\fits Syrian-national employees back to the United States to participate in its annual, week-long strategic planning and training retreat at its headquarters in New York, which would adversely impact IRAP’s operations and mission.\nThese injuries are not “merely speculative.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). MESA has described at least one specific individual from Iran who would attend the MESA annual meeting and whose fees would have to be refunded if he cannot attend, and IRAP has referenced a specific employee who cannot receive the in-person training and participate in strategic planning at its annual retreat. Even without identifying specific individuals who will definitely be barred from entry into the United States to attend its events, IAAB has alleged that the Proclamation presently constrains their efforts to recruit attendees for their upcoming meetings and conferences and to secure their arrival in time for the events. Cf.Hawaii 859 F.3d at 766 (finding that Hawaii had standing based on its interest in students attending the University of Hawaii). Thus, the Proclamation would injure MESA, IAAB, and IRAP by impeding their efforts to accomplish their missions and by disrupting their ability to raise money, train staff, and convene programs designed to foster the free flow of ideas on topics of significance to their organization’s purpose. See Lane, 703 F.3d at 674.\n[13]MESA, IAAB, and IRAP also fall within the zone of interests protected by the INA. Where MESA’s purpose is to foster “study and public understanding of the Middle East,” J.R. 431–32, and IAAB is focused on “address[ing] issues affecting the Iranian Diaspora Community, Kharazzi Aff. ¶ 17, these organizations necessarily engage in collaboration and exchange with foreign nationals who visit the United States. Accordingly, they necessarily have a substantial interest in the effective operation of the INA, particularly its provisions for admitting foreign scholars and other foreign nationals to the United States as nonimmigrants to attend educational conferences. See, e.g., 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 402.2– 5(B)(5). Likewise, as an organization focused on refugee resettlement, IRAP has a need to engage foreign-national employees familiar with parts of the world with refugee populations and periodically to have those employees travel to and from the United States for planning, direction, and training. It, too, has an ongoing interest in operation of the INA’s nonimmigrant visa provisions. See 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 402.2–5(B)(3) (stating that one of the permitted activities on a B–1 visa is to “consult with business associates”). Thus, as organizations that depend on the entry of foreign nationals into the United States under the INA, MESA, IAAB, and IRAP are within the zone of interest of the law. See Abourezk, 785 F.2d at\n\n1050–51 (finding that organizations that invited foreign nationals to the United States to speak at a rally had a cognizable stake in the Government’s interpretation of a provision of the INA).\nThe Court also finds that these organizational injuries are fairly traceable to Defendants’ actions and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision because the Proclamation imposes an entry ban on nationals from the Designated Countries who would otherwise be able to apply for visas to enter the United States and participate in the organizational events. See Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2661. Therefore, the Court finds that MESA, IAAB, and IRAP each have standing to challenge the Proclamation as a violation of the INA.\n14 [14] [15]Finally, several organizations can assert standing as representatives of their members. To establish associational standing, an organization must establish that (1) its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) “the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose”; and (3) “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert.Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (stating that a single member with standing in his or her own right is sufficient to establish that an organization has standing). An organization must “make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm.” Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009)).\n[16]MESA and YAMA both identify at least one individual member who is a U.S. citizen or LPR seeking to secure an immigrant visa for a close relative from one of the Designated Countries. MESA alleges that one of its members of Syrian descent is imminently filing a petition seeking an immigrant visa for his mother-in-law, a Syrian national. YAMA asserts that one of its members, “Ahmed,” is a U.S. citizen whose wife has petitioned for his Yemeni national wife and their five Yemeni national children to immigrate to the United States.\n[17]The interests raised by Plaintiffs’ claims are germane to the organizations’ purposes. MESA seeks to foster greater understanding and dialogue with Middle East nations, including one or more of the Designated Countries. YAMA, in part, seeks to help Yemeni American business owners navigate immigration issues they face. Plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining an injunction to\n26\n\n\fpreserve the ability of foreign nationals from the Designated Countries to travel to the United States squarely relates to both of these missions. Finally, where the claims in these cases consist of constitutional and statutory challenges to the Proclamation, there is no discernible reason why the participation of individual members, as opposed to their representatives in the form of the organization, is required for the effective advancement of this lawsuit. With all the requirements met, the Court concludes that MESA and YAMA have standing to assert their INA claims on behalf of their members. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434.\n2. Establishment Clause\n[18] [19]To have standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim, a plaintiff must meet the same elements as for any other claim: (1) a cognizable injury, (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1997). To show an injury in the context of the Establishment Clause, the plaintiff must have “personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion” resulting in a personal injury. Id. at 1086. The injury can take the form of noneconomic, intangible harm to spiritual beliefs, such as “[f]eelings of marginalization and exclusion” because “one of the core objectives of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the State from sending a message to non-adherents of a particular religion that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.” Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012); see Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086; Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that a Muslim plaintiff residing in Oklahoma suffered a cognizable injury in the form of condemnation of his religion and exposure to “disfavored treatment” based on a voter-approved state constitutional amendment prohibiting Oklahoma state courts from considering Sharia law); Catholic League v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that a “psychological consequence” constitutes a concrete injury where it is “produced by government condemnation of one’s own religion or endorsement of another’s in one’s own community”). The injury, however, needs to be a “personal injury suffered” by the plaintiff “as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).\n15 [20]Here, multiple Individual Plaintiffs have asserted\n\n“personal contact” with the Proclamation’s alleged Establishment Clause violation to demonstrate standing. As discussed above, multiple Plaintiffs have asserted that they have been personally injured by the Proclamation through the harm of prolonged separation from close relatives who would be barred from entry to the United States under the Proclamation. See supra Part I.A.1. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ claim, they are asserting a personal injury sustained as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, not an injury to others. See Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086 (finding that “unwelcome direct contact with a religious display that appears to be endorsed by the state” is a personal injury). It is this personal impact that separates the claims of Plaintiffs here from those in Valley Forge, in which the plaintiffs had merely read about a conveyance of property to a religious institution that they believed to be unfairly advantageous, Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 468–69, 485, 102 S.Ct. 752, or in In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2008), in which Protestant Navy chaplains alleging that Catholic chaplains received a preference in the chaplain retirement system had observed the impact of the alleged Establishment Clause violation on others but had not suffered any personal consequences from it, id. at 764–65.\nSeveral of these Plaintiffs have also asserted specific, intangible injuries resulting from this personal contact with the alleged Establishment Clause violation. Among the IRAP Plaintiffs, John Doe No. 4 states that he “felt insulted” by EO–1 and received “more suspicious looks from people,” which caused him to feel that “I am being labeled as a Muslim more often,” and that the Proclamation “has made me feel this more strongly” such that “I continue to feel demeaned by the ban.” J.R. 461– 62. Jane Doe No. 2 states that she understands the Proclamation to fulfill campaign promises to condemn her religion, which has made her feel depressed and has caused her to question whether to remain in the United States because she does not want her children to face discrimination. Afsaneh Khazaeli states that the Proclamation and the predecessor travel bans have made him feel like a “second-class citizen” and has made his family the target of abuse and discrimination. J.R. 465– 66. Shapour Shirani states that the anti-Muslim nature of the travel ban has made the separation from his wife “more painful,” and the Proclamation has made him “feel even worse” and worry that discrimination against Muslims will persist and interfere with his rights. J.R. 476–77.\nOf the IAAB Plaintiffs, Doe Plaintiff No. 2, Doe Plaintiff No. 3, Doe Plaintiff No. 5, and Doe Plaintiff No. 6 have all expressed similar intangible harms arising from the Proclamation’s alleged Establishment Clause violation. For example, Doe Plaintiff No. 2 states that because the\n27\n\n\fProclamation “targets” her based on her religion, “I feel insecure and I fear for my safety and the safety of my loved ones,” and “I feel that I am being treated as an outsider in my own country.” Jane Doe No. 2 Aff. ¶ 9, IAAB Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 3, ECF No. 26–5. Doe Plaintiff No. 3 has stated that she fears the Proclamation will result in “more hatred and attacks against my community” such that “I fear for my safety and the safety of my loved ones.” Jane Doe No. 3 Aff. ¶ 9, IAAB Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 4, ECF No. 26–6. Both Doe Plaintiff No. 5 and Doe Plaintiff No. 6 express that they feel attacked, targeted, and disparaged by the Proclamation’s hostility to Muslims and that they fear for their safety as a result.\nZakzok Plaintiffs Fahed Muqbil, Eblal Zakzok, Sumaya Hamadmad, John Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 all express that they feel condemned, stigmatized, attacked, or discriminated against as a result of the Proclamation. For example, Fahed Muqbil feels “as if I and my fellow American Muslims are unwanted, different, and somehow dangerous” as a result of the Proclamation. Fahed Muqbil Decl.¶ 15, Zakzok Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 1, ECF No. 6–1.\nThese feelings of marginalization constitute an injury in fact in an Establishment Clause case. See Moss, 683 F.3d at 607 (holding that a Jewish father and daughter suffered an injury when they felt like “outsiders” upon receiving a school letter stating that academic credit was available for taking a class at a Christian bible school). Furthermore, these injuries are traceable in whole or in part to the Proclamation, and an injunction is likely to redress these injuries by removing the stigma associated with the Proclamation. Multiple Individual Plaintiffs can establish both a personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion through the prolonged separation from their family members and a direct injury from the Proclamation through their feelings of marginalization and exclusion. These Plaintiffs include IRAP Plaintiffs John Doe No. 4, Jane Doe No. 2, and Shapour Shirani; IAAB Plaintiffs Doe Plaintiff No. 3, Doe Plaintiff No. 5, and Doe Plaintiff No. 6; and Zakzok Plaintiffs Eblal Zakzok, Jane Doe No. 2, and Sumaya Hamadmad.\n16 Finally, MESA and YAMA, which have standing to assert an INA claim based on their representation of members injured by the Proclamation, likewise have standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim on behalf of their members. As discussed above, both have asserted that at least one specific member faces prolonged separation from a close relative as a result of the Proclamation. See supra Part I.A.1. Both also assert that the same member has experienced feelings of marginalization or emotional distress as a result of the Proclamation’s alleged anti-Muslim message. According\n\nto MESA, the various versions of the travel ban have caused its member “extreme stress” and “ma[d]e him feel unwelcome, even more so now that he is a citizen.” J.R. 429. According to YAMA, Ahmed, one of its members facing a prolonged separation from family, states that the ban has made him “scared here in the United States because the message is coming from the highest people in government that Muslims are terrorists.” J.R. 486.\n[21]Where both of these organizations have at least one member with both a personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion and a direct injury as a result of it, the injury-in-fact requirement has been satisfied. Since MESA serves to foster understanding of the Middle East, in which there are many predominantly Muslim nations, and YAMA was founded in part to oppose what its members perceived to be a Muslim ban arising from EO– 1, the interests they seek to protect through an Establishment Clause claim are germane to their organizations’ purposes. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434. Lastly, as discussed above, there is no discernible reason why the individual members themselves must participate in this suit, rather than their membership organization. Id. Accordingly, MESA and YAMA have standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim on behalf of their members.\nHaving found that multiple Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs have standing to assert both INA and Establishment Clause claims, the Court need not address whether the remaining Plaintiffs have standing. By not addressing those arguments, the Court does not convey any view on whether those Plaintiffs have standing to assert one or more claims.\nB. Ripeness [22] [23]The Government also argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe because their relatives have not yet been denied both a visa and a waiver. For the Individual Plaintiffs discussed above whose family members are already in the process of seeking visas, denial of visas is generally mandated because they are ineligible based on the plain language of the Proclamation. Although a claim is generally not ripe if it is based on contingent future events, Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998), the potential to receive a waiver does not render the claims unripe because the waiver process itself presents an additional hurdle not faced by other visa applicants which would delay reunification, thus creating a harm not contingent on future events. See Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding in a Fair Housing Act action that plaintiffs’ claim was ripe where,\n28\n\n\f“assuming that [plaintiffs] successfully prove at trial that this [challenged] additional hurdle was interposed with discriminatory purpose and/or with disparate impact, then the additional hurdle itself is illegal whether or not it might have been surmounted”).\n[24] [25]In assessing ripeness, courts are to consider the fitness of the issues for decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial consideration. See Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003). Where this case centers on legal issues arising from the Proclamation, which has been issued in its final form, and is not dependent on facts that may derive from application of the waiver process, it is now fit for decision. See Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006). In light of the individual Plaintiffs’ circumstances, withholding judicial consideration of their claims until waivers are adjudicated would cause undue hardship in the form of additional prolonged separation. The Court therefore finds that the claims are now ripe.\nC. Consular Nonreviewability 17 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable pursuant to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, citing Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Defendants also cite United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950), in which the Supreme Court held that a foreign national could not challenge the Attorney General’s decision to exclude her from the country and deny her a hearing to which she would ordinarily be entitled. Id. at 547, 70 S.Ct. 309. Defendants assert that, taken together, these cases establish that any judicial review of the President’s decision to exclude an alien for any reason is unreviewable.\n[26]Plaintiffs, however, challenge not individual visa decisions by consular officers, but the overarching travel ban policy imposed by the Proclamation. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 768 (rejecting the argument that consular nonreviewability barred judicial review of statutory claims challenging EO–2 and noting that “[c]ourts can and do review both constitutional and statutory challenges to the substance and implementation of immigration policy”) (citation omitted); Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162; Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (distinguishing challenges to consular decisions on individual visa applications from a challenge to general operational instructions promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service); cf.Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41,\n\n103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (noting that although Congress has plenary authority over immigration, the Court could still review an immigration statute to ensure that it implemented that authority by “constitutionally permissible means”). The Defendants’ reliance on Knauff and Saavedra Bruno is thus misplaced. These decisions relate only to aliens appealing individual denials of entry into the United States. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539, 70 S.Ct. 309; Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1155, 1163–64. Where Plaintiffs include U.S. citizens asserting statutory and constitutional claims challenging a broader policy as opposed to individual consular determinations, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not applicable. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 768–69; see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587.\nD. APA Defendants assert that the APA has foreclosed the Plaintiffs’ statutory claims on multiple grounds. The APA provides standing for any party that is “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 471. This general grant of standing is subject to several limitations. Judicial review is available only for “final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, and is not available if “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).\n[27]First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim under the APA because they are not “adversely affected or aggrieved” within the meaning of the APA. As discussed above, the Individual Plaintiffs and several Organizational Plaintiffs are within the zone of interests of the INA and are injured by the denial of immigrant or nonimmigrant visas for family members or expected conference attendees. See supra Part I.A.1. They are thus “adversely affected or aggrieved” by Defendants’ use of their authority under the INA. 5 U.S.C. § 702; see LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 471–72 (finding that U.S. family members of Vietnamese nationals desiring to be processed for visas in Hong Kong but ordered to return to Vietnam were “aggrieved” under the APA and within the “zone of interests” of the INA); Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1051 (finding that U.S. citizens who invited foreign nationals to speak were “aggrieved” by the State Department’s interpretation of an INA definition that led to the exclusion of the intended speakers).\n18 [28] [29] [30] [31]Second, Defendants assert that judicial review is not available because the Proclamation was issued by the President, not the head of a federal department or agency, and thus is not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the APA. In Franklin v.\n29\n\n\fMassachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme Court held that the President is not subject to the APA such that his actions cannot be reviewed under that law. Id. at 800–01, 112 S.Ct. 2767. To the extent that the Plaintiffs seek an injunction against the President himself, this argument has merit. See id. at 802, 112 S.Ct. 2767 (stating that “a grant of injunctive relief against the President himself is extraordinary and should ... raise[ ] judicial eyebrows”); see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 605. However, Plaintiffs have named as defendants federal agency officials who will implement the Proclamation. “[I]t is now well established” that “[r]eview of the legality of a Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President’s directive.” Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (permitting judicial review of an Executive Order through a suit against the Secretary of Labor). Such review is warranted because there is a “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.” Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). As for Defendants’ claim that the agency action to date is not “final,” the Proclamation is already in effect as to certain individuals and is being enforced by federal agencies, and, as discussed above in relation to ripeness, a formal denial of a visa or waiver is not necessary for the case to be subject to review. See supra Part I.B.\n[32]Third, Defendants claim that review of the Proclamation is foreclosed by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) as “committed to agency discretion by law.” Under their view, Congress committed the use of § 1182(f) to the sole discretion of the President, such that a reviewing court has no manageable standard by which to evaluate it. Despite the Government’s asserted claim of a lack of intelligible standard, courts have had no difficulty reaching the merits of challenges to the President’s use of § 1182(f). See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 187, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993); Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 770– 74; cf.Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1051 (finding that the INA “does not commit to unguided agency discretion the decision to exclude an alien”).\nMore generally, courts have regularly reviewed Presidential action, including action taken in the context of foreign policy and immigration, to ensure that it fits within the bounds of federal statutes. See, e.g., Sale, 509 U.S. at 187, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (reviewing on the merits an INA challenge to President’s use of § 1182(f)); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669–88, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed.2d 918 (1981) (reviewing on the merits an Executive Order regarding the attachment of Iranian assets pursuant to the International Emergency Economic\n\nPowers Act); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (establishing the framework for judicial review of Presidential action). Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiffs cannot contest the Proclamation in court cannot square with this body of precedent. The Court therefore finds that this case is justiciable and proceeds to the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims.\nII. Legal Standard [33] [34]To obtain a preliminary injunction, moving parties must establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); see Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011). A moving party must satisfy each requirement as articulated. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089, 130 S.Ct. 2371, 176 L.Ed.2d 764 (2010). Because a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy,” it “may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365.\nIII. Likelihood of Success on the Merits [35]Because “courts should be extremely careful not to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings,” Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161, 109 S.Ct. 1693, 104 L.Ed.2d 139 (1989) (per curiam), the Court first addresses the statutory claims and then proceeds, if necessary, to the constitutional claim.\nA. Immigration and Nationality Act 19 [36]Plaintiffs assert that the Proclamation violates provisions of the INA. The formulation of immigration policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954). In the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, Congress delegated some of its power to the President in the form of what is now Section 212(f) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (“§ 1182(f)”), which provides that:\nWhenever the President finds that\n30\n\n\fthe entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).\nCongress has also authorized the President to take action relating to entry into the United States in what is now Section 215(a) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (“§ 1185(a)”):\nUnless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful—\n(1) for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.\n8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1). The Proclamation relies on these two provisions as the statutory authority for the President’s action.\nPlaintiffs assert that the Proclamation violates the INA in three ways. First, they argue, as they did in challenging EO–2, that the Proclamation violates Section 202(a) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (“§ 1152(a)”), which bars discrimination on the basis of nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas. Second, they assert that the Proclamation fails to comply with the requirement in § 1182(f) that the President find that the suspension of entry by nationals from the Designated Countries would “be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Third, they contend that the Proclamation exceeds the authority granted by § 1182(f) because it effectively rewrites portions of the INA or otherwise intrudes on Congress’s legislative power.\n1. Nationality Discrimination\nPlaintiffs argue that the Proclamation’s suspension of entry into the United States by immigrants from the Designated Countries violates the INA’s bar on discrimination based on nationality in the issuance of\n\nimmigrant visas. In opposition, the Government asserts that the Proclamation was lawful because it was issued pursuant to § 1182(f), which grants the President broad authority to bar the entry of immigrants, and that the nondiscrimination provisions of § 1152(a) do not limit the President’s § 1182(f) authority.\nSection 1152(a) provides that, with certain exceptions:\nNo person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence[.]\n8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).\nSection 1152(a) was enacted as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which was adopted expressly to abolish the “national origins system” imposed by the Immigration Act of 1924, which keyed yearly immigration quotas for particular nations to the percentage of foreign-born individuals of that nationality who were living in the continental United States, based on the 1920 census, in order to “maintain, to some degree, the ethnic composition of the American people.” H. Rep. No. 89–745, at 9 (1965). President Lyndon B. Johnson sought this reform because the national origins system was at odds with “our basic American tradition” that we “ask not where a person comes from but what are his personal qualities.” Id. at 11.\n20 [37]In reviewing the motion for a preliminary injunction of EO–2, this Court considered the interplay between § 1182(f) and § 1152(a) and concluded, based on canons of statutory construction, that the President’s authority under § 1182(f) is limited by the § 1152(a) bar on discrimination based on nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas. See IRAP, 241 F.Supp.3d at 553–56. The Court reaches the same conclusion here as to both § 1182(f) and § 1185(a). Under the canon that a lateradopted provision controls over an earlier one, § 1152(a), enacted in 1965, controls over § 1182(f) and the relevant text of § 1185(a)(1), enacted in 1952.3 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981). Section 1152(a) is also the more specific provision, in that it requires a particular result, namely non-discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas on specific, enumerated bases, while § 1182(f) and § 1185(a) mandate no particular action, but instead set out general parameters for the President’s power to bar entry and impose rules and regulations on entry and departure. Thus, to the extent that § 1152(a) may conflict with § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)\n31\n\n\fon whether the President can bar the issuance of immigrant visas based on nationality, § 1152(a), as the more specific provision, controls. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 2071, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012) (“The general/specific canon is perhaps the most frequently applied ... To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision is construed as the exception to the general one.”); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 657, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997) (“Ordinarily, where a specific provision conflicts with a general one, the specific governs.”); United States v. Smith, 812 F.2d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 1987).\nFinally, it is highly significant that § 1152(a) explicitly excludes certain sections of the INA from its scope, specifically §§ 1101(a)(27), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1153, but does not exclude § 1182(f) or § 1185(a) from its reach. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). The absence of any reference to § 1182(f) or § 1185(a) among these exceptions provides strong evidence that Congress did not intend for those provisions to be exempt from the antidiscrimination provision of § 1152(a). United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836, 121 S.Ct. 1934, 150 L.Ed.2d 45 (2001) (“[T]he mention of some implies the exclusion of others not mentioned.”); Reyes– Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that Congress “knows how to expand the jurisdictional reach of a statute”). Thus, pursuant to § 1152(a), a proclamation under § 1182(f) or § 1185(a) may not discriminate in the issuance of immigrant visas.\nThis conclusion is consistent with that of the Ninth Circuit, which found a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim that EO–2’s ban on entry by immigrants based on nationality exceeded the President’s § 1182(f) authority, concluding that “§ 1152(a)(1)(A)’s nondiscrimination mandate cabins the President’s authority under § 1182(f).” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 778. To reach this determination, the Ninth Circuit similarly applied the canons of statutory construction and relied on the facts that § 1152(a) was more recently enacted, § 1152(a) was the more specific statute, and § 1182(f) was not listed among sections of the INA exempt from the nondiscrimination requirements of § 1152(a)(1)(A). See id. at 778.\n[38]The Government argues that the Proclamation does not conflict with § 1152(a) because it suspended the entry of immigrants, not the issuance of visas. There is a textual difference. Section 1182(f) authorizes the President to bar “entry” to certain classes of aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Section 1152(a) bars discrimination based on nationality in the “issuance of an immigrant visa.” Id. § 1152(a)(1)(A). These activities, however, usually go\n\nhand-in-hand. An immigrant cannot seek entry without first obtaining an immigrant visa. But receiving an immigrant visa is meaningless without later receiving permission to enter. Thus, the denial of entry to immigrants would generally have the effect of causing the denial of immigrant visas. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 776 (holding that the EO–2’s suspension on entry “in substance operates as a ban on visa issuance on the basis of nationality”); see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 637 (Thacker, J., concurring) (“Here, the ultimate effect of what EO–2 actually does is require executive agencies to deny visas based on nationality.”). If § 1182(f) can be used to deny entry based on nationality, “the President could circumvent the limitations set by § 1152(a)(1)(A) by permitting the issuance of visas to nationals of ... designated countries, but then deny them entry. Congress could not have intended to permit the President to flout § 1152(a) so easily.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 777.\n21 There may be scenarios under which denial of entry based on nationality under § 1182(f) or § 1185(a) could be deemed to have such a limited impact that it would not also effect a denial of an immigrant visa. For example, a nationality-based denial of entry of limited duration, such as during a specific urgent national crisis or public health emergency, that was not designed to halt visa issuances but instead simply to impose a delay or limitations on migration, arguably would not result in discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas in violation of § 1152(a). President Reagan’s 1986 decision to bar entry to Cuban nationals in retaliation for Cuba’s suspension of an immigration agreement and facilitation of illegal migration into the United States, the only historical example of the use of § 1182(f) authority to bar entry based on nationality, falls into this category. That bar of entry, by its own terms, was to continue only until “the restoration of normal migration procedures between the two countries.” Proclamation 5,517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (Aug. 22, 1986). Likewise, President Carter’s invocation of 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) in response to the Iran Hostage Crisis authorized “limitations and exceptions on the rules and regulations governing the entry” of Iranians into the United States without any reference to visa issuance. Exec. Order 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 1979); Exec. Order 12,206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,101 (Apr. 7, 1980). Accordingly, when considering EO–2, which imposed only a 90–day “temporary pause” during which some entry could have been denied without impacting the issuance of visas, this Court drew a distinction between entry and visa issuance. See IRAP, 241 F.Supp.3d at 556.\n[39]Here, however, the Proclamation has no specified end date and no requirement of renewal. Where the Proclamation has effectively imposed a permanent, rather than temporary, ban on immigrants from the Designated\n32\n\n\fCountries, and has effectively stopped the issuance of\n\nimmigrant visas indefinitely, the bar on entry is the\n\nequivalent of a ban on issuing immigrant visas based on\n\nnationality. This conclusion is supported by the\n\nProclamation itself, which, even more than EO–2, makes\n\nclear that its intended effect is to deny the issuance of\n\nimmigrant visas, in violation of § 1152(a). First, unlike\n\nEO–2, which generally barred entry by nationals of the\n\nDesignated Countries, the Proclamation explicitly and\n\nspecifically targets nationals seeking to immigrate to the\n\nUnited States. The Proclamation states, “For all but one of\n\nthose 7 countries ... I am restricting the entry of all\n\nimmigrants.” Procl. § 1(h)(ii). Second, the text of the\n\nProclamation reveals that its primary effect is not that\n\nnationals of the Designated Countries holding immigrant\n\nvisas will be denied entry at the border by CBP, but that\n\nthe State Department and consular officers will stop\n\nissuing immigrant visas to such nationals. Indeed, the\n\nProclamation actually permits entry by any nationals\n\nholding approved visas. Id. § 3(a)(iii). Thus, as a result of\n\nthe Proclamation, Defendants will effect the travel ban by\n\nno longer issuing immigrant visas to nationals of the\n\nDesignated Countries. Moreover, the fact that the\n\nProclamation provides that the Secretary of State and\n\nconsular officers may grant waivers to the entry ban,\n\nProcl. § 3(c), further reveals that the Proclamation\n\ngenerally imposes a ban on visa issuance, because those\n\nofficials’ statutory role is to issue visas, not to oversee\n\nactual entry into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §\n\n1101(a)(16) (stating that an “immigrant visa” is “issued\n\nby a consular officer”). Indeed, the Proclamation erases\n\nthe line between the issuance of a visa and entry into the\n\nUnited States when it specifically provides that a waiver\n\nissued by a consular officer “will be effective both for the\n\nissuance of a visa and for any subsequent entry on that\n\nvisa.” Procl. § 3(c)(iii). Finally, any claim that the\n\nProclamation relates only to the question of entry to the\n\nUnited States is belied by its multiple references to visa\n\nissuance, including the provision stating that “visa\n\nadjudications for nationals of Somalia and decisions\n\nregarding their entry as nonimmigrants should be subject\n\nto additional scrutiny.” Procl. § 2(h)(ii). Notably, the State\n\nDepartment publicly describes the Proclamation not as\n\nlimiting entry, but as a “Presidential Proclamation on\n\nVisas.” New Presidential Proclamation on Visas\n\nSeptember 24, 2017, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of\n\nConsular\n\nAffairs\n\n(Sept.\n\n24,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/news/important-\n\nannouncement.html. Because § 1152(a) does not permit\n\nsuch discriminatory denials of immigrant visas, the\n\nProclamation exceeds the President’s statutory authority\n\nunder § 1182(f) and § 1185(a). See Abourezk, 785 F.2d at\n\n1061 (noting that the President’s authority in the\n\nimmigration context derives from “the statutory authority\n\nconferred by Congress”).\n\n22 Defendants’ remaining arguments do not alter this conclusion. Defendants unpersuasively claim that § 1182(f) and § 1185(a) do not conflict with § 1152(a) because they “limit the universe of individuals eligible to receive visas” to which the non-discrimination provision of § 1152(a) would apply. This argument fails because there is nothing in the text of either statute that remotely suggests that they serve any function relating to visa eligibility. Moreover, acceptance of the Government’s construction, under which discrimination would be permitted before the application of the non-discrimination provision, would render § 1152(a) meaningless. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633, 93 S.Ct. 2469, 37 L.Ed.2d 207 (1973) (stating that “all parts of a statute, if at all possible, are to be given effect”).\n[40]Likewise, the Court finds unpersuasive Defendants’ assertion that nationality discrimination is permissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B), which states that “[n]othing in [§ 1152(a)] shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications will be processed.” This provision applies only to the Secretary of State and thus does not provide a basis to uphold discriminatory action in a Presidential Proclamation. More importantly, where the Proclamation now imposes an indefinite travel ban based on nationality, rather than a 90–day “pause,” such an action cannot fairly be construed as a change in “procedures” or the “location” of visa processing. § 1152(a)(1)(B).\nThe Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Proclamation violates the non-discrimination provision of § 1152(a) to the extent that it bars entry by immigrants on the basis of nationality. Because this argument does not apply to nonimmigrants seeking entry to the United States, the Court must consider Plaintiffs’ remaining statutory arguments.\n2. Section 1182(f) Finding\n[41]Plaintiffs further contend that the President has failed to make an adequate finding to support his invocation of authority under § 1182(f). Section 1182(f) requires that the President find that the entry of a class of aliens would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (emphasis added); see also Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 770, 774 (concluding that EO–2 did not contain\n33\n\n\fadequate findings that the entry of nationals from the countries subject to that travel ban would be detrimental to the interests of the United States). The INA does not define key elements of this requirement, such as “find” or “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (defining terms used in the INA). “Classes of aliens” is also not defined, but examples are given in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). These examples include aliens who have “engaged in a terrorist activity,” § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), and “illegal entrants and immigration violators,” § 1182(a)(6). None of these examples are based on nationality. See §§ 1182(a)(1)–(10).\nThe President explicitly made the finding that “absent the security measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons” barred from entry by the proclamation “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Procl. pmbl. In support of that finding, the Proclamation describes two purposes. First, the Proclamation helps to prevent the “entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States.” Procl. § 1(h)(i). Second, the Proclamation will help “elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments” and thus “advance foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.” Id. The Proclamation contains additional information in support of its conclusion that a ban on entry of Designated Country nationals will further these two goals. With regard to addressing information deficiencies, the Proclamation states that “information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols of the United States,” and, citing the September 15, 2017 DHS Report, concludes that seven of the Designated Countries “continue to have ‘inadequate identity-management protocols, information-sharing practices, and risk factors.” Procl. § 1(b), (g). It further states that Somalia, although not identified as inadequate in the DHS Report, “lacks command and control of its territory” such that its ability to share information about nationals who pose terrorist risks is compromised. Id. § 2(h)(i). Without this information from the Designated Countries, the President finds, nationality-based restrictions are needed to prevent the entry of individuals about whom there is insufficient risk information. Id. § 1(h)(i). According to the Proclamation, a nationalitybased policy also fits with the diplomatic purpose of the Proclamation to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing practices. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 772 n.13 (noting that the two past nationalitybased entry bans as to Cuba and Iran were for “retaliatory diplomatic measures responsive to government conduct”).\n\n23 Plaintiffs assert compelling arguments that the Proclamation’s nationality-based restrictions are not actually necessary. Under current policy, applicants for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas, not their governments, are required to produce the information necessary to demonstrate that they are eligible to enter the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Dozens of former national security officials have stated that this travel ban is unnecessary, that it serves no national security purpose, and that there is no evidence that the United States needs to shift away from this individualized vetting system to nationality-based bans. See Joint Decl. of Former Nat’l Sec. Officials, J.R. 770. Notably, the Proclamation does not provide examples of vetting failures involving nationals from the Designated Countries that resulted in the entry of terrorists or others who should not have been admitted.\nPlaintiffs also question the choices made in the Proclamation given that Somalia met the Proclamation’s baseline criteria and was included in the entry ban, while Iraq did not meet the baseline criteria but was not included. Procl. § 1(g), 2(h). Further, the Proclamation appears to be overbroad with regard to its purported goals. It prohibits almost all Designated Country nationals from entering the United States, regardless of age, health, or even connection to the Designated Country itself. At least one of the Plaintiffs, Dr. Sumaya Hamadmad, seeks to reunite with her sister, a Syrian national who has spent her entire life in Jordan, about whom the Syrian government would have no relevant information.\nUnder a more robust standard of review, these criticisms might carry the day. But there is no requirement that a § 1182(f) entry restriction meet more stringent standards found elsewhere in the law, such as that it be “narrowly tailored” or the “least restrictive means” to obtain its stated aims. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb– 1(b)(2) (2012). The text of § 1182(f) does not even require the President to find that suspending the entry of a class of aliens would be detrimental to national security, only that it is detrimental to the interests of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Under this broad standard, previous § 1182(f) proclamations have provided far less detail regarding their findings. See, e.g., Proclamation 8,015, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,541 (May 12, 2006) (barring entry of members of the Government of Belarus based on “the importance to the United States of fostering democratic institutions in Belarus”); Exec. Order. No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,133 (May 24, 1992) (barring entry of “any defined vessel carrying [illegal] aliens” based on a finding that “there continues to be a serious problem of persons\n34\n\n\fattempting to come to the United States by sea without necessary documentation and otherwise illegally”). Against this background, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Proclamation fails to make a finding of detrimental interest sufficient to invoke § 1182(f).\n3. Section 1182(f) Authority\nLastly, Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation’s ban on entry of nationals from the Designated Countries exceeds the authority granted to the President in § 1182(f). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the Proclamation effectively revises the INA by imposing alternative visa issuance criteria that conflict with statutory criteria and thereby overrides Congress’s policy judgments, particularly those made in establishing the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”). Defendants counter that (1) the issue of whether the Proclamation exceeds the authority granted in § 1182(f) is not judicially reviewable; and (2) even if subject to review, the Proclamation is an appropriate use of the President’s broad authority under § 1182(f). Although the Proclamation also relies on § 1185(a)(1), the parties do not argue that this section provides broader authority than § 1182(f). Therefore, the Court need only consider whether the Proclamation exceeds the President’s delegated authority under § 1182(f).\n24 [42] [43]The Court first addresses Defendants’ claim that the President’s exercise of authority pursuant to § 1182(f) is not subject to judicial review. In Defendants’ view, review of § 1182(f) would be inappropriate because it would amount to a second-guessing of a decision that is appropriately committed to the President. Yet the Supreme Court had no difficulty reaching the merits of a challenge asserting that the President’s use of § 1182(f) to blockade illegal migrants from Haiti violated another provision of the INA. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 170–74, 187, 113 S.Ct. 2549. Moreover, in evaluating Plaintiffs’ argument, the Court is not second-guessing the President’s discretion, but examining whether the Proclamation fits within the President’s grant of authority. Such review of whether executive action exceeds statutory authority is plainly within the purview of the courts. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, –– – U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2076, 2090, 192 L.Ed.2d 83 (2015) (reviewing whether the President’s decision to not list “Jerusalem, Israel” as a birthplace on a passport conflicted with a provision of the 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S at 668, 101 S.Ct. 2972 (stating, in reviewing a claim that President Carter’s actions in freezing Iranian assets during the Iran\n\nHostage Crisis exceeded his statutory and constitutional authorities, that “the validity of the President’s action, at least so far as separation-of-powers principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the Legislative Branch toward such action”). Thus, the Court rejects the argument that it may not review Plaintiffs’ claim that the Proclamation exceeds the authority granted in § 1182(f).\n[44]Plaintiffs’ claim centers on two alleged transgressions. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation imposes new criteria on the issuance of visas that conflict with Congress’s statutorily established criteria. Indeed, although the text of § 1182(f) authorizes the President only to “suspend the entry” of classes of immigrants and nonimmigrants, the Proclamation goes further. The Proclamation does not stop nationals of the Designated Countries from entering the United States if they already have a valid visa or if they are able to obtain one through the processes described in the Proclamation. Rather, as with EO–2, the Proclamation effectuates the travel ban by using the visa issuance process. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 777 (noting the Government’s acknowledgment that “the entry ban” under EO–2 “would be implemented through visa denials”). Thus, Plaintiffs correctly observe that the Proclamation goes beyond mere suspension of entry and delves into the criteria for issuing visas to nationals of the Designated Countries. Specifically, the Proclamation allows a consular officer to issue waivers to such nationals that would be “effective both for the issuance of a visa and for any subsequent entry on that visa.” Procl. § 3(c)(iii). These waivers may be granted only if a foreign national demonstrates that denial of entry would cause “undue hardship,” that entry would not pose a threat to the United States, and that entry will be in the “national interest.” Procl. §§ 3(c)(i)(A), (C). The Proclamation then directs the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish guidance for consular officials to use when making waiver determinations and establishes factors that the guidance must consider along with specific factual scenarios that would generally justify a waiver.\nArguably, these criteria conflict with Congress’s detailed system governing the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas. As part of this system, Congress places on applicants for visas the burden to establish eligibility, including to show that they do not fall into any categories of individuals ineligible for visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361; id. § 1182(a). These categories include those with possible links to terrorism or criminal activity. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)-(3)(B). Plaintiffs thus assert, with some force, that the Proclamation adds additional criteria that nationals of the Designated Countries must satisfy\n35\n\n\fbefore they can obtain an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa to gain entry to the United States. This addition of such criteria, Plaintiffs argue, impermissibly replaces Congress’s list of criteria with the President’s own. The Court agrees that, as constructed, the Proclamation effectively adds new criteria for the issuance of visas and entry by nationals of certain countries beyond those formally imposed by Congress.\n25 Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation exceeds the bounds of § 1182(f) because it conflicts with Congress’s policy judgments in addressing the same problem purportedly addressed by the Proclamation: poor information sharing by foreign governments. As evidence, Plaintiffs reference the VWP, established by Congress, which allows nationals of certain foreign countries to enter the United States for periods of less than 90 days without a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(1). To be eligible for this program, a country must meet certain standards relating to cooperation and the sharing of information with the United States. § 1187(c)(2). Notably, many of the standards applied to determine if a country qualifies for the VWP are strikingly similar to those considered in the Proclamation. For example, among the criteria for VWP eligibility are whether a country provides its nationals with an electronic machine-readable passport containing biographic and biometric data, § 1187(a)(3), and whether the country reports lost and stolen passports to the United States, § 1187(c)(2)(D). The Proclamation lists these same criteria as “identity management information” considered in the assessment whether a country should be added to the travel ban list. Procl. § 1(c)(i). Other VWP criteria include whether a foreign government shares information on whether its nationals traveling to the United States pose a security threat, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(2)(F), the same type of information considered by the Proclamation under the category of “National security and public-safety information,” Procl. § 1(c)(ii). Likewise, the VWP considers whether a country is a safe haven for terrorists, 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(ii)(III), and whether the country generally accepts the repatriation of its own nationals subject to orders of removal from the United States, § 1187(c)(2)(E). These factors, along with whether a country is a participant in the VWP program itself, are the “National security and public-safety risk assessment” factors considered by the Proclamation in assessing whether a country should be subject to the travel ban. Thus, in determining which countries to subject to a travel ban, the Proclamation duplicates many of the same criteria, and revisits many of the same issues, that Congress considered in crafting the VWP.\nFurther, the Proclamation imposes a travel ban on some of the same nations, based on the some of the same criteria, on which Congress imposed lesser restrictions in its\n\nrecent amendments to the VWP. In 2015, Congress amended the VWP to exclude individuals from participating countries who were dual citizens of, or had traveled to, Iraq, Syria, a country designated by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism (Iran, Syria, and Sudan), or other countries designated by the Department of Homeland Security (Libya, Somalia, and Yemen). See Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114– 113, Div. O, Title II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)). For example, a French national who had traveled to Syria or was also a Syrian national would not be eligible for visa-free travel to the United States, even though France is a VWP country. Instead, Congress required such an individual to apply for a nonimmigrant visa and submit to a consular interview and adjudication by a consular officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12). In light of this statutory scheme, Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation exceeds the bounds of § 1182(f) because it conflicts with Congress’s policy judgments relating to the same issues and same nations. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Proclamation addresses some of the same issues considered by Congress, specifically, information sharing by foreign nations relating to travel of foreign nationals to the United States and the consequences for failing to engage in it, and that the Proclamation imposes significantly more restrictive limitations that go beyond what Congress has previously imposed.\nContrary to the Defendants’ characterization, Plaintiffs’ claim is not one of implied repeal. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 155 L.Ed.2d 407 (2003) (establishing the standard for claims that a later provision has effectively revealed a prior provision). No one is arguing that § 1182(f) has effectively been repealed. Rather, Plaintiffs’ argument appears to be that Congress’s legislative action, in enacting the VWP and criteria for issuance of visas, has implicitly limited the President’s § 1182(f) authority to bar intrusions into these areas. In a different context, the Supreme Court recognized a similar theory when it held that “the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.” Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (holding that the Food and Drug Administration’s statutory authority to regulate medical “devices” did not extend to regulation of tobacco, in part because Congress’s frequent legislation relating to tobacco signaled that Congress did not intend that result). Indeed, not only has Congress amended the VWP as recently as 2015, but it has regularly revised various aspects of the immigration system affecting visa issuance over the past\n36\n\n\f15 years. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110–161, Div. J, § 691(d), 121 Stat. 1844 (2008) (designating the Taliban as a terrorist organization representatives of which are inadmissible under the INA); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, § 7203, 118 Stat. 3638 (requiring that all visa applications be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer). Thus, Plaintiffs have offered a legitimate theory that the Proclamation has gone beyond suspending entry into legislating changes to Congress’s statutory scheme.\n26 However, this theory is undermined in two ways. First, with respect to the new visa issuance criteria arising from the waiver provisions, § 1182(f) explicitly grants the President the authority not just to suspend entry, but to “impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Thus, even if the waiver requirements are deemed to be additional criteria that must be met by an alien seeking admission, a fair reading of § 1182(f) is that it allows the President to impose such additional restrictions outside of previously listed requirements.\nSecond, it is not clear that the Proclamation directly conflicts with the judgments reflected in Congress’s construction of the VWP. The VWP covers certain participating countries that have agreed to abide by certain conditions set by the United States, including information-sharing conditions, in exchange for visa-less travel to the United States for their nationals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(2). It does not directly address whether nationals of certain non-VWP countries should be subject to even greater scrutiny than the standard visa issuance process. Likewise, the 2015 amendments related to the treatment of nationals of VWP countries who were either dual nationals of or had traveled to certain countries, including five of the countries covered by the Proclamation. See Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 § 203. Those individuals are not affected by the Proclamation. See Procl. § 3(b)(iv) (excepting dual nationals of Designated Countries traveling on a passport of a different country). Thus, although the Proclamation and the VWP address similar problems and consider similar factors, the two are not in such conflict that the VWP could fairly be deemed to foreclose the restrictions imposed through the Proclamation pursuant to § 1182(f). The Court therefore does not conclude that there is a likelihood of success on the claim that the Proclamation has effectively legislated changes to the INA in contravention of Congressional intent.\nFinally, Plaintiffs point to the sheer scope of the Proclamation and argue that it must be beyond the limit of\n\nany authority delegated by Congress. Indeed, the Proclamation is unique among past invocations of § 1182(f). Of the 42 proclamations issued pursuant to § 1182(f) or § 1185(a)(1) prior to EO–1, none have sought to ban entry by nationals of more than one country at once, let alone eight countries with approximately 150 million nationals. See Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R44743, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief 6–10 (2017). The only uses of § 1182(f) or § 1185(a)(1) to bar entry by nationals of a specific country were triggered by a specific foreign policy dispute: the Iran Hostage Crisis and a decision by the Cuban government to cancel a migration agreement with the United States. Exec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947; Exec. Order No. 12,206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,101; Proclamation No. 5,517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470. None explicitly affected the issuance of visas to the same extent as the Proclamation. Indeed, most § 1182(f) proclamations were issued in response to a discrete event and were limited to a specific group of individuals associated with that event. Manuel, supra, at 6–10. As a typical example, President Clinton invoked § 1182(f) to suspend entry of Sudanese government and military officials for their failure to comply with a United Nations Security Council Resolution. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 6,958, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,007 (Nov. 22, 1996); see also Exec. Order No. 13,606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,571 (Apr. 22, 2012) (suspending entry of certain persons associated with human rights abuses by the Iranian and Syrian governments through the use of information technology). Thus, the Proclamation is unprecedented in its combination of a broad sweep impacting millions of people based on their nationality, its imposition of additional criteria for visa issuance, and its arguable conflict with Congressional immigration policy. If there is an example of a § 1182(f) order, past or present, that exceeds the authority of that statute, it would be this one.\n27 But other than the specific nationality restriction of § 1152(a), Plaintiffs have not identified, nor has the Court found, any clear limit on the President’s authority under § 1182(f) that this proclamation has crossed. Nor have Plaintiffs cited any case where a court has struck down a § 1182(f) order as beyond the scope of that provision. In the only Supreme Court decision considering such an argument, the Court held that the statute gave “the President ample power to establish a naval blockade” to prevent Haitian migrants from entering the United States. Sale, 509 U.S. at 187, 113 S.Ct. 2549. Rather, courts have generally recognized that § 1182(f) provides the President with a “sweeping proclamation power.” Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 n. 2; see Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1507 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that § 1182(f) provides the President with “broad discretionary authority”); Allende, 845 F.2d at 1117–1118 (stating that\n37\n\n\f§ 1182(f) grants the President “vast power to exclude any individual alien or class of aliens whose entry might harm the national interest”); Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 744 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980) (referring to § 1182(f) as an “extreme power”).\nThe text of the statute itself is similarly unhelpful for discerning its limit. As discussed above, § 1182(f) does not impose a time limit on the President, stating that any restriction is “for such period as he shall deem necessary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). The President can impose restrictions on “any aliens or [ ] any class of aliens.” Id. The President is not required to find that entry would be detrimental to the nation’s security, only to its “interests,” a term that encompasses any number of reasons. Id.\nNevertheless, Plaintiffs are correct that there must be some limit on § 1182(f) authority. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129–30, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958) (holding that a broad statute authorizing the Secretary of State to issue passports under rules established by the President did not allow the Secretary to deny passports to Communists due to constitutional considerations); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) (noting that statutes affecting foreign relations often “leave the exercise of power to [the President’s] unrestricted judgment,” but that does not mean that the President has “totally unrestricted freedom of choice”). For example, Plaintiffs persuasively argue that the use of § 1182(f) to rewrite immigration law, such as to ban all family-based immigrant visas, would likely go too far. But that line has yet to be drawn. Where the Proclamation does not clearly run afoul of any identified limit on § 1182(f) authority with regard to nonimmigrant visas, the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. Because Plaintiffs’ statutory arguments do not support their requested relief in its entirety, the Court must consider their constitutional claims.\nB. Establishment Clause Plaintiffs assert that the Proclamation’s ban on citizens from the Designated Countries is the next step in a “clear and direct chain” that began with President Trump’s campaign promise to ban Muslims from entering the United States and continued through EO–1 and EO–2. IRAP Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 24. They argue that the Proclamation therefore violates the Establishment Clause.\n1. Legal Standard\n\nDefendants first argue that Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim summarily fails upon application of the standard set forth in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). Under Mandel, pursuant to Congress’s plenary power over immigration, courts review a claim that a consular officer denied a visa in contravention of constitutional rights only to determine whether there was a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the denial, in which case the court will not “look behind the exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576 (rejecting a claim that the denial of a visa to Mandel, a Marxist, violated the First Amendment rights of professors who invited him to speak because the Government offered the facially legitimate reason that on a prior visit, Mandel had engaged in activities outside the scope of his visa). Although Mandel involved the denial of an individual visa, the Supreme Court extended the use of the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard to a categorical immigration determination in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977), where a father alleged that the INA’s grant of an immigration preference to illegitimate children based on their relationship with their mothers, but not their fathers, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 788–89, 795, 97 S.Ct. 1473.\n28 [45]There are persuasive reasons to conclude that the Mandel standard does not apply to Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. First, there is a more recent line of cases recognizing that courts must not simply defer to the political branches when constitutional rights are at stake. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (emphasizing that in immigration matters, the judicial branch is not required wholly to defer to the political branches because their plenary “power is subject to important constitutional limitations”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940–41, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (underscoring that even when another branch of government has “plenary authority,” courts may still review whether that branch chose “a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power”). Here, where the right at issue arises from the Establishment Clause, the Mandel standard is a poor fit because the core harm of a violation of the Establishment Clause, as opposed to the Free Speech Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, is not a limitation on an individual’s right—whether to speak, listen, or be treated equally to another—but the dissemination of a public message that the Government has adopted an official policy of favoring one religion. A “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard designed to evaluate an individual visa determination is therefore not compatible with a fair evaluation of that public message, which necessarily requires some evaluation of the purpose behind the message. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S.\n38\n\n\fat 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (stating that an Establishment Clause violation consists of “an official purpose” to disapprove of a religion). Notably, the Supreme Court has not applied the Mandel standard to an Establishment Clause claim.\n[46] [47]Nevertheless, in light of the Fourth Circuit’s application of Mandel to its review of EO–2, see IRAP, 857 F.3d at 588–91, Plaintiffs do not seriously contest, and this Court accepts, the applicability of Mandel. The Court then looks to the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Kerry v. Din, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 192 L.Ed.2d 183 (2015), to understand the distinction between “facially legitimate” and “bona fide.” See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”) (citation omitted). An action is “facially legitimate” if there is a valid reason for it on the face of the action. Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2140–41 (Kennedy, J. concurring). An action is “bona fide” if there has been no “affirmative showing of bad faith” by the decisionmaker. Id. at 2141. Based on Din, this Court concludes that if there is a particularized showing of bad faith, a court should then “look behind” the action to evaluate its justification. Id. at 2140–41; see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590–91.\n[48]Here, the Proclamation states that the President, pursuant to § 1182(f) and § 1185(a), is suspending entry into the United States of nationals from the Designated Countries “to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people.” Procl. pmbl. This national security interest is a facially legitimate reason for the actions set forth in the Proclamation, to the extent authorized by those statutes. See Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J. concurring).\nPlaintiffs, however, assert that the Proclamation’s proffered national security rationale is not the true motivation behind the restrictions, but is instead a pretext for an anti-Muslim bias. In support of their assertion of bad faith, Plaintiffs, as part of their challenge to EO–2, previously offered President Trump’s statements during his presidential campaign calling for a “Muslim ban”; his statements that he would fulfill his campaign promise of a Muslim ban by focusing on territories rather than religion; EO–1, adopted without agency consultation, which targeted only majority-Muslim countries and contained preferences for religious minorities within those countries; and statements of President Trump and his advisors that EO–2 had the same policy goals as EO–1. Plaintiffs also pointed to the continued focus in EO–2 on\n\ncountries with majority-Muslim populations, and what they asserted was a lack of correlation between the stated national security aims of EO–2 and the mechanisms outlined to achieve it. Based on these facts, this Court concluded that the primary purpose for EO–2 was to effect the equivalent of a Muslim ban. IRAP, 241 F.Supp.3d at 560, 562–63. The Court now reaffirms that finding for purposes of the present analysis.\n29 In their challenge to the Proclamation, Plaintiffs link it to this history of bad faith by noting that the Proclamation is the specific result of the President’s directive in EO–2 that agencies develop a list of countries to be subject to a travel ban. They have supplemented the previous factual record with statements by President Trump since the injunctions against EO–2 were entered urging a return to and a toughening of the travel ban. They again note what they see as the misalignment between the stated national security goals of the ban and the means implemented to achieve them. They also assert that the Proclamation continues disproportionately to affect Muslims, despite the inclusion of two non-Muslim majority nations on the list of Designated Countries. This combined record provides facts that plausibly allege with sufficient particularity an affirmative showing of bad faith in the stated rationale for the Proclamation. Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).\nHaving found that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Government’s stated, facially legitimate, reason for the Proclamation is not bona fide, this Court “look[s] behind” that stated reason. See id. at 2140–41. The Court thus turns to a traditional constitutional analysis, in this case by applying the traditional tests for evaluating an Establishment Clause claim. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695, 121 S.Ct. 2491; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940–41, 103 S.Ct. 2764; see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590–91.\n[49] [50]The First Amendment prohibits any “law respecting an establishment of religion,” U.S. Const. amend. I, and “mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion,” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). When a government action does not differentiate among religions on its face, courts apply the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), to evaluate an Establishment Clause challenge. See Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 695, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989). Under Lemon, to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge (1) an act must have a secular purpose, (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) it must not “foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Id. at 612–613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting Walz v.\n39\n\n\fTax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)). All three prongs of the test must be satisfied. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987).\n[51] [52] [53]As the first prong of the Lemon test makes clear, in Establishment Clause cases, “purpose matters.” McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 n.14, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005). Thus the purpose test is not satisfied by the identification of any secular purpose. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 865 n.13, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Such a rule “would leave the purpose test with no real bite, given the ease of finding some secular purpose for almost any government action.” Id. (“[A]n approach that credits any valid purpose ... has not been the way the Court has approached government action that implicates establishment.” (emphasis added)). Although governmental statements of purpose generally receive deference, an identified secular purpose must be “genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” Id. at 864, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Further, if a religious purpose for the government action is the predominant or primary purpose, and the secular purpose is “secondary,” the purpose test has not been satisfied. Id. at 860, 862–65, 125 S.Ct. 2722; see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594, 107 S.Ct. 2573 (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause where the “primary purpose” of the challenged act was “to endorse a particular religious doctrine”).\n[54] [55] [56]An assessment of the purpose of an action is a “common” task for courts. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 861, 125 S.Ct. 2722. An “understanding of official objective” can emerge from “readily discoverable fact” without “any judicial psychoanalysis” of the decisionmaker. Id. at 862, 125 S.Ct. 2722. In determining purpose, a court acts as an “objective observer” who considers “the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000)). Because “the world is not made brand new every morning,” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315, 120 S.Ct. 2266), the Court must also consider the “historical context” of a challenged action and the “specific sequence of events” leading up to it. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594–95, 107 S.Ct. 2573. Such evidence is “perfectly probative” and considering it is a matter of “common sense,” because when determining purpose, courts are “forbid[den] ... ‘to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.’ ” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315, 120 S.Ct. 2266).\n\n2. Historical Context\n30 This Court previously applied the Lemon test to EO– 2 and found that it likely failed the purpose prong because there was substantial direct evidence that the travel ban was motivated by a desire to ban Muslims as a group from entering the United States. IRAP, 241 F.Supp.3d at 560, 562–63. In making this factual determination, the Court relied largely on a record of public statements made by President Trump and his advisors before his election, before the issuance of EO–1, and after the decision to issue EO–2. Id. at 558–59, 562, 564. See Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 801 (10th Cir. 2009) (considering quotations from county commissioners that appeared in news reports in finding that a Ten Commandments display violated the Establishment Clause); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1282, 1284– 85, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding an Establishment Clause violation based on a record that included the state chief justice’s campaign materials, including billboards and television commercials, proclaiming him to be the “Ten Commandments Judge”).\nThat record revealed that on December 7, 2015, while still a Republican primary candidate, Trump posted a “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” on his campaign website “calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our representatives can figure out what is going on.” J.R. 85. Then in a March 22, 2016 Fox Business interview, Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslim immigration, explaining that his call for the ban had gotten “tremendous support” and that “we’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” J.R. 261. On December 21, 2016, when asked whether a recent attack in Germany affected his proposed Muslim ban, President– Elect Trump replied, “You know my plans. All along, I’ve proven to be right. 100% correct.” J.R. 245. After becoming the Republican presidential nominee, Trump clarified his plans for a Muslim ban. In a July 24, 2016 interview on Meet the Press, Trump asserted that immigration should be immediately suspended “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism.” J.R. 219. When questioned whether his new formulation was a “rollback” of his call for a “Muslim ban,” he described it as an “expansion” and explained that “[p]eople were so upset when I used the word Muslim,” so he was instead “talking territory instead of Muslim.” J.R. 220.\nWithin a week of taking office, President Trump issued EO–1. Upon signing it, President Trump remarked, “This\n40\n\n\fis the ‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ We all know what that means.” J.R. 142. The next day, Mayor Giuliani asserted on Fox News that President Trump told him he wanted a Muslim ban and asked Giuliani to “[s]how me the right way to do it legally.” J.R. 247. Giuliani explained that, after consulting with others, he proposed that the action be “focused on, instead of religion ... the areas of the world that create danger for us,” specifically “places where there are [sic] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country.” J.R. 247–48.\nEO–1 mirrored this rhetoric. It suspended for 90 days the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, all countries where the vast majority of the population is Muslim. The stated purpose of this suspension was to “protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States.” EO–1 pmbl. EO–1 cautioned that this threat required the United States to be “vigilant during the visa-issuance process,” a process that “plays a crucial role in detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering the United States.” EO–1 § 1. However, EO–1 contained no facts tying the seven banned countries to any particular terror threats or to any visa-issuance failures. EO–1 also expressly drew distinctions based on religion, requiring that refugee claims on the basis of religious persecution be prioritized for individuals who were members of a minority religion in their country of nationality.\n31 EO–1 was issued without traditional interagency consultation. Considering this abbreviated process, the similarity between the provisions of EO–1 and the public statements about the form the promised Muslim ban would take, the express references to religion within its text, and the lack of any articulated connection between the scope of the ban and particular national security threats, this Court concluded, in resolving the motion for a preliminary injunction against EO–2, that there was a “convincing case” that the purpose of EO–1 was “to accomplish, as nearly as possible, President Trump’s promised Muslim ban” through a policy of restricting entry of nationals of predominantly Muslim countries deemed to be dangerous territory. IRAP, 241 F.Supp.3d at 558–59. This Court reaffirms this finding for purposes of the present analysis.\nThat conclusion echoed the determination of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which had enjoined EO–1 on Establishment Clause grounds. Aziz, 234 F.Supp.3d at 730, 737–38 (quoting from a July 17, 2016 interview during which thencandidate Trump, upon hearing a tweet stating “Calls to\n\nban Muslims from entering the U.S. are offensive and unconstitutional,” responded “So you call it territories. OK? We’re gonna do territories.”). Similarly, in reviewing a TRO halting EO–1, the Ninth Circuit opined that an Establishment Clause claim as to EO–1 raised “serious allegations” and presented “significant constitutional questions.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1168.\nEO–2 followed only six weeks after EO–1. EO–2 again instituted a 90–day suspension of entry from Designated Countries. However, EO–2 removed Iraq from the list of Designated Countries, which was otherwise the same, exempted certain categories of individuals from the ban, and delineated other categories of individuals who might be eligible for a case-by-case waiver. It also removed the preference for refugees from religious minorities and contained no express mention of religion. EO–2 contained a more fulsome factual predicate for its stated national security purpose, asserting that there is a heightened risk that individuals from the Designated Countries will be “terrorist operatives or sympathizers” because each Designated Country is “a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones,” such that their governments will therefore be less willing or able to “share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States.” EO–2 § 1(d).\nEO–2 required that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the DNI, conduct a “worldwide review to identify whether, and if so what, additional information” would be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate a visa application and determine that the applicant is not a security threat. EO–2 § 2(a). A report on that review was to be submitted 20 days after the effective date of EO–2. Then, the Secretary of State was to begin a 50–day process of requesting that foreign governments bring their practices into compliance with any of the report’s recommendations. After that period, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the DNI, was to “submit to the President of list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested.” EO–2 § 2(e). This review and recommendation plan (collectively, the “DHS Review”) was largely unchanged from a comparable review process contained in EO–1.\nIn public statements, the Trump Administration repeatedly emphasized that EO–2 was, in substance, the same as EO–1. On February 16, 2017, before EO–2 was issued, Stephen Miller, Senior Policy Advisor to the President, characterized the changes made as “mostly\n41\n\n\fminor technical differences” and asserted that the “basic policies are still going to be in effect.” J.R. 319. When EO–2 was signed on March 6, 2017, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer emphasized that “[t]he principles of the [second] executive order remain the same” as those of EO–1. J.R. 118. EO–2 itself explicitly stated that changes from EO–1, particularly the addition of exemption and waiver categories, were made to address “judicial concerns.” EO–2 § 1(i).\n32 Considering EO–2 in this context, this Court concluded that despite the modifications from EO–1 and the removal of any reference to religion, the history of public statements “continued to provide a convincing case that the purpose of EO–2 remains the realization of the long-envisioned Muslim ban.” IRAP, 241 F.Supp.3d at 559. In so finding, the Court determined that the core policy outcome of a ban on entry of nationals from the Designated Countries remained intact, that EO–2 continued to have the same practical mechanics of a Muslim ban by another name that President Trump had so publicly described, and that the national security rationale, under the circumstances, represented at most a secondary purpose for the travel ban. Id. at 559–60, 562– 63. This Court accordingly found that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that EO–2 violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 560, 564; see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 601. The Court reaffirms this finding for purposes of the present analysis.\n[57] [58]It is against this backdrop that the Court must now assess the likelihood of success of Plaintiffs’ claim that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause. Because “reasonable observers have reasonable memories,” past Establishment Clause violations are relevant to the assessment of present government actions. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866, 874, 125 S.Ct. 2722. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000) (rejecting the argument, in a case involving successive school-prayer policies, that adoption of a new, facially neutral schoolprayer policy “insulates the continuation of such prayers from constitutional scrutiny,” because any such inquiry “must include an examination of the circumstances surrounding its enactment”). When faced with allegations of a successive Establishment Clause violation, a court must thus not lapse into the role of “an absentminded objective observer,” but must instead remain “familiar with the history of the government’s action and competent to learn what history has to show.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Here, where EO–1 and EO–2 were each likely to violate the Establishment Clause, and the third iteration, the Proclamation, was issued close on their heels—within nine and six months, respectively—it is “common sense” that the Proclamation stands in their\n\nshadow. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 855, 869–72, 874, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (evaluating the purpose of a third proposed display of the Ten Commandments in light of two prior proposals made within the course of a year).\n[59] [60]However, past actions do not “forever taint” present ones. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874, 125 S.Ct. 2722. While courts should reject an “implausible claim that governmental purpose has changed,” they should also “take account of genuine changes in constitutionally significant conditions.” Id. The Supreme Court has not articulated what kind of changes are necessary to obviate the taint of a prior Establishment Clause violation. On this point, Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016), cited by Defendants, is instructive. In Felix, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that “it is possible that a government may begin with an impermissible purpose, or create an unconstitutional effect, but later take affirmative actions to neutralize” the Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 863. In assessing “whether curative effects are sufficient to overcome an objective observer’s impression” of an impermissible Establishment Clause violation, governmental curative actions would have “not only to persuasively present a primary nonreligious effect, but also to disassociate the [government action] from its previous religious effect.” Id. Specifically, the governmental cure should be (1) “purposeful,” (2) “public,” and (3) “at least as persuasive” as the initial Establishment Clause violation. Id.\n3. The Proclamation\nThe Government argues that the Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause because unlike EO–2, it is based on a worldwide review by the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security of information-sharing practices and other factors relevant to the visa issuance process. A comparison of the two orders reveals certain changes that support this argument. First, the Proclamation describes the review process conducted in advance of the Proclamation’s issuance, which included consideration of baseline criteria for assessing available information relevant to the visa issuance process, an assessment of each country against those factors, the consultation with foreign governments to increase compliance, and recommendations on restrictions for countries whose compliance remains inadequate. Procl. §§ 1(e), (f). Second, the Proclamation also alters the list of Designated Countries. In EO–1 and EO–2, all the banned countries were majority-Muslim; the Proclamation’s Designated Countries include two non-majority Muslim countries:\n42\n\n\fNorth Korea and Venezuela. Like EO–2, the Proclamation includes certain exceptions and authorizes case-by-case waivers, but its restrictions are more finely tuned, with distinctions made for most of the Designated Countries as to particular kinds of visas subject to suspension.\n33 [61]Defendants also emphasize that the Proclamation makes no express distinctions based on religion. As with EO–2, the fact that, within the four corners of the document, there is no explicit distinction among countries based on religion does not end the inquiry. Establishment Clause violations can arise from facially neutral government action. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 699–702, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534, 542, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (holding that a facially neutral city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice and intended to target the Santeria faith violated the Free Exercise Clause because “the Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination” and action targeting religion “cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality”). As in Kiryas Joel, where a facially neutral delegation of civic power to “qualified voters” of a village predominantly comprised of followers of Satmas Hasidism was deemed to be a “purposeful and forbidden” violation of the Establishment Clause, a simple check on the demographics of the geographic area affected by the Proclamation, with a combined population that is predominantly Muslim, reveals that its impact closely aligns with religious affiliation. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699–702, 114 S.Ct. 2481.\nLikewise, the inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations, North Korea and Venezuela, does not persuasively show a lack of religious purpose behind the Proclamation. The Venezuela ban is qualitatively different from the others because it extends only to government officials, and the ban on North Korea will, according to Department of State statistics, affect fewer than 100 people, only a fraction of one percent of all those affected by the Proclamation. In short, the inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea in the Proclamation has little practical consequence. The Court must therefore still assess whether, as has occurred in other Establishment Clause cases, the insertion of these countries was “a litigating position” rather than an earnest effort to “cast off” the prior “unmistakable” objective. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 871–72, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (finding that the addition of secular texts to a Ten Commandments display did not remedy a prior Establishment Clause violation).\nAs with EO–2, the Court must consider not whether the\n\nProclamation has stated a nonreligious purpose for the travel ban, but whether that purpose is, in fact, the primary purpose for the travel ban, rather than a purpose secondary to the religious animus that the Court has found, and continues to find, to be the primary purpose for the EO–2. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860, 862–65, 125 S.Ct. 2722. The Court also considers whether the governmental curative action since EO–2 was purposeful, public, and “at least as persuasive as the initial endorsement of religion.” Felix, 841 F.3d at 863. At the outset of this analysis, the Court notes that, on its face, the Proclamation is not entirely independent of the President’s history of public advocacy for a Muslim ban. In a July 24, 2016 interview on Meet the Press, thencandidate Trump, when asked about his proposed “Muslim ban,” responded by stating that “[w]e must immediately suspend immigration from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism until such time as proven vetting mechanisms have been put in place.” J.R. 219–20. When asked if this formulation represented a “rollback” of the Muslim ban, President Trump answered that it was an “expansion,” noting that he was now “looking at territories” because “[p]eople were so upset when I used the word Muslim.” J.R. 220. President Trump’s characterization of the Muslim ban on that occasion, as a suspension of immigration until vetting mechanisms have been implemented, appears to mirror the contours of the Proclamation. Likewise, the permanent travel ban imposed by the Proclamation was forecast at the time of EO–1 and EO–2. On January 30, 2017, three days after issuing the 90–day ban under EO– 1, ostensibly for the purpose of conducting an internal review of vetting procedures, President Trump seemed to predict the results of that review, stating, “we’re going to have a very, very strict ban.” J.R. 123. Shortly after the issuance of EO–2, White House officials, noting that EO– 2’s provisions were temporary, stated that the ban might be extended past 90 days and to additional countries. J.R. 116.\n34 Upon consideration of the text of EO–1, EO–2, and the Proclamation, there are substantial reasons to question whether the asserted national security purpose has now indeed become the primary purpose. First, the underlying architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same. Each of these executive actions bans the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas on the basis of nationality to multiple majority-Muslim countries on the basis of concerns about terrorism. The Proclamation does not abandon this fundamental approach, but rather doubles down on it, because rather than imposing a temporary, 90–day travel ban, the Proclamation establishes an indefinite travel ban, which is subject to periodic review, but which would become permanent in the absence of additional action.\n43\n\n\fAlthough the Government frames the Proclamation review process as an independent action that has cured any taint from EO–2, a close read of EO–1 and EO–2 reveals that the outcome of the DHS Review was at least partially pre-ordained. It is undisputed that the DHS Review was conducted pursuant to the President’s directive, contained in both EO–1 and EO–2, mandating a review of information-sharing practices, but that directive also telegraphed the expected recommendations. Specifically, EO–2 instructed that the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals.” EO–2 § 2(e), see EO–1 § 2(e) (omitting the phrase “appropriate categories of”). This language does not permit the Secretary to recommend that no nationality-based travel ban is necessary. The language of EO–2 thus indicates that the President had decided, even before the study had been conducted, that regardless of the results, some nationals would be subject to a travel ban. Where EO–2 contemplated and planned for the very type of travel ban imposed by the Proclamation, the Proclamation cannot be framed as an independent product of bureaucratic operation.\nMoreover, a comparison of EO–2 with the Proclamation reveals that many of the criteria considered in the DHS Review, and used to justify the ban on specific countries in the Proclamation, were substantially similar to those used to select the list of countries banned by EO–2. EO–2 explained its choice of countries by noting that some or all were “a state sponsor of terrorism,” had “been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations,” and made it difficult for the United States to deport their nationals because they “typically delay issuing, or refuse to issue, travel documents.” EO–2 § 1(d). These factors largely track the “National security and public-safety risk assessment” factors considered in the DHS Review, which include whether a country is a “known or potential terrorist safe haven” and “fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.” Proclamation § 1(c)(iii). Likewise, EO–2 ostensibly selected banned countries in part because country circumstances diminished “the foreign government’s willingness or ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States,” a consideration that encompasses many of the “Identity-management information” and “National security and public-safety information” criteria used as the baseline for the DHS Report. Id. § 1(c)(i)-(ii).\nMany of EO–2’s specific findings about banned countries are also substantially the same as those described in the\n\nProclamation. For example, EO–2 noted as one factor in banning Iran that it “regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks,” EO–2 § 2(e)(i), while the Proclamation concluded that “Iran does not cooperate with the United States in counterterrorism efforts,” Procl. § 2(b) (i). EO–2 justified the ban on Somalia in part because “most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents,” EO–2 § 2(e)(iii), one of the same factors used to justified the Somali ban in the Proclamation, see Procl. § 2(h)(i). In both orders, the ban on Syria is justified in part by the fact that Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism and does not cooperate with the United States in addressing security or terrorism risks. This substantial overlap between EO–2 and the Proclamation in terms of the criteria considered and applied in identifying countries to ban undermines the characterization of the Proclamation’s determination to impose a travel ban as the product of an independent evaluation unconnected to the earlier, tainted travel bans, and further suggests that many of the results may have been pre-ordained. Where the President ordered the submission of a list of countries to be banned, and the criteria used to arrive at that list substantially aligned with those he applied to generate the list of banned countries in the tainted EO–2, it is not surprising that agency officials acting in good faith could and did propose a similar list of countries to be banned in the Proclamation.\n35 Some of the specific determinations made in the Proclamation, by deviating from the general findings of the DHS Review, also undermine the argument that the Designated Countries were selected by an independent process completely untethered to the President’s earlier statements advocating for a Muslim ban. For example, although the Proclamation’s travel ban is purportedly designed to combat deficient information-sharing practices, Somalia, which was found to have adequate information-sharing practices, is nevertheless on the list of Designated Countries and is subject to a ban on all immigrants from that nation. Somalia is a majorityMuslim country that was included in the list of Designated Countries in both EO–1 and EO–2. Venezuela, meanwhile, a non-majority Muslim nation, was determined to have inadequate information-sharing practices, to have at least one national security risk factor, and to not reliably receive its nationals slated for deportation. Despite these deficiencies, only officials of the Venezuelan government are barred from entry. Thus, by its own terms, the Proclamation did not simply rely on the results of an objective information-sharing review but instead made certain subjective determinations that resulted in a disproportionate impact on majority-Muslim nations, and a greater alignment with the travel ban of EO–2, than would otherwise flow from the objective factors considered in the review. Moreover, the exception\n44\n\n\fgiven to Venezuela serves to reveal that informationsharing deficiencies do not necessarily warrant a broad, nationality-based ban.\nThat fact brings into relief a continued lack in the Proclamation, as in EO–1 and EO–2, of facts establishing that a broad nationality-based travel ban is justified by possible failures in the visa-issuance process and the terrorist and public safety threats that the Proclamation’s ban is meant to thwart. While the President’s findings may meet the low bar of “detrimental interest,” 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(f); see supra part II.A.2, they do not explain why the broad travel ban is necessary in a way that convincingly demonstrates that its primary purpose is now unrelated to religious animus. As discussed above, a nationality-based travel ban against eight nations consisting of over 150 million people is unprecedented. Since the enactment of § 1182(f), only two of the 42 invocations of that authority have sought to bar entry based on nationality, and in those cases only against a single nation and in response to a specific diplomatic dispute with that nation. See Exec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947; Exec. Order No. 12,206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,101; Proclamation No. 5,517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470. Such a ban was not even imposed after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Furthermore, while EO–1 and EO–2 sought to justify the travel ban based on prior acts of terrorism involving nationals of the Designated Countries, Defendants offer no evidence, even in the form of classified information submitted to the Court, showing an intelligence-based terrorism threat justifying a ban on entire nationalities; rather, the Proclamation relies primarily on the lack of information sharing from the Designated Countries. Numerous distinguished former national security officials have attested to the unique nature of this travel ban and the lack of a discernible national security rationale for it, including any rationale that would flow from information-sharing deficiencies. Notably, in the context of the VWP, Congress as recently as 2015 examined this same issue and responded with legislation that falls well short of any kind of nationalitybased travel ban. See supra part III.A.3. Thus, the Proclamation fails adequately to explain not the need to respond to information-sharing deficiencies, but the need for the specific response of an unprecedented, sweeping nationality-based travel ban against majority-Muslim nations.\nThe Court does not reference the record evidence showing the apparent disconnect between the identified problem and the broad, nationality-based travel ban to evaluate the merits of the travel ban as a national security matter. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–34, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (stating that generally, courts should afford deference to national\n\nsecurity and foreign policy judgments of the Executive Branch). Nor does it question that information-sharing deficiencies can have a national security impact and should be addressed. Rather, it considers this context only to assess whether the Proclamation persuasively establishes that the primary purpose of the travel ban is no longer religious animus. Based on the facts that the Proclamation’s ban generally resembles President Trump’s earlier description of the Muslim ban, EO–2 dictated the Proclamation’s outcome of a recommended list of nations to be subjected to a travel ban, the criteria used to select countries were highly correlated with those used to select the countries for EO–2, the terms of the Proclamation’s travel ban skew against Muslim nations as compared to the objective measures applied in the DHS Review, and the proposed response has not been adequately explained as a necessary one to the identified problem, the Court cannot conclude that the Proclamation sufficiently offers a “purposeful” curative action that establishes that the taint of EO–2 no longer underlies the travel ban. See Felix, 841 F.3d at 863.\n36 [62]To the extent that the Government might have provided additional evidence to establish that national security is now the primary purpose for the travel ban, it has not done so. It has not offered classified information such as the September 15, 2017 DHS Report which, even though not “public,” could have been submitted to the Court to explain the shift in purpose. Of course, even if such evidence was forthcoming, its value in obviating the taint of the earlier Executive Orders would be limited. As noted, in Establishment Clause cases, it is the opinion of the reasonable observer that controls. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315, 120 S.Ct. 2266). Purposes that can be discerned only if one “burrow[s] into a difficult-to-access” record do little to “assure [the public] that the government is not endorsing a religious view.” Felix, 841 F.3d at 863.\nBeyond the Proclamation itself, Defendants have offered only one additional “public” statement to bolster the case that the Proclamation is now cured of religious animus: a speech by the President delivered in Saudi Arabia in May 2017 in which he made various positive statements about Islam. See Felix, 841 F.3d at 863. Such a statement, however, did not in any way repudiate the President’s prior intention to impose a Muslim ban. Particularly where, in August 2017, President Trump tweeted a statement that a method hostile to Islam—shooting Muslims with bullets dipped in pig’s blood—should be used to deter future terrorism, there is no record of public statements showing any change in the President’s intentions relating to a Muslim ban.\nRather, the only other available public statements not only\n45\n\n\ffail to advance, but instead undermine, the position that the primary purpose of the travel ban now derives from the need to address information-sharing deficiencies. Even while interagency consultation regarding the travel ban took place behind closed doors, another conversation continued in the public eye. The day after EO–2 was enjoined, President Trump proclaimed at a rally that it had been a “watered down version of the first one” that had been “tailor[ed]” by lawyers to respond to legal challenges. J.R. 652–53. He suggested instead that “we ought to go back to the first one and go all the way, which is what I wanted to do in the first place.” J.R. 653. In a June 3, 2017 tweet, days after the Fourth Circuit’s opinion upholding this Court’s injunction against EO–2, President Trump declared in a tweet that “We need the Travel Ban as an extra level of safety!” J.R. 662. On June 5, 2017, President Trump tweeted that “[t]he Justice Dept. should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the watered down, politically correct version they submitted to [the Supreme Court],” and that “the Justice Dept. should ask for an expedited hearing of the watered down Travel Ban before the Supreme Court—& seek much tougher version!” J.R. 664. Then, on September 15, 2017, the same day that the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security submitted her report, President Trump again called for an expansion of the travel ban, tweeting that “the travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specific-but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!” J.R. 705.\nThus, while Defendants assert that the Proclamation’s travel ban was arrived at through the routine operations of the government bureaucracy, the public was witness to a different genealogy, one in which the President— speaking “straight to the American people,” J.R. 667— announced his intention to go back to and get even tougher than in EO–1 and EO–2. Notably, the June 5 tweet calling for a “much tougher version” reveals that even before President Trump had received any reports on the DHS Review that ostensibly identified the need for a travel ban, the first of which he received over a month later on July 9, 2017, the President had already decided that the travel ban would continue. His September 15, 2017 tweet calling for a “far larger, tougher” travel ban, issued the same day that that the final report was received, reinforced this position. Against the backdrop of two prior Executive Orders that this Court and others have deemed likely violated the Establishment Clause, see, e.g., Aziz, 234 F.Supp.3d at 739 and Hawaii, 241 F.Supp.3d at 1137–38, this Court is obligated to pay attention to such statements. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (cautioning courts that they cannot become “an absentminded objective observer,” but must instead remain “familiar with the history of the government’s action and competent to learn what history has to show”).\n\nThe reasonable observer using a “head with common sense” would rely on the statements of the President to discern the purpose of a Presidential Proclamation. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Here, those statements do not offer “persuasive” rejection of the President’s prior calls for a Muslim ban, or his stated intention to use a ban on certain “dangerous territory” to effectuate a Muslim ban, Felix, 841 F.3d at 863, nor do they show that the stated intention to impose a Muslim ban has been “repealed or otherwise repudiated,” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 871–72, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Rather, they cast the Proclamation as the inextricable reanimation of the twice-enjoined Muslim ban, and, in echoes of McCreary, convey the message that the third iteration of the ban—no longer temporary—will be the “enhanced expression” of the earlier ones. Id. at 872, 125 S.Ct. 2722.\n37 The “initial” announcement of the Muslim ban, offered repeatedly and explicitly through President Trump’s own statements, forcefully and persuasively expressed his purpose in unequivocal terms. Under Felix, the Government’s cure must be made “as persuasively as the initial” violation. Felix, 841 F.3d at 863. Here, the Court concludes that where the Proclamation itself is not sufficiently independent of EO–2 to signal a purposeful, persuasive change in the primary purpose of the travel ban, and there were no other public signs that “as persuasively” as the original violation established a different primary purpose for the travel ban, it cannot find that a “reasonable observer” would understand that the primary purpose of the Proclamation’s travel ban is no longer the desire to impose a Muslim ban. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 872, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (finding that a third version of a Ten Commandments display continued to have a primarily religious purpose); Felix, 841 F.3d at 863. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. Having reached this conclusion, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their Equal Protection Clause claim.\nIV. Irreparable Harm [63]Having concluded that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits on their § 1152(a) and Establishment Clause claims, the Court turns to whether they have shown a likelihood of irreparable harm. The Supreme Court has held that “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (finding irreparable harm upon a violation of the\n46\n\n\ffreedom of association). The Fourth Circuit has applied this holding to cases involving the freedom of speech and expression. E.g., Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 190, 191–92 (4th Cir. 2013); Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2011). Although the Fourth Circuit has not held that a violation of the Establishment Clause likewise necessarily results in irreparable harm, other circuits have. See, e.g., Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ingebretsen ex rel. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996); Parents’ Ass’n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235, 1242 (2d Cir. 1986); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding irreparable harm in an Establishment Clause case and stating that the “harm is irreparable as well as substantial because an erosion of religious liberties cannot be deterred by awarding damages to the victims of such erosion”).\nHere, as in Elrod, “First Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was sought.” 427 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673. “[W]hen an Establishment Clause violation is alleged, infringement occurs the moment the government action takes place.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 303. The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of irreparable harm arising from their Establishment Clause claim at the time the Proclamation takes effect.\n[64]The Court also finds that Plaintiffs with a family member seeking an immigrant visa have established a likelihood of irreparable harm as a result of the Proclamation’s violation of the INA. Irreparable harm occurs when the threatened injury impairs a court’s ability to grant an effective remedy, such as a harm that cannot be compensated by money damages at a later trial. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 782; see also 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed. 1998). The injury must be likely, not merely speculative, in order to be considered irreparable. Wright & Miller, supra, § 2948.1. Without an injunction, Plaintiffs will be subjected to imminent and irreparable harm as a result of the prolonged separation from their family members caused by the Proclamation. Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 782 (considering separation from family members in finding a likelihood of irreparable harm); see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 611–12 (Keenan, J., concurring). The absence of a family member cannot be cured through a later payment of money damages, and is therefore irreparable. For the same reason that Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe, the injury is not speculative, despite the Proclamation’s waiver provisions. See supra part I.B. Thus, Plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm as a result of\n\nthe Proclamation.\nV. Balance of the Equities 38 [65]In balancing the equities, the Court considers the significant, irreparable harm Plaintiffs would face both from the prolonged separation from family members and the Establishment Clause violation. While Plaintiffs would likely face irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction and would plainly benefit from an injunction, Defendants are not directly harmed by a preliminary injunction preventing them from enforcing a Proclamation likely to be found unconstitutional. See Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle Cty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003); Aziz, 234 F.Supp.3d at 738.\nAt the same time, the Supreme Court has stated that “no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Although the Proclamation seeks to further information-sharing and diplomatic purposes, Defendants have not shown that national security cannot be maintained without an unprecedented eight-country travel ban. An injunction would not grant entry to any individual foreign national, but would only preclude the use of a blanket ban. Even with an injunction, visa applicants from the Designated Countries would be screened through the standard, individualized vetting process under which the burden is on individual applicants to prove that they are not inadmissible to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. An injunction would not shift or lessen that burden or prevent the denial of any particular visa application. Thus, as a general matter, the balance of the equities favors the issuance of an injunction.\nHowever, in partially staying the injunction of EO–2, the Supreme Court noted that the balance of equities varies depending on a foreign national’s strength of connection to the United States. See Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088. For those individuals who lack “a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” the equities shift such that Defendants’ interest in national security prevails over any harms resulting from the Proclamation’s likely Establishment Clause or INA violations. See id. Accordingly, this factor supports an injunction extending only to individuals with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States, as discussed below.\nVI. Public Interest [66]Preventing an Establishment Clause violation provides\n47\n\n\fa significant public benefit. The Supreme Court has recognized the “fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985). The Founders “brought into being our Nation, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights with its prohibition against any governmental establishment of religion” because they understood that “governmentally established religions and religious persecution go hand in hand.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432–33, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962). When the government chooses sides among religions, the “inevitable result” is “hatred, disrespect, and even contempt” from those who adhere to different beliefs. See id. at 431, 82 S.Ct. 1261. Thus, to avoid sowing seeds of division in our nation, upholding this fundamental constitutional principle at the core of our Nation’s identity serves a significant public interest.\n[67]The Court also finds that granting an injunction on the Proclamation’s violation of the INA advances the public interest. Section 1152(a) represents a judgment by Congress that our immigration policy should not discriminate on the basis of nationality. To the extent that this judgment is undermined by the Proclamation, the public interest is furthered by an injunction on those grounds.\n39 Although the Government’s interest in national security is a significant public interest, for the reasons discussed above, see supra part V, those interests are not paramount in this instance. Accordingly, the Court finds that the public interest favors an injunction.\nVII. Scope of Relief The Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause and § 1152(a) arguments focused primarily on the travel ban for citizens of the eight Designated Countries in Section 2 of the Proclamation. The Court will therefore enjoin Section 2 only, subject to the following exceptions.\nAs discussed above, because the balance of equities favor Defendants as to visa applicants with no ties to the United States, the injunction is limited to barring enforcement of Section 2 against those individuals “who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088. For individuals, the injunction covers visa applications by individuals with immediate family members, such as parents, children, or siblings, as well as “grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States.” Id.; Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 658\n\n(9th Cir. 2017) (clarifying the scope of the injunction against EO–2). For organizations, the connection must be “formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course” rather than for the purposes of evading the Proclamation. Trump, 137 S.Ct. at 2088. For example, IRAP’s employee or an invited speaker for MESA’s annual meeting or IAAB’s conference would qualify. See id. (including a “lecturer invited to address an American audience” and a “worker who accepted an offer of employment” within the scope of the injunction). A member of MESA or another membership organization who formally joined the organization before the date of the injunction and seeks to enter the United States for organized activities or meetings of the association would also fall within its scope. See id. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s stay of the Ninth Circuit’s determination that a refugee with a formal sponsorship assurance from a U.S. resettlement agency has a bona fide connection to the United States, the Court concludes that clients of IRAP and HIAS, and those similarly situated, are not covered by the injunction absent a separate bona fide relationship as defined above. See id. at 2088; Hawaii, 871 F.3d at 661–64 (finding that a refugee with a formal sponsorship assurance from a U.S. resettlement agency has a bona fide connection to the United States); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17A275, ––– U.S. ––––, ––– S.Ct. ––––, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2017 WL 3975174 (Sept. 11, 2017) (staying the Ninth Circuit mandate “with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance”).\nThe injunction also will not apply to travelers from Venezuela or North Korea because the balance of equities favors Defendants with respect to those two countries. Section 1152(a) provides no basis to support an injunction relating to Venezuela because the Proclamation does not bar immigrants from Venezuela. Given the extremely limited number of visas typically issued to individuals from North Korea, Plaintiffs have neither argued nor shown how any individuals from that nation with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States will be harmed by the § 1152(a) violation. Likewise, they have not shown how travelers from Venezuela or North Korea would be harmed by the likely Establishment Clause violation. Accordingly, the injunction will not apply to nationals of Venezuela or North Korea.\n40 Finally, in light of the constitutional concerns associated with enjoining the President of the United States, this injunction does not apply to the President and instead applies only to the other Defendants and the federal officials who will actually enforce the Proclamation. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800–01, 112 S.Ct. 2767.\n[68] [69] [70]The injunction will apply nationwide. It is “well\n48\n\n\festablished” that a federal district court has “wide discretion to fashion appropriate injunctive relief in a particular case.” Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1308 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the “Constitution vests the District Court with ‘the judicial Power of the United States,’ ” which “extends across the country” (quoting U.S. Const. art. III § 1)), aff’d by an equally divided court, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2271, 195 L.Ed.2d 638 (2016). Injunctive relief “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). However, nationwide injunctions are appropriate if necessary to afford relief to the prevailing party. See id.; Richmond Tenants Org., Inc., 956 F.2d at 1308–39; Texas, 809 F.3d at 188.\n[71]The Court has found that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that Section 2 of the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause and § 1152(a). The Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs are located in different parts of the United States, indicating that nationwide relief may be appropriate. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc., 956 F.2d at 1309 (holding that a nationwide injunction was “appropriately tailored” because the plaintiffs lived in different parts of the country). Moreover, although the Government has argued that relief should be strictly limited to the specific interests of Plaintiffs, an Establishment Clause violation has impacts beyond the personal interests of individual parties. Joyner v. Forsyth Cty., 653 F.3d 341, 355 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]hese plaintiffs are not so different from other citizens who may feel in some way marginalized on account of their religious beliefs and who decline to risk the further ostracism that may ensue from bringing their case to court or who simply lack the resources to do so.”); City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d at 275 (stating that a violation of the Establishment Clause causes “harm to society”). Here, nationwide relief is appropriate because this case involves an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause by the federal government manifested in immigration policy with nationwide effect. See Decker v. O’Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 618 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming a nationwide injunction in a facial challenge to a federal statute and regulations on Establishment Clause grounds).\nNationwide relief is also warranted on the § 1152(a) claim, with respect to applicants for immigrant visas, because under these facts, a “fragmented” approach “would run afoul of the constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform immigration law and policy.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166–67. “Congress has instructed that the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly, and the\n\nSupreme Court has described immigration policy as a comprehensive and unified system.” Texas, 809 F.3d at 187–88 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, Section 2 of the Proclamation, with the exceptions and to the extent described above, will be enjoined on a nationwide basis.\nCONCLUSION\n41 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motions for a Preliminary Injunction are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court will issue a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2 of the Proclamation, subject to the terms stated in the separate Order.\nORDER\nFor the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this civil action and have established that they are likely to succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, and that the balance of the equities and the public interest favor an injunction.\nAccordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:\n1. Plaintiffs’ Motions for a Preliminary Injunction, TDC–17–0361 ECF No. 205, TDC–17–2921 ECF No. 26, TDC–17–2969 ECF No.2, are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.\n2. The Motions are GRANTED as to Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 (“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public–Safety Threats”). All Defendants with the exception of the President of the United States; all officers, agents, and employees of the Executive Branch of the United States government; and anyone acting under their authorization or direction, are ENJOINED from enforcing Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 except with regard to:\na. Sections 2(d) and 2(f) of the Proclamation;\nb. Individuals lacking a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, as defined in the\n49\n\n\faccompanying Memorandum Opinion.\n3. This Preliminary Injunction is granted on a nationwide basis and prohibits the enforcement of Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 in all places, including the United States, at all United States borders and ports of entry, and in the issuance of visas, with the above exceptions, pending further orders from this Court.\n4. The Motion is DENIED as to the President of the United States and as to all other provisions of Presidential Proclamation 9645.\nFootnotes\n\n5. Plaintiffs are not required to pay a security deposit. 6. The Court declines to stay this ruling or hold it in abeyance should an emergency appeal of this Order be filed.\nAll Citations --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2017 WL 4674314\n\n1\n\nBecause the judgment of the Fourth Circuit has been vacated as moot, it has been “strip[ped] of its binding effect.” Deakins v.\n\nMonaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988). Accordingly, this Court does not rely on the Fourth Circuit’s\n\nopinion as controlling authority and will review all legal questions decided by the Fourth Circuit anew, without reliance on that\n\nCourt’s prior decision. However, as confirmed at the hearing on the Motions, the parties agree that the Court may cite the Fourth\n\nCircuit opinion as persuasive authority, so this Court does so on a limited basis.\n\n2\n\nAt the time the IRAP Amended Complaint was filed, Plaintiff Mohamad Mashta had an approved I–130 visa petition for his Syrian-\n\nnational wife and was awaiting a visa for her. At the hearing, counsel informed the Court that Mashta’s wife had been granted a\n\nvisa and that she is on her way to the United States, which appears to render his claim moot.\n\n3\n\nSection 1185 was amended in 1978, to broaden its applicability beyond times of war or national emergency, but the operative\n\nlanguage of § 1185(a)(1) remained unchanged. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95–426, §\n\n707(a), 92 Stat. 992–993 (1978).\n\n50\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 3\n\nFiled: 10/20/2017 Pg: 1 of 3\n\nCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 43 Filed 10/20/17 Page 1 of 3\n\nFILED: October 20, 2017\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n___________________\n\nNo. 17-2231 (L) (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ___________________\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients\n\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\n\nand\n\nALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO\n\nPlaintiffs\n\nv.\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence\n\nDefendants - Appellants\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 3\n\nFiled: 10/20/2017 Pg: 2 of 3\n\nCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 43 Filed 10/20/17 Page 2 of 3\n\n___________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ___________________\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customes and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States\nDefendants - Appellants\n___________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ___________________\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3\nPlaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States;\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 3\n\nFiled: 10/20/2017 Pg: 3 of 3\n\nCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 43 Filed 10/20/17 Page 3 of 3\n\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, In her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, In his official capacity as Secretary of State\n\nDefendants - Appellants\n\n___________________\n\nO R D E R ___________________\n\nThe court consolidates Case No. 17-2231(L) with Case No. 17-2232 and\n\nCase No. 17-2233. Entry of appearance forms and disclosure statements filed by\n\ncounsel and parties to the lead case are deemed filed in the secondary case.\n\nFor the Court--By Direction\n\n/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3;\nJANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED\nMOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State;\nDANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Maryland, Southern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\nFIRST CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS\n\nNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\n\nCHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nDOUGLAS N. LETTER SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ____________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his\nofficial capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\n____________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ____________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\nELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants – Appellants.\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ____________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3;\nJANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients,\nPlaintiffs – Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO,\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National\nIntelligence,\nDefendants – Appellees\n\n\fTABLE OF CONTENTS Page\nINTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................4 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE.................................................................................4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................4\nA. Statutory Background............................................................................4 B. Executive Order No. 13,780..................................................................6 C. Proclamation No. 9645..........................................................................8 D. District Court Injunction .....................................................................12 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................16 STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................19 ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................19\nI. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable...........................................................19 A. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable................................ 19 B. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable .................................................................................... 25\nII. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of Their Statutory Or Constitutional Claims.................................... 28 A. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA ...................................29\ni\n\n\f1. The President Has Extremely Broad Discretion To Suspend Entry Of Aliens Abroad........................................29\n2. The Proclamation Is Fully Justified By The President’s National-Security And Foreign-Affairs Judgments .................................................................................. 32\n3. Section 1152(a)(1)’s Prohibition On Nationality Discrimination In Issuing Immigrant Visas Does Not Restrict The President’s Authority To Suspend Entry .............34\nB. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause ..........................................................................39 1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Neutral And Bona Fide Reasons .....................................................................................40 2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary............................43\nIII. The Balance Of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief..........53 A. The District Court’s Injunction Imposes Serious, Irreparable Harm On The Government And The Public ...................................... 53 B. A Preliminary Injunction Is Not Necessary To Prevent Any Substantial Harm To Plaintiffs ........................................................... 55\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................56 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nii\n\n\fTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases:\n\nPage(s)\n\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) .............................. 21-22, 29\n\nAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) .............................................................................................27\n\nAllende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988) ....................................................................... 29, 30\n\nBlock v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) .............................................................................................24\n\nCamreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) ...............................................................................................7\n\nChurch of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) .............................................................................................43\n\nDalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) .............................................................................................30\n\nDepartment of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) .............................................................................................33\n\nDirex Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................55\n\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) .............................................................................................19\n\nFranklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) .............................................................................................22\n\nHaig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) ...................................................................................... 30, 53\niii\n\n\fHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) .............................................................................................21\nHawaii v. Trump : 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017) ...................................................................7 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................... 7, 36\nHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ......................................................................................... 52, 53\nInternational Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................ 22\nIRAP v. Trump: 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017) ................................................................ 7, 35 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) ......................................................... 7, 21, 28, 40, 41\nJackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994) ..............................................................................23\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) ............................................................................ 26, 28, 42\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ............................................ 15, 18, 25, 26, 28, 39, 40, 41, 42\nLeague of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................10\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of Justice, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996) .......................................................................................... 22, 24\nLewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) .............................................................................................56\nLujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) .............................................................................................24\niv\n\n\fMadsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) .............................................................................................56\nMalek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981) .................................................................... 31-32, 36\nMaryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ...........................................................................................54\nMcCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) .......................................................................... 39, 43, 45, 46\nMcGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ...................................................................................... 26, 46\nMorfin v. Tillerson, 851 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2017 WL 3136962 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017) ............................................................. 42\nNademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1982) ..............................................................................32\nIn re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167 (2009) ...................................28\nNixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) .............................................................................................54\nNLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) .......................................................................................... 39\nO Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 2002) ..................................................................... 54\nPBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................19\nRadzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) .............................................................................................34\nv\n\n\fReno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ...................................................................................... 30, 51\nSaavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999)......................................................... 20, 21, 22, 24\nSalazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) .........................................................................................46\nSale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) .................................................................... 25, 29, 31, 39, 53\nSessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) .........................................................................................41\nSteel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 823 (1998) .............................................................................................25\nTexas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998) .............................................................................................23\nTrump v. Hawaii, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017) ................................................................7\nTrump v. IRAP: 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) .................................................................................... 7, 56 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) ................................................................7\nUnited States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) .............................................................................................41\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ................................................................ 6, 20, 24, 25, 29, 53\nUnited Transp. Union v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 130 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................19\nValley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) ................................................... 27, 28\nvi\n\n\fWebster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) ...................................................................................... 25, 30\nWestern & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981) .............................................................................................41\nYassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980) ..............................................................................32\nZelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) .............................................................................................48\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) .........................................................................................54\nStatutes:\nAdministrative Procedure Act: 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) .............................................................................................20 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) .............................................................................................24 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)..................................................................................................20 5 U.S.C. § 704 ......................................................................................................22\nForeign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963 (1978) ..............................................................38\nImmigration and Nationality Act: 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. ...........................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) ..................................................................................... 1, 35, 37 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) .............................................................................. 17, 36. 38 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)................................................. 15, 24, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B)......................................................................................39 8 U.S.C. § 1181 ......................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)....................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(iv) ..................................................................................5 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II)...............................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) ......................... 6, 10, 15, 17, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) ............................................................................. 17, 32, 34, 35 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) ............................................ 6, 10, 17, 24, 29, 30, 31, 35, 38\nvii\n\n\f8 U.S.C. § 1185(b)................................................................................................30 8 U.S.C. § 1187 ..................................................................................................... 5 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) .........................................................................................44 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)-(ii)............................................................................5 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(i)-(ii)............................................................................5 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) .............................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)................................................................................................35 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i).................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1202(h)..................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1203 ......................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1204 ......................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)..................................................................................................4\n6 U.S.C. § 236(f)......................................................................................................20\n28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)...............................................................................................4\n28 U.S.C. § 1331........................................................................................................4\n28 U.S.C. § 1343........................................................................................................4\nRegulation:\n22 C.F.R. § 42.62 .......................................................................................................4\nLegislative Materials:\nH. Rep. No. 89-745 (1965) ......................................................................................36\nS. Rep. No. 89-748 (1965) .......................................................................................36\nOther Authorities: Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against Iran: Remarks Announcing\nU.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=33233............................................................................................... 37, 38\nviii\n\n\fCent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Africa (Chad), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/cd.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2017)............................................................44\n\nExec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (1979) ...................................... 31, 37\n\nExec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992) .............................................31\n\nExec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (2017) ...................................... 6, 7, 8 Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (1986) ................................. 32, 37, 38 Proclamation No. 5829, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,289 (1988) ............................................. 31\n\nProclamation No. 5887, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,185 (1988) ............................................. 31\n\nProclamation No. 6958, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,007 (1996) ............................................. 31\n\nProclamation No. 8342, 74 Fed. Reg. 4093 (2009) ................................................ 31\n\nProclamation No. 8693, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,751 (2011) ............................................. 31\nProclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017) ............. 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 32, 34, 38, 40, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50\n\nPres. Donald J. Trump, Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit\n\n(May\n\n21,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/\n\n2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit.................52\n\nU.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/ news/2016/02/18/dhs-announces-further-travel-restrictions-visawaiver-program ......................................................................................................5\n\nU.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (June 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf..................................5\n\nix\n\n\fINTRODUCTION The district court enjoined worldwide a Proclamation issued by the President of the United States pursuant to his broad constitutional and statutory authority to suspend or restrict the entry of aliens abroad when he deems it in the Nation’s interest. The Proclamation—“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017)—was issued after a global review by the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Department of State, of foreign governments’ information-sharing practices and risk factors, culminating in a recommendation by the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security that the President restrict entry of certain nationals of eight countries that have inadequate practices or otherwise present heightened risks. The Proclamation imposes countryspecific restrictions that, in the President’s judgment, will most effectively “encourage cooperation” in information sharing and “protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id. at 45,164. The district court nevertheless ruled that, despite the thorough review process and tailored substantive measures that were not present in the temporary entry suspension that preceded this one, the Proclamation is motivated by religious animus in violation of the Establishment Clause and constitutes impermissible nationalitybased discrimination in the issuance of immigration visas under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).\n\n\fThat erroneous ruling threatens the ability of this and future Presidents to address national-security threats. The alleged flaws in the prior entry suspension do not apply to the Proclamation, which was issued after a worldwide, religion-neutral review by multiple Cabinet officials whose good faith has never been questioned, and which imposes only tailored restrictions on Muslim-majority as well as nonMuslim-majority nations. The district court’s conclusion that this is insufficient to refute religious discrimination threatens to disable the President permanently from addressing immigration-related national-security risks in countries that pose the greatest concern. Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibit the President from imposing nationality-specific restrictions on entry to the United States, as past Presidents have also done.\nAll that said, this Court should not even reach the merits, because plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable in the first place. As a general matter, courts cannot review a challenge to the political branches’ exclusion of aliens abroad absent express statutory authorization. Congress has not provided such authorization, and thus plaintiffs’ statutory claims are barred. Although there is a limited exception to the principle of nonreviewability where the exclusion of aliens abroad allegedly violates the constitutional rights of persons in the United States, the Proclamation’s alleged discrimination against certain nationals of the covered countries does not violate plaintiffs’ own religious-freedom rights.\n2\n\n\fThe district court also erred in its evaluation of the remaining factors governing preliminary injunctive relief. The interests of the public and the government are significantly impaired by barring effectuation of a judgment of the President that restricting entry for certain nationals of eight countries is warranted to protect the Nation’s safety. By contrast, plaintiffs have not identified any cognizable and irreparable injury that they personally would incur if the restrictions on entry take effect while the case is being adjudicated, and any impact from the Proclamation on their relatives’ or other identified individuals’ receipt of a visa is speculative. The preliminary injunction should be vacated for this reason as well.\nAt a minimum, the global injunctive relief was vastly overbroad. Under both Article III and equitable principles, any injunction cannot properly go further than necessary to redress plaintiffs’ own injuries—i.e., to identified aliens whose exclusion would impose cognizable, irreparable injury on plaintiffs themselves. The district court extended the injunction further to reach any alien with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a U.S. person or entity, but that standard—which the Supreme Court adopted in staying the injunction against the prior entry suspension—is not the proper standard for issuing a preliminary injunction in the first place.\n3\n\n\fSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The district court’s jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. JA 475. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The district court entered its order granting a preliminary injunction in these cases on October 17, 2017. JA 1084. Defendants filed timely notices of appeal on October 20, 2017. JA 1087, 1198, 1494. Plaintiffs in No. 17-2240 filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on October 23, 2017. JA 1090.\nSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE Whether the district court abused its discretion in entering a worldwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2 of the Proclamation.\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Statutory Background The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., governs admission of aliens into the United States. Admission normally requires a valid immigrant or nonimmigrant visa. Id. §§ 1181, 1182(a)(7)(A)(i), (B)(i)(II), 1203. The visa-application process typically includes an in-person interview and results in a decision by a State Department consular officer. Id. §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202(h), 1204; 22 C.F.R. § 42.62. Although a visa is typically necessary for admission, it does not guarantee admission; the alien still must be admissible upon arriving at a port of entry. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(h), 1225(a).\n4\n\n\fCongress has created a Visa Waiver Program enabling nationals of approved countries to seek temporary admission for tourism or certain business purposes without a visa. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(7)(B)(iv), 1187. In 2015, Congress excluded from travel under that Program aliens who are dual nationals of or recent visitors to Iraq or Syria (where “[t]he Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) * * maintain[s] a formidable force”) as well as countries designated by the Secretary of State as state sponsors of terrorism (currently Iran, Sudan, and Syria).1 Id. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)-(ii). Congress authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to designate additional countries of concern, considering whether a country is a “safe haven for terrorists,” “whether a foreign terrorist organization has a significant presence” in the country, and “whether the presence of an alien in the country * * * increases the likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to” U.S. national security. Id. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(i)-(ii). Applying those criteria, in February 2016, DHS excluded recent visitors to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen from travel under the Program.2\n1 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, at 6, 299-302 (June 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf.\n2 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/18/dhs-announces-further-travel-restrictionsvisa-waiver-program.\n5\n\n\fIn addition, building upon the President’s inherent authority to exclude aliens,\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950), Congress has\naccorded the Executive broad discretion to suspend or restrict entry of aliens. 8\nU.S.C. § 1182(f) provides:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) grants the President broad general authority to adopt\n“reasonable rules, regulations, and orders” governing entry of aliens, “subject to\nsuch limitations and exceptions as [he] may prescribe.” Pursuant to these authorities,\nPresident Reagan suspended entry of all Cuban nationals in 1986, and President\nCarter authorized the denial and revocation of visas for Iranian nationals in 1979.\nSee pp. 31-33, 37-38, infra.\nB. Executive Order No. 13,780 On March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed.\nReg. 13,209 (2017) (EO-2). Among other things, EO-2 directed the Secretary of\nHomeland Security to conduct a global review of whether foreign governments\nprovide adequate information about their nationals seeking U.S. visas, and to report\nfindings to the President. See EO-2 § 2(a), (b). The Secretary of State would then\nencourage countries identified as inadequate to alter their practices; following that 6\n\n\fdiplomatic-engagement process, the Secretary of Homeland Security would recommend whether and it so what entry restrictions to impose on nations that continued to have inadequate practices or to pose other risks. See id. § 2(d)-(f).\nDuring that review, EO-2 temporarily suspended the entry of foreign nationals from six countries that had been identified by Congress or the Executive Branch in connection with the Visa Waiver Program as presenting heighted terrorism-related concerns. See EO-2 § 2(c). The district court below, and another district court, preliminarily enjoined that entry suspension, IRAP v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017), and were affirmed in relevant part, IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\nThe Supreme Court granted certiorari, and partially stayed the injunctions pending review. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam). After EO2’s temporary entry suspension and certain other provisions expired, the Supreme Court vacated both injunctions as moot. See Trump v. IRAP, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017); see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 713 (2011) (point of vacatur upon mootness is “to prevent an unreviewable decision from spawning any legal consequences” and to “clear[] the path for future relitigation”).\n7\n\n\fC. Proclamation No. 9645 On September 24, 2017, the President signed Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017). The Proclamation is the product of the comprehensive review of vetting and screening procedures conducted pursuant to Section 2 of EO-2, and reflects the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, and consultations with the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the Attorney General. 1. DHS, in consultation with the Department of State and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, conducted “a worldwide review to identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA * * * in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat.” EO-2 § 2(a). In a report submitted to the President on July 9, 2017, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security developed a “baseline” for the kinds of information required, which includes three components: (1) identity-management information, i.e., “information needed to determine whether individuals seeking benefits under the immigration laws are who they claim to be,” which turns on criteria such as “whether the country issues electronic passports embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity, reports lost and stolen passports to appropriate entities, and makes available upon request identity-related information not included in its passports”;\n8\n\n\f(2) national-security and public-safety information about whether a person seeking entry poses a risk, which turns on criteria such as “whether the country makes available * * * known or suspected terrorist and criminal-history information upon request,” “whether the country impedes the United States Government’s receipt of information about passengers and crew traveling to the United States,” and “whether the country provides passport and nationalidentity document exemplars”; and\n(3) a national-security and public-safety risk assessment of the country, which turns on criteria such as “whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven, whether it is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program * * * that meets all of [the program’s] requirements, and whether it regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.”\nProcl. § 1(c).\nDHS, in coordination with the Department of State, collected data on, and\nevaluated, nearly 200 countries, and identified each country’s information-sharing\npractices and risk factors. Id. § 1(d). The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security\nidentified 16 countries as having “inadequate” information-sharing practices and\nrisk factors, and another 31 countries as “at risk” of becoming “inadequate.” Id.\n§ 1(e).\nThese preliminary results were submitted to the President on July 9, 2017.\nId. § 1(c). The Department of State conducted a 50-day engagement period with\nforeign governments to encourage them to improve their performance, which\nyielded significant gains. Id. § 1(f).\n2. On September 15, 2017, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security\nrecommended that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from\n9\n\n\fseven countries that were determined to be inadequate in their information-sharing practices or to present other risk factors: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. Id. § 1(h). The Acting Secretary also recommended entry restrictions for nationals of Somalia, which, although it was determined to satisfy baseline requirements for information-sharing, has significant identity-management deficiencies and is unable to effectively control all of its territory. Id. § 1(i).\n3. The President evaluated the Acting Secretary’s recommendation in consultation with multiple Cabinet members and other high-level government officials. Id. § 1(h)(i), (ii). The President considered a number of factors, including each country’s “capacity, ability, and willingness to cooperate with our identitymanagement and information-sharing policies and each country’s risk factors,” as well as “foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.” Id. § 1(h)(i).\nActing in accordance with the Acting Secretary’s recommendation, the President exercised his constitutional authority and his statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) to impose tailored entry restrictions on certain nationals from eight countries. The restrictions were intended “to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and * * , at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id. § 1(h)(i). The President determined that these entry restrictions are “necessary to prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient\n10\n\n\finformation to assess the risks they pose to the United States,” and which are “needed to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments.” Ibid.\nFor countries that refuse to cooperate regularly with the United States (Iran, North Korea, and Syria), the Proclamation suspends entry of all nationals, except for Iranian nationals seeking nonimmigrant student (F and M) and exchange-visitor (J) visas. Procl. § 2(b)(ii), (d)(ii), (e)(ii). For countries that are valuable counterterrorism partners but have information-sharing deficiencies (Chad, Libya, and Yemen), the Proclamation suspends entry only of nationals seeking immigrant visas and nonimmigrant business, tourist, and business/tourist (B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2) visas. Id. § 2(a)(ii), (c)(ii), (g)(ii). For Somalia, which has significant identity-management deficiencies and is unable to effectively control all of its territory, the Proclamation suspends entry of nationals seeking immigrant visas and requires additional scrutiny of nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas. Id. § 2(h)(ii). And for Venezuela, which refuses to cooperate in information-sharing but for which alternative means of obtaining identity information are available, the Proclamation suspends entry of government officials “involved in screening and vetting procedures,” and “their immediate family members,” on nonimmigrant business or tourist visas. Id. § 2(f)(ii).\n11\n\n\fThe Proclamation provides for case-by-case waivers where a foreign national demonstrates that denying entry would cause undue hardship, entry would not pose a threat to the national security or public safety, and entry would be in the national interest. Id. § 3(c)(i)(A)-(C). The Proclamation requires an ongoing review of the Proclamation’s restrictions, taking into account whether countries have improved their identity-management and information-sharing protocols, and periodic reporting to the President about whether entry restrictions should be continued, modified, terminated, or supplemented. Id. § 4.\nThe Proclamation took effect immediately for all foreign nationals who were subject to entry restrictions under Section 2(a) of EO-2 pursuant to the Supreme Court’s partial stay of the injunctions barring enforcement of that provision, and was to take effect on October 18, 2017, for all other persons subject to the Proclamation. Id. § 7.\nD. District Court Injunction 1. These three cases are brought by individual and organizational plaintiffs who challenge the Proclamation under the INA as well as the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The individual plaintiffs include U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who have relatives from Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia seeking immigrant\n12\n\n\for nonimmigrant visas, as well as a few LPRs who do not have relatives seeking entry from one of the covered countries. JA 1013-14.\nOrganizational plaintiffs include the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), and HIAS, Inc., both of which provide services to refugees in the resettlement process; the Arab American Association of New York (AAANY), which provides legal and other services to the Arab-American and Arab immigrant community; The Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA), an organization of graduate students and faculty focused on Middle Eastern studies; the Yemeni-American Merchants Association (YAMA), a membership organization that protects against harassment and assists with immigration issues; Iranian Alliances Across Borders (IAAB), which organizes youth camps, educational events, and international conferences for the Iranian diaspora; and the Iranian Students’ Foundation (ISF), which organizes events for Iranian-American students. JA 1014.\n2. After expedited briefing and argument, the district court entered a worldwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2 of the Proclamation against any alien with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship to a U.S. person or entity, except nationals of Venezuela and North Korea. JA 1079-81.\nThe court held that U.S. residents may challenge the exclusion of aliens abroad where they have a specific interest in the entry of those aliens. JA 1016-17.\n13\n\n\fThe court reasoned that exclusion orders are nonreviewable only where they involve “individual visa decisions by consular officers,” rather than “a broader policy.” JA 1029.\nThe court further held that several individual plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims that the entry restrictions in Section 2 of the Proclamation violate the INA. The court reasoned that the entry restrictions harm individual plaintiffs by threatening to prolong their separation from family members from the designated countries seeking visas to come to the United States. JA 1017-18. The district court reasoned that several organizational plaintiffs have standing either on behalf of their members for similar reasons, JA 1022, or in their own right because foreign nationals subject to the entry restrictions will be unable to attend sponsored conferences and events, JA 1019-20. The court further concluded that the individuals whose family members are subject to the Proclamation have standing to challenge the entry restrictions under the Establishment Clause because of their alleged “personal contact” with those restrictions and the intangible “feelings of marginalization or emotional distress [they experience] as a result of the Proclamation’s alleged antiMuslim message.” JA 1024-27.\n3. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits as to some of their statutory and constitutional claims.\n14\n\n\fAlthough the court held that plaintiffs had failed to show they are likely to succeed on their claim that the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority to suspend the entry of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), JA 1041-53, it held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Proclamation violates the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), JA 1034-40. The court reasoned that the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are “the equivalent of a ban on issuing immigrant visas based on nationality.” JA 1038. The court acknowledged that “[t]here may be scenarios under which denial of entry based on nationality” would be permissible, “such as during a specific urgent national crisis or public health emergency,” JA 1037, but it distinguished the Proclamation on the ground that it “imposed a permanent * * ban on immigrants from the Designated Countries,” JA 1038.\nThe court also held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. JA 1053-76. It agreed with the Government that the Proclamation should be reviewed under the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and that the Proclamation’s national-security interest is facially legitimate. JA 1055. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs had “plausibly allege[d]” that the stated rationale for the Proclamation was not bona fide, which the court held entitled it to look behind the Proclamation’s stated rationale. JA 1056-57. Doing so, the court concluded that\n15\n\n\fthe Proclamation “stands in the[] shadow” of EO-2, which the court had previously concluded was likely to violate the Establishment Clause, JA 1064, and that the Proclamation did not constitute “curative action” that would remove the “taint” the court perceived, JA 1064, 1067.\nThe court concluded that the balancing of harms supports an injunction. JA 1076-77. Although the court acknowledged that “no government interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” JA 1078, the court was of the view that the Proclamation was not necessary to ensure national security, ibid., and that those interests “are not paramount in this instance,” JA 1079.\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. The district court erred in holding that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. It is a fundamental separation-of-powers principle that the political branches’ decisions to exclude aliens abroad generally are not judicially reviewable absent express authorization by law. That principle bars review of plaintiffs’ statutory claims, which in any event are not cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Article III ripeness requirements. Although the Supreme Court has allowed limited judicial review when a U.S. citizen claims that the exclusion of an alien abroad infringes the plaintiff’s own constitutional rights, plaintiffs here assert no cognizable violation of their own Establishment Clause rights.\n16\n\n\fII. The district court also erred in holding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.\nPlaintiffs’ statutory claims fail because the entry restrictions imposed by the Proclamation fall well within the President’s broad, discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). The Proclamation contains ample findings that the identified countries have inadequate information-sharing practices or other risk factors, and that the entry restrictions encourage those countries to improve and protect this country from those risks in the interim. Past Presidents have similarly invoked this statutory authority to impose nationality-based bans on the entry of nationals from countries that pose national-security and foreign-policy concerns.\nImposing nationality-based bans on entry does not contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of an immigrant visa. Section 1152(a)(1) applies to immigrants who are otherwise eligible for a visa, but does not abrogate the President’s authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) to limit eligibility in the first place. The statutory provisions can, and should, be harmonized.\nThe Proclamation is also consistent with the Establishment Clause. The Proclamation’s entry restrictions are justified by facially legitimate and bona fide reasons. The district court’s second-guessing of the President’s subjective\n17\n\n\fmotivation is inconsistent with Mandel and subsequent precedent, and fails to give due regard to the President’s national-security judgment.\nFurthermore, even under domestic Establishment Clause precedent, the Proclamation is clearly lawful. It is religion-neutral on its face and in operation, and its tailored restrictions, which apply to both Muslim-majority and non-Muslimmajority nations, are animated by country-specific conditions identified after a comprehensive review by multiple Cabinet officials, not by religious animus. In light of the current Proclamation’s valid process and substance, it cannot be invalidated simply based on some perceived historical taint from the prior entry suspensions or earlier campaign statements.\nIII. Finally, the district court erred in concluding that the balancing of harms supports its injunction. The injunction causes irreparable harm by overriding the President’s national-security judgment. Plaintiffs have not identified any cognizable and irreparable injury that they personally would incur, and any effect on the receipt of visas by their relatives or other identified individuals is speculative. In any event, the injunction was overbroad under Article III and equitable principles, because it extended beyond plaintiffs’ own alleged injuries to reach aliens who have relationships only with unidentified non-parties in this country.\n18\n\n\fSTANDARD OF REVIEW This Court “review[s] the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” United Transp. Union v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 130 F.3d 627, 631 (4th Cir. 1997). “A district court abuses its discretion when it misapprehends or misapplies the applicable law.” League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 235 (4th Cir. 2014). “[T]he court will vacate an injunction if it is broader in scope than that necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff or if an injunction does not carefully address only the circumstances of the case.” PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir. 2011).\nARGUMENT As demonstrated below, the Government is likely to prevail on the merits, both because plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable and because plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail under the statutory and constitutional provisions they invoke. I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable A. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable 1. The Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). “[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the\n19\n\n\fGovernment to exclude a given alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).\nCourts have distilled from this deeply rooted principle of nonreviewability the rule that the denial or revocation of a visa for an alien abroad “is not subject to judicial review * * * unless Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Congress has not provided for judicial review of decisions to exclude aliens abroad, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 236(f ), and has forbidden “judicial review” of visa revocations (subject to a narrow exception inapplicable to aliens abroad), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). Accordingly, the longstanding bar on judicial review of the political branches’ exclusion of aliens abroad forecloses plaintiffs’ statutory challenges to the Proclamation.\nMoreover, history “unmistakabl[y]” confirms that “the immigration laws ‘preclude judicial review’ of consular visa decisions.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1160. The lone time the Supreme Court held that certain aliens (only those physically present in the United States) could seek review of exclusion orders under the APA, Congress abrogated the ruling and limited those aliens to the habeas remedy (which is not available to aliens abroad). See id. at 1157-62. Because even an alien present in the United States cannot invoke the APA to obtain review, a fortiori neither can aliens abroad nor U.S. citizens acting at their behest. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), 702(1).\n20\n\n\fThe district court held that the principle of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens applies only to a challenge to “individual visa decisions by consular officers,” not to a Presidential proclamation restricting entry of nationals from eight countries. JA 1029. Although the nonreviewability principle is applied most frequently to decisions by consular officers adjudicating visa applications, it would invert the constitutional structure to limit review in that context while permitting review of the President’s decision to restrict entry of classes of aliens. A consular officer is a subordinate executive-branch official under the constitutional hierarchy. Consular nonreviewability is grounded in the “firmly-established principle” that the power to exclude aliens is “inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country,” and “to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1158-59. Those considerations apply even more strongly to broader nationalsecurity judgments of the President than to individualized decisions by a consular official. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 584-91 (1952) (relying on these considerations in rejecting broad challenges to immigration statute).\nThis Court’s since-vacated opinion addressing EO-2 does not support the district court’s rationale, because it rested solely on the constitutional claims and did not address whether the statutory claims were reviewable. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 57980. The district court relied instead on Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.\n21\n\n\fCir. 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987), in which the D.C. Circuit concluded that U.S. citizens who invited foreign nationals to speak were aggrieved by the State Department’s interpretation of an INA definition that led to the exclusion of the intended speakers. JA 1017. As the D.C. Circuit subsequently recognized in Saavedra Bruno, however, Abourezk “rested in large measure” on an INA provision that was subsequently amended to “make[] clear that district courts do not have general jurisdiction over claims arising under the immigration laws and that their jurisdiction extends only to actions brought by the government.” 197 F.3d at 1164.3\n2. Even if the general rule of nonreviewability did not foreclose judicial review of plaintiffs’ statutory claims, review would still be unavailable for three additional reasons.\nFirst, the APA provides for judicial review only of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The President’s Proclamation is not “agency action” at all, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992), and there also has been no “final” agency decision denying a visa based on the Proclamation to any of the aliens abroad identified by plaintiffs. Even in cases where courts have considered constitutional\n3 The district court also relied on Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State (LAVAS), 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996), and International Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985), JA 1017, 1030, but neither case even involved, let alone sustained, a challenge to orders excluding aliens abroad.\n22\n\n\fclaims of U.S. plaintiffs challenging the exclusion of aliens abroad, see pp. 25-26, infra, they have not done so until after the aliens had been denied visas.\nIndeed, for this reason, plaintiffs’ statutory claims as well as their constitutional claims do not satisfy Article III and equitable ripeness requirements. If any alien in whose entry a U.S. plaintiff has a cognizable interest is found otherwise eligible for a visa and denied a waiver, then that plaintiff can bring suit at that time (if the plaintiff’s claim is otherwise justiciable) and the Court can consider the challenge in a concrete dispute. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’”).\nThe district court reasoned that the waiver process “itself presents an additional hurdle not faced by other visa applicants which would delay reunification.” JA 1028. But it is not at all clear that the process of seeking a waiver would cause any meaningful delay of the definitive resolution of an application for a visa. Visa times vary widely, and it is not unusual for an alien to wait months or years from the time he applies for an immigrant visa before receiving one. Nor is the waiver process a discriminatory “hurdle” like the law challenged in Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994), because it applies only to aliens who lack any constitutional rights concerning entry, Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542, not to the plaintiffs themselves.\n23\n\n\fSecond, plaintiffs lack a statutory right to enforce. Nothing in the INA gives plaintiffs a direct right to judicial review, and the APA’s “general cause of action” exists only for “persons ‘adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,’ ” Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). The statutory provisions empowering the President to restrict entry of aliens, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f ), 1185(a)(1), and prohibiting nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, id. § 1152(a)(1)(A), do not confer any legally cognizable rights on third parties like plaintiffs here—i.e., U.S. persons or organizations seeking entry of aliens abroad.\nAlthough the district court invoked Abourezk and the vacated decision in LAVAS, JA 1030, the D.C. Circuit has since held that, even when the INA permits a U.S. person to file a petition for a foreign family member’s classification as a relative for immigrant status, any arguable interest the U.S. person has “terminate[s]” “[w]hen [his] petition [i]s granted.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1164. Likewise, the INA does not protect any interest of organizations that merely provide services to aliens seeking entry. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).\nThird, the APA does not apply to the extent “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Here, the relevant statutes give the President unreviewable discretion to impose restrictions on entry. See pp. 29-30, infra. The district court rejected this argument on the ground that “courts have had\n24\n\n\fno difficulty reaching the merits of challenges to the President’s use of § 1182(f),” JA 1031, relying principally on Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). But the Supreme Court in Sale did not question the President’s national security judgment under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and did not address whether plaintiffs’ claims were reviewable because it rejected them on the merits. Sale, 509 U.S. at 170-88; cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (“driveby jurisdictional rulings * * * have no precedential effect”).\nB. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable 1. Although Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review of Executive decisions to exclude aliens abroad, it has not “clear[ly]” “preclude[d] judicial review” for persons asserting violations of their own constitutional rights. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988). The exclusion of aliens typically raises no constitutional questions because aliens abroad lack any constitutional rights regarding entry. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. However, the Supreme Court has twice engaged in limited judicial review when a U.S. citizen contended that the denial of a visa to an alien abroad violated the citizen’s own constitutional rights. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (reviewing but rejecting claim that the denial of a waiver of visa-ineligibility to a Belgian national violated U.S. citizens’ own First Amendment right to receive information); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)\n25\n\n\f(reviewing but rejecting claim by a U.S. citizen that the refusal of a visa to her husband violated her own alleged due-process rights concerning her spouse’s entry).\nMandel and Din are inapposite here. Even putting aside that plaintiffs have identified no visa application that has yet been denied based on the Proclamation, their claimed injury from the exclusion of aliens abroad is not cognizable because it does not stem from an alleged infringement of plaintiffs’ own constitutional rights to religious freedom.\nIn McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Supreme Court held that individuals who are indirectly injured by alleged religious discrimination against others generally may not sue, because they have not suffered violations of their own rights. Id. at 429-30. The plaintiffs, employees of a store subject to a Sunday-closing law, lacked standing to challenge the law on free-exercise grounds because they “d[id] not allege any infringement of their own religious freedoms,” id. at 429, and had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge only because they suffered “direct * * * injury, allegedly due to the [law’s] imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian religion,” id. at 430-31.\nHere, by contrast, plaintiffs are not directly subject to the Proclamation, and thus are not asserting violations of their own constitutional rights. They instead allege indirect injuries from the Proclamation’s application to others—the individual plaintiffs’ family members and the organizational plaintiffs’ clients—who\n26\n\n\fthemselves have no constitutional rights. In reaching the contrary conclusion, JA 1024, the district court erroneously conflated the question whether an individual has suffered an injury-in-fact from an alleged Establishment Clause violation with the question whether the violation was of the individual’s own Establishment Clause rights.\n2. Plaintiffs also asserted that they have “experienced feelings of marginalization or emotional distress as a result of the Proclamation’s alleged antiMuslim message.” JA 1026-27. This “message” injury likewise is not cognizable; the Supreme Court has “ma[de] clear” that “the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial [or other invidious] discrimination * * * accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). The same rule applies to Establishment Clause claims. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).\nTo be sure, a plaintiff may suffer a cognizable injury where he himself has been “subjected to unwelcome religious exercises” or “forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.” Id. at 486 n.22. But the Proclamation says nothing about religion and does not subject plaintiffs to any religious exercise, and the D.C. Circuit correctly has rejected the notion that a putative Establishment Clause plaintiff may “re-characterize[]” an abstract injury flowing from “government action” directed\n27\n\n\fagainst others as a personal injury from “a governmental message [concerning] religion” directed at the plaintiff. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J.), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167 (2009). Permitting that approach would “eviscerate well-settled standing limitations” in cases like Valley Forge that involve challenges to government actions concerning third parties on the grounds that they endorse or disfavor religion. Id.\nIndeed, the district court, like this Court in its since-vacated opinion addressing EO-2, acknowledged that plaintiffs could not challenge the Proclamation based solely on the Proclamation’s alleged message, absent “personal contact” with the Proclamation. JA 1024; see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 582-83. But, as already discussed, plaintiffs do not have “personal contact” with the Proclamation since it does not apply to them at all, but only to third-party aliens abroad. In sum, Plaintiffs’ alleged third-party injuries are insufficient to invoke the limited review for firstparty constitutional claims afforded in Mandel and Din. II. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of\nTheir Statutory or Constitutional Claims The government is also likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal because the district court erred in holding that the Proclamation’s entry restrictions likely contravene the INA and the Establishment Clause.\n28\n\n\fA. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA 1. The President Has Extremely Broad Discretion To Suspend Entry Of Aliens Abroad\na. The President’s Proclamation was issued pursuant to his inherent Article II authority to exclude aliens, see Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543, and his broad statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1).\nSection 1182(f) provides that “[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” As courts have repeatedly recognized, Section 1182(f) provides the President “sweeping” discretionary power to suspend the entry of aliens. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2; see also, e.g., Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (1st Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has deemed it “perfectly clear that [Section] 1182(f ) * * * grants the President ample power to establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 187.\nSection 1185(a)(1) similarly authorizes the President to restrict the entry of aliens into the United States, or to set “such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders,” and “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” This\n29\n\n\fstatutory text likewise confirms the breadth of the President’s authority; the text does not require any predicate findings, but simply gives the President the authority to restrict entry to the United States according to “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” Id.; see Allende, 845 F.2d at 1118 & n.13; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297 (1981) (construing similar language in § 1185(b) as “le[aving] the power to make exceptions exclusively in the hands of the Executive”).\nThe plain terms of Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) provide no basis for judicial second-guessing of the President’s determination about what restrictions to “prescribe” or what restrictions are necessary to avoid “detriment[] to the interests of the United States.” In these circumstances, where Congress has traditionally and expressly committed these matters to the President’s judgment and discretion, there are no meaningful standards for review. See Doe, 486 U.S. at 600-01; Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1994). As the Supreme Court recognized in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (AAADC), courts are “ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of the Executive’s reasons for excluding particular foreign nationals. At a minimum, to the extent Section 1182(f) envisions any “find[ings],” the fact that the President acts by “proclamation” suggests that they need not be extensive and should not be subject to searching review.\n30\n\n\fb. Historical practice confirms the breadth of, and deference owed to, the President’s exercise of authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). For decades, Presidents have restricted entry pursuant to those statutes without detailed public justifications or findings; some have discussed the President’s rationale in one or two sentences that broadly declare the Nation’s interests.4 The only justification provided for the Presidential action at issue in Sale, for example, was that “[t]here continues to be a serious problem of persons attempting to come to the United States by sea without necessary documentation and otherwise illegally.” Executive Order No. 12,807, pmbl. pt. 4, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). The Supreme Court expressed no concerns about the adequacy of that finding, ruling that “[w]hether the President’s chosen method” made sense from a policy perspective was “irrelevant to the scope of his authority” under Section 1182(f). Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88.\nSimilarly, in 1979, when President Carter invoked Section 1185(a)(1) in response to the Iranian hostage crisis, he made no express findings and delegated to lower Executive Branch officials the authority to deny and revoke visas for Iranian nationals. See Exec. Order No. 12,172, § 1-101, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (1979). Courts had no trouble upholding those restrictions. E.g., Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d\n4 E.g., Proclamation No. 8693, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,751 (2011); Proclamation No. 8342, 74 Fed. Reg. 4093 (2009); Proclamation No. 6958, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,007 (1996); Proclamation No. 5887, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,185 (1988); Proclamation No. 5829, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,289 (1988).\n31\n\n\f113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980); Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1982). And when President Reagan suspended the entry of Cuba nationals as immigrants in 1986 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), he offered only a single sentence explaining the basis for his action. See Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (1986).\n2. The Proclamation Is Fully Justified By The President’s National Security And Foreign Affairs Judgments\nHere, the Presidential findings and explanation set forth in the Proclamation amply support the exercise of his authority to impose entry restrictions under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a). The President imposed the entry restrictions after reviewing the recommendations of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, following a worldwide review that evaluated every country according to established criteria. The Acting Secretary recommended entry restrictions on eight countries, each of which was identified as “inadequate” in its information-sharing practices or as presenting other special circumstances. See Procl. § 1(c)-(g), (i). The entry restrictions for each country are tailored to the country’s particular circumstances and conditions. See id. §§ 1(h)(i), 2(a)-(h).\nThe President found that the “entry into the United States of persons described in Section 2 of [the] proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.” Id. pmbl. As the President explained, the entry restrictions serve two\n32\n\n\fpurposes. First, they “prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States.” Procl. § 1(h)(i); id. § 1(a), (b) (discussing the importance of foreign governments’ information-sharing to vetting process). Plaintiffs have offered no basis to second-guess this national-security judgment. Cf. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). Second, the entry restrictions are “needed to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments” whose nationals are subject to the restrictions. Procl. § 1(h)(i). The diplomatic-engagement period described in the Proclamation yielded significant improvements in foreign governments’ information sharing, id. § 1(e)-(g), and encouraging changes in the behavior of foreign governments through entry restrictions is an accepted foreign-policy method, as illustrated by President Carter’s Iranian order and President Reagan’s Cuban order. See pp. 37-38, supra.\nFurthermore, both of these purposes are furthered by nationality-based entry restrictions. Foreign governments “manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals” and “control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments.” Id. § 1(b). Because the Proclamation’s entry restrictions seek both to protect against and to encourage improvement of deficient information-sharing practices by certain foreign countries, it is eminently sensible to impose those restrictions on nationals of those countries\n33\n\n\ftraveling on those countries’ passports (and, conversely, not to apply them to dual nationals of a covered country who are traveling on a non-covered country’s passport, id. § 3(b)(iv)).\n3. Section 1152(a)(1)’s Prohibition On Nationality Discrimination In Issuing Immigrant Visas Does Not Restrict The President’s Authority To Suspend Entry\nAlthough the district court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Proclamation exceeded the President’s authority under Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a), JA 1041-53, it held that the Proclamation’s targeted entry restrictions violate 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality in the “issuance of [an] immigrant visa[],” JA 1034-40. The court erred in reading Section 1152(a) to override the President’s distinct authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a), especially in light of the statutory deference afforded to the President, contrary historical practice, and the serious constitutional concerns raised by that interpretation.\na. It is axiomatic that “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts * * * to regard each as effective.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976). That principle applies here. As the district court itself previously (and correctly) recognized, “barring entry to the United States based on nationality pursuant to the President’s authority under § 1182(f) does not appear to run afoul of the provision in § 1152(a) barring discrimination in the issuance of\n34\n\n\fimmigrant visas.” IRAP, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 554 (emphasis added). At an absolute\nminimum, Section 1152(a)(1)(A) by its plain terms does not prohibit the President\nfrom restricting entry based on nationality under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a), even\nif it were to require the State Department to issue immigrant visas to aliens whose\nentry the President has suspended based on nationality. Moreover, Section 1152(a)\ndoes not even require issuing immigrant visas to aliens whose entry has been validly\nsuspended based on nationality under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a). The two sets\nof statutory provisions simply operate in different spheres: Sections 1182(f) and\n1185(a), like numerous other provisions of the INA, limit the universe of individuals\neligible to receive visas; Section 1152(a)(1)(A), by contrast, prohibits discrimination\non the basis of nationality within that universe of eligible individuals. Indeed, the\nINA expressly requires the denial of visas to aliens who are ineligible “under section\n1182.” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g).5\nLegislative history confirms that Congress understood the INA to operate in\nthis manner. The 1965 amendment enacting the provision codified at 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1152(a)(1)(A) was designed to eliminate the country-quota system previously in\n5 The district court thus erred both in relying on consular officers’ role in implementing the Proclamation through visa denials, JA 1039, and in finding it “highly significant that § 1152(a) explicitly excludes certain sections of the INA from its scope * * * but * * * not § 1182(f) or § 1185(a),” JA 1036. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to those who are eligible for entry to the United States, which necessarily excludes individuals whom the President determines are ineligible for entry, and thus for visas, under Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a)(1).\n35\n\n\feffect, but it was intended to operate only as to those aliens otherwise eligible for visas, not to modify the eligibility criteria for admission or to limit pre-existing provisions like Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a)(1) addressing entry. See H. Rep. No. 89745, at 12 (1965) (“Under this [new] system, selection from among those eligible to be immigrants * * * will be based upon the existence of a close family relationship to U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens and not on the existing basis of birthplace or ancestry.” (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 89-748, at 13 (1965) (similar).\nMoreover, harmonizing the statutes is particularly appropriate where the President is imposing restrictions on the entry of aliens to influence foreign governments’ behavior. As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in Hawaii, the President may permissibly distinguish among “classes of aliens on the basis of nationality” when warranted “as retaliatory diplomatic measures responsive to government conduct directed at the United States.” 859 F.3d at 772 n.13. This Court has upheld nationality-based restrictions challenged on constitutional and statutory grounds, see Malek-Marzban, 653 F.2d at 116, and construing Section 1152(a)(1) to disable the President from taking action against the nationals of a foreign state for foreign affairs or national-security reasons (e.g., when on the brink of war with a country) would of course raise serious constitutional concerns.\n36\n\n\fHistorical practice also strongly supports the government’s interpretation of the relevant provisions. In 1986, President Reagan suspended the immigrant entry of “all Cuban nationals,” subject to certain exceptions, until “the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, determines that normal migration procedures with Cuba have been restored.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,470-71. President Carter issued an order in 1979 in response to the Iranian hostage crisis; although the order did not itself deny or revoke visas, the President explained upon its issuance that the State Department would “invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens” and would not reissue visas or issue new visas “except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires.” Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against Iran: Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33233 (“Sanctions Against Iran”); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (1979). Construing Section 1152(a)(1)(A) to forbid nationality-based restrictions on entry would mean that those measures were unlawful.\nThe district court distinguished these prior Presidential actions, as well as the brink-of-war scenario, on the ground that they were of “limited duration, such as during a specific urgent national crisis or public health emergency.” JA 1037. But that distinction has no textual basis in Section 1152(a). Nor is it supported by the underlying facts; if anything, the prior suspensions were more indefinite in scope\n37\n\n\fthan the Proclamation. President Reagan’s suspension of entry of Cuban immigrants was to “remain in effect until such time as the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, determines that normal migration procedures with Cuba have been restored.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,471. And President Carter’s instruction to the State Department was to “invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens” and not to reissue visas or issue new visas “except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires.” Sanctions Against Iran, supra. The Proclamation, by contrast, requires periodic review of the continuing need for the restrictions and establishes a process for recommending that they be terminated or modified. Procl. § 4.\nb. Even assuming that Section 1152(a)(1)(A) were inconsistent with Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1), background principles of construction would require finding that Section 1152(a)(1) gives way. Section 1185(a)(1) was amended to its current form in 1978, after enactment of Section 1152(a)(1)(A), and as the most recent statute, would prevail. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 707(a), 92 Stat. 963, 992-93 (1978). Furthermore, while Section 1152(a)(1)(A) establishes a general rule governing nondiscrimination in the issuance of visas by consular officers and others involved in that process, Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) constitute more specific, and thus controlling, grants of authority expressly and directly to the President to restrict entry of aliens to protect\n38\n\n\fthe national interest. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 170-73; see also NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 941 (2017).\nFinally, even if the district court were correct that Section 1152(a)(1)(A) would otherwise forbid withholding immigrant visas from aliens whose entry was suspended, Section 1152(a)(1)(B) confirms that Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not “limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications.” The means by which the Secretary of State implements the Proclamation’s entry restrictions—i.e., by withholding visas from aliens who are not eligible for entry—constitutes a “procedure[]” within the meaning of Section 1152(a)(1)(B).\nB. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause\nThe district court also erred in holding that the Proclamation’s entry restrictions likely violate the Establishment Clause. The Proclamation is constitutional regardless of whether the Court applies Mandel’s limited standard of review that there need only be a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for excluding aliens abroad, 408 U.S. at 770, or the primary “secular purpose” standard applied in the domestic context in certain circumstances, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).\n39\n\n\f1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Legitimate And Bona Fide Reasons\nThis Court’s now-vacated ruling in IRAP correctly acknowledged that Mandel’s test applies to constitutional challenges to the exclusion of aliens abroad. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 588. Under that test, when the Executive gives “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for excluding an alien, “courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the” asserted constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.\na. Mandel compels the rejection of plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. As the district court correctly acknowledged, JA 1055, the Proclamation’s entry restrictions rest on facially legitimate reasons: protecting national security and encouraging foreign governments to improve their information-sharing practices. See Procl. § 1. The Proclamation describes the global review process undertaken by DHS, in consultation with other agencies; the neutral criteria against which all nations were assessed; the subsequent diplomatic engagement process during which the Department of State encouraged nations to improve their performance; and the resulting recommendations of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. See id. § 1(a)-(f), 1(i).\nThe Proclamation further explains that, in accordance with the Acting Secretary’s recommendations and after consulting with members of the Cabinet, the\n40\n\n\fPresident “craft[ed] * * * country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and that would, at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” See id. § 1(h)(i). These facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for the Proclamation’s entry restrictions readily satisfy Mandel’s test.\nb. Relying on this Court’s opinion reviewing the constitutionality of EO2, the district court held that Mandel’s “bona fide” requirement permits courts to look behind the Government’s stated reasons to determine whether they were given in good faith. JA 1055 (citing IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590-91). But IRAP’s holding on that point is no longer good law, not only because it has been vacated as moot, but also because it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017), which described Mandel’s standard as “minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review).” Rational-basis review is objective and does not permit probing government officials’ subjective intentions. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).\nMoreover, even apart from Morales-Santana, IRAP’s holding was not persuasive on its own terms, because it erroneously relied on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Din. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence did not propose an enormous loophole in Mandel, especially with respect to a formal national-security and\n41\n\n\fforeign-policy determination of the President. It merely hypothesized that, if the government had not identified a factual basis for the consular officers’ decision at issue, the plaintiff might have been able to seek “additional factual details” about the basis of the consular officer’s decision (provided the information is not classified). Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). In contrast, when the government does identify a factual basis—as it did in Mandel and in Din (by citing a statutory provision that itself included sufficient factual predicates), and has also done here through the Proclamation’s text—that is the end of the analysis. See id. at 2140 (observing that the citation of a statutory ground of inadmissibility involving terrorism indicates that the government “relied upon a bona fide factual basis for denying [the] visa”). Plaintiffs’ overreading of the Din concurrence also cannot be squared with Mandel, where the Court explicitly rejected “look[ing] behind” the government’s stated reason for denying a waiver of inadmissibility grounds, 408 U.S. at 770, and declined Justice Marshall’s invitation in dissent to take “[e]ven the briefest peek behind the Attorney General’s reason for refusing a waiver,” which he asserted was a “sham.” Id. at 778; see also Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that the concurring decision in Din “left things as Mandel had left them” and that “Mandel tells us not to go behind a facially legitimate and bona fide explanation”), cert. denied, 2017 WL 3136962 (Oct. 30, 2017).\n42\n\n\f2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary a. In McCreary, the Court asked whether the challenged government conduct had the primary purpose or effect of advancing religion. 545 U.S. at 85960. Here, the Proclamation neither mentions nor draws any distinction based on religion, and its “operation,” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993), confirms that it is religion-neutral and not intended to discriminate on the basis of religion. The Proclamation is the result of a months-long worldwide review and process of diplomatic engagement combining the efforts of multiple government agencies and recommendations from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security to the President regarding whether and what entry restrictions were necessary to address the inadequacies identified. The President acted in accordance with those recommendations. Neither plaintiffs nor the district court have even suggested, let alone demonstrated, that the Cabinet secretaries and numerous other government officials involved in that review and consultative process culminating in the Proclamation were acting in bad faith or harbored anti-Muslim animus. Furthermore, the Proclamation establishes entry restrictions that are tailored to the particular information-sharing deficiencies and terrorism risks in each nation. Of the seven countries from which EO-2 and its predecessor suspended entry, the Proclamation omits two Muslim-majority countries (Sudan and Iraq). The President\n43\n\n\fconcluded that Sudan met the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security’s baseline and that, although Iraq fell below the baseline, entry restrictions were not warranted in light of “the close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).” Procl. § 1(g). The Proclamation added entry restrictions for three new countries, two of which are non-Muslim-majority (Venezuela and North Korea) and the third of which has a substantial (approximately 48%) non-Muslim population (Chad). See CIA, The World Factbook: Africa (Chad), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/cd.html. The five other Muslim-majority countries included were all previously identified by Congress or the Executive Branch as posing terrorism-related concerns. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12).\nMoreover, the Proclamation tailors the entry restrictions to the particular country, allowing students and exchange visitors from Iran, while restricting business and tourist nonimmigrant entry for nationals of Libya, Yemen, and Chad, and imposing no exclusions on nonimmigrant entry for Somali nationals.\nThis particularized selection of countries and restrictions would be nonsensical as a supposed “Muslim ban,” but is readily justified as a tailored means of encouraging individual countries to improve inadequate information-sharing and\n44\n\n\fof protecting against security risks in the interim, which are obviously purely secular, not to mention compelling, government interests.\nb. Citing McCreary as principal support, the district court held that these features are insufficient to cure the alleged “taint” from the prior Executive Orders and earlier campaign statements. JA 1063-64, 1072-75. As a threshold matter, the government strongly disagrees that the history preceding the Proclamation is evidence of anti-Muslim bias. But more importantly for present purposes, the Proclamation is significantly different from the prior entry suspensions, both procedurally and substantively. It thus involves nothing remotely like the history of overt and explicit religious displays that were at issue in McCreary. The district court’s criticisms of the Proclamation reflect exactly the kinds of improper secondguessing of national security judgments that the Supreme Court has directed the lower courts not to attempt.\nIn McCreary, the Supreme Court was confronted with a history of three successive Ten Commandments displays at a county courthouse. The first display, of the Ten Commandments standing alone, was clearly unconstitutional under prior Supreme Court precedent, see 545 U.S. at 868, and a second display, erected after suit was filed, also focused on religious messages and was authorized by a resolution that clearly endorsed religion. See id. at 870. The counties then mounted a third display, which “quoted more of the purely religious language of the Ten\n45\n\n\fCommandments than the first two displays had done.” Id. at 872. The Supreme Court concluded that all the displays plainly violated the Establishment Clause, and that the third display in particular represented nothing more than a “litigating position,” and was even more explicitly religious than its predecessors. Id. at 871.\nMcCreary is readily distinguishable in multiple respects. The Proclamation, unlike the religious displays in McCreary, contains no textual or operational reference to religion. The Proclamation is the result of separate action by the President, based on the study, analysis, and recommendations of multiple government offices and officials (including four Cabinet-level officials), none of whom plaintiffs suggest had a religious basis for making the recommendations and providing the advice that culminated in the Proclamation. In addition, EO-2, which expired by its own terms, see p. 7, supra, itself expressly repudiated the notion that it was motivated by or intended to display religious animus, see EO-2 §§ 1(b)(iv), (h)(i). These are exactly the kinds of “genuine changes in constitutionally significant conditions” that McCreary held defeat any claim that the government has acted with an “implausible” secular purpose. 545 U.S. at 874.\nSimilarly in McGowan, the Supreme Court held that a Sunday closing law’s secular exemptions were sufficient to establish that the law no longer was motivated by its original religious purpose of observing the Sabbath, even though the law still contained expressly religious references. 366 U.S. at 445. Here, likewise, the\n46\n\n\flimited restrictions and express exclusions for certain Muslim-majority nations (as well as the process of review and recommendation by government officials whose motives have never been questioned) make clear that the Proclamation implements a good-faith and secular national-security objective. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715-16 (2010) (plurality op.) (criticizing a district court for “dismissing Congress’s motives” for transferring land on which a cross had been unconstitutionally erected to a private party as “illicit” rather than attributing a “reasonable,” lawful purpose for Congress’s actions).\nc. The district court gave several specific reasons for questioning the Proclamation’s secular bona fides, but none withstands even minimal scrutiny, and all represent an inappropriate effort to second-guess national-security determinations that are constitutionally committed to the Executive.\nThe district court first considered it significant that “the underlying architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same,” reasoning that each “bans the issuance of immigrant and non-immigrant visas on the basis of nationality to multiple majority-Muslim countries on the basis of concerns about terrorism.” JA 1067-68. But the Proclamation’s “architecture” is in fact fundamentally different, because it reflects a multi-agency review and recommendation process and tailored substantive restrictions. The district court’s troubling suggestion that none of this matters because countries that are Muslim-\n47\n\n\fmajority are still included in the Proclamation threatens to permanently disable the President from addressing terrorism-related concerns relating to nationality in the very countries where those concerns are currently the most acute. In similar contexts, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of a facially neutral government program “does not turn on” statistical evidence regarding the expected religious/secular impact of that program at any given time. Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639, 658 (2002).\nThe court then questioned the Proclamation’s secular purpose, asserting that “the outcome of the DHS Review was at least partially pre-ordained.” JA 1068. That assertion ignores the relevant EO-2 provisions governing the review process, which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish the criteria by which to identify “whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country,” EO-2 § 2(a) (emphasis added), and to provide a list of any “countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested,” id. § 2(e) (emphases added). Nothing in those provisions cabined the independent judgment of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security—whose good-faith has never been called into question— to decide whether and which countries to recommend for appropriate entry restrictions.\n48\n\n\fThe district court ascribed additional significance to the fact that “a comparison of EO-2 with the Proclamation reveals that many of the criteria considered in the DHS Review, and used to justify the ban on specific countries in the Proclamation, were substantially similar to those used to select the list of countries banned by EO-2.” JA 1068-69. As explained, however, the criteria used were religion-neutral, reflect compelling government interests in national security, and are similar to the criteria that Congress and other Presidents have relied on in the past in previously identifying countries that pose heightened terrorism risks. See pp. 5-7, 31-34, 40-45, supra. For example, the fact that Iran “regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks” and “is the source of significant terrorist threats,” Procl. § 2(b)(i), are exactly the compelling, secular concerns that those charged with protecting our country’s national security should be considering—and that is precisely why both the agencies and the President chose to consider them.\nThe district court also inferred anti-Muslim bias because the Proclamation supposedly treats countries with similar deficiencies differently, in a manner that is asserted to have “a disproportionate impact on majority-Muslim nations” and to manifest animus rather than “flow from the objective factors considered in the review.” JA 1070. But the seemingly different treatment is instead explained by different circumstances, as outlined in the Proclamation itself. For example,\n49\n\n\falthough Somalia generally satisfies the information-sharing baseline, it not only “has significant identity-management deficiencies” but “stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory.” Procl. § 2(h). Likewise, although Venezuela’s “government is uncooperative in verifying whether its citizens pose national security or publicsafety threats,” it “has adopted many of the baseline standards identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security” and the United States has “alternative sources for obtaining information to verify the citizenship and identity of nationals from Venezuela.” Id. § 2(f)(i). These country-specific differences, rather than animus, are the self-evident basis for the differing treatment.\nThe district court also diminished the significance of the inclusion of North Korea in the list of countries subject to entry restrictions on the basis that the restrictions were of “little practical consequence” because that country would likely involve “only a fraction of one percent of all those affected by the Proclamation.” JA 1066. The inclusion of those non-Muslim-majority countries in the Proclamation underscores the Proclamation’s religion-neutral purpose and effect, and the Proclamation sets forth valid reasons for concluding that the inclusion of those countries is important.\nThe district court further asserted that the country-based entry restrictions in the Proclamation are “unprecedented,” distinguishing prior country-based entry bans\n50\n\n\fon the basis that they applied to “a single nation” “in response to a specific diplomatic dispute.” JA 1071. But the President determined that each of the eight countries presented specific risks warranting entry restrictions, just as the Iran and Cuba restrictions were the result of specific problems relating to those countries. The entry restrictions are commensurate with the problem they are intended to address, and that does not change simply because more than one country presents the problem.\nThe district court also maintained that “[d]efendants offer no evidence * * * showing an intelligence-based terrorism threat justifying a ban on entire nationalities,” and suggested that individualized assessment of nationals from those countries could adequately protect against the threat. JA 1071. Where the government faces a structural problem that is common to all nationals of a foreign country, however, it surely has the latitude to address the problem on a national basis—particularly where one of the goals sought to be attained is to encourage that country to change its practices nationwide to address the problem. The district court’s reasoning was particularly problematic because it involved second-guessing the President’s predictive judgments about what is necessary to protect the country against national-security risks, which are entitled to the utmost deference. See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 491 (noting that courts are generally “ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of the Executive’s\n51\n\n\f“reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat”); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). The district court purported to acknowledge that it was required to defer to that judgment, yet immediately, and improperly, rejected it in the guise of assessing whether the government acted with a permissible secular purpose. JA 1072.\nFinally, the court concluded that statements by the President and his advisors show that the Proclamation fundamentally rests on an illicit religious purpose. The President’s campaign statements are irrelevant for reasons already discussed, see pp. 45-47, supra, and the cited statements that occurred after the issuance of EO-2 do not reflect any religious animus, but the compelling secular goal of protecting national security from an amply-documented present threat. That reading is consistent with other statements, such as the President’s statements in an official address praising Islam as “one of the world’s great faiths;” decrying “the murder of innocent Muslims;” and emphasizing that the fight against terrorism “is not a battle between different faiths, different sects, or different civilizations,” but one “between barbaric criminals who seek to obliterate human life, and decent people of all religions who seek to protect it.” Pres. Donald J. Trump, Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit (May 21, 2017), httpps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit.\n52\n\n\fIn sum, the district court plainly erred in holding that plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on their Establishment Clause claim. And because plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim rests on the same religious-purpose allegations as their Establishment Clause claims, it fails for the same reasons. III. The Balance of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief\nA. The District Court’s Injunction Imposes Serious, Irreparable Harm On The Government And The Public\n1. The district court’s injunction barring enforcement of the Proclamation’s entry restrictions undermines the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to safeguard the Nation’s security and intrudes on the political branches’ constitutional prerogatives. “[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” Agee, 453 U.S. at 307, and “the Government’s interest in combatting terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order,” HLP, 561 U.S. at 28.\nThe injunction also causes irreparable injury by invalidating an action taken at the height of the President’s authority. “[T]he President has unique responsibility” over “foreign and military affairs.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 188. Rules “concerning the admissibility of aliens” necessarily rely on not just legislative authority but also “inherent executive power.” Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. And because “the President act[ed] pursuant to an express * * * authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress\n53\n\n\fcan delegate.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84 (2015).\nThe district court’s injunction overriding the President’s judgment thus necessarily imposes irreparable harm. Even a single State “suffers a form of irreparable injury” “[a]ny time [it] is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); see, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 2002). A fortiori, this injunction imposes irreparable injury on the President and the public given “the singular importance of [his] duties” to the entire Nation. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982).\n2. The district court held that “Defendants are not directly harmed by a preliminary injunction preventing them from enforcing a Proclamation likely to be found unconstitutional,” JA 1077-78, but that ignores the harm if, instead, the Proclamation is ultimately held to be constitutional. The district court also expressed the view that “[d]efendants have not shown that national security cannot be maintained without an unprecedented eight-country travel ban,” and that “[e]ven with an injunction, visa applicants from the Designated Countries would be screened through the standard, individualized vetting process under which the burden is on the individual applicants to prove that they are not inadmissible to the United States.”\n54\n\n\fJA 1078. That approach improperly second-guessed the President’s nationalsecurity determination, by disregarding that the purpose of the entry restrictions is to encourage the covered countries to improve their information-sharing practices and to protect this country in the interim in light of the adverse effect those inadequate practices have on individualized vetting and screening. And it also ignores that waivers are available on a case-specific basis under the Proclamation.\nB. A Preliminary Injunction Is Not Necessary To Prevent Any Substantial Harm To Plaintiffs\nPlaintiffs, by contrast, would suffer no cognizable harm, much less irreparable injury, if the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are allowed to take effect. The district court cited “prolonged separation from their family members,” JA 1077, but delay in entry alone does not amount to irreparable harm. As already noted, visa times vary widely, and it is not unusual for an alien to wait months or years for an immigrant visa. Until aliens abroad meet otherwise-applicable visa requirements and seek and are denied a waiver, they have not received final agency action, and plaintiffs’ claimed harms are too “remote” and “speculative” to merit injunctive relief. Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991).\nThe district court also concluded that plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims show irreparable harm per se, JA 1076-77, but the cited cases all involved plaintiffs whose own Establishment Clause rights were violated. The district court cited no\n55\n\n\fcase supporting the proposition that a plaintiff challenging alleged religious discrimination against third parties has established irreparable harm per se.\nC. The Global Injunction Is Improper At a minimum, the district court erred because Article III and equitable principles require that any injunction be limited to redressing plaintiffs’ own cognizable, irreparable injuries. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). The global injunction is vastly overbroad, notwithstanding the district court’s exclusion of “[i]ndividuals lacking a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Order 2. Although the Supreme Court so narrowed the injunctions against EO-2, see Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088-89, the Court did not conclude that similar relief was required in all circumstances, and it tailored its stay to its assessment of the equities. This case is very different for the reasons described, and the equitable balancing requires following the ordinary rule of plaintiff-specific relief.\nCONCLUSION For these reasons, the district court’s preliminary injunction should be reversed. At a minimum, it should be vacated except for those aliens whose exclusion would impose a cognizable, irreparable injury on plaintiffs.\n56\n\n\fNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\nNOVEMBER 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nCHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nDOUGLAS N. LETTER /s/ Sharon Swingle SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n57\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-face requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-volume limitations of Rule 32(a)(7)(B). The brief contains 12,711 words, excluding the parts of the brief excluded by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 1, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 1 of 27\n\nNos. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nNO. 17-2231(L) INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 8:17-cv-361-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\n[Caption Continues on Inside Cover]\nBRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE, THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, SUPPORTING DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ON THE MERITS AND URGING REVERSAL. BRIEF FILED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES.\n\nJAY ALAN SEKULOW Counsel of Record\nSTUART J. ROTH COLBY M. MAY ANDREW J. EKONOMOU* JORDAN SEKULOW* CRAIG L. PARSHALL MATTHEW R. CLARK* BENJAMIN P. SISNEY AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 201 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 Tel.: 202-546-8890 Email: sekulow@aclj.org\n* Not admitted to Fourth Circuit Bar\n\nEDWARD L. WHITE III ERIK M. ZIMMERMAN* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Tel.: 734-680-8007 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\nFRANCIS J. MANION GEOFFREY R. SURTEES* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 6375 New Hope Road New Hope, Kentucky 40052 Tel.: 502-549-7020 Email: fmanion@aclj.org Counsel for amicus curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 2 of 27\n\nNO. 17-2232 IRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 8:17-cv-2921-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\nNO. 17-2233 EBLAL ZAKZOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 1:17-cv-2969-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\nNO. 17-2240 INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellants,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 8:17-cv-361-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 3 of 27\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(A) and Circuit Rule 26.1, amicus\n\ncuriae, the American Center for Law and Justice (“ACLJ”), makes the following\n\ndisclosures:\n\n1. The ACLJ is a non-profit organization that has no parent corporation.\n\n2. No publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity owns any\n\nportion of the ACLJ.\n\n3. The ACLJ is unaware of any publicly held corporation or other publicly\n\nheld entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation.\n\n4. This case does not arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding.\n\nDated: November 1, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Telephone: (734) 680-8007 Facsimile: (734) 680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\n\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 4 of 27\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......................................................... i\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29(A)(4)(E) ........................1\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.............................................1\nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................2\nARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3\nI. Supreme Court precedent dictates that the challenged Presidential Proclamation be reviewed under the deferential standards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches, which the Proclamation satisfies................................................................................3\nA. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential.........................................................................................................4\nB. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional under the Supreme Court’s deferential standards applicable to constitutional challenges to the political branches’ immigration-related actions. ...............................................................6\nII. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis. ................................................................................10\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................17\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29 AND 32 .......................18\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................19\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 5 of 27\n\nCASES\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999) .................................................................................15\n\nBd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)....................................................................................... 1, 13\n\nBowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)............................................................................................14\n\nClinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)............................................................................................12\n\nEvans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004)………………………………………………..16\n\nFEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)..............................................................................................1\n\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)..........................................................................................4, 7\n\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)..............................................................................................4\n\nINS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)..........…………………………………………………16\n\nInt'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879 (D. Md. 2017)……………………………10, 15\n\nInt'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................1\n\nKennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)..............................................................................................4\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 6 of 27\n\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)..........................................................................................6\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)..............................................................................................6\nLamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).…………………………………………………….…..1\nLandon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)................................................................................................4\nLemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)............................................................................................11\nLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)............................................................................................14\nMcConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)................................................................................................1\nMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)...................................................................................... 12-15\nMoss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist., 683 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2012) ..............................................................................11\nMueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)………………………………………………………..13\nPleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009)…………………………………………………………1\nRajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................................... 9-10\nRepublican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)............................................................................................12\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 7 of 27\n\nRoark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2009) ..............................................................................15\nShaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)…………………………………………………………4\nUnited States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)..........................................................................................1\nVan Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)..................................................................................... 10, 14\nWallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)..............................................................................................14\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ..............................................................................1\nWashington v. Trump, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................8\nWashington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................13\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)…………………………………………………………5\nZiglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1861 (2017)..........................................................................................6\nZivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)..........................................................................................5\nSTATUTES AND RULES\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)......................................................................................................5\nCircuit Rule 26.1 ........................................................................................................ i\nFed. R. App. P. 29 ............................................................................................ i, 1, 18\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 8 of 27\n\nFed. R. App. P. 32....................................................................................................18\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\nPresidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/24/enhancingvetting-capabilities-and-processes-detecting-attempted-entry ............... 2, passim\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 9 of 27\n\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29(A)(4)(E) Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), the American Center for Law and Justice (“ACLJ”) affirms that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made any monetary contributions intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The ACLJ is an organization dedicated to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by law. Counsel for the ACLJ have presented oral argument, represented parties, and submitted amicus curiae briefs before the Supreme Court of the United States, this Court, and other courts around the country in cases involving the Establishment Clause and immigration law. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). The ACLJ has actively defended, through advocacy and litigation, immigration-related policies that protect American citizens. This brief is supported\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 10 of 27\n\nby members of the ACLJ’s Committee to Defend Our National Security from Terror, which represents more than 276,000 Americans who have stood in support of the President’s efforts to protect this nation from the entry of foreign terrorists. This brief supports the position of the Defendants-Appellants, President Donald J. Trump, et al., on the merits and urges the reversal of the lower court’s decision. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.\nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The federal government’s primary job is to keep this nation safe. The Presidential Proclamation at issue in this case is designed to do just that.1 Under the Constitution and federal statutes, the President has broad power to exclude aliens from this country for national security reasons. Courts generally defer to the exercise of the President’s power in this area, which is what the district court should have done here. The Proclamation is a valid exercise of President Trump’s authority that should not be disturbed. Moreover, the mere suggestion of a possible religious or anti-religious motive, mined primarily from past comments of a political candidate or his supporters uttered on the campaign trial as private citizens, is not enough to defeat\n1 Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2017/09/24/enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processesdetecting-attempted-entry.\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 11 of 27\n\nthe validity of the Proclamation, even under Lemon’s “purpose prong.” The Proclamation clearly serves a genuine secular purpose—protecting our national security—and is not motivated by anti-religious considerations.\nThe decision below should be reversed and the preliminary injunction should be vacated to permit the Proclamation to be implemented in full to protect our nation from foreign terrorists.\nARGUMENT I. The Presidential Proclamation should be reviewed under the deferential\nstandards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches, which the Proclamation satisfies. This case involves the special context of a Presidential Proclamation concerning the entry into the United States of nationals of eight countries, enacted pursuant to the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to protect national security. The governing purpose of the Proclamation is to protect our “citizens from terrorist attacks” and other public-safety threats. Procl. § 1(a). As the Proclamation explains, Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that policy. They enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United States.\nId.\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 12 of 27\n\nAs discussed herein, when the Supreme Court has considered constitutional challenges to immigration-related actions like the Proclamation, it has declined to subject those actions to the same level of scrutiny applied to non-immigrationrelated actions, choosing instead to take a considerably more deferential approach, which is what the district court should have done here. Under the appropriately deferential standard of review, the Proclamation is constitutionally sound.\nA. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential. The Supreme Court has “long recognized the power to expel or exclude\naliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)). Indeed, “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Moreover, the Constitution “is not a suicide pact,” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963), and the President has broad national security powers that may be exercised through immigration restrictions. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952).\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 13 of 27\n\nNot only does the decision below undermine the President’s national\nsecurity authority, it also undercuts the considered judgment of Congress (in\nbolstering the President’s broad discretion) that:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012) (emphasis added).\nWhere, as here, a President’s action is authorized by Congress, “his\nauthority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right\nplus all that Congress can delegate.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084\n(2015) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635\n(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Proclamation falls squarely within the\nPresident’s constitutional and statutory authority and should be upheld in full. As\nthe Supreme Court recently explained:\nNational-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President. Judicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to other branches. . . . For these and other reasons, courts have shown [that] deference to what the Executive Branch has determined . . . is essential to national security. Indeed, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise. Congress has not provided otherwise here.\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 14 of 27\n\nZiglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017) (citation and internal quotation\nmarks omitted).\nB. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional under the Supreme Court’s deferential standards applicable to challenges to the political branches’ immigration-related actions.\nIn Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), the Court rejected a\nFirst Amendment challenge to the Attorney General’s decision to decline to grant a\nwaiver that would have allowed a Belgian scholar to enter the country on a visa in\norder to speak to American professors and students. The Court held that “the\npower to exclude aliens is ‘inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining\nnormal international relations and defending the country against foreign\nencroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively by the political\nbranches of government. . . .’” Id. at 765 (citations omitted). The Court concluded\nby stating that\nplenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable under § 212(a)(28), Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.\nId. at 769–70; see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139–41 (2015) (Kennedy,\nJ., concurring) (the government’s statement that a visa application was denied due\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 15 of 27\n\nto suspected involvement with terrorist activities “satisf[ied] Mandel’s ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ standard”).\nSimilarly, in Fiallo, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to statutory provisions that granted preferred immigration status to most aliens who are the children or parents of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, except for illegitimate children seeking that status by virtue of their biological fathers, and the fathers themselves. 430 U.S. at 788–90, 799–800. The Court stated:\nAt the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens. Id. at 792 (citation omitted). The Court noted that it had previously “resolved similar challenges to immigration legislation based on other constitutional rights of citizens, and has rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny is required.” Id. at 794. Additionally, the Court stated, “We can see no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case.” Id. at 795. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that “it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision,” id. at 799, and concluded that the plaintiffs raised “policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government.” Id. at 798.\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 16 of 27\n\nThe legality of Presidential orders related to immigration does not turn on a judicial guessing game of what the President’s subjective motives were at the time the order was issued. Instead, Mandel, Fiallo, and other cases dictate that courts should rarely look past the face of such orders. On its face, the Proclamation is designed to protect national security, and the analysis of the Proclamation’s legality under the Establishment Clause should end there. See Washington v. Trump, 853 F.3d 933, 939 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc) (the panel’s “unreasoned assumption that courts should simply plop Establishment Clause cases from the domestic context over to the foreign affairs context ignores the realities of our world”).\nThe mere fact that six of the eight countries designated by the Proclamation happen to have Muslim majority populations is not evidence of religious animus. Under such reasoning, the benefits that the government provides to military veterans would be rendered constitutionally suspect by the mere fact that approximately 85% of veterans happen to be male, even though there are many legitimate reasons for providing such benefits unrelated to any gender-based bias.\nNotably, the Proclamation does not single out Muslims (or people of any other faith, or no faith) for disfavored treatment. It is religiously neutral. The countless millions of non-American Muslims who live outside the designated countries are not restricted by the Proclamation. Neither does it limit its application\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 17 of 27\n\nto Muslims in the designated countries; instead, it applies to nationals of the enumerated countries irrespective of their faith. Plaintiffs’ objection to the Proclamation is, at its core, a policy dispute that should be resolved by the political branches, not by the federal courts.\nThe Proclamation is similar in principle to the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”) implemented after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which was upheld by numerous federal courts. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438–39 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing cases). Under this system, the Attorney General imposed special requirements upon foreign nationals present in the United States who were from specified countries. The first group of countries designated by the Attorney General included Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, and a total of twenty-four Muslim majority countries and North Korea were eventually designated. Id. at 433 n.3.\nIn one illustrative NSEERS case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected arguments that are strikingly similar to the arguments accepted by the lower court here:\nThere was a rational national security basis for the Program. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were facilitated by the lax enforcement of immigration laws. The Program was [rationally] designed to monitor more closely aliens from certain countries selected on the basis of national security criteria. . . . To be sure, the Program did select countries that were, with the exception of North Korea, predominantly Muslim. . . . However, one major threat of\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 18 of 27\n\nterrorist attacks comes from radical Islamic groups. The September 11 attacks were facilitated by violations of immigration laws by aliens from predominantly Muslim nations. The Program was clearly tailored to those facts. . . . The program did not target only Muslims: non-Muslims from the designated countries were subject to registration. There is therefore no basis for petitioners’ claim. Id. at 438–49 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Similarly, the Proclamation at issue here is constitutional. It is premised upon sound, reasoned determinations made by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Rather than affording the Proclamation and the Secretary’s determinations substantial deference as controlling precedent requires, the district court improperly overrode those determinations with its own opinion of the national security interests served by the Proclamation and the opinions of “former national security officials” relied upon by Plaintiffs. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879, at 34–36, 121–25 (D. Md. 2017). This is precisely the kind of judicial second-guessing on matters of immigration and national security that is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.\nII. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis. Justice Breyer’s controlling opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677\n(2005), observed that, “Where the Establishment Clause is at issue, tests designed to measure ‘neutrality’ alone are insufficient.” Id. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated that in “difficult borderline cases . . . I see no test-related\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 19 of 27\n\nsubstitute for the exercise of legal judgment . . . [which] must reflect and remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the [Religion] Clauses. . . .” Id. at 700. In this case, “the exercise of legal judgment” must take into account the deferential nature of judicial review of immigration-related actions such as the Proclamation. Nevertheless, the Proclamation is constitutional even under inapplicable nonimmigration-related Establishment Clause jurisprudence.\nAssuming the “purpose prong” of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test applies, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Proclamation clearly satisfies it. The “purpose prong” asks whether the challenged government action is “driven in part by a secular purpose.” Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist., 683 F.3d 599, 608 (4th Cir. 2012). Here, the Proclamation’s predominant purpose is its stated objective—protecting our national security—and, as such, the Proclamation satisfies the “purpose prong.” See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13; Procl. § 1.\nThe district court sidestepped the Proclamation’s obvious secular purpose by focusing mainly on miscellaneous comments made by then-candidate Trump, or his campaign advisors, despite any subsequent clarifications provided by the Trump Administration regarding its efforts to protect this country from the entry of foreign terrorists. The district court’s approach is flawed for at least four reasons.\nFirst, the Supreme Court has stated that the primary purpose inquiry concerning statutes may include consideration of the “plain meaning of the\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 20 of 27\n\nstatute’s words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history [and] the historical context of the statute . . . and the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (noting that the primary purpose inquiry is limited to consideration of “the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act”) (citation omitted and emphasis added).\nThe district court improperly focused on numerous quotes, made as long ago as 2015, by then-candidate Trump and/or individuals holding some nongovernmental position within his political campaign. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879, at 103-07. What matters for Establishment Clause analysis, however, are official government acts. Comments made, or actions taken, by a private citizen while a candidate for public office (or his or her advisors) while on the campaign trail are not “official” government acts, and do not constitute “contemporaneous legislative history.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 862; cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686 (1997) (alleged misconduct occurring before Bill Clinton became President was not an “official” act).\nClearly, “one would be naive not to recognize that campaign promises are— by long democratic tradition—the least binding form of human commitment.” Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002). Therefore, the\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 21 of 27\n\ndistrict court failed to properly limit its inquiry to official acts or statements in conducting its Establishment Clause analysis. Presidential campaign rhetoric is inherently unofficial and unreliable and should not be considered. See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc) (explaining that, for Establishment Clause analysis, it “is folly” to consider a political candidate’s campaign trail rhetoric, which is often contradictory or inflammatory).\nSecond, the district court’s extensive reliance upon purported evidence of a subjective, personal anti-Muslim bias of the President and some of his advisors is improper because “what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.” Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In short, the district court engaged in the kind of “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts” that is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 862.\nThe Proclamation, on its face, serves an indisputably secular purpose (protecting national security) and no amount of rehashing of miscellaneous campaign trail commentary can change that. A foray into the malleable arena of legislative history is not even a requirement in Establishment Clause cases where, as here, a secular purpose is readily apparent from a law or policy’s text. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–95 (1983) (noting the Supreme Court’s\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 22 of 27\n\n“reluct[ance] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the [government] particularly when a plausible secular purpose . . . may be discerned from the face of the statute”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that inquiry into the government’s purpose should be “deferential and limited”).\nThird, the mere suggestion of a possible religious or anti-religious motive, mined from past comments of a political candidate or his supporters, and intermixed with various secular purposes, is not enough to doom government action (along with all subsequent attempts to address the same subject matter). “[A]ll that Lemon requires” is that government action have “a secular purpose,” not that its purpose be “exclusively secular,” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6, 700 (1984) (citation omitted and emphasis added), and a policy is invalid under this test only if “the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 860 (emphasis added); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (upholding government action that “serv[ed] a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (“[A] court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose.”) (emphasis added). The Proclamation clearly serves secular purposes and, therefore, satisfies Lemon’s purpose test.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 23 of 27\n\nLastly, under the district court’s incorrect analysis, any hypothetical future immigration-related actions taken by the current President or officials within his Administration will be irredeemably tainted by the alleged subjective, predominantly anti-Muslim intent of the President and his surrogates, which runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s admonition that the government’s “past actions” do not “forever taint any effort . . . to deal with the subject matter.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 874; see also ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 105 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.) (“The mere fact that Jersey City’s first display was held to violate the Establishment Clause is plainly insufficient to show that the second display lacked ‘a secular legislative purpose,’ or that it was ‘intended to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.’”) (citation omitted); Roark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573 F.3d 556, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Another reason we reject the district court’s Lemon analysis is that . . . [it] would preclude the District from ever creating a limited public forum in which religious materials may be distributed in a constitutionally neutral manner.”).\nThe district court’s starting point was a presumption that the Proclamation is unconstitutional unless the government could bear the burden of proving that it is “a ‘purposeful’ curative action that establishes that the taint of EO-2 no longer underlies the travel ban.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879, at 125–26. This approach is backwards. As the Supreme Court noted in a\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 24 of 27\n\ncase challenging part of the Immigration and Nationality Act, “[w]e begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he President . . . [is] sworn to uphold the Constitution. And when the President is acting under the color of express authority of the United States Constitution, we start with a presumption that his acts are constitutional. . . . [T]he burden is on the challengers to overcome it with their arguments and to persuade us to the contrary.”).\nIn sum, the Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause. It should be enforced in full to protect our nation from foreign terrorists. The preliminary injunction jeopardizes our national security and improperly obstructs the President from exercising his constitutional and statutory duty to protect our nation.\n\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 25 of 27\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThis Court should reverse the decision below and vacate the preliminary\n\ninjunction.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nJAY ALAN SEKULOW Counsel of Record\nSTUART J. ROTH COLBY M. MAY ANDREW J. EKONOMOU JORDAN SEKULOW* CRAIG L. PARSHALL MATTHEW R. CLARK* BENJAMIN P. SISNEY AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 201 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 Tel.: 202-546-8890 Fax: 202-546-9309 Email: sekulow@aclj.org\n* Not admitted to Fourth Circuit Bar\n\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III ERIK M. ZIMMERMAN* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Tel.: 734-680-8007 Fax: 734-680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\nFRANCIS J. MANION GEOFFREY R. SURTEES* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 6375 New Hope Road New Hope, Kentucky 40052 Tel.: 502-549-7020 Fax: 502-549-5252 Email: fmanion@aclj.org\n\nNovember 1, 2017\n\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 26 of 27\n\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29 AND 32\n\nThis amicus curiae brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R.\n\nApp. P. 29(a)(5) and 32(a)(7) because it contains 3,726 words, excluding the parts\n\nof the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f). This brief complies with the\n\ntypeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements\n\nof Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced\n\ntypeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Times New Roman font.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Telephone: (734) 680-8007 Facsimile: (734) 680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\n\nDated: November 1, 2017\n\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 27 of 27\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that on November 1, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy\nof the foregoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of Court for the United\nStates Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit using CM/ECF, which will send\nnotification of such filing to counsel of record. On the same date, I caused four true\nand correct paper copies of the foregoing to be sent by Federal Express next-\nbusiness day delivery to the Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the\nFourth Circuit, 1100 East Main Street, Suite 501, Richmond, Virginia 23219-3517.\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Telephone: (734) 680-8007 Facsimile: (734) 680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-2\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSI ON & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fomth Circuit, you must complete and renm1 an Application for Admission before filing this fonn. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include yom f01mer name when completing tllis form so that we can locate you on the attomey roll. Electronic filing by com1sel is required in all Fomth Circuit cases. Ifyou have not registered as a Fomt h Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. 17-2231 (L), -2232, -2233, -2240 as\n\n[ZIRetained [Jcomt-appointed(CJA) [Jcourt-assigned(non-CJA) []Federal Defender 0 Pro Bono []Govemment\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: American Center for Law and Justice\n\n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _as the (party n ame)\n\nO appellaut(s) O appellee(s) D etitioner(s) O respondent(s) [Z}mucus curiae D intervenor(s) O movant(s)\n\n/s/ Edward L. Wh ite Ill (signatme)\n\nEdward L. White Ill Name (plinted or typed)\n\n734-680-8007 Voice Phone\n\nAmerican Center for Law and Justice Finn Name (if applicable)\n\n734-680-8006 Fax Number\n\n3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203\n\nAnn Arbor, Michigan 48105 Address\n\newhite@aclj.org E-mail address (plint or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify tl1at on November 1, 2017 the foregoing document was se1ved on all prut ies or their counsel ofrecord through tl1e CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by se1ving a true and conect copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n/s/ Edward L. White Ill Signa hire\nOl/19/2016 sec\n\nNovember 1. 2017 Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-3\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 1 of 2\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_-_L_\n\nCaption: _In_te_r_n_a_ti_o_na_l_R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t._P_r_o_je_c_t_, e_t_a_l_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__J._T_r_u_m_p_,_e_t_a_l\n\n17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_A_m_e_r_ic_a_n_C_e_n_t_e_r _fo_r_L_a_w__an_d__J_u_st_ic_e___________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______a_m_i_cu_s__c_ur_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-3\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 2 of 2\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_E__d_w_a_r_d__L_. _W__h_it_e_I_I_I ________________ Counsel for: _A_m__e_ri_c_a_n__C_e_n_t_e_r_f_o_r_L_a_w__a_n__d_J_u_s_t_ic_e__\n\nDate: ___N_o_v_e_m_b_e_r_1_,_2_0_1_7___\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n************************** I certify that on __N_o_v_e_m_b_e_r_1_,_2_0_1_7__ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/s_/_E__d_w_a_r_d__L_._W__h_it_e__II_I___________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n____N_o__v_e_m_b_e__r _1_,_2_0_1_7_____ (date)\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 1 of 38\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L); 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nIn the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\n\nInternational Refugee Assistance Project, a Project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; HIAS, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; John Does #1 & 3; Jane Doe #2; Middle East Studies Ass’n of North America, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Members; Muhammed Meteab; Paul Harrison; Ibrahim Ahmed Mohomed; Arab American Ass’n of New York, on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees, and Allan Hakky; Samaneh Takaloo, v. Plaintiffs, Donald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; U.S. Dep’t of State; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Elaine C. Duke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; Rex Tillerson, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State; Daniel R. Coats, in His Official Capacity as Director of National Intelligence,\nDefendants-Appellants (cont’d)\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\n\nBRIEF FOR THE STATES OF TEXAS, ALABAMA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, FLORIDA, KANSAS, LOUISIANA, MISSOURI,\nOHIO, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND WEST VIRGINIA AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF\nDEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS\n\nKen Paxton Attorney General of Texas\n\nScott A. Keller Solicitor General\n\nJeffrey C. Mateer First Assistant Attorney General\n\nJ. Campbell Barker Deputy Solicitor General\n\nOffice of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-2697 scott.keller@oag.texas.gov\n\nAri Cuenin Assistant Solicitor General\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 2 of 38\n\nNo. 17-2232 Iranian Alliances Across Borders; Jane Doe #1; Jane Doe #2;\nJane Doe #3; Jane Doe #4; Jane Doe #5; Jane Doe #6, v. Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nDonald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; Elaine C. Duke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of\nHomeland Security; Kevin K. McAleenan, in His Official Capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; James\nMcCament, in His Official Capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; Rex Tillerson;\nJefferson B. Sessions III, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants-Appellants\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\nNo. 17-2233 Eblal Zakzok; Sumaya Hamadmad; Fahed Muqbil; John Doe #1;\nJohn Doe #2; John Doe #3, v. Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nDonald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; U.S. Dep’t of State; Elaine C.\nDuke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; Rex Tillerson, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State,\nDefendants-Appellants (cont’d)\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 3 of 38\n\nNo. 17-2240 International Refugee Assistance Project, a Project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; HIAS, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Clients; John Does #1 & 3; Jane Doe #2; Middle East Studies Ass’n of North America, Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Its Members; Muhammed Meteab; Arab American Ass’n of New York, on\nBehalf of Itself and Its Clients, Plaintiffs-Appellants,\nand Paul Harrison; Ibrahim Ahmed Mohomed; Allan Hakky;\nSamaneh Takaloo, v. Plaintiffs,\nDonald J. Trump, in His Official Capacity as President of the United States; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; Dep’t of State; Office of the\nDirector of National Intelligence, Elaine C. Duke, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; Rex Tillerson, in\nHis Official Capacity as Secretary of State; Daniel R. Coats, in His Official Capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants-Appellees.\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 4 of 38\n\nTable of Contents\n\nPage(s)\n\nInterest of amici curiae............................................................................................. 1\nSummary of the argument........................................................................................ 2\nArgument ................................................................................................................. 5\nI. Plaintiffs cannot overcome the exacting standard that applies to discriminatory-purpose challenges to facially neutral government actions. ....................................................................................................... 5\nA. An exacting standard insulates government action from being deemed a discriminatory pretext absent clear proof overcoming the presumptions of constitutionality and good faith. ..................................................................................................... 6\nB. There is nothing close to clear proof that the Proclamation here, which classifies aliens by nationality and reflects national-security concerns, is a pretext for a religious test. .................. 9\nII. The Proclamation complies with the INA, so it also receives “the strongest of presumptions” of validity because it is within Youngstown’s first category as executive action pursuant to power delegated expressly by Congress................................................................11\nIII. The constitutional provisions invoked by plaintiffs do not extend extraterritorially, nonresident aliens abroad possess no constitutional rights regarding entry into this country, and the Proclamation provides all process that could possibly be due....................19\nConclusion ............................................................................................................. 26\nCertificate of service .............................................................................................. 28\nCertificate of compliance ....................................................................................... 29\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 5 of 38\n\nTable of Authorities\n\nPage(s)\n\nCases\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ..........................................................................16\nAm. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) ............................................................................................ 22\nArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)........................................................................................ 1, 17\nAzizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1990)............................................................................. 22\nBoumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) .................................................................................6, 10, 20\nCity of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) ............................................................................................. 7\nCrosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) ...........................................................................................17\nDames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) .......................................................................................11, 17\nDe Avilia v. Civiletti, 643 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) .............................................................................. 22\nDemore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) .......................................................................................... 23\nFlemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)............................................................................................. 8\nFletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810) .......................................................................................... 7, 8\nHaitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987)......................................................................13, 20\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) .......................................................................................... 10\nHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)............................................................................................... 14\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 6 of 38\n\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)...............................................................15\nJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) ........................................................................................... 20\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) ..................................................................................18, 25\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)..................................................................................... passim\nKnoetze v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 634 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1981).............................................................................. 23\nLamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991)............................................................................... 21\nLandon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)..................................................................................19, 23, 24\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997).......................................................................... 22\nLouhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2017) .................................................................. 22\nMathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. (1976) ............................................................................................. 10-11\nMcCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) ............................................................................................. 7\nMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) ........................................................................................ 2, 8\nMiller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) ............................................................................................. 6\nPers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)........................................................................................ 8, 11\nReno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) .............................................................................6, 10, 13, 14\nRepublican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) ........................................................................................... 11\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 7 of 38\n\nSale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) ............................................................................. 3, 13, 15, 19\nShaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)........................................................................................... 12\nSmith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) .............................................................................................. 8\nSunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350 (1918) ............................................................................................. 6\nSwarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (per curiam) ...................................................................... 22\nTenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).............................................................................................. 8\nTexas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015)...............................................................................17\nTrump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam) ................................................................ 4, 7\nU.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) ......................................................................................... 5, 6\nUnited States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926)................................................................................................. 6\nUnited States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) .......................................................................................... 20\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ........................................................................................... 18\nVill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)......................................................................................... 7, 8\nWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) ............................................................................................ 8\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).......................................22, 23, 24, 25 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 7, 11\nYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ........................................................................................... 20\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 8 of 38\n\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ............................................................................. 3, 11, 12, 17\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)........................................................................................... 20\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) ................................................................................... 17-18\nConstitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules\nU.S. Const. amend. I.....................................................................................3, 20, 21\nU.S. Const. amend. V ...................................................................................... passim\nImmigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq................................ passim § 1101(a)(4)........................................................................................................15 § 1101(a)(13)(A).................................................................................................15 § 1101(a)(15)-(16) .............................................................................................. 14 § 1101(a)(42) ..................................................................................................... 24 § 1151(a)-(b) ...................................................................................................... 14 § 1152(a)(1)(A)............................................................................................. 14, 15 § 1157(a)............................................................................................................ 24 § 1157(a)(3) ....................................................................................................... 21 § 1157 note ........................................................................................................ 21 § 1158 ................................................................................................................ 24 § 1158(a)............................................................................................................ 24 § 1158(a)(1) ....................................................................................................... 24 § 1158(c)(1) ....................................................................................................... 24 § 1181 .................................................................................................................15 § 1181(a)............................................................................................................ 14 § 1181(c)............................................................................................................ 24 § 1182(a) ...................................................................................................... 15, 16 § 1182(f) ...................................................................................................... passim § 1184.................................................................................................................15 § 1185(a)(1) ....................................................................................................... 12 § 1187(a)(12) ....................................................................................................... 9 § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)(III) ....................................................................................... 9 § 1201(h)............................................................................................................15 § 1201(h)-(i) ...................................................................................................... 23 § 1201(i) ............................................................................................ 12, 13, 15, 24 § 1231 note ........................................................................................................ 25\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 9 of 38\n\n50 U.S.C. § 1541 note............................................................................................. 10\n22 C.F.R. § 41.122..............................................................................................................15 § 42.82 ...............................................................................................................15\nAuthorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)........................................................... 10\nDepartment of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. K, 129 Stat. 2705 (2015) ............................................ 21\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 .................................................................. 24\nMiscellaneous\nExecutive Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) ....................................................................... 23\nPresidential Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (Oct. 10, 1985) ...................................................................16\nPresidential Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (Aug. 26, 1986) ..................................................................15\nPresidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ........................................................... passim\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 10 of 38\n\nInterest of Amici Curiae\nAmici curiae are the States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and West Virginia.1 The States have a significant interest in protecting their residents’ safety. But the States and their elected officials must generally rely on the federal Executive Branch to restrict or set the terms of aliens’ entry into the States for public-safety and nationalsecurity reasons, pursuant to the laws of Congress. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409-10 (2012). And the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) gives the Executive significant authority to suspend aliens’ entry into the country. Amici therefore have a substantial interest in the alleged existence of restrictions on the President’s ability to suspend the entry of aliens as he determines is in the national interest.\n\n1 The amici States file this brief as of right under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(2).\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 11 of 38\n\nSummary of the Argument\nThe court below issued yet another remarkable injunction of the President’s Proclamation suspending the entry of specified classes of nonresident aliens. The injunction denies the federal government—under a statutory regime crafted by the people’s representatives in Congress—the latitude necessary to make national-security, foreign-affairs, and immigration-policy judgments inherent in this country’s nature as a sovereign. The injunction is contrary to law because it issued despite multiple longstanding doctrines limiting the availability of judicial remedies for disagreement with policy decisions like the Proclamation here.\nFirst, the injunction cannot be justified by a discriminatory-purpose challenge to the Proclamation based on purported religious animus. The Supreme Court accords facially neutral government actions a presumption of validity and good faith, so those actions can be invalidated under a discriminatory-purpose analysis only if there is clear proof of pretext to overcome these presumptions. This longstanding, exacting standard for judicial scrutiny of government motives has been recognized in multiple types of constitutional challenges. See infra Part I.A. This limit respects institutional roles by precluding “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). And no grounds here satisfy the exacting standards for showing that the Proclamation is pretext masking a religious classification. The Proclamation classifies aliens according to nationality based on concerns about the government’s ability to adequately vet and manage nationals of eight covered countries. That result is the culmination of months of review and input from\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 12 of 38\n\nnumerous federal officials. Not only that, but several countries covered by the Proclamation were previously identified by Congress and the Obama Administration, under the visa-waiver program, as national-security “countries of concern.” The Proclamation is therefore valid, as it provides a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for exercising the President’s 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) national-security and foreign-affairs powers to restrict entry. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).\nSecond, the President had statutory authority to issue the Proclamation. The Proclamation comports with Congress’s scheme granting the President sweeping power, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), to restrict alien entry into the United States. Thus, in addition to the presumptions of constitutionality and good faith, the Proclamation must also be further accorded “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,” because it is in Youngstown’s first zone of executive action pursuant to congressionally delegated power. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).\nThird, the injunction cannot be justified under a procedural-due-process theory turning on whether a nonresident alien abroad has a sufficient connection to the United States. The Constitution does not apply extraterritorially to nonresident aliens abroad seeking entry. So neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Establishment Clause extend to the aliens covered by the Proclamation. Indeed, this Court has specifically recognized that there is no “judicial remedy” to override the Executive’s use of its delegated 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) power to deny classes of nonresident aliens entry into this country. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993).\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 13 of 38\n\nBut even assuming the Constitution applies to nonresident aliens abroad seeking entry, the Proclamation fully complies with any possible due-process requirements. The Proclamation publicly sets forth facially valid, bona fide national-security grounds for restricting entry to classes of nonresident aliens abroad. At a minimum, constitutional rights do not extend extraterritorially to “foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States at all.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (per curiam) (IRAP).\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 14 of 38\n\nArgument I. Plaintiffs Cannot Overcome the Exacting Standard that Applies to\nDiscriminatory-Purpose Challenges to Facially Neutral Government Actions.\nAs the Supreme Court has recognized for years and in many different contexts, a discriminatory-purpose challenge to facially neutral government action faces an exacting standard. The central principle in this well-established body of case law is that a facially neutral government action can be invalidated as pretext only upon a clear showing. See infra pp. 7-8. This high standard for overriding government action by discerning a discriminatory purpose respects the “heavy presumption of constitutionality to which a carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government is entitled.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThat heavy presumption cannot be overcome by plaintiffs’ arguments here, especially given the Proclamation’s detailed national-security findings, the resonance of those findings in determinations of numerous federal officials, and the judicial deference owed to executive decisions in this context. See Presidential Proclamation No. 9645 § 1(c)-(j), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,162-65 (Sept. 24, 2017). Arguments deeming the Proclamation pretext for a religious test discount those weighty considerations, and undermine the sound reasons for the exacting standard required to invalidate facially neutral government action based on an alleged discriminatory purpose.\n\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 15 of 38\n\nA. An exacting standard insulates government action from being deemed a discriminatory pretext absent clear proof overcoming the presumptions of constitutionality and good faith.\nA discriminatory-purpose challenge to facially neutral government action faces an exacting standard under Supreme Court precedent: it requires clear proof of pretext.\n1. This exacting standard for discriminatory-purpose challenges is just one application of the Supreme Court’s general recognition that government action is presumed valid, e.g., Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918); that government actors are presumed to act in good faith, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); and that a “presumption of regularity” attaches to official government action, United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). These doctrines create a “heavy presumption of constitutionality.” Triplett, 494 U.S. at 721.\nAnd this presumption of constitutionality applies with particular force to the foreign-affairs and national-security determinations at issue here. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999) (AADC). After all, “[u]nlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of th[e Supreme] Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008). Indeed, “the Government’s interest in enforcing” the Proclamation’s travel restrictions “and the Executive’s authority to do so” extend from the government’s “interest in preserving national security[, which] is an urgent objective of the highest order,” particularly “when there is no\n\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 16 of 38\n\ntie between the foreign national and the United States.” IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (quotation marks omitted).\n2. Consequently, the Supreme Court “has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, [6 Cranch 87, 130-31 (1810),] that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977); see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court has therefore permitted a discriminatory-purpose analysis of government action in only a “very limited and well-defined class of cases.” City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377 n.6 (1991).\nEven when it has permitted a discriminatory-purpose analysis of government action, this Court has concomitantly stated that any such analysis proceeds under an exacting standard. As Chief Justice Marshall explained for the Supreme Court over two centuries ago in Fletcher, government action can be declared unconstitutional only upon a “clear and strong” showing. 6 Cranch at 128.\nThe Supreme Court has thus repeatedly explained, in various contexts, that courts can override facially neutral government actions as pretext only upon clear proof. For example:\n When there are “legitimate reasons” for government action, courts “will not infer a discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 29899 (1987) (rejecting equal-protection claim).\n\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 17 of 38\n\n A law’s impact does not permit “the inference that the statute is but a pretext” when the classification drawn by a law “has always been neutral” as to a protected status, and the law is “not a law that can plausibly be explained only as a [suspect class]-based classification.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 275 (1979) (rejecting equal-protection claim); see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269-71; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976).\n Only the “clearest proof” will suffice to override the stated intent of government action, to which courts “defer.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (rejecting ex-post-facto claim); see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (citing Fletcher, 6 Cranch at 128).\n “[Unless] an understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts,” judicial inquiry into purpose may make little “practical sense.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 862.\nThis exacting standard for a discriminatory-purpose challenge to facially neutral\ngovernment action exists for good reason. It ensures that a purpose inquiry will re-\nmain judicial in nature, safeguarding against a devolution into policy-based reasoning\nthat elevates views about a perceived lack of policy merit into findings of illicit pur-\npose. Even when an official adopts a different policy after criticism of an earlier pro-\nposal, critics can be quick to perceive an illicit purpose when they disagree with the\nfinal policy issued. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (“In times of\npolitical passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed . . . and as\nreadily believed.”). The clearest-proof standard helps keep the Judiciary above that\npolitical fray.\n\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 18 of 38\n\nB. There is nothing close to clear proof that the Proclamation here, which classifies aliens by nationality and reflects nationalsecurity concerns, is a pretext for a religious test.\nThe Proclamation’s travel restrictions classify aliens by nationality—not religion. The Proclamation’s suspension of entry by certain nationals from eight countries neither mentions any religion nor depends on whether affected aliens are Muslim. See Proclamation No. 9645 §§ 2, 3.\nThe Proclamation therefore is emphatically not a “Muslim ban.” The Proclamation includes two non-majority-Muslim countries (North Korea and Venezuela), and excludes two majority-Muslim countries (Iraq and Sudan) that were covered by the President’s previous entry suspensions. Data from the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project indicates that the countries covered by the Proclamation contain fewer than 9% of the world’s Muslims. Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia are identified as “Countries of Identified Concern,” from which entry is suspended or limited as “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Proclamation pmbl., § 2. Six of these countries were already included in the list of seven countries under 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) was created by Congress and the Obama Administration, in administering the visa-waiver program, upon finding each to be a national-security “country or area of concern.” 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)(III).\nThe manifestly legitimate rationale for suspending entry for certain nationals (see Proclamation §§ 1-2) includes “each country’s capacity, ability, and willingness to cooperate with [U.S.] identity-management and information-sharing policies and\n\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 19 of 38\n\neach country’s risk factors,” and “foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.” Proclamation § 1(h)(i). The proclamation reflects the “country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and that would, at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id.\nMoreover, before the current Administration took office, numerous federal officials—including the FBI Director, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division—expressed concerns about the country’s current ability to vet alien entry. According to the House Homeland Security Committee, ISIS and other terrorists “are determined” to abuse refugee programs, and “groups like ISIS may seek to exploit the current refugee flows.” The national-security interests implicated by the ongoing War on Terror against radical Islamic terrorists have been recognized since the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).\nGiven this national-security grounding, a challenge to the Proclamation as a pretext for religious discrimination must fail. Ample reason exists for courts to leave undisturbed the delicate policy judgments inherent in the Proclamation. These decisions account for sensitive border-security factors indicating a heightened nationalsecurity risk that courts are not well situated to evaluate. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797; AADC, 525 U.S. at 491. When it comes to deciding the best way to use a sovereign’s power over its borders to manage risk, courts have long recognized that the political branches are uniquely well situated. E.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89, 591 (1952).\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 20 of 38\n\nComments the President made during his campaign for office cannot overcome the combination of (1) the Proclamation’s detailed explanation of its national-security basis, (2) the legitimate basis for that reasoning in conclusions of numerous federal officials, see supra p. 10, and (3) the exacting standard for deeming facially neutral government action pretext for a discriminatory purpose, see supra Part I.A. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the limited significance of campaign statements made before candidates assume the responsibilities of office. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002); see also Washington, 858 F.3d at 1172-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). And comments made by nongovernment officials are irrelevant for determining whether the Executive Branch took action as a pretext for a prohibited, discriminatory purpose. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.\nII. The Proclamation Complies with the INA, so It Also Receives “the Strongest of Presumptions” of Validity Because It Is Within Youngstown’s First Category as Executive Action Pursuant to Power Delegated Expressly by Congress.\nThe Proclamation also complies with Congress’s statutory delegation of Executive power, so no purported INA violation would justify the injunction. In fact, the President’s action here is accorded “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981). That is because the Proclamation is within Youngstown’s first zone of executive action: Congress expressly delegated to the President the authority he exercised here. The burden of\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 21 of 38\n\npersuasion for plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges will therefore “rest heavily upon” plaintiffs, as the parties challenging the President’s Youngstown-zone-one action. Id.\nA. The Proclamation suspends the entry into the United States of several classes of aliens comprising certain nationals of eight listed countries, subject to certain exceptions. Proclamation §§ 2, 3, 6. This Proclamation exercises authority that Congress expressly delegated.\n1. “Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). Congress too has recognized this sovereign power to exclude aliens, giving the President broad discretion to suspend the entry of any class of aliens:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (emphases added). It is unlawful for an alien to enter the country in violation of “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” Id. § 1185(a)(1). In addition to the President’s broad § 1182(f) power to suspend the entry of aliens, Congress also provided that the Executive “may at any time, in [its] discretion,” revoke a visa. Id. § 1201(i). Such a discretionary visa revocation is judicially\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 22 of 38\n\nunreviewable except in one narrow circumstance: in a removal proceeding (as opposed to an entry denial), if the “revocation provides the sole ground for removal.” Id.\n2. Any challenge to congressional authorization for the Proclamation’s nationality-based suspension of entry under § 1182(f) founders on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88. Sale held—in terms equally applicable here— that no “judicial remedy” exists to override the Executive’s use of its § 1182(f) power to deny entry to specified classes of nonresident aliens. Id. at 188 (quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).\nSale is fatal to any claim that the Proclamation here is unauthorized by the INA. Sale held it “perfectly clear that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) . . . grants the President ample power to establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.” Id. at 187. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that a later-enacted statutory provision limits the President’s power under § 1182(f) to suspend aliens’ entry into the United States, reasoning that it “would have been extraordinary for Congress to make such an important change in the law without any mention of that possible effect.” Id. at 176.\nLikewise here. The Proclamation cannot be enjoined on the basis that there is no sufficient finding that the entry of the excluded classes would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The President need not even disclose his “reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat,” AADC, 525 U.S. at 491, let alone to a court’s satisfaction. Even when the President does disclose his\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 23 of 38\n\nreasons for deeming certain nationals to present a national-security risk, courts are “ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.” Id.\nIn all events, the Proclamation provides extensive findings supporting the need for a suspension of entry for several failed states, governments that are state sponsors of terrorism, or governments otherwise unwilling or unable to respond to adequate vetting or other terrorism-related concerns. Proclamation §§ 1(g)-(j), 2(a)-(h). “[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences” regarding determinations such as these, “the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked, and respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010).\n3. Nor is Congress’s broad delegation of authority to suspend the entry of classes of aliens undermined by 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which makes no mention of § 1182(f). Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not address the entry of aliens into the country at all. Instead, it is part of a set of restrictions on the issuance of immigrant visas— that is, permission for aliens to seek admission for permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)-(16), 1151(a)-(b), 1181(a). Added in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished an earlier nationality-based quota system for allocating immigrant visas, § 1152(a)(1)(A) provides:\nExcept as specifically provided [elsewhere in the INA], no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.\n\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 24 of 38\n\nSection 1152(a)(1)(A) does not conflict with § 1182(f) or impliedly restrict nationality-based denials of entry under § 1182(f). See Sale, 509 U.S. at 176. An alien’s entry into this country is a different and much more consequential event than the preliminary step of receiving a visa, which merely entitles the alien to apply for admission into the country. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(4), 1181, 1182(a), 1184. Visa possession does not control or guarantee entry; the INA provides several ways in which visa-holding aliens can be denied entry. E.g., id. §§ 1101(a)(13)(A), 1182(a), (f), 1201(h), (i); 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.122, 42.82. One of them is the President’s express authority under § 1182(f) to suspend the entry of classes of aliens.\nThis design of the INA has been repeatedly recognized in past practice. For example, over 30 years ago, the President suspended the entry of Cuban nationals as immigrants, subject to certain exceptions. Presidential Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (Aug. 26, 1986); see also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 648 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citing additional examples), vacated as moot, __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017). Plaintiffs point to no instance in which the government has read § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s visa-allocation provisions as prohibiting nationality-based suspensions of entry under § 1182(f). See, e.g., U.S.Br.35-38.\nFinally, § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to immigrant visas, and does not cover other prospective entrants, such as those seeking nonimmigrant visas. So, even on plaintiffs’ view, this section cannot possibly establish that § 2 of the Proclamation is statutorily unauthorized as applied to aliens seeking entry as nonimmigrants.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 25 of 38\n\n4. The President’s § 1182(f) authority to suspend aliens’ entry is not limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), which also makes no mention of § 1182(f). In § 1182(a), Congress enumerated no fewer than seventy grounds that make an alien automatically inadmissible to this country, unless an exception applies. Congress did not provide that these are the only grounds on which the Executive can deny aliens entry. Instead, Congress in § 1182(f) separately enabled the President to impose additional entry restrictions.\nAs the D.C. Circuit correctly recognized in Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), § 1182(f) permits the Executive to deny aliens entry even if the aliens are not within one of the enumerated § 1182(a) categories that automatically make aliens inadmissible: “The President’s sweeping proclamation power [in § 1182(f)] thus provides a safeguard against the danger posed by any particular case or class of cases that is not covered by one of the categories in section 1182(a).” Id. at 1049 n.2. The Abourezk court even noted an example of this understanding in a nationality-based § 1182(f) proclamation issued by President Reagan, which suspended entry for “officers or employees of the Cuban government or the Cuban Communist Party.” Id. (citing Presidential Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (Oct. 10, 1985)).2\n2 Nor are the Proclamation’s travel restrictions contrary to other INA provisions that plaintiffs cite. For example, the visa waiver program does not contradict the Proclamation (P.I.Mot.15 (Dkt.No.205)) because it merely sets minimum standards for visaless entry of aliens. U.S.Resp.29-30 (Dkt.No.212). The Proclamation’s restrictions similarly do not contradict Congress’s visa-processing scheme for similar reasons. Id.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 26 of 38\n\nB. Because the Proclamation is an exercise of power delegated by Congress in the INA, it is executive action in the first Youngstown zone. The Proclamation is therefore also “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674. Overcoming this strongest presumption for any claim challenging the Proclamation is a burden that rests “heavily” on plaintiffs. Id.\nPlaintiffs’ significant burden is well-founded here, not only because of the explicit congressional grant of authority to deny entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), but also because of the INA’s complementary approach to allowing entry. Specifically, Congress enacted “extensive and complex” provisions detailing how over forty different classes of nonimmigrants, refugees, and other aliens can attain lawful presence in the country. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395; see Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 179 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). But while Congress imposed these detailed criteria to significantly restrict the Executive’s ability to unilaterally allow aliens to be lawfully present in the country, Congress simultaneously provided the Executive broad authority to exclude aliens from the country, under § 1182(f).\nThe President’s authority in this context therefore “includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000), and Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 27 of 38\n\n84 (2015). The injunction here is thus remarkable for interfering with a decision authorized by two branches of government in a particularly sensitive area. The admission of aliens into this country is a federal prerogative “inherent in sovereignty” that must “be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government.” Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765 (quotation marks omitted); accord United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).\nPlaintiffs’ claim that the Proclamation is pretext for a religious classification thus fails for this additional reason that the Proclamation is within Youngstown’s first zone. And the Proclamation is already accorded the heavy presumption that facially neutral government action is valid and taken in good faith. See supra Part I.A.\nEspecially with those presumptions in mind, the Executive provided a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for exercising 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) national-security and foreign-affairs powers to restrict entry. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770; see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140-41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (federal government official informing alien of visa denial based expressly on statutory provision is a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason under Mandel). Courts therefore must “neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against” plaintiffs’ asserted constitutional rights. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 28 of 38\n\nIII. The Constitutional Provisions Invoked by Plaintiffs Do Not Extend Extraterritorially, Nonresident Aliens Abroad Possess No Constitutional Rights Regarding Entry into this Country, and the Proclamation Provides All Process that Could Possibly Be Due.\nFinally, the Proclamation cannot be enjoined on a procedural-due-process theory. Any such theory, turning on whether a nonresident alien abroad has a sufficient connection to the United States, cannot prevail. That is because the constitutional provisions on which plaintiffs rely do not apply extraterritorially. And even if they do, the Proclamation provides all process that is possibly due by giving facially neutral, bona fide national-security grounds for its restrictions.\nA. The constitutional claims here are fundamentally untenable because the constitutional provisions that plaintiffs invoke are inapplicable to the nonresident aliens abroad covered by the Proclamation.\n1. Nonresident aliens outside territory under clear United States control possess no constitutional rights regarding the terms on which they may enter the country: It is “clear” that “an unadmitted and nonresident alien” “ha[s] no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.” Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762. The “power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative,” and aliens seeking admission to the United States request a “privilege.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).\nConsequently, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides no “judicial remedy” to override the President’s 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) power to deny classes of nonresident aliens entry. Sale, 509 U.S. at 188; see id. (“agree[ing] with the conclu-\n\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 29 of 38\n\nsion expressed in Judge Edwards’ concurring opinion” regarding statutory and constitutional challenges in Gracey, 809 F.2d at 841: “‘there is no solution to be found in a judicial remedy’” overriding the Executive’s exercise of § 1182(f) authority (emphasis added)).\nThe Supreme Court has long “rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)). Rather, the Due Process Clause applies only “within the territorial jurisdiction.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).\nThe Constitution does not regulate immigration policy regarding foreign nationals who are neither resident nor present in United States territory. The Court has therefore recognized a key distinction between aliens inside versus outside the United States, according the former certain constitutional rights while not extending those rights to the latter. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754 (involving (1) lengthy detention, rather than entry denial, at (2) Guantanamo Bay, where the United States had “plenary control, or practical sovereignty”).\n2. Plaintiffs’ challenges fare no better if framed as claims that the Proclamation violates rights against religious discrimination under the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and under the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs’ theory is the same as to both Clauses—that the Proclamation is a\n\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 30 of 38\n\npretext for discrimination on account of religion. But that theory fails because nonresident aliens seeking to enter the country lack constitutional rights regarding entry in the first place. See supra p. 19.\nWhat is more, Congress has repeatedly designated members of certain religious groups—such as Soviet Jews, Evangelical Christians, and members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—as presenting “special humanitarian concern to the United States” for immigration purposes. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) & note; see Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. K, § 7034(k)(8)(A), 129 Stat. 2705, 2765 (2015) (reauthorizing this designation). That accepted practice underscores the inapplicability in this context of the religious-nondiscrimination rights invoked by plaintiffs.\nPlaintiffs cannot make an end-run around the territorial limits on constitutional rights by relying on the alleged stigmatizing effect on individuals within the United States of a challenged decision about whether nonresident aliens outside this country are admitted. To hold otherwise would allow bootstrapping a constitutional claim based on government action regulating only aliens beyond constitutional protection. Amici are aware of no instance, outside the present context, in which a U.S. citizen or alien resident in this country prevailed on an Establishment Clause claim based on the stigma allegedly perceived by how the government treated other persons who possessed no constitutional rights regarding entry. Cf. Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 827, 843 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing an Establishment Clause claim to proceed based on the unique taxpayer-standing doctrine in a challenge to the expenditure of government funds in foreign countries).\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 31 of 38\n\nB. Even if the constitutional provisions at issue could somehow apply extraterritorially, there is still no constitutional violation from the Proclamation’s limits on the entry of nonresident aliens abroad. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim would thus fail for this reason as well.\n1. There can be no Fifth Amendment violation if one is not deprived of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property. E.g., Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). And nonresident aliens abroad have no constitutionally protected interest in entering the United States. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762. Even apart from the issue of entry into the United States, “[t]here is no constitutionally protected interest in either obtaining or continuing to possess a visa.” Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2017). Similarly, multiple courts of appeals have rejected due-process claims regarding visa issuance or processing. See, e.g., Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1990); De Avilia v. Civiletti, 643 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1981). Thus, plaintiffs lack support for the notion that aliens have due-process claims to advance.\n2. In Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), a panel of the Ninth Circuit posited that several categories of aliens, other than lawful permanent residents, may have “potential” claims to constitutional protections regarding travel and entry. Id. at 1166. That suggestion was incorrect because the four categories of aliens cited by the Ninth Circuit lack valid constitutional claims.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 32 of 38\n\nFirst, there are no constitutional rights regarding prospective entry for aliens who are in the United States “unlawfully.” Id. The INA provides that visas issued to aliens seeking admission to the country confer no entitlement to be admitted, and that visas can be revoked at any time in the Executive’s discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h)-(i). Even as to an alien who was admitted into the country under a visa, “revocation of an entry visa issued to an alien already within our country has no effect upon the alien’s liberty or property interests,” and thus cannot support a dueprocess challenge. Knoetze v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 634 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1981).\nIf removal proceedings—which involve the distinct situation of potential detention and forcible removal—were instituted against an alien who is in this country and whose visa was revoked, that alien would have certain due-process protections under the Fifth Amendment. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (noting that it is “well established” that aliens have due-process rights in deportation hearings). But the Supreme Court has never held that the Fifth Amendment is violated when restrictions are placed on nonresident aliens abroad seeking to enter the country. Cf. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.\nSecond, this Proclamation does not cover any nonresident alien visa holders who travelled internationally and are attempting to reenter the country. The Proclamation applies only to aliens who were outside the United States on the effective date of the Proclamation, who did not have a valid visa on the effective date of the Proclamation, and who did not have a visa that was canceled or revoked under Executive Order 13,769 of January 27, 2017. Proclamation §§ 3(a), 6(d). Regardless, Landon does not establish that “non-immigrant visaholders” have due-process rights when\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 33 of 38\n\nseeking to return from abroad. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166 (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 33-34). Landon involved a resident alien, and suggested that any process due must account for the circumstances of an alien’s ties to this country. See 459 U.S. at 32-34. Those ties are significantly less in the case of a nonresident alien who was temporarily admitted on a nonimmigrant visa. In any event, Landon was decided before Congress changed the nature of an alien’s interest in visa possession by amending the INA, in 2004, to provide that “[t]here shall be no means of judicial review . . . of a revocation” of a visa, “except in the context of a removal proceeding if such revocation pro-vides the sole ground for removal under” the INA. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5304(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3736 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i)).\nThird, there are no viable due-process claims for aliens abroad seeking refugee status. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166. That argument morphs statutory protections for those seeking asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158, into constitutional protections for refugees. Asylum and refugee admission are not the same thing. The INA’s asylum protection can be sought by individuals who are already “physically present in the United States or who arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). Only an alien outside the United States may apply to be admitted as a refugee. See id. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157(a), 1158(a), (c)(1), 1181(c). Hence, § 1182(f) independently permits the Executive to deny refugee applicants entry into the United States. Similarly, statutory provisions under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) provide that certain aliens may not be returned to a country in which they fear torture, “regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.”\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 34 of 38\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1231 note. The CAT provisions, however, merely limit the possible countries to which an alien can be returned and say nothing about overriding the President’s statutory authority to restrict alien entry into the United States. See id. § 1182(f).\nFourth, plaintiffs lack viable due-process arguments based on visa applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident or institution. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166 (citing Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762–65. Din did not hold that such due-process rights exist. To the contrary, the narrowest opinion concurring in the judgment in Din expressly did not decide whether a U.S. citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of her alien spouse, such that she was entitled to notice of the reason for the application’s denial. See 135 S. Ct. at 2139-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In fact, the concurrence reasoned that, even if due process applied in this context, the only process possibly required was that the Executive give a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying a visa to an alien abroad. Id. at 2141.\nAnd the Din concurrence’s standard is plainly met here by the Proclamation’s lengthy recitation of national-security reasons. See Proclamation §§ 1-2. The Proclamation therefore already provides whatever process may be due, as it publicly announces the “facially legitimate and bona fide” invocation of the President’s 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) national-security and foreign-affairs powers to restrict entry. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 35 of 38\n\nConclusion\nThe Court should reverse the district court’s order enjoining the Proclamation.\n\nSteve Marshall Attorney General of Alabama\nMark Brnovich Attorney General of Arizona\nLeslie Rutledge Attorney General of Arkansas\nPamela Jo Bondi Attorney General of Florida\nDerek Schmidt Attorney General of Kansas\nJeff Landry Attorney General of Louisiana\nJoshua D. Hawley Attorney General of Missouri\nMichael DeWine Attorney General of Ohio\n\nRespectfully submitted.\nKen Paxton Attorney General of Texas\nJeffrey C. Mateer First Assistant Attorney General\ns/ Scott A. Keller Scott A. Keller Solicitor General\nJ. Campbell Barker Deputy Solicitor General\nAri Cuenin Assistant Solicitor General\nOffice of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-2697 scott.keller@oag.texas.gov\n\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 36 of 38\n\nMike Hunter Attorney General of Oklahoma\nAlan Wilson Attorney General of South Carolina\nPatrick Morrisey Attorney General of West Virginia\n\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 37 of 38\n\nCertificate of Service\nI hereby certify that on November 3, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\ns/ Scott A. Keller Scott A. Keller\n\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-1\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 38 of 38\n\nCertificate of Compliance\nThis brief complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it is prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface in Microsoft Word using 14-point Equity typeface and with the type-volume limitation because it contains under 6,500 words.\ns/ Scott A. Keller Scott A. Keller\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 64-2\n\nFiled: 11/03/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Effective 12/01/2016\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_____ Caption: _In__'t_R_e__fu_g_e_e__A_s_s_i_s_ta__n_c_e_P__ro_j_._e_t_a_l_._v_._T_r_u_m__p_e_t__a_l.______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT Type-Volume Limit, Typeface Requirements, and Type-Style Requirements\n\nType-Volume Limit for Briefs: Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellee’s Response Brief, and Appellant’s Response/Reply Brief may not exceed 13,000 words or 1,300 lines. Appellee’s Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 15,300 words or 1,500 lines. A Reply or Amicus Brief may not exceed 6,500 words or 650 lines. Amicus Brief in support of an Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 7,650 words. Amicus Brief filed during consideration of petition for rehearing may not exceed 2,600 words. Counsel may rely on the word or line count of the word processing program used to prepare the document. The word-processing program must be set to include headings, footnotes, and quotes in the count. Line count is used only with monospaced type. See Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(e), 29(a)(5), 32(a)(7)(B) & 32(f).\n\nType-Volume Limit for Other Documents if Produced Using a Computer: Petition for permission to appeal and a motion or response thereto may not exceed 5,200 words. Reply to a motion may not exceed 2,600 words. Petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or other extraordinary writ may not exceed 7,800 words. Petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc may not exceed 3,900 words. Fed. R. App. P. 5(c)(1), 21(d), 27(d)(2), 35(b)(2) & 40(b)(1).\n\nTypeface and Type Style Requirements: A proportionally spaced typeface (such as Times New Roman) must include serifs and must be 14-point or larger. A monospaced typeface (such as Courier New) must be 12-point or larger (at least 10½ characters per inch). Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5), 32(a)(6).\n\nThis brief or other document complies with type-volume limits because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. R. 32(f) (cover page, disclosure statement, table of contents, table of citations, statement regarding oral argument, signature block, certificates of counsel, addendum, attachments):\n[✔] this brief or other document contains 6203 [state number of] words\n\n[ ] this brief uses monospaced type and contains\n\n[state number of] lines\n\nThis brief or other document complies with the typeface and type style requirements because:\n\n[✔] this brief or other document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using\n\nMicrosoft Word\n\n[identify word processing program] in\n\nEquity 14-point\n\n[identify font size and type style]; or\n\n[ ] this brief or other document has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [identify word processing program] in [identify font size and type style].\n\n(s) Scott A. Keller\n\nParty Name State of Texas et al.\n\nDated: Nov. 3, 2017\n\n11/14/2016 SCC\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 1 of 27\n\nNos. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nNO. 17-2231(L) INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 8:17-cv-361-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\n[Caption Continues on Inside Cover]\nBRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE, THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, SUPPORTING DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ON THE MERITS AND URGING REVERSAL. BRIEF FILED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES.\n\nJAY ALAN SEKULOW Counsel of Record\nSTUART J. ROTH COLBY M. MAY ANDREW J. EKONOMOU* JORDAN SEKULOW* CRAIG L. PARSHALL MATTHEW R. CLARK* BENJAMIN P. SISNEY AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 201 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 Tel.: 202-546-8890 Email: sekulow@aclj.org\n* Not admitted to Fourth Circuit Bar\n\nEDWARD L. WHITE III ERIK M. ZIMMERMAN* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Tel.: 734-680-8007 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\nFRANCIS J. MANION GEOFFREY R. SURTEES* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 6375 New Hope Road New Hope, Kentucky 40052 Tel.: 502-549-7020 Email: fmanion@aclj.org Counsel for amicus curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 2 of 27\n\nNO. 17-2232 IRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 8:17-cv-2921-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\nNO. 17-2233 EBLAL ZAKZOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 1:17-cv-2969-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\nNO. 17-2240 INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellants,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nOn Appeal from Entry of Preliminary Injunction United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 8:17-cv-361-TDC, Hon. Theodore D. Chuang\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 3 of 27\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(A) and Circuit Rule 26.1, amicus\n\ncuriae, the American Center for Law and Justice (“ACLJ”), makes the following\n\ndisclosures:\n\n1. The ACLJ is a non-profit organization that has no parent corporation.\n\n2. No publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity owns any\n\nportion of the ACLJ.\n\n3. The ACLJ is unaware of any publicly held corporation or other publicly\n\nheld entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation.\n\n4. This case does not arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding.\n\nDated: November 1, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Telephone: (734) 680-8007 Facsimile: (734) 680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\n\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 4 of 27\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......................................................... i\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29(A)(4)(E) ........................1\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.............................................1\nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................2\nARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3\nI. Supreme Court precedent dictates that the challenged Presidential Proclamation be reviewed under the deferential standards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches, which the Proclamation satisfies................................................................................3\nA. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential.........................................................................................................4\nB. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional under the Supreme Court’s deferential standards applicable to constitutional challenges to the political branches’ immigration-related actions. ...............................................................6\nII. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis. ................................................................................10\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................17\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29 AND 32 .......................18\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................19\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 5 of 27\n\nCASES\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999) .................................................................................15\n\nBd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)....................................................................................... 1, 13\n\nBowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)............................................................................................14\n\nClinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)............................................................................................12\n\nEvans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004)………………………………………………..16\n\nFEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)..............................................................................................1\n\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)..........................................................................................4, 7\n\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)..............................................................................................4\n\nINS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)..........…………………………………………………16\n\nInt'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879 (D. Md. 2017)……………………………10, 15\n\nInt'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................1\n\nKennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)..............................................................................................4\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 6 of 27\n\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)..........................................................................................6\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)..............................................................................................6\nLamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).…………………………………………………….…..1\nLandon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)................................................................................................4\nLemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)............................................................................................11\nLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)............................................................................................14\nMcConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)................................................................................................1\nMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)...................................................................................... 12-15\nMoss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist., 683 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2012) ..............................................................................11\nMueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)………………………………………………………..13\nPleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009)…………………………………………………………1\nRajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................................... 9-10\nRepublican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)............................................................................................12\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 7 of 27\n\nRoark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2009) ..............................................................................15\nShaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)…………………………………………………………4\nUnited States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)..........................................................................................1\nVan Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)..................................................................................... 10, 14\nWallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)..............................................................................................14\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ..............................................................................1\nWashington v. Trump, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................8\nWashington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................13\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)…………………………………………………………5\nZiglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1861 (2017)..........................................................................................6\nZivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)..........................................................................................5\nSTATUTES AND RULES\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)......................................................................................................5\nCircuit Rule 26.1 ........................................................................................................ i\nFed. R. App. P. 29 ............................................................................................ i, 1, 18\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 8 of 27\n\nFed. R. App. P. 32....................................................................................................18\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\nPresidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/24/enhancingvetting-capabilities-and-processes-detecting-attempted-entry ............... 2, passim\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 9 of 27\n\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29(A)(4)(E) Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), the American Center for Law and Justice (“ACLJ”) affirms that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made any monetary contributions intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The ACLJ is an organization dedicated to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by law. Counsel for the ACLJ have presented oral argument, represented parties, and submitted amicus curiae briefs before the Supreme Court of the United States, this Court, and other courts around the country in cases involving the Establishment Clause and immigration law. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). The ACLJ has actively defended, through advocacy and litigation, immigration-related policies that protect American citizens. This brief is supported\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 10 of 27\n\nby members of the ACLJ’s Committee to Defend Our National Security from Terror, which represents more than 276,000 Americans who have stood in support of the President’s efforts to protect this nation from the entry of foreign terrorists. This brief supports the position of the Defendants-Appellants, President Donald J. Trump, et al., on the merits and urges the reversal of the lower court’s decision. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.\nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The federal government’s primary job is to keep this nation safe. The Presidential Proclamation at issue in this case is designed to do just that.1 Under the Constitution and federal statutes, the President has broad power to exclude aliens from this country for national security reasons. Courts generally defer to the exercise of the President’s power in this area, which is what the district court should have done here. The Proclamation is a valid exercise of President Trump’s authority that should not be disturbed. Moreover, the mere suggestion of a possible religious or anti-religious motive, mined primarily from past comments of a political candidate or his supporters uttered on the campaign trial as private citizens, is not enough to defeat\n1 Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2017/09/24/enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processesdetecting-attempted-entry.\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 11 of 27\n\nthe validity of the Proclamation, even under Lemon’s “purpose prong.” The Proclamation clearly serves a genuine secular purpose—protecting our national security—and is not motivated by anti-religious considerations.\nThe decision below should be reversed and the preliminary injunction should be vacated to permit the Proclamation to be implemented in full to protect our nation from foreign terrorists.\nARGUMENT I. The Presidential Proclamation should be reviewed under the deferential\nstandards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches, which the Proclamation satisfies. This case involves the special context of a Presidential Proclamation concerning the entry into the United States of nationals of eight countries, enacted pursuant to the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to protect national security. The governing purpose of the Proclamation is to protect our “citizens from terrorist attacks” and other public-safety threats. Procl. § 1(a). As the Proclamation explains, Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that policy. They enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United States.\nId.\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 12 of 27\n\nAs discussed herein, when the Supreme Court has considered constitutional challenges to immigration-related actions like the Proclamation, it has declined to subject those actions to the same level of scrutiny applied to non-immigrationrelated actions, choosing instead to take a considerably more deferential approach, which is what the district court should have done here. Under the appropriately deferential standard of review, the Proclamation is constitutionally sound.\nA. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential. The Supreme Court has “long recognized the power to expel or exclude\naliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)). Indeed, “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Moreover, the Constitution “is not a suicide pact,” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963), and the President has broad national security powers that may be exercised through immigration restrictions. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952).\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 13 of 27\n\nNot only does the decision below undermine the President’s national\nsecurity authority, it also undercuts the considered judgment of Congress (in\nbolstering the President’s broad discretion) that:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012) (emphasis added).\nWhere, as here, a President’s action is authorized by Congress, “his\nauthority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right\nplus all that Congress can delegate.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084\n(2015) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635\n(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Proclamation falls squarely within the\nPresident’s constitutional and statutory authority and should be upheld in full. As\nthe Supreme Court recently explained:\nNational-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President. Judicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to other branches. . . . For these and other reasons, courts have shown [that] deference to what the Executive Branch has determined . . . is essential to national security. Indeed, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise. Congress has not provided otherwise here.\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 14 of 27\n\nZiglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017) (citation and internal quotation\nmarks omitted).\nB. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional under the Supreme Court’s deferential standards applicable to challenges to the political branches’ immigration-related actions.\nIn Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), the Court rejected a\nFirst Amendment challenge to the Attorney General’s decision to decline to grant a\nwaiver that would have allowed a Belgian scholar to enter the country on a visa in\norder to speak to American professors and students. The Court held that “the\npower to exclude aliens is ‘inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining\nnormal international relations and defending the country against foreign\nencroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively by the political\nbranches of government. . . .’” Id. at 765 (citations omitted). The Court concluded\nby stating that\nplenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable under § 212(a)(28), Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.\nId. at 769–70; see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139–41 (2015) (Kennedy,\nJ., concurring) (the government’s statement that a visa application was denied due\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 15 of 27\n\nto suspected involvement with terrorist activities “satisf[ied] Mandel’s ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ standard”).\nSimilarly, in Fiallo, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to statutory provisions that granted preferred immigration status to most aliens who are the children or parents of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, except for illegitimate children seeking that status by virtue of their biological fathers, and the fathers themselves. 430 U.S. at 788–90, 799–800. The Court stated:\nAt the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens. Id. at 792 (citation omitted). The Court noted that it had previously “resolved similar challenges to immigration legislation based on other constitutional rights of citizens, and has rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny is required.” Id. at 794. Additionally, the Court stated, “We can see no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case.” Id. at 795. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that “it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision,” id. at 799, and concluded that the plaintiffs raised “policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government.” Id. at 798.\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 16 of 27\n\nThe legality of Presidential orders related to immigration does not turn on a judicial guessing game of what the President’s subjective motives were at the time the order was issued. Instead, Mandel, Fiallo, and other cases dictate that courts should rarely look past the face of such orders. On its face, the Proclamation is designed to protect national security, and the analysis of the Proclamation’s legality under the Establishment Clause should end there. See Washington v. Trump, 853 F.3d 933, 939 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc) (the panel’s “unreasoned assumption that courts should simply plop Establishment Clause cases from the domestic context over to the foreign affairs context ignores the realities of our world”).\nThe mere fact that six of the eight countries designated by the Proclamation happen to have Muslim majority populations is not evidence of religious animus. Under such reasoning, the benefits that the government provides to military veterans would be rendered constitutionally suspect by the mere fact that approximately 85% of veterans happen to be male, even though there are many legitimate reasons for providing such benefits unrelated to any gender-based bias.\nNotably, the Proclamation does not single out Muslims (or people of any other faith, or no faith) for disfavored treatment. It is religiously neutral. The countless millions of non-American Muslims who live outside the designated countries are not restricted by the Proclamation. Neither does it limit its application\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 17 of 27\n\nto Muslims in the designated countries; instead, it applies to nationals of the enumerated countries irrespective of their faith. Plaintiffs’ objection to the Proclamation is, at its core, a policy dispute that should be resolved by the political branches, not by the federal courts.\nThe Proclamation is similar in principle to the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”) implemented after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which was upheld by numerous federal courts. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438–39 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing cases). Under this system, the Attorney General imposed special requirements upon foreign nationals present in the United States who were from specified countries. The first group of countries designated by the Attorney General included Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, and a total of twenty-four Muslim majority countries and North Korea were eventually designated. Id. at 433 n.3.\nIn one illustrative NSEERS case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected arguments that are strikingly similar to the arguments accepted by the lower court here:\nThere was a rational national security basis for the Program. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were facilitated by the lax enforcement of immigration laws. The Program was [rationally] designed to monitor more closely aliens from certain countries selected on the basis of national security criteria. . . . To be sure, the Program did select countries that were, with the exception of North Korea, predominantly Muslim. . . . However, one major threat of\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 18 of 27\n\nterrorist attacks comes from radical Islamic groups. The September 11 attacks were facilitated by violations of immigration laws by aliens from predominantly Muslim nations. The Program was clearly tailored to those facts. . . . The program did not target only Muslims: non-Muslims from the designated countries were subject to registration. There is therefore no basis for petitioners’ claim. Id. at 438–49 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Similarly, the Proclamation at issue here is constitutional. It is premised upon sound, reasoned determinations made by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Rather than affording the Proclamation and the Secretary’s determinations substantial deference as controlling precedent requires, the district court improperly overrode those determinations with its own opinion of the national security interests served by the Proclamation and the opinions of “former national security officials” relied upon by Plaintiffs. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879, at 34–36, 121–25 (D. Md. 2017). This is precisely the kind of judicial second-guessing on matters of immigration and national security that is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.\nII. The Presidential Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis. Justice Breyer’s controlling opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677\n(2005), observed that, “Where the Establishment Clause is at issue, tests designed to measure ‘neutrality’ alone are insufficient.” Id. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated that in “difficult borderline cases . . . I see no test-related\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 19 of 27\n\nsubstitute for the exercise of legal judgment . . . [which] must reflect and remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the [Religion] Clauses. . . .” Id. at 700. In this case, “the exercise of legal judgment” must take into account the deferential nature of judicial review of immigration-related actions such as the Proclamation. Nevertheless, the Proclamation is constitutional even under inapplicable nonimmigration-related Establishment Clause jurisprudence.\nAssuming the “purpose prong” of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test applies, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Proclamation clearly satisfies it. The “purpose prong” asks whether the challenged government action is “driven in part by a secular purpose.” Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist., 683 F.3d 599, 608 (4th Cir. 2012). Here, the Proclamation’s predominant purpose is its stated objective—protecting our national security—and, as such, the Proclamation satisfies the “purpose prong.” See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13; Procl. § 1.\nThe district court sidestepped the Proclamation’s obvious secular purpose by focusing mainly on miscellaneous comments made by then-candidate Trump, or his campaign advisors, despite any subsequent clarifications provided by the Trump Administration regarding its efforts to protect this country from the entry of foreign terrorists. The district court’s approach is flawed for at least four reasons.\nFirst, the Supreme Court has stated that the primary purpose inquiry concerning statutes may include consideration of the “plain meaning of the\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 20 of 27\n\nstatute’s words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history [and] the historical context of the statute . . . and the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (noting that the primary purpose inquiry is limited to consideration of “the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act”) (citation omitted and emphasis added).\nThe district court improperly focused on numerous quotes, made as long ago as 2015, by then-candidate Trump and/or individuals holding some nongovernmental position within his political campaign. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879, at 103-07. What matters for Establishment Clause analysis, however, are official government acts. Comments made, or actions taken, by a private citizen while a candidate for public office (or his or her advisors) while on the campaign trail are not “official” government acts, and do not constitute “contemporaneous legislative history.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 862; cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686 (1997) (alleged misconduct occurring before Bill Clinton became President was not an “official” act).\nClearly, “one would be naive not to recognize that campaign promises are— by long democratic tradition—the least binding form of human commitment.” Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002). Therefore, the\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 21 of 27\n\ndistrict court failed to properly limit its inquiry to official acts or statements in conducting its Establishment Clause analysis. Presidential campaign rhetoric is inherently unofficial and unreliable and should not be considered. See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc) (explaining that, for Establishment Clause analysis, it “is folly” to consider a political candidate’s campaign trail rhetoric, which is often contradictory or inflammatory).\nSecond, the district court’s extensive reliance upon purported evidence of a subjective, personal anti-Muslim bias of the President and some of his advisors is improper because “what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.” Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In short, the district court engaged in the kind of “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts” that is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 862.\nThe Proclamation, on its face, serves an indisputably secular purpose (protecting national security) and no amount of rehashing of miscellaneous campaign trail commentary can change that. A foray into the malleable arena of legislative history is not even a requirement in Establishment Clause cases where, as here, a secular purpose is readily apparent from a law or policy’s text. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–95 (1983) (noting the Supreme Court’s\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 22 of 27\n\n“reluct[ance] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the [government] particularly when a plausible secular purpose . . . may be discerned from the face of the statute”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that inquiry into the government’s purpose should be “deferential and limited”).\nThird, the mere suggestion of a possible religious or anti-religious motive, mined from past comments of a political candidate or his supporters, and intermixed with various secular purposes, is not enough to doom government action (along with all subsequent attempts to address the same subject matter). “[A]ll that Lemon requires” is that government action have “a secular purpose,” not that its purpose be “exclusively secular,” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6, 700 (1984) (citation omitted and emphasis added), and a policy is invalid under this test only if “the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 860 (emphasis added); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (upholding government action that “serv[ed] a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (“[A] court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose.”) (emphasis added). The Proclamation clearly serves secular purposes and, therefore, satisfies Lemon’s purpose test.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 23 of 27\n\nLastly, under the district court’s incorrect analysis, any hypothetical future immigration-related actions taken by the current President or officials within his Administration will be irredeemably tainted by the alleged subjective, predominantly anti-Muslim intent of the President and his surrogates, which runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s admonition that the government’s “past actions” do not “forever taint any effort . . . to deal with the subject matter.” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 874; see also ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 105 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.) (“The mere fact that Jersey City’s first display was held to violate the Establishment Clause is plainly insufficient to show that the second display lacked ‘a secular legislative purpose,’ or that it was ‘intended to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.’”) (citation omitted); Roark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573 F.3d 556, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Another reason we reject the district court’s Lemon analysis is that . . . [it] would preclude the District from ever creating a limited public forum in which religious materials may be distributed in a constitutionally neutral manner.”).\nThe district court’s starting point was a presumption that the Proclamation is unconstitutional unless the government could bear the burden of proving that it is “a ‘purposeful’ curative action that establishes that the taint of EO-2 no longer underlies the travel ban.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879, at 125–26. This approach is backwards. As the Supreme Court noted in a\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 24 of 27\n\ncase challenging part of the Immigration and Nationality Act, “[w]e begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he President . . . [is] sworn to uphold the Constitution. And when the President is acting under the color of express authority of the United States Constitution, we start with a presumption that his acts are constitutional. . . . [T]he burden is on the challengers to overcome it with their arguments and to persuade us to the contrary.”).\nIn sum, the Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause. It should be enforced in full to protect our nation from foreign terrorists. The preliminary injunction jeopardizes our national security and improperly obstructs the President from exercising his constitutional and statutory duty to protect our nation.\n\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 25 of 27\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThis Court should reverse the decision below and vacate the preliminary\n\ninjunction.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nJAY ALAN SEKULOW Counsel of Record\nSTUART J. ROTH COLBY M. MAY ANDREW J. EKONOMOU JORDAN SEKULOW* CRAIG L. PARSHALL MATTHEW R. CLARK* BENJAMIN P. SISNEY AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 201 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 Tel.: 202-546-8890 Fax: 202-546-9309 Email: sekulow@aclj.org\n* Not admitted to Fourth Circuit Bar\n\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III ERIK M. ZIMMERMAN* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Tel.: 734-680-8007 Fax: 734-680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\nFRANCIS J. MANION GEOFFREY R. SURTEES* AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 6375 New Hope Road New Hope, Kentucky 40052 Tel.: 502-549-7020 Fax: 502-549-5252 Email: fmanion@aclj.org\n\nNovember 1, 2017\n\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 26 of 27\n\nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29 AND 32\n\nThis amicus curiae brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R.\n\nApp. P. 29(a)(5) and 32(a)(7) because it contains 3,726 words, excluding the parts\n\nof the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f). This brief complies with the\n\ntypeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements\n\nof Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced\n\ntypeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Times New Roman font.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Telephone: (734) 680-8007 Facsimile: (734) 680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\n\nDated: November 1, 2017\n\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-1\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 27 of 27\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that on November 1, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy\nof the foregoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of Court for the United\nStates Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit using CM/ECF, which will send\nnotification of such filing to counsel of record. On the same date, I caused four true\nand correct paper copies of the foregoing to be sent by Federal Express next-\nbusiness day delivery to the Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the\nFourth Circuit, 1100 East Main Street, Suite 501, Richmond, Virginia 23219-3517.\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Edward L. White III EDWARD L. WHITE III AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW\nAND JUSTICE 3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 Telephone: (734) 680-8007 Facsimile: (734) 680-8006 Email: ewhite@aclj.org\nCounsel for amicus curiae\n\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-2\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSI ON & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fomth Circuit, you must complete and renm1 an Application for Admission before filing this fonn. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include yom f01mer name when completing tllis form so that we can locate you on the attomey roll. Electronic filing by com1sel is required in all Fomth Circuit cases. Ifyou have not registered as a Fomt h Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. 17-2231 (L), -2232, -2233, -2240 as\n\n[ZIRetained [Jcomt-appointed(CJA) [Jcourt-assigned(non-CJA) []Federal Defender 0 Pro Bono []Govemment\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: American Center for Law and Justice\n\n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _as the (party n ame)\n\nO appellaut(s) O appellee(s) D etitioner(s) O respondent(s) [Z}mucus curiae D intervenor(s) O movant(s)\n\n/s/ Edward L. Wh ite Ill (signatme)\n\nEdward L. White Ill Name (plinted or typed)\n\n734-680-8007 Voice Phone\n\nAmerican Center for Law and Justice Finn Name (if applicable)\n\n734-680-8006 Fax Number\n\n3001 Plymouth Road, Suite 203\n\nAnn Arbor, Michigan 48105 Address\n\newhite@aclj.org E-mail address (plint or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify tl1at on November 1, 2017 the foregoing document was se1ved on all prut ies or their counsel ofrecord through tl1e CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by se1ving a true and conect copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n/s/ Edward L. White Ill Signa hire\nOl/19/2016 sec\n\nNovember 1. 2017 Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-3\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 1 of 2\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_-_L_\n\nCaption: _In_te_r_n_a_ti_o_na_l_R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t._P_r_o_je_c_t_, e_t_a_l_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__J._T_r_u_m_p_,_e_t_a_l\n\n17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_A_m_e_r_ic_a_n_C_e_n_t_e_r _fo_r_L_a_w__an_d__J_u_st_ic_e___________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______a_m_i_cu_s__c_ur_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 55-3\n\nFiled: 11/01/2017 Pg: 2 of 2\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_E__d_w_a_r_d__L_. _W__h_it_e_I_I_I ________________ Counsel for: _A_m__e_ri_c_a_n__C_e_n_t_e_r_f_o_r_L_a_w__a_n__d_J_u_s_t_ic_e__\n\nDate: ___N_o_v_e_m_b_e_r_1_,_2_0_1_7___\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n************************** I certify that on __N_o_v_e_m_b_e_r_1_,_2_0_1_7__ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/s_/_E__d_w_a_r_d__L_._W__h_it_e__II_I___________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n____N_o__v_e_m_b_e__r _1_,_2_0_1_7_____ (date)\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3;\nJANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED\nMOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State;\nDANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Maryland, Southern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\nFIRST CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS\n\nNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\n\nCHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nDOUGLAS N. LETTER SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ____________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his\nofficial capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\n____________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ____________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\nELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants – Appellants.\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ____________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3;\nJANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients,\nPlaintiffs – Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO,\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National\nIntelligence,\nDefendants – Appellees\n\n\fTABLE OF CONTENTS Page\nINTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................4 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE.................................................................................4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................4\nA. Statutory Background............................................................................4 B. Executive Order No. 13,780..................................................................6 C. Proclamation No. 9645..........................................................................8 D. District Court Injunction .....................................................................12 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................16 STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................19 ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................19\nI. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable...........................................................19 A. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable................................ 19 B. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable .................................................................................... 25\nII. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of Their Statutory Or Constitutional Claims.................................... 28 A. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA ...................................29\ni\n\n\f1. The President Has Extremely Broad Discretion To Suspend Entry Of Aliens Abroad........................................29\n2. The Proclamation Is Fully Justified By The President’s National-Security And Foreign-Affairs Judgments .................................................................................. 32\n3. Section 1152(a)(1)’s Prohibition On Nationality Discrimination In Issuing Immigrant Visas Does Not Restrict The President’s Authority To Suspend Entry .............34\nB. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause ..........................................................................39 1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Neutral And Bona Fide Reasons .....................................................................................40 2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary............................43\nIII. The Balance Of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief..........53 A. The District Court’s Injunction Imposes Serious, Irreparable Harm On The Government And The Public ...................................... 53 B. A Preliminary Injunction Is Not Necessary To Prevent Any Substantial Harm To Plaintiffs ........................................................... 55\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................56 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nii\n\n\fTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases:\n\nPage(s)\n\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) .............................. 21-22, 29\n\nAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) .............................................................................................27\n\nAllende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988) ....................................................................... 29, 30\n\nBlock v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) .............................................................................................24\n\nCamreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) ...............................................................................................7\n\nChurch of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) .............................................................................................43\n\nDalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) .............................................................................................30\n\nDepartment of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) .............................................................................................33\n\nDirex Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................55\n\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) .............................................................................................19\n\nFranklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) .............................................................................................22\n\nHaig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) ...................................................................................... 30, 53\niii\n\n\fHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) .............................................................................................21\nHawaii v. Trump : 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017) ...................................................................7 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................... 7, 36\nHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ......................................................................................... 52, 53\nInternational Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................ 22\nIRAP v. Trump: 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017) ................................................................ 7, 35 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) ......................................................... 7, 21, 28, 40, 41\nJackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994) ..............................................................................23\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) ............................................................................ 26, 28, 42\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ............................................ 15, 18, 25, 26, 28, 39, 40, 41, 42\nLeague of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................10\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of Justice, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996) .......................................................................................... 22, 24\nLewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) .............................................................................................56\nLujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) .............................................................................................24\niv\n\n\fMadsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) .............................................................................................56\nMalek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981) .................................................................... 31-32, 36\nMaryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ...........................................................................................54\nMcCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) .......................................................................... 39, 43, 45, 46\nMcGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ...................................................................................... 26, 46\nMorfin v. Tillerson, 851 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2017 WL 3136962 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2017) ............................................................. 42\nNademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1982) ..............................................................................32\nIn re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167 (2009) ...................................28\nNixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) .............................................................................................54\nNLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) .......................................................................................... 39\nO Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 2002) ..................................................................... 54\nPBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................19\nRadzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) .............................................................................................34\nv\n\n\fReno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ...................................................................................... 30, 51\nSaavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999)......................................................... 20, 21, 22, 24\nSalazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) .........................................................................................46\nSale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) .................................................................... 25, 29, 31, 39, 53\nSessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) .........................................................................................41\nSteel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 823 (1998) .............................................................................................25\nTexas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998) .............................................................................................23\nTrump v. Hawaii, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017) ................................................................7\nTrump v. IRAP: 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) .................................................................................... 7, 56 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) ................................................................7\nUnited States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) .............................................................................................41\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ................................................................ 6, 20, 24, 25, 29, 53\nUnited Transp. Union v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 130 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................19\nValley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) ................................................... 27, 28\nvi\n\n\fWebster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) ...................................................................................... 25, 30\nWestern & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981) .............................................................................................41\nYassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980) ..............................................................................32\nZelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) .............................................................................................48\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) .........................................................................................54\nStatutes:\nAdministrative Procedure Act: 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) .............................................................................................20 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) .............................................................................................24 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)..................................................................................................20 5 U.S.C. § 704 ......................................................................................................22\nForeign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963 (1978) ..............................................................38\nImmigration and Nationality Act: 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. ...........................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) ..................................................................................... 1, 35, 37 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) .............................................................................. 17, 36. 38 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)................................................. 15, 24, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B)......................................................................................39 8 U.S.C. § 1181 ......................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)....................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(iv) ..................................................................................5 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II)...............................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) ......................... 6, 10, 15, 17, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) ............................................................................. 17, 32, 34, 35 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) ............................................ 6, 10, 17, 24, 29, 30, 31, 35, 38\nvii\n\n\f8 U.S.C. § 1185(b)................................................................................................30 8 U.S.C. § 1187 ..................................................................................................... 5 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) .........................................................................................44 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)-(ii)............................................................................5 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(i)-(ii)............................................................................5 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) .............................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)................................................................................................35 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i).................................................................................................20 8 U.S.C. § 1202(h)..................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1203 ......................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1204 ......................................................................................................4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)..................................................................................................4\n6 U.S.C. § 236(f)......................................................................................................20\n28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)...............................................................................................4\n28 U.S.C. § 1331........................................................................................................4\n28 U.S.C. § 1343........................................................................................................4\nRegulation:\n22 C.F.R. § 42.62 .......................................................................................................4\nLegislative Materials:\nH. Rep. No. 89-745 (1965) ......................................................................................36\nS. Rep. No. 89-748 (1965) .......................................................................................36\nOther Authorities: Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against Iran: Remarks Announcing\nU.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=33233............................................................................................... 37, 38\nviii\n\n\fCent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Africa (Chad), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/cd.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2017)............................................................44\n\nExec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (1979) ...................................... 31, 37\n\nExec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992) .............................................31\n\nExec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (2017) ...................................... 6, 7, 8 Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (1986) ................................. 32, 37, 38 Proclamation No. 5829, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,289 (1988) ............................................. 31\n\nProclamation No. 5887, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,185 (1988) ............................................. 31\n\nProclamation No. 6958, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,007 (1996) ............................................. 31\n\nProclamation No. 8342, 74 Fed. Reg. 4093 (2009) ................................................ 31\n\nProclamation No. 8693, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,751 (2011) ............................................. 31\nProclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017) ............. 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 32, 34, 38, 40, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50\n\nPres. Donald J. Trump, Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit\n\n(May\n\n21,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/\n\n2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit.................52\n\nU.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/ news/2016/02/18/dhs-announces-further-travel-restrictions-visawaiver-program ......................................................................................................5\n\nU.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (June 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf..................................5\n\nix\n\n\fINTRODUCTION The district court enjoined worldwide a Proclamation issued by the President of the United States pursuant to his broad constitutional and statutory authority to suspend or restrict the entry of aliens abroad when he deems it in the Nation’s interest. The Proclamation—“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017)—was issued after a global review by the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Department of State, of foreign governments’ information-sharing practices and risk factors, culminating in a recommendation by the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security that the President restrict entry of certain nationals of eight countries that have inadequate practices or otherwise present heightened risks. The Proclamation imposes countryspecific restrictions that, in the President’s judgment, will most effectively “encourage cooperation” in information sharing and “protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id. at 45,164. The district court nevertheless ruled that, despite the thorough review process and tailored substantive measures that were not present in the temporary entry suspension that preceded this one, the Proclamation is motivated by religious animus in violation of the Establishment Clause and constitutes impermissible nationalitybased discrimination in the issuance of immigration visas under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).\n\n\fThat erroneous ruling threatens the ability of this and future Presidents to address national-security threats. The alleged flaws in the prior entry suspension do not apply to the Proclamation, which was issued after a worldwide, religion-neutral review by multiple Cabinet officials whose good faith has never been questioned, and which imposes only tailored restrictions on Muslim-majority as well as nonMuslim-majority nations. The district court’s conclusion that this is insufficient to refute religious discrimination threatens to disable the President permanently from addressing immigration-related national-security risks in countries that pose the greatest concern. Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibit the President from imposing nationality-specific restrictions on entry to the United States, as past Presidents have also done.\nAll that said, this Court should not even reach the merits, because plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable in the first place. As a general matter, courts cannot review a challenge to the political branches’ exclusion of aliens abroad absent express statutory authorization. Congress has not provided such authorization, and thus plaintiffs’ statutory claims are barred. Although there is a limited exception to the principle of nonreviewability where the exclusion of aliens abroad allegedly violates the constitutional rights of persons in the United States, the Proclamation’s alleged discrimination against certain nationals of the covered countries does not violate plaintiffs’ own religious-freedom rights.\n2\n\n\fThe district court also erred in its evaluation of the remaining factors governing preliminary injunctive relief. The interests of the public and the government are significantly impaired by barring effectuation of a judgment of the President that restricting entry for certain nationals of eight countries is warranted to protect the Nation’s safety. By contrast, plaintiffs have not identified any cognizable and irreparable injury that they personally would incur if the restrictions on entry take effect while the case is being adjudicated, and any impact from the Proclamation on their relatives’ or other identified individuals’ receipt of a visa is speculative. The preliminary injunction should be vacated for this reason as well.\nAt a minimum, the global injunctive relief was vastly overbroad. Under both Article III and equitable principles, any injunction cannot properly go further than necessary to redress plaintiffs’ own injuries—i.e., to identified aliens whose exclusion would impose cognizable, irreparable injury on plaintiffs themselves. The district court extended the injunction further to reach any alien with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a U.S. person or entity, but that standard—which the Supreme Court adopted in staying the injunction against the prior entry suspension—is not the proper standard for issuing a preliminary injunction in the first place.\n3\n\n\fSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The district court’s jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. JA 475. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The district court entered its order granting a preliminary injunction in these cases on October 17, 2017. JA 1084. Defendants filed timely notices of appeal on October 20, 2017. JA 1087, 1198, 1494. Plaintiffs in No. 17-2240 filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on October 23, 2017. JA 1090.\nSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE Whether the district court abused its discretion in entering a worldwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2 of the Proclamation.\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Statutory Background The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., governs admission of aliens into the United States. Admission normally requires a valid immigrant or nonimmigrant visa. Id. §§ 1181, 1182(a)(7)(A)(i), (B)(i)(II), 1203. The visa-application process typically includes an in-person interview and results in a decision by a State Department consular officer. Id. §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202(h), 1204; 22 C.F.R. § 42.62. Although a visa is typically necessary for admission, it does not guarantee admission; the alien still must be admissible upon arriving at a port of entry. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(h), 1225(a).\n4\n\n\fCongress has created a Visa Waiver Program enabling nationals of approved countries to seek temporary admission for tourism or certain business purposes without a visa. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(7)(B)(iv), 1187. In 2015, Congress excluded from travel under that Program aliens who are dual nationals of or recent visitors to Iraq or Syria (where “[t]he Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) * * * maintain[s] a formidable force”) as well as countries designated by the Secretary of State as state sponsors of terrorism (currently Iran, Sudan, and Syria).1 Id. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)-(ii). Congress authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to designate additional countries of concern, considering whether a country is a “safe haven for terrorists,” “whether a foreign terrorist organization has a significant presence” in the country, and “whether the presence of an alien in the country * * * increases the likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to” U.S. national security. Id. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(i)-(ii). Applying those criteria, in February 2016, DHS excluded recent visitors to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen from travel under the Program.2\n1 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, at 6, 299-302 (June 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf.\n2 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/18/dhs-announces-further-travel-restrictionsvisa-waiver-program.\n5\n\n\fIn addition, building upon the President’s inherent authority to exclude aliens,\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950), Congress has\naccorded the Executive broad discretion to suspend or restrict entry of aliens. 8\nU.S.C. § 1182(f) provides:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) grants the President broad general authority to adopt\n“reasonable rules, regulations, and orders” governing entry of aliens, “subject to\nsuch limitations and exceptions as [he] may prescribe.” Pursuant to these authorities,\nPresident Reagan suspended entry of all Cuban nationals in 1986, and President\nCarter authorized the denial and revocation of visas for Iranian nationals in 1979.\nSee pp. 31-33, 37-38, infra.\nB. Executive Order No. 13,780 On March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed.\nReg. 13,209 (2017) (EO-2). Among other things, EO-2 directed the Secretary of\nHomeland Security to conduct a global review of whether foreign governments\nprovide adequate information about their nationals seeking U.S. visas, and to report\nfindings to the President. See EO-2 § 2(a), (b). The Secretary of State would then\nencourage countries identified as inadequate to alter their practices; following that 6\n\n\fdiplomatic-engagement process, the Secretary of Homeland Security would recommend whether and it so what entry restrictions to impose on nations that continued to have inadequate practices or to pose other risks. See id. § 2(d)-(f).\nDuring that review, EO-2 temporarily suspended the entry of foreign nationals from six countries that had been identified by Congress or the Executive Branch in connection with the Visa Waiver Program as presenting heighted terrorism-related concerns. See EO-2 § 2(c). The district court below, and another district court, preliminarily enjoined that entry suspension, IRAP v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017), and were affirmed in relevant part, IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\nThe Supreme Court granted certiorari, and partially stayed the injunctions pending review. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam). After EO2’s temporary entry suspension and certain other provisions expired, the Supreme Court vacated both injunctions as moot. See Trump v. IRAP, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017); see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 713 (2011) (point of vacatur upon mootness is “to prevent an unreviewable decision from spawning any legal consequences” and to “clear[] the path for future relitigation”).\n7\n\n\fC. Proclamation No. 9645 On September 24, 2017, the President signed Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017). The Proclamation is the product of the comprehensive review of vetting and screening procedures conducted pursuant to Section 2 of EO-2, and reflects the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, and consultations with the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the Attorney General. 1. DHS, in consultation with the Department of State and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, conducted “a worldwide review to identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA * * * in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat.” EO-2 § 2(a). In a report submitted to the President on July 9, 2017, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security developed a “baseline” for the kinds of information required, which includes three components: (1) identity-management information, i.e., “information needed to determine whether individuals seeking benefits under the immigration laws are who they claim to be,” which turns on criteria such as “whether the country issues electronic passports embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity, reports lost and stolen passports to appropriate entities, and makes available upon request identity-related information not included in its passports”;\n8\n\n\f(2) national-security and public-safety information about whether a person seeking entry poses a risk, which turns on criteria such as “whether the country makes available * * * known or suspected terrorist and criminal-history information upon request,” “whether the country impedes the United States Government’s receipt of information about passengers and crew traveling to the United States,” and “whether the country provides passport and nationalidentity document exemplars”; and\n(3) a national-security and public-safety risk assessment of the country, which turns on criteria such as “whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven, whether it is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program * * * that meets all of [the program’s] requirements, and whether it regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.”\nProcl. § 1(c).\nDHS, in coordination with the Department of State, collected data on, and\nevaluated, nearly 200 countries, and identified each country’s information-sharing\npractices and risk factors. Id. § 1(d). The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security\nidentified 16 countries as having “inadequate” information-sharing practices and\nrisk factors, and another 31 countries as “at risk” of becoming “inadequate.” Id.\n§ 1(e).\nThese preliminary results were submitted to the President on July 9, 2017.\nId. § 1(c). The Department of State conducted a 50-day engagement period with\nforeign governments to encourage them to improve their performance, which\nyielded significant gains. Id. § 1(f).\n2. On September 15, 2017, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security\nrecommended that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from\n9\n\n\fseven countries that were determined to be inadequate in their information-sharing practices or to present other risk factors: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. Id. § 1(h). The Acting Secretary also recommended entry restrictions for nationals of Somalia, which, although it was determined to satisfy baseline requirements for information-sharing, has significant identity-management deficiencies and is unable to effectively control all of its territory. Id. § 1(i).\n3. The President evaluated the Acting Secretary’s recommendation in consultation with multiple Cabinet members and other high-level government officials. Id. § 1(h)(i), (ii). The President considered a number of factors, including each country’s “capacity, ability, and willingness to cooperate with our identitymanagement and information-sharing policies and each country’s risk factors,” as well as “foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.” Id. § 1(h)(i).\nActing in accordance with the Acting Secretary’s recommendation, the President exercised his constitutional authority and his statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) to impose tailored entry restrictions on certain nationals from eight countries. The restrictions were intended “to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and * * , at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” Id. § 1(h)(i). The President determined that these entry restrictions are “necessary to prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient\n10\n\n\finformation to assess the risks they pose to the United States,” and which are “needed to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments.” Ibid.\nFor countries that refuse to cooperate regularly with the United States (Iran, North Korea, and Syria), the Proclamation suspends entry of all nationals, except for Iranian nationals seeking nonimmigrant student (F and M) and exchange-visitor (J) visas. Procl. § 2(b)(ii), (d)(ii), (e)(ii). For countries that are valuable counterterrorism partners but have information-sharing deficiencies (Chad, Libya, and Yemen), the Proclamation suspends entry only of nationals seeking immigrant visas and nonimmigrant business, tourist, and business/tourist (B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2) visas. Id. § 2(a)(ii), (c)(ii), (g)(ii). For Somalia, which has significant identity-management deficiencies and is unable to effectively control all of its territory, the Proclamation suspends entry of nationals seeking immigrant visas and requires additional scrutiny of nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas. Id. § 2(h)(ii). And for Venezuela, which refuses to cooperate in information-sharing but for which alternative means of obtaining identity information are available, the Proclamation suspends entry of government officials “involved in screening and vetting procedures,” and “their immediate family members,” on nonimmigrant business or tourist visas. Id. § 2(f)(ii).\n11\n\n\fThe Proclamation provides for case-by-case waivers where a foreign national demonstrates that denying entry would cause undue hardship, entry would not pose a threat to the national security or public safety, and entry would be in the national interest. Id. § 3(c)(i)(A)-(C). The Proclamation requires an ongoing review of the Proclamation’s restrictions, taking into account whether countries have improved their identity-management and information-sharing protocols, and periodic reporting to the President about whether entry restrictions should be continued, modified, terminated, or supplemented. Id. § 4.\nThe Proclamation took effect immediately for all foreign nationals who were subject to entry restrictions under Section 2(a) of EO-2 pursuant to the Supreme Court’s partial stay of the injunctions barring enforcement of that provision, and was to take effect on October 18, 2017, for all other persons subject to the Proclamation. Id. § 7.\nD. District Court Injunction 1. These three cases are brought by individual and organizational plaintiffs who challenge the Proclamation under the INA as well as the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The individual plaintiffs include U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who have relatives from Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia seeking immigrant\n12\n\n\for nonimmigrant visas, as well as a few LPRs who do not have relatives seeking entry from one of the covered countries. JA 1013-14.\nOrganizational plaintiffs include the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), and HIAS, Inc., both of which provide services to refugees in the resettlement process; the Arab American Association of New York (AAANY), which provides legal and other services to the Arab-American and Arab immigrant community; The Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA), an organization of graduate students and faculty focused on Middle Eastern studies; the Yemeni-American Merchants Association (YAMA), a membership organization that protects against harassment and assists with immigration issues; Iranian Alliances Across Borders (IAAB), which organizes youth camps, educational events, and international conferences for the Iranian diaspora; and the Iranian Students’ Foundation (ISF), which organizes events for Iranian-American students. JA 1014.\n2. After expedited briefing and argument, the district court entered a worldwide preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2 of the Proclamation against any alien with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship to a U.S. person or entity, except nationals of Venezuela and North Korea. JA 1079-81.\nThe court held that U.S. residents may challenge the exclusion of aliens abroad where they have a specific interest in the entry of those aliens. JA 1016-17.\n13\n\n\fThe court reasoned that exclusion orders are nonreviewable only where they involve “individual visa decisions by consular officers,” rather than “a broader policy.” JA 1029.\nThe court further held that several individual plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims that the entry restrictions in Section 2 of the Proclamation violate the INA. The court reasoned that the entry restrictions harm individual plaintiffs by threatening to prolong their separation from family members from the designated countries seeking visas to come to the United States. JA 1017-18. The district court reasoned that several organizational plaintiffs have standing either on behalf of their members for similar reasons, JA 1022, or in their own right because foreign nationals subject to the entry restrictions will be unable to attend sponsored conferences and events, JA 1019-20. The court further concluded that the individuals whose family members are subject to the Proclamation have standing to challenge the entry restrictions under the Establishment Clause because of their alleged “personal contact” with those restrictions and the intangible “feelings of marginalization or emotional distress [they experience] as a result of the Proclamation’s alleged antiMuslim message.” JA 1024-27.\n3. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits as to some of their statutory and constitutional claims.\n14\n\n\fAlthough the court held that plaintiffs had failed to show they are likely to succeed on their claim that the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority to suspend the entry of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), JA 1041-53, it held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Proclamation violates the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), JA 1034-40. The court reasoned that the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are “the equivalent of a ban on issuing immigrant visas based on nationality.” JA 1038. The court acknowledged that “[t]here may be scenarios under which denial of entry based on nationality” would be permissible, “such as during a specific urgent national crisis or public health emergency,” JA 1037, but it distinguished the Proclamation on the ground that it “imposed a permanent * * ban on immigrants from the Designated Countries,” JA 1038.\nThe court also held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. JA 1053-76. It agreed with the Government that the Proclamation should be reviewed under the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and that the Proclamation’s national-security interest is facially legitimate. JA 1055. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs had “plausibly allege[d]” that the stated rationale for the Proclamation was not bona fide, which the court held entitled it to look behind the Proclamation’s stated rationale. JA 1056-57. Doing so, the court concluded that\n15\n\n\fthe Proclamation “stands in the[] shadow” of EO-2, which the court had previously concluded was likely to violate the Establishment Clause, JA 1064, and that the Proclamation did not constitute “curative action” that would remove the “taint” the court perceived, JA 1064, 1067.\nThe court concluded that the balancing of harms supports an injunction. JA 1076-77. Although the court acknowledged that “no government interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” JA 1078, the court was of the view that the Proclamation was not necessary to ensure national security, ibid., and that those interests “are not paramount in this instance,” JA 1079.\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. The district court erred in holding that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. It is a fundamental separation-of-powers principle that the political branches’ decisions to exclude aliens abroad generally are not judicially reviewable absent express authorization by law. That principle bars review of plaintiffs’ statutory claims, which in any event are not cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Article III ripeness requirements. Although the Supreme Court has allowed limited judicial review when a U.S. citizen claims that the exclusion of an alien abroad infringes the plaintiff’s own constitutional rights, plaintiffs here assert no cognizable violation of their own Establishment Clause rights.\n16\n\n\fII. The district court also erred in holding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.\nPlaintiffs’ statutory claims fail because the entry restrictions imposed by the Proclamation fall well within the President’s broad, discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). The Proclamation contains ample findings that the identified countries have inadequate information-sharing practices or other risk factors, and that the entry restrictions encourage those countries to improve and protect this country from those risks in the interim. Past Presidents have similarly invoked this statutory authority to impose nationality-based bans on the entry of nationals from countries that pose national-security and foreign-policy concerns.\nImposing nationality-based bans on entry does not contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of an immigrant visa. Section 1152(a)(1) applies to immigrants who are otherwise eligible for a visa, but does not abrogate the President’s authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) to limit eligibility in the first place. The statutory provisions can, and should, be harmonized.\nThe Proclamation is also consistent with the Establishment Clause. The Proclamation’s entry restrictions are justified by facially legitimate and bona fide reasons. The district court’s second-guessing of the President’s subjective\n17\n\n\fmotivation is inconsistent with Mandel and subsequent precedent, and fails to give due regard to the President’s national-security judgment.\nFurthermore, even under domestic Establishment Clause precedent, the Proclamation is clearly lawful. It is religion-neutral on its face and in operation, and its tailored restrictions, which apply to both Muslim-majority and non-Muslimmajority nations, are animated by country-specific conditions identified after a comprehensive review by multiple Cabinet officials, not by religious animus. In light of the current Proclamation’s valid process and substance, it cannot be invalidated simply based on some perceived historical taint from the prior entry suspensions or earlier campaign statements.\nIII. Finally, the district court erred in concluding that the balancing of harms supports its injunction. The injunction causes irreparable harm by overriding the President’s national-security judgment. Plaintiffs have not identified any cognizable and irreparable injury that they personally would incur, and any effect on the receipt of visas by their relatives or other identified individuals is speculative. In any event, the injunction was overbroad under Article III and equitable principles, because it extended beyond plaintiffs’ own alleged injuries to reach aliens who have relationships only with unidentified non-parties in this country.\n18\n\n\fSTANDARD OF REVIEW This Court “review[s] the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” United Transp. Union v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 130 F.3d 627, 631 (4th Cir. 1997). “A district court abuses its discretion when it misapprehends or misapplies the applicable law.” League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 235 (4th Cir. 2014). “[T]he court will vacate an injunction if it is broader in scope than that necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff or if an injunction does not carefully address only the circumstances of the case.” PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir. 2011).\nARGUMENT As demonstrated below, the Government is likely to prevail on the merits, both because plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable and because plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail under the statutory and constitutional provisions they invoke. I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable A. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable 1. The Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). “[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the\n19\n\n\fGovernment to exclude a given alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).\nCourts have distilled from this deeply rooted principle of nonreviewability the rule that the denial or revocation of a visa for an alien abroad “is not subject to judicial review * * * unless Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Congress has not provided for judicial review of decisions to exclude aliens abroad, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 236(f ), and has forbidden “judicial review” of visa revocations (subject to a narrow exception inapplicable to aliens abroad), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i). Accordingly, the longstanding bar on judicial review of the political branches’ exclusion of aliens abroad forecloses plaintiffs’ statutory challenges to the Proclamation.\nMoreover, history “unmistakabl[y]” confirms that “the immigration laws ‘preclude judicial review’ of consular visa decisions.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1160. The lone time the Supreme Court held that certain aliens (only those physically present in the United States) could seek review of exclusion orders under the APA, Congress abrogated the ruling and limited those aliens to the habeas remedy (which is not available to aliens abroad). See id. at 1157-62. Because even an alien present in the United States cannot invoke the APA to obtain review, a fortiori neither can aliens abroad nor U.S. citizens acting at their behest. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), 702(1).\n20\n\n\fThe district court held that the principle of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens applies only to a challenge to “individual visa decisions by consular officers,” not to a Presidential proclamation restricting entry of nationals from eight countries. JA 1029. Although the nonreviewability principle is applied most frequently to decisions by consular officers adjudicating visa applications, it would invert the constitutional structure to limit review in that context while permitting review of the President’s decision to restrict entry of classes of aliens. A consular officer is a subordinate executive-branch official under the constitutional hierarchy. Consular nonreviewability is grounded in the “firmly-established principle” that the power to exclude aliens is “inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country,” and “to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1158-59. Those considerations apply even more strongly to broader nationalsecurity judgments of the President than to individualized decisions by a consular official. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 584-91 (1952) (relying on these considerations in rejecting broad challenges to immigration statute).\nThis Court’s since-vacated opinion addressing EO-2 does not support the district court’s rationale, because it rested solely on the constitutional claims and did not address whether the statutory claims were reviewable. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 57980. The district court relied instead on Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.\n21\n\n\fCir. 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987), in which the D.C. Circuit concluded that U.S. citizens who invited foreign nationals to speak were aggrieved by the State Department’s interpretation of an INA definition that led to the exclusion of the intended speakers. JA 1017. As the D.C. Circuit subsequently recognized in Saavedra Bruno, however, Abourezk “rested in large measure” on an INA provision that was subsequently amended to “make[] clear that district courts do not have general jurisdiction over claims arising under the immigration laws and that their jurisdiction extends only to actions brought by the government.” 197 F.3d at 1164.3\n2. Even if the general rule of nonreviewability did not foreclose judicial review of plaintiffs’ statutory claims, review would still be unavailable for three additional reasons.\nFirst, the APA provides for judicial review only of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The President’s Proclamation is not “agency action” at all, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992), and there also has been no “final” agency decision denying a visa based on the Proclamation to any of the aliens abroad identified by plaintiffs. Even in cases where courts have considered constitutional\n3 The district court also relied on Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State (LAVAS), 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996), and International Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985), JA 1017, 1030, but neither case even involved, let alone sustained, a challenge to orders excluding aliens abroad.\n22\n\n\fclaims of U.S. plaintiffs challenging the exclusion of aliens abroad, see pp. 25-26, infra, they have not done so until after the aliens had been denied visas.\nIndeed, for this reason, plaintiffs’ statutory claims as well as their constitutional claims do not satisfy Article III and equitable ripeness requirements. If any alien in whose entry a U.S. plaintiff has a cognizable interest is found otherwise eligible for a visa and denied a waiver, then that plaintiff can bring suit at that time (if the plaintiff’s claim is otherwise justiciable) and the Court can consider the challenge in a concrete dispute. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’”).\nThe district court reasoned that the waiver process “itself presents an additional hurdle not faced by other visa applicants which would delay reunification.” JA 1028. But it is not at all clear that the process of seeking a waiver would cause any meaningful delay of the definitive resolution of an application for a visa. Visa times vary widely, and it is not unusual for an alien to wait months or years from the time he applies for an immigrant visa before receiving one. Nor is the waiver process a discriminatory “hurdle” like the law challenged in Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994), because it applies only to aliens who lack any constitutional rights concerning entry, Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542, not to the plaintiffs themselves.\n23\n\n\fSecond, plaintiffs lack a statutory right to enforce. Nothing in the INA gives plaintiffs a direct right to judicial review, and the APA’s “general cause of action” exists only for “persons ‘adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,’ ” Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). The statutory provisions empowering the President to restrict entry of aliens, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f ), 1185(a)(1), and prohibiting nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, id. § 1152(a)(1)(A), do not confer any legally cognizable rights on third parties like plaintiffs here—i.e., U.S. persons or organizations seeking entry of aliens abroad.\nAlthough the district court invoked Abourezk and the vacated decision in LAVAS, JA 1030, the D.C. Circuit has since held that, even when the INA permits a U.S. person to file a petition for a foreign family member’s classification as a relative for immigrant status, any arguable interest the U.S. person has “terminate[s]” “[w]hen [his] petition [i]s granted.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1164. Likewise, the INA does not protect any interest of organizations that merely provide services to aliens seeking entry. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).\nThird, the APA does not apply to the extent “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Here, the relevant statutes give the President unreviewable discretion to impose restrictions on entry. See pp. 29-30, infra. The district court rejected this argument on the ground that “courts have had\n24\n\n\fno difficulty reaching the merits of challenges to the President’s use of § 1182(f),” JA 1031, relying principally on Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). But the Supreme Court in Sale did not question the President’s national security judgment under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and did not address whether plaintiffs’ claims were reviewable because it rejected them on the merits. Sale, 509 U.S. at 170-88; cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (“driveby jurisdictional rulings * * * have no precedential effect”).\nB. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable 1. Although Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review of Executive decisions to exclude aliens abroad, it has not “clear[ly]” “preclude[d] judicial review” for persons asserting violations of their own constitutional rights. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988). The exclusion of aliens typically raises no constitutional questions because aliens abroad lack any constitutional rights regarding entry. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. However, the Supreme Court has twice engaged in limited judicial review when a U.S. citizen contended that the denial of a visa to an alien abroad violated the citizen’s own constitutional rights. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (reviewing but rejecting claim that the denial of a waiver of visa-ineligibility to a Belgian national violated U.S. citizens’ own First Amendment right to receive information); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)\n25\n\n\f(reviewing but rejecting claim by a U.S. citizen that the refusal of a visa to her husband violated her own alleged due-process rights concerning her spouse’s entry).\nMandel and Din are inapposite here. Even putting aside that plaintiffs have identified no visa application that has yet been denied based on the Proclamation, their claimed injury from the exclusion of aliens abroad is not cognizable because it does not stem from an alleged infringement of plaintiffs’ own constitutional rights to religious freedom.\nIn McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Supreme Court held that individuals who are indirectly injured by alleged religious discrimination against others generally may not sue, because they have not suffered violations of their own rights. Id. at 429-30. The plaintiffs, employees of a store subject to a Sunday-closing law, lacked standing to challenge the law on free-exercise grounds because they “d[id] not allege any infringement of their own religious freedoms,” id. at 429, and had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge only because they suffered “direct * * * injury, allegedly due to the [law’s] imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian religion,” id. at 430-31.\nHere, by contrast, plaintiffs are not directly subject to the Proclamation, and thus are not asserting violations of their own constitutional rights. They instead allege indirect injuries from the Proclamation’s application to others—the individual plaintiffs’ family members and the organizational plaintiffs’ clients—who\n26\n\n\fthemselves have no constitutional rights. In reaching the contrary conclusion, JA 1024, the district court erroneously conflated the question whether an individual has suffered an injury-in-fact from an alleged Establishment Clause violation with the question whether the violation was of the individual’s own Establishment Clause rights.\n2. Plaintiffs also asserted that they have “experienced feelings of marginalization or emotional distress as a result of the Proclamation’s alleged antiMuslim message.” JA 1026-27. This “message” injury likewise is not cognizable; the Supreme Court has “ma[de] clear” that “the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial [or other invidious] discrimination * * * accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). The same rule applies to Establishment Clause claims. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).\nTo be sure, a plaintiff may suffer a cognizable injury where he himself has been “subjected to unwelcome religious exercises” or “forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.” Id. at 486 n.22. But the Proclamation says nothing about religion and does not subject plaintiffs to any religious exercise, and the D.C. Circuit correctly has rejected the notion that a putative Establishment Clause plaintiff may “re-characterize[]” an abstract injury flowing from “government action” directed\n27\n\n\fagainst others as a personal injury from “a governmental message [concerning] religion” directed at the plaintiff. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J.), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167 (2009). Permitting that approach would “eviscerate well-settled standing limitations” in cases like Valley Forge that involve challenges to government actions concerning third parties on the grounds that they endorse or disfavor religion. Id.\nIndeed, the district court, like this Court in its since-vacated opinion addressing EO-2, acknowledged that plaintiffs could not challenge the Proclamation based solely on the Proclamation’s alleged message, absent “personal contact” with the Proclamation. JA 1024; see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 582-83. But, as already discussed, plaintiffs do not have “personal contact” with the Proclamation since it does not apply to them at all, but only to third-party aliens abroad. In sum, Plaintiffs’ alleged third-party injuries are insufficient to invoke the limited review for firstparty constitutional claims afforded in Mandel and Din. II. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of\nTheir Statutory or Constitutional Claims The government is also likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal because the district court erred in holding that the Proclamation’s entry restrictions likely contravene the INA and the Establishment Clause.\n28\n\n\fA. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA 1. The President Has Extremely Broad Discretion To Suspend Entry Of Aliens Abroad\na. The President’s Proclamation was issued pursuant to his inherent Article II authority to exclude aliens, see Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543, and his broad statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1).\nSection 1182(f) provides that “[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” As courts have repeatedly recognized, Section 1182(f) provides the President “sweeping” discretionary power to suspend the entry of aliens. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2; see also, e.g., Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (1st Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has deemed it “perfectly clear that [Section] 1182(f ) * * * grants the President ample power to establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 187.\nSection 1185(a)(1) similarly authorizes the President to restrict the entry of aliens into the United States, or to set “such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders,” and “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” This\n29\n\n\fstatutory text likewise confirms the breadth of the President’s authority; the text does not require any predicate findings, but simply gives the President the authority to restrict entry to the United States according to “such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” Id.; see Allende, 845 F.2d at 1118 & n.13; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297 (1981) (construing similar language in § 1185(b) as “le[aving] the power to make exceptions exclusively in the hands of the Executive”).\nThe plain terms of Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) provide no basis for judicial second-guessing of the President’s determination about what restrictions to “prescribe” or what restrictions are necessary to avoid “detriment[] to the interests of the United States.” In these circumstances, where Congress has traditionally and expressly committed these matters to the President’s judgment and discretion, there are no meaningful standards for review. See Doe, 486 U.S. at 600-01; Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1994). As the Supreme Court recognized in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (AAADC), courts are “ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of the Executive’s reasons for excluding particular foreign nationals. At a minimum, to the extent Section 1182(f) envisions any “find[ings],” the fact that the President acts by “proclamation” suggests that they need not be extensive and should not be subject to searching review.\n30\n\n\fb. Historical practice confirms the breadth of, and deference owed to, the President’s exercise of authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). For decades, Presidents have restricted entry pursuant to those statutes without detailed public justifications or findings; some have discussed the President’s rationale in one or two sentences that broadly declare the Nation’s interests.4 The only justification provided for the Presidential action at issue in Sale, for example, was that “[t]here continues to be a serious problem of persons attempting to come to the United States by sea without necessary documentation and otherwise illegally.” Executive Order No. 12,807, pmbl. pt. 4, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). The Supreme Court expressed no concerns about the adequacy of that finding, ruling that “[w]hether the President’s chosen method” made sense from a policy perspective was “irrelevant to the scope of his authority” under Section 1182(f). Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88.\nSimilarly, in 1979, when President Carter invoked Section 1185(a)(1) in response to the Iranian hostage crisis, he made no express findings and delegated to lower Executive Branch officials the authority to deny and revoke visas for Iranian nationals. See Exec. Order No. 12,172, § 1-101, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (1979). Courts had no trouble upholding those restrictions. E.g., Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d\n4 E.g., Proclamation No. 8693, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,751 (2011); Proclamation No. 8342, 74 Fed. Reg. 4093 (2009); Proclamation No. 6958, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,007 (1996); Proclamation No. 5887, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,185 (1988); Proclamation No. 5829, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,289 (1988).\n31\n\n\f113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980); Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1982). And when President Reagan suspended the entry of Cuba nationals as immigrants in 1986 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), he offered only a single sentence explaining the basis for his action. See Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (1986).\n2. The Proclamation Is Fully Justified By The President’s National Security And Foreign Affairs Judgments\nHere, the Presidential findings and explanation set forth in the Proclamation amply support the exercise of his authority to impose entry restrictions under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a). The President imposed the entry restrictions after reviewing the recommendations of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, following a worldwide review that evaluated every country according to established criteria. The Acting Secretary recommended entry restrictions on eight countries, each of which was identified as “inadequate” in its information-sharing practices or as presenting other special circumstances. See Procl. § 1(c)-(g), (i). The entry restrictions for each country are tailored to the country’s particular circumstances and conditions. See id. §§ 1(h)(i), 2(a)-(h).\nThe President found that the “entry into the United States of persons described in Section 2 of [the] proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.” Id. pmbl. As the President explained, the entry restrictions serve two\n32\n\n\fpurposes. First, they “prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States.” Procl. § 1(h)(i); id. § 1(a), (b) (discussing the importance of foreign governments’ information-sharing to vetting process). Plaintiffs have offered no basis to second-guess this national-security judgment. Cf. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). Second, the entry restrictions are “needed to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments” whose nationals are subject to the restrictions. Procl. § 1(h)(i). The diplomatic-engagement period described in the Proclamation yielded significant improvements in foreign governments’ information sharing, id. § 1(e)-(g), and encouraging changes in the behavior of foreign governments through entry restrictions is an accepted foreign-policy method, as illustrated by President Carter’s Iranian order and President Reagan’s Cuban order. See pp. 37-38, supra.\nFurthermore, both of these purposes are furthered by nationality-based entry restrictions. Foreign governments “manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals” and “control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments.” Id. § 1(b). Because the Proclamation’s entry restrictions seek both to protect against and to encourage improvement of deficient information-sharing practices by certain foreign countries, it is eminently sensible to impose those restrictions on nationals of those countries\n33\n\n\ftraveling on those countries’ passports (and, conversely, not to apply them to dual nationals of a covered country who are traveling on a non-covered country’s passport, id. § 3(b)(iv)).\n3. Section 1152(a)(1)’s Prohibition On Nationality Discrimination In Issuing Immigrant Visas Does Not Restrict The President’s Authority To Suspend Entry\nAlthough the district court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Proclamation exceeded the President’s authority under Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a), JA 1041-53, it held that the Proclamation’s targeted entry restrictions violate 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality in the “issuance of [an] immigrant visa[],” JA 1034-40. The court erred in reading Section 1152(a) to override the President’s distinct authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a), especially in light of the statutory deference afforded to the President, contrary historical practice, and the serious constitutional concerns raised by that interpretation.\na. It is axiomatic that “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts * * * to regard each as effective.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976). That principle applies here. As the district court itself previously (and correctly) recognized, “barring entry to the United States based on nationality pursuant to the President’s authority under § 1182(f) does not appear to run afoul of the provision in § 1152(a) barring discrimination in the issuance of\n34\n\n\fimmigrant visas.” IRAP, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 554 (emphasis added). At an absolute\nminimum, Section 1152(a)(1)(A) by its plain terms does not prohibit the President\nfrom restricting entry based on nationality under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a), even\nif it were to require the State Department to issue immigrant visas to aliens whose\nentry the President has suspended based on nationality. Moreover, Section 1152(a)\ndoes not even require issuing immigrant visas to aliens whose entry has been validly\nsuspended based on nationality under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a). The two sets\nof statutory provisions simply operate in different spheres: Sections 1182(f) and\n1185(a), like numerous other provisions of the INA, limit the universe of individuals\neligible to receive visas; Section 1152(a)(1)(A), by contrast, prohibits discrimination\non the basis of nationality within that universe of eligible individuals. Indeed, the\nINA expressly requires the denial of visas to aliens who are ineligible “under section\n1182.” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g).5\nLegislative history confirms that Congress understood the INA to operate in\nthis manner. The 1965 amendment enacting the provision codified at 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1152(a)(1)(A) was designed to eliminate the country-quota system previously in\n5 The district court thus erred both in relying on consular officers’ role in implementing the Proclamation through visa denials, JA 1039, and in finding it “highly significant that § 1152(a) explicitly excludes certain sections of the INA from its scope * * * but * * * not § 1182(f) or § 1185(a),” JA 1036. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to those who are eligible for entry to the United States, which necessarily excludes individuals whom the President determines are ineligible for entry, and thus for visas, under Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a)(1).\n35\n\n\feffect, but it was intended to operate only as to those aliens otherwise eligible for visas, not to modify the eligibility criteria for admission or to limit pre-existing provisions like Sections 1182(f) or 1185(a)(1) addressing entry. See H. Rep. No. 89745, at 12 (1965) (“Under this [new] system, selection from among those eligible to be immigrants * * * will be based upon the existence of a close family relationship to U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens and not on the existing basis of birthplace or ancestry.” (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 89-748, at 13 (1965) (similar).\nMoreover, harmonizing the statutes is particularly appropriate where the President is imposing restrictions on the entry of aliens to influence foreign governments’ behavior. As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in Hawaii, the President may permissibly distinguish among “classes of aliens on the basis of nationality” when warranted “as retaliatory diplomatic measures responsive to government conduct directed at the United States.” 859 F.3d at 772 n.13. This Court has upheld nationality-based restrictions challenged on constitutional and statutory grounds, see Malek-Marzban, 653 F.2d at 116, and construing Section 1152(a)(1) to disable the President from taking action against the nationals of a foreign state for foreign affairs or national-security reasons (e.g., when on the brink of war with a country) would of course raise serious constitutional concerns.\n36\n\n\fHistorical practice also strongly supports the government’s interpretation of the relevant provisions. In 1986, President Reagan suspended the immigrant entry of “all Cuban nationals,” subject to certain exceptions, until “the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, determines that normal migration procedures with Cuba have been restored.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,470-71. President Carter issued an order in 1979 in response to the Iranian hostage crisis; although the order did not itself deny or revoke visas, the President explained upon its issuance that the State Department would “invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens” and would not reissue visas or issue new visas “except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires.” Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against Iran: Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33233 (“Sanctions Against Iran”); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (1979). Construing Section 1152(a)(1)(A) to forbid nationality-based restrictions on entry would mean that those measures were unlawful.\nThe district court distinguished these prior Presidential actions, as well as the brink-of-war scenario, on the ground that they were of “limited duration, such as during a specific urgent national crisis or public health emergency.” JA 1037. But that distinction has no textual basis in Section 1152(a). Nor is it supported by the underlying facts; if anything, the prior suspensions were more indefinite in scope\n37\n\n\fthan the Proclamation. President Reagan’s suspension of entry of Cuban immigrants was to “remain in effect until such time as the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, determines that normal migration procedures with Cuba have been restored.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,471. And President Carter’s instruction to the State Department was to “invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens” and not to reissue visas or issue new visas “except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires.” Sanctions Against Iran, supra. The Proclamation, by contrast, requires periodic review of the continuing need for the restrictions and establishes a process for recommending that they be terminated or modified. Procl. § 4.\nb. Even assuming that Section 1152(a)(1)(A) were inconsistent with Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1), background principles of construction would require finding that Section 1152(a)(1) gives way. Section 1185(a)(1) was amended to its current form in 1978, after enactment of Section 1152(a)(1)(A), and as the most recent statute, would prevail. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 707(a), 92 Stat. 963, 992-93 (1978). Furthermore, while Section 1152(a)(1)(A) establishes a general rule governing nondiscrimination in the issuance of visas by consular officers and others involved in that process, Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) constitute more specific, and thus controlling, grants of authority expressly and directly to the President to restrict entry of aliens to protect\n38\n\n\fthe national interest. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 170-73; see also NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 941 (2017).\nFinally, even if the district court were correct that Section 1152(a)(1)(A) would otherwise forbid withholding immigrant visas from aliens whose entry was suspended, Section 1152(a)(1)(B) confirms that Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not “limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications.” The means by which the Secretary of State implements the Proclamation’s entry restrictions—i.e., by withholding visas from aliens who are not eligible for entry—constitutes a “procedure[]” within the meaning of Section 1152(a)(1)(B).\nB. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause\nThe district court also erred in holding that the Proclamation’s entry restrictions likely violate the Establishment Clause. The Proclamation is constitutional regardless of whether the Court applies Mandel’s limited standard of review that there need only be a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for excluding aliens abroad, 408 U.S. at 770, or the primary “secular purpose” standard applied in the domestic context in certain circumstances, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).\n39\n\n\f1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Legitimate And Bona Fide Reasons\nThis Court’s now-vacated ruling in IRAP correctly acknowledged that Mandel’s test applies to constitutional challenges to the exclusion of aliens abroad. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 588. Under that test, when the Executive gives “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for excluding an alien, “courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the” asserted constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.\na. Mandel compels the rejection of plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. As the district court correctly acknowledged, JA 1055, the Proclamation’s entry restrictions rest on facially legitimate reasons: protecting national security and encouraging foreign governments to improve their information-sharing practices. See Procl. § 1. The Proclamation describes the global review process undertaken by DHS, in consultation with other agencies; the neutral criteria against which all nations were assessed; the subsequent diplomatic engagement process during which the Department of State encouraged nations to improve their performance; and the resulting recommendations of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. See id. § 1(a)-(f), 1(i).\nThe Proclamation further explains that, in accordance with the Acting Secretary’s recommendations and after consulting with members of the Cabinet, the\n40\n\n\fPresident “craft[ed] * * * country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances, and that would, at the same time, protect the United States until such time as improvements occur.” See id. § 1(h)(i). These facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for the Proclamation’s entry restrictions readily satisfy Mandel’s test.\nb. Relying on this Court’s opinion reviewing the constitutionality of EO2, the district court held that Mandel’s “bona fide” requirement permits courts to look behind the Government’s stated reasons to determine whether they were given in good faith. JA 1055 (citing IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590-91). But IRAP’s holding on that point is no longer good law, not only because it has been vacated as moot, but also because it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017), which described Mandel’s standard as “minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review).” Rational-basis review is objective and does not permit probing government officials’ subjective intentions. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).\nMoreover, even apart from Morales-Santana, IRAP’s holding was not persuasive on its own terms, because it erroneously relied on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Din. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence did not propose an enormous loophole in Mandel, especially with respect to a formal national-security and\n41\n\n\fforeign-policy determination of the President. It merely hypothesized that, if the government had not identified a factual basis for the consular officers’ decision at issue, the plaintiff might have been able to seek “additional factual details” about the basis of the consular officer’s decision (provided the information is not classified). Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). In contrast, when the government does identify a factual basis—as it did in Mandel and in Din (by citing a statutory provision that itself included sufficient factual predicates), and has also done here through the Proclamation’s text—that is the end of the analysis. See id. at 2140 (observing that the citation of a statutory ground of inadmissibility involving terrorism indicates that the government “relied upon a bona fide factual basis for denying [the] visa”). Plaintiffs’ overreading of the Din concurrence also cannot be squared with Mandel, where the Court explicitly rejected “look[ing] behind” the government’s stated reason for denying a waiver of inadmissibility grounds, 408 U.S. at 770, and declined Justice Marshall’s invitation in dissent to take “[e]ven the briefest peek behind the Attorney General’s reason for refusing a waiver,” which he asserted was a “sham.” Id. at 778; see also Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that the concurring decision in Din “left things as Mandel had left them” and that “Mandel tells us not to go behind a facially legitimate and bona fide explanation”), cert. denied, 2017 WL 3136962 (Oct. 30, 2017).\n42\n\n\f2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary a. In McCreary, the Court asked whether the challenged government conduct had the primary purpose or effect of advancing religion. 545 U.S. at 85960. Here, the Proclamation neither mentions nor draws any distinction based on religion, and its “operation,” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993), confirms that it is religion-neutral and not intended to discriminate on the basis of religion. The Proclamation is the result of a months-long worldwide review and process of diplomatic engagement combining the efforts of multiple government agencies and recommendations from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security to the President regarding whether and what entry restrictions were necessary to address the inadequacies identified. The President acted in accordance with those recommendations. Neither plaintiffs nor the district court have even suggested, let alone demonstrated, that the Cabinet secretaries and numerous other government officials involved in that review and consultative process culminating in the Proclamation were acting in bad faith or harbored anti-Muslim animus. Furthermore, the Proclamation establishes entry restrictions that are tailored to the particular information-sharing deficiencies and terrorism risks in each nation. Of the seven countries from which EO-2 and its predecessor suspended entry, the Proclamation omits two Muslim-majority countries (Sudan and Iraq). The President\n43\n\n\fconcluded that Sudan met the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security’s baseline and that, although Iraq fell below the baseline, entry restrictions were not warranted in light of “the close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).” Procl. § 1(g). The Proclamation added entry restrictions for three new countries, two of which are non-Muslim-majority (Venezuela and North Korea) and the third of which has a substantial (approximately 48%) non-Muslim population (Chad). See CIA, The World Factbook: Africa (Chad), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/cd.html. The five other Muslim-majority countries included were all previously identified by Congress or the Executive Branch as posing terrorism-related concerns. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12).\nMoreover, the Proclamation tailors the entry restrictions to the particular country, allowing students and exchange visitors from Iran, while restricting business and tourist nonimmigrant entry for nationals of Libya, Yemen, and Chad, and imposing no exclusions on nonimmigrant entry for Somali nationals.\nThis particularized selection of countries and restrictions would be nonsensical as a supposed “Muslim ban,” but is readily justified as a tailored means of encouraging individual countries to improve inadequate information-sharing and\n44\n\n\fof protecting against security risks in the interim, which are obviously purely secular, not to mention compelling, government interests.\nb. Citing McCreary as principal support, the district court held that these features are insufficient to cure the alleged “taint” from the prior Executive Orders and earlier campaign statements. JA 1063-64, 1072-75. As a threshold matter, the government strongly disagrees that the history preceding the Proclamation is evidence of anti-Muslim bias. But more importantly for present purposes, the Proclamation is significantly different from the prior entry suspensions, both procedurally and substantively. It thus involves nothing remotely like the history of overt and explicit religious displays that were at issue in McCreary. The district court’s criticisms of the Proclamation reflect exactly the kinds of improper secondguessing of national security judgments that the Supreme Court has directed the lower courts not to attempt.\nIn McCreary, the Supreme Court was confronted with a history of three successive Ten Commandments displays at a county courthouse. The first display, of the Ten Commandments standing alone, was clearly unconstitutional under prior Supreme Court precedent, see 545 U.S. at 868, and a second display, erected after suit was filed, also focused on religious messages and was authorized by a resolution that clearly endorsed religion. See id. at 870. The counties then mounted a third display, which “quoted more of the purely religious language of the Ten\n45\n\n\fCommandments than the first two displays had done.” Id. at 872. The Supreme Court concluded that all the displays plainly violated the Establishment Clause, and that the third display in particular represented nothing more than a “litigating position,” and was even more explicitly religious than its predecessors. Id. at 871.\nMcCreary is readily distinguishable in multiple respects. The Proclamation, unlike the religious displays in McCreary, contains no textual or operational reference to religion. The Proclamation is the result of separate action by the President, based on the study, analysis, and recommendations of multiple government offices and officials (including four Cabinet-level officials), none of whom plaintiffs suggest had a religious basis for making the recommendations and providing the advice that culminated in the Proclamation. In addition, EO-2, which expired by its own terms, see p. 7, supra, itself expressly repudiated the notion that it was motivated by or intended to display religious animus, see EO-2 §§ 1(b)(iv), (h)(i). These are exactly the kinds of “genuine changes in constitutionally significant conditions” that McCreary held defeat any claim that the government has acted with an “implausible” secular purpose. 545 U.S. at 874.\nSimilarly in McGowan, the Supreme Court held that a Sunday closing law’s secular exemptions were sufficient to establish that the law no longer was motivated by its original religious purpose of observing the Sabbath, even though the law still contained expressly religious references. 366 U.S. at 445. Here, likewise, the\n46\n\n\flimited restrictions and express exclusions for certain Muslim-majority nations (as well as the process of review and recommendation by government officials whose motives have never been questioned) make clear that the Proclamation implements a good-faith and secular national-security objective. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715-16 (2010) (plurality op.) (criticizing a district court for “dismissing Congress’s motives” for transferring land on which a cross had been unconstitutionally erected to a private party as “illicit” rather than attributing a “reasonable,” lawful purpose for Congress’s actions).\nc. The district court gave several specific reasons for questioning the Proclamation’s secular bona fides, but none withstands even minimal scrutiny, and all represent an inappropriate effort to second-guess national-security determinations that are constitutionally committed to the Executive.\nThe district court first considered it significant that “the underlying architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same,” reasoning that each “bans the issuance of immigrant and non-immigrant visas on the basis of nationality to multiple majority-Muslim countries on the basis of concerns about terrorism.” JA 1067-68. But the Proclamation’s “architecture” is in fact fundamentally different, because it reflects a multi-agency review and recommendation process and tailored substantive restrictions. The district court’s troubling suggestion that none of this matters because countries that are Muslim-\n47\n\n\fmajority are still included in the Proclamation threatens to permanently disable the President from addressing terrorism-related concerns relating to nationality in the very countries where those concerns are currently the most acute. In similar contexts, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of a facially neutral government program “does not turn on” statistical evidence regarding the expected religious/secular impact of that program at any given time. Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639, 658 (2002).\nThe court then questioned the Proclamation’s secular purpose, asserting that “the outcome of the DHS Review was at least partially pre-ordained.” JA 1068. That assertion ignores the relevant EO-2 provisions governing the review process, which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish the criteria by which to identify “whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country,” EO-2 § 2(a) (emphasis added), and to provide a list of any “countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested,” id. § 2(e) (emphases added). Nothing in those provisions cabined the independent judgment of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security—whose good-faith has never been called into question— to decide whether and which countries to recommend for appropriate entry restrictions.\n48\n\n\fThe district court ascribed additional significance to the fact that “a comparison of EO-2 with the Proclamation reveals that many of the criteria considered in the DHS Review, and used to justify the ban on specific countries in the Proclamation, were substantially similar to those used to select the list of countries banned by EO-2.” JA 1068-69. As explained, however, the criteria used were religion-neutral, reflect compelling government interests in national security, and are similar to the criteria that Congress and other Presidents have relied on in the past in previously identifying countries that pose heightened terrorism risks. See pp. 5-7, 31-34, 40-45, supra. For example, the fact that Iran “regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks” and “is the source of significant terrorist threats,” Procl. § 2(b)(i), are exactly the compelling, secular concerns that those charged with protecting our country’s national security should be considering—and that is precisely why both the agencies and the President chose to consider them.\nThe district court also inferred anti-Muslim bias because the Proclamation supposedly treats countries with similar deficiencies differently, in a manner that is asserted to have “a disproportionate impact on majority-Muslim nations” and to manifest animus rather than “flow from the objective factors considered in the review.” JA 1070. But the seemingly different treatment is instead explained by different circumstances, as outlined in the Proclamation itself. For example,\n49\n\n\falthough Somalia generally satisfies the information-sharing baseline, it not only “has significant identity-management deficiencies” but “stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory.” Procl. § 2(h). Likewise, although Venezuela’s “government is uncooperative in verifying whether its citizens pose national security or publicsafety threats,” it “has adopted many of the baseline standards identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security” and the United States has “alternative sources for obtaining information to verify the citizenship and identity of nationals from Venezuela.” Id. § 2(f)(i). These country-specific differences, rather than animus, are the self-evident basis for the differing treatment.\nThe district court also diminished the significance of the inclusion of North Korea in the list of countries subject to entry restrictions on the basis that the restrictions were of “little practical consequence” because that country would likely involve “only a fraction of one percent of all those affected by the Proclamation.” JA 1066. The inclusion of those non-Muslim-majority countries in the Proclamation underscores the Proclamation’s religion-neutral purpose and effect, and the Proclamation sets forth valid reasons for concluding that the inclusion of those countries is important.\nThe district court further asserted that the country-based entry restrictions in the Proclamation are “unprecedented,” distinguishing prior country-based entry bans\n50\n\n\fon the basis that they applied to “a single nation” “in response to a specific diplomatic dispute.” JA 1071. But the President determined that each of the eight countries presented specific risks warranting entry restrictions, just as the Iran and Cuba restrictions were the result of specific problems relating to those countries. The entry restrictions are commensurate with the problem they are intended to address, and that does not change simply because more than one country presents the problem.\nThe district court also maintained that “[d]efendants offer no evidence * * * showing an intelligence-based terrorism threat justifying a ban on entire nationalities,” and suggested that individualized assessment of nationals from those countries could adequately protect against the threat. JA 1071. Where the government faces a structural problem that is common to all nationals of a foreign country, however, it surely has the latitude to address the problem on a national basis—particularly where one of the goals sought to be attained is to encourage that country to change its practices nationwide to address the problem. The district court’s reasoning was particularly problematic because it involved second-guessing the President’s predictive judgments about what is necessary to protect the country against national-security risks, which are entitled to the utmost deference. See AAADC, 525 U.S. at 491 (noting that courts are generally “ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of the Executive’s\n51\n\n\f“reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat”); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). The district court purported to acknowledge that it was required to defer to that judgment, yet immediately, and improperly, rejected it in the guise of assessing whether the government acted with a permissible secular purpose. JA 1072.\nFinally, the court concluded that statements by the President and his advisors show that the Proclamation fundamentally rests on an illicit religious purpose. The President’s campaign statements are irrelevant for reasons already discussed, see pp. 45-47, supra, and the cited statements that occurred after the issuance of EO-2 do not reflect any religious animus, but the compelling secular goal of protecting national security from an amply-documented present threat. That reading is consistent with other statements, such as the President’s statements in an official address praising Islam as “one of the world’s great faiths;” decrying “the murder of innocent Muslims;” and emphasizing that the fight against terrorism “is not a battle between different faiths, different sects, or different civilizations,” but one “between barbaric criminals who seek to obliterate human life, and decent people of all religions who seek to protect it.” Pres. Donald J. Trump, Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit (May 21, 2017), httpps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/05/21/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit.\n52\n\n\fIn sum, the district court plainly erred in holding that plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on their Establishment Clause claim. And because plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim rests on the same religious-purpose allegations as their Establishment Clause claims, it fails for the same reasons. III. The Balance of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief\nA. The District Court’s Injunction Imposes Serious, Irreparable Harm On The Government And The Public\n1. The district court’s injunction barring enforcement of the Proclamation’s entry restrictions undermines the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to safeguard the Nation’s security and intrudes on the political branches’ constitutional prerogatives. “[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” Agee, 453 U.S. at 307, and “the Government’s interest in combatting terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order,” HLP, 561 U.S. at 28.\nThe injunction also causes irreparable injury by invalidating an action taken at the height of the President’s authority. “[T]he President has unique responsibility” over “foreign and military affairs.” Sale, 509 U.S. at 188. Rules “concerning the admissibility of aliens” necessarily rely on not just legislative authority but also “inherent executive power.” Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. And because “the President act[ed] pursuant to an express * * * authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress\n53\n\n\fcan delegate.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84 (2015).\nThe district court’s injunction overriding the President’s judgment thus necessarily imposes irreparable harm. Even a single State “suffers a form of irreparable injury” “[a]ny time [it] is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); see, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 2002). A fortiori, this injunction imposes irreparable injury on the President and the public given “the singular importance of [his] duties” to the entire Nation. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982).\n2. The district court held that “Defendants are not directly harmed by a preliminary injunction preventing them from enforcing a Proclamation likely to be found unconstitutional,” JA 1077-78, but that ignores the harm if, instead, the Proclamation is ultimately held to be constitutional. The district court also expressed the view that “[d]efendants have not shown that national security cannot be maintained without an unprecedented eight-country travel ban,” and that “[e]ven with an injunction, visa applicants from the Designated Countries would be screened through the standard, individualized vetting process under which the burden is on the individual applicants to prove that they are not inadmissible to the United States.”\n54\n\n\fJA 1078. That approach improperly second-guessed the President’s nationalsecurity determination, by disregarding that the purpose of the entry restrictions is to encourage the covered countries to improve their information-sharing practices and to protect this country in the interim in light of the adverse effect those inadequate practices have on individualized vetting and screening. And it also ignores that waivers are available on a case-specific basis under the Proclamation.\nB. A Preliminary Injunction Is Not Necessary To Prevent Any Substantial Harm To Plaintiffs\nPlaintiffs, by contrast, would suffer no cognizable harm, much less irreparable injury, if the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are allowed to take effect. The district court cited “prolonged separation from their family members,” JA 1077, but delay in entry alone does not amount to irreparable harm. As already noted, visa times vary widely, and it is not unusual for an alien to wait months or years for an immigrant visa. Until aliens abroad meet otherwise-applicable visa requirements and seek and are denied a waiver, they have not received final agency action, and plaintiffs’ claimed harms are too “remote” and “speculative” to merit injunctive relief. Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991).\nThe district court also concluded that plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims show irreparable harm per se, JA 1076-77, but the cited cases all involved plaintiffs whose own Establishment Clause rights were violated. The district court cited no\n55\n\n\fcase supporting the proposition that a plaintiff challenging alleged religious discrimination against third parties has established irreparable harm per se.\nC. The Global Injunction Is Improper At a minimum, the district court erred because Article III and equitable principles require that any injunction be limited to redressing plaintiffs’ own cognizable, irreparable injuries. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). The global injunction is vastly overbroad, notwithstanding the district court’s exclusion of “[i]ndividuals lacking a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Order 2. Although the Supreme Court so narrowed the injunctions against EO-2, see Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2088-89, the Court did not conclude that similar relief was required in all circumstances, and it tailored its stay to its assessment of the equities. This case is very different for the reasons described, and the equitable balancing requires following the ordinary rule of plaintiff-specific relief.\nCONCLUSION For these reasons, the district court’s preliminary injunction should be reversed. At a minimum, it should be vacated except for those aliens whose exclusion would impose a cognizable, irreparable injury on plaintiffs.\n56\n\n\fNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\nNOVEMBER 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nCHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nDOUGLAS N. LETTER /s/ Sharon Swingle SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n57\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-face requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-volume limitations of Rule 32(a)(7)(B). The brief contains 12,711 words, excluding the parts of the brief excluded by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 1, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 1 of 38\n\nNos. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n____________________________________________________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients;\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO,\nPlaintiffs,\nv. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary\nof Homeland Security; REX W. TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence,\nDefendants – Appellants. ____________________________________________________________\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Maryland, Southern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n____________________________________________________________\n[Caption continued on inside cover] ____________________________________________________________\nBRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER\nIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE\nAmir H. Ali Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center 718 7th Street NW Washington D.C. 20001 P: (202) 869-3434 F: (202) 689-3435 amir.ali@macarthurjustice.org\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 2 of 38\n\n____________________________________________________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ____________________________________________________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K.\nMCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in hisofficial capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official\ncapacity as Attorney General of the United States,\nDefendants-Appellants. ____________________________________________________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ____________________________________________________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT\nOF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State,\nDefendants-Appellants.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 3 of 38\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center discloses that it is a not-for-profit organization with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates, and that no publicly-held corporation owns 10 percent or more of its stock.\n\nDated: November 15, 2017\n\n/s/ Amir H. Ali\nAmir H. Ali Counsel for Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 4 of 38\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS Corporate Disclosure Statement .................................................................................i\nTable Of Authorities ................................................................................................ iii\nInterest Of Amicus Curiae .........................................................................................1\nIntroduction And Summary Of Argument.................................................................2\nArgument.................................................................................................................... 5\nI. The President’s Expressions Of Hatred, Dissemination Of Propaganda, And Pledges To Use His Official Power Against Muslims. ........................................5\nA. The President’s Description Of Muslim People As A “Problem” And His Spreading Of Vilifying Propaganda. ...................................................5\n1. Labeling Muslims A “Problem.”...........................................................5\n2. Spreading Anti-Muslim Propaganda.....................................................8\nB. The President’s Express Desire To Close Down And Surveille Mosques, Profile Muslims, And Create A Muslim Registry. ..................11\n1. Closing And Surveilling Mosques. .....................................................11\n2. Registering American Muslims...........................................................14\n3. Profiling Muslims................................................................................15\nC. The President’s Specific Pledge To Restrict The Entry Of Muslims Under The Guise Of A Neutral Order. .....................................................16\nD. The President Has Reaffirmed His Discriminatory Purpose On Several Occasions In The Lead Up To This Proclamation. .....................22\nII. This Court’s Failure To Intervene Would Be A Serious Abdication Of The Judicial Role........................................................................................................28\nConclusion ...............................................................................................................30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 5 of 38\n\nCASES\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nPage(s)\n\nBoumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) ..............................................................29\n\nDred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) ..............................................................4\n\nHamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) .......................................................... 29-30\n\nHawai‘i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) ........................................1\n\nHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ......................................29\n\nKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)...........................................4, 5, 19\n\nUnited States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) ...............................29\n\nUnited States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) ..................................................29\n\nVill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) .........28\n\nSTATUTES\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)................................................................................................3, 20\n\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\n\nMichael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257 (2004).....................................................................30\n\nJamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379 (2011) ...............................................................................30\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 6 of 38\n\nINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The MacArthur Justice Center (“MJC”) is a not-for-profit organization founded by the family of J. Roderick MacArthur to advocate for human rights and social justice through litigation. MJC has represented clients facing myriad human rights and civil rights injustices, including issues of discrimination, the unlawful detention of foreign nationals, and the rights of marginalized groups in the American justice system. MJC has an interest in the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in determining whether government officials have acted with discriminatory animus against an unpopular minority group. MJC submits this brief to document the President’s extensive record of hatred against people of the Muslim faith, his open desire to curtail their rights, and his specific, sustained promise to inhibit their entry to the U.S. MJC’s prior briefing was relied upon by the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii in enjoining Executive Order 13780, see Hawai‘i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1137 n.14 (D. Haw. 2017), and by parties in the various proceedings challenging the President’s orders.1\n1 The parties have provided blanket consent for the filing of amicus briefs. No party, party’s counsel, or person other than MJC authored this brief in whole or in part, or contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 7 of 38\n\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This President of the United States selected an unpopular minority faith that makes up 1% of the nation’s population, ran a campaign that vilified and spread propaganda about that minority faith, and has, upon taking office, sought to deliver on one of his most repeated promises: To prevent people of that faith from entering the country. The MacArthur Justice Center submits this brief to document the President’s extensive record of hatred against Muslims, his open desire to curtail their rights in various ways, and his specific, sustained pledge to inhibit their entry. In its brief to this Court, the government suggests that these proceedings arise from “some perceived” sense of hostility toward people of the Muslim faith. Gov’t Br. at 18. The government says, without elaboration, that it “strongly disagrees” there “is evidence of anti-Muslim bias” in “the history proceeding the Proclamation.” Id. at 45. Those representations are divorced from fact. As documented herein, the historical record shows that the President engaged in a sustained and targeted attack on Muslim people, labeling the religion as a “problem” and affirmatively disseminating anti-Muslim propaganda. He openly and repeatedly expressed his desire to curtail the rights of persons who practice Islam, including by shutting down mosques, surveilling and profiling Muslims, and creating a Muslim registry.\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 8 of 38\n\nThe record also shows that the President not only pledged to restrict the entry of Muslim people, but that he did so with remarkable specificity. In addition to openly expressing his intent to exclude Muslims from the country, Mr. Trump telegraphed that he would achieve it under the guise of a neutral order—by speaking in terms of “territories” and “extreme vetting” instead of “Muslims” (just as he attempts to do in his Proclamation). He also explained how he would get away with it—by asserting the President’s broad immigration authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), the provision invoked in his Proclamation and by the government before this Court. Gov’t Br. at 4-5. Indeed, Mr. Trump even expressly invoked the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II as proof that he would succeed in singling out Muslims. This Presidential Proclamation is the assault on Muslims that the President promised he would deliver.\nThe government presupposes that this case is about whether or how the President can overcome the “taint” of his pledge to discriminate against and restrict the entry of Muslim people. Gov’t Br. at 18. But that question is academic on this record. The President has never even attempted to retract his pledge since taking office and has, to the contrary, reaffirmed it. Before replacing his second Executive Order with the present Proclamation, for instance, the President expressly stated that he would prefer an order that “go[es] all the way” and does “what [he] wanted\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 9 of 38\n\nto do in the first place.” In the immediate lead up to the present Proclamation, he\nalso repeatedly chided the Department of Justice for making the language in his\norders “politically correct”—a criticism whose only plausible interpretation is that\nthe President views the territories named in the orders as a proxy for religion. And\ndespite the Acting Solicitor General’s repeated representations that the President’s\norders and Proclamation have no relation to his long-promised “Travel Ban,” the\nPresident has repeatedly characterized it as just that.\nIf this Court failed to intervene on this record, the judicial abdication would\nbe matched only by cases like Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), and\nKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Indeed—setting aside that the\nPresident himself has expressly invoked the internment of Japanese Americans to\njustify his actions—the government’s call for this Court to step aside the moment\nthe President utters the word “national-security interest,” Gov’t Br. 15, is chillingly\nreminiscent of the closing remarks defending the government’s detention of\nJapanese Americans in Korematsu itself:\nTo cast this case into outlines of [religious] prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. [Muslims were] not excluded from the [United States] because of hostility to [them] or [their religion]. [They were] excluded because we are at war with [radical Islamic terrorism], because the [President] feared an invasion of our [country] and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because [he] decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that [certain persons of Muslim religion] be segregated from the [United States]\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 10 of 38\n\ntemporarily, and, finally, because [the President] . . . determined that [he] should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some [Muslims], the [President] considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.\nId. at 233 (with modification in brackets).\nThe MacArthur Justice Center urges the Court not to repeat that depraved\nmoment in U.S. history.\nARGUMENT I. The President’s Expressions Of Hatred, Dissemination Of Propaganda,\nAnd Pledges To Use His Official Power Against Muslims. The President’s Proclamation followed repeated and unabashed admissions\nof an intent to discriminate against people who choose to practice Islam. This\nSection documents the President’s hateful statements against Muslim people, his\naffirmative dissemination of propaganda vilifying them, his expressed desire to\noppress them, and his specific and sustained pledge to restrict their entry into the\ncountry.\nA. The President’s Description Of Muslim People As A “Problem” And His Spreading Of Vilifying Propaganda.\n1. Labeling Muslims A “Problem.” President Trump has long advocated that a “Muslim problem” exists in the\nU.S., that Islam is a religion of “tremendous hatred,” and that there is no\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 11 of 38\n\nmeaningful distinction between being Muslim and being a terrorist. As early as\nApril 2011, he recounted:\nBill O’Reilly asked me is there a Muslim problem? And I said absolutely, yes. . . . I mean I could have said, “Oh absolutely not Bill, there’s no Muslim problem, everything is wonderful, just forget about the World Trade Center.” But you have to speak the truth. . . . The Koran is very interesting. . . . there’s something there that teaches some very negative vibe. . . . there’s tremendous hatred out there that I’ve never seen anything like it.2\nThe President has repeatedly echoed these views. On September 18, 2015,\nfor instance, Mr. Trump had the following exchange with an audience member at\nan event:\nQuestioner: “We have a problem in this country. It’s called Muslims.”\nMr. Trump: “Right.”\nQuestioner: “You know our current president is one. You know he’s not even an American.”\nMr. Trump: “We need this question.”3\n\n2 David Brody, Brody File Exclusive: Donald Trump Says Something in Koran Teaches a ‘Very Negative Vibe,’ CBN News (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www1.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2011/04/12/brody-file-exclusivedonald-trump-says-something-in-koran-teaches. 3 Jonathan Merritt, Trump’s Proposals Could Backfire on Christians, The Atlantic (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/donaldtrump-muslims-christians/417255/; Theodore Schleifer, Trump doesn’t challenge anti-Muslim questioner at event, CNN (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/ 2015/09/17/politics/donald-trump-obama-muslim-new-hampshire/.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 12 of 38\n\nThe President has adhered to his view that people of the Muslim faith are a\n“problem” and vilified them on numerous other occasions:\n On December 10, 2015, Mr. Trump tweeted three separate statements referring to a “massive Muslim problem,” praising an author for acknowledging “Muslim problems,” and associating Muslims with terrorism.4\n On February 4, 2016, Mr. Trump was asked to clarify: “Is it really a Muslim problem, or is it a radical Islamist problem?” He declined to accept that distinction, saying, “Maybe it’s a Muslim problem, maybe it’s not.”5\n On March 9, 2016, Mr. Trump stated, “I think Islam hates us” and that Muslims have “tremendous hatred” and “unbelievable hatred.” He expressly rejected that a distinction could be drawn between radical Islam and Islam itself, claiming “[i]t’s very hard to define.”6\n The following day, on March 10, 2016, Mr. Trump was asked whether his statement that “Islam hates us” referred to all 1.6 billion Muslims in the world. He responded: “I mean a lot of them. I mean a lot of them.” When given another opportunity to clarify, he stated: “There’s something going on that maybe you don’t know about, maybe a lot of other people don’t know about, but there’s tremendous hatred. And I will stick with exactly what I said [the previous day].”7\n4 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Dec. 10, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/674934005725331456; Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Dec. 10, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/674936832010887168; Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Dec. 10, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/ 675123192864899072. 5 CNN Interview of Donald Trump, YouTube (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uW9UlMqJtro (minutes 18:42 to 18:46). 6 Theodore Schleifer, Donald Trump: ‘I think Islam hates us’, CNN (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/. 7 Transcript of Republican Debate in Miami, CNN (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/10/politics/republican-debate-transcript-full-text/.\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 13 of 38\n\n On June 13, 2016, Mr. Trump equated Islam with the Islamic State terrorist group and stated that “[r]efugees are trying to take over our children” by telling them “how wonderful Islam is.”8\n2. Spreading Anti-Muslim Propaganda.\nThe President has gone further, disseminating propaganda that vilifies\npeople of the Muslim faith. On November 21, 2015, for instance, he falsely\nproclaimed: “I watched when the World Trade Center came tumbling down. And I\nwatched in Jersey City, New Jersey, where thousands and thousands of people\nwere cheering as that building was coming down. Thousands of people were\ncheering.”9\nIn the face of the authorities and articles debunking his claim,10 Mr. Trump\ncontinued to spread this lie:\n On November 22, 2015, he stated: “There were people that were cheering on the other side of New Jersey, where you have large Arab populations. They were cheering as the World Trade Center came down. . . . there were people\n8 Donald Trump Remarks in Manchester, New Hampshire, C-SPAN (Jun. 13, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?410976-1/donald-trump-delivers-remarksnational-security-threats (minutes 20:05 to 20:30). 9 Glenn Kessler, Trump’s outrageous claim that ‘thousands’ of New Jersey Muslims celebrated the 9/11 attacks, Wash. Post (Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/11/22/donaldtrumps-outrageous-claim-that-thousands-of-new-jersey-muslims-celebrated-the911-attacks/. 10 See, e.g., Lauren Carroll, Fact Checking Trump’s claim that thousands in New Jersey cheered when World Trade Center tumbled, Politifact (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/nov/22/donaldtrump/factchecking-trumps-claim-thousands-new-jersey-ch/.\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 14 of 38\n\ncheering as that building came down—as those buildings came down. And that tells you something.”11\n On November 23, 2015, he again stated: “I saw people getting together and, in fairly large numbers, celebrating as the World Trade Center was coming down, killing thousands of people–thousands and thousands of people… People are still dying over what happened with the World Trade Center. And they’re dying a terrible death. And I saw people.”12\n On November 25, 2015, Mr. Trump tweeted: “Credible Source on 9-11 Muslim Celebrations: FBI” and linked to an article stating that a retired FBI agent referred to Mr. Trump’s claims as “plausible.”13 He repeated this tweet on December 7, 2015.14\n On December 2, 2015, Mr. Trump shared another individual’s tweet claiming to have seen “militant Muslims burning our flag and burning George Bush photos and figures, right after 9/11!”15\nThe President also repeatedly praised a false story involving the mass\nmurder of Muslims using pig blood. On February 19, 2016—treating “terrorist” as\na synonym for being Muslim—he approvingly recounted the following story:\n11 See Kessler, supra note 9. 12 AP Archive, Trump Defends 9/11 Celebrations with Article (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/US-OH-Trump-CR/cadcfee1334d2a1fea065ba383ef6f8e; Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump on waterboarding: “If it doesn’t work, they deserve it anyway,’ Wash. Post (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/11/23/ donald-trump-on-waterboarding-if-it-doesnt-work-they-deserve-it-anyway/. 13 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 25, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/669682774673137665; see also Bill Riales, Credible Source on 9-11 Muslim Celebrations: FBI, WKRG (Nov 25, 2015), http://wkrg.com/2015/11/25/crediblesource-on-9-11-muslim-celebrations-fbi/. 14 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Dec 7, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/673905762087936000; see also Riales, supra note 13. 15 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Dec 2, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/672182509111767041.\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 15 of 38\n\nEarly in the century, last century . . . they had a terror problem. And you know there’s a whole thing with swine and animals and pigs and you know the story, they don’t like that. General Pershing was a rough guy . . . he took the 50 terrorists, and he took 50 men and he dipped 50 bullets in pigs’ blood . . . And he had his men load his rifles, and he lined up the 50 people, and they shot 49 of those people. . . . And for 25 years, there wasn’t a problem.16\nPresident Trump repeated this anti-Muslim propaganda, adding new\nflourish. On March 11, 2016, for instance, again equating being a terrorist to being\na Muslim, he recounted:\nSo General Pershing, . . . they catch 50 terrorists in the Philippines . . . And as you know, swine, pig, . . . a big problem for them, big problem. He took two pigs, they chopped them open. Took the bullets that were going to go and shoot these men. Took the bullets, the 50 bullets, dropped them in the pigs, swished them around, so there was blood all over those bullets . . . They put the bullets into the rifles. And they shot 49 men . . . I’m just saying, if we’re going to win, we’re going to win or let’s not play the game and let’s not be a country any more. They put the bullets in the rifles and they shot 49 of the 50 men. Dead. Boom. So it was a pig-infested bullet in each one. . . .\n16 C-Span, Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Charleston, South Carolina (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?404947-1/donald-trump-campaign-rallycharleston-south-carolina (minutes 34:09 to 35:31); Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump cites dubious legend about Gen. Pershing, pig’s blood and Muslims, Politifact (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/ 2016/feb/23/donald-trump/donald-trump-cites-dubious-legend-about-gen-pershi/; Jenna Johnson and Jose A. DelReal, Trump tells story about killing terrorists with bullets dipped in pigs’ blood, though there’s no proof of it, Wash. Post (Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/20/ trumps-story-about-killing-terrorists-with-bullets-dipped-in-pigs-blood-is-likelynot-true/; see also David Mikkelson, Pershing the Thought, Snopes (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.snopes.com/rumors/pershing.asp, debunking Mr. Trump’s story about General Pershing.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 16 of 38\n\nFor 28 years, there was no terrorism. . . . We have to do what we have to do. We have to clean it out.17\nAs discussed in Section I.D, the President has continued to repeat this\nparticular propaganda after taking office, including in the lead up to the present\nProclamation.18\nB. The President’s Express Desire To Close Down And Surveille Mosques, Profile Muslims, And Create A Muslim Registry.\n1. Closing And Surveilling Mosques.\nThe President has, on numerous occasions, called for closing and surveilling\nmosques in America. On November 16, 2015, for example, he expressed his\npreference for shutting down mosques, saying: “[I]t’s something that you’re going\nto have to strongly consider because some of the ideas and some of the hatred—the\nabsolute hatred—is coming from these areas.”19\n17 FULL Speech: Donald Trump rally in Dayton, OH 3-12-2016, YouTube (Mar. 12, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9KOAHf4GCw (minutes 42:45 to 46:45); Mark Z. Barabak, All in a day’s Trump rally: sneering, sarcasm, protests, Los Angeles Times (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/ nation/politics/la-na-trump-rallies-20160312-story.html; see also Lydia Wheeler, Trump resurrects story of Muslims shot with pig’s blood-dipped bullets, The Hill (Mar. 12, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news-campaigns/ 272780-trump-resurrects-story-of-muslims-shot-with-pigs. 18 See Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Aug. 17, 2017), https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/898254409511129088 (encouraging people to “[s]tudy what General Pershing of the United States did to terrorists when caught.”). 19 Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump would ‘strongly consider’ closing some mosques in the United States, Wash. Post (Nov. 16, 2015),\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 17 of 38\n\nTwo days later, when asked whether he would actually shut down mosques,\nMr. Trump responded that there was “absolutely no choice” but to do so: “A lot of\npeople understand it. We’re going to have no choice. There’s absolutely no\nchoice.”20\nThe President has called for shutting down mosques or the suspicionless\nsurveillance of mosques on numerous other occasions:\n On October 21, 2015, Mr. Trump stated that he was “going to have to certainly look at” closing mosques in the United States.21\n On November 16, 2015, Mr. Trump said: “You’re going to have to watch and study the mosques, because a lot of talk is going on at the mosques.”22\n On November 19, 2015, Mr. Trump was asked whether his push for increased surveillance of American Muslims could include warrantless searches. He stated that he would consider a series of drastic measures against Muslims: “We’re going to have to do things that we never did\nhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/11/16/donald-trumpwould-strongly-consider-closing-some-mosques-in-the-united-states/. 20 Nick Gass, Trump: ‘Absolutely no choice’ but to close mosques, Politico (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/trump-close-mosques-216008; Trump says US will ‘have no choice’ but to shut some mosques down, Fox News (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/11/17/trump-says-us-willhave-no-choice-but-to-shut-mosques-down.html. 21 Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Donald Trump says he would consider closing down some mosques in the U.S., Wash. Post (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/10/21/donald-trumpsays-he-would-consider-closing-down-some-mosques-in-the-u-s/. 22 Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump says he never called for profiling Muslims, Politifact (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/ 2016/sep/21/donald-trump/donald-trump-says-he-never-called-profiling-muslim/.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 18 of 38\n\nbefore. . . . And certain things will be done that we never thought would happen in this country in terms of information and learning about the enemy. And so we’re going to have to do certain things that were frankly unthinkable a year ago.”23\n At a November 21, 2015 rally, Mr. Trump stated: “[J]ust to say it clear—I want surveillance of these people. I want surveillance if we have to, and I don’t care. . . . I want surveillance of certain mosques.”24\n On December 7, 2015, Mr. Trump called for the surveillance of mosques, again equating the Muslim religion with hatred and terror: “Yes, we have to look at mosques. . . . We have no choice. We have to see what’s out there, because something is happening in there. Man, there’s anger. There’s anger. And we have to know about it.”25\n On June 13, 2016, Mr. Trump stated: “We have to be very strong in terms of looking at the mosques, you know, which a lot of people say, ‘Oh, we don’t want to do that. We don’t want to do that.’ We’re beyond that.”26\n On June 15, 2016, Mr. Trump stated: “We have to go and we have to maybe check, respectfully, the mosques.”27\n On June 19, 2016, when asked what it means to “respectfully check a mosque,” Mr. Trump clarified that he meant the suspicionless surveillance and shutdown of mosques: “Well, you do as they used to do in New York,\n23 Hunter Walker, Donald Trump has big plans for ‘radical Islamic’ terrorists, 2016 and ‘that communist’ Bernie Sanders, Yahoo News (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/donald-trump-has-big-plans1303117537878070.html. 24 Lauren Carroll, In Context: Donald Trump’s comments on a database of American Muslims, Politifact (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2015/nov/24/donald-trumps-comments-database-american-muslims/. 25 Transcript, Trump Calls for Ban on Muslims Entering the U.S., CNN (Dec 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1512/08/es.02.html. 26 See Jacobson, supra note 22. 27 Jeremy Diamond, Trump doubles down on calls for mosque surveillance, CNN (Jun. 15, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/15/politics/donald-trump-muslimsmosque-surveillance/.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 19 of 38\n\nprior to this mayor dismantling. By the way, if you go to France right now, . . . they are closing down mosques. . . . They are actually closing down mosques.”28\n2. Registering American Muslims.\nMr. Trump also repeatedly advocated for registering all Americans who\nchoose to practice the Muslim faith.\nOn November 19, 2015, Mr. Trump was asked whether he would require\nMuslims to register or carry a special form of identification that noted their\nreligion, and he responded: “We’re going to have to look at a lot of things very\nclosely. We’re going to have to look at the mosques. We’re going to have to look\nvery, very carefully.”29 The following day, when asked pointedly whether he was\nin favor of implementing a database tracking Muslims, he responded, “Oh I would\ncertainly implement that. Absolutely.”30 When asked whether Muslims would be\nlegally obligated to sign into the database, Mr. Trump responded, “They have to\nbe—they have to be.”31\n28 Face the Nation transcripts June 19, 2016: Trump, Lunch, LaPierre, Feinstein, CBS News (Jun. 19, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nationtranscripts-june-19-2016-trump-lynch-lapierre-feinstein/; see also Jacobson, supra note 22. 29 See Walker, supra note 23. 30 Vaughn Hillyard, Donald Trump’s Plan for a Muslim Database Draws Comparison to Nazi Germany, NBC News (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-says-he-would-certainlyimplement-muslim-database-n466716. 31 Id.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 20 of 38\n\nMr. Trump was asked how registering Muslims would be different from the\nNazis’ registration of Jewish people. He responded four times: “You tell me.”32\nThe President has echoed his call for a registry of American Muslims on\nseveral occasions:\n On November 21, 2015, Mr. Trump reaffirmed his desire to have a database of all Muslims: “So the database—I said yeah, that’s alright fine . . . but database is okay, and watch list is okay, and surveillance is okay. If you don’t mind, I want to be—I want to surveil.”33\n The following day, Mr. Trump was asked: “You did stir up a controversy with those comments over the database. Let’s try to clear that up. Are you unequivocally now ruling out a database on all Muslims?” He responded, “No not at all.”34\n The day following that, Mr. Trump stated: “We have to really be vigilant with respect to the Muslim population . . . we have to surveil; we have to create lists; we have the refugees coming in and we have to create lists.”35\n3. Profiling Muslims.\nOn June 19, 2016, Mr. Trump stated that it was “common sense” to profile\nMuslims.36 He later went further, stating on September 19, 2016, that there is “no\nchoice” but to profile Muslim people.37\n32 Id. 33 ABC 33/40, Donald Trump in Birmingham: Full speech at the BJCC (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgvPoFo1zPY (minutes 43:11 to 43:32). 34 See Carroll, supra note 22. 35 Donald Trump in Ohio: U.S. has become ‘soft, weak,’ Dayton Daily News (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/national-govt--politics/donaldtrump-ohio-has-become-soft-weak/5ZOBQutE4XSjTxV2NjvFnJ/.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 21 of 38\n\nC. The President’s Specific Pledge To Restrict The Entry Of Muslims Under The Guise Of A Neutral Order.\nMr. Trump repeatedly promised that he would prevent Muslims from\nentering the U.S. and that he would achieve this result by speaking in terms of\n“territories” and “extreme vetting” instead of using the word “Muslim.” He also\npreviewed that, upon doing so, he would invoke the President’s broad immigration\npowers—just as the Government does now—and justify that position by reference\nto the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.\nOn December 7, 2015, Mr. Trump announced on his website: “Donald J.\nTrump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United\nStates.”38 The same day that Mr. Trump issued this announcement, he tweeted it\nwith the title “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration.”39 Further equating\nMuslims with hatred and terror, he tweeted, “Just put out a very important policy\n36 Face the Nation transcripts June 19, 2016: Trump, Lynch, LaPierre, Feinstein, CBS News (June 19, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nationtranscripts-june-19-2016-trump-lynch-lapierre-feinstein/. 37 Aaron Blake, Donald Trump doesn’t call his position racial profiling. It is., Wash. Post (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/09/20/donald-trump-doesnt-call-his-position-racial-profiling-it-is/. 38 Press Release, Trump-Pence, Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20170508054010/ https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-onpreventing-muslim-immigration (Internet Archive record on May 8, 2017). 39 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Dec. 7, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/673993417429524480.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 22 of 38\n\nstatement on the extraordinary influx of hatred & danger coming into our country. We must be vigilant!”40 At a rally the same day, Mr. Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims,” and added: “We have no choice. We have no choice. We have no choice.”41 He also appeared on national television to advocate his ban on Muslims.42\nOn December 8, 2015, the day following the announcement of his intent to ban Muslims, Mr. Trump was asked whether such a “broad approach against all Muslims” would be counterproductive, in contrast to targeting people the Government had reason to investigate. Mr. Trump confirmed that he would not distinguish between Muslims and people suspected of wrongdoing, citing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World War II Executive Proclamations authorizing the detention and internment of Japanese, German, and Italian aliens: “[L]ook at Franklin Roosevelt . . . Take a look at Presidential proclamations back a long time\n\n40 Jenna Johnson, Trump calls for ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims\nentering the United States,’ Wash. Post (Dec. 7, 2015),\nhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-\ncalls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-united-states/. 41 Id. 42 Id.\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 23 of 38\n\nago, 2525, 2526, and 2527 what he was doing with Germans, Italians, and\nJapanese because he had to do it.”43\nWhen asked how border officials might implement his plan, Mr. Trump\nexplained: “They would say, ‘are you Muslim?’” The commentator further\nquestioned: “And if they said yes, they would not be allowed in the country?”\nMr. Trump responded, “That’s correct.”44\nThat same day, when asked whether he was given “any pause at all” by\nbeing compared to Hitler, Mr. Trump again justified banning Muslims based on\nPresident Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese Americans, stating: “No because\nwhat I’m doing is no different than what F.D.R. did. F.D.R.’s solution for\nGermans, Italians, Japanese, many years ago.”45 Asked if he was in favor of\ninternment camps, Mr. Trump repeated his reliance upon President Roosevelt’s\nactions during World War II: “He did the same thing.”46\n43 Donald Trump On Muslim Travel Ban, Obama And 2016, YouTube (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5I3E3-U-1jc (minutes 00:46 to 01:03). 44 Donald Trump On Muslim Travel Ban, Obama And 2016, YouTube (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5I3E3-U-1jc (minutes 14:58 to 15:14); Hardball with Chris Matthews Transcript 12/8/15, MSNBC (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/transcripts/hardball/2015-12-08. 45 Miriam Hernandez, Trump Cites History to Defend Muslim Immigration Ban, ABC 7 (Dec. 9, 2015), http://abc7.com/politics/trump-cites-history-to-defendmuslim-immigration-ban/1116396/. 46 Id.\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 24 of 38\n\nTwo days later, on December 10, 2015, Mr. Trump defended his position by\npublishing a link to an article stating that Islam is a “very evil and wicked\nreligion,” a “false religion,” advocating that Muslims should be banned, and\nmaking further analogy to the treatment of Japanese during World War II.47\nOn March 9, 2016, Mr. Trump denied that a distinction could be made\nbetween “radical Islam” and “Islam itself,” and stated “we can’t allow people\ncoming into this country who have this hatred of the United States.”48 Echoing the\njustification used by the Government to detain Japanese Americans in\nKorematsu—he claimed that it was necessary to include all Muslims because “you\ndon’t know who is who.”49 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19 (“temporary\nexclusion [of all Japanese Americans] was rested by the military” on the rationale\nthat “it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal\nfrom the loyal”).\nMoreover, on June 13, 2016, Mr. Trump previewed that he would attempt to\ndefend his religious ban based on the President’s immigration authority. Indeed,\n47 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Dec. 10, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/675034063447662592; see also Sarah Larimer, Why Franklin Graham says Donald Trump is right about stopping Muslim immigration, Wash. Post (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/12/10/whyfranklin-graham-says-donald-trump-is-right-about-stopping-muslim-immigration/. 48 Transcript, Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/09/acd.01.html. 49 Id.; see also Schleifer, supra note 6.\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 25 of 38\n\njust as he did in his Proclamation and the government does before this Court, Mr. Trump invoked the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), stating that “laws of the United States give the president powers to suspend entry into the country of any class of persons . . . as he or she deems appropriate.”50\nTwo days later, on June 15, 2016, Mr. Trump explained that he would not back down from pursuing his “temporary ban on Muslim integration,” again equating being Muslims with being a radical terrorist. He stated, “You are going to have to watch and are going to have to see. I have done a lot of things that nobody thought I could do.”51\nIn July 2016, Mr. Trump made explicit that he would continue to pursue a ban on Muslim entry into the U.S. upon being elected, but explained that he would achieve it by speaking in terms of “territories” and “extreme vetting.” On July 21, 2016, Mr. Trump stated, “[W]e must immediately suspend immigration from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism until such time it’s proven that\n\n50 Donald Trump Remarks in Manchester, New Hampshire, C-SPAN (June 13, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?410976-1/donald-trump-delivers-remarks-\nnational-security-threats (minutes 5:30 to 6:40). 51 Face the Nation transcripts June 5, 2016: Trump, CBS News (June 5, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-june-5-2016-trump/.\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 26 of 38\n\nvetting mechanisms have been put in place.”52 Three days later, asked whether this\nlanguage indicated an intent to “pull back from” the “Muslim ban,” Mr. Trump\nmade clear that it was not:\nI don’t think so. . . . In fact, you could say it’s an expansion, I’m looking now at territory. People were so upset when I used the word “Muslim”: “Oh, you can’t use the word ‘Muslim.’” Remember this. And I’m okay with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim. . . .\nNow, we have a religious, you know, everybody wants to be protected. And that’s great. . . . I view it differently. . . .\nWe’re making it territorial. We have nations and we’ll come out, I’m going to be coming out over the next few weeks with a number of the places.53\nThe President advocated restricting the entry of Muslims to the United States\non numerous other occasions:\n On September 18, 2015, when asked about getting “rid of” Muslims, Mr. Trump responded that he was “going to be looking at that and many other things.”54\n On October 12, 2015, Mr. Trump tweeted: “Muslims escorted into U.S. through Mexico. Now arriving to Oklahoma and Kansas! Congress?”55\n52 Politico, Full text: Donald Trump 2016 RNC draft speech transcript (July 21, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trumpnomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974. 53 Transcript, Meet the Press, NBC News (July 24, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706; Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump is expanding his Muslim ban, not rolling it back, Wash. Post (July 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/07/24/donald-trump-is-expanding-his-muslim-ban-not-rolling-itback/. 54 See Schleifer, supra note 3.\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 27 of 38\n\n On January 2, 2016, Mr. Trump tweeted: “Hillary Clinton said that it is O.K. to ban Muslims from Israel by building a WALL, but not O.K. to do so in the U.S. We must be vigilant!”56\n On March 22, 2016, Mr. Trump tweeted that Hillary Clinton was “incompetent” because she would “let the Muslims flow in. No way!”57\n On March 24, 2016, Mr. Trump tweeted that “[i]t is amazing how often I am right” about “Muslims.”58\nD. The President Has Reaffirmed His Discriminatory Purpose On Several Occasions In The Lead Up To This Proclamation.\nThe government’s unsubstantiated assertion that it “strongly disagrees” there\nexists “evidence of anti-Muslim bias,” Gov’t Br. at 45, disregards the voluminous\nand appalling record above. The government also disregards fact, however, in its\nunexplained attempt to characterize all the President’s discriminatory statements as\n“campaign statements.” Gov’t Br. at 18, 45, 52. As set forth below, the President\nhas made numerous statements since being elected to office—and in the immediate\nlead up to the present Proclamation—that have harkened back to, and reaffirmed,\nhis discriminatory intent.\n55 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 12, 2015), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/653774823483703297. 56 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Jan. 2, 2016), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/683277309969694720. 57 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Mar. 22, 2016), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/712473816614772736. 58 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Mar. 24, 2016), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/713012045214531584.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 28 of 38\n\nOver a month after being elected, Mr. Trump was asked whether he would\nreevaluate his intention to ban entry of Muslim people. Referring to his earlier\npledge, he responded: “You know my plans all along, and I’ve been proven to be\nright.”59\nWithin a week of taking the oath of office, the President signed his initial\nExecutive Order. Upon reading its abstruse title, “Protecting the Nation from\nForeign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” he added, “We all know what that\nmeans”—an obvious reference to his well-known pledge to prevent Muslims from\nentering the country.60 The same day, President Trump explained on national\ntelevision that the exceptions he had set forth in his Order were intended to\nprioritize Christians over Muslims. He stated that he sees Christians as a “priority”\nand—expressly drawing a comparison between Christian refugees and Muslim\nrefugees—he explained that he was “going to help” Christians.61\n59 Video, Trump: ‘You've known my plans’ on proposed Muslim ban, Wash. Post (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-youveknown-my-plans-on-proposed-muslim-ban/2016/12/21/8a7bba66-c7ba-11e6-acda59924caa2450_video.html. 60 Trump Signs Executive Orders at Pentagon, ABC News (Jan. 27, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/trump-signs-executive-orders-pentagon45099173. 61 David Brody, Brody File Exclusive: President Trump Says Persecuted Christians Will Be Given Priority As Refugees, CBN News (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www1.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2017/01/27/brody-file-exclusivepresident-trump-says-persecuted-christians-will-be-given-priority-as-refugees.\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 29 of 38\n\nOn February 4, 2017, President Trump referred to his initial Executive Order\nthe same way he had throughout his campaign—as a “ban”—stating that “certain\nMiddle-Eastern countries agree with the ban.”62 After the government received\nstays in judicial proceedings across the country while they revised the Executive\nOrder, the President’s senior advisor stated that the new Order would be designed\nto achieve “the same basic policy outcome” as the first Order and to address only\n“very technical issues.”63 The President’s Press Secretary similarly stated that “the\nprinciples of the executive order remain the same.”64\nOn March 15, 2017, the day that President Trump’s second Executive Order\nwas first enjoined, President Trump himself stated that the Order was simply “a\nwatered down version of the first order” and expressed that he would prefer to “go\nall the way” and do “what [he] wanted to do in the first place.”65 The next day,\n62 Politico, Trump warns of ‘death & destruction’ if U.S. not allowed to limit immigration (Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-travelban-judge-james-robart-234643; Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Feb. 4, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827865957750161408. 63 Fox News, Transcript, Miller: New order will be responsive to the judicial ruling (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2017/02/21/miller-new-orderwill-be-responsive-to-judicial-ruling-rep-ron-desantis/. 64 The White House, Press Release, Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Mar. 6, 2017,) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/pressgaggle-press-secretary-sean-spicer. 65 Andrew Prokop, With Trump’s new travel order blocked and his health bill flailing, his agenda’s in tatters, Vox (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2017/3/16/14935784/trump-achievements-accomplishments.\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 30 of 38\n\nPresident Trump reiterated his oft-expressed view during the campaign that “[t]he\nassimilation [of Muslims in the U.S.] has been very, very hard. It’s been a very,\nvery difficult process.”66\nDespite being updated daily, the President’s website continued to call for a\n“total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” when he\nissued his initial Executive Order, his revised Executive Order, and for long after.\nNotwithstanding repeated notification,67 the President continued to call for a total\nand complete ban on Muslims from the U.S. until May 8, 2017, when the Acting\nSolicitor General was questioned about it by this Court.68\nOn August 17, 2017, the President again promoted the same anti-Muslim\npropaganda he repeated while campaigning, that General Pershing was able to\n66 Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump’s explanation of his wire-tapping tweets will shock and amaze you, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/the-fix/wp/2017/03/16/donald-trump-explained-twitter-the-universe-andeverything-to-tucker-carlson/. 67 See, e.g., Complaint at 7, Hawai‘i v. Trump, 1:17-cv-00050 (D. Haw. Feb. 3, 2017); Amended Complaint at 8, Hawai‘i v. Trump, 1:17-cv-00050 (D. Haw. Mar. 7, 2017). 68 Cristian Farias, Trump’s ‘Muslim Ban’ Pledge Scrubbed From Website Just As Judges Ask About It, Huffington Post (May 9, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-muslim-ban-pledge website_us_591204dfe4b050bdca5ff6c1; Press Release, Trump-Pence, Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20170508054010/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/pres s-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration (Internet Archive record on May 8, 2017).\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 31 of 38\n\neradicate terrorism by murdering captured Muslims with bullets soaked in pigs’ blood. See supra Section I.A.2. In the immediate wake of a terror attack in Barcelona, he stated, “Study what General Pershing of the United States did to terrorists when caught. There was no more Radical Islamic Terror for 35 years!”69\nIn these proceedings, the Acting Solicitor General has repeatedly represented that the President’s orders and Proclamation bear no connection to the “Travel Ban” or “Muslim Ban” for which the President long advocated, attempting to sanitize them as reflecting a national security judgment based on a need for greater information from the selected nations. See, e.g., Gov’t Br. at 44.70 The President’s own statements between the time of his initial orders and the present Proclamation, however, make clear that he views them as effectuating his longpromised “Travel Ban.” In particular, the President has made the following statements:\n\n69 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Aug. 17, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/898254409511129088. 70 See also Garrett Epps, Trump's Tweets May Have Sunk His Travel Ban, Atlantic (June 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/trumpstweets-may-have-sunk-his-travel-ban/529167/. The President’s Press Secretary made similar representations that “it’s not a travel ban.” Peter W. Stevenson, Trump says it’s a travel ‘ban.’ His staff insisted it wasn’t, Wash. Post (June 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/05/trump-saysits-a-travel-ban-his-staff-insisted-it-wasnt/.\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 32 of 38\n\n On February 16, 2017, President stated, “Let me tell you about the travel ban. We had a very smooth rollout of the travel ban.”71\n On April 26, 2017, the President stated, “the Ninth Circuit rules against the ban . . . ridiculous.”72\n On June 3, 2017, the President stated, “We need the Travel Ban as an extra level of safety!”73\n Two days later, the President stated, “People, the lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!”74\n The same day, he stated, “The Justice Dept. should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the watered down, politically correct version they submitted to S.C.”75 He further stated, “we need a TRAVEL BAN . . . not some politically correct term that won’t help us protect our people.”76\n One week later, on June 13, 2017, he wrote: “the 9th Circuit did it again Ruled against the TRAVEL BAN.”77\n On September 15, 2017, the President again derided the political correctness of the travel ban: “The travel ban into the United States should be far larger,\n71 Full Transcript and Video: Trump News Conference, New York Times (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trump-pressconference-transcript.html 72 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (April 26, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/857177434210304001. 73 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (June 3, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/871143765473406976. 74 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (June 5, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/871674214356484096. 75 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (June 5, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/871675245043888128. 76 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (June 5, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/871899511525961728 77 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (June 13, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/874578159676665857.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 33 of 38\n\ntougher and more specific-but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!”78 The President’s repeated derisions of the Department of Justice for making the language in his orders “politically correct”—statements made in the immediate lead up to the present Proclamation—are damning to the Department’s suggestion that his Proclamation is not a manifestation of his long-promised Muslim ban. The only plausible interpretation of those criticisms is that the President views the territories named as a proxy for religion. II. This Court’s Failure To Intervene Would Be A Serious Abdication Of The Judicial Role. The above factual record makes clear that the President’s decision to target people from six Muslim-majority countries is intended to effectuate his longstanding and reaffirmed (let alone never disavowed) pledge to restrict the entry of Muslim people. Discrimination against a protected class, such as religion, on the basis of such overt animus is the most obvious and fundamental abuse of government authority that the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses exist to protect. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (“When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, . . . judicial deference is no longer justified.”).\n78 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 15, 2017), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ status/908645126146265090.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 34 of 38\n\nThe government argues that regardless of whether the President is, in fact, using his power to oppress Muslims, the Court must defer to the Proclamation’s facial purpose and the Executive’s broad authority over matters relating to immigration. See Gov’t Br. at 40-42. Not so. This Court has the obligation to protect discrete and insular minority communities, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and to prevent the exercise of Executive power to “harm a politically unpopular group,” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts have a duty to enforce the Constitution even when the Executive claims national security concerns. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (the President does not “have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will” by invoking national security); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (“Our precedents . . . make clear that concerns of national security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role.”). Indeed, the importance of judicial intervention is at its highest in these circumstances. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 35 of 38\n\npeace or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain security.”).\nThe Government’s argument is not novel. It is the same line of argument it advanced 70 years ago to justify the internment of Japanese Americans in Korematsu, now viewed as one of the most shameful decisions in American history. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257, 1259 (2004) (Complete “judicial acquiescence or abdication” in the face of executive discretion “has a name. That name is Korematsu.”); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380 (2011) (Korematsu “embodies a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute”).\nThe MacArthur Justice Center urges the Court not to overlook the extensive record showing that the President’s Proclamation was motivated by animus against people of the Muslim faith, and to avoid repeating the terrible mistake made in generations past.\nCONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the MacArthur Justice Center respectfully urges the Court to affirm.\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 36 of 38\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nAmir H. Ali Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center 718 7th Street NW Washington D.C. 20001 P: (202) 869-3434 F: (202) 689-3435 amir.ali@macarthurjustice.org\nCounsel for the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center\n\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 37 of 38\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT\nI hereby certify that:\n1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 6,921 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).\n2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Times New Roman typeface.\n\nDated: November 15, 2017\n\n/s/ Amir H. Ali Amir H. Ali\nCounsel for the Roderick & Solange\nMacArthur Justice Center\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-1\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 38 of 38\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that on November 15, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: November 15, 2017\n\n/s/ Amir H. Ali Amir H. Ali\nCounsel for the Roderick & Solange\nMacArthur Justice Center\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 87-2\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_______________________ as\n\n[✔]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government COUNSEL FOR: _T_h_e__R_o_d_e__ri_c_k_&__S_o__la_n_g_e__M__a_c_A_r_th_u__r _J_u_s_ti_c_e__C_e_n_t_e_r__________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_A__m_i_r_H__. _A_li__________________________ (signature)\n\n_A_m__i_r _H_._A__li______________________________ Name (printed or typed)\nR__o_d_e_r_ic_k__&__S_o_l_a_n_g_e__M_a__c_A_r_th_u_r__J_u_s_ti_c_e_C__e_n_t_er Firm Name (if applicable)\n_7_1_8__7_t_h_S__t._N__W___________________________\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_C__2_0__0_0_1___________________ Address\n\n_(_2_0_2_)_8_6_9_-_3_4_3_4__ Voice Phone _(_2_0_2_)_8_6_9__-3_4_3__5_ Fax Number\n_a_m__ir_.a_l_i@__m__a_c_a_r_th__u_rj_u_s_ti_c_e_._o_rg_______ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _N_o_v_e_m__b_e_r_1_5_,_2_0_1_7_ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_A__m_i_r_H__. _A_l_i ________________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_5__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Southern Division\n(8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n\nFIRST CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF FOR APPELLEES\n\nKaren C. Tumlin Nicholas Espíritu Melissa S. Keaney Esther Sung NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600 Los Angeles, CA 90010 Tel: (213) 639-3900 Fax: (213) 639-3911 tumlin@nilc.org\n\nOmar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Hina Shamsi Hugh Handeyside Sarah L. Mehta David Hausman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004\nAdditional counsel on the next page\n\n\fespiritu@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org sung@nilc.org\nJustin B. Cox NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER P.O. Box 170208 Atlanta, GA 30317 Tel: (678) 279-5441 Fax: (213) 639-3911 cox@nilc.org\nKathryn Claire Meyer Mariko Hirose INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT 40 Rector Street, 9th Floor New York, New York 10006 Tel: (646) 459-3044 Fax: (212) 533-4598 kmeyer@refugeerights.org mhirose@refugeerights.org\nDavid Rocah Deborah A. Jeon Sonia Kumar Nicholas Taichi Steiner AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 Tel: (410) 889-8555 Fax: (410) 366-7838 jeon@aclu-md.org rocah@aclu-md.org kumar@aclu-md.org steiner@aclu-md.org\n\nTel: (212) 549-2600 Fax: (212) 549-2654 ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org hshamsi@aclu.org hhandeyside@aclu.org smehta@aclu.org dhausman@aclu.org\nCecillia D. Wang Cody H. Wofsy Spencer E. Amdur AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 343-0770 Fax: (415) 395-0950 cwang@aclu.org cwofsy@aclu.org samdur@aclu.org\nDavid Cole Daniel Mach Heather L. Weaver AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 915 15th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 675-2330 Fax: (202) 457-0805 dcole@aclu.org dmach@aclu.org hweaver@aclu.org\nAdditional counsel on the next page\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees IRAP, et al.\n\n\fJohnathan Smith Sirine Shebaya MUSLIM ADVOCATES P.O. Box 66408 Washington, D.C. 20035 Tel: (202) 897-2622 Fax: (415) 765-1774 johnathan@muslimadvocates.org sirine@muslimadvocates.org\nRichard B. Katskee Eric Rothschild Andrew L. Nellis^ AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1310 L St. NW, Ste. 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 466-3234 Fax: (202) 466-3353 katskee@au.org rothschild@au.org nellis@au.org\n\nMark H. Lynch Mark W. Mosier Herbert L. Fenster Jose E. Arvelo John W. Sorrenti Katherine E. Cahoy Rebecca G. Van Tassell Karun Tilak COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One City Center 850 10th Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: (202) 662-6000 Fax: (202) 662-6302 mlynch@cov.com mmosier@cov.com hfenster@cov.com jarvelo@cov.com jsorrenti@cov.com kcahoy@cov.com rvantassell@cov.com ktilak@cov.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees I.A.A.B., et al.\n\nCharles E. Davidow Robert A. Atkins Liza Velazquez Andrew J. Ehrlich Steven C. Herzog PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\n\nLena F. Masri Gadeir Abbas COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nAdditional counsel on the next page\n\n\fFaiza Patel Michael Price BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\n\nJethro Eisenstein PROFETA & EISENSTEIN 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees Zakzok, et al.\n\n^Admitted only in New York; supervised by Richard B. Katskee, a member of the D.C. Bar\n\n\fTABLE OF CONTENTS\nINTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1\nSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................3\nSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES...............................................................................3\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................4\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................11\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................14\nARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................14\nI. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE. ......................................14\nA. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Justiciable. ................................14\nB. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Justiciable. ........................19\nII. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. ..................................................................22\nA. The Proclamation Violates the INA’s Non-Discrimination Mandate. .........................................................................................23\nB. The Proclamation Exceeds the President’s Delegated Authority Under § 1182(f)..............................................................................28\n1. The President Cannot Override the INA. ...........................28\n2. The Proclamation Conflicts with the Basic Design of Congress’s Admissions System. ................................33\nIII. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE. ................................................................................................41\nA. Mandel Does Not Defeat the Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claim ..............................................................................................42\nB. The Proclamation Suffers from the Same Constitutional Defects as Did the Precursor Executive Orders...............................................44 i\n\n\fC. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause’s Fundamental Command that the Government Not Target and Disfavor People Based on Their Religion. ....................................52\nIV. A NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS APPROPRIATE. ................................................................................55\nV. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO INDIVIDUALS WITH BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS TO U.S. PERSONS OR ENTITIES. 57 A. The Partial Injunction Does Not Provide Complete Relief to the Plaintiffs. ........................................................................................58 B. The Government’s Harms Are Significantly Weaker Even Than Those It Claimed in Defending EO-2 ............................................60 C. A Full Injunction Is Appropriate After This Court Reaches the Merits .............................................................................................62\nVI. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUGGESTING THAT IRAP AND HIAS CLIENTS CATEGORICALLY LACK BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS. ............63\nCONCLUSION .......................................................................................................65\nii\n\n\fTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986)................................ 16, 18, 28 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)........................................................29 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) ........................17 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012)............................................... 22, 53 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,\n512 U.S. 687 (1994) ................................................................................ 45, 46, 54 Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) .............17 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) ............................................................59 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).................................................................30 Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San Francisco,\n624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ..............................................................22 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ...........................18 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,\n508 U.S. 520 (1993) ................................................................................ 46, 52, 53 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) ........................................... 23, 62 Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)...........17 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) ......54 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).....................................................17 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ............................................................46 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ......................................................................62 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).......................36 Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016).....................................48\ni\n\n\fFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)................................................................... 16, 43 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)....................................................16 Hawai‘i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017) ........................................5 Hawai‘i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)........................ passim Hawai‘i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)................................59 Hawai‘i v. Trump, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2017 WL 2989048\n(D. Haw. July 13, 2017) .......................................................................................64 Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999) ........14 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .......................................................................23 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017)......4 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,\n857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.) (en banc), ................................................................ passim Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese,\n761 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1985)....................................................................... 15, 16 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)................................................................ 20, 43 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) .............................................. 20, 41, 42 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)...................................................55 Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1995) ...................................................1 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) ..................................................... 53, 54, 55 Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State,\n45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995)................................................................... 16, 18, 27 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) .......................................................................57 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) ....18 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) ..........................................................................30 Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981).............................................27\nii\n\n\fMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) .............................................46 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) .................................................. 21, 62 Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F. 3d 710 (7th Cir. 2017) ..................................................42 Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1988) ..................................................15 Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,\n145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998)............................................................................62 Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) ..................................................26 Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................................15 Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976).......................................27 Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ................... 15, 16, 17 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) ............................ 14, 19 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) .................................. 45, 46 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).............................................43 Trump v. Hawai‘i, — S. Ct. —, 2017 WL 4014838 (Sept. 12, 2017).....................64 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistant Project,\n137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam)............................................................. passim Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)........ 20, 21 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).................. 16, 30 United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2006).......................................1 United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) ....................................................30 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and\nState, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) .................................................................... 21, 22 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).............................................17 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ................ 22, 28, 29\niii\n\n\fZemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ............................................................................30 Statutes 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).................................................................................................19 6 U.S.C. § 485(f)(1) .................................................................................................31 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1).................................................................................................17 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)...............................................................................................17 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) ........................................................................................... passim 8 U.S.C. §1153 .........................................................................................................29 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) ................................................................................ 26, 31, 33, 37 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) ............................................................................................ passim 8 U.S.C. § 1187 ........................................................................................................34 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12).............................................................................................37 8 U.S.C. § 1187a ......................................................................................................39 8 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)................................................................................................17 8 U.S.C. §1201(g) ....................................................................................................33 8 U.S.C. § 1202 ........................................................................................................34 8 U.S.C. § 1361 ........................................................................................... 34, 35, 39 22 U.S.C. § 1631a(c)................................................................................................31 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-\n173 ........................................................................................................................37 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139 ........................................................35 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.\n110-53 ...................................................................................................................36 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,\niv\n\n\fPub. L. No. 108-458 .............................................................................................36 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242 ......................................37 Regulations 22 C.F.R. § 40.6 .......................................................................................................39 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) ........................ 1, 5, 51 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).................................4, 5 Exec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 1979) ...............................32 Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992)................................32 Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41329 (Oct. 4, 1985) ............................ 32, 33 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sep. 24, 2017). ................. 1, 8, 24, 34 Legislative History 161 Cong. Rec. H9050-58 (Dec. 8, 2015) ........................................................ 37, 38 H.R. Rep. No. 68-176, 68 Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 9, 1924........................................35 H.R. Rep. No. 1365, H.R. 5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1952 .....................38 Other Authorities 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.14-3(B) (2016) ........................................................32 The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) ........................................................29 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 1 WEEKLY\nCOMP. PRES. DOC. 364 (Oct. 3, 1965). ......................................................... 24, 26\nv\n\n\fINTRODUCTION On September 24, the President issued Proclamation 9645 (the “Proclamation”), imposing an indefinite ban on most travel to the United States by more than 150 million people, the vast majority of whom are Muslim. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161. By its own terms, the Proclamation flows directly from the President’s March 6 Executive Order (“EO-2”), 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, which imposed a similar—but temporary—ban, and which this Court found to violate the Establishment Clause. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir.) (en banc), vacated as moot, 86 USLW 3175 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (EO-2 “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination”). 1 The government claims, however, that everything is different this time because it undertook a review and recommendation procedure before the President imposed the new ban in the Proclamation. The district court carefully considered that claim, and rejected it. As the district court explained, the government’s argument that the Proclamation has wiped the slate clean cannot be squared with the facts, including: the remarkable similarity between the current ban and its predecessors; EO-2’s directives, which\n1 IRAP remains persuasive authority, particularly as an en banc decision of this Court addressing an earlier stage of this same litigation. See Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1995) (relying on vacated decision as “instructive” and “persuasive”); United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2006).\n1\n\n\feffectively “pre-ordained” the outcome of the review-and-recommendation process; the subjective, post-hoc manipulation of the process to make the results even more of a Muslim ban; and the President’s own statements “cast[ing] the Proclamation as the inextricable re-animation of the twice-enjoined Muslim ban.” J.A. 1070, 1075.\nOnce again, the government’s arguments in response boil down to a demand for total deference, no matter how strong the evidence is, and an assertion that the Court should simply ignore facts inconvenient to the government. The Court properly rejected the government’s demands for judicial abdication before, and it should do so again.\nEven leaving aside the Proclamation’s purpose and effect of denigrating Islam and disfavoring Muslims, the new ban violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). It discriminates on the basis of national origin in direct violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), as the district court found, and it also exceeds the President’s statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) by unilaterally replacing Congress’s detailed admissions system with one designed by the President. The government’s breathtaking defense—that the President can override Congress at will, recrafting the immigration system however he sees fit regardless of the Congressional judgments embodied in the INA—is anathema to the separation of powers.\n2\n\n\fThe district court’s injunction should therefore be affirmed in full as far as it goes. But, because the court’s partial preliminary injunction does not provide complete relief to all the plaintiffs, who are harmed by the indefinite ban’s effects on noncitizens lacking formal relationships with U.S. persons, the Court should modify the preliminary injunction so that it is no longer “limited to barring enforcement of Section 2 against those individuals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”\nSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. J.A. 475. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and cross-appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The district court entered its order granting a preliminary injunction in these cases on October 17, 2017. J.A. 1084. Defendants filed timely notices of appeal on October 20, 2017. J.A. 1087, 1198, 1494. Plaintiffs in No. 17-2240 filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on October 23, 2017. J.A. 1090.\nSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES Did the district court abuse its discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction? On cross-appeal:\n3\n\n\f1) Did the district court err in limiting the preliminary injunction to persons with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States?\n2) Even if such a limitation were appropriate, did the district court’s order define such relationships too narrowly?\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE The Proclamation is the third order the President has signed this year banning more than one hundred million individuals from Muslim-majority nations from coming to the United States. See generally J.A. 997-1013 (district court findings of fact). These bans fulfill months of promises to ban Muslims from the United States—promises the President stood by after his election and on the day he signed the first order, and that he justified with the assertions that “Islam hates us” and “we’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” J.A. 997. The President signed the first ban, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (“EO-1”), on his eighth day in office and with “no consultation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, or the Department of Homeland Security.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 545 (D. Md. 2017); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 632 (Thacker, J., concurring) (Attorney General was “actively shielded” from learning the order’s contents); J.A. 1060. The ban was swiftly challenged and enjoined. J.A. 1000-01.\n4\n\n\fThe second iteration of the ban, signed March 6, 2017, reproduced the original in most respects. 82 Fed. Reg. 13209. In prior proceedings in this case, the district court enjoined Section 2(c) of EO-2, and this Court, sitting en banc, affirmed in relevant part. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 604-05; see also Hawai‘i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw.), aff’d in relevant part, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\nEO-2, like EO-1 before it, directed reviews of the information other countries share with the United States to facilitate vetting of visa applicants. EO1 § 3(a)-(b); EO-2 § 2(a)-(b). It further directed that, once the vetting review was complete, the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall” submit “a list of countries” to be subjected to an indefinite ban. EO-1 § 3(e)-(f); EO-2 § 2(e)-(f).\nWhile the Department of Homeland Security was still undertaking the review and recommendations required by EO-2, the President repeatedly issued public statements criticizing the injunctions that had been issued against EO-2 and promising to put a “tougher version” of the ban into place. J.A. 1006-07. The White House also put an individual in charge of the Department of Homeland Security’s task force on implementing executive orders, including the directives in EO-2, who said in 2014 that a blanket ban on visas for Muslim-majority countries\n5\n\n\f“is one of these sort of great ideas that can never happen,”2 and has a consistent, public history of hostility toward Muslims and Islam, including recent assertions that a notorious mass shooter was simply “a Muslim who is following the strictures of Islam.”3\nAs directed, the Department of Homeland Security submitted a list of countries to ban. And on September 24, the President forged the next link in this chain of events: the Proclamation.\nThe Proclamation, like the first two bans, would disproportionately ban Muslims. The ban encompasses nationals of eight countries: five of the six countries barred by both EO-1 and EO-2—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—along with Chad, North Korea, and individuals affiliated with certain government agencies in Venezuela. Individuals seeking immigrant visas, which\n\n2 Eric Hananoki, New DHS Senior Advisor Pushed “Mosque Surveillance\n\nProgram,” Claimed that Muslims “By-And-Large” Want to Subjugate Non-\n\nMuslims,\n\nMedia\n\nMatters\n\n(Mar.\n\n14,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.mediamatters.org/research/2017/03/14/new-dhs-senior-adviser-\n\npushed-mosque-surveillance-program-claimed-muslims-and-large-want-\n\nsubjugate/215634.\n\n3 Noah Lanard, A Fake Jihadist Has Landed a Top Job at Homeland Security, Mother Jones (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/11/afake-jihadist-has-landed-a-top-job-at-homeland-security/. This individual’s role overseeing executive order implementation at DHS came to light on November 1, after the district court issued its decision, so the relevant sources are not in the record below.\n\n6\n\n\flead to permanent resident status and the possibility of U.S. citizenship, from each designated country except Venezuela are banned. Restrictions on nonimmigrant visas vary among the banned countries. See J.A. 511, 868-69 (charts comparing bans imposed by the three orders).\nChad and the five countries banned by the Proclamation, EO-1, and EO-2, are majority-Muslim, and have a combined population of approximately 150 million. J.A. 852-859. Almost everyone whom the Proclamation will prevent from obtaining visas or entering the United States is from one of those six nations—which collectively are approximately 95% Muslim. J.A. 234-248.\nIn contrast, virtually no one from North Korea or Venezuela—the two countries named in the Proclamation that are not majority-Muslim—will be affected in that way. North Korea accounts for a negligible number of visas. And for Venezuela, only officials of particular Venezuelan government agencies and their families are banned, and then only from obtaining tourist or temporary visas. To illustrate, if in effect in 2016, the Proclamation would have barred 12,998 Yemenis, 7,727 Iranians, 9 North Koreans, and no Venezuelans from obtaining immigrant visas. J.A. 868.\nTo justify the bans, the Proclamation asserts that countries were assessed against a set of baseline criteria. Those criteria were not applied uniformly. See J.A. 1283-1300 (David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not\n7\n\n\fObjective Criteria, Cato Institute, Oct. 9, 2017) (explaining, for example, that more than 80 countries fail to issue electronic passports, yet three of the banned Muslimmajority countries do issue such passports). The Proclamation also acknowledges that Somalia (a majority-Muslim country) was banned even though it satisfies the government’s baseline criteria, and that Venezuela (a country that is not majorityMuslim) was effectively exempted even though it fails to meet the baseline. Proclamation §§ 2(f), 2(h).4\nLike its predecessors, the Proclamation does not cite any visa vetting failures or otherwise explain how the President concluded that existing vetting procedures were or might be inadequate. And a sworn declaration by 49 former national security officials explains that the ban is “unnecessary” because of the robust existing vetting procedures, and will instead “cause serious harm” to national security. J.A. 897.\nThe individual plaintiffs in this litigation are U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents whose relatives—including spouses, parents, and children— will be unable to obtain visas if the Proclamation takes effect. The organizational\n4 The Proclamation states that the government has other ways of verifying Venezuelans’ identity. But it does not suggest that Venezuela is unique in that regard. See J.A. 1300 (David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato Institute, Oct. 9, 2017) (observing that “there is absolutely no doubt that this factor applies to all eight travel ban countries”).\n8\n\n\fplaintiffs, which include legal and social services organizations and associations of scholars, merchants, and young people, have similarly situated members and clients. See, e.g., J.A. 1244-48, 587-89, 597-98, 612-13; J.A. 1259-62 (spouses); J.A. 1268-69 (fiancé); J.A. 573-75, 1170-71, 1249, 1251, (parent and child); J.A. 1260 (parent and stepchild); J.A. 1174-75 (in-laws).\nSeveral of the plaintiffs have relatives who are gravely ill and are seeking urgent family reunification that will be prevented by the Proclamation. See, e.g., J.A. 1245-46 (critically ill infant); J.A. 1256 (father-in-law with cancer); J.A. 591 (husband with terminal cancer). Some of the plaintiffs’ loved ones have little connection with their country of nationality, but are excluded nonetheless. See, e.g., J.A. 1256 (Syrian national has never been to Syria). And several plaintiffs fear that if the Proclamation takes effect, their loved ones will have no choice but to return to countries where they face grave danger. See, e.g., J.A. 611-13, 1159, 1250, 1266.\nThe organizational plaintiffs are also injured in their own right. For example, plaintiff MESA’s mission of bringing together scholars of Middle Eastern Studies will suffer, as will its finances, which rely heavily on the annual meeting that many members and other scholars will no longer be able to attend. J.A. 557-60. Similarly, plaintiff Iranian Alliances Across Borders’ planned International Conference on the Iranian Diaspora in New York in April 2018 will\n9\n\n\fbe severely impacted if the Proclamation goes into effect. J.A. 1191. Plaintiffs Arab-American Association of New York and International Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”) have both been forced to divert resources to aid clients and others. J.A. 565, 567-68, 576-78.\nThe district court concluded that the Proclamation’s nationality-based ban on the issuance and use of immigrant visas violated the INA’s anti-discrimination provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). J.A. 1034-40 (rejecting the government’s distinction between visa issuance and entry). The court declined to hold the rest of the Proclamation invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), but it acknowledged that “[i]f there is an example of a § 1182(f) order, past or present, that exceeds the authority of that statute, it would be this one.” J.A. 1051.\nThe district court then held that the Proclamation, like EO-2, violated the Establishment Clause. J.A. 1053-76. In so doing, the court rejected the government’s argument that the Proclamation’s “review process” or the “inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations” negated the ample evidence of improper purpose and effect. J.A. 1068, 1066. The district court explained that the Proclamation arose from EO-2’s criteria for banning countries and from EO-2’s requirement that the review process yield a list of banned countries. J.A. 1072. It observed that the “underlying architecture of [EO-1, EO-2,] and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same.” J.A. 1067. And it canvassed public statements by the\n10\n\n\fPresident since EO-2, which showed that “even before President Trump had received any reports on the DHS Review,” he “had already decided that the travel ban would continue.” J.A. 1074. The court concluded that “the Proclamation [i]s the inextricable re-animation of the twice-enjoined Muslim ban,” only this time it is “no longer temporary.” J.A. 1075.\nAccordingly, the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing Section 2 of the Proclamation. The preliminary injunction does not cover North Korea and the limited group of Venezuelans subject to the ban. J.A. 1081. The district court also limited the injunction’s protection to “those individuals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” J.A. 1080 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. The district court correctly held that the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. The doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not apply to policies like the Proclamation, and the plaintiffs have a cause of action under the APA and in equity. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are also justiciable, as this Court previously held, because the plaintiffs invoke their own rights under the Establishment Clause to be free from religious isolation, exclusion, and condemnation.\n11\n\n\fII. The Proclamation violates the INA. As the district court held, it violates 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s prohibition of nationality discrimination. The Proclamation also exceeds the President’s authority to suspend entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Section 1182(f)’s role in the INA is not to allow the President to unilaterally rewrite or discard fundamental aspects of the INA, like its two-track admissions system for visa and visa-less travel. But that is what the Proclamation does, by indefinitely banning eligible individuals from receiving visas even if they can meet their burden under the INA, based solely on their governments’ failure to satisfy some of the visa waiver criteria. III. The district court correctly held that the Proclamation, like EO-2, violates the Establishment Clause. As this Court previously held, the Court may look beyond the face of the Proclamation because plaintiffs have adduced ample evidence of bad faith. The effect of the ban will overwhelmingly fall on Muslims, and the ban on North Korea and certain Venezuelan officials will have little practical impact. The Proclamation’s context and history, like EO-2’s, makes clear that this is another attempt to implement the promised Muslim ban. The Proclamation’s review and recommendation process does not undercut that conclusion, and in fact underscores the continuity from EO-2. IV. The injunction was appropriate in light of the religious denigration and separation from loved ones that plaintiffs face, and the lack of concrete or\n12\n\n\fimminent injury to the government from interim relief. As this Court previously held, nationwide relief is warranted because the ban’s effect extends nationwide and a narrower injunction would not fully remedy the ban’s condemnation of the plaintiffs. V. The district court erred in narrowing its injunction to only noncitizens who have a formal, documented relationship with a U.S. person or entity. The Supreme Court fashioned that limitation in a different factual and procedural context. This case now involves an indefinite ban and a wider array of plaintiffs than were before the Supreme Court, who would suffer a variety of harms from the exclusion of even individuals without formal relationships in this country. The government’s interests are weaker than they were before the Supreme Court. And the task before the district court was fashioning interim relief after preliminarily deciding the merits, not crafting a stay pending initial consideration of the merits. The statutory and constitutional violations here, and the threatened injuries to the plaintiffs, merit a preliminary injunction that is not narrowed in this way. VI. At a minimum, the district court’s injunction should be modified to make clear that relationships between entities in the United States and their clients are sufficient under the preliminary injunction so long as they are formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course.\n13\n\n\fSTANDARD OF REVIEW The Court reviews “the district court’s injunction for abuse of discretion.” Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 1999).\nARGUMENT I. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE.\nThe government relies on two sweeping arguments to oppose judicial review here: That this Court has no power at all to consider statutory claims involving exclusion policies, and that the plaintiffs, who are personally affected by the Proclamation, cannot challenge its denigration of their religion. Both arguments lack merit.\nA. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Justiciable. 1. The government makes the startling claim that the courts cannot review whether the executive’s exclusion policies are consistent with the governing statutes. Br. 19-22. No court has ever recognized the broad nonreviewability principle that the government presses here, despite its claim that the principle is “deeply rooted” in the law. To the contrary, the Supreme Court itself reviewed a statutory claim against an § 1182(f) suspension in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 165-66, 172 & n.27 (1993). The government offers no persuasive reason to discount Sale. Br. 25. Indeed, the government in Sale vigorously argued that\n14\n\n\fexclusion policies under § 1182(f) were immune from judicial review. U.S. Br. 13-18 & n.9, 55-57, 1992 WL 541276, Reply Br. 1-4, 1993 WL 290141, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. (No. 92-344). The Supreme Court nonetheless reviewed the claim on the merits—precisely what the government now claims has long been forbidden.\nWhat the government’s non-justiciability argument really asks this Court to do is to enormously expand the doctrine of consular non-reviewability to preclude review of statutory claims against all exclusion policies. The consular nonreviewability doctrine—which is itself not absolute—restricts the review of purely statutory challenges to “a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). As the circuits have uniformly held, that doctrine applies only to “a particular decision in a particular case,” not a “general” policy like the one in this case. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).\nThe single out-of-circuit case on which the government leans heavily (Br. 20-22), Saavedra Bruno, was a routine application of the consular nonreviewability doctrine to a single noncitizen’s visa denial. The court repeatedly\n15\n\n\fspecified that its analysis pertained to the “decisions of consular officials.” 197 F.3d at 1160 (emphasis added); see id. at 1158, 1162.\nIndeed, the very same Circuit has repeatedly reviewed statutory challenges to admissions policies on the merits. See Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 761 F.2d at 801 (collecting cases); see also Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“LAVAS”) (reviewing visa policy abroad), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996). It has even reviewed statutory claims against individual visa denials when necessary to avoid constitutional issues. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1986); accord id. at 1062 n.1 (Bork, J., dissenting).5\nConsular non-reviewability does not, as the government claims, “invert the constitutional structure [by] limit[ing] review in [the consular] context while permitting review of the President’s decision[s].” Br. 21. Distinctions between individual adjudications and high-level policy are common, both in immigration and throughout the law. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587 (distinguishing between individual fact-finding and “high-level government policy”); Washington v.\n5 The government’s other cases are even further afield, because they review claims against admissions policies on the merits, including statutory claims where raised. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-99 (1977); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 583 & n.4 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544-47 (1950) (reviewing two statutory claims against regulations promulgated under a presidential proclamation).\n16\n\n\fTrump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (same); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1986) (statute granted review of “a regulation” but not a single “determination” made under that regulation); cf. Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“There are ample reasons for distinguishing the two situations.”).6\n2. The government also argues that Plaintiffs lack a cause of action to bring their statutory claims. It first points out that the President is not subject to the APA. Br. 22. But no APA cause of action is necessary to review presidential action, which the Court can review under its inherent equitable authority. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-88 (1981) (reviewing multiple presidential orders in equity); see also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384-85 (2015) (describing “a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action” by “courts of equity”).\nNor can the government dispute that the plaintiffs have a cause of action against the agencies implementing the Proclamation. “[I]t is now well established”\n6 Consular officers make millions of individual visa decisions each year, in most cases thousands of miles from the United States, and have unique discretion over granting and denying visas. See, e.g., Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1156; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1201(a)(1); 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). This case involves no similar considerations.\n17\n\n\fthat “[r]eview of a Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President’s directive.” Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 1326-27 (holding that an agency’s actions to implement an executive order are not “insulate[d] . . . from judicial review under the APA” or “a non-statutory cause of action”).\nThe government argues that the plaintiffs nonetheless fall outside the relevant zone of interests. Br. 24. Both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have correctly held otherwise, as the district court did here. See Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 766-67 (concluding that relatives of visa applicants “fall well within the zone of interest Congress intended to protect,” as did employer) (quoting LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 47172); Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1047, 1050-51 (holding individuals who invited noncitizens “to attend meetings or address audiences” were within the zone of interests); J.A. 1017, 1021, 1030. The zone-of-interests test “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests” are “marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The\n18\n\n\fplaintiffs here—family members, spouses, employers, colleagues, conference hosts—easily clear that bar.7\nPlaintiffs’ claims are also ripe. As before, plaintiffs have brought a facial challenge that “is squarely presented for [the Court’s] review” and “not dependent on the factual uncertainties of the waiver process.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587 (holding that the waiver process would impose “undue hardship”). In any event, several plaintiffs’ relatives have already completed their interviews and are awaiting the administrative processing of their visas. See, e.g., J.A. 605-06; 587-88; 603; 1255; 1247; 1268; 1175; 1171. Their injuries from the Proclamation’s ban are all too imminent. Ripeness is not a problem in this case.\nB. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Justiciable. Turning to the constitutional claims, the government argues that because the Proclamation does not deny visas to the plaintiffs themselves, it cannot injure them, or violate their rights, in a legally relevant manner. That argument has been rejected at every stage of this case, and fails here for the same reasons. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 582-87; J.A. 1023-27.\n7 The government’s contention that § 1182(f) orders are “committed to agency discretion” because there is no meaningful statutory standard of review, Br. 24-25 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)); Br. 30,)), depends entirely on its incorrect view, on the merits, that § 1182(f) grants the President limitless power, addressed infra. See also Sale, 509 U.S. at 165-66. And in any event this objection is no answer to plaintiffs’ argument under § 1152(a).\n19\n\n\fThe plaintiffs have explained in detail how they have been injured by the government’s condemnation of their religion. For example, IRAP Plaintiff John Doe #4 feels “demeaned” by the Proclamation’s religious intent, and he has perceived the bans as “collective punishment.” J.A. 588-89. For plaintiff Khazaeli, the bans have “taken the discrimination that my family has previously endured because people have seen us as Muslim and made it into law.” J.A. 593. The same is true for YAMA’s and MESA’s members, see J.A. 608, 611, 555-56, clients of AAANY and IRAP, see J.A. 567, 578, 579-80, and other individual plaintiffs in this case, see, e.g., J.A. 585, 571-72, 574, 600-01, 606-07.\nThe Supreme Court has repeatedly decided the claims of individuals in the United States who—like the plaintiffs here—allege that the government is injuring them and violating their rights by refusing to allow foreign nationals abroad to travel to the United States. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1972); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140-42 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. Oral Arg., Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WLNR 4070578 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2017) (government conceding that “a U.S. citizen with a connection to someone seeking entry” would have standing to challenge EO-1).\nThe Supreme Court has also recognized that injuries that arise where the government regulates others are cognizable under the Establishment Clause. In Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), the\n20\n\n\fplaintiff company had standing to challenge a Sunday closing law, even though only the company’s employees—not the company itself—had been regulated, prosecuted, and fined for violating a previous version of the law, or threatened with prosecution under the new version. Id. at 585-87. Two Guys’ companion case, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), did not hold that plaintiffs had to be directly regulated to invoke the Establishment Clause. McGowan merely explained that the plaintiffs in that case could not allege that their Free Exercise Clause rights were violated without explaining what their religious beliefs were. Id. at 429. But it went on to hold that the plaintiffs did have standing to raise Establishment Clause claims, since they had suffered a “direct economic injury” under the challenged law. Id. at 430. McGowan and Two Guys underscore that the question is whether the challenged action injures the plaintiff, not whether it directly regulates him or her. Accord IRAP, 857 F.3d at 585 (rejecting government argument that EO-2 was “not directly targeted at plaintiffs”).\nThe district court correctly focused on that question and concluded that plaintiffs who would suffer a particularized injury as a consequence of the government’s constitutional violation could sue to enforce their rights. See J.A. 1023-24. The district court also correctly rejected the government’s attempt to analogize this case to Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), in which the plaintiffs\n21\n\n\fwere complete strangers to the challenged conduct, “abstractly disagreeing” with a transfer of property far away that they had never seen, who claimed no injury of isolation, exclusion, or condemnation, id. at 485. J.A. 1024; accord IRAP, 857 F.3d at 585; see also id. at 585 n.11 (explaining why In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008), is inapposite); id. at 585 n.10 (finding that “[p]laintiffs’ injuries are . . . consistent with the injuries that other courts have recognized in Establishment Clause cases that do not involve religious displays or prayer”) (citing Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1122 (10th Cir. 2012) and Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).\nThe plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. II. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE IMMIGRATION AND\nNATIONALITY ACT. For hundreds of millions of people in the United States and abroad, the Proclamation replaces Congress’s detailed visa system with a new one of the President’s design. On an indefinite and potentially permanent basis, it bars the issuance and use of immigrant visas by nationals of the designated countries. It also erases numerous categories of nonimmigrant visas for those countries. These changes read very much “like a statute,” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952)—just not the one Congress enacted.\n22\n\n\fThese sweeping alterations cannot be reconciled with Congress’s admissions scheme. The Proclamation reinstitutes a nationality-based system that Congress outlawed decades ago. And it jettisons Congress’s individualized vetting system, which has governed for almost a hundred years, and which Congress has repeatedly reaffirmed, even when considering the same problems the Proclamation purports to address.\nThe President’s authority under the INA does not permit him to make this sort of unilateral revision of the immigration laws. As the Supreme Court explained in a prior immigration case, the Framers were “acutely conscious” of the danger posed by subjecting national policy decisions to the “arbitrary action of one person.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). Once Congress enacts its own policy choices into law, nothing “authorizes the President” to “amend, or to repeal” its handiwork. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998). But that is precisely what the Proclamation does.\nA. The Proclamation Violates the INA’s Non-Discrimination Mandate.\nThe district court correctly concluded that the Proclamation violates the explicit non-discrimination mandate in 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which provides that “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s . . . nationality.” J.A. 1034-40. Congress enacted\n23\n\n\f§ 1152(a)(1)(A) in 1965 when it abolished the discriminatory national-origins quota system, which had banned Asian immigration and restricted entry from southern and eastern Europe, preventing family reunification for many immigrants in order to maintain “the ethnic composition of the American people.” J.A. 103435 (quoting H. Rep. No. 89-745, at 9 (1965)); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 626-27 (Wynn, J., concurring).\nThe Proclamation is nothing less than a new national-origins system. It provides that nationals of the six Muslim-majority countries may not come to the United States “as immigrants,” indefinitely, solely because of their nationality. Proclamation § 2(a)-(h); see id. § 1(h)(ii) (explaining that the Order “distinguish[es] between the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants” and bars the use of immigrant visas). The breadth of this nationality-based ban has no post1965 parallel.\nIn signing the 1965 bill, President Johnson emphasized that, under the quota system, “[f]amilies were kept apart because a husband or a wife or a child had been born in the wrong place.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 1 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 364, 365 (Oct. 3, 1965). That is exactly what the Proclamation is designed to do. Cf. J.A. 832-33 (President Trump calling, in September, for a “larger, tougher and more specific” ban and opposing “CHAIN MIGRATION”). Congress has emphatically rejected that approach. See\n24\n\n\fIRAP, 857 F.3d at 635-38 (Thacker, J., concurring); Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 776-79 (same).\nThe government claims it is not violating Congress’s prohibition because it is barring only “entry” using immigrant visas, not the issuance of those visas. J.A. 1036-37. First, the claim is wrong: The government has repeatedly admitted that it implements these bans “by denying visas.” Br. for the Petitioners at 51-52, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436 & 16-1540, (U.S. filed Aug. 10, 2017). Even the State Department, the agency that issues visas, describes the Proclamation as a “Presidential Proclamation on Visas.” J.A. 633. Second, banning entry to immigrant visa holders achieves the same effect as banning issuance of the visas themselves, because a visa is meaningless if its holder is indefinitely barred from entering the country. An indefinite immigrant-visa entry ban therefore achieves the precise result that § 1152(a) forbids. J.A. 1038-39. Asserting, as the government does, that § 1182(f) allows the President to “limit the universe of individuals eligible to receive [immigrant] visas,” Br. 35, is simply wordplay. Congress’s non-discrimination command cannot be so easily evaded. J.A. 1039-40.8\n8 The district court rightly rejected the government’s attempt, see Br. 39, to repackage visa denials as “a change in ‘procedures’ or the ‘location’” of visa\n25\n\n\fThe government further claims that even as Congress abolished the discriminatory national-origins system in 1965, it intended to preserve the President’s ability to reverse its judgment at any time and institute a nationalorigins ban. Br. 35-36. That makes no sense. The legislative history the government cites does not remotely suggest such a self-defeating intent. Rather, it merely reflects that Congress recognized that non-nationality-based grounds of ineligibility for visas, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), would remain in effect. And in fact, the “legislative history surrounding the 1965 Act is replete with the bold antidiscriminatory principles of the Civil Rights Era.” Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1997); see Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 1 Weekly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 364, 365 (Oct. 3, 1965) (immigration policy had been “twisted and . . . distorted by the harsh injustice” of the “un-American” quota system).\nNor does § 1152(a) conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). As explained below, infra Part II.B.1, § 1182(f) only authorizes the President to take action consistent with the INA, see J.A. 1048-49, including its repudiation of national origins discrimination, as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). But if there were any conflict, § 1152(a) would control. It was enacted after § 1182(f) and is more\nprocessing. J.A. 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B)); accord Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 779.\n26\n\n\fspecific, because it addresses nationality discrimination in the issuance of visas, whereas § 1182(f) is silent as to both visa issuance in general and discrimination in particular. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 & n.7 (1976); accord J.A. 1036.9\nFinally, the government tries to justify the Proclamation’s nationality discrimination by pointing to past entry suspensions against Cuban and Iranian nationals. Br. 37. Those suspensions were never challenged under § 1152(a).10 Whatever the President’s authority to react to bilateral emergencies, § 1182(f) does not license him to transform the congressionally-enacted visa process into a congressionally-rejected nationality-based system. Cf. LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473 (holding that an exception to § 1152(a) would require a justification that was “most compelling—perhaps a national emergency”).\n9 The government points to a post-1965 amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a). But “a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153. 10 The government wrongly suggests that this Court reviewed a § 1152(a) claim in Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981). Br. 36. In fact, no party in that case raised § 1152(a), and the Court did not mention it.\n27\n\n\fB. The Proclamation Exceeds the President’s Delegated Authority Under § 1182(f).\nThe President’s authority to alter Congress’s admission system “extends only as far as the statutory authority conferred by Congress.” Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061. Section 1182(f) does not, contrary to the government’s claims, provide the President with limitless authority to restructure Congress’s visa system and override congressional judgments that are embedded in the INA. Because that is precisely what the Proclamation does, it exceeds the President’s authority.\n1. The President Cannot Override the INA. The government claims that, as long as a proclamation contains a bare recital that the banned entry would be detrimental to the Nation’s interests, there is no limit to what parts of the INA the President can cancel or revise. Br. 30. That position raises grave separation-of-powers concerns. “Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). The government’s position is also wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation. Under the government’s interpretation of § 1182(f), the President could override not only the parts of the INA implicated here, see supra (nondiscrimination mandate); infra (individualized visa system), but any others as well.\n28\n\n\fThe President could declare that immigrant workers are detrimental to the interests of the United States, and then ban all entry on employment-based visas indefinitely. He could declare that U.S. interests require skills-based immigration only, and then ban all entry on family-based visas. It would be no obstacle, on the government’s view, that Congress had enacted a detailed employment- and familybased immigration system. 8 U.S.C. §1153(b) (“Preference allocation for employment-based immigrants”); id. § 1153(a) (“Preference allocation for familysponsored immigrants”). The President would be free to upend the basic structure of Congress’s visa system.\nThat cannot be. The Constitution assigns the legislative power, including the power to make “[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens[,] . . . exclusively to Congress.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). By entrusting this power to Congress, the Framers avoided the sort of unlimited “prerogative” over immigration that had been “exercised by George III.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) (identifying acts of “absolute Tyranny” by “the present King of Great Britain” that included “obstructing the laws for Naturalization of Foreigners” and “refusing to pass [Laws] to encourage their migrations hither”).\n29\n\n\fThe Congress that enacted § 1182(f) was acutely aware of these separationof-powers principles: Just months earlier, the Supreme Court had reaffirmed, in an immigration case, that a “delegation of legislative power” is “permissible” only when “the executive judgment is limited by adequate standards.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542-44 (1952). And as the Supreme Court confirmed, even a statute dealing with “the formulation of travel controls” cannot “grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). Section 1182(f) thus does not grant the President authority to reverse Congress’s own policy decisions codified in the INA.\nInstead, the President may exercise his § 1182(f) authority only in “carrying out the congressional intent.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-47 (1950);11 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1924) (executive immigration actions must conform to the “declared policy of Congress”); see Carlson, 342 U.S. at 543 (interpreting statute to require the executive to “justify” its use of delegated authority “by reference to the legislative scheme”); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1957) (holding that even apparently\n11 By contrast, the Court in Knauff noted that Congress could commit to executive discretion the decision “to exclude a given alien” during “the national emergency of World War II.” 338 U.S. at 542-43 (emphasis added). The Court did not address rewriting the statutory scheme.\n30\n\n\f“unbounded authority” must be exercised consistent with the “purpose of the legislative scheme”).\nSection 1182(f)’s text confirms that the President’s power is not limitless and must be exercised consistent with the rest of the INA. It eschews the language of other parts of the INA that explicitly commit immigration decisions to sole executive “discretion.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), (a)(10)(C)(iii)(II); see also 6 U.S.C. § 485(f)(1); 22 U.S.C. § 1631a(c). It applies to “class[es] of aliens,” a term that other parts of § 1182 make clear does not encompass entire nations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(10) (enumerating the “classes of aliens” who are inadmissible, none of which are connected to nationality); accord J.A. 1041. It only authorizes the President to “suspend” entry for a limited “period,” not to rewrite the INA permanently. See Amicus Br. of T.A. 4-7 (discussing textual limits on § 1182(f) authority). And it requires an explicit “find[ing]” of detriment, which of course cannot conflict with Congress’s own enacted determination about what would serve “the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).\nUnsurprisingly, no President has ever claimed the power under § 1182(f) to do anything like what the Proclamation does. Instead, nearly all prior § 1182(f) suspensions have targeted very narrow groups, reaching only a handful of individuals who had contributed to recent crises abroad. See generally J.A. 844-48\n31\n\n\f(listing § 1182(f) suspensions); 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.14-3(B)(1)(b)(2)-(3) (2016).12\nThe only two suspensions that applied to more than a small group of individuals each addressed acute foreign policy crises that Congress had not already addressed. When President Carter imposed restrictions on Iranian nationals in 1979, Exec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 1979); Exec. Order No. 12,206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24101 (Apr. 7, 1980), Iran was holding U.S. citizens hostage. President Reagan suspended the entry of Cuban nationals as immigrants one month after a breakdown in bilateral negotiations. See Associated Press, U.S., Cuba Fail to Reach Accord on Immigration, July 10, 1986;13 contra Br. 29. And he suspended Cuban nonimmigrant entry mere months after Cuba withdrew from a migration agreement. See Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg.\n12 The government also invokes 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), Br. 29-30, but does not seriously contend that § 1185(a) provides authority beyond § 1182(f). That is a sensible concession, because § 1185(a) does not speak to entry suspensions, it requires that any conditions on entry be “reasonable,” and it is subject to the same separation-of-powers principles as § 1182(f). 13 http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07-10/news/mn-22586_1_radio-marti.\n32\n\n\f41329 (Oct. 4, 1985).14 Like all the narrower § 1182(f) orders, these suspensions responded to situations that Congress had not already addressed.\n2. The Proclamation Conflicts with the Basic Design of Congress’s Admissions System.\nThe Proclamation upends the basic operation of Congress’s visa system. For nearly a century, that system has relied on individual visa applicants, not governments, to establish that they are eligible for visas and not inadmissible. Without identifying any problems with that system, the Proclamation fundamentally alters it by denying visas regardless of whether applicants can meet their burden under the INA. Yet Congress has repeatedly reaffirmed its own system in the face of the same security and information-sharing concerns cited by the Proclamation. Section 1182(f) does not empower the President to upend Congress’s approach, especially with no relevant explanation.\n1. For decades, Congress’s admissions system has been divided into two different tracks: one for entry on visas, the other for visa-less entry. The visa system places the burdens of production and persuasion on individual visa applicants. See Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, J.A. 898. The applicant must produce sufficient information and documentation to establish her identity and 14 President Bush’s suspension of entry by sea in 1992 addressed only individuals “without necessary documentation,” Exec. Order 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992), and so created no conflict with congressional immigration admissions policy.\n33\n\n\feligibility for a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a)-(d). The applicant must then “submit to an in person interview with a consular officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(h). And the applicant bears the ultimate burden to convince the consular officer that she is not subject to any ground of inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1201(g), including numerous terrorism and public-safety bars, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), (a)(3)(A)-(C), (a)(3)(F). Individuals about whom the government does not have adequate information are denied visas, while individuals who can supply the requisite information are not needlessly excluded solely because of the perceived failings of their governments.\nThe visa-less admissions system—the Visa Waiver Program—is different. Since 1986, Congress has allowed certain foreign nationals to enter the country without visas if their governments meet certain criteria. To participate, a foreign government must issue electronic passports, 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(3)(B), report lost or stolen passports, id. § 1187(c)(2)(D), share terrorism and crime information about its nationals, id. § 1187(c)(2)(F), not provide safe haven for terrorists, id. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(ii), maintain control over its territory, id. § 1187(c)(5)(B)(ii), and receive its deported nationals, id. § 1187(c)(2)(E). Reliance on governments for identity and security information makes sense in the context of visa-less entry, because individuals are no longer supplying that information through the visa application process.\n34\n\n\fThe Proclamation upends this deliberate structure. It places the burden on governments to provide information for visa applications, even though the INA places it on individuals. And its new requirements for visa travel are almost exactly the same as Congress’s requirements for visa-less travel: governments must issue electronic passports, report lost or stolen passports, Proclamation § 1(c)(i), share terrorism and crime information, id. § 1(c)(ii), not provide safe haven for terrorists, maintain control over their territory, and receive deported nationals, id. § 1(c)(iii). See J.A. 1047 (noting that the Proclamation’s criteria are “strikingly similar” to the Visa Waiver Program’s). The conflict here is stark. Under Congress’s scheme, nationals of countries that fail these criteria must apply for visas; under the Proclamation’s scheme, nationals of those countries are barred from receiving visas.\nThe Proclamation thus discards the individualized visa system Congress has chosen. Even if an applicant can “establish to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he is eligible to receive a visa” and “is not inadmissible,” 8 U.S.C. § 1361, he must still be denied a visa because his government fails some of the requirements for visa-less travel. That revision is incompatible with the INA. It is also unprecedented. Congress’s individualized visa system has been in place since\n35\n\n\f1924.15 In recent decades, Congress has frequently updated the requirements for both visa and visa-less travel, but it has never conflated the two. Nor has any President invoked § 1182(f) to alter the basic method for determining visa eligibility. Instead, as described above, all prior § 1182(f) suspensions have addressed conduct or diplomatic events that Congress had not. None has been based merely on dissatisfaction with the core structure of the INA’s applicantbased visa process.\nCongress, moreover, has repeatedly and recently adhered to that basic structure. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137, 143 (2000) (rejecting statutory authority to deviate from recent congressional policy choices). In the years after September 11, 2001, Congress adjusted both the visa and visa-less schemes, but maintained the clear distinction. See, e.g., Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 711 (“enhancing program security requirements” for governments to participate in the Visa Waiver Program); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §§ 5301, 5302 (imposing new “visa\n15 See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, §§ 7, 23; Report of the Comm. on Imm. & Naturalization, at 9, H.R. Rep. 68-176, 68 Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 1924) (noting that an applicant would have to produce “all available public records concerning him kept by the government to which he owes allegiance”); id., Minority Report, at 11 (acknowledging that this would be a difficult burden to meet for applicants from war-torn countries).\n36\n\n\frequirements” on individual applicants); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 501(b) (identifying new “information required of [certain] visa applicant[s]”), § 303(c)(1) (imposing new requirements on “government[s]” who “participate in the visa waiver program”), § 307(a) (same).\nIndeed, in 2015 Congress addressed the possibility that nationals of and visitors to certain countries—including the very countries banned in EO-1, EO-2, and now the Proclamation—might pose a security risk. Congress’s solution was to transfer those individuals from the visa-less system to the visa system, where they would now have to supply the necessary information themselves. See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)); see 161 Cong. Rec. H9050 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Lofgren) (explaining that “a visa interview, rather than visa-free travel, would be required”). Congress pointedly declined to make them categorically ineligible to travel to the United States. See 161 Cong. Rec. H9051 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Conyers), H9054-55 (Rep. Lee), H9056 (Rep. McCarthy), H9057 (Rep. Schiff). Congress thus reaffirmed its confidence in the existing visa process.16\n16 See, e.g., 161 Cong. Rec. H9051 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Miller) (describing “the formal visa screening process” as providing “an abundance of caution”); see also id. at H9054-55 (Rep. Lee) (emphasizing the importance of the visa interview); id.\n37\n\n\fThat process represents a careful balancing of competing interests. By adhering to an individual-based regime, and eschewing nationality bans since 1965, Congress has weighed security needs against countervailing values. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1365, H.R. 5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1952 (explaining that “legislation such as” the 1952 Act required a “careful weighing of equities, human rights,” and the “social, economic, and security interests of the people of the United States”); 161 Cong. Rec. H9058 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Titus) (2015 visa waiver amendment “strikes the right balance between security and accommodation” of economic interests); id. (Rep. Quigley) (same). The President cannot overturn that balance.\n2. Worse still, the Proclamation does not even acknowledge, must less explain, its conflation of Congress’s visa and visa-less admission schemes. So while it purports to identify deficient practices by foreign governments—which might justify excluding their nationals from visa-less travel—it contains no findings at all about its real target: the visa system. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 609 (Keenan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that “an unsupported conclusion will not satisfy [§ 1182(f)’s] ‘finding’ requirement”); Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 770-74 (same).\nat H9057 (Rep. Schiff) (emphasizing the “in-person interview” and the visa system’s “rigorous security screening processes”).\n38\n\n\fThe Proclamation asserts that its unprecedented bans are “necessary to prevent the entry” of visa applicants about whom consular officers “lack[] sufficient information,” Proclamation § 1(h)(i), but fails to mention that existing law already requires consular officers to deny visas when they lack sufficient information. 8 U.S.C. § 1361; 22 C.F.R. § 40.6. It also claims that the bans are necessary to elicit information from foreign governments, Proclamation § 1(b), (h), but does not acknowledge that Congress’s visa scheme already accounts for the potential lack of such information from foreign governments. In fact, Congress recently considered the specific question of how to encourage information-sharing by countries that do not participate in the Visa Waiver Program, and settled on a dramatically different solution: helping those countries supply the information, rather than banning their nationals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187a (providing for “assistance to non-program countries” in meeting certain program criteria); see also Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7204(b) (2004) (directing the President to encourage secure passport practices by seeking “international agreements”).\nThe Proclamation provides no explanation as to “why the country suddenly needs to shift from this tested system of individualized vetting . . . to a national origin-based ban.” Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶ 7, J.A. 898. It gives no reason to doubt the efficacy of Congress’s applicant-based visa system. It points to no new circumstances that Congress has not addressed. It documents no problems with\n39\n\n\ffraud, mistaken identity, missing information, or vetting failures of any kind.17\nThese are glaring omissions for such a sweeping order. The Proclamation strikes\nat the basic premise of our visa system—that individuals bear the burden to\nproduce documentation and establish eligibility—without tying that premise to any\nactual “detriment[s] to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).\nThe government responds that prior § 1182(f) orders contained little\nexplanation. Br. 31-32 & n.4. But none of those proclamations sought to rewrite\nthe INA’s basic approach to visa adjudication. They were self-explanatory,\nbecause they addressed discrete, narrow, often fast-developing problems that\nCongress plainly had not addressed, like a mass influx of unauthorized migrants, or the Iran hostage crisis.18 Whatever finding may be required in those more limited\ncircumstances, the President cannot fundamentally reorient Congress’s visa\nsystem, and certainly cannot do so without explaining what was wrong with it.\n17 In reality, vetting failures for nationals of the banned countries are vanishingly rare. See J.A. 861-64 (David Bier, The Basic Premise of Trump’s Travel Ban is Wrong, Cato Institute, Sept. 26, 2017). Moreover, in the banned countries, consular officers have already been denying visa applications at a much higher rate than for other countries. See Br. for Cato Inst. at 9-11, IRAP, No. 16-1436, (U.S. filed Sept. 9, 2017) (denial rates for banned countries “79 percent higher than for all other nationalities”). 18 Contrary to the government’s suggestion, Br. 31-32, no court addressed, much less upheld, the Iran entry restrictions. The government’s other examples (Br. 31 n.4) not only addressed problems that the INA clearly did not—and thus required little explanation—but also applied to a very small number of individuals.\n40\n\n\f\n\n\n\n\n\nCongress rejected national-origin quotas fifty years ago, and has long\n\nmaintained an individualized visa process. The Proclamation—with its\n\nnationality-based bans, indefinite duration, focus on governments instead of visa\n\napplicants, and failure to find any problems with Congress’s applicant-based\n\nsystem—vastly exceeds the President’s § 1182(f) authority and violates\n\n§ 1152(a)’s bar on nationality discrimination.\n\nIII. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE.\nThis Court previously rejected the government’s requests “to ignore\n\nevidence, circumscribe [the Court’s] own review, and blindly defer to executive\n\naction.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594, 601. The legal principles this Court articulated\n\nwere correct, and the evidentiary record contains all it did before and more. Like\n\nits predecessor, the Proclamation is an attempt to implement the promised Muslim\n\nban and overwhelmingly impacts Muslims. Unlike its predecessor, the\n\nProclamation is indefinite and potentially permanent. The district court rightly\n\nenjoined it.\n\n41\n\n\fA. Mandel Does Not Defeat the Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claim.\nAs an initial matter, the government again contends that the fundamental constraints of the Establishment Clause have no bearing here because of Mandel, 408 U.S. 753.19\nUnder Mandel, the government may “defeat a constitutional challenge” if the challenged action is both “facially legitimate” and “bona fide,” but “where a plaintiff makes ‘an affirmative showing of bad faith’ that is ‘plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity,’ courts may ‘look behind’ the challenged action to assess its ‘facially legitimate’ justification.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590-91 (quoting Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). The district court correctly found that the plaintiffs had made the affirmative showing of bad faith that is required under Mandel, based on the “combined record” demonstrating how the improper purpose behind EO-2 also motivates the Proclamation. J.A. 1056; see also infra Part III.B.2 (addressing the involvement of executive agencies).\nThe government asserts that the face of the Proclamation itself demonstrates that it is both facially legitimate and bona fide. That cannot be reconciled with\n19 As the district court recognized, even though it applied Mandel there are “persuasive reasons” not to take that approach, including that the Establishment Clause violation is not only “a limitation on an individual’s right” but also a structurally forbidden “public message that the Government has adopted an official policy of favoring one religion.” J.A. 1054.\n42\n\n\fMandel itself or with Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence in Din. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 592 (government’s argument “reads out Mandel’s ‘bona fide’ test altogether”). The government also contends that Din suggested only that “when the government does identify a factual basis . . . that is the end of the analysis,” Br. 42, but that likewise cannot be squared with what Din actually says: If there is an “an affirmative showing of bad faith,” the analysis continues. 135 S. Ct. at 2141; see IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590.20\nAnd the government is wrong that subsequent Supreme Court precedent contradicts this Court’s interpretation of Mandel. Br. 41. Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693-94 (2017), does not cite Mandel at all. Instead, it cites Fiallo v. Bell. But Fiallo—like Morales-Santana—involved an equal protection challenge to congressional line-drawing on the face of a statute, with no allegation of bad faith. 430 U.S. at 792-97. This Court has already rejected the rote application of rational-basis review doctrine to the very different context of an executive officer’s bad faith. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 589 & n.14 (explaining that the label “rational basis” is “incomplete” in a case like this one because it “does not properly account for Mandel’s ‘bona fide’ requirement”).\n20 Cf. Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F. 3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 2017) (Br. 42) (acknowledging that visa denial might be reviewable if consular officer acted in bad faith by citing a basis he believed to be false).\n43\n\n\fB. The Proclamation Suffers from the Same Constitutional Defects as Did the Precursor Executive Orders.\nIn reviewing the constitutionality of EO-2, the en banc Court rejected the government’s contention that courts should defer to presidential action without regard to how a challenged policy came about, or how the President describes and justifies it. The Court observed that deference to the President “must yield in certain circumstances, lest [the Court] abdicate [its] own duties to uphold the Constitution.” Id. at 601. And looking at all the evidence, the Court concluded that EO-2 simply could not be “divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it.” Id.\nApplying this same framework, the district court found that the Proclamation, too, cannot be divorced from the policy and history that gave rise to it. “The Proclamation does not abandon th[e] fundamental approach” of barring entry by people from Muslim-majority countries “but rather doubles down on it.” J.A. 1068.\n1. As a practical matter, the Proclamation almost exclusively targets Muslims. Like the executive orders from which it springs, the Muslim-majority countries the Proclamation bans are together approximately 95% Muslim. J.A. 234-48, 852-59. The government leans heavily on the inclusion of two nonMuslim-majority countries, but as the district court recognized, their inclusion will\n44\n\n\fhave “little practical consequence.” J.A. 1066 (explaining that the ban will affect only certain Venezuelan officials and “fewer than 100” North Koreans).\nNor is this vastly disproportionate effect explainable based on any objective set of criteria. The Proclamation repeatedly deviates from the very test that it purports to impose, banning more Muslims and exempting more non-Muslims than its “baseline” criteria (which are really just the visa waiver criteria) would dictate. Those criteria were themselves applied haphazardly and inconsistently. See J.A. 1283-1300 (David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato Institute, Oct. 9, 2017) (documenting dozens of countries that fail various criteria but were not banned); Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶ 12, J.A. 900 (noting that “non-Muslim majority countries such as Belgium” were not banned despite “widely-documented problems with information sharing” and nationals who “have carried out terrorist attacks on Europe”).\nAn examination of the actual effects of the ban thus fatally undermines the government’s reliance on supposedly “tailored substantive restrictions.” Br. 47. While different nonimmigrant visas are banned for each country, the reality is that Muslims—especially those seeking to permanently immigrate—will overwhelmingly be the ones excluded from the country. Such governmental targeting of minorities based on religion or belief, see Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel\n45\n\n\fVillage Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), violates the mandates of the Establishment Clause.\nThe government responds that the Proclamation is legitimate because it “neither mentions nor draws any distinction based on religion.” Br. 43 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). It said the same of the prior order, which this Court invalidated. Moreover, Lukumi makes clear that the Establishment Clause “extends beyond facial discrimination” to “forbid[] subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.” 508 U.S. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 547 (striking down religious gerrymander that did not expressly identify its target); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307 n.21 (2000); Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699. This Court was correct to reject the government’s claim that it can sidestep the Establishment Clause by studiously avoiding the words “Islam” or “Muslim” in the operative order. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 597.\n2. Likewise, “the context in which this policy arose” demonstrates the constitutional violation. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315 (warning against “turn[ing] a blind eye” to context); see also, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987). To be sure, “past actions do not ‘forever taint’ present ones.” J.A. 1064 (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874). But as the district court recognized, the Proclamation is a clear\n46\n\n\fcontinuation and outgrowth of the Muslim ban policy and the executive orders on which it is built. J.A. 1072.\nThe Proclamation is on its face a successor to and continuation of EO-2. The new order implements the indefinite ban that EO-2 expressly contemplated and that the President has long promised. And as the district court observed, the “underlying architecture of [EO-1, EO-2] and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same.” J.A. 1067. Each invokes 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), and each bars nationals of various countries from entering the United States, subject to a case-by-case waiver procedure. As this Court previously observed, such use of nationality was the “exact form” the President had earlier promised for his Muslim ban. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594. Indeed, even as he reiterated his calls for a nationality-based Muslim ban during the campaign, the President announced his plan to issue a temporary ban followed by more permanent measures. J.A. 652.\nThe government argues that “the Proclamation is significantly different from the prior entry suspensions” because of the “multi-agency review and recommendation process.” Br. 45, 47. But nothing about that process or the officials’ recommendations can overcome the ban’s clear purpose and effect: to deliver the promised Muslim ban.\nNotably, the government has flatly refused to disclose what was recommended by those officials. Indeed, the government has declined even to say\n47\n\n\fwhether there were “material inconsistencies” between the DHS report, the DHS recommendation, and the Proclamation as actually issued. J.A. 952-53; see id. (conceding that “it’s potentially possible that various government advisors disagree among themselves”). As the district court recognized here, such hidden recommendations can offer “little to ‘assure the public that the government is not endorsing a religious view.’” J.A. 1072-73 (quoting Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848, 863-64 (10th Cir. 2016)) (alterations omitted).\nWhat the courts and the public do know—beyond the President’s many calls for a Muslim ban—forecloses the government’s argument that the involvement and unknown recommendations of agency officials cure the Establishment Clause violation. First, EO-2 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to “submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals.” EO-2 § 2(e) (emphasis added); see id. (Secretary “shall” submit list). As the district court explained, that directive itself reveals “that the President had decided, even before the study had been conducted, that regardless of the results, some countries’ nationals would be subject to a travel ban.” J.A. 1068. Second, any doubt on that score was dispelled by the President himself, who announced publicly his plan to impose a “much tougher version” of the ban even before EO2’s review process was underway. J.A. 664, 1074. And during the review he\n48\n\n\fcalled for “the travel ban into the United States” to “be far larger, tougher and\nmore specific.” J.A. 832, 1074.\nThird, the Proclamation’s extreme disproportionate effect is not surprising:\nAs the district court observed, “many of the criteria . . . used to justify the ban on\nspecific countries in the Proclamation[] were substantially similar to those used to\nselect the list of countries banned by EO-2.” J.A. 1068-69 (describing overlap\nbetween the criteria used). Moreover, it has recently come to light that the White\nHouse placed an official who has a record of overt anti-Muslim animus to oversee\nthe report and recommendation process at the Department of Homeland Security.\nSee Hananoki, supra note 2, at 4; Lanard, supra note 3, at 4; contra Br. 47 (relying\non “the process of review and recommendation by government officials whose\nmotives have never been questioned”). And fourth, there are other troubling\nindications that White House pressure may well have warped the agency recommendations.21 Thus, as with the government’s prior assertion that EO-2 was\n21 See Jonathan Blitzer, How Stephen Miller Single-Handedly Got the U.S. to Accept Fewer Refugees, The New Yorker (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-stephen-miller-singlehandedlygot-the-us-to-accept-fewer-refugees (indicating that the parallel agency process for reaching a recommendation regarding the new annual cap on refugees—which both EO-1 and EO-2 addressed—was “purely political” and dictated by White House senior advisor Stephen Miller); cf. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 575 (discussing the conclusions of two DHS reports that contradict the premise of all three bans, which became public only after being leaked to the press).\n49\n\n\fadopted based on the recommendations of agency officials, see IRAP, 857 F.3d at 577, 598, here the mere existence of recommendations from advisors—which may not match the ban—does not break the straight line from the President’s promises of a Muslim ban through all three ban orders.\nMore fundamentally, the involvement of Executive Branch officials does not and cannot insulate the Proclamation from the President’s record of religious animus and promises to ban Muslims, because, as the government itself concedes, “[a]t the end of the day, the President is the one who made the decision and the President has adopted the rules he wants by issuing the proclamation.” J.A. 95253.\nCandidate Trump promised a ban on Muslims, and never repudiated that promise. President Trump, one week into office, issued EO-1 without consulting any of the relevant national security agencies. After he issued EO-2 to replace it, he repeatedly asserted that he accepted the alterations, which he described as “watered down,” only at the urging of his lawyers, and that in his view he “should have stayed with the original.” J.A. 780, 791. Now, he has issued the Proclamation, the indefinite Muslim ban he had planned and promised all along.\n3. Nor can the government’s invocation of national security justify this ban any more than it did EO-2. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 597. Examining the same criteria as the Proclamation, Congress—balancing security and other values—\n50\n\n\fchose not to ban entire nations from entering, but instead to require individualized vetting. See supra Part II.B. And, like EO-2, the Proclamation does not identify any failures in the vetting system that justify these drastic and unprecedented measures.\nThe available evidence is to the contrary. As this Court noted in its decision on the last appeal, 857 F.3d at 575, 596, the Department of Homeland Security has found that restrictions based on nationality do not advance national security, see J.A. 213-20, and a bipartisan group of dozens of former national security officials has concluded that the Proclamation, like EO-2 before it, serves no legitimate national security interests, see J.A. 892–903. This is, once again, “strong evidence that any national security justification for [the ban] was secondary to its primary religious purpose.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 596.\n4. Finally, the government points to a single address by the President as showing a more tolerant attitude toward Muslims. See Br. 52. This isolated speech did not repudiate his previously enjoined executive orders, and does nothing to counteract his long-standing, frequent, and ongoing denigration of Muslims and professed intent to exclude Muslim immigrants and travelers.\nIndeed, the President has time and again expressed his overriding desire to make permanent, and harsher, his ban on Muslims. He did so in EO-2’s text. See EO-2 § 2(e); J.A. 1068. He did so in his repeated calls for a “tougher” ban even\n51\n\n\fbefore the mandated review was completed. See J.A. 791. He did so on the very\nday that he received DHS’s recommendations, tweeting: “the travel ban into the\nUnited States should be far larger, tougher and more specific—but stupidly, that\nwould not be politically correct!” J.A. 832. And he recently reaffirmed his\nhostility to Islam, tweeting “a statement that . . . shooting Muslims with bullets\ndipped in pig’s blood should be used to deter future terrorism.” See J.A. 1073. As\nthe district court found, these statements—regardless of what DHS recommended\nor why—“cast the Proclamation as the inextricable re-animation of the twiceenjoined Muslim ban.” J.A. 1075.22\nC. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause’s Fundamental Command that the Government Not Target and Disfavor People Based on Their Religion.\nBecause the evidence of denigration of Islam is so strong in this case, the\nanalysis in the Court’s prior opinion properly focused on the thread of\nEstablishment Clause jurisprudence addressing the purpose of government\nconduct. But it is equally true that the primary effect of the Proclamation is to\n22 The government again seeks to cloak itself in deference to the President’s “predictive judgment.” Br. 51-52. But the “judgment” here has been the same since before he was elected, and it was initially adopted and implemented without consultation with the relevant national security agencies. In any event, the deference to predictive judgments afforded in the cases that the government cites concerned only case-by-case decisions about individuals, and none addressed— much less blessed—such judgments based on religion or national origin. See Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 772.\n52\n\n\f“burden . . . [a] selected religious denomination[]”—Islam, through restrictions on the immigration overwhelmingly of Muslims to the United States. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). Indeed, the contours of the ban—barring almost entirely Muslims, effectively exempting Venezuela, including a ban on North Korea that will have almost no effect, and banning Somalia despite the government’s own baseline—reflect a religious “gerrymander.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533-35, 538 (basing free-exercise analysis on Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and striking down as impermissible religious “gerrymander” an ordinance for which “almost the only conduct subject to it” was associated with a particular religion).\nAs this Court recognized in holding EO-2 unconstitutional, “the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment yet stands as an untiring sentinel for the protection of one of our most cherished founding principles—that government shall not establish any religious orthodoxy, or favor or disfavor one religion over another.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 572; accord Awad, 670 F.3d at 1127 (striking down anti-Muslim state constitutional amendment). “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 244; see also id. at 255 (“the Framers of the First Amendment forbade” any “official denominational preference”). Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s “Establishment Clause cases . . . have often\n53\n\n\fstated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to\ndisapprove of a particular religion.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532. At its most\nfundamental level, this means that “the Establishment Clause forbids the\ngovernment to use religion as a line-drawing criterion.” Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).23\nNo matter which aspect of the Proclamation the Court focuses on—its\npurpose, effect, or religious gerrymandered line drawing—the conclusion is the\nsame. The new Proclamation, like its forbears, operates both by design and in\nactual effect to disadvantage Muslims like the individual plaintiffs here in the most\npersonal, palpable ways: It forcibly separates their families and marks them as the\nobject of official denigration, disfavor, and maltreatment in ways that individuals\nof other faiths do not experience. That flies in the face of the Establishment\nClause. See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.\n573, 593-94 (1989) (“The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits\n23 The Establishment Clause works in tandem with the Free Exercise Clause and equal protection to safeguard this principle of equality and equal respect under law without regard to religion or belief. See, e.g., Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 715 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Religious Test Clause, Art. VI, cl. 3, and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to religion[] all speak with one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual circumstances, one’s religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or duties or benefits.”); Larson, 456 U.S. at 245. The same evidence that establishes the Establishment Clause violation also establishes a violation of equal protection in this case.\n54\n\n\fgovernment from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.\nThere is no dispute that a presidential directive expressly banning Muslims would be unconstitutional even if imposed in the name of national security. See Oral Arg., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, CSPAN 30:29 (May 8, 2017), http://cs.pn/2j4kM4h. The same is true where, as here, such a ban is effectuated by “talking territory instead of Muslim.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594. The contrary holding the government seeks, would, as Justice Jackson warned in Korematsu v. United States, “lie[] about like a loaded weapon.” 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Governmental denigration of and disregard for a religious minority and its adherents cannot be squared with the mandates of the Establishment Clause. IV. A NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS APPROPRIATE.\nThe district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction of the Proclamation, as it had previously issued a nationwide preliminary injunction of EO-2. This Court and the Supreme Court rejected the government’s requests to vacate or stay the EO-2 preliminary injunction in its entirety, or to limit it to the specific plaintiffs or their family members. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance\n55\n\n\fProject, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam) (leaving in effect a nationwide injunction). The Court should reject the government’s renewed request to limit the current injunction in the same way.\nAs the district court recognized, the plaintiffs would suffer “significant, irreparable harm . . . both from the prolonged separation from family members and the Establishment Clause violation.” J.A. 1077 (emphasis added). The government asserts that “delay in entry alone does not amount to irreparable harm,” Br. 55, but it fails to explain how “[t]he absence of a family member” could possibly be “cured through a later payment of money damages.” J.A. 1077; see Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 782. For example, Fahed Muqbil’s wife needs to enter the United States to help Mr. Muqbil, a U.S. citizen, care for their desperately ill oneyear-old U.S. citizen daughter. J.A. 1245-46. IAAB plaintiff Jane Doe #5, a 79year-old wheelchair-bound permanent resident in poor health, may never again see her youngest son, an Iranian national, if he is banned or delayed from receiving a visa. J.A. 1170-71. Nor does the government dispute that Establishment Clause injuries are irreparable; it simply rehashes its standing arguments. Br. 55-56.\nOn the other side of the balance, the government offers the same abstract interest this Court previously rejected—“the notion that the President, because he or she represents the entire nation, suffers irreparable harm whenever an executive action is enjoined,” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 603, together with invocations of national\n56\n\n\fsecurity interests—without any identification of concrete harms. The government’s invocation of national security is not a “silver bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries.” Id. at 603; see also Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶¶ 13-15, J.A. 900-01 (explaining why “Travel Ban 3.0 would undermine the national security of the United States”). The public interest also strongly favors a preliminary injunction: when courts “protect the constitutional rights of the few,” or, in this case, the many, “it inures to the benefit of all.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 604.\nFinally, a policy as sweeping and disruptive as this one will injure millions of people, harming the plaintiffs in complex and unpredictable ways. It would be exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to effectively tailor an injunction to the plaintiffs. The “systemwide impact” here warrants a “systemwide remedy.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 359 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). V. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIMITING\nTHE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO INDIVIDUALS WITH BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS TO U.S. PERSONS OR ENTITIES. The district court limited the scope of the preliminary injunction in light of the temporary “equitable balance” that the Supreme Court struck in its opinion partially staying the injunction of Section 2(c) of EO-2. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2089. But the Supreme Court’s stay opinion does not require or even support that limitation.\n57\n\n\fThe Supreme Court’s stay opinion considered a different question from the one that faced the district court. The Supreme Court was deciding whether to issue a partial, temporary stay pending appeal, id. at 2087, and did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims; by contrast, the district court was fashioning relief after (preliminarily) resolving the merits.\nMoreover, the equities involved are different from those the Supreme Court balanced in IRAP. This time, the government’s ban is indefinite and possibly permanent, and will injure the plaintiffs for months or even years (not just 90 days) while the case is resolved. The plaintiffs currently before the Court are also more likely to be injured by the exclusion of an individual who does not have the “bona fide relationship” required by the district court’s order (for example, an extended family member, a friend, or a professional collaborator with whom they have no current formal relationship). Yet in the face of these even more serious harms to the plaintiffs, the government has presented weaker claims of harm pending appeal. The balance of harms therefore favors a comprehensive injunction.\nA. The Partial Injunction Does Not Provide Complete Relief to the Plaintiffs.\nThe plaintiffs will be injured by the Proclamation’s restrictions on noncitizens whose relationships to U.S. persons or entities—while significant—are insufficiently formal or documented to meet the bona fide relationship standard.\n58\n\n\fThe injunction therefore fails to provide the plaintiffs “complete relief.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).\nThe Supreme Court’s equitable balance in crafting its stay standard placed particular emphasis on the injuries that John Doe #1, Dr. Elshikh, and Hawai‘i had alleged. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (“The injunctions remain in place only with respect to parties similarly situated to Doe, Dr. Elshikh, and Hawai‘i.”); see also Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 761-65 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 58187. The temporary but severe injuries to those plaintiffs—for example, the exclusion of close family members—were reflected in the temporary equitable balance the Court set. The Court did not discuss possible injuries to friends and more distant relatives, or injuries to individuals with whom U.S. organizations had significant but informal relationships. See J.A. 1080; Hawai‘i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2017), stay denied in relevant part, No. 17A275 (16-1540), 2017 WL 4014838 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2017).\nThe plaintiffs now before this Court have described injuries that the narrowed injunction will not remedy, and which would persist over the ban’s indefinite period. For example, YAMA’s members have felt the impact of the bans through friends and acquaintances abroad, as well as through family members. J.A. 611. Similarly, AAANY’s clients have been and will be harmed by the bans’ effects on friends and distant family members. J.A. 567, 570. IRAP has diverted\n59\n\n\fresources to produce materials on the Proclamation, J.A. 577, which are distributed to clients and non-clients alike. IAAB will have many fewer participants at its conference, including participants who would attend but are not invited as speakers. J.A. 1154. And MESA will be harmed not only by the Proclamation’s impact on its members, but also by its impact on nonmembers who would attend its meeting (without necessarily signing up in advance) but will be barred from doing so. J.A. 559-60.\nMoreover, an injunction limited to noncitizens with formal relationships fails to fully remedy the condemnation, exclusion, and isolation that the Proclamation imposes on the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are injured by the stigmatizing message it sends—even when that message is sent by the exclusion of noncitizens with whom they do not have a qualifying relationship. This harm is more severe than EO-2’s because the Proclamation’s ban is indefinite. The lack of interim relief could cause condemnation injuries to persist for years as this case makes its way through the courts. See supra Part I.B (describing the condemnation harms the Proclamation would inflict).\nB. The Government’s Harms Are Significantly Weaker Even Than Those It Claimed in Defending EO-2.\nAt the same time that the Proclamation’s indefinite duration heightens the harm to the plaintiffs, the government’s claimed harm from the injunction is even\n60\n\n\fweaker. The government no longer asserts, for example, that the ban is required to make resources available while it conducts a review—an assertion on which the Supreme Court specifically relied in granting a partial stay. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2089; see also Amicus Br. of T.A. 21-26 (describing differences between the rationales for EO-2 and the Proclamation). And the President’s decisions to allow in the nationals of several countries that failed the review process’s baseline evaluation (Iraq and Venezuela), as well as individuals with certain nonimmigrant visas from other countries that fail the baseline, illustrate that individuals from countries that do not meet the baseline criteria do not pose a categorical risk.\nThe government, apparently appreciating the weakness of the rationale for EO-2, has asserted a newfound “independent” reason for the Proclamation’s ban: that it is necessary to provide leverage with other nations and thereby “elicit improved identify-management and information-sharing” practices. Defs’ Opp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 23-24, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 212 (quoting Proclamation § 1(h)(i)). Yet in seeking a stay from this Court, the government correctly declined to claim that it was urgently harmed on this basis. Stay Mot. 8-9; Stay Opp. 5 n.2; cf. Br. 54-55.\nIn sum, the government claims less severe harm in justifying a new ban that more seriously injures the plaintiffs, including through the exclusion of noncitizens\n61\n\n\fwith whom the plaintiffs have significant but non-qualifying relationships. The balance of harms tips decisively in favor of a comprehensive injunction.\nC. A Full Injunction Is Appropriate After This Court Reaches the Merits.\nIn IRAP, the Supreme Court did not address the merits; it limited its discussion to “interim equitable relief.” 137 S. Ct. at 2087. That interim equitable balance should not dictate what this Court does once it reaches a decision on the merits.24 When a court determines, on the merits, that an executive action facially violates constitutional or statutory constraints, the “result is that [the action is] vacated—not that [its] application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.” Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nSuch standard injunctive relief is especially appropriate here, where the Proclamation’s entry restrictions facially violate two structural constitutional limits. The Establishment Clause creates both an individual right and a structural constraint on governmental power. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 430. And the Proclamation’s wholesale rewriting\n24 At a minimum, if this Court finds for the plaintiffs on the merits, it should remove the “bona fide relationship” limitation from the preliminary injunction itself and then consider whether to partially stay the preliminary injunction pending further review. In the plaintiffs’ view, because the interim balance of harms favors a complete injunction, such a stay would not be appropriate.\n62\n\n\fof the INA fundamentally upsets the separation of powers. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438 (noting that the President may not enact, amend, or repeal laws). Only a comprehensive injunction can prevent the President from violating these structural restraints.\nAny other result would allow the President to violate the Constitution and the INA indefinitely, so long as the targets of the illegal action are noncitizens without formal relationships with U.S. persons. The Supreme Court did not remotely suggest that it intended that result. This Court should reverse the district court’s order limiting the injunction to noncitizens who have bona fide relationships with U.S. persons or entities. VI. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN\nSUGGESTING THAT IRAP AND HIAS CLIENTS CATEGORICALLY LACK BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS. Even if the district court correctly limited its injunction to those without bona fide relationships, one particular aspect of the ruling should still be corrected. The district court held that “clients of IRAP and HIAS, and those similarly situated, are not covered by the injunction absent a separate bona fide relationship as defined above.” J.A. 1080. This definition excludes noncitizens from the injunction who were protected by the previous equitable balance struck by the Supreme Court, and should be reversed.\n63\n\n\fThe district court’s holding in this regard appears to be grounded in a misapprehension of the Supreme Court’s actions implementing the bona fide relationship standard. Plaintiffs in the Hawai‘i litigation argued that refugees with formal assurances from a refugee resettlement organization were categorically protected by the injunctions against EO-2, and the Hawai‘i district court agreed. The Supreme Court stayed that decision only “with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance.” Trump v. Hawai‘i, — S. Ct. —, 2017 WL 4014838 (Sept. 12, 2017).\nThe district court in this case appears to have interpreted this stay ruling to mean that no client relationships can ever qualify under the Supreme Court’s standard. But the government conceded before the District of Hawai‘i that some client relationships (as opposed to refugee assurance relationships) would satisfy the “bona fide relationship” standard. See Defs’ Opp. to Mot. to Enforce, Dkt. No. 338, Hawai‘i v. Trump, No. 17-cv-50, at 14-15 (D. Haw. filed July 11, 2017) (stating that client relationships “require[] a case-by-case analysis”). The Hawai‘i district court agreed, explaining that, for client relationships, “the nature of [the] representational services varies significantly,” making it impossible to determine, as a categorical matter, whether client relationships qualify. Hawai‘i v. Trump, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2017 WL 2989048, at 8 (D. Haw. July 13, 2017). Neither the\n64\n\n\fgovernment nor the plaintiffs appealed that decision, and the Ninth Circuit did not\n\naddress it. Hawai‘i, 871 F.3d at 653 n.4.\n\nUnder the Supreme Court’s stay order, whether or not a given client has\n\nformed a qualifying relationship therefore depends on whether the connection is\n\n“formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course.” IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at\n\n2088. While some client relationships may not meet that standard—for instance, if\n\nthey are formed solely to “secure [the client’s] entry” under the injunction, id.—\n\nmany others will. The district court erred to the extent it held that the clients of\n\nIRAP and HIAS, and similar organizations, categorically lack a qualifying\n\nrelationship with those organizations.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThe preliminary injunction should be affirmed, except as to its limitation to\n\npersons with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United\n\nStates.\n\nDated: November 15, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nKaren C. Tumlin Nicholas Espíritu Melissa S. Keaney Esther Sung NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600\n\n/s/ Omar C. Jadwat Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Hina Shamsi Hugh Handeyside Sarah L. Mehta David Hausman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION\n65\n\n\fLos Angeles, CA 90010 Tel: (213) 639-3900 Fax: (213) 639-3911 tumlin@nilc.org espiritu@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org sung@nilc.org\nJustin B. Cox NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER P.O. Box 170208 Atlanta, GA 30317 Tel: (678) 279-5441 Fax: (213) 639-3911 cox@nilc.org\nKathryn Claire Meyer Mariko Hirose INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT 40 Rector Street, 9th Floor New York, New York 10006 Tel: (646) 459-3044 Fax: (212) 533-4598 kmeyer@refugeerights.org mhirose@refugeerights.org\nDavid Rocah Deborah A. Jeon Sonia Kumar Nicholas Taichi Steiner AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 Tel: (410) 889-8555 Fax: (410) 366-7838 jeon@aclu-md.org\n\n125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 549-2600 Fax: (212) 549-2654 ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org hshamsi@aclu.org hhandeyside@aclu.org smehta@aclu.org dhausman@aclu.org\nCecillia D. Wang Cody H. Wofsy Spencer E. Amdur AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 343-0770 Fax: (415) 395-0950 cwang@aclu.org cwofsy@aclu.org samdur@aclu.org\nDavid Cole Daniel Mach Heather L. Weaver AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 915 15th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 675-2330 Fax: (202) 457-0805 dcole@aclu.org dmach@aclu.org hweaver@aclu.org\n66\n\n\frocah@aclu-md.org kumar@aclu-md.org steiner@aclu-md.org\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees IRAP, et al.\n\nJohnathan Smith Sirine Shebaya MUSLIM ADVOCATES P.O. Box 66408 Washington, D.C. 20035 Tel: (202) 897-2622 Fax: (415) 765-1774 johnathan@muslimadvocates.org sirine@muslimadvocates.org\nRichard B. Katskee Eric Rothschild Andrew L. Nellis^ AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1310 L St. NW, Ste. 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 466-3234 Fax: (202) 466-3353 katskee@au.org rothschild@au.org nellis@au.org\n\nMark H. Lynch Mark W. Mosier Herbert L. Fenster Jose E. Arvelo John W. Sorrenti Katherine E. Cahoy Rebecca G. Van Tassell Karun Tilak COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One City Center 850 10th Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: (202) 662-6000 Fax: (202) 662-6302 mlynch@cov.com mmosier@cov.com hfenster@cov.com jarvelo@cov.com jsorrenti@cov.com kcahoy@cov.com rvantassell@cov.com ktilak@cov.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees I.A.A.B., et al.\n\nCharles E. Davidow Robert A. Atkins Liza Velazquez Andrew J. Ehrlich Steven C. Herzog PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas\n\nLena F. Masri Gadeir Abbas COUNCIL ON AMERICANISLAMIC RELATIONS 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833\n67\n\n\fNew York, NY 10019-6064 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\nFaiza Patel Michael Price BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\n\nlmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nJethro Eisenstein PROFETA & EISENSTEIN 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees Zakzok, et al.\n\n^Admitted only in New York; supervised by Richard B. Katskee, a member of the D.C. Bar\n\n68\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-face requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(e)(2)(B)(ii) and the type-volume limitations of Rule 28.1(e)(2)(B)(i). The brief contains 14,572 words, excluding the parts of the brief described in Rule 32(f).\n/s/ Omar C. Jadwat Omar. C. Jadwat\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI hereby certify that on November 15, 2017, I electronically filed the\n\nforegoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals\n\nfor the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the\n\ncase are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the\n\nappellate CM/ECF system, except for the following, who will be served by first\n\nclass mail on November 15, 2017:\n\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n/s/ Omar C. Jadwat Omar C. Jadwat\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 1 of 44\n\n17-2231(L)\n17-2232(C), 17-2233(C), 17-2240(XAP)\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nALLAN HAKKY, et al., Plaintiffs,\nv. DONALD J. TRUMP, etc., et al,\nDefendants-Appellants.\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland at Greenbelt\n\nBRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE STATES OF NEW YORK, CALIFORNIA, CONNECTICUT, DELAWARE, ILLINOIS, IOWA, MAINE,\nMARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS, NEW MEXICO, OREGON, RHODE ISLAND, VERMONT, VIRGINIA, and WASHINGTON, and the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES\n\nBARBARA D. UNDERWOOD Solicitor General\nANISHA S. DASGUPTA Deputy Solicitor General ZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY Assistant Solicitor General\nof Counsel\n(Counsel list continues on signature pages.)\n\nERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General State of New York\n120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 (212) 416-8921\nDated: November 16, 2017\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 2 of 44\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................ii\nINTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS OF AMICI..................................... 1\nARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 5\nI. THE PROCLAMATION PERPETUATES, AND MAKES PERMANENT, THE HARM THAT ITS PREDECESSOR ORDERS INFLICTED ON THE AMICI STATES...................................................................................... 5\nA. Harms to the Amici States’ Proprietary Interests. .................. 5\nB. Harms to the Amici States’ Sovereign and QuasiSovereign Interests .................................................................. 22\nII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. ...................................... 25\nA. Balancing the Equities and Weighing the Relative Harms Tips Decidedly in Favor of Preliminary Relief........... 26\nB. The Nationwide Scope of the Injunction Is Proper in View of the Proclamation’s Violations and Actual and Threatened Harms. .................................................................. 32\nCONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 35\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 3 of 44\n\nCases\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nPage(s)\n\nAlfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) .............................................................................. 29\nAmerican Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. McCreary County, Ky., 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003).......................................................... 27, 34\nChaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006) .............................................................. 27\nEast Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004)................................................................ 32\nHawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017)............................................................ 6, 25\nInternational Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017)........................................................ passim\nMoore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) .............................................................................. 28\nOstergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010)................................................................ 34\nTrump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) .................................................................... 26, 29\nUnited States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) .............................................................................. 32\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)........................................................ 25, 30\nWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) .............................................................................. 26\nWinter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ............................................................................ 26, 27\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 4 of 44\n\nCases\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nPage(s)\n\nWV Association of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2009)................................................................ 26\n\nConstitutions\n\nCal. Const.\nart. I, § 4 ............................................................................................... 22 art. I, § 7 ............................................................................................... 22\nart. I, § 8 ............................................................................................... 22\nart. I, § 31 ............................................................................................. 22\n\nN.M. Const. art. II, § 11 ........................................................................... 22\n\nIll. Const. art. I, § 3 ............................................................................................... 22 art. I, § 17 ............................................................................................. 22\n\nStatutes\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1182 ......................................................................................... 31\n\nCal. Civ. Code § 51(b) ............................................................................... 22\n\nCal. Gov’t Code §§ 11135-11137..................................................................................... 22 § 12900 et seq. ...................................................................................... 22\n\nConn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 ........................................................................ 22\n\nDel. Code § 710 et seq............................................................................... 22\n\nIll. Comp. Stat. ch. 740, § 23/5(a)(1) .............................................................................. 22\nch. 775, § 5/1-102(A)............................................................................. 22\nch. 775, § 5/10-104(A)(1) ...................................................................... 22\n\nMaine Rev. Stat. § 784...................................................................................................... 22 § 4551-4634 .......................................................................................... 22\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 5 of 44\n\nStatutes\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nPage(s)\n\nMd. Code, State Gov’t § 20-606 ................................................................ 22\n\nMass. Gen. L.\nch. 93, § 102 .......................................................................................... 22 ch. 151B, § 1 ......................................................................................... 22\nch. 151B, § 4 ......................................................................................... 22\n\nN.M. Stat. § 28-1-7.................................................................................... 22\n\nOr. Rev. Stat. § 659A.006(1)..................................................................... 22\n\nR.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1)(i) .................................................................... 22\n\nVt. Stat. tit. 9, §§ 4500-4507 ............................................................................... 22\ntit. 21, § 495.......................................................................................... 22\n\nWash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1) ............................................................... 22\n\nExecutive Orders/Proclamations\nExecutive Order No.13,769 (Jan. 27, 2017), 82 Fed.Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017) ................................................................................ 2\nExecutive Order No.13,780 (Mar. 6, 2017), 82 Fed.Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017) ............................................................................. 2\nProclamation No. 9645 (Sept. 24, 2017), 82 Fed.Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017)............................................................................. passim\n\nMiscellaneous Authorities\nAbha Bhattarai, Even Canadians are Skipping Trips to the U.S. After Trump Travel Ban, Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2017), at http://tinyurl.com/WashPost-Bhattarai-Tourism........................... 19\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 6 of 44\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES Miscellaneous Authorities\n\nPage(s)\n\nAlana Wise, Travel to the United States Rose in April, But Industry Remains Wary, Reuters (June 6, 2017), at\nhttp://tinyurl.com/Reuters-Wise-TraveltoUS...................................... 20\n\nAnna Maria Barry-Jester, Trump’s New Travel Ban Could Affect Doctors, Especially in the Rust Belt and Appalachia, FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 6, 2017), at http://goo.gl/dT2Z6h ................... 24\n\nHironao Okahana, Data Sources: Admissions Yields of\nProspective International Graduate Students: A First Look (Council of Graduate Schools, June 2017),\nhttp://tinyurl.com/CouncilGradSchs-Okahana-Survey ........................ 9\n\nImmigrant Doctors Project, https://immigrantdoctors.org ..................... 24\n\nInstitute of Int’l Educ., Advising International Students in an Age of Anxiety (Mar. 31, 2017), at\nhttp://tinyurl.com/IIE-AdvisingStudents ............................................ 19\n\nKirk Carapezza, Travel Ban’s ‘Chilling Effect’ Could Cost Universities Hundreds of Millions, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Apr. 7, 2017), at http://goo.gl/CqkNEy .................................................... 9, 10\n\nMaryam Saleh, Hospitals in Trump Country Suffer As Muslim Doctors Denied Visas to U.S., The Intercept (Aug. 17, 2017), at http://tinyurl.com/Intercept-Saleh-MD ......................... 25\n\nSam Petulla, Entry Ban Could Cause Doctor Shortages in\nTrump Territory, New Research Finds, NBC News (Mar. 7, 2017), at http://tinyurl.com/NBCNews-Petulla-\nMDShortages.............................................................................. 9, 14, 16\n\nU.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs,\nReciprocity and Civil Documents by Country, at https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/fees/reciprocity-\nby-country.html/................................................................................... 11\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 7 of 44\n\nINTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS OF AMICI The States of New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington, and the District of Columbia, submit this brief as amici curiae in support of affirmance. This appeal arises from a challenge to Presidential Proclamation No. 9645: the third in a series of presidential orders executed this year that imposed discriminatory bans on the entry into the United States of nationals from six overwhelmingly Muslim countries.1 The United States District Court for the District of Maryland (Chuang, J.) issued a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from implementing those sections of the Proclamation against individuals who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.2 IRAP v. Trump, 2017 WL 4674314 (D.Md. Oct. 17, 2017). The district court held that interim relief was warranted because plaintiffs would experience irreparable injury in\n\n1 See Proclamation No.9645, § 2(a)-(c),(e),(g)-(h) (Sept. 24, 2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017).\n2 The injunction does not cover the provisions that bar entry of a limited number of government officials from Venezuela and all North Korean nationals, see Proclamation § 2(d),(f).\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 8 of 44\n\nthe absence of an injunction, the balance of the equities favored an injunction, and plaintiffs had made a strong showing of the likelihood of success on the merits of their claims under Immigration and Nationality Act § 1152(a) and the Establishment Clause. This Court previously affirmed an injunction entered against the similar travel ban contained in the second of two Executive Orders that preceded the Proclamation,3 in an earlier stage in this case.4\nThis brief supplements plaintiffs’ brief by providing the perspective and experience of 15 additional sovereign States and the District of Columbia. Like its predecessors, the Proclamation’s entry ban gravely and irreparably harms our universities, hospitals, businesses, communities, and residents. Keeping the preliminary injunction in place will continue to provide critical protection to the state interests the ban endangers.\n\n3 Executive Order No.13,780, §§ 2(c),6(a)-(b) (Mar. 6, 2017), 82 Fed.Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017); see also Executive Order No.13,769, §§ 3(c),5(a)-(c),5(e) (Jan. 27, 2017), 82 Fed.Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017).\n4 See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 2080, vacated and remanded, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017).\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 9 of 44\n\nAmici thus have a strong interest in plaintiffs’ challenges to the Proclamation’s entry ban. Indeed, like plaintiffs here, many of the amici States have brought suits challenging the two preceding Executive Orders on the grounds that certain provisions of those Orders violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and various other constitutional and statutory provisions.5 We have also previously filed briefs amicus curiae in this and related cases, including briefs supporting the entry of preliminary injunctions against the previous Orders, and briefs opposing any stay of such injunctions.6\n\n5 Many of the amici States challenged the March Order in Washington v. Trump, No.17-cv-141 (W.D.Wash. 2017). They challenged the January Order in Washington v. Trump, No.17-cv-141 (W.D.Wash. 2017), stay pending appeal denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Mass. & N.Y. Amicus Br. (15 States and D.C.), Washington v. Trump, No.1735105 (9th Cir. 2017), ECF No.58-2; Aziz v. Trump, 2017 WL 580855 (E.D.Va. 2017).\n6 N.Y. Amicus Br. (17 States and D.C.), Trump v. IRAP and Trump v. Hawaii, Nos.16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S. Sept. 18, 2017); N.Y. Amicus Br. (15 States and D.C.), Trump v. Hawaii, No.16-1540 (U.S. July 18, 2017); Va. Amicus Br. (16 States and D.C.), Trump v. IRAP, Nos.16-A1190, 16A1191 (U.S. June 12, 2017); N.Y. Amicus Br. (16 States and D.C.), Trump v. IRAP, Nos.16A-1190, 16A-1191 (U.S. June 12, 2017); Ill. Amicus Br. (16 States and D.C.), Hawaii v. Trump, No.17-15589 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017), ECF No.125; Va. & Md. Amicus Br. (16 States and D.C.), IRAP v. Trump, No.17-1351 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017), ECF No.153.\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 10 of 44\n\nWhile amici States differ in many ways, all benefit from immigration, tourism, and international travel by students, academics, skilled professionals, and businesspeople. Like the previous bans, the disputed provisions of the Proclamation continue to significantly disrupt the ability of our States’ public colleges and universities to recruit and retain students and faculty, impairing academic staffing and research needs, and causing the loss of tuition and tax revenues, among other costs. The Proclamation likewise continues to disrupt the provision of medical care at amici States’ hospitals and further harms our science, technology, finance, and tourism industries by inhibiting— permanently—the free exchange of information, ideas, and talent between the designated countries and our States, causing long-term economic and reputational damage. In addition, the ban has made it more difficult for the States to effectuate our own constitutional and statutory policies of religious tolerance and nondiscrimination.\nIf this Court vacates or narrows the preliminary injunction, all amici States will face further immediate, concrete—and likely permanent—harms flowing directly from the the disputed provisions of the Proclamation. Accordingly, amici States have a strong interest in\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 11 of 44\n\nensuring that the protection provided by the nationwide injunction remains in place throughout the course of this litigation.\n\nARGUMENT I. THE PROCLAMATION PERPETUATES, AND MAKES PERMANENT,\nTHE HARM THAT ITS PREDECESSOR ORDERS INFLICTED ON THE AMICI STATES. A. Harms to the Amici States’ Proprietary Interests. The disputed provisions of the Proclamation block the entry of all\nimmigrants and most nonimmigrants from six Muslim-majority\ncountries,7 including those who seek to be students and faculty at our\npublic universities, physicians and researchers at our medical\ninstitutions, employees of our businesses, and guests who contribute to\nour economies when they come here as tourists or for family visits.8 The\n\n7 Five of these countries were covered under the previous travel bans: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. The sixth country is Chad.\n8 The Proclamation bars all immigration from the six affected countries; the issuance of all non-immigrant visas to Syrians; all business and tourist visas for nationals of Chad, Libya, and Yemen; and all nonimmigrant visas for nationals of Iran, except certain student and exchange visas that will be subject to additional but unspecified scrutiny. See § 2(a)-(c),(e),(g)-(h).\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 12 of 44\n\nprovisions are thus irreparably harming the work of our state institutions and treasuries.9 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 783 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing such irreparable harms), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 2080, vacated and remanded, 2017 WL 4782860 (Oct. 24, 2017).\nHarms to State Colleges and Universities. State colleges and universities rely on faculty and students from across the world. By interfering with the entry of individuals from the designated countries, the disputed provisions of the Proclamation continue to seriously disrupt our public institutions’ ability to recruit and retain students and faculty—causing lost tuition revenue, increased administrative burdens, and the expenditure of additional university resources.10\nAs with the two previous travel bans, announcement of the Proclamation’s entry ban has created serious doubt as to whether faculty\n\n9 All of the amici States support the legal arguments put forth in this brief, although not every specified harm occurs in every State. For example, almost all amici States operate state hospitals, but Delaware does not.\n10 See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41, 43-44, 53, 55-56, 80, 93, 105, 107108, 125, Washington v. Trump, No.17-cv-141 (W.D.Wash.), ECF No.198.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 13 of 44\n\nfrom the designated countries will be able to obtain the visas they need to timely assume positions with public universities in amici States. For example, two scholars who had accepted offers at the University of Washington in 2017 were unable to enter to begin their positions due to the initial travel ban.11 Similarly, officials at the University of Massachusetts—which typically hires a dozen new employees from the affected countries annually—believe that the Proclamation’s now indefinite entry ban will result in the University being “permanently unable to hire top-ranked potential faculty, lecturers or visiting scholars from the affected countries, because [the Proclamation] may preclude them from reaching the United States to fulfill their teaching obligations.”12\nThe Proclamation’s entry ban also continues to disrupt the ability of our public universities to recruit and retain foreign students from the designated countries, imperiling hundreds of millions of tuition dollars\n\n11 Id. ¶ 40. 12 Id. ¶ 93.\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 14 of 44\n\nand other revenue generated from such students, as well as important academic research projects.13\nBefore this series of travel bans was implemented, amici States’ colleges and universities had already made numerous offers of admission for the 2017-2018 academic year to students from the affected countries and—but for the bans’ interference with their continuing admissions process—might have admitted many more.14 Some schools are continuing to make such offers, including to students from nations designated in the Proclamation. But some of these students have withdrawn applications; others have had to abandon entirely their plans to enroll in our university programs due to the bans; and many have chosen not to apply at all, resulting in a significant decline in international student applications at many of amici States’ universities.15\nIndeed, in this climate of uncertainty and discrimination, forty percent of colleges surveyed across the nation reported a drop in\n\n13 E.g., id. ¶¶ 38, 43-46, 53, 57, 86, 94-95, 105, 107, 112. 14 E.g., id. ¶¶ 43-44. 15 E.g., id. ¶¶ 37, 46, 53, 122.\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 15 of 44\n\napplications from foreign students in the wake of the first two travel bans.16 Graduate departments in science and engineering have reported that “international student applications for many programs declined by 20 to 30 percent for 2017 programs.”17 Additionally, 80 percent of college registrars and admissions officials surveyed have serious concerns about their future application yields from international students.18 And 46 percent of graduate deans have reported “substantial” declines in admission yields for international students.19 Not surprisingly, countries that are perceived as more welcoming—such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—have already seen a jump in\n\n16 See Kirk Carapezza, Travel Ban’s ‘Chilling Effect’ Could Cost Universities Hundreds of Millions, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Apr. 7, 2017) (internet). (For authorities available on the internet, full URLs are listed in the table of authorities.)\n17 Sam Petulla, Entry Ban Could Cause Doctor Shortages in Trump Territory, New Research Finds, NBC News (Mar. 7, 2017) (internet).\n18 Carapezza, supra.\n19 Hironao Okahana, Data Sources: Admissions Yields of Prospective International Graduate Students (Council of Graduate Schs., June 2017) (internet).\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 16 of 44\n\napplications in this same time period.20 This drain of highly qualified student talent will continue under the Proclamation.\nThe ability of state institutions of higher education to retain their existing foreign students and faculty has also been compromised by the broad, continuing entry ban contained in the Proclamation. Amici States’ public universities and colleges currently have hundreds of students and faculty members from the targeted countries. For example, at Washington State University, there are 140 students and 9 faculty members from the countries designated in the Proclamation, and 105 such graduate students at the University of Washington.21 The University of Massachusetts has 180 similarly situated students and 25 employees.22 There are 529 such students in the University of California system; 250 in the California State University system; 297 at the State University of New York; and 61 at Portland State University.23\n\n20 Carapezza, supra. 21 Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36. 22 Id. ¶¶ 91, 94. 23 Id. ¶¶ 53, 58, 108, 124.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 17 of 44\n\nMany of these students will need to apply for additional visas during the course of their academic studies because only single-entry visas are permitted from some of the affected countries, and because the required visas are valid only for relatively short periods.24 And those students and faculty members whose visas are set to expire will face obstacles to renewal—if renewal of their visas is even possible under the disputed provisions of the Proclamation, which prohibit the issuance of most nonimmigrant visas for nationals of the affected countries. Thus, if enforcement of the disputed provisions of the Proclamation is permitted, certain students who are no longer eligible for student visas (e.g., Syrian students) may be required to discontinue their courses of study. And other students will face the prospect of not knowing whether they may be denied access to the U.S. institutions where they are studying, particularly if the Proclamation calls for them to be subject to heightened scrutiny and vetting procedures (e.g., Iranian and Somali students).25\n\n24 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Reciprocity and Civil Documents by Country (internet) (search by country and visa types F, M).\n25 Although the Proclamation gives consular officers discretion to waive the travel ban in individual cases, it does not describe the process\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 18 of 44\n\nAny such visa delays or denials could jeopardize not only these individuals’ education or employment, but also any grant funding and scientific research projects that depend on their work.26 And those whose visas remain valid for a longer duration may be unwilling to take the risk of participating in educational, professional, or personal obligations that require travel outside the United States, and will also face the hardship of being unable to receive visits from their parents, spouses, children, and other relatives.27 Indeed, many faculty members and researchers at amici States’ universities are contemplating leaving their current positions for opportunities in more welcoming countries in the the wake of the Proclamation’s now indefinite ban.28\n\nfor applying for a waiver, specify a time frame for receiving a waiver, or set concrete guidelines for issuance of a waiver beyond providing a list of circumstances in which waivers “may be appropriate.” § 3(c). And there is no guarantee that a waiver will be issued because the ultimate decision on whether to issue it lies solely within a consular official’s discretion. See id.\n26 Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 42, 55, 91, 94. 27 Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 54, 78-79, 91, 94, 107, 109-110, 112, 123. 28 Id. ¶¶ 38, 42, 111.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 19 of 44\n\nThe foreign-national scholars and faculty employed by or recruited by our state universities typically have specialized expertise that cannot easily be replaced. Universities that are delayed in or prevented from recruiting international faculty and related staff thus suffer significant financial and reputational harm, including delayed or lost federal funding for research efforts.29 Our educational institutions have needed to expend considerable amounts of scarce university resources to make contingency plans for filling unexpected gaps in faculty rosters caused by the exclusion or possible departure of scholars from the designated countries. Despite this effort, there is no guarantee that our universities will be able to meet all of their needs.30\nWhile public colleges and universities are always subject to federal immigration law and policy, these successive travel bans have injured them unexpectedly, by upending with no advance notice the established\n\n29 Id. ¶¶ 38, 43-44, 55, 105-106, 112. 30 Id. ¶ 55 (Proclamation “disrupts the ability of California’s universities and colleges to meet staffing needs”); id. ¶ 93 (Proclamation will “severely interfere” with ability of University of Massachusetts “to hire top-ranked” faculty).\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 20 of 44\n\nframework around which they have designed their faculty recruitment and student enrollment processes.31 As explained above, this has left seats unfilled, tuition dollars irretrievably lost, and important academic programs and research projects in peril.\nThe disputed provisions of the Proclamation’s third ban have also harmed and will continue to harm our educational institutions’ core missions of excellence in education and scholarship. The loss of students, scholars, and faculty from the affected nations not only impairs important academic and medical research at our States’ universities, but also inhibits the free exchange of information, ideas, and talent that is so essential to academic life and our state universities’ missions.32\nHarms to State Hospitals and Medical Institutions. The disputed provisions of the Proclamation, like the travel bans of the earlier Executive Orders, have created staffing disruptions in state hospitals\n\n31 See Petulla, supra (University of Massachusetts and others have had to “shift[] their recruitment strategies to avoid a talent drought”).\n32 Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 105-106.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 21 of 44\n\nand medical institutions, which employ physicians, medical residents, research faculty, and other professionals from the designated countries.33\nFor example, foreign-national medical residents at public hospitals often provide crucial services, such as caring for some of the most underserved populations in our States.34 They are assigned to our state university hospital residency programs through a computerized “match” that, after applications and interviews, ranks and assigns residency candidates to programs nationwide; programs and candidates are advised of match results in the spring of each calendar year and all new residents begin their positions on July 1.35\nMany state university residency programs regularly match residents from the affected countries. If a program’s matched residents are precluded from obtaining a visa under the disputed provisions of the\n\n33 E.g., id. ¶ 127 (Oregon Health and Sciences University employs 11 such individuals from seven of the countries designated in the Proclamation).\n34 E.g., id. ¶ 115 (New York’s public safety-net hospitals employ a “significant number” of foreign-national residents in 97 medically underserved communities).\n35 Id. ¶ 116.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 22 of 44\n\nProclamation, as many of them were under the predecessor travel bans, the program risks having an insufficient number of residents to meet staffing needs.36 This continuing uncertainty is of particular concern in view of the indefinite duration of the Proclamation’s entry ban. The practical effect of this dilemma is that our state university programs will be reluctant (or unable) to interview or rank highly-qualified residency candidates from the designated countries going forward, because there is no guarantee they will be able to begin or complete their residencies.37 Indeed, residency programs are at this very moment in the process of interviewing candidates for next year’s match.38\nIn addition, if current residents who are nationals of the designated countries cannot renew or extend their visas—as the Proclamation continues to threaten—state university residency programs will be\n\n36 The 2017 match took place one day after the revised Executive Order was scheduled to take effect, and there was serious doubt whether “[a]s many as several hundred doctors” from the six countries designated in that Order would be granted waivers to be able to begin the residencies for which they had matched. Petulla, supra.\n37 Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 115, 127. 38 Id. ¶ 115.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 23 of 44\n\nunable to continue to employ them; these multiyear programs will then be left with unfilled positions, and further staffing gaps will result.39 Such disruptions will translate into uncertainty in residency training programs, as well as threats to the provision and quality of health care services.40 And because patients at our medical facilities must be cared for, our facilities must quickly adapt to any staffing complications resulting from the disputed provisions of the Proclamation—and spend precious time and resources preparing to do so.41\nDiminished Tax Revenues and Broader Economic Harms. In addition to losing the tuition, room and board, and other fees paid by students at our public universities, amici States have suffered—and will continue to suffer—other direct and substantial economic losses as a result of the disputed provisions of the Proclamation, just as we did under the Proclamation’s predecessors. Every foreign student (whether attending a public or private college or university), every tourist, and\n\n39 Id. 40 See infra pp. 23-25. 41 Third Am. Compl. ¶ 59 (shortage of “even one physician” can have “serious implications” for safety-net hospitals in underserved areas).\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 24 of 44\n\nevery business visitor arriving in our States contributes to our economies through their purchases of our goods and services and the tax receipts that their presence generates. Despite the present preliminary injunction, and those that were issued against the Proclamation’s predecessor Orders, this series of successive travel bans during the past ten months has blocked or dissuaded thousands of individuals—potential consumers all—from entering amici States, thereby eliminating the significant tax contributions those individuals would have made.42 That lost revenue will never be recovered and the lasting economic damage cannot be undone, even if plaintiffs ultimately prevail.\nThe contribution of foreign students alone to our States’ economies is immense. A survey by the Institute of International Education conducted in the months following the issuance of the initial travel ban found that “more than 15,000 students enrolled at U.S. universities during 2015-16 were from the [six] countries named in [the revised Executive Order]”; more than half of those students attended institutions in amici States and Hawaii; and, nationwide, “these students contributed\n\n42 See id. ¶¶ 31-32, 62, 75, 87-88, 120-121. 18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 25 of 44\n\n$496 million to the U.S. economy, including tuition, room and board and other spending.”43 For example, in both New York and Illinois, nearly 1,000 foreign nationals from the countries designated in the revised Order were studying on temporary visas in 2015-2016 in each State, and they collectively contributed approximately $30 million to each State’s economy.44 And such figures do not even begin to account for the indirect economic benefits to our States, such as the contributions of international students and scholars to innovation in academic and medical research.\nTourism dollars are also a critical component of amici States’ economies. As a result of the successive travel bans, including the ban announced in the Proclamation, an estimated 4.3 million fewer tourists are expected to visit the United States this year, resulting in $7.4 billion in lost revenue; and in 2018, those numbers will increase to 6.3 million fewer tourists and $10.8 billion in lost revenue.45 This reduction results\n\n43 Institute of Int’l Educ., Advising International Students in an Age of Anxiety 3 (Mar. 31, 2017) (internet).\n44 See id. at app. 1. 45 See Abha Bhattarai, Even Canadians are Skipping Trips to the U.S. After Trump Travel Ban, Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2017) (internet); see also Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-32 (describing “chilling effect” on tourism\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 26 of 44\n\nfrom trips that were prohibited by the parts of the initial bans that were not enjoined, or because individual travelers were deterred by fear that the previous injunctions would be lifted. The now indefinite ban may also lead to the loss of hundreds of thousands of tourism-related jobs held by our States’ residents.46\nAbsent relief from the courts, including interim relief, these broad chilling effects will likely continue.47 This is hardly surprising in view of defendants’ clear message to the world that foreign visitors—particularly those from certain regions, countries, or religions—are unwelcome. Indeed, the disputed provisions of the Proclamation have made this message clearer and more permanent.\nThe disputed provisions of the Proclamation also continue the profound harms that the initial and revised travel bans have inflicted on amici States’ ability to remain internationally competitive destinations\n\nin Washington); id. ¶¶ 52, 61 (Proclamation has decreased tourist travel to California and will cause significant losses in tourism revenues).\n46 Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-64 (Los Angeles tourism board projecting a $220 million loss in tourism revenue in 2017, which jeopardizes hundreds of thousands of tourism-related jobs held by City’s residents).\n47 Alana Wise, Travel to the United States Rose in April, But Industry Remains Wary, Reuters (June 6, 2017) (internet).\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 27 of 44\n\nfor businesses in the sectors of science, technology, finance, and health care, as well as for entrepreneurs. Even a temporary disruption in our ability to attract the best-qualified individuals and entities world-wide— including from the affected countries—puts the institutions and businesses in our States at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace, particularly where the excluded individuals possess specialized skills or training.48 And now that the initially temporary entry bans have become an indefinite ban, defendants’ message of intolerance and uncertainty more deeply threatens amici States’ ability to attract and retain the foreign professionals, entrepreneurs, and companies that are vital to our economies.\nThus, as the experience of amici States shows, our States and our residents have been subjected to widespread, particularized, and welldocumented harm from the moment the first travel ban was announced through today—and likely for the foreseeable future.\n\n48 See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-23, 33, 51-52, 69-70, 74, 86-87, 113, 118, 120-123.\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 28 of 44\n\nB. Harms to the Amici States’ Sovereign and Quasi-Sovereign Interests\nDecreased Effectiveness of Anti-Discrimination Laws. The amici States have exercised their sovereign prerogatives to adopt constitutional provisions and enact laws that protect their residents from discrimination. For example, our residents and businesses—and, indeed, many of the amici States ourselves—are prohibited by such state enactments from taking national origin and religion into account when determining to whom they can extend employment and other opportunities.49 The disputed provisions of the Proclamation interfere with the effectiveness of these laws by encouraging discrimination against Muslims in general, and nationals of six of the designated countries in particular.\n\n49 See, e.g., Cal. Const. art.I, §§ 4,7-8,31; Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 11135-11137,12900 et seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60; 19 Del. Code § 710 et seq.; Ill. Const. art.I, §§ 3,17; 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 23/5(a)(1); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-102(A); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10104(A)(1); 5 Me. Rev. Stat. §§ 784,4551-4634; Md. Code, State Gov’t § 20606; Mass. Gen. L. ch.93, § 102; Mass. Gen. L. ch.151B, §§ 1,4; N.M. Const. art.II, § 11; N.M. Stat. § 28-1-7; Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.006(1); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1)(i); 9 Vt. Stat. §§ 4500-4507; 21 Vt. Stat. § 495; Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1).\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 29 of 44\n\nHarms to Residents Seeking Medical Care. Like its predecessors, the Proclamation’s entry ban will harm residents seeking medical care in our States, particularly those in underserved communities. The countries designated in the Proclamation are important sources of physicians who provide health care to our residents, particularly in underserved areas of our States.50 The current ban will thus impede the States’ efforts to recruit and retain providers of essential primary care, dental health, and mental health services.51 In New York, safety-net hospitals—which include all public acute care hospitals, the entire New York City Health and Hospitals system, and most of the hospitals in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx—rely heavily on foreign-national physicians.52 Indeed, many foreign-national physicians work in the primary care field at a time when primary care physicians are in short supply in many areas across the country.53\n\n50 See Third Am. Compl. ¶ 26 (nearly 200 such physicians and medical residents in Washington); id. ¶ 58 (191 such physicians in California); id. ¶ 114 (500 such physicians in New York).\n51 Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 58, 128-129.\n52 Id. ¶¶ 114, 116.\n53 Id. ¶¶ 27, 58-59, 116, 128-129.\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 30 of 44\n\nAt least 7,000 physicians practicing in the United States attended medical school in one of the six countries designated in the previous Executive Orders (five of which remain designated in the current Proclamation), and these physicians provide 14 million appointments a year, 2.3 million of which are in areas with “a shortage of medical residents and doctors.”54 When residents or physicians from the designated countries are unable to commence or continue their employment at public hospitals, those staffing disruptions will result in serious risks to the quality of our States’ health care services and put the public health of our communities at risk.55 Even before defendants made permanent the latest version of the entry ban through issuance of the Proclamation at issue here, researchers had concluded that the federal government’s travel restrictions were likely to hurt the health of millions\n\n54 Immigrant Doctors Project, https://immigrantdoctors.org; see also Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Trump’s New Travel Ban Could Affect Doctors, Especially in the Rust Belt and Appalachia, FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 6, 2017) (internet).\n55 See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 58-59, 116, 128.\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 31 of 44\n\nof Americans who rely on physicians trained in the designated countries.56\nII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. This Court has previously affirmed a similar preliminary injunction\nissued in an earlier stage of this case challenging one of the Proclamation’s predecessor travel bans. In IRAP v. Trump, the Court held that preliminary relief was justified to restrain a likely violation of the Establishment Clause that threatened substantial harm, and that the nationwide scope of that injunction was justified by the nationwide scope of the threatened harm. 857 F.3d at 588-606; see also Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d at 769-88 (affirming nationwide preliminary injunction in related challenge to predecessor ban based on likelihood of success of plaintiffs’ statutory challenge). Although that decision has been vacated as moot, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, for\n\n56 See Maryam Saleh, Hospitals in Trump Country Suffer As Muslim Doctors Denied Visas to U.S., The Intercept (Aug. 17, 2017) (internet) (foreign physicians “take care of the sickest of the sick and the poorest of the poor,” many have pledged to work in areas designated as “medically underserved,” and without them “the U.S. healthcare system would simply collapse, with the pain felt most acutely in rural areas”).\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 32 of 44\n\nsimilar reasons, that preliminary relief is once again justified to enjoin application of the disputed provisions of the Proclamation. See WV Association of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009) (factors to be considered include whether plaintiff “‘is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,’” and whether “‘the balance of equities tips in his favor, [and an] injunction is in the public interest’” (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008))).\nA. Balancing the Equities and Weighing the Relative Harms Tips Decidedly in Favor of Preliminary Relief.\nAs the Supreme Court recognized during an earlier stage of this case, “[c]rafting a preliminary injunction” is “often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.” Trump v. IRAP, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017). Balancing the equities requires the Court to explore the relative harms to the parties, as well as to “pay particular regard for the public consequences.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); see also IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 602 (considering balance of equities and public interest factors together).\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 33 of 44\n\nCertainly, as the district court correctly found (Opinion 84-85), plaintiffs would be irreparably injured if the Proclamation’s disputed provisions were permitted to go into effect, given the threat of prolonged separation from family members and the Establishment Clause violation.57 This Court has previously recognized that the loss of First Amendment freedoms, including Establishment Clause violations, “‘for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 601-02 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); see also Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2006); cf. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. McCreary County, Ky., 354 F.3d 438, 445 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (presuming irreparable harm where plaintiffs were likely to succeed on merits of Establishment Clause claim).\nAnd in view of the widespread, particularized, and welldocumented harms that have affected—and will continue to affect—amici States and our residents, the balance of the equities also requires that\n\n57 As to the fourth factor to be considered in evaluating the propriety of a preliminary injunction, Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, the plaintiffs have made a strong showing of the likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims. See IRAP Br.22-25.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 34 of 44\n\nthe district court’s injunction remain in place to serve the compelling public interest in minimizing such irreparable harms. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 572 (Court noting that predecessor ban “stands to cause irreparable harm to individuals across this nation”).\nAs described in Point I, implementation of the disputed provisions of the Proclamation, like the previous versions of the travel ban, will result in concrete and irreparable harms to amici States’ economic and proprietary interests. In addition, these provisions will indefinitely prevent our States’ residents from receiving visits from family members.58 Such deprivations constitute a constitutionally cognizable hardship to the affected United States–based persons.59 Moreover, the exclusions at issue hinder amici States’ ability to prohibit discrimination under their own constitutions and statutes,60 and to protect their residents to the extent allowed under other federal laws. See Alfred L.\n\n58 See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25, 104-105 (examples of Washington and New York residents).\n59 See, e.g, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (tradition of sharing household with extended family “deserving of constitutional recognition”).\n60 See supra p. 22.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 35 of 44\n\nSnapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607-08 (1982) (recognizing State’s interests in ensuring that its residents are “not excluded from benefits that are to flow from participation in the federal system” and in “securing observance of the terms under which it participates in” that system).\nThese are some of the very same interests that the preliminary injunctions issued in the earlier travel ban litigation were designed to protect, and that the Supreme Court carefully sought to avoid when leaving certain portions of those prior injunctions in place. See Trump v. IRAP, 137 S.Ct. at 2088 (preserving injunction as to those having “a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States”). Indeed, the district court here adopted the precise balancing previously struck by the Supreme Court when it modified those injunctions (Opinion 86-88; Order 2).\nDefendants have not articulated any reason why this same balancing is not appropriate here, nor have they demonstrated that lifting the injunction is necessary to prevent any irreparable harm to their interests. Defendants’ generalized claim of harm to their interest in maintaining national security (D.Br.53-56) is, again, abstract and\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 36 of 44\n\nconclusory—unlike the concrete and particularized harms to amici States and their residents outlined above. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 603 (Court “unmoved by the Government’s rote invocation of harm to ‘national security interests’ as the silver bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries”). For example, defendants have identified no specific urgency warranting immediate implementation of the disputed provisions of the Proclamation, nor do they claim any disastrous result from the injunction thus far (or any of the prior related injunctions for that matter).\nIndeed, defendants’ assertions of harm to national security interests are substantially undermined by several factors. First, the terms of the Proclamation itself contain internal inconsistencies that significantly undermine the national security rationale. For instance, not every country that failed to meet the Proclamation’s stated criteria is included in the entry ban—and even with respect to the some of the designated countries, not every category of travelers is presumptively barred from entry. Second, the Proclamation itself delayed implementation of its entry ban for approximately one month, undermining defendants’ suggestion that a short stay of the Proclamation would cause\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 37 of 44\n\nirreparable harm. See § 7(a) (signed on September 24, but setting effective date as either October 18 or October 24 for different groups of foreign nationals). Third, as the district court correctly observed (Opinion 86), defendants’ assertions fail to account for current immigration law’s well-established, individualized vetting process, which already permits the exclusion of foreign nationals who present a national security concern or for whom the United States lacks adequate information.61 As the Ninth Circuit observed in connection with its review of an injunction enjoining provisions of the initial travel ban, such an order “merely returned the nation . . . to the position it has occupied for many previous years.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1168.\nIn sum, while national security is a compelling government interest, it “will [not] always tip the balance of the equities in favor of the government.” IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 603. Rather, in a case like this, the balance of the equities here tips decidedly in favor of preserving the preliminary injunction because defendants have identified no\n\n61 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (inadmissibility of aliens for terrorist activities and other security grounds); id. § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility of aliens who fail to meet documentation requirements).\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 38 of 44\n\nappreciable harm that the injunction will cause to their interests, but reversing the district court’s order would allow further irreparable harm to be imposed on amici States and our residents. The status quo should thus be preserved while this litigation continues.\nB. The Nationwide Scope of the Injunction Is Proper in View of the Proclamation’s Violations and Actual and Threatened Harms.\nThe preliminary injunction entered by the district court was appropriately crafted to restrain the systemic, nationwide harm perpetuated by the disputed provisions of the Proclamation, including the harms to amici States. Although defendants’ claim (D.Br.56) that any injunction here must be to limited to redressing only plaintiffs’ individual injuries, the numerous actual and threatened harms to amici States exemplify the public interests affected and underscore the appropriateness of the injunction’s nationwide scope.\nThis Court has recognized that “courts of equity may go to greater lengths to give ‘relief in furtherance of the public interest than...when only private interests are involved.’” East Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 826 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)); see also United States v. Oakland\n32\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 39 of 44\n\nCannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 496 (2001) (district courts enjoy broad discretion “to consider the necessities of the public interest when fashioning injunctive relief” (quotation marks omitted)).\nConsistent with these principles, this Court previously found no error in the district court’s issuance of a nationwide injunction enjoining the previous travel ban. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 605. The Court correctly recognized that the myriad harms flowing from such a ban would not be addressed by injunctive relief limited just to plaintiffs because that “would not cure the constitutional deficiency, which would endure in all [of the ban’s] applications” to similarly situated individuals. Id.; see also id. (citing Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1308-09 (4th Cir. 1992), upholding nationwide injunction “where challenged conduct caused irreparable harm in myriad jurisdictions across the country”). Thus, the Court concluded that “‘a nationwide injunction was necessary to provide complete relief.’” Id. (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 778 (1994)). The district court properly made the same assessment here, finding that an Establishment Clause violation “has impacts beyond the personal interests of individual parties” (Opinion 90).\n33\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 40 of 44\n\nAffirmance of the preliminary injunction here is also necessary to provide continued relief to amici States from the cumulative “nationwide effect” of defendants’ policy (id.), including the substantial disruption and uncertainty unleashed by this entire series of discriminatory travel bans and which now has no end in sight. The disputed provisions of the Proclamation have not only exacerbated the harms that amici States, our institutions, and our residents have experienced, but the current indefinite ban may make these irreparable injuries permanent if the preliminary injunction is vacated or narrowed in any respect.\nFinally, the injunction cannot be characterized as “vastly overbroad” (D.Br.56) given its applicability only to those individuals having “a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” as explained above (supra p. 29). In sum, the district court did not abuse its “broad discretion [in] fashioning” the injunctive relief at issue here.62 Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 288 (4th Cir. 2010); see also McCreary, 545 U.S. at 867 (scope of preliminary injunction is matter within district court’s sound discretion).\n\n62 For all the reasons stated above, the circumstances here would support even the broader injunction that plaintiffs sought below.\n34\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 41 of 44\n\nCONCLUSION\nThis Court should affirm the preliminary injunction.\nDated: New York, New York November 16, 2017\nRespectfully submitted,\nERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General State of New York\nBARBARA D. UNDERWOOD Solicitor General\nANISHA S. DASGUPTA Deputy Solicitor General\nZAINAB A. CHAUDHRY Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel\n120 Broadway, 25th Floor New York, New York 10271 (212) 416-8921\n(Counsel listing continues on next page.)\n\n35\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 42 of 44\n\nXAVIER BECERRA Attorney General State of California\n1300 I Street Sacramento, CA 95814 GEORGE JEPSEN\nAttorney General State of Connecticut 55 Elm Street Hartford, CT 06106 MATTHEW P. DENN Attorney General State of Delaware Carvel State Bldg., 6th Fl. 820 N. French Street Wilmington, DE 19801 LISA MADIGAN Attorney General State of Illinois 100 W. Randolph St., 12th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 THOMAS J. MILLER Attorney General State of Iowa 1305 E. Walnut Street Des Moines, IA 50319 JANET T. MILLS Attorney General State of Maine 6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04333 BRIAN E. FROSH Attorney General State of Maryland 200 Saint Paul Place Baltimore, MD 21202 MAURA HEALEY Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108\n\nHECTOR BALDERAS Attorney General State of New Mexico\n408 Galisteo Street Santa Fe, NM 87501 ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM\nAttorney General State of Oregon 1162 Court Street, N.E. Salem, OR 97301 PETER F. KILMARTIN Attorney General State of Rhode Island 150 S. Main Street Providence, RI 02903\nTHOMAS J. DONOVAN, JR. Attorney General State of Vermont\n109 State Street Montpelier, VT 05609 MARK R. HERRING\nAttorney General Commonwealth of Virginia 202 North Ninth Street Richmond, VA 23219 ROBERT W. FERGUSON Attorney General State of Washington 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104 KARL A. RACINE Attorney General District of Columbia 441 4th Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001\n\n36\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 43 of 44\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\nPursuant to Rules 29 and 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Oren L. Zeve, an employee in the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, hereby certifies that according to the word count feature of the word processing program used to prepare this brief, the brief contains 6,472 words and complies with the typeface requirements and length limits of Rules 29 and 32(a)(5)-(7).\n\n. /s/ Oren L. Zeve\n\n.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-1\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 44 of 44\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on November 16, 2017 the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system, and all parties or their counsel are registered CM/ECF users.\n. /s/ Anisha S. Dasgupta .\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 90-2\n\nFiled: 11/16/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _\u0014_\u001a_\u0010_\u0015_\u0015_\u0016_\u0014_\u0003______________________ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [✔]Government\nCOUNSEL FOR: 6__WD_WH_V_\u0003_R_I\u0003_1_H_Z_\u0003<_R_U_N_\u000f\u0003_&_D_OL_IR_UQ_L_D_\u000f\u0003_&_R_Q_Q_H_FW_LF_X_W\u000f_\u0003'__HO_D_Z_D_UH_\u000f_\u0003,_OO_LQ_R_LV_\u000f\u0003_,R_Z_D_\u000f_\u00030__D_LQ_H_\u000f\u0003_0_D_U_\\O_D_Q_G_\u000f\u0003_0_D_V_V_DF_K_XVHWWV\u000f _\u00031__H_Z_\u00030__H[_L_F_R\u000f_\u00032__UH_J_R_Q_\u000f\u0003_5_K_R_G_H_\u0003,_V_OD_Q_G_\u000f\u0003_9_H_UP__R_QW_\u000f\u0003_9_LU_J_LQ_LD_\u000f_\u0003D_Q_G_\u0003_:_D_V_K_LQ_J_W_RQ_\u000f_\u0003D_Q_G_\u0003_WK_H_\u0003'__LV_WU_LF_W\u0003_R_I\u0003_&_R_OX_P__EL_D_______as the\n(party name)\n\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_A__n_is_h_a__S_.__D_a_s_g_u_p_t_a__________________ (signature)\n\n_/_s_/ _A_n_i_s_h_a_S__._D_a_s_g__u_p_ta____________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_1_2_-_4_1_6_-_8_9_2_1___ Voice Phone\n\n_N__Y_S__O_f_f_ic_e__o_f_th__e_A__tt_o_rn__e_y_G__e_n_e_r_a_l ________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_1_2_-_4_1_6_-_6_3_5_0___ Fax Number\n\n_1_2_0__B_r_o_a_d_w__a_y_,_2_5_t_h__F_lo_o_r_________________\n\n_N__e_w__Y_o_r_k_,_N_Y__1_0__2_7_1_____________________ Address\n\n_a_n_i_s_h_a_.d_a__s_g_u_p_ta__@__a_g_.n_y_._g_o_v________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_1_7__________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_A__n_is_h__a_S__._D__a_s_g_u_p__ta________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n________N_o__v_._1_6_,__2_0_1_7________ Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 12\n\nCase Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) IN THE\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ET AL., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., Defendants and Appellants.\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, No. 17-cv-00361 (Chuang, J.)\nUNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF BY CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES\nFOR AFFIRMANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 12\n\nBERNABEI & KABAT, PLLC Lynne Bernabei (D.C. Bar No. 938936)\nbernabei@bernabeipllc.com Alan R. Kabat (D.C. Bar No. 464258)\nkabat@bernabeipllc.com 1400 – 16th Street, N.W., Suite 500\nWashington, D.C. 20036-2223 (202) 745-1942\n(202) 745-2627 (Fax)\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;\nAdvocates for Youth; Center for Reproductive Rights; Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law; The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund Mississippi Center for Justice; National Center for Lesbian Rights;\nNational Urban League; People for the American Way Foundation; Southern Coalition for Social Justice; and The Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs\n\n- 2 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 12\n\nOn behalf of Amici National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Advocates for Youth, Center for Reproductive Rights, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Mississippi Center for Justice, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Urban League, People for the American Way Foundation, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, and Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, we seek the Court’s permission to file a brief of amici curiae in support of Appellees. The parties consent to the filing of the proposed amici brief, which accompanies this motion.\nAs set forth below, amici are national and regional civil rights groups interested in the promotion of civil liberties throughout the country, and elimination of discrimination in whatever form:\n1. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is the nation’s largest and oldest civil rights grassroots organization. Since its founding in 1909, the mission of the NAACP has been to ensure the political, educational, social, and economic equality of all persons and to eliminate race-based discrimination. The NAACP has fought in the courts for decades to protect the guarantee of equal protection under law. To advance its mission, the NAACP has represented parties in landmark civil rights cases, perhaps most\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 12\n\nfamously in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which outlawed segregation in public schools. The NAACP also has filed numerous amicus briefs over its decades of existence in cases that significantly impact minority groups.\n2. The Advocates for Youth (Advocates) is a nonprofit organization that helps young people make informed and responsible decisions about their reproductive and sexual health. For more than three decades, Advocates has partnered with youth leaders, adult allies, and youth-serving organizations to advocate for effective adolescent reproductive and sexual health programs and policies. In 2017, Advocates launched the Muslim youth Leadership Council (MyLC). MyLC is a yearlong Leadership Council dedicated to bringing together young Muslim-identifying people in the United States and furthering their goals of becoming leaders within their communities and beyond. Each year MyLC recruits and trains 15-20 young people who advocate for the inclusion of young Muslimidentifying people in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of Reproductive Justice related programming and policies at the local, state, and federal levels.\n3. The Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR) is a global human rights organization that uses the law to advance reproductive freedom as a fundamental right that all governments are legally obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill. In the United States, CRR’s work focuses on ensuring that all people have access to a full\n- 2 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 12\n\nrange of high-quality reproductive health care. Since its founding in 1992, CRR has been actively involved in nearly all major litigation in the U.S. concerning reproductive rights, in both state and federal courts, including most recently, serving as lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). As a rights-based organization, the Center has a vital interest in protecting individuals who endeavor to exercise their fundamental rights free from unwarranted government intrusion and discrimination. CRR’s ability to bring litigation challenging executive and regulatory action, and to seek relief where individuals are threatened with irreparable harm, is crucial to its mission.\n4. The Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (CLCCR) is a nonprofit public interest law organization founded in 1969. CLCCR works to secure racial equity and economic opportunity for all. CLCCR provides legal representation through partnerships with the private bar, and collaborates with grassroots organizations and other advocacy groups to implement communitybased solutions that advance civil rights. In all practice areas, including education equity, fair housing, economic opportunity, hate crime prevention, and voting rights, CLCCR advocates for immigrants who have been subject to raciallydiscriminatory governmental practices and policies. CLCCR’s goal is to ensure that America fulfills its promise of democracy and equal justice for all.\n5. The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law is a\n- 3 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 12\n\nnational public interest organization founded in 1972 to advance the rights of individuals with mental disabilities. The Bazelon Center advocates for laws and policies that provide people with mental illness or intellectual disabilities the opportunities and resources they need to participate fully in their communities. Its litigation and policy advocacy is based on the Americans with Disabilities Act’s guarantees of non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation. People with mental illness or intellectual disability commonly face discrimination based on myths and stereotypes, and the eradication of such discrimination is among the Bazelon Center’s primary goals.\n6. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund is a national impactlitigation, public-policy, and advocacy organization committed to achieving full recognition of the civil rights of those who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender or living with HIV—including many who are Muslim and face increased discrimination because of the challenged Executive Order. Through its decades of work on behalf of historically persecuted people, Lambda Legal has deep knowledge of the corrosive effect of government measures that single out marginalized groups for mistreatment. Lambda Legal has also worked to vindicate protections afforded by the Establishment Clause to those treated unequally based on religious beliefs and affiliations, and has a long-standing interest in access to immigration and asylum for individuals who are LGBT or living with HIV.\n- 4 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 12\n\nLambda Legal has participated as counsel or amicus curiae in the Supreme Court and lower courts in numerous cases addressing First Amendment, Equal Protection, and other civil-rights bulwarks for LGBT people, and has had a longstanding interest in immigration and asylum matters. For example, Lambda Legal has served as party counsel in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), and participated as an amicus in asylum cases such as Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), and Velasquez-Banegas v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 2017).\n7. The Mississippi Center for Justice is a nonprofit public interest law organization founded in 2003 in Jackson, Mississippi and committed to advancing racial and economic justice. Supported and staffed by attorneys and other professionals, the Center develops and pursues strategies to combat discrimination and poverty statewide. One of amicus’ original areas of interest involved predatory loan practices directed at migrant poultry workers, and MCJ has remained concerned about the plight of Mississippi’s growing immigrant population for the last decade, particularly in the areas of access to healthcare, education, housing, and fair lending.\n8. The National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) is a national nonprofit legal organization dedicated to protecting and advancing the civil rights of\n- 5 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 12\n\nlesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and their families through litigation, public policy advocacy, and public education. Since its founding in 1977, NCLR has played a leading role in combating discrimination and securing fair and equal treatment for LGBT people and their families in cases across the country involving constitutional and civil rights. NCLR has a particular interest in protecting the rights of LGBT immigrants and other immigrants to this country. Since 1994, NCLR’s Immigration Project has provided free legal assistance to thousands of LGBT immigrants nationwide through, among other services, direct representation of immigrants in impact cases and individual asylum cases and advocacy for immigration and asylum policy reform.\n9. The National Urban League is a civil rights organization dedicated to the empowerment of African Americans to achieve economic parity and racial equality. Founded in 1910 and headquartered in New York City, the League improves the lives of more than two million people annually across the nation through direct service programs, including education, employment training and placement, housing, and health. The Urban League seeks to ensure our civil rights by actively working to eradicate all barriers to equal participation in all aspects of American society, whether political, economic, social, educational, or cultural.\n10. People For the American Way Foundation (PFAWF) is a nonpartisan civic organization established to promote and protect civil and constitutional rights,\n- 6 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 12\n\nincluding religious liberty and freedom from discrimination. Founded in 1981 by a group of civic, educational, and religious leaders, PFAWF now has hundreds of thousands of members nationwide. Over its history, PFAWF has conducted extensive education, outreach, litigation, and other activities to promote these values. PFAWF strongly supports the principles that it violates the First Amendment and civil rights principles for government to take action that, effectively or on its face, harms one particular religious group. This is especially important because of the additional harm such government opprobrium can and has caused, and with respect to particularly vulnerable populations like immigrants, as in this case.\n11. The Southern Coalition for Social Justice is a nonprofit public interest law organization founded in 2007 in Durham, North Carolina. SCSJ partners with communities of color and economically disadvantaged communities in the south to advance their political, social, and economic rights through the combination of legal advocacy, research, organizing, and communications. Originally, one of amicus’ primary practice areas was immigrants’ rights, which remains important to its mission. SCSJ frequently advocates on behalf of immigrants who have been subject to racially-discriminatory governmental practices, and promotes the application of basic human rights principles to policies affecting migrant communities.\n- 7 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 12\n\n12. The Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs is a non-profit civil rights organization established to eradicate discrimination and poverty by enforcing civil rights laws through litigation. In furtherance of this mission, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee has a dedicated Immigrant Rights Project, which has served as a critical resource for some of the most vulnerable populations in the Washington, D.C. area: newcomers and nonEnglish speakers, who are often discriminated against on the basis of their religious background or national origin, and who are often unaware of their legal rights and protections.\nThis case, and several other related cases that seek to enjoin President Trump’s September 24, 2017 Executive Order, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats” are important, and the participation of Civil Rights Organizations is desirable. The Amici are national and regional civil rights groups interested in the promotion of civil liberties throughout the country, and elimination of discrimination in whatever form. Amici’s proposed brief argues that the public interest weighs heavily in favor of enjoining President Trump’s Executive Order, as the Order improperly promotes social categorization and stereotyping that endangers the lives and well-being of individuals of the Muslim faith.\n- 8 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 12\n\nThe attached proposed amici brief complies with the type-volume limitation for an amicus brief on the merits, because it contains less than half of the 13,000 words allotted for Appellants’ opening brief.\nAll parties consent to filing of the proposed amicus brief.\n\nDATED: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Lynne Bernabei Lynne Bernabei bernabei@bernabeipllc.com Alan R. Kabat kabat@bernabeipllc.com Bernabei & Kabat, PLLC 1400 – 16th Street, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036-2223 (202) 745-1942 (202) 745-2627 (Fax) Counsel for Amici Curiae\n\n- 9 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 12\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\nThis motion complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it uses a proportionally spaced typeface (Times New Roman) in 14-point.\n\n/s/ Alan R. Kabat __________________ Alan R. Kabat\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that on November 17, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\n/s/ Alan R. Kabat __________________ Alan R. Kabat\n\n- 10 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 61\n\nCase Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) IN THE\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ET AL., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., Defendants and Appellants.\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, No. 17-cv-00361 (Chuang, J.)\nAMICI CURIAE BRIEF BY CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS\nIN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES FOR AFFIRMANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 61\n\nBERNABEI & KABAT, PLLC Lynne Bernabei (D.C. Bar No. 938936)\nbernabei@bernabeipllc.com Alan R. Kabat (D.C. Bar No. 464258)\nkabat@bernabeipllc.com 1400 – 16th Street N.W., Suite 500\nWashington, D.C. 20036-2223 (202) 745-1942\n(202) 745-2627 (Fax)\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;\nAdvocates for Youth; Center for Reproductive Rights; Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law; The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund Mississippi Center for Justice; National Center for Lesbian Rights;\nNational Urban League; People for the American Way Foundation; Southern Coalition for Social Justice; and The Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 61\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nPage\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI . . . . . . . .\n\n1\n\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . .\n\n1\n\nARGUMENT . . . . . . . . .\n\n2\n\nSocial Categorization and Stereotyping Creates Dangerous Conditions for\n\nMembers of Minority Groups . . . . . . .\n\n2\n\nA. Stereotyping Minorities Creates a Climate for Discrimination .\n\n2\n\nB. The Executive Order Is the Product of Centuries of Discriminatory\n\nStereotypes About Muslims . . . . . .\n\n5\n\nC. The Executive Order Is Based on Stereotypes About Muslims as\n\n“Anti-American” and “Terrorists” . . . . .\n\n9\n\nD. Government Legitimization of Muslim Stereotypes Has Encouraged Violence Against Muslims, and Inhibited Millions of Muslims in the Practice of Their Religion . . . . . . 17\n\n1. Government Stereotyping Leads to Violence and Discrimination 18\n\n2. The President’s Statements Have Encouraged Violence . 19\n\n3. Stereotyping and Discrimination Harms All Americans, Not Just\n\nThose Directly Affected by Specific Acts\n\n. . . 23\n\nCONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . 24\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 61\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nPage\n\nCASES\n\nAhmed v. Johnson,\n\n752 F.3d 490 (1st Cir. 2014) . . . . . . .\n\n4\n\nAziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) . . . . . 13\n\nBrown v. Board of Education of Topeka,\n\n347 U.S. 483 (1954) . . . . . . . .\n\n5\n\nCity of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) . . . . . .\n\n. . 3, 18\n\nDarweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) . . . . 13\n\nGlassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . 11-12\n\nGriggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) . . . . . . . . 3-4\n\nHassan v. City of New York,\n\n804 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 2016) . . . . . . .\n\n4\n\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) .\n\n. 10, 14\n\nJames Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:17-cv-00144, Def. Supp. Mem. (ECF No. 29) (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017) . . 13\n\nLawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) . . . . . . . . 19\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 61\n\nLoving v. Virginia,\n\n388 U.S. 1 (1967) . . . . . . . .\n\n5\n\nLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) . . . . . . . . 19\n\nMcCreary County v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) . . . . . . . . 14\n\nMiller-El v. Dretke,\n\n545 U.S. 231 (2005) . . . . . . . .\n\n3\n\nPrice Waterhouse v. Hopkins,\n\n490 U.S. 228 (1989) . . . . . . . .\n\n3\n\nReynolds v. City of Chicago,\n\n296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002) . . . . . .\n\n4\n\nSanta Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) . . . . . . . . 18\n\nTexas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) . . . . . 2-3\n\nThomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.,\n\n183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) . . . . . . .\n\n4\n\nTootkaboni v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10154, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 386550 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017) . . . . 13\n\nTrump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) . . . 14\n\nUnited States v. Allen, et al., No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016) . 20\n\nUnited States v. Perez, No. 6:17-cr-00035, Superseding Indictment (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2017) 21\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 61\n\nUnited States v. Purinton, No. 2:17-cr-20028, Indictment (D. Kan. June 9, 2017) . . . 20\n\nUnited States v. Stephens,\n\n421 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2005) . . . . . .\n\n4\n\nUnited States v. Windsor,\n\n570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) . . . . .\n\n3\n\nUnited States v. Yonkers Board of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987) . . . . . . 11\n\nVillage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) . . . . . . . . 12\n\nWashington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-141, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), motion for stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) . . . 13\n\nEXECUTIVE ORDERS\n\nExecutive Order No. 13,769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist\n\nEntry into the United States,” 82 FED. REG. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017)\n\n. 12-13\n\nExecutive Order No. 13,780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” 82 FED. REG. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017) . 13\n\nExecutive Proclamation 9,645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” 82 FED. REG. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) . . . . . . . . .\n\n1, 14\n\nLEGISLATIVE MATERIALS\n\nHEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 61st Cong. 383 (1910) (statement of Rep. John L. Burnett, Alabama) . . . . 6-7\n\n158 CONG. REC. S5,106 (daily ed. July 18, 2012) (statement of Sen. John McCain) . . . . . . 24\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 61\n\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\n\nAbigail Hauslohner, Anti-Muslim Discrimination on Rise in U.S., Study Finds, WASHINGTON POST, July 26, 2017, at A-3 . . . . 16\n\nAlbert Samaha & Talal Ansari, Four Mosques Have Burned in Seven Weeks – Leaving Many Muslims and Advocates Stunned, BuzzfeedNews (Feb. 28, 2017) . . . . . . . . . 22\n\nAnonymous, Fire Destroys Texas Mosque in Early Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017, at A4 . . . . . . . . 21\n\nAnonymous, 2nd Florida Mosque Hit by Arson in Past 6 Months, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2017, at A6 . . . . . . 21\n\nAudra D. S. Burch, Facing a Void Left by Hate, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2017, at A1, A12-A13 . . . . . . . . . 20\n\nBarbara Perry, Anti-Muslim Violence in the Post-9/11 Era: Motive Forces,\n\n4 HATE CRIMES 172 (Barbara Perry & Randy Blazak, eds. 2009)\n\n. 7-8\n\nCarol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J. L. & POL. 71 (2010) . . . . . . . . 17\n\nChristine Wang, “Trump Website Takes Down Muslim Ban Statement after Reporter Grills Spicer in Briefing,” CNBC.com (May 8, 2017) . . 10\n\nCleve R. Wootson, Sikh Man, 39, Shot in Suspected Hate Crime, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2017, at A-3 . . . . . . . 22\n\nDalia Lithwick & Jeremy Stahl, Sneak Attack: Trump Is Trying to Secretly Push Through Another Muslim Ban, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2017) . . 15\n\nEllen Barry, U.S. and Indian Officials Condemn Shooting of Sikh, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2017, at A-9 . . . . . . 22\n\nErik Love, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA (2017) .\n\n.\n\n6\n\nJack McDevitt, et al., Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias-Motivated Assaults, 45 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 697 (2001) 23\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 61\n\nJack Moore, Trump’s Failure to Condemn Minnesota Mosque Attacks Stirs Social Media Anger, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2017) . . . . 11\n\nJane Onyanga-Omara, British PM Criticizes Trump’s Travel Ban; Theresa May Calls Controversial Move “Divisive and Wrong,” USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2017, at 5A . . . . . . . . 13\n\nJeffrey L. Thomas, SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND\n\nTHE AMERICAN MUSLIM (2015) .\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n6, 23-24\n\nJennifer Couzin-Frankel, Battling Bias: How Can We Blunt Prejudice Against Immigrants?, 350 SCIENCE 687 (May 19, 2017) . . . 16\n\nJeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN POLITICS (Dec. 8, 2015) . . . . . . . 10\n\nJill Colvin & Steve Peoples, “Trump’s First TV Ad Pushes Proposal to Ban Muslims from Entering U.S.,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 5, 2016, at A-9 . . . . . . . . 10\n\nJohn Eligon, et al., Drinks at a Bar, Ethnic Insults, then Gunshots, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, A1, A17 . . . . . . 20\n\nKurtis Lee, U.S. Muslims on Edge after Bombing; the FBI Is Leading the Investigation into an Attack that Damaged a Minnesota Mosque, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-10 . . . . . . . . 22\n\nMatt Stevens, Justice Dept. Calls Killing in Kansas a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2017, at A18 . . . . . . 20\n\nNick Corasaniti, Minnesota Mosque Shaken by an Early-Morning Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-19 . . . . . . 22\n\nN.Y. TIMES, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech (April 27, 2016) . . . . . . . . . 11\n\nPeter Gottschalk & Gabriel Greenberg, Common Heritage, Uncommon Fear:\n\nIslamophobia in the United States and British India, 1687-1947, in\n\nISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF INTOLERANCE (2013) .\n\n6\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 61\n\nPew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Muslim-Western Tensions Persist (July 21, 2011) . . . . . . . . 15-16\n\nPew Research Center, U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream (July 26, 2017) . . 16\n\nRichard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS\n\nABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) .\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n5\n\nRobert J. Allison, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE\n\nMUSLIM WORLD 1776-1815 (1995) . . . . . .\n\n6\n\nSahar F. Aziz, Losing the ‘War of Ideas:’ A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 255 (2017) . . . 8, 9\n\nSandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes\n\nabout Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004) . .\n\n5\n\nSheryll Cashin, To Be Muslim or Muslim-Looking in America: A Comparative\n\nExploration of Racial and Religious Prejudice in the 21st Century,\n\n2 DUKE FORUM L. & SOC. CHANGE 125 (2010) .\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n8\n\nStanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.\n\nPSYCHOL. 371 (1963) . . . . . . . .\n\n5\n\nSusan T. Fiske, et al, Policy Forum: Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners, 206 SCIENCE 1482-1483 (Nov. 26, 2004) . . . 17\n\nTaylor Goldenstein, Blaze Completely Destroys Islamic Center’s Building,\n\nAUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan, 8, 2017, at B1\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n22\n\nThomas S. Kidd, “Is It Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?” Early\n\nAmerican Uses of Islam, 72 CHURCH HISTORY 766 (2003)\n\n. .\n\n6\n\nThomas S. Kidd, AMERICAN CHRISTIANS AND ISLAM: EVANGELICAL CULTURE AND MUSLIMS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE AGE OF TERRORISM (2009) 6\n\nTodd H. Green, THE FEAR OF ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMOPHOBIA\n\nIN THE WEST (2015) . . . . . . . .\n\n9\n\nvii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 61\n\nTony Marrero, Mosque Fire Deliberately Set, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, at 1. . . . . . . . . 21\n\nU.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Victoria Man Charged with Hate Crime in Burning of Mosque (June 22, 2017) . . . 21\n\nU.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE\n\nCRIME VICTIMIZATION, 2004-2015 (2017) .\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n9\n\nU.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE\n\nCRIMES REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE (2005) .\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n9\n\nviii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 61\n\nINTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE Amici, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Advocates for Youth, Center for Reproductive Rights, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Mississippi Center for Justice, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Urban League, People for the American Way Foundation, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, and Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, are national and regional civil rights groups interested in the promotion of civil liberties throughout the country, and the elimination of discrimination in any form.1\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT In promotion of their interests, amici respectfully submit this brief to advance a key argument in support of affirming the district court’s ruling. Amici submit that the balance of equities and public interest weigh heavily in favor of enjoining President Trump’s September 24, 2017 Executive Order, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats” (the “Executive Order”), as it\n1 Amici submit this brief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2); all parties have consented to its filing. No counsel for any party participated in the authoring of this document, in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel contributed any money that was intended to fund preparation or submission of the brief; and no person, other than amici curiae, their members and their counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund preparation or submission of the brief.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 61\n\nimproperly promotes social categorization and stereotyping that endangers the lives and well-being of individuals of the Muslim faith. The Executive Order is the product of several centuries of Muslim stereotyping in this country, and harms even those who are not the direct victims of specific attacks on immigrants. Here, the evidence demonstrates that, regardless of the Government’s post-hoc explanations, the Executive Order was motivated by animus toward Muslims and singled out, as a proxy, those born in the targeted majority-Muslim countries.\nARGUMENT Social Categorization and Stereotyping Creates Dangerous Conditions for Members of Minority Groups.\nA. Stereotyping Minorities Creates a Climate for Discrimination. The balance of equities and public interest in this case weigh in favor of enjoining the Executive Order due to the discrimination it promotes. As the courts have long recognized, laws such as the Executive Order improperly promote social categorization and stereotyping of Muslims that lead to the endangerment of the lives of those who practice Islam, a minority religion. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that discriminatory stereotypes can improperly affect decision making. Most recently, the Court recognized that disparate impact liability prevents segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from the role of “covert and illicit stereotyping.” Texas Dep’t of Hous. &\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 61\n\nCmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (recognizing that “subtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, and unintentional and escape notice, even the notice of those enacting the bias”).\nIn Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court recognized the role that sex stereotyping plays in discrimination cases, explaining that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an adverse employment decision. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).\nIn Windsor, the Supreme Court emphasized that laws whose “purpose and effect” is “disapproval of” a “class” of people “impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma” on the targeted group. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). The law at issue in that case, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, targeted same-sex couples for discrimination and stigma, just as the challenged Executive Order today singles out Muslim individuals for ill-treatment.\nSimilarly, in Cleburne, the Supreme Court explained that “race, alienage, and national origin” are “so seldom relevant” to state interests, meaning that “such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that the “absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 61\n\nprocedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).\nThe courts in other circuits also recognize that social categorization and stereotyping create fertile grounds for discrimination, including in housing, employment decisions, and police actions. See, e.g., Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 306 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting “appeals to ‘common sense’ which might be infected by stereotypes” as insufficient to justify police surveillance of Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions) (quoting Reynolds v. Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2002)); Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 503 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding “lack of explicitly discriminatory behaviors” does not preclude a finding of “unlawful animus” in employment discrimination because “unlawful discrimination can stem from stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious animus”) (quoting Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999)); United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 515 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that racial stereotyping continues to play a role in jury selection and the outcome of trials); Thomas, 183 F.3d at 42 (holding that Title VII’s ban on “disparate treatment because of race” includes “acts based on conscious racial animus” and “employer decisions that are based on stereotyped thinking”).\nRelevant research shows that a psychological triggering phenomenon known\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 61\n\nas “priming” exacerbates stereotyping and makes it more extreme. Priming occurs when “subtle influences . . . increase the ease with which certain information comes to mind.” Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 69 (2008). In the case of racial stereotyping, which shares many attributes with stereotyping of Muslims, priming an individual with race-based stereotypes can influence later decisions by that individual. Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 489 (2004).\nSocial science research repeatedly demonstrates that individuals have a persistent tendency to defer blindly to priming from authority figures. See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 375-76 (1963). Therefore, as the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1967), demonstrate, discrimination with the sanction of law raises unique and particular dangers.\nB. The Executive Order Is the Product of Centuries of Discriminatory Stereotypes About Muslims.\nThis country has had a long history of official stereotyping of Muslims as un-American and unworthy of becoming Americans. During the Colonial era, two of the most outspoken public figures who disseminated stereotypes of Muslims (then known as “Mahometans”) were Cotton Mather and Aaron Burr – they\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 61\n\nconsistently referred to “Mahometans” in highly derogatory terms, including denouncing “that false Prophet and great Imposter Mahomet.”2\nEven after this country became independent, prejudice against Muslims, as expressed through consistent stereotyping, continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.3 For example, in discussing immigration legislation in 1910, Representative Burnett of Alabama repeatedly referred to “Syrians” – then a catch-all term for Middle Eastern immigrants who were Muslims – in derogatory terms, and made clear that he and his colleagues viewed those immigrants as “the dirty Syrian[s] of today,” and among “the least desirable” aliens, because “the Syrians are the same way, mixed up with the Arabians and the people of African and western Asiatic countries, until they are not our kind of people; and they are not the kind of people from which those who settled this\n\n2 Thomas S. Kidd, AMERICAN CHRISTIANS AND ISLAM: EVANGELICAL CULTURE AND MUSLIMS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE AGE OF TERRORISM 12 (2009); Thomas S. Kidd, “Is It Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?” Early American Uses of Islam, 72 CHURCH HISTORY 766, 771-73, 779-80 (2003).\n3 See, e.g., Erik Love, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA 41, 86-89 (2017); Jeffrey L. Thomas, SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN MUSLIM 1-14 (2015); Peter Gottschalk & Gabriel Greenberg, Common Heritage, Uncommon Fear: Islamophobia in the United States and British India, 1687-1947, in ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF INTOLERANCE (Carl W. Ernst ed. 2013); Robert J. Allison, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 1776-1815 (1995).\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 61\n\ncountry sprang.”4 As set forth in Section C, infra, these are the same kind of statements recently made about Muslims.\nIn this century, the stereotyping of Muslims has continued unabated, leading to increased discrimination against Muslims, rising to the level of violence. Even prior to the Executive Orders in 2017, commentators documented and denounced the ongoing stereotyping of Muslims and the ensuing discrimination and violence.\nProfessor Perry recognized that “many commentators have suggested that Arabs generally and Muslims specifically may represent the last ‘legitimate’ subjects of slanderous imagery and stereotypes.” Barbara Perry, Anti-Muslim Violence in the Post-9/11 Era: Motive Forces, 4 HATE CRIMES 172, 176 (Barbara Perry & Randy Blazak, eds. 2009). Political leaders have an outsized impact in fostering this stereotyping and its ensuing discrimination and violence: “Even more powerful in providing justifications for anti-Muslim violence is the explicit exploitation of public images and related fears by political leaders. To the extent that this is so, there emerges a climate that bestows ‘permission to hate.’” Id. at 181. Thus, she concluded that:\n[S]tate practices provide a context and a framework for the broader demonization and marginalization of minority groups. Through its rhetoric and policies, the state absorbs and reflects back onto the public\n4 HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 61st Cong. 383, 386, 393, 396 (1910) (statement of Rep. John L. Burnett, Alabama).\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 61\n\nhostile and negative perceptions of the Other – in this case, Muslims. Public expressions of racism by state actors are constituted of and by public sentiments of intolerance, dislike, or suspicion of particular groups. Thus, the state seems to reaffirm the legitimacy of such beliefs, while at the same time giving them public voice.\nId. at 185 (emphasis added). Professor Aziz, who testified to Congress on this issue, wrote, “In the United\nStates, numerous polls show a rise in anti-Muslim bias that is manifesting into tangible hate crimes, mosque vandalism, employment discrimination, and bullying of Muslim kids in schools.” Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 255, 265 (2017).\nProfessor Cashin wrote that “Explicit, public anti-Muslim comments do not appear to engender similar widespread outrage” as do racist remarks, and instead “appear to be on the rise,” because of the lack of public rejection of such views. Sheryll Cashin, To Be Muslim or Muslim-Looking in America: A Comparative Exploration of Racial and Religious Prejudice in the 21st Century, 2 DUKE FORUM L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 127-28 (2010). “In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it is more socially acceptable to express explicit bias against Arabs or Muslims than against blacks or other racial/ethnic groups.” Id. at 132.\nMuslim stereotyping has manifested in the form of violence against Muslims, or even those who are erroneously perceived as being Muslims (such as Sikhs). Although the serious under-reporting of such crimes causes the available\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 61\n\nstatistics to understate the actual prevalence of anti-Muslim violence,5 it is welldocumented throughout 2016,6 and continuing into 2017. See Section D.2, infra.\nThus, from Colonial times to the present, this country has had a long and deliberate political tradition of officially stereotyping Muslims – a history that created an atmosphere that legitimizes and encourages discrimination and violence against Muslims.\nC. The Executive Order Is Based on Stereotypes About Muslims as “Anti-American” and “Terrorists.”\nAs in the cases cited above, the Muslim ban bears the imprimatur of the Executive Branch and engenders precisely the type of discriminatory harms that the Supreme Court has held cannot withstand constitutional muster. Since December 7, 2015, when then-candidate Donald Trump issued a written statement calling for a “total and complete shutdown on Muslims entering the United States” in the wake of the terror attack in San Bernardino, California, a “Muslim ban” has\n\n5 Todd H. Green, THE FEAR OF ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE WEST 282-84 (2015) (discussing statistics on crimes against Muslims and problems with underreporting); see generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATION, 2004-2015 (2017) (noting problems with underreporting and different methodologies for categorizing these crimes); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE CRIMES REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE (2005) (same).\n6 See, e.g., Aziz, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J., supra, at 266-68 & nn. 65-80 (collecting examples from 2015 and 2016 of violence against Muslims).\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 61\n\nbeen a major item on his policy agenda.7 At that time, his campaign characterized\na bar on Muslim entry into the United States as a way to stop this country from\nbeing the “victims of the horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad.”8\nHe did so with no evidence other than extensive stereotyping.\nMr. Trump’s labeling of Muslims as “terrorists” has been relentless. On\nJanuary 4, 2016, the Trump campaign premiered its first television advertisement,\nin which Trump “call[ed] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering\nthe United States” until doubts about “radical Islamic terrorism” can be “figure[d]\nout.”9 The link the Presidential candidate drew between “radical Islamic\nterrorism” and all individual Muslims entering the United States was stated with no\nsupporting evidence. Subsequently, candidate Trump, in a major foreign policy\nspeech on April 27, 2016, stated that “The struggle against radical Islam also takes\nplace in our homeland. . . . We must stop importing extremism through senseless\n7 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575-76 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017)); see also Christine Wang, “Trump Website Takes Down Muslim Ban Statement After Reporter Grills Spicer in Briefing,” CNBC.COM (May 8, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/08/trump-website-takes-down-muslim-banstatement-after-reporter-grills-spicer-in-briefing.html.\n8 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 575 n.5.\n9 Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim Travel to United States, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trumpmuslim-ban-immigration; see also Jill Colvin and Steve Peoples, “Trump’s First TV Ad Pushes Proposal to Ban Muslims from Entering U.S.,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 5, 2016, at A-9.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 61\n\nimmigration policies.”10 Again, he made these statements, relying entirely on\nstereotypes, and presenting no evidence or facts to support these claims.11\nAs a matter of law, this Court can rely on campaign statements as part of its\nanalysis of whether the Executive Orders reflect illegal stereotyping and bias\nagainst Muslims. For example, the Second Circuit held that campaign statements\nby the successful candidate for Mayor of Yonkers – in which he “promised … to\nimpose a moratorium on all subsidized housing in Yonkers” – was evidence of the\n“intent to preserve the existing racial imbalance” in that city. United States v.\nYonkers Board of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1191, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987). Similarly, the\nEleventh Circuit held that campaign promises by Roy Moore, made while running\nfor the position of Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, i.e., that he would\ninstall the Ten Commandments monument in the courthouse rotunda, could be\nused as evidence of his intent to violate the Establishment Clause. Glassroth v.\nMoore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285-87, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). More generally, “the\n10 N.Y. TIMES, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech (April 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreignpolicy.html.\n11 Although President Trump has publicly labeled Muslims as dangerous “terrorists,” he has failed to condemn the hate crimes perpetuated against them over the past year. See, e.g., Jack Moore, Trump’s Failure to Condemn Minnesota Mosque Attacks Stirs Social Media Anger, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-failure-condemn-minnesota-mosque-attackstirs-social-media-anger-647694 (President Trump’s silence following a January 2017 shooting at a Quebec mosque, June 2017 attacks in Virginia and London, and an August 2017 bomb attack at a mosque in Minnesota).\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 61\n\nhistorical background of the decision [to discriminate] is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (citations omitted). Here, as in Yonkers, Glassroth, and Village of Arlington Heights, evidence of candidate-Trump’s campaign statements and campaign promises is probative evidence of the intent to discriminate against Muslims – an intent that was implemented just one week after the Inauguration, when he issued the first of a series of Executive Orders that all shared the same goals: to fulfill his campaign pledge.\nOn January 27, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13,769, entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” 82 FED. REG. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). Among other immigration restrictions, Executive Order 13,769 temporarily banned all nationals from seven majorityMuslim countries from entering the United States: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia.\nWhile many surrogates of the current Administration pushed back at the characterization of E.O. 13,769 as a “Muslim ban,” the President embraced it. He told the public via Twitter, “[c]all it what you want, [E.O. 13,769] is about keeping\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 61\n\nbad people (with bad intentions) out of country!”12 Throughout his campaign, and\nnow in office, President Trump has consistently labeled Muslims as “bad people”\nwho must be kept out of America in the interest of national security.\nAfter multiple lower courts enjoined enforcement of E.O. 13,769,13 the\nTrump Administration announced plans to revise the order. On March 6, 2017, the\nAdministration issued Executive Order 13,780, “Protecting the Nation from\nForeign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” 82 FED. REG. 13,209 (Mar. 9,\n2017). The revised Executive Order preserved several core provisions of the prior\nOrder: it suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days,\nand it suspended the entry into the United States of nationals of six of the seven\nmajority-Muslim countries designated in E.O. 13,769 for 90 days. See E.O.\n13,780, §§ 6(a); 2(c). As did E.O. 13,769, the redrafted Order targeted only\nmajority-Muslim countries, as proxies for all Muslims. This Court upheld the\n12 Jane Onyanga-Omara, British PM Criticizes Trump’s Travel Ban; Theresa May Calls Controversial Move “Divisive and Wrong,” USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2017, at 5A. The Department of Justice recently informed a district court that Trump’s tweets (Twitter postings) are “official statements of the President of the United States,” since “a tweet can be the equivalent of a public statement or speech.” James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:17-cv-00144, Def. Supp. Mem., at 2, 5-6 & n.4 (ECF No. 29) (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017).\n13 Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-141, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), motion for stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10154, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 386550 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17cv-480, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) (preliminary injunction).\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 61\n\ndistrict court’s decision enjoining the second Executive Order. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The Supreme Court vacated this Court’s decision as moot in light of the expiration of the second Executive Order. Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017).\nPresident Trump then issued the third iteration of the Executive Order on September 24, 2017. See 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). Although that order purported to expand its scope into non-Muslim countries by including North Korea and Venezuela, this country has hardly any visitors from North Korea, and the order as to Venezuela was limited to certain high-level officials. Id.\nThe third version of the Executive Order continues to target Muslims. The district court correctly found that “the inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations, North Korea and Venezuela, does not persuasively show a lack of religious purpose behind the Proclamation,” requiring the court to “assess whether, as has occurred in other Establishment Clause cases, the insertion of these countries was ‘a litigating position’ rather than an earnest effort to ‘cast off’ the prior ‘unmistakable’ objective.” See JA 1066 (quoting McCreary County v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 871-72 (2005)).14 The district court thus granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction as to this third 14 The district court’s opinion is reported at 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017).\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 61\n\niteration of the travel ban. See JA 993-1083. The district court reviewed the record of Trump’s campaign statements, see JA 1059, and the statements that he made after taking office, see JA 1060, 1062, JA 1067, JA 1073-1074, to conclude that the “primary purpose” of the travel ban was “the desire to impose a Muslim ban.” See JA 1075.\nThus, “approximately 80 percent of all the Muslim refugees who resettled in the United States over the past two years were from the [nine] targeted countries. Perhaps more tellingly, of the refugees who came to the U.S. over the last two years from all of the other countries . . . approximately 70 percent were Christian and just 16 percent were Muslim.”15\nThe government’s intent to ban Muslims will exacerbate widespread discrimination that Muslims already face. The official action of marking a group, Muslims, as a dangerous “fifth column,” drives societal biases against them and creates conditions where violence against them is seen as more acceptable because they are perceived, in President Trump’s words, to be “bad people.”\nIn 2011, the Pew Research Center surveyed Western cultures to determine which characteristics Western populations associate with people in the Muslim\n15 Dalia Lithwick & Jeremy Stahl, Sneak Attack: Trump Is Trying to Secretly Push Through Another Muslim Ban, SLATE, JURISPRUDENCE (Nov. 10, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/11/trump_is_t rying_to_secretly_sneak_through_another_muslim_ban.html.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 61\n\nworld. That survey found that about half of the respondents characterized Muslims as “violent,” and more than half characterized Muslims as “fanatical.”16\nThus, it is no surprise that the Pew Research Center’s 2017 survey of Muslims in this country found that discrimination against them was increasing, and that they are even more concerned in light of the President’s Executive Orders.17\nIn a recent news analysis discussing ongoing social science research relating to stereotyping against the most recent Muslim immigrants in this country and Canada, Science magazine recognized that “Prejudice of course can be directed against any group by any other. But immigrants, and even more so refugees and asylum seekers, may be especially vulnerable because of their tenuous place in a larger society.” Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Battling Bias: How Can We Blunt Prejudice Against Immigrants?, 350 SCIENCE 687, 688 (May 19, 2017). This applies with even greater force to child immigrants and refugees, who are even more vulnerable than their parents. (The recent escalation of deportation orders similarly harms child immigrants and refugees.)\n16 Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Muslim-Western Tensions Persist (July 21, 2011), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-westerntensions-persist/#. 17 Pew Research Center, U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream (July 26, 2017) http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017survey-of-us-muslims/; see also Abigail Hauslohner, Anti-Muslim Discrimination on Rise in U.S., Study Finds, WASHINGTON POST, July 26, 2017, at A-3.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 61\n\nRecent social science research demonstrates both the already-existing climate of prejudice against Muslims and Arabs and the unconscious nature of that bias. “Non-Arab and non-Muslim test takers manifested strong implicit bias against Muslims. These results are in sharp contrast to self-reported attitudes.” Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J. L. & POL. 71, 93 (2010). A “sample of U.S. citizens on average viewed Muslims and Arabs as not sharing their interests and stereotyped them as not especially sincere, honest, friendly, or warm.” Susan T. Fiske, et al., Policy Forum: Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners, 206 SCIENCE 1482-83 (Nov. 26, 2004).\nD. Government Legitimization of Muslim Stereotypes Has Encouraged Violence Against Muslims, and Inhibited Millions of Muslims in the Practice of Their Religion.\nThere can be no doubt that, given its origin and history, the Executive Order is based on the social categorization of Muslims as “anti-American,” “terrorists,” those with “hatred for Americans,” and “bad people.” In this case, President Trump’s repeated, unsubstantiated claims that Muslims are dangerous, and should be barred from entering the country, are just the “cue” needed to release otherwise suppressed and legally prohibited violence against Muslims. The President’s deliberate stereotyping of Muslims as “dangerous” and “terrorists” and his ban on the immigration of Muslims, place an official “imprimatur” on those stereotypes, magnifying their effect.\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 61\n\nThe Supreme Court, in Cleburne, held that a city council’s insistence that a group home for individuals with intellectual disabilities obtain a special-use permit to operate was premised on unsubstantiated “negative attitudes or fears” of nearby property owners, which were impermissible bases for disparate treatment. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). Although “‘[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law . . . the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.’” Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). Here, too, the law cannot give effect to private biases against Muslims.\n1. Government Stereotyping Leads to Violence and Discrimination. When someone in a position of authority, as President Trump, categorizes Muslims as dangerous and terrorists, he communicates that they are “outsiders” and not full members of the political community. By way of comparison, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a school-sponsored religious message, delivered over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of the faculty, and pursuant to a school policy. Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000). The Supreme Court’s reasoning was based on its view that the school policy created two classes of people—those who adhered to the favored religion, and those who did not. Id. The President’s steadfast support of what he calls a “Muslim ban” similarly sends the message that those who adhere to Islam are not part of American society,\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 61\n\nas opposed to Christians and other non-Muslims, who are favored by the ban. In doing so, he “sends a message to non-adherents [to the Christian faith] that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination in both the public and in the private spheres.”). The Executive Order and the President’s statements characterize Muslims as homogenous and a national threat and thereby engender a climate conducive to violence against Muslims.\n2. The President’s Statements Have Encouraged Violence. This Administration tolerated, if not encouraged, crimes against Muslims, through its determination to implement the travel ban affecting them – in effect telling all Muslims (whether born here or abroad) – that they do not belong here. Starting in February 2016, only two months after then-candidate Trump’s December 7, 2015 and January 4, 2016 statements (supra), three nationalists in Kansas (the “Crusaders,” a militia group) engaged in a conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction “to carry out a violent attack against Muslims in their community” through “destroy[ing] an apartment complex in Garden City, Kansas,\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 61\n\nwhich contains a mosque and is home to many Muslims.”18 They openly discussed\ngoing to apartment buildings known to house refugees to “start kicking in the doors\nof the Somali apartments, and kill them one by one,” and then expanded their\ntarget to include “city/county commission meetings, local public officials,\nlandlords who rent property to Muslim refugees, and organizations providing assistance to Muslim refugees,” since “the only good Muslim is a dead Muslim.”19\nThe February 22, 2017 shooting of Srinivas Kuchibhotla, Alok Madasani,\nand Ian Grillot in Olathe, Kansas is the most horrifying example of the social categorization of Muslims as enemies of the American people.20 Kuchibhotla and\nMadasani, two engineers at a local technology company, and both Indian\nimmigrants, had gathered with co-workers at a bar near their office to watch a local\ncollege basketball game. Also at that bar was Adam Purinton, who mistook both\nKuchibhotla and Madasani as Iranians (which is one of the nationalities targeted by\nthe Executive Order and its predecessor as barred from entry into the United\n18 United States v. Allen, et al., No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint, at ¶¶ 2, 9 (ECF No. 1) (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016); see also Second Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 89) (D. Kan. Mar. 16, 2017). 19 United States v. Allen, et al., No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint, at ¶¶ 13, 19 (ECF No. 1) (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016). 20 Audra D. S. Burch, Facing a Void Left by Hate, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2017, at A1, A12-A13; Matt Stevens, Justice Dept. Calls Killing in Kansas a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2017, at A18; John Eligon, et al., Drinks at a Bar, Ethnic Insults, then Gunshots, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, A1, A17; see also United States v. Purinton, No. 2:17-cr-20028, Indictment (D. Kan. June 9, 2017).\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 61\n\nStates). Purinton approached and shot at Kuchibhotla and Madasani, telling them to “get out of our country!” Kuchibhotla was killed, and Madasani was wounded. Ian Grillot, a patrolman present at the scene, was wounded while attempting to intervene. Purinton fled across the state border into Missouri and told a bartender in a second bar that he needed to hide out because he had just shot two “Iranians.” Putting aside Purinton’s stereotyped view that his victims were Iranians simply because they were foreign-born immigrants, his actions demonstrate the danger that social categorization can cause by exaggerating both the distance between ingroups (“real Americans”) and out-groups (“Iranians”), as well the homogeneity of the out-group. The Administration’s travel ban against Muslims does just that.\nIn addition, a rash of arsons and vandalism at mosques has occurred following the issuance of E.O. 13,769. On January 28, 2017, one day after the first Order, a fire destroyed the Islamic Center of Victoria, Texas.21 On February 24, 2017, a blaze broke out at the Daarus Salaam Mosque near Tampa, Florida.22\n21 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Victoria Man Charged with Hate Crime in Burning of Mosque (June 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdtx/pr/victoria-man-charged-hate-crime-burning-mosque; Anonymous, Fire Destroys Texas Mosque in Early Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017, at A4; see also United States v. Perez, No. 6:17-cr-00035, Superseding Indictment (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2017). 22 Tony Marrero, Mosque Fire Deliberately Set, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, at 1; Anonymous, 2nd Florida Mosque Hit by Arson in Past 6 Months, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2017, at A6.\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 61\n\nCombined with two arsons of mosques shortly before President Trump’s\ninauguration, the United States has seen an unprecedented surge of hate crimes\nagainst the Muslim community.23\nOther recent attacks on mosques in the United States include an explosion at\na mosque in Bloomington, Minnesota in August 2017.24\nOn March 3, 2017, a Sikh man was shot in his Kent, Washington driveway\nwhen a man approached him and said “go back to your own country.”25\nIt is undeniable that the public interest in this country is best served by\ntolerance of different religions as the Constitution requires, and tolerance of both\nforeign-born and American-born adherents of different religions. The public\ninterest is not served by discriminatory stereotyping against Muslims that\nlegitimizes or encourages discrimination and violence in our country, or by a law\nwhich gives effect to private biases.\n23 Albert Samaha & Talal Ansari, Four Mosques Have Burned in Seven Weeks – Leaving Many Muslims and Advocates Stunned, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/four-mosques-burn-as-2017-begins; Taylor Goldenstein, Blaze Completely Destroys Islamic Center’s Building, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 8, 2017, at B1.\n24 Nick Corasaniti, Minnesota Mosque Shaken by an Early-Morning Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-19; Kurtis Lee, U.S. Muslims on Edge after Bombing; the FBI Is Leading the Investigation into an Attack that Damaged a Minnesota Mosque, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-10.\n25 Ellen Barry, U.S. and Indian Officials Condemn Shooting of Sikh, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2017, at A-9; Cleve R. Wootson, Sikh Man, 39, Shot in Suspected Hate Crime, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2017, at A-3.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 61\n\nThe insidious effect of the Muslim ban does not impact only those persons seeking to enter the United States from the seven designated countries. Instead, by promoting social stereotypes and priming individuals to act on those stereotypes, the ban creates fertile grounds for violence against all minorities. The Executive Order fundamentally threatens the American ideal of a diverse society working across divisions for the greater societal good.\n3. Stereotyping and Discrimination Harms All Americans, Not Just Those Directly Affected by Specific Acts.\nSocial science research has consistently demonstrated that stereotyping of any group harms all individuals in that group, even those who are not directly affected by specific acts of violence or discrimination. For example, Professor McDevitt and several other researchers recognized that:\nBecause bias crimes have the unique impact of reaching far beyond the primary victim, due to the dimension of victim interchangeability, every member of the minority group who is aware of the crime is affected by a solitary crime against one individual minority member.\nJack McDevitt, et al., Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and NonBias-Motivated Assaults, 45 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 697, 712 (2001).\nSimilarly, violent crimes on the basis of religious stereotypes, i.e., against Muslims, have the same broader impact as do terrorist crimes:\nNonetheless, terrorism and violent hate crimes . . . have at least one basic characteristic in common: the violence inflicted on the victims is\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 61\n\nalso aimed at a larger community. . . . hate crimes directly target individual members of a social group but indirectly send a message of intolerance to the entire group. The victims of hate crimes are selected because of their symbolic value as representatives of the entire social group.\nJeffrey Thomas, SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN MUSLIM 137 (2015).\nSenator John McCain recently recognized this fundamental principle when he criticized several fellow members of Congress who had made ad hominem attacks on a former government official due to that person’s Muslim heritage:\nWhen anyone—not least a member of Congress—launches specious and degrading attacks against fellow Americans on the basis of nothing more than fear of who they are and ignorance of what they stand for, it defames the spirit of our Nation, and we all grow poorer because of it.\n158 CONG. REC. S5106 (daily ed. July 18, 2012) (statement of Sen. John McCain). Here, too, the latest Executive Order and the underlying statements by the\nPresident have only encouraged stereotyping of Muslims, which has adversely affected all Muslims, young and old, natives and recent immigrants, and has harmed our society as a whole.\nCONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the briefs of the Appellees, amici curiae respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court’s ruling and uphold the preliminary injunction.\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 61\n\nRespectfully submitted on November 17, 2017,\n/s/ Lynne Bernabei _________________________ Lynne Bernabei Alan R. Kabat Bernabei & Kabat, PLLC 1400 – 16th Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036-2223 (202) 745-1942 Bernabei@bernabeipllc.com Kabat@bernabeipllc.com Counsel for Amici Curiae\n\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 61\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\nThis brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it uses a proportionally spaced typeface (Times New Roman) in 14-point. It was prepared using Microsoft Word. It complies with the type-volume limits of Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(5) because it contains 5,888 words, which is less than half of the 13,000 words allowed for principal briefs under Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(i).\n/s/ Alan R. Kabat Alan R. Kabat\n\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 61\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that on November 17, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n/s/ Alan R. Kabat Alan R. Kabat\n\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017\n\n________________________________\nPg: 38 of 61\n\nUNITED SLATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERES’l’S\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus ease.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 1 7-2231L\n\nCaption: lnternaUonaiRefugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al. -\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 261,\n\nNational Association for the Advancement of Colored People\n(name of partv/arnicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appel lant/appellee/petitioner/respondent!arni cus/intervenor)\n\n1.\n\nE [s party/arnicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES NO\n\n2. Does party/amieus have any parent corporations?\n\nD YES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity’?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09129/2016SCC\n\n-1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\n__\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 61\n\n4. s there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? EYESNO\nIf yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5.\n\nD Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) DYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could he affected\n\nsul,stantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nEYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature:\n\n-‘\n\n/\n\n)‘-\n\n-\n\n/\nz-i\n\n--\n\ni.\n\n/\n\n----.\n\n—-\n\n--S 7\n\n.\n\n// _,_/___‘_/__\n\n/\n/\n/\n/ /\n\nCounsel Ihr: National Assn. Adv. Colored People\n\nDate: f\\J\n\n/\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n************************\n\nI certify that on\n\nI_Th the foregoing document was seed on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM!ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\nft.\n(signature)\n\n/ V /‘ (date) -2-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTIl CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendarns in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231 L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nAdvocates for Youth (name of party/amicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appellantlappellee/petitioner/respondentJamicus/intervenor)\n\nI. Is party/arnicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? JYESZ1NO\n\n2.\n\nDoes party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nL1 YES L2INO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nEYESENO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n1-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231\n\n________________________________________\n\n_______\n\nDoc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 61\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct\nEl financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26. l(a)(2)(B))? EYES NO\nIf yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5.\n\nE Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) DYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nEYES El NO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature: Counsel for: Advocates for Youth\n\nDate:\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n *** * ** * **** * * * ***\n\nI certify that on\n\nI\n\nthe foregoing document was seed on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n1\n(signature)\n-2-\n\n(date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTI-IER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf’ of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case, In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all pat’tes to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amid curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered BCE filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231_L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nCenter for Reproductive Rights (name of party/a11ic1Is)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appellant/a ppel lee/petitioner/respondent/am icus/intervenor)\n\nI.\n\nIs party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity’?\n\nYES NO\n\n2.\n\nDoes party/arnicus have any parent corporations?\n\nD YES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3.\n\nIs I O% or more of the stock of a partv/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother 1blicly held entity’?\n\nYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\nI-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231\n\n_______________________________\n\nDoc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 61\n\n4.\n\nIs there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct\n\nflnancial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? EYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5.\n\nD Is patty a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) DYES i’O\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruplcy proceeding’?\n\nDys NO\n\nIf yes, identily any trustee and the members olany creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature: Counsel for: Center for Reproductive Rights\n\nDate:\n\n( (“\n\n1\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on\n\nithe foregoing document was served on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system i F they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n(signature) -2-\n\n(date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\n______\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than\nelectronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231L\n\nCaption: teLflahOnaI Refugee Assistance Project et aL V. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nChicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (name of party/arnicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n. makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appel lan t/appel lee/peti tioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\nI.\n\nIs party/am icus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?\n\nYES NO\n\n2.\n\nDoes party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nD YES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3.\n\nIs 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nDYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09’29/20t6 SC’C\n\nI-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 45 of 61\n\n4.\n\nIs there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct\n\nfinancial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1 (a)(2)(B))? DYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5.\n\nD Is party a trade association? (arnici curiae do not complete this question) DYES NO\n\nIf yes. identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could he affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6.\n\nDoes this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nDYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature:\n\nN-\n\nCounsel for: Chicago Lawyers Comm. for Civil\n\nDate:\n\n-\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on\n\nthe foregoing document was served on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\nli2. ((JL\n\n(signature)\n\n(date)\n\n-2-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 46 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231 L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26. 1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nJudge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (name of party/amicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appellantlappellee/petitioner/respondentlarnicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/ainicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ENO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is lO% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nEYESENO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/20 16 SCC\n\n1-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 47 of 61\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? flYESNO\nIf yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5.\n\nE Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) EYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6.\n\nDoes this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nIYES1J NO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature:\n\nDate:________\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on f\\)1l/4\n\n2.OL the foregoing document was served on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n(signature)\n\n11 /i/-\n(date)\n-2-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 48 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231 L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1.\n\nLambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund\n(name of party/arnicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\nmakes the following disclosure:\n\n(appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/am icus/intervenor)\n\nI. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES NO\n\n2. Does party/am icus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nDYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n1-\n\n-\n\n\f___________________________________\n__________\n\nAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 49 of 61\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? DYESNO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5.\n\nD Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) EYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nEYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature:\n\n-,\n\n-\n—\n\n-U---—\n\nCounsel for: Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fun\n\nDate: 11.14.17\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI ceify that on\n\n‘,\n\n**********************\nthe foregoing document was served on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n(signature)\n\n“/i /i\n(date)\n-2-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 50 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TI-IL FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSt RE OF CORPORAIE AI:I:ILIATIONS AN!) Oll-IER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be Ii led on behalF of uil puties to a civil. agency, bankruptcy or mandamus\ncase. except that a disclosure statement is tint required l’roni the U nited States, From an indicent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising From a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate de lendanis in a criminal or post—conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to tile disclosure statements.\n\nI F counsel is not a registered ECF Ii Icr and clues not intend to tile documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may tile the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic Form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231 L\n\nCaption: nternational Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 2(. 1 and I .ocal Ru Ic 26. I\n\nMississippi Center for Justice (name of party/an icus)\n\nwho is\n\nArnicus Curiae\n\nmakes the fo I lo\\\\ rig disc losure:\n\n(appel lant/appel lee/petitioner/respondent/am elK! intervenor)\n\nI.\n\nIs partv/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity’?\n\nYES NO\n\n2.\n\nDoes party/au icus have any parent corporations?\n\nD YES NO\n\nI’ yes. identify all parent corporations. includinu all genel’at ions ol’ parent corporations:\n\n3.\n\nIs 10% or more ot the stock ol’ a parR/am ens owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity’?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes. identi ‘v all such owners:\n\n09/2W2Oh5sQd\n\nI-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017\n\n________________\nPg: 51 of 61\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.I(a)(2)(B))? YESNO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amid curiae do not complete this question) EYES NO If yes, identify any publicLy held member whose stock or equity value could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nIYESEINO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature:’-7 ,?2Q_Jf\n\nDate:\n\nCounsel for: Mississippi Center for Justice\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on ‘1/ 1I D)9 the foregoing document was served on all parties or their\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n-2-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 52 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be flied on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amid curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information,\n\nNo, 17-2231 L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Assistance Project et aT. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nNational Center for Lesbian Rights\n(name of party/am icus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appel lant/appel lee/petitioner/respondent/am icus/intervenor)\n\nI.\n\nIs party/arnicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YESNO\n\n2.\n\nDoes party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ENO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3.\n\nIs 10% 01’ more of the stock of a pai’ty/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nDYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09129/2OI6SCC\n\nI-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\n_\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 53 of 61\n\n4.\n\nIs there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct\n\nfinancial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? DYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify entity and natLire of interest:\n\n5.\n\nIs party a trade association? (amid curiae do not complete this question) DYES D NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this ease arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nDYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature: —____________________________\nCounsel for: National Center for Lesbian Rights\n\nDate: November 15, 2017\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nA). I certify that on\n\n* ****** * * ** * **\n1) the foregoing document was seied on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n(signature)\n\nii/,\n(date) -2-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 54 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTI-I CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-223 1 L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nNational Urban League (name of party/amicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appel lant/appel lee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? EYES 1NO\n\n2. Does party/arnicus have any parent corporations?\n\nE YES 1NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nEYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\nO9/29J2O13SCC\n\n1-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017\n\n________________________\nPg: 55 of 61\n\n4.\n\nIs there any other publicly held corporation or other publ clv held entity that has a direct\n\nfinancial interest in the outcome of the litication (Local Rule 26,! (a)(2)(B))? DYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify entity and nature of’ interest:\n\n5.\n\nIs party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nDYES D NO\n\nIf yes. identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity. or state that there is no such member:\n\n6.\n\nDoes this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nDYES NO\n\nIf yes. identify any trustee and the members of’ any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature:\nCounsel for: National Urban League\n\n)\n\n-\n\n-\n\na/ /7\nDate:\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on\n\nthe for:g:ing document was served on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM!ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not. by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\nt7A,J2.\n(signature)\n\nOJO\n\nIt /R /L\n(date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 56 of 61\n\n1Th4ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER TNTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy’ or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231L\n\nCaption: lnLernationaRefugee Assistance Project et al. V. Trump etal.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nPeople For the American Way Foundation (name of party!arnicus)\n\nwho is\n\nArnicus Cuhae\n\n. makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appel lantlappel lee/petitioner/respondent/amicus!intervenor)\n\nI. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? DYESNO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nfl YES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a pai’ty/arnicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity’?\n\nflYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n1-\n\n-\n\n\f_\n\n__\n\nAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\n_\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 57 of 61\n\n4.\n\nIs there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct\n\nfinancial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))?YESNO\n\nIf yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) EYES NO If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6.\n\nDoes this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nYESNO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\n//\n\nSignature:\n\n.7\n....\n\nCounsel for: P&ple For the American Way Fdn\n\n/ Date: /‘ //\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nN. I certify that on\n\ni\n\n * * ** * * * * ** \nforegoing document was seed on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n(signature)\n\n.--t/ /// (date)\n-2-\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\n______________________________\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 58 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER iNTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local govermnent in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Asstance Projectetal. v. Trumpetal.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nSouthern Coalition for Social Justice (name of party/amicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1.\n\nIs party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?\n\nYES NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3.\n\nIs 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09129/2OI6SCC\n\n-1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 59 of 61\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct\nfinancial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? EYES NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5.\n\nE Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) ZYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a banlcruptcy proceeding?\n\nYESI2]NO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\njt1 Siamre:\nCounsel for: Southern Coalition for Social Justice\n\n/H I/i Date:\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\n************************\n\nMv1 I certify that on\n\naZi.-the foregoing document was served on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CM/BCF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n•\n— (signature)\n\n-\n-2-\n\nu /i /L\n(date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 60 of 61\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. 17-2231 L\n\nCaption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\nWashington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs (name of party/amicus)\n\nwho is\n\nAmicus Curiae\n\n, makes the following disclosure:\n\n(appellantlappellee/petitioner/respondentlamicus/intervenor)\n\n1.\n\nfl Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n1-\n\n-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 61 of 61\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? EYESNO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\nE 5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question) EYES NO If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?\n\nEYEs1 NO\n\nIf yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nSignature:\n\nDate: // / ‘\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nA)g)/1 I certify that on\n\nI\n\n1)12).. the foregoing document was served on all parties or their\n\ncounsel of record through the CMIECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by\n\nserving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\nMlatQ t1o2\n(signature)\n-2-\n\nLI /i/\n(date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233 as\n\nRetained Court-appointed(CJA) Court-assigned(non-CJA) Federal Defender Pro Bono flGovernment\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: Amici Advocates for Youth, et al.\n\n(party name)\n\nas the\n\nappellant(s)appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) amicus curiae Dintervenor(s) Emovant(s)\n\n(signature)\nnrre Bernabei\nName (printed or typed)\nBernabei & Kabat, PLLC Firm Name (if applicable)\n1400 - 16th Street N.W., Suite 500\nWashington, D.C. 20036-2223 Address\n\n202-745-1942 Voice Phone 202-745-2627 Fax Number\nBernabei@Bernabeipllc.com E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on Nov. 17, 2017\n\nthe foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record\n\nthrough the CMIECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the\n\naddresses listed below:\n\nSignature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\nNov. 17. 2017 Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 91-4\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: if you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233 as\n\nRetained JCourt-appointed(CJA) Court-assigned(non-CJA) IFederal Defender Pro Bono flGovernment COUNSEL FOR: Amid Advocates for Youth, et al.\n\n(party name)\n\nas the\n\nap,e1lant(s)appellee(s) Epetitioner(s) respondent(s) amicus curiae Dintervenor(s) Emovant(s)\nko1\n(signature)\n\nAlan R. Kabat Name (printed or typed)\nBernabei & Kabat, PLLC Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n202-745-1942 Voice Phone\n202-745-2627 Fax Number\n\n1400 - 16th Street N.W., Suite 500\nWashington, D.C. 20036-2223 Address\n\nKabat@Bernabeipllc.com E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on Nov. 17, 2017\n\nthe foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record\n\nthrough the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the\n\naddresses listed below:\n\n(,k04,at\nSignature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\nNov. 17,2017 Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 44 17-2231, 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240\n\nIN THE\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n\nFOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\nd INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice\nCenter, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD MASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5,\n\n—and—\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED,\n—v.—\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\n(Caption continued on inside cover)\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\n\nBRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CATO INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE\n\nDANIEL BRAUN PETER JAFFE FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS\n& DERINGER US LLP 700 13th Street, NW, 10th Floor Washington, DC 20005 (202) 777-4500\n\nDAVID Y. LIVSHIZ CAMERON C. RUSSELL KAREN WISWALL FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS\n& DERINGER US LLP 601 Lexington Avenue, 31st Floor New York, New York 10022 (212) 277-4000\n\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 44\n\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence,\nDefendants-Appellants.\nTHE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE; ALABAMA; IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE; ARKANSAS; FLORIDA; LOUISIANA; OHIO; OKLAHOMA; SOUTH CAROLINA; TEXAS; WEST VIRGINIA,\nAmici Supporting Appellant.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 44\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_, _e_t _a_l._v_. _T_ru_m_p_,_e_t_a_l.____\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_T_h_e_C_a_t_o_I_ns_t_it_u_te_________________________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 44\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _/_s_/_C_a_m__e_r_o_n__C_._R__u_s_s_e_ll_______________ Counsel for: _T_h_e__C_a_t_o__In_s_t_it_u_te___________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n************************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n__/s_/_C__a_m_e__ro_n__C_.__R_u_s_s_e_l_l _________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 44\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nTABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... iii\nINTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.................................................................1\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.......................................2\nARGUMENT.......................................................................................................... 5\nI. The Cato Institute’s Original Immigration Research Bears On The Proclamation’s Basis, Which Is Material To Key Legal Questions In This Case.....................................................................................................5\nII. The Cato Institute’s Original Research Suggests That The Proclamation’s Restrictions Are Inconsistent With The Government’s Stated Basis For Those Restrictions...........................................................11\nA. The Proclamation’s “Neutral” Criteria Do Not Actually Explain The Government’s Selection Of Designated Countries. ....................11\nB. The Entry Ban Is Based On The False Premise That The Government Needs The Cooperation Of Foreign Governments To Process Visa Applications.................................................................21\nC. The Entry Ban Would Not Have Prevented The Entry Of Any Terrorists Since 9/11. ........................................................................24\nD. Nationals Of The Designated Countries Have Not Committed Any Deadly Terrorist Attacks. ..........................................................27\nCONCLUSION ....................................................................................................32\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.....................................................................33\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..............................................................................34\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 44\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases\n\nPage(s)\n\nAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).......................................................................................7, 9\n\nArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)...........................................................................................9\n\nBlackwelder v. Millman, 522 F.2d 766 (4th Cir. 1975)..............................................................................5\n\nBowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)...........................................................................................6\n\nBurwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).......................................................................................9\n\nChurch of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)...................................................................................6, 7, 8\n\nFlorida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)...........................................................................................8\n\nGillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)...........................................................................................6\n\nHunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)...........................................................................................9\n\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)...................................................................................2, 5, 6\n\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)...........................................................................................7\n\nMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)...........................................................................................6\n\nMcGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)...........................................................................................7\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 44\n\nNew Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)...........................................................................................9\nNewsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle Cty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2003)............................................................................10\nReed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).......................................................................................8\nW. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).......................................................................................2, 6\nStatutes, Regulations, and Executive Orders and Proclamations\n8 U.S.C. § 1361 ....................................................................................................21\n42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1.............................................................................................9\nExec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 § 1(h) (Mar. 6, 2017).....................26\nPresidential Proclamation No. 9,645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) ........................................................................................................passim\nOther Authorities\nAlex Nowrasteh and David Bier, A List of Deadly Terrorists, CATO INSTITUTE (Nov. 16, 2017), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/wpcontent/uploads/cato_a_list_of_deadly_terrorists.pdf.................................28, 29\nAlex Nowrasteh, The Halloween Terror Attack in New York: The Threat from Foreign-Born Terrorists, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/halloween-terror-attack-new-yorkthreat-foreign-born-terrorists ............................................................................ 27\nAlex Nowrasteh, Immigration and Crime—What the Research Says, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (July 14, 2015), https://www.cato.org/blog/immigration-crime-what-research-says ..................31\nAlex Nowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, 798 CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS 1, 2-4 (Sept. 13, 2016), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_2.pdf ......................28\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 44\n\nAlex Nowrasteh, There Is No Public Safety Justification for the “Travel Ban”, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/there-no-public-safety-or-criminaljustification-travel-ban .....................................................................................30\nArshad Mohammed & Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. will not issue some visas in 4 nations in deportation crackdown (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-usa-immigration-visas/us-will-not-issue-some-visas-in-4-nations-in-deportationcrackdown-idUSKCN1BO1YR .................................................................14, 18\nDavid Bier, New Travel Ban Would Not Have Prevented the Entry of Any Terrorists Since 9/11, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/new-travel-ban-wouldve-preventedentry-no-terrorists-911 ............................................................................... 24, 25\nDavid Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/travel-ban-based-executive-whim-notobjective-criteria ........................................................................................17, 19\nDavid Bier, Very Few Immigration Vetting Failures of Terrorists Since 9/11, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/very-few-immigration-vetting-failuresterrorists-911..............................................................................................25, 26\nDEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF PLCY OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND CHIEF DIPLOMATIC OFFICER ALAN BERSIN AND CBP OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER JOHN WAGNER FOR A HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY HEARING TITLED “PASSPORT FRAUD: AN INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITY” (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/04/04/written-testimony-plcyoffice-international-affairs-and-cbp-office-field-operations .............................17\nFirst Cross-Appeal Brief for Appellants.........................................................passim\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 44\n\nInternational Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO PKD Participants, https://icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAOPKDParticipants.aspx ......................................................................................19\nINTERPOL, Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database, https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Bordermanagement/SLTD-Database ..........................................................................17\nMark Berman & Matt Zapotosky, Investigators probe New York attack suspect’s communications while Trump calls for death penalty, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/11/02/investigators-probe-new-york-attacksuspects-communications-while-trump-calls-for-death-penalty .......................25\nMichelangelo Landgrave & Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants: Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin, CATO INSTITUTE: IMMIGR. RES. & POL’Y BRIEF 1 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-reformbulletin/criminal-immigrants-their-numbers-demographicscountries ..........................................................................................................31\nPat St. Claire, Greg Botelho & Ralph Ellis, San Bernadino shooter Tashfeen Malik: Who was she?, CNN (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/06/us/san-bernardino-shootertashfeen-malik/index.html ................................................................................ 26\nU.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/summaryfile.2015.html................................................................................................... 30\nU.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS ANNOUNCES IMPLEMENTATION OF VISA SANCTIONS ON FOUR COUNTRIES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/13/dhs-announcesimplementation-visa-sanctions-four-countries ...........................................15, 18\nU.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CALCULATION OF THE ADJUSTED VISA REFUSAL RATE FOR TOURIST AND BUSINESS TRAVELERS UNDER THE GUIDELINES OF THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/NonImmigrant-Statistics/refusalratelanguage.pdf .............................................22, 23\nvii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 44\n\nU.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2016 (July 2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf ........... 13, 14, 18, 20\nU.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NONIMMIGRANT VISA STATISTICS: NONIMMIGRANT VISA ISSUANCE BY VISA CLASS AND NATIONALITY, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-andpolicy/statistics/non-immigrant-visas.html ....................................................... 26\nU.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2006: TABLE XIV, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/FY06AnnualRe portTableXIV.pdf ............................................................................................26\nU.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2016: TABLE XIV, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/ FY2016AnnualReport/FY16AnnualReport-TableXIV.pdf............................... 25\nU.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Visitor Visa, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visitor.html .................................22\n\nviii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 44\n\nINTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE The Cato Institute (Cato) is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free markets, and limited government. The Cato Institute believes that those values depend on holding government to rigorous standards of evidence and justification for its actions. Toward those ends, Cato conducts conferences, publishes books and studies, and issues the annual Cato Supreme Court Review.\nThe Cato Institute and its scholars have significant experience studying immigration law and policy in the United States. The Cato Institute therefore believes that it can assist the Court by providing evidence relevant to Presidential Proclamation No. 9,645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (the Proclamation) and its ban on the entry of certain foreign nationals (Entry Ban).1\n\n1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no such counsel or a party contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. No person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E). The parties have, through counsel, consented to the filing of this brief.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 44\n\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The government claims that the current Presidential Proclamation—now the government’s third attempt at a ban on the entry of certain categories of persons— will help prevent terrorist attacks in the United States. Amicus respectfully disagrees. Cato’s original research shows that this justification does not withstand scrutiny. As a procedural matter, the Court may consider real-world evidence about the Proclamation’s stated justifications and effects. Each is part of the prevailing legal tests governing the claims here. Even under the government’s view that Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), governs this Court’s assessment of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Proclamation, a court entertaining an Establishment Clause challenge to an exclusion order should probe whether there is a “bona fide reason” for the exclusion. First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 40 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770). The government also agrees that courts should consider whether the government rationally could have believed in the purposes for the exclusion. See First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 41 (citing W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981)). And to the extent that the Court reaches the substance of the challenges, the threshold inquiries for Establishment Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) challenges to government actions require courts to decide\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 44\n\nwhether those actions are motivated by a sincere permissible purpose. If government actions fail that threshold inquiry, then prevailing doctrine requires courts to subject the actions to heightened scrutiny, which requires courts to consider evidence about whether the actions are appropriate means to advance the government’s interests. In short, the government bears an initial burden of showing that its action reflects a sincerely held, rational, and permissible basis. (See Part I.)\nCato’s original research belies the government’s stated justifications. The Proclamation’s Entry Ban denies visas to nationals of six Muslim-majority countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen), as well as all nationals of North Korea and some government officials from Venezuela (the Designated Countries). The Proclamation asserts that this Entry Ban is necessary because certain governments fail to share sufficient information to allow consular officials to vet nationals of those countries before entry. The Proclamation also claims that the government arrived at this list by applying certain stated criteria for inclusion and exclusion. Yet consular officers already deny—as the law requires—all applicants that fail to prove their eligibility. And the Proclamation’s application of the requirements is facially inconsistent: it fails to apply its stated requirements to the Designated Countries, and ignores dozens of other countries that fail them. Further, the Proclamation’s assertion that the failures of the Designated Countries have made their nationals more dangerous than others is also without basis. The\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 44\n\nEntry Ban would not have prevented the entry of any terrorism offender since 9/11 (and, of course, the 9/11 hijackers were not nationals of the Designated Countries), and not a single person from these countries has killed anyone in a terrorist attack in the United States in over four decades. They are also much less likely to commit other serious crimes than U.S.-born persons or other foreign nationals.\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 44\n\nARGUMENT I. THE CATO INSTITUTE’S ORIGINAL IMMIGRATION RESEARCH\nBEARS ON THE PROCLAMATION’S BASIS, WHICH IS MATERIAL TO KEY LEGAL QUESTIONS IN THIS CASE\nThe Court should consider evidence of the Proclamation’s actual purpose\nand effects because the legal tests in this case require it. The various plaintiffs in\nthis case challenging the Proclamation under the Establishment Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and RFRA have successfully enjoined the Proclamation.2 The\nprevailing doctrines governing these claims and remedies differ, of course, but they\nshare one thing in common: they require courts to consider real-world evidence\nabout some combination of the purposes, operation, or effects of the government actions being challenged.3\nEven under the government’s view that Mandel governs this Court’s\nassessment of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Proclamation, that case would require\nthe Court to probe whether there is a “bona fide reason” for the exclusion (First\nCross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 40 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770)) and to\nconsider whether the government rationally could have believed in the purposes for\n2 Although the trial court enjoined the Proclamation based on statutory and Establishment Clause grounds and therefore did not reach equal protection or RFRA arguments, those arguments remain relevant because the Court may affirm the decision below on any ground in the record. Blackwelder v. Millman, 522 F.2d 766, 771 (4th Cir. 1975). 3 The Cato Institute takes no ultimate position on whether the present case triggers the doctrines above, or whether the prevailing doctrinal tests are correct.\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 44\n\nthe exclusion (see id. at 41 (citing W. & S. Life, 451 U.S. at 671-72)). Thus, even under that deferential standard of review, the Court still must determine whether the government’s stated reason for its action may be credited.\nA court applying prevailing Establishment Clause doctrine to a challenged government action must evaluate the authenticity of the government’s articulated secular purpose. The Establishment Clause “‘forbids subtle departures from neutrality,’ and ‘covert suppression of particular religious beliefs,’” even in facially neutral laws. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (citations omitted) (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971) and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)). Courts applying the prevailing Establishment Clause test therefore must evaluate evidence about whether a government measure is motivated by a “secular purpose” that is “genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005). Moreover, courts probe the real purpose of state action by considering the operation of the government action, as “the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535. And when the “openly available data support[s] a commonsense conclusion that a religious objective permeated the government’s action,” such action is impermissible. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 863.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 44\n\nHere, the government justifies the Proclamation by asserting the need to “protect [U.S.] citizens from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats” by detecting “foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat” and preventing “such individuals from entering the United States.” Proclamation § 1(a). Cato’s research, as set forth below, belies that claim. That evidence therefore bears on the Establishment Clause analysis.\nMoreover, the Supreme Court has held that government actions that discriminate among religions require application of strict scrutiny. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). Strict scrutiny requires consideration of whether government action furthers a compelling government interest and whether the action is narrowly tailored to that interest. Id. at 246-47; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Critical to the inquiry is whether the government action “visits ‘gratuitous restrictions’” that are unwarranted by the government’s claimed interest. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 538 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). Where government action imposes such overinclusive restrictions, “[i]t is not unreasonable to infer, at least when there are no persuasive indications to the contrary, that [such] a law . . . seeks not to effectuate the stated governmental interests,” but rather to advance impermissible purposes. Id.; see also Larson, 456 U.S. at 248 (“Appellants must demonstrate that the\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 44\n\nchallenged . . . rule is closely fitted to further the interest that it assertedly serves.”). On the other hand, when a government action is materially underinclusive by failing to restrict activities “that endanger[] [the government’s] interests in a similar or greater degree than” those activities that the action does restrict, the government undermines its claim that it is pursuing a compelling interest and raises the specter that the government is using its stated objective to pursue prohibited discrimination. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 543. To assess whether a government action’s purported purpose is genuine, both law and common sense require courts to consider the extent to which the government has failed to take less-restrictive actions that would further its purpose. See, e.g., id. at 547 (“[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”) (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he facial underinclusiveness of [the statute] raises serious doubts about whether Florida is, in fact, serving, with this statute, the significant interests which appellee invokes in support of [the statute].”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (holding a law limiting signage as impermissible under the First Amendment because it left other threats to the town’s asserted interests unprohibited).\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 44\n\nThe evidence presented by Cato in Part II demonstrates a complete disconnect between the stated purpose of the Proclamation and its actual operation and effects, and therefore bears on precisely these issues. In particular, Part II.A shows that the Proclamation is internally inconsistent: the criteria used to designate countries are not those criteria on which it purports to rely. Parts II.B to II.D show that Entry Ban is based on a false premise, would not have prevented the entry into the U.S. of any terrorists since 9/11, and that nationals from the countries affected by the Proclamation have not committed any deadly terrorist acts on U.S. soil.\nSimilar doctrines apply, with variations not relevant here, to the Equal Protection and RFRA challenges to the Proclamation. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (as to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) (as to RFRA). RFRA governs actions that place burdens on the exercise of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1; the Equal Protection doctrine governs government action that draws distinctions based on suspect classifications such as race, religion, or alienage, see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Where such distinctions exist, a court may engage in “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985).\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 44\n\nIf, at the end of its analysis, the Court concludes that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that one or more of the challenges brought against the Proclamation is likely to succeed, then it will need to review the appropriateness of the injunction ordered by the District Court,4 and that too will require the Court to consider real-world evidence about the Proclamation’s purposes and effects. To obtain the injunction, IRAP and its co-plaintiffs had to show, among other things, that enjoining the Proclamation would not harm the public interest—the fourth prong of the test for an injunction. Newsom ex rel. Newsom, 354 F.3d at 261. Evidence of whether the Entry Ban reduces the risk of terrorist attack would be directly relevant to the government’s argument that the public interest is “significantly impaired by barring effectuation of a judgment of the President that restricting entry for certain nationals of eight countries is warranted to protect the Nation’s safety.” First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 3.\n\n4 In that case, the Court would review for abuse of discretion. Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle Cty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 2003).\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 44\n\nII. THE CATO INSTITUTE’S ORIGINAL RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT THE PROCLAMATION’S RESTRICTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT’S STATED BASIS FOR THOSE RESTRICTIONS A. The Proclamation’s “Neutral” Criteria Do Not Actually Explain The Government’s Selection Of Designated Countries. The government asserts that the Proclamation safeguards the United States\nagainst terrorism by placing entry and immigration restrictions on nationals of certain designated countries. The government’s stated basis for designating those countries is a set of “baseline” criteria (the Baseline Criteria) against which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) measured “all foreign governments.” Proclamation § 1(d). Countries that fail the Baseline Criteria were supposedly added to the list. The government describes the Baseline Criteria as “neutral criteria against which all nations were assessed.” First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 40. The facts stated in the Proclamation do not support—and to the contrary, affirmatively belie—this stated basis for the Proclamation’s restrictions.\nAccording to the Proclamation, the Baseline Criteria were split into three categories:\n1. Identity-management information, i.e., “whether the country issues electronic passports embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity [Criterion 1], reports lost and stolen passports to appropriate entities [Criterion 2], and makes available upon request identity-related\n\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 44\n\ninformation not included in its passports [Criterion 3].” Proclamation § 1(c)(i). 2. National security and public-safety information, i.e., “whether the country makes available, directly or indirectly, known or suspected terrorist and criminal-history information upon request [Criterion 4], whether the country provides passport and national-identity document exemplars [Criterion 5], and whether the country impedes the United States Government’s receipt of information about passengers and crew traveling to the United States [Criterion 6].” Proclamation § 1(c)(ii). 3. National security and public-safety risk assessment, i.e., “whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven [Criterion 7], whether it is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program [Criterion 8] . . . and whether it regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States [Criterion 9].” Proclamation § 1(c)(iii). These Baseline Criteria, however, do not explain the government’s design of the Designated Countries list. The government included countries on the list despite them passing the government’s Baseline Criteria. (See subpart 1.) On the flip side, the government failed to designate many countries that fail the government’s Baseline Criteria. (See subpart 2.)\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 44\n\n1. The Government Included Countries That, Under Its Stated Criteria, Should Not Have Been Designated.\nThe government’s Baseline Criteria prove too little: they do not explain the inclusion of most countries actually included in the Entry Ban. The criteria cannot, therefore, be considered the real reason for the ban on nationals of those countries.\na) Chad is included on the list in part because “several terrorist groups are active within Chad or in the surrounding region.” Proclamation § 2(a)(i). However, the Baseline Criteria do not include “terrorist groups . . . in the surrounding region” as a criterion. Rather, under Criterion 7, a country must be a “known or potential terrorist safe haven.” Proclamation § 1(c)(iii). The Department of State acknowledges that Chad is not a terrorist safe haven, nor has it ever been one;5 yet it is included among the Designated Countries.\nb) Iran and Syria are included on the list of Designated Countries in part because they are “the source of significant terrorist threats, and [are] state sponsor[s] of terrorism.” Proclamation §§ 2(b), (e). However, no criterion asks whether a county is a “source of significant terrorist threats.” In addition, being a state sponsor of terrorism is not a Baseline criterion\n5 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2016 313-322 (July 2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf (listing terrorist safe havens, but not including Chad) (Dep’t of State, 2016 Terrorism Report).\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 44\n\ndespite being applied to both Iran and Syria. If it were a criterion Sudan would be a necessary addition to the list of Designated Countries.6\nc) The Proclamation faults Libya and Venezuela for not being “fully”\ncooperative with respect to Criterion 9, concerning accepting deportees\nfrom the United States. Proclamation §§ 2(c), (f). However, the reported\nstandard under the Baseline Criteria asks not whether each country is\n“fully” cooperative, but “whether [each country] regularly fails to receive\nits nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.”\nProclamation § 1(c)(iii) (emphasis added). As of July 2017, neither Libya\nnor Venezuela were on the Immigration and Customs Enforcement\nagency’s (ICE) list of countries that are “recalcitrant” in accepting deportees from the U.S.7 Of the Designated Countries, ICE only found Iran to be “recalcitrant,”8 but no Designated Country including Iran was\ndeemed a severe enough violator to be included in the sanctions applied\nby DHS in September 2017 (just days before the Presidential\nProclamation) to four other countries for failure to accept U.S.\n6 Dep’t of State, 2016 Terrorism Report at 303-06. 7 Arshad Mohammed & Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. will not issue some visas in 4 nations in deportation crackdown (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-usa-immigration-visas/u-s-will-not-issuesome-visas-in-4-nations-in-deportation-crackdown-idUSKCN1BO1YR (Mohammed & Torbati, Deportation Crackdown). 8 Id.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 44\n\ndeportees.9 Here too it is inescapable that the Baseline Criteria as described in section 1 of the Proclamation do not provide a basis for the justifications enumerated in section 2.\nIt is clear, therefore, that based on the Proclamation’s own terms, the inclusion of at least five of the seven countries that were “inadequate” under the Baseline Criteria (Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Venezuela) are not explained by the standards described in the Proclamation itself.10\nIndeed, the Proclamation also includes Somalia as a Designated Country despite not being “inadequate” under the Baseline Criteria, and here the government is upfront that the stated criteria do not explain its designs. Proclamation §§ 1(i), 2(h). Although Somalia issues an electronic passport—and therefore passes Criterion 1—the Proclamation includes it as a Designated Country in part because “the United States and many other countries do not recognize” its\n\n9 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS ANNOUNCES IMPLEMENTATION OF VISA\n\nSANCTIONS\n\nON\n\nFOUR\n\nCOUNTRIES\n\n(Sept.\n\n13,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/13/dhs-announces-implementation-visa-\n\nsanctions-four-countries (Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Visa Sanctions). 10 Although the Proclamation states that the President considered other factors,\n\nsuch as “each country’s capacity, ability, and willingness to cooperate with [U.S.]\n\nidentity-management and information-sharing policies . . . whether [each country]\n\nhas a significant terrorist presence within its territory [and] foreign policy, national\n\nsecurity, and counterterrorism goals,” Proclamation § 1(h)(i), these were explicitly\n\nnot the criteria relied on in the initial selection of the Designated Countries by the\n\nSecretary of Homeland Security. See Proclamation § 1(c). In addition, these factors\n\ndid not alter the final choice of Designated Countries. See Proclamation §§ 1(g)-(i).\n\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 44\n\npassport. Proclamation § 2(h). This more stringent requirement is not the Baseline standard under Criterion 1. In addition, although Somalia “satisfies the information-sharing requirements of the baseline,” its “lack of territorial control . . . compromises Somalia’s ability . . . to share.” Id. In other words, Somalia was held to a different standard than other countries: although it shares what it can, it cannot collect the information that the United States wants. The Proclamation alters the standard for being included in the list of Designated Countries specifically to include Somalia.\nAccordingly, the Proclamation’s stated criteria do not ultimately explain which countries became the Designated Countries.\n2. The Government Omitted Countries That, Under Its Stated Criteria, Should Have Been Designated.\nThe Proclamation’s Baseline Criteria also prove too much: the Proclamation omits a large number of countries from the banned list despite those countries failing one or more Baseline Criteria. Iraq is explicitly said to have failed the Criteria, but nonetheless was not included on the Designated Countries list. Proclamation § 1(g). But Iraq is not alone:\n\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 44\n\na) Criterion 1. In 2017, 86 countries failed the requirement to use electronic passports, and many other countries allow their nationals to travel under older non-electronic passports.11\nb) Criterion 2. At least 16 countries never report lost and stolen passport information,12 and DHS has warned that, outside Canada and Europe, an “alarming number of countries . . . report very little.”13 Indeed, three of the four most populous countries in the world—China, India, and Indonesia—rarely or never reported this data.14\n\n11 David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/travel-ban-based-executive-whim-not-objective-criteria (Bier, Executive Whim). 12 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF PLCY OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND CHIEF DIPLOMATIC OFFICER ALAN BERSIN AND CBP OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER JOHN WAGNER FOR A HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY HEARING TITLED “PASSPORT FRAUD: AN INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITY” (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/04/04/written-testimony-plcy-office-internationalaffairs-and-cbp-office-field-operations (Bersin Testimony) (showing that the U.S. relies on INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, and that Interpol has 190 member countries); INTERPOL, Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database, https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Bordermanagement/SLTD-Database (showing that the SLTD database is populated by only 174 countries) (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 13 Bersin Testimony. 14 Id.\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 44\n\nc) Criterion 7. In 2017, the State Department identified 13 terrorist safe\nhavens—the focus of Criterion 7—but nine of these did not end up as\nDesignated Countries.15\nd) Criterion 9. Criterion 9 is meant to address countries that regularly refuse\nto accept U.S. deportees. However, although ICE maintains a list of\ncounties which are “recalcitrant” in receiving deportees from the U.S.,\nonly one country (Iran) out of the 12 countries identified in ICE’s latest\nJuly 2017 report became a Designated Country.16 Moreover, in\nSeptember 2017, the United States sanctioned four countries for refusing\nto accept deportees, but, again, none became Designated Countries.17\nIn short, if the government were really applying the Baseline Criteria\nneutrally and objectively, it would have had to include a far greater number of\ncountries on the Designated Countries list than it did.18 The only explanations are\n15 See Dep’t of State, 2016 Terrorism Report at 313-22. 16 Those countries are China, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Iran, Cambodia, Burma, Morocco, Hong Kong, South Sudan, Guinea and Eritrea. Mohammed & Torbati, Deportation Crackdown. 17 Those countries were Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Visa Sanctions. 18 The Proclamation actually states that sixteen countries were found to be “inadequate” when assessed against these Baseline Criteria. However, after several countries provided passport exemplars or agreed to share information on known or suspected terrorists, the Secretary of Homeland Security ultimately recommended to the President—and the President agreed—that only seven of these countries be included on the list of Designated Countries. Proclamation §§ 1(e)-(h). Those\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 44\n\nthat the government did not actually design the Designated Countries list based on the Baseline Criteria, or did not apply the Baseline Criteria neutrally.\n\nThe government’s failure to include many countries on the ban list is even less rational if one considers not the government’s stated criteria, but the actual criteria that it applied to exclude Iran, Syria, Chad, and Somalia. For example:\n\na) The government included Somalia as a Designated Country in part because many “countries do not recognize” its electronic passport. Proclamation § 2(h)(i). But if the government applied this criterion consistently, it would have to add another 39 countries that issue electronic passports that do not conform to the international standards recognized by the United States (in addition to the 86 countries that issue no electronic passport at all).19\n\nb) Somalia was also added to the Designated Countries list in part because it\n\nlacks “territorial control.” Proclamation § 2(h)(i). If the government were\n\npassport exemplars and agreements in no way address whether those otherwise\n\n“inadequate” countries still fail to use electronic passports, report lost or stolen\n\npassport information, provide safe havens for terrorists, or regularly refuse to\n\naccept deportees from the U.S. 19 Bier, Executive Whim (noting that 86 countries fail to use electronic passports,\n\nand that 125 do not use electronic passports or use electronic passports that many\n\ncountries do not recognize, and citing the International Civil Aviation\n\nOrganization’s (ICAO) list of countries conforming to the Public Key Directory\n\n(PKD) standards for passports, ICAO PKD Participants,\n\nhttps://icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAO-PKDParticipants.aspx)\n\n(last\n\nvisited Nov. 13, 2017).\n\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 44\n\nto consistently apply this unstated “territorial control” criterion the number of Designated Countries would increase by at least nine.20\nc) The government included Iran and Syria in part because they are state\nsponsors of terrorism. Proclamation §§ 2(b), (e). But if the government\napplied this actual criteria consistently, it would have to include Sudan, too, which it did not.21\nd) The government included Chad in part because terrorists are “active\nwithin [the country] or the surrounding region.” Proclamation § 2(a).\nHowever, there are more than 30 other countries that similarly have U.S.-\ndesignated Foreign Terrorist Organizations operating inside their borders\nbut which are not Designated Countries, including countries such as France, India, Spain, and the United Kingdom.22\nIn short, the consistent application of the government’s criteria—whether the\ngovernment’s stated criteria or the actual criteria that the government applied—\nshould have produced a very different list of Designated Countries. These criteria\ncannot, therefore, explain the government’s selection of nationals to exclude from 20 This number is calculated by counting the thirteen State Department designated terrorist safe havens, and subtracting those countries already included among the Designated Countries (Libya, Somalia, Venezuela, and Yemen). See Dep’t of State, 2016 Terrorism Report at 313-22 (defining “terrorist safe haven” to include countries with “ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas”). 21 See Dep’t of State, 2016 Terrorism Report at 303-06. 22 Id. at 381-444 (listing terrorist groups and where they operate).\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 44\n\nentry. Because the Baseline was not applied, the Proclamation’s purpose cannot be, as the government claims, to “encourage cooperation” with it. First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 10. This inconsistency belies the government’s purported rationale.\nB. The Entry Ban Is Based On The False Premise That The Government Needs The Cooperation Of Foreign Governments To Process Visa Applications.\nThe Entry Ban resulted from a report by the DHS of what “additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application.” Proclamation § 1(c). The resulting report concluded that the Entry Ban is required because the government is not able “to confirm the identity of individuals seeking entry” from certain countries. Id. But it is applicants, and not the government, who bear the burden to produce information showing their eligibility for a visa. The government has no obligation to obtain this information on its own, and may exclude any individual who fails to meet this burden. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The government makes no assertion that consular officers are not enforcing this burden of proof. Publicly available evidence indicates that they do enforce this law and have reacted to the changing conditions in each of the Designated Countries on an individualized basis. For the past seven years, the B visa refusal rate (the share of applicants denied a business and/or tourism visitor\n\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 44\n\nvisa for any reason) for the Designated Countries has been an average of 61 percent higher than for all other nationalities.23\n\n23 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CALCULATION OF THE ADJUSTED VISA REFUSAL RATE FOR TOURIST AND BUSINESS TRAVELERS UNDER THE GUIDELINES OF THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/Non-ImmigrantStatistics/refusalratelanguage.pdf (Dep’t of State, Visa Refusal Rate) (last visited Nov. 3, 2017); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Visitor Visa, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visitor.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 44\n\nTable 1: B Visa Refusal Rate (% of Applicants) by Country24\n\nCountry 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016\n\nSomalia\n\n70\n\n67\n\n62\n\n66\n\n52\n\n65\n\n64\n\nSyria\n\n28\n\n33\n\n42\n\n46\n\n60\n\n63\n\n60\n\nYemen\n\n54\n\n48\n\n48\n\n44\n\n44\n\n54\n\n49\n\nIran\n\n39\n\n31\n\n38\n\n48\n\n42\n\n39\n\n45\n\nChad\n\n59\n\n43\n\n44\n\n36\n\n32\n\n34\n\n43\n\nLibya\n\n14\n\n31\n\n39\n\n34\n\n34\n\n43\n\n41\n\nVenezuela 18\n\n16\n\n12\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n40\n\nNorth Korea\n\n23\n\n8\n\n36\n\n29\n\n56\n\n48\n\n15\n\nAverage25\n\n38\n\n35\n\n40\n\n40\n\n42\n\n45\n\n44\n\nAll other countries26\n\n26\n\n25\n\n24\n\n25\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\nThese denial rates reflect in part the existing availability of documentary\nevidence from visa applicants. While the average visa denial rate for all other\ncountries has remained relatively constant in recent years, the average denial rate\n24 Dep’t of State, Visa Refusal Rate. 25 Average based on the simple arithmetic mean of the data for the eight countries shown in the table and not weighted by number of applicants. 26 Average based on the arithmetic mean of the data for all countries, excluding the eight shown in the table; data includes stateless persons.\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 44\n\nof the eight Designated Countries increased from approximately 38% to 44% between 2010 and 2016—a rate increase of 16%. In particular, the conflicts in Libya and Syria coincided with refusal rates that more than doubled. See supra Table 1. These rejections demonstrate that consular officers can respond to changing circumstances without a blanket ban and that they do enforce applicants’ burden of proof.\nC. The Entry Ban Would Not Have Prevented The Entry Of Any Terrorists Since 9/11.\nThe Proclamation claims that individualized “vetting is less reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate exhibits significant gaps in its identity-management or information-sharing policies, or presents risks to the national security of the United States.” Proclamation § 1(h)(ii). Yet the government provides no evidence that these “gaps”—however defined—have, in fact, made individualized vetting from these countries less reliable.\nThe Entry Ban would not have prevented the entry of any terrorist who received a visa since 9/11 and who was convicted of, or killed during, a plot to carry out an attack in the United States.27 This is not a surprise because very few\n27 David Bier, New Travel Ban Would Not Have Prevented the Entry of Any Terrorists Since 9/11, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/new-travel-ban-wouldve-prevented-entry-no-terrorists911 (Bier, Terrorists Since 9/11) (reporting findings based on a review of the terrorist information provided by the Department of Justice National Security Division, the Department of Justice website, the George Washington University\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 44\n\nterrorists have entered the United States since 9/11. Since October 2001—when\nCongress began to revamp the individualized vetting system—only seven foreign-\nborn persons entered the United States on immigrant or nonimmigrant visas and\nwent on to be convicted of or killed during a terrorist attack on U.S. soil.28 None of\nthe six nationalities that these attackers represent are subject to the Entry Ban.29\nAt most six of these offenders radicalized prior to entry,30 meaning that—at\nworst—consular officers failed to identify one terrorist out of every 19.3 million\nvisa approvals during fiscal years 2002 to 2016.31 The only offender who\nProgram on Extremism, and the New America Foundation International Security Program). The 9/11 hijackers themselves were not nationals of the Designated Countries. 28 David Bier, Very Few Immigration Vetting Failures of Terrorists Since 9/11, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/very-few-immigration-vetting-failures-terrorists-911 (Bier, Few Vetting Failures) (last updated Nov. 13, 2017). This includes selfadmitted terrorist Sayfullo Saipov, who was injured while killing eight people in New York City in October 2017. 29 Id. (the seven individuals were: Umar Abdulmatallab (Nigeria), Khalid Aldawsari (Saudi Arabia), Tashfeen Malik (Pakistan), Ulugbek Kodirov (Uzbekistan), Quazi Nafis (Bangladesh), Hosam Smadi (Jordan), and Sayfullo Saipov (Uzbekistan)). 30 Bier, Terrorists Since 9/11; Mark Berman & Matt Zapotosky, Investigators probe New York attack suspect’s communications while Trump calls for death penalty, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/11/02/investigators-probe-new-york-attack-suspectscommunications-while-trump-calls-for-death-penalty (showing that, according to U.S. government officials, the October 31, 2017 New York City truck attacker radicalized after entering the United States in response to Islamic State propaganda). 31 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2016: TABLE XIV, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2016Annual\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 44\n\nradicalized prior to entry and killed anyone on U.S. soil was a Pakistani national,\nTashfeen Malik.32 In other words, one vetting failure that led to deaths in the\nUnited States occurred in over 116 million visa approvals from 2002 to 2016.33\nNeither Pakistan nor any of the other nationalities represented by attackers who\nradicalized prior to entry are subject to the Entry Ban.34\nAlthough the past is not necessarily prologue, the government provides no\nevidence of new threats from these nationals. Indeed, the Proclamation states that it\ndid not select Designated Countries based on intelligence regarding future plans to\nconduct attacks inside the United States, but rather factors related to identity and\ninformation sharing procedures (and, in some cases, terrorist activity inside or near\nthe country of origin). Proclamation § 2. Moreover, the president justified his order\nto carry out the study that led to the Entry Ban with evidence relating exclusively\nto past terrorist infiltrations. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 § 1(h)\nReport/FY16AnnualReport-TableXIV.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2017); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2006: TABLE XIV, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/FY06AnnualReportTableXIV.p df (last visited Nov. 13, 2017); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NONIMMIGRANT VISA STATISTICS: NONIMMIGRANT VISA ISSUANCE BY VISA CLASS AND NATIONALITY, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/non-immigrantvisas.html (data file) (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 32 Bier, Few Vetting Failures; see also Pat St. Claire, Greg Botelho & Ralph Ellis, San Bernadino shooter Tashfeen Malik: Who was she?, CNN (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/06/us/san-bernardino-shooter-tashfeenmalik/index.html. 33 Bier, Few Vetting Failures. 34 Id.\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 44\n\n(Mar. 6, 2017). This suggests that the government also considers the past the best predictor of future threats, and the past indicates that the Entry Ban fails to target those threats.\nD. Nationals Of The Designated Countries Have Not Committed Any Deadly Terrorist Attacks.\nThe government’s selection of the Designated Countries is not based on any meaningful national security risk when viewed in light of the “terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats” suggested by the Proclamation. Proclamation § 1. To the contrary, there is a total disconnect between the countries chosen and countries whose nationals, historically, have committed acts of terrorism or other crimes on U.S. soil.\nTable 2 provides the number of deaths and the historical probability of death on U.S. soil by foreign-born nationals from the Designated Countries, other nonU.S. countries, and U.S.-born or unidentified attackers. Based on data from 1975 through October 31, 2017, the annual probability of death in an act of terrorism committed by other foreign nationals was 1 in 3.8 million.35 During this time, no\n\n35 Alex Nowrasteh, The Halloween Terror Attack in New York: The Threat from Foreign-Born Terrorists, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/halloween-terror-attack-new-york-threat-foreign-bornterrorists.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 44\n\none has been killed in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil by nationals from any of the eight Designated Countries.36\n\nTable 2: Risk of Death by Terrorism by Nationality, 1975-201737\n\nNationality\nOther Non-U.S. Countries U.S. Citizen and Unknown Eight Designated Countries\n\nDeaths 3,037 411 Zero\n\nHistorical Annual Chance of Death 1 in 3.8 million\n1 in 28 million\nZero\n\nThe Proclamation also specifically singles out immigrant visa applicants (those who would receive legal permanent residency upon entry), barring all such applications from six countries while allowing some nonimmigrants (temporary visitors, such as students) from all but two countries. Proclamation § 2. The evidence regarding terrorism threats cannot justify this discrimination. Indeed, as Table 3 highlights, nonimmigrants (e.g., tourists, students, and those with fiancée\n\n36 Alex Nowrasteh and David Bier, A List of Deadly Terrorists, CATO INSTITUTE\n\n(Nov.\n\n16,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/wp-\n\ncontent/uploads/cato_a_list_of_deadly_terrorists.pdf (Cato, Deadly Terrorists). 37 Calculations based on data and sources in Cato, Deadly Terrorists. Annual\n\nchance of death was calculated according to the methodology used in Alex\n\nNowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, 798 CATO INSTITUTE\n\nPOLICY\n\nANALYSIS\n\n1,\n\n2-4\n\n(Sept.\n\n13,\n\n2016),\n\nhttps://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_2.pdf.\n\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 44\n\nvisas) caused 87 percent of all terrorism deaths from 1975 to 2017, and immigrants (e.g., Green Card holders) caused one half of one percent.\n\nTable 3: Annual Chance of Being Killed in an Attack on U.S. Soil, Based on Immigration Status of Terrorist, 1975-201738\n\nCategory\nNonimmigrant (tourist, student, fiancé visas) Other foreign entry Immigrant visa (permanent resident) U.S. Citizen or Unknown\n\nDeaths 3,003\n18 16 411\n\nShare of Deaths\n\nAnnual Chance of Being Killed\n\n87.1%\n\n1 in 3.9 million\n\n0.5%\n\n1 in 642 million\n\n0.5%\n\n1 in 723 million\n\n11.9%\n\n1 in 28 million\n\nThe Proclamation also determines that the Designated Countries’ nationals pose a “public safety threat.” See Proclamation § 1(c). Again, neither the Proclamation nor government presents any evidence to support this conclusion. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau, however, lead to the opposite inference: nationals of Designated Countries are much less likely to be threats or become\n\n38 Calculations based on Cato, Deadly Terrorists. 29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 44\n\nthreats to the nation. Each individual nationality subject to restrictions under the Entry Ban is less likely to be incarcerated than U.S.-born persons.39\n\nAs Table 4 shows, people from Designated Countries as a group are about half as likely to end up incarcerated in the United States as those from other\n\nforeign countries. U.S.-born persons are about five times more likely to be\n\nincarcerated as those born in the Designated Countries. This evidence indicates that people from Designated Countries are much less likely to commit the types of\n\nserious crimes that result in incarceration than nationals from other countries.\n\nTable 4: Incarceration Rates by Country of Origin, Ages 18-54, 201540\n\nIncarceration Rate\n\nOther Non-U.S. Countries\n0.59%\n\nDesignated Countries\n0.32%\n\nUnited States 1.54%\n\nAllowing lower-crime populations to immigrate to the United States—such as the individuals targeted by the Entry Ban—reduces the overall crime rate. The United States has benefited tremendously from an influx of legal immigrants who\n\n39 Alex Nowrasteh, There Is No Public Safety Justification for the “Travel Ban”, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/there-no-public-safety-or-criminal-justification-travelban (deriving statistics based on U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/summaryfile.2015.html). 40 Id.\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 44\n\nare less than one-third as likely as native-born Americans to be incarcerated, and their lower rates of criminality have reduced crime rates across the country.41 Immigrants from the Designated Countries are not only no exception, but even better in this regard than other immigrants.\n\n41 Michelangelo Landgrave & Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants: Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin, CATO INSTITUTE: IMMIGR. RES. & POL’Y BRIEF 1 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/immigrationreform-bulletin/criminal-immigrants-their-numbers-demographics-countries (finding that the native incarceration rate is 1.53 percent whereas the legal immigrant incarceration is only 0.47 percent); Alex Nowrasteh, Immigration and Crime—What the Research Says, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (July 14, 2015), https://www.cato.org/blog/immigration-crime-what-research-says.\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 44\n\nCONCLUSION Amicus respectfully submits that the Court should consider the foregoing evidence in assessing the statutory and constitutional challenges to the Proclamation and the government’s challenge to the preliminary injunction.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017 New York\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nBy: /s/ Cameron C. Russell .\nFRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER US LLP\nDAVID Y. LIVSHIZ CAMERON C. RUSSELL KAREN WISWALL 601 Lexington Avenue,\n31st Floor New York, New York 10022 (212) 277-4000 david.livshiz@freshfields.com\nDANIEL BRAUN PETER JAFFE 700 13th Street, NW,\n10th Floor Washington, DC 20005 (202) 777-4500\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae The Cato Institute\n\n32\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 44\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the type-volume limitation under Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4) because, excluding items exempted under Fed. R. App. P. 32(f), it contains 6453 words.\n\nThis brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it uses a proportionally spaced Times New Roman typeface in 14-point size.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017 New York\n\n/s/ Cameron C. Russell\nCAMERON C. RUSSELL FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS\nDERINGER US LLP\nAttorney for Amicus Curiae The Cato Institute\n\n33\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 44\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Cameron C. Russell, hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing motion with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on November 17, 2017.\n\nI certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\nExecuted November 17, 2017, at New York, New York.\n\n/s/ Cameron C. Russell\nCAMERON C. RUSSELL FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS\nDERINGER US LLP\nAttorney for Amicus Curiae The Cato Institute\n\n34\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 94-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_______________________ as\n\n[✔]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government COUNSEL FOR: _T_h_e__C_a_t_o__In_s_t_it_u_te________________________________________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/_s_/_C_a__m_e_r_o_n__C_._R__u_s_s_e_ll_________________ (signature)\n\n_C__a_m_e_r_o_n__C_._R__u_s_s_e_l_l _____________________ Name (printed or typed)\n_F_r_e_s_h_f_ie_l_d_s__B_r_u_c_k_h_a_u_s__D_e_r_in_g_e__r _U_S__L_L_P_____ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_1_2_-_2_3_0_-_4_6_5_4___ Voice Phone\n_2_1_2_-_2_7_7_-_4_0_0_1___ Fax Number\n\n_6_0_1__L_e_x_i_n_g_t_o_n_A__v_e_,_3_1_s_t_F__lo_o_r_____________\n_N__e_w__Y_o_r_k_,_N_Y__1_0__0_2_2_____________________ Address\n\n_c_a_m__e_ro__n_.r_u_s_s_e_l_l@__f_re_s_h_f_ie__ld_s_._c_o_m____ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n__/s_/__C_a_m__e_r_o_n__C__._R__u_s_s_e_l_l ______ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 39\n\nNo. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n________________________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients;\nHIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES ##1 and 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA,\nINC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION\nOF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE; in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State;\nDANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellants\n________________________________\n[Caption continued on inside cover] ________________________________\nBRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE Muslim Justice League,\nMuslim Public Affairs Council, and Council on American-Islamic Relations, California in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance\n________________________________\nAmy Briggs, John W. McGuinness, Sirena Castillo, Matthew Bottomly, Olufunmilayo Showole, Ketakee Kane, and Benjamin G. Shatz MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP 11355 W. Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90064 (310) 312-4000 Fax (310) 312-4224\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 39\n\n________________________________\nNo. 17-2231(L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court District of Maryland, Southern Division No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC\n________________________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ________________________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1, JANE DOE #2, JANE DOE #3, JANE DOE #4, JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland\nSecurity; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\n________________________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC)\n________________________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 39\n\nDisclosure Of Corporate Affiliations And Other Interests Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1, Amici Muslim Justice\nLeague, Muslim Public Affairs Council, and Council on AmericanIslamic Relations, California, state that:\n1. None of Amici are publicly held corporations or entities; 2. None of Amici have any parent corporates; 3. None of Amici issue stock; 4. No publicly held corporation or entity related to Amici has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\nMANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP\n\nBy: s/Benjamin G. Shatz Attorneys for Amici Curiae MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE, ET AL.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 39\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................. 4\nARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 5\nThe Proclamation Harms Muslims Throughout The Country, Violates The Establishment Clause, And Was Properly Enjoined ......... 5\nI. The Proclamation’s Effect On Muslims In The United States Constitutes Injury Under The Establishment Clause ................... 5\nA. The Muslim Ban unlawfully and injuriously restrains travel among Muslim communities ....................................... 9\n1. The Muslim Ban has had a chilling effect on personal activities ......................................................... 9\n2. The Muslim Ban has interfered with professional activities ...................................................................... 12\n3. The Muslim Ban has also impeded academic activities ...................................................................... 13\n4. The Muslim Ban impacts nationals beyond those from the Designated Countries................................... 16\nB. The Muslim Ban promotes harmful stereotypes about Muslims ................................................................................ 17\nC. In targeting Muslims, the Muslim Ban has caused psychological—and arguably physical—harm .................... 21\nII. Despite Inclusion Of Two Non-Muslim Majority Countries And Attempts To Sanitize Its Text, The Clear Intent Of The Muslim Ban Is To Disfavor And Burden Muslims ....................... 25\nIII. The Focus On Muslims And Muslim-Majority Countries Is Divorced From Evidence, Ill-Conceived, And Ill-Advised ............ 27\nCONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 29\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 39\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCASES Aziz v. Trump,\n234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) ................................................ 6, 7 Hawai‘i v. Trump,\n241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017)........................................... 6, 7, 8 IRAP v. Trump,\n2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) ...................................... 8, 26 IRAP v. Trump,\n241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017) ................................................... 6, 7 IRAP v. Trump,\n857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017)....................................................... passim Larson v. Valente,\n456 U.S. 228 (1982)............................................................................... 5 Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven,\n683 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2012)................................................................. 7 Sarsour v. Trump,\n245 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D. Va. 2017) .......................................... 6, 7, 20 Washington v. Trump,\n847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................... 6, 7\nREGULATIONS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ................................................ passim Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) ........... passim Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) .......... passim\nOTHER AUTHORITIES @BannedGrandmas, Instagram (July 1, 2017) ...................................... 11 @BannedGrandmas, Instagram (July 2, 2017) ...................................... 11 @BannedGrandmas, Instagram (June 30, 2017).................................... 11\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 39\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\nAround the World and the U.S., New Travel Ban Draws Anger, Applause and Shrugs, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 2017) ............... 22\nBarry-Jester, Trump’s New Travel Ban Could Affect Doctors, Especially In The Rust Belt And Appalachia, FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 6, 2017) .......................................................... 13\nBerman, He yelled ‘Get out of my country,’ witnesses say, and then shot 2 men from India, killing one, Wash. Post (Feb. 24, 2017) ................................................................. 23\nBernstein, MAX attack unfolded quickly: extremist cut three in neck, police say, The Oregonian/OregonLive (Jun. 2, 2017) .............. 23\nBeutel, Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States, Muslim Public Affairs Council (June 2012) ....................................... 28\nBeydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) ........................................................................ 24, 29\nBeydoun, Being a Muslim under Trump is risky. That’s why many are hiding their identity, The Guardian (Mar. 30, 2017)......... 19\nBharath, Muslim groups to march with allies to protest travel ban and call for immigration, criminal justice reform, The Orange County Registry (Oct. 13, 2017) ........................ 12\nBier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato at Liberty (Oct. 9, 2017) .............................................. 25\nBothwell, International students less likely to accept offers in Trump’s US, Times Higher Education (July 6, 2017)........................ 14\nCapecchi, Chapman Where the Immigration Ban Hits Home, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2017) ........................................................... 10, 22\nChalabi, Support for Trump travel ban in line with antiMuslim attitudes in America, The Guardian (Feb. 2, 2017) .............. 18\nFariz, Torrance Islamic community shaken by travel ban, Easy Reader News (Feb. 25, 2017) ..................................................... 22\nGostin, Presidential Immigration Policies Endangering Health and Well-being?, JAMA (Mar. 23, 2017) ................................ 22\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 39\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\nGuerra, Students still uneasy, despite travel-ban ruling, The Boston Globe (Oct. 18, 2017) .............................................................. 16\nHauslohner, Imam: There’s an atmosphere of intolerance that says, ‘That’s okay, that’s acceptable now’, Wash. Post (Mar. 10, 2017)........................................................... 19, 24\nHealy, Love, Interrupted: Travel Ban Separates Couples, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2017) ................................................................... 10\nHoffman, Meet the People Posting Photos of ‘Banned Grandmas’ to Protest the Travel Ban, Time Magazine (July 6, 2017)....................................................................................... 11\nHuman Rights Watch, US: Trump’s new refugee order renews old harms (Mar. 6, 2017) ........................................................ 20\nIngraham, American mosques—and American Muslims—are being targeted for hate like never before, Wash. Post. (Aug. 8, 2017).................................................................. 24\nKaroub, Batrawy Eid al-Adha 2017: US Muslims fear Donald Trump’s travel ban will prevent them returning from Hajj, The Independent (Sept. 1, 2017)....................................... 11\nLee, ‘There is too much anger out there.’ Bombing of a Minnesota mosque leaves Muslims concerned, L.A. Times (Aug. 5, 2017) ................................................................... 24\nLui, President Trump Added Three New Countries to His Travel Ban. Here's What to Know About Them, Time Magazine (Sept. 25, 2017) ......................................................... 26\nMcCrummen, Love Thy Neighbor? When a Muslim doctor arrived in a rural Midwestern town, “it felt right.” But that feeling began to change after the election of Donald Trump, Wash. Post (July 1, 2017) ................................................................... 13\nMcNeil Jr., Trump’s Travel Ban, Aimed at Terrorists, Has Blocked Doctors, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2017) ........................... 10, 20, 23\nMeet the Press (Jul. 24, 2016)................................................................... 8\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 39\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\nMourad, Muslims at haj are worried about Trump’s policies towards them, Reuters (Sept. 2, 2017) ............................................... 26\nMunshi, Muslim Americans express anxiety over Trump travel ban, Financial Times (Feb. 2, 2017)......................................... 21\nN.Y. Times Editorial Board, President Trump’s Muslim Ban Lite, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2017) .................................................................. 21\nPennington, Immigration puts Middle Eastern students off studying in US, The National (Aug. 16, 2017) ................................... 14\nPew Research Center, A new estimate of the U.S. Muslim population (Jan. 6, 2016) .................................................................... 28\nPew Research Center, The Religious Affiliation of U.S. Immigrants: Majority Christian, Rising Share of Other Faiths (May 17, 2013) ......................................................................... 28\nPilkington, Trump travel crackdown turns ‘wedding celebration into a family separation,’ The Guardian (Apr. 14, 2017) ................... 10\nRappeport, Donald Trump Repeats Call to Inspect Mosques for Signs of Terrorism, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2015) ........................... 18\nRedden, Fragile Status: Two students from Libya consider the executive order banning entry to the U.S. for them and their compatriots, Inside Higher Ed (Feb. 1, 2017)............................ 16\nRedden, International Enrollments: From Flat to Way Down, Inside Higher Ed. (Sept. 5, 2017) ....................................................... 15\nSaul, Fewer Foreign Students Are Coming to U.S., Survey Shows, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2017) .............................................. 14, 15\nShear, New Order Indefinitely Bars Almost All Travel From Seven Countries N.Y. Time (Sept. 24, 2017) ........................................ 8\nSiddiqui, At mosque Obama visited, fear replaces hope as new Trump travel ban looms, The Guardian (Mar. 14, 2017)....... 11, 21, 23\nSrikantiah, The new travel ban, national security, and immigration, Stanford Law School Blogs (Feb. 1, 2017) ................... 17\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 39\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\nTrump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Feb. 11, 2017, 4:12 AM)............ 26\nTrump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017, 3:37 AM)............. 27\nTrump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017, 6:20 PM)............. 27\nTrump, Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (Dec. 7, 2015)..... 18\nUnited Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, US travel ban: “New policy breaches Washington’s human rights obligations\" (Feb. 1, 2017)........................................................ 21\nWilinson, Iranian Americans join human rights groups in protesting new ban, L.A. Times (Mar. 6, 2017) .................................. 19\nZapotosky, Takase, Schetti, Federal judge in Hawaii freezes President Trump’s new entry ban, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2017)......... 26\nZapotosky, Nakamura, Hauslohner, Revised executive order bans travelers from six Muslim-majority countries from getting new visas, Wash. Post (Mar. 6, 2017)..................................... 28\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 39\n\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Amici Curiae are organizations that advocate for the dignity and fair treatment of the Muslim community throughout the United States. Amici can provide unique and important insights regarding the impact of the September 24, 2017, Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the “Proclamation” or “Muslim Ban”) and how it unfairly subjects Muslims, persons from Muslim-majority countries, and even those simply perceived as Muslim, to unwarranted harassment and religious discrimination by government officials. Moreover, Amici can address the effects and public perceptions caused by an executive order that targets the Muslim community under the guise of national security, including the stigmatization of Muslims and Muslim communities, increased discrimination, and discouragement of Muslims and persons from Muslim-majority countries—U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike— from fully and freely participating in American society for fear of reprisal, directly undermining Amici’s work. This case addresses the legality of the latest incarnation of a Muslim Ban that restricts immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States from designated countries, most of which are Muslimmajority. Amici support the arguments that the Proclamation is 1 This brief is filed with consent of all parties. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no entity or person, aside from Amici and their counsel, made any monetary contribution toward the preparation or submission of this brief.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 39\n\nunconstitutional, and submit this brief to address the deleterious effects of targeting members, or perceived members, of a religious community via a proclamation that is the third attempt to implement a policy “motivated” by a “desire to exclude Muslims from the United States.”2 Accordingly, Amici have a substantial interest in the proper resolution of the issues this case presents.\nThe Muslim Justice League (MJL) is an independent nonprofit organization advocating for the protection of human and civil rights that are threatened under national security pretexts, through community education and organizing, and legal and policy advocacy. In the course of providing educational workshops, MJL has fielded and increasing number of questions since the announcement of the Muslim Ban from concerned community members regarding their fears about the consequences of traveling to see family or to pursue educational, professional, or religious objectives. MJL participated as amicus curiae in Ashcroft v. Abbasi (U.S. 2017) challenging government policies and practices that targeted people based on their race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin.\n2 IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 626 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (May 31 and June 15, 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated and remanded, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017).\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 39\n\nThe Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) is a communitybased public affairs nonprofit organization working for the integration of Muslims into American society. MPAC aims to increase the public understanding of Islam and to improve policies that affect American Muslims, by engaging our government, media, and communities. MPAC’s view is that America is enriched by the vital contributions of American Muslims. MPAC works diligently to offer the public a portrayal that goes beyond stereotypes and shows that Muslims are part of a vibrant American pluralism. MPAC participated as amicus curiae in cases concerning civil liberties (Boumediene v. Bush and al Odah v. U.S. (U.S. 2007)), immigration (Arizona v. U.S. (U.S. 2012)), and religious liberties (Holt v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction (U.S. 2014)).\nThe Council on American-Islamic Relations, California (CAIR-CA), is a chapter of the nation’s largest American Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization. CAIR-CA’s mission is to enhance the understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding. Through its four offices, CAIR-CA serves California’s estimated one million American Muslims by providing direct legal services to victims of discrimination, working with the media, facilitating community education, and engaging in policy advocacy to advance civil rights and civic engagement.\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 39\n\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued the Proclamation that will indefinitely bar or limit the entry into the United States of some or all nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela.3 The Proclamation is the Trump Administration’s third attempt to limit or bar the entry of nationals from certain Muslim-majority countries and to tie the alleged “risks” of their nationals’ entry to the need for enhanced vetting procedures, thus violating the Establishment Clause by creating a disfavored religion in the United States. The Administration’s first attempt to restrain entry from a number of Muslim-majority countries was Executive Order 13,769 (“EO-1”), barred the entry of nationals of seven predominantly Muslim countries for a 90-day period.4 After EO-1 was enjoined, the Administration issued Executive Order 13,780 (“EO-2”).5 Courts, including the U.S. District Court of Maryland, enjoined enforcement of significant portions of EO-2 for again violating the Establishment Clause. This court affirmed in substantial part the issuance of a nationwide preliminary injunction, recognizing the Plaintiffs’ right to challenge an Executive Order that\n3 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017). 4 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 5 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017).\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 39\n\npoorly concealed religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination behind vague words of national security.6\nHere, just as with earlier iterations, the injuries the Proclamation inflicts apply to Muslim communities across the country, disrupting personal, professional, and academic activities and unfairly and irreparably stigmatizing Muslims. Because the Muslim Ban, in all of its iterations, is nothing more than religious intolerance masquerading as an attempt to address (unfounded) security concerns, the decision below should be affirmed.\nARGUMENT THE PROCLAMATION HARMS MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, AND\nWAS PROPERLY ENJOINED. I. The Proclamation’s effect on Muslims in the United States\nconstitutes injury under the Establishment Clause. “[T]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one\nreligious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). By imposing an indefinite ban on entry from six Muslim-majority countries and proposing either “additional scrutiny or “enhanced screening and vetting requirements” targeting travelers from Muslim-majority countries, the President has violated this “clearest command” and created a system officially\n6 IRAP, 857 F.3d at 584.\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 39\n\ndisfavoring Muslims. Multiple courts evaluating challenges to the Proclamation’s predecessors (EO-1 and EO-2) have found that the harms caused by the Muslim Ban are direct, concrete injuries under the Establishment Clause.7 These injuries include:\n• Prolonged separation of family members, an “imminent, sufficiently ‘real’ and concrete” injury that causes “a personal and ‘particularized’” harm.8\n• The loss of First Amendment freedoms, causing unquestionable irreparable harm from the moment the government action took place.9\n7 See, e.g., IRAP, 857 F.3d at 584 (finding Plaintiff “Doe #1 has had ‘personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion’” due to injuries caused by prolonged separation from his wife, an Iranian national, and the alleged state-sanctioned message that foreign-born Muslims, like Doe #1, are political outsiders); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168-1169 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When the [E.O.] was in effect, the States contend that the travel prohibitions harmed the States’ university employees and students, separated families, and stranded the States’ residents abroad. These [deprivations of constitutional rights] are substantial injuries and even irreparable harms.”); Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719, 740 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“The Fourth Circuit has held that, as a matter of law, ‘loss of First Amendment rights, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’”); IRAP v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 564 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (May 31 and June 15, 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated and remanded, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (“‘[W]hen an Establishment Clause violation is alleged, infringement occurs the moment the government action takes place.’ … The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of irreparable harm when the Second Executive Order takes effect.”); see also Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 737 (E.D. Va. 2017); Hawai‘i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1139 (D. Haw. 2017). 8 IRAP, 857 F.3d at 583-84. 9 Id.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 39\n\n• Significant restraint of travel and freedom of movement, causing, e.g., the separation of families,10 the cancellation of personal and professional travel plans abroad or visits from family or colleagues to America,11 and disruption of academic activities12.\n• The promotion of harmful stereotypes of Muslims, conveying the message that a broad travel ban is “needed” to prevent people from certain Muslim countries from entering the United States, and further sending an “alleged state-sanctioned message that foreign-born Muslims” are “outsiders.”13\n• Psychological harm and mental stress, including “significant fear, anxiety and insecurity” due to the Muslim Ban and underlying “anti-Muslim attitudes” and “official anti-Muslim sentiment”;14 feelings of isolation and disparagement, worries about safety and belonging in this country, and concerns about “the disfavoring of Islam”;15 “anxiety, confusion, and distress” due to the uncertainty introduced by the Muslim Ban, and “an uptick in students, employees, and faculty using [university] counseling services”;16 being affected by the knowledge that the federal government would discriminate against their ethnicity and religion; “psychological harm that flows from confronting official action preferring or disfavoring a particular religion”;17 the “direct, painful effects” of a message of “religious condemnations”;18 feeling targeted as Muslim because of their religious views and national origin, and concern about not being\n10 Id., at 606 (Keenan, J., concurring); Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169. 11 Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 728-29; Washington, 847 F.3d at 1159. 12 Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 728; Sarsour, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 729. 13 IRAP, 857 F.3d at 584 (citing Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012)); Hawai‘i, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1132. 14 IRAP, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 552. 15 Id.; IRAP, 857 F.3d at 584-585. 16 Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 729. 17 IRAP, 857 F.3d at 585. 18 Id.\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 39\n\nable to associate as freely as those of other faiths; and hurt, confusion, sadness, and stigma generally.19\nTaking the Proclamation in context, it is common sense that the Proclamation is driven by the same anti-Muslim animus as EO-1 and EO-2.20 In a Meet the Press interview, then-candidate Trump articulated his plan, stating: “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. … [Now] I’m okay with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”21 And unlike EO-1 and EO-2, which were temporary, the Proclamation represents an indefinite extension of restrictions.22 With the Proclamation, the Administration again chose to use the bluntest of tools to tackle a problem that does not exist—there was no immediate security need that justified the ban.\nRather, the only common thread between those affected is their religion. While the President is provided wide discretion in administering the immigration laws, the policies and directives must be constitutional. The Administration’s intentional disfavoring of one religion is not constitutional.\n19 Hawai‘i, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 1132. 20 See generally IRAP v. Trump, CV TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017). 21 Meet the Press. (Jul. 24, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-thepress/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706. 22 Michael Shear, New Order Indefinitely Bars Almost All Travel From Seven Countries (Sept. 24, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/us/politics/new-order-bars-almostall-travel-from-seven-countries.html.\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 39\n\nA. The Muslim Ban unlawfully and injuriously restrains travel among Muslim communities.\nThe harmful impact of this and previous iterations of the Muslim Ban have been far-reaching—upending the personal, professional, and academic activities of countless Muslim individuals and communities around the world. Amici have been overwhelmed with inquiries from concerned Muslim individuals, both citizens and non-citizens alike, who are justifiably worried about the impact of a seemingly never-ending series of bans. Like the plaintiffs in this case, Amici’s members include Muslims and those from Muslim-majority countries forced to make difficult travel-related decisions on account of the Muslim Ban and facing alienation from loved ones who are banned from visiting them in the United States. In short, Muslims are disproportionally affected despite the government’s assertion of a religiously neutral order.\n1. The Muslim Ban has had a chilling effect on personal activities.\nAs intended, this and previous iterations of the Muslim Ban have prevented peoples from traveling to the United States from designated Muslim-majority countries, often with heartrending effect on families. For instance, a bride’s mother and sister were barred from attending a wedding in Baltimore because the U.S. consulate canceled their scheduled visa interviews after the first executive order was instituted, and refused to reschedule, even after the initial Muslim Ban was\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 39\n\nstayed.23 The bride’s sister-in-law (a green card holder) and her infant child were also visiting Iran and were temporarily barred from returning home to the United States when the initial Muslim Ban went into effect.24\nThose already in the United States with families from countries affected by the Muslim Ban are unable to see their families due to fear the Muslim Ban will bar their reentry into the United States.25 Couples based in the United States “with immigrant parents say they are hesitant about traveling to their familial homelands to celebrate [weddings]” because they fear that they may not be allowed back into the United States.26\n\n23 Ed Pilkington, Trump travel crackdown turns ‘wedding celebration into a family separation,’ The Guardian (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/14/trump-travel-banvisa-iran-wedding. 24 Id. 25 See, e.g., Christina Capecchi, Mary Chapman, Where the Immigration Ban Hits Home, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/immigration-ban-locations.html; Donald McNeil Jr., Trump’s travel ban, aimed at terrorists, has blocked doctors, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/health/trump-travel-bandoctors.html. 26 Jack Healy, Anemona Hartocollis, Love, interrupted: travel ban separates couples, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/love-interrupted-a-travel-banseparates-couples.html.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 39\n\nThe Muslim Ban has resulted in familial separation for those in the United States.27 At the popular Instagram account “Banned Grandmas,” people share pictures of their grandmothers with stories that include grandparents missing weddings, college and graduate school graduations, and being unable to receive medical treatment in the United States because of the travel ban.28\nReligious activity has also been chilled. For example, the Islamic Society of Baltimore canceled its annual pilgrimage to Mecca “amid fears that Donald Trump’s travel ban on certain Muslim-majority countries might bar reentry even to those who call the United States their home.”29 Travelers embarking on the annual hajj pilgrimage feared that they would not be allowed to return to the United States.30\n27 Ashley Hoffman, Meet the people posting photos of “Banned Grandmas” to protest the travel ban, TIME Magazine (July 6, 2017), http://time.com/4845841/travel-ban-banned-grandmas-social-media/. 28 Id., @BannedGrandmas, Instagram (July 2, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/BWEJI3_HxGf/; @BannedGrandmas, Instagram (July 1, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/BWAvUJ_neD/?hl=en&taken-by=bannedgrandmas; @BannedGrandmas, Instagram (June 30, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/BV-cFrin0U4/?takenby=bannedgrandmas. 29 Sabrina Siddiqui, At mosque Obama visited, fear replaces hope as new Trump travel ban looms, The Guardian (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/14/mosque-obamavisited-trump-travel-ban-muslim. 30 Jeff Karoub, Aya Batrawy, Eid al-Adha 2017: US Muslims fear Donald Trump’s travel ban will prevent them returning from Hajj (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/hajj-2017-latest-us-muslims-fear-border-controls-return-islammecca-saudi-arabia-pilgrimage-a7923486.html.\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 39\n\nAnd in the United States this has led to Muslims changing the way they practice their religion, including Muslim women taking off their head scarves and some individuals becoming too fearful to pray in their mosques.31\n2. The Muslim Ban has interfered with professional activities.\nThe Proclamation, like all previous versions of the Muslim Ban, has deeply impacted the professional lives of American Muslims and those traveling to the United States to conduct business. Amici report members carrying a United States passport when traveling domestically for fear of having to provide documentation of citizenship.\nThe Muslim Ban has also directly affected Amici’s professional endeavors. For example, the various iterations of the Muslim Ban have led to Amicus MJL ratifying a practice of not allowing its staff to travel with electronics containing client information. MJL was concerned about how the profiling of Muslims at the border or at airports could lead to government searches of its employees’ devices containing confidential client information and privileged communications. This burdens MJL’s limited time and resources, requiring MJL employees to 31 Deepa Bharath, Muslim groups to march with allies to protest travel ban and call for immigration, criminal justice reform, The Orange County Registry (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/10/13/muslim-group-to-march-withallies-to-protest-travel-ban-and-call-for-immigration-criminal-justicereform/.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 39\n\nmake alternate arrangements and additional purchases to ensure that MJL staff can continue their vital work while traveling.\nFurther, this ban has greatly impacted highly skilled professionals who are working in the United States. There are over 7,000 physicians working in the U.S. who trained in the six countries that were listed in EO-2, many of whom would also be targeted by the Proclamation.32 Many of these highly skilled professionals are considering leaving the country, and their loss would be devastating for the mostly rural, underserved communities in which they practice.33 For example, a physician in rural Minnesota found himself questioning why he should come to rural America to help people who think he is a “terrorist.”34\n3. The Muslim Ban has also impeded academic activities.\nThe Muslim Ban has resulted in a sharp drop in foreign student enrollment at universities due to fears of discrimination against Muslim\n32 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Trump’s new travel ban could affect doctors, especially in the Rust Belt and Appalachia, FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 6, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trumps-new-travelban-could-affect-doctors-especially-in-the-rust-belt-and-appalachia/. 33 Id. 34 Stephanie McCrummen, Love Thy Neighbor? When a Muslim doctor arrived in a rural Midwestern town, “it felt right.” But that feeling began to change after the election of Donald Trump, Wash. Post (July 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-midwestern-town-thatwent-for-trump-a-muslim-doctor-tries-to-understand-hisneighbors/2017/07/01/0ada50c4-5c48-11e7-9fc6c7ef4bc58d13_story.html?utm_term=.3577e33033a1.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 39\n\nstudents.35 According to the Institute of International Education, the number of newly arriving international students declined an average of 7% in 2017, with 45% of campuses reporting drops in new international enrollment.36\nFurther, half of the universities responding stated that they noted declines in admission yield for students from the Middle East and North Africa.37 Many international university students, particularly Muslim students, have expressed fears that can be linked to the President’s anti-immigration rhetoric in general and to the Muslim Ban in particular.38 Many professionals in higher education believe the Muslim\n\n35 Stephanie Saul, Fewer Foreign Students Are Coming to U.S., Survey Shows, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/us/fewer-foreign-students-comingto-us.html. 36 Id. 37 Ellie Bothwell, International students less likely to accept offers in Trump’s US, Times Higher Education (July 6, 2017), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/international-studentsless-likely-accept-offers-trumps-us. 38 See Roberta Pennington, Immigration puts Middle Eastern students off studying in US, The National (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/uae/immigration-puts-middle-easternstudents-off-studying-in-us-1.620323 (reporting 46% of institutions surveyed were told by Middle Eastern international students that securing and maintaining a visa were their biggest concerns, followed by “feeling welcome in the US [as] almost an equal concern” at 41% of institutions).\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 39\n\nbans have caused significant damage to the country’s reputation for openness.39\nOne university official stated that fewer students were enrolling “because of concerns about the Trump administration’s travel ban.”40 Muslim students from countries like India, which is not even subject to the Muslim Ban, were still concerned about the ban and said they did not feel welcome and safe in the United States.41 Further, the rhetoric from the White House has enhanced the perception that the United States is less welcoming and more xenophobic than before.42\nEven for foreign students who are already enrolled in an American university, the Muslim Ban has had a measurable impact. Amici have been contacted by students on valid visas who are forgoing trips home because they are concerned that their visas may be canceled, rendering meaningless their years of work toward advanced degrees. One Libyan graduate student reported that he had not seen his family in three years—“If I want to see them, I will not be able to come back\n39 Elizabeth Redden, International Enrollments: From Flat to Way Down, Insider Higher Ed. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/09/05/some-universities-arereporting-declines-international-enrollments-ranging-modest. 40 Saul, supra, Fewer Foreign Students Are Coming to U.S., Survey Shows. 41 Id. 42 Redden, supra, International Enrollments: From Flat to Way Down.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 39\n\nhere, and if I want to stay here, I will not be able to see my family.”43 A Harvard pre-med student of Syrian and Lebanese descent stated that she did not attend her grandmother’s funeral because she feared not being able to return to Harvard.44 Further, if the latest travel ban is implemented, her parents would not be able to see her graduate in May.45\nA recent Harvard graduate said “[t]he messaging, the signaling [of the travel ban] is[:] we want a country with less Muslims … regardless of your contribution in society, regardless of what you do.”46\n4. The Muslim Ban impacts nationals beyond those from the designated countries.\nAmici have reported that even those with no ties to the designated Muslim-majority countries have expressed concern about or described unpleasant experiences upon returning from travel outside of the country. For example, CAIR-CA was contacted by a U.S. citizen of\n43 Elizabeth Redden, Fragile Status: Two students from Libya consider the executive order banning entry to the U.S. for them and their compatriots, Inside Higher Ed (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/02/01/two-students-libyaconsider-trumps-entry-ban. 44 Cristela Guerra, Students still uneasy, despite travel-ban ruling, The Boston Globe (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/10/17/college-students-holdprayer-and-vigil-protest-trump-latest-travelban/S1YUqjQBtLQ5xjhUl3UTLK/story.html. 45 Id. 46 Id.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 39\n\nPakistani origin traveling to China for business. He was frightened that ancestry from a Muslim-majority country could bar or complicate his reentry into the United States.47 Additionally, the unpredictable changes to restrictions and designated countries between EO-1, EO-2, and the Proclamation, combined with the immediate implementation of some restrictions, fuel concern that a traveler not subject to present restrictions of the Muslim Ban may be barred entry or reentry based on some future shift.\nThose concerns are explicitly justified by Section 4 of the Proclamation, which requires regular reports and authorization recommendations for the President to consider extending the suspensions or limitations to countries not identified in the Proclamation.\nB. The Muslim Ban promotes harmful stereotypes about Muslims.\nNot only are this current and previous iterations of the Muslim Ban premised on offensive and false stereotypes, but they also further 47 See also, Jayashri Srikantiah, et al., The new travel ban, national security, and immigration, Stanford Law School Blogs (Feb. 1, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/2017/02/01/the-new-travel-ban-nationalsecurity-and-immigration/ (“[T]here have been numerous reports of effects on individuals from countries that are not included in the current travel ban, such as Pakistan, possibly as the result of border agents treating the travel ban as a license to discriminate against other groups of travelers who are Muslim or perceived to be Muslim [thus affecting] immigrants beyond refugees and individuals from the seven countries.”).\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 39\n\nperpetuate harm against Muslims across the country by broadly typecasting Muslims and those from Muslim-majority countries as threats to national safety. While campaigning, then-candidate Trump repeatedly invoked offensive stereotypes in calling for a ban to prevent Muslims from entering the United States,48 a required registry of Muslims in the United States,49 and the consideration of shutting down mosques as a purported strategy to fight terrorists.50\nIn candidate Trump’s press release calling for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” he claimed “large segments of the Muslim population” harbored “great hatred towards Americans” and further justified a Muslim Ban by claiming it would protect the country from becoming “the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life.”51 Candidate Trump further\n48 Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trumpstatement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration. 49 Mona Chalabi, Support for Trump travel ban in line with anti-Muslim attitudes in America, The Guardian (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/polls-widespreadbacking-trump-travel-ban. 50 Alan Rappeport, Donald Trump repeats call to inspect mosques for signs of terrorism, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/11/16/donald-trumprepeats-call-to-inspect-mosques-for-signs-of-terrorism/. 51 Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, supra.\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 39\n\ninsinuated that a majority of Muslims believe that “murder against non-believers who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women” should become authorized in the United States.52\nIt is therefore no surprise that previous versions of the Muslim Ban have been interpreted “by civil rights organizations and in other Muslim communities across the country [] as a ban on Muslims and, more broadly, as a statement that Muslims are not welcome in the United States.”53\nAll versions of the Muslim Ban rest on, and serve to bolster, harmful and blatantly offensive stereotypes.54 Like the stereotypes\n52 Id. 53 Abigail Hauslohner, Imam: There’s an atmosphere of intolerance that says, ‘That’s okay, that’s acceptable now,’ Wash. Post (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/imam-theres-a-climate-ofhate-that-says-thats-okay-thats-acceptable-now/2017/03/09/127f4fd00434-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.76d9792b8d12; see also Tracey Wilinson, Iranian Americans join human rights groups in protesting new ban, L.A. Times (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-live-updates-9th-circuit-argumentsiranian-americans-others-protest-new-1488825822-htmlstory.html (“Margaret Huang, executive director of the U.S. branch of Amnesty International, said the [revised] order represented ‘the same hate and fear with new packaging’ and ‘blatant bigotry.’ ‘It will cause extreme fear and uncertainty for thousands of families by, once again, putting anti-Muslim hatred into policy,’ she said, ‘and will do nothing to make the country safer.’”). 54 See Khaled Beydoun, Being a Muslim under Trump is risky. That’s why many are hiding their identity, The Guardian (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/30/beingmuslim-under-trump-risky-many-hiding-identity (“The stereotypes …\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 39\n\nperpetuated during the President’s campaign, the stereotypes advanced by the Muslim Ban depict “Islam [as] an inherently violent and foreign faith, and Muslims [as] a presumptively subversive and inassimilable class of people,”55 and further “send a message that Muslims are not welcome in the U.S.”56 Many Muslims are receiving this message not only from the country’s highest office, but from their neighbors as well, putting some in the harmful position of “religious advocacy and outreach” to combat the Muslim Ban’s “pernicious effects.”57 One Minneapolis physician described having to respond to these stereotypes after a patient asked, “Why do you people hate us?” in the weeks following the second Muslim Ban.58\nSince the initial Muslim Ban’s signing, Muslim parents have been burdened with explaining to their children why their faith has been vilified in official U.S. policy. One Baltimore mother described finding her 10-year-old daughter crying when she went to pick her up from school; a friend told her that she “wasn’t allowed to be friends with\nare deeply rooted, and readily repackaged and redeployed by Trump’s ‘Muslim Ban’ and rhetoric holding that ‘Islam hates us.’”). 55 Id. 56 Human Rights Watch, US: Trump’s new refugee order renews old harms (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/06/us-trumpsnew-refugee-order-renews-old-harms. 57 Sarsour, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 729. 58 McNeil, supra, Trump’s travel ban, aimed at terrorists, has blocked doctors.\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 39\n\npeople who wear those things on their heads.”59 “Kids,” a Pennsylvania parent explained, “don’t understand the difference between a green card or a citizen or a visa—but they know that Islam is mentioned all the time, and they want to know why the president is singling out Islam— are we different? Is there something wrong with us?”60\nIn short, “the new ban, and its justification, conveys the same spurious messages: that Muslims are inherently dangerous.”61 These stereotypes foster the stigmatization of the Muslim communities, increase discrimination, and effectively prevent Muslims and persons from Muslim-majority countries from fully and freely participating in American society.\nC. In targeting Muslims, the Muslim Ban has caused psychological—and arguably, physical—harm.\nMuslims across the country have also suffered psychological harm and distress as a result of the Muslim Ban. A recent Somali immigrant reported feeling “lonely” following the announcement of the newest Muslim Ban because it destroyed her dream of bringing her parents\n59 Siddiqui, supra, At mosque Obama visited, fear replaces hope as new Trump travel ban looms. 60 Neil Munshi, Muslim Americans express anxiety over Trump travel ban, Financial Times (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ba9f2d88-e905-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539. 61 N.Y. Times Editorial Board, President Trump’s Muslim Ban Lite, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/president-trumps-muslimban-lite.html.\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 39\n\nover to unite with her toddler children, and stated: “When my children grow up, they will feel the pain.”62 Public health specialists warn that the Muslim Ban could result in mental health harms, as those targeted may “experience social isolation and alienation from their community.”63 From “growing anxiety,”64 “fear,”65 and feeling “terrified,”66 to describing the ban as “traumatizing,”67 “increas[ing] stigmatization of Muslim communities,”68 and leaving one “feeling\n62 Around the World and the U.S., New Travel Ban Draws Anger, Applause and Shrugs, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/travel-ban-reaction.html. 63 Lawrence Gostin, et al., Presidential immigration policies endangering health and well-being? JAMA (Mar. 23, 2017), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2613724 (“[L]awful residents such as Muslims could be adversely affected, experiencing social isolation and alienation from their community.”). 64 Saima Fariz, Torrance Islamic community shaken by travel ban, Easy Reader News (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.easyreadernews.com/torrance-islamic-community-shakentravel-ban/. 65 Id. 66 Capecchi and Chapman, supra, Where the Immigration Ban Hits Home. 67 Id. 68 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, US travel ban: “New policy breaches Washington’s human rights obligations” – UN experts (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsI D=21136&LangID=E (“‘Such an order is clearly discriminatory based on one’s nationality and leads to increased stigmatization of Muslim communities,’ said the UN Special Rapporteurs on migrants, François Crépeau; on racism, Mutuma Ruteere; on human rights and counterterrorism, Ben Emmerson; on torture, Nils Melzer; and on freedom of religion, Ahmed Shaheed.”).\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 39\n\nhunted [], as if you did something wrong, even if you didn’t,”69 the psychological harms of the Muslim Ban have been concrete and indisputable.\nWorse still, the dangerous stereotypes fostered by the Muslim Ban have also led to physical violence against its targets.70 In February 2017, a gunman in Kansas shot two Indian men, killing one and injuring the other.71 Before opening fire, he allegedly used racial slurs indicating that he thought the men were Middle Eastern and shouted, “Get out of my country.”72 In May 2017, two men were killed and a third was violently injured in Oregon when they tried to intervene in a verbal attack against a Muslim teen and her African American friend.73 At one 69 McNeil, supra, Trump’s travel ban, aimed at terrorists, has blocked doctors. 70 See Siddiqui, supra, At mosque Obama visited, fear replaces hope as new Trump travel ban looms (“‘When you talk about the policies being harmful, that’s one thing,’ said Ahmed Mahmoud, a native of Maryland who attends prayer services at the Islamic Society of Baltimore. ‘But the discourse that they use to justify and facilitate the creation of [Trump’s] policies—that in and of itself has been harmful and you see that manifesting in the increase in hate crimes, targeting especially not just Muslims but anybody who shares the physical traits of Muslims.’”). 71 Mark Berman, He yelled ‘Get out of my country,’ witnesses say, and then shot 2 men from India, killing one, Wash. Post (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/24/getout-of-my-country-kansan-reportedly-yelled-before-shooting-2-menfrom-india-killing-one/?utm_term=.6c3c7c2a1ef9. 72 Id. 73 Maxine Bernstein, MAX attack unfolded quickly: extremist cut three in neck, police say, The Oregonian/OregonLive (Jun. 2, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2017/05/horrific_scene_un folds_on_max.html#incart_river_index#incart_big-photo.\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 39\n\npoint the attacker allegedly stated that “Muslims should die.”74 In August 2017, an improvised explosive device was used to bomb a mosque in Minneapolis.75 According to CAIR’s figures, the tally of antiIslamic incidents at mosques during the first six months of 2017 was already greater than the total number of incidents in any year between 2009 and 2015.76\nUnfortunately, in the midst of increasing anti-Muslim rhetoric, “attacks on conspicuous Muslim expression were hardly confined to one part of the country, or in rural instead of urban centers.”77 Many\n74 Id. 75 Kurtis Lee, ‘There is too much anger out there.’ Bombing of a Minnesota mosque leaves Muslims concerned, L.A. Times (Aug. 5, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-mosque-bombing-20170805story.html. 76 Christopher Ingraham, American mosques—and American Muslims—are being targeted for hate like never before, Wash. Post. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/08/americanmosques-and-american-muslims-are-being-targeted-for-hate-like-neverbefore/?utm_term=.b066b29d76a0. 77 Khaled Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev., (forthcoming 2017) at 39, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926162; see also Hauslohner, supra, Imam: There’s an atmosphere of intolerance that says, ‘That’s okay, that’s acceptable now’ (“Law enforcement officials in Texas and Florida are investigating fires at three mosques, at least two of which have been ruled arson. Last month in Kansas, a white man shouting ‘Get out of my country’ shot dead an Indian engineer, who he apparently believed to be from the Middle East. Near Seattle this month, a masked assailant wounded a Sikh man—a member of an Indian religious minority who are sometimes confused for Muslims because the men wear turbans—after shouting at him to ‘go back to your country,’ and authorities are investigating it as a hate crime.\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 39\n\nAmerican Muslims say they live in an atmosphere in which people feel as though they can voice prejudices or attack Muslims without fear of retribution.78 II. Despite inclusion of two non-Muslim-majority countries\nand attempts to sanitize its text, the clear intent of the Muslim Ban is to disfavor and burden Muslims. The addition of two non-Muslim majority countries, North Korea and Venezuela, does not disguise the anti-Muslim animus of the Muslim Ban. As the Maryland District Court found, the underlying architecture of the Proclamation is fundamentally the same as EO-1 and EO-2, and in fact doubles down by establishing an indefinite travel ban. The Cato Institute noted that the Muslim Ban is based on executive whim to achieve a pre-ordained result, instead of on any consistent criteria.79 The government intentionally made subjective determinations to result in a disproportionate impact on majorityMuslim nations, and the inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela is\nPolice in South Carolina are investigating the shooting death of an Indian man there the day before.”). 78 Mahmoud Mourad, Stephen Kalin, Muslims at haj are worried about Trump’s policies towards them, Reuters (Sept. 2, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-haj-trump/muslims-at-haj-areworried-about-trumps-policies-towards-them-idUSKCN1BD0N4?il=0. 79 David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato at Liberty (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/travelban-based-executive-whim-not-objective-criteria.\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 39\n\nmerely window dressing.80 As explained by the lower court, “[T]he Venezuela ban is qualitatively different from the others because it extends only to government officials, and the ban on North Korea will, according to State Department statistics, affect fewer than 100 people, only a fraction of one percent of all those affected by the Proclamation.”81\nNotably, President Trump expressed regret for having to revise the Muslim Ban in light of successful court challenges82 and continued to portray Muslim-majority countries subject to the ban as “suspect” and the people as “SO DANGEROUS!”83 In fact, President Trump said the “travel ban” was for “certain DANGEROUS countries, not some\n80 Kevin Lui, President Trump Added Three New Countries to His Travel Ban. Here's What to Know About Them, Time Magazine (Sept. 25, 2017), http://time.com/4955280/donald-trump-new-travel-banwhat-to-know/ (“The administration is once again making cosmetic adjustments to the Muslim ban in hopes that it will pass the barest possible definition of anything else,” Johnathan Smith, legal director of legal advocacy group Muslim Advocates, said in a statement. “The vast majority of the executive order is completely unchanged.”). 81 IRAP, 2017 WL 4674314 at 10. 82 Matt Zapotosky, Kalani Takase, Maria Schetti Federal judge in Hawaii freezes President Trump’s new entry ban, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/lawyers-faceoff-on-trump-travel-ban-in-md-court-wednesdaymorning/2017/03/14/b2d24636-090c-11e7-93dc00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?utm_term=.2b9167813bd3. 83 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Feb. 11, 2017, 4:12 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/830389130311921667.\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 39\n\npolitically correct term that won’t help us protect our people!”84 and requested that the Justice Department “seek [a] much tougher version.”85\nThese statements highlight the Administration’s continued commitment, carried through multiple iterations of the Muslim Ban, to exclude people from the United States on the basis of their religious identity, thereby causing irreparable harm to Muslims across the country. These statements cannot be dismissed as campaign rhetoric. Indeed, these are statements made or endorsed by the President to explain the reasoning behind, and support the continuance of, his Muslim Ban. III. The focus on Muslims and Muslim-majority countries is\ndivorced from evidence, ill-conceived, and ill-advised. In stark contrast to the Administration’s claims, reports clearly demonstrate that Muslims, especially Muslim immigrants, pose an infinitesimal threat to national security.86 For example, an assessment\n84 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017, 6:20 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871899511525961728. 85 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017, 3:37 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871677472202477568. 86 Muslim immigrants constitute a very small portion of the American population. The Pew Research Center estimates that there were about 3.3 million Muslims living in the United States in 2015—approximately 1% of the total population. Approximately 10% of all immigrants are Muslim, and approximately half of all Muslims in the United States\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 39\n\nof the initial executive order by the Department of Homeland Security reported that the targeted Muslim-majority countries were “rarely implicated” in U.S.-based terrorism and that citizenship (including citizenship from a Muslim-majority country) is an unreliable indication of a terrorist threat.87\nAll told, the newest version of the Muslim Ban, like previous attempts, does nothing to make the United States safer.88 Instead, the Proclamation traffics in prejudicial stereotypes, contributes to a climate of distrust toward the Muslim community, and has further stoked fears\nimmigrated in the past 25 years. Thus, recent immigrants make up approximately 0.5% of the total population. Pew Research Center, A new estimate of the U.S. Muslim population (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-ofthe-u-s-muslim-population/; Pew Research Center, The religious affiliation of U.S. immigrants: majority Christian, rising share of other faiths (May 17, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/05/17/thereligious-affiliation-of-us-immigrants/#muslim. 87 Matt Zapotosky, David Nakamura, Abigail Hauslohner, Revised executive order bans travelers from six Muslim-majority countries from getting new visas, Wash. Post (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/newexecutive-order-bans-travelers-from-six-muslim-majority-countriesapplying-for-visas/2017/03/06/3012a42a-0277-11e7-ad5bd22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.f4a41594a2f8 (“A Department of Homeland Security report assessing the terrorist threat posed by people from the seven countries covered by the president’s original travel ban had cast doubt on the necessity of the executive order, concluding that citizenship was an ‘unreliable’ threat indicator and that people from the affected countries had rarely been implicated in U.S.-based terrorism.”). 88 Alejandro Beutel, Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States, Muslim Public Affairs Council (June 2012), http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-Post-911Terrorism-Data.pdf.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 39\n\nin the Muslim community that “the Trump Administration would scrutinize their religious identity with an unprecedented degree of suspicion and heavy-handed policy.”89\n\nCONCLUSION This Court should affirm.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nMANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP Amy Briggs, John W. McGuinness, Sirena Castillo, Matthew Bottomly, Olufunmilayo Showole, Ketakee Kane, and Benjamin G. Shatz\n\nBy: s/Benjamin G. Shatz Attorneys for Amici Curiae MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE, ET AL.\n\n89 Beydoun, Acting Muslim, supra at n. 48.\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 39\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\nThis amicus brief complies with this Court’s 6,500-word length limitation because it contains 6,153 words, excluding exempted parts of the brief. This brief complies with this Court’s typeface and typestyle requirements because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Century Schoolbook font.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\nMANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP\n\nBy: s/Benjamin G. Shatz Attorneys for Amici Curiae MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE, ET AL.\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on November 17, 2017 the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users, or if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed online.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\nMANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP\n\nBy: s/Benjamin G. Shatz Attorneys for Amici Curiae MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE, ET AL.\n\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_(_L_)_(_c_o_n_s_o_l_id_a_t_e_d__c_a_s_e_s_)_ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [✔]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _M_u__s_lim___J_u_s_ti_c_e_L__e_a_g_u_e_,_M__u_s_li_m__P_u__b_li_c_A_f_f_a_ir_s_C__o_u_n_c_i_l,_a_n_d____________________\n\n_C_o_u_n__c_il_o_n__A_m__e_r_ic_a_n_-_Is_l_a_m__ic__R_e_l_a_ti_o_n_s_,_C__a_li_fo_r_n_ia_______________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_s_/B__e_n_ja_m__i_n_G__._S_h_a_t_z____________________ (signature)\n\n_B_e__n_ja_m__in__G__. _S_h_a_t_z_______________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_3_1_0_-_3_1_2_-_4_3_8_3___ Voice Phone\n\n_M__A_N__A_T_T_,__P_H_E__L_P_S__&__P_H__IL_L_I_P_S__, _L_L_P_______ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_3_1_0_-_3_1_2_-_4_2_2_4___ Fax Number\n\n_1_1_3__5_5_W__._O__ly_m__p_i_c_B_l_v_d_.__________________\n\n_L_o_s__A_n_g__e_le_s_,_C__A__9_0_0_6_4___________________ Address\n\n_b_s_h_a_t_z_@__m_a__n_a_tt_.c_o__m_______________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_s_/_B_e__s_s_H__u_b_b__a_rd_______________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 2\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_L__\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._T_r_u_m_p_____________\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_M_u_s_li_m__Ju_s_t_ic_e_L_e_a_g_u_e_, _M_u_s_li_m_P__ub_l_ic_A_f_fa_i_rs__C_o_u_n_ci_l,_C_o_u_n_c_il_o_n_A_m__e_ri_c_an_-_Is_l_a_m_ic__R_e_la_t_io_n_s_, C__a_lif_o_rn_i_a_ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is __________A_m__ic_i _________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 95-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 2\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/B__e_n_ja_m__in__G__. _S_h_a_t_z__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n*********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_s_/_B_e_n_j_a_m_i_n_G__._S_h__a_tz_____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 43\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L); 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his\nofficial capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants-Appellants.\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\nBRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\nJonathan Weissglass Rebecca C. Lee Altshuler Berzon LLP 177 Post Street, Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 Tel: (415) 421-7151 jweissglass@altshulerberzon.com rlee@altshulerberzon.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae\n\nNicole G. Berner Deborah L. Smith Leo Gertner Service Employees International Union 1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 730-7466 nicole.berner@seiu.org debbie.smith@seiu.org leo.gertner@seiu.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Service Employees International Union\nAdditional Counsel on Inside Cover\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 43\n\nJudith Rivlin American Federation of State, County\nand Municipal Employees 1101 17th St., NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 775-5900 jrivlin@afscme.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFSCME\nDavid J. Strom American Federation of Teachers,\nAFL-CIO 555 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001 Tel: (202) 393-7472 dstrom@aft.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae AFT\nJody Calemine Communications Workers of America 501 3rd St., NW Washington, DC 20001 Tel: (202) 434-1234 jcalemine@cwa-union.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae CWA\n\nNiraj R. Ganatra Ava Barbour International Union, United\nAutomobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) 8000 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48214 Tel: (313) 926-5216 nganatra@uaw.net abarbour@uaw.net Attorneys for Amicus Curiae UAW\nMario Martínez Martínez Aguilasocho & Lynch,\nAPLC 1527 19th St., Suite 332 Bakersfield, CA 93301 Tel: (661) 859-1174 mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFW\nNicholas Clark United Food and Commercial Workers 1775 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 466-1520 nclark@ufcw.org Attorney for Amicus Curiae UFCW\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 43\n\nNo. 17-2232\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland\nSecurity; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in\nhis official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants-Appellants.\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\nNo. 17-2233 ELBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL;\nJOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants-Appellants.\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 43\n\nNo. 17-2240\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a Project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST\nSTUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED\nMOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF\nSTATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland\nSecurity; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence,\nDefendants-Appellants.\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 43\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. ii\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE............................................................................ 1\nINTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 7\nBACKGROUND ................................................................................................... 8\nARGUMENT....................................................................................................... 10\nI. The Challenged Proclamation Causes Irreparable Harm by Separating Citizens and Immigrants from Family Members Abroad ............................................................................................ 10\nII. The Proclamation Promotes Anti-Muslim Hostility, Discrimination, and Stigma ....................................................................................... 14\nIII. Union Members and Their Families Have Been Harmed by the Proclamation.................................................................................... 19\nCONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 32\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 43\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nFederal Rules and Regulations\nexE,96731rdOvituc>0:os<xecutive Order 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) ..........................passim\n>10:os<Executive Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) .........................passim\n>20:os<F.R.A.P. 29(c)(5) ................................................................................................... 6\n>30:os<Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45 (Sept. 24, 2017) .................passim\nAdditional Authorities\n2017 on Track to Becoming One of the Worst Years Ever for Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, CAIR (October 11, 2017), http://islamophobia.org/articles/ 209-2017-on-track-to-becoming-oneof-the-worst-years-ever-for-anti-muslim-hate-crimes.html.................................15\nCAIR Calls for Hate Crime Probe for Racist Harassment Targeting Tenn. Muslim Girls, Knife Attack on Father, Threat to Kill Entire Family, CAIR (October 11, 2017), https://www.cair.com/press-center/pressreleases/14735-cair-calls-for-hate-crime-probe-of-racist-harassment-..........16, 17\nCAIR 3rd Quarter Civil Rights Report Shows Rise in Hate Crimes Over Same Period Last Year, Moderate Decline in Total Cases, CAIR (October 25, 2017), http://cair.com/press-center/press-releases/14715cair-3rd-quarter-civil-rights-report-shows-rise-in-hate-crimes-oversame-period-l .....................................................................................................16\nCarola Suárez-Orozco et al., I Felt Like My Heart Was Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for Immigrant Youth, 26(2) J. of Adolescent Res. 222 (2010)............................11, 12\nCecile Rousseau et al., Trauma and Extended Separation from Family among Latin American and African Refugees in Montreal, 64(1) Psychiatry 40 (2001) ..........................................................................................13\nDana Rusch & Karina Reyes, Examining the Effects of Mexican Serial Migration and Family Separations on Acculturative Stress, Depression, and Family Functioning, 35(2) Hispanic J. Behav. Sci. 139 (2012) ...................11\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 43\n\nDavid K. Androff et al., U.S. Immigration Policy and Immigrant Children’s Well-being: The Impact of Policy Shifts, 38(1) J. of Soc. & Welfare 77 (2011) ..............................................................................................18\nDavid R. Williams et al., Health Effects of Dramatic Social Events— Ramifications of the Recent Presidential Election, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. 2295 (June 8, 2017) ............................................................ 16, 17, 18, 19\nDena Hassouneh, Anti-Muslim Racism and Women’s Health, 26(5) J. of Women’s Health 401 (2017) ..............................................................................17\nGoleen Samari, Islamophobia and Public Health in the United States, 106(11) Persp. from the Soc. Sci. 1920 (Nov. 2016) ..........................................18\nHyung-Jin Kim, Trump’s Travel Ban Unlikely to Affect North Korea, PBS (Sep 25, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trumpstravel-ban-unlikely-affect-north-korea ................................................................ 9\nJeanne Miranda et al., Depression Among Latina Immigrant Mothers Separated from their Children, 56(6) Psychiatric Servs. 717 (2005) ..................13\nKarlijn Haagsman et al., Transnational Families and the Subjective WellBeing of Migrant Parents: Angolan and Nigerian Parents in the Netherlands, 38:15 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 2652 (2015)......................................10\nKevin L. Nadal et al., Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia, VI(2) J. of Muslim Mental Health 15 (2012) ...................................................................14\nMuniba Saleem & Srividya Ramasubramanian, Muslim Americans’ Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination, Media Psychol. (Apr. 4 2017), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15213269.2017.1302345 ............18\nPew Research Ctr., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-20102050/. .................................................................................................................15\nRebecca A. Clay, Islamophobia: Psychologists Are Studying the Impact of Anti-Muslim Sentiment and Exploring Ways To Prevent It, 48(4) Monitor on Psychol. 34 (Apr. 2017).............................................................14, 15\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 43\n\nSara Reardon, Health Toll of Immigration Policies Begins To Emerge, 544 Nature 148 (Apr. 13, 2017) .........................................................................12\nSarah Horton, A Mother’s Heart Is Weighed Down with Stones: A Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Transnational Motherhood, 33 Culture, Med., & Psychiatry 21 (2009) ....................................10\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 43\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Amici curiae are the Service Employees International Union (SEIU); American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME); American Federation of Teachers (AFT); Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UAW); United Farm Workers of America (UFW); and United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW). Service Employees International Union (SEIU) is a labor organization of approximately two million working men and women in the United States and Canada. SEIU’s members include foreign-born U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and immigrants authorized to work in the United States. Many of SEIU’s members have mixed-status families. As described below, SEIU members are directly affected by the challenged Proclamation. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), is a union of 1.6 million members in the United States and Puerto Rico, both in the public and private sectors, who share a commitment to service. AFSCME is participating in this case to advance its mission of helping all working people, including immigrants and people of color, achieve the American dream regardless of their identity. AFSCME is proud to represent members who have\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 43\n\nimmigrated from Muslim-majority countries targeted by the illegal ban at issue, and/or who have family members who currently live in those countries, and staunchly opposes their being unconstitutionally subjected to the harms detailed in this brief. The public servants of AFSCME, and indeed all Americans, deserve better.\nThe American Federation of Teachers (AFT), an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, was founded in 1916 and today represents approximately 1.7 million members who are employed across the nation in K-12 and higher education, public employment, and healthcare. The AFT has a longstanding history of supporting and advocating for the civil rights of its members and the communities they serve. AFT members at a variety of institutions provide essential and necessary services, such as healthcare and education, to the public. Many of these members, especially those at institutions of higher education, are involved in global collaborations and in teaching and research duties that are being disrupted and threatened by the Proclamation. Additionally, a significant number of AFT members were born in, or have friends or family members in, countries named in the Proclamation. These members are directly impacted by the travel restrictions, which have affected their ability to work, travel, connect with, and care for their communities.\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 43\n\nThe Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA), is an international labor union representing more than 700,000 workers in the telecommunications, media, manufacturing, airlines, and health care industries and in a wide variety of public sector positions in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. CWA represents and advocates on behalf of workers of all creeds in the United States and abroad with respect to workplace rights and broader political and civil rights. In light of recent developments in U.S. domestic politics and federal policy that have targeted people of Islamic faith with discrimination, including those who may be members of the union or family members thereof, the CWA Convention resolved this year to continue the union’s “fight against discrimination in all its forms, including the targeting of people of the Islamic faith,” and to “act in defense of and solidarity with those targeted by Islamophobia in our union, our workplaces, and our communities.”\nThe International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, has nearly one million active and retired members throughout the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Since its founding in 1935, the UAW’s membership has included immigrants from around the globe, and the UAW opposes any policies that\n\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 43\n\ndiscriminate against immigrants and non-immigrants alike based on their religion or national origin.\nThe UAW and its affiliated Local Unions represent workers in diverse sectors, including over 40,000 academic student employees and post-doctoral researchers at universities in the United States. Many of these workers are foreignborn nationals of Muslim-majority countries targeted by the Proclamation and are naturalized U.S. citizens or hold valid visas permitting them to study, live, and work in the United States. The Proclamation has disrupted their ability to travel freely into and outside of the country to visit family and loved ones and to conduct research related to their university employment and course of study, and prevented their family members from traveling to the United States.\nUnited Farm Workers of America (UFW) represents thousands of migrant and seasonal farmworkers in various agricultural occupations throughout the country and has members of diverse racial, ethnic, and immigration backgrounds throughout the United States. UFW seeks to improve the lives, wages, and working conditions of agricultural workers and their families through collective bargaining, worker education, state and federal legislation, and through public campaigns. Since its founding in 1962 by Cesar Chavez, UFW has been dedicated to the cause of eliminating discrimination against farmworkers, Latinos, and any\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 43\n\nother groups that have been the target of unfair or unlawful treatment. UFW members, their families, and other farmworkers represented by UFW are directly affected by the challenged Proclamation.\nUnited Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) is a labor organization that represents working men and women across the United States. UFCW’s 1.3 million members work in a range of industries, with the majority working in retail food, poultry and meatpacking, food processing and manufacturing, and non-food retail. UFCW’s objective is the elevation of its members through first-class wages, hours, benefits, and working conditions. And that objective extends to the uplift of the families of its members.\nUFCW and its predecessor unions have represented immigrants from around the world since the beginning of the last century, particularly workers in the packinghouses and stockyards. Immigrant workers continue to form a vital part of these and other workforces that UFCW represents. UFCW has members from the nations whose citizens are banned by the Proclamation. UFCW is aware that many of these workers experienced wrenching separation from their homelands due to war and famine. Accordingly, UFCW opposes religious and national origin discrimination and forced family separation.\n\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 43\n\nThe parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and no person other than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. See F.R.A.P. 29(c)(5).\n\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 43\n\nINTRODUCTION The issue in this case is whether Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017), which, like President Donald J. Trump’s two prior Executive Orders on the same subject, continues to single out six predominantly Muslim countries—following presidential campaign promises and many postelection assurances of a “Muslim ban”—violates the Constitution or immigration laws of the United States.1 Amici submit this brief to demonstrate the devastating consequences of the President’s actions for individuals in the United States. The challenged Proclamation, like the two Executive Orders that preceded it, separates families, and the Orders and Proclamation have already been associated with increased antiMuslim discrimination and violence. Myriad studies show that such family separation and religious intolerance have concrete, negative effects on the physical and psychiatric well-being of targeted groups. The stories of individual union members recounted below confirm and illustrate that research, demonstrating the\n\n1 The prior Orders are: Executive Order 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (First Executive Order), and Executive Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) (Second Executive Order).\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 43\n\nconcrete effects, trauma, and stigma the Proclamation inflicts on U.S. citizens and persons lawfully present in the United States.\nAlthough some members of our society harbored anti-Muslim animus before President Trump issued the Proclamation and the two Executive Orders that preceded it, that only makes the harm done by the Proclamation all the more consequential. Instead of redressing or ameliorating the threat to Muslims and their families in the United States, the President’s action exacerbates that threat by giving discrimination and intolerance the official imprimatur of the most important elected official in our democracy.\nBACKGROUND The Proclamation was issued the same day that the Second Executive Order’s travel ban expired. Compare Proc. 9645 with EO 13780. The Proclamation is substantially similar to the two prior Executive Orders. Indeed, the first line of the Proclamation explains that it grew out of the Second Executive Order. Preamble, Proc. 9645. Moreover, the Proclamation continues almost the same exact travel ban that has been at the core of the two prior Executive Orders. See id. §2. Unlike the previous two Executive Orders, the Proclamation bans travel from the affected countries permanently.\n\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 43\n\nSpecifically, the Proclamation imposes a total ban on immigration from five of the six predominantly Muslim countries that were singled out in the Second Executive Order: Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. Id. §ௗ2(b)-(c), (e), (g)(h). Although the Proclamation does not bar immigration from the sixth Muslimmajority country covered by the Second Executive Order, Sudan, it does bar all immigration from yet another Muslim-majority country, Chad. Id. §2(a). Further, the Proclamation bars non-immigrant visas for Syrian nationals, all non-immigrant visas other than student and exchange visas for Iranian nationals, and business and tourist visas for Libyan, Yemeni, and Chadian nationals. Id. §ௗ2(a)-(c), (e), (g)-(h).\nThe Proclamation also bars some forms of entry for a small number of Venezuelan government officials and their immediate families, id. ௗ2(f), and all entry from North Korea—which had only 100 nationals enter the United States last year, and was already subject to extensive entry bans. See, e.g., Hyung-Jin Kim, Trump’s Travel Ban Unlikely to Affect North Korea, PBS (Sep 25, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/ newshour/politics/trumps-travel-ban-unlikely-affect-northkorea. Thus, although the Proclamation, unlike its predecessors, now addresses two non-Muslim-majority countries, these calculated and almost entirely meaningless additions are a mere fig leaf intended to conceal the primary antiMuslim purpose of President Trump’s travel ban.\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 43\n\nARGUMENT I. The Challenged Proclamation Causes Irreparable Harm by Separating\nCitizens and Immigrants from Family Members Abroad The negative physical and mental health consequences of compelled family separation are both obvious and well-documented. Numerous studies and reports document the harm of such separation. Studies of transnational families, for example, document and explain how separation negatively affects parents and children as individuals and the bond between them. See, e.g., Sarah Horton, A Mother’s Heart Is Weighed Down with Stones: A Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Transnational Motherhood, 33 Culture, Med., & Psychiatry 21, 21–40 (2009). The limits on physical interaction imposed by geographic separation make intimate relations between parents and children challenging and, consequently, the parent-child bond suffers. See Karlijn Haagsman et al., Transnational Families and the Subjective Well-Being of Migrant Parents: Angolan and Nigerian Parents in the Netherlands, 38:15 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 2652, 2653–54 (2015). “This loss of intimacy and frustrated efforts to maintain close bonds . . . can cause severe emotional distress for both parents and children who feel that the bond is deteriorating.” Id. at 2654.\n\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 43\n\nFor parents, the pain of separation is often accompanied by feelings of guilt. See id. And because norms of “good mothering” frequently assume that women are primary caregivers and responsible for reproductive care work, women especially tend to be emotionally affected by family separation. Id. Geographic distance prevents women from fulfilling expected roles, and, as a result, “women feel guilty, ashamed and stigmatized.” Id.\nThe pain of separation is long-lasting for parents. One study found that parents recalled the circumstances of their family’s migration process and “emotionally laden details of their family separations” even after living in the United States for ten years or more. Dana Rusch & Karina Reyes, Examining the Effects of Mexican Serial Migration and Family Separations on Acculturative Stress, Depression, and Family Functioning, 35(2) Hispanic J. Behav. Sci. 139, 151 (2012).\nNot surprisingly, family separation inflicts serious harm on children as well. One 14-year-old girl described her experience this way: “The day I left my mother I felt like my heart was staying behind.” Carola Suárez-Orozco et al., I Felt Like My Heart Was Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations & Reunifications for Immigrant Youth, 26(2) J. of Adolescent Res. 222, 240 (2010). The separation is damaging even though parents may try to maintain\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 43\n\ncontact through letters, phone calls, and contributions to their children’s material well-being. Id. Children face difficult experiences not only when they are first separated from their parents but also at reunification, when children can feel disoriented, estranged from their parents, mistrustful, and uncomfortable in their new family dynamic (sometimes including new siblings). Id. at 242–45. Children also experience a sense of loss all over again as they are separated from interim caretakers. Id.\nStudies show that family separation has meaningful physiological consequences as well. Family separation is almost inevitably accompanied by “[p]rolonged exposure to serious stress—known as toxic stress,” which the American Academy of Pediatrics has warned “can harm the developing brain and negatively impact short- and long-term health.” Sara Reardon, Health Toll of Immigration Policies Begins To Emerge, 544 Nature 148 (Apr. 13, 2017).\nFurther, “[a] number of clinical studies . . . show that there are substantial negative psychological repercussions for immigrant children and youth who have been separated from their parents.” Suárez-Orozco, 26(2) J. of Adolescent Res. at 227. Children who feel abandoned by their parents may respond with despair and detachment, id., and separated children are more likely to report symptoms of anxiety and depression in the initial years after migration than children who were\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 43\n\nnot separated from their parents. Id. at 222; see also Jeanne Miranda et al., Depression Among Latina Immigrant Mothers Separated from their Children, 56(6) Psychiatric Servs. 717, 720 (2005) (finding that immigrant Latinas separated from their children are at greater odds for depression than women not separated).\nFamily separation has particularly severe consequences for those fleeing trauma who are admitted to the United States as refugees. Data indicate that “the family plays a central role in modulating the processes that influence the aftermath of trauma.” Cecile Rousseau et al., Trauma and Extended Separation from Family among Latin American and African Refugees in Montreal, 64(1) Psychiatry 40, 57 (2001). The family is “an anchor for both emotion and identity” and aids “torture victims who often feel estranged and alienated.” Id. For refugees able to stay together with family, the presence of close relatives can even “seem to transform adversity into a source of strength, perhaps by aiding in the rebuilding of a meaningful universe.” Id.\nBy contrast, refugees separated from their loved ones feel “more disoriented than those living with at least part of their families” and “seem more overwhelmed by unspeakably painful memories.” Id. at 56. They are also “tormented daily by worry about what will become of the family members still overseas,” id. at 49, and feel significant guilt about having left their families behind with threats of reprisals\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 43\n\nlooming over them, id. at 41. “For refugees who have had traumatic experiences, extended separation from family members may serve as a continuing link to an unbearable past . . . .” Id. at 41 II. The Proclamation Promotes Anti-Muslim Hostility, Discrimination, and\nStigma In addition to causing harm via forced family separation, the challenged Proclamation, like the two Executive Orders that preceded it, promotes stigma and encourages anti-Muslim hostility and violence. A persistent theme in anti-Muslim discrimination is the allegation and assumption that Muslims are not “real” Americans—and are perpetual outsiders and aliens in their own land, despite viewing themselves as completely American. See, e.g., Kevin L. Nadal et al., Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia, VI(2) J. of Muslim Mental Health 15, 22, 27–28 (2012). The anti-Muslim rhetoric used by President Trump before and after his election has encouraged such erroneous claims, and the singling out of predominantly Muslim countries for disfavored treatment in the Proclamation, as with the two prior Executive Orders, furthers and deepens the sense of Muslims as unwelcome outsiders. Indeed, the travel ban has been seen by many as encouraging the false and dangerous equating of Islam with violence and terrorism, see generally Rebecca A. Clay, Islamophobia: Psychologists Are Studying the Impact of Anti-Muslim\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 43\n\nSentiment and Exploring Ways To Prevent It, 48(4) Monitor on Psychol. 34 (Apr. 2017), even though Islam is one of the world’s great religions and the faith tradition of 23% of the world’s population.2 Indeed, President Trump himself cited the September 11 attacks as justification for the Second Executive Order even though none of the men behind those attacks (or any subsequent, fatal terrorist attack in the United States) hailed from the targeted countries in the Second Executive Order. See Clay, 48(4) Monitor on Psychol. 34. The reference to September 11 thus makes sense only if one links Muslims generally with terrorism.\nHaving that link drawn from the White House and embodied in official policy gives people tending toward Islamophobia the permission to act on their biases. The 2017 second quarterly report by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) shows that the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the first half of 2017 spiked 91% as compared to the same period in 2016; the third quarterly CAIR report also indicates a rise in hate crimes over the same period last year. See 2017 on Track to Becoming One of the Worst Years Ever for AntiMuslim Hate Crimes, CAIR (October 11, 2017), http://islamophobia.org/articles/\n2 Pew Research Ctr., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, at 6 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 43\n\n209-2017-on-track-to-becoming-one-of-the-worst-years-ever-for-anti-muslimhate-crimes.html; CAIR 3rd Quarter Civil Rights Report Shows Rise in Hate Crimes Over Same Period Last Year, Moderate Decline in Total Cases, CAIR (Oct. 25, 2017), http://cair.com/press-center/press-releases/14715-cair-3rd-quartercivil-rights-report-shows-rise-in-hate-crimes-over-same-period-last-year-moderatedecline-in-total-cases.html. Disturbingly, the Southern Poverty Law Center found that post-election incidents of harassment and intimidation were most commonly reported in K-12 schools. See David R. Williams et al., Health Effects of Dramatic Social Events—Ramifications of the Recent Presidential Election, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. 2295, 2296 (June 8, 2017).\nThere has also been a noticeable escalation in violence, as reflected in the recent incident of fires, Nazi graffiti, and broken glass at an Iraqi-American business in downtown Flagstaff, Arizona, which followed the ripping up of copies of the Quran at a Tucson mosque in March, which followed broken windows at a Middle Eastern bakery in Phoenix shortly before that, and most recently, harassment of Tennessee Muslim girls, a knife attack on their father and a threat to kill the entire family. See CAIR Calls for Hate Crime Probe for Racist Harassment Targeting Tenn. Muslim Girls, Knife Attack on Father, Threat to Kill Entire Family, CAIR (October 25, 2017), https://www.cair.com/press-center/press-\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 43\n\nreleases/14735-cair-calls-for-hate-crime-probe-of-racist-harassment-targeting-tennmuslim-girls-knife-attack-on-father-threat-to-kill-entire-family.html.\nThe hostility and discrimination encouraged by the Proclamation’s singling out of predominantly Muslim countries has negative physical and mental health consequences as well for those who feel targeted. As explained recently in the New England Journal of Medicine, “communities who feel vulnerable because they belong to a stigmatized, marginalized, or targeted group” can experience negative health effects as a result. Williams, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. at 2295. With respect to people of Middle Eastern descent, in particular, a post-September 11 study conducted in the Detroit area “found that experiences of discrimination and abuse . . . were positively associated with physiological distress . . . .” Id. at 2296. Another study found that Arab-American women in California experienced increased risk of low-birth-weight babies or pre-term births in the six months after September 11; women in other racial and ethnic groups did not experience any similar effects. Id.\nAdditional research has found an association between religious discrimination and depression in American Muslim women. See Dena Hassouneh, Anti-Muslim Racism and Women’s Health, 26(5) J. of Women’s Health 401 (2017). Another study of Muslim Americans found that those who reported\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 43\n\nexperiencing discrimination were more likely to distrust, display negative attitudes, and display avoidant behaviors toward majority group members. See Muniba Saleem & Srividya Ramasubramanian, Muslim Americans’ Responses to Social Identity Threats: Effects of Media Representations and Experiences of Discrimination, Media Psychol. (Apr. 4 2017), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ full/10.1080/15213269.2017.1302345.\nResearch also shows the negative health effects of discrimination more generally. One 2015 study found an elevated risk of death among adults residing in communities where levels of racial prejudice were high, Williams, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. at 2296, and immigrant children exposed to discrimination have been found to suffer adverse psychological consequences, David K. Androff et al., U.S. Immigration Policy and Immigrant Children’s Well-being: The Impact of Policy Shifts, 38(1) J. of Soc. & Welfare 77, 90 (2011). Everyday experiences of discrimination have also been associated with coronary artery calcification, high blood pressure, poor sleep, and depression, distress, and anxiety. Goleen Samari, Islamophobia and Public Health in the United States, 106(11) Persp. from the Soc. Sci. 1920, 1921 (Nov. 2016). Moreover, research indicates that associated stress adversely affects health not only through actual experiences but also because of\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 43\n\nrumination, vigilance, and worry over potential exposure. See Williams, 376(23) New Eng. J. of Med. at 2297. III. Union Members and Their Families Have Been Harmed by the\nProclamation Millions of employees nationwide are united in the amici unions, and many union members, participants in union campaigns, and their families have been harmed by the travel-ban Proclamation and the Executive Orders that preceded it. The experiences of individual union members confirm and illustrate the social science data cited above.3 Dr. K.Z. Dr. K.Z. is an internal medicine resident at a New York teaching hospital in Brooklyn, New York, and a member of SEIU’s Committee of Interns and Residents (CIR). In 1998, Dr. K.Z. and his family fled persecution in Iran and entered the United States with refugee status. Although born in Iran, Dr. K.Z. became a naturalized U.S. citizen more than a decade ago. Four months ago, Dr. K.Z. married Dr. N.N., a gastroenterology fellow who works at the same hospital and is also a CIR member. Dr. N.N. is a legal resident\n3 The individuals whose stories are told below all consented to having their experiences recounted here, and records of the interviews conducted with them are on file with counsel. Some participants chose to maintain a measure of anonymity by using first names or initials only.\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 43\n\nand citizen of Iran. As the couple planned their wedding, they did everything in their power to ensure that Dr. N.N’s Iranian father would be able to come to the United States and participate in the wedding ceremony.\nAfter issuance of President Trump’s Second Executive Order, Dr. N.N’s father was denied permission to enter the United States. The couple sought and received the assistance of their congressional representative, but even that did not help, and Dr. N.N’s father was unable to give his daughter away during the wedding ceremony.\nDr. K.Z. says that his “wife was heart-broken that her father, the parent who had raised her, could not attend our wedding or participate in the wedding rituals that meant so much to her. Her father’s absence tainted what was to be one of the best days of our lives.”\nDr. K.Z., while respectful of his Iranian heritage, feels completely Americanized. He completed his undergraduate work at the University of California, Los Angeles, and graduated from the University of California’s Davis School of Medicine. Dr. K.Z.’s hospital serves low-income patients from diverse backgrounds, including Orthodox Jews and people of Arab, Chinese, Latin, Russian, Caribbean, and South and Southeast Asian descent. When Dr. K.Z. completes his residency, he intends to continue working in a U.S. hospital with a\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 43\n\ndiverse group of patients providing critical care and treatment to patients suffering from cancer.\nDr. K.Z. was deeply disturbed and shaken by his personal experience with the travel ban. “The United States welcomed and encouraged me and I truly believed that the words on the Statute of Liberty were meant for me.” But “[i]t has been a crushing personal disappointment to learn that the citizens of certain countries, people like my father-in-law, were no longer welcome.”\nAbdi Abdi is 32 years old and has worked for the past nine years at MinneapolisSt. Paul International Airport and is a member of SEIU’s Airport Workers United campaign. He is a naturalized American citizen who was born in Somalia. Before coming to the United States, Abdi spent several years in refugee camps with his mother and siblings. While Abdi lived in the camps, his education was interrupted several times. But once Abdi arrived in the United States at the age of 18, he completed high school and earned a bachelor’s degree at Metropolitan State University in Minneapolis. Abdi was then able to bring his wife and one of his three children to the United States. Unfortunately, visas for Abdi’s two older children, aged nine and seven, were not granted when his wife’s was. As a result, Abdi’s two older children still\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 43\n\nlive in Somalia with his mother, who cares for them even though she is in her sixties. Abdi sends money but he fears they will not be able to travel to the United States to reunite with him if the Proclamation is upheld. He says, “I can’t stop thinking about them. I have to be able to do this.”\nAbdi also worries about his and other relatives’ ability to travel as Somaliborn citizens. One of his aunts, an American citizen, wants to travel home to visit a sick uncle but worries about being detained on her way back. He says, “What kind of American value is this, to keep families apart?”\nA.F. A.F. is an Iranian citizen and member of the UAW and its Local 5810 who came to the United States for graduate studies in 2011. A.F. obtained his Ph.D. in chemical engineering in 2016 from a prestigious American university, and he currently works as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). After being offered the position at LBNL, A.F. underwent an extensive, nine-month-long background check conducted by the Department of Energy. Since the signing of President Trump’s First Executive Order, A.F. has suffered from chronic stress and has felt unwelcome in the country where he has successfully lived, worked, studied, and paid taxes for six years. A.F. has applied\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 43\n\nfor a green card under a national interest waiver, but his application has been pending for more than 15 months. A.F. currently holds a single-entry visa and fears that if he leaves the United States he will not be permitted to reenter. Prior to the issuance of the First Executive Order, A.F.’s parents visited him in the United States, but now A.F. fears it is impossible for them or other members of his family to obtain a visa to visit the United States. In addition, A.F.’s work is impacted because he is fears it is impossible for him to travel to attend annual conferences, including the International Conference on Thermoelectrics, which are crucial for scientists in his field. Because of the travel ban, A.F. fears that Iranian nationals like him are “doomed” to live in limbo.\nA.T. A.T. is an Iranian citizen enrolled in a Ph.D. program at the University of Washington. A.T. holds a single-entry F-1 visa. A.T. has been studying in the United States for the last four years and also works as an academic student employee. He is a member of the UAW and its Local 4121. A.T. was in Iran visiting family in January 2017 when the First Executive Order was issued. A.T. was initially unable to secure a visa to return to his home and studies in the United States. He contacted UAW Local 4121, which worked to assist him in getting back into the country. As a result of assistance from\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 43\n\nWashington State’s governor, one of its senators, and a congressional representative, A.T. was lucky to be able to reenter the United States and resume his Ph.D. program while the First Executive Order was enjoined. He is currently unable to leave the United States again while he completes his studies; he has no family in the United States, and due to the Proclamation, his parents, who live in Iran, are unable to visit him here. A.T. is also deeply concerned that the hostility generated by the travel ban will inhibit his ability to complete his Ph.D. in a timely manner and begin his professional career.\nSafyia Yonis Safyia Yonis is a 46-year-old American citizen who was born in Somalia. She has lived in Minneapolis for the last 20 years, where she works as a janitor in a government building, and is a member of SEIU Local 26. Safyia and her husband, who was also born in Somalia, have seven children born in the United States, aged 3 to 16. When civil war broke out in Somalia in 1991, Safyia fled to Kenya where she lived in a refugee camp. She says that life there was “very, very difficult,” with no access to education or healthcare. When Safyia arrived in the United States two years later, she felt safe and grateful she could go to see the doctor, to school, and work.\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 43\n\nSince the Muslim ban was announced, Safyia has felt increasingly afraid of violence and harassment. Her sister and brother-in-law attend the mosque that was bombed on August 5 in the suburb of Bloomington.\nSafyia worries in particular that her daughter, who is in high school and wears a hijab, could be a target for harassment. Safyia feels her daughter should not have to live in fear: “She is an innocent; she has done nothing wrong.”\nMohammad Al Zayed Mohammad Al Zayed is a 50-year-old Syrian refugee who arrived with his family in the United States in September 2016. Mohammad works at O’Hare International Airport as a janitor and lives on the far North Side of Chicago with his wife and three children; he is also a member of SEIU’s Airport Workers United campaign. His two sons are 21 and 8, and his daughter is 19. Before fleeing Syria, Mohammad and his family lived in a suburb outside Damascus. When unrest began to approach their community, the family fled into the capital. Eventually, the textile factory where Mohammad worked was destroyed in the fighting, and his children could no longer go to school because of the danger. Once the war reached Damascus, the family left Syria for Jordan to escape the violence and bombings.\n\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 43\n\n“We can’t even explain it,” Mohammad said of the violence and destruction he and his family witnessed in Syria. “Shelling. Killing. Street fighting. Nobody knows who’s fighting who, but everybody dying is innocent people.”\nConditions improved for the family in Jordan but they still faced hardship. Mohammad’s children were able to attend school, but he could not work because he could not get a work permit given his refugee status. As a result, the family could not afford healthcare. As Syrians, Mohammad and his family also experienced discrimination in Jordan.\nMohammad was relieved when he arrived with his family in the United States, where he hoped there would be more opportunity for his children. His 8year-old son is in school, already speaks English, and claims math as his favorite subject. Mohammad’s 19-year-old daughter is finishing high school this year. His 21-year-old son has joined him in working at O’Hare. Mohammad feels fortunate to work alongside colleagues at O’Hare who represent over 100 nationalities. He says it is “very nice” to be in a welcoming environment where he can even observe his religion, as he did during the month of Ramadan.\nHowever, Mohammad worries about relatives left behind and about whether he will see them again. Mohammad’s two brothers, father, and stepmother remain in Syria, and he has not seen them since 2012. His father is 85 years old and has\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 43\n\nhealth problems. If the Muslim travel ban is upheld, Mohammad may never see his father again. Mohammad’s wife also has 11 sisters and 4 brothers, some of whom are in Syria and Jordan. Mohammad’s daughter married a Jordanian citizen last year, and she worries that if her new husband is not able to come to the United States, she may have to consider returning to Jordan and being barred from reentering the country.\nFor Mohammad, the Trump Administration’s travel ban “is not right.” Refugees are simply seeking a better life. He says: “It’s very sad. Who would want to leave their home if they don’t have to? People are running for their lives.”\nMarwan Marwan is a senior organizer for SEIU, where he has worked for the past thirteen years. Marwan is 43 years old and is a Yemen-born, naturalized U.S. citizen. The first person in Marwan’s family to arrive in the United States was his father. Marwan’s father reunited the family by bringing his brothers, Marwan, Marwan’s mother, and his siblings one by one to the Detroit area over the course of several decades. Marwan came to the United States in 1989 from Yemen and became a citizen in 1991. He is married with five children, aged 18, 13, 9, 6, and 3.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 43\n\nMany members of Marwan’s and his wife’s extended families remain in Yemen, where a civil war is raging. One of Marwan’s brothers returned to Yemen before becoming an American citizen and lives in the capital of Sana’a with his wife and five children. Approximately eight months ago an airstrike hit a military compound 200 yards from that brother’s house, shattering all the windows in the neighborhood. Marwan’s nephew’s arm was injured in the blast. Marwan’s family’s ancestral village has also been the target of rebel activity and air strikes. Nine relatives, including two of his cousins, have been killed in the last three years.\nMarwan’s wife’s three brothers and three sisters also all live in Yemen. An elderly aunt in her eighties, who helped raise Marwan as his father worked to bring him to the United States, remains there as well and requires care. Marwan worries for the safety of all his and his wife’s extended family members. He says: “I think about this every day and ask myself, ‘How do I bring them here?’”\nThe challenged Proclamation will make it impossible for Marwan to reunite his family the way his father did in the past. “If my dad hadn’t come to the United States, I would be there right now and living under terror. I would be stuck.” Marwan now worries that more of his family members, for whom he feels responsible, will be hurt or harassed by the warring factions in his home country.\n\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 43\n\nMarwan currently works to help airport employees at O’Hare International Airport. As a union organizer who interacts every day with employees who came to the United States as immigrants and refugees, he knows many other families are in the same situation. As he says: “This won’t make America safe, only tear families apart.”\nMajd Majd is a homecare worker, member of SEIU Local 2015, and naturalized U.S. citizen. Majd lives in San Jose, California, with her husband, her two children (aged 22 and 19), and her 90-year-old mother, all of whom are also U.S. citizens. Majd was born and educated in Syria, where she worked as an agricultural engineer until she came to the United States 25 years ago. Most of Majd’s extended family emigrated from Syria to the United States, with the exception of a nephew who is in the midst of processing his application for legal permanent residency. Majd’s nephew lives alone in Damascus where he fears leaving his home. Although he is not affiliated with any political organizations, he has been arrested twice and was interrogated and jailed for several weeks by Syrian government agents. That experience, combined with Syria’s brutal civil war and the departure of all of his family members, has plunged him into a severe depression.\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 43\n\nMajd and her elderly mother, her nephew’s grandmother, are desperate for her nephew to join them in the United States. Majd’s mother suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, heart problems, and arthritis. She fears that the travel ban will prevent her grandson from traveling to the United States before she dies. Majd worries about both her nephew and the effect on her mother of his inability to travel to the United States.\nEdvin Edvin, a member of SEIU United Healthcare Workers West, is a 41-year-old Kaiser employee who has been a chief union steward for 17 years. Edvin was born in Iran and came to the United States as a 9-year-old refugee 32 years ago. Edvin is a U.S. citizen and lives in Glendale, California. When Edvin and his parents fled Iran in the 1980s, they left several family members behind. One of Edvin’s cousins, a 27-year-old woman, came to the United States eight months ago as a refugee from Iran. She was granted refugee status after having lived alone in Austria for eight months while she waited for the United States to process her case. Prior to leaving Iran, she had always lived with her parents. Although she is grateful to be safe in the United States, she misses her parents terribly and had assumed they would be able to come visit her, because they had traveled to the United States several times in the past.\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 43\n\nEdvin has provided support to his cousin during her transition to life in the United States. He would like for her to get the emotional support that a visit from her parents would provide, and he is saddened that the Proclamation will prevent families from seeing each other: “I always believed that the United States was a place that valued family relationships and encouraged loved ones to be together. Now it seems like if you’re from a Muslim-majority country, your family doesn’t matter and you’re treated as if you’re a terrorist, no matter what your beliefs are.”\nK.K. K.K. is an Iranian citizen and F-1 visa holder currently working in the United States as a postdoctoral researcher. In January 2017, K.K. was working at a prestigious American university, where she was part of a UAW campaign to organize postdoctoral researchers. After the First Executive Order was issued, K.K. was suddenly dismissed from her appointment. She had never received any negative performance reviews or feedback, and she was previously provided with a letter promising funding for her position through at least May 31, 2017. K.K.’s supervisor told her that the funding on the grant she was working on had dried up, but a colleague told K.K. that the supervisor confided the real reason for her dismissal was that the supervisor was concerned about having an Iranian citizen working on the research project after the issuance of the First Executive Order.\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 43\n\nFollowing her dismissal from the university, K.K. was able to secure a new position at a university in another state. However, she lost several months of work, which, in addition to causing financial strain, delayed her ability to complete her research. K.K. also had to move to another state, and she estimates that moving to another university and another state cost her around $5,000 in out-of-pocket expenses.\nCONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the preliminary injunction below, except as to its limitation to persons with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Jonathan Weissglass Jonathan Weissglass Rebecca C. Lee Altshuler Berzon LLP 177 Post St., Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108\nNicole G. Berner Deborah L. Smith Leo Gertner Service Employees International Union 1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n32\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 43\n\nJudith Rivlin American Federation of State, County and\nMunicipal Employees 1101 17th St., NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036\nDavid J. Strom American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO 555 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001\nJody Calemine Communications Workers of America 501 3rd St., NW Washington, DC 20001\nNiraj R. Ganatra Ava Barbour International Union, United Automobile,\nAerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) 8000 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48214\nMario Martínez Martínez Aguilasocho & Lynch, APLC 1527 19th St., Suite 332 Bakersfield, CA 93301\nNicholas Clark United Food and Commercial Workers 1775 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006\n\n33\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 43\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Effective 12/01/2016\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232\nNo. _17_-_2_23_3_,_1_7_-2_2_4_0 Caption: _In_t_'l_R__e_f_u_g_e_e__A_s_s_is_t_a_n_c_e__P_r_o_je_c_t_,_e_t_a_l_._v_._T_r_u_m__p_,_e_t_a_l_.__\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT Type-Volume Limit, Typeface Requirements, and Type-Style Requirements\n\nType-Volume Limit for Briefs: Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellee’s Response Brief, and Appellant’s Response/Reply Brief may not exceed 13,000 words or 1,300 lines. Appellee’s Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 15,300 words or 1,500 lines. A Reply or Amicus Brief may not exceed 6,500 words or 650 lines. Amicus Brief in support of an Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 7,650 words. Amicus Brief filed during consideration of petition for rehearing may not exceed 2,600 words. Counsel may rely on the word or line count of the word processing program used to prepare the document. The word-processing program must be set to include headings, footnotes, and quotes in the count. Line count is used only with monospaced type. See Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(e), 29(a)(5), 32(a)(7)(B) & 32(f).\n\nType-Volume Limit for Other Documents if Produced Using a Computer: Petition for permission to appeal and a motion or response thereto may not exceed 5,200 words. Reply to a motion may not exceed 2,600 words. Petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or other extraordinary writ may not exceed 7,800 words. Petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc may not exceed 3,900 words. Fed. R. App. P. 5(c)(1), 21(d), 27(d)(2), 35(b)(2) & 40(b)(1).\n\nTypeface and Type Style Requirements: A proportionally spaced typeface (such as Times New Roman) must include serifs and must be 14-point or larger. A monospaced typeface (such as Courier New) must be 12-point or larger (at least 10½ characters per inch). Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5), 32(a)(6).\n\nThis brief or other document complies with type-volume limits because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. R. 32(f) (cover page, disclosure statement, table of contents, table of citations, statement regarding oral argument, signature block, certificates of counsel, addendum, attachments):\n[!] this brief or other document contains 6,493 [state number of] words\n\n[ ] this brief uses monospaced type and contains\n\n[state number of] lines\n\nThis brief or other document complies with the typeface and type style requirements because:\n\n[!] this brief or other document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using\n\nMicrosoft Word\n\n[identify word processing program] in\n\nFont size 14, Times New Roman\n\n[identify font size and type style]; or\n\n[ ] this brief or other document has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [identify word processing program] in [identify font size and type style].\n\n(s) Jonathan Weissglass\n\nParty Name Amici Int'l Labor Organizations\n\nDated: 11/17/17\n\n11/14/2016 SCC\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 43\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on _1_1_/_1_7_/2__0_1_7_______ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/s_/_J_on_a_t_h_a_n_W__e_is_s_g_la_s_s_________ Signature\n\n_1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7_______________ Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _17_-_2_23_1__(L_),_1_7_-2_2_3_2_, _17_-_2_23_3_,_1_7_-2_2_4_0___ as\n\n[!]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _In_t_e_r_n_a_t_io_n_a_l_L_a__b_o_r_O__rg_a_n__iz_a_t_io_n_s__(_S_E_I_U_,_A__F_S_C__M_E__, _A_F_T__, _C_W__A_,_U__A_W__,_U__F_W__,___\n\n_U_F_C__W__)___________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\n\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ! amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s_________________ (signature)\n\n_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s_____________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_(_4_1_5_)_4_2_1_-_7_1_5_1__ Voice Phone\n\n_A__lt_s_h_u_le_r__B_e_r_z_o_n_L__L_P_____________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_(_4_1_5_)_3_6_2__-8_0_6__4_ Fax Number\n\n_1_7__7_P__o_s_t _S_t_, _S_u_i_te__3_0_0____________________\n\n_S__a_n_F__ra_n_c_i_s_c_o_,_C__A_9__4_1_0_8_________________ Address\n\n_jw__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s_@__a_l_tb_e_r_._c_o_m____________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J__o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_i_s_s_g_l_a_s_s_______ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2__0_1_7_________ Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the\n\nrequired disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than\n\nelectronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232,\n\nNo. 1_7_-2_2_3_3_, _17_-_2_240\n\nCaption: _In_t_'l._R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_ta_n_c_e_P__ro_je_c_t_, _e_t a_l_. _v_. D__o_na_l_d_J_._T_r_um__p_, _e_t _al_. __\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_S_e_rv_i_ce__E_m_p_l_o_ye_e_s__In_te_r_n_a_ti_on_a_l_U_n_i_o_n_________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES 4 NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n-1-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 14\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES 4 NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W_e__is_s_g_l_a_s_s_______________ Counsel for: _S_E_I_U______________________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s__________ (signature)\n-2-\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the\n\nrequired disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than\n\nelectronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232,\n\nNo. 1_7_-2_2_3_3_, _17_-_2_240\n\nCaption: _In_t_'l._R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_ta_n_c_e_P__ro_je_c_t_, _e_t a_l_. _v_. D__o_na_l_d_J_._T_r_um__p_, _e_t _al_. __\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_A_m_e_r_ic_a_n_F_e_d_e_r_a_tio_n__o_f _S_ta_t_e,_C__o_un_t_y_a_n_d_M__u_n_ic_ip_a_l_E_m_p_l_o_ye_e_s_______________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES 4 NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n-1-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 14\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES 4 NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W_e__is_s_g_l_a_s_s_______________ Counsel for: _A_F_S__C_M__E__________________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s__________ (signature)\n-2-\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232,\nNo. 1_7_-_22_3_3_,_1_7-_2_240 Caption: _In_t_'l._R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_ta_n_c_e_P__ro_je_c_t_, _e_t a_l_. _v_. D__o_na_l_d_J_._T_r_um__p_, _e_t _al_. __\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n_A_m_e_r_ic_a_n_F_e_d_e_r_a_tio_n__o_f _T_e_ac_h_e_r_s_, A__F_L-_C_I_O______________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n______________________________________________________________________________\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES 4 NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n-1-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 14\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES 4 NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W_e__is_s_g_l_a_s_s_______________ Counsel for: _A_F_T_______________________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s__________ (signature)\n-2-\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the\n\nrequired disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than\n\nelectronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232,\n\nNo. 1_7_-2_2_3_3_, 1_7_-_22_40\n\nCaption: _In_t_'l._R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_ta_n_c_e_P__ro_je_c_t_, _e_t a_l_. _v_. D__o_na_l_d_J_._T_r_um__p_, _e_t _al_. __\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_C_o_m_m__u_n_ic_a_tio_n_s__W_o_r_k_er_s_o_f_A_m__e_ri_ca___________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES 4 NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n-1-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 14\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES 4 NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W_e__is_s_g_l_a_s_s_______________ Counsel for: _C_W__A______________________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s__________ (signature)\n-2-\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232,\nNo. 1_7_-_22_3_3_,_1_7-_2_240 Caption: _In_t_'l._R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_ta_n_c_e_P__ro_je_c_t_, _e_t a_l_. _v_. D__o_na_l_d_J_._T_r_um__p_, _e_t _al_. __\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n_In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l U__n_io_n_, _U_n_it_e_d_A_u_to_m__o_b_ile_,_A_e_r_o_s_p_ac_e__a_n_d_A_g_ri_c_u_ltu_r_a_l _Im__pl_e_m_e_n_t_W__or_k_e_rs__o_f A__m_e_ri_c_a_____ (name of party/amicus)\n_(U_A__W_)_________________________________________________________________________\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES 4 NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n-1-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 14\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES 4 NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W_e__is_s_g_l_a_s_s_______________ Counsel for: _U_A__W______________________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s__________ (signature)\n-2-\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the\n\nrequired disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than\n\nelectronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232,\n\nNo. 1_7_-2_2_3_3_, 1_7_-_22_40\n\nCaption: _In_t_'l._R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_ta_n_c_e_P__ro_je_c_t_, _e_t a_l_. _v_. D__o_na_l_d_J_._T_r_um__p_, _e_t _al_. __\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_U_n_it_e_d_F_a_r_m_W__o_rk_e_r_s_o_f_A_m_e_r_ic_a__(U_F_W__)________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES 4 NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n-1-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 14\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES 4 NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W_e__is_s_g_l_a_s_s_______________ Counsel for: _U_F_W_______________________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s__________ (signature)\n-2-\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the\n\nrequired disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than\n\nelectronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232,\n\nNo. 1_7_-2_2_3_3_, 1_7_-_22_40\n\nCaption: _In_t_'l._R_e_f_u_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_ta_n_c_e_P__ro_je_c_t_, _e_t a_l_. _v_. D__o_na_l_d_J_._T_r_um__p_, _e_t _al_. __\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_U_n_it_e_d_F_o_o_d_a_n_d__C_o_m_m_e_r_c_ia_l_W_o_r_k_e_rs__________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _________a_m__ic_u_s_________, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES 4 NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n-1-\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 96-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 14\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES 4 NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES 4 NO\n\nSignature: _/s_/_J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W_e__is_s_g_l_a_s_s_______________ Counsel for: _U_F_C__W_____________________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n************************ I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/J_o_n_a_t_h_a_n__W__e_is_s_g_l_a_s_s__________ (signature)\n-2-\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 46\n\nNos. 17-2231, 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nIn The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\n_______________\nNo. 17-2231(L) INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, A PROJECT OF THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; HIAS, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES\nASS’N OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS MEMBERS; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB\nAMERICAN ASS’N OF NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE\nDIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REX TILLERSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE; DANIEL R. COATS, IN HIS OFFICIAL\nCAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,\n\nDefendants-Appellants (cont’d)\n\n_______________\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland\n_______________\n\nAmicus Curiae Brief of Immigration Equality, the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander\nAlliance, the LGBT Bar Association of Los Angeles, the LGBT Bar Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Bay Area Lawyers for\nIndividual Freedom in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees\n\n_____________________________\n\nEric J. Gorman* SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 155 North Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 407-0700 eric.gorman@skadden.com Counsel of Record (Additional counsel listed on following page)\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae\n\nMatthew E. Sloan Noelle M. Reed Allison B. Holcombe Richard A. Schwartz Alyssa J. Clover Sarah Grossnickle Jonathan Fombonne Jennifer H. Berman Joseph M. Sandman Brittany Ellenberg SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 46\n\nAaron Morris IMMIGRATION EQUALITY 40 Exchange Place Suite 1300 New York, NY 10005 (212) 714-2904 amorris@ immigrationequality.org\n\nVirginia M. Goggin NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTIVIOLENCE PROJECT 116 Nassau Street Floor 3 New York, NY 10038 (212) 714-1184 vgoggin@avp.org\n\nGlenn Magpantay THE NATIONAL QUEER ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER ALLIANCE 233 Fifth Avenue Suite 4A New York, NY 10016 (917) 439-3158 glenn_magpantay@ nqapia.org\n\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 46\n\n___________________________\nNo. 17-2232 IRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3;\nJANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF\nHOMELAND SECURITY; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; JAMES MCCAMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, IN HIS\nOFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,\nDefendants-Appellants\n_______________\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland ___________________________\nNo. 17-2233 EBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE\n#2; JOHN DOE #3,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE; ELAINE C.\nDUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REX TILLERSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE,\nDefendants-Appellants (Cont’d)\n_______________\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland ___________________________\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 46\n\n___________________________ No. 17-2240\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, A PROJECT OF THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; HIAS, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASS’N OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS MEMBERS; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASS’N OF NEW YORK, ON\nBEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS,\nPlaintiffs-Appellants,\nand\nPAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO,\nPlaintiffs, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEP’T OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE\nDIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REX TILLERSON, IN\nHIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE; DANIEL R. COATS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,\nDefendants-Appellees.\n_______________\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland ___________________________\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 46\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(A) and Circuit Rule 26.1, amicus curiae, Immigration Equality, The New York City Gay And Lesbian AntiViolence Project, The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance, The LGBT Bar Association of Los Angeles, The LGBT Bar Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom (collectively, “amici”), make the following disclosures: 1. Each Amici is a non-profit organization that has no parent corporation. 2. No publicly-held corporation or other publicly-held entity owns any portion of any of the amici. 3. Amici are unaware of any publicly-held corporation or other publiclyheld entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation. 4. This case does not arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding.\n * * (signature appears on following page)\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 46\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Eric J. Gorman Eric J. Gorman SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 155 North Wacker Dr. Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 407-0700\nCounsel for Amici Curiae Immigration Equality, The New York City Gay And Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance, The LGBT Bar Association of Los Angeles, The LGBT Bar Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 46\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS Page\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST................................................................................ 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 4\nI. MANY LGBTQ INDIVIDUALS FACE PERSECUTION AND HOSTILE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS IN THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, ESPECIALLY IN THE EIGHT COUNTRIES TARGETED IN THE PROCLAMATION ................. 4\nARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 17 I. THE UNIQUE HARDSHIPS IMPOSED ON LGBTQ POPULATIONS BY THE PROCLAMATION ARE CONTRARY TO U.S. LAW AND AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST ......................................................................... 17 A. Constitutional And Federal Law Emphasize The Importance Of Family Reunification And Marriage .......................................................................... 17 B. “Familial Relations” Should Be Construed Broadly To Give Equal Dignity To LGBTQ Families ........... 20 II. THE PROCLAMATION CONTRAVENES U.S. LAW AND POLICY, WHICH ACCEPT LGBTQ INDIVIDUALS AS IMMIGRANTS ................................................ 24 III. THE PROCLAMATION’S WAIVER PROVISIONS DO NOT LESSEN THE IMPACT OF THE PROCLAMATION ON LGBTQ INDIVIDUALS ........................... 28\nCONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 30\n\nvii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 46\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage\nCASES\nBassett v. Snyder, 59 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2014) ..........................................................26\nBoard of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).......................................................................................23\nBoutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).......................................................................................26\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).......................................................................................19\nHawaii v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 2989048 (D. Haw. July 13, 2017) ................................................................................23\nINS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).......................................................................................19\nIranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-17-2921, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) .................2\nInternational Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) ...........2\nKaliski v. District Director of INS, 620 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980) .........................................................................23\nKhan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................20\nMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).......................................................................................17\nMoore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).......................................................................................23\nObergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) ...............................................17, 21, 26\nSolis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) ...........................................................18, 19, 25\nTroxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).........................................................................................22\nviii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 46\n\nTrump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) ...........................................................27\nUnited States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2014) .......................................................................19\nZablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).......................................................................................17\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).................................................................................17, 18\nZazok v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-2969-TDC, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) .............2\nSTATUTES\nUnited States Constitution Article VI, cl. 2 .............................................................20\n8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)...............................................................................................27\n8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1)...............................................................................................27\n8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)...............................................................................................18\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\nAengus Carroll, State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (12th ed. 2017), http://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ILGA_State_ Sponsored_Homophobia_2017_WEB.pdf ............................................3, 5, 21\nAmnesty International, Making Love a Crime, Criminalization of Same-Sex Conduct in Sub-Saharan Africa (June 24, 2013), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/making-love-a-crime-criminalizationof-same-sex-conduct-in-sub-saharan-africa/ .................................................11\nAmnesty International: Torture was my Punishment: Abductions, Torture and Summary Killings Under Armed Group Rule in Aleppo and Idleb, Syria (July 2016), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/torture-was-mypunishment-abductions-torture-and-summary-killings-under-armed-grouprule-in-aleppo-and-idleb-syria/ ......................................................................14\nBen Gladstone, For Yemen’s gay community social media is a savior, The Irish Times (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middleeast/for-yemen-s-gay-community-social-media-is-a-saviour-1.2324447 .....16\nCanada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Libya: Situation of sexual minorities, including legislation; treatment by society and authorities; state protection and available services (2011-July 2014), July 17, 2014, LBY104913.E, http://www.refworld.org/docid/54ca12544.html ...............8, 9\nix\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 46\n\nCatarina Stewart, Young Somali activist sentenced to death for being a lesbian, The Independent (Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/Africa/young-somali-activistsentenced-to-death-for-being-a-lesbian-a6844216.html .........................11, 12\nChoe Sang-Hun, North Korean Defector Opens Up About Long-Held Secret: His Homosexuality, N.Y. Times (June 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/world/asia/north-korea-defectorjang-yeong-jin-gay.html?_r=0...............................................................3, 9, 10\nCriminal Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2009), Articles 194, 262............................................................................................10\nGlenn Garner, Parliament of Chad Calls for Criminalization of Homosexuality, Out Magazine (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.out.com/newsopinion/2016/12/16/parliament-chad-calls-criminalizationhomosexuality .................................................................................................. 6\nH.R. Rep. No. 1365 (1952) .....................................................................................19\nH.R. Rep. No. 85-1199 (1957).................................................................................19\nHuman Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1Rev.1 (1994)...............................................................................20\nHuman Rights Watch, We Are a Buried Generation (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/15/we-are-buried-generation/ discrimination-and-violence-against-sexual-minorities ..............................3, 7\nHuman Rights Watch, World Report 2017: Events of 2016, https://hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017web.pdf ................................................................................................9, 13, 14\nInternational Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992)..................................................................................20\nInternational Labour Organization, Republican Decree for Law No 12 for the Year 1994 Concerning Crimes and Penalties, Section 11, Article 264, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/83557/92354/ F1549605860/YEM83557.pdf ....................................................................... 16\nInternational Refugee Rights Initiative, Rights In Exile Programme, Yemen LGBTI Resources, http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/yemen-lgbtiresources ........................................................................................................15\nKate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, Family unity and refugee protection, Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/419dbf664.html .......................................................... 24\nLibya: Penal Code of 1953 as amended by Law 70 of 2 October 1973, Articles 407(4), 408(4) ..................................................................................................7\nx\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 46\n\nMission for Establishment of Human Rights in Iran, Islamic Penal Code of Iran, http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf. .......................................... 7\nNick Robins-Early, North Korea Responds To Human Rights Report With Homophobic Statement, HuffPost (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/23/north-koreahomophobia_n_5198717.html .......................................................................11\nNorth executes lesbians for being influenced by capitalism, The Korea Times (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/ news/nation/2011/09/18295702.html ............................................................10\nRed LGBTI de Venezuela and Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, Universal Periodic Review- Venezuela (November, 2016) A summary on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Trans and Intersex (LGBTI) human rights issues in Venezuela and recommendations, http://ilga.org/downloads/SUMMARY_VENEZUELA.pdf ......................... 15\nRed LGBTI de Venezuela and Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, Report of the LGBTI Network of Venezuela to the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the Fourth Periodic Report of Venezuela concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights during the 114th Period of Sessions (May 2015), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/VEN/INT _CCPR_CSS_VEN_20596_E.pdf...........................................................14, 15\nPresidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats (Sep. 24, 2017)..........................................................................passim\nRichard Fry & Jeffrey S. Passel, In Post-Recession Era, Young Adults Drive Continuing Rise in Multi-Generational Living, Pew Research Center (July 17, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/07/17/in-post-recessionera-young-adults-drive-continuing-rise-in-multi-generational-living/ .......... 22\nS. Exec. Report 102-23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.).......................................................20\nSomalia: Penal Code, Legislative Decree No. 5/1962, Article 409 ........................11\nSoon Kyu Choi & Ilan H. Meyer, LGBT Aging: A Review of Research Findings, Needs, and Policy Implications, Los Angeles: The Williams Institute (Aug. 2016), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBTAging-A-Review.pdf .....................................................................................22\nSwedish International Government Cooperation Agency, The Rights of LGBTI People in Somalia (Nov. 2014), http://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida /eng/partners/human-rights-based-approach/lgbti/rights-of-lgbt-personssomalia.pdf ..................................................................................................... 12\nSyria: Penal Code of 1949, Articles 517, 520..........................................................12\nxi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 46\n\nUnited Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report - Libya (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/408376/Cm_8593_Accessible_complete.pdf ................9\nUnited Nation Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/56 (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ IR/A-HRC-22-56_en.pdf .................................................................................6\nUnited Nation Human Rights Council, Summary Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1453302677_g1503174.pdf. .............8\nUnited Nation Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review second cycle, Summary of stakeholders’ information (Nov. 6, 2015).................................12\nUnited States Citizenship and Immigration Services, K-1 Process: Step by step, https://www.uscis.gov/family/k-1-process-step-step ....................................18\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Nonimmigrant Visa for a Fiancé(e) (K1), https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/family/fiance-k-1.html .18\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Chad (2016), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=201 6&dlid=265238 ................................................................................................ 6\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iran (2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm? year=2016&dlid=265496................................................................................. 7\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Libya (2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm ?year=2016&dlid=265510...........................................................................8, 9\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Somalia (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm? year=2016&dlid=265300............................................................................... 11\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Syria (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm? year=2016&dlid=265520............................................................................... 13\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Venezuela (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265834.pdf ............15\nxii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 46\n\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Yemen (2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year= 2016&dlid=265528 ........................................................................................ 16\nUnited States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Court Order on Presidential Proclamation on Visas (Oct. 17, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/news/importantannouncement.html ........................................................................................ 28\n\nxiii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 46\n\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST This brief sets forth the legal and policy concerns of Amici Curiae Immigration Equality, The New York City Gay And Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance, The LGBT Bar Association of Los Angeles, The LGBT Bar Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom (collectively, “Amici Curiae”) regarding the President’s Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sep. 24, 2017) (the “Proclamation” or “P.P.”).1 Amici Curiae are organizations devoted to the promotion of equal treatment for LGBTQ individuals in the United States and around the world, including through organizing, education, counseling, direct legal representation, and advocacy. In particular, Amici Curiae believe that LGBTQ individuals are entitled to equal treatment in the immigration context and under the law in general.\n\n1 No party to the appeal, nor counsel for any party to the appeal, authored any part of this brief. No party or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 46\n\nAmici Curiae are deeply troubled by the impact that the Proclamation would have on LGBTQ people in the United States and in the eight countries from which the Proclamation would drastically restrict — if not effectively ban — immigration. Indeed, for all of its negative effects generally, the Proclamation will inflict unique harm on LGBTQ people in the eight target countries by foreclosing escape from the venomous, and often vicious, anti-LGBTQ conditions that prevail there. The proclamation will also affect LGBTQ Americans by blocking potential LGBTQ reunifications with loved ones in the eight countries.\nThe Proclamation is bad policy made worse because it assaults established United States legal principles and constitutionally protected rights. Amici Curiae respectfully urge the Court to affirm the District of Maryland’s decisions in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017); Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-17-2921, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017); and Zazok v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-2969-TDC; 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017), avoid the significant, irreversible harms that the Proclamation would inflict, assuming those decisions will lapse while the litigation proceeds below.\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer live, in many countries around the world, in persistent, grave danger. As of October\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 46\n\n2016, homosexual conduct was still outlawed in more than 70 countries worldwide,\n13 of which made such conduct punishable by death.2 Some regimes deny the very\nexistence of LGBTQ people, making it impossible for LGBTQ individuals to seek\ngovernment protection from the severe persecution and violence to which they are\nroutinely subjected.3\nLike other immigrants, LGBTQ persons who already have family or partners\nliving in the United States are eligible to apply for visas based on this family status.\nThe process is long and difficult in the best of circumstances and the difficulty is\nonly compounded by the Proclamation, which, if enforced, would halt visa\nprocessing from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and\nYemen (the “eight countries”). For LGBTQ individuals, this shutdown is not\nsimply a bureaucratic inconvenience, but potentially a matter of life and death. A\n2 Aengus Carroll, State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, at 37-40 (12th ed. 2017), http://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ILGA_State _Sponsored_Homophobia_2017_WEB.pdf (“World Survey”). 3 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, We Are a Buried Generation (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/15/we-are-buried-generation/ discrimination-and-violence-against-sexual-minorities (“Buried Generation”) (recounting statement of Iran’s then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2007 that “[i]n Iran we don’t have homosexuals like you do in your country. This does not exist in our country.”); Choe Sang-Hun, North Korean Defector Opens Up About Long-Held Secret: His Homosexuality, N.Y. Times (June 5, 2015), https://www. nytimes.com/2015/06/06/world/asia/north-korea-defector-jang-yeong-jingay.html?_r=0 (“North Korean Defector”).\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 46\n\nfamily-based visa delayed by the Proclamation is, in effect, a visa denied. Visa approvals thwarted by the Proclamation mean LGBTQ individuals must remain in hostile and unsafe conditions indefinitely, delaying reunification with family members in safe communities. The danger is heightened because merely seeking visas from local consular officials, while citing a same-sex relationship as the basis for a waiver, reveals applicants’ sexual orientations or gender identities to local communities and government officials. Moreover, because the Administration will only provide waivers to applicants with “formal” and “documented” close familial relationships, LGBTQ individuals — whose relationships are neither sanctioned nor documented by their countries of origin — stand to be disproportionately excluded from these waivers.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND I. MANY LGBTQ INDIVIDUALS FACE PERSECUTION AND\nHOSTILE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS IN THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, ESPECIALLY IN THE EIGHT COUNTRIES TARGETED IN THE PROCLAMATION While the United States recently has made strides in advancing LGBTQ rights, including the right to form an officially-recognized family, the situation in many countries around the globe remains exceedingly grim. Even in countries where LGBTQ status is not considered a crime, LGBTQ individuals are still\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 46\n\nunable to forge family relationships due to severely anti-LGBTQ legal regimes.4 Consequently, for those seeking visas based on family or relationship status, documenting their LGBTQ status in their countries of origin leaves them exposed to persecution and violence, causing many visa-seekers to fear the consequences of providing documentation of their status for those visa applications.\nThe Proclamation, as drafted, would significantly impair, if not block, many LGBTQ individuals’ chances at family unification, and dramatically increase the risk of harm to these applicants abroad. Seven of the eight countries targeted by the Proclamation explicitly criminalize homosexual conduct, with some of them authorizing or even mandating the death penalty for such offenses.5 And in each of these countries, LGBTQ individuals face societal and institutionalized homophobia, with many suffering persecution from multiple sources, including disapproving family members, government and police forces, and terrorist groups. The treatment of LGBTQ people in the eight countries — treatment to which the Proclamation would indefinitely consign LGBTQ family members — is detailed below:\nChad. On December 12, 2016, Chad’s National Assembly approved a revision to the penal code that criminalizes same-sex relations, punishable by 4 World Survey, supra n.2, at 26. 5 Id. at 37-40.\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 46\n\nimprisonment and a fine.6 In support of the new law, a former prime minister stated, “Homosexuality is condemned by all religions. We do not have to forgive something that God himself rejects because Westerners have said this or that.”7 As a result of this new law, LGBTQ people in Chad are now exposed to threats of criminal and civil prosecution by virtue of their sexual orientation or gender identity.\nIran. As the U.N. Human Rights Council has noted and condemned on multiple occasions, LGBTQ people in Iran consistently “face harassment, persecution, cruel punishment, and are denied basic human rights.” 8 Iran criminalizes same-sex relations between consenting adults, and even mandates the death penalty for the “passive” male engaged in “sodomy” and for fourth-time\n\n6 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Chad 23 (2016), https://www.state.gov /j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265238.\n7 Glenn Garner, Parliament of Chad Calls for Criminalization of Homosexuality, Out Magazine (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.out.com/newsopinion/2016/12/16/parliament-chad-calls-criminalization-homosexuality.\n8 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/56 (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries /IR/A-HRC-22-56_en.pdf.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 46\n\n“lesbian” offenders.9 Authorities conduct many of these executions in public.10 Those who are not subject to the death penalty may nonetheless be punished by up to 100 lashes for engaging in same-sex relations.11\nLGBTQ people in Iran also face pervasive harassment, abuse, and violence “at the hands of private actors, including members of their family and society at large,” as well as “members of Iran’s police, security, and intelligence forces in public spaces.”12 The Iranian Penal Code does not include hate crime laws or other criminal justice mechanisms to aid in the prosecution of bias-motivated crimes.13\nLibya. Libya’s Penal Code criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual acts, which are punishable by up to five years in prison for both partners.14 “In the\n\n9 Mission for Establishment of Human Rights in Iran, Islamic Penal Code of Iran, Part 2, Article 111; Part 3, Article 131, at 5, 7, http://mehr.org/Islamic _Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf (“Iran Penal Code”). 10 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iran 3 (2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl /rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265496 (“Iran Country Report”). 11 Iran Penal Code, supra n.9, Part 2, Articles 112, 113; Part 3, Article 129, at 5-7. 12 Buried Generation, supra n.3. 13 Iran Country Report, supra n.10, at 43-44. 14 Libya: Penal Code of 1953, as amended by Law 70 of October 2, 1973, Articles 407(4), 408(4).\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 46\n\nLibyan society, to be gay [is] considered against Islam.” 15 Indeed, in 2012, Libya’s representative to the U.N. proclaimed in a U.N. Human Rights Council meeting that “gays threaten the continuation of the human race.”16\nReflecting these social mores, official and societal persecution and violence against LGBTQ individuals in Libya are widespread, and no legislation exists to protect LGBTQ individuals against such mistreatment.17 In its 2016 report on human rights in Libya, the State Department noted several reports of physical violence, harassment, and blackmail based on sexual orientation and gender identity. “Militias often policed communities to enforce compliance with militia commanders’ understanding of ‘Islamic’ behavior, and harassed and threatened with impunity individuals believed to have LGBTI orientations and their\n\n15 U.N. Human Rights Council, Summary Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.ecoi. net/file_upload/1930_1453302677_g1503174.pdf.\n16 Canada: Immigr. and Refugee Bd. of Canada, Libya: Situation of sexual minorities, including legislation; treatment by society and authorities; state protection and available services (2011-July 2014) (July 17, 2014), http://www.refworld.org/docid/54ca12544.html (“Libya: Situation of Sexual Minorities”).\n17 See id.; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Libya, at 28 (2016), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid= 265510 (“Libya’s Human Rights Practices”).\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 46\n\nfamilies.”18 For example, in 2013, reports emerged that 12 men, believed to be\nhomosexual, were detained and threatened with execution by an armed group seeking to enforce a strict form of Islamic Sharia law.19 Other individuals have\nreported being arrested and raped by Libyan police due to their sexual orientation.20\nNorth Korea. As Human Rights Watch has noted, “North Korea remains one of the most repressive authoritarian states in the world.”21 The coercive,\nintrusive atmosphere extends to nearly every aspect of North Koreans’ daily lives,\nincluding their sexuality and sexual orientation. As one North Korean refugee\nrecently explained, the totalitarian government in North Korea “maintains that\nhomosexuality does not exist because people there live with a ‘sound mentality and good morals.’”22 Consequently, homosexuality is not openly discussed in North\nKorea, and some individuals report that “no ordinary people conceptually\n18 Libya’s Human Rights Practices, supra n.17, at 28. 19 United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report - Libya 194 (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment _data/file/408376/Cm_8593_Accessible_complete.pdf. 20 Libya: Situation of Sexual Minorities, supra n.16. 21 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017: Events of 2016, at 457, https://hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf (“World Report 2017”). 22 North Korean Defector, supra n.3.\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 46\n\nunderstand what homosexuality is.” 23 Due to this ubiquitous government oppression, “[t]here are many homosexuals in North Korea who live a miserable life without even knowing why.”24\nConsistent with its totalitarian control over daily life, North Korea’s Criminal Code prohibits conduct that “reflects decadent, carnal or foul contents” as well as any “obscene activities.” 25 The government reportedly has executed LGBTQ individuals under these laws, noting that “[t]hey were badly influenced by capitalism . . . and brought corruption of public morals.”26\nNorth Korea’s government and state-controlled media openly condemn LGBTQ individuals, even in international affairs. For example, in responding to a United Nations investigation into human rights abuses in the country, the state news agency claimed that the “practice [of homosexuality] can never be found in\n\n23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Criminal Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2009), Articles 194, 262. 26 North executes lesbians for being influenced by capitalism, The Korea Times (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/ 09/182_95702.html.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 46\n\nthe DPRK” and that it was “ridiculous for such gay [sic] to sponsor dealing with others’ human rights issue.”27\nSomalia. Homosexual conduct is outlawed in Somalia. In northern Somalia, where the Somalian Penal Code governs, homosexual intercourse is punishable by imprisonment from three months to three years.28 In southern Somalia, under the control of militants, consensual same-sex sexual acts are punished by flogging or by death.29\nSomali society largely deems sexual orientation and gender identity to be taboo. 30 Thousands of LGBTQ individuals in Somalia keep their sexual orientation a “closely guarded secret,” knowing that revealing that information could attract potential retribution from terrorist groups or armed gangs.31 As one\n\n27 Nick Robins-Early, North Korea Responds To Human Rights Report With Homophobic Statement, HuffPost (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost. com/2014/04/23/north-korea-homophobia_n_5198717.html.\n28 Somalia: Penal Code, Legislative Decree No. 5/1962, Article 409.\n29 Amnesty Int’l, Making Love a Crime, Criminalization of Same-Sex Conduct in Sub-Saharan Africa (June 24, 2013), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/ making-love-a-crime-criminalization-of-same-sex-conduct-in-sub-saharan-africa.\n30 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Somalia, at 38 (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid= 265300.\n31 Catarina Stewart, Young Somali activist sentenced to death for being a lesbian, The Independent (Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/\n(cont’d)\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 46\n\nsource described it, “LGBT people in Somalia are silent and invisible, often facing violence and rejection from their families and communities that results in honour killings and suicides.”32\nViolence against LGBTQ people in Somalia is rampant. For example, there have been reports of gangs of armed men searching the streets of Somalia for people suspected of being LGBTQ.33 The U.N. Human Rights Council reported a 2013 incident in which a gay Somali 18-year-old teen was blindfolded, buried up to his waist, and then stoned to death for allegations of homosexuality.34\nSyria. The Syrian Penal Code prohibits “carnal relations against the order of nature,” and provides for at least three years’ imprisonment for violations.35 Though the law does not specifically address LGBTQ activity, police have used\n\n________________________ (cont’d from previous page)\nnews/world/Africa/young-somali-activist-sentenced-to-death-for-being-a-lesbiana6844216.html.\n32 Swedish Int’l Government Cooperation Agency, The Rights of LGBTI People in Somalia, at 1 (Nov. 2014), http://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida /eng/partners/human-rights-based-approach/lgbti/rights-of-lgbt-personssomalia.pdf.\n33 Id.\n34 U.N. Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review second cycle, Summary of stakeholders’ information, at 3 (Nov. 6, 2015).\n35 Syria: Penal Code of 1949, Articles 517, 520.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 46\n\nthis provision to persecute LGBTQ people.36 Police also frequently target LGBTQ individuals by arresting them without basis on pretexts such as abusing social values; selling, buying, or consuming illegal drugs; and organizing and promoting “obscene” parties.37\nThe State Department has recognized “overt societal discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in all aspects of [Syrian] society.”38 Syrian media has reported numerous examples of government and police forces using accusations of homosexuality as a pretext to detain, arrest, and torture LGBTQ people.39\nLGBTQ people in Syria also face extreme threats of violence at the hands of militant Islamist groups. NGOs have documented such violence, including against a fifteen-year-old boy who was stoned to death after he was accused of being gay.40 According to Human Rights Watch, at least twenty-five Syrian men were murdered in 2016 by extremist groups “on suspicion of homosexuality or for\n36 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Syria, at 53 (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid= 265520. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 World Report 2017, supra n.21, at 575-76.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 46\n\nsodomy.”41 Amnesty International documented the execution of three men — one of whom was just seventeen years old — accused of homosexuality.42 A witness\n\nto the shooting described the horrific scene: “When I approached the crowd, I saw\n\nthe body of the boy shot twice. . . . A man standing there told me that he was shot . . . in front of all the people because he was gay.”43\n\nVenezuela. In Venezuela, LGBTQ individuals “constantly live [in]\n\nsituations of discrimination, threats and attacks against their moral, psychological\n\n[and] physical integrity, and still lack legal protection which makes them\n\ndefenseless citizens in an atmosphere of alarming growth of homophobia and\n\ntransphobia, as a result of the absence of laws, policies and institutions that guarantee equality in the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.” 44\n\nAccording to a 2016 report, 175 hate crimes occurred on the basis of sexual\n\n41 Id.\n\n42 Amnesty Int’l, Torture was my Punishment: Abductions, Torture and\n\nSummary Killings Under Armed Group Rule in Aleppo and Idleb, Syria, at 28 (July\n\n2016),\n\nhttps://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/torture-was-my-punishment-\n\nabductions-torture-and-summary-killings-under-armed-group-rule-in-aleppo-and-\n\nidleb-syria/.\n\n43 Id.\n\n44 Red LGBTI de Venezuela and Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, Report of the LGBTI Network of Venezuela to the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the Fourth Periodic Report of Venezuela concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights during the 114th Period of Sessions, at 3 (May 2015), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/VEN/INT_CCP R_CSS_VEN_20596_E.pdf (“Venezuela Report”).\n\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 46\n\norientation, gender identity and expression between January 2009 and May 2016.45 Victims of these hate crimes frequently do not report incidents to the authorities, since they are often subjected to threats or extortion if they file formal complaints.46 Perpetrators of these hate crimes often act with impunity since “no progress has been made to investigate and prosecute acts of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and/or intersex people.”47 Although only a narrow category of Venezuelan government officials is affected by the Proclamation, those individuals are no less affected by such threats to their personal safety. See P.P. § 2(f).\nYemen. “Yemen is a conservative Arab state where homosexuality is seen as taboo and is condemned under the country’s strong Islamic beliefs.”48 Yemen’s Penal Code outlaws same-sex relations, with punishments ranging from 100 lashes\n\n45 Red LGBTI de Venezuela and Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, Universal Periodic Review- Venezuela (November, 2016) A summary on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Trans and Intersex (LGBTI) human rights issues in Venezuela and recommendations, http://ilga.org/downloads/SUMMARY_VENEZUELA.pdf. 46 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Venezuela, at 36 (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265834.pdf. 47 Venezuela Report, supra n.44, at 10. 48 Int’l Refugee Rights Initiative, Rights In Exile Programme, Yemen LGBTI Resources, http://www.refugeelegal aidinformation.org/yemen-lgbti-resources.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 46\n\nto death by stoning. 49 Yemen’s laws similarly do not protect against discrimination or hate crimes against LGBTQ individuals.50 Quite the opposite. “[T]he most serious issue connected to the ban on homosexuality is that victims of hate crimes cannot seek help from the authorities.”51\nBecause of the risk of criminal prosecution and severe punishment, as well as the societal condemnation they face, most LGBTQ individuals in Yemen are forced to live in hiding, and few LGBTQ people are open about their sexual orientation or gender identity.52\n\n49 Int’l Labour Org., Republican Decree for Law No 12 for the Year 1994 Concerning Crimes and Penalties, Section 11, Article 264, https://www.ilo.org /dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/83557/92354/F1549605860/YEM83557.pdf.\n50 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Yemen, at 44 (2016), http://www.state.gov/j /drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265528 (“Yemen Country Report”).\n51 Ben Gladstone, For Yemen’s gay community social media is a savior, The Irish Times (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middleeast/for-yemen-s-gay-community-social-media-is-a-saviour-1.2324447.\n52 Yemen Country Report, supra n.50, at 42-43.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 46\n\nARGUMENT I. THE UNIQUE HARDSHIPS IMPOSED ON LGBTQ POPULATIONS\nBY THE PROCLAMATION ARE CONTRARY TO U.S. LAW AND AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST A. Constitutional And Federal Law Emphasize The Importance Of\nFamily Reunification And Marriage The public interest in protecting family units, both LGBTQ and otherwise, is enshrined in constitutional law. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, the right to marry is fundamental. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right ‘to marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” (citation omitted)). In Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), the Court made clear that these rights extend to LGBTQ people. 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the samesex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”). The right to marry regardless of sexual orientation inheres in all persons within the United States, not just U.S. citizens. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within\n\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 46\n\nthe United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”).\nThe United States’ commitment to enabling families to live together is also\nembodied in its visa policies, which provide special allowances for family-\nsponsored visas. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (allowing legal permanent\nresidents to sponsor spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters).\nMembers of the LGBTQ community may normally avail themselves of such\nfamily reunification visas to assist family members living abroad, including those\nsuffering persecution in countries that discriminate against LGBTQ people. For example, LGBTQ individuals might apply for admission on a K-1 “fiancé(e)” visa, which allows the K-1 visa applicant’s sponsor in the United States to petition the government to bring the applicant to the United States to be married.53\nImmigration law must take family unity into account because “[p]ublic policy supports recognition and maintenance of a family unit.” Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Immigration and Nationality\n53 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Nonimmigrant Visa for a Fiancé(e) (K1), https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/family/fiancek-1.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2017); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, K-1 Process: Step by step, https://www.uscis.gov/family/k-1-process-step-step (last visited Nov. 16, 2017). Once approved, the applicant must submit significant documentation, including proof to substantiate the applicant’s relationship with his or her fiancé(e) in the United States, to a U.S. Consulate or Embassy, participate in an in-person interview, and submit to a medical examination. Id.\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 46\n\nAct (‘INA’) was intended to keep families together. It should be construed in\nfavor of family units and the acceptance of responsibility by family members.”);\nsee also INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220 (1966) (“Congress felt that, in many\ncircumstances, it was more important to unite families and preserve family ties\nthan it was to enforce strictly the quota limitations or even the many restrictive\nsections that are designed to keep undesirable or harmful aliens out of the country.”).54\nMoreover, the value of family unification is an important limitation on\ndeportation proceedings, wherein the Government is required to consider\n“humanitarian or public interest considerations,” including the “compelling\nhumanitarian interest in keeping families united.” United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771\nF.3d 1195, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases).\n54 Congress recognized in enacting and amending the INA that the immigration system is designed to preserve family units. See H.R. Rep. No. 85-1199, at 2 (1957) (the “legislative history of the [INA] clearly indicates that Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united.”); H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1952) (the INA implements “the underlying intention of our immigration laws regarding the preservation of the family unit”); cf. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) (“[T]he legislative history of the provision at issue here establishes that congressional concern was directed at ‘the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united.’ To accommodate this goal, Congress has accorded a special ‘preference status’ to certain aliens who share relationships with citizens or permanent resident aliens.”).\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 46\n\nThe United States has further recognized that the public interest includes\nconsideration of LGBTQ families by its ratification of the International Covenant\non Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) in 1992. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 55 Specifically, in ratifying the ICCPR, the United States\nrecognized that its domestic law incorporates the fundamental precept that “the\nfamily is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to\nprotection by society and the State.” ICCPR, art. 23, § 1. That principle obligates\nthe United States to recognize the right of a family to live together, and to adopt\nappropriate measures “to ensure the unity or reunification of families, particularly when their members are separated for political, economic or similar reasons.”56\nB. “Familial Relations” Should Be Construed Broadly To Give Equal Dignity To LGBTQ Families\nIn both the immigration context and throughout the law, policies protecting\nand valuing family reunification and “familial relations” should cover all families\n55 Even if the ICCPR is not a self-executing treaty, the United States declared that “U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant[.]” S. Exec. Report 102-23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.). Ratified treaties — even without implementing legislation — remain the supreme law of the land. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the ICCPR may be a “useful guide” to interpret domestic law. See Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 (9th Cir. 2009) (a treaty that does not have force of law nonetheless serves as a “useful guide” in interpreting other provisions of law) (citation omitted). 56 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, para. 6, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1Rev.1, at 26 (1994).\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 46\n\n— including embracing kinship arrangements that, due to discriminatory legal barriers, cultural factors, or circumstance, do not fit the traditional nuclear family model. A narrow conception of “family” that is limited to immediate legal or genetic family, as is the case for the “close familial relationship” waivers under the Proclamation, see Section II infra, fails to account for the lived experiences of many LGBTQ families. Accordingly, a narrow construction of familial relationships would cause concrete harms for LGBTQ individuals by excluding from admission to the United States in-laws, extended family and others whose relationships are no less “close” or “bona fide” than traditional nuclear family members.\nFor instance, same-sex marriage and step-parent or joint adoption of children by same-sex couples are not permitted in any of the eight countries.57 As a result, LGBTQ families in these countries may be made up of permanent partners, parents, and children who are not legally recognized as belonging to the same family.58 Moreover, many LGBTQ people, disowned by immediate family because of their sexual or gender identity, are raised by grandparents or other extended family, or form their own supportive networks with legally unrelated people. Indeed, many 57 See World Survey, supra n.3, at 68-77 (surveying countries that recognize marriage and adoption by same-sex couples). 58 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (discussing the legal patchwork that precluded adopted children of LGBTQ families from claiming two legal parents).\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 46\n\nLGBTQ people are forced to flee violence and oppression from their families of\norigin because of their sexual or gender identity. To the extent they have\n“traditional” family members in the United States, they may be unwilling or unable\nto draw upon those relationships.\nIn this country, too, non-nuclear families are increasingly common. As the\nSupreme Court noted seventeen years ago, “[t]he demographic changes of the past\ncentury make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The\ncomposition of families varies greatly from household to household.” Troxel v.\nGranville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). The number of people living in multi-\ngenerational or skipped-generation families in the United States has doubled in recent decades.59 Likewise, many LGBTQ individuals in the United States rely on\n“families of choice” or alternative family structures for the support that their biological families are unable or unwilling to provide.60 The Supreme Court has\nacknowledged that such non-traditional families are no less worthy of protection.\n59 See Richard Fry & Jeffrey S. Passel, In Post-Recession Era, Young Adults Drive Continuing Rise in Multi-Generational Living, Pew Research Center (July 17, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/07/17/in-post-recession-erayoung-adults-drive-continuing-rise-in-multi-generational-living/ (“A record 57 million Americans . . . lived in multi-generational family households in 2012, double the number who lived in such households in 1980.”). 60 See generally Soon Kyu Choi & Ilan H. Meyer, LGBT Aging: A Review of Research Findings, Needs, and Policy Implications, Los Angeles: The Williams Institute (Aug. 2016), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ LGBT-Aging-A-Review.pdf.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 46\n\n“Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (association with extended family members is constitutionally protected); see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545-46 (1987) (the Constitution “protects those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life”) (citations omitted). In the immigration context, the reason for this flexibility is simple: the “humane purpose of the [INA] to reunite families would be frustrated” by an overly strict interpretation of who is considered a family member. Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1980) (father was not required to prove under the strict laws of his home country his relationship with his child born out of wedlock; the “purpose of the Act . . . is to prevent continued separation of families”).\nAs the District of Hawaii recently observed, “context matters” when defining familial relationships.61 Recognizing that families do not look the same everywhere, the UNHCR has advocated, with respect to family reunification, that\n61 Order, Hawaii v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 2989048, at 12 (D. Haw. July 13, 2017).\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 46\n\n“[e]conomic and emotional ties should be given the same weight in reunification as relationships based on blood ties or legally sanctioned unions.”62 International\nhumanitarian law supplies a context-sensitive approach, “recogniz[ing] that a\nfamily consists of those who consider themselves and are considered by each other to be part of the family, and who wish to live together.”63\nLGBTQ people come to the United States to achieve formal recognition and\nprotection for their often unconventional families. A broad construction of “family”\nserves the public interest in family reunification and avoids perpetuating the\npolicies that prevent LGBTQ people in the eight countries from realizing co-equal\nstatus in society.\nII. THE PROCLAMATION CONTRAVENES U.S. LAW AND POLICY, WHICH ACCEPT LGBTQ INDIVIDUALS AS IMMIGRANTS Many LGBTQ individuals apply for visas to permanently relocate to the\nUnited States, including the spouses, parents, children, and fiancés of U.S. citizens,\nresidents, and asylees. The Proclamation shuts down visa processing for certain\n62 Kate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, Family unity and refugee protection, Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection 586 (Erika Feller, et al. eds., 2003) (citing UNHCR, Background Note: Family Reunification in the Context of Resettlement and Integration, Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva 2 (June 2001)), http://www.unhcr.org/419dbf664.html. 63 Id. at 585-86 (citing Commentary to the Additional Protocols of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 46\n\nvisa applicants from the eight countries. P.P. § 2(c). While the Proclamation allows for certain case-by-case exceptions to the ban on issuing visas, including “to visit or reside with a close family member” in the case of “undue hardship,” the waiver provisions provide no indication — much less assurance — that LGBTQ visa applicants will be recognized as permitted to proceed under that narrow and perhaps illusory exception, as discussed infra. P.P. § 3(c)(iv)(D).\nThe public policy goal of family reunification would be thwarted if the Proclamation were to take effect, by preventing U.S. citizens and residents from sponsoring U.S. visa applications of LGBTQ family members located in the eight countries. The Proclamation would deprive those U.S.-based family members of the fundamental right to family reunification, the very policy the INA was designed to accomplish. See Solis-Espinoza, 401 F.3d at 1094.\nFor example, the Proclamation would impair U.S. citizens and residents whose fiancés or partners are located in the eight countries from exercising the fundamental right to marry, as their partners may be prohibited from obtaining a K-1 “fiancé(e)” visa to visit the United States. See P.P. § 3(c). That harm is exacerbated for same-sex couples because those individuals cannot travel to one of the eight countries to be married, as those countries do not recognize same-sex marriages. By the same token, U.S. children and family members of same-sex couples, unable to marry because they are stranded in one of the eight countries,\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 46\n\nwould be uniquely deprived of the ability to form a legally-recognized family, and thus would be forced to bear “the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser” because their families receive unequal treatment under the Proclamation. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. The Proclamation would thus be an extension of the same context-blind immigration policies that have disparately impacted LGBTQ immigrants and their families.64 Although same-sex couples can utilize immigration benefits previously available only to opposite-sex couples, other avenues for family reunification remain closed or only available after surmounting additional hurdles. For instance, proving a parent-child relationship is significantly complicated, if not impossible, for a de facto parent who by the law of her country of origin cannot adopt or gain legal custody of her child, or marry the child’s\n\n64 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the federal government until only very recently categorically discriminated against LGBTQ people in the immigration context by, among other things, making homosexuality grounds for inadmissibility and by refusing to recognize same-sex spouses. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (noting that gays and lesbians have been “excluded under immigration laws”); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (determining that the INA’s exclusion of aliens afflicted with “psychopathic personality” was intended by Congress to exclude homosexuals from admission); Bassett v. Snyder, 59 F. Supp. 3d 837, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“The federal government categorically discriminated against gays and lesbians in immigration until 1990, barring all gay and lesbian noncitizens from entering the United States. . . . And the [INA] labeled gay and lesbian people as mentally ill.” (citations omitted)).\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 46\n\nbiological parent.65 And given that in-laws are a “clear” example of close family, see Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017), no same-sex couples in the eight targeted countries have legally recognized or documented in-law relationships, unless they were married in a country that recognizes their relationships.66\nThe Proclamation indefinitely delays the ability of LGBTQ foreign nationals to leave the eight countries, even though some of these individuals could have strong cases to obtain visas by virtue of their familial relationships with U.S. citizens or residents. Moreover, if LGBTQ visa applicants in the eight countries are forced to wait an indefinite period of time for the visa process to resume, they will be waiting in hostile political and social environments. Each day the Proclamation suspends the processing of visa applications, deserving visa applicants will be exposed to the likelihood of violence — and the certainty of discrimination — in the eight countries.\n\n65 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1), (c)(1) (defining “child” to include a genetic child, a stepchild by marriage, a child legitimated by law, or an adopted child in the adoptive parent’s legal custody). 66 These examples illustrate how the Proclamation, even with waivers for “close family members,” is too narrow to protect LGBTQ individuals’ close family relationships.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 46\n\nIII. THE PROCLAMATION’S WAIVER PROVISIONS FAIL TO MITIGATE THE HARMS THE PROCLAMATION INFLICTS ON LGBTQ INDIVIDUALS The Proclamation’s waiver provisions for visa-seekers do little to mitigate\nthe harms LGBTQ individuals would face if the Proclamation were allowed to go into effect. The Proclamation allows for waivers of the suspension on visaissuance for individuals with a “close familial relationship” to someone living in the United States, including fiancés and immediate in-laws. 67\nThe notion that the Government will issue a significant number of waivers to LGBTQ individuals from the eight affected countries, however, begs credulity in light of the Administration’s determination that the waiver provisions may only apply to “close familial relationships” that are “formal” and “documented.”68 As discussed above, LGBTQ individuals, whose familial relationships are often legally unrecognized in their countries of origin — and therefore are unlikely to be formal, much less documented — will suffer a disproportionate and unjustified restriction on their ability to qualify for visas under the terms of the Proclamation. Moreover, the Proclamation is sharply limited so as to preclude visa applications based on relationships with “extended” family members, even though that\n67 U.S. Dep’t of State, Court Order on Presidential Proclamation on Visas (Oct. 17, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/news/importantannouncement.html. 68 Id.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 46\n\ndefinition perpetuates the outdated, context-blind definition of familial relationships that fails to effectuate, and here would undermine, the purposes of U.S. immigration law. 69 Thus, in contrast to similarly situated non-LGBTQ persons whose relationships are officially recognized in the eight affected countries, LGBTQ persons stand to be disproportionately excluded from the Proclamation’s waiver provisions.\nFurthermore, waivers are unlikely to offer real protection even to those visaapplicants who can document a basis for the waiver. Neither the Proclamation nor the Administration has provided visa-seekers with meaningful guidance on the criteria that will be used in considering waiver applications. Instead, applicants are left with the cold comfort that a consular officer or Customs and Border Protection official “may, in their discretion, grant waivers on a case-by-case basis.” P.P. § 3(c). An applicant must prove to that official’s subjective satisfaction that “denying entry would cause [him or her] undue hardship,” that he or she “would not pose a threat to the national security or public safety of the United States” and that his or her “entry would be in the public interest.” P.P. § 3(c)(i). This vague language is insufficient, and could be easily abused, creating further uncertainty as to whether LGBTQ persons may obtain these waivers.\n69 See supra, Section I.B.\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 46\n\nMoreover, the fact that the waiver provisions require LGBTQ individuals to reveal information about their sexual orientation or gender identity to consular officers, and possibly the consulate’s staff (often consisting of foreign nationals), poses additional dangers beyond those typically faced by LGBTQ persons seeking to travel to the United States. The resulting chilling effect on LGBTQ persons’ willingness to apply for admission to the United States would only compound their suffering in the eight countries — and the suffering of their American relatives here. The waiver provisions therefore do not diminish any of the special risks and dangers imposed by the Proclamation on LGBTQ people.\nCONCLUSION For all the reasons stated above, Amici Curiae respectfully request that this Court affirm the order of the District of Maryland, enjoining the Government from enforcing the Proclamation.\n(signature appears on following page)\n\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 46\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Eric J. Gorman Eric J. Gorman Counsel of Record Jennifer H. Berman Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 155 North Wacker Dr. Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 407-0700 eric.gorman@skadden.com Matthew E. Sloan Richard A. Schwartz Allison B. Holcombe Alyssa J. Clover Brittany Ellenberg Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 300 South Grand Ave. Suite 3400 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 687-5000 matthew.sloan@skadden.com Noelle M. Reed Sarah Grossnickle Jonathan Fombonne Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 1000 Louisiana Street Suite 6800 Houston, TX 77002 (713) 655-5100 noelle.reed@skadden.com Joseph M. Sandman Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 1440 New York Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 371-7000\n\nAaron Morris Immigration Equality 40 Exchange Place Suite 1300 New York, NY 10005 (212) 714-2904 amorris@immigrationequality.org Virginia M. Goggin New York City Gay And Lesbian Anti-Violence Project 116 Nassau Street Floor 3 New York, NY 10038 (212) 714-1184 vgoggin@avp.org Glenn Magpantay The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance 233 Fifth Avenue Suite 4A New York, NY 10016 (917) 439-3158 glenn_magpantay@nqapia.org Attorneys for Amici Curiae Immigration Equality, The New York City Gay And Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance, The LGBT Bar Association of Los Angeles, The LGBT Bar Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 45 of 46\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it is prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface in Microsoft Word using 14-point Times New Roman typeface and with the type-volume limitation of Rule 29(a)(5) because it contains 6,358 words.\n/s/ Eric J. Gorman Eric J. Gorman\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 46 of 46\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 17, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n/s/ Eric J. Gorman Eric J. Gorman\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 2\n\n17-2231, 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 97-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 2\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM (cont’d)\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: Immigration Equality, the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, The National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance, The LGBT Bar Association of Los Angeles, The LGBT Bar Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 41\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nEBAL ZAKOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Southern Division\n(8:17-cv-00361-TDC) __________________________________________________________________\n\nBRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE IMMIGRATION LAW PROFESSORS ON STATUTORY CLAIMS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES __________________________________________________________________\n\nFATMA MAROUF* Texas A&M Univ. School of Law 1515 Commerce Street Fort Worth, TX 76102 (817) 212-4123\n\nSABRINEH ARDALAN* PHILIP L. TORREY* NATHAN MACKENZIE (Law Clerk) DALIA DEAK (Law Student) Harvard Immigration and Refugee\nClinical Program Harvard Law School 6 Everett Street Cambridge, MA 02138\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 41\n\nGEOFFREY HOFFMAN* University of Houston Law Center 4604 Calhoun Road, Room 56, TU-II Houston, TX 77204 (713) 743-2094\n\nALAN HYDE* Rutgers Law School 123 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102 (973) 353-3163\n\nKARLA MCKANDERS* Vanderbilt Law School 131 21st Avenue South Nashville, TN 37203 (615) 322-3092\n\nFiled in an individual capacity. University affiliation is for identification only.\nCounsel for Amici Curiae and Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 41\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................................................................. 1\nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 1\nARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 3\nI. CONGRESS HAS GIVEN THE PRESIDENT BROAD, BUT IN NO WAY UNLIMITED, POWERS OVER IMMIGRATION. ...................... 3\nA. Congress Has Delegated Significant Yet Restricted Powers Over Immigration to the Executive Branch. ................................................. 6\nB. The Delegation of Authority Under 1182(f) Give the President Broad Discretion in Exigencies Involving Diplomacy or Military Affairs, But Do Not Provide Unlimited Power. ................................................ 8\nII. THE INA AS A WHOLE CONSTRAINS THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY IN 1182(f)........................................................................ 15\nA. The INA Constrains the President’s Authority by Specifying Categories of Aliens Who May Be Admitted. ................................... 16\nB. The INA Constrains the President’s Delegated Authority by Specifying Categories of Aliens Who May Not Be Admitted, Including Categories Based on National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns. ............................................................................................ 18\nC. The INA’s Nondiscrimination Provision Constrains the President’s Authority Under 1182(f). ................................................................... 23\nCONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 28\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 41\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCASES\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ........................................................................... 19\nDada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008)................................................................................................. 15\nGalvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)............................................................................................... 4\nHaitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ....................................................................... 27\nHawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017)................................................................................ 25\nHillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013) ......................................................................................... 25\nINS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) ............................................................................................... 8\nInhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147 (1883)............................................................................................. 26\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated and remanded by Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, -- S.Ct. --, 2017 WL 4518553 ......................... passim\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) ................................................... 2, 13\nJean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) ............................................................................... 2\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) ........................................................................................... 4\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 41\n\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ......................................................................................... 4, 13\nLopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)............................................................................................... 15\nMarx v. General Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013) ........................................................................................... 8\nMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)............................................................................................ 26\nN.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) .......................................................................................... 9\nNishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)............................................................................................... 4\nOceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909)............................................................................................... 4\nOlsen v. Albright, 990 F.Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) ............................................................................. 23\nPuello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 511 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2007)................................................................................. 24\nRadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012) ......................................................................................... 20\nRegan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984)............................................................................................. 11\nReiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979)............................................................................................... 9\nUnited Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001)............................................................................................. 25\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)............................................................................................... 4\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 41\n\nWalters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997)............................................................................................... 8\nWatt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981)..................................................................................... 27\nWeinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973)............................................................................................. 26\nYamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)................................................................................................. 4\nYoungstown Steel and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)...................................................................................... passim\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) ................................................................................. 4, 9, 17\nCONSTITUTION\nU.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 4, 11.............................................................................. 3\nU.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.1......................................................................................... 4\nU.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2 .................................................................................. 9\nSTATUTES AND REGULATORY MATERIAL\n6 U.S.C. § 202(5) ...................................................................................................... 6\n8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)............................................................................................ 17\n8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) ................................................................................................ 5, 6\n8 U.S.C. § 1104......................................................................................................... 5\n8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) .................................................................................... 17\n8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) ............................................................................................ 26, 27\n8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) ............................................................................ 23, 24, 27\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 41\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B) ........................................................................................ 28 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2).............................................................................................. 24 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) .................................................................................................. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) .................................................................................................. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) .................................................................................................. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) .................................................................................................. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e) .................................................................................................. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3)................................................................................................ 7 8 U.S.C. § 1158......................................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) .................................................................................................. 18 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A) .......................................................................................... 5 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).............................................................................................. 12 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A) ........................................................................................ 12 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) .............................................................................. 2, 12, 19 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C) .................................................................................... 2, 12 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(bb) ...................................................................... 19 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)................................................................................... 19 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C) ........................................................................................ 20 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(ii)–(iii) ........................................................................... 20 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)...................................................................................... 7\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 41\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(iii) .................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28).............................................................................................. 4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) ............................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B) ........................................................................................ 19 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(4) ............................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) .......................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)............................................................................................ passim 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) .................................................................................................. 25 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)............................................................................................... 1 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(3)(B) ........................................................................................ 21 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(2)(D)-(F) .................................................................................. 21 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(2)................................................................................................ 5 8 U.S.C. § 1202....................................................................................................... 21 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a) ........................................................................................ 7, 12, 21 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) ........................................................................................ 7, 12, 21 8 U.S.C. § 1202(c) ........................................................................................ 7, 12, 21 8 U.S.C. § 1202(d) ........................................................................................ 7, 12, 21 8 U.S.C. § 1202(g) .................................................................................................. 12 8 U.S.C. § 1202(g)(2)(B) .......................................................................................... 8 8 U.S.C. § 1202(h) ............................................................................................ 12, 21\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 41\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1202(h)(1)(C) .......................................................................................... 8 8 U.S.C. § 1227......................................................................................................... 6 8 U.S.C. § 1229b....................................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1229c ....................................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) .................................................................................................... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1361................................................................................................. 13, 14 22 C.F.R. § 40.6 ................................................................................................ 13, 14 Homeland Security Act, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002)......................................... 5 EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS Executive Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) ........................... 13 Executive Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017).......................... 13 Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ............................... passim FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2)............................................................................................ 1 Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E)....................................................................................... 1 OTHER AUTHORITIES\nCurtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097 (2013) .......................................... 9 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 Yale L.J. 458 (2009) .......................................................................................... 6 H.R. 8662, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ................................................................. 24 H.R. Rep. No. 101-955 (1990)................................................................................ 20\nvii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 41\n\nKate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R44743, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens (2017) .................................................................................................. 10, 23\nGerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 313 (2000) ........................................ 19\nPresident’s Announcement of Sanctions Against Iran, 16 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 611 (Apr. 7, 1980) .......................................................................................... 10\nProclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,470 (Aug. 22, 1986) ......................... 10-11\nRemarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, 546 Pub. Papers 1037 (Oct. 3, 1965) ............................................................................. 23\nS. 500/H.R. 2580, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) .................................................... 23\n\nviii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 41\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Amici are immigration law scholars. They teach immigration and refugee law, have written numerous scholarly articles on immigration and refugee law, and understand the practical aspects of immigration law through client representation. They submit this brief to show that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as a whole constrains the authority delegated to the Executive Branch under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), rendering Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017) (“Proclamation”), ultra vires.1\nSUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT While Congress has delegated broad powers to the Executive Branch concerning the enforcement of immigration laws, the INA’s content, structure, and usage limit those powers. Viewing the INA in its entirety, as an integrated statute, proves fatal to the Government’s arguments that Congress imposed no constraints on the President’s power to suspend the entry of classes of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).2\n1 All parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2). No party’s counsel authored any part of the brief, and no party, party’s counsel, or person, other than the amici, contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E). 2 While the President cites both 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) in the Proclamation as the statutory basis for his authority, the boilerplate language in 1185(a)(1) has never been held by itself to authorize any particular Executive Branch restriction on\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 41\n\nAlthough Congress has delegated broad authority to the President under the INA, he cannot impermissibly use that authority to upend the INA’s system of determining who should be allowed into the country and who should not be allowed. Congress has carefully crafted the categories of aliens who may and may not be admitted to the United States, and in doing so it specifically created terrorism-related and foreign policy grounds of inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)–(C). Congress did not grant the President unbridled power under 1182(f) to circumvent those provisions.\nOther INA provisions would similarly be rendered meaningless if the President had unchecked power under 1182(f). Most notably, the INA’s nondiscrimination provision, which was created with the express purpose of ending an admissions system based solely on national origin, would be rendered meaningless if the President could prevent the admission of aliens based solely on their nationality. Since 1952, when 1182(f) was enacted, Congress has repeatedly amended the INA. One of the critical changes that occurred in 1965 involved abandoning a system rooted in national origin discrimination and creating a more\nentry; 1182(f) is the broader grant of authority, subsuming 1185(a)(1). See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 966–67 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 WL 4674314, at 23 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) (“Although the Proclamation also relies on § 1185(a)(1), the parties do not argue that this section provides broader authority than § 1182(f). Therefore, the Court need only consider whether the Proclamation exceeds the President’s delegated authority under § 1182(f).”).\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 41\n\nequitable method for determining admission. Congress has also repeatedly constrained executive discretion over the past several decades to further prevent discriminatory practices. This historical trajectory underscores the importance of construing 1182(f) in the context of the contemporary INA, with its current structure, content, objectives, and purpose.\nThe broad grant of authority under 1182(f) can only be reconciled with the rest of the statute if construed to apply in exceptional circumstances involving diplomacy and the Commander-in-Chief powers, where the President’s authority is at its peak. Indeed, prior usage of 1182(f) has rested on such an interpretation. The President’s Proclamation here purports to be related to national security and diplomacy, but its provisions and its origin undercut those proffered justifications.\nIn this brief, we demonstrate how the INA as a whole unambiguously dooms the Proclamation.\nARGUMENT I. CONGRESS HAS GIVEN THE PRESIDENT BROAD, BUT IN NO\nWAY UNLIMITED, POWERS OVER IMMIGRATION. Primary responsibility over immigration lies with Congress, which has the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” “declare War,” and—in a veiled reference to slavery—prohibit “[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit” after the year 1808. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 4, 11\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 41\n\n& § 9, cl.1. Based on these enumerated powers, combined with the Necessary and\nProper Clause, the Supreme Court has long recognized that regulating immigration is primarily—if not exclusively—within Congress’s domain.3 See, e.g., Galvan v.\nPress, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“[T]hat the formulation of [immigration policy]\nis entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the\nlegislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our\ngovernment.”); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 340\n(1909) (“[T]he authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United\nStates embraces every conceivable aspect of that subject.”).\nCongress can, of course, delegate authority to the Executive Branch. See\nYamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97–98 (1903); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,\n142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Via the INA, Congress has delegated substantial\n3 While the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the President has some inherent power over immigration derived from the foreign affairs power, those cases involved actions taken pursuant to statutory delegations of authority. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539–41 (1950) (explaining that the President acted pursuant to a 1941 Act that authorized him to impose additional restrictions on entry and departure “during the national emergency proclaimed May 27, 1941,” upon finding that the interests of the United States required it); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (stating that the Executive Branch denied a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to a delegation of authority in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131–32 (2015) (upholding the denial of a visa by a consular official acting pursuant to a statutory provision prohibiting the issuance of visas to persons who engage in terrorist activities).\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 41\n\nauthority to certain Executive Branch officials, including the President, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of Labor, and Secretary of Health and Human Services.4 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a) (delegating authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security), 1104 (Secretary of State), 1182(a)(1)(A) (Secretary of Health and Human Services), and 1188(a)(2) (Secretary of Labor). But those delegated powers are not so broad as to allow the Executive Branch authorities to bypass the elaborate admission scheme developed by Congress.\nPart A below explains the main powers that Congress has delegated to the Executive Branch regarding immigration enforcement and the admission of individuals. Part B turns to the authority delegated under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). The brief explains that the INA as a whole constrains the President’s power under 1182(f), limiting that power to exigent diplomatic or military concerns, where the President’s authority is at its peak. See Youngstown Steel and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).\n\n4 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred certain powers from the Attorney General to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Homeland Security Act, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002).\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 41\n\nA. Congress Has Delegated Significant Yet Restricted Powers Over Immigration Enforcement, Adjudication, and Visa Processing to the Executive Branch.\nThe broadest delegations of authority to the Executive Branch pertain to enforcement and removal, rather than admission. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 464–65 (2009). Congress has charged the Secretary of Homeland Security with “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities,” and, even more generally, with “the administration and enforcement” of immigration laws. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). These powers allow the President, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, to prioritize certain classes of noncitizens for removal and provide guidance regarding the use of prosecutorial discretion. Although Congress has set forth detailed grounds of deportability, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227, decisions about who is actually placed in removal proceedings and who is ultimately deported remain largely in the hands of the Executive Branch.\nIn addition, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency within the Department of Justice, conducts immigration court proceedings and appellate review of most removal decisions. As part of that process, EOIR officials are authorized to make determinations about whether to grant certain forms of relief and protection from removal after an individual satisfies the INA’s eligibility criteria. Decisions about whether to grant asylum, different types of\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 41\n\ncancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and adjustment of status require an Executive Branch official to exercise some degree of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1229b, 1229c, 1255(c).\nCongress has also delegated authority to the Executive Branch concerning the admission of individuals into the country, including discretionary waivers of certain inadmissibility grounds in individual cases. While some types of waivers are quite broad, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3), others may be granted only if the applicant satisfies specific statutory requirements. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (waiver of three and ten-year bars to admission for unlawful presence), (a)(9)(C)(iii) (waiver for aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations), (d)(4) (waiver of requirement to have a valid entry document), 1157(c)(3) (waiver of inadmissibility grounds for refugees). Congress has also authorized Executive Branch officials to grant “parole,” which allows entry “on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).\nFurthermore, Congress has authorized certain Executive Branch officials to determine the form and manner of processing “immigrant” and “nonimmigrant” visa applications. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a)–(d). For example, Congress has authorized the Secretary of State to waive the general requirement of an in-person interview for nonimmigrant visa applicants if it is “in the national interest of the United\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 41\n\nStates” or “necessary as a result of unusual or emergent circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(h)(1)(C). In addition, the Secretary of State is authorized to grant an exception to the general rule that overstaying a nonimmigrant visa makes an individual ineligible to be readmitted as a nonimmigrant if “extraordinary circumstances” exist. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(g)(2)(B).\nB. The Delegation of Authority Under 1182(f) Gives the President Broad Discretion in Exigencies Involving Diplomacy or Military Affairs, But Does Not Provide Unlimited Power.\nThe President may suspend the “entry” of “classes of aliens” under 1182(f) only if he “finds” that such entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Each of those terms must be given some meaning to avoid being mere surplusage and render the statutory admission scheme and its restraints on the Executive Branch’s discretion surplusage. See Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997) (“Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 41\n\nquotation marks omitted)); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.”).\nPrior Presidents’ usage of 1182(f) provides further support for interpreting the scope of the delegated power. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (turning to “judicial precedent and historical practice” in interpreting the President’s power to decide what foreign power is legitimate); N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) (putting “significant weight upon historical practice” in interpreting the President’s powers under the Recess Appointments Clause, and explaining that “[t]he longstanding ‘practice of the government’ . . . can inform [the Court’s] determination of ‘what the law is’” in a separation-of-powers case) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097 (2013) (addressing the importance of history in defining the scope of executive power).\nPresidents have typically relied upon 1182(f) in emergency situations that implicate their Commander-in-Chief powers and their authority concerning international diplomacy. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2. Such situations include suspending entry of classes of aliens after foreign coups or revolutions; putting pressure on a foreign government—often as part of broader sanctions;\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 41\n\nenforcing a treaty; and responding to an act of aggression or an emergency. See Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R44743, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens 6–10 (2017) (listing all previous presidential suspensions). In these types of situations, the President’s power is at its zenith. By contrast, when the President attempts to restrict entry of classes of aliens in situations that do not implicate specific diplomatic exigencies or military crises, he is encroaching on Congress’s undelegated power to establish the classes of persons who may and may not be admitted to the United States, and consequently his power is at its lowest ebb. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).\nIn response to the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, for example, President Carter directed the Secretary of State to invalidate and suspend the issuance of visas to Iranians “except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires.” President’s Announcement of Sanctions Against Iran, 16 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 611 (Apr. 7, 1980). Restricting the entry of Iranians was just one of several measures, including ending diplomatic relations, which President Carter used to increase pressure on Iran to release the hostages taken during the storming of the U.S. embassy. Id.\nPerhaps the most sweeping use of 1182(f) was President Reagan’s exercise of the power to “suspend entry into the United States as immigrants by all Cuban nationals,” subject to certain exceptions. Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 41\n\n30,470 (Aug. 22, 1986). President Reagan issued Proclamation 5517 in response to the Cuban government’s refusal to honor an immigration agreement between the two countries and disruption of normal migration procedures. Id. Two years prior to President Reagan’s Proclamation, the Supreme Court upheld President Reagan’s ability to restrict U.S. citizens’ travel to Cuba citing “weighty concerns of foreign policy” as the justification for the restriction. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 241–42 (1984).\nThe Proclamation at issue here is much different. President Trump’s Proclamation suspending the entry of foreign nationals from eight countries cannot fairly be characterized as an act related to exigent diplomatic or military affairs. There is no evidence, for example, that the President suspended entry to negotiate or enforce a treaty with any of these eight countries, or to respond to an act of aggression by or a coup or recent revolution in any of the eight countries. The Proclamation summarily asserts that information-sharing and identity-management deficiencies in the designated countries compromise national security, and that the Proclamation serves a diplomatic purpose by encouraging the designated countries to improve their practices in those areas, but the Government’s purported reasons are utterly disjointed from the restrictions actually imposed.\nThe Proclamation fails to show why the current admission system Congress crafted should be scrapped and replaced with a system that bans individuals based\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 41\n\nsolely on their nationality. Further, if information-sharing and identitymanagement deficiencies compromise national security, it does not serve the Government’s purported purpose to allow individuals from Chad, Yemen and Libya with all types of nonimmigrant visas, except for business and tourist visas, to be allowed entry. Likewise, it makes no sense to allow only Iranian nonimmigrants with student and exchange visas to enter, while barring all other Iranian nonimmigrants. And if the purpose of the Proclamation is indeed to serve a diplomatic purpose by encouraging foreign governments to improve their practices, why would the President contradict his own alleged findings by excluding a country, like Iraq, which did not meet the baseline criteria, and including a country like Somalia, which met the baseline criteria? Indiscriminately excluding certain nonimmigrants as opposed to the previous Executive Orders’ wholesale exclusion of nonimmigrants does not automatically render the Proclamation a permissible exercise of presidential authority.\nThe Proclamation’s asserted purpose rings hollow when considering that the INA places the burden on individual visa applicants—not their governments—to provide the information necessary to establish their identity and eligibility for a visa, including their admissibility into the United States, through both documentation and an in-person interview. See 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a)–(d), (g)–(h); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), (a)(3)(A)–(C) (inadmissibility bars based on threats to\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 41\n\nnational security and public safety). Under the INA, consular officers must deny visas to individuals who fail to provide sufficient information and documentation. 8 U.S.C. § 1361; 22 C.F.R. § 40.6.\nThe Proclamation, however, makes no mention of any deficiencies with the current visa system; provides no explanation for shifting from the current system to a ban based on nationality; and provides no information about the review process, agency recommendations, or report that purportedly supports the restrictions imposed. Although the District Court found that the Proclamation need not meet stringent standards found elsewhere in the law, such as being “narrowly tailored” or the “least restrictive means,” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4674314, at 23, it cannot be devoid of any rational relationship to its purported purpose. The Proclamation therefore cannot meet the “facially legitimate and bona fide test” in Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769–70, when the restrictions it imposes are so far afield from its asserted goals.\nThe Proclamation also cannot be viewed in isolation from its predecessors. Executive Order 13769 (EO-1) was issued on January 27, 2017 within days of the President’s inauguration and corresponded only to his campaign promises—not to any identifiable classified or otherwise information, or security review that could conceivably have been ordered in such a short time. The President provided no “findings” to support either EO-1 or its second version, Executive Order 13780\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 41\n\n(EO-2), and no nexus to any identifiable U.S. interests. Furthermore, as this Court noted, both EO-1 and EO-2 invoked “the specter of ‘honor killings,’ . . . a wellworn tactic for stigmatizing and demeaning Islam and painting the religion, and its men, as violent and barbaric.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 596 n. 17 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated and remanded by Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, -- S.Ct. --, 2017 WL 4518553.\nThe most recent version of the travel ban attempts, belatedly, to correct those prior deficiencies, but it fails to adequately do so. To be certain, it does not mention honor killings and nominally adds two non-Muslim countries with little practical impact on migration; it also provides a new purported rationale. But its roots cannot be ignored. The Proclamation fulfills its predecessors’ promise of a permanent ban, using nationality as a proxy for religion. As Judge Wynn explained in his concurring opinion in Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, allowing the President to use “national origin as a proxy for discrimination based on religious animus” under 1182(f) “essentially contends that Congress delegates to the President virtually unfettered discretion to deny entry to any class of aliens, including to deny entry solely on the basis of nationality and religion.” 857 F.3d at 613 (Wynn, J., concurring). Judge Wynn correctly concluded that “the Immigration Act provides no indication that Congress intended ‘broad generalized’ delegation of authority in Section 1182(f) to allow the President ‘to trench . . .\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 41\n\nheavily on [fundamental] rights.’” Id. (footnote omitted). Under these circumstances, the Proclamation exceeds the authority delegated to the President by Congress. II. THE INA AS A WHOLE CONSTRAINS THE DELEGATION OF\nAUTHORITY PROVIDED IN 1182(f). Allowing the President to ignore the statutory constraints on his delegated authority would upend the INA and improperly allow the Executive Branch unchecked, absolute authority in an area historically deemed to be a Congressional power. See Youngstown Steel and Tube, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, concurring). The statutory provisions on which the Government relies must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the INA as a whole. See, e.g., Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008) (“In reading a statute we must not look merely to a particular clause, but consider in connection with it the whole statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that reading provisions of the INA in isolation could lead to “so much trickery, violating the cardinal rule that statutory language must be read in context.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 56 (2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That is precisely “why our interpretive regime reads whole sections of a statute together to fix on the meaning of any one of them . . . .” Id. As shown below, reading 1182(f) in the context of the entire INA demonstrates that the provision does not authorize the\n\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 41\n\nblanket ban on immigrant visas and improper and self-contradictory restrictions on nonimmigrant visas set forth in the Proclamation.\nCongress has carefully determined the categories of aliens who may and may not be admitted to the country. Congress amended the current admissibility rules nearly fifty years ago to prohibit nationality-based discrimination. Today’s admission system prohibits the admission of certain individuals who meet specified criteria—it does not allow for the exclusion of an entire population based solely on that group’s nationality. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 623 (Wynn, J., concurring).\nThe President cannot upend that structure by effectively rewriting the rules of admission via executive fiat. The President’s delegated authority pursuant to 1182(f) thus cannot be used to undermine other provisions of INA. Indeed, Congress has repeatedly legislated to limit the President’s authority related to the admissions system. The President is not free to ignore these constraints.\nA. The INA Constrains the President’s Delegated Authority by Specifying Categories of Aliens Who May Be Admitted to the United States.\nThe INA provides detailed categories of aliens who may be admitted to the United States, which the President cannot unilaterally alter. For individuals seeking permanent residence, Congress has established three primary methods to obtain an immigrant visa: family relationships, employment, and the diversity lottery. 8\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 41\n\nU.S.C. §§ 1153(a)–(c). For both family and employment-based immigrant visas, Congress has devised an intricate method for calculating the number of visas available. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)–(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (providing an unlimited number of visas to “immediate relatives”). The diversity lottery, which requires applicants to meet certain threshold conditions, similarly applies a complicated, statutorily-designated formula to determine the number of people who will be admitted in a random order from certain underrepresented geographical regions. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)–(e).\nFor nonimmigrants, who comprise the vast majority of individuals admitted to the United States, Congress has created an equally elaborate system. That system includes an alphabet soup of nonimmigrant visa categories, including, but not limited to, visas for individuals coming to the United States for tourism, business, investment, study, training, agricultural or seasonal work, artistic performances, athletic events, and exchange programs. 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(15).\nThe President’s Proclamation directly contravenes the deliberate and systematic process for immigrant and nonimmigrant admissions set forth in the INA. By suspending the entry of foreign nationals from eight countries, the Proclamation upends the statutory admissions scheme that Congress created and is thus “incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress.” Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)); see\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 41\n\nalso Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 638 (Thacker, J., concurring) (“Reading § 1182(f) as bestowing upon the President blanket authority to . . . reject[] a particular country’s immigrant visa applications as a matter of course, would . . . allow the chief executive to override any of Congress’s carefully crafted visa criterion or grounds for inadmissibility.”).\nB. The INA Constrains the President’s Delegated Authority by Specifying Classes of Aliens Who May Not Be Admitted to the United States, Including Based on National Security and Foreign Policy Concerns.\nJust as Congress has specified categories for admission, so too, has it specified categories of aliens who may not be admitted. 8 U.S.C § 1182. These inadmissibility grounds render certain aliens “ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). The inadmissibility grounds include, but are not limited to, categories based on: criminal convictions, crime-related conduct, immigration violations, fraudulent misrepresentation, national security, and foreign policy. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Congress has incorporated into this framework very specific exceptions to certain inadmissibility grounds, as well as discretionary “waivers” of certain grounds of inadmissibility. See supra Section I.A.\nThe two grounds of inadmissibility addressing national security and foreign policy are critical in interpreting the scope of the President’s authority under\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 41\n\n1182(f). First, the national security ground in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) provides very broad definitions of “terrorist activity” and “engag[ing] in terrorist activity,” facilitating their use in a discretionary manner by consular officials and immigration officers. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 313, 321–22 (2000). For example, the definition of “terrorist activity” includes any unlawful use of a weapon or dangerous device “other than for mere personal monetary gain,” and “[e]ngag[ing] in terrorist activity” includes providing “material support” for any “terrorist activity” or organization. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(bb), (B)(iv). Congress has also provided a mechanism for seeking an exemption from this inadmissibility ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B). It would be pointless for Congress to legislate specific criteria for terrorism-related inadmissibility, as well as inadmissibility exceptions and exemptions, if Congress also authorized the President to summarily exclude entire nations. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1057–58 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (prohibiting the Executive Branch from using the general exclusionary authority conferred by Congress in one provision of the INA to circumvent a more specific provision dealing with exclusion of aliens on the basis of organizational affiliation).\nSecond, the foreign policy inadmissibility ground applies to any alien “whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the Secretary of State has\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 41\n\nreasonable grounds to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign\npolicy consequences for the United States.” 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(C). Congress has\ncarved out two exceptions to this inadmissibility ground that curb the Secretary of\nState’s discretion, providing that a person generally should not be excluded based\non “past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations that would be\nlawful within the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(ii)–(iii). The conference\ncommittee report accompanying the 1990 Immigration Act, which introduced the\nforeign policy ground, provides:\nUnder current law there is some ambiguity as to the authority of the Executive Branch to exclude aliens on foreign policy grounds . . . . The foreign policy provision in this title would establish a single clear standard for policy exclusions (which is designated as 212(a)(3)(C) of the INA). The conferees . . . expect that, with the enactment of this provision, aliens will be excluded not merely because of the potential signal that might be sent because of their admission, but when there would be a clear negative foreign policy impact associated with their admission.\nH.R. Rep. No. 101-955, at 128–29 (1990). There would be no point in requiring\nthe Executive Branch to have “reasonable grounds to believe” that an individual\n“would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the\nUnited States” before denying the admission of such an individual, if the President\nhad unfettered authority to restrict entry under 1182(f). See RadLAX Gateway\nHotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012) (interpreting a statute to\n\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 41\n\navoid “the superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed by the general one”).\nConstruing 1182(f) as broadly as the Government suggests would allow the President to destabilize—and ultimately destroy—the detailed admission structure described above. The President would effectively be able to create new categories of inadmissible aliens by suspending entry of classes he defines, thereby also altering the categories of people admitted to the country.\nDenying entry to classes of aliens based on alleged governmental deficiencies in information-sharing and identity verification also unlawfully extends Congress’s requirements for participation in the Visa Waiver Program to the regular visa application process, where the individual applicant has the burden of proving eligibility. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(3)(B) & (c)(2)(D)–(F) (requiring foreign governments to issue electronic passports, report lost or stolen passports, and share security-related information about its nationals to participate in the Visa Waiver Program) with 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a)-(d), (h) (placing the burden on applicants in the visa application process). When a country ceases to be eligible for Visa Waiver Program (as is true of the countries affected by the Proclamation), its nationals are still eligible to come to the United States if they apply for the relevant visa and go through the careful visa-vetting process. Those visa processes are well defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1202 and cannot be changed by the President unilaterally.\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 41\n\nCongress did not intend to delegate such unlimited discretionary authority under 1182(f). As the District Court observed, “the Proclamation effectively adds new criteria for the issuance of visas and entry by nationals of certain countries beyond those formally imposed by Congress.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 WL 4674314, at 54 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017). The District Court further noted that the Proclamation “imposes significantly more restrictive limitations that go beyond what Congress has previously imposed,” specifically with respect to consequences for foreign governments’ information-sharing practices. Id. at 56. Nevertheless, the District Court improperly rejected the argument that the Proclamation amounts to legislative changes, relying on the language in 1182(f) that allows the President to “impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).\nThe District Court reached the wrong conclusion for at least two reasons. First, the language in 1182(f) about imposing restrictions only applies if there is a finding that entry of any class of aliens would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. As discussed above, the purported findings in the Proclamation do not meet that requirement, and are unexplained and highly suspect, especially given the Proclamation’s background and context. Furthermore, the District Court’s conclusion, which focuses disproportionately on the lack of conflict with the Visa Waiver Program, fails to give due weight to how the Proclamation more\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 41\n\ngenerally undermines the visa categories and inadmissibility grounds set forth by Congress, particularly those pertaining to national security and foreign policy, discussed above.\nC. The INA’s Nondiscrimination Provision Constrains the President’s Delegated Authority Under 1182(f).\nSection 1152(a)(1)(A) of the INA prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality and place of birth in the issuance of immigrant visas. Introduced as part of the Immigration Act of 1965, the INA’s nondiscrimination provision was designed to remedy the “harsh injustice of the national origins quota system.” Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, 546 Pub. Papers 1037, 1038 (Oct. 3, 1965) (noting the national origins quota system “violated the basic principle of American democracy—the principle that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man”); see also Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1997) (discussing enactment of the 1965 Amendments, including “[t]he legislative history surrounding the 1965 Act [which] is replete with the bold anti-discriminatory principles of the Civil Rights Era,” and noting that visas may not be denied through applying prejudicial national stereotypes); Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., supra, 1–10. Congress rejected a proposal to transition gradually away from national origin quotas, preferring instead to require their immediate abolition and to limit the executive’s discretion in the visa allocation process. S.500/H.R. 2580, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Hart-\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 41\n\nCeller, Johnson administration bill); H.R. 8662, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Feighan bill).\nConsidering Congress’s specific intent to repeal the national origin quota and its discriminatory foundation, it is unsurprising that the text of the nondiscrimination provision is succinct and unambiguous: “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). That text is clear and should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning. See Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 2007). The nondiscrimination provision thus reflects a significant step by Congress to end discriminatory immigration practices previously allowed by the INA. It is through that nondiscriminatory lens that the President’s statutory authority must be construed.\nAlthough Congress did create some narrow statutory exceptions to the nondiscrimination provision, none are applicable with regard to the Proclamation.5 Notably, Congress did not choose to exempt from the nondiscrimination provision\n\n5 Most significantly, Congress can discriminate by assigning per-country caps on the number of family and employment-based visas that are issued. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), (2).\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 41\n\nthe President’s authority pursuant to 1182(f). See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953 (2013) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”) (citations omitted)). Further, as the District Court emphasized, none of the exceptions to the nondiscrimination provision grant the President the authority to create his own exceptions. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4674314, at 20 (finding it “highly significant that § 1152(a) explicitly excludes certain sections of the INA from its scope . . . but does not exclude § 1182(f) or § 1185(a)” and pointing to “[t]he absence of any reference to § 1182(f) or § 1185(a) among these exceptions” as “strong evidence that Congress did not intend for those provisions to be exempt from the anti-discrimination provision” (citing, inter alia, United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836 (2001) (“[T]he mention of some implies the exclusion of others not mentioned.”); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2017) (“§ 1152(a)(1)(A)’s non-discrimination mandate cabins the President’s authority under § 1182(f).”)). It is therefore unsurprising that the President’s statutory authority is not exempted from the nondiscrimination provision. There would be no point to a law that proscribes the President from discriminating, except when the President chooses to discriminate.\n\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 41\n\nPresidential authority pursuant to 1182(f) must therefore be construed in conformance with the INA’s nondiscrimination provision. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4674314, at 20 (holding that “the President’s authority under § 1182(f) is limited by the § 1152(a) bar on discrimination based on nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas”). Only then can both statutory provisions be given effect as Congress intended. See Inhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“It is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973) (holding that an interpretation of one statutory provision that renders another provision superfluous “offends the well-settled rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute, if at all possible, are to be given effect”).\nAdditionally, established canons of statutory interpretation dictate that the nondiscrimination provision should cabin 1182(f). See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974) (“[A] specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”). Congress enacted 1152(a)(1) against the backdrop of 1182(f) meaning that1182(f) must be read as limited by the later-enacted nondiscrimination provision. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4674314, at 20 (“Under the canon that a lateradopted provision controls over an earlier one, § 1152(a), enacted in 1965, controls\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 41\n\nover § 1182(f) and the relevant text of § 1185(a)(1), enacted in 1952.” (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981)); see also Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 636 (Thacker, J., concurring) (“The crux of the Government’s argument, however, is that § 1152(a)(1)(A) does not prevent the President, acting pursuant to his § 1182(f) authority, from suspending entry based on nationality, even if that suspension necessarily mandates the denial of immigrant visas based on nationality. This is nonsensical. I find that argument to contravene longstanding canons of statutory construction as well as the text and effect of EO-2 itself.”).\nAlthough the President has the authority to suspend the entry of immigrants “detrimental to the interests of the United States” via 1182(f), he cannot establish blanket prohibitions on entry based solely on nationality. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (“[U]nder 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a), INS has no authority to discriminate on the basis of national origin, except perhaps by promulgating regulations in a time of national emergency.”). Indeed, as noted, the only instances in which the Executive Branch has imposed nationality-based restrictions on entry to the United States—in the context of the bar to entry of Cuban nationals imposed by President Reagan in response to Cuba’s suspension of an immigration agreement and the limitations on entry of Iranians imposed by President Carter in the wake of the Iran Hostage Crisis—were both highly limited in time and in scope. This Proclamation, in contrast, imposes a blanket prohibition\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 41\n\non the issuance of immigrant visas for the named countries, with “no specified end date and no requirement of renewal,” in direct contravention of 1152(a). See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4674314, at 21 (noting that “where the Proclamation now imposes an indefinite travel ban based on nationality, rather than a 90-day ‘pause,’ such an action cannot fairly be construed as a change in ‘procedures’ or the ‘location’ of visa processing,” pursuant to § 1152(a)(1)(B)). To allow such a blanket prohibition would undermine the visa allocation system over which Congress retains authority, and would run afoul of the INA’s nondiscrimination provision.\nCONCLUSION Amici submit that the arguments set forth above show that the INA unambiguously constrains the president’s authority under 1182(f), rendering the Proclamation ultra vires and inconsistent with the statute. Based on the foregoing, Amici respectfully submit that the Court should find the Proclamation ultra vires.\n\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 41\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\nSABRINEH ARDALAN PHILIP L. TORREY* NATHAN MACKENZIE (Law Clerk) DALIA DEAK (Law Student) Harvard Immigration and Refugee\nClinical Program Harvard Law School 6 Everett Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 348-8165 sardalan@law.harvard.edu ptorrey@law.harvard.edu\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Fatma E. Marouf _________________________ FATMA E. MAROUF* Texas A&M Univ. School of Law 1515 Commerce St. Fort Worth, TX 76102 (817) 212-4123 fatma.marouf@law.tamu.edu\n\nGEOFFREY HOFFMAN* University of Houston Law Center 4604 Calhoun Road, Room 56, TU-II Houston, TX 77204 (713) 743-2094 ghoffman@central.uh.edu\n\nALAN HYDE* Rutgers Law School 123 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102 (973) 353-3163 professoralanhyde@gmail.com\n\nKARLA MCKANDERS* Vanderbilt Law School 131 21st Avenue South Nashville, TN 37203 (615) 322-3092\n\nFiled in an individual capacity. University affiliation is for identification only.\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 41\n\nCERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the typeface and type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5)(a) and (a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, using Microsoft Word in Times New Roman 14-point font.\n\nThis brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(5) because it contains 6,022 words. (The maximum number of words is 6,500 for an amicus brief in connection with a principal brief, which has a word limit of 13,000 words under Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)).\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Fatma E. Marouf _____________________ Fatma E. Marouf\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 41\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI hereby certify that on November 17, 2017, I electronically filed the\n\nforegoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for\n\nthe Fourth Circuit using the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\nI certify that all participants in this case are registered CM/ECF users and\n\nthat service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\nDATED: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Fatma E. Marouf _____________________ Fatma E. Marouf\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 100-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1__(_L_),_-_2_2_3_2__, _-2_2__3_3_,_-_2_2_4_0_ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [✔]Pro Bono [ ]Government COUNSEL FOR: _Im__m__ig_r_a_t_io_n__L_a_w__P_r_o_f_e_s_s_o_r_s______________________________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\n\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_F__a_tm__a__E_._M__a_r_o_u_f____________________ (signature)\n\n_F_a_t_m__a_E__. _M_a__ro_u_f_________________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_8_1_7_-_2_1_2_-_4_1_2_3___ Voice Phone\n\n________________________________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_8_1_7_-_2_1_2_-_4_1_2_4___ Fax Number\n\n_3_0_7__W__._7_t_h_S__t._S__u_it_e__L_L_5_0_________________\n\n_F_o__rt_W__o_r_t_h_, _T_X__7_6_1_0_2_____________________ Address\n\n_fa__tm__a_.m__a_r_o_u_f_@__la_w__.t_a_m_u__.e_d_u________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_F_a__tm__a__E_.__M_a__ro_u__f __________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 45\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE\nDIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants-Appellants.\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Maryland, Southern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on next page]\nBRIEF OF CHICAGO, LOS ANGELES, NEW YORK, PHILADELPHIA, AND OTHER CITIES AND COUNTIES, JOINED BY THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS\n\nNICK KAHLON Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP Three First National Plaza 70 W. Madison Street, Suite 2900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 471-8700\nRYAN P. POSCABLO BRIAN NEFF ELIBERTY LOPEZ Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP 1330 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor New York, NY 10019 (212) 660-1030\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae, City of Chicago\n\nEDWARD N. SISKEL Corporation Counsel\nof the City of Chicago BENNA RUTH SOLOMON Deputy Corporation Counsel ANDREW W. WORSECK Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel CARL NEWMAN SARA K. HORNSTRA JONATHON D. BYRER Assistant Corporation Counsel 30 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-7764 benna.solomon@cityofchicago.org\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae, City of Chicago\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 45\n\nMICHAEL N. FEUER City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles 200 N. Main St., 800 CHE Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attorney for City of Los Angeles\nZACHARY W. CARTER Corporation Counsel of the City of New York 100 Church St. New York, NY 10007 Attorney for Mayor & City Council of New York\nSOZI PEDRO TULANTE City Solicitor City of Philadelphia Law Department 1515 Arch St., 17th Fl. Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorney for City of Philadelphia\n\nJOHN DANIEL REAVES 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036 Attorney for The U.S. Conference of Mayors\nAdditional counsel for amici curiae are listed in the appendix to this brief\n\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC)\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his\nofficial capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC)\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants – Appellants.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 45\n\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE\nDIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence,\nDefendants – Appellees.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 45\n\nAdditional Counsel for Amici Curiae\n\nJAMES L. BANKS, Jr. City Attorney 301 King St. Ste. 1300 Alexandria, VA 23214 Attorney for City of Alexandria and Mayor Allison Silberberg\n\nKENNETH W. GORDON Attorney to the Town 2300 Elmwood Ave. Rochester, NY 14618 Attorney for Town of Brighton, NY\n\nANNE L. MORGAN City Attorney City of Austin Law Department P.O. Box 1088 Austin, TX 78767 Attorney for City of Austin\nANDRE M. DAVIS City Solicitor Baltimore City Department of Law 100 Holiday St. Baltimore, MD 21202 Attorney for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore\n\nG. NICHOLAS HERMAN General Counsel The Brough Law Firm, PLLC 1526 E. Franklin St. Ste. 200 Chapel Hill, NC 27514 Attorney for Town of Carrboro\nMATTHEW T. JERZYK City Solicitor 580 Broad St. Central Falls, RI 02863 Attorney for James A. Diossa, Mayor of Central Falls, Rhode Island\n\nEUGENE L. O’FLAHERTY Corporation Counsel 1 City Hall Square, Rm. 615 Boston, MA 02201 Attorney for Boston and Mayor Martin J. Walsh\n\nKIMBERLY M. FOXX State’s Attorney for Cook County 69 W. Washington, 32nd Fl. Chicago, IL 60602 Attorney for Cook County, Illinois\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 45\n\nW. GRANT FARRAR Corporation Counsel City of Evanston Law Department 2100 Ridge Ave. Evanston, IL 60201 Attorney for City of Evanston\nGREGORY L. THOMAS City Attorney 401 Broadway, Ste. 101 Gary, IN 46402 Attorney for City of Gary\nELEANOR M. DILKES City Attorney 410 E. Washington St. Iowa City, IA 52240 Attorney for City of Iowa City\nAARON O. LAVINE City Attorney 108 E. Green St. Ithaca, NY 14850 Attorney for Svante L. Myrick, Mayor of Ithaca\nSUSAN L. SEGAL City Attorney 350 South 5th St., Rm. 210 Minneapolis, MN 55415 Attorney for City of Minneapolis\n\nMICHAEL P. MAY City Attorney 210 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., Rm. 401 Madison, WI 53703 Attorney for City of Madison\nMARC P. HANSEN County Attorney Montgomery County, Maryland 101 Monroe St., 3rd Fl. Rockville, MD 20850 Attorney for Montgomery County\nJON COOPER Director of Law Department of Law Metro Courthouse, Ste. 108 Nashville, TN 37219 Attorney for Mayor Megan Barry, Metropolitan Government of Nashville, and Davidson County\nJOHN ROSE Jr. Corporation Counsel 165 Church St. New Haven, CT 06501 Attorney for City of New Haven and Mayor Toni N. Harp\nBARBARA J. PARKER City Attorney 1 Frank H. Ogawa Plz. 6 Fl. Oakland, CA 94612 Attorney for City of Oakland\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 45\n\nLOURDES SANCHEZ RIDGE City Solicitor Chief Legal Officer 414 Grant St. 3rd Fl. Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Attorney for City of Pittsburgh\nTRACY REEVE City Attorney 430 City Hall 1221 SW Fourth Ave. Portland, OR 97204 Attorney for Portland\nJEFFREY DANA City Solicitor 444 Westminster St. Ste. 220 Providence, RI 02903 Attorney for City of Providence and Mayor Jorge O. Elorza\nBRIAN F. CURRAN Corporation Counsel 30 Church St., Rm. 400A Rochester, NY 14614 Attorney for City of Rochester\nSAMUEL J. CLARK City Attorney 400 City Hall 15 Kellogg Blvd. W Saint Paul, MN 55102 Attorney for City of Saint Paul\n\nDENNIS J. HERRERA San Francisco City Attorney City Attorney’s Office City Hall Room 234 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Pl. San Francisco, CA 94102 Attorney for City and County of San Francisco\nRICHARD DOYLE City Attorney 200 East Santa Clara St. 16th Fl. San José, CA 95113 Attorney for City of San José\nJAMES R. WILLIAMS County Counsel Office of the County Counsel 70 West Hedding St., 9th Fl. San Jose, CA 95110-1770 Attorney for Santa Clara County\nPETER S. HOLMES Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Ave., Ste. 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 Attorney for City of Seattle\nMICHAEL M. LORGE Corporation Counsel 5127 Oakton Ave. Skokie, IL 60077 Attorney for Village of Skokie\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 45\n\nSTEPHANIE STEELE Corporation Counsel Department of Law 227 W. Jefferson Blvd., Suite 1200S South Bend, IN 46601 Attorney for City of South Bend\nMICHAEL RANKIN City Attorney 255 W. Alameda, 7th Fl. P.O. Box 27210 Tucson, AZ 85726-7210 Attorney for City of Tucson\nMICHAEL JENKINS JENKINS & HOGIN, LLP 1230 Rosecrans Ave. Ste. 110 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 Attorney for West Hollywood\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 45\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS _______\n\nPage\n\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1\n\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................. 11\n\nARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 12\n\nI. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS. . ....................................................................................... 13\n\nA. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause. ........... 13\n\n1. The primary purpose of the Proclamation is to discriminate against Muslims. .................................................. 16\n\n2. The asserted national security rationale for the Proclamation is, at best, secondary. .......................................... 19\n\n3. The Proclamation does not cure the serious Establishment Clause violations of the Executive Orders………………...........21\n\nB. The Proclamation Unlawfully Discriminates Based On National Origin.................................................................... 23\n\nII. THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS AN INJUNCTION.. .............................................................................. 28\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 30\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 45\n\nCases\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES _______\n\nPage(s)\n\nAstoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) ........................................................................ 26\n\nChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) ............................................................ 14, 15, 19\n\nEdwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ........................................................................ 15\n\nEpperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) .......................................................................... 14\n\nFDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) ...................................................................25-26\n\nFelix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016) ........................................................ 21\n\nFTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959) ........................................................................ 26\n\nGustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) ........................................................................ 26\n\nHamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ........................................................................ 27\n\nHawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated as moot, No. 16-1540 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017), and vacated and dismissed as moot, No. 17-15589 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2017) ............................................. 25\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 45\n\nHoffman ex rel. NLRB v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen’s Local Union No. 888, 536 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1976) ...................................................24-25\nIRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated and remanded as moot, No. 16-1436 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) ........................................ 15, 17, 22\nJudulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011) .......................................................................... 28\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) .................................................................... 15\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ........................................................................ 15\nKorematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ............................................... 27\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) ........................................................................ 14\nLemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) ........................................................................ 15\nLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) ........................................................................ 14\nMcCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) ............................................................ 13, 19, 21\nOlsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997).................................................. 23, 24\nRadzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) ........................................................................ 26\nU.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ........................................................................ 27\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 45\n\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................ 19\nStatutes, Legislative Materials, and Ordinances 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)...........................................................................24 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328. ......................................................................... 24 Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 2-160-010 ............................................. 9 Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 5-8-010 ................................................. 9 Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 9-115-180 ............................................. 9 Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 13-72-040 ............................................. 9 Municipal Code of Los Angeles Charter § 104(i) ...................................... 9 Municipal Code of Los Angeles Charter § 1024........................................9 Municipal Code of Los Angeles Admin. Code § 4.400 ............................ 10 Municipal Code of Los Angeles Admin. Code § 10.8 .............................. 10 Municipal Code of Los Angeles Admin. Code § 10.13 ............................ 10 New York City Charter § 900..................................................................10 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 4-116....................................................................10 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107....................................................................10 Philadelphia Code § 9-1101.....................................................................10 Philadelphia Code § 9-1103.....................................................................10 Philadelphia Code § 9-1106.....................................................................10 Philadelphia Code § 9-1108.....................................................................10 Other Sources Immigrants & Competitive Cities, Americas Society/Council of the\nAmericas, http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/ ImmigrantsandCompetitiveCities.pdf ............................................. 2\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 45\n\nAlan Berube, These communities have a lot at stake in Trump’s executive order on immigration, http://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/01/30/thesecommunities-have-a-lot-at-stake-in-trumps-executive-order-onimmigration ...................................................................................... 2\nCommunity Policing Defined, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (rev. 2014), http://ric-zaiinc.com/Publications/cops-p157-pub.pdf .......................................... 7\nDHS Announces Expansion of the Securing the Cities Program, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/14/dhs-announces-expansionsecuring-cities-program ................................................................... 7\nSally Herships, Trump’s travel ban worries international students, http://www.marketplace.org/2017/02/08/world/overseasstudents .......................................................................................... 10\nTed Hesson, Why American Cities Are Fighting to Attract Immigrants, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/us-citiesimmigrants-economy/398987/ (NYC, LA, Houston, and Chicago are roughly 1/5 of GDP).................................................................... 2\nJohn F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants 3 (Harper rev. ed. 2008) ................................................................ 5, 23\nJames Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 8 The Papers of James Madison 299 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1973) ........................................................ 13\nJohn Maxfield, More Foreign Visitors Say ‘No Thanks’ to U.S. as a Destination, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/10/21/afoolish-take-the-us-tourism-slump/106719412/. .............................. 4\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 45\n\nDavid Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 Law & Soc’y Rev. 635 (Sept. 2005), http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/73848/j.15 40-5893.2005.00236.x.pdf?sequence=1 .........................................6-7\nNational Travel and Tourism Office, “Non-Resident Arrivals to the United States: World Region of Residence,” available at http://travel.trade.gov/view/m-2017-I-001/index.asp ...................... 5\nUpdate: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Month Following the Election, http://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update1094-bias-related-incidents-month-following-election .................... 9\nKristen Schorsch, How Trump’s Travel Ban Could Hit Medical Tourism Hard, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170201/news03/1702099 96/how-trumps-travel-ban-could-hit-medical-tourism-hard ........... 5\nMitch Silber and Adam Frey, Detect, Disrupt, and Detain: Local Law Enforcement’s Critical Roles in Combating Homegrown Terrorism and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2508&con text=ulj ............................................................................................. 6\nShivani Vora, After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines, http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/aftertravel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html............... 4\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 45\n\nSTATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 ______________\nAmici include some of the largest cities and counties in the United States. The U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM), founded in 1932, is the official nonpartisan organization of all U.S. cities with a population of more than 30,000 people, which presently includes over 1,400 cities. Each city is represented in USCM by its chief elected official, the mayor. Amici are categorically opposed to the travel bans adopted by the Trump Administration, including the current iteration, Proclamation 9645 (“the Proclamation”), which discriminates invidiously on the basis of religion and national origin and will significantly undermine the safety, economic well-being, and social cohesion in our communities and across the United States.\nOur cities are heavily dependent on the contributions of\n\n1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), amici state that no counsel for any party authored this brief, in whole or in part, and no person other than amici contributed monetarily to its preparation or submission.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 45\n\nimmigrants.2 Of the 16.6 million residents of Chicago, Los Angeles,\nNew York City, and Philadelphia, more than five million are\nimmigrants, who hail from 150 countries.3 These cities account for\nalmost one-fifth of the Nation’s gross domestic product.4 As of 2015,\napproximately 210,200 residents in the Chicago, Los Angeles, and New\nYork City metropolitan areas were born in four of the Muslim-majority\ncountries targeted by the Proclamation.5\nChicago, Los Angeles, and New York City are some of their\njurisdictions’ largest employers, collectively employing approximately\n365,000 people. In New York City, 34% of city workers are foreign-\n2 Immigrants & Competitive Cities, Americas Society/Council of the Americas, http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/ ImmigrantsandCompetitiveCities.pdf.\n3 Support for the data cited is in the appendix to this brief.\n4 Ted Hesson, Why American Cities Are Fighting to Attract Immigrants, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/us-citiesimmigrants-economy/398987/ (NYC, LA, Houston, and Chicago are roughly 1/5 of GDP).\n5 Alan Berube, These communities have a lot at stake in Trump’s executive order on immigration, http://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/01/30/thesecommunities-have-a-lot-at-stake-in-trumps-executive-order-onimmigration.\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 45\n\nborn; in Los Angeles, 22% are. Immigrants also make up a substantial portion of our cities’ private workforces: 46% of the 4.3 million workers in New York; 26.5% of the 1.27 million workers in Chicago; and approximately 17% of the 640,000 workers in Philadelphia. At least 12,500 private employees work on international visas in Chicago, which is also home to more than 100,000 immigrant entrepreneurs. Immigrants are a majority of New York City’s business owners; 44% in Los Angeles; 27% in Chicago; and 14% in Philadelphia.\nChicago and Los Angeles welcome and resettle some of the largest numbers of refugees in the United States. In 2016, approximately 2,091 refugees resettled in the Chicago area, including nearly 764 from the targeted countries. 2,322 resettled in the Los Angeles area, including 1,808 from Iran alone. 794 refugees arrived in Philadelphia, including 253 from the targeted countries. Approximately 1,300 refugees resettled in New York City from October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2016. And from October 1, 2016 through September 2017, our cities have become home to more than 3,000 refugees.\nChicago, Los Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia also operate or are served by large international airports. More than 400\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 45\n\ninternational flights, bringing more than 60,000 passengers, arrive daily in Chicago and Los Angeles alone. Tourism in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia generates roughly $70 billion a year in local revenue. In 2016, our cities hosted more than 20 million foreign visitors, who spent an estimated $6.3 billion in Los Angeles County, and $1.88 billion in Chicago. As a result of the travel bans, Los Angeles stands to lose an estimated $736 million and New York expects to lose $600 million.6 More generally, following EO-1, “the demand for travel to the United States took a nosedive, according to data from several travel companies and research firms.”7 The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that for the first five months of 2017, the number of international visitors fell by 5% overall, and 25-30% from Africa and the\n\n6 John Maxfield, More Foreign Visitors Say ‘No Thanks’ to U.S. as a Destination, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/10/21/a-foolishtake-the-us-tourism-slump/106719412/.\n7 Shivani Vora, After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines, http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declininginterest-trips-to-united-states.html.\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 45\n\nMiddle East.8 Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia together\nhave 162 four-year colleges and universities, with approximately 100,000 international students. Chicago is also home to 44 major hospitals, and Philadelphia is home to 29, which serve thousands of international patients a year. The Middle East is the top source of patients traveling to the U.S. for medical care.9\nLike the two Executive Orders before it, the Proclamation is as misguided as it is unconstitutional. Our cities serve as gateways for immigrants and refugees starting new lives in America. And when they have come, “[e]verywhere immigrants have enriched and strengthened the fabric of American life.”10 Indeed, perhaps uniquely in the world, the identity of American cities has been forged from the toil of\n8 National Travel and Tourism Office, “Non-Resident Arrivals to the United States: World Region of Residence,” available at http://travel.trade.gov/view/m-2017-I-001/index.asp. 9 Kristen Schorsch, How Trump’s Travel Ban Could Hit Medical Tourism Hard, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/ 20170201/news03/170209996/how-trumps-travel-ban-could-hit-medicaltourism-hard. 10 John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants 3 (Harper rev. ed. 2008).\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 45\n\nimmigrants. But beyond our ideals, the Proclamation subverts the very\nnational security purpose it claims to serve. With decades of experience policing neighborhoods that are home to immigrant populations, amici are keenly and uniquely aware that frightened or ostracized residents are reluctant to report crimes, against themselves or others, or behavior that should, in the interest of safety and national security, be reported as suspicious. Although this hurts the entire Nation, the effects on amici are especially profound. Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, and the other amici, as financial, political, and cultural hubs, draw unique attention from individuals looking to cause harm in this country. Additionally, local law enforcement officers play an increasingly important role in detecting and protecting against national security threats. For these and other reasons, cities are a crucial part of the first-line defense against terrorism.11 And to serve these purposes,\n11 E.g., Mitch Silber and Adam Frey, Detect, Disrupt, and Detain: Local Law Enforcement’s Critical Roles in Combating Homegrown Terrorism and the Evolving Terrorist Threat, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2508&context= ulj; David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, (cont. . . .)\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 45\n\nour cities must be able to work with everyone in our diverse communities. Even at the strictly local level, the safety and security of our residents and visitors depends upon cooperation between the residents and local police. The U.S. Department of Justice’s own Office of Community Oriented Policing Services has emphasized this fact time and again.12 In short, by targeting immigrants based on religion and national origin, the Proclamation undermines trust between our law enforcement agencies and our immigrant communities, which in turn makes all of our residents and visitors, and indeed everyone in the country, less safe.\nOvert discrimination presents other dangers. Immigrant residents of our cities who feel unwelcome are more likely to cut themselves off from public life and participation in public programs.\n(. . . cont.) 39 Law & Soc’y Rev. 635 (Sept. 2005), http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/73848/j.15405893.2005.00236.x.pdf?sequence=1; DHS Announces Expansion of the Securing the Cities Program, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/14/dhsannounces-expansion-securing-cities-program. 12 E.g., Community Policing Defined, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (rev. 2014), http://ric-zaiinc.com/Publications/cops-p157-pub.pdf.\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 45\n\nThey may refuse to participate in public health programs such as vaccinations or to seek medical care for contagious diseases. They may keep their children out of school to avoid harassment and stay away from mosques because of the fear that they will be unsafe. These effects will not be limited to individuals from the targeted countries. Thousands of other Muslims in the amici cities and counties have reason to worry that the public will embrace the anti-Muslim stance embodied in the Proclamation. It therefore places millions of people at risk of harm or being driven underground, which makes both those residents and our cities less safe.\nWorse still, the message that citizens of majority-Muslim countries threaten national security conveys that members of those communities, and other immigrant communities, are to be distrusted and feared. Thus, targeting Muslims makes these residents more vulnerable to victimization, and adds to the difficulty local governments face in trying to provide protection. At the extreme, this climate gives rise to hate crimes. The Southern Poverty Law Center reports that in the 34 days following the 2016 presidential election, there were 1,094 hate crimes and lesser hate incidents; 315 were categorized as anti-\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 45\n\nimmigrant, and 112 as anti-Muslim.13 In cities across the country, hate crimes have risen dramatically since that election. New York City reported twice the number of hate crime incidents in the three months after the election compared to the same period a year prior. In Los Angeles, hate crime incidents doubled in the month following the election. And in the first five weeks of 2017, the number of hate crimes recorded in Chicago was more than triple the number for the same period in 2016. Philadelphia received more reports of hate crimes in the first half of 2017 than in all of 2016, and, at that rate will see more hate crimes in 2017 than in the previous three years combined.\nThe Proclamation also undermines local laws prohibiting discrimination based on religion and national origin, among other invidious grounds, in all aspects of life – housing, employment, public accommodation, transportation, schooling, and government services. E.g., Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. §§ 2-160-010, 5-8-010, 9-115-180, 13-72-040; Los Angeles Charter §§ 104(i), 1024; Los Angeles Admin.\n13 Update:1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Month Following the Election, http://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094bias-related-incidents-month-following-election.\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 45\n\nCode §§ 4.400, 10.8, 10.13; New York City Charter § 900; N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 4-116; 8-107; Philadelphia Code §§ 9-1101, 9-1103, 9-1106, 91108. Such laws reflect amici’s strong commitment to equal rights, as well as their belief that diversity enriches us and diminishes no one. The Proclamation’s blatant discrimination turns the clock back on civil rights.\nFinally, the Proclamation deprives our communities and our residents of the opportunity to interact with persons from the targeted countries, including not just people who are barred but others who decide not to travel to the United States, much less to live here. These individuals enrich us with their customs and celebrations, their hard work and perseverance, and their unique skills and training. Our cities would be bereft without them. Foreign residents and students also make an immeasurable contribution to America’s ability to participate in the global economy, among other reasons because fewer than half of Americans have passports.14 Thus, many Americans become acquainted with other cultures only if visitors and students from foreign\n14 Sally Herships, Trump’s travel ban worries international students, http://www.marketplace.org/2017/02/08/world/overseas-students.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 45\n\ncountries come here. Amici file this brief to urge the court to affirm the district court’s\npreliminary injunction. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ________\nDefendants have failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction.\nThe district court properly recognized that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause. The record presents compelling evidence that the Proclamation continues to be motivated by President Trump’s stated belief that “Islam hates us” and his related desire to exclude Muslims. Broadcast many times and in many ways, the President’s anti-Muslim message has been clear and consistent. Accordingly, the national security considerations defendants cite are, at best, a secondary consideration. In addition, the Proclamation’s minor modifications to the prior travel bans fall far short of curing the prior, egregious Establishment Clause violations.\n\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 45\n\nThe Proclamation also unlawfully discriminates based on national origin. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 prohibits this arbitrary, blanket discrimination.\nPlaintiffs, and amici, would be greatly harmed if the Proclamation were not enjoined. In contrast, the injunction does not prevent defendants from individually vetting those who apply for entry from the targeted countries. The district court appropriately balanced the interests on both sides in issuing the injunction.\nARGUMENT ________\nLike the EOs, the Proclamation continues to ban immigration by most individuals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. It adds most individuals from Chad, another Muslim-majority country. And it adds perhaps a few hundred from North Korea and Venezuela—the only two countries that are not predominately Muslim. Thus, the vast majority of people affected by the Proclamation are Muslim.\nThe Proclamation’s minor changes from EO-2 are mere decoration—foreign policy non-sequiturs strung together in a single document to attempt to cast it as something other than round three of\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 45\n\ninvidious discrimination based on religious and national origin. The district court properly enjoined it. I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT\nPLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS. A. The Proclamation Violates The Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause prohibits any “law respecting an establishment of religion.” It enshrines, in the first words of the First Amendment, the special protection that the Framers intended for religion to have from governmental compulsion. Those words were “written by the descendants of people who had come to this land precisely so that they could practice their religion freely,” and were “designed to safeguard the freedom of conscience and belief that those immigrants had sought.” McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 8 The Papers of James Madison 299 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1973) (“The Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”).\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 45\n\nConsistent with these principles, the “clearest command” of the Establishment Clause is that the government cannot favor or disfavor one religion over another. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); accord Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1993) (“In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion . . . .”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (Establishment Clause “forbids hostility toward any [religion]”); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (“[T]he State may not adopt programs or practices . . . which aid or oppose any religion. This prohibition is absolute.”) (internal citations and quotation omitted).\nThe Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause by disfavoring Muslims. Five of the targeted countries are, as in EO-2, Muslim-majority countries, and now there is a sixth, Chad, as well. That the Proclamation does not explicitly reference Islam is beside the point. The Establishment Clause “extends beyond facial discrimination” and “protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt. The Court must survey meticulously the\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 45\n\ncircumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were,\nreligious gerrymanders.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (citation and\nquotation omitted).\nConsistent with this Court’s conclusion in the prior travel ban\nappeal, IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 592 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc),\nvacated and remanded as moot, No. 16-1436 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017), the\ndistrict court found that the facially legitimate reason for the\nProclamation defendants claimed is not bona fide. R. 46 at 64-65. The\ncourt then assessed the Proclamation under the three-part test of\nLemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).15 If a policy fails any\npart, it violates the Establishment Clause, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482\nU.S. 578, 583 (1987), and here, the Proclamation fails at least the first.\nAs the district court recognized, there is every indication that the\npredominant purpose of the Proclamation was religious discrimination,\n15 Defendants urge reliance on Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). First Cross-Appeal Brief for Appellants [“Trump Br.”] 40-42. These cases did not involve limits the Establishment Clause imposes on the federal government’s immigration powers. Instead, both cases involved discretionary decisions made by executive officers to admit or deny specific aliens under statutory immigration restrictions, the constitutionality of which was not challenged.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 45\n\nand that the stated secular purpose of protecting national security was, at best, a secondary consideration. JA 1065-76. Moreover, the district court properly found that the Proclamation does not adequately cure the serious Establishment Clause violations in the earlier Executive Orders.\n1. The primary purpose of the Proclamation is to discriminate against Muslims.\nPresident Trump’s formal statement calling for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” JA 135, was a defining moment of his campaign, and a policy position he defended by asserting that “Islam hates us,” JA 305.16 Just one week after swearing the oath of office, he moved to turn that campaign rhetoric into official policy, banning travel to the United States from seven Muslim-majority countries. After EO-1 was enjoined on due process grounds, President Trump issued EO-2—a measure that made minor technical changes to EO-1, but preserved the ban on entry of\n16 Campaign statements may not always evince intent, since candidates sometimes pledge one thing and do another once elected. But here, President Trump confirmed the discriminatory purpose of his travel bans after taking office—and they have functioned exactly as he promised when campaigning.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 45\n\nnationals from six of these seven countries.17 All the while, he repeatedly confirmed that these Executive Orders spring from the same discriminatory well as his campaign promise. He declared, for example, that EO-2 was “a watered down version of the first one” and lamented that “we ought to go back to the first one and go all the way.” JA 780. After reviewing this and other evidence, this Court rightly concluded that “[t]he evidence in the record, viewed from the standpoint of the reasonable observer, creates a compelling case that EO-2’s primary purpose is religious.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594.\nThe Proclamation is nothing more than a repackaged version of the same discriminatory policy. As the district court noted, “the underlying architecture of the prior Executive Orders and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same.” JA 1067. Moreover, the impact of the Proclamation again “closely aligns with religious affiliation.” JA 1066. Indeed, of the eight countries whose citizens are now banned, five are the same Muslim-majority countries that have been banned from the beginning, and another Muslim-majority country,\n17 Defendants omit EO-1 from their statement of facts.\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 45\n\nChad, has been added. Adding fewer than 100 North Korean citizens, JA 1066, and\ncertain Venezuelan officials and their families, does not change this. These additions are window dressing. They reflect entirely different foreign policy concerns from those defendants claim as a basis for the list of Muslim countries. North Korea is a rogue state, and Venezuela is hostile to the United States. And even then, these restrictions are nearly pointless. North Korean citizens do not emigrate in any event; and only certain Venezuelan government officials and their families are barred—private Venezuelan citizens are not. Indeed, defendants themselves recognize that the Proclamation’s collection of countries serves different interests. Trump Br. 11. Thus, these separate agenda items cannot conceal the religious motivation for targeting the Muslim countries. That the Proclamation also bars a small number of nonMuslims from the targeted Muslim countries likewise does not matter. That makes its religious gerrymander imprecise and inefficient; it does not make it constitutional. Overwhelmingly, the Proclamation operates to exclude Muslims from entering the United States, precisely as President Trump has long promised. Collateral damage to non-\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 45\n\nMuslims is not evidence of a secular purpose. Thus, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation\nshares the same primary purpose as its predecessors: discrimination against adherents of Islam.\n2. The asserted national security rationale for the Proclamation is, at best, secondary.\nIt is of no moment that the Proclamation professes a national security purpose, or that it lacks an explicit religious preference. “Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534. Instead, it is “the duty of the courts” to distinguish a “sincere” secular purpose from one that is a “sham,” or that is “secondary” to a “predominately religious” purpose. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862.\nThe Proclamation’s asserted national security interests are suspect. The observation the Ninth Circuit made in reviewing EO-1— that there is “no evidence that any alien from any of the countries named in the Order has perpetrated a terrorist attack in the United States,” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017)—\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 45\n\nremains true with respect to the countries targeted by the Proclamation. Nor is there a legitimate concern that individuals from those countries present a heightened risk of perpetrating such an attack in the future; to the contrary, numerous former national security officials have attested that there is no national security rationale for these measures against the targeted Muslim-majority countries. JA 879-85, 892-903. Although defendants now argue that the Proclamation is the independent product of DHS Review, Trump Br. 8-10, 40, 48-49, the district court found that the evidence indicates that this outcome “was at least partially pre-ordained,” JA 1068. Moreover, the information-sharing deficiencies the Proclamation identifies do not establish the need for “the specific response of an unprecedented, sweeping nationality-based travel ban against majority-Muslim nations.” JA 1072.\nThus, a reasonable observer would conclude that national security considerations are secondary to President Trump’s stated purpose to discriminate against Muslims.\n\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 45\n\n3. The Proclamation does not cure the serious Establishment Clause violations of the Executive Orders.\nDHS Review and the Proclamation’s modifications to EO-2 are also insufficient because “the Government’s cure must be made ‘as persuasively as the initial’ violation.” JA 1075 (quoting Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016)). McCreary rejected the argument that the two defendant counties remedied their earlier Establishment Clause violation by modifying their courthouse displays of the Ten Commandments to add certain historical documents, such as the Declaration of Independence. The Court declined to limit its focus to only “the last in a series of governmental actions, however close they may all be in time and subject.” 545 U.S. at 866. Noting that the counties had failed to repudiate their earlier resolutions endorsing the religious message of the displays, id. at 871-72, the Court concluded that a reasonable observer would not “swallow the claim that the Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays,” id. at 872.\nAs in McCreary, the Administration’s remedial efforts fall far short when assessed in light of the egregious Establishment Clause\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 45\n\nviolations of the Executive Orders. Those Orders barred entry of millions of members of what is a religious minority in this country—and that action was closely tied to explicit statements of animus towards that religious group. See generally IRAP, 857 F.3d at 572 (concluding that EO-2 “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination”). This frontal assault on the Establishment Clause came from the President himself. It was the focus of extensive nationwide attention, and applied nationwide.\nThe Proclamation is weak medicine for the serious harm wrought by the EOs. For example, the President has failed to make any “public statements showing any change in [his] intentions relating to a Muslim ban.” JA 1073. Rather, as the district court found, the Proclamation “doubles down on” the Orders’ fundamental approach. JA 1068.\nAs important, defendants seem to misunderstand what is needed to break with the past. Merely offering new justifications, even if they are non-discriminatory, for past actions that were driven by discriminatory animus does not suffice. That is why adding nonreligious documents to a religious display did not cure the violation in McCreary. Just so here—adding two non-Muslim countries to a Muslim\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 45\n\nban does not change or even obscure the ban’s purpose. That purpose was set at the outset and remains the purpose today.\nAccordingly, the district court properly found that defendants failed to purge the taint of the prior Establishment Clause violations.\nB. The Proclamation Unlawfully Discriminates Based On National Origin.\nDefendants’ claim that the Proclamation is not a religious ban at all but one based on national origin does not save it. To the contrary, the discrimination based on national origin violates the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”). “During most of its history, the United States openly discriminated against individuals on the basis of race and national origin in its immigration laws.” Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1997). But, as President Kennedy noted, “the national origins quota system ha[d] strong overtones of an indefensible racial preference.” John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants 45 (Harper rev. ed 2008). Accordingly, “[t]hroughout the latter half of the Twentieth Century, Congress moved away from such discriminatory policies. The most profound change was the [INA],” which “eliminated discrimination on the basis of race and national\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 45\n\norigin.” Olsen, 990 F. Supp. at 37; see also 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3328 (quoting S. Rep. No. 89-748) (principal purpose of INA was “to repeal the national origin quota provisions of the [INA], and to substitute a new system for the selection of immigrants to the United States”). The INA could not be more clear: “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Moreover, “[t]he legislative history surrounding the [INA] is replete with the bold antidiscriminatory principles of the Civil Rights Era. Indeed, the [INA] was passed alongside the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” Olsen, 990 F. Supp. at 37. The Proclamation directly violates section 1152(a).\nTo be sure, the President has broad authority over the entry of aliens generally under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). But for a number of reasons, section 1182(f) does not permit the Proclamation’s discrimination.\nFirst, section 1182(f) authorizes the President to “suspend” the entry of aliens under certain circumstances. “The word ‘suspend’ connotes a temporary deferral.” Hoffman ex rel. NLRB v. Beer Drivers\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 45\n\n& Salesmen’s Local Union No. 888, 536 F.2d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1976). Unlike the prior EOs, however, “the Proclamation has effectively imposed a permanent, rather than temporary, ban on immigrants from the Designated Countries.” JA 1038. Thus, section 1182(f) does not apply.\nIn any event, defendants’ reliance on section 1182(f) fails because, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in its ruling on EO-2, “§ 1152(a)(1)(A)’s non-discrimination mandate cabins the President’s authority under § 1182(f).” Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 779 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated as moot, No. 16-1540 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017), and vacated and dismissed as moot, No. 17-15589 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2017). Section 1152(a)’s prohibition on discrimination was enacted after section 1182(f) and is properly understood as a limitation on the authority granted under section 1182(f) to suspend entry. “[T]he meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.\n\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 45\n\n120, 133 (2000).18 Thus, although section 1182(f) grants the President\nauthority to suspend entry of a class of immigrants whose entry “would\nbe detrimental to the interests of the United States,” section 1152\ndeclares Congress’s determination that it is not in the national interest\nto discriminate based upon national origin. This reading also construes\nthese provisions “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,”\nGustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995), and “fit[s] all parts\ninto an harmonious whole,” FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385,\n389 (1959). By contrast, to read section 1182(f) as though section\n1152(a) did not exist is inconsistent with settled rules of statutory\nconstruction and should be rejected. E.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan\nAss’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991) (“[W]e construe statutes,\nwhere possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts\n18 Defendants argue that section 1185(a)(1) should prevail as the more recent provision because it was amended after the enactment of section 1152(a). Trump Br. 38. That claim should be rejected. The amendment of section 1185(a)(1) did not address the specific subject of discrimination based on nationality in the issuance of an immigrant visa. “It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 45\n\nthereof.”). Because section 1182(f) is constrained by section 1152(a),\nsection 1182(f) no more empowers the President to discriminate on\nnational origin than it allows him to suspend immigration by women.19\nIn addition, section 1182(f) should be read in light of the grounds\nfor denial of admission for terrorist activity that are specifically set\nforth in section 1182(a)(3)(B). That provision mandates an\nindividualized inquiry; it does not authorize blanket exclusion based\nsolely on the applicant’s nation of origin.\nEven considering section 1182(f) in isolation, the Proclamation’s\nexclusion of immigrants from the designated countries, solely because of\nthe happenstance of their birthplace, cannot stand. The plain language\n19 The Court should reject defendants’ assertion that invoking section 1152(a) to limit the President’s authority under section 1182(f) raises “serious constitutional concerns.” Trump Br. 34, 36. Defendants cite U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950), for the proposition that rules concerning the admission of aliens draw on “inherent executive power,” as well as legislation, Trump Br. 53, ignoring the Court’s recognition in Knauff itself that “[n]ormally Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States,” 338 U.S. at 543. As for defendants’ specter that the President might sometime act on the “brink of war,” Trump Br.36, that is not the situation here. In any event, the Supreme Court has emphasized that even “a state of war is not a blank check for the President.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). See also Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Cal. 1984).\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 45\n\nof section 1182(f) requires a determination that the entry of aliens or a class of aliens is “detrimental to the interests of the United States,” and here it is simply not possible to say that every single person, or even a majority of persons, born in the targeted countries presents a security risk to the United States. Most obviously, this group includes people who left their birthplace as infants or children, and perhaps had parents who were not citizens of their children’s birthplace country. These individuals could have lived nearly their entire lives in countries that even defendants do not think present any risk to the United States, and yet they are banned solely because of where they were born. Even on immigration matters, discretion must be exercised “in a reasoned manner.” Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). The Proclamation’s classification based on national origin is not rational. II. THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS AN\nINJUNCTION. Defendants have failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. In contrast to the specific, concrete harms that plaintiffs would sustain if the Proclamation were\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 45\n\nnot enjoined, defendants identify no actual irreparable harm from the injunction. They rely upon the general proposition that the interests of the public are impaired “by barring effectuation of a judgment of the President,” Trump Br. 3, but the district court properly determined that “Defendants are not directly harmed by a preliminary injunction preventing them from enforcing a Proclamation likely to be found unconstitutional,” JA 1077. Moreover, even with the injunction in place, visa applicants from the targeted countries still will be screened through the standard, individualized vetting process. JA 1078.\nAccordingly, amici urge the Court to affirm the preliminary injunction.\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 45\n\nCONCLUSION ________\nThe district court’s preliminary injunction should be affirmed.\nRespectfully submitted,\ns/Benna Ruth Solomon\n\nNICK KAHLON Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP Three First National Plaza 70 W. Madison Street, Suite 2900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 471-8700 nkahlon@rshc-law.com\nRYAN P. POSCABLO BRIAN NEFF ELIBERTY LOPEZ Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP 1330 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor New York, NY 10019 (212) 660-1030 rposcablo@rshc-law.com\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae, City of Chicago\n\nEDWARD N. SISKEL Corporation Counsel\nof the City of Chicago BENNA RUTH SOLOMON Deputy Corporation Counsel ANDREW W. WORSECK Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel CARL NEWMAN SARA K. HORNSTRA JONATHON D. BYRER Assistant Corporation Counsel 30 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-7764 benna.solomon@cityofchicago.org Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, City of Chicago\n\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 45\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that on November 17, 2017, I electronically filed\nthe foregoing Brief and Appendix of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York,\nPhiladelphia, and Other Cities and Counties joined by the U.S.\nConference of Mayors as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs with the\nClerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth\nCircuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.\nParticipants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be\nserved by the appellate CM/ECF system.\ns/Benna Ruth Solomon BENNA RUTH SOLOMON Deputy Corporation Counsel\nof the City of Chicago 30 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-7764 benna.solomon@cityofchicago.org\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 45 of 45\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief and appendix comply with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because they use a proportionally spaced typeface (Century Schoolbook) in 14-point using Microsoft Word. The brief and appendix comply with the type-volume limits of Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(5) because they together contain no more than 7,088 words, which is less than half of the 15,300 words allowed for principal briefs under Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(e)(2)(B)(i).\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 12\n\n___________________________________________________\nAPPENDIX ___________________________________________________\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 12\n\nCHICAGO\nThe population of the City of Chicago is 2,717,534.20\nChicago has residents from more than 127 foreign countries.21\nAt least 572,066 of our residents are immigrants.22\nApproximately 5,600 of Chicago’s residents were born in Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.23\nApproximately 1.27 million people are employed in Chicago.24 Of those, 26.5% are foreign-born immigrants,25 including an estimated 976 noncitizen immigrants from the six targeted countries.26 The City of Chicago itself employs more than 32,000 people.27\nApproximately 27% of Chicago’s business owners are immigrants,28 of whom an estimated 0.7% come from the six targeted countries.29\n20 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey PUMS 1-Year 2016 Data. 24 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dhr/dataset/ current_employeenames%salariesandpositiontitles.html 28 https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/newamericans-illinois. 29 Id.\nA2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 12\n\nAt least 12,500 private employees work in Chicago on international visas.30\nIn 2016, approximately 2,091 refugees were resettled in our city, including 764 from the six targeted Muslim-majority countries.31\nChicago has 34 four-year colleges and universities, and these have more than 13,789 international students in the 2015-16 academic year.32 City Colleges of Chicago (CCC) has 7 colleges, and these had approximately 338 international students in the 2016-17 academic year. Of these, 145 CCC students were born in, arrived on visas from, or are nationals of the six countries.33\nThe tourism sector of Chicago’s local economy accounts for $911 million a year in local tax revenue and $2.3 billion in hotel revenue alone.34\nOn any given day, 232 flights arrive at Chicago airports from international destinations, bringing 31,856 passengers.35\nEach international flight arrival yields approximately $212,000 in local economic impact.36\n30 http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/ (by destination and nationality). 31 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Office of Admissions – Refugee Processing Center, available at http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/. 32 http://www.collegesimply.com/colleges/illinois/chicago/four-yearcolleges/; http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/OpenDoors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-US-State/2016%-%.WJe7MrYrJTY. 33 Jeff Donoghue, CCC (includes Credit students only). 34 Alfred Orendorff (ChooseChicago). 35 http://www.flychicago.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/OHare/AboutUs/ Facts and Figures/Air Traffic Data/1216%ORD%SUMMARY.pdf. 36 Jonathan Leach, Chicago Department of Aviation.\nA3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 12\n\nIn 2016, Chicago welcomed 54.1 million visitors,37 1.62 million of whom visited from overseas.38 Approximately 1000 international visitors were from the six targeted countries.39\nIn 2015, tourism brought $14.66 billion in direct spending to Chicago. Spending by international visitors to Chicago is estimated at $1.88 billion per year. This generates $112 million in state and local tax revenues annually.40\nThe average overseas visitor spends about $2,313 per trip while visiting Chicago.41\nTourists from the six countries account for an estimated $1.25 million of local economic impact per year.42\nChicago is home to 44 major hospitals,43 which serve thousands of international patients a year, and the Middle East is the top source of patients traveling to the U.S. for medical care.44\n37 https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/ press_releases/2016/april/Mayor-Choose-Chicago-Announce-RecordTourism-2015.html. 38 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Travel and Tourism Office, http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/ 2015_States_and_Cities.pdf. 39 Alfred Orendorff (ChooseChicago). 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 http://www.ihatoday.org/uploadDocs/1/hospcounty.pdf; https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cdph/supp_info/clinical_healt h/Find_a_clinic.html. 44 http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170201/news03/ 170209996/how-trumps-travel-ban-could-hit-medical-tourism-hard.\nA4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 12\n\nThe City of Chicago established the Chicago Legal Protection Fund (“the Fund”) to increase legal services for immigrant communities across the city.45 $1.3 million has been allocated to the Fund for FY2017 to support organizations – including Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center (NIJC) and the Resurrection Project (TRP) – that will serve more than 20,000 immigrants through community-based outreach, education, legal consultations, and legal representation, including courtroom representation.46\nNIJC also received $150,000 from the City of Chicago for FY2017 for its Immigrant Children’s Protection Project, which provides legal services to unaccompanied children held in Chicago-area shelters.47\nIn calendar year 2016, NIJC and TRP represented clients from at least 132 countries, including clients from each of the six targeted countries.48\nIn Chicago, there were twice as many arrests for hate crimes in the three months after the election than during the same period in the prior year.49\nIn the first five weeks of 2017, the number of hate crimes recorded in Chicago was more than triple the number for the same period in 2016. Additionally, hate crimes categorized as anti-Muslim or anti-Arab hit five-year highs in Chicago in 2016.50\n45 Seemi Choudry, Director of Office of New Americans, City of Chicago. 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Brandon Nemec, Mayor’s Office liaison with Chicago Police Department. 50 Zak Koeske, Hate crimes in Chicago rose 20 percent in 2016, marking 5-year high, police data show, Chicago Tribune (Mar. 3, 2017).\nA5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 12\n\nNEW YORK CITY\nThe population of New York City is 8,537,673 as of 2016.51\nWe have residents from more than 150 foreign countries.52\nNew York City is home to over 3 million foreign-born New Yorkers, about 37% of the City’s population. Approximately 49% of New Yorkers speak a language other than English at home.53\nNew York City is home to an estimated 33,792 individuals born in Chad, Yemen, Syria, Iran, Somalia, and Libya.54\nApproximately 4.1 million people are employed in New York City; of those, 46% are foreign-born immigrants.55 New York City itself employs 287,000 people,56 34% of them foreign-born.57\n51% of New York City’s business owners are immigrants.58\nAbout 1,300 refugees have been resettled in New York City between October 1, 2012 and September 30, 2017, according to federal data.59 76 refugees from the targeted countries resettled in the city in 2016 alone.\n51 U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates. 52 Id. 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 Id. 56 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/nyregion/bill-de-blasiogovernment-jobs.html?_r=0. 57 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. 58 Our Immigrant Population Helps Power NYC Economy, Comptroller Scott Stringer, 2017.\nA6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 12\n\nThe tourism sector of New York City’s local economy includes direct visitor spending in 2016 of $43 billion.60\nIn 2016, New York City welcomed 60.5 million visitors, including 12.7 million foreign visitors.61\nNew York City has 87 four-year colleges and universities, and these have approximately 47,000 international students.62\nIn the six months following the President’s first travel ban executive order in January, NYPD Hate Crime Task Force data show 215 incidents of bias crime have occurred in the city. This is an increase of 31% when compared to the same timeframe last year.63\n\n59 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrants Office of Admissions—Refugee Processing Center. 60 http://www.nycandcompany.org/research/nyc-statistics-page. 61 Id. 62 https://www.nycedc.com/blog-entry/international-students-nyc. 63 NYPD data through July 31, 2017.\nA7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 12\n\nLOS ANGELES\nThe population of our metropolitan area (Los Angeles County) is 10.2 million people, with more than 3.9 million living within the city limits.64\nWe have residents from more than 135 foreign countries, and 185 languages are spoken here.65\nAt least 1.5 million of our city’s residents are themselves immigrants, 37.8% of our total population. Approximately 43% of all residents of Los Angeles County were born in another country.66\nAs of 2015, the Los Angeles metropolitan area had over 152,000 immigrants from the six affected countries, including 136,000 from Iran, 14,900 from Syria, 500 from Somalia, and 100 from Yemen. 67\nOur city employs approximately 45,000 people, 22% of whom are foreign-born immigrants.\n44% of business owners in Los Angeles are immigrants.68\nIn 2016, approximately 2,322 refugees were resettled in Los Angeles County, including approximately 1,936 from the six targeted countries, and 1,808 from Iran alone.69\n64 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/01/30/thesecommunities-have-a-lot-at-stake-in-trumps-executive-order-onimmigration/. 68 2010 ACS Single year estimate. 69 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Office of Admissions – Refugee Processing Center.\nA8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 12\n\nOn any given day, 185 flights arrive at LAX from international destinations bringing 31,000 passengers, including more than 150 from the targeted countries.70\nThe tourism sector of the local economy accounts for $21 billion a year in direct spending by visitors to Los Angeles County and $260 million in hotel taxes alone. Tourism supports approximately 500,000 jobs in the leisure and hospitality sectors.71\nIn 2016, Los Angeles welcomed 47 million visitors, 7.1 million of whom were foreign nationals who spent a combined $6.3 billion. At least 160,000 of those visitors hail from the Middle East, and they spent at least $185 million while in Los Angeles.72\nLos Angeles has at least ten four-year colleges and universities, and these have approximately 25,000 international students.73\nThe Mayor of Los Angeles has reported that hate crime incidents doubled following the presidential election, with 30 such reported incidents during the month following.74\n\n70 LAX officials. 71 Discover LA. 72 Id. 73 University enrollment data. 74 http://abc7.com/politics/garcetti-discusses-las-rise-in-hate-crimesafter-election/1651429/.\nA9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 12\n\nCITY OF PHILADELPHIA\nThe population of the City of Philadelphia is approximately 1,526,006,75 and for the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area, the estimated population is 6,051,170.76\nPhiladelphia has residents from more than 130 foreign countries.77\nAt least 197,563 of our residents are immigrants.78\nApproximately 830 of Philadelphia residents were born in Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.79\nApproximately 640,661 people are employed in Philadelphia, and 108,010 of them are foreign-born, a figure that does not include individuals who work in Philadelphia but reside outside the city.80\nIn 2013, immigrants made up 14% of business owners in Philadelphia; and immigrants are 28% of the area’s “Main Street” business owners, including 23% of retail store owners and 34% of restaurant owners.81\n75 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. 76 U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 – United States – Metropolitan and Micropolitan. 77 U.S. Census Bureau, Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-year Estimates. 78 Id. 79 Id. 80 U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Characteristics of the Native and Foreign-Born Populations, 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5Year Estimates.\nA10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 12\n\nIn 2016, approximately 794 refugees were resettled in Philadelphia, including 253 from the six targeted countries.82\nThe Philadelphia Metropolitan Area is home to 31 four-year colleges and universities, whose students include 21,273 international students.83\nThe economic impact from tourism in the City of Philadelphia in 2015 was $6.2 billion, including $3.9 billion in direct visitor spending, and that tourism generated an estimated $277 million in tax revenues for the City of Philadelphia.84\n\n81 Americas Society/Council of the Americas and Fiscal Policy Institute, Bringing Vitality to Main Street: How Immigrant Small Businesses Help Local Economies Grow, at 16 (available at http://www.ascoa.org/sites/default/files/ImmigrantBusinessReport.pdf). 82 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Office of Admissions – Refugee Processing Center. Available at http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/. 83 CampusPhilly; Christine Farrugia, Rajika Bhandari, Ph.D., 2015 Open Doors, Report on International Educational Exchange. 84 Philadelphia Convention and Visitors Bureau (Staff Person), citing Tourism as an Economic Engine for Greater Philadelphia 2015 Visitation and Economic Impact Report, available at http://files.visitphilly.com/Visit-Philly-2015-Visitation-and-Impact-FullReport.pdf.\nA11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 12\n\nIn the 3 months immediately after the November 2016 election (11/1601/17), 11 hate crimes were reported to Philadelphia police. In the 3month period around the same time last year (11/15-01/16), 7 hate crimes were reported, a 157% increase.85 In the same time period, the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations received reports of 43 separate hate or bias incidents, as compared to just 3 reports during the same time last year, a 1433% increase.86 In just the first eight months of 2017, Philadelphia has already received 30 reports of hate crimes, approximately double the number received in each of the preceding five years.87\n\n85 Philadelphia Police Department, Research and Analysis Unit Statistical Section; see also Uniform Crime Reporting System, Monthly Summary Hate / Bias Motivation Report for Philadelphia City, available at http://ucr.psp.state.pa.us/UCR/Reporting/Monthly/ Summary/MonthlySumHateUI.asp?rbSet=4. 86 Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations; see also 87 http://ucr.psp.state.pa.us/UCR/Reporting/Monthly/Summary/ MonthlySumHateUI.asp.\nA12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 101-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_______________________ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _C_I_T_Y__O_F__C__H_I_C_A_G__O______________________________________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\n\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_s_/B__e_n_n_a__R_u_t_h_S__o_lo_m__o_n__________________ (signature)\n\n_B_e__n_n_a_R__u_t_h_S__o_lo_m__o_n_____________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_(_3_1_2_)_7_4_4_-_7_7_6_4__ Voice Phone\n\n_C__it_y_o_f_C__h_ic_a__g_o_D__e_p_a_r_tm__e_n_t_o_f__L_a_w_________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_(_3_1_2_)_7_4_4__-3_5_8__8_ Fax Number\n\n_3_0__N_.__L_a_S_a_l_le__S_t_.,_R__o_o_m__8_0_0_______________\n\n_C__h_ic_a_g_o__, _Il_li_n_o_is__6_0_6_0_2____________________ Address\n\n_b_e_n_n_a_._s_o_l_o_m_o_n__@__c_it_y_o_fc_h_i_c_a_g_o_._o_rg___ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _N_o_v_e_m__b_e_r _1_7_, _2_0_1_7_ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_s_/_B_e__n_n_a__R_u__th__S_o__lo_m__o_n________ Signature\n\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\nPrint\n\nSave\n\n_____N__o_v_e_m__b_e_r__1_7_,_2__0_1_7_____ Date\nReset Form\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 68\n\nNos. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE\nDOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself\nand its clients\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND\nSECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE; in her official\ncapacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence Defendants-Appellants.\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\n\nBRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN\nSUPPORT OF APPELLEES\n\nAaron X. Fellmeth Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law Mail Code 9520 111 E. Taylor St. Phoenix, AZ 85004-4467 Telephone: 480.241.8414 aaron.fellmeth@asu.edu\n\nBruce V. Spiva Elisabeth C. Frost Amanda R. Callais Perkins Coie LLP 700 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington. DC 20005 Telephone: 202.654.6256 BSpiva@perkinscoie.com EFrost@perkinscoie.com ACallais@perkinscoie.com\n\nCounsel for Proposed Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 68\n\n________________________________\nNo. 17-2231(L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of\nMaryland, Southern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ___________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC)\n________________________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1, JANE DOE #2, JANE DOE #3, JANE DOE #4, JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland\nSecurity; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in\nhis official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official\ncapacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\n________________________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ________________________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3,\nPlaintiffs – Appellees\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_A_m_n_e_s_ty__In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l L_i_m_it_e_d________________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n************************ I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nVictor Williams AMERICA FIRST LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 5209 Baltimore Ave.Bethesda, MD 20816 Telephone: 301.951.9045\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_H_u_m_a_n__R_ig_h_t_s _&_G__e_n_de_r_J_u_s_ti_c_e_C_l_in_ic_,_C_i_ty_U__ni_v_e_rs_it_y_o_f_N_e_w__Y_o_rk__S_c_h_oo_l_o_f_L_a_w__________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_H_u_m_a_n__R_ig_h_t_s _A_d_v_o_ca_t_e_s___________________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l A__ss_o_c_ia_t_io_n_o_f_D_e_m__o_c_ra_ti_c_L_a_w_y_e_r_s__________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l C__e_nt_e_r_fo_r_A_d_v_o_c_a_te_s__A_g_ai_n_s_t _D_is_c_ri_m_in_a_t_io_n____________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l J_u_s_ti_c_e_P_r_o_je_c_t _________________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l J_u_s_ti_c_e_R_e_s_o_u_rc_e__C_e_n_te_r__________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_L_e_g_al_A_i_d_S_o_c_ie_t_y_(_N_e_w_Y__o_rk_)________________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nVictor Williams AMERICA FIRST LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 5209 Baltimore Ave.Bethesda, MD 20816 Telephone: 301.951.9045\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_M_A_D_R__E________________________________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_N_a_ti_o_n_a_l L_a_w__C_e_n_te_r_o_n__H_o_m_e_le_s_s_n_e_s_s_&__P_o_ve_r_ty__________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nVictor Williams AMERICA FIRST LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 5209 Baltimore Ave.Bethesda, MD 20816 Telephone: 301.951.9045\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_N_a_ti_o_n_a_l L_a_w_y_e_r_s_G_u_i_ld_____________________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_S_e_c_u_la_r_C_o_m_m__u_n_iti_e_s_o_f_A_r_iz_o_n_a______________________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n********************** I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nVictor Williams AMERICA FIRST LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 5209 Baltimore Ave.Bethesda, MD 20816 Telephone: 301.951.9045\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nDisclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to the mandamus case.\n\nCorporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are required to file disclosure statements.\n\nIf counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1___\n\nCaption: _In_t_e_rn_a_ti_o_n_a_l R__e_fu_g_e_e_A_s_s_is_t_a_nc_e__P_ro_j_e_ct_v_._D_o_n_a_ld__T_ru_m__p_______\n\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,\n\n_T_'r_u_a_h:_T_h_e__R_a_b_b_in_ic__C_a_ll_fo_r_H__u_m_a_n_R_i_g_h_ts______________________________________________ (name of party/amicus)\n\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nwho is _______A_m__ic_i_C_u_r_ia_e_______, makes the following disclosure: (appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)\n\n1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES ✔ NO\n\n2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:\n\n3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or\n\nother publicly held entity?\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify all such owners:\n\n09/29/2016 SCC\n\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 68\n\n4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? YES ✔ NO If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:\n\n5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nIf yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected\n\nsubstantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is\n\npursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:\n\n6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding? If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:\n\nYES ✔ NO\n\nSignature: _s_/ _A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is__________________ Counsel for: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e_______________________\n\nDate: ______1_1/_1_7_/2_0_1_7______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n************************ I certify that on _____1_1_/1_7_/2_0_1_7_____ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s____________ (signature)\n- 2 -\n\n_______1_1_/_1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ (date)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 68\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ ii RULE 29 STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .......................1 I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................2 II. ARGUMENT.................................................................................................3\nA. International Law Is Relevant to Assessing the Legality of the Executive Order....................................................................................3\nB. International Law Regarding Discrimination on the Basis of Religion and National Origin ...............................................................7 1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.........7 2. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination...............................................11\nC. Relevant Provisions of the Proclamation ...........................................14 D. Legitimate Aim and Proportionality ..................................................15 III. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................18\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 68\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage\n\nU.S. CASES\n\nF. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)..............................................................................................5\n\nFilartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) .............................................................................5, 6\n\nImmigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984)..............................................................................................4\n\nKerry v. Din, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).....................................................................10\n\nLandon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)..............................................................................................10\n\nMurray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) .................................................................................5\n\nThe Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)..........................................................................................5, 6\n\nSale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)..............................................................................................5\n\nTalbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) ...................................................................................5\n\nUnited States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) ...............................................................................6\nU.S. CONSTITUTION\nU.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ................................................................................................6\n\nU.S. Const. art. VI......................................................................................................6\n\nU.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.........................................................................................2, 3\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 68\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES cont.\nPage\nRULES\n\nFed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E)........................................................................................1\n\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\n\n138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) ...............................................3, 7\n\n140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed., June 24, 1994) ..............................................11\n\nHearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. (1990) ....................................................................................................................4\n\nS. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-29 (1994) ........................................................................................4\nTREATIES\nConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.............................4\n\nInternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965), art. 2 ..........................................................12, 15\n\nInternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965), art. 2(1) .....................................................11, 12\n\nInternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965), art. 4 ..........................................................12, 15\n\nInternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965), art. 5 ................................................................12\n\nInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ..........................................................................7, 8, 9, 10\n\nInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(2), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ........................................................................................3\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 68\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES cont.\nPage\nInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ........................................................................................8\n\nInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ..................................................................................9\n\nInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ..........................................................................10, 12, 15\nINTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS\nG.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 2, 7, 12 (Dec. 10, 1948). .........................................................................................11\nOTHER INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS\nComm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Commc’n No. 48/2010, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/82/D/48/2010 (2013) ..........................................13\n\nComm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against non-citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004) ...............................................................8\n\nComm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 35: Combating Racist Hate Speech, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (2013)........................................................................12, 13\n\nG.A. Res. 2106 (XX), annex, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965)...................4\n\nHuman Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994) .......................................................................9\n\nHuman Rights Comm., General Comment No. 18, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994) .................................................................8, 10\n\nHuman Rights Comm., General Comment No. 19, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994) .......................................................................9\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 68\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES cont.\nPage\nO.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 13 (2010)......................................................................................................11\n\nRep. of the Comm. Against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000)....................................................................................................4, 5\nOTHER SOURCES\nAaron Xavier Fellmeth, Paradigms of International Human Rights Law (2016) ............................................................................................................8\n\nAlexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds. 1969) .....................................................................................................................6\n\nCentral Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-worldfactbook/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017)..................................................14\n\nHurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287 (1995/96) .................................................................................................11\n\nRestatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111(3)–(4) (Am. Law Inst. 1987) .........................................................................................................3, 5\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 68\n\nRULE 29 STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 The Amici are 85 international law scholars and several nongovernmental organizations. See Appendix A (listing all individual and organizational Amici). The individual amici whose views are presented here are international law scholars specializing in public international law and international human rights law. They include members of the International Human Rights Committee of the International Law Association, American Branch,2 as well as university professors and practicing lawyers with expertise in these subjects. They have devoted extensive efforts to the study and practice of international law. They research, teach, speak, and publish widely on international law issues, and they routinely advise and practice in matters addressing such issues before American courts. The Amici also include nongovernmental organizations with expertise in civil rights law, immigration law, or international human rights law. Amici submit this brief to vindicate the public interest in ensuring a proper understanding and application of the international human rights law relevant to this case. As scholars and practitioners in the area, the Amici have a strong interest in ensuring that the Court reaches a decision that conforms to the existing body of international law. The 1No counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party has made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. No person other than amici or their counsel has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E).\n\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 68\n\nAmici support the Plaintiffs-Appellees in this matter and urge affirmance of the decision below.\nI. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this brief is to bring to the Court’s attention U.S. treaty provisions and customary international law principles that bear on the legality of the Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats of September 24, 2017 (“Proclamation”), apparently superseding Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (“EO”), which replaces the nowrescinded Executive Order dated January 27, 2017. International law, which includes treaties ratified by the United States as well as customary international law, is part of U.S. law and must be faithfully executed by the President and enforced by U.S. courts except when clearly inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or subsequent acts of Congress. The United States is a party to and bound by several international human rights treaties relevant to the subject matter of the Proclamation. In assessing the legality of the Proclamation, the Court should be cognizant of those treaty obligations, and of customary international law, which should influence constructions of the U.S. Constitution and statutes that prohibit discrimination based on religion or national origin.\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 68\n\nIn addition, the Immigration and Nationality Act and other statutes must be read in harmony with these international legal obligations pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and long established principles of statutory construction requiring acts of Congress to be interpreted in a manner consistent with international law, whenever such a construction is reasonably possible. In this case, the international law obligations described below reinforce interpretations of those statutes forbidding discrimination of the type threatened by Sections 2 and 11 of the Proclamation.\nII. ARGUMENT A. International Law Is Relevant to Assessing the Legality of the Executive\nOrder International law is relevant to this case because the U.S. Constitution makes treaties part of U.S. law. Customary international law is also part of U.S. law and is enforceable by U.S. courts. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, “treaties made . . . under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby.”3 Although the Constitution does not require legislation prior to treaties taking legal effect, the Supreme Court distinguishes between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.4 The Senate or the President has declared that the relevant human rights\n3 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 4 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111(3)–(4) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 68\n\ntreaties to which the United States is a party are non-self-executing.5 Nevertheless,\nby ratifying those treaties, the United States has bound itself to provide judicial or\nother remedies for violations of treaty obligations.6 Thus, even if the treaty\nprovisions themselves are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts, the rights they\ngrant should be protected by the courts through their interpretation of constitutional\nprovisions and statutes addressing the same or similar subject matter.\nThis is consistent with the positions taken by both the Executive Branch and\nCongress in those cases in which Congress has not passed implementing\nlegislation.7 When submitting human rights treaties to the Senate for its advice and\nconsent, both Presidents George H.W. Bush and William Clinton assured the\nSenate that the United States could and would fulfill its treaty commitments by\napplying existing federal constitutional and statutory law.8 Courts generally\n5 See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 6 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(2), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter “CCPR”]. 7 See, e.g., Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, ¶¶ 58–60, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000) (“Where domestic law already makes adequate provision for the requirements of the treaty and is sufficient to enable the United States to meet its international obligations, the United States does not generally believe it necessary to adopt implementing legislation.”). 8 For example, during Senate hearings on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, the State Department Legal Advisor told the Senate: “Any Public official in the United States, at any level of government, who inflicts torture . . . would be subject to an effective system of control and punishment in the U.S. legal system.” Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 68\n\nconstrue federal constitutional and statutory law to be consistent with human rights\ntreaties in part because the Senate has relied on such assurances as a basis for its\nconsent to ratification.9 The United States acknowledged this principle in its\ncomments to the U.N. Committee Against Torture: “Even where a treaty is ‘non-\nself-executing’, courts may nonetheless take notice of the obligations of the United\nStates thereunder in an appropriate case and may refer to the principles and\nobjectives thereof, as well as to the stated policy reasons for ratification.”10\n“Taking notice” of treaty obligations comports with a core principle of statutory\nconstruction announced by the Supreme Court in Murray v. The Schooner\nCharming Betsy: “[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the\nlaw of nations if any other possible construction remains.”11 That doctrine has\nbeen consistently and recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.12\nCong. 8 (1990). Similarly, with respect to G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), annex, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) (Dec. 21, 1965), the Clinton Administration told the Senate: “As was the case with the prior treaties, existing U.S. law provides extensive protections and remedies sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present Convention.” S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-29, at 25-26 (1994). 9 See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 426 (1984). 10 Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, supra note 7, ¶ 57 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)). 11 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); accord Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801). 12 See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 68\n\nMoreover, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the\nSecond Circuit observed that a treaty that is not self-executing may provide evidence of customary international law.13 Customary international law must be\nenforced in U.S. courts even in the absence of implementing legislation, regardless of whether customary rules appear in a treaty.14 In The Paquete Habana, the\nSupreme Court held that customary international law “is part of our law” and\ndirectly enforceable in courts when no conflicting treaty, legislative act, or judicial decision controls.15 As discussed below, several human rights treaty rules\napplicable in this case are also customary international law.\nThe President is also obligated to respect international law pursuant to his constitutional duty faithfully to execute the law.16 Because Article VI of the\nConstitution makes treaties the supreme law of the land, the President is\nconstitutionally required to comply with U.S. treaty obligations as well as with customary international law. This was the intent of the Framers.17 Courts\n13 630 F.2d 876, 882 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980). 14 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law § 111(3) (Am. Law Inst. 1987). 15 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Filartiga, 603 F.2d at 886 (“Appellees . . . advance the proposition that the law of nations forms a part of the laws of the United States only to the extent that Congress has acted to define it. This extravagant claim is amply refuted by the numerous decisions applying rules of international law uncodified by any act of Congress.”). 16 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 17 Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33, 33–43 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds. 1969).\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 68\n\ntherefore have a duty to restrain federal executive action that conflicts with a duly ratified treaty. As the Supreme Court wrote in ordering the President to restore a French merchant ship to its owner pursuant to a treaty obligation: “The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United States must be admitted.”18\nEven if the President were not directly bound by international law, however, he is still obligated to comply with the Constitution itself and all applicable legislation enacted by Congress within its authority, which (as noted) must be interpreted in a manner consistent with international law whenever possible.\nThe following sections identify the treaties and customary international law relevant to the legality of the Proclamation. B. International Law Regarding Discrimination on the Basis of Religion\nand National Origin 1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Discrimination based on religion or national origin is prohibited by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“CCPR”). The United States ratified the CCPR in 1992.19 Article 2 of the CCPR states in relevant part: 1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and\nto ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without\n18 United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801). 19 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992).\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 68\n\ndistinction of any kind, such as race, . . . religion, . . . national or social origin, . . . or other status.\n3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:\n(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;\n(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;\n(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.\nThe United Nations Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) is charged by the\nCCPR to monitor implementation by state parties and to issue guidance on its\nproper interpretation. The HRC interprets article 2 to prohibit “any distinction,\nexclusion, restriction or preference” based on a prohibited ground, and which has\n“the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or\nexercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms” protected by the treaty.20 To justify a derogation from the nondiscrimination (or\nany other human rights) duty, a measure must pursue a legitimate aim and be\n\n20 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 18, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994).\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 68\n\nproportionate to that aim.21 A “proportionate” measure is one effective at\nachieving the aim and narrowly tailored (or “necessary”) to it.22\nThe substantive rights guaranteed by the CCPR, which must be protected\nwithout discrimination based on religion or national origin under article 2, include\nthe protection of the family. Article 23 provides in relevant part: “The family is\nthe natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by\nsociety and the State.”23 The HRC has interpreted this right to include living\ntogether, which in turn obligates the state to adopt appropriate measures “to ensure\nthe unity or reunification of families, particularly when their members are\nseparated for political, economic or similar reasons.”24\nRestrictions on travel and entry caused by the Proclamation that impose\ndisparate and unreasonable burdens on the exercise of this right violate CCPR\narticle 2. The HRC has explained that, although the CCPR does not generally\nrecognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party . . . , in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise.25\n21 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against non-citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, at 2 (2004). 22 See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Paradigms of International Human Rights Law 119–21 (2016). 23 CCPR, supra note 6, art. 23(1). 24 Human Rights Comm., supra note 20, General Comment No. 19, ¶ 5. 25 Id. at 9, General Comment No. 15, ¶ 5.\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 68\n\nThus, the right of entry is not beyond the scope of the CCPR. On the contrary, the CCPR’s nondiscrimination principles and protections for family life should be considered by courts in interpreting government measures affecting family unification. This treaty-based protection for family life is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence respecting the role of due process of law in governmental decisions affecting family unity.26\nMore generally, article 26 of the CCPR prohibits discrimination in any government measure, regardless of whether the measure violates a Covenant right:\nAll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. As interpreted by the HRC and consistent with its wording, this provision “prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated” by the government.27 Notably, unlike CCPR article 2, the equal protection provisions of CCPR article 26 lack article 2’s limitation to “all individuals within [the state party’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”\n26 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34, 37 (1982); Kerry v. Din, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140–41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 27 Human Rights Comm., supra note 20, General Comment No. 18, ¶ 12 (emphasis added).\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 68\n\nThe nondiscrimination provisions of the CCPR are also customary international law binding on the United States, forming part of U.S. law unless contrary to the Constitution or a statute. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the United States approved in 1948, mandates nondiscrimination in religion and national origin, equal protection of the law, and protection from arbitrary interference in family life.28 The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which the United States approved when it signed and ratified the Charter of the Organization of American States the same year, has similar provisions in articles 6 and 17.29 These nondiscrimination principles and the right to family unity have become sufficiently widespread and accepted by the international community that they have entered into customary international law in the present day.30\n2. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination\nThe International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) also bars discrimination based on national origin. The United States has been a party to the CERD since 1994.31 Under article 2,\n28 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 2, 7, 12 (Dec. 10, 1948). 29 O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 13, at 13 (2010). 30 See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 287, 329 (1995/96). 31 See 140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed., June 24, 1994).\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 45 of 68\n\nparagraph (1)(a), each state party commits to refraining from and prohibiting all forms of racial discrimination, and each further undertakes “to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination . . . and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national or local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.” CERD defines “racial discrimination” to include distinctions and restrictions based on national origin.32 With regard to immigration practices, CERD makes clear that states are free to adopt only such “nationality, citizenship or naturalization” policies that “do not discriminate against any particular nationality.”33 Like the nondiscrimination provisions of CCPR article 26, CERD article 2 does not limit its application to citizens or resident noncitizens. While CERD does not speak specifically to restrictions on entry of nonresident aliens, the general language of CERD expresses a clear intention to eliminate discrimination based on race or national origin from all areas of government activity: “States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms . . . without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin . . . .”34\nArticle 4 of CERD further provides that state parties “[s]hall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination,” which (as noted) includes discrimination based on national origin.\n32 CERD, supra note 8, art. 2(1)(a). 33 Id. art. 2(1)(c). 34 Id. art. 5.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 46 of 68\n\nThe Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the body of independent experts appointed to monitor CERD’s implementation, interprets article 4 to require states to combat speech stigmatizing or stereotyping noncitizens generally, immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers,35 with statements by high-ranking officials causing “particular concern.”36 In TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, for example, the Committee specifically determined that Germany violated the Convention when it failed to discipline or punish a minor government official who had inter alia drawn attention to low employment rates of Turkish and Arab populations in Germany, suggested their unwillingness to integrate into German society, and proposed that their immigration should be discouraged.37 These statements, the Committee determined, implied “generalized negative characteristics of the Turkish population” and incited racial discrimination.38\nThe legality of the Proclamation in this case, and the proper interpretation of the statutes and constitutional provisions cited by the parties, should be assessed with those proscriptions in mind. Those international law principles require courts to reject any attempt by the President to define classes based on national origin or\n35 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 35: Combating Racist Hate Speech, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (2013). 36 Id. ¶ 22. 37 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Commc’n No. 48/2010, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/82/D/48/2010 (2013). 38 Id. ¶ 12.6.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 47 of 68\n\nreligion, and then to impose on those classes disparate treatment, except to the extent necessary to achieve a legitimate government purpose. C. Relevant Provisions of the Proclamation\nThe Proclamation suspends immigration from, and the grant of nonimmigrant visas to, seven countries and to certain government officials of an eighth country, Venezuela. It differs from the second EO primarily by adding Chad, North Korea, and the Venezuelan officials to the ban, removing Sudan from the list of banned countries, and limiting the ban in certain cases to specific classes of visas and not to others. Refugees from some countries, such as Syria, are categorically denied entry visas.\nThe Proclamation thus makes an explicit distinction based on national origin that, unless necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate government aim, would violate U.S. obligations under international law. In effect, the Proclamation also makes a distinction based on religion, as Appellees have argued. Notably, every one of the designated countries, except for North Korea, has a population that is majority Muslim.39 Unlike the previous two EOs, which did not suspend immigration from any state without an overwhelmingly Muslim majority, the Proclamation adds one non-Muslim country and a few (presumably nonMuslim) government officials. The amici do not challenge the suspension of visas 39 See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 48 of 68\n\nto certain Venezuelan government officials, because that suspension is not based directly or indirectly on religion, and it appears sufficiently narrowly tailored not to constitute discrimination based on national origin.\nD. Legitimate Aim and Proportionality\nTo comply with U.S. obligations under international law and correlative domestic constitutional and statutory requirements, the Proclamation must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim.\nThe amici concede that the stated aim of the Proclamation—protecting the United States from the entry of terrorists and other public safety threats—is a legitimate one. However, all evidence strongly indicates that the stated aim does not reflect the real aim of the Proclamation. As extensively briefed by the Appellees and other amici in this case and its predecessors, the Trump Campaign and, later, the Trump Administration have made clear their intent to issue a blanket ban on the entry of Muslims into the United States. Discriminatory intent based on religion violates U.S. obligations under international law regardless of whether the intent is accompanied by discriminatory effect (which, in this case, it is).\nEven if the Proclamation pursues a legitimate aim, it does not use proportionate means. To be proportionate, a measure must be “necessary in a\n\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 49 of 68\n\ndemocratic society,”40 meaning that it satisfies three criteria. The measure must: (1) be appropriate to and effective at achieving the aim, (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve the aim so that human rights are infringed no more than strictly necessary, and (3) not unduly burden the exercise of the relevant human rights in relation to the benefit achieved.41\nThe Proclamation does not satisfy either of the first two conditions of proportionality. The Proclamation is not appropriate and effective at protecting national security because it is both over inclusive and under inclusive. It is over inclusive because, like the means of the EO, the means in the Proclamation to protect the United States do not correspond to any reasoned basis. As discussed in the briefs of Appellees and other amici, none of the countries designated in the Proclamation has a history of exporting terrorists to the United States. Moreover, the Appellants have offered no evidence whatsoever that the purported rationale for the choice of countries, which rests primarily on information sharing and the presence of terrorist groups in the country, actually corresponds to the risk of terrorism by immigrants or visa applicants. The means are under inclusive because none of the countries with the most active history of terrorist immigration to the\n\n40 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, para. 11, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999). 41 Fellmeth, supra note 22, at 119-21.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 50 of 68\n\nUnited States, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Pakistan,42 are included in the Proclamation.\nThe Proclamation is also not narrowly tailored for its stated aim. It infringes\nthe human right against discrimination of a large class of persons based on two\nprohibited grounds, national origin and religion, and further threatens the human\nright to family life of numerous visa applicants, while offering little or no\ncompensating benefit to national security. Enhanced vetting procedures could\nunder some circumstances be a proportionate means for protecting national\nsecurity; a blanket freeze or ban on immigration based on national origin or\nreligion is flatly disproportionate.\nAs for North Korea, considering that before the Proclamation, the United States issued only a few dozen entry visas to North Koreans every year,43 and the\nAppellants have cited no evidence that a North Korean has ever been convicted of\nterrorism in the United States, the inclusion of North Korea in the proclamation is\nquite simply arbitrary from the perspective of national origin discrimination.\n42 See Alex Nowrasteh, Guide to Trump’s Executive Order to Limit Migration for “National Security” Reasons, Cato Institute: Cato at Liberty, Jan. 26, 2017, at https://www.cato.org/blog/guide-trumps-executive-order-limit-migration-nationalsecurity-reasons. 43 See U.S. State Dep’t, Report of the Visa Office 2016, Table XIV: Immigrant Visas Issued at Foreign Service Posts, Fiscal Years 2007-2016, at https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2016Annual Report/FY16AnnualReport-TableXIV.pdf.\n\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 51 of 68\n\nIII. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, amici request that the Court consider U.S. obligations under international law, which forms part of U.S. law, in evaluating the legality of the Proclamation. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of November, 2017.\n\nBy: s/ Aaron X. Fellmeth Aaron X. Fellmeth Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law Mail Code 9520 111 E. Taylor St. Phoenix, AZ 85004-4467 Telephone: 480.241.8414 aaron.fellmeth@asu.edu\n\nBy: s/ Amanda R. Callais Bruce V. Spiva Elisabeth C. Frost Amanda R. Callais Perkins Coie LLP 700 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington. DC 20005 Telephone: 202.654.6256 BSpiva@perkinscoie.com EFrost@perkinscoie.com ACallais@perkinscoie.com\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 52 of 68\n\nAPPENDIX A The amici are nongovernmental organizations and legal scholars specializing\n\nin public international law and international human rights law. They have\n\nsubstantial expertise in issues directly affecting the outcome of this case. These\n\namici are identified below.\n\nOrganizations\n\nAmnesty International Limited\n\nInternational Justice Project\n\nCenter for Justice & Accountability (San Francisco)\nGlobal Justice Center\nHuman Rights Advocates\nHuman Rights & Gender Justice Clinic, City University of New York School of Law\n\nInternational Justice Resource Center Legal Aid Society (New York) MADRE National Law Center on Homelessness\n& Poverty National Lawyers Guild\n\nInternational Association of Democratic Lawyers\nInternational Center for Advocates Against Discrimination\n\nSecular Communities of Arizona\nT’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights\n\nA-i\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 53 of 68\n\nIndividuals Institutional affiliations are listed for identification purposes only; opinions in this brief do not reflect those of any affiliated organization.\n1. William Aceves, Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law, California Western School of Law\n2. Dr. Johannes van Aggelen, former senior human rights official, United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights\n3. Wanda M. Akin, Esq., Co-Founder, International Justice Project 4. Shifa Alkhatib, Esq., Phoenix, AZ 5. Don Anton, Professor of International Law & Director, Law Future Centre,\nGriffith University Law School, Australia 6. Angela Banks, Charles J. Merriam Distinguished Professor of Law, Arizona\nState University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law 7. Paige Berges, Esq., London, United Kingdom 8. Wendi Warren H. Binford, Associate Professor of Law; Director, Clinical\nLaw Program, Willamette University 9. Carolyn Patty Blum, Interim Director, Benjamin B. Ferencz Human Rights\nand Atrocity Prevention Clinic, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School 10.Anthony P.X. Bothwell, Esq., Law Offices of Anthony P.X. Bothwell 11.Bill Bowring, Professor & Director of the LLM/MA in Human Rights,\nUniversity of London, Birkbeck College School of Law, U.K. 12.Raymond M. Brown, Co-Founder, International Justice Project 13.Gráinne de Búrca, Florence Ellinwood Allen Professor of Law, New York\nUniversity Law School\nA-ii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 54 of 68\n\n14.Elizabeth Burleson, Esq., Greenwich, CT\n15.Roderick P. Bushnell, Esq., Law Offices of Roderick P. Bushnell, San Francisco, CA\n16.Linda Carter, Professor of Law Emerita, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law\n17.Dr. Grace Cheng, Associate Professor of Political Science, Hawai’i Pacific University\n18.Marjorie Cohn, Professor Emerita, Thomas Jefferson School of Law\n19.Jorge Contesse, Assistant Professor, Rutgers (Newark) Law School\n20.Michael D. Cooper, Esq., University of Oxford and Chair, United Nations Committee of the New York City Bar Association\n21.Kevin Cope, Research Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia\n22.Omar Dajani, Professor, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law\n23.Thomas A. Dallal, Esq., Deputy Director, Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Resource Center, Jerusalem\n24.Margaret M. deGuzman, Associate Professor, Temple University, Beasley School of Law\n25.Daniel H. Derby, Professor, Touro Law Center\n26.Margaret Drew, Associate Professor & Director, Human Rights at Home Clinic, University of Massachusetts Law School\n27.Ariel Dulitzky, Clinical Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law\n28.Monica Feltz, Esq., Executive Director, International Justice Project\n\nA-iii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 55 of 68\n\n29.Martin S. Flaherty, Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights Law, Co-Director, Leitner Center for International Law & Justice, Fordham Law School\n30.Daniel Fullerton, Counsel, Public International Law & Policy Group\n31.Hannah Garry, Clinical Professor of Law & Director, International Human Rights Clinic, University of Southern California, Gould School of Law\n32.Seyedeh Shannon Ghadiri-Asli, Legal Office, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia\n33.Peter Halewood, Professor of Law, Albany Law School\n34.Alexandra Harrington, Adjunct Professor, Albany Law School\n35.Christina Hioureas, Counsel and Chair of the United Nations Practice Group, Foley Hoag, LLP\n36.Deena Hurwitz, Esq., Charlottesville, VA\n37.Dr. Alice de Jonge, Senior Lecturer, Monash University, Australia\n38.Christine Keller, Esq., Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia\n39.Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Telford Taylor Visiting Clinical Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law\n40.Nigel N.T. Li, President, International Law Association, Chinese (Taiwan) Branch; Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law\n41.Robert Lutz, Paul E. Treusch Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School\n42.Daniel Barstow Magraw, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute and Professorial Lecturer, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies\n43.Anna R. Maitland, Schuette Clinical Fellow, Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern University, Pritzker School of Law\nA-iv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 56 of 68\n\n44.Kathleen Maloney, Adjunct Professor, Lewis & Clark School of Law\n45.Annette M. Martínez-Orabona, Adjunct Professor, Inter-American University of Puerto Rico, School of Law\n46.Thomas M. McDonnell, Professor of Law, Pace University, Elisabeth Haub School of Law\n47.Jeanne Mirer, Esq., President, International Association of Democratic Lawyers\n48.Catherine Moore, LLB, LLM, Coordinator for International Law Programs, University of Baltimore School of Law\n49.Steven S. Nam, Distinguished Practitioner, Center for East Asian Studies, Stanford University\n50.Dr. Andrew Novak, Term Assistant Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, George Mason University\n51.Natasha Lycia Ora Bannan, President, National Lawyers Guild\n52.Aparna Polavarapu, Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law\n53.Dianne Post, Esq., Central Arizona National Lawyers Guild\n54.William Quigley, Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans, Loyola College of Law\n55.Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Professor of Law & Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology\n56.Jaya Ramji-Nogales, I. Herman Stern Professor of Law, Temple University, Beasley School of Law\n57.Nicole Rangel, Esq., Associate Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia\nA-v\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 57 of 68\n\n58.Marny Requa, Associate Professor, Georgian Court University (Lakewood, NJ)\n59.Nani Jansen Reventlow, Associate Tenant, Doughty Street Chambers, U.K.\n60.Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, Director, International Human Rights Clinic, Santa Clara University School of Law\n61.Gabor Rona, Visiting Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School\n62.Joshua Root, Esq., Instructor of Human Rights and International Law, Newport, RI\n63.Leila Sadat, Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law; Director, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, Washington University School of Law\n64.Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law\n65.Beth Van Schaack, Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights, Stanford Law School\n66.Mortimer Sellers, Regents Professor and Director, Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Baltimore School of Law\n67.Corey Shenkman, Esq., Principal Investigator, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding\n68.Dr. Anette Sikka, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, University of Illinois, Springfield\n69.Matiangai Sirleaf, Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh Law School\n70.David L. Sloss, Professor of Law, Santa Clara University Law School\n71.Rachel A. Smith, International Law Association, American Branch, Program Director\n72.Juliet S. Sorensen, Harry R. Horrow Professor of International Law, Northwestern University, Pritzker School of Law\nA-vi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 58 of 68\n\n73.Dr. Michael Stein, Executive Director & Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School Project on Disability\n74.Milena Sterio, Professor of Law & Associate Dean, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n75.Jessica Stern, Executive Director, OutRight Action International\n76.Anastasia Sarantos Taskin, Esq., Taskin Law & Mediation\n77.Juliet S. Sorensen, Harry R. Horrow Professor of International Law, Northwestern University, Pritzker School of Law\n78.Beth Stephens, Distinguished Professor, Rutgers (Camden) Law School\n79.Jeremy Telman, Director of International Programs and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School\n80.Dr. Tara Van Ho, Assistant Professor, Aarhus University Department of Law\n81.Constance de la Vega, Professor of Law, University of San Francisco\n82.Meghan Waters, Esq., Denver, CO\n83.Dr. Ralph Wilde, Reader, University College of London Faculty of Laws, U.K.\n84.Matthew Zagor, Associate Professor, Australia National University College of Law\n85.Katja Ziegler, Sir Robert Jennings Professor International Law, Director, Centre of European Law and Internationalisation, University of Leicester School of Law, U.K.\n\nA-vii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 59 of 68\n\nAPPENDIX B STATUTORY ADDENDUM\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nI. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13780: PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES ........................................................................................................II\nA. Section 2. Temporary Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern During Review Period..................... ii\nB. Section 11. Transparency and Data Collection. ................................ iii\nII. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ..................................................... IV\nA. Article II § 3. Messages; Convene and Adjourn Congress; Receive Ambassadors; Execute Laws; Commission Officers. ...........iv\nB. Article VI. Cl. 2. Supreme Law of Land.............................................v\nIII. RELEVANT TREATIES............................................................................V\nA. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination...........................................................................v 1. Article 2......................................................................................v 2. Article 4.....................................................................................vi\nB. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .........................vi 1. Article 2.....................................................................................vi 2. Article 23................................................................................. vii 3. Article 26................................................................................. vii\nIV. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS ....................... VIII\nA. Universal Declaration of Human Rights .......................................... viii 1. Article 2.................................................................................. viii 2. Article 7.................................................................................. viii 3. Article 12................................................................................ viii\nB. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.................. viii 1. Article 6.................................................................................. viii 2. Article 17................................................................................ viii\n\nB-i\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 60 of 68\n\nI. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13780: PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES\nA. Section 2. Temporary Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern During Review Period.\n(a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall conduct a worldwide review to identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat. The Secretary of Homeland Security may conclude that certain information is needed from particular countries even if it is not needed from every country.\n(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the worldwide review described in subsection (a) of this section, including the Secretary of Homeland Security’s determination of the information needed from each country for adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 20 days of the effective date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy of the report to the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence.\n(c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and in light of the national security concerns referenced in section 1 of this order, I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I therefore direct that the entry into the United States of nationals of those six countries be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of this order, subject to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set forth in sections 3 and 12 of this order.\nB-ii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 61 of 68\n\n(d) Upon submission of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the information needed from each country for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request that all foreign governments that do not supply such information regarding their nationals begin providing it within 50 days of notification.\n(e) After the period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested until they do so or until the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the country has an adequate plan to do so, or has adequately shared information through other means. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security may also submit to the President the names of additional countries for which any of them recommends other lawful restrictions or limitations deemed necessary for the security or welfare of the United States.\n(f) At any point after the submission of the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, may submit to the President the names of any additional countries recommended for similar treatment, as well as the names of any countries that they recommend should be removed from the scope of a proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section.\n(g) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 60 days of the effective date of this order, a second report within 90 days of the effective date of this order, a third report within 120 days of the effective date of this order, and a fourth report within 150 days of the effective date of this order.\nB. Section 11. Transparency and Data Collection.\n(a) To be more transparent with the American people and to implement more effectively policies and practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General,\nB-iii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 62 of 68\n\nshall, consistent with applicable law and national security, collect and make publicly available the following information:\n(i) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; convicted of terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; or removed from the United States based on terrorismrelated activity, affiliation with or provision of material support to a terrorism-related organization, or any other national-security-related reasons;\n(ii) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and who have engaged in terrorism-related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States;\n(iii) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called “honor killings,” in the United States by foreign nationals; and\n(iv) any other information relevant to public safety and security as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General, including information on the immigration status of foreign nationals charged with major offenses.\n(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall release the initial report under subsection (a) of this section within 180 days of the effective date of this order and shall include information for the period from September 11, 2001, until the date of the initial report. Subsequent reports shall be issued every 180 days thereafter and reflect the period since the previous report.\nII. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION\nA. Article II § 3. Messages; Convene and Adjourn Congress; Receive Ambassadors; Execute Laws; Commission Officers.\nHe shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both\nB-iv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 63 of 68\n\nHouses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.\nB. Article VI. Cl. 2. Supreme Law of Land.\nThis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.\nIII. RELEVANT TREATIES\nA. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination\n1. Article 2\n(1) States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races, and, to this end:\n(a) Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation;\n(b) Each State Party undertakes not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations;\n(c) Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists;\n\nB-v\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 64 of 68\n\n2. Article 4\nStates Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:\n(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;\n(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;\n(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.\n(iii) The right to housing;\nB. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\n1. Article 2\n(1) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.\n(2) Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures,\n\nB-vi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 65 of 68\n\neach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.\n(3) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:\n(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;\n(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;\n(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.\n2. Article 23\n(1) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.\n3. Article 26\nAll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.\n\nB-vii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 66 of 68\n\nIV. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS\nA. Universal Declaration of Human Rights\n1. Article 2\nEveryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.\n2. Article 7\nAll are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.\n3. Article 12\nNo one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.\nB. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man\n1. Article 6\nEvery person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection therefore.\n2. Article 17\nEvery person has the right to be recognized everywhere as a person having rights and obligations, and to enjoy the basic civil rights.\n\nB-viii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 67 of 68\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Effective 12/01/2016\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_____ Caption: _In__te_r_n_a_t_io_n_a_l_R__e_fu__g_e_e_A__s_s_is_t_a_n_c_e__P_r_o_je_c_t_v_.__T_ru__m_p______\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT Type-Volume Limit, Typeface Requirements, and Type-Style Requirements\n\nType-Volume Limit for Briefs: Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellee’s Response Brief, and Appellant’s Response/Reply Brief may not exceed 13,000 words or 1,300 lines. Appellee’s Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 15,300 words or 1,500 lines. A Reply or Amicus Brief may not exceed 6,500 words or 650 lines. Amicus Brief in support of an Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 7,650 words. Amicus Brief filed during consideration of petition for rehearing may not exceed 2,600 words. Counsel may rely on the word or line count of the word processing program used to prepare the document. The word-processing program must be set to include headings, footnotes, and quotes in the count. Line count is used only with monospaced type. See Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(e), 29(a)(5), 32(a)(7)(B) & 32(f).\n\nType-Volume Limit for Other Documents if Produced Using a Computer: Petition for permission to appeal and a motion or response thereto may not exceed 5,200 words. Reply to a motion may not exceed 2,600 words. Petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or other extraordinary writ may not exceed 7,800 words. Petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc may not exceed 3,900 words. Fed. R. App. P. 5(c)(1), 21(d), 27(d)(2), 35(b)(2) & 40(b)(1).\n\nTypeface and Type Style Requirements: A proportionally spaced typeface (such as Times New Roman) must include serifs and must be 14-point or larger. A monospaced typeface (such as Courier New) must be 12-point or larger (at least 10½ characters per inch). Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5), 32(a)(6).\n\nThis brief or other document complies with type-volume limits because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. R. 32(f) (cover page, disclosure statement, table of contents, table of citations, statement regarding oral argument, signature block, certificates of counsel, addendum, attachments):\n[✔] this brief or other document contains 4,177 [state number of] words\n\n[ ] this brief uses monospaced type and contains\n\n[state number of] lines\n\nThis brief or other document complies with the typeface and type style requirements because:\n\n[✔] this brief or other document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using\n\nMicrosoft Word\n\n[identify word processing program] in\n\n14-Point Times New Roman Font [identify font size and type style]; or\n\n[ ] this brief or other document has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [identify word processing program] in [identify font size and type style].\n\n(s) s/ Amanda R. Callais Party Name Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Nongovernmental Organizations\n\nDated: 11/17/2017\n\n11/14/2016 SCC\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 68 of 68\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on November 17, 2017 the forgoing document was served on\nall parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are\nregisters users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy by First Class\nU.S. Mail at the address listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\nI certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.\nDATED this 17th day of November, 2017.\n\nBy: s/ Aaron X. Fellmeth Aaron X. Fellmeth Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law Mail Code 9520 111 E. Taylor St. Phoenix, AZ 85004-4467 Telephone: 480.241.8414 aaron.fellmeth@asu.edu\n\nBy: s/ Amanda R. Callais Bruce V. Spiva\nElisabeth C. Frost Amanda R. Callais Perkins Coie LLP 700 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington. DC 20005 Telephone: 202.654.6256\nBSpiva@perkinscoie.com EFrost@perkinscoie.com ACallais@perkinscoie.com\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_(_L_)_,_2_2_3_2_,_2__2_3_3_,_2_2_4_0____ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [✔]Pro Bono [ ]Government COUNSEL FOR: _In_t_e_r_n_a_t_io_n_a_l_L_a__w__S_c_h_o_l_a_rs__a_n_d__N_o_n_g__o_v_e_rn__m_e_n_t_a_l_O__rg_a__n_iz_a_t_io_n_s_______________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_s_/_A_m__a_n_d_a__R_._C__a_ll_a_is____________________ (signature)\n\n_A_m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C_a_l_la_i_s_______________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_0_2_._6_5_4_._6_3_9_6___ Voice Phone\n\n_P__e_rk_i_n_s_C__o_ie__L_L_P_________________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_0_2_._6_5_4_._9_9_9_5___ Fax Number\n\n_7_0_0__1_3_t_h__S_t_N_W___________________________\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_C__2_0__0_0_5___________________ Address\n\n_A_C__a_ll_a_is_@__p_e_r_k_i_n_s_c_o_ie_._c_o_m__________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_A__m__a_n_d_a__R__. _C__a_ll_a_is__________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_(_L_)_,_2_2_3_2_,_2__2_3_3_,_2_2_4_0____ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [✔]Pro Bono [ ]Government COUNSEL FOR: _In_t_e_r_n_a_t_io_n_a_l_L_a__w__S_c_h_o_l_a_rs__a_n_d__N_o_n_g__o_v_e_rn__m_e_n_t_a_l_O__rg_a__n_iz_a_t_io_n_s_______________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_s_/_B_r_u_c_e__V_._S_p__iv_a_______________________ (signature)\n\n_B_r_u_c_e__V_._S__p_iv_a___________________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_0_2_._6_5_4_._6_2_0_3___ Voice Phone\n\n_P__e_rk_i_n_s_C__o_ie__L_L_P_________________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_0_2_._6_5_4_._9_6_6_4___ Fax Number\n\n_7_0_0__1_3_t_h__S_t_N_W___________________________\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_C__2_0__0_0_5___________________ Address\n\n_B_S__p_iv_a_@__p_e_r_k_i_n_s_c_o_ie_._c_o_m___________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_B__r_u_c_e__V_._S__p_i_v_a_____________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 102-4\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_(_L_)_,_2_2_3_2_,_2__2_3_3_,_2_2_4_0____ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [✔]Pro Bono [ ]Government COUNSEL FOR: _In_t_e_r_n_a_t_io_n_a_l_L_a__w__S_c_h_o_l_a_rs__a_n_d__N_o_n_g__o_v_e_rn__m_e_n_t_a_l_O__rg_a__n_iz_a_t_io_n_s_______________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_s_/_E_l_is_a_b_e_t_h__C_._F_r_o_s_t____________________ (signature)\n\n_E_l_is_a_b__e_th__C_._F__ro_s_t________________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_0_2_._6_5_4_._6_2_5_6___ Voice Phone\n\n_P__e_rk_i_n_s_C__o_ie__L_L_P_________________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_0_2_._6_5_4_._9_9_5_9___ Fax Number\n\n_7_0_0__1_3_t_h__S_t_N_W___________________________\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_C__2_0__0_0_5___________________ Address\n\n_E_F_r_o_s_t_@__p_e_r_k_in_s_c_o_i_e_.c_o__m___________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n_s_/_E__li_s_a_b_e__th__C__. _F_r_o_s_t__________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 28\n\n17-2231(L), 17-2232(CON), 17-2233(CON), 17-2240(XAP)\n\nIn the\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n\nfor the Fourth Circuit\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION\nOF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD MASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI\nZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5,\n\n– and –\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED,\n\n– v. –\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE\nDIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of\nState; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence,\n______________________________ Defendants-Appellants.\n(For C_o_n_ti_nu_a_t_io_n_o_f_C_a_p_tio_n__Se_e_R_e_v_e_rs_e_S_id_e_o_f_Cover)\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND AT GREENBELT\n\nBRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE\nIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\nIlana H. Eisenstein* John M. Leitner* Ryan S. Macpherson\nDLA PIPER LLP (US)\nOne Liberty Place\n1650 Market Street, Suite 4900\nPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania 19103\n(215) 656-3300\n\nDonald Francis Donovan David W. Rivkin Jennifer R. Cowan* Elizabeth Nielsen\nDEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP\n919 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\n(212) 909-6000\n\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute\n\nNot Admitted to the Fourth Circuit Bar\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 28\n\n17-2232\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JOHN DOE #6; IRANIAN STUDENTS’ FOUNDATION, Iranian Alliances Across Borders Affiliate at the University of Maryland College Park,\n\n– v. –\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K.\nMCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customes and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship\nand Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,\n______________________________ Defendants-Appellants.\n\n17-2233\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3, Plaintiffs-Appellees, – v. –\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, In her official capacity as Acting Secretary of\nHomeland Security; REX TILLERSON, In his official capacity as Secretary of State,\n______________________________ Defendants-Appellants.\n\n17-2240\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENIAMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD MASHTA; GRANNAZ\nAMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs-Appellants, – and –\n\nPAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO,\n\n– v. –\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of\nNational Intelligence, Defendants-Appellees.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 28\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(a)(4)(A), amicus curiae certifies that it has no parent corporations or any publicly held corporations owning 10% or more of its stock.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Donald Francis Donovan Donald Francis Donovan Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 909-6000 dfdonovan@debevoise.com\nCounsel for Amicus Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 28\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nI. RULE 29 STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ....................1 II. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................1 III. ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................2\nA. International Law Principles Should Be Considered In Assessing The Proclamation. .........................................................................................2\nB. Judicial Independence ...................................................................................3 1. Judicial Independence Is a Fundamental Principle of International Law. .......................................................................................................... 3 2. Judicial Independence Is Enshrined in U.S. Domestic Law....................5 3. Recent Actions by Defendants-Appellants Violate Core Principles of Judicial Independence. .......................................................7\nC. Due Process Rights Of Refugees ................................................................12 1. The United States Treatment Of Refugees Within U.S. Borders Is Bound By International Law Obligations..............................................12 2. The Proclamation Violates the Principle of Non-Discrimination against Refugees ....................................................................................13 3. The Proclamation Violates the Due Process Rights of Refugees Within U.S. Borders...............................................................................14 4. The Proclamation Effectively Eliminates the Right to Petition for Asylum ...................................................................................................16\nIV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................16\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 28\n\nCases:\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nPage(s)\n\nAugustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984) ..................................................................................16\n\nHaitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) .............................................................................16\n\nINS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) ............................................................................................12\n\nMatthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) ..............................................................................................15\n\nMurray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804) ....................................................................................................3\n\nPlyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ............................................................................................15\n\nUnited States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) ................................................................................3\n\nWong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) ............................................................................................15\n\nYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ............................................................................................15\n\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) ............................................................................................15\n\nUnited States Constitution:\n\nArt. II, § 3 ..................................................................................................................5\n\nArt. III ........................................................................................................................5\n\nArt. VI, cl. 2. .........................................................................................................2, 3\n\nFourteenth Amendment ............................................................................................6\n\nSixth Amendment .....................................................................................................6\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 28\n\nStatutes:\n8 U.S.C. § 1158 .................................................................................................12, 16\n8 U.S.C. § 1229a .....................................................................................................15\nRules:\nFed. R. App. P. 29(a) ................................................................................................1\nFed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E) ..................................................................................1n.1\nInternational Materials:\nConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85., https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=I V-9&chapter=4&lang=en ...............................................................................13n.9\nInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ...................................................................................................6\nOFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & THE INT’L BAR ASS’N, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS 120 (2003), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter4en.pdf ..................4, 5\nRefugee Convention and Protocol, Article 3 ...........................................................13\nRefugee Convention and Protocol, Article 4 ...........................................................13\nUniversal Declaration of Human Rights Article 10 .................................................6\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 28\n\nNews Articles:\nAnn E. Marimow & Robert Barnes, Federal Appeals Court Maintains Freeze Of Trump's Travel Ban. Attorney General Vows Supreme Court Appeal, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/federal-appealscourt-largely-maintains-freeze-of-trumps-travelban/2017/05/25/395aa394-365b-11e7-b4ee434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.5744a41049b0 .................................10n.8\nBrent Kendall, Trump Says Judge's Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict,’ WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-onjudge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442 ...................................................................8n.3\nFace the Nation Transcript February 12, 2017: Schumer, Flake, Miller, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcript-february12-2017-schumer-flake-miller/ ........................................................................9n.6\nFull Transcript and Video: Trump News Conference, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trumppress-conference-transcript.html?_r=0 ................................................8n.2, 9, 9n.5\nJohn Bowden, Trump Says He May Break Up 9th Circuit Court After Rulings Go Against Him, THE HILL (Apr. 26, 2017, 5:32PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/330757-trump-says-hesabsolutely-considering-breaking-up-court-that-blocked .....................................11\nJordan Fabian, Trump Attacks Judges Weighing Travel Ban, THE HILL (Feb. 8, 2017, 9:45AM) http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/318451-trumpattacks-judges-weighing-travel-ban .................................................... 8n.2, 8-9n.4\nKristine Phillips, All the Times Trump Personally Attacked Judges And Why His Tirades Are ‘Worse Than Wrong,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/26/all-thetimes-trump-personally-attacked-judges-and-why-his-tirades-areworse-than-wrong/?utm_term=.8b84ddb3528d .............................................10n.7\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 28\n\nMatt Zapotosky, Kalani Takase & Maria Sacchetti, Federal Judge in Hawaii Freezes President Trump's New Entry Ban, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/lawyers-face-offon-trump-travel-ban-in-md-court-wednesdaymorning/2017/03/14/b2d24636-090c-11e7-93dc00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.8b84ddb3528d ................10n.7\nMaureen Groppe, What Trump has said about Judge Curiel, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (June 11, 2016), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/06/11/what-trump-hassaid-judge-curiel/85641242/ .............................................................................8n.3\nPhilip Rucker, Stephen Miller says White House will fight for travel ban, advances false voter fraud claims, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/12/step hen-miller-says-white-house-will-fight-for-travel-ban-advances-falsevoter-fraud-claims/?utm_term=.9c4e3cc7459b ...............................................9n.6\nOther Authority:\nDonald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:03 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/829299566344359936 ...............8n.4\nDonald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 9:12 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 ....................7\nDonald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800 ....................8\nDonald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 2, 2016, 9:54 AM) https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/738413456118841345 ...............8n.3\nDonald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 2:45 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/737399475509985280 ...............8n.3\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 28\n\nDonald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 2:55 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/737402123453878272 ...............8n.3\nOffice of the Press Secretary, Statement on Sanctuary Cities Ruling, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/25/statementsanctuary-cities-ruling .........................................................................................10\nOffice of the Press Secretary, Statement Regarding Court Action Affecting the President’s Proclamation Regarding Travel to the United States by Nationals of Certain Countries, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/10/17/statement-regarding-court-action-affectingpresidents-proclamation ......................................................................................11\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 28\n\nI. RULE 29 STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 Amicus, the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute is the\nhuman rights arm of the International Bar Association, the world’s leading organization of international legal practitioners, bar associations, and law societies with a membership of more than 80,000 individual lawyers spanning over 160 counties. Amicus helps to promote, protect and enforce human rights under a just rule of law, and works to preserve the independence of judiciaries and the legal profession worldwide. Amicus submits this brief in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees in this matter in order to vindicate the public interest in ensuring a proper understanding and application of international legal principles relevant to this case.\nPursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), amicus submits this brief without an accompanying motion for leave to file or leave of court because all parties have consented to its filing.\nII. INTRODUCTION This brief addresses international law principles that bear on the legality of the Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-\n1No counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party has made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. No person other than amicus or its counsel has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E).\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 28\n\nSafety Threats of September 24, 2017 (the “Proclamation”), apparently superseding Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (“EO2”), which replaces the now-rescinded Executive Order dated January 27, 2017 (“EO1”) (collectively, the “Travel Bans”). Specifically, the Proclamation and Defendants-Appellants’ treatment of this case threaten judicial independence, the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of national origin and religion, and due process rights of refugees and aliens within U.S. borders, which are core principles of the international law that are directly incorporated into U.S. law and which amicus exists to support.\nIII. ARGUMENT A. International Law Principles Should Be Considered In Assessing The\nProclamation. International law, which includes treaties ratified by the United States as well as customary international law, is part of United States law and must be faithfully executed by the President and enforced by United States courts except when clearly inconsistent with the United States Constitution or subsequent acts of Congress. International law is relevant to resolving the legality of the Executive Order. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, “treaties made … under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. As\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 28\n\nacknowledged by the Supreme Court in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801), Article VI of the Constitution therefore makes treaties the supreme law of the land. In addition, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and long-established principles of statutory construction require acts of Congress to be interpreted in a manner consistent with international law, whenever such a construction is reasonably possible. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).\nThe United States is a party to and bound by several international human rights treaties relevant to the subject matter of the Proclamation. In assessing the legality of the Proclamation, the Court should be cognizant of those treaty obligations, and of customary international law, which should influence constructions of the Constitution and statutes that protect judicial independence, prohibit discrimination based on religion or national origin, and protect the due process rights of refugees within the United States. B. Judicial Independence\n1. Judicial Independence Is a Fundamental Principle of International Law.\nJudicial independence is a fundamental legal principle recognized in numerous international treaties. International human rights treaties and declarations routinely incorporate a right to a fair trial before an independent and\n\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 28\n\nimpartial court or tribunal, which derives from the basic principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers.\nIn 1985, the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (hereinafter the “Basic Principles”). G. A. Res. 40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985), G.A.Res. 40/146 (Dec. 13 1985). These principles represent “universally accepted views on this matter by the States Members of the United Nations.” In adopting the Basic Principles, UN member states recognized the importance of enshrining the integrity of the judiciary within their countries’ law and culture through legislation, administrative action, and public education. While the Basic Principles are viewed as only persuasive authority, the United States has committed to respect them as a UN member state.\nAt its core, judicial independence means that “the Judiciary has to be independent of the other branches of government, namely the Executive and Parliament.” OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & THE INT’L BAR ASS’N, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS 120 (2003), available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter4en.pdf. The Basic Principles place judicial independence at their forefront, mandating in Principle 1 that the “independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 28\n\ngovernmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.” Id. at 120. Principle 2 of the Basic Principles introduces the importance of “non-interference,” which requires that judges be permitted to decide matters before them on the merits and without restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or other interferences from any quarter and for any reason.\nJudges “have both a right and a duty to decide the cases before them according to the law, free from fear of personal criticism or reprisals of any kind, even in situations where they are obliged to render judgments in difficult and sensitive cases.” Id. at 119. If individual judges are unable to make decisions without interference from other branches of government, a judiciary that is pro forma independent will be compromised.\n2. Judicial Independence Is Enshrined in U.S. Domestic Law. Respect for the internationally-recognized principle of judicial independence lies at the heart of the U.S. constitutional system. Indeed, the President, vested with a constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the law, is himself obligated to act in accordance with it. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The principle of separation of powers requires an independent judiciary. Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the federal judiciary as a branch independent of both the legislature and the executive. The Bill of Rights similarly relies upon an\n\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 28\n\nindependent judiciary for its guarantees: the right to a fair trial established for criminal defendants in the Sixth Amendment and extended to all criminal prosecutions in the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands an independent and impartial judiciary.\nThe principle of judicial independence and impartiality is further enshrined in a number of treaties to which the United States is a signatory. For example, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1948 and portions of which have been accepted as customary international law, recognizes that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by the United States in 1992, stipulates that “in the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit of law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Regionally, Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that “every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal.” American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.\n\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 28\n\n3. Recent Actions by Defendants-Appellants Violate Core Principles of Judicial Independence.\nDefendants-Appellants’ actions with regards to the Travel Bans threaten judicial independence and seriously undermine the basic principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. In response to judicial decisions concerning the Travel Bans, President Donald J. Trump and other Executive Branch officials have questioned the validity of judicial rulings, denigrated the motives and integrity of U.S. federal judges, and issued veiled threats which may be seen as having the potential to influence future rulings.\nThere is a clear pattern of the Executive Branch appearing to interfere in judicial rulings regarding the Travel Bans. On February 4, 2017, after U.S. District Judge James L. Robart issued a stay temporarily blocking the enforcement of EO1, President Trump unleashed a torrent of tweets questioning Judge Robart’s legitimacy, including a statement that: “The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 9:12 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976. After Judge Robart made the stay permanent, President Trump issued a veiled threat on Twitter that Judge Robart would be held responsible for putting the country’s security at risk, stating: “Just cannot believe a judge would put our country in such peril. If something happens blame him and court system. People pouring in. Bad!”\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 28\n\nDonald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM),\nhttps://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800.2 In a statement\nthat was reminiscent of his prior personal attacks on another federal judge\nfollowing an adverse ruling in a private lawsuit,3 President Trump also questioned\nJudge Robart’s integrity by asking whether his decision was motivated by political\nconsiderations,4 stated that Judge Robart’s decision came from a “bad court” and\n2 See also Jordan Fabian, Trump Attacks Judges Weighing Travel Ban, THE HILL (Feb. 8, 2017, 9:45AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/318451trump-attacks-judges-weighing-travel-ban. (“I think our security is at risk today. And it will be at risk until such time that we are entitled and get what we are entitled to as citizens of this country. We want security.”); Full Transcript and Video: Trump News Conference, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trump-press-conferencetranscript.html?_r=0. (“We had a court that gave us what I consider to be, with great respect, a very bad decision. Very bad for the safety and security of our country.”)\n3 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 2:45 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/737399475509985280; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 2:55 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/737402123453878272; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 2, 2016, 9:54 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/738413456118841345; Brent Kendall, Trump Says Judge's Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict,’ WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keepsup-attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442. Maureen Groppe, What Trump has said about Judge Curiel, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (June 11, 2016), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/06/11/what-trump-has-said-judgecuriel/85641242/.\n4 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:03 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/829299566344359936 (“If the U.S. does not win this case as it so obviously should, we can never have the security and safety to which we are entitled. Politics!”); Jordan Fabian, Trump Attacks Judges Weighing Travel Ban, THE HILL (Feb. 8, 2017, 9:45AM),\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 28\n\nfrom a circuit that was “in chaos” and “overturned 80 percent of the time”,5 and\nimplied that respect for the judicial system depended on the court’s support of\nEO1. Full Transcript and Video: Trump News Conference, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16,\n2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trump-press-\nconference-transcript.html?_r=0.\nOther Executive Branch officials similarly rejected Judge Robart’s decision\nstaying EO1, going so far as to question whether the judiciary should serve as a\ncheck on Executive power. For example, Stephen Miller, a senior advisor to\nPresident Trump, stated that: “the whole world will soon see, as we begin to take\nfurther actions, that the powers of the president to protect our country are very\nsubstantial and will not be questioned.”6\nOn March 16, 2017, following the issuance of a nationwide injunction\nblocking the revised EO2 by U.S. District Judge Derrick K. Watson of Hawaii,\nhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/318451-trump-attacks-judgesweighing-travel-ban. (“Courts seem to be so political and it would be so great for our justice system if they could read a statement and do what’s right.”). 5 Full Transcript and Video, Trump News Conference, N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/donald-trump-press-conferencetranscript.html?_r=0. 6 Face the Nation Transcript February 12, 2017: Schumer, Flake, Miller, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nationtranscript-february-12-2017-schumer-flake-miller/. See also Philip Rucker, Stephen Miller says White House will fight for travel ban, advances false voter fraud claims, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/12/stephenmiller-says-white-house-will-fight-for-travel-ban-advances-false-voter-fraudclaims/?utm_term=.9c4e3cc7459b\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 28\n\nPresident Trump called the ruling “terrible” and suggested that it was “done by a\njudge for political reasons.”7 Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III, similarly\ncondemned and marginalized the ruling, stating: “I really am amazed that a judge\nsitting on an island in the Pacific can issue an order that stops the president of the\nUnited States from what appears to be clearly his statutory and constitutional\npower.”8 In April 2017, the White House issued a statement condemning another\nfederal court decision as “yet one more example of egregious overreach by a\nsingle, unelected district judge,” by which “the rule of law suffered another blow”.\nOffice of the Press Secretary, Statement on Sanctuary Cities Ruling,\nWHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-\noffice/2017/04/25/statement-sanctuary-cities-ruling. President Trump also\n7 Kristine Phillips, All the Times Trump Personally Attacked Judges - And Why His Tirades Are ‘Worse Than Wrong,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/26/all-the-timestrump-personally-attacked-judges-and-why-his-tirades-are-worse-thanwrong/?utm_term=.8b84ddb3528d; Matt Zapotosky, Kalani Takase & Maria Sacchetti, Federal Judge in Hawaii Freezes President Trump's New Entry Ban, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/socialissues/lawyers-face-off-on-trump-travel-ban-in-md-court-wednesdaymorning/2017/03/14/b2d24636-090c-11e7-93dc00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.8b84ddb3528d.\n8 Ann E. Marimow & Robert Barnes, Federal Appeals Court Maintains Freeze Of Trump's Travel Ban. Attorney General Vows Supreme Court Appeal, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/federal-appeals-court-largely-maintains-freeze-of-trumps-travelban/2017/05/25/395aa394-365b-11e7-b4ee434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.5744a41049b0.\n\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 28\n\nindicated that he was considering restructuring the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. John Bowden, Trump Says He May Break Up 9th Circuit Court After Rulings Go Against Him, THE HILL (Apr. 26, 2017, 5:32PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/330757-trump-says-hes-absolutelyconsidering-breaking-up-court-that-blocked.\nThe Executive Branch has continued this pattern with the present Proclamation. After Judge Watson issued a temporary restraining order on October 17, 2017 the White House issued a statement saying that: “Today’s dangerously flawed district court order undercuts the President’s efforts to keep the American people safe and enforce minimum security standards for entry into the United States.” Office of the Press Secretary, Statement Regarding Court Action Affecting the President’s Proclamation Regarding Travel to the United States by Nationals of Certain Countries, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/17/statement-regardingcourt-action-affecting-presidents-proclamation.\nThe cumulative impact of these statements has been to undermine judicial independence by creating an appearance of attempted political interference or intimidation of the judiciary by the Executive Branch.\n\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 28\n\nC. Due Process Rights Of Refugees 1. The United States Treatment Of Refugees Within U.S. Borders Is Bound By International Law Obligations. In the wake of World War II, a series of international law instruments\nstandardized, codified, and advanced the recognition and humane treatment of refugees around the world. Most notable is the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the “Refugee Convention”), to which 145 nations are party. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. While the United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention, it later assumed the obligations set forth in the Refugee Convention by ratifying the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the “Protocol”), which incorporates the Refugee Convention’s key terms. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 60 U.N.T.S. 267. The United States Refugee Act of 1980 (the “Refugee Act”) provided the domestic statutory basis by which the United States simultaneously affirmed and complied with its obligations under the Protocol (and, by extension, the Refugee Convention) by acting “to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the [Protocol].” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987).\nThe Refugee Convention and other international law agreements commit the United States to providing due process protections to refugees within its borders, and prohibit the United States from discrimination against refugees wherever they\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 28\n\nmay be found on the basis of national origin or religion.9 Moreover, our treaty obligations and federal law requires refugees, once present in the United States, to be accorded due process.\n2. The Proclamation Violates the Principle of Non-Discrimination against Refugees\nArticle 3 of the Refugee Convention and Protocol bars discrimination against refugees on the basis of race, religion or country of origin. That nondiscrimination provision applies to refugees both within and outside a signatory’s borders. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. Likewise, states-parties agree that refugees within their territorial limits will be treated “at least as favourabl[y]” as their nationals “with respect to freedom to practice their religion” and religious education for their children. Id., Art. 4.\nThe Proclamation and the Executive Order of October 24, 2017 (“EO 13815”) violate the letter and spirit of those international commitments by imposing stringent restrictions on refugee admissions in a manner that discriminates on the basis of national origin and religion. Although it does not\n9 The treatment of refugees may implicate other international rules as well. See e.g. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85., available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=en.\n\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 28\n\ncontinue the suspension of the refugee admissions program, the Proclamation, along with the recent EO 13815, subjects refugees to “enhanced vetting,” based on their national origin and religion. The discriminatory intent and effect of the Proclamation and EO 13815 violate the commitment of the United States under the Refugee Convention and Protocol not to discriminate against refugees on those bases.\n3. The Proclamation Violates the Due Process Rights of Refugees Within U.S. Borders\nUnder the Refugee Convention, as incorporated and amended by the Protocol to which the United States is a party, signatories agree to afford refugees within their borders rights of access to courts and due process regarding any decision to expel refugees. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. In particular, Article 32 delineates the due process requirements for refugees facing expulsion from a county and provides that (1) a decision to expel a refugee “shall be reached in accordance of due process of law;” (2) except where reasons of national security require otherwise, a refugee must be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself and to appeal to and be represented before competent authority; and (3) once a decision has been made to expel a refugee, a refugee must be given “a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country.”\n\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 28\n\nMoreover, it is well-settled that aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of the Unites States are entitled to due process protections, including in deportation proceedings. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“These provisions [in the Fourteenth Amendment] are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regarding to any differences of race, or color, or of nationality.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (concluding that “all persons within the territory of the United States” are entitled to the protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendments and “even aliens shall not … be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (due process “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, or permanent”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which provides procedures for the admission and exclusion of aliens, also provides aliens with certain due process rights. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (setting forth the procedures for immigration proceedings and the affirmative rights for aliens subject to removal proceedings).\nBy placing a blanket ban on all aliens from certain countries, the Proclamation effectively eliminates the right to due process guaranteed by the Constitution and the INA to all aliens within the United States.\n\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 28\n\n4. The Proclamation Effectively Eliminates the Right to Petition for Asylum\nThe Refugee Act established a statutory right to seek asylum in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Although the Refugee Act does not address an asylum seeker’s due process rights explicitly, and although the decision to grant asylum remains discretionary, courts have held that the Refugee Act created a substantive right to petition for asylum. See Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984). Courts have held that this right to petition for asylum is a sufficient interest to “invoke the guarantee of due process.” Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. 1982).\nBy placing a blanket ban on all aliens from certain countries, the Proclamation effectively eliminates the right to petition for asylum provided by Congress in the Refugee Act. Thus, the Proclamation violates the due process rights bestowed upon all aliens present in the United States.\nIV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, amicus urges this Court to consider U.S. obligations under international law, which form part of U.S. law, in evaluating the legality of the Proclamation.\n\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 28\n\nRESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of November, 2017.\n\nIlana H. Eisenstein* John M. Leitner* Ryan S. Macpherson* DLA PIPER LLP (US) One Liberty Place 1650 Market Street, Suite 4900 Philadelphia, PA 19103-7300 (212) 335-4500 ilana.eisenstein@dlapiper.com John.Leitner@dlapiper.com Ryan.Macpherson@dlapiper.com\n\n/s/ Donald Francis Donovan Donald Francis Donovan David W. Rivkin* Jennifer R. Cowan* Elizabeth Nielsen* DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 909-6000 dfdonovan@debevoise.com dwrivkin@debevoise.com jrcowan@debevoise.com enielsen@debevoise.com\nCounsel for Amicus Curiae\n\n* Not admitted to Fourth Circuit Bar\n\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 28\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 29, 32(a)(5), and 32(a)(7), the foregoing amicus curiae brief is proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 point Times New Roman, and contains 3,490 words, excluding those sections identified in Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Donald Francis Donovan Donald Francis Donovan Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 909-6000 dfdonovan@debevoise.com\nCounsel for Amicus Curiae\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 28\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on November 17, 2017, the foregoing amicus curiae brief was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system. On the same date, I caused sixteen true and correct paper copies of the foregoing to be sent to the Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1100 East Main Street, Suite 501, Richmond, Virginia 23219-3517.\n\n/s/ Donald Francis Donovan Donald Francis Donovan Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 909-6000 dfdonovan@debevoise.com\nCounsel for Amicus Curiae\n\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 103-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_______________________ as\n\n[✔]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government COUNSEL FOR: _In_t_e_r_n_a_t_io_n_a_l_B__a_r_A_s_s_o_c_i_a_t_io_n_'_s_H__u_m_a_n__R__ig_h_t_s_I_n_s_t_it_u_te________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_D__o_n_a_l_d_F__ra_n_c_i_s_D__o_n_o_v_a_n______________ (signature)\n\n_D__o_n_a_ld__F_r_a_n_c_i_s_D__o_n_o_v_a_n__________________ Name (printed or typed)\n_D__e_b_e_v_o_i_s_e_&__P_l_im__p_t_o_n_L__L_P________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_(_2_1_2_)_9_0_9_-_6_0_0_0__ Voice Phone\n_(_2_1_2_)_9_0_9_-_6_8_3_6__ Fax Number\n\n_9_1_9__T_h_i_r_d_A__v_e_n_u_e________________________\n_N__e_w__Y_o_r_k_,_N_Y__1_0__0_2_2_____________________ Address\n\n_d_f_d_o_n_o_v_a_n_@__d_e_b__e_v_o_is_e_._c_o_m_________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_1_7__________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_D__o_n_a_l_d__F_r_a_n_c_i_s_D__o_n_o__v_a_n___ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n__________1__1_/1__7_/1__7__________ Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 38\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL.,\n\nDefendants-Appellants.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, SOUTHERN DIVISION\n(8:17-CV-00361-TDC)\nBRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE SCHOLARS OF IMMIGRATION LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\nPETER MARGULIES ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY\nSCHOOL OF LAW 10 Metacom Avenue Bristol, RI 02809 (401) 254-4564\n\nALAN E. SCHOENFELD SCOTT MCABEE WILMER CUTLER PICKERING\nHALE AND DORR LLP 250 Greenwich Street 7 World Trade Center New York, NY 10007 (212) 937-7294\n\nCounsel for Amici Curiae Scholars of Immigration Law\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 38\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS Page\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE..............................................................................1\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................2\nARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3\nI. THE PROCLAMATION RESUSCITATES THE NATIONAL-ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION CONGRESS SOUGHT TO BAR IN THE 1965 AMENDMENTS ................................................................................................... 3\nA. The Proclamation Runs Afoul Of Congress’s Purposes Behind The 1965 Amendments To The INA........................................4\n1. Eliminating the unfairness and discrimination inherent in a quota system...........................................................4\n2. Prioritizing family reunification .................................................9\n3. Remedying the substantial inefficiency the quota system created in the legislative process ..................................10\n4. Addressing the foreign-policy implications of American immigration law .......................................................13\nB. The Proclamation Asserts The Kind Of Unbridled Discretion That The 1965 Amendments Sought Specifically To Constrain....................................................................17\nII. THE PROCLAMATION’S INDEFINITE BAR IS AN IMPROPER EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION ...........................................................19\nA. Congress Enacted § 1182(f) Against The Backdrop Of Tailored Presidential Authority To Limit Entry .................................21\nB. The Proclamation Is Inconsistent With Past Invocations Of § 1182(f).........................................................................................24\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................30\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n- i -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 38\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCASES\n\nPage(s)\n\nBenitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) ..................................................26\n\nFDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).......................23\n\nHaitian Centers Council v. Sale, 509 U.S. 155 (1993)............................................28\n\nKent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 1 (1958) ............................................................................24\n\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ...........................................................17\n\nKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)...................................................20\n\nNarenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979)...........................................24, 25\n\nOlsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) ....................................................4\n\nRegan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) .......................................................................26\n\nRussello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).........................................................19\n\nSosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).......................................................25\n\nZemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ............................................................................26\n\nDOCKETED CASES\n\nTrump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540 (U.S.) ....................................................................21 STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(D)-(G).......................................................................................8 § 1151 ..............................................................................................................9 § 1152(a)(1)(A).......................................................................................passim § 1153 ..............................................................................................................9 § 1182(a)(1)-(3) .............................................................................................28 § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)......................................................................................28 § 1182(f) .................................................................................................passim § 1185(a)(1) .............................................................................................23, 24\n\n- ii -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 38\n\nTravel Control Act and the Entry & Departure Control Act, Pub. L. No. 65-154, 40 Stat. 559, 559 (1918) ............................................................21\nPub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044 (1954)................................................................10 Act of September 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (1961) ....................12 Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 215, 66 Stat. 190 (1952).......................................................23 Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957)..................................................................10 Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76 Stat. 1247 (1962)................................................................12 Alien Visa Act, Pub. L. No. 77-113, 55 Stat. 252 (1941)........................................22 Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953) ...................10 Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965)....................................................................2 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29....................................................................1 6 Fed. Reg. 5929 (1941) ..........................................................................................23\nLEGISLATIVE MATERIALS\nH.R. Doc. No. 84-329 (1956) ..................................................................................11 H.R. Rep. No. 77-754 (1941)...................................................................................22 H.R. Rep. No. 86-582 (1959)...................................................................................11 S. Rep. No. 89-748 (1965) .....................................................................5, 8, 9, 10, 16\nImmigration: Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964) ...................passim\n87 Cong. Rec. 5286 (1941) ......................................................................................22 98 Cong. Rec. 8021 (1952) ..............................................................................4, 5, 13\nEXECUTIVE MATERIALS\nMessage from the President Transmitting Recommendations Relative to Our Immigration and Nationality Laws, H.R. Doc. No. 84329 (1956)........................................................................................................6\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 38\n\nMessage from the President Relative to Immigration Matters, H.R. Doc. No. 85-85 (1957).....................................................................................5\nMessage from the President Relative to Urging the Liberalization of Some of Our Existing Restrictions upon Immigration, H.R. Doc. No. 86-360 (1960).............................................................................6, 13\nPresident Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against Iran Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980), available at http://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33233 ...............................................................................25\nPresident John F. Kennedy, Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on Revision of the Immigration Laws (July 23, 1963), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb. edu/ws/index.php?pid=9355................................................................7, 14, 16\nPresident Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), available at http://www.presi dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787 ....................................................................... 7\nPresident Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 5517: Suspension of Cuban Immigration (Aug. 22, 1986), available at http://www.presiden cy.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37775...........................................................................25\nProclamation No. 1473 (1918), available at http://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=117715 .............................................................21\nProclamation No. 3292, in H.R. Rep. No. 86-1433 (1960) .......................................6\nProclamation No. 4865 (1981), avaliable at http://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44316 ...............................................................28\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\nAuerbach, Frank L., Immigration Legislation, 1959, Department of State Bulletin (Oct. 26, 1959)........................................................................11\nBier, David, Travel Ban is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato at Liberty (Oct. 9, 2017), availabla at https:// www.cato.org/blog/travel-ban-based-executive-whim-notobjective-criteria ............................................................................................27\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 38\n\nCox, Adam B. & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 Yale L.J. 458 (2009) .................................................29\nCongressional Research Service, U.S. Immigration Law and Policy: 1952-1979 (1979), reprinted in 3 Immigr. & Nat’lity L. Rev. 95 (1980).........................................................................................5, 6, 10, 11, 12\nMaddux, Thomas R., Ronald Reagan and the Task Force on Immigration, 74 Pac. Hist. Rev. 195 (2005)..................................................26\nManuel, Kate M., Congressional Research Service, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief (Jan. 23, 2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44743.pdf .............................................29\nMargulies, Peter, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, __ Mich. St. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2018), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=3029655 ............................................................................................. 9\nWeinraub, Bernard, U.S. and Cuba Gain an Accord on Repatriation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1984, at A1, available at http://www. nytimes.com/1984/12/15/world/us-and-cuba-gain-an-accordon-repatriation.html .................................................................................26, 27\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 38\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Amici curiae are law professors who teach and publish scholarship about United States immigration law. They accordingly have an abiding interest in the proper interpretation and administration of the Nation’s immigration laws, in particular the Immigration and Nationality Act. Amici are:2 Richard Boswell, University of California, Hastings College of the Law Gabriel J. Chin, University of California, Davis School of Law Marisa S. Cianciarulo, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, Chapman University Maryellen Fullerton, Brooklyn Law School Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Santa Clara University Alan Hyde, Rutgers Law School Daniel Kanstroom, Boston College Law School Stephen Legomsky, Washington University School of Law Matthew Lindsay, University of Baltimore School of Law Peter Margulies, Roger Williams University School of Law\n\n1 Amici submit this brief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(2) and state that all parties have consented to its timely filing. Amici further state, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E), that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than the amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.\n2 Institutional affiliations are listed for purposes of identification only.\n- 1 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 38\n\nMichael A. Olivas, University of Houston Law Center David Rubenstein, Washburn University School of Law Bijal Shah, Arizona State University Anita Sinha, American University, Washington College of Law Shoba Wadhia, Penn State Law\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT By indefinitely suspending immigration from designated countries, President Trump’s third iteration of his travel ban (the “Proclamation”) engages in precisely the kind of discrimination that Congress prohibited in the landmark Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) amendments of 1965 and runs roughshod over the carefully calibrated system of checks and balances Congress sought to impose on the President’s exercise of discretion in administering immigration law. See Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). Prior to 1965, the INA supported a quota system that limited visa issuance based on national origin and ancestry. Over time, a political consensus formed that recognized that the quota system operated inequitably and inefficiently and that it undermined the foreign affairs objectives of the United States. Congress remedied these ills by abolishing the quota system in the 1965 amendments and by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality in the issuance of visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (the “Nondiscrimination\n\n- 2 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 38\n\nProvision”). In furtherance of its goals, Congress also specifically sought to constrain executive discretion in the allocation of visas.\nDespite these amendments, the Government claims in this case that a provision of the INA enacted in 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (the “Entry Provision”), supports the Proclamation’s legality. The Government’s unchecked interpretation of § 1182(f), however, discounts the 1965 amendments and incorrectly assumes that § 1182(f) is an uncabined source of executive authority. Instead, § 1182(f) authorizes executive action only on a temporary basis in emergency situations, not for indefinite periods. And while the Government claims that its statutory interpretation is consistent with past executive actions limiting immigration to the United States, see Appellants’ Br. 31-32, the Proclamation in fact is unprecedented in nature and asserts executive authority far beyond the bounds of § 1182(f).\nARGUMENT I. THE PROCLAMATION RESUSCITATES THE NATIONAL-ORIGIN\nDISCRIMINATION CONGRESS SOUGHT TO BAR IN THE 1965 AMENDMENTS As Plaintiffs have explained, there are powerful textual and structural arguments why the President’s authority under § 1182(f) is cabined by the Nondiscrimination Provision, which prohibits any executive action that would discriminate against immigrants on the basis of national origin. Appellees’ Br. 2627. The history of the Nondiscrimination Provision further demonstrates that\n\n- 3 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 38\n\nCongress enacted the provision to narrow the power that it delegated to the President under the INA.\nA. The Proclamation Runs Afoul Of Congress’s Purposes Behind The 1965 Amendments To The INA\nCongress amended the INA in 1965 to eliminate the quota system and bar national-origin discrimination in immigration law. Congress had at least four goals in mind when it amended the statute. The Proclamation frustrates each of those objectives.\n1. Eliminating the unfairness and discrimination inherent in a quota system\n“During most of its history, the United States openly discriminated against individuals on the basis of race and national origin in its immigration laws.” Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1997). Those laws were consolidated and codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which preserved preexisting quotas on immigration from particular countries. In his message vetoing the Act, President Truman noted the regime’s abiding unfairness, observing that “the present quota system … discriminates, deliberately and intentionally, against many of the peoples of the world.” 98 Cong. Rec. 8021, 8083 (1952).\nTruman singled out for particular opprobrium the quotas that suppressed immigration by persons from Asia and of Asian ancestry. Until 1952, racial\n\n- 4 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 38\n\nrestrictions in the immigration statute had barred naturalization of most Asian noncitizens and suppressed immigration. See S. Rep. No. 89-748, at 14 (1965) (“Senate Judiciary Report”). The 1952 statute, while eliminating race as an absolute bar to immigration, subjected nationals from the Asia-Pacific triangle to particularly narrow and rigid quotas. Id. A total of only 2,000 visas per year were available to all countries in the entire region. Id. Moreover, the 1952 Act also provided that the immigration to the U.S. of persons of Asian ancestry anywhere in the world would count against the 2,000-person quota applicable to the AsiaPacific triangle. Id. In other words, persons of Asian descent who were nationals of countries in other regions, such as Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, or Latin America, were nonetheless subject to the quota’s parsimonious 2,000-person quota. Truman denounced the impact of “this invidious discrimination” and lamented the dissonance between the quota system and “our national ideals.” 98 Cong. Rec. at 8084-8085. Congress overrode Truman’s veto.\nPresident Eisenhower reiterated his predecessor’s concerns, again observing that the quota system “operate[d] inequitably,” Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Immigration Law and Policy: 1952-1979, at 115 (1979) (quoting Message from the President Relative to Immigration Matters, H.R. Doc. No. 85-85, at 1 (1957))\n\n- 5 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 38\n\n(“CRS Report”),3 and advising Congress that “the present national-origins method of admitting aliens needs to be reexamined, and a new system adopted,” id. at 112 (quoting Message from the President Transmitting Recommendations Relative to Our Immigration and Nationality Laws, H.R. Doc. No. 84-329, at 2 (1956)). In 1960, President Eisenhower noted that “[i]n the world of today our immigration law badly needs revision.” Id. at 117 (quoting Message from the President Relative to Urging the Liberalization of Some of Our Existing Restrictions upon Immigration, H.R. Doc. No. 86-360, at 2 (1960) (“Liberalization Message”)). Eisenhower urged a doubling in the number of immigrants granted admission under the quotas then in effect, explaining that this would “moderate the features of existing law which operate unfairly in certain areas of the world.” Liberalization Message 2. Eisenhower also strongly recommended the elimination of the ceiling of 2,000 annual immigrant visas from the Asia-Pacific Triangle. Id. In addition, President Eisenhower proclaimed on May 19, 1959 a shortly ensuing twelve-month period as “World Refugee Year as a practical means of securing increased assistance for refugees throughout the world.” Proclamation No. 3292, in H.R. Rep. No. 86-1433, at 4 (1960).\n\n3 The report is reprinted at 3 Immigr. & Nat’lity L. Rev. 95 (1980). - 6 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 38\n\nBy the early 1960s, the political branches’ consensus was that the nationalorigin quota system was “an anachronism … [that] discriminates among applicants for admission into the United States on the basis of accident of birth.” Pres. John F. Kennedy, Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on Revision of the Immigration Laws (July 23, 1963) (“Kennedy Letter”). In his message to Congress in July 1963, President Kennedy highlighted the unfairness of national-origin quotas in stressing the urgent need for their abolition. President Kennedy noted that the national-origin quota system was “without basis in either logic or reason.” Id. President Johnson was just as forthright in his State of the Union message shortly after President Kennedy’s assassination. Echoing a wellknown passage from President Kennedy’s Inaugural Address, Johnson observed that “a nation that was built by the immigrants of all lands can ask those who now seek admission: ‘What can you do for our country?’ But we should not be asking: ‘In what country were you born?’” Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964).\nAppearing before the House Judiciary Committee in 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk cited Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in reiterating the quota system’s unfairness. Secretary Rusk explained: “We in the United States have learned to judge our fellow Americans on the basis of their ability, industry, intelligence, integrity and all the other factors which truly determine … value to society. We do\n- 7 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 38\n\nnot reflect this judgment of our fellow citizens when we hold to immigration laws which classify … according to national and geographical origin.” Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., at 386 (1964) (“Hearings on H.R. 7700”).4\nThe centerpiece of Congress’s efforts to address these concerns was the Nondiscrimination Provision, which declares that no individual shall “be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” The exceptions to the provision are surpassingly narrow. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(D)-(G). The Nondiscrimination Provision accordingly reflects an abiding national commitment to nondiscrimination on the basis of national origin in the administration of the Nation’s immigration laws. That commitment was critical to effecting Congress’s remaining purposes in removing the quota system.\n\n4 Echoing Truman’s concern on the subject, the 1965 Senate Judiciary Report stressed the particularly adverse impact of quota provisions governing the AsiaPacific triangle. The Report declared that in the future, there would be “no differentiation” in the treatment of Asian immigrants. Senate Judiciary Report 15.\n- 8 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 38\n\n2. Prioritizing family reunification The 1965 amendments provided a detailed structure for immigrant admissions that prioritized close family relationships.5 As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted, the revisions to the statute included “a new system of allocation based on a system of preferences which extends priorities … to close relatives of U.S. citizens and [lawful permanent residents],” along with certain “members of the professions, arts, or sciences,” whose skills or other attributes were needed in the U.S. economy, and refugees. Senate Judiciary Report 11. The Committee Report declared that “[r]eunification of families is to be the foremost consideration.” Id. at 13. The 1965 amendments decisively rejected the system of national-origin quotas because the system lacked the “required degree of flexibility” to handle such factors as “the reuniting of families.” Senate Judiciary Report 13. Because of this flaw—and as discussed in further detail below—Congress repeatedly resorted to “special legislation” to be appropriately “generous and sympathetic” to the needs of families and others. Id. In sparing Congress from the need for this continual recourse to special legislation, the Judiciary Committee pointedly praised\n\n5 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153; cf. Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, __ Mich. St. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2018), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3029655.\n- 9 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 38\n\nthe 1965 amendments’ replacement of the national-origin quota system with a family-based visa program that was to be “fair, rational, humane, and in the national interest.” Id.\n3. Remedying the substantial inefficiency the quota system created in the legislative process\nAs noted, the United States’ commitment to family reunification was complicated by the existence of the quota system. So too was the Nation’s commitment to refugees and others who sought entry to the United States. As a result, in the period between the 1952 Act and the 1965 amendments, Congress repeatedly passed ad hoc legislation to admit relatives of U.S. citizens, refugees, and others over and above the quotas. These recurring ad hoc efforts drained legislative time, effort, and deliberation.\nThe Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953), amended by Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044 (1954), provided for admission beyond the otherwise applicable quotas of a broad swath of foreign nationals, including refugees, escapees from Communist countries, persons expelled from such countries, and relatives of U.S. citizens. CRS Report 113.\nIn 1957, Congress, in a bill whose principal sponsor was then-Senator John F. Kennedy, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957), enacted still more ad hoc adjustments within the overall structure of the quota system. CRS Report 115. First, the 1957 Act, as a temporary expedient to mitigate the harshness of the quota\n- 10 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 38\n\nsystem, provided that foreign national visa applicants on whose behalf petitions had been filed by a “specified date” would qualify for visas without regard to the quota system. Id. at 116. This relief, to a cohort of foreign nationals whose admission would otherwise have been severely delayed by the quota system’s operation, was the “first of a series” of ad hoc adjustments that Congress made to provisions for such nationals. Id. Along the same lines, on September 22, 1959, Congress again made ad hoc time-bound adjustments to certain petitions for foreign nationals who were relatives of United States citizens in service of “the recognized principle of avoiding separation of families.” Id. at 118 (quoting Auerbach, Immigration Legislation, 1959, Department of State Bulletin 600 (Oct. 26, 1959) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 86-582, at 2 (1959))).\nMoreover, members of Congress compensated for the rigidity of nationalorigin quotas with what President Eisenhower, who strongly favored comprehensive reform of the quota system, called an “avalanche … of private bills.” H.R. Doc. No. 84-329, at 3 (1956). In the 85th Congress, fully “[t]wenty percent of all legislation” stemmed from 4,364 private immigration bills providing relief to 5,282 persons who would otherwise have been caught up in delays attributable to the quota system. CRS Report 120. Because of Congress’s persistence in fashioning continual ad hoc adjustments to the quota system through\n\n- 11 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 38\n\nspecial and private legislation, less than half of the over 2.5 million immigrants admitted between 1951 and 1960 entered under the quota system. Id.\nThis same exhausting regime of ad hoc adjustments continued through the early 1960s. In the Act of September 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (1961), Congress again enacted a temporary program for the admission outside the quota system of specified cohorts of foreign nationals. CRS Report 140. Since certain visa categories were severely backlogged because of the quota system, the 1961 Act authorized temporary non-quota admission for a discrete cohort of petitions. Id. at 141. Legislation passed in 1962 accomplished the same result. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76 Stat. 1247 (1962)). In overall terms, all of this legislation “reflect[ed] a gradual shift in focus, at least on an ad hoc basis,” from national-origin quotas to “values” such as the “reunification of families.” Id.\nIn crucial testimony before the House Judiciary Committee in 1964, Secretary of State Rusk acknowledged the adverse impact that the quota system had on the efficiency of the legislative process. Secretary Rusk put a diplomatic spin on these extensive, iterative efforts, noting that Congress had repeatedly found it “desirable” to pass “special laws” allowing admission outside the quota system. Hearings on H.R. 7700, at 386. Secretary Rusk reminded Congress of the fitfully spinning wheels caused by the need to regularly pass additional legislation, noting\n\n- 12 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 38\n\nthat from 1953 to 1962, only 34 percent of immigrants to the United States were quota immigrants. Id.\n4. Addressing the foreign-policy implications of American immigration law\nIn 1965, Congress explicitly recognized what presidents since Truman had noted regarding the 1952 Act’s hardening of quotas: that the “quota system [was] … unrealistic in the face of present world conditions … [and] a constant handicap in the conduct of our foreign relations.” 98 Cong. Rec. at 8083. President Truman urged Congress to abandon the quota system and enact a “decent policy of immigration—a fitting instrument for our foreign policy and a true reflection of the ideals we stand for, at home and abroad.” Id. Indeed, President Truman reiterated his contention that the need for a replacement of the quota system was nothing short of a national “emergency.” Id.\nPresident Eisenhower was equally vocal in noting the foreign policy costs of the quota system. Urging that Congress pass legislation that would result in “[a]bandonment of the concept of race and ethnic classifications within our population” and an increase in the number of immigrants allowed and of refugee admissions, President Eisenhower noted that victims of persecution who at that time had to wait long periods for admission “will become worthwhile citizens and will keep this Nation strong and respected as a contributor of thought and ideals.” Liberalization Message 2.\n- 13 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 38\n\nPresident Kennedy continued this emphasis on liberalizing or eliminating quotas. In a July 1963 message to Congress, President Kennedy denied that the quota system “satisfies a national need[] or accomplishes an international purpose.” Kennedy Letter. Critiquing the quota system as counterproductive to American interests, President Kennedy observed that “[o]ur investment in new citizens has always been a valuable source of our strength.” Id.\nIn hearings before the House Judiciary Committee in 1964, Secretary of State Rusk alluded to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and added his own assessment of the foreign policy reasons for abolishing the quota system. As Secretary Rusk put it: “Since the end of World War II, the United States has been placed in the role of critical leadership in a troubled and constantly changing world. We are concerned to see that our immigration laws reflect our real character and objectives. What other peoples think about us plays an important role in the achievement of our foreign policies.” Hearings on H.R. 7700, at 386. Secretary Rusk added that because America’s immigration laws are “the basis of how we evaluate others around the world,” we can readily detect “their effect on people abroad and consequently on our influence.” Id.\nSpeaking about the Asia-Pacific Triangle quota, Secretary Rusk was even more pointed in his critique, observing that, “[t]here have been times in the past when we have been accused of preoccupation with the peoples of the West to the\n- 14 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 38\n\nneglect of Asian peoples in the Far East.” Hearings on H.R. 7700, at 386. Secretary Rusk warned Congress that “the national origins system gives a measure of support and credence to these observations.” Id. Responding to committee members’ questions, Secretary Rusk further noted that perceptions of United States discrimination in immigration policy were “picked up by people unfriendly to the United States and made an issue” in other countries around the world, “caus[ing] political disturbances in the good relations which we would hope to establish.” Id. at 390. Rusk described this political blowback as a “matter of frequent discussion … with foreign ministers of other countries.” Id. Summing up the tone and tenor of discourse with foreign officials occasioned by the quota system, Rusk described the quotas as creating an “unwholesome atmosphere.” Id. Secretary Rusk thus echoed the calls of Presidents Eisenhower through Johnson for the quotas’ demise.\nFaced with these concerns, the 1965 Congress chose to accept the political branches’ shared view that the quota system undermined the foreign affairs objectives of the United States. The 1965 amendments abolished the quota system to permanently heal the wounds inflicted by our discriminatory policies.\n* * * The Proclamation, if allowed to take effect, would reopen these wounds. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, Congress very specifically intended the Nondiscrimination Provision to prohibit the formulation of immigration policy that\n- 15 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 38\n\nturned on national origin. Congress identified particular ills attributable to the old system and viewed the elimination of national-origin discrimination as critical to remedying them. The ban, however, imposes an indeterminate bar on the entry of immigrants from designated nations, thus reprising precisely the form of nationalorigin discrimination Congress eliminated in the 1965 amendments. It does so without regard to the goal of family reunification, which Congress in 1965 declared was the “foremost consideration” in the allocation of visas. Senate Judiciary Report 13. The Proclamation indefinitely delays reunification of close relatives from listed countries with United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, and it shifts the default position from the equitable visa allocation that Congress envisioned in 1965 back to the nationality-based system that President Kennedy declared to be an “anachronism” in 1963 and that Congress rejected in 1965. Kennedy Letter.\nAs was the case with the national-origin quota system, congressional efforts to override or adjust the Proclamation would create a sustained spectacle of legislative inefficiency. The recurring need to pass special legislation imposed substantial costs on pre-1965 Congresses, requiring time, effort, and deliberation that legislators could otherwise have devoted to other matters of public importance. The point of the 1965 amendments was to “eliminate the need for th[e]se special bills.” Hearings on H.R. 7700, at 421. But the Proclamation would redouble that\n- 16 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 38\n\nneed. Finally, the Proclamation risks precisely the adverse impact on foreign relations that the 1965 amendments were meant to address. It singles out for adverse treatment the citizens of nations located in critical parts of the world, compromising the “good relations which we would hope to establish” with those nations and their neighbors and defenders. Id. at 390.\nIn sum, the Proclamation undoes much of the work Congress accomplished in the 1965 amendments, which were decades in the making. Nothing in the INA gives the President the authority to so thoroughly undermine Congress’s handiwork in a domain over which it has plenary power. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).\nB. The Proclamation Asserts The Kind Of Unbridled Discretion That The 1965 Amendments Sought Specifically To Constrain\nIn enacting the 1965 amendments—including the Nondiscrimination Provision—Congress sought specifically to constrain executive power. More to the point, it sought specifically to prevent the President from making immigration decisions based on national origin. Indeed, a review of the legislative history reveals that members of Congress were gravely concerned with the executive’s encroachment upon the legislature’s authority to regulate immigration. The Chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee, Rep. Michael Feighan of Ohio, repeatedly expressed his desire to cabin administrative discretion that might perpetuate vestiges of the quota system.\n- 17 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 38\n\nAs originally drafted, the bill that reached Rep. Feighan’s subcommittee provided for an Immigration Board that could recommend funneling visas in a “quota reserve” to particular countries. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, at 387-388, 392 (testimony of Secretary of State Rusk). Representative Feighan resisted leaving such discretion with the Executive Branch (either the presidential administration or the proposed board), arguing that the best approach was to enact comprehensive legislation. Id. at 392-393.\nSkeptical about the proposed deference to executive discretion, Rep. Feighan probed Secretary Rusk’s defense of the “Immigration Board” concept, inquiring whether “Congress is inadequate for the task of establishing a clear and allinclusive immigration policy.” See Hearings on H.R. 7700, at 392. And Secretary Rusk conceded that “[b]oth under the Constitution and under the practices of our system of government, it is for the Congress to establish the basic policy and the basic legislation” regarding immigration. Id.\nRep. Feighan also objected to the administration’s proposal of establishing an Immigration Board due to the absence of “checks and balances” on administrative discretion in the draft proposal of the bill. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, at 99. Because of the absence of such safeguards in the draft bill, Rep. Feighan suggested that the Immigration Board would be “subject to all sorts of charges as well as pressures, thus creating more problems than we already have.”\n- 18 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 38\n\nId. at 422. Rep. Feighan also resisted the proposal to lodge in the executive branch “broad authority … to allocate quotas, to actually set preferences and priorities … to admit 10 percent per country by Presidential determination, and similar discretionary authority.” Id. at 423.\nThe President’s assertion of authority to promulgate the Proclamation, regardless of its conflict with the Nondiscrimination Provision, runs roughshod over Congress’s very clear intent to cabin executive discretion in the administration of the immigration laws. As the evolution of the 1965 amendments makes plain, the nondiscrimination mandate in 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) ensured that administrative discretion would not backslide to the discredited practices of the quota system. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (using the “evolution of … statutory provisions” as evidence of congressional intent). II. THE PROCLAMATION’S INDEFINITE BAR IS AN IMPROPER EXERCISE OF\nEXECUTIVE DISCRETION In imposing a ban of indeterminate duration on the entry of immigrants from particular countries, the Proclamation not only runs afoul of the Nondiscrimination Provision, but it also breaches the very prescribed limitations of Section 1182(f), the ban’s purported source of statutory authority. The Entry Provision allows the President to act quickly and decisively when situations require an exigent response, but it does not authorize actions of indefinite duration, which require a more\n\n- 19 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 38\n\nsubstantial justification as they are more likely to interfere with the INA’s overall plan—including the Nondiscrimination Provision.\nThe Government’s invocation of § 1182(f) to justify the Proclamation’s indefinite alteration of Congress’s reticulated immigration scheme lacks a coherent limiting principle. Extended to the “limit of its logic,” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted), the government’s reading would render superfluous the Nondiscrimination Provision. It would also strain the entire structure of visa allocation that Congress sought to erect in 1965 and in subsequent amendments to the INA. Fortified merely by a thin claim that admission of immigrants from countries X, Y, and Z would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), the President would be able to sweep aside Congress’s commitment to a uniform system of percountry visa allocation and its prohibition on discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. The result would be a de facto return to the national-origin-based system that Congress decisively rejected in 1965 and to the broad discretion that Congress sought to combat by insisting on the Nondiscrimination Provision.\nSimilarly, the government’s interpretation of § 1182(f) would undermine the intricately constructed latticework of inadmissibility grounds that Congress has enacted in § 1182 of the INA. Armed with an unchecked reading of § 1182(f), the President could unilaterally add revisions of indefinite duration to § 1182’s list of\n- 20 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 38\n\ninadmissibility grounds. Supplementing that list in exigent circumstances may be permissible. However, an executive decree of an indefinite ban on otherwise admissible individuals from several countries is not.\nA. Congress Enacted § 1182(f) Against The Backdrop Of Tailored Presidential Authority To Limit Entry\nThe statutory pedigree of § 1182(f) illustrates its limited scope. See generally Resp. Br. 31, Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540 (U.S. filed Sept. 11, 2017). Following the United States’ entry into World War I, President Wilson sought authority to exclude persons “reasonably suspected of aiding Germany’s purposes.” Proclamation No. 1473 (1918). In recognizing the need to limit the entry and departure of immigrants during wartime, Congress empowered the President to implement such limitations “if the President shall find that the public safety requires.” Travel Control Act and the Entry & Departure Control Act, Pub. L. No. 65-154, 40 Stat. 559, 559 (1918).\nThe legislation also contained provisions regarding authority to set rules governing passports issued to Americans for travel abroad. Pub. L. No. 65-154, §§ 1(b)-(g), 2. President Wilson issued a proclamation restricting entry and departure of persons whose admission would be “prejudicial to the interests of the United States,” including persons acting as German agents. Proclamation No. 1473, § 2.\n\n- 21 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 38\n\nThe political branches’ activity during World War II reflected the same tailored model. In the months before the Pearl Harbor attack and America’s entry into World War II, President Roosevelt sought authority from Congress to limit both departure and entry “whenever … the President shall deem that the interests of the United States require it.” H.R. Rep. No. 77-754, at 1 (1941). This time, Congress pushed back. Senator Robert Taft, presaging concerns about executive discretion raised by Rep. Feighan almost twenty-five years later, cautioned that codifying the broad language proposed by the White House would add “another statute which would give the President unlimited power, under any circumstances, to make the law of the United States and to prescribe the terms upon which any person—any American or any other person—might leave the United States.” 87 Cong. Rec. 5286, 5326 (1941). Senator Taft warned about the prospect that the “extreme” power granted to the President under the proposal would apply not only during wartime, but also to “any time that war exists anywhere in the world and the President desires to exercise the power.” Id. at 5386. Addressing Senator Taft’s warning, Senator Van Nuys explained that the State Department had provided assurances that the wartime authority granted to the President would be used only to deter “subversive activities.” Id.\nCongress enacted the bill with no material changes, see Alien Visa Act, Pub. L. No. 77-113, 55 Stat. 252 (1941), and President Roosevelt tailored exercise of his\n- 22 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 38\n\nnew statutory authority to persons suspected of working on behalf of hostile foreign powers. See 6 Fed. Reg. 5929, 5931-5932 (1941) (deeming “prejudicial to the interests of the United States” the entry of certain categories of persons, including foreign nationals “affiliated with … a political organization associated with or carrying out the policies of any foreign government opposed to the measures adopted by the Government of the United States in the public interest,” or who possessed “unauthorized secret information concerning … the national defense of the United States,” or conducted “activities designed to obstruct, impede, retard, delay, or counteract the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the Government of the United States for the defense of the United States or any other country”).\nCongress was aware of this backdrop when it enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. To provide authority in wartime and emergencies, Congress enacted a precursor of 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), rendering it unlawful for a foreign national to depart from or enter the United States in wartime except under rules prescribed by the President. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 215, 66 Stat. 190 (1952). Congress also enacted the present § 1182(f) in 1952 as a supplement to that wartime authority.\nReading these provisions as a “harmonious whole,” see FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000), Congress must be\n- 23 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 38\n\nunderstood to have authorized nothing more than the limited exigent authority successfully sought by presidents Wilson and Roosevelt, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 1, 130 (1958) (declining to hold that executive branch “has been silently granted” a “larger, more pervasive power” to restrict travel). Indeed, it would have been particularly odd to expand the President’s peacetime power beyond the power that Congress had granted the President to address the exigencies of war.\nB. The Proclamation Is Inconsistent With Past Invocations Of § 1182(f)\nDefenders of the Proclamation have pointed to purported historical precedent to buttress the President’s claim to authority under § 1182(f). But none of the cited precedents lends any credence to the government’s claim of authority here. Rather, historical invocations of § 1182(f) demonstrate that past presidents have used this authority to address discrete bilateral diplomatic disputes or control the migration of persons who were already inadmissible under the INA. In marked contrast to the tailored nature of these historical invocations, the Proclamation’s indefinite ban sweeps far more broadly.\nPresident Carter used authority under the INA6 in response to Iran’s illegal seizure and imprisonment of U.S. diplomatic personnel in 1979. See Narenji v.\n6 President Carter invoked authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) to regulate foreign nationals’ entry into and departure from the United States. In this case, the government has treated authority under §§ 1185(a)(1) and 1182(f) as interchangeable.\n- 24 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 38\n\nCiviletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747-748 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The measures taken by President Carter to respond to this illegal act included requiring Iranian students in the United States to report to a government office with updated information showing compliance with the terms of their visas, id. at 746, and suspending issuance of new immigrant visas to Iranian nationals, apart from those required for humanitarian reasons, see Pres. Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against Iran Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980).\nIn upholding the first measure, the D.C. Circuit cited the INA’s requirement that student visa-holders maintain their nonimmigrant status and comply with conditions pertinent to that status. Narenji, 617 F.2d at 747. The second measure, suspending issuance of new immigrant visas apart from those issued on humanitarian grounds, was a tailored response to the Iranian regime’s violation of international law regarding protection of diplomats. Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004) (describing “infringement of the rights of ambassadors” as a core violation of international law that was universally acknowledged during the days of the “early Republic”).\nPresident Reagan’s invocation of § 1182(f) in 1986 to suspend immigration from Cuba stemmed from a diplomatic dispute regarding inadmissible foreign nationals. See Pres. Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 5517: Suspension of Cuban Immigration (Aug. 22, 1986). President Reagan’s action was one salvo in an\n- 25 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 38\n\nextended dispute between the United States and Cuba with wide effects on immigration and travel between the two countries. In a policy repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court, the United States had for a quarter-century limited travel of U.S. nationals to Cuba, to deprive the Castro regime of resources for foreign incursions that endangered U.S. interests. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). Cuba had contributed to this longstanding dispute by alternating rigid control of immigration to the United States with episodes, such as the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, in which Cuban officials knowingly facilitated the migration to the United States of over 130,000 persons, including individuals with criminal records or other conditions that rendered them inadmissible. See Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1290 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003), rev’d & remanded on other grounds sub nom. Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Maddux, Ronald Reagan and the Task Force on Immigration, 74 Pac. Hist. Rev. 195, 202 (2005).\nPresident Reagan issued the 1986 proclamation in response to Cuba’s repudiation of a 1984 agreement curbing this confounding pattern. In that agreement, Cuba had committed itself to accept the return of almost 3,000 of its nationals with known criminal records or other disqualifying conditions. See Weinraub, U.S. and Cuba Gain an Accord on Repatriation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1984, at A1. To persuade Cuba to accept return of these individuals and exercise\n- 26 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 38\n\nfuture due diligence in its immigration policy, the Reagan Administration had agreed to issue immigrant visas to an additional cohort of Cuban nationals who had close relatives in the United States. Id. When Cuba reneged on the agreement, President Reagan proclaimed that the United States would also return to the preagreement status quo. In taking this step, President Reagan hoped to exert some leverage over Cuba to promote compliance with the 1984 agreement’s terms.\nPresident Reagan’s action was both tailored and transactional, responding in a measured way to a discrete problem with a single foreign state. This tailored approach was entirely consistent with the INA’s overall scheme. In contrast, the Proclamation’s indefinite ban is programmatic, not transactional. No country subject to the ban has emulated Cuba by knowingly engineering the migration to the United States of inadmissible foreign nationals. Indeed, with the exception of Iran, the countries designated in the Proclamation cooperate with the United States on immigration, while many countries not on the list do not cooperate with the United States. See Bier, Travel Ban is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato at Liberty (Oct. 9, 2017). Far from responding to a particularly exigent crisis, the Proclamation appears untethered to any emergent foreign policy issue. Moreover, unlike President Reagan’s 1986 Proclamation, which targeted only one country, the Proclamation is an indefinite ban on immigration from several countries.\n- 27 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 38\n\nDeterrence of the “attempted mass migration” of inadmissible foreign nationals played a role in another prominent use of § 1182(f) by President Reagan. See Haitian Centers Council v. Sale, 509 U.S. 155, 187-188 (1993) (discussing Proclamation 4865: High seas interdiction of illegal aliens (Sept. 29, 1981)). Addressing efforts by thousands of Haitians who sought to escape political oppression and economic privation by securing passage to the United States from smugglers—often on unseaworthy vessels—President Reagan “suspended” the entry of undocumented persons from the high seas and ordered the Coast Guard to interdict vessels engaged in this activity. President Reagan’s proclamation did not suspend the granting of visas to Haitian nationals or other persons. Any foreign national with a close family relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident could still apply for and receive a visa if she had a qualifying relationship with a citizen or lawful permanent resident and did not fall within any of the INA’s express exclusion grounds, such as those concerning health, criminal history, or national security. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(3).\nPresident Reagan’s proclamation, subsequently followed by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, applied only to persons who lacked a visa and were therefore already inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (current version) (providing that foreign national who applies for admission to the United States without “valid unexpired immigrant visa … or other valid entry document”\n- 28 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 38\n\nis inadmissible).7 President Reagan’s order had no effect at all on the issuance of immigrant visas in Haiti or elsewhere. The contrast is marked with the Proclamation, which expressly restricts issuance of immigrant visas for nationals of the countries named.\nIn sum, past practice under § 1182(f) and related statutory authority has been limited to resolution of discrete bilateral diplomatic disputes or other exigent matters such as the Iranian hostage crisis and efforts to deter or redress entry of persons who were inadmissible under the INA. Cf. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief, 7-12 (Jan. 23, 2017) (discussing background and past practice regarding § 1182(f)). In contrast, a presidentially decreed indefinite ban on otherwise admissible individuals from several countries threatens Congress’s carefully wrought structure. It also defies the “checks and balances” that Chairman Feighan and his fellow legislators sought to inscribe in the INA. This Court should reject the government’s invitation to so undermine the statutory scheme.\n\n7 Under the procedure provided for in the proclamation, U.S. State Department and immigration officials would interview foreign nationals interdicted under the proclamation who alleged that they had a well-founded fear of persecution if they were returned to their country of origin. Those who made this showing were transported to the United States. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 Yale L.J. 458, 495-496 (2009).\n- 29 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 38\n\nCONCLUSION\nThe district court’s order preliminarily enjoining the Proclamation should be\naffirmed.\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Alan E. Schoenfeld ALAN E. SCHOENFELD SCOTT MCABEE WILMER CUTLER PICKERING\nHALE AND DORR LLP 250 Greenwich Street 7 World Trade Center New York, New York 10007 (212) 937-7294\nPETER MARGULIES ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 10 Metacom Avenue Bristol, RI 02809 (401) 254-4564\nCounsel for Amici Curiae Scholars of Immigration Law\nNovember 17, 2017\n\n- 30 -\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 38\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that the foregoing complies with the type-volume limitation established by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B), because it contains 6,439 words, excluding the portions of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f). I also certify that this brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, 14-point Times New Roman, using Microsoft Word 2016.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Alan E. Schoenfeld ALAN E. SCHOENFELD WILMER CUTLER PICKERING\nHALE AND DORR LLP 250 Greenwich Street 7 World Trade Center New York, New York 10007 (212) 937-7294\nCounsel for Amicus Curiae Scholars\nof Immigration Law\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 38\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Alan E. Schoenfeld, hereby certify that on this 17th day of November, 2017, I served true and correct copies of the foregoing on all counsel of record via ECF.\n/s/ Alan E. Schoenfeld ALAN E. SCHOENFELD\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 2\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_,_-_2_2_3_2__, _-2_2__3_3_,_-_2_2_4_0____ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [✔]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _S_c_h_o_l_a_r_s_o_f_I_m__m_i_g_ra__ti_o_n_L_a__w__in__S_u_p_p_o_r_t_o_f_P__la_i_n_ti_ff_s_-_A_p_p_e_l_le_e_s_________________ _______________(s_e_e_a_t_ta_c_h_e_d_A__d_d_e_n_d_u_m__fo_r__li_s_t _o_f _in_d_i_v_id_u_a_l_s_c_h_o_l_ar_s_)________________________as the\n(party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_A__la_n__E_._S__c_h_o_e_n_f_e_ld___________________ (signature)\n\n_A_l_a_n__E_._S_c_h__o_e_n_fe__ld_______________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_(_2_1_2_)_9_3_7_-_7_9_2_4__ Voice Phone\n\n_W__i_lm__e_r_C_u__tl_e_r _P_i_c_k_e_ri_n_g__H_a_l_e_a_n__d_D__o_rr__L_L_P__ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_(_2_1_2_)_2_3_0__-8_8_8__8_ Fax Number\n\n_2_5_0__G__re_e__n_w_i_c_h_S__tr_e_e_t_, _7_W__o_r_ld__T_r_a_d_e__C_t_r_. __\n\n_N__e_w__Y_o_r_k_,_N_e__w__Y_o_r_k_1_0_0__0_7_______________ Address\n\n_a_la__n_.s_c_h_o_e__n_fe_l_d_@__w_i_lm__e_r_h_a_le_._c_o_m____ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_1_7__________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_A__la_n__E_.__S_c_h_o__e_n_f_e_ld_________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n__________1__1_/1__7_/1__7__________ Date\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 104-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 2\n\nADDENDUM TO APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nCounsel For:\n Richard Boswell, University of California, Hastings College of the Law  Gabriel J. Chin, University of California, Davis School of Law  Marisa S. Cianciarulo, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, Chapman University  Maryellen Fullerton, Brooklyn Law School  Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Santa Clara University  Alan Hyde, Rutgers Law School  Daniel Kanstroom, Boston College Law School  Stephen Legomsky, Washington University School of Law  Matthew Lindsay, University of Baltimore School of Law  Peter Margulies, Roger Williams University School of Law  Michael A. Olivas, University of Houston Law Center  David Rubenstein, Washburn University School of Law  Bijal Shah, Arizona State University  Anita Sinha, American University, Washington College of Law  Shoba Wadhia, Penn State Law\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 56\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIn the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, A PROJECT OF THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; HIAS, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE DOE #2,\nMIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS MEMBERS; MUHAMMED METEAB,\nPAUL HARRISON, IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING\nSECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REX TILLERSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE; DANIEL R. COATS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY\nAS DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,\nDefendants-Appellants [caption continued].\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC)\n\nBRIEF FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE\n\nPeter Karanjia Geoffrey Brounell DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nSuite 800 Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel.: (202) 973-4200 peterkaranjia@dwt.com\n\nElizabeth B. Wydra Brianne J. Gorod David H. Gans CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY\nCENTER 1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 501 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel.: (202) 296-6889 elizabeth@theusconstitution.org\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 56\n\nVictor A. Kovner DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas, 21st Floor New York, New York 10020\n\nRaymond H. Brescia Professor of Law* Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208 For affiliation purposes only\n\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 56\n\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC)\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS\nACTING COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; JAMES MCCAMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,\nIN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2232 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC)\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees, v.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER\nOFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REX TILLERSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendants – Appellants.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 56\n\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, A PROJECT OF THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; HIAS, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS CLIENTS; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., ON\nBEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS MEMBERS; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS\nCLIENTS,\nPlaintiffs – Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO,\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DANIEL R. COATS, IN HIS OFFICIAL\nCAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF NTIONAL INTELLIGENCE,\nDefendants – Appellees\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 56\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT\nPursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, amici curiae state that no party to this brief is a publicly-held corporation, issues stock, or has a parent corporation.\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 56\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nPage\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .................................................. i\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. iv\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ........................................................................ 1\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................................................................... 1\nARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 5\nI. SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES DO NOT PERMIT THE PRESIDENT TO WRITE RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION INTO OUR NATION’S IMMIGRATION LAWS .................................................................................................... 5\n\nII. THE PROCLAMATION RUNS AFOUL OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ....................................8\n\nA. The Proclamation Subverts a Carefully Crafted Legislative Scheme Designed to Prevent Potential Terrorists from Entering the United States .................................9\n\nB. The Proclamation Violates the INA’s Categorical Prohibition on Nationality-Based Discrimination ....................13\n\nC. The Proclamation Lacks the Requisite Finding That Entry of Covered Nationals “Would Be Detrimental” to National Interests ..................................................................15\n\nIII. THE PROCLAMATION RUNS AFOUL OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ...........................................................17\n\nA. The Text and History of the Religion Clauses Forbid Laws That Target a Disfavored Religious Minority for Discriminatory Treatment.........................................................17\n\nB. The Constitution’s Command of Religious Neutrality Squarely Applies to Immigration Regulations .........................22\n\nC. The Proclamation Violates the Central Meaning of the First Amendment.......................................................................26\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 56\n\nCONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 29 APPENDIX: LIST OF AMICI ............................................................................ 30 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 56\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)..........................................................................................5, 6\nBd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)..........................................................................17, 22, 26, 27\nBoumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)..........................................................................................4, 5\nCarlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)..............................................................................................6\nChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)............................................................................................26\nClinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)..................................................................................3, 4, 7, 8\nEverson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)................................................................................................21\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)............................................................................................28\nGalvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)..............................................................................................5\nHaitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ......................................................................13\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012)............................................................................................21\nHughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999)............................................................................................12\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 56\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES – cont’d\nPage(s)\nINS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)..............................................................................................7\nJudulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011)................................................................................................1\nKendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).................................................................................7\nKent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)..............................................................................................9\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)..........................................................................................4\nKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)............................................................................................16\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)........................................................................................5, 22\nLee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)................................................................................20, 22, 26\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995)........................................................................13, 14\nMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005)................................................................................20, 26, 27\nMedellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)..............................................................................................7\nNachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980)............................................................................................12\nNat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)............................................................................................28\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 56\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES – cont’d\nPage(s)\nTown of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014)..........................................................................................5\nUnited States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)..............................................................................................7\nUtil. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)....................................................................................8, 13\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)................................................................................4, 6, 7, 16\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)............................................................................................28\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)..........................................................................................6\nConstitutional Provisions\nU.S. Const. amend. I...............................................................................................................19 art. I, § 8, cl. 4 .......................................................................................................6 art. VI, cl. 3 .........................................................................................................17\nStatutes\n8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)...............................................................................................15 § 1152(a)(1)(A)...................................................................................4, 13, 14, 15 § 1153..................................................................................................................15 § 1182(a)(3)(B) .....................................................................................................4 § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) .........................................................................................10, 12 § 1182(f)........................................................................................................13, 17 § 1187..................................................................................................................11 § 1187(a)(12)(A)...........................................................................................11, 15 § 1735(a) .............................................................................................................10\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 56\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES – cont’d\nPage(s)\nVisa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2989, Div. O, § 203 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)) ...............................................................................................10, 11\nLegislative Materials\nAct of 1646: Heresie Error, in Colonial Laws of Massachusetts (William H. Whitmore ed., 1889).......................................................................24\nAct of 1715, ch. 36, § 7, in Thomas Bacon, Laws of Maryland at Large (1765) .......................................................................................................25\n1 Annals of Cong. (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)................................................22\nCombatting Terrorist Travel: Does the Visa Waiver Program Keep Our Nation Safe?, Hearing on H.R. 158 Before the Subcomm. On Border & Maritime Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. (2015)..............................................................................11\n161 Cong. Rec. H9054 (Dec. 8, 2015).....................................................................11\n2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) ...............................18, 28\n4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) .......................1, 5, 17, 18\nHearings Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 2580 to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, 89th Cong. (1965)................................................14\nH.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-475 (1987).........................................................................9\nH.R. Rep. No. 89-745 (1965)...................................................................................14\nH.R. Rep. No. 114-369 (2015).................................................................................11\n\nvii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 56\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES – cont’d\nPage(s)\nThomas Jefferson, Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, ch. XXXIV (Oct. 1785), in 12 William Walter Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia (1823) ..................................................................................................................20\nKentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) ...................................................................................................3\nNotes on the Debates in the Pennsylvania Convention Taken by James Wilson, reprinted in Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788 (John Bach McMaster and Frederick Dawson Stone eds., 1888)...........................................................................................................19\n2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) .....................................................................................................................6\nSecond Charter to the Treasurer and Company for Virginia, § XXIX (May 23, 1609), in 1 William Walter Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia (1809) ...........................24\nProclamations\nProclamation 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (Nov. 14, 1941) .............................................9\nOther Authorities\n1 The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia (Allen D. Candler ed., 1904) ...................................................................................................................25\nThe Federalist No. 47 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., rev. ed. 1999) ....................7\nNoah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 346 (2002) ............................................................................19\nLyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill (Oct. 3, 1965) ......................................................................................................14\nLetter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, R.I. (Aug. 18, 1790)............................................................................20\nviii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 56\n\nJames Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 The Writings of James Madison (G. Hunt ed., 1901) .......................................................................................................20, 23, 25\nMichael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105 (2003) ................................................................................................21\nMichael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990)................................17\nJoel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: ChurchState Relations in Colonial and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1693 (2005)............................................................................................25\nAlex Nowrasteh, Guide to Trump’s Executive Order to Limit Migration for “National Security” Reasons, Cato Inst.: Cato at Liberty (Jan. 26, 2017)........................................................................................27\nPress Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016) ....................12\nRobert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 259 (2009) ....................................................................................................7\nU.S. Dep’t of State, Presidential Proclamations, https://perma.cc/M2RL-6775 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) ................................15\n“Z,” Boston Indep. Chron., Dec. 6, 1787................................................................19\n\nix\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 56\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Amici are members of Congress who are familiar with the Immigration and Nationality Act and other immigration laws. Amici are committed to ensuring that our immigration laws and policies both protect the nation from foreign and domestic attacks and comport with fundamental constitutional principles. Amici are thus particularly well-situated to provide the Court with insight into the limitations that both the Constitution and federal immigration laws impose on the Executive Branch’s discretion to restrict admission into the country, and have a strong interest in seeing those limitations respected. A full listing of amici appears in the Appendix.\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The First Amendment reflects our Founding promise that “no sect here is superior to another.” 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 194 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (“Elliot’s Debates”). Consistent with this heritage of religious liberty, our nation’s immigration laws regulate entry based on an individualized assessment of an individual’s “fitness to reside in this country,” Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011), not on the basis of religious belief. 1 Amici state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the brief’s preparation or submission. Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of this brief.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 56\n\nIn a Presidential Proclamation (the “Proclamation”) issued on September 24, 2017—the third such order issued since President Trump took office—the President seeks to rewrite our immigration laws to categorically prohibit immigration into the United States by nationals of seven countries: Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Chad, and North Korea, virtually all countries with overwhelmingly Muslim populations. The sole exception—North Korea, which sent fewer than 100 nationals, including many diplomats, to the United States last year—is entirely symbolic. The Proclamation also prohibits the issuance of nonimmigrant visas to nationals from Syria and North Korea, certain non-immigrant visas to nationals of Iran, Libya, Yemen, and Chad, and business and tourist visas to a tiny number of Venezuelan government officials.\nThe Proclamation purports to be data-driven, focused on countries that failed to comport with information-sharing and identity management protocols. But the Proclamation was jerry-rigged to target Muslims. Numerous countries failed to meet one or more of the Proclamation’s criteria, but were not included in its travel ban. Somalia, a Muslim-majority nation, satisfied the information-sharing criteria, but was nevertheless subjected to the ban; Venezuela, which is less than 1% Muslim, failed the same criteria, but its nationals—other than a small number of government officials—are permitted to travel to the United States. Like its predecessors, the Proclamation targets Muslim-majority nations; it imposes a\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 56\n\nreligiously gerrymandered test for immigration. All told, the Proclamation excludes tens of millions of individuals from the United States—overwhelmingly from Muslim-majority nations—and prevents U.S. citizens and others from sponsoring and reuniting with relatives from the targeted countries. The Proclamation reflects President Trump’s view that “‘there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population’” and that “‘Islam hates us.’” ER 78, 141.\nThe Proclamation cannot be squared with our Constitution’s system of separation of powers. Our nation revolted in opposition to a king’s tyrannical rule, and the Framers of our Constitution took pains to deny the President the power to both make the law and execute it, recognizing that such concentrated power “in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Framers gave the legislative power, including the authority to make rules concerning immigration, to Congress, ensuring that control of our borders would not be left to the “absolute dominion of one man.” Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 4 Elliot’s Debates at 543.\nCongress delegated a limited portion of these powers to the Executive in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The government relies on Section 212(f) to defend the Proclamation, but that section does not give the President the power to override the parts of the INA he dislikes in favor of his own preferred\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 56\n\npolicy. That is what he has done here. By treating all persons from the designated Muslim-majority countries as potential terrorists, the Proclamation ignores Congress’s carefully chosen, “specific criteria for determining terrorism-related inadmissibility,” Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), and flouts Congress’s explicit prohibition against discrimination on account of “nationality, place of birth, or place of residence,” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), in the issuance of immigrant visas. Further, the Proclamation lacks a credible finding that entry of the targeted nationals— almost exclusively from Muslim-majority nations—“would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). In short, the Proclamation “does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).\nIncredibly, the government says that no court can review the President’s arrogation of legislative power. But “[a]bdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The President may not switch the Constitution’s separation of powers “on or off at will.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 56\n\nThe Proclamation also violates the First Amendment, which prevents official disapproval of a religious minority, “secur[ing] universal religious liberty, by putting all sects on a level—the only way to prevent persecution.” 4 Elliot’s Debates at 196. Where, as here, the government “classif[ies] citizens based on their religious views” and “single[s] out dissidents for opprobrium,” Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014), it violates the “clearest command of the Establishment Clause”: “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Because the Proclamation is shot through with anti-Muslim animus, it violates the Establishment Clause.\nThe best way to protect the nation’s security, while also upholding foundational American values, is to respect the Constitution’s fundamental protections and the laws passed by Congress. “Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.\nARGUMENT I. SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES DO NOT PERMIT THE\nPRESIDENT TO WRITE RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION INTO OUR NATION’S IMMIGRATION LAWS. Our Constitution entrusts Congress with “broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.\n\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 56\n\n387, 394 (2012); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress.”). This is reflected explicitly in the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, which the Framers wrote to “leave a discretion to the Legislature . . . which will answer every purpose,” 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 268 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).\nOf course, Congress may choose to delegate substantial powers to the Executive Branch, see Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952), but the Executive has no independent lawmaking power over the subject of immigration. “[T]he President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587; id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power.”); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (“The Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”).\nWhen the Framers wrote the Constitution, they gave the lawmaking power to Congress, recognizing that “the Prerogatives of the British Monarch” were not “a proper guide in defining the Executive powers.” 1 Records of the Federal\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 56\n\nConvention, supra, at 65.2 By denying the Executive lawmaking power, the Framers sought “to implement a fundamental insight: Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see The Federalist No. 47, at 269 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., rev. ed. 1999) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).\nThus, “[t]he Constitution does not confer upon [the President] any power to enact laws or to suspend or repeal such as the Congress enacts.” United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 505 (1915); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (refusing to “cloth[e] the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress”). Rather, “[t]he President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585). The President cannot make an end-run around the “single, finely wrought,” “step-by step, deliberate and deliberative process,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 959\n2 From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, British Kings had claimed, as a royal prerogative, the power to make law without the approval of Parliament as well as the power to suspend the execution of laws enacted by Parliament. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 259, 27277, 279-81 (2009).\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 56\n\n(1983), the Framers prescribed for lawmaking. Yet, as demonstrated below, that is exactly what the President has done. II. THE PROCLAMATION RUNS AFOUL OF THE IMMIGRATION\nAND NATIONALITY ACT. In support of its claimed authority, the government principally relies on a single statutory provision. However, that provision does not give the President the breathtaking authority that the government claims. Section 212(f) of the INA authorizes the President to “suspend the entry” of any class of aliens into the United States on the basis of the President’s “find[ing]” that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). This provision—enacted to codify wartime emergency powers—gives the President the flexibility to address promptly admission questions that Congress has not addressed. It does not give the President the authority to supersede Congress’s judgment when Congress has already considered an issue and addressed it. Nor does it give the President the equivalent of a lineitem veto over the immigration laws enacted by Congress, permitting him to excise those parts of the INA he dislikes. That would “deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers,” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014), and would “enhance[] the President’s powers beyond what the Framers would have endorsed,” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 56\n\nA. The Proclamation Subverts a Carefully Crafted Legislative Scheme Designed To Prevent Potential Terrorists from Entering the United States.\nSection 212(f) does not give President a blank check; rather, it must be understood against the backdrop of wartime emergency restrictions it codified. See Proclamation 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, 5822, ¶ 3 (Nov. 14, 1941) (“No alien shall be permitted to enter the United States if it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that such entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States as provided in the rules and regulations hereinbefore authorized to be prescribed by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General.”); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-475, at 165 (1987) (describing the President’s authority under Section 212(f) as the authority “to deny admissions by proclamation or to deny entry to aliens when the United States is at war or during the existence of a national emergency proclaimed by the President”). In codifying those emergency powers, Congress gave the President an important, but limited, grant of authority, ensuring that he could act quickly in emergency situations—that is, when Congress had not yet had an opportunity to consider a particular issue or class of possible entrants to the country. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958) (refusing to read congressional statute to give the Executive “unbridled discretion” and instead reading it narrowly “in light of prior administrative practice”). But Congress did not give the President the power to override the\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 56\n\nconsidered judgment of Congress—a form of executive lawmaking alien to the Constitution’s system of separation of powers.\nThe President says Section 212(f) authorizes him to deny entry to millions of individuals on the ground that they may pose a terrorist threat. But Congress has already specified in Section 212(a) several terrorism-related grounds on which an individual may be denied a visa to enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i). In painstaking detail, the statute declares inadmissible any foreign national who has “engaged in,” “incited,” or “endorse[d] . . . terrorist activity,” or “is a member of a terrorist organization.” Id. As an additional safeguard, the statute expressly authorizes “a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security” to deny entry to any visa applicant he or she “knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity.” Id. Further, a separate provision makes citizens of countries designated as “state sponsor[s] of terrorism”— including Iran, Syria, and Sudan—ineligible for nonimmigrant visas absent a determination by the Secretary of State and Attorney General that they “do[] not pose a threat to the safety or national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1735(a).\nCongress recently revisited terrorism concerns when it passed the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, Pub.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 56\n\nL. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2989, Div. O, § 203 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)). Under the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”), the Department of Homeland Security may waive the B1/B2 visa requirement for aliens traveling from 38 approved countries, permitting stays of up to 90 days for business or tourism. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187. The 2015 Act gave the Homeland Security Secretary the authority to temporarily suspend any VWP country if it “fails to live up to its agreement to provide terrorism-related information.” H.R. Rep. No. 114-369, at 3-4 (2015). Nationals from the suspended countries are not barred from traveling to the United States; they simply must obtain a visa to do so. Despite a documented risk of terrorist travel to the United States, Congress deliberately chose this solution as an alternative to “end[ing] this valuable program.” Combatting Terrorist Travel: Does the Visa Waiver Program Keep Our Nation Safe?, Hearing on H.R. 158 Before the Subcomm. On Border & Maritime Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (Rep. Candice Miller). It concluded that the admission of persons from Muslim-majority nations, with proper vetting, is fully consistent with national interests. See 161 Cong. Rec. H9054 (Dec. 8, 2015).\nTo be sure, under the 2015 Act, nationals of VWP countries may no longer be admitted to the United States without a visa if they have traveled to a number of the countries identified in the Proclamation, or are dual-nationals of those countries, and are not subject to a specified exception. See § 203, 129 Stat. at 2989\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 56\n\n(2015); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016). But the 2015 law does not categorically bar the entry of such travelers. Instead, its tailored remedy reinforces Congress’s determination that the proper response to the threat of terrorist travel is to require that certain entrants first obtain a visa. The President seeks here to override that judgment.\nThe government’s categorical, indefinite bar on tens of millions of nationals, virtually all from Muslim-majority countries, based on the hypothesis that they might pose a terrorist threat, thus, upends Congress’s “‘comprehensive and reticulated statute.’” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). The Proclamation writes discrimination into the INA, substituting an applicant’s nationality alone for Congress’s detailed requirements in evaluating the risk that a visa applicant may engage in terrorist activity in the United States. Further, it ignores that Section 212(a) already allows Executive Branch officials to make an individualized assessment that a noncitizen seeking to enter the United States is “likely to engage” in terrorist activity upon arriving in the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i). In light of these detailed and “specific criteria for determining terrorism-related inadmissibility,” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy,\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 56\n\nJ., concurring), the government’s reliance on Section 212(f) to impose a blanket ban on entry is untenable.\nB. The Proclamation Violates the INA’s Categorical Prohibition on Nationality-Based Discrimination.\nSection 212(f) also does not authorize the President to ignore Congress’s categorical prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. The President cannot use Section 212(f) to make an end-run around the congressional mandate of equality in the issuance of immigrant visas in order to keep out Muslims. “The power of executing the laws . . . does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms[.]” Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2446.\nThe INA provides, in relevant part, that “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). “Congress could hardly have chosen more explicit language,” “unambiguously direct[ing] that no nationality-based discrimination shall occur.” Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“LAVAS”), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996).\nThe adoption of this provision was a sharp rebuke to what had come before: a “national quota system of immigration,” Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 56\n\nSupp. 442, 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980), according to which “the selection of immigrants was based upon race and place of birth,” H.R. Rep. No. 89-745, at 8-10 (1965). As President Lyndon Johnson recognized in signing the law, the prior system “violated the basic principle of American democracy—the principle that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill (Oct. 3, 1965). Congress made the considered judgment that immigration of worthy individuals from all corners of the globe benefits the nation as a whole. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 2580 to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, 89th Cong. 8-9 (1965) (Attorney General Katzenbach) (prior system “prevented or delayed” “brilliant and skilled residents of other countries . . . from coming to this country”). Thus, the 1965 ban on discrimination in immigrant visa issuance was designed to prohibit the Executive from practicing wholesale discrimination against people coming from certain countries—precisely what the Proclamation commands.\nReading Section 212(f) to allow the sort of discrimination that the Proclamation requires would render the later nondiscrimination provision a dead letter. See LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473 (“The appellees’ proffered statutory interpretation, leaving it fully possessed of all its constitutional power to make nationality-based distinctions, would render 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) a virtual nullity.”).\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 56\n\nSignificantly, Congress spoke explicitly in making exceptions to Section 1152’s nondiscrimination rule. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies “[e]xcept as specifically provided in . . . sections 1101(a)(27), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1153 of this title.” These exceptions permit certain preferences for, among others, immediate relatives of U.S. citizens in specified circumstances. Id. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153. Similarly, Congress expressly carved out exceptions to the Visa Waiver Program, see id. § 1187(a)(12)(A), thereby requiring persons from certain countries to undergo more rigorous screening. Congress did not, however, create a similar exception for Section 212(f).\nSection 212(f) has never been used to enact a categorical bar on entry by all aliens from a particular nation—much less millions of individuals like those covered by the Proclamation here. Rather, as the current Administration has recognized, Section 212(f) orders “arise from a foreign policy decision to keep certain elements in a given country from getting a visa.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Presidential Proclamations, https://perma.cc/M2RL-6775 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). The power may not be used to supersede the nondiscrimination rule that Congress added to the INA in 1965—after Section 212(f) was enacted.\nC. The Proclamation Lacks the Requisite Finding That Entry of Covered Nationals “Would Be Detrimental” to National Interests.\nThe Proclamation also fails to comply with Section 212(f) itself. The Proclamation does not establish that admitting individuals from the six covered\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 56\n\ncountries and more than 50,000 refugees “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” as Section 212(f) requires.\nThe Proclamation is predicated on a perceived potential threat—or, in other words, speculation that entry of the covered individuals could be detrimental to national interests. ER 115 (travel ban “prevent[s] the entry” of persons for “whom the United States government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States”). But, under the immigration laws, the burden of proving an entitlement to a visa rests with the person seeking admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Especially when viewed against the backdrop of the carefully drawn statutory provisions Congress designed to protect the country from foreign attacks, and the searching scrutiny required of sweeping assertions of presidential power under these circumstances, see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring), this does not suffice to trigger the exclusion power granted by Section 212(f). The government has failed to substantiate its use of nationality as a proxy for risk. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he exclusion order necessarily must rely . . . upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage . . . . It is difficult to believe that reason, logic or experience could be marshalled in support of such an assumption.”).\n\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 56\n\nIII. THE PROCLAMATION RUNS AFOUL OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE. A. The Text and History of the Religion Clauses Forbid Laws That Target a Disfavored Religious Minority for Discriminatory Treatment. Our Constitution promises religious freedom to people of all religions and\nnationalities. The Religion Clauses “all speak with one voice”: “Absent the most unusual circumstances, one’s religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or duties or benefits.” Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The Constitution’s Religion Clauses prohibit the government from writing into law discrimination against any one set of religious believers, reflecting that “no sect here is superior to another.” 4 Elliot’s Debates at 194. By commanding a course of religious neutrality, the Framers sought to free our nation “from those persecutions . . . with which other countries have been torn.” Id.\nThe original Constitution prohibited all religious tests for federal office, providing that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3. The Framers’ “decision to ban religious tests was a dramatic departure from the prevailing practice in the states, eleven of which then banned non-Christians and at least four of which banned non-Protestants from office.” Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv.\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 56\n\nL. Rev. 1409, 1474 (1990). The Framers insisted that this kind of official discrimination against disfavored religious beliefs had no place in the Constitution.\nIn the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell explained that the ban on religious tests “is calculated to secure universal religious liberty, by putting all sects on a level—the only way to prevent persecution.” 4 Elliot’s Debates at 196; id. at 208 (“No sect is preferred to another. Every man has the right to worship the Supreme Being in the manner he thinks proper.”). These founding principles ensure religious liberty for all believers of any religion without exception. As Iredell observed, “it is objected that the people of America may, perhaps, choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices. But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?” Id. at 194.\nIn the Massachusetts ratifying convention as well, supporters of the Constitution stressed that the United States was conceived as a “great and extensive empire,” where “there is, and will be, a great variety of sentiments in religion among its inhabitants.” 2 Elliot’s Debates at 118-19. “[A]s all have an equal claim to the blessings of the government under which they live, and which they support, so none should be excluded from them for being of any particular denomination in religion.” Id. at 119. As Reverend Daniel Shute observed:\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 56\n\n“[W]ho shall be excluded from national trusts? Whatever answer bigotry may suggest, the dictates of candor and equity, I conceive, will be, None.” Id. (emphasis in original).\nArticle VI’s ban on religious tests, however, was not alone sufficient to ensure religious freedom to all. Antifederalists objected that “[t]he rights of conscience are not secured” and that “Congress may establish any religion.” See Notes on the Debates in the Pennsylvania Convention Taken by James Wilson, reprinted in Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, at 785 (John Bach McMaster and Frederick Dawson Stone eds., 1888). “What security,” they asked, “will there be, in case the government should have in their heads a predilection for any one sect in religion?” See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 346, 399 (2002) (quoting “Z,” Boston Indep. Chron. (Dec. 6, 1787)).\nThese objections convinced the American people to add the First Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting the making of any “law respecting an establishment of religion” and guaranteeing the “free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment “expresses our Nation’s fundamental commitment to religious liberty”: the Religion Clauses were “written by the descendents of people who had come to this land precisely so that they could practice their religion freely. . . . [T]he Religion Clauses were designed to\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 56\n\nsafeguard the freedom of conscience and belief that those immigrants had sought.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The “central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment” is that “all creeds must be tolerated and none favored.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992). This prohibits government from “classif[ying] citizens based on their religious views” and “singl[ing] out dissidents for opprobrium.” Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1826.\nAs its Framers understood, the First Amendment ensures that “[t]he Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man,” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 The Writings of James Madison 184 (G. Hunt ed., 1901), and that “opinion[s] in matters of religion . . . . shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect [our] civil capacities,” Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, ch. XXXIV (Oct. 1785), in 12 William Walter Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia 84, 86 (1823). It guarantees that “[a]ll possess alike liberty of conscience . . . . It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. [H]appily the Government of the United States . . . gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance.” Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, R.I.\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 56\n\n(Aug. 18, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-020135.\nThe Framers wrote the First Amendment against the backdrop of the long history of colonial establishments of religion, which used the power of the state to disfavor certain religious beliefs and deny their adherents the right to freely practice their religion. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 183 (2012) (“Familiar with life under the established Church of England, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a national church.”). While not all of the colonies had religious establishments and those that did varied in important ways, the colonial religious establishments had this in common: Each used the machinery of government to discriminate against disfavored religious believers. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2115-30, 2159-69, 2177-81 (2003). “Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be in a minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they steadfastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own consciences dictated.” Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10 (1947).\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 56\n\nDuring the debates over the First Amendment, Madison argued that, without the Establishment Clause, “one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform.” 1 Annals of Cong. 758 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). To prevent such abuses, the Framers withdrew “the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy,” recognizing that “[a] state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.\nConsistent with this text and history, Supreme Court precedent confirms that the “clearest command of the Establishment Clause” is that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 244; Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he government generally may not treat people differently based on the God or gods they worship, or do not worship.”); id. at 728-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criterion.”). These First Amendment principles apply in the immigration context no less than in other contexts.\nB. The Constitution’s Command of Religious Neutrality Squarely Applies to Immigration Regulations.\nOur Constitution’s Framers understood that immigration rules could be used to entrench a religious majority and disfavor a religious minority. Madison viewed\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 56\n\nsuch religious establishments as an impermissible “Beacon on our Coast, warning” the “magnanimous sufferer” to “seek some other haven.” Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 The Writings of James Madison, supra, at 188. The First Amendment denied the federal government the power to write this kind of religious discrimination into law.\nAs Madison knew, colonial establishments had often included immigration restrictions designed to keep out persons who possessed disfavored religious beliefs, who were often thought to represent a danger to the state. See, e.g., McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra, at 2180 (observing that “Americans were convinced that Roman Catholics were under a kind of spiritual submission to Rome that made them incapable of exercising the independent thought necessary to be a good republican citizen”). Although these laws had generally been swept from the books by the time of the Founding, see McConnell, Origins, supra, at 1436-37, the bitter experience of living under a state-sponsored religious orthodoxy was still fresh in the Framers’ minds.\nMadison’s home state of Virginia had long used its immigration laws to keep out disfavored religious believers. As early as 1609, the Virginia charter provided that “none be permitted to pass in any voyage . . . but such, as first shall have taken the oath of supremacy” to the Church of England and specifically noted that “we should be loath, that any person should be permitted to pass, that we\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 56\n\nsuspected to effect the superstitions of the church of Rome.” Second Charter to the Treasurer and Company for Virginia, § XXIX (May 23, 1609), in 1 William Walter Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia 80, 97-98 (1809). The oath Virginia required “included recognition of the king or queen as head of the Church, thus barring non-Anglicans, and specifically repudiated belief in the Catholic doctrines of papal authority and transubstantiation.” McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra, at 2116. “So successful was this policy that until after the Revolution, there was no Catholic Church and there were few, if any, Catholic individuals in the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Id. at 2117.\nOther colonies, too, had religious restrictions on entry. In New England, Massachusetts Bay adopted an Act against Heresy in 1646 that provided that “no Master or Commander of any Ship . . . or other Vessel, shall henceforth bring . . . within this Jurisdiction, any known Quaker or Quakers, or any other blasphemous hereticks” on penalty of “one hundred pounds.” Act of 1646: Heresie Error, in Colonial Laws of Massachusetts 155 (William H. Whitmore ed., 1889). Any such ship owner, if convicted, was required “to carry them backe to the place, whence he brought them.” Id.\nFurther south, a number of colonies tried to keep out Catholics. In Maryland, a 1715 law sought to “prevent too great a number of Irish Papists being\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 56\n\nimported into this province,” by requiring “All Masters of Ships and Vessels, or others, importing Irish Servants into this Province” to pay a poll tax of 20 shillings “for every Irish Servant so imported.” Act of 1715, ch. 36, § 7, in Thomas Bacon, Laws of Maryland at Large (1765). Georgia also imposed religious restrictions on Catholics. Georgia’s 1732 Charter promised “all . . . persons, except Papists, shall have a free exercise of religion.” 1 The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 21 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1904). “Catholics were not even permitted to live in the colony.” Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: ChurchState Relations in Colonial and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1693, 1711 (2005). “[T]he prohibition on Catholics was generally effective, as the largest number reported in Georgia over the first twenty years was four, in 1747.” Id. at 1749.\nMadison called religious establishments that denied an “asylum to the persecuted” based on their religion “a signal of persecution.” Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 The Writings of James Madison, supra, at 188. As Madison recognized, “whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yielded to the evidence which has convinced us.” Id. at 186. By adding the First Amendment to the Constitution, the Framers denied the federal government the\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 56\n\npower to draw lines based on religion—including in the immigration context. The “central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment” is that “all creeds must be tolerated and none favored.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. That principle prohibits a religious test for immigration.\nC. The Proclamation Violates the Central Meaning of the First Amendment.\nThe Proclamation targets Muslims, just as President Trump’s previous travel bans did. Virtually all the countries singled out by the Proclamation are majorityMuslim, and those that are not—North Korea and Venezuela—are entirely symbolic: only a paltry number of nationals seek entry from North Korea, and the Proclamation covers only a handful of government officials from Venezuela. The Proclamation thus creates a “danger of stigma and stirred animosities” toward Muslims, see Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring), denying them the equal dignity the Constitution affords to all, regardless of religious belief.\nIt is irrelevant that the Proclamation does not mention Muslims by name. “Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993); Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699 (“[O]ur analysis does not end with the text of the statute at issue.”). Context matters, see McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 861-62; Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699, and the evidence that the Proclamation singles out and stigmatizes\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 56\n\nMuslims is overwhelming. The Proclamation is shot through with animus against Muslims on account of their religion, and “purpose needs to be taken seriously under the Establishment Clause,” McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 874. Therefore this Court must take account of “the history of the government’s actions,” not “‘turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.’” Id. at 866 (citation omitted).\nIt also does not matter that the Proclamation does not apply to all Muslims. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 705 (“Here the benefit flows only to a single sect [of a religion], but aiding this single, small religious group causes no less a constitutional problem than would follow from aiding a sect with more members or religion as a whole.”). The Proclamation’s terms, which apply almost exclusively to Muslim-majority nations, are based on religious hostility to Muslims.\nThere is no legitimate purpose—independent of religious animus—for the Proclamation’s sweeping, gerrymandered prohibitions. There is no evidence to suggest that broadly excluding individuals from the targeted countries bears any rational relationship to protecting Americans from terrorist attacks. Significantly, not a single American has been killed as a result of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil carried out by individuals born in those countries since at least 1975. Alex Nowrasteh, Guide to Trump’s Executive Order To Limit Migration for “National Security” Reasons, Cato Inst.: Cato at Liberty (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/guide-trumps-executive-order-limit-migration-national-\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 56\n\nsecurity-reasons; see id. (“[T]he countries that Trump chose to temporarily ban are not serious terrorism risks.”). Indeed, the government’s own evidence demonstrates that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity.” ER 85.\nEven under a more limited form of judicial review, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), the Proclamation is unconstitutional. “Our deference in matters of policy cannot . . . become abdication in matters of law.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012). Respect for the powers of the President “can never extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal power that the Constitution carefully constructed.” Id. In immigration, as in other cases, when other branches of government transgress constitutional boundaries, “the judicial department is a constitutional check.” 2 Elliot’s Debates at 196. Because the Proclamation transgresses “important constitutional limitations,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001), it must be invalidated.\n\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 56\n\nCONCLUSION The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Peter Karanjia Peter Karanjia Geoffrey Brounell DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nSuite 800 Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel.: (202) 973-4200 peterkaranjia@dwt.com\nVictor A. Kovner DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas, 21st Floor New York, New York 10020\n\n/s/ Elizabeth B. Wydra Elizabeth B. Wydra Brianne J. Gorod David H. Gans CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY\nCENTER 1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 501 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel.: (202) 296-6889 elizabeth@theusconstitution.org\nRaymond H. Brescia Associate Professor of Law Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208 For affiliation purposes only\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 56\n\nAPPENDIX: LIST OF AMICI\nU.S. Senate Richard J. Durbin Senator of Illinois\nSheldon Whitehouse Senator of Rhode Island\nAmy Klobuchar Senator of Minnesota\nAl Franken Senator of Minnesota\nChristopher A. Coons Senator of Delaware\nRichard Blumenthal Senator of Connecticut\nMazie K. Hirono Senator of Hawai’i\nTammy Baldwin Senator of Wisconsin\nMichael F. Bennet Senator of Colorado\nCory A. Booker Senator of New Jersey\nSherrod Brown Senator of Ohio\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 56\n\nBenjamin L. Cardin Senator of Maryland\nThomas R. Carper Senator of Delaware\nTammy Duckworth Senator of Illinois\nKamala D. Harris Senator of California\nMaggie Hassan Senator of New Hampshire\nEdward J. Markey Senator of Massachusetts\nRobert Menendez Senator of New Jersey\nJeff Merkley Senator of Oregon\nJack Reed Senator of Rhode Island\nBernard Sanders Senator of Vermont\nJeanne Shaheen Senator of New Hampshire\nChris Van Hollen Senator of Maryland\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 45 of 56\n\nElizabeth Warren Senator of Massachusetts\nRon Wyden Senator of Oregon\nU.S. House of Representatives\nJohn Conyers, Jr. Representative of Michigan\nJerrold Nadler Representative of New York\nZoe Lofgren Representative of California\nSheila Jackson Lee Representative of Texas\nSteve Cohen Representative of Tennessee\nHenry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr. Representative of Georgia\nTheodore E. Deutch Representative of Florida\nLuis V. Gutiérrez Representative of Illinois\nKaren Bass Representative of California\n32\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 46 of 56\n\nCedric Richmond Representative of Louisiana\nDavid N. Cicilline Representative of Rhode Island\nEric Swalwell Representative of California\nTed W. Lieu Representative of California\nJamie Raskin Representative of Maryland\nPramila Jayapal Representative of Washington\nBrad Schneider Representative of Illinois\nAlma Adams Representative of Louisiana\nNanette Barragán Representative of California\nSanford D. Bishop, Jr. Representative of Georgia\nEarl Blumenauer Representative of Oregon\nSuzanne Bonamici Representative of Oregon\n\n33\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 47 of 56\n\nBrendan F. Boyle Representative of Pennsylvania\nAnthony Brown Representative of Maryland\nJulia Brownley Representative of California\nG.K. Butterfield Representative of North Carolina\nMichael E. Capuano Representative of Massachusetts\nSalud Carbajal Representative of California\nAndré Carson Representative of Indiana\nKathy Castor Representative of Florida\nJudy Chu Representative of California\nKatherine M. Clark Representative of Massachusetts\nYvette Clarke Representative of New York\nW. M. Lacy Clay Representative of Missouri\nGerald E. Connolly Representative of Virginia\n34\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 48 of 56\n\nJoe Courtney Representative of Connecticut\nJoseph Crowley Representative of New York\nElijah E. Cummings Representative of Maryland\nDanny Davis Representative of Illinois\nPeter DeFazio Representative of Oregon\nDiana DeGette Representative of Colorado\nSuzan K. DelBene Representative of Washington\nMark DeSaulnier Representative of California\nDebbie Dingell Representative of Michigan\nLloyd Doggett Representative of Texas\nKeith Ellison Representative of Minnesota\nEliot L. Engel Representative of New York\nAnna Eshoo Representative of California\n35\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 49 of 56\n\nAdriano Espaillat Representative of New York\nDwight Evans Representative of Pennsylvania\nBill Foster Representative of Illinois\nLois Frankel Representative of Florida\nMarcia Fudge Representative of Ohio\nTulsi Gabbard Representative of Hawai’i\nJimmy Gomez Representative of California\nMichelle Lujan Grisham Representative of New Mexico\nRaúl M. Grijalva Representative of Arizona\nColleen Hanabusa Representative of Hawai’i\nBrian Higgins Representative of New York\nJared Huffman Representative of California\nWilliam R. Keating Representative of Massachusetts\n36\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 50 of 56\n\nJoseph P. Kennedy III Representative of Massachusetts\nRo Khanna Representative of California\nDerek Kilmer Representative of Washington\nBarbara Lee Representative of California\nSander Levin Representative of Michigan\nJohn Lewis Representative of Georgia\nAlan Lowenthal Representative of California\nNita Lowey Representative of New York\nBen Ray Luján Representative of New Mexico\nDoris Matsui Representative of California\nBetty McCollum Representative of Minnesota\nA. Donald McEachin Representative of Virginia\nJames P. McGovern Representative of Massachusetts\n37\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 51 of 56\n\nGrace Meng Representative of New York\nGwen Moore Representative of Wisconsin\nSeth Moulton Representative of Massachusetts\nGrace F. Napolitano Representative of California\nRick Nolan Representative of Minnesota\nEleanor Holmes Norton Representative of District of Columbia\nFrank Pallone, Jr. Representative of New Jersey\nBill Pascrell, Jr. Representative of New Jersey\nDonald M. Payne, Jr. Representative of New Jersey\nNancy Pelosi Representative of California\nEd Perlmutter Representative of Colorado\nChellie Pingree Representative of Maine\nMark Pocan Representative of Wisconsin\n38\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 52 of 56\n\nJared Polis Representative of Colorado\nDavid Price Representative of North Carolina\nMike Quigley Representative of Illinois\nKathleen M. Rice Representative of New York\nLucille Roybal-Allard Representative of California\nTim Ryan Representative of Ohio\nJohn P. Sarbanes Representative of Maryland\nJan Schakowsky Representative of Illinois\nAdam B. Schiff Representative of California\nRobert C. “Bobby” Scott Representative of Virginia\nJosé E. Serrano Representative of New York\nCarol Shea-Porter Representative of New Hampshire\n\n39\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 53 of 56\n\nBrad Sherman Representative of California\nLouise Slaughter Representative of New York\nAdam Smith Representative of Washington\nDarren Soto Representative of Florida\nJackie Speier Representative of California\nBennie Thompson Representative of Mississippi\nDina Titus Representative of Nevada\nNiki Tsongas Representative of Massachusetts\nJuan Vargas Representative of California\nFilemon Vela, Jr. Representative of Texas\nNydia Velázquez Representative of New York\nDebbie Wasserman Schultz Representative of Florida\nBonnie Watson Coleman Representative of New Jersey\n40\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 54 of 56\n\nPeter Welch Representative of Vermont\nJohn Yarmuth Representative of Kentucky\n\n41\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 55 of 56\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\nI hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 29(d) because it contains 6,497 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).\nI further certify that the attached amici curiae brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6), because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2007 14-point Times New Roman font.\nExecuted this 17th day of November, 2017.\n/s/ Peter Karanjia Peter Karanjia\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 56 of 56\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on November 17, 2017.\nI certify that all parties in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\nExecuted this 17th day of November, 2017.\n/s/ Peter Karanjia Peter Karanjia\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 105-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_(_L_)_,_-_2_2_3_2_,_-_2_2_3_3_,_-_2_2_4_0__ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e__M_e_m__b_e_r_s__o_f _C_o_n_g__re_s_s________________________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\n\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n______________________________________ (signature)\n\n_/_s_/ _P_e_t_e_r_K_a__ra_n_j_ia_________________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_0_2_-_9_7_3_-_4_2_0_0___ Voice Phone\n\n_D__a_v_is__W__ri_g_h_t_T_r_e_m__a_in_e__L_L_P________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_0_2_-_9_7_3_-_4_4_9_9___ Fax Number\n\n_1_9_1__9_P__e_n_n_s_y_lv_a__n_ia__A_v_e_._, _N_._W__. _-_S_u_i_te__8_0_0___\n\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_C___2_0_0_0_6___________________ Address\n\n_p_e_t_e_rk_a__ra_n_j_ia_@__d__w_t_.c_o_m_____________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/_1_7_/2_0__1_7_______ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_P__e_te__r _K_a__ra_n__ji_a_____________ Signature\n\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\nPrint\n\nSave\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\nReset Form\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 41\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) __________________________________________________________________\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al.,\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nv.\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, SOUTHERN DIVISION (NO. 8:17-CV-00361-TDC) __________________________________________________________________\n\nBRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE PROFESSORS OF FEDERAL COURTS\n\nJURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND IMMIGRATION\n\nLAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nCATHERINE Y. KIM\n\nMEIR FEDER\n\nNew York, NY\n\nRASHA GERGES SHIELDS\n\nJONES DAY\n\nJUDITH RESNIK\n\n250 Vesey Street\n\nNew Haven, CT\n\nNew York, NY 10281-1047\n\nTelephone: (212) 326-3939\n\nBURT NEUBORNE\n\nFacsimile: (212) 755-7306\n\nNew York, NY\n\nEmail: mfeder@jonesday.com\n\nLUCAS GUTTENTAG Palo Alto, CA\n\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 41\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS Page\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................................................................1\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................1\nARGUMENT ............................................................................................................3\nI. THE GOVERNING LEGAL FRAMEWORK ..............................................5\nII. SECTION 1182(F) DOES NOT GRANT THE PRESIDENT UNFETTERED DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE NONCITIZENS................9\nIII. THE GENERAL TENOR OF IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IS CONTRARY TO THE PROCLAMATION ................................................19\nA. Congress Historically Used Nationality Categorically To Exclude Noncitizens...........................................................................20\nB. In 1965, Congress Expressly Prohibited the Use of Nationality in the Issuance of Immigrant Visas ....................................................22\nC. Congress Has Repeatedly Required That Entry Decisions Be Based on Assessment of Non-Invidious Criteria ...............................24\nIV. THE PROCLAMATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE YOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK ................................................................27\nCONCLUSION .......................................................................................................30\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 41\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases\n\nPage\n\nBank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2017)..............................................................................8, 18, 28\n\nChae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)............................................................................................11\n\nDames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).....................................................................................passim\n\nGulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981)........................................................................................ 18-19\n\nHamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)..................................................................................4, 11, 12\n\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)............................................................................................11\n\nJean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)......................................................................................12, 13\n\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)........................................................................................29\n\nKnauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)............................................................................................28\n\nMarbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) .............................................................................................4\n\nMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)............................................................................................26\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 41\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nSale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)............................................................................................23\nUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)......................................................................................11, 19\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).....................................................................................passim\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)..............................................................................................9\nZivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)..........................................................................................4\nSTATUTES 3 U.S.C. § 301..........................................................................................................10 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) ............................................................................................passim 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(B)..............................................................................................25 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) .............................................................................................passim 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)...................................................................................10, 14, 15 8 U.S.C. § 1187........................................................................................................16 22 U.S.C. § 1732......................................................................................................13 Act of April 27, 1904, Chapter 1630, 33 Stat. 428 (1904) ......................................20 Act of February 5, 1917, Chapter 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) ...............................21\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 41\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, § 302 (1996) ......................................................................18\nAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 411 ..........................................24 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chapter 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882)...........................20 Geary Act of 1892, Chapter 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).................................................20 Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277,\n112 Stat. 2681 .....................................................................................................25 Hart-Celler Act.........................................................................................................22 Hostage Act of 1868 ............................................................................................8, 13 International Emergency Economic Powers Act .......................................................8 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of\n1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 §§ 342, 346 .....................................24, 25 Immigration Act of 1924, Chapter 190, § 13, 43 Stat. 153, 161–62\n(1924) ..................................................................................................................21 Immigration and Nationality Act ......................................................................passim Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 215(a)(1), 243(h) .....................................10, 23 International Emergency Economic Powers Act .......................................................8 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997,\nPub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 .........................................................................25 Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, § 2 (1965)..................................................................23\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 41\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nPub. L. No. 89-236, § 202, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911–912 (1965) ...................................22 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, § 103\n(2005) ..................................................................................................................18 Scott Act of 1888, Chapter 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) ............................................20 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411 (2001)..................18 FEDERAL REGULATIONS 46 Fed. Reg. 48017 (Oct. 1, 1981) ..........................................................................15 50 Fed. Reg. 41329 (Oct. 10, 1985) ........................................................................15 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 26, 1986)........................................................................16 64 Fed. Reg. 62561 (Nov. 19, 1999)........................................................................15 67 Fed. Reg. 8857 (Feb. 26, 2002) .........................................................................15 76 Fed. Reg. 49277 (Aug. 9, 2011) .........................................................................15 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ........................................................................1 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 ......................................................................................................1 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 ....................................................................................................1 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 70 Cong. Rec. 3526 (1929) ......................................................................................21 111 Cong. Rec. 686 (Jan. 15, 1965).........................................................................22\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 41\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nH. R. Rep. 45-62, 3 (1879).......................................................................................20 H. R. Rep. 68-350, 13-14.........................................................................................21 H. R. Rep. 68-350 (1924).........................................................................................21 H.R. Report 82-1365 at 5‒6.....................................................................................10\nOTHER AUTHORITIES Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1885 (1993) ..........................................................................20 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the\nSeparation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 449 (2012)................................19 Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration &\nNaturalization, 89 Cong. 4 (1965) ......................................................................22 Jimmy Carter, “Sanctions Against Iran Remarks Announcing U.S.\nActions” (Apr. 7, 1980) ......................................................................................15\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 41\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Amici curiae are academics whose expertise includes the jurisprudence of federal courts, constitutional law, and/or immigration law. Amici submit this brief to explain why, given constitutional commitments to separation of powers, the President lacked authority to issue the directive set forth in section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the “Proclamation”) barring immigration to the United States by nationals of seven countries—as well as the issuance of various categories of non-immigrant visas—solely on the basis of nationality. 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017).\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Proclamation eliminates immigrant visas from a designated list of countries (five of which are majority-Muslim countries targeted in both of the President’s previous Executive Orders, see 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209)—and denies various categories of non-immigrant visas—solely on the basis of nationality, on the premise that all of the affected nationals present heightened risks to national security. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), is central to evaluating the validity of this executive action to\n\n1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No party, or counsel for a party, played a role in the drafting or preparation of this brief; nor did any person other than amici provide financial support in connection with the preparation and filing of this brief. A list of amici may be found at Appendix A.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 41\n\nassess whether it complies with established separation-of-powers principles. The Youngstown framework, and its subsequent application in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), requires analysis of what Congress has authorized, what it has prohibited, and the “general tenor” of congressional immigration legislation. As we explain below, the Proclamation is not authorized by statute and contravenes express and implied congressional mandates; and the President lacks the independent and exclusive authority to supplant congressional authority over immigration.\nContrary to the President’s assertion, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) does not delegate plenary authority to the Executive to act invidiously by invoking nationality as the sole basis for excluding millions of people from the United States. Reading section 212(f), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (hereinafter § 1182(f)), as authorizing such unfettered discretion is at odds with the provision’s historical interpretation and usage and cannot be reconciled with the broader statutory context within which it operates. Moreover, the President’s broad reading of § 1182(f) would raise concerns that Congress has abdicated its own constitutional role in setting immigration policy.\nSection 1182(f) itself does not sustain the Proclamation, and must be read in the context of the INA as a whole, which has articulated a detailed scheme for\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 41\n\nimmigration and imposed rules governing how decisions about migrants are to be made. In 1965, Congress, troubled by the historic abuse of nationality as a stalking horse for racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance, banned its use in the issuance of immigrant visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). In the half century since, Congress has repeatedly insisted on the use of specific nondiscriminatory criteria when excluding entrants to the United States as purported threats to safety and security.\nThe Proclamation, like the two Executive Orders preceding it, employs nationality as a stand-in for the propensity to undermine Americans’ safety. This action by the President to resurrect the use of nationality as a sole basis to ban entry into the United States contravenes the congressional rejection of such historically-discredited tests for entry. In these circumstances, under separation-ofpowers principles, the President’s power is at or near its “lowest ebb” and is valid only if the President possesses independent and exclusive constitutional powers that preclude Congress “from acting upon the subject.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637‒38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Because the President has no such constitutional power over immigration, the Proclamation cannot be sustained.\nARGUMENT Throughout the Nation’s history, our courts have played a foundational role in delineating and enforcing constitutional limits on the authority of the other\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 41\n\nbranches of government. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (holding unconstitutional an executive order that “legislated” the seizure of the nation’s steel mills); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (holding that courts possess power to review actions by even the highest officers of the government).\nWhen seeking to avoid judicial review, the Executive branch has often argued its prerogatives in the areas of national security, foreign affairs, citizenship, or immigration. Repeatedly, courts have concluded that such labels do not bar adjudication. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (notwithstanding Commander-in-Chief powers and an existing exigency, Executive lacked authority to convene the military commission at issue). See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (evaluating Executive action to settle claims against a foreign nation against the “general tenor” of congressional legislation). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015).\nHere, the President’s claimed basis for authorization must be scrutinized in the context of Congress’s other, more specific actions dealing with the same general subject. As explained below, the President’s use of nationality as a proxy for the individualized determination of risks to security—and to bar entry to\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 41\n\nmillions of individuals on that basis alone—not only lacks specific statutory authorization, but contravenes both express and implicit congressional directives. I. THE GOVERNING LEGAL FRAMEWORK\n“The President’s power, if any, to issue [an] order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. Youngstown provides the framework for assessing the validity of the Proclamation in this case. As the Court explained, the President’s power must be analyzed initially in light of relevant legislation. See id. at 585‒86.\nYoungstown invalidated an executive order directing a temporary government seizure of the nation’s steel mills to avoid a strike that could have halted steel production during the Korean War.2 Despite the threat to the lives of American service members if steel production ceased, the Court struck down the seizure order as an unconstitutional exercise of unilateral presidential power. The Court found that it was “not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment,” but also effectively legislated policy that Congress had specifically rejected. Id. at\n\n2 At the time Youngstown was decided, American armed forces had been fighting in Korea for “almost two full years . . . suffering casualties of over 108,000 men,” and hostilities had not abated. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 41\n\n586.3 The Court further held that the President’s constitutionally derived power\ncould not authorize the seizure order. Id. at 587. At bottom, the Court deemed the\npower “to take possession of private property to keep labor disputes from stopping\nproduction ... [to be] a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military\nauthorities.” Id.\nIn his concurrence, Justice Jackson set forth what has become an important\ntripartite framework to evaluate the legality of presidential action. He described\nexercises of presidential power as typically falling within one of three categories:\n1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. [hereinafter “Category 1”] 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. [hereinafter “Category 2”] 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers . . . . Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such as case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. [hereinafter “Category 3”]\n3 Five years prior, Congress had considered—and rejected—enacting a law that would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 41\n\nId. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson concluded that the seizure order fell in Category 3 because\nno statute explicitly authorized it, and Congress had enacted detailed procedures for the seizure of property that were inconsistent with the President’s order. Id. at 639. Accordingly, the order could be sustained only if the seizure was “within [the President’s] domain and beyond control by Congress.” Id. at 640. Justice Jackson rejected each of the President’s asserted bases for such “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority. Id. at 638, 640-46.\nThirty years later, in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court returned to the Youngstown categories. In evaluating three executive orders implementing an agreement to secure the release of U.S. hostages in Iran, the Court recognized that “executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669.\nThe Supreme Court held that the first two executive orders were specifically authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and thus fell within Youngstown’s Category 1. Id. at 670‒74. With respect to the third order, suspending pending claims against Iranian interests, however, the Court\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 41\n\nruled that neither the IEEPA nor the so-called Hostage Act of 1868 provided statutory authority for this executive action. “Although the broad language of the Hostage Act suggests it may [have] cover[ed] this case,” the Court recognized that the Act was passed in response to a non-analogous situation, and was therefore “somewhat ambiguous” as to whether Congress contemplated the presidential action at issue. Id. at 675‒77.\nGiven this ambiguity, the Court looked to two factors: (a) the “general tenor of Congress’s legislation in this area” and (b) the long and unbroken history of claims settlement through Executive Agreement. Id. at 678‒80. Based on these factors, the Court concluded that Congress had acquiesced in the President’s exercise of authority to settle claims against foreign powers. Id. The Court emphasized the “narrowness” of its decision, id. at 688, and subsequently indicated that its approach was not intended to “be construed as license of the broad exercise of unilateral executive power.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1328 & n.28 (2017).\nUnder Youngstown and Dames & Moore, § 1182(f)’s facially broad language cannot sustain the Proclamation’s categorical and permanent bar, solely on the basis of nationality, to the entry of millions of immigrants and nonimmigrants who would otherwise qualify for admission. Neither of the factors\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 41\n\npresent in Dames & Moore, suggesting congressional “acquiescence” to the\nPresident’s exercise of unilateral authority, is present in this case. Indeed, other\n“legislation in this area,” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678, demonstrates\nCongress’s affirmative opposition to the use of nationality in determining\neligibility for entry and its opposition to substituting categorical proxies for\n“dangerousness” in place of an individualized assessment. Because the President\nlacks any “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional power to override this\ncongressional intent, Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring), the\nProclamation was not authorized.\nII. SECTION 1182(F) DOES NOT GRANT THE PRESIDENT UNFETTERED DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE NONCITIZENS As Youngstown and Dames & Moore illustrate, careful analysis of specific\nstatutes is essential to evaluating the lawfulness of Executive action. The President\nasserts that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) provides authorization for the Proclamation.\nSection 1182(f) provides:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.\n\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 41\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).4 Although the President claims that this language delegates unfettered\ndiscretion to exclude whole “class[es] of aliens” based on any criteria whatsoever, canons of statutory construction as well as the statute’s interpretive history counsel against such an expansive reading. The House Report recommending the bill that would enact § 1182(f) began with a lengthy affirmance of the power of Congress to control immigration, see H.R. Report 82-1365 at 5‒6, a principle derived directly from the Constitution, which vests Congress with authority to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” and to regulate or prohibit the “Migration” of persons. U.S. Const., art. I, s. 8,9.5 The Migration Clause, notwithstanding its sorry history aimed at protecting the slave trade from immediate interference, provides the governing constitutional framework: after the stipulated twenty-year\n4 The Proclamation cites two additional provisions: section 215(a)(1) of the INA, which provides: “Unless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful … for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe,” 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), and 3 U.S.C. § 301, which allows the President to delegate his authority to others within the Executive branch. Neither provision adds to the President’s substantive authority.\n5 Article I, Section 9 prohibits Congress, for a period of twenty years, from prohibiting “[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit.”\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 41\n\nhiatus, it was for Congress to decide on the “Migration … of … Persons.”6 This area is thus unlike others in which the constitutional scheme may contemplate a primary role for Executive power. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936).\nGiven congressional power, the question becomes understanding what Congress has delegated. This case is one of many in which a potentially broad authorization from Congress has to be read to reflect basic separation-of-powers principles and to avoid constitutional questions about the limits of delegation. In Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, the Supreme Court concluded that the Joint Resolution for the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), enacted by Congress immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, while capacious, did not authorize the use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists. The AUMF delegates to the President power to “‘use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks … in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or\n6 The Supreme Court has identified other sources for Congress’s power to regulate immigration, including the Commerce Clause, war powers, and powers inherent in sovereignty. See generally, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 41\n\npersons.’” Id. at 568 (quoting AUMF, 115 Stat. 224). The President invoked this authority to provide for trial by military commission for any individual suspected of membership in al Qaeda or participation in terrorist acts against the United States. Id. at 568. The Court concluded that “there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter Article 21 of the” Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at 594. Even in the context of a direct response to domestic terrorist attacks, the Supreme Court did not approve the claim of unfettered authority to convene military commissions to try noncitizens.\nSimilarly, Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), shows that a broad statutory delegation of immigration discretion to the Executive does not confer limitless power to engage in discrimination. There, the Eleventh Circuit had concluded that a statute granting the Attorney General discretion to “parole into the United States any … alien applying for admission ‘under such conditions as he may prescribe,’” authorized parole decisions on the basis of race or national origin, and was consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 848, 852 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The Supreme Court declined to endorse this view, concluding that the statute and its implementing regulations prohibited such discrimination, id.\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 41\n\nat 854‒56, despite the absence of statutory language expressly prohibiting nationality-based distinctions, see id. at 862‒63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).\nIn Dames & Moore, which upon review of the Executive action found it was within congressional authorization, the Court was unwilling to read a broadly worded statute without also considering the context of other relevant statutes and past practices. In particular, the Court analyzed the Hostage Act of 1868, which provided that whenever a U.S. citizen was unjustly held by a foreign government, “if the release … is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release.” 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (emphasis added). While recognizing this “broad language,” the Court declined to construe it as authorizing the President’s suspension of pending claims against foreign nations. The Court noted that the issue prompting the 1868 legislation involved not foreign powers interested in trading hostages back, but rather foreign powers seeking to repatriate American citizens. See Dames & Moore at 676-77. The Court then turned to the legislative history, which it found “somewhat ambiguous.” Id. at 677. It was only after finding (1) “a longstanding practice of settling such claims by executive agreement,” and (2) that Congress had enacted specific procedures to implement Executive Agreements of this kind, that\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 41\n\nthe Court concluded that Congress had “placed its stamp of approval” on such actions. Id. at 679-80.\nThe Proclamation here benefits from no such “stamp of approval.” Unlike in Dames & Moore, there is no evidence that Congress assumed, much less endorsed, unlimited executive power to exclude noncitizens on the basis of nationality. No President has ever issued an order akin to the Proclamation— eliminating any possible inference that Congress has “acquiesced” in such a practice. Rather, past presidential actions suggest an understanding of meaningful limits to this power. A Congressional Research Service Report identified 43 instances between 1981 and 2017 where the president invoked § 1182(f) to suspend the entry of noncitizens. See Kate Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R44743, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief (Jan. 23, 2017). In one additional instance, the President relied on § 1185(a)(1) rather than § 1182(f) to justify suspending entry of a class of noncitizens.7\nOn no occasion has a President used nationality alone to impute individualized characteristics to bar noncitizens’ entry into the United States. In the vast majority of instances, the Executive barred noncitizens who engaged in a\n7 As discussed below, President Carter relied on § 1185(a) to “prescribe limitations and exceptions” on the entry of Iranians.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 41\n\nparticular course of conduct. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8697, 76 Fed. Reg. 49277 (Aug. 9, 2011) (individuals who participate in serious human rights violations); Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48017 (Oct. 1, 1981) (noncitizens who approach the United States by sea without documentation).\nA number of instances target individuals from particular nations based on specific conduct or affiliations. See Exec. Order No. 13687, 80 Fed. Reg. 819 (Jan. 6, 2015) (officials of the North Korean government or the Workers’ Party of Korea); Proclamation No. 7524, 67 Fed. Reg. 8857 (Feb. 26, 2002) (individuals who threaten Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions); Proclamation No. 7249, 64 Fed. Reg. 62561 (Nov. 19, 1999) (individuals responsible for repression of civilian population in Kosovo); Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41329 (Oct. 10, 1985) (nonimmigrant officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba).\nThe President has suspended entry without regard to individualized conduct on only two occasions. During the Iran hostage crisis, President Carter invoked § 1185(a)(1) to deny entry to Iranian nationals. Exec. Order No. 12172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 1979); Exec. Order 12206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24101 (Apr. 7, 1980); see also Jimmy Carter, “Sanctions Against Iran Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions” (Apr. 7, 1980). Then, in response to the Cuba’s decision to suspend\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 41\n\nexecution of a bilateral immigration agreement with the U.S., President Reagan, in August 1986, suspended the entry of Cuban nationals under certain types of immigrant visas. Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 26, 1986).8 Both instances were considerably narrower than the instant case, which imposes a potentially permanent bar to the entry of millions of individuals from eight countries. Moreover, in neither instance did the Executive’s actions impute individualized characteristics—such as dangerousness or criminality—on the basis of nationality. Nationality was instead used to sanction a country for hostile acts towards the United States during a discrete foreign policy crisis.9 As such, they qualitatively differ from the Proclamation.\nIn an attempt to avoid suggesting that the covered non-citizens are presumed dangerous solely because of their nationalities, the Proclamation states that these individuals all hail from countries with “deficient . . . identity-management and information-sharing capabilities, protocols, and practices.” Proclamation 9645,\n8 The exclusion of Cubans applied only to those immigrant entrants who did not enter as “immediate relatives under Section 201(b)” or “as preference immigrant under Section 203(a).” Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 26, 1986).\n9 The President has, through Executive Orders, identified specific nationalities in another context—to determine (and to potentially relax) the level of scrutiny to be applied to visa applicants—but those actions are explicitly authorized by Congress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 41\n\npreamble. The Government’s brief similarly proffers this purported justification. See Gov’t Br. at 32-34. But this rationale is hard to take seriously. The Proclamation targets five of the six countries targeted by the two prior, similar Executive Orders—both of which made clear that they selected nationalities based on a presumed heightened risk of terror. Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen are targeted in all three orders, and the Proclamation adds only Chad (another Muslim-majority nation) and North Korea (from which there is no appreciable immigration) as subject to categorical exclusion based on nationality.\nNo prior precedents support this Proclamation. The two isolated instances the Government cites—the response to the Iran hostage crisis and Cuba’s suspension of a bilateral agreement with the U.S.—do not establish the type of “systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned” that was deemed sufficient to infer congressional acquiescence in Dames & Moore. 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11).\nThe present case is, thus, the inverse of Dames & Moore. There, the President asserted authority in an area in which the Executive had long exercised the power, and Congress had repeatedly acquiesced to such exercises. Here, by contrast, the President asserts broader authority than any president before him—in\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 41\n\nessence, the type of “license for the broad exercise of unilateral executive power” that the Supreme Court forbade. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328 & n.28.\nNor does the “general tenor” of legislation in the immigration arena suggest congressional approval of the President’s actions. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme that suggests just the opposite: Contrary to the Proclamation, denials of entry must be based on more individualized evaluations of dangerousness rather than the blanket assumption that certain nationalities are per se dangerous. See, e.g., AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, § 302 (1996); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411 (2001); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, § 103 (2005). As FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. put it, “[i]t is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).10 Amici now turn to these other provisions of the INA.\n10 Given that § 1182(f), properly construed, does not allow unfettered executive discretion to engage in invidious nationality-based discrimination, see supra § II, this Court need not address whether the President’s sweeping view of § 1182(f) would make Congress’s delegation to the Executive invalid. See, e.g., Gulf\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 41\n\nIII. THE GENERAL TENOR OF IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IS CONTRARY TO THE PROCLAMATION A review of the history of immigration law is required to understand how the\n“general tenor” of congressional legislation changed during the last century. By\nthe time § 1182(f) was enacted in 1952, Congress had already begun to eschew the\nuse of nationality as a proxy for racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance in entry\ndeterminations. And legislation enacted after 1952 evinces Congress’s repudiation\nof the use of nationality as the sole basis to exclude persons based on generalized\nfears of terrorism.11 Thereafter, in 1965, Congress enacted an explicit ban on the\nuse of nationality to discriminate against persons seeking immigrant visas. And in\nother legislation, Congress has repeatedly demonstrated a commitment to relying\non individualized assessments—rather than discredited stereotypes—to determine\nadmissibility.\nOil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981) (“Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936) (rejecting non-delegation challenge where President acted pursuant to a specific, limited authorization from Congress to prohibit “the sale of arms and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco”).\n11 Given “the institutional and other barriers to the passage of legislation,” affirmative acts by Congress rejecting a particular course of presidential conduct “should be given very heavy interpretive weight.” Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 449 (2012).\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 41\n\nA. Congress Historically Used Nationality Categorically To Exclude Noncitizens\nOur Nation’s immigration policies once routinely relied on notions of racial and cultural inferiority and religious prejudice to exclude certain nationalities as threats to our safety and stability. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that Congress, recognizing the frequency with which nationality and national origin had historically been employed as the basis for invidious discrimination based on race, religion, and ethnicity, prohibited the use of such classifications.\nA brief recap of this history is helpful here. Beginning after the Civil War, Congress relied expressly on nationality to restrict the entry of noncitizens perceived as threats to national security and American identity.12 Congress enacted a series of laws targeting and ultimately prohibiting virtually all Chinese immigration. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888); Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); Act of April 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 428 (1904).13 In 1917, Congress created the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” excluding noncitizens from a\n12 Prior to the Civil War, states regulated the entry of noncitizens. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1885 (1993).\n13 Proponents of these measures frequently invoked national security rationales, characterizing the Chinese as “a standing menace to the social and political institutions of the country.” H. R. Rep. 45-62, 3 (1879).\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 41\n\nvast swathe of the globe from Saudi Arabia to the Polynesian islands. See Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). In 1924, Congress imposed an even broader prohibition on the immigration of noncitizens who were not “free white persons,” “aliens of African nativity, . . . [or] persons of African descent.” See Immigration Act of 1924, Ch. 190, § 13, 43 Stat. 153, 161–62 (1924); H. R. Rep. 68-350 at 6 (1924) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nNoncitizens who were not categorically excluded on these racial grounds remained subject to strict national-origin quotas that favored immigrants from northern and western Europe. Id. These restrictions were understood to be aimed “principally at two peoples, the Italians and the Jews.” 70 Cong. Rec. 3526 (1929). During this time, national origin served as a proxy for undesirable groups perceived to “reproduce more rapidly on a lower standard of living” and “unduly charge our institutions for the care of the socially inadequate.” H. R. Rep. 68-350, 13-14. The goal was to “preserve, as nearly as possible, the racial status quo in the United States.” Id. at 16. These measures were described as necessary to national survival: “If therefore, the principle of individual liberty, guarded by a constitutional government created on this continent nearly a century and a half ago, is to endure, the basic strain of our population must be maintained.” Id. at 13.\n\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 41\n\nB. In 1965, Congress Expressly Prohibited the Use of Nationality in the Issuance of Immigrant Visas\nIn 1965, Congress enacted the Hart-Celler Act, amending the Immigration and Nationality Act by abandoning the national-origin quota system and instead imposing a uniform per-country limit of 20,000 immigrant visas for all countries outside the western hemisphere. See Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 202, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911–912 (1965).\nAn overarching goal of the 1965 Act was to ensure that exclusions would be based on individualized determinations, not blanket stereotypes about race and country of origin. Senator Philip Hart, one of the chief sponsors of the bill, explained the rejection of the national-origins quota system: “[I]it is impossible to defend and it is offensive to anyone with a sense of the right of an individual to be judged as a good or a bad person, not from which side of the tracks he comes.” Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 89 Cong. 4 (1965). President Johnson described the system as “incompatible with our basic American tradition…. The fundamental, longtime American attitude has been to ask not where a person comes from but what are his personal qualities.” See 111 Cong. Rec. 686 (Jan. 15, 1965). Thereafter, when he signed the bill, the President made plain its commitments: “This bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to immigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 41\n\ntheir close relationship with those already here.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill (Oct. 3, 1965).\nIn addition, the 1965 Act expressly ruled out the use of nationality—as well as race, sex, place of birth, and place of residence—in the issuance of long-term immigrant visas. Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, sec. 2 (1965). Section 1152(a) provides, in relevant part, that except to enforce the uniform per-country visa allocation: “[N]o person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).\nCongress intended this prohibition on discrimination to be applied broadly. Unlike other provisions of the INA, § 1152(a) restrains the entire executive branch, including the President. Cf. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 172 (1993) (concluding that § 243(h) of the INA constrains the Attorney General but not the President). Congress enumerated limited exceptions to the bar on using nationality to deny immigrant visas, relating to enforcement of the uniform cap on immigrant visas for all countries; the President’s exercise of § 1182(f) power is notably absent from that list of exceptions.\n\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 41\n\nC. Congress Has Repeatedly Required That Entry Decisions Be Based on Assessment of Non-Invidious Criteria\nIn addition to the express language of § 1152(a) prohibiting discrimination against noncitizens seeking entry as permanent residents, the historical arc of our Nation’s immigration laws and the overall structure of the INA demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the use of invidious stereotypes for non-immigrant temporary entrants as well.\nBeginning in the 1940s with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, Congress has jettisoned nationality-based bars to entry in favor of individualized assessments for undesirable traits. Since the 1965 legislation, it has repeatedly affirmed the need for individualized assessment to determine whether a given noncitizen—immigrant or a non-immigrant—should be excluded as a national security risk. See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 411 (expanding grounds for excluding noncitizens affiliated with terrorist organizations); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 § 342; USA PATRIOT Act § 411 (2001) (expanding definition of terrorist activity for purposes of exclusion); REAL ID Act § 103 (same). Thus, individuals may be excluded because, for example, they are “a member of a terrorist organization”—unless “the alien can demonstrate” that he or she “did not know, and should not reasonably have known,\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 41\n\nthat the organization was a terrorist organization”—or because they are “the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible” on this basis, unless the spouse or child did not know of or has renounced the terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(B).\nSimilarly, with immigration issues unrelated to terrorism, Congress has also eschewed the use of nationality as a basis for exclusion. See generally IIRIRA § 346. On the few occasions where Congress has employed nationality classifications, it did so to grant relief based on particular country conditions— either to permit special opportunities to enter the United States or to avoid deportation—and did so without imputing invidious or stigmatizing traits. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160; Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.\nThe historical evolution of our Nation’s immigration laws, the 1965 statutory ban on the use of nationality in issuing immigrant visas, and Congress’s post-1965 enactments focusing on individualized assessments to determine admissibility all demonstrate that the “general tenor of Congress’s legislation in this area” repudiates the blanket use of “nationality” to impute traits of dangerousness or criminality for the purpose of imposing a categorical bar to entry.\n\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 41\n\nDames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. Here, as a result, the President is “acting alone,” without “the acceptance of Congress.” Id.\nThis conclusion is consistent with the accepted approach to statutory interpretation. “[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). “Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one . . . .” Id. at 550–51; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133 (“[T]he meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.”).\nHere, § 1152(a) was enacted after § 1182(f) and mandates nondiscrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. Given that the President cannot discriminate against persons in the issuance of immigrant visas based on nationality, § 1182(f) should not be read to permit such discrimination. See, e.g. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133. Moreover, the two sections are reconcilable: the President may exercise § 1182(f) power—suspending entry of a “class of aliens” deemed to be “detrimental to the interests of the United States”—in circumstances where such exercise does not violate § 1152(a). Absent\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 41\n\na discrete intergovernmental conflict—such as Iran’s taking of U.S. hostages or Cuba’s suspension of a bilateral agreement with the U.S.—imposing a bar to entry solely on the basis of nationality, and in a manner that carries invidious implications of criminal, terrorist, or dangerous tendencies on the part of all persons of that nationality, is not permissible. In short, the Executive’s use of nationality as a proxy for dangerousness, and to prevent entry into the United States, cannot be reconciled with § 1152(a) and subsequent immigration laws, which demonstrate congressional intent to move the United States away from reliance on nationality as a categorical basis for exclusion.14 IV. THE PROCLAMATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE\nYOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK By excluding individuals based solely on nationality—and justifying its use as a credible proxy for “heightened risks to the security of the United States” instead of making more individualized assessments—the President took “measures\n\n14 Amici do not suggest that nationality classifications are never permitted in the immigration context in any respect. For example, the President has used nationality as a factor to determine the level of scrutiny for individuals of identified countries, or to respond to special disaster needs. In such instances, there is no imputation of invidious, discriminatory purpose based on nationality, of the kind that can redound to the detriment of U.S. citizens and others within the United States of the same heritage.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 41\n\nincompatible with the expressed [and] implied will of Congress.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).\nEven if this Court decided that Congress’s position is “somewhat ambiguous,” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677, the Proclamation could not be sustained. No longstanding history suggests congressional acquiescence to the action at issue here. Cf. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680. See also Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328 & n.28 (“Much of the [Dames] Court’s cause for concern, however, was the risk that the ruling could be construed as license for the broad exercise of unilateral executive power.”). At a minimum, the Proclamation is quite close, on the “spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition,” to the type of discriminatory actions Congress has rejected. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669.\nNor can the President rely on his exclusive constitutional powers to authorize the Proclamation. “Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Id.\nHere, the President can make no such claim. Although some earlier case law characterized executive authority over immigration as capacious, see Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (addressing executive exercise of power\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 41\n\nexpressly authorized by Congress), the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized legislative control over immigration as pivotal. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (“Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law,” subject to constitutional limitations); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (same). Any constitutionally derived presidential authority to regulate immigration is, at best, shared with Congress. Absent “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional power, the President has no power to act unilaterally, in contravention of congressional intent to prohibit the use of nationality as a basis for discrimination. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J. concurring).\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 41\n\nCONCLUSION The President lacked statutory and constitutional authority to issue the Proclamation. The decision of the court below should be affirmed.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER Lead Counsel RASHA GERGES SHIELDS JONES DAY 250 Vesey Street New York, NY 10281-1047 Telephone: (212) 326-3939 Facsimile: (212) 755-7306 Email: mfeder@jonesday.com\nCATHERINE Y. KIM New York, NY\nJUDITH RESNIK New Haven, CT\nBURT NEUBORNE New York, NY\nLUCAS GUTTENTAG Palo Alto, CA\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 41\n\nAppendix A\nAmici Curiae Law Professors∗\nJanet Cooper Alexander, Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Emerita, Stanford Law School\nGabriel J. Chin, Edward L. Barrett Chair and Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law\nLaura K. Donahue, Professor of Law, Director of the Center on National Security and the Law, and Director of the Center on Privacy and Technology, Georgetown University Law Center\nLucas Guttentag, Professor of the Practice of Law, Stanford Law School\nAlan Hyde, Distinguished Professor of Law and Sidney Reitman Scholar\nCatherine Y. Kim, George B. Ward Term Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law\nBurt Neuborne, Norman Dorsen Professor in Civil Liberties, New York University School of Law\nGerald L. Neuman, J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School\nJudith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School\nStephen I. Vladeck, A. Dalton Cross Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law\nMichael J. Wishnie, William O. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School\n\n∗ Affiliations of amici curiae are listed for identification purposes only.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 41\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that the foregoing brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 6,489 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by that Rule, as counted using the word-count function on Microsoft Word 2007 software.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER Counsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 41\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 41\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on this 17th day of November 2017, I electronically filed the original of the foregoing document with the clerk of this Court by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 46\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) __________________________________________________________________\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al.,\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nv.\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, SOUTHERN DIVISION (NO. 8:17-CV-00361-TDC) __________________________________________________________________\n\nMOTION BY PROFESSORS OF FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE,\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND IMMIGRATION LAW FOR LEAVE TO\n\nFILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nCATHERINE Y. KIM\n\nMEIR FEDER\n\nNew York, NY\n\nRASHA GERGES SHIELDS\n\nJONES DAY\n\nJUDITH RESNIK\n\n250 Vesey Street\n\nNew Haven, CT\n\nNew York, NY 10281-1047\n\nTelephone: (212) 326-3939\n\nBURT NEUBORNE\n\nFacsimile: (212) 755-7306\n\nNew York, NY\n\nEmail: mfeder@jonesday.com\n\nLUCAS GUTTENTAG Palo Alto, CA\n\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 46\n\nMOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF Catherine Y. Kim, Judith Resnik, Burt Neuborne, Lucas Guttentag, Janet Cooper Alexander, Gabriel J. Chin, Laura K. Donahue, Alan Hyde, Gerald L. Neuman, Stephen I. Vladeck, and Michael J. Wishnie (collectively, “Amici”) respectfully move for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffsappellees, and to uphold the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the “Proclamation”). Amici state as follows: 1. Amici are academics whose expertise includes the jurisprudence of federal courts, constitutional law, and/or immigration law. Amici are concerned about the statutory and constitutional implications of the Proclamation issued on September 24, 2017, entitled, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats.” Amici request to submit an amicus brief to explain why, given constitutional commitments to separation of powers, the President lacked authority to issue the directive set forth in section 2 of that Proclamation. 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). 2. The proposed amicus brief is attached to this motion as Exhibit A. 3. Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of an amicus brief.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 46\n\nCONCLUSION Amici respectfully request that this Court grant them leave to file the amicus\n\nbrief attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER Lead Counsel RASHA GERGES SHIELDS JONES DAY 250 Vesey Street New York, NY 10281-1047 Telephone: (212) 326-3939 Facsimile: (212) 755-7306 Email: mfeder@jonesday.com\n\nCATHERINE Y. KIM New York, NY\n\nJUDITH RESNIK New Haven, CT\n\nBURT NEUBORNE New York, NY\n\nLUCAS GUTTENTAG Palo Alto, CA\n\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 46\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on this 17th day of November 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the clerk of this Court by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER\n\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 46\n\nEXHIBIT A\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 46\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) __________________________________________________________________\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al.,\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nv.\n\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, SOUTHERN DIVISION (NO. 8:17-CV-00361-TDC) __________________________________________________________________\n\nBRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE PROFESSORS OF FEDERAL COURTS\n\nJURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND IMMIGRATION\n\nLAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\n__________________________________________________________________\n\nCATHERINE Y. KIM\n\nMEIR FEDER\n\nNew York, NY\n\nRASHA GERGES SHIELDS\n\nJONES DAY\n\nJUDITH RESNIK\n\n250 Vesey Street\n\nNew Haven, CT\n\nNew York, NY 10281-1047\n\nTelephone: (212) 326-3939\n\nBURT NEUBORNE\n\nFacsimile: (212) 755-7306\n\nNew York, NY\n\nEmail: mfeder@jonesday.com\n\nLUCAS GUTTENTAG Palo Alto, CA\n\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 46\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS Page\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................................................................1\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................1\nARGUMENT ............................................................................................................3\nI. THE GOVERNING LEGAL FRAMEWORK ..............................................5\nII. SECTION 1182(F) DOES NOT GRANT THE PRESIDENT UNFETTERED DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE NONCITIZENS................9\nIII. THE GENERAL TENOR OF IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IS CONTRARY TO THE PROCLAMATION ................................................19\nA. Congress Historically Used Nationality Categorically To Exclude Noncitizens...........................................................................20\nB. In 1965, Congress Expressly Prohibited the Use of Nationality in the Issuance of Immigrant Visas ....................................................22\nC. Congress Has Repeatedly Required That Entry Decisions Be Based on Assessment of Non-Invidious Criteria ...............................24\nIV. THE PROCLAMATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE YOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK ................................................................27\nCONCLUSION .......................................................................................................30\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 46\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases\n\nPage\n\nBank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2017)..............................................................................8, 18, 28\n\nChae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)............................................................................................11\n\nDames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).....................................................................................passim\n\nGulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981)........................................................................................ 18-19\n\nHamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)..................................................................................4, 11, 12\n\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)............................................................................................11\n\nJean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)......................................................................................12, 13\n\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)........................................................................................29\n\nKnauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)............................................................................................28\n\nMarbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) .............................................................................................4\n\nMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)............................................................................................26\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 46\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nSale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)............................................................................................23\nUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)......................................................................................11, 19\nYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).....................................................................................passim\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)..............................................................................................9\nZivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)..........................................................................................4\nSTATUTES 3 U.S.C. § 301..........................................................................................................10 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) ............................................................................................passim 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(B)..............................................................................................25 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) .............................................................................................passim 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)...................................................................................10, 14, 15 8 U.S.C. § 1187........................................................................................................16 22 U.S.C. § 1732......................................................................................................13 Act of April 27, 1904, Chapter 1630, 33 Stat. 428 (1904) ......................................20 Act of February 5, 1917, Chapter 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) ...............................21\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 46\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, § 302 (1996) ......................................................................18\nAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 411 ..........................................24 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chapter 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882)...........................20 Geary Act of 1892, Chapter 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).................................................20 Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277,\n112 Stat. 2681 .....................................................................................................25 Hart-Celler Act.........................................................................................................22 Hostage Act of 1868 ............................................................................................8, 13 International Emergency Economic Powers Act .......................................................8 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of\n1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 §§ 342, 346 .....................................24, 25 Immigration Act of 1924, Chapter 190, § 13, 43 Stat. 153, 161–62\n(1924) ..................................................................................................................21 Immigration and Nationality Act ......................................................................passim Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 215(a)(1), 243(h) .....................................10, 23 International Emergency Economic Powers Act .......................................................8 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997,\nPub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 .........................................................................25 Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, § 2 (1965)..................................................................23\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 46\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nPub. L. No. 89-236, § 202, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911–912 (1965) ...................................22 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, § 103\n(2005) ..................................................................................................................18 Scott Act of 1888, Chapter 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) ............................................20 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411 (2001)..................18 FEDERAL REGULATIONS 46 Fed. Reg. 48017 (Oct. 1, 1981) ..........................................................................15 50 Fed. Reg. 41329 (Oct. 10, 1985) ........................................................................15 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 26, 1986)........................................................................16 64 Fed. Reg. 62561 (Nov. 19, 1999)........................................................................15 67 Fed. Reg. 8857 (Feb. 26, 2002) .........................................................................15 76 Fed. Reg. 49277 (Aug. 9, 2011) .........................................................................15 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) ........................................................................1 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 ......................................................................................................1 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 ....................................................................................................1 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 70 Cong. Rec. 3526 (1929) ......................................................................................21 111 Cong. Rec. 686 (Jan. 15, 1965).........................................................................22\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 46\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)\n\nPage(s)\n\nH. R. Rep. 45-62, 3 (1879).......................................................................................20 H. R. Rep. 68-350, 13-14.........................................................................................21 H. R. Rep. 68-350 (1924).........................................................................................21 H.R. Report 82-1365 at 5‒6.....................................................................................10\nOTHER AUTHORITIES Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1885 (1993) ..........................................................................20 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the\nSeparation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 449 (2012)................................19 Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration &\nNaturalization, 89 Cong. 4 (1965) ......................................................................22 Jimmy Carter, “Sanctions Against Iran Remarks Announcing U.S.\nActions” (Apr. 7, 1980) ......................................................................................15\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 46\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Amici curiae are academics whose expertise includes the jurisprudence of federal courts, constitutional law, and/or immigration law. Amici submit this brief to explain why, given constitutional commitments to separation of powers, the President lacked authority to issue the directive set forth in section 2 of Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the “Proclamation”) barring immigration to the United States by nationals of seven countries—as well as the issuance of various categories of non-immigrant visas—solely on the basis of nationality. 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017).\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Proclamation eliminates immigrant visas from a designated list of countries (five of which are majority-Muslim countries targeted in both of the President’s previous Executive Orders, see 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209)—and denies various categories of non-immigrant visas—solely on the basis of nationality, on the premise that all of the affected nationals present heightened risks to national security. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), is central to evaluating the validity of this executive action to\n\n1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No party, or counsel for a party, played a role in the drafting or preparation of this brief; nor did any person other than amici provide financial support in connection with the preparation and filing of this brief. A list of amici may be found at Appendix A.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 46\n\nassess whether it complies with established separation-of-powers principles. The Youngstown framework, and its subsequent application in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), requires analysis of what Congress has authorized, what it has prohibited, and the “general tenor” of congressional immigration legislation. As we explain below, the Proclamation is not authorized by statute and contravenes express and implied congressional mandates; and the President lacks the independent and exclusive authority to supplant congressional authority over immigration.\nContrary to the President’s assertion, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) does not delegate plenary authority to the Executive to act invidiously by invoking nationality as the sole basis for excluding millions of people from the United States. Reading section 212(f), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (hereinafter § 1182(f)), as authorizing such unfettered discretion is at odds with the provision’s historical interpretation and usage and cannot be reconciled with the broader statutory context within which it operates. Moreover, the President’s broad reading of § 1182(f) would raise concerns that Congress has abdicated its own constitutional role in setting immigration policy.\nSection 1182(f) itself does not sustain the Proclamation, and must be read in the context of the INA as a whole, which has articulated a detailed scheme for\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 46\n\nimmigration and imposed rules governing how decisions about migrants are to be made. In 1965, Congress, troubled by the historic abuse of nationality as a stalking horse for racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance, banned its use in the issuance of immigrant visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). In the half century since, Congress has repeatedly insisted on the use of specific nondiscriminatory criteria when excluding entrants to the United States as purported threats to safety and security.\nThe Proclamation, like the two Executive Orders preceding it, employs nationality as a stand-in for the propensity to undermine Americans’ safety. This action by the President to resurrect the use of nationality as a sole basis to ban entry into the United States contravenes the congressional rejection of such historically-discredited tests for entry. In these circumstances, under separation-ofpowers principles, the President’s power is at or near its “lowest ebb” and is valid only if the President possesses independent and exclusive constitutional powers that preclude Congress “from acting upon the subject.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637‒38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Because the President has no such constitutional power over immigration, the Proclamation cannot be sustained.\nARGUMENT Throughout the Nation’s history, our courts have played a foundational role in delineating and enforcing constitutional limits on the authority of the other\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 46\n\nbranches of government. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (holding unconstitutional an executive order that “legislated” the seizure of the nation’s steel mills); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (holding that courts possess power to review actions by even the highest officers of the government).\nWhen seeking to avoid judicial review, the Executive branch has often argued its prerogatives in the areas of national security, foreign affairs, citizenship, or immigration. Repeatedly, courts have concluded that such labels do not bar adjudication. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (notwithstanding Commander-in-Chief powers and an existing exigency, Executive lacked authority to convene the military commission at issue). See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (evaluating Executive action to settle claims against a foreign nation against the “general tenor” of congressional legislation). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015).\nHere, the President’s claimed basis for authorization must be scrutinized in the context of Congress’s other, more specific actions dealing with the same general subject. As explained below, the President’s use of nationality as a proxy for the individualized determination of risks to security—and to bar entry to\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 46\n\nmillions of individuals on that basis alone—not only lacks specific statutory authorization, but contravenes both express and implicit congressional directives. I. THE GOVERNING LEGAL FRAMEWORK\n“The President’s power, if any, to issue [an] order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. Youngstown provides the framework for assessing the validity of the Proclamation in this case. As the Court explained, the President’s power must be analyzed initially in light of relevant legislation. See id. at 585‒86.\nYoungstown invalidated an executive order directing a temporary government seizure of the nation’s steel mills to avoid a strike that could have halted steel production during the Korean War.2 Despite the threat to the lives of American service members if steel production ceased, the Court struck down the seizure order as an unconstitutional exercise of unilateral presidential power. The Court found that it was “not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment,” but also effectively legislated policy that Congress had specifically rejected. Id. at\n\n2 At the time Youngstown was decided, American armed forces had been fighting in Korea for “almost two full years . . . suffering casualties of over 108,000 men,” and hostilities had not abated. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 46\n\n586.3 The Court further held that the President’s constitutionally derived power\ncould not authorize the seizure order. Id. at 587. At bottom, the Court deemed the\npower “to take possession of private property to keep labor disputes from stopping\nproduction ... [to be] a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military\nauthorities.” Id.\nIn his concurrence, Justice Jackson set forth what has become an important\ntripartite framework to evaluate the legality of presidential action. He described\nexercises of presidential power as typically falling within one of three categories:\n1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. [hereinafter “Category 1”] 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. [hereinafter “Category 2”] 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers . . . . Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such as case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. [hereinafter “Category 3”]\n3 Five years prior, Congress had considered—and rejected—enacting a law that would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 46\n\nId. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson concluded that the seizure order fell in Category 3 because\nno statute explicitly authorized it, and Congress had enacted detailed procedures for the seizure of property that were inconsistent with the President’s order. Id. at 639. Accordingly, the order could be sustained only if the seizure was “within [the President’s] domain and beyond control by Congress.” Id. at 640. Justice Jackson rejected each of the President’s asserted bases for such “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority. Id. at 638, 640-46.\nThirty years later, in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court returned to the Youngstown categories. In evaluating three executive orders implementing an agreement to secure the release of U.S. hostages in Iran, the Court recognized that “executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669.\nThe Supreme Court held that the first two executive orders were specifically authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and thus fell within Youngstown’s Category 1. Id. at 670‒74. With respect to the third order, suspending pending claims against Iranian interests, however, the Court\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 46\n\nruled that neither the IEEPA nor the so-called Hostage Act of 1868 provided statutory authority for this executive action. “Although the broad language of the Hostage Act suggests it may [have] cover[ed] this case,” the Court recognized that the Act was passed in response to a non-analogous situation, and was therefore “somewhat ambiguous” as to whether Congress contemplated the presidential action at issue. Id. at 675‒77.\nGiven this ambiguity, the Court looked to two factors: (a) the “general tenor of Congress’s legislation in this area” and (b) the long and unbroken history of claims settlement through Executive Agreement. Id. at 678‒80. Based on these factors, the Court concluded that Congress had acquiesced in the President’s exercise of authority to settle claims against foreign powers. Id. The Court emphasized the “narrowness” of its decision, id. at 688, and subsequently indicated that its approach was not intended to “be construed as license of the broad exercise of unilateral executive power.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1328 & n.28 (2017).\nUnder Youngstown and Dames & Moore, § 1182(f)’s facially broad language cannot sustain the Proclamation’s categorical and permanent bar, solely on the basis of nationality, to the entry of millions of immigrants and nonimmigrants who would otherwise qualify for admission. Neither of the factors\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 46\n\npresent in Dames & Moore, suggesting congressional “acquiescence” to the\nPresident’s exercise of unilateral authority, is present in this case. Indeed, other\n“legislation in this area,” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678, demonstrates\nCongress’s affirmative opposition to the use of nationality in determining\neligibility for entry and its opposition to substituting categorical proxies for\n“dangerousness” in place of an individualized assessment. Because the President\nlacks any “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional power to override this\ncongressional intent, Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring), the\nProclamation was not authorized.\nII. SECTION 1182(F) DOES NOT GRANT THE PRESIDENT UNFETTERED DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE NONCITIZENS As Youngstown and Dames & Moore illustrate, careful analysis of specific\nstatutes is essential to evaluating the lawfulness of Executive action. The President\nasserts that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) provides authorization for the Proclamation.\nSection 1182(f) provides:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.\n\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 46\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).4 Although the President claims that this language delegates unfettered\ndiscretion to exclude whole “class[es] of aliens” based on any criteria whatsoever, canons of statutory construction as well as the statute’s interpretive history counsel against such an expansive reading. The House Report recommending the bill that would enact § 1182(f) began with a lengthy affirmance of the power of Congress to control immigration, see H.R. Report 82-1365 at 5‒6, a principle derived directly from the Constitution, which vests Congress with authority to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” and to regulate or prohibit the “Migration” of persons. U.S. Const., art. I, s. 8,9.5 The Migration Clause, notwithstanding its sorry history aimed at protecting the slave trade from immediate interference, provides the governing constitutional framework: after the stipulated twenty-year\n4 The Proclamation cites two additional provisions: section 215(a)(1) of the INA, which provides: “Unless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful … for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe,” 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), and 3 U.S.C. § 301, which allows the President to delegate his authority to others within the Executive branch. Neither provision adds to the President’s substantive authority.\n5 Article I, Section 9 prohibits Congress, for a period of twenty years, from prohibiting “[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit.”\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 46\n\nhiatus, it was for Congress to decide on the “Migration … of … Persons.”6 This area is thus unlike others in which the constitutional scheme may contemplate a primary role for Executive power. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936).\nGiven congressional power, the question becomes understanding what Congress has delegated. This case is one of many in which a potentially broad authorization from Congress has to be read to reflect basic separation-of-powers principles and to avoid constitutional questions about the limits of delegation. In Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, the Supreme Court concluded that the Joint Resolution for the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), enacted by Congress immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, while capacious, did not authorize the use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists. The AUMF delegates to the President power to “‘use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks … in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or\n6 The Supreme Court has identified other sources for Congress’s power to regulate immigration, including the Commerce Clause, war powers, and powers inherent in sovereignty. See generally, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 46\n\npersons.’” Id. at 568 (quoting AUMF, 115 Stat. 224). The President invoked this authority to provide for trial by military commission for any individual suspected of membership in al Qaeda or participation in terrorist acts against the United States. Id. at 568. The Court concluded that “there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter Article 21 of the” Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at 594. Even in the context of a direct response to domestic terrorist attacks, the Supreme Court did not approve the claim of unfettered authority to convene military commissions to try noncitizens.\nSimilarly, Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), shows that a broad statutory delegation of immigration discretion to the Executive does not confer limitless power to engage in discrimination. There, the Eleventh Circuit had concluded that a statute granting the Attorney General discretion to “parole into the United States any … alien applying for admission ‘under such conditions as he may prescribe,’” authorized parole decisions on the basis of race or national origin, and was consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 848, 852 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The Supreme Court declined to endorse this view, concluding that the statute and its implementing regulations prohibited such discrimination, id.\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 46\n\nat 854‒56, despite the absence of statutory language expressly prohibiting nationality-based distinctions, see id. at 862‒63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).\nIn Dames & Moore, which upon review of the Executive action found it was within congressional authorization, the Court was unwilling to read a broadly worded statute without also considering the context of other relevant statutes and past practices. In particular, the Court analyzed the Hostage Act of 1868, which provided that whenever a U.S. citizen was unjustly held by a foreign government, “if the release … is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release.” 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (emphasis added). While recognizing this “broad language,” the Court declined to construe it as authorizing the President’s suspension of pending claims against foreign nations. The Court noted that the issue prompting the 1868 legislation involved not foreign powers interested in trading hostages back, but rather foreign powers seeking to repatriate American citizens. See Dames & Moore at 676-77. The Court then turned to the legislative history, which it found “somewhat ambiguous.” Id. at 677. It was only after finding (1) “a longstanding practice of settling such claims by executive agreement,” and (2) that Congress had enacted specific procedures to implement Executive Agreements of this kind, that\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 46\n\nthe Court concluded that Congress had “placed its stamp of approval” on such actions. Id. at 679-80.\nThe Proclamation here benefits from no such “stamp of approval.” Unlike in Dames & Moore, there is no evidence that Congress assumed, much less endorsed, unlimited executive power to exclude noncitizens on the basis of nationality. No President has ever issued an order akin to the Proclamation— eliminating any possible inference that Congress has “acquiesced” in such a practice. Rather, past presidential actions suggest an understanding of meaningful limits to this power. A Congressional Research Service Report identified 43 instances between 1981 and 2017 where the president invoked § 1182(f) to suspend the entry of noncitizens. See Kate Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R44743, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief (Jan. 23, 2017). In one additional instance, the President relied on § 1185(a)(1) rather than § 1182(f) to justify suspending entry of a class of noncitizens.7\nOn no occasion has a President used nationality alone to impute individualized characteristics to bar noncitizens’ entry into the United States. In the vast majority of instances, the Executive barred noncitizens who engaged in a\n7 As discussed below, President Carter relied on § 1185(a) to “prescribe limitations and exceptions” on the entry of Iranians.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 46\n\nparticular course of conduct. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8697, 76 Fed. Reg. 49277 (Aug. 9, 2011) (individuals who participate in serious human rights violations); Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48017 (Oct. 1, 1981) (noncitizens who approach the United States by sea without documentation).\nA number of instances target individuals from particular nations based on specific conduct or affiliations. See Exec. Order No. 13687, 80 Fed. Reg. 819 (Jan. 6, 2015) (officials of the North Korean government or the Workers’ Party of Korea); Proclamation No. 7524, 67 Fed. Reg. 8857 (Feb. 26, 2002) (individuals who threaten Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions); Proclamation No. 7249, 64 Fed. Reg. 62561 (Nov. 19, 1999) (individuals responsible for repression of civilian population in Kosovo); Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41329 (Oct. 10, 1985) (nonimmigrant officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba).\nThe President has suspended entry without regard to individualized conduct on only two occasions. During the Iran hostage crisis, President Carter invoked § 1185(a)(1) to deny entry to Iranian nationals. Exec. Order No. 12172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 1979); Exec. Order 12206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24101 (Apr. 7, 1980); see also Jimmy Carter, “Sanctions Against Iran Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions” (Apr. 7, 1980). Then, in response to the Cuba’s decision to suspend\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 46\n\nexecution of a bilateral immigration agreement with the U.S., President Reagan, in August 1986, suspended the entry of Cuban nationals under certain types of immigrant visas. Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 26, 1986).8 Both instances were considerably narrower than the instant case, which imposes a potentially permanent bar to the entry of millions of individuals from eight countries. Moreover, in neither instance did the Executive’s actions impute individualized characteristics—such as dangerousness or criminality—on the basis of nationality. Nationality was instead used to sanction a country for hostile acts towards the United States during a discrete foreign policy crisis.9 As such, they qualitatively differ from the Proclamation.\nIn an attempt to avoid suggesting that the covered non-citizens are presumed dangerous solely because of their nationalities, the Proclamation states that these individuals all hail from countries with “deficient . . . identity-management and information-sharing capabilities, protocols, and practices.” Proclamation 9645,\n8 The exclusion of Cubans applied only to those immigrant entrants who did not enter as “immediate relatives under Section 201(b)” or “as preference immigrant under Section 203(a).” Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 26, 1986).\n9 The President has, through Executive Orders, identified specific nationalities in another context—to determine (and to potentially relax) the level of scrutiny to be applied to visa applicants—but those actions are explicitly authorized by Congress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 46\n\npreamble. The Government’s brief similarly proffers this purported justification. See Gov’t Br. at 32-34. But this rationale is hard to take seriously. The Proclamation targets five of the six countries targeted by the two prior, similar Executive Orders—both of which made clear that they selected nationalities based on a presumed heightened risk of terror. Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen are targeted in all three orders, and the Proclamation adds only Chad (another Muslim-majority nation) and North Korea (from which there is no appreciable immigration) as subject to categorical exclusion based on nationality.\nNo prior precedents support this Proclamation. The two isolated instances the Government cites—the response to the Iran hostage crisis and Cuba’s suspension of a bilateral agreement with the U.S.—do not establish the type of “systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned” that was deemed sufficient to infer congressional acquiescence in Dames & Moore. 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11).\nThe present case is, thus, the inverse of Dames & Moore. There, the President asserted authority in an area in which the Executive had long exercised the power, and Congress had repeatedly acquiesced to such exercises. Here, by contrast, the President asserts broader authority than any president before him—in\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 46\n\nessence, the type of “license for the broad exercise of unilateral executive power” that the Supreme Court forbade. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328 & n.28.\nNor does the “general tenor” of legislation in the immigration arena suggest congressional approval of the President’s actions. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme that suggests just the opposite: Contrary to the Proclamation, denials of entry must be based on more individualized evaluations of dangerousness rather than the blanket assumption that certain nationalities are per se dangerous. See, e.g., AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, § 302 (1996); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411 (2001); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, § 103 (2005). As FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. put it, “[i]t is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).10 Amici now turn to these other provisions of the INA.\n10 Given that § 1182(f), properly construed, does not allow unfettered executive discretion to engage in invidious nationality-based discrimination, see supra § II, this Court need not address whether the President’s sweeping view of § 1182(f) would make Congress’s delegation to the Executive invalid. See, e.g., Gulf\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 46\n\nIII. THE GENERAL TENOR OF IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IS CONTRARY TO THE PROCLAMATION A review of the history of immigration law is required to understand how the\n“general tenor” of congressional legislation changed during the last century. By\nthe time § 1182(f) was enacted in 1952, Congress had already begun to eschew the\nuse of nationality as a proxy for racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance in entry\ndeterminations. And legislation enacted after 1952 evinces Congress’s repudiation\nof the use of nationality as the sole basis to exclude persons based on generalized\nfears of terrorism.11 Thereafter, in 1965, Congress enacted an explicit ban on the\nuse of nationality to discriminate against persons seeking immigrant visas. And in\nother legislation, Congress has repeatedly demonstrated a commitment to relying\non individualized assessments—rather than discredited stereotypes—to determine\nadmissibility.\nOil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981) (“Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936) (rejecting non-delegation challenge where President acted pursuant to a specific, limited authorization from Congress to prohibit “the sale of arms and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco”).\n11 Given “the institutional and other barriers to the passage of legislation,” affirmative acts by Congress rejecting a particular course of presidential conduct “should be given very heavy interpretive weight.” Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 449 (2012).\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 46\n\nA. Congress Historically Used Nationality Categorically To Exclude Noncitizens\nOur Nation’s immigration policies once routinely relied on notions of racial and cultural inferiority and religious prejudice to exclude certain nationalities as threats to our safety and stability. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that Congress, recognizing the frequency with which nationality and national origin had historically been employed as the basis for invidious discrimination based on race, religion, and ethnicity, prohibited the use of such classifications.\nA brief recap of this history is helpful here. Beginning after the Civil War, Congress relied expressly on nationality to restrict the entry of noncitizens perceived as threats to national security and American identity.12 Congress enacted a series of laws targeting and ultimately prohibiting virtually all Chinese immigration. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888); Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); Act of April 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 428 (1904).13 In 1917, Congress created the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” excluding noncitizens from a\n12 Prior to the Civil War, states regulated the entry of noncitizens. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1885 (1993).\n13 Proponents of these measures frequently invoked national security rationales, characterizing the Chinese as “a standing menace to the social and political institutions of the country.” H. R. Rep. 45-62, 3 (1879).\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 46\n\nvast swathe of the globe from Saudi Arabia to the Polynesian islands. See Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). In 1924, Congress imposed an even broader prohibition on the immigration of noncitizens who were not “free white persons,” “aliens of African nativity, . . . [or] persons of African descent.” See Immigration Act of 1924, Ch. 190, § 13, 43 Stat. 153, 161–62 (1924); H. R. Rep. 68-350 at 6 (1924) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nNoncitizens who were not categorically excluded on these racial grounds remained subject to strict national-origin quotas that favored immigrants from northern and western Europe. Id. These restrictions were understood to be aimed “principally at two peoples, the Italians and the Jews.” 70 Cong. Rec. 3526 (1929). During this time, national origin served as a proxy for undesirable groups perceived to “reproduce more rapidly on a lower standard of living” and “unduly charge our institutions for the care of the socially inadequate.” H. R. Rep. 68-350, 13-14. The goal was to “preserve, as nearly as possible, the racial status quo in the United States.” Id. at 16. These measures were described as necessary to national survival: “If therefore, the principle of individual liberty, guarded by a constitutional government created on this continent nearly a century and a half ago, is to endure, the basic strain of our population must be maintained.” Id. at 13.\n\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 46\n\nB. In 1965, Congress Expressly Prohibited the Use of Nationality in the Issuance of Immigrant Visas\nIn 1965, Congress enacted the Hart-Celler Act, amending the Immigration and Nationality Act by abandoning the national-origin quota system and instead imposing a uniform per-country limit of 20,000 immigrant visas for all countries outside the western hemisphere. See Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 202, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911–912 (1965).\nAn overarching goal of the 1965 Act was to ensure that exclusions would be based on individualized determinations, not blanket stereotypes about race and country of origin. Senator Philip Hart, one of the chief sponsors of the bill, explained the rejection of the national-origins quota system: “[I]it is impossible to defend and it is offensive to anyone with a sense of the right of an individual to be judged as a good or a bad person, not from which side of the tracks he comes.” Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 89 Cong. 4 (1965). President Johnson described the system as “incompatible with our basic American tradition…. The fundamental, longtime American attitude has been to ask not where a person comes from but what are his personal qualities.” See 111 Cong. Rec. 686 (Jan. 15, 1965). Thereafter, when he signed the bill, the President made plain its commitments: “This bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to immigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 46\n\ntheir close relationship with those already here.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill (Oct. 3, 1965).\nIn addition, the 1965 Act expressly ruled out the use of nationality—as well as race, sex, place of birth, and place of residence—in the issuance of long-term immigrant visas. Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, sec. 2 (1965). Section 1152(a) provides, in relevant part, that except to enforce the uniform per-country visa allocation: “[N]o person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).\nCongress intended this prohibition on discrimination to be applied broadly. Unlike other provisions of the INA, § 1152(a) restrains the entire executive branch, including the President. Cf. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 172 (1993) (concluding that § 243(h) of the INA constrains the Attorney General but not the President). Congress enumerated limited exceptions to the bar on using nationality to deny immigrant visas, relating to enforcement of the uniform cap on immigrant visas for all countries; the President’s exercise of § 1182(f) power is notably absent from that list of exceptions.\n\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 46\n\nC. Congress Has Repeatedly Required That Entry Decisions Be Based on Assessment of Non-Invidious Criteria\nIn addition to the express language of § 1152(a) prohibiting discrimination against noncitizens seeking entry as permanent residents, the historical arc of our Nation’s immigration laws and the overall structure of the INA demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the use of invidious stereotypes for non-immigrant temporary entrants as well.\nBeginning in the 1940s with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, Congress has jettisoned nationality-based bars to entry in favor of individualized assessments for undesirable traits. Since the 1965 legislation, it has repeatedly affirmed the need for individualized assessment to determine whether a given noncitizen—immigrant or a non-immigrant—should be excluded as a national security risk. See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 411 (expanding grounds for excluding noncitizens affiliated with terrorist organizations); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 § 342; USA PATRIOT Act § 411 (2001) (expanding definition of terrorist activity for purposes of exclusion); REAL ID Act § 103 (same). Thus, individuals may be excluded because, for example, they are “a member of a terrorist organization”—unless “the alien can demonstrate” that he or she “did not know, and should not reasonably have known,\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 46\n\nthat the organization was a terrorist organization”—or because they are “the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible” on this basis, unless the spouse or child did not know of or has renounced the terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3)(B).\nSimilarly, with immigration issues unrelated to terrorism, Congress has also eschewed the use of nationality as a basis for exclusion. See generally IIRIRA § 346. On the few occasions where Congress has employed nationality classifications, it did so to grant relief based on particular country conditions— either to permit special opportunities to enter the United States or to avoid deportation—and did so without imputing invidious or stigmatizing traits. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160; Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.\nThe historical evolution of our Nation’s immigration laws, the 1965 statutory ban on the use of nationality in issuing immigrant visas, and Congress’s post-1965 enactments focusing on individualized assessments to determine admissibility all demonstrate that the “general tenor of Congress’s legislation in this area” repudiates the blanket use of “nationality” to impute traits of dangerousness or criminality for the purpose of imposing a categorical bar to entry.\n\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 46\n\nDames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. Here, as a result, the President is “acting alone,” without “the acceptance of Congress.” Id.\nThis conclusion is consistent with the accepted approach to statutory interpretation. “[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). “Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one . . . .” Id. at 550–51; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133 (“[T]he meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.”).\nHere, § 1152(a) was enacted after § 1182(f) and mandates nondiscrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. Given that the President cannot discriminate against persons in the issuance of immigrant visas based on nationality, § 1182(f) should not be read to permit such discrimination. See, e.g. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133. Moreover, the two sections are reconcilable: the President may exercise § 1182(f) power—suspending entry of a “class of aliens” deemed to be “detrimental to the interests of the United States”—in circumstances where such exercise does not violate § 1152(a). Absent\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 46\n\na discrete intergovernmental conflict—such as Iran’s taking of U.S. hostages or Cuba’s suspension of a bilateral agreement with the U.S.—imposing a bar to entry solely on the basis of nationality, and in a manner that carries invidious implications of criminal, terrorist, or dangerous tendencies on the part of all persons of that nationality, is not permissible. In short, the Executive’s use of nationality as a proxy for dangerousness, and to prevent entry into the United States, cannot be reconciled with § 1152(a) and subsequent immigration laws, which demonstrate congressional intent to move the United States away from reliance on nationality as a categorical basis for exclusion.14 IV. THE PROCLAMATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE\nYOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK By excluding individuals based solely on nationality—and justifying its use as a credible proxy for “heightened risks to the security of the United States” instead of making more individualized assessments—the President took “measures\n\n14 Amici do not suggest that nationality classifications are never permitted in the immigration context in any respect. For example, the President has used nationality as a factor to determine the level of scrutiny for individuals of identified countries, or to respond to special disaster needs. In such instances, there is no imputation of invidious, discriminatory purpose based on nationality, of the kind that can redound to the detriment of U.S. citizens and others within the United States of the same heritage.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 46\n\nincompatible with the expressed [and] implied will of Congress.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).\nEven if this Court decided that Congress’s position is “somewhat ambiguous,” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677, the Proclamation could not be sustained. No longstanding history suggests congressional acquiescence to the action at issue here. Cf. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680. See also Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328 & n.28 (“Much of the [Dames] Court’s cause for concern, however, was the risk that the ruling could be construed as license for the broad exercise of unilateral executive power.”). At a minimum, the Proclamation is quite close, on the “spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition,” to the type of discriminatory actions Congress has rejected. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669.\nNor can the President rely on his exclusive constitutional powers to authorize the Proclamation. “Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Id.\nHere, the President can make no such claim. Although some earlier case law characterized executive authority over immigration as capacious, see Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (addressing executive exercise of power\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 46\n\nexpressly authorized by Congress), the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized legislative control over immigration as pivotal. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (“Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law,” subject to constitutional limitations); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (same). Any constitutionally derived presidential authority to regulate immigration is, at best, shared with Congress. Absent “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional power, the President has no power to act unilaterally, in contravention of congressional intent to prohibit the use of nationality as a basis for discrimination. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J. concurring).\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 46\n\nCONCLUSION The President lacked statutory and constitutional authority to issue the Proclamation. The decision of the court below should be affirmed.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER Lead Counsel RASHA GERGES SHIELDS JONES DAY 250 Vesey Street New York, NY 10281-1047 Telephone: (212) 326-3939 Facsimile: (212) 755-7306 Email: mfeder@jonesday.com\nCATHERINE Y. KIM New York, NY\nJUDITH RESNIK New Haven, CT\nBURT NEUBORNE New York, NY\nLUCAS GUTTENTAG Palo Alto, CA\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 46\n\nAppendix A\nAmici Curiae Law Professors∗\nJanet Cooper Alexander, Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Emerita, Stanford Law School\nGabriel J. Chin, Edward L. Barrett Chair and Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law\nLaura K. Donahue, Professor of Law, Director of the Center on National Security and the Law, and Director of the Center on Privacy and Technology, Georgetown University Law Center\nLucas Guttentag, Professor of the Practice of Law, Stanford Law School\nAlan Hyde, Distinguished Professor of Law and Sidney Reitman Scholar\nCatherine Y. Kim, George B. Ward Term Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law\nBurt Neuborne, Norman Dorsen Professor in Civil Liberties, New York University School of Law\nGerald L. Neuman, J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School\nJudith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School\nStephen I. Vladeck, A. Dalton Cross Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law\nMichael J. Wishnie, William O. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School\n\n∗ Affiliations of amici curiae are listed for identification purposes only.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 46\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that the foregoing brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 6,489 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by that Rule, as counted using the word-count function on Microsoft Word 2007 software.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER Counsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 45 of 46\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 46 of 46\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on this 17th day of November 2017, I electronically filed the original of the foregoing document with the clerk of this Court by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\nNovember 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Meir Feder MEIR FEDER\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 107-3\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 43\n\nNos. 17-2231, 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nFOR THE\nFourth Circuit\n_______________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nALLAN HAKKY, et al., Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n_______________________\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court, District of Maryland, The Honorable Theodore D. Chuang, United States District Judge Case No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC\nBRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS\nThomas J. Perrelli Lindsay C. Harrison Tassity S. Johnson Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave NW Washington, DC 20001-4412 Phone: (202) 639-6000 Attorneys for Amici Colleges and Universities\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 43\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, counsel for amici curiae Boston University, Brandeis University, Brown University, Bucknell University, Carnegie Mellon University, Case Western Reserve University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Duke University, Emory University, George Washington University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Middlebury College, Northeastern University, Northwestern University, Princeton University, Rice University, Stanford University, Tufts University, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, University of Pennsylvania, University of Southern California, Vanderbilt University, Washington University, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Yale University certifies that amici, respectively, are not publicly held corporations, that amici, respectively, do not have a parent corporation, and that no publicly held corporation owns 10 percent or more of amici’s respective stock. Dated: November 17, 2017\nBy: /s/ Lindsay C. Harrison Lindsay C. Harrison Attorney for Amici Colleges and Universities\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 43\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..........................................................i\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ...............................................................................1\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................2\nARGUMENT .............................................................................................................7\nI. International Students, Faculty, and Scholars Are Vital to Amici, the U.S., and the World. ........................................................................................7\nA. Each Amicus Is Home to a Significant Percentage of Students, Faculty, and Scholars Who Are Citizens of Other Nations. .................7\nB. International Students, Faculty, and Scholars Contribute Significantly to Amici’s Campuses. ....................................................15\nC. The Enrollment and Employment of International Students, Faculty, and Scholars Benefit the U.S. and the World. ......................17\nII. The Proclamation Harms Students, Faculty, Scholars, and Universities. ...................................................................................................21\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................33\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 43\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCASES\nFisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).......................15, 16\nGrutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)...............................................................16\nInternational Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017)................ 6-7, 30, 32\nTrump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) .........30\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\nAmerican Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, Treading Topics Survey: International Applicants for Fall 2017— Institutional & Applicant Perceptions (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.aacrao.org/docs/default-source/TrendTopic/Immigration/ final-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0 ...............................................................................24\nAmerican Immigration Council, Fact Sheet: The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program and Its Impact on Jobs, Wages, and the Economy (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil. org/research/h1b-visa-program-fact-sheet ..................................................... 13\nStuart Anderson, Immigrants Flooding America with Nobel Prizes, Forbes (Oct. 16, 2016, 10:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ stuartanderson/2016/10/16/immigrants-flooding-america-with-nobelprizes/#3de213817f5f ..............................................................................18, 19\nStuart Anderson, Nat’l Found. for American Policy, Immigrants and Billion Dollar Startups, http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ Immigrants-and-Billion-Dollar-Startups.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2016.pdf .........................................................................................................18\nBureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Visas: Temporary Worker Visas, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/employment/ temporary.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017)..................................................13\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 43\n\nBureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Visas: Visitor Visa, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visitor.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) ...............................................................................................14\nBureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, J-1 Visa Exchange Visitor Program, About the J-2 Visa, https://j1visa.state.gov/basics/j2-visa/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) ..............12\nBureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, J-1 Visa Exchange Visitor Program, Common Questions - Basics, https://j1visa.state.gov/basics/common-questions/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) ..............................................................................................................12\nSara Custer, Open Doors: U.S. Surpasses 1 Million International Students, The Pie News (Nov. 14, 2016), https://thepienews.com/news/opendoors-us-surpasses-1-million-international-students/ ...............................8, 17\nEnhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) ..............3, 4, 5\nExecutive Order No. 13,769, § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) .................3\nExecutive Order No. 13,780 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).................3\nLarry Hardesty, Signal Intelligence, MIT Tech. Rev. (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542131/signal-intelligence/ ..............19\nIn Solidarity with People Affected by the ‘Muslim Ban,’ https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeNN_2HHREt1hdm_CgWpFHw8NDPGLCkOwB4lLRFtKFJqI25w/viewform?c=0&w =1&fbzx=2104368019732744200 (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) ...................29\nJoint Declaration of Madeline K. Albright, Avril D. Haines, Michael V. Hayden, John F. Kerry, John E. McLaughlin, Lisa O. Monaco, Michael J. Morell, Janet A. Napolitano, Leon E. Panetta, and Susan E. Rice, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2017), ECF No. 28-2 ..........................................................................................................14, 17\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 43\n\nMolly Land & Kathryn Libal, Trump is Undermining Higher Education as a Global Enterprise, The Chronicle of Higher Education (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Trump-Is-UnderminingHigher/239060 .................................................................................................8\nNAFSA, NAFSA International Student Economic Value Tool, http://www.nafsa.org/Policy_and_Advocacy/Policy_Resources/Policy _Trends_and_Data/NAFSA_International_Student_Economic_Value_ Tool/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017)..................................................................17\nAdams Nager, et al., Information Technology & Innovation Found., The Demographics of Innovation in the United States (Feb. 24, 2016), https://itif.org/publications/2016/02/24/demographics-innovationunited-states ...................................................................................................18\nShannon Najmabadi, Academics Mull Boycott of U.S. Conferences as a Way of Fighting Travel Ban, The Chronicle of Higher Education (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Academics-Mull-Boycott-ofUS/239047?cid=pm&utm_source=pm&utm_medium=en&elqTrackId =e9a82fa115e24765bc019b2dfc9d480e&elq=ef21be06f46043e287aee dd6a611eb6e&elqaid=12357&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=5023 ...................28\nHironao Okahana, Data Sources: Admission Yields of Prospective International Graduate Students: A First Look, http://cgsnet.org/datasources-admission-yields-prospective-international-graduate-studentsfirst-look (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017) ........................................................24\nChris Parr, Response: international universities speak out against Trump ban, The Times Higher Education (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/response-internationaluniversities-speak-out-against-trump-ban .........................................22, 23, 27\nElizabeth Redden, Boycotting the U.S., Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/31/protest-trumpentry-ban-some-scholars-areboycotting-us-based-conferences .............. 28-29\nKatie Rose Quandt, Meet the First Woman to Win the “Nobel Prize of Mathematics,” Mother Jones (Aug. 14, 2014), http://m.motherjones.com/mixed-media/2014/08/maryam-mirzakhanifirst-woman-fields-medal-mathematics ......................................................... 19\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 43\n\nOmer Taspinar, The Problem With Radicalism, 19 Cairo Rev. 76 (2015)..............20\nU.S. Customs & Immigration Services, Optional Practical Training (OPT) for F-1 Students (last updated Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchangevisitors/students-and-employment/optional-practical-training .....................10\n\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 43\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Amici are Boston University, Brandeis University, Brown University, Bucknell University, Carnegie Mellon University, Case Western Reserve University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Duke University, Emory University, George Washington University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Middlebury College, Northeastern University, Northwestern University, Princeton University, Rice University, Stanford University, Tufts University, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, University of Pennsylvania, University of Southern California, Vanderbilt University, Washington University, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Yale University. Though amici are located in the United States, their missions and reach are global: they educate, employ, conduct research, and collaborate with students, faculty, and scholars from all over the world—individuals who speak different languages, practice different religions, and have wide-ranging life experiences. These individuals make significant contributions to their fields of study and to campus life by bringing their unique perspectives and talents to amici’s classrooms,\n1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person, other than amici or their counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 43\n\nlaboratories, and performance spaces. They also contribute by making scientific discoveries, starting businesses, and creating literature and art, all of which redound to the benefit of others far beyond amici’s campuses. So too, by studying and engaging with other scholars in the U.S., these individuals gain a greater understanding of and appreciation for the values we hold dear, including democratic principles and respect for the rule of law, tolerance, and human rights—values which they may then share with citizens of their home countries.\nRecognizing the invaluable contributions of international students, faculty, and scholars, amici make significant efforts to attract the most talented individuals from around the globe and to engage persons around the world through international campuses and programs. In light of their educational missions, amici are deeply interested in ensuring that individuals from around the globe can continue to enter the U.S. and share their unique skills and perspectives. Amici recognize the imperative need for the government to protect national security, but students and scholars already undergo significant scrutiny on an individual basis to study or work here. Amici therefore submit this brief in support of Appellees on the merits of the government’s appeal regarding the district court’s preliminary injunction.\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT American colleges and universities have long recognized the importance of attracting international students, faculty, staff, and scholars. International scholars\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 43\n\nand faculty share important insights about conditions, traditions, and cultural values and practices in their nations. Their work leads to critical advancements across all disciplines, from science and technology to arts and letters, often through crossborder collaborations that enhance their teaching and research. International students study here and return home as leaders in business, medicine, politics, and other fields. The benefits of international diversity in American higher education thus inure not only to colleges and universities themselves, but to the country and indeed the world as a whole.\nThe third in a series of presidential orders banning entry into the U.S. of nationals of Muslim-majority countries, Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, like its predecessors, impairs amici’s ability to attract talented individuals from around the globe and thus to meet their goals of educating tomorrow’s leaders. See 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter “Proclamation”]. Unlike the temporary bans of its predecessors, however, the Proclamation indefinitely bars or otherwise restricts entry of all immigrants and most non-immigrants from Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.2 Proclamation § 2.\n2 The predecessor travel bans suspended entry of nationals from all of these countries except Chad; they also suspended entry of nationals from Sudan, which the Proclamation does not. See Executive Order No. 13,769, § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Executive Order No. 13,780 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). In addition, the Proclamation suspends entry of all North Korean nationals, limits entry of certain Venezuelan government officials and their immediate family\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 43\n\nThe Proclamation permanently interferes with the entry of nationals from the six Muslim-majority countries who seek the categories of visas most commonly relied upon by amici’s international students, faculty, staff, and scholars. It excludes all Syrian nationals, preventing amici from recruiting promising students, faculty, staff, and scholars and jeopardizing the education and careers of Syrian nationals who are currently enrolled at or employed by amici on visas that will need to be renewed. Id. § 2(e)(ii). For Iranian nationals, it suspends all nonimmigrant visas, with the exception of student and exchange visas, throwing amici’s recruitment efforts of prospective Iranian faculty and staff, and the careers of Iranian nationals currently employed by amici, into similar jeopardy. Id. § 2(b)(ii). It also suspends travel and business visas for nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, and Yemen, inhibiting amici from interviewing prospective faculty from these countries in person, recruiting prospective students from these countries through campus visits, collaborating with researchers from these countries at conferences, and inviting world-renowned scholars from these countries to speak. Id. §§ 2(a)(ii), (b)(ii), (c)(ii), (g)(ii).\n\nmembers, and subjects all other Venezuelan nationals to enhanced screening. Proclamation §§ 2(d), (f). These sections of the Proclamation are not subject to the district court’s injunction.\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 43\n\nDespite the extensive individualized vetting a person already must undergo to secure a visa to study here, the Proclamation imposes additional but unspecified “enhanced screening and vetting” on students and scholars from Iran, and students, scholars, or faculty from Somalia. Id. §§ 2(b)(ii), (h)(ii). This additional scrutiny may mean that many otherwise qualified students and scholars will not be able to obtain visas, and it all but ensures that others will be deterred from applying. Amici moreover risk losing current students, faculty, and scholars from the targeted Muslim-majority countries because their family members who remain in those countries will never be able to visit on travel visas or join them here on immigrant visas. Id. § 2.\nThe Proclamation threatens amici’s ability to attract persons not only from the six specified countries, but from around the world. It contradicts the values that American colleges and universities have traditionally touted as benefits of studying and working here, including the freedom of religion and equality embodied in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, large groups of scholars have threatened to boycott meetings and conferences hosted in the U.S. because of the travel ban. Universities in other countries have used the predecessor travel bans, and the arbitrariness and unpredictability that the bans have introduced into this country’s immigration policy, to recruit international students, faculty, and scholars away from U.S. institutions. The Proclamation only strengthens these appeals.\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 43\n\nAmici have already felt some of the predecessor travel bans’ damaging effects, and the Proclamation promises to exacerbate these harms. International scholars and faculty advised many of amici that they could not accept invitations to work and teach here given the uncertainty surrounding the predecessor travel bans. The Proclamation has removed all doubt that scholars and faculty from Syria cannot work and teach at amici, and that persons from the other targeted countries will face an uphill battle to do so, a battle in which victory may mean permanent separation from their families. Likewise, the predecessor bans deterred students from applying to and studying at American universities. And, if permitted to stand, the Proclamation will discourage many prospective international students from applying to American colleges and universities during future application cycles. Even worse, amici have been harmed by the predecessor travel bans and the Proclamation without any evidence that an appreciable number of nationals from these countries—all of whom the government already vets before permitting them to study or work here— pose any safety or security threat. Upholding the Proclamation will telegraph to all countries that their citizens may be unjustly targeted for exclusion, worsening the Proclamation’s negative effects.\nAmici support the injunction of Section 2 of the Proclamation as applied to all visa applicants, and believe the injunction should not be limited only to individuals “who have a credible claim of bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 43\n\nUnited States.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, Civil Action Nos. TDC17-0361, TDC-17-2921, TDC-17-2969, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 4674314, at 39 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (per curiam)). The harms of the Proclamation to amici are not cured by limiting its scope to only those lacking such a “bona fide” relationship.\nBecause the Proclamation both harms American higher education and offends important, defining principles of our country, amici respectfully submit this brief in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.\nARGUMENT I. International Students, Faculty, and Scholars Are Vital to Amici, the U.S.,\nand the World. Amici’s ability to foster rich educational environments depends in part on their ability to attract students, faculty, and scholars from around the globe. The international members of amici’s communities contribute to the vibrant campus life, world-class educational offerings, and research discoveries for which amici are known. These contributions redound to the benefit of all members of amici’s campus communities, the U.S., and the world. A. Each Amicus Is Home to a Significant Percentage of Students,\nFaculty, and Scholars Who Are Citizens of Other Nations. Amici are firmly committed to attracting the most exceptional individuals from all nations. In the 2015–16 academic year, U.S. universities welcomed more\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 43\n\nthan one million international students.3 Amici’s campuses reflect this trend. Each is home to a significant percentage of international students, faculty, and scholars— including many nationals of the six countries affected by the Proclamation. This international presence is true across amici’s campuses even though amici vary in size, location, and focus.\nFor example, in fall 2016, Columbia University enrolled 1,416 international undergraduates (16% of Columbia’s undergraduate population) and 7,571 international graduate and professional students (38.7% of its graduate/professional students). USC had 10,571 international students—24.1% of its student body— enrolled in fall 2016. At Duke, in fall 2016, 27% of the student population was international, including 13% of the undergraduate students, and 38% of the graduate students. The University of Pennsylvania’s numbers are similar: 4,859 international students were enrolled in fall 2016, including 13% of the incoming freshmen and more than 25% of graduate students. As of October 2016, Stanford enrolled 4,164 international students, comprising 24% of the student population. In fall 2016, 6,764\n\n3 Sara Custer, Open Doors: U.S. Surpasses 1 Million International Students, The Pie News (Nov. 14, 2016), https://thepienews.com/news/open-doors-us-surpasses-1million-international-students/; see also Molly Land & Kathryn Libal, Trump is Undermining Higher Education as a Global Enterprise, The Chronicle of Higher Education (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Trump-IsUndermining-Higher/239060.\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 43\n\ninternational students were enrolled at the University of Michigan, comprising 15% of its student population.\nAmici also benefit from the contributions of international faculty and scholars. More than 40% of MIT’s faculty is international. At Princeton, approximately 30% of faculty appointees, 50% of academic professionals (professional researchers, specialists, librarians, and postdoctoral fellows), and 50% of visiting faculty and researchers are international (including lawful permanent residents). The University of Chicago counts as international (including lawful permanent residents) 24% of its faculty and other academic appointees, as well as 63% of its postdoctoral researchers and 10% of its staff members. At Cornell, 5.1% of faculty are international, as are 26.4% of other academic employees and post-doctorates. Yale’s faculty is 10% international, as is approximately 65% of its postdoctoral research community. In fall 2016, Northwestern was home to 1,534 international scholars, in positions from postdoctoral scholars to researchers and faculty. Thirty-four percent of Emory’s 944 full-time research staff are nonresident aliens.\nAmici’s international students, faculty, and scholars include persons from the six countries affected by the Proclamation. USC had 168 students from Iran alone enrolled in fall 2016. Princeton has more than 50 students and employees from the six affected countries, and its graduate school received approximately 150 applications for fall 2017 (and more than 700 applications in the past five years)\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 43\n\nfrom students from those nations. Over the past three years, Rice has hosted between 32 and 35 students from the six affected countries and received more than 600 applications from undergraduate and graduate students from those countries. Brown has more than 20 students and scholars from the countries affected by the Proclamation. The University of Chicago has 22 students from Iran, as well as two students from Syria and two recent graduates from Iran who are employed under Optional Practical Training (OPT) and University sponsorship.4 In the past academic year, Northwestern was home to 45 students and 22 scholars from Iran, as well as two students from Syria and one from Yemen, and extended offers of admission for the current academic year to at least 16 prospective students affected by the Proclamation. Carnegie Mellon has 31 students and 10 faculty and scholars from the six affected countries at its U.S. locations. WPI has 32 undergraduate and graduate students and 29 faculty and scholars from the affected countries. Harvard counts 45 students and 63 scholars from the six affected countries who are present on nonimmigrant visas, along with 77 dependents from those countries, and has admitted 23 students from those countries for fall 2017. MIT currently has 58 degree\n\n4 “Optional Practical Training (OPT) is temporary employment that is directly\n\nrelated to an F-1 student’s major area of study.” U.S. Customs & Immigration\n\nServices, Optional Practical Training (OPT) for F-1 Students (last updated Feb. 1,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-\n\nvisitors/students-and-employment/optional-practical-training.\n\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 43\n\nand non-degree students, 53 scholars, and 6 recent graduates on OPT from the six affected countries. Emory hosts 40 faculty members and scholars from those countries. Twenty of Boston University’s faculty and scholars are from two of the six countries. Tufts hosts 18 faculty and scholars from the affected countries. These are just a few of the universities where persons from the affected countries make invaluable contributions to amici’s communities.\nThe international presence at amici’s campuses is no accident. Amici have invested significant time and resources to attract international students, faculty, and scholars. For example, amici have established many programs and centers focused on specific subjects like archaeology and the ancient world, including the Joukowsky Institute for Archaeology and the Ancient World at Brown and the University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute for the study of ancient Near Eastern civilizations; schools dedicated to international relations like the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia; residential communities focusing on cross-cultural collaboration like the Global Village at Dartmouth; and centers that serve as the focal point for international students, faculty, and scholars, like the Davis International Center and Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice at Princeton, the Bechtel International Center at Stanford, the McDonnell International Scholars Academy at Washington University, and the World Fellows Program, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, and MacMillan Center for International and Area\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 43\n\nStudies at Yale. Other programs focus on educating foreign ministers, including those from the six countries affected by the Proclamation. For example, Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard’s T.H. Chan School of Public Health offer an annual Harvard Ministerial Leadership Program, in which ten to twelve serving education, health, and finance ministers are invited to a rigorous summer course in Cambridge for leadership enhancement.\nThe success of these centers, programs, and offerings—and the success of amici in more generally attracting persons from around the world—depends on U.S. immigration policies. Many international students, faculty, and scholars are present on J-1 visas. This longstanding program is administered by the State Department to “foster[] global understanding through educational and cultural exchanges.”5 Indeed, the State Department’s website expressly instructs J-1 visa recipients to “return to their home country…to share their exchange experiences.”6 As discussed below, many do—and the U.S. and the world reap wide-ranging benefits from their\n\n5 Bureau of Educ. and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, J-1 Visa Exchange\n\nVisitor\n\nProgram,\n\nCommon\n\nQuestions\n\n-\n\nBasics,\n\nhttps://j1visa.state.gov/basics/common-questions/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).\n\n6 Id. The importance of the J-1 Visa Program is underscored by the existence of J-2 visas, which permit “spouses and dependents . . . of J-1 exchange visitors [to] accompany or later join the J-1 holder in the United States.” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, J-1 Visa Exchange Visitor Program, About the J-2 Visa, https://j1visa.state.gov/basics/j2-visa/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 43\n\nreturn, including advances in medicine and science, progress toward equal treatment\nof women and religious minorities, and respect for democracy and the rule of law.\nThe U.S. offers other types of visas to international students, faculty, and\nscholars as well. Many students attending full-time degree programs rely on F-1\nvisas, which allow them to remain in the U.S. for as long as it takes to complete their\ncourses of study. And some university faculty, research scholars, and staff hold H-\n1B visas, which allow U.S. employers to fill gaps in the existing labor force with\nhighly-skilled, temporary workers from other countries. A significant number of\nresearchers are employed through H-1B visas, most notably for positions in technology and the sciences.7 Some universities also use the O-1 visa program,\nwhich enables professors or researchers with extraordinary demonstrated ability in\nthe arts, sciences, education, business, or athletics to enter the U.S. temporarily to work in their specified field.8 Prospective students who wish to visit college\n7 See, e.g., American Immigration Council, Fact Sheet: The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program and Its Impact on Jobs, Wages, and the Economy (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/h1b-visa-programfact-sheet (reporting that “the presence of research universities accounts for H-1B demand” in many metro areas, and that “[n]early two-thirds of requests for H-1B workers are for STEM occupations. There is also high demand for workers in healthcare, business, finance, and life sciences industries.”). 8 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Visas: Temporary Worker Visas, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/employment/temporary.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 43\n\ncampuses before deciding where to attend, prospective faculty and staff invited to in-person job interviews, and scholars who wish to attend conferences in their fields or to speak at university events may do so on B-1, B-2, or B-1/B-2 visas for business and travel.9\nThrough these visa programs, the many international students, faculty, and scholars at amici’s campuses are thoroughly vetted by the U.S. using existing procedures.10 Amici must be able to assure current and prospective international students, faculty, and scholars that once they have been cleared through standard vetting procedures, they may enter the U.S. to pursue their studies and scholarship. Amici’s ability to fully accomplish their educational missions thus necessarily depends on clear, consistent, predictable, and nondiscriminatory application of American immigration policies.\n\n9 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Visas: Visitor Visa, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visitor.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 10 Joint Decl. of Madeline K. Albright, Avril D. Haines, Michael V. Hayden, John F. Kerry, John E. McLaughlin, Lisa O. Monaco, Michael J. Morell, Janet A. Napolitano, Leon E. Panetta, and Susan E. Rice ¶ 6, Washington v. Trump, No. 1735105 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2017), ECF No. 28-2 (hereinafter “Government Officials Declaration”).\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 43\n\nB. International Students, Faculty, and Scholars Contribute Significantly to Amici’s Campuses.\nInternational students, faculty, and scholars make substantial contributions to amici’s campuses. International diversity benefits amici by facilitating regular interactions between individuals from different cultures with varied life experiences: a Muslim student from Iran brings something different to the seminar table than a Jewish professor from the Midwestern U.S. or a Christian graduate student from Western Europe. This diversity promotes the free exchange of ideas, encouraging individuals to consider issues from a multiplicity of perspectives and giving students and faculty a greater understanding of our global, pluralistic society. Moreover, when individuals from different backgrounds live and study together on the same campus, the resulting diversity increases understanding of all parts of the world.\nThe Supreme Court acknowledged these benefits when it held that universities have a compelling interest in obtaining the “educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.” Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)). “The academic mission of a university is a special concern of the First Amendment,” and “[p]art of the business of a university [is] to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation.” Id. at 2418 (internal quotation marks omitted; second bracket in original). A diverse student body contributes to this\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 43\n\natmosphere by fostering “enhanced classroom dialogue” and “lessening . . . isolation and stereotypes.” Id. Accordingly, the Court has recognized that to “fulfill[] [their] mission[s],” universities must be able to recruit students (and, by extension, faculty and scholars) who will “contribute the most to the robust exchange of ideas.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).\nInternational diversity is uniquely valuable. For many of amici’s students, enrollment in the university will be their first exposure to persons from other nations or religious backgrounds. Such exposure enriches students’ experiences and teaches them how to collaborate across ethnic and religious differences in a world that is fundamentally interconnected. Moreover, international students, faculty, and scholars provide particular insight into the world’s current problems and potential solutions. A Syrian student who has lived through the country’s ongoing civil war necessarily will have an important perspective on the causes of that conflict and on how the rest of the world might help alleviate it. These opportunities for crosscultural understanding are integral to amici’s ability to provide some of the best educational programs in the world.\nInternational students, faculty, and scholars also contribute to amici’s campuses through their academic interests and achievements. For example, many study, teach, and research in fields that are underpopulated by American-born\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 43\n\nstudents, faculty, and scholars, such as STEM fields. By one account, more than one third of international students during the 2015–16 year studied engineering, math, or computer science, and “many” of the 14% who participated in F-1 OPT worked in STEM fields.11 Encouraging international students and faculty to study and work at amici universities is particularly important given the pressing need for scholarship and research in these fields.\nC. The Enrollment and Employment of International Students, Faculty, and Scholars Benefit the U.S. and the World.\nInternational students, faculty, and scholars make significant scientific, technological, social, and political contributions to the U.S. and the world.\nTo begin, international students make significant contributions to the U.S. economy. One estimate provides that international students directly contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S. economy and supported or contributed to the creation of 400,000 American jobs in the 2015–16 academic year;12 others suggest that international students “inject hundreds of billions into the U.S. economy” and “support[] well over a million U.S. jobs.”13\n11 Sara Custer, Open Doors, supra note 3. 12 NAFSA, NAFSA International Student Economic Value Tool, http://www.nafsa.org/Policy_and_Advocacy/Policy_Resources/Policy_Trends_and _Data/NAFSA_International_Student_Economic_Value_Tool/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 13 Government Officials Declaration ¶ 5(g).\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 43\n\nIn addition, many international students choose to remain in the U.S. and become leading innovators, entrepreneurs, artists, and thought-leaders. One study found that more than one third of U.S. innovators were born outside the country, and another ten percent have at least one foreign-born parent.14 Another analysis found that “[i]mmigrants have started more than one half (44 of 87) of America’s startup companies valued at $1 billion dollars or more and are key members of management or product development teams in over 70 percent (62 of 87) of these companies.”15\nThe benefits from this international presence at American universities are not just economic. These individuals make significant discoveries and contributions in their fields. Since 2000, forty percent of all American Nobel prize winners in Chemistry, Medicine, and Physics have been immigrants—and in 2016, all six American winners of the Nobel Prize in economics and scientific fields were foreign-born.16 These awards “represent great individual achievement but also\n\n14 Adams Nager, et al., Information Technology & Innovation Found., The Demographics of Innovation in the United States (Feb. 24, 2016), https://itif.org/publications/2016/02/24/demographics-innovation-united-states.\n\n15 Stuart Anderson, Nat’l Found. for American Policy, Immigrants and Billion Dollar Startups, http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Immigrants-andBillion-Dollar-Startups.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March-2016.pdf.\n\n16 Stuart Anderson, Immigrants Flooding America with Nobel Prizes, Forbes (Oct.\n\n16,\n\n2016,\n\n10:48\n\nAM),\n\nhttp://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2016/10/16/immigrants-flooding-\n\namerica-with-nobel-prizes/#3de213817f5f.\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 43\n\nreflect the state of research, openness and scientific advancement within [American] society.”17\nAmici have seen these successes up close. In 2014, the late Maryam Mirzakhani was the first woman to win the Fields Medal, known as the “Nobel Prize of Mathematics.” Mirzakhani grew up in Iran before earning her Ph.D. at Harvard and becoming a professor at Princeton and then Stanford.18 Professor Muawia Barazangi came to the U.S. from Syria for graduate study after earning his undergraduate degree from the University of Damascus; he earned a Ph.D. from Columbia before joining the faculty at Cornell, where he became a U.S. citizen and had a long and distinguished research and teaching career in the field of Earth Sciences. Syrian-born Dina Katabi, a professor at MIT, came to the U.S. for graduate study at MIT, and has since won a Macarthur “Genius” grant for her work on improving wireless network efficiency and security.19\nEducation and employment at leading American universities also provide opportunities for individuals to experience life in the U.S. and gain a greater\n17 Id. 18 See Katie Rose Quandt, Meet the First Woman to Win the “Nobel Prize of Mathematics,” Mother Jones (Aug. 14, 2014), http://m.motherjones.com/mixedmedia/2014/08/maryam-mirzakhani-first-woman-fields-medal-mathematics. 19 Larry Hardesty, Signal Intelligence, MIT Tech. Rev. (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542131/signal-intelligence/.\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 43\n\nappreciation for American social and political norms and ideas. Individuals return to their home countries with a deeper understanding of and appreciation for the U.S. and its values—and, hopefully, a greater desire to engage in continuing discourse and exchange. They also return home with the tools necessary to improve conditions on the ground, such as through public health initiatives and good governance. This, in turn, promotes the economies of developing nations, and may stymie radicalization.20\nInternational students, faculty, and scholars become leaders in their home countries. Yale counts among its distinguished alumni many foreign leaders, including Valdis Zatlers, former President of Latvia, and Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Yemen. Alumni from MIT include Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel; Kofi Annan, former SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations; and Lucas Papademos, former Prime Minister of Greece. World leaders educated at Harvard include current Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (Africa’s first elected female President) and former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto. And Georgetown counts among its alumni many foreign leaders, including Abdullah II bin al-Hussein, the King of Jordan; José Manuel\n20 See, e.g., Omer Taspinar, The Problem With Radicalism, 19 Cairo Rev. 76, 80 (2015) (noting that “[a]n agenda based on human development with equal emphasis on education reform, democratic reforms, and socioeconomic advancement can address the ideological as well as economic root causes of radicalization.”).\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 43\n\nBarroso, former President of the European Commission; Saad Hariri, former Prime Minister of Lebanon; and Nasser Judeh, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan. II. The Proclamation Harms Students, Faculty, Scholars, and Universities.\nThe Proclamation has serious and chilling implications for amici’s students, faculty, and scholars. It separates current students from their families, impairs the ability of American universities to draw the finest international talent, and inhibits the free exchange of ideas. It is imperative to amici that the Court consider these and other detrimental effects of the Proclamation.\nFirst, the Proclamation hurts American universities by prohibiting or deterring international students, faculty, and scholars from studying here. Amici, like other American universities, aim to attract talented students, faculty, and scholars from around the globe. The Proclamation hampers amici’s ability to do so by arbitrarily and indefinitely banning or unduly burdening the entry of persons from six majority-Muslim countries and contemplating further categorical entry bans based on national origin. The exclusion of those persons diminishes the experience of studying at amici universities for everyone, and as the effects of the predecessor bans demonstrate, inevitably will deter persons from other countries from choosing to study or work here.\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 43\n\nReducing the international presence on amici’s campuses will detract from the academic experience for those who do study in this country. As amici have explained, the benefits of international diversity to American universities are manifold. And it is not merely the classroom experience that will suffer. The success of American laboratories, a major driver of our economy, depends on their ability to attract the best trainees and postdoctoral fellows wherever they may be found, and on their ability to collaborate with foreign scientists. The Proclamation diminishes amici’s ability to attract these scientists, who will otherwise go to foreign laboratories.\nIndeed, international universities have noted this effect and issued statements criticizing the predecessor Orders and touting their own opportunities for international students and scholars.21 Regarding the first iteration of the travel ban, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, UK stated: “While we acknowledge that a country must have the right to manage its own borders, this ban is fundamentally at odds with the values of openness, tolerance and evidence-based decision-making that the University of Cambridge stands for.”22 He added: “We are\n\n21 Chris Parr, Response: international universities speak out against Trump ban, The\n\nTimes\n\nHigher\n\nEducation\n\n(Jan.\n\n31,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/response-international-universities-\n\nspeak-out-against-trump-ban.\n\n22 Id.\n\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 43\n\ndetermined to champion openness, and the free exchange of knowledge across borders. Even as governments around the world seek to curb freedom of movement, the University of Cambridge remains committed to welcoming the best and brightest students and staff—irrespective of their nationality.”23\nThe effects of the Proclamation on prospective international students are not speculative. Some amici have already suffered the negative effects of the predecessor travel bans, and given the indefinite nature of the Proclamation’s bans and restrictions on entry, amici will continue to suffer them. Many admissions letters for fall 2017 were sent in spring of this year, just after the first travel ban was issued. Prospective international students had a short window to decide whether to attend a U.S. college or university. Faced with the prospect that they might not be able to obtain visas, many reasonably chose to enroll at universities in other countries instead of studying here. Many amici received calls from concerned prospective and admitted students who questioned whether they could enroll at all in light of this uncertainty.\nAmici’s experiences of potential, and actual, declining international student enrollment in the wake of the Proclamation and predecessor travel bans reverberate throughout U.S. higher education. In a survey issued shortly after execution of the\n23 Id.\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 43\n\nsecond travel ban, 79% of surveyed U.S. college and university recruiters of international students expressed serious concerns about their yield of admitted undergraduate students from the Middle East; moreover, based only on the political rhetoric around immigration leading up to the 2016 presidential election, nearly 40% of the educational institutions surveyed reported an overall decrease in international student applications for fall 2017 enrollment.24 In another survey, 46% of U.S. graduate school deans reported seeing substantial declines in admission yields for all international students for fall 2017 enrollment, and 52% reported seeing these declines in admission yields of prospective international graduate students from the Middle East and North Africa.25\nThese very real difficulties extend to faculty and scholars. Yale’s MacMillan Center Council on Middle East Studies and its Program on Iranian Studies are currently conducting searches for post-doctoral fellows and visiting scholars, with the most promising candidates being Iranian nationals who are currently abroad. The Proclamation’s indefinite suspension for Iranian nationals of all immigrant visas,\n24 American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, Treading Topics Survey: International Applicants for Fall 2017—Institutional & Applicant Perceptions 1-2, 8, 10 (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.aacrao.org/docs/defaultsource/TrendTopic/Immigration/final-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 25 Hironao Okahana, Data Sources: Admission Yields of Prospective International Graduate Students: A First Look, http://cgsnet.org/data-sources-admission-yieldsprospective-international-graduate-students-first-look (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017).\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 43\n\nand all non-immigrant visas other than student and exchange visitor visas, will mean that some candidates may have to turn down Yale’s offers. The University of Pennsylvania has similar concerns, with three faculty recruits whose opportunities may be eliminated by the Proclamation. Princeton and MIT, too, have received numerous inquiries from academic departments about how to handle the questions and concerns of faculty and scholar recruits and invited visitors who have expressed hesitation about coming to the U.S.\nSecond, the Proclamation harms the current members of amici’s campuses from the six affected countries. Even if it does not prematurely cancel their visas, the Proclamation still separates members of amici’s communities from their family members living abroad. For instance, the spouses and children of scholars and researchers from Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen will be unable to enter the U.S. even for a short-term visit, creating a traumatic separation as a result of their family members’ decision to study and work here. Given that the Proclamation suspends all categories of visas for Syrian nationals and suspends all visas other than student and exchange visas for Iranian nationals, students, faculty, and scholars from Syria and faculty and scholars from Iran are wary of leaving the U.S. because their re-entry may be barred or challenged by immigration authorities. Many students from the five countries also named in the predecessor travel bans remained in the U.S. this past summer, in fear that leaving to work, study abroad, or visit their\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 43\n\nfamilies would risk indefinite exclusion or detention upon their return. By subjecting students from Iran and students, faculty, and scholars from Somalia to undefined “enhanced screening and vetting,” the Proclamation gives them no comfort that their fears were unfounded. The inscrutability of what this additional vetting entails means that, even though students and scholars currently studying or working at amici universities have already undergone and passed thorough vetting, they have no assurances that they will pass the additional vetting ordered by the Proclamation if they leave the U.S. and seek reentry.\nThese individuals are thus deterred from conducting field research, attending academic conferences, or participating in international meetings in foreign nations; for some, travel concerns will cause them to set aside projects that simply cannot be completed without international travel. The Proclamation also takes a personal toll because they may feel compelled to cancel any plans to visit family and friends abroad: fly home to attend the wedding or funeral of a family member, and one risks the loss of one’s visa, separation from family and friends here in the U.S., and the loss of a job, an academic degree, and years of hard work and research, indefinitely.\nThird, the Proclamation’s chilling effects extend beyond persons from the six targeted countries. Given the review of other countries directed by the Proclamation, Proclamation § 4(a)(ii), and the possibility that other countries will be added to the Proclamation’s scope, all international students, faculty, and scholars may\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 43\n\nreasonably fear that their immigration status may be revoked at any time for reasons having nothing to do with their conduct and based on no evidence that they pose any security risk to this country. And should a new country find itself the target of a subsequent Order banning entry of its nationals, the chaos resulting from the first travel ban would repeat itself, reinforcing feelings of doubt and insecurity about this nation.\nFourth, the Proclamation will impede successful academic collaboration. American universities host thousands of conferences and symposia each year. These academic meetings convene scholars within and across disciplines of study. They are incubators for innovation and promote the free flow of information and ideas. By hosting these events, amici ensure that their participating scholars can encounter and collaborate with other scholars. The resulting collaborations are essential to addressing problems that are global in scope, such as geopolitical conflict, terrorism, and the spread of communicable diseases.\nThe Proclamation threatens these efforts by prohibiting certain academics from traveling to the U.S., and by provoking a backlash from others who are not subject to the ban. Indeed, international universities observed that the predecessor travel bans would impede collaborative partnerships with American universities.26\n26 Parr, supra note 21 (quoting the President of McMaster University, Canada, as stating “This is a misguided and harmful step that is unnecessarily disruptive for\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 43\n\nThe negative consequences of the predecessor bans to collaboration have already\nbeen felt. The University of Pennsylvania had planned to invite three Iranian human\nrights activists to a conference in March 2017, but with the second travel ban in\neffect, their participation would have been barred. Participants in a conference at\nthe Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies voluntarily withdrew due to current\nU.S. immigration policies or perceptions thereof. The Sharmin & Bijan Mossavar-\nRahmani Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies at Princeton expressly aims to\nadvance understanding of Iran and the Persian Gulf; if the Center cannot invite\nIranian guest speakers, as the Proclamation inhibits it from doing, the Center\nobviously will be impeded in serving its mission.\nWhat is more, faculty members from around the world already have called for\na boycott of academic conferences in the U.S. in response to the predecessor travel\nbans.27 Thousands of scholars in the U.S. and abroad have pledged not to attend\nstudents, faculty members and other partners. . . . As an internationally engaged research intensive university, this abrupt change in policy has a chilling impact on individual scholars and their families, and on the important relationships we have carefully built over the years. Our collaborative partnerships allow us to forge important research and educational programs and activities, which are threatened by arbitrary measures such as the one announced last week.”). 27 See Shannon Najmabadi, Academics Mull Boycott of U.S. Conferences as a Way of Fighting Travel Ban, The Chronicle of Higher Education (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Academics-Mull-Boycott-ofUS/239047?cid=pm&utm_source=pm&utm_medium=en&elqTrackId=e9a82fa115 e24765bc019b2dfc9d480e&elq=ef21be06f46043e287aeedd6a611eb6e&elqaid=12 357&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=5023; Elizabeth Redden, Boycotting the U.S., Inside\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 43\n\ninternational conferences here because of these bans. 28 Given that the Proclamation indefinitely extends the bans’ discriminatory restrictions on entry, these scholars have no reason to end their boycott.\nAcademic conferences and meetings facilitate major breakthroughs and discoveries, candid discussion and debate, and face-to-face meetings that generate future partnerships. Excluding scholars from the six affected countries—and other scholars who choose not to participate because of the Proclamation—will hamper the success of these collaborations. This nation will inevitably suffer when these meetings are shifted abroad to avoid the Proclamation effects.\nFifth, amici strive to foster a culture of diversity, inclusion, and tolerance on their campuses. Supra Part I. The Proclamation undercuts those important efforts by making many of amici’s students, faculty, and scholars feel “less than,” and signaling, from the highest levels of government, that discrimination and religious intolerance is not only acceptable but appropriate. Rather than securing American\n\nHigher\n\nEd\n\n(Jan.\n\n31,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/31/protest-trump-entry-ban-some-\n\nscholars-areboycotting-us-based-conferences.\n\n28 In Solidarity with People Affected by the ‘Muslim Ban,’ https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeNN_2HHREt1hdm_CgWpFHw8NDPGLCkOwB4lLRFtKFJqI25w/viewform?c=0&w=1&fbzx=21 04368019732744200 (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 43\n\nuniversities, this thwarts amici’s ability to foster a diverse environment in which individuals feel comfortable contributing to a robust exchange of ideas.\nFinally, limiting the scope of the Proclamation to “foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017), as the district court did in imposing an injunction only in part, International Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4674314 at 39, does not rectify the Proclamation’s harms to amici. Though the Supreme Court, in carving out a bona fide relationship exception to the predecessor travel ban, offered some examples of which relationships would qualify as “bona fide,” regrettably these examples did not resolve the uncertainty the Proclamation has introduced into potential collaborations between amici and international students, faculty, and scholars.\nStudents who have already been admitted to American universities, and workers who have already accepted offers of employment here, are two examples of qualifying bona fide relationships. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088. But what about international scholars at amici universities who are not students or employees of amici or any other American entity? The populations of such international scholars at amici are sizeable. For instance, over 50 scholars from the six targeted countries contribute to Harvard’s academic departments as visiting researchers, research and postdoctoral fellows, and interns. None of these scholars is a student at Harvard, or\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 43\n\nan employee of Harvard on a sponsored work visa. To Harvard, their relationship is surely bona fide, but the University has no assurance that the U.S. will not conclude otherwise at the border. The discretion afforded the government under this rule has harsh consequences; for example, scholars and students may be loath to publish research or other works critical of the government, its political preferences, or U.S. foreign policy, lest their immigration status be threatened as a result. The ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in the “bona fide relationship” test could well have a destructive chilling effect on scholars and students who have traditionally enjoyed an environment of academic freedom in this country.\nThe “bona fide relationship” carve-out also leaves the substantial class of prospective international students, faculty, and scholars in a state of uncertainty. The Supreme Court did not address whether this carve-out applies to individuals who do not currently have, but may in the near future enter into a relationship with an American entity. International students considering applying to amici in the 20172018 application cycle likely do not currently have a formal, documented relationship with any U.S. entity, and they will not unless and until they are accepted by an amicus university. So too for many international faculty and scholars not currently employed by amici universities, or any other American entity, whom amici universities may wish to recruit, interview, invite to lecture, or host for forthcoming conferences. Yet without the ability to visit campus and meet with potential\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 43\n\ncolleagues or faculty, international students, faculty, and scholars are far less likely to select an American college or university. Even as partially enjoined, the Proclamation thus places amici at a distinct disadvantage relative to international schools.\nThere are other problems with the Proclamation as partially enjoined. Although the Supreme Court made clear that “a lecturer invited to address an American audience” has a qualifying bona fide relationship with the inviting entity, IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088, it said nothing about a scholar who intends to attend an academic conference here. That scholar may informally participate in the conference by engaging with lecturers and other attendees, but he or she may not have been invited formally to do so. There is no telling whether that sort of relationship would qualify under the bona fide relationship test (or the government’s interpretation thereof). These sorts of situations arise frequently each year at American colleges and universities.\nBecause the “bona fide relationship” carve-out fails to account for the myriad ways in which amici universities collaborate with international students, faculty, and scholars, it may impede the creation of amici’s future bona fide relationships. Worse still, this carve-out will not prevent the potential long-term attrition at amici of persons from the countries directly affected by the Proclamation—and from other\n32\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 43\n\ncountries as well. Even in its more limited form, the Proclamation harms American colleges and universities and should be enjoined in its entirety.\nCONCLUSION Amici take seriously the safety and security of their campuses and the nation: if amici’s campuses were not safe, or the towns and cities in which they are located were not secure, amici could not maintain their world-renowned learning environments. Amici, however, believe that safety and security concerns can be addressed in a manner that is consistent with the values America has always stood for, including the free flow of ideas across borders and the welcoming of foreign nationals to our campuses. The Proclamation falls far short of justifying its indefinite restrictions on the entry of individuals from the Muslim-majority countries it targets. Given this, as well as the significant burdens the Proclamation inflicts on amici’s current and potential students, faculty, and scholars and its substantial impediment of amici’s ability to fulfill their educational missions, amici respectfully urge this Court to reverse the decision to the extent that its injunction is limited to individuals with a qualifying “bona fide” relationship, and otherwise affirm the decision enjoining the Proclamation.\n\n33\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 43\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nJENNER & BLOCK LLP\n/s/ Lindsay C. Harrison\nThomas J. Perrelli Lindsay C. Harrison Tassity S. Johnson 1099 New York Ave NW Washington, DC 20001-4412 Phone: (202) 639-6000 Fax: (202) 639-6066 tperrelli@jenner.com\nAttorneys for Amici Colleges and Universities\n\n34\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 43\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Counsel for amici curiae certifies that this brief contains 7,301 words, based on the “Word Count” feature of Microsoft Word 2013, including footnotes. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), this word count does not include the words contained in the Corporate Disclosure Statement, Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, and Certificates of Counsel. Dated: November 17, 2017\nBy: /s/ Lindsay C. Harrison Lindsay C. Harrison Attorney for Amici Colleges and Universities\n\n35\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 43\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on November 17, 2017. Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate CM/ECF system.\nBy: /s/ Lindsay C. Harrison Lindsay C. Harrison Attorney for Amici Colleges and Universities\n\n36\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 109-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1__(_L_),_2__2_3_2_,_2_2_3_3_,__2_2_4_0___ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _A_m__ic_i_C__u_ri_a_e__C_o_l_le_g_e_s__a_n_d__U_n_i_v_e_r_s_it_ie_s_____________________________________\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_L_in__d_s_a_y_C__._H_a_r_r_is_o_n___________________ (signature)\n\n_L_i_n_d_s_a_y__C_._H__a_rr_is_o__n______________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_0_2_-_6_3_9_-_6_8_6_5___ Voice Phone\n\n_J_e_n_n__e_r _&__B_l_o_c_k_L_L_P_______________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_0_2_-_6_3_9_-_6_0_6_6___ Fax Number\n\n_1_0_9__9_N__e_w__Y_o_r_k_A__v_e_.,__N_W__,_S_u_i_te__9_0_0________\n\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_C__2_0__0_0_1___________________ Address\n\n_L_H_a__rr_is_o_n__@__je_n_n_e_r_._c_o_m_____________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_1_/1_7_/_2_0_1_7________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/L__in_d__s_a_y__C_._H__a_r_r_is_o_n_________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_________1_1__/1_7__/2_0__1_7_________ Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 41\n\nNo. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, ET AL. Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, ET AL.,\nDefendants-Appellants.\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, case no. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC, Judge Theodore D. Chuang\nBRIEF OF INTERFAITH GROUP OF RELIGIOUS AND INTERRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CLERGY MEMBERS AS\nAMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\nJENNIFER K. BROWN AMANDA AIKMAN MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, New York 10019\nPURVI G. PATEL MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 707 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90017\nNovember 17, 2017\n\nMARC A. HEARRON SOPHIA M. BRILL SANDEEP N. NANDIVADA MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Telephone: 202.778.1663 MHearron@mofo.com\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 41\n\nDISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS\nPursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1, corporate amici curiae make the following disclosure:\n1. No amicus has any parent corporation.\n2. No amicus has 10% or more of its stock owned by a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity.\n3. No other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Marc A. Hearron\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 41\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nDISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS ................................................................................................... i\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................iii\nBRIEF OF INTERFAITH GROUP OF RELIGIOUS AND INTERRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CLERGY MEMBERS AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES ................................................................................................... 1\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE.............................................................................1\nINTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................6\nARGUMENT ............................................................................................................8\nI. THE ORDER DISCRIMINATES AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HARMS MEMBERS OF ALL FAITHS .......................................................8\nA. The Order Is Intended to Target Muslims............................................8\nB. The Order Harms Muslims.................................................................14\nC. Singling Out Members Of One Faith Erodes Core Constitutional Principles Critical To The Free Exercise Of All Faiths ..................................................................................................17\nII. THE ORDER OFFENDS VALUES THAT ARE CENTRAL TO AMICI’S FAITHS ........................................................................................18\nCONCLUSION .......................................................................................................23\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 41\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCASES\nAziz v. Trump, No. 17-cv-116, 2017 WL 580855 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017)..............................15\nChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)..............................................................................................8\nEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)........................................................................................9, 17\nHobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)......................7, 17\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) ..................................................................11, 12, 13\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-cv-0361, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017).............................12\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)..............................................................................................9\nSanta Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)..............................................................................................9\nTown of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014)........................................................................................18\nVan Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)............................................................................................18\nW. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)..............................................................................................8\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\nDaniel Victor, Three Men Stood Up to Anti-Muslim Attack. Two Paid With Their Lives, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2017)...................................................15\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 41\n\nBill Lindelof, Two Suspected Hate Crimes in Less Than Two Weeks at Davis, Roseville Mosques, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 1, 2017) ............................15\nDouglas Laycock, The Religious freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 221 (1993)..................................................................................10, 11, 13\nEd Pilkington, Trump Travel Ban Crackdown Turns Wedding Celebration Into a Family Separation, The Guardian (Apr. 14, 2017) ...................................................................................................................14\nFaiyaz Jaffer, The Travel Ban Has Been Particularly Harsh on Shiite Muslims, Gazette (May 26, 2017).......................................................................14\nThe Golden Rule, https://tanenbaum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ The-Golden-Rule.pdf ..........................................................................................19\nJack Healy & Anemona Hartocollis, Love, Interrupted: A Travel Ban Separates Couples, N.Y. Times (Feb. 8, 2017)..................................................14\nMichael W. McConnell, Is There Still a “Catholic Question” in America? Reflections on John F. Kennedy’s Speech to the Houston Ministerial Association, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1635 (2011) ..........................10\nNancy Coleman,Mosques Targeted in 2017, CNN.com .........................................15\nNeil Munshi, Muslim Americans Express Anxiety Over Trump Travel Ban, Financial Times (Feb. 2, 2017) ..................................................................14\nProclamation No. 9645: Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).....................................................................................................1\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 41\n\nBRIEF OF INTERFAITH GROUP OF RELIGIOUS AND INTERRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND CLERGY MEMBERS AS\nAMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES Amici curiae, an interfaith group of religious and interreligious organizations and clergy members, respectfully submit this brief in support of plaintiffs-appellees.1\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Amici are a diverse group of more than sixty faith-based and interfaith religious and interreligious associations, congregations, organizations, and clergy members pursuing our respective faiths alongside each other and standing for the right of all believers to practice their religions, as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Amici have a wide array of beliefs and come from different faith traditions, yet we unite here to speak with one voice to urge the Court to affirm the district court’s injunction restricting implementation of Proclamation No. 9645: Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (“Order”).\n\n1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than amici curiae, their members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 41\n\nAmici have a strong interest in this case because the Order harms us and our right to practice our faiths. Although the Order is ostensibly a nationality-based ban, it is focused by design on citizens of majority-Muslim nations. It is of a piece with its predecessors, Executive Order 13,769, issued January 27, 2017, and Executive Order 13,780, issued March 6, 2017. Amici therefore see it for what it is: anti-Muslim discrimination. Such government-imposed discrimination has real harms. By targeting members of a particular faith, it promotes dangerous stereotypes and fosters baseless fear.\nDiscrimination against members of one faith harms people of other faiths as well. All religious people in this Nation depend on the right to practice their faith free from discrimination. When religious-based discrimination is permitted— especially when propagated at the highest levels of government—the free-exercise right of members of all faiths is chilled.\nAdditionally, amici’s various faiths teach us to treat others, including immigrants, as we would like to be treated and to welcome the stranger— particularly in times of crisis. The Order offends these profound values and directly impedes amici’s ability to carry out our immigrant-assistance missions.\n\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 41\n\nAmici curiae are listed below and are described more fully in an addendum to this brief:\n Alliance of Baptists  American Baptist Churches - USA  American Jewish World Service  Avodah  Bend the Arc Jewish Action  Bishops of the Episcopal Diocese of Maryland  Bishops of the Episcopal Diocese of New York  Bishops of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington  Catholic Charities Community Services, NY  Central Conference of American Rabbis  Church of the Brethren  Congregation Beit Simchat Torah  Congregation B'nai Jeshurun  Congregation of our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, US\nProvinces  Franciscan Action Network  Franciscans for Justice  Franciscan Friars Province of St. Barbara\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 41\n\n Friends Committee on National Legislation  Hyde Park & Kenwood Interfaith Council  Interfaith Alliance  Interfaith Worker Justice  Islamic Relief USA  Leadership Conference of Women Religious  Missionary Servants of the Most Holy Trinity  Multifaith Alliance for Syrian Refugees  National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd  National Council of Churches  National Council of Jewish Women  National Justice for Our Neighbors  NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice  North Carolina Council of Churches  Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association  School Sisters of St. Francis  Sisters of St. Francis of Clinton, Iowa  Sisters of St. Francis of Penance and Christian Charity, Sacred Heart\nProvince\n\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 41\n\n Sisters of St. Francis of Penance and Christian Charity, St. Francis Province\n Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia  Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, U.S.-Ontario Province  Sound Vision Foundation  Southwest Conference of the United Church of Christ  Tanenbaum  T'ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights  Union for Reform Judaism  Union Theological Seminary  Unitarian Universalist Association  Unitarian Universalist Service Committee  Women of Reform Judaism  Women's Alliance for Theology, Ethics and Ritual  Rabbi Sharon Brous, IKAR, Los Angeles, California  Rabbi Ayelet S. Cohen, New Israel Fund  Reverend Curtis W. Hart, M. Div., Lecturer, Weill Cornell Medical\nCollege  Reverend Doctor Katharine Henderson, President, Auburn\nTheological Seminary\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 41\n\n Noa Kushner, Founding Rabbi, The Kitchen  Cindy Lapp, Pastor, Hyattsville Mennonite Church, Hyattsville,\nMaryland  Rabbi Joy Levitt, New York, New York  Rabbi Joel Mosbacher, Temple Shaaray Tefila, New York, New York  Rabbi James Ponet, Howard M. Holtzmann Jewish Chaplain,\nEmeritus and Lecturer, Yale University  Rabbi John Rosove, Temple Israel of Hollywood, Hollywood,\nCalifornia  Reverend Timothy B. Tutt, Westmoreland Congregational United\nChurch of Christ, Bethesda, Maryland  Reverend Julie Windsor Mitchell, University Christian Ministry at\nNorthwestern University  Rabbi Peretz Wolf-Prusan, Lehrhaus Judaica, Albany, California\nINTRODUCTION Amici, who represent members of a wide range of faiths, sects, and interreligious groups, are acutely aware that when the U.S. government carries out official acts that are motivated by religious animus, it harms people of all faiths. Proclamation No. 9645, like its predecessors, is such an act—the continuation of the President’s long-stated objective to exclude Muslims from entering this Nation.\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 41\n\nThe Order offends the very notion of the United States “as a refuge of religious tolerance” for people of all faiths. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1153 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J., concurring), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Establishment Clause’s central purpose is to protect religious liberty by prohibiting the government from picking and choosing among faiths, or from singling out any one faith for disfavor. The Order contravenes that purpose. It directly harms Muslims not only by restricting immigration and travel rights but also by singling out Muslims as a disfavored group. In so doing, the Order harms members of all faiths as beneficiaries of this Nation’s commitment to religious free exercise.\nThe Order further offends the most fundamental tenets of amici’s faiths, including the Golden Rule, the imperative to welcome the stranger, and the belief that every individual has inherent value and dignity. Amici’s faiths compel them to assist immigrants, particularly immigrants fleeing persecution. The Order not only offends amici’s core values; it also impairs our ability to assist immigrants in their hour of need.\nThe district court’s determination that the Order is unlawful and its injunction restricting implementation of the Order should be affirmed.\n\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 41\n\nARGUMENT I. THE ORDER DISCRIMINATES AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HARMS\nMEMBERS OF ALL FAITHS Amici are united in our embrace of the Nation’s fundamental constitutional commitments to religious freedom and non-discrimination. Amici believe the Order contravenes those basic principles. The Order and its predecessors all were intended to target Muslims—they have resulted in the vilification of Muslims, and they have obstructed Muslims in the practice of their faith. By undermining the constitutional guarantees of free exercise and non-discrimination, the Order harms not only Muslims but members of all faiths, who rely on those basic constitutional rights to freely practice their religions. A. The Order Is Intended to Target Muslims The Order is clearly intended to do what the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment forbids: target members of one faith—here, Islam. The Nation’s commitment to religious freedom and non-discrimination is firmly woven into our national fabric and our constitutional system. The government is prohibited from favoring a particular religion over others and from singling out any religion for censure. The Establishment Clause “forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 41\n\n(“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Efforts by the government to favor one religion “inevitabl[y] result” in incurring “the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who h[o]ld contrary beliefs.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). Such acts send messages to members of minority faiths “that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).\nAmici, both as faith and interfaith leaders and as members of faiths that have experienced religious persecution, are unfortunately familiar with the history of religious minorities who have faced discrimination and exclusion from the United States based on stereotypes and stigma. One of the most infamous instances occurred in 1939, when a ship carrying more than 900 Jewish men, women, and children fleeing Nazi Germany was turned away from U.S. shores. Many in the United States suspected that these Jewish refugees were threats to national security. The ship was forced to return to Europe, and more than a quarter of its\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 41\n\npassengers perished in the Holocaust. See Daniel A. Gross, The U.S. Government Turned Away Thousands of Jewish Refugees, Fearing That They Were Nazi Spies, Smithsonian.com (Nov. 18, 2015).2\nOur history shows that laws that are written to appear neutral on the basis of religion may actually have been designed as tools of religious persecution. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 221, 223 (1993). For example, the large influx of Roman Catholic immigrants in the mid-nineteenth century led to anti-Catholic riots, burnings of Catholic churches, beatings of Catholic students who refused to use the King James Bible, and the rise of nativist political movements that campaigned to restrict immigration by Catholics. See Michael W. McConnell, Is There Still a “Catholic Question” in America? Reflections on John F. Kennedy’s Speech to the Houston Ministerial Association, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1635, 1639 (2011). Amidst the furor, the Ku Klux Klan and other nativist groups secured the enactment of a law requiring all children to attend public schools, effectively shuttering Catholic schools. Laycock, 1993 BYU L. Rev. at 223-24. Similarly, Mormons were persecuted in the nineteenth century as they were driven off their lands and forced to flee across the country. Id. at 223. Among the tools of\n2 http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/us-government-turned-awaythousands-jewish-refugees-fearing-they-were-nazi-spies-180957324/.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 41\n\npersecution were neutral-sounding laws enacted to target Mormons, which required citizens to take anti-polygamy oaths as a condition of their right to vote. Id. at 223-24.\nAll three Orders barring entry by citizens of predominantly Muslim countries have similarly been couched in neutral-sounding terms, imposing a categorical ban on nationals from enumerated countries. Yet amici understand these Orders for what they are: official acts of discrimination on the basis of religion. As this Court concluded when reviewing the second Executive Order, its primary purpose is to discriminate against Muslims. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594-601 (4th Cir. 2017). All seven countries included in the first Executive Order, all six countries included in the second Executive Order, and six of the seven countries whose nationals are barred by the current Order have predominantly Muslim populations. (The only exception is North Korea.)\nThe cascade of orders is consistent with President Trump’s call as a candidate for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our representatives can figure out what is going on.” Id. at 594. This call for a “Muslim ban” was repeated throughout the 2016 Presidential campaign, accompanied by further statements from then-candidate Trump that “Islam hates us” and that “we’re having problems with the Muslims.” Id. The proposed\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 41\n\n“Muslim ban” later morphed into a plan to “call it territories” and impose nationality-based travel restrictions. See id. The President, upon signing the predecessor version of the Order, stated that it was meant to protect the Nation from entry by foreign terrorists—and then added, “We all know what that means.” Id. Indeed, as recently as September 15, 2017, the President stated: “The travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specific–but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 15, 2017, 3:54 a.m.)3 (emphasis added).\nMoreover, were combating terrorism the true motivation behind restricting immigration and travel, country-based bans would not have been implemented— and certainly not the countries included in the Orders. Former top-ranking national security officials, in a joint declaration quoted by the court below, have concluded that “‘concrete evidence’ has shown that ‘country-based bans are ineffective’” in combating terrorism. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-cv-0361, 2017 WL 4674314, at 10 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017). And a Department of Homeland Security assessment of the rationale of one of the predecessor Orders found that citizens of countries affected by the order were “[r]arely [i]mplicated in\n\n3 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/908645126146265090. 12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 41\n\nUS-[b]ased [t]errorism.” Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States.4\nIt is therefore plain to members of the faith community that a desire to exclude Muslims motivated the issuance of all three orders, including the current one.5 Were the Court to reverse the injunction, despite such overwhelming evidence of animus, it would send a message that religious-based discrimination is tolerable so long as it is framed in a way that appears superficially neutral toward religion. It would provide an Establishment Clause-evading roadmap for governments at all levels that wished to enact policies disfavoring Muslims (or adherents of any faith that is not in or falls out of favor). And it also would have the potential to further fan the flames of anti-Muslim sentiment, signaling to the public that anti-Muslim hatred is not only tolerated but sanctioned by the government. Cf. Laycock, 1993 BYU L. Rev. at 223 (describing outburst of private violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses after the Supreme Court’s decision upholding a flag-salute requirement).\n\n4 https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730/DHS-intelligencedocument-on-President-Donald.pdf.\n5 Indeed, the second order was not even neutral on its face. It invoked the specter of “honor killings,” which is a coded term that reinforces the stigmatization of Muslims as violent and backward. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 596 n.17.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 41\n\nB. The Order Harms Muslims The Order is also directly harmful to Muslims who are constitutionally entitled to freely practice their faith in the United States. The Order and its predecessors have disrupted the lives of Muslim Americans who fear that they are being targeted for exclusion and could face separation from their families. See, e.g., Neil Munshi, Muslim Americans Express Anxiety Over Trump Travel Ban, Financial Times (Feb. 2, 2017);6 see also Faiyaz Jaffer, The Travel Ban Has Been Particularly Harsh on Shiite Muslims, Gazette (May 26, 2017) (describing the story of a college student who feared that, if he went to say his final goodbyes to a dying relative in Iran, he might be unable to return to the United States to study).7 The three orders have separated couples engaged to be married and caused family members to miss weddings of their loved ones, as well as births and deaths—key moments in the personal and religious life of a faith community. See Jack Healy & Anemona Hartocollis, Love, Interrupted: A Travel Ban Separates Couples, N.Y. Times (Feb. 8, 2017);8 Ed Pilkington, Trump Travel Ban Crackdown Turns Wedding Celebration Into a Family Separation, The Guardian\n6 https://www.ft.com/content/ba9f2d88-e905-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539? mhq5j=e2.\n7 http://gazette.com/the-travel-ban-has-been-particularly-harsh-on-shiitemuslims/article/1603972.\n8 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/love-interrupted-a-travel-banseparates-couples.html.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 41\n\n(Apr. 14, 2017).9 The Order’s predecessor interfered with religious practice and community by barring prominent Muslims with citizenship or dual citizenship in the affected countries from fulfilling long-planned speaking engagements at conferences, religious services, festivals, and universities in the United States. E.g., Aziz v. Trump, No. 17-cv-116, 2017 WL 580855, at 2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017).\nThe Order also has harmed all American Muslims at a profoundly deeper level. It has ostracized those who simply want to practice their faith freely and live peacefully as neighbors, students, colleagues, families, and members of their communities. It has contributed to an environment in which Muslims are increasingly subject to violence, harassment, and discrimination because of their faith. This is borne out by recent hate crimes that have been perpetrated against Muslims10—or people perceived to be Muslims.11 Indeed, a recent FBI report on\n\n9 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/14/trump-travel-ban-visairan-wedding.\n10 See Nancy Coleman, Mosques Targeted in 2017, CNN.com, available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/20/us/mosques-targeted-2017-trnd/index.html (last visited September 12, 2017). The map, which contains data from January through July 2017, describes 63 reported incidents of attacks against mosques, including suspected arson and spray-painting of anti-Muslim epithets. See also, e.g., Bill Lindelof, Two Suspected Hate Crimes in Less Than Two Weeks at Davis, Roseville Mosques, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/ crime/article130135154.html.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 41\n\nhate-crime statistics showed that while hate crimes have risen by 6% overall, hate\ncrimes motivated by anti-Islamic bias increased by 26.5% in 2016.12\nAs amicus Islamic Relief USA recounts:\nSingling out Muslims in this manner creates fear that additional fundamental freedoms are also under threat. We know of a family that came to the United States because their lives were threatened by ISIS after they helped U.S. troops in Iraq. They now fear that their citizenship applications will be jeopardized. A nonMuslim donor called us weeping after a family member was denied access to a grocery store because she was wearing a head scarf. A wife was afraid she wouldn’t be reunited with her husband. A mother fears she will be separated from her child because she wears the hijab. Their fears and experiences demonstrate the underlying intent to target and discriminate against Muslims, whether framed as a regional travel ban or something more explicit.\nThat the Orders’ proffered justifications have been based on the threat of\nterrorism makes the Orders all the more pernicious. Conflating “Muslims” with\n“terrorists” obscures the fact that most victims of terrorism are themselves\n(Footnote continued from previous page.)\n11 See Daniel Victor, Three Men Stood Up to Anti-Muslim Attack. Two Paid With Their Lives, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2017) (describing stabbing victims’ efforts to intervene when a man shouted anti-Muslim insults at two women in Portland, Oregon, and noting that one of the women is not Muslim), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/us/portland-stabbing-victims.html.\n12 Compare FBI, 2016 Hate Crime Statistics, Table 1 (7,321 total offenses and 381 anti-Islamic offenses), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/tables/table-1, with FBI, 2015 Hate Crime Statistics, Table 1 (6,885 total offenses and 301 antiIslamic offenses), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/tables-and-data-declarations/ 1tabledatadecpdf.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 41\n\nMuslims. National Counterterrorism Center, 2011 Report on Terrorism at 14.13 Attempts to justify the Orders based on the threat of terrorism—and to treat populations of entire Muslim-majority countries as potential terrorists—only compound anti-Muslim vilification.\nThese harms would be revisited if the injunction were to be reversed. Muslims living in the United States would be subjected anew to what they and many others rightly view as official condemnation of their faith.\nC. Singling Out Members Of One Faith Erodes Core Constitutional Principles Critical To The Free Exercise Of All Faiths\nIn contrast with many other countries, where religious conflict has at times led to upheaval and suffering, the United States has generally strived for peaceful co-existence among religions. “It was in large part to get completely away from . . . religious persecution that the Founders brought into being our Nation, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights with its prohibition against any governmental establishment of religion.” Engel, 370 U.S. at 433. As a result of those guarantees, the United States today is a country of vibrant religious beliefs, practices, and communities in which faith continues to play an important role in most Americans’ lives.\n\n13 https://fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2011.pdf. 17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 41\n\nThus, the harm caused by singling out members of one religious faith is not restricted to the disfavored sect; it harms all religious groups by eroding core principles that have allowed a multitude of faiths to coexist and to thrive. Protections for the free exercise of religion are critical to “vindicat[e] this nation’s long-held aspiration to serve as a refuge of religious tolerance.” Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014) (official efforts to “denigrate . . . religious minorities” violate the Establishment Clause). By both protecting the free exercise of religion and prohibiting the government from favoring or disfavoring any one religion, the First Amendment “seek[s] to avoid . . . divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike.” Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).\nAffirming the injunction is essential to not only protect Muslims from discrimination but to ensure religious liberties for members of all faiths. II. THE ORDER OFFENDS VALUES THAT ARE CENTRAL TO\nAMICI’S FAITHS The indefinite and indiscriminate ban on immigration by more than 150 million people who live in the targeted countries offends values that are central to all of amici’s faiths. Our faiths teach us to treat others as we wish to be treated, to\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 41\n\nwelcome the stranger, and to honor the inherent dignity and worth of every individual.\nOur faith-based commitments toward immigrants arise from multiple sources. Among them, the Golden Rule—to treat others as we wish to be treated— is one of the most widely shared tenets among faiths.14\n Christianity teaches: “In everything do to others as you would have them do to you.” Matthew 7:12.\n Hinduism commands: “This is the sum of duty: do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you.” The Mahabharata, 5:1517.\n Islam instructs: “Not one of you is a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself.” Fortieth Hadith of an-Nawawi, 13.\n Judaism teaches: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor.” Talmud, Shabbat, 31a.\nBeyond the Golden Rule, many faiths specifically instruct that “the stranger” should be embraced, giving rise to a powerful sense of duty toward immigrants. As amicus T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, observes: “On more than 36 occasions, the Torah declares that our experience as strangers in the land of Egypt obligates us to care for the most vulnerable among us; particularly the sojourners, migrants, and immigrants seeking refuge in our midst.” The ancient Jews’ experience of exile in Egypt has been repeated time and again as members of\n14 The Golden Rule, https://tanenbaum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/TheGolden-Rule.pdf.\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 41\n\nminority sects have been rejected by their countries and forced to take flight from\ntheir persecutors, right up to the Rohingya fleeing Myanmar today. Thus, it is no\nsurprise that the texts of many faiths repeat the exhortation to welcome the\nstranger.\n Islam instructs: “Be kind to parents, and the near kinsman, and to orphans, and to the needy, and to the neighbor who is of kin, and to the neighbor who is a stranger, and to the companion at your side, and to the traveler, and to that your right hands own.” Qur’an 4.36-37.\n Sikhism teaches: “None is our enemy, none is stranger to us, we are in accord with one and all . . . .” Sri Guru Granth Sahib, page 1299, Full Shabad.\n Pope Francis recently summed up Catholic teaching: “In migrants, the Church has always contemplated the image of Christ who said, ‘I was a stranger and you made me welcome.’ (Mt. 25:35).” Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to Members of the International Federation of Catholic Universities (Nov. 4, 2017).15\nThis religious obligation to offer welcome to the stranger is reinforced in\nthe United States by this country’s identity as a nation of immigrants and a refuge\nto those fleeing religious persecution. Congregations of many faiths can relate to\namicus Congregation Beit Simchat Torah’s description of itself as “a community\nof immigrants and refugees and descendants of immigrants and refugees.” Amicus\nNETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice notes the words of Pope Francis\n\n15 http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2017/november/docum ents/papa-francesco_20171104_federazione-universita-cattoliche.html.\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 41\n\nwhen he addressed Congress: “We, the people of this continent, are not fearful of foreigners, because most of us were once foreigners.”\nThe Order’s near-absolute ban on entry by citizens of the seven countries it names is entirely contrary to the Golden Rule as well as the religious calling to welcome the stranger. But what is more, it utterly disregards the inherent value of the more than 150 million people who, in one fell swoop, it labels as unfit to enter the United States. Amici understand that the people barred by the Order are mothers and fathers, children and grandparents; they are clerics, congregants, shopkeepers, and students. Each one’s life is sacred—each a unique expression of the divine and a common member of humanity. In the words of Brother John Skrodinsky of amicus the Missionary Servants of the Most Holy Trinity: “Sweeping all people from a certain country or religion under the same discriminatory ban does not allow for the human rights and dignity that each one holds.” The Order is a grave affront to this most basic and unifying insight of the world’s religions.\nThese fundamental precepts are not merely words. Amici have responded to our religious obligations through action. Amicus Catholic Charities Community Services–NY offers legal and social services to thousands of immigrants each year. Amicus National Justice for Our Neighbors is a ministry that the United Methodist Church established specifically to provide legal help to immigrants. The American\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 41\n\nBaptist Home Mission Society, which is part of amicus American Baptist Churches–USA, has just announced an initiative to support vulnerable immigrants in the New York City area with legal services as well as spiritual support.16 Amicus Islamic Relief provides relief in refugee camps abroad and resettlement aid to refugees here. Members of amicus Congregation Beit Simchat Torah are offering to accompany immigrants to court dates and helping asylum-seekers. As amicus Franciscan Action Network declares, “The U.S. Catholic Church is a church of immigrants and has a long history of protecting immigrant and refugee rights.” Some Roman Catholic religious orders, represented here both individually and through the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, trace their very existence in the United States to sisters who came to this country specifically to work with immigrants.\nProviding material and spiritual sustenance to immigrants is central to the practice of churches, synagogues, mosques, and interfaith groups throughout the nation. In the words of amicus National Justice for Our Neighbors, “As people of faith, we are called upon to seek mercy, do justice, and to love our neighbors as ourselves. Times change; governments change; yet these commands remain unchanged.”\n16 http://abhms.org/about-us/news/abhms-launches-immigration-assistanceinitiative-pilot-in-partnership-with-abcmny/\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 41\n\nCONCLUSION Amici urge the Court to affirm the ruling below, recognizing the profound harm that the Order wreaks on the mission and values that amici, as representatives of a broad range of faith traditions, hold dear.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Marc A. Hearron MARC A. HEARRON SOPHIA M. BRILL SANDEEP N. NANDIVADA MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Telephone: 202.778.1663 MHearron@mofo.com\nJENNIFER K. BROWN AMANDA AIKMAN MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, New York 10019\nPURVI G. PATEL MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 707 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90017\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 41\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on November 17, 2017. I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Marc A. Hearron\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 41\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 29(A)(5) This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Rule 29(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(f), it contains 4,424 words, which is below the limit of 6,500 words. This brief complies with the typeface and type style requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate procedure because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft® Office Word 2010 in 14-point Times New Roman font.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Marc A. Hearron\n\ndc-906939\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 41\n\nAPPENDIX\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 41\n\nINDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE\nThe Alliance of Baptists is a faith community comprised of 140 congregations across the United States and over 3,000 individual members. We are Christians knit together by love for God, committed—like the Baptists who, generations ago, agitated for religious freedom to be protected by the Bill of Rights—to religious liberty for all, whatever their faith tradition, including those of no faith. Our response to the call of God in Jesus Christ to be disciples and servants includes a commitment to prophetic action to bring about justice and healing in our world. The Alliance, whose congregations work with and support refugees and immigrants, joins this amicus brief in response to a Covenant of commitment to side with those who are poor and to pursue justice with and for those who are oppressed.\nThe American Baptist Churches USA is a spiritual family of approximately 5,000 churches and 1.3 million members. We are an ethnically diverse people called to radical personal discipleship in Christ Jesus. We believe in promoting a society where justice and love reign. Through the love of Christ, we embrace the world as neighbor. Historically, based on Baptist core convictions such as the infinite value of every person, individual liberty, soul freedom, and separation of church and state, ABCUSA has been a leading Protestant agency advocating for fair immigration laws and assisting refugees to resettle in the United States, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, or religious backgrounds.\nAmerican Jewish World Service (AJWS) is the first and only Jewish organization dedicated solely to ending poverty and promoting human rights in the developing world. AJWS has joined this amicus brief because it believes that the policies addressed in the brief run counter to the best traditions of the United States—welcoming refugees and immigrants is central to American identity. Furthermore, as a Jewish American organization, AJWS refuses to stand idly by while ethnic and religious minorities are under attack for simply being who they are.\nAvodah, an organization committed to developing Jewish leaders who become lifelong agents for social change, offers Jewish leadership programs for young adults and focuses on integrating Jewish identity and social justice. Avodah has joined this amicus brief because Jewish tradition requires that Jews speak out against injustice, and Jewish history teaches the critical importance of standing up for those targeted by hatred and intolerance.\n\nA1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 41\n\nBend the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice, is the nation’s leading progressive Jewish voice empowering Jewish Americans to be advocates for the nation’s most vulnerable. Bend the Arc mobilizes Jewish Americans beyond religious and institutional boundaries to create justice and opportunity for all, through bold leadership development, innovative civic engagement, and robust progressive advocacy. Bend the Arc supports this brief because as Jews, we understand personally what it is to be a religious minority in this nation and the pain that religious discrimination causes; we also believe such discrimination betrays fundamental American—and Jewish—values.\nBishops of the Episcopal Dioceses of Washington, New York, and Maryland. The Right Reverend Mariann Edgar Budde is the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington, which is made up of over 90 congregations located in Washington, D.C. and the counties of Montgomery, Prince George’s, Charles, and St. Mary’s in Maryland. The Right Reverend Andrew Dietsche is the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of New York, which is made up of over 190 congregations encompassing Manhattan, the Bronx, and Staten Island in New York City, and the counties of Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Sullivan, Ulster, and Westchester in the state of New York. The Right Reverend Allen K. Shin is Bishop Suffragan of the Episcopal Diocese of New York. The Right Reverend Mary D. Glasspool is Bishop Assistant of the Episcopal Diocese of New York. The Right Reverend Eugene Taylor Sutton is the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Maryland, which is made up of over 100 congregations located in the Maryland counties of Garrett, Allegany, Washington, Frederick, Carroll, Baltimore, Baltimore City, Harford, Howard, Anne Arundel and Calvert. The Right Reverend Chilton R. Knudsen is Assistant Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Maryland. Every bishop of The Episcopal Church, upon his or her consecration, promises to “guard the faith, unity, and discipline of the Church” and “show compassion to the poor and strangers, and defend those who have no helper.” The Church’s Baptismal Covenant, which reflects the denomination’s core beliefs, asks for commitments from persons being baptized as well as all other witnesses to “strive for justice and peace among all people, and respect the dignity of every human being.” In addition, the Church has adopted a resolution “affirm[ing] its support for religious freedom for all persons” and “affirm[ing] religious freedom as a goal to be sought in all societies.”\nSince 1949, Catholic Charities Community Services, NY (CCCS) has provided direct human and legal services to over 170,000 people each year from all parts of New York City and the Lower Hudson Valley. These services are offered to all New Yorkers in need, regardless of religious belief, because our work is\nA2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 41\n\ngrounded in our belief in the dignity of each person and the building of a just, compassionate society, especially for the most vulnerable among us. CCCS is a leading provider of refugee resettlement and immigration legal assistance in its service area, providing reception, reunification, integration, employment and ESL assistance to refugees and asylees and direct legal representation to immigrant families, workers, and those seeking protection, including over 6,000 unaccompanied minors each year.\nThe Church of the Brethren is a Christian denomination committed to continuing the work of Jesus peacefully and simply, and to living out its faith in community. Based in the Anabaptist and Pietist faith traditions, it celebrated its 300th anniversary in 2008 and today counts some 114,000 members across the United States and Puerto Rico, with missions and sister churches around the world. Out of its faith tradition of seeking peace in community and in discipleship to Jesus Christ, the Church of the Brethren opposes the Presidential Proclamation barring immigration and most travel to the United States from six predominantly Muslim countries. As declared in its 1982 statement, Undocumented Persons and Refugees in the United States, “The primary truth of faith as we consider immigrants and refugees today is that Christ has made another appearance among us, as Himself an immigrant and refugee in the person of political dissidents, the economically deprived, and foreigners on the run. We are to join them as pilgrims in search of that city yet to come, with foundations of love and justice whose architect and builder is God.”\nCongregation Beit Simchat Torah, founded in the 1970s as a “gay synagogue” and led since 1992 by Senior Rabbi Sharon Kleinbaum, is a vibrant spiritual community and a progressive voice within Judaism that rejoices in diversity, denounces social injustice, and strives for human rights for all people. As a community of immigrants and refugees and descendants of immigrants and refugees, it is an active part of the New Sanctuary movement in New York City, meeting the Muslim ban and other anti-immigrant initiatives with a spirit of love and resistance.\nFor nearly two centuries, Congregation B’nai Jeshurun (NYC) has been at the forefront of American Jewish life. As we move into our third century, our vision is focused on the spiritual work of transformation—of ourselves, our community of nearly 1700 member households, and of the larger world. We believe that as a faith community we are called upon to hold ourselves, each other, and our elected leaders accountable for sustaining the core values of our nation, and to bring to bear the moral values of our Jewish tradition and teachings for the benefit\nA3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 41\n\nof all. For many years, these beliefs have manifest through engagement in the growing global refugee crisis, and efforts to assist immigrants and refugees in New York City. We are proud to join this brief to help ensure that the rights of all immigrants and refugees, regardless of race, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, financial status, or country of origin, are treated fairly and equally, and with respect and dignity, by the American government.\nThe Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, US Provinces represents Sisters who, with their Mission Partners address the needs of thousands of low-income people in 22 states of the United States and overseas each year. Dedicated to serving girls, women, and families who experience poverty, exploitation, vulnerability, and marginalization, the Congregation and their lay partners minister to immigrants and victims of human trafficking here and abroad. The National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd educates and advocates on social-justice issues for the transformation of society to the benefit of all people. The center reflects the spirituality, history, and mission of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd, who have had a presence in the United States for over 175 years. We strongly oppose the Presidential Proclamation barring citizens of six predominantly Muslim countries from immigrating to the United States.\nInspired by the Gospel of Jesus, and the example of Saints Francis and Clare, the Franciscan Action Network (FAN) is a collective Franciscan voice seeking to transform U.S. public policy related to peace-making, care for creation, poverty, and human rights including advocacy on behalf of immigrants and refugees. The Presidential Proclamation effectively halting immigration from predominantly Muslim countries is deeply disturbing to Franciscans all over the country. Providing protection to people seeking safety and an open door to immigrants seeking to better their lives in this country are among our nation’s proudest and longest standing traditions, which we are morally obligated to uphold. By barring millions of people based on their nationality and religion, this executive action abdicates America’s leadership role on human rights.\nFranciscans for Justice is a joint project of the Franciscan Friars of the St. Barbara Province and the Our Lady of Guadalupe Province that includes more than 200 friars throughout the western United States. For over 800 years, Franciscans have upheld the fact that twice St. Francis of Assisi went to the Muslim sultan, not to convert him, but to befriend him; Franciscans hold Muslim believers dear to our hearts. Franciscans for Justice challenges the U.S. government to reach out to all Muslims—not to ban them, but to befriend them.\nA4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 41\n\nThe Franciscan Friars Province of St. Barbara is dedicated to serving the poor and promoting justice, peace, care of creation, and reconciliation. Living these values requires that the Friars support this amicus brief.\nThe Friends Committee on National Legislation is the oldest religious lobby in Washington, D.C., lobbying Congress and the Administration to advance peace, justice, opportunity, and environmental stewardship. FCNL opposes the Presidential Proclamation because it goes against our core values of welcome, religious freedom, and assistance to those most in need. The Muslim ban is discriminatory, unconstitutional, and immoral.\nThe Hyde Park & Kenwood Interfaith Council, led by Rabbi Frederick Reeves, is an association of congregations and religious and spiritual bodies, founded in the Hyde Park and Kenwood neighborhoods of Chicago in 1911. Our purpose is to provide effective channels for cooperative expression of our shared concern for the well-being of the communities in which our member organizations are situated. As representatives of a large number of faith traditions, we recognize that when one religious group is targeted, it is a threat to us all. We are particularly concerned because we sponsor two Syrian refugee families in our neighborhood and know from them the difficulties that they have faced both leaving Syria and coming to this country.\nInterfaith Alliance advocates from a faith perspective for the guarantees of the independence of conscience from government and of government from religion, including special attention to the rights of minorities. It rejects any religious test in this country, not just for elected office but also for securing the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It believes the attempt to exclude immigrants because they are part of a particular religion or subset of that religion violates the nation’s basic values and constitutional guarantees.\nInterfaith Worker Justice is a national affiliate network of more than sixty worker centers and faith-labor organizations. We support our affiliates in workerled campaigns to bring dignity and justice to all working people, regardless of faith tradition, national origin, ethnicity, or immigration status. Any travel ban which discriminates based on national origin or faith tradition is not only unconstitutional, it is unjust and immoral.\nIslamic Relief USA is a nonprofit humanitarian organization that provides the necessities of life in refugee camps outside the United States and resettlement aid to refugees here. Its work to protect the most vulnerable in the human family,\nA5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 41\n\nparticularly those who have fled poverty, violence, and oppression, is guided by the timeless values and teachings provided by the revelations contained within the Qur’an and prophetic example. Despite the fear and anguish created by this Presidential Proclamation, which has profoundly affected its staff, donors and beneficiaries, Islamic Relief USA continues to reach out to its neighbors in love and serve them with dignity believing that what unites us is stronger than the fears that divide us.\nThe Leadership Conference of Women Religious (LCWR) is an association of leaders of congregations of Catholic women religious in the United States. LCWR has nearly 1,300 members, who represent approximately 38,800 women religious. Catholic sisters began coming to these shores 288 years ago as immigrants to serve immigrant populations and continue to this day to minister to new immigrants in education, health care, and social service agencies. Founded in 1956, LCWR assists its members to collaboratively carry out their service of leadership to further the mission of the Gospel in today’s world. As women of faith, we believe that all people are created in God’s image and all are worthy of respect and protection. We strongly object to President Trump’s attempts to limit our ability to heed God’s call to welcome the stranger (Mt. 25:35) and to care for those most in need (Mt. 25:40). We are particularly concerned about rules and regulations that deny access to immigrants because of their religion, race, or nationality. Such discrimination violates our deeply held faith beliefs and is inimical to the Gospel.\nThe Missionary Servants of the Most Holy Trinity, founded in 1929, is a congregation of Catholic priests and Brothers who work in the United States and Latin America with the poor and abandoned, including recent immigrants.\nThe Multifaith Alliance for Syrian Refugees (MFA), a project of the Tides Center, is a coalition of nearly 90 faith-based and secular organizations. MFA’s mission is to mobilize the interfaith response to the Syrian humanitarian crisis; raise funds to alleviate suffering; cultivate partnerships to advance future stability in the region; advocate for sensible and humane refugee policies; and create awareness of the facts, the needs, and the opportunities for positive action. Because the Presidential Proclamation dated September 24, 2017 indefinitely bans immigration and drastically restricts travel from six Muslim-majority countries, including Syria; and because the Proclamation violates the tenets of every major religious faith and the principles on which our democracy is founded, MFA has significant interest in this litigation.\n\nA6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 41\n\nThe National Council of Churches is the largest and oldest ecumenical organization in the United States and is comprised of 38 denominations numbering some 30 million adherents in more than 100,000 local congregations. Based on its understanding of scripture, the NCC believes we have a responsibility to welcome and assist immigrants and refugees of all faiths and nationalities.\nThe National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW) is a grassroots organization of 90,000 volunteers and advocates who are inspired by Jewish values to strive for social justice. NCJW joins this brief in keeping with its formal resolve to work for “[c]omprehensive, humane, and equitable immigration, refugee, asylum, and naturalization laws, policies, and practices that facilitate and expedite legal status and a path to citizenship for more individuals.”\nNational Justice for Our Neighbors, a United Methodist ministry, supports a network of 16 sites around the country that provide immigration legal services to low-income immigrants and refugees. Our work reflects the United Methodist belief that human dignity is the image of God in each human being, and that we protect human dignity with human rights.\nNETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice educates, organizes, and lobbies for social and economic transformation. Founded by Catholic Sisters in the progressive spirit of Vatican II, we are rooted in the Catholic Social Justice tradition and open to all who share our passion. The NETWORK community of justice-seekers is more than 50,000 strong with members in every state and every congressional district. NETWORK joins in this amicus brief because we are called by faith to welcome the stranger and love our neighbor.\nThe North Carolina Council of Churches is committed to immigration rights and reform, as well as refugee matters. The Council has joined the amicus brief as an expression of its long and proud history of “welcoming the stranger.”\nThe Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association, established in 1974, represents 350 rabbis across North America and serves as a voice of Reconstructionist Jewish values in partnership with more than 100 Reconstructionist Jewish congregations and their members. Its understanding of Jewish tradition and experience compels its support for refugees and immigrants as an act of justice and compassion in the world.\nThe School Sisters of Saint Francis, United States Province are part of an international congregation of religious women. The United States Province was established when immigrant sisters came to the United States from Europe in order\nA7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 41\n\nto work with immigrants. Its mission is to serve the poor and otherwise needy. As a province, it joins the ranks of others who wish to speak out to challenge the anti-immigrant Presidential Proclamation.\nThe Sisters of St. Francis of Clinton, Iowa is a Catholic religious order. The Leadership Team of the order decided to join this amicus brief because the order has taken a corporate stand to welcome immigrants and refugees and to advocate for policies that uphold their basic civil and human rights.\nThe Sisters of St. Francis of Penance and Christian Charity are called to solidarity with those who are powerless and work with them to change situations in which the dignity of persons is violated. The Sisters of the St. Francis Province, based in Redwood City, California, and the Sacred Heart Province, based in Denver, have joined the amicus brief because the ban on immigrants is counter to their beliefs and values as Franciscan Sisters.\nThe Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia are a community of approximately 430 Catholic women who choose a Gospel way of life and uphold a long and honored tradition of loving God through service. A community that “seeks to participate in the Spirit’s action in the world,” they have joined this amicus brief because of their commitment to directing personal and corporate resources to the promotion of justice, peace, and reconciliation.\nThe Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, U.S.-Ontario Province is a Catholic Women Religious congregation with 430 Sisters and over 300 Lay Associates in the United States and Ontario, Canada. We have great interest in this amicus brief because our values include welcoming and advocating for immigrants and refugees. Several of our Sisters and Associates work and volunteer with immigrants and refugees, so we are familiar with the roadblocks and struggles they have to endure. We wish to be proactive in assisting and welcoming immigrants and refugees to the United States.\nSound Vision Foundation, based in Chicago, is a Muslim religious institution. We believe singling out any group of people as an instrument of policy is an extremely problematic decision. For that reason, Sound Vision has initiated a large civic coalition called “One America Coalition.” The Foundation’s president, Imam Abdul Malik Mujahid, is an interfaith leader who states, “it is not the material aspect of the American dream which is at stake here with the Muslim Ban, but rather the understanding of high constitutional principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.”\nA8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 41\n\nThe Southwest Conference of the United Church of Christ is the regional body that provides support and services to 49 local UCC congregations and clergy within Arizona, New Mexico, and El Paso, Texas. We join this brief because our sacred texts affirm the right and need of human beings to migrate by instructing their followers, irrespective of national origin, to welcome strangers and to treat aliens and foreigners as they treat citizens. Denying this basic human need puts some people at a disadvantage, maintains privilege for others, and subjects minorities in particular to violence and oppression. Our mission statement, “extravagantly welcoming and affirming followers of Christ called to embody God’s unconditional justice and love,” is manifested in a deep commitment to ministry of extravagant welcome that we extend to all, including migrants, undocumented permanent residents, refugees and the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community.\nTanenbaum (Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding) is a secular, non-sectarian organization combating religious stereotypes, hatred, and violence through practical approaches in workplaces, schools, health care institutions and conflict zones. Tanenbaum collaborates with religiously driven Peacemakers in Action, who risk their lives in armed conflicts including in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. The travel ban that is the subject of this submission targets immigrants based on their religious identity; undermines Tanenbaum’s work to support religious pluralism and freedom of belief; and directly impairs Tanenbaum’s work with our Peacemakers from conflict zones.\nT’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights brings together rabbis and cantors from all streams of Judaism, together with all members of the Jewish community, to act on the Jewish imperative to respect and advance the human rights of all people. We join this amicus brief to express our condemnation of the Presidential Proclamation, which effectively closes our borders to Muslims and flagrantly violates America’s longstanding, values-driven commitment to welcome immigrants to our shores.\nThe Union for Reform Judaism, whose 900 congregations across North America include 1.5 million Reform Jews, the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), whose membership includes more than 2,000 Reform rabbis, and Women of Reform Judaism, which represents more than 65,000 women in nearly 500 women’s groups in North America and around the world, come to this issue out of our affirmation of the supreme value of human life and the equal dignity of every human being. We also share a longstanding commitment to the principle of religious liberty that has lifted up people of all faiths while providing more protections, rights and opportunities than have been known anywhere else throughout\nA9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 41\n\nhistory. We are committed to fulfilling the mandate of the Prophets of Israel who bade us to pursue justice, seek peace, and build a society of loving-kindness among all of God’s creatures.\nUnion Theological Seminary is the oldest independent seminary in the United States. The seminary’s education is rooted in Christian traditions but instructed by other faiths. The seminary and its President, the Reverend Doctor Serene Jones, join this brief in the belief that religious respect and equity are critical to the safety and well-being of our local and national community, and that the Presidential Proclamation is anathema to this core tenet.\nThe Unitarian Universalist Association (UUA) comprises more than 1,000 Unitarian Universalist congregations nationwide and is dedicated to the principle of freedom of religion for all people and to freedom from oppression. The UUA has joined the amicus brief because it believes that the Presidential Proclamation is unconstitutional and undermines the UUA’s core principles.\nThe Unitarian Universalist Service Committee is a non-sectarian humanrights organization powered by grassroots collaboration. UUSC began its work in 1939 when Rev. Waitstill and Martha Sharp took the extraordinary risk of traveling to Europe to help refugees escape Nazi persecution. A moral commitment to protecting the rights and dignity of persons, particularly those seeking refuge from violence, discrimination, persecution, and natural disasters, has been at the center of our organization’s mission for more than 75 years. Given our history, we seek to promote a just immigration system that upholds the rights of all migrants— regardless of nationality, religion, status or other characteristic—in a manner consistent with our nation’s moral, legal, and political obligations as a member of the world community.\nThe Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics and Ritual is a global network and center for dialogue on feminism, faith, and justice. We connect activists, religious leaders, students, scholars, and allies who are using feminist religious values to create social change. Our commitment to equality, and our special interest in providing for the well-being of those who are marginalized, compels us to reject the travel ban on Muslims.\n\nA10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 110-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. If you were admitted to practice under a different name than you are now using, you must include your former name when completing this form so that we can locate you on the attorney roll. Electronic filing by counsel is required in all Fourth Circuit cases. If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1__1_7_-2_2_3_2__1_7_-2_2__3_3_1_7_-_2_2_4_0_ as\n\n[✔]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _In_t_e_r_fa_i_th__G__ro_u__p_o_f_R__e_li_g_io__u_s_a_n_d__I_n_te_r_r_e_li_g_io_u__s_O__rg_a__n_iz_a_t_io_n_s__a_n_d______________\n\n_C_l_e_rg__y_M__e_m__b_e_rs____________________________________________________________________as the (party name)\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) ✔ amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_M__a_r_c_A__._H_e_a__rr_o_n_____________________ (signature)\n\n_M__a_r_c_A_.__H_e_a_r_r_o_n_________________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_0_2_-_7_7_8_-_1_6_6_3___ Voice Phone\n\n_M__o_r_ri_s_o_n__&_F__o_e_r_s_te_r_L__L_P__________________ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_0_2_-_8_8_7_-_0_7_6_3___ Fax Number\n\n_2_0_0__0_P__e_n_n_s_y_lv_a_n__ia__A_v_e_n_u_e_,__N_._W_.__________\n\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_._C_._2__0_0_0_6__________________ Address\n\n_M__H_e_a_r_r_o_n_@__m_o__fo_._c_o_m______________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _1_7_N__o_v_e_m_b_e_r_2_0_1_7__ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_M__a_r_c__A_._H__e_a_r_r_o_n___________ Signature\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\n_____1__7_N__o_v_e__m_b__e_r_2_0__1_7_____ Date\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 56\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) In the\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the\nFourth Circuit\n______________________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY and SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\n– v. –\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n______________________________\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Maryland, Southern Division [Caption continued on inside cover] ______________________________\nBRIEF OF TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES IN 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233\nAND APPELLANTS IN 17-2240 ______________________________\nAndrew J. Pincus Paul W. Hughes John T. Lewis MAYER BROWN LLP 1999 K Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 263-3000\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 56\n\n______________________________ No. 17-2232\n______________________________ IRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees, – v. –\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n______________________________ No. 17-2233\n______________________________ EBLAL ZAKZOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, – v. –\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n______________________________ No. 17-2240\n______________________________ INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.,\nPlaintiffs-Appellants and PAUL HARRISON, et al.,\nPlaintiffs, – v. –\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 56\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS Amici curiae submit their corporate disclosure statements, as required by Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and 29(c), in Appendix B.\n/s/ Andrew J. Pincus\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 56\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nCorporate Disclosure Statements...........................................................i Table of Authorities.............................................................................. iii Interest of Amici Curiae.........................................................................1 Introduction ............................................................................................1 Argument ................................................................................................5 I. The Proclamation Harms American Innovation\nAnd Economic Growth. ...................................................................5 II. The Proclamation Is Unlawful. ....................................................13\nA. The INA does not authorize the executive branch to implement unilateral, permanent revisions of the Nation’s immigration laws..........................13\nB. The Proclamation exceeds the authority conferred by Section 1182......................................................16 1. The Proclamation does not contain a finding sufficient to justify exercise of the authority conferred by Section 1182(f). .........................16 2. The Proclamation conflicts with other provisions of the INA......................................................21 3. The Proclamation is procedurally unreasonable. ..................................................................23\nC. The Proclamation violates Section 1152’s nondiscrimination requirement. .................................................25\nConclusion ............................................................................................. 28 Appendix A............................................................................................1a Appendix B............................................................................................6a\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 56\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .................................................14, 22\nAmoco Oil Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974) .........................................................17\nArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)..........................................................................15\nCarlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)..........................................................................16\nCrawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)..........................................................................27\nDalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994)..........................................................................24\nFoley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)............................................................................1\nHawaii v. Trump, 2017 WL 4639560 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017) ....................................20\nHawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................................... passim\nIndus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)..........................................................................17\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) ................................................... passim\nKent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)....................................................................17, 18\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) .....................................................................21\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 56\n\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ...........................................................25\nMobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se. Inc. v. United Distribution Companies, 498 U.S. 211 (1991)..........................................................................17\nMotor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)............................................................................24\nOlsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) ........................................................28\nUnited Distribution Companies v. F.E.R.C., 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996) .........................................................17\nUnited States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)..........................................................................24\nUnited States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957)....................................................................16, 17\nVayeghan v. Kelly, 2017 WL 396531 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2017) ....................................26\nWhitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)..........................................................................16\nZemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)........................................................................16, 18\nStatutes, Rules, and Regulations\n5 U.S.C. § 553(c) ...................................................................................24\n\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 56\n\n8 U.S.C. § 1152........................................................................................ passim § 1152(a) ...........................................................................................27 § 1152(a)(1)(A)..................................................................................25 § 1152(a)(1)(B)..................................................................................26 § 1182........................................................................................ passim § 1182(a) .....................................................................................14, 22 § 1182(f) .................................................................................... passim § 1182(a)(3)(B)..................................................................................21 § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II).........................................................................21 § 1185(a) ................................................................................... passim § 1185(a)(1).......................................................................................15\nPub. L. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242.........................22\nFed. R. App. 29(a)(4)(E)..........................................................................1\n82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 29, 2017).......................................................................2, 3 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).........................................................................3 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) ............................................................ passim\nMiscellaneous\nAmericas Soc’y & Council of the Americas, Bringing Vitality to Main Street (2015), https://goo.gl/i9NWc9 .........................6\nStuart Anderson, Nat’l Found. for Am. Pol’y, The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America (Mar. 2017), https://goo.gl/7noMyC ...................................7\nStuart Anderson, Nat’l Found. for Am. Pol’y, Immigrants and Billion Dollar Startups (Mar. 2016), https://goo.gl/Mk7iJM ........................................................................ 5\nStuart Anderson, Immigrants Flooding America with Nobel Prizes, Forbes (Oct. 16, 2016), http://goo.gl/RILwXU ......................................................................... 7\nMaksim Belenkiy & David Riker, Face-to-Face Exports: The Role of Business Travel in Trade Promotion, 51 J. Travel Res. 632 (2012).....................................................................11\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 56\n\nBGRS, Breakthrough to the Future of Global Talent Mobility (2016), http://goo.gl/ZhIxSr....................................................10\nMuzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Migration Pol’y Inst., Post-9/11 Policies Dramatically Alter the U.S. Immigration Landscape (Sept. 8, 2011), https://goo.gl/6rdagt ........................................................................... 2\nJeff Daniels, Trump Immigration Ban Puts $20 Billion in Boeing Aircraft Sales to Iran, Iraq at Risk, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2017), https://goo.gl/uT2goG............................................11\nRobert W. Fairlie et al., Ewing Marion Kauffman Found., The 2016 Kauffman Index: Startup Activity (Aug. 2016), https://goo.gl/6Wr5Mc ............................................................5\nSeth Fiegerman, Former Google Exec Calls Trump Travel Ban an ‘Enormous Problem,’ CNN Tech (Jan. 30, 2017), https://goo.gl/vNVgLt ...........................................................10\nMichael Greenstone & Adam Looney, The Hamilton Project, Ten Economic Facts About Immigration (Sept. 2010), https://goo.gl/3zpdpn ..............................................................7\nHarv. Bus. Rev., Strategic Global Mobility (2014), http://goo.gl/AV3nhJ ........................................................................10\nH.R. Rep. No. 89-745 (1965).................................................................26\nNune Hovhannisyan & Wolfgang Keller, International Business Travel: An Engine of Innovation?, 20 J. Econ. Growth 75 (2015) .............................................................................11\nImmigration Laws and Iranian Students, 4A Op. O.L.C. 133 (1979) ................................................................18\nInternational Migration Outlook 2017, Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. (41st ed. 2017) ....................................................12\nKate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief (Jan. 23, 2017), https://goo.gl/D0bRkS ......................................................................13\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 56\n\nNew Am. Econ., Open For Business: How Immigrants Are Driving Small Business Creation in the United States (Aug. 2012), https://goo.gl/zqwpVQ...................................................6\nNew Am. Econ., Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship (Oct. 2016), https://goo.gl/QRd8Vb ...................................................6\nTara Palmeri & Bryan Bender, U.S. Diplomats Warning GE’s Major Deals in Iraq at Risk over Travel Ban, Politico (Feb. 1, 2017), http://goo.gl/nhj9CZ .......................................11\nPia Orrenius, George W. Bush Inst., Benefits of Immigration Outweigh the Costs, The Catalyst (2016), https://goo.gl/qC9uOc......................................................................... 6\nP’ship for a New Am. Econ., The “New American” Fortune 500 (2011), http://goo.gl/yc0h7u ....................................................5, 6\nRemarks at the Opening Ceremonies of the Statute of Liberty Centennial Celebration (July 3, 1986), https://goo.gl/1qwq5N ........................................................................1\nS. Rep. No. 89-748 (1965) .....................................................................26\nU.S. Chamber of Commerce, Immigration: Myths and Facts (2016), https://goo.gl/NizPEQ..................................................7\nVivek Wadhwa et al., America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs (Jan. 4, 2007), https://goo.gl/wCIySz .......................7\n\nvii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 56\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Amici curiae are 96 of the Nation’s leading technology companies. A complete list of amici is set forth in Appendix A.1\nINTRODUCTION For decades, stable U.S. immigration policy has embodied the principles that we are a people descended from immigrants, that we welcome new immigrants, and that we provide a home for refugees seeking protection. As President Reagan noted when rededicating the Statue of Liberty in 1986, “which of us does not think of … grandfathers and grandmothers, from so many places around the globe, for whom this statue was the first glimpse of America?” Remarks at the Opening Ceremonies of the Statute of Liberty Centennial Celebration (July 3, 1986), https://goo.gl/1qwq5N; see also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (describing America as “a nation of immigrants”). At the same time, America has long recognized the importance of protecting ourselves against those who would do us harm. But it has done so while maintaining our fundamental commitment to welcoming immigrants— through increased background checks and other controls on people seeking to\n1 Counsel for amici certify that counsel for the other parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici or its counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. See Fed. R. App. 29(a)(4)(E).\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 56\n\nenter our country.2 For more than fifty years, moreover, immigration rules have been based on input from, and consideration of views advanced by, all relevant stakeholders—through congressional legislation and agency noticeand-comment rulemakings—with exceptions limited to temporary measures addressing emergency situations.\nOn January 27, 2017, “[o]ne week after inauguration and without interagency review,” Executive Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 29, 2017) (“First Executive Order”), was issued. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 756 (9th Cir.), vacated, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. 2017). That Order altered immigration policy in significant respects: it barred nationals of seven countries— Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan—from entering the United States for at least 90 days (First Executive Order § 3(c)), with the possibility of expansion to additional countries (id. § 3(e)-(f)), and it gave the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security discretion to issue visas to affected nationals “on a case-by-case basis” (id. § 3(g)).\n\n2 “In the decade since 9/11,” immigration policy has incorporated, among other things, “major new border security and law enforcement initiatives, heightened visa controls and screening of international travelers and wouldbe immigrants, the collection and storage of information in vast new interoperable databases used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and the use of state and local law enforcement as force multipliers in immigration enforcement.” Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Migration Pol’y Inst., Post9/11 Policies Dramatically Alter the U.S. Immigration Landscape (Sept. 8, 2011), https://goo.gl/6rdagt.\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 56\n\nOn March 6, 2017, the First Executive Order was rescinded, and Executive Order 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (“Second Executive Order”), was issued. That Order banned nationals from six countries for 90 days beginning on March 16—the same countries as the first order, omitting Iraq, but subjecting nationals from Iraq to intensive scrutiny—and otherwise contained many of the same deficiencies as the First Executive Order. Second Executive Order §§ 2(c), 4. That Order, too, was enjoined by multiple courts. See, e.g., Hawaii, 859 F.3d 741; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).\nOn September 24, 2017, the Second Executive Order was supplanted by Presidential Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (the “Proclamation”). The Proclamation bans nationals, in whole or in part, from eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. Proclamation § 2. The Proclamation again confers discretion on consular officers to “grant waivers on a case-by-case basis” to nationals from the designated countries. Id. § 3(c). And the Proclamation creates a procedure by which the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State can identify new countries to subject to the ban. Id. § 4(a)(ii). The Proclamation does not have an expiration date.\nLike its prior iterations, the Proclamation effects a significant shift in the rules governing entry into the United States; injects substantial uncertainty and instability into the Nation’s immigration system; and inflicts harm\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 56\n\non American companies, their employees, and the entire economy. It hinders the ability of American companies to attract talented employees; increases costs imposed on business; makes it more difficult for American firms to compete in the international marketplace; and gives global enterprises a new, significant incentive to build operations—and hire new employees—outside the United States.\nThe Proclamation is unlawful because it exceeds the executive branch’s authority under the Nation’s immigration laws. Narrow statutory provisions that authorize the executive branch to address emergency circumstances on a temporary basis do not license significant, permanent alterations to the immigration landscape.\nMoreover, to bar a class of aliens from the United States, the executive branch must reasonably determine that their entry would be detrimental to the Nation, and then craft an order that reasonably addresses any threat that those individuals might pose. But the Proclamation neither explains why the targeted individuals’ entry would be detrimental to the United States nor imposes reasonable restrictions.\nFinally, Congress in 1965 prohibited discrimination in immigration decisions on the basis of national origin precisely so that the Nation would not shut its doors to immigrants based on where they come from—but the Proclamation does just that. It would turn the clock back and restore the nationalorigins system that Congress expressly abolished.\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 56\n\nThe Court accordingly should affirm the decision below barring enforcement of the Proclamation.\nARGUMENT I. THE PROCLAMATION HARMS AMERICAN INNOVATION\nAND ECONOMIC GROWTH. Immigration has a positive impact on the U.S. economy. The Proclamation, both via its direct effects and by its signaling to the world as a whole, hinders American innovation and economic growth. A. Immigration provides significant benefits to the U.S. economy. To begin with, immigrants are leading entrepreneurs. “The American economy stands apart because, more than any other place on earth, talented people from around the globe want to come here to start their businesses.” P’ship for a New Am. Econ., The “New American” Fortune 500, at 5 (2011), http://goo.gl/yc0h7u. Indeed, “[i]mmigrants continue to be a lot more likely than the native-born to become entrepreneurs.” Robert W. Fairlie et al., Ewing Marion Kauffman Found., The 2016 Kauffman Index: Startup Activity 7 (Aug. 2016), https://goo.gl/6Wr5Mc. Some of these businesses are large. “Immigrants have started more than half (44 of 87) of America’s startup companies valued at $1 billion dollars”—so-called “unicorns”—“and are key members of management and product development teams in over 70 percent (62 of 87) of these companies.” Stuart Anderson, Nat’l Found. for Am. Pol’y, Immigrants and Billion Dollar\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 56\n\nStartups 1 (Mar. 2016), https://goo.gl/Mk7iJM. Immigrants or their children founded more than 200 of the companies on the Fortune 500 list, including Apple, Kraft, Ford, General Electric, AT&T, Google, McDonald’s, Boeing, and Disney. P’ship for a New Am. Econ., supra, at 1-2. Collectively, these companies generate annual revenue of $4.2 trillion and employ millions of Americans. Id. at 2.\nMany of these businesses are small. “While accounting for 16 percent of the labor force nationally and 18 percent of business owners, immigrants make up 28 percent of Main Street business owners.” Americas Soc’y & Council of the Americas, Bringing Vitality to Main Street 2 (2015), https://goo.gl/i9NWc9. These are “the shops and services that are the backbone of neighborhoods around the country.” Id. In 2011, immigrants opened 28% of all new businesses in the United States. See P’ship for a New Am. Econ., Open For Business: How Immigrants Are Driving Small Business Creation in the United States 3 (Aug. 2012), https://goo.gl/zqwpVQ.\nImmigrant entrepreneurs come from all parts of the world. In 2014, “19.1 percent of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa were entrepreneurs.” New Am. Econ., Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship 2 (Oct. 2016), https://goo.gl/QRd8Vb.\nImmigrants also fuel the growth of the economy as a whole. “When immigrants enter the labor force, they increase the productive capacity of the economy and raise GDP. Their incomes rise, but so do those of natives.” Pia\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 56\n\nOrrenius, George W. Bush Inst., Benefits of Immigration Outweigh the Costs, The Catalyst (2016), https://goo.gl/qC9uOc. Immigrants thus create new jobs for U.S. citizens “through the businesses they establish … [and] play an important role in job creation in both small and large businesses.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Immigration: Myths and Facts 3 (2016), https://goo.gl/NizPEQ.\nImmigrants are also innovators. Since 2000, more than one-third of all American Nobel Prize winners in Chemistry, Medicine, and Physics have been immigrants. See Stuart Anderson, Immigrants Flooding America with Nobel Prizes, Forbes (Oct. 16, 2016), http://goo.gl/RILwXU. Among individuals with advanced educational degrees, immigrants are nearly three times more likely to file patents than U.S.-born citizens. Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, The Hamilton Project, Ten Economic Facts About Immigration 11 (Sept. 2010), https://goo.gl/3zpdpn. By one estimate, noncitizen immigrants were named on almost a quarter of all U.S.-based international patent applications filed in 2006. Vivek Wadhwa et al., America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs 4 (Jan. 4, 2007), https://goo.gl/wCIySz. And children of immigrants made up 83% of the top-performing students in the well-known Intel high school science competition. Stuart Anderson, Nat’l Found. for Am. Pol’y, The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America 1-3, 5, 12 (Mar. 2017), https://goo.gl/7noMyC.\n\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 56\n\nB. The Proclamation abandons the principles that have undergirded U.S. immigration policy for more than half a century—clear, settled standards and constrained discretion. It introduces sudden changes without an opportunity for affected parties to inform decisionmakers of the consequences of those changes before their adoption, provides unclear standards for implementation, and leaves entirely to individual officers’ discretion the exercise of case-specific waiver authority.\nMoreover, nothing limits future executive branch changes in the immigration system to the matters addressed in this Proclamation. Businesses need a predictable, stable system so they can make long-term personnel and investment decisions and be certain that they will be able to interact with their global customers. The continuing risk of additional, unanticipated changes in immigration rules creates significant uncertainty that imposes a substantial burden on managing global businesses and planning for the future. The Proclamation will make it more difficult and expensive for U.S. companies to recruit, hire, and retain some of the world’s best employees. It will disrupt ongoing business operations—making it harder for U.S. companies to compete in today’s global markets. And it will inhibit investment in the United States. That will inflict significant harm on American business, innovation, and economic growth.\nThe Proclamation does so by injecting intolerable uncertainty in the immigration system. It impairs necessary business travel. And it creates a\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 56\n\nstrong incentive for businesses and entrepreneurs to grow their companies outside the United States.\nFirst, the Proclamation establishes a system of “case-by-case” exceptions from its ban on nationals from eight countries, but leaves the application of those exceptions to the discretion of Customs and Border Protection— setting forth a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which such exceptions “may be appropriate.” Proclamation § 3(c) (emphasis added). Because individual immigration officers retain broad discretion in issuing these individualby-individual exceptions, it is unclear what exemptions will actually be given, or why—and whether that authority is being exercised fairly and without discrimination or favoritism.\nEven more important, the Proclamation provides that the ban, and its accompanying standardless exception process, may be expanded to include an unspecified number of additional countries if those nations do not provide information the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State deem necessary to approve visas. See Proclamation § 4(a). Individuals and businesses thus face the significant risk that new, as-yet-unidentified countries will be added to the ban—all without any governing standard.\nThe Proclamation will have the immediate, adverse consequences of making it far more difficult and expensive for U.S. companies to hire the world’s best talent and compete effectively in the global marketplace. Businesses and employees have little incentive to go through the laborious process\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 56\n\nof sponsoring or obtaining a visa, and relocating to the United States, if an employee may be unexpectedly halted at the border. Skilled individuals will not wish to immigrate to this country if they may be cut off without warning from their spouses, grandparents, relatives, and friends—they will not pull up roots, incur significant economic risk, and subject their family to considerable uncertainty to immigrate to the United States in the face of this instability. Seth Fiegerman, Former Google Exec Calls Trump Travel Ban an ‘Enormous Problem,’ CNN Tech (Jan. 30, 2017), https://goo.gl/vNVgLt. The Proclamation therefore significantly disadvantages U.S. companies in the global competition for talent.\nSecond, the Proclamation’s bans on travel also will significantly impair day-to-day business. The marketplace for today’s businesses is global. Companies routinely send employees across borders for conferences, meetings, or job rotations, and invite customers, clients, or users from abroad. Global mobility is critical to businesses whose customers, suppliers, users, and workforces are spread all around the world. See, e.g., BGRS, Breakthrough to the Future of Global Talent Mobility (2016), http://goo.gl/ZhIxSr; Harv. Bus. Rev., Strategic Global Mobility (2014), http://goo.gl/AV3nhJ.\nGlobal business travel enables employees to develop new skills, take on expanded roles, and stay abreast of new technological or business developments. It also facilitates new markets and business partnerships. Indeed, one study has shown that each additional international business trip increases\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 56\n\nexports from the United States to the visited country by, on average, over $36,000 per year. Maksim Belenkiy & David Riker, Face-to-Face Exports: The Role of Business Travel in Trade Promotion, 51 J. Travel Res. 632, 637 (2012); see also Nune Hovhannisyan & Wolfgang Keller, International Business Travel: An Engine of Innovation?, 20 J. Econ. Growth 75 (2015).\nBut the Proclamation will mean that many companies and employees (both inside and outside the United States) would be unable to take advantage of these opportunities. The Proclamation will prevent companies from inviting customers to the United States and prevent employees from outside the United States from traveling here. That is true even for persons or countries not currently covered by the Proclamation because there is no way to know whether or when a country may be added to the no-entry list.\nThe Proclamation also could lead to retaliatory actions by other countries, which would seriously hinder U.S. companies’ ability to do business or negotiate business deals abroad. U.S. companies’ deals have already been threatened. See, e.g., Jeff Daniels, Trump Immigration Ban Puts $20 Billion in Boeing Aircraft Sales to Iran, Iraq at Risk, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2017), https://goo.gl/uT2goG; Tara Palmeri & Bryan Bender, U.S. Diplomats Warning GE’s Major Deals in Iraq at Risk over Travel Ban, Politico (Feb. 1, 2017), http://goo.gl/nhj9CZ.\nThird, the Proclamation will incentivize both immigration to and investment in foreign countries rather than the United States. Highly skilled\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 56\n\nindividuals will be more interested in working elsewhere, in places where they and their colleagues can travel freely and with assurance that their immigration status will not suddenly be revoked. Other countries have already begun “actively pursuing foreign investors and entrepreneurs, with the aim of increasing investment and creating jobs for the benefit of the national economy.” International Migration Outlook 2017, Org. Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 46 (41st ed. 2017).\nNon-U.S. companies have taken note, too. Multinational companies will have strong incentives, including pressure from their own employees, to base operations outside the United States or to move or hire employees and make investments abroad. Foreign companies will have significantly less incentive to establish operations in the United States and to hire American citizens, because the Proclamation will preclude the ability of those companies to employ their world-class talent within their U.S. subsidiaries. Ultimately, American workers and the economy will suffer as a result.\nOf course, the federal government can and should implement targeted, appropriate adjustments to our country’s immigration system to enhance the Nation’s security. But a broad, open-ended ban—together with the indication that the ban could be expanded to other countries, or that additional, different restrictions could be adopted, without notice—will undermine rather than protect American interests, producing serious, widespread adverse conse-\n\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 56\n\nquences without any reasonable relationship to the goal of making the country more secure. II. THE PROCLAMATION IS UNLAWFUL.\nThe Proclamation is unlawful for several reasons. We focus on three. First, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) does not authorize the use of unilateral executive action to fundamentally and permanently change the character of the Nation’s immigration laws. Second, the Proclamation is not authorized by Section 1182 or the Immigration and Nationality Act as a whole; the Proclamation lacks an adequate finding of detriment; it conflicts with other relevant statutory provisions; and it fails to comply with necessary procedural requirements. And third, the Proclamation violates the nondiscrimination requirement of Section 1152.\nA. The INA does not authorize the executive branch to implement unilateral, permanent revisions of the Nation’s immigration laws.\nThe government relies primarily on the President’s power under the INA to “suspend the entry of … any class of aliens” whose entry he finds “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States … for such period as he shall deem necessary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). It also points to Section 1185(a), which permits the President to issue “reasonable rules, regulations, and orders” and “limitations and exceptions” for the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants. Those grants of authority, the government claims, give the\n\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 56\n\nexecutive branch unilateral authority to put in place a permanent ban on admitting any category of aliens, for any reason.\nBut these statutory provisions do not confer such unlimited authority. No other administration has used these statutes to presumptively prohibit the entry of millions of foreign nationals solely on the basis of their nationality—and in perpetuity. The text and context of Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a) make clear that an exercise of authority must be limited to a specific, emergency situation. The Proclamation here exceeds those limitations.\nBy its terms, Section 1182(f) allows the executive branch to “suspend” the entry of certain aliens for a designated “period”—not to prohibit entry by those aliens in perpetuity. In other words, Section 1182(f) is a gap-filler provision, authorizing targeted, temporary action to respond to an emergency situation. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that Section 1182(f) “provides a safeguard against the danger posed by any particular case or class of cases that is not covered by one of the [inadmissibility] categories in [S]ection 1182(a)”).\nThat was the context in which the language contained in Section 1182(f) was enacted. See page 18, infra. And it is how past administrations have employed this authority since 1952, each time issuing a targeted restriction, usually limited to dozens or hundreds of people on the grounds that each affected person had engaged in culpable conduct, such as human trafficking, illegal entry, or corruption. See Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 56\n\nServ., Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief 6-10 (Jan. 23, 2017), https://goo.gl/D0bRkS. This consistent executive branch practice is powerful evidence of the limited reach of the provision, and it is consistent with the context of Section 1182(f)—as one provision in an extraordinarily detailed set of statutory rules, elaborated in administrative regulations, that govern the issuance of visas and entry of aliens.\nSimilarly, Section 1185(a) permits the President to issue “reasonable rules, regulations, and orders” regarding the entry of aliens into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (emphasis added). It does not purport to give the executive branch authority to engage in wholesale, permanent revision of the Nation’s immigration laws. Were it otherwise, the executive could usurp Congress’s power under Article I, Section 8 to “establish a uniform rule of naturalization.” See also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are … entrusted exclusively to Congress.”) (quotation omitted).\nThe Proclamation here exceeds the powers granted under these two statutory headings. It applies to millions of people, sweeping them in because of their nationality, rather than on the basis of culpable conduct. And unlike the first two executive actions, the Proclamation does not expire—meaning that it is the polar opposite of a time-limited, gap-filling measure. It is, instead, the replacement of the scheme devised by Congress with a new system crafted by the executive branch. That the INA does not permit.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 56\n\nB. The Proclamation exceeds the authority conferred by Section 1182.\nEven assuming that Section 1182 confers authority to permanently revise the Nation’s immigration laws, the Proclamation fails to do so in a manner that comports with the statute.\n1. The Proclamation does not contain a finding sufficient to justify exercise of the authority conferred by Section 1182(f).\nThe text of Section 1182(f) is clear: the President may only suspend the entry of aliens if he “finds” that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Congress could not have made it more plain that it did not intend to confer upon the executive branch unbounded power to bar aliens, and instead conditioned authority under Section 1182(f) upon an adequate finding of detriment.\nThat Congress required such a finding is unsurprising, for Congress may delegate power only if “the executive judgment is limited by adequate standards.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952). An “intelligible principle” must guide the exercise of delegated power. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). For this reason, the Court has consistently identified limits on discretionary authority delegated by Congress, even when confronted with a clause that seems “limitless” when read “in isolation and literally.” United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 198-202 (1957); see, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (rejecting the view that “simply be-\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 56\n\ncause a statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice”); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127, 128 (1958) (considering the power to issue passports, the Court observed that the executive’s authority was “expressed in broad terms,” but refused to “impute to Congress … a purpose to give [the executive] unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose”).\nHere, moreover, the text contains a clear limitation on presidential action: authority under Section 1182 is contingent on finding that the specified aliens’ entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” A reasonable finding of the requisite “detriment[]” thus “constitute[s] a condition precedent to embarking upon the exercise of regulatory power”—and such action is invalid in the absence of such a reasonable determination. Amoco Oil Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Indeed, courts in a variety of contexts analyze whether the executive branch has reasonably made the findings specified by Congress as prerequisites for executive action. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se. Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 227 (1991); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980); United Distribution Cos. v. F.E.R.C., 88 F.3d 1105, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1996).\nThe executive branch must therefore meet a standard of reasonableness in exercising Section 1182(f) authority. Witkovich, 353 U.S. at 198-202 (hold-\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 56\n\ning that authority to request information that the Attorney General “may deem fit and proper” had an implicit limit of reasonableness). That conclusion accords with the longstanding interpretation of the statute by the Executive Branch. See Immigration Laws and Iranian Students, 4A Op. O.L.C. 133, 140 (1979) (recognizing that any suspension under Section 1182(f) “must meet the test of ‘reasonableness’”).\nIn addition, the permissible justifications for the exercise of this authority are limited by the context in which Congress acted when it adopted the language codified in Section 1182(f). Congress drew that text from a series of narrowly drawn wartime statutes, proclamations, and regulations permitting the executive branch to exclude only limited classes of aliens, for limited periods of time, to address emergency situations. See Br. for Resp’ts at 31-36, Hawaii v. Trump, No. 16-1540 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2017). That context restricts how the authority conferred by Section 1182 may be employed. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17-18 (statute “must take its content from history”); Kent, 357 U.S. at 128 (grounds for refusing passport limited to those that “it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice”).\nThe Proclamation transgresses this limitation on executive authority. It provides barely any justification for why the admission of aliens it bans from the United States—based on nothing more than their national origin—would be detrimental to the Nation. Its express aim is to protect U.S. “citizens from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats,” by preventing “foreign na-\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 56\n\ntionals who may … pose a safety threat … from entering the United States.” Proclamation, pmbl. But it “makes no finding that nationality alone renders entry of this broad class of individuals a heightened security risk to the United States.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 772; see also IRAP, 857 F.3d at 610 (Keenan, J., concurring).\nCertainly there is no reasonable basis to conclude that nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen, simply by virtue of their national origin, will commit terrorist activities upon entry to the United States.3 Indeed, the ban applies to hundreds of thousands of students, employees, and family members of citizens who have been previously admitted to the United States—and thus who the United States, after careful, individualized review, concluded that their admission to the United States posed no security risk to the Nation.\nThe past history of admitting these individuals is especially important because “[t]here is no finding that present vetting standards are inadequate.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 771. The Proclamation simply recites well-known facts\n\n3 Indeed, the administration itself did not think so until it found itself embroiled in litigation. As the Ninth Circuit noted, “a draft report from DHS, prepared about one month after EO1 issued and two weeks prior to EO2’s issuance, concluded that citizenship ‘is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity’ and that citizens of countries affected by EO1 are ‘[r]arely [i]mplicated in U.S.-[b]ased [t]errorism.’” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 759 (alterations in original).\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 56\n\nregarding these countries as a whole, ignoring that no alien from these countries admitted to the United States has engaged in terroristic activity.\nThe Proclamation’s purported rationale falls short for other reasons. It “contains internal incoherencies” (Hawaii v. Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 4639560, at 11 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017)): some countries that failed to meet the government’s information-sharing standards are not included in the ban, and vice versa, and the Proclamation offers no rationale for banning some types of visitors from some countries but not others. It is both overinclusive and underinclusive: its focus on nationality “could have the paradoxical effect of barring entry by a Syrian national who has lived in Switzerland for decades, but not a Swiss national who has immigrated to Syria during its civil war.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 773 (quotation omitted). And its reliance on the exclusion of several listed countries from the Visa Waiver Program is unconvincing: “[r]ather than setting an outright ban on entry of nationals from those countries, Congress … instead required that persons who are nationals of or have recently traveled to these countries enter the United States with a visa.” Id. at 774.\nIt is no surprise that the Proclamation falls back on a different rationale: that the designated countries, with the exception of Somalia “continue to have ‘inadequate’ identity-management protocols, information-sharing practices, and risk factors.” Proclamation § 1(g). But “the statutory text plainly requires more than vague uncertainty regarding whether their [nationals’]\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 56\n\nentry might be detrimental to our nation’s interest.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 610 (Keenan, J., concurring). Nor does the purported need to encourage these countries to improve their practices amount to the statutorily required finding that the entry of nationals from these countries “would be detrimental” to the United States. Claimed “uncertainty” cannot constitute a reason for banning 140 million people from the United States based on nothing more than their nationality.\n2. The Proclamation conflicts with other provisions of the INA.\nThe Proclamation also displaces the INA’s specific requirements for excluding aliens on the basis that they might commit acts of terrorism. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). That statute—“a complex provision with 10 different subsections” that “cover[s] a vast waterfront of human activity” (Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2145 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting))—provides a detailed scheme for determining when an alien may be excluded based on a potential to commit terrorist acts. Specifically, an alien who has never before engaged in terrorist activities or joined a terrorist organization may be excluded only if the government has a “reasonable ground to believe” that the alien “is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II).\nThe Proclamation’s system of ad hoc waivers turns that provision on its head. Instead of creating a presumption of admittance absent any “reasona-\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 56\n\nble ground” to think an alien will commit terrorist activities—as Section 1182(a)(3)(B) requires—the Proclamation creates a presumption of exclusion and leaves it to Customs and Border Protection to decide whether an alien has demonstrated, “to the consular officer’s … satisfaction,” that he or she would not threaten national security. Proclamation § 3(c)(i).\nThe Proclamation thus eliminates Congress’s substantive requirement that there be reasonable grounds to exclude an alien on the basis of the threat of future acts of terrorism. And it does so without even attempting to explain why changed circumstances or other facts make Congress’s determinations inadequate to protect the Nation.4\nAs construed by the government, therefore, Section 1182(f) would allow the executive branch to rewrite all of Congress’s detailed rules for when aliens may be excluded, set forth in detail in Section 1182(a). “[T]he statute lists thirty-three distinctly delineated categories that conspicuously provide standards to guide the Executive in its exercise of the exclusion power.” Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1051. But if the executive may ban groups of aliens at will, even for reasons that contradict the standards specified by Congress, it could “thereby effectively nullify[] that complex body of law.” IRAP, 857 F.3d\n4 In addition, Congress in 2015 specifically considered the risk that travelers from these countries might engage in terrorism, and addressed it by exempting them from the visa waiver program. See Pub. L. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)). That congressional determination, too, is overridden by the Proclamation without any justification or explanation.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 56\n\nat 609 (Keenan, J., concurring); see also Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1057 (“The Executive may not use subsection (27) to evade the limitations Congress appended to subsection (28).”).\nIndeed, were the Court to uphold the Proclamation here, an administration could use Section 1182(f) to rewrite the immigration laws in their entirety, prescribing via executive order an entire new regime—with standards for issuing visas and excluding aliens wholly different from those prescribed by Congress. Section 1182(f) does not, as the government would have it, empower the executive to nullify duly enacted immigration laws at will. If it did, such a delegation of authority would pose severe constitutional concerns.\n3. The Proclamation is procedurally unreasonable. The comprehensive revision of the immigration system effected by the Proclamation—and the executive orders that apparently will follow— improperly circumvents Congress’s directive that significant changes in immigration rules be implemented through notice and comment rulemaking. Sections 2(a) to 2(f) of the Proclamation effectively create a new immigration system pursuant to which the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence determine what unspecified “information” countries must share with the United States in order to allow their nationals to enter this country. Then, these officials may\n\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 56\n\nrecommend to the President an expansion or extension of the ban on entry to the United States.\nIn addition, the Proclamation confers effectively unconstrained discretion on consular officers and customs officials to “grant waivers on a case-bycase basis to permit the entry of foreign nationals for whom entry is otherwise suspended or limited.” Proclamation § 3(c). Other than listing a series of nonexclusive considerations, the Proclamation neither proscribes a procedural mechanism for this exercise of discretion, nor establishes substantive guideposts to govern the exercise of this broad discretion.\nCongress expressly identified the need for rulemaking in the INA, authorizing the President to impose “reasonable rules, regulations, and orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a). But no such rulemaking occurred here, notwithstanding the Proclamation’s broad applicability. Moreover, while the Administrative Procedure Act does not generally apply to the President’s actions (see Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469 (1994)), it does apply to the subsequent conduct of the Departments of State and Homeland Security, which must ultimately implement the Proclamation.\nRulemaking “foster[s] … fairness and deliberation” (United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)), and gives “interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (rulemaking process\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 56\n\nensures that an agency has not “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, [or] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency”).\nHere, the notice-and-comment process is particularly important given the huge range of individuals and entities affected by these rules, such as families seeking to reunite, or even just to have the opportunity to visit one another; businesses wishing to interact with customers, to enable employees to obtain experience at their home offices in the United States, or to hire individuals with expertise not otherwise available; and cultural institutions planning performances by artists from outside the United States. For these reasons, Section 1182(f) does not provide a means of circumventing the ordinary rulemaking process for promulgating legal principles of general applicability.\nC. The Proclamation violates Section 1152’s nondiscrimination requirement.\nThe Proclamation separately contravenes 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which provides that “no person shall … be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” “Congress could hardly have chosen more explicit language” to “unambiguously direct[] that no nationality-based discrimination” shall occur with respect to immigration. Legal Assistance for Viet-\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 56\n\nnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996).\nCongress enacted Section 1152 “to eliminate the ‘national origins system as the basis for the selection of immigrants to the United States.’” J.A. 1209 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 89-745, at 8 (1965)). That system, as President Johnson explained, “was incompatible with our basic American tradition” that we “ask not where a person comes from but what are his personal qualities.” H.R. Rep. No. 89-745, at 11. Congress replaced the national origins system with “a new system of selection designed to be fair, rational, humane, and in the national interest” (S. Rep. No. 89-748, at 13 (1965)), based largely on “the advantage to the United States of the special talents and skills of the immigrant.” H.R. Rep. No. 89-745, at 18.\nOn its face, the Proclamation discriminates on the basis of nationality and therefore violates Section 1152. Although the Proclamation purports to bar only the entry of designated foreign nationals, “the denial of entry to immigrants would generally have the effect of causing the denial of immigrant visas.” J.A. 1037. That is precisely what Section 1152 prohibits. Id.; accord Vayeghan v. Kelly, 2017 WL 396531, at 1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2017).5\n5 The Proclamation also cannot be defended as creating “procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications” (8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B)). That statute—at most—permits the executive to regulate the manner in which foreign nationals can receive visas or enter the United States, but does not authorize a sweeping ban on nationals from eight countries.\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 56\n\nSection 1152 must be understood to constrain the powers granted by Section 1182(f). As the Ninth Circuit explained, Section 1152 was enacted after Section 1182, “and sets a limitation on the President’s broad authority to exclude aliens—he may do so, but not in a way that discriminates based on nationality.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 778; see, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (“[W]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”) (quotation omitted). And Section 1152 also “specifically identifies exemptions from the non-discrimination mandate, implying that unmentioned sections are not exempted.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 778.\nThe government asserts that there is no conflict between the Proclamation and Section 1152 because “Section 1152(a) does not even require issuing immigrant visas to aliens whose entry has been validly suspended based on nationality under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a).” Gov. Opening Br. 35. That, as Judge Wynn explained before, “is nonsensical.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 636 (Wynn, J., concurring). It makes no difference that the aliens who are banned by the Proclamation cannot receive visas because they are barred from entering the United States when the reason for that bar is their national origin. And now that “the Proclamation has effectively imposed a permanent, rather than temporary, ban on immigrants from the Designated Countries, … the\n\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 56\n\nbar on entry is the equivalent of a ban on issuing immigrant visas based on nationality.” J.A. 1038.\nThe executive branch may not use Section 1182 to circumvent Congress’s express prohibition on nationality-based discrimination by shifting the step in the process at which that discrimination occurs. Congress could not have intended to prohibit discrimination at the embassy but permit it at the airport gate. Congress instead commanded “that government must not discriminate against particular individuals because of the color of their skin or the place of their birth,” because such discrimination “is unfair and unjustified” wherever it occurs. Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 39 (D.D.C. 1997).\nIn sum, the Proclamation exceeds the authority conferred by Section 1182—but even if it does not, it nonetheless violates the ban on nationalitybased discrimination codified in Section 1152.6\nCONCLUSION The Court should affirm the district court’s decision enjoining enforcement of the Proclamation.\n\n6 To be sure, the text of Section 1152 only prohibits discrimination with respect to immigrant visas. But the basic nondiscrimination principle that it embodies is reflected throughout U.S. law. Olsen, 990 F. Supp. at 33 (addressing nonimmigrant visas). Section 1182(f) therefore does not confer authority to discriminate on this basis with respect to nonimmigrant visas in the absence of a reasonable justification for displacing this fundamental principle. Such a justification is lacking here.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 56\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Andrew J. Pincus Andrew J. Pincus Paul W. Hughes John T. Lewis MAYER BROWN LLP 1999 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 263-3000 apincus@mayerbrown.com phughes@mayerbrown.com jtlewis@mayerbrown.com\nCounsel for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 56\n\nAPPENDIX A LIST OF AMICI CURIAE 1. A Medium Corporation 2. Adobe Systems Incorporated 3. AdRoll, Inc. 4. Affirm, Inc. 5. Airbnb, Inc. 6. Akamai Technologies, Inc. 7. Alation, Inc. 8. Amazon.com, Inc. 9. Ampush LLC 10. Atlassian Corp. Plc 11. Automattic/WordPress.com 12. Azavea Inc. 13. Bigtooth Ventures 14. Box, Inc. 15. Braze, Inc. (formerly Appboy, Inc.) 16. Brightcove Inc. 17. Brocade Communications Systems, Inc 18. CareZone Inc.\n1a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 40 of 56\n\n19. Casper Sleep Inc. 20. Castlight Health 21. Cavium, Inc. 22. Checkr Inc. 23. Chegg, Inc. 24. Chobani, LLC 25. Cloudera, Inc. 26. Cloudflare, Inc. 27. Codecademy 28. Color Genomics, Inc. 29. Credit Karma, Inc. 30. DoorDash 31. Dropbox, Inc. 32. eBay Inc. 33. Electronic Arts Inc. 34. Evernote 35. General Assembly Space, Inc. 36. Glassdoor 37. Google Inc. 38. Greenough Consulting Group\n2a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 41 of 56\n\n39. HP Inc. 40. IDEO LLP 41. Imgur, Inc. 42. Indiegogo, Inc. 43. Intel Corporation 44. Kargo 45. Knotel 46. Levi Strauss & Co. 47. Linden Research, Inc. d/b/a Linden Lab 48. LinkedIn Corporation 49. Lithium Technologies, LLC 50. Lyft, Inc. 51. Mapbox, Inc. 52. Marin Software Incorporated 53. Medallia, Inc. 54. Medidata Solutions, Inc. 55. Microsoft Corporation 56. MongoDB, Inc. 57. Mozilla Corporation 58. MPOWERD Inc.\n3a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 42 of 56\n\n59. NETGEAR, Inc. 60. NewsCred, Inc. 61. NIO USA, Inc. 62. Oath, Inc. 63. Pandora Media, Inc. 64. PayPal Holdings, Inc. 65. Pinterest, Inc. 66. Pixability, Inc. 67. Postmates Inc. 68. Quantcast Corp. 69. RealNetworks, Inc. 70. Redfin Corporation 71. Salesforce.com, Inc. 72. Scopely, Inc. 73. Shutterstock, Inc. 74. Sizmek, Inc. 75. Snap Inc. 76. Spacex 77. Spokeo, Inc. 78. Spotify USA Inc.\n4a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 43 of 56\n\n79. Stripe, Inc. 80. SugarCRM 81. SurveyMonkey Inc. 82. Tesla, Inc. 83. TripAdvisor, Inc. 84. Turo Inc. 85. Twilio Inc. 86. Twitter Inc. 87. Uber Technologies, Inc. 88. Udacity, Inc. 89. Verizon Communications Inc. 90. Via Transportation, Inc. 91. Warby Parker 92. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 93. Work & Co. 94. Yelp Inc. 95. Zendesk, Inc. 96. Zymergen Inc.\n\n5a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 44 of 56\n\nAPPENDIX B CORPORATE DISCLOSURE FOR AMICI CURIAE 1. A Medium Corporation has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 2. Adobe Systems Incorporated has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 3. AdRoll, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 4. Affirm, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 5. Airbnb, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 6. Akamai Technologies, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 7. Alation, Inc. has no parent company and no publicly held company holds 10% or more of its stock. 8. Amazon.com, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 9. Ampush LLC has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n\n6a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 45 of 56\n\n10. Atlassian Corp. Plc has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock\n11. Automattic Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n12. Azavea Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n13. Bigtooth Ventures has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n14. Box, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n15. Braze, Inc. (formerly Appboy, Inc.) has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n16. Brightcove Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n17. Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n18. CareZone Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n19. Casper Sleep Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n\n7a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 46 of 56\n\n20. Castlight Health has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n21. Cavium, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n22. Checkr, Inc. has no parent corporation, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n23. Chegg, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n24. Chobani Global Holdings, LLC is the sole member of Chobani, LLC and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of the membership interest in either entity.\n25. Cloudera, Inc. has no parent corporation and the following publicly held corporation own 10% or more of its stock: Intel Corporation.\n26. Cloudflare, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n27. Ryzac, Inc. d/b/a Codecademy has no parent corporation and Naspers, Ltd., a publicly held corporation, indirectly owns 10% or more of its stock.\n28. Color Genomics, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n\n8a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 47 of 56\n\n29. Credit Karma, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n30. DoorDash has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n31. Dropbox, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n32. eBay Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n33. Electronic Arts Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n34. Evernote Corporation has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n35. General Assembly Space, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n36. Glassdoor, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n37. Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. Alphabet Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n38. Greenough Consulting Group has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n9a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 48 of 56\n\n39. HP Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n40. IDEO LLP has no parent corporation and the following publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock: Steelcase, Inc.\n41. Imgur, Inc. is a privately-held Delaware corporation. No public corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n42. Indiegogo, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n43. Intel Corporation has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n44. Kargo has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n45. Knotel has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n46. Levi Strauss & Co. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n47. Linden Research, Inc. d/b/a Linden Lab has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n48. LinkedIn Corporation’s parent corporation is Microsoft Corporation, and the following publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock: Microsoft Corporation.\n10a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 49 of 56\n\n49. Lithium Technologies, LLC’s parent corporation is Vista Equity Partners and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n50. Lyft, Inc. has no parent corporation and the following publicly held corporation own 10% or more of its stock: Rakuten, Inc., a publicly held corporation traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and General Motors Company, a publicly held corporation traded on the New York Stock Exchange, each own more than ten percent of Lyft’s outstanding stock, in each case through a subsidiary.\n51. Mapbox, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n52. Marin Software Incorporated has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n53. Medallia, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n54. Medidata Solutions, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n55. Microsoft Corporation has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n56. MongoDB, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n\n11a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 50 of 56\n\n57. Mozilla Corporation’s parent corporation is Mozilla Foundation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n58. MPOWERD Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n59. NETGEAR, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n60. NewsCred, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n61. NIO USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NIO Limited, a Hong Kong company, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NIO Inc., a Cayman company.\n62. Oath Inc’s parent corporation is Verizon Business Network Services Inc. No publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n63. Pandora Media, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n64. PayPal Holdings, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n65. Pinterest, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n66. Pixability, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n12a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 51 of 56\n\n67. Postmates Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n68. Quantcast Corp. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n69. RealNetworks, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n70. Redfin Corporation has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n71. Salesforce.com, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n72. Scopely, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n73. Shutterstock, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n74. Sizmek, Inc. is owned by Vector Capital. No public company owns 10% or more of its stock.\n75. Snap Inc. has no parent corporation and the following publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock: Tencent Holdings Ltd., together with its affiliates.\n76. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n13a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 52 of 56\n\n77. Spokeo, Inc. has no parent corporation and there are no publiclyheld corporations that own 10% or more of Spokeo, Inc.’s stock.\n78. Spotify USA Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Spotify AB, a company organized under the laws of Sweden. Spotify AB is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Spotify Technology S.A., a company organized under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Spotify Technology S.A. does not have a parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n79. Stripe, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n80. SugarCRM has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n81. SurveyMonkey Inc.'s parent corporation is SVMK Inc. and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n82. Tesla, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n83. TripAdvisor, Inc. has no parent corporation and the following publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock: Liberty TripAdvisor Holdings, Inc.\n84. Turo Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly help corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n14a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 53 of 56\n\n85. Twilio Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n86. Twitter Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n87. Uber Technologies, Inc. has no parent entity and no publicly held corporation holds 10% or more of its stock.\n88. Udacity, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n89. Verizon Communications Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n90. Via Transportation, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n91. JAND, Inc. d/b/a Warby Parker has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n92. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n93. WorkAndCo International Inc. d/b/a Work & Co. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n94. Yelp Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n\n15a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 54 of 56\n\n95. Zendesk, Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n96. Zymergen Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.\n\n16a\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 55 of 56\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(C), undersigned counsel certifies that this brief: (i) complies with the type-volume limitation of Rule 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 6,482 words, including footnotes and excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii); and (ii) complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared using Microsoft Office Word 2007 and is set in Century Schoolbook font in a size equivalent to 14 points or larger.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Andrew J. Pincus\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 56 of 56\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 17, 2017, I filed the foregoing Brief of Technology Companies As Amici Curiae via the CM/ECF system and served the foregoing via the CM/ECF system on all counsel who are registered CM/ECF users.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Andrew J. Pincus\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 112-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nNO. 17-2331 (L) INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. Defendants-Appellants\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court For the District of Maryland\n(Hon. Theodore D. Chuang, United States District Judge) [Caption Continues on Inside Cover]\nBRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE, THE AMERICAN-ARAB ANTIDISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\n\nAbed A. Ayoub Samer E. Khalaf Yolanda C. Rondon Anton G. Hajjar AMERICAN-ARAB ANTIDISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE 1705 DeSales St. NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 244-2990 aayoub@adc.org\n\nChristopher J. Wright Counsel of Record\nAdrienne E. Fowler E. Austin Bonner HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP 1919 M Street NW, Eighth Floor Washington, DC 20036 (202) 730-1300 cwright@hwglaw.com\n\nCounsel for Amicus Curiae\n\n\fNO. 17-2232 IRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al.\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv. DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.\nDefendants-Appellants\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court For the District of Maryland\n(Hon. Theodore D. Chuang, United States District Judge) (8:17-cv-020921-TDC)\nNO. 17-2233 EBLAL ZAKZOK, et al. Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv. DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.\nDefendants-Appellants\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court For the District of Maryland\n(Hon. Theodore D. Chuang, United States District Judge) (1:17-cv-2969-TDC)\n\n\fNO. 17-2240 INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al.\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. Defendants-Appellants\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court For the District of Maryland\n(Hon. Theodore D. Chuang, United States District Judge) (8:17-cv-361-TDC)\n\n\fTABLE OF CONTENTS\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................ii INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................... 5 ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 11\nI. SECTION 1182(f) DOES NOT PERMIT THE PRESIDENT TO INTENTIONALLY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST MUSLIMS.....11 RFRA limits the scope of the President’s § 1182(f) power. ......... 13 The Court must examine presidential motive to determine whether Proclamation 9645 substantially burdens appellees’ belief in Islam...............................................................................15\nII. RELIGIOUS ANIMUS SUBSTANTIALLY MOTIVATED PROCLAMATION 9645. ............................................................. 20 Well-developed tools can guide the Court in this case. ............... 20\n1. Jury Selection. ...........................................................................20 2. Employment Discrimination. .................................................... 21 3. Free Exercise Clause. ................................................................ 22\nReligious animus impermissibly motivated Proclamation 9645. ............................................................................................. 23 1. Comparisons. ............................................................................. 23 2. Lack of Fit..................................................................................28 3. Atmosphere of Discrimination. ................................................. 30 III. THE PROCLAMATION CANNOT SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY. ................................................................................. 33 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 35 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\n\fii\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,\n422 U.S. 405 (1975) .............................................................................. 28\nBatson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)..................................................................... 20, 21, 24\nBurwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)..................................................................... 16, 18\nChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)....................................................................... passim\nDesert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).................................................................................22\nEmployment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)...............................................................................17\nFoster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016)...........................................................................24\nInt’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. 2017) .......................................................... 5, 19\nJones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995)...................................................................21\nKesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006).................................................................21\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)...............................................................................19\n\n\fiii\nMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)...............................................................................24\nMereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2004).................................................................22\nMiller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)............................................................. 21, 24, 30, 33\nMiller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)............................................................. 24, 28, 29, 33\nPatterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)...............................................................................30\nPurkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995)...............................................................................24\nSherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)................................................................... 16, 17, 18\nStatutes Immigration and Nationality Act,\n8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) .................................................................. 9, 11, 12, 16\nReligious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq............................................................. passim\nOther Authorities Brief of Scholars of Mormon History & Law as Amici Curiae,\nTrump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2017) .............................................................................. 17\nChristopher Woody, The Tipping Point: More And More Venezuelans Are Uprooting Their Lives To Escape Their Country’s Crises, Business Insider (Dec. 2, 2016) ................................................ 26\nExecutive Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017)................2, 7\n\n\fiv\nExecutive Order 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) ............... 2, 7\nH.R. Rep. No. 103-88 (1993)....................................................................14\nLeti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575 (2002).................................................................4\nPew Research Center, The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Major Religious Groups as of 2010 (2012) ..................................................................................... 2\nPresident Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit (May 21, 2017) ........................................................................................ 4\nRonald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, 6 Treatise on Constitutional Law-Substance & Procedure (5th ed. 2017) ........................................................................................ 17\nS. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993) ...................................................................... 14\n\n\fINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) is a nonprofit, grassroots civil rights organization committed to defending the rights of people of Arab descent and promoting their rich cultural heritage. Founded in 1980 by U.S. Senator James Abourezk, ADC is non-sectarian and non-partisan. With members from all fifty states and chapters nationwide, it is the largest Arab-American grassroots organization in the United States. ADC protects the Arab-American and immigrant communities against discrimination, racism, and stereotyping, and it vigorously advocates for immigrant and civil rights.1 Presidential Proclamation 9645 places a significant and undeserved burden on ADC and its members. It indefinitely bans from entry into the United States immigrants who are nationals of six Muslim-majority nations: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Chad. Proclamation 9645 also significantly limits or bans the entry of\n1 ADC certifies that all parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, no party or party’s counsel made a monetary contribution to fund its preparation or submission, and no person other than amicus or its counsel made such a monetary contribution.\n1\n\n\fnon-immigrants who are nationals of these six nations. JA 624; see also Pew Research Center, The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Major Religious Groups as of 2010, 46 (2012). Four of these nations are majority-Arab,2 and the other two have significant Arab minority populations.3 Proclamation 9645 also affects nationals of two non-Muslim-majority nations: all nationals of North Korea and certain specific individuals who are Venezuelan nationals. JA 624. However, the overwhelming majority of individuals harmed by Proclamation 9645 are nationals of Muslim-majority nations, as was the case with the Presidents’ earlier efforts to prevent Muslims and Arabs from entering into the United States.4\nADC has worked with thousands of close friends and family of ADC members located in the United States affected by the ban. By way of example, A.A. is a Yemeni citizen who trained as an engineer; his sister and brother-in-law are lawful permanent residents of the U.S.\n2 Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. 3 Iran and Chad. 4 Proclamation 9645 follows two executive orders that exclusively banned entry by nationals of certain majority-Muslim nations. Executive Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (“January Order”); Executive Order 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (“March Order”).\n2\n\n\fUnable to secure work due to ongoing armed conflict in Yemen, A.A. studied English. He applied and was selected for a diversity visa interview. After his interview, a consular official informed A.A. that, due to a predecessor travel ban that, see infra 6-8, A.A. must prove a bona fide, close familial relationship with a U.S. citizen or green card holder before receiving his visa. A.A. quickly provided this information, but the delay meant that all 50,000 diversity visas that could be issued in 2017 had already been allotted before his application was processed. A.A. is currently in limbo; his family in the United States lives in fear for his safety and feel that they, too, are unwelcome in the U.S. because, like A.A., they are Muslim Yemeni nationals. If Proclamation 9645 is implemented, A.A. may remain perpetually in limbo.\nSimilarly, Q.A. is a Muslim Yemeni national whose daughter is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. He also “won” eligibility for a diversity visa in the lottery. The visa would have enabled him, his wife, and his four other children to enter the United States. Q.A. faced similar administrative delays associated with having to prove his bona fide connection to the United States; as a result, he could not get his visa processed before all of the 2017 diversity visas\n3\n\n\fhad already been issued, despite quickly providing information regarding his bona fide ties. Q.A.’s daughter remains in the United States without the familial, religious, and economic support of her parents and siblings.\nMoreover, Proclamation 9645 was intended to have and has had the effect of branding Islam as a dangerous religion and making clear that Muslims are not fully welcome in the United States. Plainly, this harms Muslim American Arabs. But it also harms American Arabs who are not Muslim. Americans frequently conflate Arabic ethnicity with belief in Islam, despite the fact that most Muslims are not Arab.5 Accordingly, Arab-Americans, regardless of faith, suffer from the effects of a government-sanctioned message that Muslims are threatening and un-American. ADC therefore urges the Court to uphold the portions of the district court’s decision that granted relief to appellees, and to overturn the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs are not\n5 See generally Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1584 (2002); see also President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit (May 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/21/presidenttrumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit (describing as a single category “Arab, Muslim and Middle Eastern nations”).\n4\n\n\fsubstantially likely to succeed in their claim that Proclamation 9645 exceeds the President’s statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Presidential motive matters here. It may not always (or even often) matter when the President bars a given category of individuals from entering the United States. But the specific history behind Proclamation 9645 and the discriminatory manner in which it operates require the Court to examine whether the President is telling the truth about why he adopted the Proclamation, or if his purported national security rationale shelters the primary motive: disadvantaging belief in Islam. Various courts, including this one, have already concluded that the two Executive Orders, on which the President based Proclamation 9645, were specifically designed to keep Muslims out of America based largely on extraordinary statements where President Trump declared his intent to discriminate against Muslims in the immigration context. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. 2017). In describing his plans for future immigration policy, Candidate Trump\n5\n\n\fpromised “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” JA 135. He made his animus for Muslims inside and outside of the U.S. clear, stating in public interviews that “Islam hates us [and] . . . we can’t allow people coming into the country who have this hatred,” and, “[W]e’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” JA 305-306, 311.\nAlmost immediately after taking office, President Trump signed a first Executive Order, which both imposed a temporary travel ban and set the criteria officials should examine when designing a permanent travel ban, without consulting any government national security experts. See JA 173. With a wink and a nod, he made clear that the first Executive Order made good on his promise of a Muslim ban even though the ban applied to immigration from majority-Muslim countries. JA 192 (“This is the ‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ We all know what that means.”). Any ambiguity on that score was clarified by the Executive Order’s provisions ensuring that non-Muslims from the affected countries would be given preferential treatment. See January Order § 5. The Executive\n6\n\n\fOrder directed the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with additional government officials, to conduct a worldwide review of whether foreign governments could provide additional information that would suffice for the U.S. to determine an applicant is not a security threat and (if so) what additional information was needed for each country. January Order § 2(a). After giving each country the opportunity to provide any necessary and sufficient additional information, the Secretary was to recommend a list of countries whose nationals should be included in a permanent travel ban. Id. § 2(e).\nAfter the first Executive Order was invalidated, President Trump enacted a revised Muslim ban designed to evade judicial scrutiny. See JA 778-779. Like the January Executive Order, the March Executive Order required the Secretary of Homeland Security to engage in an analysis that would evaluate countries’ citizens for inclusion in a future, permanent travel ban. March Order § 2.\nAfter this Court (and others) found the second Executive Order to likely be unlawful, the President enacted the Proclamation now under review. The face of the Proclamation claims that it is designed to “protect the security and interests of the United States and its people”\n7\n\n\fand that it neutrally affects nationals of countries that “remain deficient . . . with respect to their identity-management and information-sharing capabilities, protocols, and practices.” JA 620. But Proclamation 9645 is more of the same: Presidential action that is designed to keep Muslims out of the United States because of their faith, despite being facially neutral toward religion. It indefinitely bans from entry into the United States immigrants who are nationals of six Muslim-majority nations (all but one of which had been covered by the earlier Executive Orders) and indefinitely limits non-immigrant entry by nationals of these countries—impacting tens of thousands of individuals from these nations on the theory that Muslims are dangerous. JA 624-626. While on its face the Proclamation also affects nationals of two non-Muslim-majority nations, Venezuela and North Korea, id., in practice, it excludes only a handful of individuals from those nations. See JA 1066. All the while, the President has continued to demonstrate that he personally has animus against Muslims, see JA 644, 1073-1074. The government has refused to disclose whether Proclamation 9645 is materially inconsistent with the advice he received from his advisors. JA 952-953.\n8\n\n\fThe government urges the Court to look away, contending that, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), the Court must take the President at his word that his primary motivation in enacting Proclamation 9645 was national security—and that the Court must decline to take the President at his earlier word that he intended to impose a travel ban on Muslims. See Appellants’ Br. at 29-32, 40-43. Not so.\nAs the district court properly held, the Establishment Clause enables courts to examine the President’s motives because appellees had “plausibly alleged” that the President’s national security rationale was “not bona fide.” JA 1056. It applied an analysis of the President’s motive grounded in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and it concluded appellees were likely to show that Proclamation 9645 was unconstitutional because it was primarily motivated by religious animus.\nHowever, the district court did not fully analyze the interplay between primary presidential motive and the extent of the President’s power in the statutory context. The district court held that § 1182(f) authorized the President to adopt Proclamation 9645, and that\n9\n\n\fCongress had not provided “any clear limit on the President’s authority under § 1182(f) that this proclamation has crossed.” JA 1051. But promulgating a proclamation based on religious animus would exceed the limit Congress placed on the President’s § 1182(f) authority in adopting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).\nWhen adopting RFRA, Congress revoked any prior authority the President may have had under § 1182(f) to take any action that “substantially burden[s] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless he can show that the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. A showing of animus provides clear-cut evidence that the Proclamation, in fact, disfavors belief in Islam. History shows that laws designed to single out and discriminate against members of a minority religion almost always serve their intended purpose, and then some. Thus, RFRA requires the Court to examine whether the Presidents’ purported justification for Proclamation 9645 conceals unlawful animus against Muslims.\nIn engaging in this statutory pretext analysis—or, for that matter,\n10\n\n\fa pretext analysis under the Establishment Clause—the Court can reply on well-developed frameworks for unmasking unlawful discrimination underlying facially reasonable justifications. These frameworks, developed in cases involving jury selection, employment discrimination, and the free exercise of religion, confirm the district court’s conclusion that the President’s primary motivation in promulgating Proclamation 9645 was animus toward Muslims—making the Proclamation subject to strict scrutiny under both RFRA and the Establishment Clause.\nLooking at motive here does not prevent executive action under § 1182(f) that is primarily aimed at advancing national security interests, because such interests are indeed compelling. It surely must be the unusual case where executive action addressing national security interests is the product of religious animus and is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. But the Court is presented with such an unusual case here.\nARGUMENT I. SECTION 1182(f) DOES NOT PERMIT THE PRESIDENT\nTO INTENTIONALLY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST MUSLIMS. The district court properly concluded that (1) the President may\n11\n\n\fnot use § 1182(f) in a manner that violates the Establishment Clause and (2) courts, in Establishment Clause cases, have the power to find the President acted with a primary purpose of religious animus upon an affirmative showing of bad faith. However, the district court did not consider that the same holds true as a matter of statutory analysis. Section 1182(f) provides an alternative reason for affirming the district court’s ruling that is supported by the record.\nThe government contends that § 1182(f) authorized the President to promulgate Proclamation 9645. That section provides:\nWhenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). While this provision is facially quite broad, Congress mandated that it be read in harmony with RFRA. RFRA makes clear that the President has no power to use § 1182(f) in a way that substantially burdens belief in Islam, unless his action represents the least restrictive means of furthering some compelling governmental\n12\n\n\finterest.6 Substantial burden can be presumed if the President was\nsubstantially motivated by religious animus when invoking § 1182(f).\nCongress intended RFRA to apply with equal force to the President’s\npower in the immigration arena. As such, this Court must examine\nwhether the President was substantially motivated by religious animus\nwhen he adopted the Proclamation pursuant to 1182(f). RFRA limits the scope of the President’s § 1182(f) power.\nRFRA limits the federal government’s ability to “substantially\nburden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a\nrule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. Such action, even if\nsupported by statute and facially religion-neutral, is valid only if it “(1)\nis in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the\nleast restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental\ninterest.”\n6 The IRAP appellees’ complaint includes a claim based on RFRA’s independent cause of action. JA 539. The district court did not evaluate whether the IRAP appellees were likely to succeed on the merits of their RFRA claim. If the Court determines that appellees are not entitled to preliminary relief for their Establishment Clause or INA causes of action, the Court should evaluate whether RFRA provides an alternative basis for affirming the decision below, or remand with instructions to consider the issue.\n13\n\n\fRFRA limits all federal statutes that were passed before its effective date; it prevents any government official from interpreting a statute or engaging in statutorily authorized action that could substantially burden religion, unless the action or interpretation can survives strict scrutiny. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3. In other words, to the extent that § 1182(f) could be construed to impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion in a manner that did not pass strict scrutiny, that construction is invalid.\nImportantly, RFRA does not contain an exception for the immigration or national security arenas, or for the President; it “applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993.” Id. Consequently, “[s]eemingly reasonable regulations based upon speculation [and] exaggerated fears of thoughtless policies cannot stand,” even in contexts where the political branches are due considerable deference. H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 8 (1993) (explaining that RFRA applies even to the military context, where executive authority is at its height); accord S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8, 12 (1993). Thus, Proclamation 9645 exceeds the President’s § 1182(f) authority if it\n14\n\n\fimposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion in a manner that fails strict scrutiny.\nThe Court must examine presidential motive to determine whether Proclamation 9645 substantially burdens appellees’ belief in Islam. The district court examined the religious liberty implications of Proclamation 9645 only under the Establishment Clause. But if appellees successfully show that the Proclamation was motivated by animus against Muslims, the Proclamation would be subject to strict scrutiny under both the Establishment Clause and the statutory and constitutional protections for free exercise, including RFRA. Because both the Establishment Clause and RFRA limit the President’s authority under the INA, whether the President adopted the Proclamation due to religious animus is highly relevant to whether the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority under the INA. Government action that privileges belief in one religion over another undoubtedly implicates the Establishment Clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (courts have repeatedly held that government activity designed to “discriminate[] against some or all religious beliefs” violates the\n15\n\n\fEstablishment Clause). Accordingly, ADC echoes the district court’s conclusion that the Establishment Clause prevents the President from exercising § 1182(f) with the aim of disfavoring Islam.\nBut favoring belief in one religion over another also implicates protections for the free exercise of religion. Holding a religious belief is a form of religious exercise and an extraordinarily protected form at that. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (“The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 (2014) (explaining that the term “exercise of religion” within the meaning of RFRA involves religious belief that does not result in any additional action). Government may not “penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities.” Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (incorporating the Sherbert standard into RFRA). This is because government action adopted to discriminate against religious beliefs, almost without fail, will penalize belief in that religion. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 564 (striking down a “rare example of a law actually aimed at suppressing religious exercise” on Free Exercise\n16\n\n\fClause grounds); Brief of Scholars of Mormon History & Law as Amici Curiae, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2017). Accordingly, both free exercise and antiestablishment jurisprudence “prevent the government from singling out specific religious sects for special benefits or burdens.” Ronald Rotunda & John E. Nowak, 6 Treatise on Constitutional Law-Substance & Procedure § 21.1(a) (5th ed. 2017).\nBecause Sherbert and its progeny require courts to apply strict scrutiny to government action animated by animus a particular religious belief, 374 U.S. at 402, so too does RFRA. This approach is a product of history and of statute: In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-90 (1990), the Supreme Court substantially limited the application of Sherbert, holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not subject most facially neutral laws of general applicability to strict scrutiny. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to Smith and applied statutory protections that mirrored the protections for free exercise set out in Sherbert and its progeny by specific reference. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. Thus, the Supreme Court has used the Sherbert line of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence to determine whether government action substantially\n17\n\n\fburdens the exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770.\nLukumi and Sherbert show that government action based on animus toward believers in any particular faith so strongly suggests the imposition of a substantial burden that, if Proclamation 9645 was adopted to discriminate against Muslims, appellees need to show little more (if anything) to demonstrate Proclamation 9645 imposes a substantial burden on them. Appellees are likely to make such a showing. Multiple organizational appellees allege that their members “will remain in limbo as to whether they will ever be reunited” with family members who could not enter the U.S. due to the Proclamation. JA 521; accord JA 517. Another organizational appellee represents students who, under the Proclamation, “lose their ability to visit family and friends abroad with an assurance they will be permitted to reenter,” including for religious and secular holidays. JA 524. Yet another has members who, since the issuance of the President’s first travel ban, “have been subjected to harassment by law enforcement agencies conducting new security checks” and “been detained at airports, or rejected from flights multiple times even though they are\n18\n\n\fpresenting valid visas.” JA 517. Individual appellees also allege significant burdens, including being accosted by a customer or experiencing differential treatment when wearing a headscarf due to the travel ban. JA 537-538. If proven, these allegations would surely suffice to demonstrate that appellees are substantially burdened because they believe in (or are an organization serving individuals that believe in) Islam.\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972), does not alter this conclusion. The government contends that Mandel precludes the Court from “looking behind” the rationale put forth in the text of Proclamation 9645. Appellants’ Br. 40. Even assuming arguendo that Mandel precludes the Court from examining the President’s motives as part of its constitutional analysis,7 Mandel plainly does not apply to the Court’s statutory analysis. Mandel did not involve an application of § 1182(f) and was decided before RFRA was enacted.\n7 It does not. As this Court previously held, Mandel and other precedents requiring deference to the President’s national security judgment do not bar an inquiry beyond the face of his justifications where, as in this case, there has been “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590-91.\n19\n\n\fII. RELIGIOUS ANIMUS SUBSTANTIALLY MOTIVATED PROCLAMATION 9645. As courts have long recognized, discriminatory actions are often\nsheltered behind or intertwined with facially legal reasoning. Accordingly, courts have developed robust tools for determining whether a party’s stated reason for acting masks an impermissible discriminatory motive, including in cases involving the free exercise of religion, jury selection, and employment. Here, where the President’s extraordinary public statements cannot help but raise the specter of religious animus (and where RFRA narrows the deference ordinarily owed to the President in the immigration and national security arenas), those tools can aid the Court in evaluating whether the Proclamation is unlawful, despite the government’s assertions that it was adopted solely to promote national security.\nWell-developed tools can guide the Court in this case. 1. Jury Selection. When criminal defendants allege racial discrimination in prosecutors’ use of peremptory strikes, courts evaluate prosecutors’ proffered reasons for pretext as part of the Batson v. Kentucky framework. 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). In a Batson challenge, the defendant\n20\n\n\fmust first produce evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. at 97. Once the prima facie case is established, the government must come forward with a neutral non-discriminatory explanation for the strike. Id. at 97-98. The court then determines whether, in light of the prosecution’s proffered reason, the defendant has nevertheless established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98. Batson’s third step often turns on a pretext analysis. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). In mixed motive cases—cases where a strike “has been exercised in part for a discriminatory purpose” and in part for a non-discriminatory purpose—a strike survives Batson step three only if the prosecutor persuasively demonstrates that “the strike would have nevertheless been exercised even if an improper factor had not motivated in part the decision to strike.” Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 420-21 (4th Cir. 1995). While a Batson analysis is deferential to the government, it “is not toothless in the face of . . . blatant” discrimination. Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2006).\n2. Employment Discrimination. Allegations brought under employment discrimination statutes often include a pretext inquiry even in mixed-motive cases, where an\n21\n\n\femployer allegedly engaged in adverse employment action “where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003). To succeed in such mixedmotive cases where pretext is alleged, the plaintiff must show that discrimination “was a substantial motivating factor” in the employer’s decision to engage in adverse action. Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 339 (4th Cir. 2004). Proof that “would have taken the same action even absent” discriminatory intent serves as an affirmative defense. Id.\n3. Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has also evaluated pretext in the context of a Free Exercise Clause challenge to government action allegedly motivated by religious animus. In Lukumi, the Supreme Court held that “[f]acial neutrality” of government action “is not determinative” of whether it is designed to limit the free exercise of religion. 508 U.S. at 534. After noting that the text, history, and application of the challenged ordinance suggested discrimination on the basis of religious belief, the Supreme Court engaged in an independent analysis of whether the ordinance was adopted for a religiously neutral purpose. Id.\n22\n\n\fReligious animus impermissibly motivated Proclamation 9645. In ferreting out discrimination in these areas, a few categories of evidence are especially probative of pretext. Courts have been particularly alert to: (1)unexplained differences between the treatment of members of different groups; (2)a lack of fit between the stated reasons for an action and that action’s results; and (3)an atmosphere of discrimination, based on past statements or actions. Looking to those forms of evidence here, the inevitable conclusion is that animus towards Muslims substantially motivated Proclamation 9645. 1. Comparisons. Courts compare individuals or groups subject to a challenged action to those not affected in order to assess whether an unlawful motive hides behind a facially valid one. In the Free Exercise context, a strong inference of discriminatory motive arises when the burden of governmental action “in practical terms, falls on adherents [of a particular religion] but almost no others” or the challenged government action exempts non-religiously motivated conduct. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at\n23\n\n\f536-37. In employment discrimination cases, such comparisons are “especially relevant” to a finding of pretext. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). In the Batson context, “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005); see also Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1750 (2016) (finding certain explanations “difficult to credit because the State willingly accepted white jurors with the same traits that supposedly rendered Garrett an unattractive juror”).\nPut simply, if a party claims to have a particular rationale for its actions, but then applies that rationale in a disparate manner based on race, gender, or religion, that strongly suggests that race, gender, or religion is the true basis for the party’s actions. When no plausible explanation is offered for that disparate application, the inference of discrimination becomes stronger still. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 345; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (characterizing “implausible or fantastic justifications” as “pretexts for purposeful discrimination”).\nThe stated rationale for Proclamation 9645—alleviating the risk\n24\n\n\fthat a foreign government’s vetting procedures will fail to identify a dangerous individual, JA 624—has quite clearly been applied disparately, in a way that is nearly impossible to explain without reference to religion. Most of the nations covered by Proclamation 9645 are majority-Muslim. But more importantly for a religious discrimination analysis, Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536-37, almost all of the individuals whose entry into the United States is affected are nationals of majority-Muslim nations.8 The Proclamation affects roughly 65,000 nationals of majority-Muslim nations—every single national of six nations who seeks entry to the United States. See JA 866 (estimating number of affected individuals). Less than a hundred nationals of nonmajority-Muslim nations are likely effected. See id. (estimating 61 affected individuals for North Korea and a small handful of specific individuals from Venezuela). In other words, an estimated 99.9% of individuals affected by the ban will be nationals of Muslim-majority nations.\nThis gross disparity might conceivably be justified if only\n8 There are various ways to estimate the number of affected individuals, but all show that almost everyone affected is the national of a Muslimmajority nation. See First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellees at 7.\n25\n\n\fgovernments of Muslim-majority countries had security and information-sharing problems. Or if entry from all non-Muslim-majority countries with security and information-sharing problems were rare. The Proclamation’s treatment of Venezuelan nationals, however, shows that neither of these scenarios exists.\nA large and growing number of Venezuelan nationals seek to enter the United States. See Christopher Woody, The Tipping Point: More And More Venezuelans Are Uprooting Their Lives To Escape Their Country’s Crises, Business Insider (Dec. 2, 2016). The President concluded that “Venezuela’s government fails to share public-safety and terrorism-related information adequately, fails to satisfy at least one key risk criterion, and has been assessed to be not fully cooperative with respect to receiving its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States.” JA 625. Nonetheless, unlike similarly situated majority-Muslim nations, the Proclamation restricts entry only by “officials of government agencies of Venezuela involved in screening and vetting procedures” rather than all Venezuelan nationals. Id.\nThe Proclamation attempts to dismiss this disparity, stating “[t]here are . . . alternative sources for obtaining information to verify\n26\n\n\fthe citizenship and identity of nationals from Venezuela.” Id. This leaves entirely unaddressed the Proclamation’s own conclusions that Venezuela fails to satisfy at least one key risk criterion (i.e., that terrorist groups are active within Venezuela, see JA 1296) and does not cooperate with taking back Venezuelans who have been deported from the U.S. The President used these same factors to justify restricting entry by any citizen from Chad and Somalia. See JA 624, 626.\nComparing the Proclamation’s treatment of Somalia to nonmajority-Muslim nations is also telling. Somalia met the informationsharing requirements that the government applied to every other nation. JA 626. Nonetheless, the President deemed Somalia—and no other country—to present such a risk to national security that all Somalian nationals should face severe restrictions on entry into the U.S. Id. The government provides no evidence that it engaged in the same type of analysis with respect to non-majority-Muslim nations that met the government’s information-sharing requirements. The government’s religion-neutral explanation for imposing a burden on a large group of individuals, 99.9% of whom come from Muslim-majority nations, simply does not add up.\n27\n\n\f2. Lack of Fit. The inference of discriminatory pretext becomes stronger still when a party’s stated goal could be accomplished just as effectively without a disparate impact. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (explaining that evidence that an employment policy’s goal could be accomplished without an “undesirable racial effect” demonstrates pretext); Dretke, 545 U.S. at 260 (examining the “fit” between prosecutors’ stated reason for striking jurors and the actual impact on the jury pool). If a more efficient method exists to accomplish a stated goal, the natural question to ask is why someone chose the less efficient method. When ignoring efficiency creates clear disparate impact on members of a particular class, that question answers itself: the stated goal is a pretext for discrimination. Restricting all nationals of six majority-Muslim nations and North Korea is not an effective way to combat terrorism. A Department of Homeland Security draft report, prepared about two weeks before the President’s second Executive Order took effect, concluded that citizenship “is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity.” JA 898. Indeed, the biggest nationality-based predictor of\n28\n\n\fsomeone committing a terrorist act on U.S. soil is American citizenship. Id. Yet the President directed the Department of Homeland Security to focus on citizenship when recommending which countries should be included in a permanent travel ban—recommendations that laid the basis for Proclamation 9645.\nThe point is not that the Proclamation constitutes bad policy or relies on questionable national security judgments. Rather, this evidence makes clear that the Proclamation’s means do not match its stated ends. There is no “fit of fact and explanation.” Dretke, 545 U.S. at 260. And when a party’s stated explanation deviates so dramatically from clear facts, this Court often draws the obvious inference that the stated explanation is not really the main one.\nThat inference is even stronger when, as here, a different, discriminatory explanation leads to a “much tighter fit of fact and explanation.” Id. Although the Proclamation does a poor job of preventing terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, it makes significant strides toward fulfilling a campaign promise to curtail the entry of Muslims into the United States.\n29\n\n\f3. Atmosphere of Discrimination. An atmosphere of discrimination also provides evidence of pretext. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989), abrogated on other statutory grounds (“[P]etitioner could seek to persuade the jury that respondent had not offered the true reason for its promotion decision by presenting evidence of respondent’s past treatment of petitioner, including the instances of the racial harassment.”); Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 539 (looking to the timing and circumstances surrounding an ordinance’s passage when evaluating its constitutionality); Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 346-47 (explaining “historical evidence of racial discrimination” and a “culture [that] in the past was suffused with bias” tend “to erode the credibility of the prosecution’s assertion that race was not a motivating factor,” especially when the prosecution uses the same tactics that had previously been shown to be racially motivated). Repeated invidious statements by the President and his advisors evince just the sort of culture suffused with bias that warrants skepticism toward alleged explanations. Most prominently, for a long period of time during his presidential campaign, President Trump explicitly called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering\n30\n\n\fthe United States until our country’s representatives can figure out\nwhat is going on.” JA 135. But President Trump did not back down from\nthese positions after Election Day. The text of the January Executive\nOrder echoed language about presumed hate and anti-American\nattitudes among Muslims that he had used in his original calls for a\nban, alluding to stereotypes particularly commonly applied to Arab\nMuslims:\nIn order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles. The United States cannot, and should not, admit those who do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including “honor” killings, other forms of violence against women, or the persecution of those who practice religions different from their own) or those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation. January Order § 10. In signing that Executive Order, President Trump\nsaid, “This is the ‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry\ninto the United States.’ We all know what that means.” JA 192. The\nclear implication is that the Order furthered President Trump’s\nlongstanding promise to implement a “shutdown of Muslims entering\nthe United States.” JA 257.\n31\n\n\fPresident Trump has never disavowed his earlier anti- Muslim sentiments. To the contrary, President Trump reiterated his intent to “keep my campaign promises” despite negative judicial decisions regarding the legality of his first Executive Order. JA 141. Senior Policy Advisor to the President Stephen Miller, in discussing plans for a second Executive Order, explained that it would produce the “same basic policy outcome for the country,” with “mostly minor technical differences.” JA 756. Then-Press Secretary Sean Spicer concurred, saying, “The principles of the Executive Order remain the same.” JA 168. And after he had signed the March Executive Order, President Trump described it in a major speech as “a watered down version of the first order.” JA 779.\nThe President’s discriminatory statements continued through shortly before he signed Proclamation 9645. While awaiting recommendations from his advisors, the President promised that his final travel ban, now embodied in Proclamation 9645, would impose a “much tougher version” of his earlier travel bans. JA 664. On August 17, 2017, President Trump tweeted, “Study what General Pershing of the United States did to terrorists when caught. There was no more Radical Islamic Terror for 35 years!” JA 509. As appellees explain:\n32\n\n\fThis statement refers to the apocryphal story of General Pershing executing 49 out of 50 terrorists with bullets dipped in pigs’ blood, leaving the fiftieth person alive to tell the tale. While this is not the first time President Trump has referred to this story, it has been routinely debunked by historians and the press. Id.\nThese statements provide strong evidence that religion “was on\n[President Trump’s] mind[] when [he] considered” the Proclamation.\nDretke, 545 U.S. at 266. This case presents the sort of atmosphere of\ndiscrimination that “tends to erode the credibility of” assertions that\nimpermissible discrimination “was not a motivating factor.” Cockrell, 537\nU.S. at 346. Given President Trump’s numerous, unequivocal\nstatements focused on the threat of “hatred and danger” from Muslims,\nthe reasons proffered for implementing Proclamation 9645 were, at the\nvery most, secondary to religious animus. III. THE PROCLAMATION CANNOT SURVIVE STRICT\nSCRUTINY. Because Proclamation 9645 imposes a substantial burden on belief\nin Islam, the President only has authority to promulgate it under\n§ 1182(f) if the Proclamation sets forth the least restrictive means of\nfurthering the government’s indisputably compelling interest in\nnational security. Under this “more robust standard of review,”\n33\n\n\fappellees’ § 1182(f) argument must “carry the day.” JA 1043. As the district court concluded, the government has “not shown that national security cannot be maintained without an unprecedented eight-country travel ban.” JA 1078.\nThe government is also unlikely to show that the Proclamation is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The government has no compelling interest in discriminating against belief in Islam. Although national security is a compelling interest, the Proclamation is not narrowly tailored to meet it; instead, focusing on entrants’ nationality is at best a crude and ineffective proxy for the security risks they present. See supra Part II(B)(2). Therefore, the Proclamation cannot survive the scrutiny required by the Establishment Clause and § 1182(f) as limited by RFRA.\n34\n\n\fCONCLUSION We respectfully request that the Court grant appellees’ crossappeal and deny appellants’ cross-appeal.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nAbed A. Ayoub Samer E. Khalaf Yolanda C. Rondon Anton G. Hajjar AMERICAN-ARAB ANTIDISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE 1705 DeSales St. NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 244-2990 aayoub@adc.org\n\n/s/ Christopher J. Wright Christopher J. Wright\nCounsel of Record Adrienne E. Fowler E. Austin Bonner HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP 1919 M Street NW, Eighth Floor Washington, DC 20036 (202) 730-1300 cwright@hwglaw.com\n\nCounsel for Amicus Curiae\n\n35\n\n\fUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Effective 12/01/2016\n\nNo. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_____ Caption: _IR__A_P__e_t_a_l_._v_._T_r_u_m__p_e_t__a_l.___________________________\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT Type-Volume Limit, Typeface Requirements, and Type-Style Requirements\n\nType-Volume Limit for Briefs: Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellee’s Response Brief, and Appellant’s Response/Reply Brief may not exceed 13,000 words or 1,300 lines. Appellee’s Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 15,300 words or 1,500 lines. A Reply or Amicus Brief may not exceed 6,500 words or 650 lines. Amicus Brief in support of an Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 7,650 words. Amicus Brief filed during consideration of petition for rehearing may not exceed 2,600 words. 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A monospaced typeface (such as Courier New) must be 12-point or larger (at least 10½ characters per inch). Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5), 32(a)(6).\n\nThis brief or other document complies with type-volume limits because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. R. 32(f) (cover page, disclosure statement, table of contents, table of citations, statement regarding oral argument, signature block, certificates of counsel, addendum, attachments):\n[✔] this brief or other document contains 6482 [state number of] words\n\n[ ] this brief uses monospaced type and contains\n\n[state number of] lines\n\nThis brief or other document complies with the typeface and type style requirements because:\n\n[✔] this brief or other document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using\n\nMicrosoft Word\n\n[identify word processing program] in\n\nCentury Schoolbook, 14 pt.\n\n[identify font size and type style]; or\n\n[ ] this brief or other document has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [identify word processing program] in [identify font size and type style].\n\n(s) Christopher J. Wright\n\nParty Name American-Arab Anti-Discrimination\n\nDated: 11/17/2017\n\n11/14/2016 SCC\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 1 of 39\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself\nand its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD\nMASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED;, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R.\nCOATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence. Defendants-Appellants.\n\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross- Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,\nSouthern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\n\nAMICI BRIEF OF KAREN KOREMATSU, JAY HIRABAYASHI, HOLLY YASUI, THE FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY, CIVIL RIGHTS\nORGANIZATIONS, AND NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES\n\nFRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY\nRobert S. Chang Lorraine K. Bannai Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic Seattle University School of Law 1215 East Columbia St. Seattle, WA 98122 Telephone: (206) 398-4025 Facsimile: (206) 398-4261\n\nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP\nPratik A. Shah Martine E. Cicconi Robert S. Strauss Building 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 887-4000 Facsimile: (202) 887-4288\n\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae (Counsel continued on inside cover)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 2 of 39\n\nNO. 17-2232 (8:17-CV-02921-TDC)\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6; IRANIAN STUDENTS’ FOUNDATION, Iranian Alliances Across Borders\nAffiliate at the University of Maryland College Park, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his\nofficial capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration\nServices; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States. Defendants-Appellants.\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC)\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his\nofficial capacity as Secretary of State. Defendants-Appellants.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 3 of 39\n\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself\nand its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD\nMASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs-Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R.\nCOATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence. Defendants-Appellees.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 4 of 39\n\nEric Yamamoto Fred T. Korematsu\nProfessor of Law and Social Justice William S. Richardson School of Law University of Hawai’i 2515 Dole Street Honolulu, Hawai`i 96822 Telephone: (808) 956-6548 Facsimile: (808) 956-5569\nEmail: ericy@hawaii.edu\nRobert L. Rusky 159 Beaver St. San Francisco, CA 94114 (415) 255-7385\nDale Minami Donald K. Tamaki MINAMI TAMAKI LLP 360 Post St. 8th Floor San Franciso, CA 94108 Telephone: (415) 788-9000\nPeter Irons Director Emeritus, EARL WARREN BILL OF RIGHTS PROJECT University of California,\nSan Diego 8862 Sovereign Rd. San Diego, CA 92123 Telephone: (530) 310-3903\nLeigh-Ann K. Miyasato 3465 Waialae Ave. Suite 300A Honolulu, HI 96816 Telephone: (808) 380-1444\nRodney L. Kawakami 671 So. Jackson St. Suite 201 Seattle, WA 98104 Telephone: (206) 682-9932\n\nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP\nRobert A. Johnson Alice Hsu One Bryant Park New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 872-1000 Facsimile: (212) 872-1002 Email: rajohnson@akingump.com\nJessica M. Weisel 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 229-1000 Facsimile: (310) 229-1001 Email: jweisel@akingump.com\n\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 5 of 39\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), undersigned counsel for amici make the following disclosures: The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”) is a research and advocacy organization based at Seattle University, a non-profit educational institution under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Korematsu Center does not have any parent corporation or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held corporation which owns 10 percent or more of its stock. Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Hispanic National Bar Association, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc., the National Bar Association, and the South Asian Bar Association of North America are not-for-profit organizations with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter (“JACL Honolulu”) is a non-profit corporation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code based in Honolulu, Hawaii. JACL Honolulu is not a publicly traded corporation. It does not have any parent corporation or issue stock and, consequently, there exists no publicly held corporation that owns 10 percent or more of its stock.\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 6 of 39\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........................................................i\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................................................................1\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................3\nARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................8\nI. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCEPTION OF PLENARY POWER DERIVES FROM CASES INFECTED WITH RACIST AND XENOPHOBIC PREJUDICES..................................8\nII. KOREMATSU, HIRABAYASHI, AND YASUI STAND AS STARK REMINDERS OF THE NEED FOR SEARCHING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TARGETING DISFAVORED MINORITIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY............................................................15\nCONCLUSION ......................................................................................................28\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 7 of 39\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCASES:\nChae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)................................................................................4, 5, 9, 10\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)..............................................................................................8\nFong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)......................................................................................10, 11\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)......................................................................................11, 12\nHirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).......................................................................................passim 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986) ..................................................22, 23, 25 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) ..................................................................23, 24, 25\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)..................................................................................13, 14\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)............................................................................................14\nKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).....................................................................................passim 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).......................................................24, 25, 26\nLandon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)..............................................................................................13\nReno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)............................................................................................13\nShaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)............................................................................................12\nUnited States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40 (D. Or. 1942) ..............................................................................19\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 8 of 39\n\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ..............................................................................5\nYasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943)........................................................................................3, 19\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)............................................................................................13\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)..............................................................................................5\nSTATUTES:\nAn Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173.................................16\nOTHER AUTHORITIES:\nExecutive Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)............................16\nGeneral DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast (1942)........................................................................................................23\nIRONS, PETER, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1984)...................................................17, 18, 24\nPresidential Proclamation No. 4417, An American Promise, 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976) ..................................................................................26\nPresidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sep. 24, 2017) .....................................................................................................................1\nREPORT OF CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund & University of Washington Press, 1997) ....................26\nTestimony of Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress, Japanese Am. Citizens League, Comm’n on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (1981) ..............................................................................................17\nU.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases (May 20, 2011) .............................................................................................................27\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 9 of 39\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly Yasui, the children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui, come forward as amici curiae because they see the disturbing relevance of the Supreme Court’s decisions in their fathers’ infamous cases challenging the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II to the serious questions raised by Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161. Minoru Yasui was a 25-year-old attorney in Portland, Oregon, when, on March 28, 1942, he intentionally defied the government’s first actionable order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry in order to bring a test case challenging its constitutionality. Gordon Hirabayashi was a 24-year-old college senior in Seattle, Washington, when he similarly chose to defy the government’s curfew and removal orders on May 16, 1942. Fred Korematsu was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland, California, when, on May 30, 1942, he was arrested for refusing to report for removal. All three men brought their constitutional challenges to the courts. Deferring to the government’s claim that the orders were justified by military necessity, the Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. Our Nation has since\n1 This brief is filed with the consent of all parties. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amici curiae made a monetary contribution intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission.\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 10 of 39\n\nrecognized that the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans was wrong; the three cases have been widely condemned; and all three men have been recognized with the Presidential Medal of Freedom for their wartime courage and lifetime work advancing civil and human rights.\nTheir children have sought to carry forward their fathers’ legacy, educating the public and reminding the courts of the harm wrought by governmental actions, carried out in the name of national security, that impact men, women, and children belonging to disfavored minority groups—both the human toll and the danger of sacrificing our country’s fundamental values. Guilt, loyalty, and threat are individual attributes. Courts must be vigilant when these attributes are imputed to entire racial, religious, and/or ethnic groups. The Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases stand as important symbols of the need for courts to fulfill their essential role in our democracy by checking unfounded exercises of executive power.\nThe Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui families are proud to stand with the following civil rights and national bar associations of color:\nFred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law;\nAsian Americans Advancing Justice; The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund;\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 11 of 39\n\nThe Hispanic National Bar Association (“HNBA”); The Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter; LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc.; The National Bar Association; and The South Asian Bar Association of North America.\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT “Often the question has been raised whether this country could wage a new war without the loss of its fundamental liberties at home. Here is one occasion for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that question and show the world that we can fight for democracy and preserve it too.” Gordon Hirabayashi made that plea to the Supreme Court in 1943, as he appealed his conviction for violating military orders issued three months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Authorized by Executive Order No. 9066, those orders led to the forced removal and incarceration of over 120,000 men, women, and children of Japanese descent.\nMr. Hirabayashi did not stand alone before the Court. Minoru Yasui likewise invoked our Nation’s ideals in casting his separate but related appeal as “the case of all whose parents came to our shores for a haven of refuge” and insisting that the country should respond to war and strife “in the American way and not by acts of injustice.” Appellant Br. 55-56, Yasui v. United States, No. 871 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1943). The Court denied the appeals of both men. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 12 of 39\n\nThe following year, the Supreme Court revisited the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Court again failed to stand as a bulwark against governmental action that undermines core constitutional principles. By refusing to scrutinize the government’s claim that its abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans was justified by military necessity, the Court enabled the government to cover its racially discriminatory policies in the cloak of national security.\nIn this case, the courts are once again asked to abdicate their critical role in safeguarding fundamental freedoms. Invoking national security, the government seeks near complete deference to the President’s decision to deny visas to nationals of six Muslim-majority nations. Indeed, the government will not even permit courts to review the classified report purporting to justify the President’s decision on national security grounds. See J.A. 951-955.\nAlthough the government claims it is merely asking for the application of established legal principles, the extreme deference it seeks is not rooted in sound constitutional tradition. Rather, it rests on doctrinal tenets infected with longrepudiated racial and nativist precepts. In support of the sweeping proposition that the President’s authority to exclude aliens is unbounded, the government previously invoked the so-called “plenary power” doctrine—a doctrine that derives from decisions such as Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889),\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 13 of 39\n\nwhich relied on pejorative racial stereotypes to eschew judicial scrutiny in upholding a law that prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the United States after travel abroad. Id. at 595.\nAlthough the government’s arguments have evolved, it has not changed its message or its impact. While no longer invoking the term “plenary power,” the government continues to assert that the “deeply rooted principle of nonreviewability” precludes courts from scrutinizing political decisions to deny visas, including, as here, denials to entire classes of aliens. Gov’t Br. 20. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the numbing judicial passivity the government demands “runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy” in which “it is the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a duty that will sometimes require the ‘[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches.’” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).\nEven more than the early “plenary power” decisions, the shades of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui lurking in the government’s argument should give this Court pause. In those cases, as here, the government’s policies were justified in a controversial report. And like in this case, the government denied that its policies were grounded in “invidious * discrimination” and asked the\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 14 of 39\n\ncourts to take it at its word that “the security of the nation” justified blanket action against an “entire group * at once.” Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 870 (U.S. May 8, 1943).\nThe Supreme Court agreed. First, in Hirabayashi, the Court employed a double negative to conclude that, even though racial distinctions are “odious to a free people,” it “[could] []not reject as unfounded the judgment” of the government. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99-100. Going further in Korematsu, the Court denied that race played any role in the government’s decisions: “cast[ing] this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.” 323 U.S. at 223. Accepting the government’s assurance, the Court went on to find that “Korematsu was not excluded from the [West Coast] because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because * the properly constituted military authorities * decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated * temporarily.” Id.\nNot all members of the Court were convinced, however. Three Justices dissented, including Justice Murphy, who declared that the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast “falls into the ugly abyss of racism,” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, and Justice Jackson, who pointed out that the Court “had no real evidence” to support the government’s assertions of military necessity. Moreover,\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 15 of 39\n\nJustice Jackson warned, the Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id. at 246.\nAs history has made us acutely aware, the dissenters’ doubts as to the veracity of the government’s assertion of military necessity were well-founded, and their recognition of the gravity of the Court’s decision was prophetic. Four decades later, Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu successfully sought vacatur of their convictions in unprecedented coram nobis proceedings. Evidence presented in those cases showed that the “military urgency” on which the Supreme Court predicated its decision was nothing more than a smokescreen: the real reason for the government’s deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans was not acts of espionage (as the government maintained) but rather a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes.\nKorematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are as wrong today as they were on the day they were decided. If it were to accept the government’s invitation here to abdicate its judicial responsibility, this Court would repeat the failures in those widely condemned cases. The Court should instead take this opportunity to acknowledge the historic wrong in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, and to repudiate the refusal in those cases to scrutinize the government’s claim of necessity and its consequent failure to recognize the military orders’ racist\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 16 of 39\n\nunderpinnings. Heeding the lessons of history, this Court should subject Proclamation No. 9645 to meaningful judicial scrutiny and affirm the Founders’ visionary principle that an independent and vigilant judiciary is a foundational element of a healthy democracy.\nARGUMENT I. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCEPTION OF PLENARY POWER\nDERIVES FROM CASES INFECTED WITH RACIST AND XENOPHOBIC PREJUDICES When the Trump Administration first attempted to deny visas and suspend the entry of aliens from Muslim-majority nations, the government argued that the “political branches[] [have] plenary constitutional authority over foreign affairs, national security, and immigration.” Gov’t Emergency Mot. 15-16, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017). In light of that “plenary authority,” the government asserted, “[j]udicial second-guessing of the President’s determination that a temporary suspension of entry of certain classes of aliens was necessary * to protect national security * constitute[s] an impermissible intrusion.” Id. at 15.\nDespite shedding the “plenary power” label in its defense of the Proclamation, the government’s central argument remains unchanged: The political branches’ “power to * exclude aliens” is “largely immune from judicial control.” Gov’t Br. 19 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). The\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 17 of 39\n\nSupreme Court, however, has never recognized an unbridled “plenary” power in the immigration realm that would preclude judicial review. And to the extent that it has shown excessive deference to the political branches in some cases, those precedents are linked to racist attitudes from a past era that have long since fallen out of favor.\n1. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, known as The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a statute preventing the return of Chinese laborers who had departed the United States prior to its passage. 130 U.S. at 581-582. Describing the reasons underlying the law’s enactment, the Court characterized Chinese laborers as “content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and artisans,” and observed that they remained “strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, * adhering to the customs and usages of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with our people.” Id. at 595. “The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.” Id. Residents of the West Coast, the Court explained, warned of an “Oriental invasion” and “saw or believed they saw * great danger that at no distant day * [the West] would be overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.” Id.\nFar from applying a skeptical eye to the law in light of the clear animus motivating its passage, the Court found that “[i]f * the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 18 of 39\n\ndifferent race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security * its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.” The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. In reality, the “right of selfpreservation” that the Court validated as justification for the government’s unbounded power to exclude immigrants was ethnic and racial self-preservation, not the preservation of borders or national security. 130 U.S. at 608; see id. at 606 (“It matters not in what form * aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.”).\nSimilar racist and xenophobic attitudes are evident in decisions following The Chinese Exclusion Case. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement that Chinese resident aliens offer “at least one credible white witness” in order to remain in the country); id. at 730 (noting Congress’s belief that testimony from Chinese witnesses could not be credited because of “the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an oath” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).\n2. Even in its early plenary power decisions, however, the Court recognized that the government’s sovereign authority is subject to constitutional limitations. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (“[S]overeign powers * [are] restricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself and\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 19 of 39\n\nconsiderations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”). Indeed, from the doctrine’s inception, the Court divided over the reach of the government’s power in light of those limitations.\nFong Yue Ting, which upheld a law requiring Chinese laborers residing in the United States to obtain a special certificate of residence to avoid deportation, generated three dissenting opinions. See 149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, J., dissenting). Even Justice Field, who authored the Court’s opinion in The Chinese Exclusion Case, sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s application with regard to alien residents:\nAs men having our common humanity, they are protected by all the guaranties of the constitution. To hold that they are subject to any different law, or are less protected in any particular, than other persons, is * to ignore the teachings of our history * and the language of our constitution. Id. at 754.\nNearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism regarding an unrestrained plenary power persisted—and proliferated. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), the Court, relying on Korematsu, upheld a provision permitting the deportation of resident aliens who were members of the Communist Party. In dissent, Justice Douglas quoted Justice Brewer’s words in Fong Yue Ting, observing that they “grow[] in power with the passing years”:\n\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 20 of 39\n\nThis doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous. * The governments of other nations have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely, as it seems to me, they gave to this government no general power to banish. Id. at 599-600.\nIn another McCarthy-era precedent, four Justices advocated for limitations on the plenary power doctrine. Dissenting in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), in which the Court rejected any constitutional challenge to the exclusion of an alien who had previously resided in the United\nStates, Justice Black reasoned that “[n]o society is free where government makes one person’s liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another.” Id. at 217 (Douglas, J., joining). “Dictatorships,” he observed, “have done this since time\nimmemorial. They do now.” Id. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added that aliens returning to the United States must be “accorded procedural due process of law.” Id. at 224.\n3. Perhaps reflecting the shift away from the xenophobic and race-based characterizations prevalent in its early plenary power precedents, the Court in recent years has been more willing to enforce constitutional limitations on the\ngovernment’s authority over immigration matters.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 21 of 39\n\nIn Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), for example, the Court held that INS regulations must at least “rationally advanc[e] some legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 306. In Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), the Court affirmed that a resident alien returning from a brief trip abroad must be afforded due process in an exclusion proceeding. Id. at 33. And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in response to the government’s contention that “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and * the Judicial Branch must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,” the Court observed that such “power is subject to important constitutional limitations.” Id. at 695 (citations omitted). “[F]ocus[ing] upon those limitations,” id., the Court determined that the indefinite detention of aliens deemed removable would raise “serious constitutional concerns” and accordingly construed the statute at issue to avoid those problems, id. at 682.\nThe Court’s most recent decision in this area provides further support for the conclusion that, after more than a century of erosion, the notion of plenary power over immigration is little more than a relic.\nIn Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), the Supreme Court considered a due process claim arising from the denial without adequate explanation of a spouse’s visa application. Although it described the power of the political branches over immigration as “plenary,” Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Din made clear\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 22 of 39\n\nthat courts may review an exercise of that power. Id. at 2139-2140. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined to balance the constitutional rights of American citizens injured by a visa denial against “Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.’” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766). But he explained that the Court did inquire “whether the Government had provided a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ reason for its action.” Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770). And while as a general matter courts are not to “look behind” the government’s asserted reason, courts should do so if the challenger has made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” Id. at 2141.\nTo be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din acknowledged that the political branches are entitled to wide latitude and deference in immigration matters. For that reason, the government relies heavily on Din and Mandel to argue that its assertion of a national security rationale is sufficient to justify Proclamation No. 9645 and to preclude further judicial scrutiny. But, as the courts of appeals recognized, Din (and Mandel before it) concerned an individual visa denial on the facts of that case. By contrast, the Proclamation sets a nationwide immigration policy, suspending entry and foreclosing visa adjudications for aliens of certain nationalities. While it may be sensible for courts ordinarily to defer to the\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 23 of 39\n\njudgment of the political branches when considering the application of immigration law to a particular alien, the President’s decision to issue a broadlyapplicable immigration policy—especially one aimed at nationals of particular countries likely to share a common religion—is properly the subject of more searching judicial review.\nAll told, modern judicial precedent supports the notion that courts have both the power and the responsibility to review Proclamation No. 9645. Where, as here, the Court is asked to review a far-reaching program—promulgated at the highest level of the Executive Branch and targeting aliens based on nationality and religion—precedent and common sense demand more than an assessment of whether the government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide” rationale for its policy. Rather, the Proclamation, both on its face and in light of the glaring clues as to its motivations, cries out for careful judicial scrutiny.\nII. KOREMATSU, HIRABAYASHI, AND YASUI STAND AS STARK REMINDERS OF THE NEED FOR SEARCHING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TARGETING DISFAVORED MINORITIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY\nThis Court need not look far for a reminder of the constitutional costs and human suffering that flow from the Judiciary’s failure to rein in sweeping governmental action against disfavored minorities. And it need not look far for a reminder of the Executive Branch’s use of national security as a pretext to\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 24 of 39\n\ndiscriminate against such groups. The Court need look only to the all but universally condemned wartime decisions in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.\n1. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War to designate “military areas” from which “any or all persons” could be excluded and “with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave” would be subject to “whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose.” Exec. Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Adding its imprimatur to the Executive Order, Congress made violation of any restrictions issued thereunder a federal offense. An Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173.\nLieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, used that authority to issue a series of proclamations that led to the removal and incarceration of all individuals of Japanese ancestry living in “Military Area No. 1”—an exclusion area covering the entire Pacific Coast. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89. A curfew order came first. Soon after, Japanese Americans were ordered to abandon their homes and communities on the West Coast for tarpaper barracks (euphemistically called “relocation centers”) surrounded by barbed wire and machine gun towers in desolate areas inland. Id. at 90.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 25 of 39\n\nFor different individual reasons, but sharing a deep sense of justice, Minoru Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Fred Korematsu refused to comply with General DeWitt’s orders. Yasui, a young lawyer, regarded the curfew as an affront to American constitutional values. “To make it a crime for me to do the same thing as any non-Japanese person * solely on the basis of ancestry,” he explained, “was, in my opinion, an absolutely abominable concept and wholly unacceptable.” Testimony of Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress, Japanese Am. Citizens League 9, Comm’n on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (1981). “Our law and our basic concept of justice had always been founded upon the fundamental principle that no person should be punished but for that individual’s act, and not because of one’s ancestry.” Id. at 10. Convinced of the curfew’s illegality, Yasui immediately defied it in order to initiate a constitutional challenge.\nHirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, also defied the orders so that he could challenge their constitutionality, saying that he “considered it [his] duty to maintain the democratic standards for which this nation lives.” PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 88 (1984). Korematsu, a welder living in Oakland, California, refused to obey the removal orders so that he could remain with his fiancée who was not subject to removal because she was not Japanese American. The last of the three to face arrest and prosecution, Korematsu “shared with Yasui and Hirabayashi an\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 26 of 39\n\nequal devotion to constitutional principle” and believed that the statute under which he was convicted was wrong. Id. at 98.\n2. The constitutional challenges Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu made to the military orders soon made their way to the Supreme Court. But far from fulfilling its essential role in the constitutional structure that entrusts the Judiciary with the protection of fundamental rights, the Court set upon a path of judicial abdication that today serves as a cautionary tale.\nIn Hirabayashi’s case, the Court elected to consider only his conviction for violating the curfew order, leaving unanswered his challenge to his conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control Station—a precursor to removal from his home in Seattle. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85. Harkening back to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court repeated the government’s claim that “social, economic and political conditions” “intensified the[] solidarity” of Japanese Americans and “prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population.” Id. at 96. Betraying no skepticism of these premises, the Court found that, in view of these and other attributes of the “isolation” of Japanese Americans and their “relatively little social intercourse * [with] the white population,” “Congress and the Executive could reasonably have concluded that these conditions * encouraged the continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese institutions.” Id. at 98. “Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 27 of 39\n\nthis country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry,” the Court continued, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.” Id. at 99.\nHaving upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, the Court issued only a short opinion remanding Yasui’s case to the Ninth Circuit. Yasui, 320 U.S. at 115. Because the district court had imposed a sentence based on its determination that Yasui had renounced his American citizenship, and the government did not defend that finding, the Court remanded the matter for resentencing. Id. at 117. The Court thereby avoided addressing the lower court’s conclusion, supported by extensive analysis, that the military orders were unconstitutional as applied to citizens. See United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 44-54 (D. Or. 1942).\nThe Court’s third opportunity to confront the mass removal and incarceration program came a year-and-a-half later, in Korematsu’s case. The Court again narrowed the issues before it, rejecting Korematsu’s argument that the removal order could not be extricated from the incarceration he would inevitably face if he complied with that order. 323 U.S. at 216. Then, despite affirming that racial distinctions are “immediately suspect” and “must [be] subject * to the most rigid scrutiny,” id., the Court denied, without probing examination, that the military orders were driven by racial hostility. The Court reiterated its conclusion from\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 28 of 39\n\nHirabayashi that it would not substitute its judgment for that of the military authorities. “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some,” the Court reasoned, and “the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.” Id. at 223-224.\nWhen the Court decided Korematsu, however, three members rejected the government’s arguments. Although acknowledging that the discretion of those entrusted with national security matters “must, as a matter of * common sense, be wide,” Justice Murphy declared that “it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion” and that individuals not be “left impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor support.” 323 U.S. at 234. In his view, the exclusion order “clearly d[id] not meet th[is] test” as it relied “for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.” Id. at 234-235 (emphasis added). In fact, as Justice Murphy noted, intelligence investigations found no evidence of Japanese American sabotage or espionage. Id. at 241. And even if “there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast,” Justice Murphy reasoned, “to infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify discriminatory action\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 29 of 39\n\nagainst the entire group” is nothing more than “th[e] legalization of racism.” Id. at 240-241, 242.\nJustice Jackson was equally skeptical of the factual basis for the government’s claims of military necessity and specifically questioned General DeWitt’s “Final Report,” on which the government relied. “How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable basis in necessity?” Justice Jackson asked. 323 U.S. at 245. Pointing out that “[n]o evidence whatever on that subject ha[d] been taken by this or any other court” and that the DeWitt Report was the subject of “sharp controversy as to [its] credibility,” Justice Jackson observed that the Court had “no real evidence before it.” Id. Accordingly, the Court “ha[d] no choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any crossexamination, that what he did was reasonable.” Id.\nJustice Jackson saw grave dangers in the Court’s opinion. While an unconstitutional military order is short lived, he observed, “once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.” 323 U.S. at 246. With that, Justice Jackson issued a prophetic warning: By “validat[ing] the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens,” the\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 30 of 39\n\nCourt had created “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id.\n3. The dissenters’ fears proved to be well-founded. Decades after the Court’s decisions in Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, newly discovered government records revealed not only that intelligence reports and data contradicted the claim that the mass removal and incarceration program was justified by military necessity, but also that the government knew as much when it convinced the Court to affirm the defendants’ convictions.2\nIn 1983, armed with those newly discovered records, Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu filed coram nobis petitions seeking to vacate their convictions. As the court found in the Hirabayashi case, government records showed that the DeWitt Report had been materially altered in order to fabricate an acceptable factual justification for the mass removal and incarceration program. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1456-1457 (W.D. Wash. 1986). Although the version of the report presented to the Supreme Court stated that it was impossible to identify potentially disloyal Japanese Americans in the time available, DeWitt’s original report—submitted to the War Department while the government’s briefs in Hirabayashi and Yasui were being finalized—made clear that the decision to issue\n2 Those records are discussed in Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases by Peter Irons, who, with Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, unearthed them.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 31 of 39\n\nthe challenged orders had nothing to do with urgency. Rather, General Dewitt’s decision turned on his view that Japanese Americans were inherently disloyal on account of their “ties of race, intense feeling of filial piety and * strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs.” Id. at 1449. “It was not that there was insufficient time in which to make such a determination,” the original report stated; “a positive determination could not be made [because] an exact separation of the ‘sheep and the goats’ was unfeasible.” Id. (quoting General DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast ch. 2 (1942)). That original report was ordered destroyed, and the altered version was presented to the Court.\nBeyond exposing the racist underpinnings of General DeWitt’s orders (as well as the pretextual nature of the claim of urgency), the coram nobis cases revealed that the government’s own intelligence agencies rebutted assertions in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were involved in sabotage and espionage. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1987). The Office of Naval Intelligence (“ONI”), which the President charged with monitoring West Coast Japanese American communities, had determined in its official report that Japanese Americans were overwhelmingly loyal and posed no security risk. ONI thus recommended handling any potential disloyalty on an individual, not group, basis. ONI found, contrary to the government’s representation to the Court, that mass incarceration was unnecessary, as “individual determinations could be made\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 32 of 39\n\nexpeditiously.” Id. at 602 n.11 (emphasis added); see also IRONS, supra, at 203. In addition, reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) directly refuted claims in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were engaged in shore-to-ship signaling, intimating Japanese-American espionage. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984).\nDepartment of Justice attorney John Burling, co-author of the government’s brief, sought to alert the Court of the FBI and FCC intelligence that directly refuted the DeWitt Report. Burling included in his brief a crucial footnote that read: “The recital [in General DeWitt’s report] of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a matter of military necessity * is in several respects, particularly with reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information in the possession of the Department of Justice.” Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis and citation omitted). But high-level Justice Department lawyers stopped the brief’s printing. Despite Burling’s vociferous protest about the DeWitt Report’s “intentional falsehoods,” the footnote was diluted to near incoherence, even implying the opposite of Burling’s intended message. As revised, the footnote stated:\n[The DeWitt Report] is relied on in this brief for statistics and other details concerning the actual evacuation and the events that took place subsequent thereto. We have specifically recited in this brief the facts\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 33 of 39\n\nrelating to the justification for the evacuation, of which we ask the Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon the Final Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts. Gov’t Br. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1944).\nNotwithstanding an earlier warning from Justice Department lawyer Edward Ennis\nthat failing to alert the Court to the contrary intelligence in DOJ’s possession\n“might approximate the suppression of evidence,” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 602\nn.11 (citation omitted), the Justice Department concealed from the Court this\ncrucial evidence on military necessity.\nIn light of the evidence presented, the courts hearing Fred Korematsu and\nGordon Hirabayashi’s coram nobis cases concluded that the government’s\nmisconduct had effected “a manifest injustice” and that the mass removal and\nincarceration program had been validated based on unfounded charges of treason. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417; Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1447.3 In granting\nKorematsu’s coram nobis petition, Judge Patel articulated the modern significance\nof the wartime cases:\nKorematsu * stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to\n3 In Minoru Yasui’s coram nobis case, the court acceded to the government’s request to vacate his conviction and dismiss his petition for relief without making any determinations regarding government misconduct—and without acknowledging the injustice he suffered.\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 34 of 39\n\nprotect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.\nIn vacating Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi’s convictions, the coram nobis courts joined other institutions of government in recognizing the wrongs committed against Japanese Americans during World War II. In 1976, on behalf of the Executive Branch, President Ford officially rescinded Executive Order 9066, explaining that “[w]e now know what we should have known then—not only was * evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.” Presidential Proclamation 4417, An American Promise, 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976). In 1983, after extensive hearings and research, the congressionally authorized Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) issued a report concluding that it was not “military necessity” that underpinned the program of removal and incarceration, but rather “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” REPORT OF CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 459 (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund & University of Washington Press, 1997). Five years later, Congress passed (and President Reagan signed) the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which, on the CWRIC’s recommendations, acknowledged the injustice of the removal and incarceration program, issued an\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 35 of 39\n\nofficial apology, and conferred symbolic reparations to the survivors of the incarceration centers.\n\nMost recently, in 2011, the Acting Solicitor General confirmed what the\n\ncoram nobis cases had established decades earlier: the Supreme Court’s decisions\n\nin the wartime cases were predicated on lies. “By the time the cases of Gordon\n\nHirabayashi and Fred Korematsu reached the Supreme Court, [DOJ] had learned of\n\na key intelligence report that undermined the rationale behind the internment. \n\nBut the Solicitor General did not inform the Court of the report despite warnings\n\n that failing to alert the Court ‘might approximate the suppression of evidence.’\n\nInstead, he argued that it was impossible to segregate loyal Japanese Americans\n\nfrom disloyal ones.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The Solicitor\n\nGeneral’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases (May 20,\n\n2011),\n\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-\n\nmistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases.\n\n**\n\nDuring World War II, the Supreme Court’s refusal to probe the government’s claim that military necessity justified the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans made it unwittingly complicit in the government’s deception. The Court’s blank-check treatment of the Executive Branch’s wartime policies— underscored by its repeated refusal to confront the most grievous aspects of those\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 36 of 39\n\npolicies or to acknowledge their racist underpinnings—allowed the wrongs inflicted on Japanese Americans to continue unabated for years, and allowed the government to avoid accountability for its egregious misconduct for decades.\nHirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu are powerful reminders not only of the need for constant vigilance in protecting our fundamental values, but also of the essential role of the courts as a check on abuses of government power, especially during times of national and international stress. Rather than repeat the failures of the past, this Court should repudiate them and affirm the greater legacy of those cases: Blind deference to the Executive Branch, even in areas in which decisionmakers must wield wide discretion, is incompatible with the protection of fundamental freedoms. Meaningful judicial review is an essential element of a healthy democracy.\nConsistent with those principles, this Court should reject the government’s invitation to abdicate its critical role in our constitutional system, subject Proclamation No. 9645 to searching judicial scrutiny, and stand—as Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu did—as a bulwark against governmental action that undermines core constitutional values.\nCONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the relief sought by the government should be denied.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 37 of 39\n\nDated: November 22, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah Martine E. Cicconi Jessica M. Weisel Robert A. Johnson Alice Hsu AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP\nRobert S. Chang Lorraine K. Bannai FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND\nEQUALITY\nEric Yamamoto Fred T. Korematsu Professor of Law and\nSocial Justice\nRobert L. Rusky\nDale Minami Donald K. Tamaki MINAMI TAMAKI LLP\nPeter Irons Director Emeritus, EARL WARREN BILL OF RIGHTS PROJECT\nLeigh-Ann K. Mitasato\nRodney L. Kawakami\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 38 of 39\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nI hereby certify that, pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure\n\n29(a)(5) and 32(a)(7)(B), and 4th Circuit Rule 32(b), the attached brief is double\n\nspaced, uses a proportionately spaced typeface of 14 points or more, and contains a\n\ntotal of 6,496 words, based on the word count program in Microsoft Word.\n\nDated: November 22, 2017\n\n/s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah\n\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-1\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 39 of 39\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the\n\nCourt for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the\n\nappellate CM/ECF system on November 22, 2017.\n\nI certify that all parties in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that\n\nservice will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: November 22, 2017\n\n/s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah\n\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 121-2\n\nFiled: 11/22/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nAPPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FORM\nBAR ADMISSION & ECF REGISTRATION: If you have not been admitted to practice before the Fourth Circuit, you must complete and return an Application for Admission before filing this form. 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If you have not registered as a Fourth Circuit ECF Filer, please complete the required steps at Register for eFiling.\n\nTHE CLERK WILL ENTER MY APPEARANCE IN APPEAL NO. _1_7_-_2_2_3_1_,_-_2_2_3_2__, _-2_2__3_3_,_-_2_2_4_0____ as\n\n[ ]Retained [ ]Court-appointed(CJA) [ ]Court-assigned(non-CJA) [ ]Federal Defender [ ]Pro Bono [ ]Government\n\nCOUNSEL FOR: _K_a_r_e_n__K_o_r_e_m__a_ts_u_,_J_a__y_H__ir_a_b_a_y_a_s_h_i_, _H_o_l_ly__Y_a_s_u_i_,_th__e_F_r_e_d__T_._K__o_re_m__a_t_s_u_C__e_n_t_e_r_\n\n_fo_r__L_a_w__a_n_d__E_q_u_a_l_it_y_,_C_i_v_il_R__ig_h_t_s__O_r_g_a_n_i_z_a_ti_o_n_s_,_a_n_d__N_a_t_io__n_a_l _B_a_r_A__s_s_o_c_ia_t_io__n_s_o_f_C__o_lo__r ____as the (party name)\n\nappellant(s) appellee(s) petitioner(s) respondent(s) amicus curiae intervenor(s) movant(s)\n\n_/s_/_P__ra__ti_k_A_.__S_h_a_h_______________________ (signature)\n\n_P_r_a_t_ik__A_._S__h_a_h___________________________ Name (printed or typed)\n\n_2_0_2_-_8_8_7_-_4_2_1_0___ Voice Phone\n\n_A__k_in__G_u_m__p__S_t_ra_u_s_s__H_a__u_e_r_&__F_e_l_d_L_L__P______ Firm Name (if applicable)\n\n_2_0_2_-_8_8_7_-_4_2_8_8___ Fax Number\n\n_1_3_3__3_N__e_w__H_a_m__p_s_h_i_re__A_v_e_n__u_e_N__W__________\n\n_W__a_s_h_i_n_g_t_o_n_,_D_._C_._2__0_0_3_6__________________ Address\n\n_p_s_h_a_h_@__a_k_i_n_g_u_m__p_._c_o_m_____________ E-mail address (print or type)\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on _N_o_v_e_m__b_e_r _2_2_, _2_0_1_7_ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:\n\n_/_s_/_P__ra_t_i_k_A__. _S_h__a_h_____________ Signature\n\n01/19/2016 SCC\n\nPrint\n\nSave\n\n_____N__o_v_e_m__b_e_r__2_2_,_2__0_1_7_____ Date\nReset Form\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3;\nJANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED\nMOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State;\nDANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Maryland, Southern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\nTHIRD CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS\n\nNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\n\nCHAD A. READLER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nSHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ____________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his\nofficial capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\n____________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ____________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\nELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants – Appellants.\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ____________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellees\n\n\fTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................5\nI. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable.............................................................5 A. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable.................................. 5 B. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable ...................................................................................... 9\nII. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of Their Statutory Or Constitutional Claims.................................... 11 A. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA ...................................11 1. The Proclamation Is Within The President’s Statutory Authority Under Sections 1182(f) And 1185(a)(1) ..................12 2. The Proclamation Does Not Violate Section 1152(a)(1)(A) ............................................................................16 B. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause ..........................................................................18 1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Neutral And Bona Fide Reasons .............................................................................18 2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary............................20\nIII. The Balance Of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief..........27 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................29\ni\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nii\n\n\fTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases:\n\nPage(s)\n\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) ................................. 6, 8, 13\n\nAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ...............................................................................................9\n\nAllende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988) ..............................................................................13\n\nArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).............................................................................................12\n\nArmstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).......................................................................................8, 9\nDepartment of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) ...............................................................................................6\n\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) .............................................................................................20\n\nHaig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) .............................................................................................27\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) ...............................................................................................6\n\nHawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168, Order (Nov. 13, 2017) ..................................................................28\n\nHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ................................................................................................ 27\n\nInternational Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1985) .............................................................................. 7\n\niii\n\n\fIRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) ......................... 2, 9, 19\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) .................................................................................... 9, 19\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ........................................................................ 3, 9, 18, 19, 20\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of Justice, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996) .......................................................................................... 6, 7, 8\nLujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) ...............................................................................................8\nMcCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) .................................................................................. 3, 20, 26\nMcGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ...................................................................................... 10, 26\nMulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................7\nPatel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................7\nReno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) .............................................................................................25\nSaavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..........................................................................6, 8\nSale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) ........................................................................................ 6, 12\niv\n\n\fSessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) .........................................................................................20\nSuhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................9\nTrump v. IRAP: 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) .........................................................................................27\nTwo Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley: 179 F. Supp. 944, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1959)................................................................10 366 U.S. 582 (1961).............................................................................................10\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ........................................................................................ 5, 12\nValley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) ..................................................... 9, 19\nStatutes:\nAdministrative Procedure Act: 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) ...............................................................................................7 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)....................................................................................................7 5 U.S.C. § 703 ........................................................................................................8\nImmigration and Nationality Act: 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)............................................................... 3, 11, 16, 17, 18 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) ........................................................................................... 3, 13 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) ............................................. 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) .................................................... 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(3) .......................................................................................... 24 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)....................................................................................24 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D)....................................................................................24 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)................................................................................................15\nv\n\n\fOther Authorities: 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 403.7-3 .............................................................................8 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 504.1-3(f) .........................................................................8 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017) ...................................... passim U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: The President’s\nProclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/24/ fact-sheet-president-s-proclamation-enhancing-vettingcapabilities-and-processes ...................................................................................24\nvi\n\n\fINTRODUCTION The President issued Proclamation No. 9645 pursuant to his broad constitutional and statutory authority to exclude aliens whose entry he determines would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The Proclamation was the product of a global review and evaluation of foreign governments’ informationsharing practices and other risk factors, involving multiple Cabinet heads and other agency officials whose motives have never been questioned. That process culminated in a recommendation by the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security to restrict the entry of certain nationals of eight countries, and, acting in accordance with that recommendation, the President imposed tailored substantive restrictions for those eight countries to encourage improvement in their inadequate practices and to protect the Nation unless and until they do so. Plaintiffs disregard these critical features of the Proclamation, simply labeling it a “re-animation” of the Executive Order (EO-2) previously before this Court. Br. 1-2. Relying on the views of former government officials and commentators, plaintiffs suggest that the entry restrictions in the Proclamation are unnecessary to protect national security or to encourage foreign governments to improve their practices. This Court should reject plaintiffs’ invitation to second-guess the national-security and foreign-policy judgment of the President and his top advisors,\n\n\fwhich could disable this President and future ones from addressing critical security risks and would impugn the validity of past Presidents’ entry restrictions.\nAs an initial matter, there is no basis for allowing these harms because the district court exceeded the proper limits on its jurisdiction. As to plaintiffs’ statutory claims, the political branches’ exclusion of aliens abroad is beyond the province of courts to review absent express authorization by Congress. Plaintiffs neither identify any such authorization nor provide a principled justification why the rule should apply to individual decisions by subordinate officials but not to policy decisions by the head of the Executive Branch. As to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, this Court has previously recognized that alleged “condemnation” injuries are not cognizable absent “personal contact” with an Establishment Clause violation. IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 582 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017). Plaintiffs fail to explain how their own constitutional rights are violated merely because they allegedly suffer indirect injuries flowing from the Proclamation’s alleged discrimination against aliens abroad who lack constitutional rights.\nPlaintiffs’ claims also fail on the merits. As to their claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), plaintiffs mischaracterize the government’s position as being that the President can invoke 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) to override Congress’s judgment. Instead, and as the district court acknowledged,\n2\n\n\fCongress in § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) ratified the President’s authority to supplement 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)’s grounds of inadmissibility by excluding aliens whose entry he finds to be detrimental. This includes, contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, when entry would be detrimental because of concerns that are similar to ones that Congress has addressed in other INA provisions or that are focused on those aliens’ governments. And where the problem sought to be addressed is nationspecific, it is wrong to read 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s discrimination protections for eligible immigrant-visa applicants to impliedly repeal the President’s authority under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) to suspend the entry eligibility of those nations’ citizens. Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ half-hearted denials, their arguments would necessarily imply that the actions of past Presidents were invalid, including President Carter’s Iran order and President Reagan’s Cuba order.\nAs to plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim, they fail to show a constitutional violation under either the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), or the “secular purpose” standard in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the review and recommendation process that culminated in the Proclamation was a “preordained” sham (Br. 2) is belied by the undisputed good faith of the agencies involved and the clear instructions in EO-2 to recommend only those restrictions they deemed appropriate. And plaintiffs’ suggestion that there was “subjective,\n3\n\n\fpost-hoc manipulation of the process to make the results even more of a Muslim ban” (id.) is irreconcilable with the substance of the tailored restrictions, which exclude two Muslim-majority countries from which entry was previously restricted (Iraq and Sudan); add two non-Muslim-majority countries and a third that is barely Muslim-majority (North Korea, Venezuela, and Chad); and provide additional exemptions for nonimmigrant visas from certain Muslim-majority countries (Somalia, Chad, Libya, Yemen, and Iran). Although plaintiffs emphasize that the process nevertheless culminated in coverage of mostly Muslim-majority countries that overlap substantially with those covered under EO-2, that hardly calls into question the validity of the process, because most of those countries were also previously identified by Congress or the Executive Branch as posing heightened risks. Plaintiffs further emphasize pre-Proclamation statements (and a few postProclamation statements) by the President that are alleged to show religious animus, but it is both illogical and dangerous to use such statements to disable the President from acting on the national-security and foreign-policy recommendations of his Cabinet.\nFinally, even if some injunctive relief were appropriate, the district court erred in refusing to limit its injunction to identified aliens whose exclusion would impose concrete, irreparable harm on plaintiffs. A fortiori, this Court should reject plaintiffs’ argument that the injunction should be expanded to reach aliens who lack\n4\n\n\feven a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, the exclusion of whom by definition causes no cognizable harm to plaintiffs.\nARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable\nA. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable 1. Plaintiffs’ statutory claims are barred by the longstanding principle that “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). Plaintiffs seek to cabin this principle to “review of purely statutory challenges to a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa.” Br. 15. But regardless of whether a distinction between individualized decisions and broad policies might make sense in some contexts (cf. Br. 16-17), it makes no sense here, because it turns upside-down the separation-of-powers rationale of the nonreviewability principle. Rather than relying on anything specific to the individualized nature of consular officials’ visa decisions, the principle of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens rests more broadly on the “recognition that ‘any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with * * the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government’”—matters “ʻso exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely\n5\n\n\fimmune from judicial inquiry or interference.’” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)); see also id. at 1162 (“When it comes to matters touching on national security or foreign affairs * * * the presumption of review ‘runs aground.’”) (quoting Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)). That separation-of-powers rationale applies a fortiori to the President’s policy decision to exclude certain classes of aliens abroad whose entry he finds would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, as compared to an individualized visa determination under the INA by a subordinate executive official.\n2. Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs fail to cite a single case prior to this litigation and the related Hawaii litigation where a court without express congressional authorization has held that judicial review is available of a statutory claim seeking to order the Executive to allow the entry of an alien abroad. Each case on which they rely (Br. 14-16) is readily distinguishable, including on grounds that the government explained in its opening brief yet plaintiffs notably ignore.\nSale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 170-88 (1993), denied relief on the merits and did not address reviewability at all. Gov’t Br. 25. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1051 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986), asserted that Congress had expressly authorized review, but Congress subsequently amended the INA to eliminate the purported authorization. Gov’t Br. 22. Legal Assistance for\n6\n\n\fVietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, 45 F.3d 469, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (LAVAS), involved only a procedural question of where a visa interview would occur, and it was vacated in any event when Congress again abrogated the basis for review, 519 U.S. 1 (1996). International Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985), involved a challenge to aliens’ admission (not exclusion) by unions that did not want competition. Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1997), involved a challenge to a consular officer’s procedural authority to decline to act on a visa application, not a substantive decision to deny a visa. Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1988), similarly challenged the procedure adopted by the Secretary of State for establishing chronological priority for visa applications, and the reviewability discussion was immaterial because relief was denied on the merits regardless.\n3. Plaintiffs also err in their arguments (Br. 17-19) that Congress has authorized judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).\nFirst, the APA does not apply where a statute “preclude[s] review” or the agency’s action is otherwise nonreviewable. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), 702(1). As the government showed in its opening brief (at 19-22, 24-25), those exemptions apply here, given the principle of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens abroad. Plaintiffs offer no response to that showing, nor to the government’s related\n7\n\n\fdemonstration that Congress expressly abrogated APA review even for the exclusion of aliens physically present in the United States at the border.\nSecond, plaintiffs have no statutory right to enforce under the APA. They invoke Abourezk and the vacated decision in LAVAS, but those decisions cannot be reconciled with Saavedra Bruno and Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and plaintiffs make no attempt to do so. See Gov’t Br. 24.\nThird, there is no final agency action to review under the APA. Although plaintiffs emphasize that Presidential decisions can be challenged through actions of subordinate officials, they have not overcome the government’s showing that there is no final action to challenge because none of their relatives or other aliens with whom they have a bona fide connection has actually been excluded yet by virtue of the Proclamation. See Gov’t Br. 22-23. As for plaintiffs’ observation that some relatives had completed interviews and were awaiting administrative processing, that means their visa applications had already been denied on independent grounds, see 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 504.1-3(f), 403.7-3, and it is unclear whether those relatives will ever be found otherwise eligible for a visa wholly apart from the Proclamation.\n4. Finally, plaintiffs cannot evade these problems by invoking (Br. 17) the Court’s inherent equitable authority. The APA governs suits challenging government action, 5 U.S.C. § 703, and in any event Armstrong v. Exceptional Child\n8\n\n\fCenter, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015), makes clear that equitable authority is constrained by “express and implied statutory limitations” on review. Id. at 1385.\nB. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable Plaintiffs also argue (Br. 20) that the Proclamation’s supposed condemnation of their religion provides Article III injury, but as the government’s opening brief explained (at 27-28), mere stigma does not establish standing, for Establishment Clause purposes or otherwise. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). A plaintiff must show “personal contact” with challenged government action, Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 582-83, which is lacking here because the Proclamation does not apply to plaintiffs but only to third-party aliens abroad. Plaintiffs argue (Br. 20) that their constitutional claims are no different than the ones reviewed by the Supreme Court in Mandel and Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), but the plaintiffs in those cases alleged that the exclusion of aliens abroad violated their own constitutional rights. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 (alleged free-speech right); Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (alleged due-process right). Here, by contrast, plaintiffs are not asserting violations of their own constitutional rights, but instead indirect injuries resulting from the Proclamation’s application to others—the individual plaintiffs’ family members and the organizational plaintiffs’ clients\n9\n\n\fabroad (who, moreover, themselves have no constitutional rights). In that context, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may not sue. See Gov’t Br. 26.\nPlaintiffs argue that Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), recognized a company’s standing to challenge a Sunday closing law “even though only the company’s employees—not the company itself— had been regulated, prosecuted, and fined for violating a previous version of the law.” Br. 21. That is incorrect. Like the employee in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961), the business in Two Guys was directly regulated by the Sunday closing law, 366 U.S. at 583 n.1, and the Supreme Court characterized the challenge as one by the business to prevent enforcement of “th[e] statute against it,” id. at 586. The law’s operation against the employees was merely an additional means of regulating the businesses. See Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1959).\nFinally, plaintiffs’ suggestion (Br. 21) that alleged injury-in-fact alone is sufficient to bring an Establishment Clause claim—even where it is only the indirect effect of the challenged law’s regulation of third parties—cannot possibly be correct. If true, for example, that would mean that a U.S. Christian could challenge the Proclamation’s exclusion of his relatives who are Syrian Christians as a violation of his own Establishment Clause rights. That would be a nonsensical result.\n10\n\n\fII. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of Their Statutory Or Constitutional Claims As the government’s opening brief described (at 6, 8-12), the Proclamation is\nthe result of a months-long worldwide review and process of diplomatic engagement that involved the efforts of multiple government agencies and officials whose motives have never been questioned. That process culminated in a recommendation from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, with which the President acted in accordance—namely, by adopting tailored substantive restrictions designed to encourage improvement by eight countries with inadequate information-sharing practices or other risk factors and to protect this Nation unless and until they do so. In light of these critical features of the Proclamation, plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional arguments all fail.\nA. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA Despite the district court’s rejection of their argument, JA 1041-53, plaintiffs assert that the President exceeded his authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) because the Proclamation supposedly overrides the INA. Plaintiffs also defend the district court’s narrower conclusion, JA 1034-40, that the Proclamation violates the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination for immigrant visas under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Both arguments are incorrect.\n11\n\n\f1. The Proclamation Is Within The President’s Statutory Authority Under Sections 1182(f) And 1185(a)(1)\na. Plaintiffs mischaracterize the government’s position as asserting “limitless authority” for the President under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Br. 28. Whatever the outer bounds of the President’s power, the Proclamation’s entry restrictions fall well within his legal authority and historical practice.\nFirst, the entry restrictions are based on the President’s determination that they are needed to encourage countries with inadequate information-sharing practices or other risk factors to improve their practices, while protecting the Nation from those risks in the interim. Plaintiffs posit hypotheticals (Br. 29) such as a ban on entry on all employment-based visas in order to affect the domestic labor market, but the exclusion of aliens abroad based on national-security and foreign-policy concerns is action taken at the height of the President’s authority. See Gov’t Br. 53-54. The President was exercising his “unique responsibility” over “foreign * * * affairs,” Sale, 509 U.S. at 188, and his “inherent executive power” concerning the “admissibility of aliens,” Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542, as well as his statutory authority in Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion (Br. 30), Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), holds that States lack power to regulate immigration because that power is exclusively “entrusted to * * * the Federal Government,” id. at 409, not that the President lacks power to exclude aliens absent Congressional authorization. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers\n12\n\n\fconcerns (Br. 2, 28, 30, 63) are at their nadir, and their non-delegation concerns (Br. 30) are misplaced.\nSecond, the President is supplementing the inadmissibility grounds in Section 1182(a) based on additional findings under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). Plaintiffs argue that because of “Congress’s detailed visa system,” Br. 22, the President may not “override” specific provisions in the INA, Br. 28. But Congress has expressly authorized the President to impose additional limitations under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). For example, in Abourezk v. Reagan, supra, and Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988), the courts held that a certain ground for visa ineligibility under Section 1182(a) required particular harm from the alien’s activities in the United States rather than from their mere entry alone, but also held that the President nevertheless could rely on the entry-based harms to deny entry under Section 1182(f). Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2, 1053-60; Allende, 845 F.2d at 1116-18, 118 n.13, 1119. Indeed, the Abourezk Court noted that President Reagan had issued a Proclamation doing so for the entry of officers and employees of the Cuban Communist Party. 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2. Likewise, President Reagan later excluded all Cubans in response to a diplomatic dispute, and President Carter had previously authorized the exclusion of all Iranians in response to the Iranian hostage crisis. See Gov’t Br. 37-38. These historic examples flatly refute plaintiffs’ atextual arguments (Br. 31-32) that Section 1182(f)’s reference to “class[es] of aliens” does\n13\n\n\fnot apply to entire nations, or that the President may take action under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) only to address topics that Congress has not already addressed.\nPlaintiffs likewise err in arguing that Section 1182(f) is limited to “foreign policy crises,” Br. 32, or to “discrete, narrow, often fast-developing problems,” Br. 40. Those restrictions appear nowhere in the statute. Nor is the President’s Section 1182(f) authority confined to “limited” periods of time, Br. 31; to the contrary, it permits suspension of entry “for such period as he shall deem necessary.” Plaintiffs’ proposal invites judicial second-guessing of the President’s discretion, without manageable criteria as to whether a particular foreign-policy problem is a true “crisis,” is sufficiently “narrow,” or has an appropriately “limited” duration. In any event, though, the findings in the Proclamation amply demonstrate the critical need for the entry restrictions.\nb. Plaintiffs also argue that the Proclamation conflicts with the “basic operation of Congress’s visa system,” Br. 33, because, in their view, individualized vetting and screening through the visa application process is sufficient to address security concerns, Br. 34-36. Plaintiffs’ argument fails for multiple reasons.\nFirst, the fact that Congress generally requires individualized vetting and screening for visa applicants does not dictate how the President must treat nationals of countries with information-sharing inadequacies, and other risk factors, that\n14\n\n\fundermine the reliability of that vetting and screening process. There is no reason to assume that Congress would have wanted to foreclose Presidential action and depend solely on the ability of individual consular officers to repeatedly recognize the problem of inadequate information-sharing by those foreign governments. A systemic problem warrants a systemic solution, especially since such solutions are more likely to induce improvements by the foreign country.\nSecond, the President did not need to identify specific “vetting failures,” Br. 40, in order to act on the risk of potential failures and the desire to improve information-sharing. Again, plaintiffs’ argument assumes that the President must focus only on individuals and individualized vetting, but Section 1182(f) permits the President to restrict the entry of “any class of aliens” whose entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and authorizes the President to make his own judgment about the adequacy of existing restrictions on entry.\nThird, as the district court correctly held (JA 1050), plaintiffs are wrong to argue that the Proclamation conflicts with the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), Br. 3436. For the specific purpose of the VWP’s facilitation of travel, Congress has excluded a country if it fails any one of several criteria, see 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c), but Congress was not addressing the more general issue of what to do about a country that fails multiple criteria. Although Congress decided that the appropriate consequence for countries that fail to meet a single statutory criterion is that their\n15\n\n\fnationals must obtain visas, that narrow decision in no way forecloses the President’s determination that a different consequence is appropriate for countries that fail so many criteria that their information-sharing practices and other risk factors are collectively inadequate—namely, certain of their nationals shall be denied entry, unless a waiver applies. Likewise, the 2015 amendments to the VWP addressed the distinct problem of nationals of VWP countries who were either dual nationals of, or had traveled to, certain countries that posed heightened terrorism concerns yet could travel without a visa based on their VWP-country passport; the Proclamation, by contrast, addresses the problem of nationals traveling on passports from countries that have inadequate information-sharing practices or present other risk factors. In any event, even if plaintiffs were correct that the VWP and the Proclamation were sufficiently “close” in the topics they address, the fact that Congress addresses a specific situation in one provision of the INA does not foreclose the President from supplementing those provisions through his authority under Section 1182(f).\n2. The Proclamation Does Not Violate Section 1152(a)(1)(A)\nPlaintiffs do not dispute that Section 1152(a)(1)(A)’s nationalitydiscrimination ban is limited to the issuance of visas to otherwise-eligible aliens by consular officers and other government officials, whereas Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) address the President’s authority to deem aliens ineligible to enter based\n16\n\n\fon the national interest. That is fatal to plaintiffs’ statutory challenge given the judicial obligation to read the statutes in harmony rather than in conflict.\nPlaintiffs argue that it would make “no sense” to ban nationalitydiscrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas if nationality nevertheless could be used as a basis to suspend entry. Br. 26. But this overlooks the obvious difference between Congress’s constraining the ability of inferior Executive Branch officers to allocate immigrant visas among the set of aliens that Congress and the President allow to enter the country, and Congress’s constraining the President’s ability to exclude aliens from entering based on national-security and foreign-policy concerns. The latter would raise serious separation-of-powers concerns, and would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of President Reagan’s order barring Cuban nationals and President Carter’s order authorizing a ban on Iranian nationals. See Gov’t Br. 3738. Plaintiffs hypothesize that such restrictions are permissible under Section 1152(a)(1)(A) in case of “bilateral emergencies,” Br. 27, but that atextual exception is created out of whole cloth in a failed effort to avoid the unacceptable consequences that follow from plaintiffs’ interpretation. And again, plaintiffs provide no administrable standard for determining what constitutes an “emergency,” or why that category does not include the inadequate information-sharing practices and other risk factors that the Acting DHS Secretary has identified for the President.\n17\n\n\fFurthermore, even if Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) were thought to conflict with Section 1152(a)(1)(A), the former would control. Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion (Br. 26-27), if Section 1152(a)(1)(A) were a general ban on nationality discrimination concerning immigrant visas, it still would not supplant the more specific, and thus controlling, grants of authority in Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) for the President to restrict entry of aliens to protect the national interest, particularly in light of the serious constitutional concerns that a contrary construction would raise. Gov’t Br. 36.\nAt a minimum, any possible violation of Section 1152(a)(1)(A) could not justify the district court’s injunction. At most, the government would be required to issue immigrant visas to aliens whose entry would nevertheless remain suspended. And Section 1152(a)(1)(A) certainly could not require the government to issue visas or allow entry for nonimmigrants, as even plaintiffs do not dispute.\nB. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause 1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Legitimate And Bona Fide Reasons\nPlaintiffs fail to refute the government’s showing that Mandel prohibits “looking behind” a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. Because the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are rationally based on valid reasons, as the district court essentially recognized, see JA 1055, plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause challenge\n18\n\n\ffails under Mandel. Gov’t Br. 40-42; see IRAP, 857 F.3d at 588 (noting that Mandel\ngoverns constitutional challenges to the exclusion of aliens abroad).1\nPlaintiffs argue (Br. 41-42) that Mandel’s reference to a “bona fide” reason\nauthorizes a subjective pretext inquiry. But plaintiffs offer no response to our\nshowing (Gov’t Br. 41) that interpreting “bona fide” to require anything more than\nobjective rationality is foreclosed by Mandel, where the Court explicitly rejected\n“look[ing] behind” the government’s stated reason for denying a waiver of\ninadmissibility, 408 U.S. at 770, and declined Justice Marshall’s invitation to take\n“[e]ven the briefest peek behind the Attorney General’s reason for refusing a\nwaiver,” which he asserted was a “sham.” Id. at 778.\nPlaintiffs next argue, relying on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Din, 135 S.\nCt. at 2141, that “an affirmative showing of bad faith” justifies further scrutiny of\nthe government’s stated rationale. Br. 42. But that misreads the Din concurrence,\nas the government explained (Gov’t Br. 41-42), and plaintiffs fail to refute.\nCritically, Justice Kennedy merely noted that a plaintiff might be able to seek\n“additional factual details” where the government fails to offer any factual basis for\n1 Plaintiffs suggest (Br. 42 n.19) that Mandel should not govern because the Establishment Clause is a “structural[]” limitation on government action. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not countenance that kind of Establishment Clause exceptionalism. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86 (The Establishment Clause “establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is bound to honor—to no greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution.”).\n19\n\n\fa consular officer’s decision. 135 S. Ct. at 2141. When the government does identify a factual basis, though, Justice Kennedy properly recognized that that is the end of the analysis under Mandel. See id. at 2140 (citation of a rationally applicable statutory ground of inadmissibility is sufficient to establish that the government “relied upon a bona fide factual basis”).\nPlaintiffs also argue (Br. 43) that the Supreme Court’s recent description of Mandel’s standard as authorizing only “minimal scrutiny (rational basis review),” Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017), does not foreclose their position, because that case cited Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), which involved a challenge to a congressional policy with no explanation of bad faith. But Fiallo recited and applied Mandel’s “legitimate and bona fide reason” standard. Id. at 79495. And Fiallo acknowledged but declined to consider allegations of bad faith— namely, that the statutory distinctions at issue were “based on an overbroad and outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children” rather than any legitimate purpose. Id. at 799 n.9.\n2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary The Proclamation would be consistent with the Establishment Clause even if the Court were to ignore its facially legitimate and bona fide justification and look for “bad faith” under plaintiffs’ view of Mandel or for a primary religious purpose or effect under McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).\n20\n\n\fPlaintiffs fail to refute the critical features of the Proclamation that the government’s\nopening brief emphasized, and their efforts nevertheless to equate the Proclamation\nwith EO-2’s temporary entry suspension also fail.\na. Plaintiffs have no meaningful response to the multi-agency review and\nrecommendation process, which makes clear that the Proclamation was not the\nproduct of discriminatory animus. See Gov’t Br. 43, 47-48.\nFirst, plaintiffs provide no basis to question the integrity of the Cabinet heads\nand other government officials who conducted the review, formulated the\nrecommendation to the President, and assisted the President in considering those\nrecommendations; much less do plaintiffs provide evidence that those officials were\nmotivated by discriminatory animus.2\nSecond, plaintiffs repeat the district court’s erroneous conclusion that the\noutcome of the review process “was at least partially pre-ordained” because EO-2\n“required the Secretary of Homeland Security to ‘submit to the President a list of\ncountries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would\nprohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals.’” Br. 48; JA 1068.\n2 Relying solely on extra-record Internet articles that are not before this Court on appeal, plaintiffs question the motives of one official at DHS based on alleged prior statements unrelated to the Proclamation. Br. 5-6 nn.2-3. Even if that single subordinate were biased, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that he somehow compromised the independent judgment of multiple Cabinet officials, whose motives plaintiffs have not challenged, or that he otherwise overbore the process with his personal views.\n21\n\n\fAs the government’s opening brief noted, though, this provision addressed only “foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested”; it did not require the Secretary to conclude that any category of foreign nationals from those countries would be “appropriate” for an entry suspension; and it in no way constrained the Secretary’s discretion to determine what additional information should be requested from any country in the first place. Gov’t Br. 48. Plaintiffs are tellingly silent in response.\nThird, plaintiffs speculate (Br. 47-50) that the Proclamation may diverge from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security’s recommendation in some unidentified respect. But the President’s selection of countries from which to restrict entry mirrors the Acting Secretary’s recommendation, see Procl. § 1(g)-(i), and the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are “in accordance with” the Acting Secretary’s recommendations, see id. § 1(h)(iii); see also Procl., pmbl. (noting that the President’s determinations as reflected in the Proclamation were made “on the basis of recommendations from the Secretary of Homeland Security and other members of my Cabinet”). There is no basis to suggest any material difference between the recommendation and the Proclamation.\nb. Plaintiffs also fail to counter our showing that the Proclamation’s careful tailoring of substantive entry restrictions makes clear that they are not the product of anti-Muslim bias. See Gov’t Br. 43-45.\n22\n\n\fFor example, plaintiffs offer no explanation for why the Proclamation, if it were intended to discriminate against Muslims, would have omitted two Muslimmajority countries (Sudan and Iraq) from the seven countries from which EO-2 or its predecessor suspended entry. Similarly, plaintiffs do not explain why the Proclamation would have added only one new Muslim-majority country (Chad, which is only 52% Muslim), and two non-Muslim-majority countries (Venezuela and North Korea). Plaintiffs assert that the inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea will have “little practical consequence,” Br. 45, but, even if that is so (which courts are ill equipped to second-guess), it simply underscores the good faith of the agency officials who applied their religion-neutral criteria consistently. Nor do plaintiffs offer any explanation for why the Proclamation would have provided exemptions for all or some nonimmigrant visa applicants from the Muslim-majority countries of Somalia, Chad, Libya, Yemen, and Iran.\nCiting an Internet article, plaintiffs contend that the Proclamation is a religious gerrymander because it “ban[s] more Muslims and exempt[s] more non-Muslims than its ‘baseline’ criteria * * * would dictate.” Br. 45. But the author of this article erroneously assumed that failure of any one of nine criteria in the baseline renders a country inadequate under the Proclamation, when instead the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined adequacy based on all nine criteria collectively. Procl. §§ 1(c), (e), 2; see also U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: The\n23\n\n\fPresident’s Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/24/fact-sheet-president-sproclamation-enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes.\nc. Plaintiffs also seek to impugn the integrity of the Proclamation based on various similarities between the Proclamation and its predecessor Executive Orders, but that attempt fails. For instance, it is unsurprising that, as Plaintiffs note (Br. 47), the multi-agency review process culminated in a recommendation to include under the Proclamation many of the same countries included in EO-2 and its predecessor: after all, five of those countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen) were previously identified by Congress or the Executive Branch as posing heightened terrorism-related concerns based on criteria that the agencies likewise deemed relevant to their review and recommendation. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1187(a)(3), (a)(12)(A), (a)(12)(D), (c)(2)(C)-(F), with Procl. § 1(c).\nNor is the Proclamation unconstitutional because, as plaintiffs further emphasize (Br. 49), it relies on many of the same criteria that were present in EO-2. The criteria that overlap are all religion-neutral and reflect compelling nationalsecurity interests, similar to the criteria that Congress and other Presidents have relied on in the past. See Gov’t Br. 49 (noting, for example, that Iran “regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks” and\n24\n\n\f“is the source of significant terrorist threats”) (quoting Procl. § 2(b)(i)). The fact that serious national-security risks are posed by some Muslim-majority nations cannot prevent the government from addressing those problems, especially after the kind of extensive, multi-agency review process that occurred here.\nPlaintiffs (Br. 50-51) seek to minimize those threats, but in so doing ignore the bedrock point that courts are generally “ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of the Executive’s “reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat.” Reno v. AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (AAADC). Plaintiffs’ individual criticisms also fall short in their own right. For instance, they rely on opinions of former national-security officials, but those officials were not part of the comprehensive worldwide review and evaluation process that led to the Proclamation. The draft Department of Homeland Security reports that plaintiffs cite likewise predate that review, and also do not reflect the views of the thenSecretary.\nPlaintiffs also take issue (Br. 47) with the “indefinite” duration of the Proclamation’s entry restrictions, but contrary to their suggestion, indefinite does not mean “permanent.” The Proclamation requires periodic review of the restrictions, Procl. § 4, and “encourage[s] the countries to work with the United States to address [identified] inadequacies and risks so that the restrictions and\n25\n\n\flimitations imposed by this proclamation may be relaxed or removed as soon as possible,” id. § 1(h). As the government explained in its opening brief (at 37-38), the entry restrictions imposed by President Carter and President Reagan were, if anything, more indefinite in scope.\nd. Finally, plaintiffs’ reliance (Br. 51-52) on statements by the President does not establish that the Proclamation was the product of anti-Muslim bias. As the government’s opening brief explained (at 52), the statements primarily reflect an intent to protect the United States from the threat of terrorism by nationals from countries that pose heightened risks, and in any event cannot disable the President from adopting the Proclamation’s religion-neutral restrictions in accordance with the national-security and foreign-policy recommendations of his Cabinet. Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge those key points, which distinguish the Establishment Clause cases they cite, see Br. 45-46, 51-55, all of which involved either explicit religious expression or discriminatory laws that lacked any valid secular purpose. For example, plaintiffs cite McCreary, supra, which involved a Ten Commandments display at a county courthouse, but make no attempt to refute our explanation for why that case is inapposite. Gov’t Br. 45-46. Conversely, plaintiffs fail to address McGowan, supra, which is relevant and confirms that the Proclamation has a valid secular purpose and effect. Gov’t Br. 46-47.\n26\n\n\fIII. The Balance Of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief The President has suspended the entry of aliens whose entry he has determined\nwould be detrimental to the interests of the United States, exercising his broad constitutional and statutory authority. There is no “more compelling” interest than the security of the Nation, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981), and the interest in combatting terrorism “is an urgent objective of the highest order,” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). Plaintiffs simply evade these harms by ignoring the prospect at the preliminary-injunction stage that the Proclamation will ultimately be upheld as lawful. Br. 56-57.\nPlaintiffs also do not dispute that an injunction should extend no further than is necessary to redress plaintiffs’ own injuries. Gov’t Br. 56. Plaintiffs contend that it would be “difficult” to tailor the injunction to their own alleged injuries, Br. 57, but there would be little difficulty in tailoring an injunction to identified aliens whose exclusion imposes concrete, irreparable injury on plaintiffs.\nIt follows a fortiori that, contrary to plaintiffs’ cross-appeal arguments (Br. 59-60), the injunction against the Proclamation should not be extended beyond foreign nationals with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, under the Supreme Court’s stay of the EO-2 injunctions in Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). Plaintiffs make the remarkable assertion that they will suffer irreparable harm from the exclusion of aliens with whom they\n27\n\n\flack any relationship at all, but their argument rests on the abstract “condemnation” injuries that this Court already held are not cognizable at all without additional “personal contact.” Supra p. 2. Indeed, when a district court in Hawaii recently enjoined enforcement of the Proclamation as to aliens without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship, the Ninth Circuit promptly stayed that portion of the injunction. See Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168, Order (Nov. 13, 2017).\nIn arguing for broader injunctive relief, plaintiffs observe that the Proclamation will last longer than EO-2 and thus there is greater alleged injury even to those relationships that do not meet the standard established in the Supreme Court’s stay decision. Br. 59-60. But such injuries concerning mere “friends and acquaintances” and other “insufficiently formal” connections (Br. 58-59) pale in comparison to the harm to the government’s national-security and foreign-policy interests, especially since that harm is significantly greater under the Proclamation, which now reflects a multi-agency review and recommendation acted on by the President.\nFinally, plaintiffs assert that the district court’s injunction defined “bona fide relationships” differently than the Supreme Court did. Br. 63. But the district court simply repeated verbatim the Supreme Court’s language, stated that IRAP and HIAS clients are not covered by the injunction “absent a separate bona fide relationship,” and left for individualized determination whether a given relationship qualifies. JA\n28\n\n\f1080 (emphasis added). And to the extent the district court’s injunction is unclear, which the government believes it is not, plaintiffs can seek (and in fact have sought) clarification in district court.\nCONCLUSION For these reasons and those stated in the Government’s first cross-appeal brief, the district court’s preliminary injunction should be reversed. At a minimum, it should be vacated except for those identified aliens whose exclusion would impose a cognizable, irreparable injury on plaintiffs. And in no circumstance should the injunction be extended to reach aliens without a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States.\n29\n\n\fNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\nNOVEMBER 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nCHAD A. READLER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\n/s/ Sharon Swingle SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n30\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-face requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-volume limitations of Rule 32(a)(7)(B). The brief contains 6,544 words, excluding the parts of the brief excluded by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 22, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 1 of 81\n\nNos. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated) IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Southern Division\n(8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n\nFIRST CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF FOR APPELLEES\n\nKaren C. Tumlin Nicholas Espíritu Melissa S. Keaney Esther Sung NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600 Los Angeles, CA 90010 Tel: (213) 639-3900 Fax: (213) 639-3911 tumlin@nilc.org\n\nOmar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Hina Shamsi Hugh Handeyside Sarah L. Mehta David Hausman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004\nAdditional counsel on the next page\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 2 of 81\n\nespiritu@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org sung@nilc.org\nJustin B. Cox NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER P.O. Box 170208 Atlanta, GA 30317 Tel: (678) 279-5441 Fax: (213) 639-3911 cox@nilc.org\nKathryn Claire Meyer Mariko Hirose INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT 40 Rector Street, 9th Floor New York, New York 10006 Tel: (646) 459-3044 Fax: (212) 533-4598 kmeyer@refugeerights.org mhirose@refugeerights.org\nDavid Rocah Deborah A. Jeon Sonia Kumar Nicholas Taichi Steiner AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 Tel: (410) 889-8555 Fax: (410) 366-7838 jeon@aclu-md.org rocah@aclu-md.org kumar@aclu-md.org steiner@aclu-md.org\n\nTel: (212) 549-2600 Fax: (212) 549-2654 ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org hshamsi@aclu.org hhandeyside@aclu.org smehta@aclu.org dhausman@aclu.org\nCecillia D. Wang Cody H. Wofsy Spencer E. Amdur AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 343-0770 Fax: (415) 395-0950 cwang@aclu.org cwofsy@aclu.org samdur@aclu.org\nDavid Cole Daniel Mach Heather L. Weaver AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 915 15th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 675-2330 Fax: (202) 457-0805 dcole@aclu.org dmach@aclu.org hweaver@aclu.org\nAdditional counsel on the next page\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees IRAP, et al.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 3 of 81\n\nJohnathan Smith Sirine Shebaya MUSLIM ADVOCATES P.O. Box 66408 Washington, D.C. 20035 Tel: (202) 897-2622 Fax: (415) 765-1774 johnathan@muslimadvocates.org sirine@muslimadvocates.org\nRichard B. Katskee Eric Rothschild Andrew L. Nellis^ AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1310 L St. NW, Ste. 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 466-3234 Fax: (202) 466-3353 katskee@au.org rothschild@au.org nellis@au.org\n\nMark H. Lynch Mark W. Mosier Herbert L. Fenster Jose E. Arvelo John W. Sorrenti Katherine E. Cahoy Rebecca G. Van Tassell Karun Tilak COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One City Center 850 10th Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: (202) 662-6000 Fax: (202) 662-6302 mlynch@cov.com mmosier@cov.com hfenster@cov.com jarvelo@cov.com jsorrenti@cov.com kcahoy@cov.com rvantassell@cov.com ktilak@cov.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees I.A.A.B., et al.\n\nCharles E. Davidow Robert A. Atkins Liza Velazquez Andrew J. Ehrlich Steven C. Herzog PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6064 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\n\nLena F. Masri Gadeir Abbas COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833 lmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nAdditional counsel on the next page\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 4 of 81\n\nFaiza Patel Michael Price BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\n\nJethro Eisenstein PROFETA & EISENSTEIN 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees Zakzok, et al.\n\n^Admitted only in New York; supervised by Richard B. Katskee, a member of the D.C. Bar\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 5 of 81\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nINTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1\nSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................3\nSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES...............................................................................3\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................4\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................11\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................14\nARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................14\nI. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE. ......................................14\nA. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Justiciable. ................................14\nB. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Justiciable. ........................19\nII. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. ..................................................................22\nA. The Proclamation Violates the INA’s Non-Discrimination Mandate. .........................................................................................23\nB. The Proclamation Exceeds the President’s Delegated Authority Under § 1182(f)..............................................................................28\n1. The President Cannot Override the INA. ...........................28\n2. The Proclamation Conflicts with the Basic Design of Congress’s Admissions System. ................................33\nIII. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE. ................................................................................................41\nA. Mandel Does Not Defeat the Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claim ..............................................................................................42\nB. The Proclamation Suffers from the Same Constitutional Defects as Did the Precursor Executive Orders...............................................44 i\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 6 of 81\n\nC. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause’s Fundamental Command that the Government Not Target and Disfavor People Based on Their Religion. ....................................52\nIV. A NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS APPROPRIATE. ................................................................................55\nV. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO INDIVIDUALS WITH BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS TO U.S. PERSONS OR ENTITIES. 57\nA. The Partial Injunction Does Not Provide Complete Relief to the Plaintiffs. ........................................................................................58\nB. The Government’s Harms Are Significantly Weaker Even Than Those It Claimed in Defending EO-2 ............................................60\nC. A Full Injunction Is Appropriate After This Court Reaches the Merits .............................................................................................62\nVI. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUGGESTING THAT IRAP AND HIAS CLIENTS CATEGORICALLY LACK BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS. ............63\nCONCLUSION .......................................................................................................65\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 7 of 81\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986)................................ 16, 18, 28 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)........................................................29 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) ........................17 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012)............................................... 22, 53 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,\n512 U.S. 687 (1994) ................................................................................ 45, 46, 54 Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) .............17 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) ............................................................59 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).................................................................30 Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San Francisco,\n624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ..............................................................22 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ...........................18 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,\n508 U.S. 520 (1993) ................................................................................ 46, 52, 53 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) ........................................... 23, 62 Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)...........17 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) ......54 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).....................................................17 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ............................................................46 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ......................................................................62 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).......................36 Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016).....................................48\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 8 of 81\n\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)................................................................... 16, 43 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)....................................................16 Hawai‘i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017) ........................................5 Hawai‘i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)........................ passim Hawai‘i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)................................59 Hawai‘i v. Trump, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2017 WL 2989048\n(D. Haw. July 13, 2017) .......................................................................................64 Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999) ........14 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .......................................................................23 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017)......4 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,\n857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.) (en banc), ................................................................ passim Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese,\n761 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1985)....................................................................... 15, 16 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)................................................................ 20, 43 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) .............................................. 20, 41, 42 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)...................................................55 Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1995) ...................................................1 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) ..................................................... 53, 54, 55 Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State,\n45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995)................................................................... 16, 18, 27 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) .......................................................................57 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) ....18 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) ..........................................................................30 Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981).............................................27\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 9 of 81\n\nMcCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) .............................................46 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) .................................................. 21, 62 Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F. 3d 710 (7th Cir. 2017) ..................................................42 Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1988) ..................................................15 Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,\n145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998)............................................................................62 Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) ..................................................26 Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................................15 Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976).......................................27 Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ................... 15, 16, 17 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) ............................ 14, 19 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) .................................. 45, 46 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).............................................43 Trump v. Hawai‘i, — S. Ct. —, 2017 WL 4014838 (Sept. 12, 2017).....................64 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistant Project,\n137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam)............................................................. passim Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)........ 20, 21 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).................. 16, 30 United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2006).......................................1 United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) ....................................................30 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and\nState, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) .................................................................... 21, 22 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).............................................17 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ................ 22, 28, 29\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 10 of 81\n\nZemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ............................................................................30 Statutes 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).................................................................................................19 6 U.S.C. § 485(f)(1) .................................................................................................31 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1).................................................................................................17 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)...............................................................................................17 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) ........................................................................................... passim 8 U.S.C. §1153 .........................................................................................................29 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) ................................................................................ 26, 31, 33, 37 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) ............................................................................................ passim 8 U.S.C. § 1187 ........................................................................................................34 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12).............................................................................................37 8 U.S.C. § 1187a ......................................................................................................39 8 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)................................................................................................17 8 U.S.C. §1201(g) ....................................................................................................33 8 U.S.C. § 1202 ........................................................................................................34 8 U.S.C. § 1361 ........................................................................................... 34, 35, 39 22 U.S.C. § 1631a(c)................................................................................................31 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-\n173 ........................................................................................................................37 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139 ........................................................35 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.\n110-53 ...................................................................................................................36 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 11 of 81\n\nPub. L. No. 108-458 .............................................................................................36 Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242 ......................................37 Regulations 22 C.F.R. § 40.6 .......................................................................................................39 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) ........................ 1, 5, 51 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).................................4, 5 Exec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 1979) ...............................32 Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992)................................32 Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41329 (Oct. 4, 1985) ............................ 32, 33 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sep. 24, 2017). ................. 1, 8, 24, 34 Legislative History 161 Cong. Rec. H9050-58 (Dec. 8, 2015) ........................................................ 37, 38 H.R. Rep. No. 68-176, 68 Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 9, 1924........................................35 H.R. Rep. No. 1365, H.R. 5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1952 .....................38 Other Authorities 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.14-3(B) (2016) ........................................................32 The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) ........................................................29 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 1 WEEKLY\nCOMP. PRES. DOC. 364 (Oct. 3, 1965). ......................................................... 24, 26\n\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 12 of 81\n\nINTRODUCTION On September 24, the President issued Proclamation 9645 (the “Proclamation”), imposing an indefinite ban on most travel to the United States by more than 150 million people, the vast majority of whom are Muslim. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161. By its own terms, the Proclamation flows directly from the President’s March 6 Executive Order (“EO-2”), 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, which imposed a similar—but temporary—ban, and which this Court found to violate the Establishment Clause. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir.) (en banc), vacated as moot, 86 USLW 3175 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (EO-2 “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination”). 1 The government claims, however, that everything is different this time because it undertook a review and recommendation procedure before the President imposed the new ban in the Proclamation. The district court carefully considered that claim, and rejected it. As the district court explained, the government’s argument that the Proclamation has wiped the slate clean cannot be squared with the facts, including: the remarkable similarity between the current ban and its predecessors; EO-2’s directives, which\n1 IRAP remains persuasive authority, particularly as an en banc decision of this Court addressing an earlier stage of this same litigation. See Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1995) (relying on vacated decision as “instructive” and “persuasive”); United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2006).\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 13 of 81\n\neffectively “pre-ordained” the outcome of the review-and-recommendation process; the subjective, post-hoc manipulation of the process to make the results even more of a Muslim ban; and the President’s own statements “cast[ing] the Proclamation as the inextricable re-animation of the twice-enjoined Muslim ban.” J.A. 1070, 1075.\nOnce again, the government’s arguments in response boil down to a demand for total deference, no matter how strong the evidence is, and an assertion that the Court should simply ignore facts inconvenient to the government. The Court properly rejected the government’s demands for judicial abdication before, and it should do so again.\nEven leaving aside the Proclamation’s purpose and effect of denigrating Islam and disfavoring Muslims, the new ban violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). It discriminates on the basis of national origin in direct violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), as the district court found, and it also exceeds the President’s statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) by unilaterally replacing Congress’s detailed admissions system with one designed by the President. The government’s breathtaking defense—that the President can override Congress at will, recrafting the immigration system however he sees fit regardless of the Congressional judgments embodied in the INA—is anathema to the separation of powers.\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 14 of 81\n\nThe district court’s injunction should therefore be affirmed in full as far as it goes. But, because the court’s partial preliminary injunction does not provide complete relief to all the plaintiffs, who are harmed by the indefinite ban’s effects on noncitizens lacking formal relationships with U.S. persons, the Court should modify the preliminary injunction so that it is no longer “limited to barring enforcement of Section 2 against those individuals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”\nSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. J.A. 475. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and cross-appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The district court entered its order granting a preliminary injunction in these cases on October 17, 2017. J.A. 1084. Defendants filed timely notices of appeal on October 20, 2017. J.A. 1087, 1198, 1494. Plaintiffs in No. 17-2240 filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on October 23, 2017. J.A. 1090.\nSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES Did the district court abuse its discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction? On cross-appeal:\n\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 15 of 81\n\n1) Did the district court err in limiting the preliminary injunction to persons with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United States?\n2) Even if such a limitation were appropriate, did the district court’s order define such relationships too narrowly?\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE The Proclamation is the third order the President has signed this year banning more than one hundred million individuals from Muslim-majority nations from coming to the United States. See generally J.A. 997-1013 (district court findings of fact). These bans fulfill months of promises to ban Muslims from the United States—promises the President stood by after his election and on the day he signed the first order, and that he justified with the assertions that “Islam hates us” and “we’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” J.A. 997. The President signed the first ban, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (“EO-1”), on his eighth day in office and with “no consultation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, or the Department of Homeland Security.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 545 (D. Md. 2017); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 632 (Thacker, J., concurring) (Attorney General was “actively shielded” from learning the order’s contents); J.A. 1060. The ban was swiftly challenged and enjoined. J.A. 1000-01.\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 16 of 81\n\nThe second iteration of the ban, signed March 6, 2017, reproduced the original in most respects. 82 Fed. Reg. 13209. In prior proceedings in this case, the district court enjoined Section 2(c) of EO-2, and this Court, sitting en banc, affirmed in relevant part. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 604-05; see also Hawai‘i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw.), aff’d in relevant part, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).\nEO-2, like EO-1 before it, directed reviews of the information other countries share with the United States to facilitate vetting of visa applicants. EO1 § 3(a)-(b); EO-2 § 2(a)-(b). It further directed that, once the vetting review was complete, the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall” submit “a list of countries” to be subjected to an indefinite ban. EO-1 § 3(e)-(f); EO-2 § 2(e)-(f).\nWhile the Department of Homeland Security was still undertaking the review and recommendations required by EO-2, the President repeatedly issued public statements criticizing the injunctions that had been issued against EO-2 and promising to put a “tougher version” of the ban into place. J.A. 1006-07. The White House also put an individual in charge of the Department of Homeland Security’s task force on implementing executive orders, including the directives in EO-2, who said in 2014 that a blanket ban on visas for Muslim-majority countries\n\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 17 of 81\n\n“is one of these sort of great ideas that can never happen,”2 and has a consistent, public history of hostility toward Muslims and Islam, including recent assertions that a notorious mass shooter was simply “a Muslim who is following the strictures of Islam.”3\nAs directed, the Department of Homeland Security submitted a list of countries to ban. And on September 24, the President forged the next link in this chain of events: the Proclamation.\nThe Proclamation, like the first two bans, would disproportionately ban Muslims. The ban encompasses nationals of eight countries: five of the six countries barred by both EO-1 and EO-2—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—along with Chad, North Korea, and individuals affiliated with certain government agencies in Venezuela. Individuals seeking immigrant visas, which\n\n2 Eric Hananoki, New DHS Senior Advisor Pushed “Mosque Surveillance\n\nProgram,” Claimed that Muslims “By-And-Large” Want to Subjugate Non-\n\nMuslims,\n\nMedia\n\nMatters\n\n(Mar.\n\n14,\n\n2017),\n\nhttps://www.mediamatters.org/research/2017/03/14/new-dhs-senior-adviser-\n\npushed-mosque-surveillance-program-claimed-muslims-and-large-want-\n\nsubjugate/215634.\n\n3 Noah Lanard, A Fake Jihadist Has Landed a Top Job at Homeland Security, Mother Jones (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/11/afake-jihadist-has-landed-a-top-job-at-homeland-security/. This individual’s role overseeing executive order implementation at DHS came to light on November 1, after the district court issued its decision, so the relevant sources are not in the record below.\n\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 18 of 81\n\nlead to permanent resident status and the possibility of U.S. citizenship, from each designated country except Venezuela are banned. Restrictions on nonimmigrant visas vary among the banned countries. See J.A. 511, 868-69 (charts comparing bans imposed by the three orders).\nChad and the five countries banned by the Proclamation, EO-1, and EO-2, are majority-Muslim, and have a combined population of approximately 150 million. J.A. 852-859. Almost everyone whom the Proclamation will prevent from obtaining visas or entering the United States is from one of those six nations—which collectively are approximately 95% Muslim. J.A. 234-248.\nIn contrast, virtually no one from North Korea or Venezuela—the two countries named in the Proclamation that are not majority-Muslim—will be affected in that way. North Korea accounts for a negligible number of visas. And for Venezuela, only officials of particular Venezuelan government agencies and their families are banned, and then only from obtaining tourist or temporary visas. To illustrate, if in effect in 2016, the Proclamation would have barred 12,998 Yemenis, 7,727 Iranians, 9 North Koreans, and no Venezuelans from obtaining immigrant visas. J.A. 868.\nTo justify the bans, the Proclamation asserts that countries were assessed against a set of baseline criteria. Those criteria were not applied uniformly. See J.A. 1283-1300 (David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 19 of 81\n\nObjective Criteria, Cato Institute, Oct. 9, 2017) (explaining, for example, that more than 80 countries fail to issue electronic passports, yet three of the banned Muslimmajority countries do issue such passports). The Proclamation also acknowledges that Somalia (a majority-Muslim country) was banned even though it satisfies the government’s baseline criteria, and that Venezuela (a country that is not majorityMuslim) was effectively exempted even though it fails to meet the baseline. Proclamation §§ 2(f), 2(h).4\nLike its predecessors, the Proclamation does not cite any visa vetting failures or otherwise explain how the President concluded that existing vetting procedures were or might be inadequate. And a sworn declaration by 49 former national security officials explains that the ban is “unnecessary” because of the robust existing vetting procedures, and will instead “cause serious harm” to national security. J.A. 897.\nThe individual plaintiffs in this litigation are U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents whose relatives—including spouses, parents, and children— will be unable to obtain visas if the Proclamation takes effect. The organizational\n4 The Proclamation states that the government has other ways of verifying Venezuelans’ identity. But it does not suggest that Venezuela is unique in that regard. See J.A. 1300 (David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato Institute, Oct. 9, 2017) (observing that “there is absolutely no doubt that this factor applies to all eight travel ban countries”).\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 20 of 81\n\nplaintiffs, which include legal and social services organizations and associations of scholars, merchants, and young people, have similarly situated members and clients. See, e.g., J.A. 1244-48, 587-89, 597-98, 612-13; J.A. 1259-62 (spouses); J.A. 1268-69 (fiancé); J.A. 573-75, 1170-71, 1249, 1251, (parent and child); J.A. 1260 (parent and stepchild); J.A. 1174-75 (in-laws).\nSeveral of the plaintiffs have relatives who are gravely ill and are seeking urgent family reunification that will be prevented by the Proclamation. See, e.g., J.A. 1245-46 (critically ill infant); J.A. 1256 (father-in-law with cancer); J.A. 591 (husband with terminal cancer). Some of the plaintiffs’ loved ones have little connection with their country of nationality, but are excluded nonetheless. See, e.g., J.A. 1256 (Syrian national has never been to Syria). And several plaintiffs fear that if the Proclamation takes effect, their loved ones will have no choice but to return to countries where they face grave danger. See, e.g., J.A. 611-13, 1159, 1250, 1266.\nThe organizational plaintiffs are also injured in their own right. For example, plaintiff MESA’s mission of bringing together scholars of Middle Eastern Studies will suffer, as will its finances, which rely heavily on the annual meeting that many members and other scholars will no longer be able to attend. J.A. 557-60. Similarly, plaintiff Iranian Alliances Across Borders’ planned International Conference on the Iranian Diaspora in New York in April 2018 will\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 21 of 81\n\nbe severely impacted if the Proclamation goes into effect. J.A. 1191. Plaintiffs Arab-American Association of New York and International Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”) have both been forced to divert resources to aid clients and others. J.A. 565, 567-68, 576-78.\nThe district court concluded that the Proclamation’s nationality-based ban on the issuance and use of immigrant visas violated the INA’s anti-discrimination provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). J.A. 1034-40 (rejecting the government’s distinction between visa issuance and entry). The court declined to hold the rest of the Proclamation invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), but it acknowledged that “[i]f there is an example of a § 1182(f) order, past or present, that exceeds the authority of that statute, it would be this one.” J.A. 1051.\nThe district court then held that the Proclamation, like EO-2, violated the Establishment Clause. J.A. 1053-76. In so doing, the court rejected the government’s argument that the Proclamation’s “review process” or the “inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations” negated the ample evidence of improper purpose and effect. J.A. 1068, 1066. The district court explained that the Proclamation arose from EO-2’s criteria for banning countries and from EO-2’s requirement that the review process yield a list of banned countries. J.A. 1072. It observed that the “underlying architecture of [EO-1, EO-2,] and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same.” J.A. 1067. And it canvassed public statements by the\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 22 of 81\n\nPresident since EO-2, which showed that “even before President Trump had received any reports on the DHS Review,” he “had already decided that the travel ban would continue.” J.A. 1074. The court concluded that “the Proclamation [i]s the inextricable re-animation of the twice-enjoined Muslim ban,” only this time it is “no longer temporary.” J.A. 1075.\nAccordingly, the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing Section 2 of the Proclamation. The preliminary injunction does not cover North Korea and the limited group of Venezuelans subject to the ban. J.A. 1081. The district court also limited the injunction’s protection to “those individuals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” J.A. 1080 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nSUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. The district court correctly held that the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. The doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not apply to policies like the Proclamation, and the plaintiffs have a cause of action under the APA and in equity. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are also justiciable, as this Court previously held, because the plaintiffs invoke their own rights under the Establishment Clause to be free from religious isolation, exclusion, and condemnation.\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 23 of 81\n\nII. The Proclamation violates the INA. As the district court held, it violates 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s prohibition of nationality discrimination. The Proclamation also exceeds the President’s authority to suspend entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Section 1182(f)’s role in the INA is not to allow the President to unilaterally rewrite or discard fundamental aspects of the INA, like its two-track admissions system for visa and visa-less travel. But that is what the Proclamation does, by indefinitely banning eligible individuals from receiving visas even if they can meet their burden under the INA, based solely on their governments’ failure to satisfy some of the visa waiver criteria. III. The district court correctly held that the Proclamation, like EO-2, violates the Establishment Clause. As this Court previously held, the Court may look beyond the face of the Proclamation because plaintiffs have adduced ample evidence of bad faith. The effect of the ban will overwhelmingly fall on Muslims, and the ban on North Korea and certain Venezuelan officials will have little practical impact. The Proclamation’s context and history, like EO-2’s, makes clear that this is another attempt to implement the promised Muslim ban. The Proclamation’s review and recommendation process does not undercut that conclusion, and in fact underscores the continuity from EO-2. IV. The injunction was appropriate in light of the religious denigration and separation from loved ones that plaintiffs face, and the lack of concrete or\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 24 of 81\n\nimminent injury to the government from interim relief. As this Court previously held, nationwide relief is warranted because the ban’s effect extends nationwide and a narrower injunction would not fully remedy the ban’s condemnation of the plaintiffs. V. The district court erred in narrowing its injunction to only noncitizens who have a formal, documented relationship with a U.S. person or entity. The Supreme Court fashioned that limitation in a different factual and procedural context. This case now involves an indefinite ban and a wider array of plaintiffs than were before the Supreme Court, who would suffer a variety of harms from the exclusion of even individuals without formal relationships in this country. The government’s interests are weaker than they were before the Supreme Court. And the task before the district court was fashioning interim relief after preliminarily deciding the merits, not crafting a stay pending initial consideration of the merits. The statutory and constitutional violations here, and the threatened injuries to the plaintiffs, merit a preliminary injunction that is not narrowed in this way. VI. At a minimum, the district court’s injunction should be modified to make clear that relationships between entities in the United States and their clients are sufficient under the preliminary injunction so long as they are formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 25 of 81\n\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW The Court reviews “the district court’s injunction for abuse of discretion.” Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 1999).\nARGUMENT I. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE.\nThe government relies on two sweeping arguments to oppose judicial review here: That this Court has no power at all to consider statutory claims involving exclusion policies, and that the plaintiffs, who are personally affected by the Proclamation, cannot challenge its denigration of their religion. Both arguments lack merit.\nA. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Justiciable. 1. The government makes the startling claim that the courts cannot review whether the executive’s exclusion policies are consistent with the governing statutes. Br. 19-22. No court has ever recognized the broad nonreviewability principle that the government presses here, despite its claim that the principle is “deeply rooted” in the law. To the contrary, the Supreme Court itself reviewed a statutory claim against an § 1182(f) suspension in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 165-66, 172 & n.27 (1993). The government offers no persuasive reason to discount Sale. Br. 25. Indeed, the government in Sale vigorously argued that\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 26 of 81\n\nexclusion policies under § 1182(f) were immune from judicial review. U.S. Br. 13-18 & n.9, 55-57, 1992 WL 541276, Reply Br. 1-4, 1993 WL 290141, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. (No. 92-344). The Supreme Court nonetheless reviewed the claim on the merits—precisely what the government now claims has long been forbidden.\nWhat the government’s non-justiciability argument really asks this Court to do is to enormously expand the doctrine of consular non-reviewability to preclude review of statutory claims against all exclusion policies. The consular nonreviewability doctrine—which is itself not absolute—restricts the review of purely statutory challenges to “a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). As the circuits have uniformly held, that doctrine applies only to “a particular decision in a particular case,” not a “general” policy like the one in this case. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).\nThe single out-of-circuit case on which the government leans heavily (Br. 20-22), Saavedra Bruno, was a routine application of the consular nonreviewability doctrine to a single noncitizen’s visa denial. The court repeatedly\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 27 of 81\n\nspecified that its analysis pertained to the “decisions of consular officials.” 197 F.3d at 1160 (emphasis added); see id. at 1158, 1162.\nIndeed, the very same Circuit has repeatedly reviewed statutory challenges to admissions policies on the merits. See Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 761 F.2d at 801 (collecting cases); see also Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“LAVAS”) (reviewing visa policy abroad), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996). It has even reviewed statutory claims against individual visa denials when necessary to avoid constitutional issues. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1986); accord id. at 1062 n.1 (Bork, J., dissenting).5\nConsular non-reviewability does not, as the government claims, “invert the constitutional structure [by] limit[ing] review in [the consular] context while permitting review of the President’s decision[s].” Br. 21. Distinctions between individual adjudications and high-level policy are common, both in immigration and throughout the law. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587 (distinguishing between individual fact-finding and “high-level government policy”); Washington v.\n5 The government’s other cases are even further afield, because they review claims against admissions policies on the merits, including statutory claims where raised. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-99 (1977); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 583 & n.4 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544-47 (1950) (reviewing two statutory claims against regulations promulgated under a presidential proclamation).\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 28 of 81\n\nTrump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (same); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1986) (statute granted review of “a regulation” but not a single “determination” made under that regulation); cf. Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“There are ample reasons for distinguishing the two situations.”).6\n2. The government also argues that Plaintiffs lack a cause of action to bring their statutory claims. It first points out that the President is not subject to the APA. Br. 22. But no APA cause of action is necessary to review presidential action, which the Court can review under its inherent equitable authority. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-88 (1981) (reviewing multiple presidential orders in equity); see also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384-85 (2015) (describing “a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action” by “courts of equity”).\nNor can the government dispute that the plaintiffs have a cause of action against the agencies implementing the Proclamation. “[I]t is now well established”\n6 Consular officers make millions of individual visa decisions each year, in most cases thousands of miles from the United States, and have unique discretion over granting and denying visas. See, e.g., Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1156; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1201(a)(1); 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). This case involves no similar considerations.\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 29 of 81\n\nthat “[r]eview of a Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President’s directive.” Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 1326-27 (holding that an agency’s actions to implement an executive order are not “insulate[d] . . . from judicial review under the APA” or “a non-statutory cause of action”).\nThe government argues that the plaintiffs nonetheless fall outside the relevant zone of interests. Br. 24. Both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have correctly held otherwise, as the district court did here. See Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 766-67 (concluding that relatives of visa applicants “fall well within the zone of interest Congress intended to protect,” as did employer) (quoting LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 47172); Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1047, 1050-51 (holding individuals who invited noncitizens “to attend meetings or address audiences” were within the zone of interests); J.A. 1017, 1021, 1030. The zone-of-interests test “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests” are “marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 30 of 81\n\nplaintiffs here—family members, spouses, employers, colleagues, conference hosts—easily clear that bar.7\nPlaintiffs’ claims are also ripe. As before, plaintiffs have brought a facial challenge that “is squarely presented for [the Court’s] review” and “not dependent on the factual uncertainties of the waiver process.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 587 (holding that the waiver process would impose “undue hardship”). In any event, several plaintiffs’ relatives have already completed their interviews and are awaiting the administrative processing of their visas. See, e.g., J.A. 605-06; 587-88; 603; 1255; 1247; 1268; 1175; 1171. Their injuries from the Proclamation’s ban are all too imminent. Ripeness is not a problem in this case.\nB. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Justiciable. Turning to the constitutional claims, the government argues that because the Proclamation does not deny visas to the plaintiffs themselves, it cannot injure them, or violate their rights, in a legally relevant manner. That argument has been rejected at every stage of this case, and fails here for the same reasons. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 582-87; J.A. 1023-27.\n7 The government’s contention that § 1182(f) orders are “committed to agency discretion” because there is no meaningful statutory standard of review, Br. 24-25 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)); Br. 30,)), depends entirely on its incorrect view, on the merits, that § 1182(f) grants the President limitless power, addressed infra. See also Sale, 509 U.S. at 165-66. And in any event this objection is no answer to plaintiffs’ argument under § 1152(a).\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 31 of 81\n\nThe plaintiffs have explained in detail how they have been injured by the government’s condemnation of their religion. For example, IRAP Plaintiff John Doe #4 feels “demeaned” by the Proclamation’s religious intent, and he has perceived the bans as “collective punishment.” J.A. 588-89. For plaintiff Khazaeli, the bans have “taken the discrimination that my family has previously endured because people have seen us as Muslim and made it into law.” J.A. 593. The same is true for YAMA’s and MESA’s members, see J.A. 608, 611, 555-56, clients of AAANY and IRAP, see J.A. 567, 578, 579-80, and other individual plaintiffs in this case, see, e.g., J.A. 585, 571-72, 574, 600-01, 606-07.\nThe Supreme Court has repeatedly decided the claims of individuals in the United States who—like the plaintiffs here—allege that the government is injuring them and violating their rights by refusing to allow foreign nationals abroad to travel to the United States. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1972); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140-42 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. Oral Arg., Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WLNR 4070578 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2017) (government conceding that “a U.S. citizen with a connection to someone seeking entry” would have standing to challenge EO-1).\nThe Supreme Court has also recognized that injuries that arise where the government regulates others are cognizable under the Establishment Clause. In Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), the\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 32 of 81\n\nplaintiff company had standing to challenge a Sunday closing law, even though only the company’s employees—not the company itself—had been regulated, prosecuted, and fined for violating a previous version of the law, or threatened with prosecution under the new version. Id. at 585-87. Two Guys’ companion case, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), did not hold that plaintiffs had to be directly regulated to invoke the Establishment Clause. McGowan merely explained that the plaintiffs in that case could not allege that their Free Exercise Clause rights were violated without explaining what their religious beliefs were. Id. at 429. But it went on to hold that the plaintiffs did have standing to raise Establishment Clause claims, since they had suffered a “direct economic injury” under the challenged law. Id. at 430. McGowan and Two Guys underscore that the question is whether the challenged action injures the plaintiff, not whether it directly regulates him or her. Accord IRAP, 857 F.3d at 585 (rejecting government argument that EO-2 was “not directly targeted at plaintiffs”).\nThe district court correctly focused on that question and concluded that plaintiffs who would suffer a particularized injury as a consequence of the government’s constitutional violation could sue to enforce their rights. See J.A. 1023-24. The district court also correctly rejected the government’s attempt to analogize this case to Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), in which the plaintiffs\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 33 of 81\n\nwere complete strangers to the challenged conduct, “abstractly disagreeing” with a transfer of property far away that they had never seen, who claimed no injury of isolation, exclusion, or condemnation, id. at 485. J.A. 1024; accord IRAP, 857 F.3d at 585; see also id. at 585 n.11 (explaining why In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008), is inapposite); id. at 585 n.10 (finding that “[p]laintiffs’ injuries are . . . consistent with the injuries that other courts have recognized in Establishment Clause cases that do not involve religious displays or prayer”) (citing Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1122 (10th Cir. 2012) and Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).\nThe plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. II. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE IMMIGRATION AND\nNATIONALITY ACT. For hundreds of millions of people in the United States and abroad, the Proclamation replaces Congress’s detailed visa system with a new one of the President’s design. On an indefinite and potentially permanent basis, it bars the issuance and use of immigrant visas by nationals of the designated countries. It also erases numerous categories of nonimmigrant visas for those countries. These changes read very much “like a statute,” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952)—just not the one Congress enacted.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 34 of 81\n\nThese sweeping alterations cannot be reconciled with Congress’s admissions scheme. The Proclamation reinstitutes a nationality-based system that Congress outlawed decades ago. And it jettisons Congress’s individualized vetting system, which has governed for almost a hundred years, and which Congress has repeatedly reaffirmed, even when considering the same problems the Proclamation purports to address.\nThe President’s authority under the INA does not permit him to make this sort of unilateral revision of the immigration laws. As the Supreme Court explained in a prior immigration case, the Framers were “acutely conscious” of the danger posed by subjecting national policy decisions to the “arbitrary action of one person.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). Once Congress enacts its own policy choices into law, nothing “authorizes the President” to “amend, or to repeal” its handiwork. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998). But that is precisely what the Proclamation does.\nA. The Proclamation Violates the INA’s Non-Discrimination Mandate.\nThe district court correctly concluded that the Proclamation violates the explicit non-discrimination mandate in 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which provides that “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s . . . nationality.” J.A. 1034-40. Congress enacted\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 35 of 81\n\n§ 1152(a)(1)(A) in 1965 when it abolished the discriminatory national-origins quota system, which had banned Asian immigration and restricted entry from southern and eastern Europe, preventing family reunification for many immigrants in order to maintain “the ethnic composition of the American people.” J.A. 103435 (quoting H. Rep. No. 89-745, at 9 (1965)); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 626-27 (Wynn, J., concurring).\nThe Proclamation is nothing less than a new national-origins system. It provides that nationals of the six Muslim-majority countries may not come to the United States “as immigrants,” indefinitely, solely because of their nationality. Proclamation § 2(a)-(h); see id. § 1(h)(ii) (explaining that the Order “distinguish[es] between the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants” and bars the use of immigrant visas). The breadth of this nationality-based ban has no post1965 parallel.\nIn signing the 1965 bill, President Johnson emphasized that, under the quota system, “[f]amilies were kept apart because a husband or a wife or a child had been born in the wrong place.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 1 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 364, 365 (Oct. 3, 1965). That is exactly what the Proclamation is designed to do. Cf. J.A. 832-33 (President Trump calling, in September, for a “larger, tougher and more specific” ban and opposing “CHAIN MIGRATION”). Congress has emphatically rejected that approach. See\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 36 of 81\n\nIRAP, 857 F.3d at 635-38 (Thacker, J., concurring); Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 776-79 (same).\nThe government claims it is not violating Congress’s prohibition because it is barring only “entry” using immigrant visas, not the issuance of those visas. J.A. 1036-37. First, the claim is wrong: The government has repeatedly admitted that it implements these bans “by denying visas.” Br. for the Petitioners at 51-52, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436 & 16-1540, (U.S. filed Aug. 10, 2017). Even the State Department, the agency that issues visas, describes the Proclamation as a “Presidential Proclamation on Visas.” J.A. 633. Second, banning entry to immigrant visa holders achieves the same effect as banning issuance of the visas themselves, because a visa is meaningless if its holder is indefinitely barred from entering the country. An indefinite immigrant-visa entry ban therefore achieves the precise result that § 1152(a) forbids. J.A. 1038-39. Asserting, as the government does, that § 1182(f) allows the President to “limit the universe of individuals eligible to receive [immigrant] visas,” Br. 35, is simply wordplay. Congress’s non-discrimination command cannot be so easily evaded. J.A. 1039-40.8\n\n8 The district court rightly rejected the government’s attempt, see Br. 39, to repackage visa denials as “a change in ‘procedures’ or the ‘location’” of visa\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 37 of 81\n\nThe government further claims that even as Congress abolished the discriminatory national-origins system in 1965, it intended to preserve the President’s ability to reverse its judgment at any time and institute a nationalorigins ban. Br. 35-36. That makes no sense. The legislative history the government cites does not remotely suggest such a self-defeating intent. Rather, it merely reflects that Congress recognized that non-nationality-based grounds of ineligibility for visas, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), would remain in effect. And in fact, the “legislative history surrounding the 1965 Act is replete with the bold antidiscriminatory principles of the Civil Rights Era.” Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1997); see Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 1 Weekly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 364, 365 (Oct. 3, 1965) (immigration policy had been “twisted and . . . distorted by the harsh injustice” of the “un-American” quota system).\nNor does § 1152(a) conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). As explained below, infra Part II.B.1, § 1182(f) only authorizes the President to take action consistent with the INA, see J.A. 1048-49, including its repudiation of national origins discrimination, as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). But if there were any conflict, § 1152(a) would control. It was enacted after § 1182(f) and is more\nprocessing. J.A. 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B)); accord Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 779.\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 38 of 81\n\nspecific, because it addresses nationality discrimination in the issuance of visas, whereas § 1182(f) is silent as to both visa issuance in general and discrimination in particular. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 & n.7 (1976); accord J.A. 1036.9\nFinally, the government tries to justify the Proclamation’s nationality discrimination by pointing to past entry suspensions against Cuban and Iranian nationals. Br. 37. Those suspensions were never challenged under § 1152(a).10 Whatever the President’s authority to react to bilateral emergencies, § 1182(f) does not license him to transform the congressionally-enacted visa process into a congressionally-rejected nationality-based system. Cf. LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473 (holding that an exception to § 1152(a) would require a justification that was “most compelling—perhaps a national emergency”).\n\n9 The government points to a post-1965 amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a). But “a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153.\n10 The government wrongly suggests that this Court reviewed a § 1152(a) claim in Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981). Br. 36. In fact, no party in that case raised § 1152(a), and the Court did not mention it.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 39 of 81\n\nB. The Proclamation Exceeds the President’s Delegated Authority Under § 1182(f).\nThe President’s authority to alter Congress’s admission system “extends only as far as the statutory authority conferred by Congress.” Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061. Section 1182(f) does not, contrary to the government’s claims, provide the President with limitless authority to restructure Congress’s visa system and override congressional judgments that are embedded in the INA. Because that is precisely what the Proclamation does, it exceeds the President’s authority.\n1. The President Cannot Override the INA. The government claims that, as long as a proclamation contains a bare recital that the banned entry would be detrimental to the Nation’s interests, there is no limit to what parts of the INA the President can cancel or revise. Br. 30. That position raises grave separation-of-powers concerns. “Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). The government’s position is also wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation. Under the government’s interpretation of § 1182(f), the President could override not only the parts of the INA implicated here, see supra (nondiscrimination mandate); infra (individualized visa system), but any others as well.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 40 of 81\n\nThe President could declare that immigrant workers are detrimental to the interests of the United States, and then ban all entry on employment-based visas indefinitely. He could declare that U.S. interests require skills-based immigration only, and then ban all entry on family-based visas. It would be no obstacle, on the government’s view, that Congress had enacted a detailed employment- and familybased immigration system. 8 U.S.C. §1153(b) (“Preference allocation for employment-based immigrants”); id. § 1153(a) (“Preference allocation for familysponsored immigrants”). The President would be free to upend the basic structure of Congress’s visa system.\nThat cannot be. The Constitution assigns the legislative power, including the power to make “[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens[,] . . . exclusively to Congress.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). By entrusting this power to Congress, the Framers avoided the sort of unlimited “prerogative” over immigration that had been “exercised by George III.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) (identifying acts of “absolute Tyranny” by “the present King of Great Britain” that included “obstructing the laws for Naturalization of Foreigners” and “refusing to pass [Laws] to encourage their migrations hither”).\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 41 of 81\n\nThe Congress that enacted § 1182(f) was acutely aware of these separationof-powers principles: Just months earlier, the Supreme Court had reaffirmed, in an immigration case, that a “delegation of legislative power” is “permissible” only when “the executive judgment is limited by adequate standards.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542-44 (1952). And as the Supreme Court confirmed, even a statute dealing with “the formulation of travel controls” cannot “grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). Section 1182(f) thus does not grant the President authority to reverse Congress’s own policy decisions codified in the INA.\nInstead, the President may exercise his § 1182(f) authority only in “carrying out the congressional intent.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-47 (1950);11 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1924) (executive immigration actions must conform to the “declared policy of Congress”); see Carlson, 342 U.S. at 543 (interpreting statute to require the executive to “justify” its use of delegated authority “by reference to the legislative scheme”); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1957) (holding that even apparently\n\n11 By contrast, the Court in Knauff noted that Congress could commit to executive discretion the decision “to exclude a given alien” during “the national emergency of World War II.” 338 U.S. at 542-43 (emphasis added). The Court did not address rewriting the statutory scheme.\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 42 of 81\n\n“unbounded authority” must be exercised consistent with the “purpose of the legislative scheme”).\nSection 1182(f)’s text confirms that the President’s power is not limitless and must be exercised consistent with the rest of the INA. It eschews the language of other parts of the INA that explicitly commit immigration decisions to sole executive “discretion.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), (a)(10)(C)(iii)(II); see also 6 U.S.C. § 485(f)(1); 22 U.S.C. § 1631a(c). It applies to “class[es] of aliens,” a term that other parts of § 1182 make clear does not encompass entire nations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(10) (enumerating the “classes of aliens” who are inadmissible, none of which are connected to nationality); accord J.A. 1041. It only authorizes the President to “suspend” entry for a limited “period,” not to rewrite the INA permanently. See Amicus Br. of T.A. 4-7 (discussing textual limits on § 1182(f) authority). And it requires an explicit “find[ing]” of detriment, which of course cannot conflict with Congress’s own enacted determination about what would serve “the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).\nUnsurprisingly, no President has ever claimed the power under § 1182(f) to do anything like what the Proclamation does. Instead, nearly all prior § 1182(f) suspensions have targeted very narrow groups, reaching only a handful of individuals who had contributed to recent crises abroad. See generally J.A. 844-48\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 43 of 81\n\n(listing § 1182(f) suspensions); 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.14-3(B)(1)(b)(2)-(3) (2016).12\nThe only two suspensions that applied to more than a small group of individuals each addressed acute foreign policy crises that Congress had not already addressed. When President Carter imposed restrictions on Iranian nationals in 1979, Exec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 1979); Exec. Order No. 12,206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24101 (Apr. 7, 1980), Iran was holding U.S. citizens hostage. President Reagan suspended the entry of Cuban nationals as immigrants one month after a breakdown in bilateral negotiations. See Associated Press, U.S., Cuba Fail to Reach Accord on Immigration, July 10, 1986;13 contra Br. 29. And he suspended Cuban nonimmigrant entry mere months after Cuba withdrew from a migration agreement. See Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg.\n\n12 The government also invokes 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), Br. 29-30, but does not seriously contend that § 1185(a) provides authority beyond § 1182(f). That is a sensible concession, because § 1185(a) does not speak to entry suspensions, it requires that any conditions on entry be “reasonable,” and it is subject to the same separation-of-powers principles as § 1182(f).\n13 http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07-10/news/mn-22586_1_radio-marti.\n32\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 44 of 81\n\n41329 (Oct. 4, 1985).14 Like all the narrower § 1182(f) orders, these suspensions responded to situations that Congress had not already addressed.\n2. The Proclamation Conflicts with the Basic Design of Congress’s Admissions System.\nThe Proclamation upends the basic operation of Congress’s visa system. For nearly a century, that system has relied on individual visa applicants, not governments, to establish that they are eligible for visas and not inadmissible. Without identifying any problems with that system, the Proclamation fundamentally alters it by denying visas regardless of whether applicants can meet their burden under the INA. Yet Congress has repeatedly reaffirmed its own system in the face of the same security and information-sharing concerns cited by the Proclamation. Section 1182(f) does not empower the President to upend Congress’s approach, especially with no relevant explanation.\n1. For decades, Congress’s admissions system has been divided into two different tracks: one for entry on visas, the other for visa-less entry. The visa system places the burdens of production and persuasion on individual visa applicants. See Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, J.A. 898. The applicant must produce sufficient information and documentation to establish her identity and 14 President Bush’s suspension of entry by sea in 1992 addressed only individuals “without necessary documentation,” Exec. Order 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992), and so created no conflict with congressional immigration admissions policy.\n33\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 45 of 81\n\neligibility for a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a)-(d). The applicant must then “submit to an in person interview with a consular officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(h). And the applicant bears the ultimate burden to convince the consular officer that she is not subject to any ground of inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1201(g), including numerous terrorism and public-safety bars, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), (a)(3)(A)-(C), (a)(3)(F). Individuals about whom the government does not have adequate information are denied visas, while individuals who can supply the requisite information are not needlessly excluded solely because of the perceived failings of their governments.\nThe visa-less admissions system—the Visa Waiver Program—is different. Since 1986, Congress has allowed certain foreign nationals to enter the country without visas if their governments meet certain criteria. To participate, a foreign government must issue electronic passports, 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(3)(B), report lost or stolen passports, id. § 1187(c)(2)(D), share terrorism and crime information about its nationals, id. § 1187(c)(2)(F), not provide safe haven for terrorists, id. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(ii), maintain control over its territory, id. § 1187(c)(5)(B)(ii), and receive its deported nationals, id. § 1187(c)(2)(E). Reliance on governments for identity and security information makes sense in the context of visa-less entry, because individuals are no longer supplying that information through the visa application process.\n34\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 46 of 81\n\nThe Proclamation upends this deliberate structure. It places the burden on governments to provide information for visa applications, even though the INA places it on individuals. And its new requirements for visa travel are almost exactly the same as Congress’s requirements for visa-less travel: governments must issue electronic passports, report lost or stolen passports, Proclamation § 1(c)(i), share terrorism and crime information, id. § 1(c)(ii), not provide safe haven for terrorists, maintain control over their territory, and receive deported nationals, id. § 1(c)(iii). See J.A. 1047 (noting that the Proclamation’s criteria are “strikingly similar” to the Visa Waiver Program’s). The conflict here is stark. Under Congress’s scheme, nationals of countries that fail these criteria must apply for visas; under the Proclamation’s scheme, nationals of those countries are barred from receiving visas.\nThe Proclamation thus discards the individualized visa system Congress has chosen. Even if an applicant can “establish to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he is eligible to receive a visa” and “is not inadmissible,” 8 U.S.C. § 1361, he must still be denied a visa because his government fails some of the requirements for visa-less travel. That revision is incompatible with the INA. It is also unprecedented. Congress’s individualized visa system has been in place since\n\n35\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 47 of 81\n\n1924.15 In recent decades, Congress has frequently updated the requirements for both visa and visa-less travel, but it has never conflated the two. Nor has any President invoked § 1182(f) to alter the basic method for determining visa eligibility. Instead, as described above, all prior § 1182(f) suspensions have addressed conduct or diplomatic events that Congress had not. None has been based merely on dissatisfaction with the core structure of the INA’s applicantbased visa process.\nCongress, moreover, has repeatedly and recently adhered to that basic structure. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137, 143 (2000) (rejecting statutory authority to deviate from recent congressional policy choices). In the years after September 11, 2001, Congress adjusted both the visa and visa-less schemes, but maintained the clear distinction. See, e.g., Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 711 (“enhancing program security requirements” for governments to participate in the Visa Waiver Program); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §§ 5301, 5302 (imposing new “visa\n15 See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, §§ 7, 23; Report of the Comm. on Imm. & Naturalization, at 9, H.R. Rep. 68-176, 68 Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 1924) (noting that an applicant would have to produce “all available public records concerning him kept by the government to which he owes allegiance”); id., Minority Report, at 11 (acknowledging that this would be a difficult burden to meet for applicants from war-torn countries).\n36\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 48 of 81\n\nrequirements” on individual applicants); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 501(b) (identifying new “information required of [certain] visa applicant[s]”), § 303(c)(1) (imposing new requirements on “government[s]” who “participate in the visa waiver program”), § 307(a) (same).\nIndeed, in 2015 Congress addressed the possibility that nationals of and visitors to certain countries—including the very countries banned in EO-1, EO-2, and now the Proclamation—might pose a security risk. Congress’s solution was to transfer those individuals from the visa-less system to the visa system, where they would now have to supply the necessary information themselves. See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. O, tit. II, § 203, 129 Stat. 2242 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)); see 161 Cong. Rec. H9050 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Lofgren) (explaining that “a visa interview, rather than visa-free travel, would be required”). Congress pointedly declined to make them categorically ineligible to travel to the United States. See 161 Cong. Rec. H9051 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Conyers), H9054-55 (Rep. Lee), H9056 (Rep. McCarthy), H9057 (Rep. Schiff). Congress thus reaffirmed its confidence in the existing visa process.16\n16 See, e.g., 161 Cong. Rec. H9051 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Miller) (describing “the formal visa screening process” as providing “an abundance of caution”); see also id. at H9054-55 (Rep. Lee) (emphasizing the importance of the visa interview); id.\n37\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 49 of 81\n\nThat process represents a careful balancing of competing interests. By adhering to an individual-based regime, and eschewing nationality bans since 1965, Congress has weighed security needs against countervailing values. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1365, H.R. 5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1952 (explaining that “legislation such as” the 1952 Act required a “careful weighing of equities, human rights,” and the “social, economic, and security interests of the people of the United States”); 161 Cong. Rec. H9058 (Dec. 8, 2015) (Rep. Titus) (2015 visa waiver amendment “strikes the right balance between security and accommodation” of economic interests); id. (Rep. Quigley) (same). The President cannot overturn that balance.\n2. Worse still, the Proclamation does not even acknowledge, must less explain, its conflation of Congress’s visa and visa-less admission schemes. So while it purports to identify deficient practices by foreign governments—which might justify excluding their nationals from visa-less travel—it contains no findings at all about its real target: the visa system. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 609 (Keenan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that “an unsupported conclusion will not satisfy [§ 1182(f)’s] ‘finding’ requirement”); Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 770-74 (same).\nat H9057 (Rep. Schiff) (emphasizing the “in-person interview” and the visa system’s “rigorous security screening processes”).\n38\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 50 of 81\n\nThe Proclamation asserts that its unprecedented bans are “necessary to prevent the entry” of visa applicants about whom consular officers “lack[] sufficient information,” Proclamation § 1(h)(i), but fails to mention that existing law already requires consular officers to deny visas when they lack sufficient information. 8 U.S.C. § 1361; 22 C.F.R. § 40.6. It also claims that the bans are necessary to elicit information from foreign governments, Proclamation § 1(b), (h), but does not acknowledge that Congress’s visa scheme already accounts for the potential lack of such information from foreign governments. In fact, Congress recently considered the specific question of how to encourage information-sharing by countries that do not participate in the Visa Waiver Program, and settled on a dramatically different solution: helping those countries supply the information, rather than banning their nationals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187a (providing for “assistance to non-program countries” in meeting certain program criteria); see also Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7204(b) (2004) (directing the President to encourage secure passport practices by seeking “international agreements”).\nThe Proclamation provides no explanation as to “why the country suddenly needs to shift from this tested system of individualized vetting . . . to a national origin-based ban.” Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶ 7, J.A. 898. It gives no reason to doubt the efficacy of Congress’s applicant-based visa system. It points to no new circumstances that Congress has not addressed. It documents no problems with\n39\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 51 of 81\n\nfraud, mistaken identity, missing information, or vetting failures of any kind.17\nThese are glaring omissions for such a sweeping order. The Proclamation strikes\nat the basic premise of our visa system—that individuals bear the burden to\nproduce documentation and establish eligibility—without tying that premise to any\nactual “detriment[s] to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).\nThe government responds that prior § 1182(f) orders contained little\nexplanation. Br. 31-32 & n.4. But none of those proclamations sought to rewrite\nthe INA’s basic approach to visa adjudication. They were self-explanatory,\nbecause they addressed discrete, narrow, often fast-developing problems that\nCongress plainly had not addressed, like a mass influx of unauthorized migrants, or the Iran hostage crisis.18 Whatever finding may be required in those more limited\ncircumstances, the President cannot fundamentally reorient Congress’s visa\nsystem, and certainly cannot do so without explaining what was wrong with it.\n17 In reality, vetting failures for nationals of the banned countries are vanishingly rare. See J.A. 861-64 (David Bier, The Basic Premise of Trump’s Travel Ban is Wrong, Cato Institute, Sept. 26, 2017). Moreover, in the banned countries, consular officers have already been denying visa applications at a much higher rate than for other countries. See Br. for Cato Inst. at 9-11, IRAP, No. 16-1436, (U.S. filed Sept. 9, 2017) (denial rates for banned countries “79 percent higher than for all other nationalities”). 18 Contrary to the government’s suggestion, Br. 31-32, no court addressed, much less upheld, the Iran entry restrictions. The government’s other examples (Br. 31 n.4) not only addressed problems that the INA clearly did not—and thus required little explanation—but also applied to a very small number of individuals.\n40\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 52 of 81\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCongress rejected national-origin quotas fifty years ago, and has long\n\nmaintained an individualized visa process. The Proclamation—with its\n\nnationality-based bans, indefinite duration, focus on governments instead of visa\n\napplicants, and failure to find any problems with Congress’s applicant-based\n\nsystem—vastly exceeds the President’s § 1182(f) authority and violates\n\n§ 1152(a)’s bar on nationality discrimination.\n\nIII. THE PROCLAMATION VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE.\nThis Court previously rejected the government’s requests “to ignore\n\nevidence, circumscribe [the Court’s] own review, and blindly defer to executive\n\naction.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594, 601. The legal principles this Court articulated\n\nwere correct, and the evidentiary record contains all it did before and more. Like\n\nits predecessor, the Proclamation is an attempt to implement the promised Muslim\n\nban and overwhelmingly impacts Muslims. Unlike its predecessor, the\n\nProclamation is indefinite and potentially permanent. The district court rightly\n\nenjoined it.\n\n41\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 53 of 81\n\nA. Mandel Does Not Defeat the Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claim.\nAs an initial matter, the government again contends that the fundamental constraints of the Establishment Clause have no bearing here because of Mandel, 408 U.S. 753.19\nUnder Mandel, the government may “defeat a constitutional challenge” if the challenged action is both “facially legitimate” and “bona fide,” but “where a plaintiff makes ‘an affirmative showing of bad faith’ that is ‘plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity,’ courts may ‘look behind’ the challenged action to assess its ‘facially legitimate’ justification.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590-91 (quoting Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). The district court correctly found that the plaintiffs had made the affirmative showing of bad faith that is required under Mandel, based on the “combined record” demonstrating how the improper purpose behind EO-2 also motivates the Proclamation. J.A. 1056; see also infra Part III.B.2 (addressing the involvement of executive agencies).\nThe government asserts that the face of the Proclamation itself demonstrates that it is both facially legitimate and bona fide. That cannot be reconciled with\n19 As the district court recognized, even though it applied Mandel there are “persuasive reasons” not to take that approach, including that the Establishment Clause violation is not only “a limitation on an individual’s right” but also a structurally forbidden “public message that the Government has adopted an official policy of favoring one religion.” J.A. 1054.\n42\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 54 of 81\n\nMandel itself or with Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence in Din. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 592 (government’s argument “reads out Mandel’s ‘bona fide’ test altogether”). The government also contends that Din suggested only that “when the government does identify a factual basis . . . that is the end of the analysis,” Br. 42, but that likewise cannot be squared with what Din actually says: If there is an “an affirmative showing of bad faith,” the analysis continues. 135 S. Ct. at 2141; see IRAP, 857 F.3d at 590.20\nAnd the government is wrong that subsequent Supreme Court precedent contradicts this Court’s interpretation of Mandel. Br. 41. Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693-94 (2017), does not cite Mandel at all. Instead, it cites Fiallo v. Bell. But Fiallo—like Morales-Santana—involved an equal protection challenge to congressional line-drawing on the face of a statute, with no allegation of bad faith. 430 U.S. at 792-97. This Court has already rejected the rote application of rational-basis review doctrine to the very different context of an executive officer’s bad faith. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 589 & n.14 (explaining that the label “rational basis” is “incomplete” in a case like this one because it “does not properly account for Mandel’s ‘bona fide’ requirement”).\n20 Cf. Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F. 3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 2017) (Br. 42) (acknowledging that visa denial might be reviewable if consular officer acted in bad faith by citing a basis he believed to be false).\n43\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 55 of 81\n\nB. The Proclamation Suffers from the Same Constitutional Defects as Did the Precursor Executive Orders.\nIn reviewing the constitutionality of EO-2, the en banc Court rejected the government’s contention that courts should defer to presidential action without regard to how a challenged policy came about, or how the President describes and justifies it. The Court observed that deference to the President “must yield in certain circumstances, lest [the Court] abdicate [its] own duties to uphold the Constitution.” Id. at 601. And looking at all the evidence, the Court concluded that EO-2 simply could not be “divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it.” Id.\nApplying this same framework, the district court found that the Proclamation, too, cannot be divorced from the policy and history that gave rise to it. “The Proclamation does not abandon th[e] fundamental approach” of barring entry by people from Muslim-majority countries “but rather doubles down on it.” J.A. 1068.\n1. As a practical matter, the Proclamation almost exclusively targets Muslims. Like the executive orders from which it springs, the Muslim-majority countries the Proclamation bans are together approximately 95% Muslim. J.A. 234-48, 852-59. The government leans heavily on the inclusion of two nonMuslim-majority countries, but as the district court recognized, their inclusion will\n44\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 56 of 81\n\nhave “little practical consequence.” J.A. 1066 (explaining that the ban will affect only certain Venezuelan officials and “fewer than 100” North Koreans).\nNor is this vastly disproportionate effect explainable based on any objective set of criteria. The Proclamation repeatedly deviates from the very test that it purports to impose, banning more Muslims and exempting more non-Muslims than its “baseline” criteria (which are really just the visa waiver criteria) would dictate. Those criteria were themselves applied haphazardly and inconsistently. See J.A. 1283-1300 (David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, Cato Institute, Oct. 9, 2017) (documenting dozens of countries that fail various criteria but were not banned); Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶ 12, J.A. 900 (noting that “non-Muslim majority countries such as Belgium” were not banned despite “widely-documented problems with information sharing” and nationals who “have carried out terrorist attacks on Europe”).\nAn examination of the actual effects of the ban thus fatally undermines the government’s reliance on supposedly “tailored substantive restrictions.” Br. 47. While different nonimmigrant visas are banned for each country, the reality is that Muslims—especially those seeking to permanently immigrate—will overwhelmingly be the ones excluded from the country. Such governmental targeting of minorities based on religion or belief, see Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel\n45\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 57 of 81\n\nVillage Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), violates the mandates of the Establishment Clause.\nThe government responds that the Proclamation is legitimate because it “neither mentions nor draws any distinction based on religion.” Br. 43 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). It said the same of the prior order, which this Court invalidated. Moreover, Lukumi makes clear that the Establishment Clause “extends beyond facial discrimination” to “forbid[] subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.” 508 U.S. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 547 (striking down religious gerrymander that did not expressly identify its target); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307 n.21 (2000); Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699. This Court was correct to reject the government’s claim that it can sidestep the Establishment Clause by studiously avoiding the words “Islam” or “Muslim” in the operative order. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 597.\n2. Likewise, “the context in which this policy arose” demonstrates the constitutional violation. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315 (warning against “turn[ing] a blind eye” to context); see also, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987). To be sure, “past actions do not ‘forever taint’ present ones.” J.A. 1064 (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874). But as the district court recognized, the Proclamation is a clear\n46\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 58 of 81\n\ncontinuation and outgrowth of the Muslim ban policy and the executive orders on which it is built. J.A. 1072.\nThe Proclamation is on its face a successor to and continuation of EO-2. The new order implements the indefinite ban that EO-2 expressly contemplated and that the President has long promised. And as the district court observed, the “underlying architecture of [EO-1, EO-2] and the Proclamation is fundamentally the same.” J.A. 1067. Each invokes 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), and each bars nationals of various countries from entering the United States, subject to a case-by-case waiver procedure. As this Court previously observed, such use of nationality was the “exact form” the President had earlier promised for his Muslim ban. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594. Indeed, even as he reiterated his calls for a nationality-based Muslim ban during the campaign, the President announced his plan to issue a temporary ban followed by more permanent measures. J.A. 652.\nThe government argues that “the Proclamation is significantly different from the prior entry suspensions” because of the “multi-agency review and recommendation process.” Br. 45, 47. But nothing about that process or the officials’ recommendations can overcome the ban’s clear purpose and effect: to deliver the promised Muslim ban.\nNotably, the government has flatly refused to disclose what was recommended by those officials. Indeed, the government has declined even to say\n47\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 59 of 81\n\nwhether there were “material inconsistencies” between the DHS report, the DHS recommendation, and the Proclamation as actually issued. J.A. 952-53; see id. (conceding that “it’s potentially possible that various government advisors disagree among themselves”). As the district court recognized here, such hidden recommendations can offer “little to ‘assure the public that the government is not endorsing a religious view.’” J.A. 1072-73 (quoting Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848, 863-64 (10th Cir. 2016)) (alterations omitted).\nWhat the courts and the public do know—beyond the President’s many calls for a Muslim ban—forecloses the government’s argument that the involvement and unknown recommendations of agency officials cure the Establishment Clause violation. First, EO-2 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to “submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals.” EO-2 § 2(e) (emphasis added); see id. (Secretary “shall” submit list). As the district court explained, that directive itself reveals “that the President had decided, even before the study had been conducted, that regardless of the results, some countries’ nationals would be subject to a travel ban.” J.A. 1068. Second, any doubt on that score was dispelled by the President himself, who announced publicly his plan to impose a “much tougher version” of the ban even before EO2’s review process was underway. J.A. 664, 1074. And during the review he\n48\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 60 of 81\n\ncalled for “the travel ban into the United States” to “be far larger, tougher and\nmore specific.” J.A. 832, 1074.\nThird, the Proclamation’s extreme disproportionate effect is not surprising:\nAs the district court observed, “many of the criteria . . . used to justify the ban on\nspecific countries in the Proclamation[] were substantially similar to those used to\nselect the list of countries banned by EO-2.” J.A. 1068-69 (describing overlap\nbetween the criteria used). Moreover, it has recently come to light that the White\nHouse placed an official who has a record of overt anti-Muslim animus to oversee\nthe report and recommendation process at the Department of Homeland Security.\nSee Hananoki, supra note 2, at 4; Lanard, supra note 3, at 4; contra Br. 47 (relying\non “the process of review and recommendation by government officials whose\nmotives have never been questioned”). And fourth, there are other troubling\nindications that White House pressure may well have warped the agency recommendations.21 Thus, as with the government’s prior assertion that EO-2 was\n21 See Jonathan Blitzer, How Stephen Miller Single-Handedly Got the U.S. to Accept Fewer Refugees, The New Yorker (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-stephen-miller-singlehandedlygot-the-us-to-accept-fewer-refugees (indicating that the parallel agency process for reaching a recommendation regarding the new annual cap on refugees—which both EO-1 and EO-2 addressed—was “purely political” and dictated by White House senior advisor Stephen Miller); cf. IRAP, 857 F.3d at 575 (discussing the conclusions of two DHS reports that contradict the premise of all three bans, which became public only after being leaked to the press).\n49\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 61 of 81\n\nadopted based on the recommendations of agency officials, see IRAP, 857 F.3d at 577, 598, here the mere existence of recommendations from advisors—which may not match the ban—does not break the straight line from the President’s promises of a Muslim ban through all three ban orders.\nMore fundamentally, the involvement of Executive Branch officials does not and cannot insulate the Proclamation from the President’s record of religious animus and promises to ban Muslims, because, as the government itself concedes, “[a]t the end of the day, the President is the one who made the decision and the President has adopted the rules he wants by issuing the proclamation.” J.A. 95253.\nCandidate Trump promised a ban on Muslims, and never repudiated that promise. President Trump, one week into office, issued EO-1 without consulting any of the relevant national security agencies. After he issued EO-2 to replace it, he repeatedly asserted that he accepted the alterations, which he described as “watered down,” only at the urging of his lawyers, and that in his view he “should have stayed with the original.” J.A. 780, 791. Now, he has issued the Proclamation, the indefinite Muslim ban he had planned and promised all along.\n3. Nor can the government’s invocation of national security justify this ban any more than it did EO-2. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 597. Examining the same criteria as the Proclamation, Congress—balancing security and other values—\n50\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 62 of 81\n\nchose not to ban entire nations from entering, but instead to require individualized vetting. See supra Part II.B. And, like EO-2, the Proclamation does not identify any failures in the vetting system that justify these drastic and unprecedented measures.\nThe available evidence is to the contrary. As this Court noted in its decision on the last appeal, 857 F.3d at 575, 596, the Department of Homeland Security has found that restrictions based on nationality do not advance national security, see J.A. 213-20, and a bipartisan group of dozens of former national security officials has concluded that the Proclamation, like EO-2 before it, serves no legitimate national security interests, see J.A. 892–903. This is, once again, “strong evidence that any national security justification for [the ban] was secondary to its primary religious purpose.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 596.\n4. Finally, the government points to a single address by the President as showing a more tolerant attitude toward Muslims. See Br. 52. This isolated speech did not repudiate his previously enjoined executive orders, and does nothing to counteract his long-standing, frequent, and ongoing denigration of Muslims and professed intent to exclude Muslim immigrants and travelers.\nIndeed, the President has time and again expressed his overriding desire to make permanent, and harsher, his ban on Muslims. He did so in EO-2’s text. See EO-2 § 2(e); J.A. 1068. He did so in his repeated calls for a “tougher” ban even\n51\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 63 of 81\n\nbefore the mandated review was completed. See J.A. 791. He did so on the very\nday that he received DHS’s recommendations, tweeting: “the travel ban into the\nUnited States should be far larger, tougher and more specific—but stupidly, that\nwould not be politically correct!” J.A. 832. And he recently reaffirmed his\nhostility to Islam, tweeting “a statement that . . . shooting Muslims with bullets\ndipped in pig’s blood should be used to deter future terrorism.” See J.A. 1073. As\nthe district court found, these statements—regardless of what DHS recommended\nor why—“cast the Proclamation as the inextricable re-animation of the twiceenjoined Muslim ban.” J.A. 1075.22\nC. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause’s Fundamental Command that the Government Not Target and Disfavor People Based on Their Religion.\nBecause the evidence of denigration of Islam is so strong in this case, the\nanalysis in the Court’s prior opinion properly focused on the thread of\nEstablishment Clause jurisprudence addressing the purpose of government\nconduct. But it is equally true that the primary effect of the Proclamation is to\n22 The government again seeks to cloak itself in deference to the President’s “predictive judgment.” Br. 51-52. But the “judgment” here has been the same since before he was elected, and it was initially adopted and implemented without consultation with the relevant national security agencies. In any event, the deference to predictive judgments afforded in the cases that the government cites concerned only case-by-case decisions about individuals, and none addressed— much less blessed—such judgments based on religion or national origin. See Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 772.\n52\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 64 of 81\n\n“burden . . . [a] selected religious denomination[]”—Islam, through restrictions on the immigration overwhelmingly of Muslims to the United States. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). Indeed, the contours of the ban—barring almost entirely Muslims, effectively exempting Venezuela, including a ban on North Korea that will have almost no effect, and banning Somalia despite the government’s own baseline—reflect a religious “gerrymander.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533-35, 538 (basing free-exercise analysis on Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and striking down as impermissible religious “gerrymander” an ordinance for which “almost the only conduct subject to it” was associated with a particular religion).\nAs this Court recognized in holding EO-2 unconstitutional, “the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment yet stands as an untiring sentinel for the protection of one of our most cherished founding principles—that government shall not establish any religious orthodoxy, or favor or disfavor one religion over another.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 572; accord Awad, 670 F.3d at 1127 (striking down anti-Muslim state constitutional amendment). “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 244; see also id. at 255 (“the Framers of the First Amendment forbade” any “official denominational preference”). Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s “Establishment Clause cases . . . have often\n53\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 65 of 81\n\nstated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to\ndisapprove of a particular religion.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532. At its most\nfundamental level, this means that “the Establishment Clause forbids the\ngovernment to use religion as a line-drawing criterion.” Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).23\nNo matter which aspect of the Proclamation the Court focuses on—its\npurpose, effect, or religious gerrymandered line drawing—the conclusion is the\nsame. The new Proclamation, like its forbears, operates both by design and in\nactual effect to disadvantage Muslims like the individual plaintiffs here in the most\npersonal, palpable ways: It forcibly separates their families and marks them as the\nobject of official denigration, disfavor, and maltreatment in ways that individuals\nof other faiths do not experience. That flies in the face of the Establishment\nClause. See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.\n573, 593-94 (1989) (“The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits\n23 The Establishment Clause works in tandem with the Free Exercise Clause and equal protection to safeguard this principle of equality and equal respect under law without regard to religion or belief. See, e.g., Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 715 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Religious Test Clause, Art. VI, cl. 3, and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to religion[] all speak with one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual circumstances, one’s religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or duties or benefits.”); Larson, 456 U.S. at 245. The same evidence that establishes the Establishment Clause violation also establishes a violation of equal protection in this case.\n54\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 66 of 81\n\ngovernment from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.\nThere is no dispute that a presidential directive expressly banning Muslims would be unconstitutional even if imposed in the name of national security. See Oral Arg., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, CSPAN 30:29 (May 8, 2017), http://cs.pn/2j4kM4h. The same is true where, as here, such a ban is effectuated by “talking territory instead of Muslim.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594. The contrary holding the government seeks, would, as Justice Jackson warned in Korematsu v. United States, “lie[] about like a loaded weapon.” 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Governmental denigration of and disregard for a religious minority and its adherents cannot be squared with the mandates of the Establishment Clause. IV. A NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS APPROPRIATE.\nThe district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction of the Proclamation, as it had previously issued a nationwide preliminary injunction of EO-2. This Court and the Supreme Court rejected the government’s requests to vacate or stay the EO-2 preliminary injunction in its entirety, or to limit it to the specific plaintiffs or their family members. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance\n55\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 67 of 81\n\nProject, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam) (leaving in effect a nationwide injunction). The Court should reject the government’s renewed request to limit the current injunction in the same way.\nAs the district court recognized, the plaintiffs would suffer “significant, irreparable harm . . . both from the prolonged separation from family members and the Establishment Clause violation.” J.A. 1077 (emphasis added). The government asserts that “delay in entry alone does not amount to irreparable harm,” Br. 55, but it fails to explain how “[t]he absence of a family member” could possibly be “cured through a later payment of money damages.” J.A. 1077; see Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 782. For example, Fahed Muqbil’s wife needs to enter the United States to help Mr. Muqbil, a U.S. citizen, care for their desperately ill oneyear-old U.S. citizen daughter. J.A. 1245-46. IAAB plaintiff Jane Doe #5, a 79year-old wheelchair-bound permanent resident in poor health, may never again see her youngest son, an Iranian national, if he is banned or delayed from receiving a visa. J.A. 1170-71. Nor does the government dispute that Establishment Clause injuries are irreparable; it simply rehashes its standing arguments. Br. 55-56.\nOn the other side of the balance, the government offers the same abstract interest this Court previously rejected—“the notion that the President, because he or she represents the entire nation, suffers irreparable harm whenever an executive action is enjoined,” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 603, together with invocations of national\n56\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 68 of 81\n\nsecurity interests—without any identification of concrete harms. The government’s invocation of national security is not a “silver bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries.” Id. at 603; see also Nat’l Sec. Officials Decl. ¶¶ 13-15, J.A. 900-01 (explaining why “Travel Ban 3.0 would undermine the national security of the United States”). The public interest also strongly favors a preliminary injunction: when courts “protect the constitutional rights of the few,” or, in this case, the many, “it inures to the benefit of all.” IRAP, 857 F.3d at 604.\nFinally, a policy as sweeping and disruptive as this one will injure millions of people, harming the plaintiffs in complex and unpredictable ways. It would be exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to effectively tailor an injunction to the plaintiffs. The “systemwide impact” here warrants a “systemwide remedy.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 359 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). V. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIMITING\nTHE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO INDIVIDUALS WITH BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS TO U.S. PERSONS OR ENTITIES. The district court limited the scope of the preliminary injunction in light of the temporary “equitable balance” that the Supreme Court struck in its opinion partially staying the injunction of Section 2(c) of EO-2. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2089. But the Supreme Court’s stay opinion does not require or even support that limitation.\n57\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 69 of 81\n\nThe Supreme Court’s stay opinion considered a different question from the one that faced the district court. The Supreme Court was deciding whether to issue a partial, temporary stay pending appeal, id. at 2087, and did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims; by contrast, the district court was fashioning relief after (preliminarily) resolving the merits.\nMoreover, the equities involved are different from those the Supreme Court balanced in IRAP. This time, the government’s ban is indefinite and possibly permanent, and will injure the plaintiffs for months or even years (not just 90 days) while the case is resolved. The plaintiffs currently before the Court are also more likely to be injured by the exclusion of an individual who does not have the “bona fide relationship” required by the district court’s order (for example, an extended family member, a friend, or a professional collaborator with whom they have no current formal relationship). Yet in the face of these even more serious harms to the plaintiffs, the government has presented weaker claims of harm pending appeal. The balance of harms therefore favors a comprehensive injunction.\nA. The Partial Injunction Does Not Provide Complete Relief to the Plaintiffs.\nThe plaintiffs will be injured by the Proclamation’s restrictions on noncitizens whose relationships to U.S. persons or entities—while significant—are insufficiently formal or documented to meet the bona fide relationship standard.\n58\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 70 of 81\n\nThe injunction therefore fails to provide the plaintiffs “complete relief.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).\nThe Supreme Court’s equitable balance in crafting its stay standard placed particular emphasis on the injuries that John Doe #1, Dr. Elshikh, and Hawai‘i had alleged. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (“The injunctions remain in place only with respect to parties similarly situated to Doe, Dr. Elshikh, and Hawai‘i.”); see also Hawai‘i, 859 F.3d at 761-65 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 58187. The temporary but severe injuries to those plaintiffs—for example, the exclusion of close family members—were reflected in the temporary equitable balance the Court set. The Court did not discuss possible injuries to friends and more distant relatives, or injuries to individuals with whom U.S. organizations had significant but informal relationships. See J.A. 1080; Hawai‘i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2017), stay denied in relevant part, No. 17A275 (16-1540), 2017 WL 4014838 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2017).\nThe plaintiffs now before this Court have described injuries that the narrowed injunction will not remedy, and which would persist over the ban’s indefinite period. For example, YAMA’s members have felt the impact of the bans through friends and acquaintances abroad, as well as through family members. J.A. 611. Similarly, AAANY’s clients have been and will be harmed by the bans’ effects on friends and distant family members. J.A. 567, 570. IRAP has diverted\n59\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 71 of 81\n\nresources to produce materials on the Proclamation, J.A. 577, which are distributed to clients and non-clients alike. IAAB will have many fewer participants at its conference, including participants who would attend but are not invited as speakers. J.A. 1154. And MESA will be harmed not only by the Proclamation’s impact on its members, but also by its impact on nonmembers who would attend its meeting (without necessarily signing up in advance) but will be barred from doing so. J.A. 559-60.\nMoreover, an injunction limited to noncitizens with formal relationships fails to fully remedy the condemnation, exclusion, and isolation that the Proclamation imposes on the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are injured by the stigmatizing message it sends—even when that message is sent by the exclusion of noncitizens with whom they do not have a qualifying relationship. This harm is more severe than EO-2’s because the Proclamation’s ban is indefinite. The lack of interim relief could cause condemnation injuries to persist for years as this case makes its way through the courts. See supra Part I.B (describing the condemnation harms the Proclamation would inflict).\nB. The Government’s Harms Are Significantly Weaker Even Than Those It Claimed in Defending EO-2.\nAt the same time that the Proclamation’s indefinite duration heightens the harm to the plaintiffs, the government’s claimed harm from the injunction is even\n60\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 72 of 81\n\nweaker. The government no longer asserts, for example, that the ban is required to make resources available while it conducts a review—an assertion on which the Supreme Court specifically relied in granting a partial stay. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2089; see also Amicus Br. of T.A. 21-26 (describing differences between the rationales for EO-2 and the Proclamation). And the President’s decisions to allow in the nationals of several countries that failed the review process’s baseline evaluation (Iraq and Venezuela), as well as individuals with certain nonimmigrant visas from other countries that fail the baseline, illustrate that individuals from countries that do not meet the baseline criteria do not pose a categorical risk.\nThe government, apparently appreciating the weakness of the rationale for EO-2, has asserted a newfound “independent” reason for the Proclamation’s ban: that it is necessary to provide leverage with other nations and thereby “elicit improved identify-management and information-sharing” practices. Defs’ Opp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 23-24, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 212 (quoting Proclamation § 1(h)(i)). Yet in seeking a stay from this Court, the government correctly declined to claim that it was urgently harmed on this basis. Stay Mot. 8-9; Stay Opp. 5 n.2; cf. Br. 54-55.\nIn sum, the government claims less severe harm in justifying a new ban that more seriously injures the plaintiffs, including through the exclusion of noncitizens\n61\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 73 of 81\n\nwith whom the plaintiffs have significant but non-qualifying relationships. The balance of harms tips decisively in favor of a comprehensive injunction.\nC. A Full Injunction Is Appropriate After This Court Reaches the Merits.\nIn IRAP, the Supreme Court did not address the merits; it limited its discussion to “interim equitable relief.” 137 S. Ct. at 2087. That interim equitable balance should not dictate what this Court does once it reaches a decision on the merits.24 When a court determines, on the merits, that an executive action facially violates constitutional or statutory constraints, the “result is that [the action is] vacated—not that [its] application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.” Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nSuch standard injunctive relief is especially appropriate here, where the Proclamation’s entry restrictions facially violate two structural constitutional limits. The Establishment Clause creates both an individual right and a structural constraint on governmental power. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 430. And the Proclamation’s wholesale rewriting\n24 At a minimum, if this Court finds for the plaintiffs on the merits, it should remove the “bona fide relationship” limitation from the preliminary injunction itself and then consider whether to partially stay the preliminary injunction pending further review. In the plaintiffs’ view, because the interim balance of harms favors a complete injunction, such a stay would not be appropriate.\n62\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 74 of 81\n\nof the INA fundamentally upsets the separation of powers. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438 (noting that the President may not enact, amend, or repeal laws). Only a comprehensive injunction can prevent the President from violating these structural restraints.\nAny other result would allow the President to violate the Constitution and the INA indefinitely, so long as the targets of the illegal action are noncitizens without formal relationships with U.S. persons. The Supreme Court did not remotely suggest that it intended that result. This Court should reverse the district court’s order limiting the injunction to noncitizens who have bona fide relationships with U.S. persons or entities. VI. CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN\nSUGGESTING THAT IRAP AND HIAS CLIENTS CATEGORICALLY LACK BONA FIDE RELATIONSHIPS. Even if the district court correctly limited its injunction to those without bona fide relationships, one particular aspect of the ruling should still be corrected. The district court held that “clients of IRAP and HIAS, and those similarly situated, are not covered by the injunction absent a separate bona fide relationship as defined above.” J.A. 1080. This definition excludes noncitizens from the injunction who were protected by the previous equitable balance struck by the Supreme Court, and should be reversed.\n\n63\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 75 of 81\n\nThe district court’s holding in this regard appears to be grounded in a misapprehension of the Supreme Court’s actions implementing the bona fide relationship standard. Plaintiffs in the Hawai‘i litigation argued that refugees with formal assurances from a refugee resettlement organization were categorically protected by the injunctions against EO-2, and the Hawai‘i district court agreed. The Supreme Court stayed that decision only “with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance.” Trump v. Hawai‘i, — S. Ct. —, 2017 WL 4014838 (Sept. 12, 2017).\nThe district court in this case appears to have interpreted this stay ruling to mean that no client relationships can ever qualify under the Supreme Court’s standard. But the government conceded before the District of Hawai‘i that some client relationships (as opposed to refugee assurance relationships) would satisfy the “bona fide relationship” standard. See Defs’ Opp. to Mot. to Enforce, Dkt. No. 338, Hawai‘i v. Trump, No. 17-cv-50, at 14-15 (D. Haw. filed July 11, 2017) (stating that client relationships “require[] a case-by-case analysis”). The Hawai‘i district court agreed, explaining that, for client relationships, “the nature of [the] representational services varies significantly,” making it impossible to determine, as a categorical matter, whether client relationships qualify. Hawai‘i v. Trump, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2017 WL 2989048, at 8 (D. Haw. July 13, 2017). Neither the\n64\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 76 of 81\n\ngovernment nor the plaintiffs appealed that decision, and the Ninth Circuit did not\n\naddress it. Hawai‘i, 871 F.3d at 653 n.4.\n\nUnder the Supreme Court’s stay order, whether or not a given client has\n\nformed a qualifying relationship therefore depends on whether the connection is\n\n“formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course.” IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at\n\n2088. While some client relationships may not meet that standard—for instance, if\n\nthey are formed solely to “secure [the client’s] entry” under the injunction, id.—\n\nmany others will. The district court erred to the extent it held that the clients of\n\nIRAP and HIAS, and similar organizations, categorically lack a qualifying\n\nrelationship with those organizations.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThe preliminary injunction should be affirmed, except as to its limitation to\n\npersons with a bona fide relationship with an individual or entity in the United\n\nStates.\n\nDated: November 15, 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nKaren C. Tumlin Nicholas Espíritu Melissa S. Keaney Esther Sung NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600\n\n/s/ Omar C. Jadwat Omar C. Jadwat Lee Gelernt Hina Shamsi Hugh Handeyside Sarah L. Mehta David Hausman AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION\n65\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 77 of 81\n\nLos Angeles, CA 90010 Tel: (213) 639-3900 Fax: (213) 639-3911 tumlin@nilc.org espiritu@nilc.org keaney@nilc.org sung@nilc.org\nJustin B. Cox NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER P.O. Box 170208 Atlanta, GA 30317 Tel: (678) 279-5441 Fax: (213) 639-3911 cox@nilc.org\nKathryn Claire Meyer Mariko Hirose INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT 40 Rector Street, 9th Floor New York, New York 10006 Tel: (646) 459-3044 Fax: (212) 533-4598 kmeyer@refugeerights.org mhirose@refugeerights.org\nDavid Rocah Deborah A. Jeon Sonia Kumar Nicholas Taichi Steiner AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 Tel: (410) 889-8555 Fax: (410) 366-7838 jeon@aclu-md.org\n\n125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 549-2600 Fax: (212) 549-2654 ojadwat@aclu.org lgelernt@aclu.org hshamsi@aclu.org hhandeyside@aclu.org smehta@aclu.org dhausman@aclu.org\nCecillia D. Wang Cody H. Wofsy Spencer E. Amdur AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 343-0770 Fax: (415) 395-0950 cwang@aclu.org cwofsy@aclu.org samdur@aclu.org\nDavid Cole Daniel Mach Heather L. Weaver AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 915 15th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 675-2330 Fax: (202) 457-0805 dcole@aclu.org dmach@aclu.org hweaver@aclu.org\n66\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 78 of 81\n\nrocah@aclu-md.org kumar@aclu-md.org steiner@aclu-md.org\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees IRAP, et al.\n\nJohnathan Smith Sirine Shebaya MUSLIM ADVOCATES P.O. Box 66408 Washington, D.C. 20035 Tel: (202) 897-2622 Fax: (415) 765-1774 johnathan@muslimadvocates.org sirine@muslimadvocates.org\nRichard B. Katskee Eric Rothschild Andrew L. Nellis^ AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1310 L St. NW, Ste. 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 466-3234 Fax: (202) 466-3353 katskee@au.org rothschild@au.org nellis@au.org\n\nMark H. Lynch Mark W. Mosier Herbert L. Fenster Jose E. Arvelo John W. Sorrenti Katherine E. Cahoy Rebecca G. Van Tassell Karun Tilak COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One City Center 850 10th Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: (202) 662-6000 Fax: (202) 662-6302 mlynch@cov.com mmosier@cov.com hfenster@cov.com jarvelo@cov.com jsorrenti@cov.com kcahoy@cov.com rvantassell@cov.com ktilak@cov.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees I.A.A.B., et al.\n\nCharles E. Davidow Robert A. Atkins Liza Velazquez Andrew J. Ehrlich Steven C. Herzog PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas\n\nLena F. Masri Gadeir Abbas COUNCIL ON AMERICANISLAMIC RELATIONS 453 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel.: (202) 488-8787 Fax: (202) 488-0833\n67\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 79 of 81\n\nNew York, NY 10019-6064 Tel.: (212) 373-3000 Fax: (212) 757-3990 ratkins@paulweiss.com lvelazquez@paulweiss.com aehrlich@paulweiss.com sherzog@paulweiss.com\nFaiza Patel Michael Price BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW 120 Broadway, Suite 1750 New York, NY 10271 Tel.: (646) 292-8335 Fax: (212) 463-7308 faiza.patel@nyu.com michael.price@nyu.com\n\nlmasri@cair.com gabbas@cair.com\nJethro Eisenstein PROFETA & EISENSTEIN 45 Broadway, Suite 2200 New York, New York 10006 Tel.: (212) 577-6500 Fax: (212) 577-6702 jethro19@gmail.com\n\nCounsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees Zakzok, et al.\n\n^Admitted only in New York; supervised by Richard B. Katskee, a member of the D.C. Bar\n\n68\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 80 of 81\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-face requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(e)(2)(B)(ii) and the type-volume limitations of Rule 28.1(e)(2)(B)(i). The brief contains 14,572 words, excluding the parts of the brief described in Rule 32(f).\n\n/s/ Omar C. Jadwat Omar. C. Jadwat\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 89\n\nFiled: 11/15/2017 Pg: 81 of 81\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI hereby certify that on November 15, 2017, I electronically filed the\n\nforegoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals\n\nfor the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the\n\ncase are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the\n\nappellate CM/ECF system, except for the following, who will be served by first\n\nclass mail on November 15, 2017:\n\nHashim M. Mooppan U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\n\n/s/ Omar C. Jadwat Omar C. Jadwat\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 39\n\nNos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself\nand its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD\nMASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED;, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R.\nCOATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence. Defendants-Appellants.\n\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross- Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,\nSouthern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\n\nAMICI BRIEF OF KAREN KOREMATSU, JAY HIRABAYASHI, HOLLY YASUI, THE FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY, CIVIL RIGHTS\nORGANIZATIONS, AND NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS OF COLOR IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES\n\nFRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY\nRobert S. Chang Lorraine K. Bannai Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic Seattle University School of Law 1215 East Columbia St. Seattle, WA 98122 Telephone: (206) 398-4025 Facsimile: (206) 398-4261\n\nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP\nPratik A. Shah Martine E. Cicconi Robert S. Strauss Building 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 887-4000 Facsimile: (202) 887-4288\n\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae (Counsel continued on inside cover)\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 2 of 39\n\nNO. 17-2232 (8:17-CV-02921-TDC)\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5; JANE DOE #6; IRANIAN STUDENTS’ FOUNDATION, Iranian Alliances Across Borders\nAffiliate at the University of Maryland College Park, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his\nofficial capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration\nServices; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States. Defendants-Appellants.\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC)\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his\nofficial capacity as Secretary of State. Defendants-Appellants.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 3 of 39\n\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 & 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself\nand its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients; YEMENI-AMERICAN MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION; MOHAMAD\nMASHTA; GRANNAZ AMIRJAMSHIDI; FAKHRI ZIAOLHAGH; SHAPOUR SHIRANI; AFSANEH KHAZAELI; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5, Plaintiffs-Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R.\nCOATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence. Defendants-Appellees.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 4 of 39\n\nEric Yamamoto Fred T. Korematsu\nProfessor of Law and Social Justice William S. Richardson School of Law University of Hawai’i 2515 Dole Street Honolulu, Hawai`i 96822 Telephone: (808) 956-6548 Facsimile: (808) 956-5569\nEmail: ericy@hawaii.edu\nRobert L. Rusky 159 Beaver St. San Francisco, CA 94114 (415) 255-7385\nDale Minami Donald K. Tamaki MINAMI TAMAKI LLP 360 Post St. 8th Floor San Franciso, CA 94108 Telephone: (415) 788-9000\nPeter Irons Director Emeritus, EARL WARREN BILL OF RIGHTS PROJECT University of California,\nSan Diego 8862 Sovereign Rd. San Diego, CA 92123 Telephone: (530) 310-3903\nLeigh-Ann K. Miyasato 3465 Waialae Ave. Suite 300A Honolulu, HI 96816 Telephone: (808) 380-1444\nRodney L. Kawakami 671 So. Jackson St. Suite 201 Seattle, WA 98104 Telephone: (206) 682-9932\n\nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP\nRobert A. Johnson Alice Hsu One Bryant Park New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 872-1000 Facsimile: (212) 872-1002 Email: rajohnson@akingump.com\nJessica M. Weisel 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 229-1000 Facsimile: (310) 229-1001 Email: jweisel@akingump.com\n\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 5 of 39\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), undersigned counsel for amici make the following disclosures: The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”) is a research and advocacy organization based at Seattle University, a non-profit educational institution under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Korematsu Center does not have any parent corporation or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held corporation which owns 10 percent or more of its stock. Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Hispanic National Bar Association, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc., the National Bar Association, and the South Asian Bar Association of North America are not-for-profit organizations with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter (“JACL Honolulu”) is a non-profit corporation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code based in Honolulu, Hawaii. JACL Honolulu is not a publicly traded corporation. It does not have any parent corporation or issue stock and, consequently, there exists no publicly held corporation that owns 10 percent or more of its stock.\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 6 of 39\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........................................................i\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................................................................1\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................3\nARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................8\nI. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCEPTION OF PLENARY POWER DERIVES FROM CASES INFECTED WITH RACIST AND XENOPHOBIC PREJUDICES..................................8\nII. KOREMATSU, HIRABAYASHI, AND YASUI STAND AS STARK REMINDERS OF THE NEED FOR SEARCHING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TARGETING DISFAVORED MINORITIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY............................................................15\nCONCLUSION ......................................................................................................29\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 7 of 39\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCASES:\nChae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)................................................................................4, 5, 9, 10\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)..............................................................................................8\nFong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)......................................................................................10, 11\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)......................................................................................11, 12\nHirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).......................................................................................passim 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986) ..................................................22, 23, 25 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) ..................................................................23, 24, 25\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)..................................................................................13, 14\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)............................................................................................14\nKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).....................................................................................passim 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).......................................................24, 25, 26\nLandon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)..............................................................................................13\nReno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)............................................................................................13\nShaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)............................................................................................12\nUnited States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40 (D. Or. 1942) ..............................................................................19\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 8 of 39\n\nWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................5, 13\nYasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943)........................................................................................3, 19\nZadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)............................................................................................13\nZivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)..............................................................................................5\nSTATUTES:\nAn Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173.................................16\nOTHER AUTHORITIES:\nExecutive Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)............................16\nGeneral DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast (1942)........................................................................................................23\nIRONS, PETER, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1984)...................................................17, 18, 24\nPresidential Proclamation No. 4417, An American Promise, 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976) ..................................................................................26\nPresidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sep. 24, 2017) .....................................................................................................................1\nREPORT OF CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund & University of Washington Press, 1997) ....................26\nTestimony of Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress, Japanese Am. Citizens League, Comm’n on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (1981) ..............................................................................................17\nU.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases (May 20, 2011) .............................................................................................................27\niv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 9 of 39\n\nINTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly Yasui, the children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui, come forward as amici curiae because they see the disturbing relevance of the Supreme Court’s decisions in their fathers’ infamous cases challenging the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II to the serious questions raised by Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161. Minoru Yasui was a 25-year-old attorney in Portland, Oregon, when, on March 28, 1942, he intentionally defied the government’s first actionable order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry in order to bring a test case challenging its constitutionality. Gordon Hirabayashi was a 24-year-old college senior in Seattle, Washington, when he similarly chose to defy the government’s curfew and removal orders on May 16, 1942. Fred Korematsu was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland, California, when, on May 30, 1942, he was arrested for refusing to report for removal. All three men brought their constitutional challenges to the courts. Deferring to the government’s claim that the orders were justified by military necessity, the Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. Our Nation has since recognized that the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans was wrong; the three cases have been widely condemned; and all three men have been\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 10 of 39\n\nrecognized with the Presidential Medal of Freedom for their wartime courage and lifetime work advancing civil and human rights.\nTheir children have sought to carry forward their fathers’ legacy, educating the public and reminding the courts of the harm wrought by governmental actions, carried out in the name of national security, that impact men, women, and children belonging to disfavored minority groups—both the human toll and the danger of sacrificing our country’s fundamental values. Guilt, loyalty, and threat are individual attributes. Courts must be vigilant when these attributes are imputed to entire racial, religious, and/or ethnic groups. The Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases stand as important symbols of the need for courts to fulfill their essential role in our democracy by checking unfounded exercises of executive power.\nThe Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui families are proud to stand with the following civil rights and national bar associations of color:\nFred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law;\nAsian Americans Advancing Justice; The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund; The Hispanic National Bar Association (“HNBA”); The Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter;\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 11 of 39\n\nLatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc.; The National Bar Association; and The South Asian Bar Association of North America.\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT “Often the question has been raised whether this country could wage a new war without the loss of its fundamental liberties at home. Here is one occasion for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that question and show the world that we can fight for democracy and preserve it too.” Gordon Hirabayashi made that plea to the Supreme Court in 1943, as he appealed his conviction for violating military orders issued three months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Authorized by Executive Order No. 9066, those orders led to the forced removal and incarceration of over 120,000 men, women, and children of Japanese descent.\nMr. Hirabayashi did not stand alone before the Court. Minoru Yasui likewise invoked our Nation’s ideals in casting his separate but related appeal as “the case of all whose parents came to our shores for a haven of refuge” and insisting that the country should respond to war and strife “in the American way and not by * acts of injustice.” Appellant Br. 55-56, Yasui v. United States, No. 871 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1943). The Court denied the appeals of both men. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).\n\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 12 of 39\n\nThe following year, the Supreme Court revisited the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Court again failed to stand as a bulwark against governmental action that undermines core constitutional principles. By refusing to scrutinize the government’s claim that its abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans was justified by military necessity, the Court enabled the government to cover its racially discriminatory policies in the cloak of national security.\nIn this case, the courts are once again asked to abdicate their critical role in safeguarding fundamental freedoms. Invoking national security, the government seeks near complete deference to the President’s decision to deny visas and suspend the entry of refugees from six Muslim-majority nations. Indeed, the government will not even permit courts to review the classified report purporting to justify the President’s decision on national security grounds. See J.A. 951-955.\nAlthough the government claims it is merely asking for the application of established legal principles, the extreme deference it seeks is not rooted in sound constitutional tradition. Rather, it rests on doctrinal tenets infected with longrepudiated racial and nativist precepts. In support of the sweeping proposition that the President’s authority to exclude aliens is unbounded, the government previously invoked the so-called “plenary power” doctrine—a doctrine that derives from decisions such as Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889),\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 13 of 39\n\nwhich relied on pejorative racial stereotypes to eschew judicial scrutiny in upholding a law that prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the United States after travel abroad. Id. at 595.\nAlthough the government’s arguments have evolved, it has not changed its message or its impact. While no longer invoking the term “plenary power,” the government continues to assert that the “deeply rooted principle of nonreviewability” precludes courts from scrutinizing political decisions to deny visas, including, as here, denials to entire classes of aliens. Gov’t Br. 20. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the numbing judicial passivity the government demands “runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy” in which “it is the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a duty that will sometimes require the ‘[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches.’” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).\nEven more than the early “plenary power” decisions, the shades of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui lurking in the government’s argument should give this Court pause. In those cases, as here, the government’s policies were justified in a controversial report. And like in this case, the government denied that its policies were grounded in “invidious * discrimination” and asked the\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 14 of 39\n\ncourts to take it at its word that “the security of the nation” justified blanket action against an “entire group * at once.” Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 870 (U.S. May 8, 1943).\nThe Supreme Court agreed. First, in Hirabayashi, the Court employed a double negative to conclude that, even though racial distinctions are “odious to a free people,” it “[could] []not reject as unfounded the judgment” of the government. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99-100. Going further in Korematsu, the Court denied that race played any role in the government’s decisions: “cast[ing] this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.” 323 U.S. at 223. Accepting the government’s assurance, the Court went on to find that “Korematsu was not excluded from the [West Coast] because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because * the properly constituted military authorities * decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated * temporarily.” Id.\nNot all members of the Court were convinced, however. Three Justices dissented, including Justice Murphy, who declared that the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast “falls into the ugly abyss of racism,” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, and Justice Jackson, who pointed out that the Court “had no real evidence” to support the government’s assertions of military necessity. Moreover,\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 15 of 39\n\nJustice Jackson warned, the Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id. at 246.\nAs history has made us acutely aware, the dissenters’ doubts as to the veracity of the government’s assertion of military necessity were well-founded, and their recognition of the gravity of the Court’s decision was prophetic. Four decades later, Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu successfully sought vacatur of their convictions in unprecedented coram nobis proceedings. Evidence presented in those cases showed that the “military urgency” on which the Supreme Court predicated its decision was nothing more than a smokescreen: the real reason for the government’s deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans was not acts of espionage (as the government maintained) but rather a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes.\nKorematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are as wrong today as they were on the day they were decided. If it were to accept the government’s invitation here to abdicate its judicial responsibility, this Court would repeat the failures in those widely condemned cases. The Court should instead take this opportunity to acknowledge the historic wrong in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, and to repudiate the refusal in those cases to scrutinize the government’s claim of necessity and its consequent failure to recognize the military orders’ racist\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 16 of 39\n\nunderpinnings. Heeding the lessons of history, this Court should subject Proclamation No. 9645 to meaningful judicial scrutiny and affirm the Founders’ visionary principle that an independent and vigilant judiciary is a foundational element of a healthy democracy.\nARGUMENT I. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCEPTION OF PLENARY POWER\nDERIVES FROM CASES INFECTED WITH RACIST AND XENOPHOBIC PREJUDICES When the Trump Administration first attempted to deny visas and suspend the entry of aliens from Muslim-majority nations, the government argued that the “political branches[] [have] plenary constitutional authority over foreign affairs, national security, and immigration.” Gov’t Emergency Mot. 15-16, Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017). In light of that “plenary authority,” the government asserted, “[j]udicial second-guessing of the President’s determination that a temporary suspension of entry of certain classes of aliens was necessary * to protect national security * constitute[s] an impermissible intrusion.” Id. at 15.\nDespite shedding the “plenary power” label in its defense of the Proclamation, the government’s central argument remains unchanged: The political branches’ “power to * exclude aliens” is “largely immune from judicial control.” Gov’t Br. 19 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). The\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 17 of 39\n\nSupreme Court, however, has never recognized an unbridled “plenary” power in the immigration realm that would preclude judicial review. And to the extent that it has shown excessive deference to the political branches in some cases, those precedents are linked to racist attitudes from a past era that have long since fallen out of favor.\n1. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, known as The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a statute preventing the return of Chinese laborers who had departed the United States prior to its passage. 130 U.S. at 581-582. Describing the reasons underlying the law’s enactment, the Court characterized Chinese laborers as “content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and artisans,” and observed that they remained “strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, * adhering to the customs and usages of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with our people.” Id. at 595. “The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.” Id. Residents of the West Coast, the Court explained, warned of an “Oriental invasion” and “saw or believed they saw * great danger that at no distant day * [the West] would be overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.” Id.\nFar from applying a skeptical eye to the law in light of the clear animus motivating its passage, the Court found that “[i]f * the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 18 of 39\n\ndifferent race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security * its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.” The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. In reality, the “right of selfpreservation” that the Court validated as justification for the government’s unbounded power to exclude immigrants was ethnic and racial self-preservation, not the preservation of borders or national security. 130 U.S. at 608; see id. at 606 (“It matters not in what form * aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.”).\nSimilar racist and xenophobic attitudes are evident in decisions following The Chinese Exclusion Case. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement that Chinese resident aliens offer “at least one credible white witness” in order to remain in the country); id. at 730 (noting Congress’s belief that testimony from Chinese witnesses could not be credited because of “the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an oath” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).\n2. Even in its early plenary power decisions, however, the Court recognized that the government’s sovereign authority is subject to constitutional limitations. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (“[S]overeign powers * [are] restricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself and\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 19 of 39\n\nconsiderations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”). Indeed, from the doctrine’s inception, the Court divided over the reach of the government’s power in light of those limitations.\nFong Yue Ting, which upheld a law requiring Chinese laborers residing in the United States to obtain a special certificate of residence to avoid deportation, generated three dissenting opinions. See 149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, J., dissenting). Even Justice Field, who authored the Court’s opinion in The Chinese Exclusion Case, sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s application with regard to alien residents:\nAs men having our common humanity, they are protected by all the guaranties of the constitution. To hold that they are subject to any different law, or are less protected in any particular, than other persons, is * to ignore the teachings of our history * and the language of our constitution. Id. at 754.\nNearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism regarding an unrestrained plenary power persisted—and proliferated. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), the Court, relying on Korematsu, upheld a provision permitting the deportation of resident aliens who were members of the Communist Party. In dissent, Justice Douglas quoted Justice Brewer’s words in Fong Yue Ting, observing that they “grow[] in power with the passing years”:\n\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 20 of 39\n\nThis doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous. * The governments of other nations have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely, as it seems to me, they gave to this government no general power to banish. Id. at 599-600.\nIn another McCarthy-era precedent, four Justices advocated for limitations on the plenary power doctrine. Dissenting in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), in which the Court rejected any constitutional challenge to the exclusion of an alien who had previously resided in the United\nStates, Justice Black reasoned that “[n]o society is free where government makes one person’s liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another.” Id. at 217 (Douglas, J., joining). “Dictatorships,” he observed, “have done this since time\nimmemorial. They do now.” Id. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added that aliens returning to the United States must be “accorded procedural due process of law.” Id. at 224.\n3. Perhaps reflecting the shift away from the xenophobic and race-based characterizations prevalent in its early plenary power precedents, the Court in recent years has been more willing to enforce constitutional limitations on the\ngovernment’s authority over immigration matters.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 21 of 39\n\nIn Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), for example, the Court held that INS regulations must at least “rationally advanc[e] some legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 306. In Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), the Court affirmed that a resident alien returning from a brief trip abroad must be afforded due process in an exclusion proceeding. Id. at 33. And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in response to the government’s contention that “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and * the Judicial Branch must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,” the Court observed that such “power is subject to important constitutional limitations.” Id. at 695 (citations omitted). “[F]ocus[ing] upon those limitations,” id., the Court determined that the indefinite detention of aliens deemed removable would raise “serious constitutional concerns” and accordingly construed the statute at issue to avoid those problems, id. at 682. See generally Washington, 847 F.3d at 11621163 (collecting cases demonstrating reviewability of federal government action in immigration and national security matters).\nThe Court’s most recent decision in this area provides further support for the conclusion that, after more than a century of erosion, the notion of plenary power over immigration is little more than a relic.\nIn Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), the Supreme Court considered a due process claim arising from the denial without adequate explanation of a spouse’s\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 22 of 39\n\nvisa application. Although it described the power of the political branches over immigration as “plenary,” Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Din made clear that courts may review an exercise of that power. Id. at 2139-2140. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined to balance the constitutional rights of American citizens injured by a visa denial against “Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.’” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766). But he explained that the Court did inquire “whether the Government had provided a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ reason for its action.” Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770). And while as a general matter courts are not to “look behind” the government’s asserted reason, courts should do so if the challenger has made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” Id. at 2141.\nTo be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din acknowledged that the political branches are entitled to wide latitude and deference in immigration matters. For that reason, the government relies heavily on Din and Mandel to argue that its assertion of a national security rationale is sufficient to justify Proclamation No. 9645 and to preclude further judicial scrutiny. But, as the courts of appeals recognized, Din (and Mandel before it) concerned an individual visa denial on the facts of that case. By contrast, the Proclamation sets a nationwide immigration\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 23 of 39\n\npolicy, presumptively suspending entry and foreclosing visa adjudications for virtually all aliens of certain nationalities. While it may be sensible for courts ordinarily to defer to the judgment of the political branches when considering the application of immigration law to a particular alien, the President’s decision to issue a broadly-applicable immigration policy—especially one aimed at nationals of particular countries likely to share a common religion—is properly the subject of more searching judicial review.\nAll told, modern judicial precedent supports the notion that courts have both the power and the responsibility to review Proclamation No. 9645. Where, as here, the Court is asked to review a far-reaching program—promulgated at the highest level of the Executive Branch and targeting aliens based on nationality and religion—precedent and common sense demand more than an assessment of whether the government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide” rationale for its policy. Rather, the Proclamation, both on its face and in light of the glaring clues as to its motivations, cries out for careful judicial scrutiny.\nII. KOREMATSU, HIRABAYASHI, AND YASUI STAND AS STARK REMINDERS OF THE NEED FOR SEARCHING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TARGETING DISFAVORED MINORITIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY\nThis Court need not look far for a reminder of the constitutional costs and human suffering that flow from the Judiciary’s failure to rein in sweeping\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 24 of 39\n\ngovernmental action against disfavored minorities. And it need not look far for a reminder of the Executive Branch’s use of national security as a pretext to discriminate against such groups. The Court need look only to the all but universally condemned wartime decisions in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.\n1. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War to designate “military areas” from which “any or all persons” could be excluded and “with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave” would be subject to “whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose.” Exec. Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Adding its imprimatur to the Executive Order, Congress made violation of any restrictions issued thereunder a federal offense. An Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173.\nLieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, used that authority to issue a series of proclamations that led to the removal and incarceration of all individuals of Japanese ancestry living in “Military Area No. 1”—an exclusion area covering the entire Pacific Coast. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89. A curfew order came first. Soon after, Japanese Americans were ordered to abandon their homes and communities on the West Coast for tarpaper barracks\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 25 of 39\n\n(euphemistically called “relocation centers”) surrounded by barbed wire and machine gun towers in desolate areas inland. Id. at 90.\nFor different individual reasons, but sharing a deep sense of justice, Minoru Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Fred Korematsu refused to comply with General DeWitt’s orders. Yasui, a young lawyer, regarded the curfew as an affront to American constitutional values. “To make it a crime for me to do the same thing as any non-Japanese person * solely on the basis of ancestry,” he explained, “was, in my opinion, an absolutely abominable concept and wholly unacceptable.” Testimony of Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress, Japanese Am. Citizens League 9, Comm’n on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (1981). “Our law and our basic concept of justice had always been founded upon the fundamental principle that no person should be punished but for that individual’s act, and not because of one’s ancestry.” Id. at 10. Convinced of the curfew’s illegality, Yasui immediately defied it in order to initiate a constitutional challenge.\nHirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, also defied the orders so that he could challenge their constitutionality, saying that he “considered it [his] duty to maintain the democratic standards for which this nation lives.” PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 88 (1984). Korematsu, a welder living in Oakland, California, refused to obey the removal orders so that he could remain with his fiancée who was not\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 26 of 39\n\nsubject to removal because she was not Japanese American. The last of the three to face arrest and prosecution, Korematsu “shared with Yasui and Hirabayashi an equal devotion to constitutional principle” and believed that the statute under which he was convicted was wrong. Id. at 98.\n2. The constitutional challenges Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu made to the military orders soon made their way to the Supreme Court. But far from fulfilling its essential role in the constitutional structure that entrusts the Judiciary with the protection of fundamental rights, the Court set upon a path of judicial abdication that today serves as a cautionary tale.\nIn Hirabayashi’s case, the Court elected to consider only his conviction for violating the curfew order, leaving unanswered his challenge to his conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control Station—a precursor to removal from his home in Seattle. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85. Harkening back to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court repeated the government’s claim that “social, economic and political conditions” “intensified the[] solidarity” of Japanese Americans and “prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population.” Id. at 96. Betraying no skepticism of these premises, the Court found that, in view of these and other attributes of the “isolation” of Japanese Americans and their “relatively little social intercourse * [with] the white population,” “Congress and the Executive could reasonably have concluded that these conditions * encouraged\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 27 of 39\n\nthe continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese institutions.” Id. at 98. “Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry,” the Court continued, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.” Id. at 99.\nHaving upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, the Court issued only a short opinion remanding Yasui’s case to the Ninth Circuit. Yasui, 320 U.S. at 115. Because the district court had imposed a sentence based on its determination that Yasui had renounced his American citizenship, and the government did not defend that finding, the Court remanded the matter for resentencing. Id. at 117. The Court thereby avoided addressing the lower court’s conclusion, supported by extensive analysis, that the military orders were unconstitutional as applied to citizens. See United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 44-54 (D. Or. 1942).\nThe Court’s third opportunity to confront the mass removal and incarceration program came a year-and-a-half later, in Korematsu’s case. The Court again narrowed the issues before it, rejecting Korematsu’s argument that the removal order could not be extricated from the incarceration he would inevitably face if he complied with that order. 323 U.S. at 216. Then, despite affirming that racial distinctions are “immediately suspect” and “must [be] subject * to the most rigid\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 28 of 39\n\nscrutiny,” id., the Court denied, without probing examination, that the military orders were driven by racial hostility. The Court reiterated its conclusion from Hirabayashi that it would not substitute its judgment for that of the military authorities. “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some,” the Court reasoned, and “the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.” Id. at 223-224.\nWhen the Court decided Korematsu, however, three members rejected the government’s arguments. Although acknowledging that the discretion of those entrusted with national security matters “must, as a matter of * common sense, be wide,” Justice Murphy declared that “it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion” and that individuals not be “left impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor support.” 323 U.S. at 234. In his view, the exclusion order “clearly d[id] not meet th[is] test” as it relied “for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.” Id. at 234-235 (emphasis added). In fact, as Justice Murphy noted, intelligence investigations found no evidence of Japanese American sabotage or espionage. Id. at 241. And even if “there were some disloyal persons of Japanese\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 29 of 39\n\ndescent on the Pacific Coast,” Justice Murphy reasoned, “to infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against the entire group” is nothing more than “th[e] legalization of racism.” Id. at 240-241, 242.\nJustice Jackson was equally skeptical of the factual basis for the government’s claims of military necessity and specifically questioned General DeWitt’s “Final Report,” on which the government relied. “How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable basis in necessity?” Justice Jackson asked. 323 U.S. at 245. Pointing out that “[n]o evidence whatever on that subject ha[d] been taken by this or any other court” and that the DeWitt Report was the subject of “sharp controversy as to [its] credibility,” Justice Jackson observed that the Court had “no real evidence before it.” Id. Accordingly, the Court “ha[d] no choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any crossexamination, that what he did was reasonable.” Id.\nJustice Jackson saw grave dangers in the Court’s opinion. While an unconstitutional military order is short lived, he observed, “once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.” 323 U.S. at 246. With that,\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 30 of 39\n\nJustice Jackson issued a prophetic warning: By “validat[ing] the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens,” the Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id.\n3. The dissenters’ fears proved to be well-founded. Decades after the Court’s decisions in Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, newly discovered government records revealed not only that intelligence reports and data contradicted the claim that the mass removal and incarceration program was justified by military necessity, but also that the government knew as much when it convinced the Court to affirm the defendants’ convictions.1\nIn 1983, armed with those newly discovered records, Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu filed coram nobis petitions seeking to vacate their convictions. As the court found in the Hirabayashi case, government records showed that the DeWitt Report had been materially altered in order to fabricate an acceptable factual justification for the mass removal and incarceration program. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1456-1457 (W.D. Wash. 1986). Although the version of the report presented to the Supreme Court stated that it was impossible to identify potentially disloyal Japanese Americans in the time available, DeWitt’s\n1 Those records are discussed in Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases by Peter Irons, who, with Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, unearthed them.\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 31 of 39\n\noriginal report—submitted to the War Department while the government’s briefs in Hirabayashi and Yasui were being finalized—made clear that the decision to issue the challenged orders had nothing to do with urgency. Rather, General Dewitt’s decision turned on his view that Japanese Americans were inherently disloyal on account of their “ties of race, intense feeling of filial piety and * strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs.” Id. at 1449. “It was not that there was insufficient time in which to make such a determination,” the original report stated; “a positive determination could not be made [because] an exact separation of the ‘sheep and the goats’ was unfeasible.” Id. (quoting General DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast ch. 2 (1942)). That original report was ordered destroyed, and the altered version was presented to the Court.\nBeyond exposing the racist underpinnings of General DeWitt’s orders (as well as the pretextual nature of the claim of urgency), the coram nobis cases revealed that the government’s own intelligence agencies rebutted assertions in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were involved in sabotage and espionage. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1987). The Office of Naval Intelligence (“ONI”), which the President charged with monitoring West Coast Japanese American communities, had determined in its official report that Japanese Americans were overwhelmingly loyal and posed no security risk. ONI thus recommended handling any potential disloyalty on an individual, not group,\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 32 of 39\n\nbasis. ONI found, contrary to the government’s representation to the Court, that mass incarceration was unnecessary, as “individual determinations could be made expeditiously.” Id. at 602 n.11 (emphasis added); see also IRONS, supra, at 203. In addition, reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) directly refuted claims in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were engaged in shore-to-ship signaling, intimating Japanese-American espionage. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984).\nDepartment of Justice attorney John Burling, co-author of the government’s brief, sought to alert the Court of the FBI and FCC intelligence that directly refuted the DeWitt Report. Burling included in his brief a crucial footnote that read: “The recital [in General DeWitt’s report] of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a matter of military necessity * is in several respects, particularly with reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information in the possession of the Department of Justice.” Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis and citation omitted). But high-level Justice Department lawyers stopped the brief’s printing. Despite Burling’s vociferous protest about the DeWitt Report’s “intentional falsehoods,” the footnote was diluted to near incoherence, even implying the opposite of Burling’s intended message. As revised, the footnote stated:\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 33 of 39\n\n[The DeWitt Report] is relied on in this brief for statistics and other details concerning the actual evacuation and the events that took place subsequent thereto. We have specifically recited in this brief the facts relating to the justification for the evacuation, of which we ask the Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon the Final Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts. Gov’t Br. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1944).\nNotwithstanding an earlier warning from Justice Department lawyer Edward Ennis\nthat failing to alert the Court to the contrary intelligence in DOJ’s possession\n“might approximate the suppression of evidence,” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 602\nn.11 (citation omitted), the Justice Department concealed from the Court this\ncrucial evidence on military necessity.\nIn light of the evidence presented, the courts hearing Fred Korematsu and\nGordon Hirabayashi’s coram nobis cases concluded that the government’s\nmisconduct had effected “a manifest injustice” and that the mass removal and\nincarceration program had been validated based on unfounded charges of treason. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417; Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1447.2 In granting\nKorematsu’s coram nobis petition, Judge Patel articulated the modern significance\nof the wartime cases:\n\n2 In Minoru Yasui’s coram nobis case, the court acceded to the government’s request to vacate his conviction and dismiss his petition for relief without making any determinations regarding government misconduct—and without acknowledging the injustice he suffered.\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 34 of 39\n\nKorematsu * stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.\nIn vacating Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi’s convictions, the coram\nnobis courts joined other institutions of government in recognizing the wrongs\ncommitted against Japanese Americans during World War II. In 1976, on behalf\nof the Executive Branch, President Ford officially rescinded Executive Order 9066,\nexplaining that “[w]e now know what we should have known then—not only was\n* evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.”\nPresidential Proclamation 4417, An American Promise, 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb.\n19, 1976). In 1983, after extensive hearings and research, the congressionally\nauthorized Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians\n(CWRIC) issued a report concluding that it was not “military necessity” that\nunderpinned the program of removal and incarceration, but rather “race prejudice,\nwar hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” REPORT OF CWRIC, PERSONAL\nJUSTICE DENIED 459 (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund & University of\nWashington Press, 1997). Five years later, Congress passed (and President Reagan\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 35 of 39\n\nsigned) the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which, on the CWRIC’s recommendations, acknowledged the injustice of the removal and incarceration program, issued an official apology, and conferred symbolic reparations to the survivors of the incarceration centers.\n\nMost recently, in 2011, the Acting Solicitor General confirmed what the\n\ncoram nobis cases had established decades earlier: the Supreme Court’s decisions\n\nin the wartime cases were predicated on lies. “By the time the cases of Gordon\n\nHirabayashi and Fred Korematsu reached the Supreme Court, [DOJ] had learned of\n\na key intelligence report that undermined the rationale behind the internment. \n\nBut the Solicitor General did not inform the Court of the report despite warnings\n\n that failing to alert the Court ‘might approximate the suppression of evidence.’\n\nInstead, he argued that it was impossible to segregate loyal Japanese Americans\n\nfrom disloyal ones.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The Solicitor\n\nGeneral’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases (May 20,\n\n2011),\n\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-\n\nmistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases.\n\n**\n\nDuring World War II, the Supreme Court’s refusal to probe the government’s claim that military necessity justified the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans made it unwittingly complicit in the government’s deception.\n27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 36 of 39\n\nThe Court’s blank-check treatment of the Executive Branch’s wartime policies— underscored by its repeated refusal to confront the most grievous aspects of those policies or to acknowledge their racist underpinnings—allowed the wrongs inflicted on Japanese Americans to continue unabated for years, and allowed the government to avoid accountability for its egregious misconduct for decades.\nHirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu are powerful reminders not only of the need for constant vigilance in protecting our fundamental values, but also of the essential role of the courts as a check on abuses of government power, especially during times of national and international stress. Rather than repeat the failures of the past, this Court should repudiate them and affirm the greater legacy of those cases: Blind deference to the Executive Branch, even in areas in which decisionmakers must wield wide discretion, is incompatible with the protection of fundamental freedoms. Meaningful judicial review is an essential element of a healthy democracy.\nConsistent with those principles, this Court should reject the government’s invitation to abdicate its critical role in our constitutional system, subject Proclamation No. 9645 to searching judicial scrutiny, and stand—as Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu did—as a bulwark against governmental action that undermines core constitutional values.\n28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 37 of 39\n\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the relief sought by the government should be denied.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah Martine E. Cicconi Jessica M. Weisel Robert A. Johnson Alice Hsu AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP\nRobert S. Chang Lorraine K. Bannai FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND\nEQUALITY\nEric Yamamoto Fred T. Korematsu Professor of Law and\nSocial Justice\nRobert L. Rusky\nDale Minami Donald K. Tamaki MINAMI TAMAKI LLP\nPeter Irons Director Emeritus, EARL WARREN BILL OF RIGHTS PROJECT\nLeigh-Ann K. Mitasato\nRodney L. Kawakami\nAttorneys for Amici Curiae\n\n29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 38 of 39\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nI hereby certify that, pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure\n\n29(a)(5) and 32(a)(7)(B), and 4th Circuit Rule 32(b), the attached brief is double\n\nspaced, uses a proportionately spaced typeface of 14 points or more, and contains a\n\ntotal of 6,480 words, based on the word count program in Microsoft Word.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah\n\n30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-1\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 39 of 39\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the\n\nCourt for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the\n\nappellate CM/ECF system on November 17, 2017.\n\nI certify that all parties in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that\n\nservice will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: November 17, 2017\n\n/s/ Pratik A. Shah Pratik A. Shah\n\n31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 99-2\n\nFiled: 11/17/2017 Pg: 1 of 1\n\nr\n\n\f", "UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nLEWIS F. POWELL, JR. UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE ANNEX 1100 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 501 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23219-3517 WWW.CA4.USCOURTS.GOV\nPATRICIA S. CONNOR CLERK\n\nTELEPHONE (804) 916-2700\n\nNovember 22,2017\nH. Thomas Byron, III U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530\nNoel J. Francisco, Solicitor General U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of the Solicitor General 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001\nSharon Swingle U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530\nHashim M. Mooppan U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Appellate Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0000\nRe: No: 17-2231(L); International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump\nDear Counsel :\nA majority of the Court has voted to request that the Government\nsupplement the record in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No.\n17-223l(L), with the following two reports referenced in both the Government's\nopening brief and the challenged Proclamation, No. 9645: a report submitted to\n\n\fthe President on July 9, 2017, identifying \"16 countries as having 'inadequate' information sharing practices and risk factors, and another 31 countries as 'at risk' of becoming 'inadequate,\"' Gov't Br. 9 (quoting Proclamation § 1(e)), and a report submitted to the President on September 15, 2017, recommending that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from seven of the countries determined as having inadequate information sharing practices and risk factors, Gov't Br. 9-10 (citing Proclamation§ 1(h)).\nCc: Omar C. Jadwat AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004-2400 Cecillia D. Wang AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004-2400\n\n\f", "Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3;\nJANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED\nMOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State;\nDANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellants.\nNo. 17-2231 (L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Maryland, Southern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n[Caption continued on inside cover]\nTHIRD CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS\n\nNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\n\nCHAD A. READLER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nSHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ____________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #3; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his\nofficial capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants.\n____________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ____________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\nELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendants – Appellants.\n\n\f____________________\nNo. 17-2240 (8:17-cv-00361-TDC) ____________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients; JOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs – Appellants,\nand PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants – Appellees\n\n\fTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................5\nI. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable.............................................................5 A. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable.................................. 5 B. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable ...................................................................................... 9\nII. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of Their Statutory Or Constitutional Claims.................................... 11 A. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA ...................................11 1. The Proclamation Is Within The President’s Statutory Authority Under Sections 1182(f) And 1185(a)(1) ..................12 2. The Proclamation Does Not Violate Section 1152(a)(1)(A) ............................................................................16 B. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause ..........................................................................18 1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Neutral And Bona Fide Reasons .............................................................................18 2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary............................20\nIII. The Balance Of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief..........27 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................29\ni\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nii\n\n\fTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases:\n\nPage(s)\n\nAbourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) ................................. 6, 8, 13\n\nAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ...............................................................................................9\n\nAllende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988) ..............................................................................13\n\nArizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).............................................................................................12\n\nArmstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).......................................................................................8, 9\nDepartment of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) ...............................................................................................6\n\nFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) .............................................................................................20\n\nHaig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) .............................................................................................27\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) ...............................................................................................6\n\nHawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168, Order (Nov. 13, 2017) ..................................................................28\n\nHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ................................................................................................ 27\n\nInternational Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1985) .............................................................................. 7\n\niii\n\n\fIRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) ......................... 2, 9, 19\nKerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) .................................................................................... 9, 19\nKleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ........................................................................ 3, 9, 18, 19, 20\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of Justice, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996) .......................................................................................... 6, 7, 8\nLujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) ...............................................................................................8\nMcCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) .................................................................................. 3, 20, 26\nMcGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ...................................................................................... 10, 26\nMulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................7\nPatel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................7\nReno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) .............................................................................................25\nSaavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..........................................................................6, 8\nSale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) ........................................................................................ 6, 12\niv\n\n\fSessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) .........................................................................................20\nSuhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................9\nTrump v. IRAP: 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) .........................................................................................27\nTwo Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley: 179 F. Supp. 944, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1959)................................................................10 366 U.S. 582 (1961).............................................................................................10\nUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ........................................................................................ 5, 12\nValley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) ..................................................... 9, 19\nStatutes:\nAdministrative Procedure Act: 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) ...............................................................................................7 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)....................................................................................................7 5 U.S.C. § 703 ........................................................................................................8\nImmigration and Nationality Act: 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)............................................................... 3, 11, 16, 17, 18 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) ........................................................................................... 3, 13 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) ............................................. 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) .................................................... 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(3) .......................................................................................... 24 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)....................................................................................24 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D)....................................................................................24 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)................................................................................................15\nv\n\n\fOther Authorities: 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 403.7-3 .............................................................................8 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 504.1-3(f) .........................................................................8 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017) ...................................... passim U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: The President’s\nProclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/24/ fact-sheet-president-s-proclamation-enhancing-vettingcapabilities-and-processes ...................................................................................24\nvi\n\n\fINTRODUCTION The President issued Proclamation No. 9645 pursuant to his broad constitutional and statutory authority to exclude aliens whose entry he determines would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The Proclamation was the product of a global review and evaluation of foreign governments’ informationsharing practices and other risk factors, involving multiple Cabinet heads and other agency officials whose motives have never been questioned. That process culminated in a recommendation by the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security to restrict the entry of certain nationals of eight countries, and, acting in accordance with that recommendation, the President imposed tailored substantive restrictions for those eight countries to encourage improvement in their inadequate practices and to protect the Nation unless and until they do so. Plaintiffs disregard these critical features of the Proclamation, simply labeling it a “re-animation” of the Executive Order (EO-2) previously before this Court. Br. 1-2. Relying on the views of former government officials and commentators, plaintiffs suggest that the entry restrictions in the Proclamation are unnecessary to protect national security or to encourage foreign governments to improve their practices. This Court should reject plaintiffs’ invitation to second-guess the national-security and foreign-policy judgment of the President and his top advisors,\n\n\fwhich could disable this President and future ones from addressing critical security risks and would impugn the validity of past Presidents’ entry restrictions.\nAs an initial matter, there is no basis for allowing these harms because the district court exceeded the proper limits on its jurisdiction. As to plaintiffs’ statutory claims, the political branches’ exclusion of aliens abroad is beyond the province of courts to review absent express authorization by Congress. Plaintiffs neither identify any such authorization nor provide a principled justification why the rule should apply to individual decisions by subordinate officials but not to policy decisions by the head of the Executive Branch. As to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, this Court has previously recognized that alleged “condemnation” injuries are not cognizable absent “personal contact” with an Establishment Clause violation. IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 582 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017). Plaintiffs fail to explain how their own constitutional rights are violated merely because they allegedly suffer indirect injuries flowing from the Proclamation’s alleged discrimination against aliens abroad who lack constitutional rights.\nPlaintiffs’ claims also fail on the merits. As to their claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), plaintiffs mischaracterize the government’s position as being that the President can invoke 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) to override Congress’s judgment. Instead, and as the district court acknowledged,\n2\n\n\fCongress in § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) ratified the President’s authority to supplement 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)’s grounds of inadmissibility by excluding aliens whose entry he finds to be detrimental. This includes, contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, when entry would be detrimental because of concerns that are similar to ones that Congress has addressed in other INA provisions or that are focused on those aliens’ governments. And where the problem sought to be addressed is nationspecific, it is wrong to read 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s discrimination protections for eligible immigrant-visa applicants to impliedly repeal the President’s authority under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) to suspend the entry eligibility of those nations’ citizens. Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ half-hearted denials, their arguments would necessarily imply that the actions of past Presidents were invalid, including President Carter’s Iran order and President Reagan’s Cuba order.\nAs to plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim, they fail to show a constitutional violation under either the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), or the “secular purpose” standard in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the review and recommendation process that culminated in the Proclamation was a “preordained” sham (Br. 2) is belied by the undisputed good faith of the agencies involved and the clear instructions in EO-2 to recommend only those restrictions they deemed appropriate. And plaintiffs’ suggestion that there was “subjective,\n3\n\n\fpost-hoc manipulation of the process to make the results even more of a Muslim ban” (id.) is irreconcilable with the substance of the tailored restrictions, which exclude two Muslim-majority countries from which entry was previously restricted (Iraq and Sudan); add two non-Muslim-majority countries and a third that is barely Muslim-majority (North Korea, Venezuela, and Chad); and provide additional exemptions for nonimmigrant visas from certain Muslim-majority countries (Somalia, Chad, Libya, Yemen, and Iran). Although plaintiffs emphasize that the process nevertheless culminated in coverage of mostly Muslim-majority countries that overlap substantially with those covered under EO-2, that hardly calls into question the validity of the process, because most of those countries were also previously identified by Congress or the Executive Branch as posing heightened risks. Plaintiffs further emphasize pre-Proclamation statements (and a few postProclamation statements) by the President that are alleged to show religious animus, but it is both illogical and dangerous to use such statements to disable the President from acting on the national-security and foreign-policy recommendations of his Cabinet.\nFinally, even if some injunctive relief were appropriate, the district court erred in refusing to limit its injunction to identified aliens whose exclusion would impose concrete, irreparable harm on plaintiffs. A fortiori, this Court should reject plaintiffs’ argument that the injunction should be expanded to reach aliens who lack\n4\n\n\feven a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, the exclusion of whom by definition causes no cognizable harm to plaintiffs.\nARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Justiciable\nA. Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Are Not Justiciable 1. Plaintiffs’ statutory claims are barred by the longstanding principle that “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). Plaintiffs seek to cabin this principle to “review of purely statutory challenges to a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa.” Br. 15. But regardless of whether a distinction between individualized decisions and broad policies might make sense in some contexts (cf. Br. 16-17), it makes no sense here, because it turns upside-down the separation-of-powers rationale of the nonreviewability principle. Rather than relying on anything specific to the individualized nature of consular officials’ visa decisions, the principle of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens rests more broadly on the “recognition that ‘any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with * * the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government’”—matters “ʻso exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely\n5\n\n\fimmune from judicial inquiry or interference.’” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)); see also id. at 1162 (“When it comes to matters touching on national security or foreign affairs * * * the presumption of review ‘runs aground.’”) (quoting Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)). That separation-of-powers rationale applies a fortiori to the President’s policy decision to exclude certain classes of aliens abroad whose entry he finds would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, as compared to an individualized visa determination under the INA by a subordinate executive official.\n2. Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs fail to cite a single case prior to this litigation and the related Hawaii litigation where a court without express congressional authorization has held that judicial review is available of a statutory claim seeking to order the Executive to allow the entry of an alien abroad. Each case on which they rely (Br. 14-16) is readily distinguishable, including on grounds that the government explained in its opening brief yet plaintiffs notably ignore.\nSale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 170-88 (1993), denied relief on the merits and did not address reviewability at all. Gov’t Br. 25. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1051 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986), asserted that Congress had expressly authorized review, but Congress subsequently amended the INA to eliminate the purported authorization. Gov’t Br. 22. Legal Assistance for\n6\n\n\fVietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, 45 F.3d 469, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (LAVAS), involved only a procedural question of where a visa interview would occur, and it was vacated in any event when Congress again abrogated the basis for review, 519 U.S. 1 (1996). International Union of Bricklayers v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1985), involved a challenge to aliens’ admission (not exclusion) by unions that did not want competition. Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1997), involved a challenge to a consular officer’s procedural authority to decline to act on a visa application, not a substantive decision to deny a visa. Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1988), similarly challenged the procedure adopted by the Secretary of State for establishing chronological priority for visa applications, and the reviewability discussion was immaterial because relief was denied on the merits regardless.\n3. Plaintiffs also err in their arguments (Br. 17-19) that Congress has authorized judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).\nFirst, the APA does not apply where a statute “preclude[s] review” or the agency’s action is otherwise nonreviewable. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), 702(1). As the government showed in its opening brief (at 19-22, 24-25), those exemptions apply here, given the principle of nonreviewability of the exclusion of aliens abroad. Plaintiffs offer no response to that showing, nor to the government’s related\n7\n\n\fdemonstration that Congress expressly abrogated APA review even for the exclusion of aliens physically present in the United States at the border.\nSecond, plaintiffs have no statutory right to enforce under the APA. They invoke Abourezk and the vacated decision in LAVAS, but those decisions cannot be reconciled with Saavedra Bruno and Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and plaintiffs make no attempt to do so. See Gov’t Br. 24.\nThird, there is no final agency action to review under the APA. Although plaintiffs emphasize that Presidential decisions can be challenged through actions of subordinate officials, they have not overcome the government’s showing that there is no final action to challenge because none of their relatives or other aliens with whom they have a bona fide connection has actually been excluded yet by virtue of the Proclamation. See Gov’t Br. 22-23. As for plaintiffs’ observation that some relatives had completed interviews and were awaiting administrative processing, that means their visa applications had already been denied on independent grounds, see 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 504.1-3(f), 403.7-3, and it is unclear whether those relatives will ever be found otherwise eligible for a visa wholly apart from the Proclamation.\n4. Finally, plaintiffs cannot evade these problems by invoking (Br. 17) the Court’s inherent equitable authority. The APA governs suits challenging government action, 5 U.S.C. § 703, and in any event Armstrong v. Exceptional Child\n8\n\n\fCenter, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015), makes clear that equitable authority is constrained by “express and implied statutory limitations” on review. Id. at 1385.\nB. Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause Claims Are Not Justiciable Plaintiffs also argue (Br. 20) that the Proclamation’s supposed condemnation of their religion provides Article III injury, but as the government’s opening brief explained (at 27-28), mere stigma does not establish standing, for Establishment Clause purposes or otherwise. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). A plaintiff must show “personal contact” with challenged government action, Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997); IRAP, 857 F.3d at 582-83, which is lacking here because the Proclamation does not apply to plaintiffs but only to third-party aliens abroad. Plaintiffs argue (Br. 20) that their constitutional claims are no different than the ones reviewed by the Supreme Court in Mandel and Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), but the plaintiffs in those cases alleged that the exclusion of aliens abroad violated their own constitutional rights. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 (alleged free-speech right); Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 (alleged due-process right). Here, by contrast, plaintiffs are not asserting violations of their own constitutional rights, but instead indirect injuries resulting from the Proclamation’s application to others—the individual plaintiffs’ family members and the organizational plaintiffs’ clients\n9\n\n\fabroad (who, moreover, themselves have no constitutional rights). In that context, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may not sue. See Gov’t Br. 26.\nPlaintiffs argue that Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), recognized a company’s standing to challenge a Sunday closing law “even though only the company’s employees—not the company itself— had been regulated, prosecuted, and fined for violating a previous version of the law.” Br. 21. That is incorrect. Like the employee in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961), the business in Two Guys was directly regulated by the Sunday closing law, 366 U.S. at 583 n.1, and the Supreme Court characterized the challenge as one by the business to prevent enforcement of “th[e] statute against it,” id. at 586. The law’s operation against the employees was merely an additional means of regulating the businesses. See Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1959).\nFinally, plaintiffs’ suggestion (Br. 21) that alleged injury-in-fact alone is sufficient to bring an Establishment Clause claim—even where it is only the indirect effect of the challenged law’s regulation of third parties—cannot possibly be correct. If true, for example, that would mean that a U.S. Christian could challenge the Proclamation’s exclusion of his relatives who are Syrian Christians as a violation of his own Establishment Clause rights. That would be a nonsensical result.\n10\n\n\fII. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of Their Statutory Or Constitutional Claims As the government’s opening brief described (at 6, 8-12), the Proclamation is\nthe result of a months-long worldwide review and process of diplomatic engagement that involved the efforts of multiple government agencies and officials whose motives have never been questioned. That process culminated in a recommendation from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, with which the President acted in accordance—namely, by adopting tailored substantive restrictions designed to encourage improvement by eight countries with inadequate information-sharing practices or other risk factors and to protect this Nation unless and until they do so. In light of these critical features of the Proclamation, plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional arguments all fail.\nA. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The INA Despite the district court’s rejection of their argument, JA 1041-53, plaintiffs assert that the President exceeded his authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) because the Proclamation supposedly overrides the INA. Plaintiffs also defend the district court’s narrower conclusion, JA 1034-40, that the Proclamation violates the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination for immigrant visas under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Both arguments are incorrect.\n11\n\n\f1. The Proclamation Is Within The President’s Statutory Authority Under Sections 1182(f) And 1185(a)(1)\na. Plaintiffs mischaracterize the government’s position as asserting “limitless authority” for the President under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). Br. 28. Whatever the outer bounds of the President’s power, the Proclamation’s entry restrictions fall well within his legal authority and historical practice.\nFirst, the entry restrictions are based on the President’s determination that they are needed to encourage countries with inadequate information-sharing practices or other risk factors to improve their practices, while protecting the Nation from those risks in the interim. Plaintiffs posit hypotheticals (Br. 29) such as a ban on entry on all employment-based visas in order to affect the domestic labor market, but the exclusion of aliens abroad based on national-security and foreign-policy concerns is action taken at the height of the President’s authority. See Gov’t Br. 53-54. The President was exercising his “unique responsibility” over “foreign * * * affairs,” Sale, 509 U.S. at 188, and his “inherent executive power” concerning the “admissibility of aliens,” Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542, as well as his statutory authority in Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion (Br. 30), Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), holds that States lack power to regulate immigration because that power is exclusively “entrusted to * * * the Federal Government,” id. at 409, not that the President lacks power to exclude aliens absent Congressional authorization. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers\n12\n\n\fconcerns (Br. 2, 28, 30, 63) are at their nadir, and their non-delegation concerns (Br. 30) are misplaced.\nSecond, the President is supplementing the inadmissibility grounds in Section 1182(a) based on additional findings under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). Plaintiffs argue that because of “Congress’s detailed visa system,” Br. 22, the President may not “override” specific provisions in the INA, Br. 28. But Congress has expressly authorized the President to impose additional limitations under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1). For example, in Abourezk v. Reagan, supra, and Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988), the courts held that a certain ground for visa ineligibility under Section 1182(a) required particular harm from the alien’s activities in the United States rather than from their mere entry alone, but also held that the President nevertheless could rely on the entry-based harms to deny entry under Section 1182(f). Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2, 1053-60; Allende, 845 F.2d at 1116-18, 118 n.13, 1119. Indeed, the Abourezk Court noted that President Reagan had issued a Proclamation doing so for the entry of officers and employees of the Cuban Communist Party. 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2. Likewise, President Reagan later excluded all Cubans in response to a diplomatic dispute, and President Carter had previously authorized the exclusion of all Iranians in response to the Iranian hostage crisis. See Gov’t Br. 37-38. These historic examples flatly refute plaintiffs’ atextual arguments (Br. 31-32) that Section 1182(f)’s reference to “class[es] of aliens” does\n13\n\n\fnot apply to entire nations, or that the President may take action under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) only to address topics that Congress has not already addressed.\nPlaintiffs likewise err in arguing that Section 1182(f) is limited to “foreign policy crises,” Br. 32, or to “discrete, narrow, often fast-developing problems,” Br. 40. Those restrictions appear nowhere in the statute. Nor is the President’s Section 1182(f) authority confined to “limited” periods of time, Br. 31; to the contrary, it permits suspension of entry “for such period as he shall deem necessary.” Plaintiffs’ proposal invites judicial second-guessing of the President’s discretion, without manageable criteria as to whether a particular foreign-policy problem is a true “crisis,” is sufficiently “narrow,” or has an appropriately “limited” duration. In any event, though, the findings in the Proclamation amply demonstrate the critical need for the entry restrictions.\nb. Plaintiffs also argue that the Proclamation conflicts with the “basic operation of Congress’s visa system,” Br. 33, because, in their view, individualized vetting and screening through the visa application process is sufficient to address security concerns, Br. 34-36. Plaintiffs’ argument fails for multiple reasons.\nFirst, the fact that Congress generally requires individualized vetting and screening for visa applicants does not dictate how the President must treat nationals of countries with information-sharing inadequacies, and other risk factors, that\n14\n\n\fundermine the reliability of that vetting and screening process. There is no reason to assume that Congress would have wanted to foreclose Presidential action and depend solely on the ability of individual consular officers to repeatedly recognize the problem of inadequate information-sharing by those foreign governments. A systemic problem warrants a systemic solution, especially since such solutions are more likely to induce improvements by the foreign country.\nSecond, the President did not need to identify specific “vetting failures,” Br. 40, in order to act on the risk of potential failures and the desire to improve information-sharing. Again, plaintiffs’ argument assumes that the President must focus only on individuals and individualized vetting, but Section 1182(f) permits the President to restrict the entry of “any class of aliens” whose entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and authorizes the President to make his own judgment about the adequacy of existing restrictions on entry.\nThird, as the district court correctly held (JA 1050), plaintiffs are wrong to argue that the Proclamation conflicts with the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), Br. 3436. For the specific purpose of the VWP’s facilitation of travel, Congress has excluded a country if it fails any one of several criteria, see 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c), but Congress was not addressing the more general issue of what to do about a country that fails multiple criteria. Although Congress decided that the appropriate consequence for countries that fail to meet a single statutory criterion is that their\n15\n\n\fnationals must obtain visas, that narrow decision in no way forecloses the President’s determination that a different consequence is appropriate for countries that fail so many criteria that their information-sharing practices and other risk factors are collectively inadequate—namely, certain of their nationals shall be denied entry, unless a waiver applies. Likewise, the 2015 amendments to the VWP addressed the distinct problem of nationals of VWP countries who were either dual nationals of, or had traveled to, certain countries that posed heightened terrorism concerns yet could travel without a visa based on their VWP-country passport; the Proclamation, by contrast, addresses the problem of nationals traveling on passports from countries that have inadequate information-sharing practices or present other risk factors. In any event, even if plaintiffs were correct that the VWP and the Proclamation were sufficiently “close” in the topics they address, the fact that Congress addresses a specific situation in one provision of the INA does not foreclose the President from supplementing those provisions through his authority under Section 1182(f).\n2. The Proclamation Does Not Violate Section 1152(a)(1)(A)\nPlaintiffs do not dispute that Section 1152(a)(1)(A)’s nationalitydiscrimination ban is limited to the issuance of visas to otherwise-eligible aliens by consular officers and other government officials, whereas Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) address the President’s authority to deem aliens ineligible to enter based\n16\n\n\fon the national interest. That is fatal to plaintiffs’ statutory challenge given the judicial obligation to read the statutes in harmony rather than in conflict.\nPlaintiffs argue that it would make “no sense” to ban nationalitydiscrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas if nationality nevertheless could be used as a basis to suspend entry. Br. 26. But this overlooks the obvious difference between Congress’s constraining the ability of inferior Executive Branch officers to allocate immigrant visas among the set of aliens that Congress and the President allow to enter the country, and Congress’s constraining the President’s ability to exclude aliens from entering based on national-security and foreign-policy concerns. The latter would raise serious separation-of-powers concerns, and would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of President Reagan’s order barring Cuban nationals and President Carter’s order authorizing a ban on Iranian nationals. See Gov’t Br. 3738. Plaintiffs hypothesize that such restrictions are permissible under Section 1152(a)(1)(A) in case of “bilateral emergencies,” Br. 27, but that atextual exception is created out of whole cloth in a failed effort to avoid the unacceptable consequences that follow from plaintiffs’ interpretation. And again, plaintiffs provide no administrable standard for determining what constitutes an “emergency,” or why that category does not include the inadequate information-sharing practices and other risk factors that the Acting DHS Secretary has identified for the President.\n17\n\n\fFurthermore, even if Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) were thought to conflict with Section 1152(a)(1)(A), the former would control. Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion (Br. 26-27), if Section 1152(a)(1)(A) were a general ban on nationality discrimination concerning immigrant visas, it still would not supplant the more specific, and thus controlling, grants of authority in Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) for the President to restrict entry of aliens to protect the national interest, particularly in light of the serious constitutional concerns that a contrary construction would raise. Gov’t Br. 36.\nAt a minimum, any possible violation of Section 1152(a)(1)(A) could not justify the district court’s injunction. At most, the government would be required to issue immigrant visas to aliens whose entry would nevertheless remain suspended. And Section 1152(a)(1)(A) certainly could not require the government to issue visas or allow entry for nonimmigrants, as even plaintiffs do not dispute.\nB. The Proclamation Is Consistent With The Establishment Clause 1. The Proclamation Is Constitutional Under Mandel Because It Relies On Facially Legitimate And Bona Fide Reasons\nPlaintiffs fail to refute the government’s showing that Mandel prohibits “looking behind” a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. Because the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are rationally based on valid reasons, as the district court essentially recognized, see JA 1055, plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause challenge\n18\n\n\ffails under Mandel. Gov’t Br. 40-42; see IRAP, 857 F.3d at 588 (noting that Mandel\ngoverns constitutional challenges to the exclusion of aliens abroad).1\nPlaintiffs argue (Br. 41-42) that Mandel’s reference to a “bona fide” reason\nauthorizes a subjective pretext inquiry. But plaintiffs offer no response to our\nshowing (Gov’t Br. 41) that interpreting “bona fide” to require anything more than\nobjective rationality is foreclosed by Mandel, where the Court explicitly rejected\n“look[ing] behind” the government’s stated reason for denying a waiver of\ninadmissibility, 408 U.S. at 770, and declined Justice Marshall’s invitation to take\n“[e]ven the briefest peek behind the Attorney General’s reason for refusing a\nwaiver,” which he asserted was a “sham.” Id. at 778.\nPlaintiffs next argue, relying on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Din, 135 S.\nCt. at 2141, that “an affirmative showing of bad faith” justifies further scrutiny of\nthe government’s stated rationale. Br. 42. But that misreads the Din concurrence,\nas the government explained (Gov’t Br. 41-42), and plaintiffs fail to refute.\nCritically, Justice Kennedy merely noted that a plaintiff might be able to seek\n“additional factual details” where the government fails to offer any factual basis for\n1 Plaintiffs suggest (Br. 42 n.19) that Mandel should not govern because the Establishment Clause is a “structural[]” limitation on government action. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not countenance that kind of Establishment Clause exceptionalism. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86 (The Establishment Clause “establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is bound to honor—to no greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution.”).\n19\n\n\fa consular officer’s decision. 135 S. Ct. at 2141. When the government does identify a factual basis, though, Justice Kennedy properly recognized that that is the end of the analysis under Mandel. See id. at 2140 (citation of a rationally applicable statutory ground of inadmissibility is sufficient to establish that the government “relied upon a bona fide factual basis”).\nPlaintiffs also argue (Br. 43) that the Supreme Court’s recent description of Mandel’s standard as authorizing only “minimal scrutiny (rational basis review),” Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017), does not foreclose their position, because that case cited Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), which involved a challenge to a congressional policy with no explanation of bad faith. But Fiallo recited and applied Mandel’s “legitimate and bona fide reason” standard. Id. at 79495. And Fiallo acknowledged but declined to consider allegations of bad faith— namely, that the statutory distinctions at issue were “based on an overbroad and outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children” rather than any legitimate purpose. Id. at 799 n.9.\n2. The Proclamation Is Valid Under McCreary The Proclamation would be consistent with the Establishment Clause even if the Court were to ignore its facially legitimate and bona fide justification and look for “bad faith” under plaintiffs’ view of Mandel or for a primary religious purpose or effect under McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).\n20\n\n\fPlaintiffs fail to refute the critical features of the Proclamation that the government’s\nopening brief emphasized, and their efforts nevertheless to equate the Proclamation\nwith EO-2’s temporary entry suspension also fail.\na. Plaintiffs have no meaningful response to the multi-agency review and\nrecommendation process, which makes clear that the Proclamation was not the\nproduct of discriminatory animus. See Gov’t Br. 43, 47-48.\nFirst, plaintiffs provide no basis to question the integrity of the Cabinet heads\nand other government officials who conducted the review, formulated the\nrecommendation to the President, and assisted the President in considering those\nrecommendations; much less do plaintiffs provide evidence that those officials were\nmotivated by discriminatory animus.2\nSecond, plaintiffs repeat the district court’s erroneous conclusion that the\noutcome of the review process “was at least partially pre-ordained” because EO-2\n“required the Secretary of Homeland Security to ‘submit to the President a list of\ncountries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would\nprohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals.’” Br. 48; JA 1068.\n2 Relying solely on extra-record Internet articles that are not before this Court on appeal, plaintiffs question the motives of one official at DHS based on alleged prior statements unrelated to the Proclamation. Br. 5-6 nn.2-3. Even if that single subordinate were biased, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that he somehow compromised the independent judgment of multiple Cabinet officials, whose motives plaintiffs have not challenged, or that he otherwise overbore the process with his personal views.\n21\n\n\fAs the government’s opening brief noted, though, this provision addressed only “foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested”; it did not require the Secretary to conclude that any category of foreign nationals from those countries would be “appropriate” for an entry suspension; and it in no way constrained the Secretary’s discretion to determine what additional information should be requested from any country in the first place. Gov’t Br. 48. Plaintiffs are tellingly silent in response.\nThird, plaintiffs speculate (Br. 47-50) that the Proclamation may diverge from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security’s recommendation in some unidentified respect. But the President’s selection of countries from which to restrict entry mirrors the Acting Secretary’s recommendation, see Procl. § 1(g)-(i), and the Proclamation’s entry restrictions are “in accordance with” the Acting Secretary’s recommendations, see id. § 1(h)(iii); see also Procl., pmbl. (noting that the President’s determinations as reflected in the Proclamation were made “on the basis of recommendations from the Secretary of Homeland Security and other members of my Cabinet”). There is no basis to suggest any material difference between the recommendation and the Proclamation.\nb. Plaintiffs also fail to counter our showing that the Proclamation’s careful tailoring of substantive entry restrictions makes clear that they are not the product of anti-Muslim bias. See Gov’t Br. 43-45.\n22\n\n\fFor example, plaintiffs offer no explanation for why the Proclamation, if it were intended to discriminate against Muslims, would have omitted two Muslimmajority countries (Sudan and Iraq) from the seven countries from which EO-2 or its predecessor suspended entry. Similarly, plaintiffs do not explain why the Proclamation would have added only one new Muslim-majority country (Chad, which is only 52% Muslim), and two non-Muslim-majority countries (Venezuela and North Korea). Plaintiffs assert that the inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea will have “little practical consequence,” Br. 45, but, even if that is so (which courts are ill equipped to second-guess), it simply underscores the good faith of the agency officials who applied their religion-neutral criteria consistently. Nor do plaintiffs offer any explanation for why the Proclamation would have provided exemptions for all or some nonimmigrant visa applicants from the Muslim-majority countries of Somalia, Chad, Libya, Yemen, and Iran.\nCiting an Internet article, plaintiffs contend that the Proclamation is a religious gerrymander because it “ban[s] more Muslims and exempt[s] more non-Muslims than its ‘baseline’ criteria * * * would dictate.” Br. 45. But the author of this article erroneously assumed that failure of any one of nine criteria in the baseline renders a country inadequate under the Proclamation, when instead the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined adequacy based on all nine criteria collectively. Procl. §§ 1(c), (e), 2; see also U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: The\n23\n\n\fPresident’s Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/24/fact-sheet-president-sproclamation-enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes.\nc. Plaintiffs also seek to impugn the integrity of the Proclamation based on various similarities between the Proclamation and its predecessor Executive Orders, but that attempt fails. For instance, it is unsurprising that, as Plaintiffs note (Br. 47), the multi-agency review process culminated in a recommendation to include under the Proclamation many of the same countries included in EO-2 and its predecessor: after all, five of those countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen) were previously identified by Congress or the Executive Branch as posing heightened terrorism-related concerns based on criteria that the agencies likewise deemed relevant to their review and recommendation. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1187(a)(3), (a)(12)(A), (a)(12)(D), (c)(2)(C)-(F), with Procl. § 1(c).\nNor is the Proclamation unconstitutional because, as plaintiffs further emphasize (Br. 49), it relies on many of the same criteria that were present in EO-2. The criteria that overlap are all religion-neutral and reflect compelling nationalsecurity interests, similar to the criteria that Congress and other Presidents have relied on in the past. See Gov’t Br. 49 (noting, for example, that Iran “regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks” and\n24\n\n\f“is the source of significant terrorist threats”) (quoting Procl. § 2(b)(i)). The fact that serious national-security risks are posed by some Muslim-majority nations cannot prevent the government from addressing those problems, especially after the kind of extensive, multi-agency review process that occurred here.\nPlaintiffs (Br. 50-51) seek to minimize those threats, but in so doing ignore the bedrock point that courts are generally “ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy” of the Executive’s “reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat.” Reno v. AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (AAADC). Plaintiffs’ individual criticisms also fall short in their own right. For instance, they rely on opinions of former national-security officials, but those officials were not part of the comprehensive worldwide review and evaluation process that led to the Proclamation. The draft Department of Homeland Security reports that plaintiffs cite likewise predate that review, and also do not reflect the views of the thenSecretary.\nPlaintiffs also take issue (Br. 47) with the “indefinite” duration of the Proclamation’s entry restrictions, but contrary to their suggestion, indefinite does not mean “permanent.” The Proclamation requires periodic review of the restrictions, Procl. § 4, and “encourage[s] the countries to work with the United States to address [identified] inadequacies and risks so that the restrictions and\n25\n\n\flimitations imposed by this proclamation may be relaxed or removed as soon as possible,” id. § 1(h). As the government explained in its opening brief (at 37-38), the entry restrictions imposed by President Carter and President Reagan were, if anything, more indefinite in scope.\nd. Finally, plaintiffs’ reliance (Br. 51-52) on statements by the President does not establish that the Proclamation was the product of anti-Muslim bias. As the government’s opening brief explained (at 52), the statements primarily reflect an intent to protect the United States from the threat of terrorism by nationals from countries that pose heightened risks, and in any event cannot disable the President from adopting the Proclamation’s religion-neutral restrictions in accordance with the national-security and foreign-policy recommendations of his Cabinet. Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge those key points, which distinguish the Establishment Clause cases they cite, see Br. 45-46, 51-55, all of which involved either explicit religious expression or discriminatory laws that lacked any valid secular purpose. For example, plaintiffs cite McCreary, supra, which involved a Ten Commandments display at a county courthouse, but make no attempt to refute our explanation for why that case is inapposite. Gov’t Br. 45-46. Conversely, plaintiffs fail to address McGowan, supra, which is relevant and confirms that the Proclamation has a valid secular purpose and effect. Gov’t Br. 46-47.\n26\n\n\fIII. The Balance Of Harms Weighs Strongly Against Preliminary Relief The President has suspended the entry of aliens whose entry he has determined\nwould be detrimental to the interests of the United States, exercising his broad constitutional and statutory authority. There is no “more compelling” interest than the security of the Nation, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981), and the interest in combatting terrorism “is an urgent objective of the highest order,” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). Plaintiffs simply evade these harms by ignoring the prospect at the preliminary-injunction stage that the Proclamation will ultimately be upheld as lawful. Br. 56-57.\nPlaintiffs also do not dispute that an injunction should extend no further than is necessary to redress plaintiffs’ own injuries. Gov’t Br. 56. Plaintiffs contend that it would be “difficult” to tailor the injunction to their own alleged injuries, Br. 57, but there would be little difficulty in tailoring an injunction to identified aliens whose exclusion imposes concrete, irreparable injury on plaintiffs.\nIt follows a fortiori that, contrary to plaintiffs’ cross-appeal arguments (Br. 59-60), the injunction against the Proclamation should not be extended beyond foreign nationals with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, under the Supreme Court’s stay of the EO-2 injunctions in Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). Plaintiffs make the remarkable assertion that they will suffer irreparable harm from the exclusion of aliens with whom they\n27\n\n\flack any relationship at all, but their argument rests on the abstract “condemnation” injuries that this Court already held are not cognizable at all without additional “personal contact.” Supra p. 2. Indeed, when a district court in Hawaii recently enjoined enforcement of the Proclamation as to aliens without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship, the Ninth Circuit promptly stayed that portion of the injunction. See Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168, Order (Nov. 13, 2017).\nIn arguing for broader injunctive relief, plaintiffs observe that the Proclamation will last longer than EO-2 and thus there is greater alleged injury even to those relationships that do not meet the standard established in the Supreme Court’s stay decision. Br. 59-60. But such injuries concerning mere “friends and acquaintances” and other “insufficiently formal” connections (Br. 58-59) pale in comparison to the harm to the government’s national-security and foreign-policy interests, especially since that harm is significantly greater under the Proclamation, which now reflects a multi-agency review and recommendation acted on by the President.\nFinally, plaintiffs assert that the district court’s injunction defined “bona fide relationships” differently than the Supreme Court did. Br. 63. But the district court simply repeated verbatim the Supreme Court’s language, stated that IRAP and HIAS clients are not covered by the injunction “absent a separate bona fide relationship,” and left for individualized determination whether a given relationship qualifies. JA\n28\n\n\f1080 (emphasis added). And to the extent the district court’s injunction is unclear, which the government believes it is not, plaintiffs can seek (and in fact have sought) clarification in district court.\nCONCLUSION For these reasons and those stated in the Government’s first cross-appeal brief, the district court’s preliminary injunction should be reversed. At a minimum, it should be vacated except for those identified aliens whose exclusion would impose a cognizable, irreparable injury on plaintiffs. And in no circumstance should the injunction be extended to reach aliens without a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States.\n29\n\n\fNOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General\nJEFFREY B. WALL EDWIN S. KNEEDLER\nDeputy Solicitors General\nNOVEMBER 2017\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nCHAD A. READLER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nSTEPHEN M. SCHENNING Acting United States Attorney\nHASHIM M. MOOPPAN Deputy Assistant Attorney General\n/s/ Sharon Swingle SHARON SWINGLE H. THOMAS BYRON III LOWELL V. STURGILL JR.\nAttorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7241 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 353-2689\n\n30\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-face requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-volume limitations of Rule 32(a)(7)(B). The brief contains 6,544 words, excluding the parts of the brief excluded by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\fCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 22, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.\n/s/ Sharon Swingle Sharon Swingle\n\n\f", "DJ # 145-1-2979\n\nU.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Staff\n950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Rm. 7250 Washington, DC 20530\nTel: (202) 353-2689\nNovember 24, 2017\n\nMs. Patricia S. Connor Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Lewis F. Powell Jr. Courthouse & Annex 1100 East Main Street, Suite 501 Richmond, VA 23219\nRE: IRAP v. Trump, No. 17-2231(L)\nDear Ms. Connor:\nThe government has received the Court’s letter of November 22, 2017, indicating that the Court has voted to request that the government supplement the record in this consolidated appeal with two reports referenced in Proclamation No. 9645 and the government’s opening brief: a report submitted to the President on July 9, 2017; and a report submitted to the President on Sept. 15, 2017. The Court’s letter appears to envision that those materials would be publicly filed with the Court.\nThe reports requested by the Court, which were not submitted in district court and are not part of the record on appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a), contain national-security information that has been classified at the Secret level under Executive Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). In addition, the reports are protected by various privileges, including the presidential-communications privilege and the deliberative-process privilege. Requiring the government to disclose the reports publicly, or to opposing counsel, would improperly compel the government to turn over classified information to persons who neither hold the requisite security clearance nor have a need to know\n\n\fthe information. In addition, compelled disclosure of the documents to the public or to opposing counsel could wrongly strip the reports of their privileges.\nThe government believes that this case can be decided based on the existing record. Should the Court nevertheless decide to review the reports, however, the government respectfully requests that the Court order their submission in camera and ex parte, so as to preserve the protections afforded to the reports as classified and privileged material. See, e.g., Tabaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 93 n.1, 96-106 (2d Cir. 2007); Bassiouni v. FBI, 436 F.3d 712, 722 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006); Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2004).\nSincerely,\n/s/ Sharon Swingle\nSharon Swingle Attorney for Appellants-Defendants\ncc: All counsel via CM/ECF\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 1 of 28\n\n17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\n__________________________________________________________________\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n__________________________________________________________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al. Plaintiffs-Appellees,\nand\nALLAN HAKKY and SAMANEH TAKALOO Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD TRUMP, et al. Defendants-Appellants\n_________________________________\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland ________________________________\nBRIEF OF MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, INC., AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES\nGare A. Smith Michael B. Keating Kristyn M. DeFilipp Christopher E. Hart Daniel L. McFadden FOLEY HOAG LLP 1717 K Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, INC.\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 2 of 28\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nPage\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... ii\nINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ..........................................................................................1\nARGUMENT.............................................................................................................................1\nI. THE THIRD TRAVEL BAN IS MERELY A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESIDENT’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANTI-MUSLIM POLICIES. .........................................................................................................3\nA. The President Banned Muslims. ............................................................3\nB. The Federal Courts Ordered The President To Cease Implementing The Ban, in Both of Its Previous Iterations. ..................5\nC. The Third Travel Ban Is A Continuation Of Its Predecessors And Is Equally Flawed. ..................................................................................6\nII. THE THIRD TRAVEL BAN IS NOT ONLY ILLEGAL, BUT IT WILL OPERATE AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INCLUDING AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE TECHNOLOGY SECTOR. .............8\nA. The Domestic Technology Industry Benefits From Immigration.........8\n1. Immigration Supports The Innovation Economy.......................................8\n2. Immigrants Are Inventors.......................................................................11\n3. Immigrants Are Technology Leaders. .....................................................12\n4. Immigrants Are Business Leaders...........................................................13\n5. Immigrants Contribute To The Field Of Medicine. .................................15\nB. Unless It Is Enjoined, The Third Travel Ban Will Harm The Technology Industry.............................................................................16\nC. Unless It Is Enjoined, the Third Travel Ban Will Undermine the Competitive Strength of the Domestic Technology Industry and Will Chill the Culture of Innovation....................................................19\nCONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................21\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 3 of 28\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAziz v. Trump, No. 17-116, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017)...........................................................................................passim\nEpperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)............................................................21\nHawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-361, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36935 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017) .....................................................................................2, 8\nPeacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1982) ......................................................8\nUnited States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ..................................................21\nWashington v. Trump, No. 17-141, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), stay denied by No. 17-35105, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2369 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) ...................................... 2, 4, 5, 7\nOrders\n82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017)..................................................................2, 4, 5\n82 Fed. Reg. 8,978 ..............................................................................................4, 5\n82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) ........................................................................2\n82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sep. 24, 2017) .......................................................................2\nOther Authorities\nAdam Vaccaro, Boston Business Leaders Oppose Trump Immigration Order, The Boston Globe (Jan. 29, 2017), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/01/29/chief-sayscompany-will-stand-with-employees-from-bannedcountries/5v00oFyvZZpGPd5CxPDjfN/story.html ......................................... 18\nJanuary 27, 2016 Letter of Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Ass’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State .....................................4\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 4 of 28\n\nSeptember 15, 2017 Tweet from Donald J. Trump, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/90864516146265090 .....................6\nTrump Advisor Says New Travel Ban Will Have ‘Same Basic Policy Outcome,’ FoxNews.com, Feb. 21, 2017, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/21/trump-adviser-saysnew-travel-ban-will-have-same-basic-policy-outcome.html...........................3, 7\nZeninjor Enwemeka, Local Tech Companies Say Trump’s Immigration Order Is Bad For Business, WBUR (Feb. 7, 2017), available at http://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2017/02/07/bostonbusiness-travel-ban ..........................................................................................18\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 5 of 28\n\nINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE Amicus Curiae is the Massachusetts Technology Leadership Council, Inc. (“MassTLC”), a not-for-profit association of companies that collectively employ more than 170,000 people in the Massachusetts technology industry. MassTLC represents a vibrant and growing community of innovators in fields including software, computers, robotics, and security products. MassTLC therefore closely follows issues—including immigration policy—that may affect the ability of its members to build value, attract talent, and compete in the diverse global marketplace. No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. No person other than MassTLC, its members or its counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief.\nARGUMENT MassTLC writes in support of the Respondents in opposing the Administration’s effort to overturn a nationwide injunction restraining the execution of President Donald Trump’s Executive Order dated September 24, 2017, entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety\n\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 6 of 28\n\nThreats” (the “Third Travel Ban”).1 As the Court is aware, the Third Travel Ban was issued to supplant a similarly-titled Executive Order entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (the “Second Travel Ban”),2 which itself was issued to voluntarily narrow an identically titled Executive Order issued January 27, 2017 (the “Original Travel Ban”).3\nThe Third Travel Ban, like the ones before it, is arbitrary, illegal, and does not serve the public interest. This is fundamentally the same discriminatory “Muslim Ban” that has been repeatedly enjoined over the last nine months.4 Cosmetic changes—such as the post hoc addition of purported security justifications, or the addition of certain non-Muslim countries—do not alter the fact that this policy still proceeds from the same irrational and unconstitutional religious animus. When the Original Travel Ban was revised, the President’s own\n\n1 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sep. 24, 2017).\n2 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).\n3 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).\n4 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2369, at 3-7 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017); Aziz v. Trump, No. 17-116, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at 9-13, 27 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-361, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36935, at 33-45 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017)\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 7 of 28\n\nSenior Policy Advisor admitted that the revision was intended to achieve the “same basic policy outcome” as its patently illegal predecessor.5\nThe public interest demands an immigration system that does not discriminate against any religion, and that is fair, orderly, and predictable. In particular, technology companies in Massachusetts require such a system to recruit innovators from around the world to build businesses here at home, and to sell their products back out into the global marketplace. President Trump’s attempt to ban the entry of entire nationalities—even when the person seeking entry clearly poses no risk—is antithetical to the public interest and undermines America’s innovation economy and its fundamental values. I. THE THIRD TRAVEL BAN IS MERELY A CONTINUATION OF\nTHE PRESIDENT’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANTI-MUSLIM POLICIES. A. The President Banned Muslims. During his election campaign, President Trump repeatedly promised to ban Muslims from entering the United States.6 As one court has explained, “[t]he\n\n5 See Trump Advisor Says New Travel Ban Will Have ‘Same Basic Policy Outcome,’ FoxNews.com, Feb. 21, 2017, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/21/trump-adviser-says-new-travel-banwill-have-same-basic-policy-outcome.html.\n6 See Aziz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at 9-13.\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 8 of 28\n\n‘Muslim ban’ was a centerpiece of the president’s campaign for months, and the press release calling for it was still available on his website as of [Feb. 13, 2017].”7\nWithin days of taking office, President Trump issued the Original Travel Ban. Section 3(c) of that order immediately prohibited all people from seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States, even including returning permanent residents and visa-holders residing in the United States.8 The President ordered that this exclusion continue for 90 days, during which time federal agencies would purportedly review their immigration security procedures.9 To implement this order, the Department of State “provisionally revoke[d] all valid nonimmigrant and immigrant visas of nationals” of those seven countries without any due process or advance notice.10\nNotably, the Original Travel Ban contained provisions to add additional countries to the “banned” list, and also to extend the ban indefinitely beyond the\n\n7 See id.\n8 See Washington, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2369, at 3-7. Notably, the order included a safety valve to permit “religious minorities”\n9 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,977-78.\n10 See January 27, 2016 Letter of Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Ass’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State. This letter made a small number of exceptions for military and diplomatic visas, or case-by-case determinations “in the national interest.”\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 9 of 28\n\ninitial 90-day period.11 Thus, with the stroke a pen, President Trump suddenly excluded a vast number of Muslims from the United States, stripped legal status from many already residing here, and created well-founded fear that more nationalities would find themselves banned without warning.\nB. The Federal Courts Ordered The President To Cease Implementing The Ban, in Both of Its Previous Iterations.\nThe Original Travel Ban was rapidly enjoined by numerous federal courts. Most broadly, Judge James Robart of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington issued an order that the federal government was “ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from . . . [e]nforcing Section 3(c)” of the Original Travel Ban on a nationwide basis.12 The federal government appealed this order, but ultimately dismissed the appeal after the 9th Circuit construed the order as a preliminary injunction and refused to stay its operation.13\nNotably, at least one court enjoined the Original Travel Ban based on the strong likelihood that it would be proved to be an exercise in religious\n11 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,978. 12 Washington, No. 17-141, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at 7-8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 13 See Washington, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2369, at 34 (stay of preliminary injunction denied); Order, Washington, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017) (granting federal government’s motion to voluntarily dismiss appeal of preliminary injunction, including payment of State of Washington’s costs).\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 10 of 28\n\ndiscrimination. Judge Brinkema of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded, based in large part on the President’s own statements, that the Commonwealth of Virginia had established such a strong likelihood of success on its Establishment Clause claim that the Original Travel Ban should be enjoined on that basis alone.14 Similarly, after President Trump signed the Second Travel Ban, that too was enjoined.15 Even while litigation concerning the Second Travel Ban was pending, just days before the Third Travel Ban was issued, the President tweeted that the “travel ban into the United States” should be “far larger” and “tougher.”16\nC. The Third Travel Ban Is A Continuation Of Its Predecessors And Is Equally Flawed.\nOn September 24, 2017, President Trump signed the Third Travel Ban, which supplants the original two orders. Unchanged, however, is the ban’s basic function: to prohibit people from predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States based solely on their national origin.17\n\n14 Aziz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at 28 n.11.\n15 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).\n16 September 15, 2017 Tweet from Donald J. Trump, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/90864516146265090.\n17 This is prohibited discrimination even if the ban does not restrict travel from every predominantly Muslim country. See id. at 26-27 (“The major premise of\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 11 of 28\n\nWhile the Third Travel Ban is somewhat narrower than the Original Travel Ban, and included two non-Muslim majority countries (unlike the previous orders), it nevertheless still achieves (in the words of President Trump’s own senior advisor concerning the Second Travel Ban) the “same basic policy outcome.”18 For example, although permanent residents and aliens already issued visas are exempted from the revised order, the residents of six Muslim-majority countries still cannot obtain new visas. Inevitably, travel from those countries will be incrementally extinguished as existing visas expire.\nFurther, although the Third Travel Ban now contains purported security justifications for restricting travel from the identified Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Chad), and extends to certain individuals from Venezuela and a tiny group of North Korean travelers (estimated at fewer than 100 annually), it is telling that these justifications were not proffered until after the Original Travel Ban had been enjoined (and new non-Muslim countries added after the Second one, too, had been enjoined).19 Asserted now—in the teeth\n\nthat argument—that one can only demonstrate animus toward a group of people by targeting all of them at once—is flawed.”).\n18 See Trump Advisor Says New Travel Ban Will Have ‘Same Basic Policy Outcome,’ n.4, supra.\n19 Washington, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2369, at 32 & n.8.\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 12 of 28\n\nof numerous adverse rulings—these post hoc rationalizations are entitled to little weight.20\nThe Third Travel Ban has the purpose and effect of banning Muslims from the United States, as is evident from the overwhelming record of the President’s statements targeting Muslims. The Third Travel Ban also violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.21 For all of these reasons, as well as for those set forth in Plaintiffs’-Appellees’ Brief, the Third Travel Ban is illegal. II. THE THIRD TRAVEL BAN IS NOT ONLY ILLEGAL, BUT IT WILL\nOPERATE AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INCLUDING AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE TECHNOLOGY SECTOR. Although the Third Travel Ban is contrary to the public interest in many ways, MassTLC writes to explain one particular facet of that harm: the ban’s profoundly disruptive effect on the technology sector, including in Massachusetts. A. The Domestic Technology Industry Benefits From Immigration.\n1. Immigration Supports The Innovation Economy. The technology industry is a critical driver of the Massachusetts economy. Nearly 400,000 people in Massachusetts work in jobs that are either in the\n\n20 Aziz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at 24 n.10 (citing Peacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. 1982)); Hawai’i, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36935 at 39-40, n. 15 (citing Aziz).\n21 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.\n8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 13 of 28\n\ntechnology sector, or are in technology-related occupations in other sectors— roughly 13% of the state’s total workforce.22 This industry is a global enterprise, fueled in large part by immigration and international travel. According to one recent study, as of January 1, 2016, “[i]mmigrants have started more than half (44 of 87) of America’s startup companies valued at $1 billion dollars or more and are key members of management or product development teams in over 70 percent (62 of 87) of these companies.”23 More than half of Silicon Valley’s corporate founders are immigrants.24\nThe integral role that immigrants play in the technology industry does not arise because “immigrants steal jobs” (as many nativist demagogues have claimed), but rather because the technology industry is growing too rapidly to be staffed through domestic labor alone. By 2020, for example, projections indicate that 1.4 million computer specialist positions will be open in the United States, but domestic universities will only produce enough graduates to fill 29% of those\n\n22 Addendum, The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S., June 2017 (“Add.”). This Addendum is a version of a publicly-available report published by MassTLC and available on its website, http://www.masstlc.org/immigration/. The report cites original sources for the data relied on in this brief. MassTLC provides a version of the full report here as an Appendix for the Court’s convenience.\n23 Add. at 24.\n24 Add. at 37-38.\n9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 14 of 28\n\njobs.25 In Massachusetts today, there are seventeen technology jobs for every person who graduates with a degree in computer science or information technology.26 Immigrants are responsible for substantial economic growth. This is true as a general matter of the country as a whole: in 2015, immigrants contributed $2 trillion to the U.S. GDP, which represents 11% of the country’s total GDP.27 Zooming in to the Massachusetts technology sector, one study projects that, if half of Massachusetts’ 3,608 advanced level graduates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) related fields, studying on temporary visas, remained in Massachusetts upon graduation, then 4,726 new jobs would be created for U.S.-born workers by 2021.28\nAs it stands, immigrant students are disproportionately more likely to get their degrees in a STEM field, and international students make up over 30% of the post-baccalaureate degrees in STEM fields.29 Individuals from the six banned countries, moreover, are more likely to have a bachelor’s degree, approximately\n\n25 Add. at 15. 26 Add. at 17. 27 Add. at 33. 28 Add. at 17. 29 Add. at 91.\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 15 of 28\n\ntwice as likely to have a graduate degree, and four times as likely to have a doctoral degree relative to the native-born population.30 Quite apart from this population being a disproportionately educated and skilled one, they are also part of a population making immediate impacts on the U.S economy: During the 201516 academic year, international students contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 400,000 jobs.31\n2. Immigrants Are Inventors. So too do immigrants drive the development of inventions and other useful arts. For example, in 2011, 76% of patents awarded to the Top 10 patentproducing U.S. universities had an inventor that was foreign-born.32 In recent years, foreign nationals contributed to more than three quarters of patents in the fields of information technology, molecular and microbiology, and pharmaceuticals.33 The amount of invention originating from immigrants can have dramatic effects on innovation, with discernable spillover effects. One academic study\n\n30 Add. at 84. 31 Add. at 85. 32 Add. at 27. 33 Add. at 27-28.\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 16 of 28\n\nnoted that a 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the overall U.S. population composed of immigrant college graduates, and a 0.7 percentage point increase in that same share composed of post-graduate immigrants, led to an increase in patenting by approximately 12 to 21%.34 Similarly, as little as a 0.45 percentage point increase in immigrant scientists and engineers in the overall U.S. population increases patenting per capita by approximately 13 to 32%.35 Highskilled immigration has an important and discernable impact on the innovation economy. Limiting such immigration clearly threatens future innovation.\n3. Immigrants Are Technology Leaders. The highly-educated foreign-born scientists, mathematicians, and engineers also represent some of the best in the field. Forty percent of the Nobel Prizes won by Americans in Chemistry, Medicine, and Physics since 2000 were awarded to immigrants.36 In 2016, all six American winners of the Nobel Prize in economics and scientific fields were foreign born.37 From 2010-2015, four out of eight U.S. Turing Award (for computing) recipients were first or second generation\n\n34 Add. at 29. 35 Add. at 29. 36 Add. at 95. 37 Add. at 95.\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 17 of 28\n\nimmigrants.38 Since 1936, 63% of Fields Medal (for mathematics) recipients affiliated with a U.S. research institution have been foreign born (and all such recipients have been foreign-born since 2002).39 Forty-one percent of National Medal of Science recipients in math or computer science are foreign-born.40 In Massachusetts, 37% of Nobel Prize winners associated with MIT are foreignborn;41 33% of Nobel prize winners who are current faculty or alumni or Harvard University are foreign-born;42 and 75% of Nobel Prize winners who have been affiliated with Boston University are foreign born.43 There is little question as to the importance of the contributions that immigrants make to STEM fields, in both the U.S. and Massachusetts.\n4. Immigrants Are Business Leaders. American companies that are household names—Microsoft, McDonald’s, U.S. Steel—are led by foreign-born CEOs.44 As of 2016, over 10% of Fortune 500\n\n38 Add. at 102. 39 Add. at 101. 40 Add. at 103-04. 41 Add. at 96. 42 Add. at 96. 43 Add. at 97. 44 Add. at 23.\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 18 of 28\n\nCEOs were born outside of the U.S.; the same was true for 14% of Fortune 100 CEOs.45 In 2016, over 40% of Fortune 500 firms were founded either by an immigrant or the child of immigrants. 46\nThe same holds true in Massachusetts. More than half of the Massachusettsbased Fortune 500 companies were founded by immigrants, or by children of immigrants.47 Their impact on the Massachusetts economy has been significant, generating over $130 billion in annual revenue, and employing nearly half a million people around the world.48 At the beginning of this decade, over 17 percent of all business owners in Massachusetts were foreign born.49 In 2013, the same was true of nearly 19 percent of business owners in the greater Boston area.50 From 2006 to 2010, Massachusetts businesses owned by new immigrants had a total net business income of $2.8 billion.51\n\n45 Add. at 23-24. 46 Add. at 25. 47 Add. at 21. 48 Add. at 21. 49 Add. at 21. 50 Add. at 21. 51 Add. at 22.\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 19 of 28\n\nProminent American innovators, past and present, hail from countries directly targeted by the Third Travel Ban, including Steve Jobs (the co-founder of Apple whose father is from Syria),52 Ali Hajimiri (an academic and entrepreneur who holds over 85 U.S. and European patents, who is from Iran),53 and Joe Kiani (founder, chairman, and CEO of Masimo, and also from Iran).54 Iranian-Americans either founded or lead mainstays of the technology sector like Twitter, Dropbox, Oracle, and eBay.55 Similarly, several of the top venture capitalists who fund new technology companies were born in Tehran.56\n5. Immigrants Contribute To The Field Of Medicine. Medicine, in particular, has benefitted greatly from immigrants. More than 25% of physicians practicing in the United States are foreign born.57 Importantly, foreign-born physicians are disproportionately represented in rural clinics and public safety-net hospitals treating isolated and vulnerable populations.58 The\n52 Add. at 25. 53 Add. at 25. 54 Add. at 25. 55 Add. at 16. 56 Add. at 16. 57 Add. at 17. 58 Add. at 17-18.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 20 of 28\n\nsimple reason for this is that the United States does not produce enough physicians to keep up with demand. According to a report published by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) in 2016, a current deficit of 11,000 physicians is expected to grow as the population grows and ages.59 The AAMC estimates that the U.S. will face a shortage of up to 94,700 doctors by 2025.60 Almost a third of the shortage will be primary care physicians.61 More than 8,400 doctors working in the U.S. are from two of the countries listed in the Third Travel Ban: Iran and Syria.62 Specifically in Massachusetts, in 2016 almost 1 in 4 physicians graduated from a medical school outside of the United States (suggesting non-U.S. origin).63\nB. Unless It Is Enjoined, The Third Travel Ban Will Harm The Technology Industry.\nImplementation of irrational and discriminatory immigration policies, including the Third Travel Ban, would severely harm the technology industry in the U.S. generally, and Massachusetts specifically. Indeed, Massachusetts has one\n\n59 Add. at 17-18. 60 Add. at 17-18. 61 Add. at 17-18. 62 Add. at 17-18. 63 Add. at 19.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 21 of 28\n\nof the highest numbers of applications for temporary non-agricultural work permits in the United States.64 The impact is expected to destabilize the workforce and reduce the competitiveness of U.S. technology firms. For example, Microsoft’s public securities filings explain that “[c]hanges to U.S. immigration policies that restrain the flow of technical and professional talent may inhibit our ability to adequately staff our research and development efforts.”65 In addition to stifling recruiting from the “banned” countries, the Third Travel Ban could accelerate the rise of technology hubs abroad, making such locales as Vancouver, London, and Singapore more “attractive alternatives to existing hubs” of technology in the United States,66 and force companies based abroad to put off opening offices in the United States.67 It will also likely result in the relocation of foreign born employees from the United States to other countries where they can reside without fear of a sudden revocation of their rights to access their families and homes.\nThe Massachusetts technology sector expects to feel this impact acutely.\n\n64 Add. at 75. 65 Add. at 19. 66 Add. at 19. 67 Add. at 19-20.\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 22 of 28\n\nAs reported in the press, numerous Boston-based businesses have expressed grave concern regarding the Administration’s travel ban and its potential expansion. As Jeff Bussgang, a general partner at the venture capital firm Flybridge and professor at Harvard Business School stated, the travel ban is “the innovation economy’s worst nightmare.”68 Paul English, founder of the travel booking site Kayak and startup Lola, expressed concern about a Mexican national hired to develop an app who was worried about traveling out of the country to visit his family.69 Leaders of Massachusetts-headquartered technology companies, from large to small— including GE, TripAdvisor, Carbonite, Brightcove, and Fuze—have expressed concern over the direct impact that implementation of the travel ban had on their businesses.70 This anecdotal evidence is strongly supported by the empirical data noted above: a high percentage of founders, managers, and employees of\n\n68 Adam Vaccaro, Boston Business Leaders Oppose Trump Immigration Order, The Boston Globe (Jan. 29, 2017), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/01/29/chief-says-company-willstand-with-employees-from-bannedcountries/5v00oFyvZZpGPd5CxPDjfN/story.html.\n69 Id.\n70 Id.; Zeninjor Enwemeka, Local Tech Companies Say Trump’s Immigration Order Is Bad For Business, WBUR (Feb. 7, 2017), available at http://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2017/02/07/boston-business-travel-ban.\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 23 of 28\n\nMassachusetts technology companies are immigrants and potentially impacted by the Third Travel Ban, either directly or indirectly.\nIt is thus clearly in the public interest—including in the interests of the Massachusetts technology industry—for the Court to restrain the operation of the Third Travel Ban. The United States deserves fair, rational, and predictable rules to govern immigration and international travel. Such a system permits individuals and companies to reliably arrange employment and commercial relationships, without fear that those relationships will be abruptly disrupted by irrational or discriminatory policies.\nC. Unless It Is Enjoined, the Third Travel Ban Will Undermine the Competitive Strength of the Domestic Technology Industry and Will Chill the Culture of Innovation.\nThe Third Travel Ban is also contrary to the public interest because it substantially undermines the ability of the Massachusetts technology industry to compete in the international marketplace. It discourages travel to the U.S. by potential customers and investors, either because they are directly impacted by the ban, or because they are worried that the ban would be unexpectedly expanded to exclude additional nationalities. Indeed, this is not a theoretical concern. Flight bookings to the United States from January 28, 2017 to February 4, 2017 dropped\n\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 24 of 28\n\nby 6.5% overall in comparison to the previous year.71 Bookings to the United States from the six targeted countries in the Second Travel Ban dropped by 80% during this same period.72\nIt may also force companies to move jobs outside of the U.S., locating businesses where employees live rather than enticing them to come to the U.S. Similarly, the Third Travel Ban discourages talented foreign students from attending local educational institutions, from which the technology industry hires many engineers and scientists to drive innovation in the United States. Foreignborn students already in the U.S. will be less likely to remain, as they may be unable to receive or renew a visa, or may be fearful of that possibility. The Third Travel Ban will inevitably reduce the relative strength of domestic industry in global markets, which does nothing to make the United States more safe, prosperous, or secure.\nThe technology industry, in Massachusetts as elsewhere, thrives on a culture of diversity, inclusivity, and equal opportunity. The Third Travel Ban is antithetical to these values. It is a patently illegal and discriminatory attempt to\n\n71 Add. at 158. 72 Add. at 158.\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 25 of 28\n\ninflict harm upon a religious minority.73 This animus was both proven and magnified by the manner of the Original Travel Ban’s implementation, which— without any notice—barred the re-entry of Muslims who have made their home in our country, separating them from their homes, families, and careers. A government that acts to hurt people based on their religion (or non-religion) undermines not only the inclusive principles of the modern technology industry, but also legal principles “rooted in the foundation soil of our Nation” and “fundamental to freedom.”74 “Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men [and women].”75\nCONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, MassTLC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision below.\n\n73 Aziz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at 9-13, 27. 74 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-09 (1968). 75 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 26 of 28\n\nDated: Washington, D.C., November 16, 2017.\n/s/ Gare Smith GARE SMITH MICHAEL B. KEATING KRISTYN DeFILIPP CHRISTOPHER E. HART DANIEL L. McFADDEN FOLEY HOAG LLP 1717 K Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, INC.\n\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 27 of 28\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on November 28, 2017, the foregoing amicus curiae brief was\nserved on all interested parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF\nsystem.\n/s/ Gare Smith GARE SMITH MICHAEL B. KEATING KRISTYN DeFILIPP CHRISTOPHER E. HART DANIEL L. McFADDEN FOLEY HOAG LLP 1717 K Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, INC.\n\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-1\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 28 of 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17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 1 of 165\n\nAddendum\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 2 of 165\n\nTHE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE U.S.\nJune 2017\n\nii\nADD-1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 3 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nACKNOWLEDGEMENTS\nSpecial thanks to the following organizations for their support: Carbonite, CHEN PR, Foley Hoag, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, TripAdvisor, and WireStone.\nAnd, thank you to the many individuals who contributed time and energy to our research and advocacy on this important issue: Catherine Alford, Mohamad Ali, Amitay Alter, Almudena Arcelus, Grace Brittan, Kip Brown, Marric Buessing, Kristyn Bunce DeFilipp, Sean Burpoe, Lenore Byers, Chris Carleton, Sonia Cheung, Pierre-Yves Cremieux, Nick Dadson, Tracy Danner, Matt Driver, Akanksha Dua, Sorcha Evenhouse, Adam Feifel, Catherine Fernan, Desiree Fish, Aaron Fix, Max Flignor, Sara Fraim, Emily Gao, Sam Green, Norman Guadagno, Carro Halpin, Christopher Hart, Owen Hearey, Alex Henslovitz, Ryan Hiatt, Alison Hill, Hunter Hillman, Victoria Hopcroft, Tom Hopcroft, Grace Howland, Samantha Jandl, Patrick Johnson, Seth Kalvert, Steve Kaufer, Michael Keating, Sarah King, Olga Korolev, Nguyen Le, Jee-Yeon Lehmann, Christopher Llop, Dana Louie, Tarek Makawi, Federico Mantovanelli, Rosamond Mate, Sean McCoy, Dan McFadden, Kate McLeod, Liz Milsark, Pedro Mora, Ruth Morris, Liz Neyens, Amanda Nguyen, Caitlin O'Malley, Alec Paulson, Shaked Peleg, Clemens Pilgram, Greg Rafert, Nina Roesner, Peter Rosenblum, Aidan Saavedra Buckley, Kate Schoenbach, Shannon Seitz, Riddhima Sharma, Jesse Shea, Danielle Sheer, Yanying Sheng, Eric Smiley, Mike Spinney, Ian Staeheli, Patricio Suarez Urtaza, Matt Summers, Neal Tan, Evelyn TaylorMcGregor, Brett Tobin, David Toniatti, Kate Uthe, Jahnvi Vaidya, Katie Williams, Frances Yen, Brad Young, Tom Yu, Haimin Zhang, and Luise Zhong.\nii\nADD-2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 4 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nINTRODUCTION\nThe Massachusetts Technology Leadership Council (MassTLC), the region’s largest non-profit technology organization, joined the national conversation on the role that immigrants play in our economy with its submission of amicus briefs in the District Court of Hawaii and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th and 9th Circuits. These briefs support the plaintiffs in those cases, who have sought to enjoin the President’s Executive Orders restricting travel to the U.S. from certain countries.\nWhile it is well understood within the technology community that diversity and the global mobility of talent and ideas into our country are critical drivers of U.S. innovation, economic growth, and global competitiveness, we felt that the submission of amicus briefs requires better documentation and sourcing of these commonly held truths. This report reflects our work to document the impact that immigrants have on our economy.\nWe entered this dialogue on behalf of the tech community in Massachusetts because, as a leading technology state, we feel the acute impact that immigrants have in our economy. As Governor Charlie Baker noted, “Massachusetts is a global community, and we all benefit from the shared experiences of our partners from around the world to support our economy and educational institutions [and] make our state the best place to live, work, and raise a family.”\nThis report illustrates a rich tapestry of unique impacts across the country. We hope this compilation of research contributes to a productive dialogue about the important role immigrants play as critical drivers of our national leadership in innovation, economic growth, and global competitiveness.\nWe encourage readers of this report to lend their voices to the conversation and use this research to complement personal insights and experiences about the role of immigrants. We welcome broad sharing of this report and have made it freely available for download at the following URL: www.MassTLC.org/Immigration.\nThank you,\n\nThomas Hopcroft President & CEO Mass Technology Leadership Council, Inc.\n\nMohamad Ali President & CEO Carbonite, Inc. Trustee, MassTLC\niii\nADD-3\n\nSteve Kaufer President & CEO TripAdvisor, Inc. Member, MassTLC\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 5 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\niv ADD-4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 6 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nv ADD-5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 7 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................................... 1\nA. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE TECH INDUSTRY ..................................................................................................... 1 B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRAVEL BAN ON INNOVATION AND THE ECONOMY....................................................................... 3\nII. COST TO BUSINESSES IMPOSED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER............................................................................ 5\nC. DEMAND FOR H-1B WORKERS....................................................................................................................................... 6 i. Massachusetts-Specific Facts ............................................................................................................................ 7\nD. THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE TECH INDUSTRY............................................................................................................ 7 i. Massachusetts-Specific Facts ............................................................................................................................ 8\nE. THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS IN MEDICINE ......................................................................................................................... 9 i. Massachusetts-Specific Facts .......................................................................................................................... 10\nF. IMPACT OF VISA RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN EMPLOYERS............................................................................................... 11 i. Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on Risk and Instability of American Workforces ........................... 11 ii. Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on the Competitiveness of U.S. Firms ............................................ 11 iii. Outsourcing ...................................................................................................................................................... 12 iv. Impact on Massachusetts ................................................................................................................................ 12\nIII. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY .................................................................. 15\nA. IMMIGRANTS IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS......................................................................................................................... 15 B. INNOVATORS FROM TARGETED COUNTRIES .................................................................................................................... 17 C. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON PATENT ACTIVITY ............................................................................................................... 18 D. COMMERCIAL VALUE OF IMMIGRANT PATENTS ............................................................................................................... 19 E. IMMIGRANTS PATENTING BY FIELD ................................................................................................................................ 19 F. SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON INNOVATION BY IMMIGRANTS...................................................................................................... 20 G. IMPACT OF VISA RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION AND PATENTING...................................................................................... 22 H. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT STUDENTS ON INNOVATION AND PATENTING ................................................................................ 23 I. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON FIRMS............................................................................................................................... 24 J. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON PRODUCTIVITY ................................................................................................................... 25\nIV. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY ......................................................................... 28\nA. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON NEW BUSINESS STARTS BY SECTOR................................................................................. 28 B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND IMMIGRATION STATUS, PARTICULARLY IN HIGH-TECH SECTORS ............ 28\ni. Literature Review.............................................................................................................................................. 28 a. Share of Business Founders ......................................................................................................................... 29 b. Business Formation Rate ............................................................................................................................. 30\nii. Descriptive Tables from Fortune 500 Companies ........................................................................................... 34 iii. Descriptive Tables from Survey of Business Owners, 2007 and 2012............................................................ 36 C. IMPACT OF NEW BUSINESSES STARTED BY IMMIGRANTS................................................................................................... 43 i. Estimates of Sales, Employment, and Payroll Generated by Immigrant-Owned Firms in 2012................... 43 ii. Regional Differences......................................................................................................................................... 44\n\nvi ADD-6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 8 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nV. REGIONAL IMPACT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ........................................................................................... 45\nA. STATE-BY-STATE FACTS FROM THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL .............................................................................. 45 B. STEM POST-BACCALAUREATE DEGREES BY STATE AND STUDENT U.S. RESIDENCY STATUS ................................................... 51 C. H-1B VISA AND GREEN CARD APPLICATIONS BY STATE .................................................................................................... 53 D. NUMBERS AND FRACTION OF IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS BY U.S. STATE, 2010-2015......................................................... 56 E. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS BY STATE, 2005-2015 ................................................................... 60 F. LEVELS AND PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF PETITIONS FOR SKILLED WORKERS, 2010-2016...................................................... 67 G. FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANT GENERATION, 2011-2013 ............................................................................................. 71\nVI. HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS .................................................................................................................... 76\nA. CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS ........................................................................................................... 76 i. Education Levels ............................................................................................................................................... 76 ii. Medical Professionals....................................................................................................................................... 78\nB. IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. MILITARY .............................................................................................................................. 80 C. IMMIGRANTS ENROLLED IN U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS .................................................................................. 82\ni. Degrees Conferred in the U.S. .......................................................................................................................... 83 ii. Impact of Degrees Conferred in Massachusetts ............................................................................................. 84 iii. Economic Benefits of International Students .................................................................................................. 84\nVII. AWARDS................................................................................................................................................ 86\nA. THE NOBEL PRIZE ....................................................................................................................................................... 87 i. Nobel Laureates Affiliated with Universities in Massachusetts ..................................................................... 88\nB. MACARTHUR FELLOWSHIP........................................................................................................................................... 89 C. RECOGNITIONS IN MEDICINE ........................................................................................................................................ 90\ni. Wolf Prize in Medicine...................................................................................................................................... 90 ii. Top Cancer Researchers ................................................................................................................................... 91 iii. Howard Hughes Investigators.......................................................................................................................... 92 D. OTHER PRIZES IN STEM .............................................................................................................................................. 92 i. Fields Medal...................................................................................................................................................... 92 ii. Turing Award .................................................................................................................................................... 94 iii. National Medal of Science ............................................................................................................................... 95 iv. Intel Science Talent Search............................................................................................................................... 96 v. Breakthrough Prize ........................................................................................................................................... 98 vi. Simons Investigators ...................................................................................................................................... 100 vii. Blavatnik Awards ............................................................................................................................................ 100 E. MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ................................................................................................ 100 F. MEDAL OF FREEDOM ................................................................................................................................................ 100 G. THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION PRIDE OF AMERICA HONOREES ........................................................................................ 102\nVIII. IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND TERRORISM ................................................................................................ 104\nA. PUBLIC OPINION....................................................................................................................................................... 105 B. IMMIGRATION AND CRIME ......................................................................................................................................... 106\ni. Existing Research Finds No Impact of Immigration on Increasing Crime .................................................... 106 ii. Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Criminals than Native-Born Individuals ........................................... 110 C. IMMIGRATION AND TERRORISM .................................................................................................................................. 113\nvii\n\nADD-7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 9 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\ni. The Link between Immigration and Terrorism is Unclear.............................................................................113 ii. Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Radicalized than Native-Born Individuals........................................113 D. IMMIGRANTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE THE VICTIMS OF HATE CRIME...............................................................................115\nIX. RHETORIC AND HATE INCIDENTS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS .......................................................................... 118\nA. HATE CRIMES AND BIAS INCIDENTS ............................................................................................................................. 119 B. ORGANIZED HATE GROUPS ........................................................................................................................................ 120 C. ANXIETY IN K-12 EDUCATION.....................................................................................................................................121 D. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S TWITTER RHETORIC ..................................................................................................................... 121\nX. PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES AND OTHER SELECTED COUNTRIES ............................. 124\nA. OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES .................................................................................................. 124 i. Department of Homeland Security Data – Summary Tables........................................................................ 126 a. Countries Covered Under Current Travel Ban .......................................................................................... 126 b. Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador.........................................................................................................128\nB. WHERE IMMIGRANTS MOVE ...................................................................................................................................... 130 i. Summary ......................................................................................................................................................... 130 ii. Literature Review............................................................................................................................................131 iii. Descriptive Tables from the American Community Survey...........................................................................131 iv. Public Opinion on Immigration ...................................................................................................................... 139\nC. HOW IMMIGRANTS SPEND THEIR TIME........................................................................................................................139 i. Summary ......................................................................................................................................................... 139 ii. Descriptive Statistics from the 2003-2015 Current Population Survey and American Time Use Survey.... 140\nD. APPENDIX: STATISTICS PERTAINING TO IRAQ ................................................................................................................. 143\nXI. THE IMPACT OF THE TRAVEL BAN ON THE U.S. TRAVEL INDUSTRY.............................................................. 145\nA. CHANGES IN TRAVEL DEMAND BEFORE/AFTER TRAVEL BAN ........................................................................................... 145 i. Flight Search Data ..........................................................................................................................................145 ii. Flight Booking Data ........................................................................................................................................ 149 iii. Additional Sources .......................................................................................................................................... 151\nB. STATISTICS REGARDING TRAVEL AND TOURISM BY IMMIGRANTS ...................................................................................... 153 i. Air Travel ......................................................................................................................................................... 153 ii. Tourism Revenue ............................................................................................................................................ 153\n\nviii ADD-8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 10 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\nA. The Impact of Immigration on the Tech Industry\nThe technology industry is a critical driver of the U.S. economy. In Massachusetts alone, nearly 400,000 people work in jobs that are either in the technology sector, or are in technology-related occupations in other sectors, together comprising about 13 percent of the state's total workforce. The tech industry is a global enterprise, fueled in large part by immigration and international travel. As of January 1, 2016, \"[i]mmigrants have started more than half (44 of 87) of America's startup companies valued at $1 billion dollars or more and are key members of management or product development teams in over 70 percent (62 of 87) of these companies.\" More than half of Silicon Valley's corporate founders are immigrants.\nThe integral role that immigrants play in the technology industry is one of job creation, innovation, and leadership. Far from taking jobs, immigrants are creating jobs for the native-born population and helping meet the needs of an industry constrained by a lack of skilled workers. By 2020, for example, projections indicate that 1.4 million computer specialist positions will be open in the United States, but domestic universities will only produce enough graduates to fill 29 percent of those jobs. In Massachusetts today, there are seventeen technology jobs for every person who graduates with a college degree in computer science or information technology.\nImmigrants are responsible for substantial economic growth. This is true of the U.S. economy where, in 2015, immigrants contributed $2 trillion to the U.S. GDP, representing 11 percent of the country's total GDP. It is also true of the Massachusetts economy, where one study found that if half of Massachusetts' 3,608 advanced level graduates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) related fields, studying on temporary visas, remained in Massachusetts upon graduation, then 4,726 new jobs would be created for U.S.-born workers by 2021.\nResearch indicates that immigrant students are disproportionately more likely to get their degrees in a STEM field – an area of critical domestic talent shortages – and that international students make up over 30 percent of the post-baccalaureate degrees in STEM fields. Furthermore, individuals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen – the six countries subject to the President’s revised Executive Order – are more likely to have a bachelor's degree, approximately twice as likely to have a graduate degree, and four times as likely to have a doctoral degree relative to the native-born population. In addition to this population being disproportionately educated and skilled, they are also part of a population making immediate impacts on the U.S economy. During the 2015-16 academic year alone, international students contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 400,000 jobs.\n\n1\nADD-9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 11 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nImmigrants also drive the development of inventions and other useful arts. For example, in 2011, 76 percent of patents awarded to the Top 10 patent-producing U.S. universities had an inventor that was foreign-born. In recent years, foreign nationals contributed to more than three quarters of patents in the fields of information technology, molecular and microbiology, and pharmaceuticals. The amount of invention originating from immigrants can have dramatic effects on innovation, with discernable spillover effects. One academic study noted that a 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the overall U.S. population composed of immigrant college graduates, and a 0.7 percentage point increase in that same share composed of post-graduate immigrants, led to an increase in patenting by approximately 12 percent to 21 percent. Similarly, as little as a 0.45 percentage point increase in immigrant scientists and engineers in the overall U.S. population increases patenting per capita by approximately 13 to 32 percent. High-skilled immigration has an important and discernable impact on patenting, a key indicator of innovation in the economy.\nThe highly-educated foreign-born scientists, mathematicians, and engineers also represent some of the best in the field. Forty percent of the Nobel Prizes won by Americans in Chemistry, Medicine, and Physics since 2000 were awarded to immigrants. In 2016, all six American winners of the Nobel Prize in economics and scientific fields were foreign-born. From 2010-2015, four out of eight American recipients of the Turing Award (for computing) were first or second generation immigrants. Since 1936, 63 percent of Fields Medal (for mathematics) recipients affiliated with a U.S. research institution have been foreign-born (and all such recipients have been foreign-born since 2002). Forty percent of National Medal of Science recipients in math or computer science are foreign-born. In Massachusetts, 37 percent of Nobel Prize winners associated with MIT are foreign-born; 33 percent of Nobel Prize winners who are current faculty or alumni at Harvard University are foreign-born; and 75 percent of Nobel Prize winners who have been affiliated with Boston University are foreign-born.\nAmerican companies that are household names—Microsoft, McDonald's, U.S. Steel—are led by foreign-born CEOs. As of 2016, over 10 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs were born outside of the U.S.; the same was true for 14 percent of Fortune 100 CEOs. In 2016, over 40 percent of Fortune 500 firms were founded either by an immigrant or a child of immigrants. The same holds true in Massachusetts. More than half of the Massachusetts-based Fortune 500 companies were founded by immigrants, or by children of immigrants. Their impact on the Massachusetts economy has been significant, generating over $130 billion in annual revenue, and employing nearly half a million people around the world. At the beginning of this decade, over 17 percent of all business owners in Massachusetts were foreign-born. In 2013, the same was true of nearly 19 percent of business owners in the greater Boston area.\nFrom 2006 to 2010, Massachusetts businesses owned by new immigrants had a total net business income of $2.8 billion. Prominent American innovators, past and present, hail from countries directly targeted by the Revised Travel Ban, including Steve Jobs; the co-founder of Apple whose father is from Syria; Ali Hajimiri, an academic and entrepreneur who holds over 85 U.S. and European patents\n\n2\n\nADD-10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 12 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nand is from Iran; and Joe Kiani, founder, chairman, and CEO of Masimo who is also from Iran. IranianAmericans either founded or lead mainstays of the technology sector like Twitter, Dropbox, Oracle, and eBay. Similarly, several of the top venture capitalists who fund new technology companies were born in Tehran.\nThe field of medicine has also benefitted greatly from immigrants. More than 25 percent of physicians practicing in the United States are foreign-born. Importantly, foreign-born physicians are disproportionately represented in rural clinics and public safety-net hospitals treating isolated and vulnerable populations. The simple reason for this is that the United States does not produce enough physicians to keep up with demand. A current deficit of 11,000 physicians is expected to grow as the population grows and ages. It is estimated that U.S. will face a shortage of up to 94,700 doctors by 2025. Almost a third of the shortage will be primary care physicians. More than 8,400 doctors working in the U.S. are from Iran and Syria, two of countries listed in the Revised Travel Ban. In Massachusetts, almost 1 in 4 physicians graduated from a medical school outside of the United States, suggesting non-U.S. origin.\n\nB. The Implications of the Travel Ban on Innovation and the Economy\nCreating unnecessary barriers for foreign innovators and job creators is likely to have an adverse impact on the technology industry and threaten the innovation capacity and economic prosperity of the United States in general, and Massachusetts specifically. Indeed, Massachusetts has one of the highest numbers of applications for temporary non-agricultural work permits in the United States. A potential impact of the executive order will be the destabilization of the workforce and the reduction of U.S. competitiveness. Microsoft's public securities filings explain that \"[c]hanges to U.S. immigration policies that restrain the flow of technical and professional talent may inhibit our ability to adequately staff our research and development efforts.\"\nIn addition to stifling recruiting from certain countries, the Revised Travel Ban could accelerate the rise of technology hubs abroad, making such locales as Vancouver, London, and Singapore more \"attractive alternatives to existing hubs\" of technology than the United States, and force companies based abroad to put off opening offices in the United States. It will also likely result in the relocation of foreign-born employees from the United States to other counties where they can reside without fear of a sudden revocation of their rights to access their families and homes.\nThe Massachusetts technology sector expects to feel this impact acutely. As reported in the press, numerous Boston-based businesses have expressed grave concerns regarding the Administration's travel ban and its potential expansion. As Jeff Bussgang, a general partner at the venture capital firm Flybridge and professor at Harvard Business School stated, the travel ban is \"the innovation economy's worst nightmare.\" Paul English, founder of the travel booking site Kayak and startup Lola, expressed concern about a Mexican national hired to develop an app who was worried about\n\n3\nADD-11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 13 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\ntraveling out of the country to visit his family. Leaders of Massachusetts-headquartered technology companies from large to small—including GE, TripAdvisor, Carbonite, Brightcove, and Fuze—have expressed concern over the direct impact that implementation of the original Travel Ban had on their businesses. This anecdotal evidence is strongly supported by the empirical data contained in this report: a high percentage of founders, managers, and employees of Massachusetts technology companies are immigrants and potentially impacted by the Revised Travel Ban, either directly or indirectly.\nThe impact of the Revised Travel Ban also inhibits the ability of the Massachusetts technology industry to compete in the international marketplace. It discourages travel to the U.S. by potential customers and investors, either because they are directly impacted by the ban, or out of concern that the ban could be unexpectedly expanded. Indeed, this is not a theoretical concern. Flight bookings to the United States from January 28, 2017 to February 4, 2017 dropped by 6.5 percent overall in comparison to the previous year. Bookings to the United States from the six countries targeted by the Revised Travel Ban have dropped by 80 percent. Companies are already considering moving jobs outside of the U.S., locating businesses where employees live rather than enticing them to come to the U.S. Moving these jobs out of the country reduces employment in domestic support jobs that will be hired in proximity to these workers.\nSimilarly, the Revised Travel Ban discourages talented foreign students from attending local educational institutions, from which the technology industry hires many engineers and scientists to drive innovation in the United States. Foreign-born students already in the U.S. will be less likely to remain, as they may be unable to receive or renew a visa, or may be fearful of that possibility. The Revised Travel Ban will inevitably reduce the relative strength of the domestic industry in global markets.\nThe technology industry, in Massachusetts as elsewhere, thrives on a culture of diversity, inclusivity, and equal opportunity. We hope that by compiling this research and highlighting the impact of immigration on the U.S. and Massachusetts economies, we can productively contribute to the national conversation and are able to illustrate the significant impact immigrants have on the growth and prosperity of our nation.\n\n4\nADD-12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 14 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nII. COST TO BUSINESSES IMPOSED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER\n\nOne of the primary contributions of immigrants1 to the United States is as members of the workforce. From 1996 to 2010, immigrants accounted for roughly half of the U.S. labor force growth.2 Strikingly, immigrants have also been leaders in innovation and entrepreneurship, comprising over half of Silicon Valley founders.3 The executive order limiting work visas and immigration from select countries, however, creates significant levels of uncertainty for immigrant workers and their employers and has the potential to impose substantial costs on firms. The proposed order also increases incentives for firms to outsource their operations, reducing employment prospects in the United States generally.\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• By 2020, it is estimated that 1.4 million computer specialist positions will be open. However U.S. universities will only produce enough graduates to fill 29 percent of these jobs. There are more than 500,000 open computing jobs, but less than 50,000 Americans graduate from college with computer-science degrees every year.\n• The tech sector accounts for 20 percent of jobs in Massachusetts. At the same time, there is a shortage of graduates in tech-related fields; there is one graduate with degrees in computer science or information technology (IT) for every 17 technology jobs in Massachusetts.\n• In 2014, immigrants comprised 15.6 percent of the population in Massachusetts and 26.6 percent of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (“STEM”) jobs.\n• Almost 1 in 4 physicians in Massachusetts were graduates from a foreign medical school in 2016.\n\n1 Unless otherwise noted, immigrants refer to foreign-born individuals who are residents of the United States. 2 Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny, “Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working\nPaper 1306, September 2013, available at https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/papers/2013/wp1306.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 8 (“Although they make up only 16 percent of U.S. workforce, these immigrants account for a much larger share of its growth. Just over half of the increase in the U.S. labor force between 1996 and 2010 was the result of immigration—legal and illegal”). 3 Kerr, William, “Why These Business School Professors Oppose Trump's Executive Order on Immigration,” Harvard Business School Working Knowledge, January 31, 2017, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-these-business-schoolprofessors-oppose-trump-s-executive-order-on-immigration, accessed March 25, 2017.\n5\nADD-13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 15 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Almost 60 percent of Fortune 500 companies based in Massachusetts were founded by immigrants or their children4 and almost 20 percent of business owners in the Boston metropolitan area were foreign-born.\n\nC. Demand for H-1B Workers\n• The private sector accounts for the intensity of demand for H1-B workers:\no Top H1-B demands are from firms such as Wal-Mart, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, JPMorgan Chase & Co.5\no Nearly two thirds of requests for H1-B visas are in STEM occupations with lower percentages of workers contributing to the healthcare, business, finance, and life sciences industries.6\n• H1-B petitions approved in 2012, by detailed industry7 (number of petitions; percent of approved H1-B Petitions):\no Computer Systems Design & Related Services (110,414; 42 percent)\no Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools (16,167; 6.2 percent)\no Software Publishers (5,367; 2.0 percent)\no Management, Scientific, & Technical Consulting Services (4,915; 1.9 percent)\no General Medical and Surgical Hospitals (4,533; 1.7 percent)\n\n4 “The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 3.\n5 “The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program and Its Impact on Jobs, Wages, and the Economy,” American Immigration Council, April 1, 2016, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/h1b-visa-program-fact-sheet, accessed March 25, 2017.\n6 “The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program and Its Impact on Jobs, Wages, and the Economy,” American Immigration Council, April 1, 2016, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/h1b-visa-program-fact-sheet, accessed March 25, 2017.\n7 “Characteristics of H1B Specialty Occupation Workers: Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Report to Congress,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, June 26, 2013, available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/H-1B/h1b-fy-12-characteristics.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 20 and Table 13A. Percent calculated as number of petitions in industry divided by total number of petitions.\n6\nADD-14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 16 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Two thirds of foreign students pursue bachelor or higher level degrees in STEM, business, management, and marketing fields in the United States as compared to 48 percent of Americanborn students.8\n\ni. Massachusetts-Specific Facts o Boston is the city with the 6th highest number of H-1B visa sponsored MBAs.9\n\nD. The Role of Immigrants in the Tech Industry\n• The U.S. relies heavily on a steady stream of skilled engineers from other countries to help create its products, as indicated by the number of H1-B petitions approved in related sectors.10\n• The U.S. does not produce enough professionals to fill all open high-tech jobs:\no There are almost five open positions for every software developer looking for work11\n• By 2020, it is estimated that 1.4 million computer specialist positions will be open, however U.S. universities will only produce enough graduates to fill 29 percent of these jobs.12 There are more than 500,000 open computing jobs, but less than 50,000 Americans graduate from college with computer-science degrees every year.13\n\n8 Ruiz, Neil G. “The Geography of Foreign Students in U.S. Higher Education: Origins and Destinations,” Global Cities Initiative: A Joint Project of Brookings and JPMorgan Chase, August 2014, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/Foreign_Students_Final.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 1.\n9 Allen, Nathan, “Where MBAs Are Most Likely to Get an H1B Visa,” Poets & Quants, March 1, 2017, available at http://poetsandquants.com/2017/03/01/mbas-likely-get-h1b-visa/, accessed March 10, 2017. This statistic is calculated using data from the 13,000 users of the website https://www.transparentcareer.com/. According to Sheryle Dirks, Associate Dean of Career Management at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, “Transparent’s data looks entirely consistent with what we have seen and known to be true, specifically at Duke Fuqua over the past few years anecdotally, as well as talking with our other business school counterparts.”\n10 Wingfield, Nick and Mike Isaac, “Tech Industry Frets over Possible Immigration Changes,” The New York Times, January 27, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/business/technology-h-1b-visa-immigration.html, accessed March 25, 2017.\n11 Koetsier, John, “Hiring and Hirable in 2013: Agile Developers,” VentureBeat, December 31, 2012, available at https://venturebeat.com/2012/12/31/hiring-and-hirable-in-2013-agile-developers/, accessed March 27, 2017 (“…4.59 job postings for each and every job-seeking agile developer.”). The statistic is calculated by talent discovery company Yoh and jobs site CareerBuilder.\n12 Nager, Adams and Robert D. Atkinson, “The Case for Improving U.S. Computer Science Education,” May 2016, available at http://www2.itif.org/2016-computer-science-education.pdf, accessed March 11, 2017, p. 3 (“In 2011, Code.org projected that the economy would add 1.4 million computing jobs by 2020, but educate just 400,000 computer science students by then”). The statistics were calculated by the authors using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Code.org, Change the Equation, and the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.\n13 “Summary of Source Data for Code.org Infographics and Stats,” Code.org, 2015, available at https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gySkItxiJn_vwb8HIIKNXqen184mRtzDX12cux0ZgZk/pub, accessed March 27, 2017\n7\nADD-15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 17 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• “Iranian-Americans founded or hold leadership positions at Twitter, Dropbox, Oracle, Expedia, eBay, and Tinder. Top venture capitalists like Shervin Pishevar, Pejman Nozad, and brothers Ali and Hadi Partovi, all of whom invest millions of dollars in technology startups, were born in Tehran.”14\n• “Immigrant founded engineering and technology firms employed approximately 560,000 workers and generated $63 billion in sales in 2012. Immigrant founders from top venture-backed firms have created an average of approximately 150 jobs per company in the United States.”15\n• “In the United States as a whole, there are almost as many immigrants in white-collar jobs (46 percent) as in all other occupations combined.”\no “In some states, more than half [of immigrants] are in white-collar jobs… the perception that nearly all immigrants work in low-wage jobs is clearly inaccurate.”16\n\ni. Massachusetts-Specific Facts\no The tech sector is critical to the state’s economy. More than 294,000 people work directly for the technology sectors in Massachusetts, which combined with over 96,000 tech occupations in other sectors and over 733,000 indirect jobs supported by the tech sector, comprise approximately 35 percent of the workforce in Massachusetts.17 Together, tech is responsible for 31% of Massachusetts Gross State Product.18\n\n(“…there were 580,940 bachelor’s degrees earned in STEM in 2015, and only 49,291 of those—8.48%—were in Computer Science…There are more than 500,000 open computing jobs in the United States.”). The number of current open computing jobs comes from the sum of the per-state jobs data from The Conference Board’s Help Wanted OnLine service. The number of STEM and Computer Science graduates comes from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) IPEDS Completions Survey, obtained using the National Science Foundation (NSF) WebCASPAR tool. 14 Waddell, Kaveh, “How Trump’s Immigration Rules Will Hurt the U.S. Tech Sector,” The Atlantic, February 1, 2017, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/how-trumps-immigration-rules-will-hurt-the-us-techsector/515202/, accessed March 11, 2017. 15 Stangler, Dane and Jason Wiens, “The Economic Case for Welcoming Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Kauffman Foundation, September 8, 2015, available at http://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/resources/entrepreneurship-policy-digest/theeconomic-case-for-welcoming-immigrant-entrepreneurs, accessed March 25, 2017. 16 Costa, Daniel, David Cooper, and Heidi Shierholz, “Facts About Immigration and the U.S. Economy,” Economic Policy Institute, August 12, 2014, available at http://www.epi.org/publication/immigration-facts/, accessed March 25, 2017. 17 MassTLC, “The Connected Commonwealth: How the Massachusetts Tech Ecosystem is Creating New Growth Opportunities,” 2016, available at http://www.masstlc.org/2016-state-of-technology-report/, accessed April 25, 2017, p. 14. 18 MassTLC, “The Connected Commonwealth: How the Massachusetts Tech Ecosystem is Creating New Growth Opportunities,” 2016, available at http://www.masstlc.org/2016-state-of-technology-report/, accessed April 25, 2017, p. 15.\n8\nADD-16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 18 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no Put together, their output was worth $160 billion in 2013, the most recent year for which statistics were available.”19\no “In the red-hot Massachusetts technology field, meanwhile, there are 17 jobs for every one graduate with a degree in computer science or IT.”20\no In 2014, immigrants comprised 15.6 percent of the population in Massachusetts and 26.6 percent of STEM jobs.21\no “If half of Massachusetts’ 3,608 advanced level STEM grads on temporary visas stayed in the state after graduation…4,726 jobs for U.S.-born workers would be created by 2021.”22\n\nE. The Role of Immigrants in Medicine\n• More than 25 percent of physicians practicing in the United States are foreign-born.23 Foreignborn physicians are disproportionally represented in rural clinics and public safety-net hospitals treating isolated and vulnerable populations.24\n• The reason such doctors are in the U.S. in the first place is that America does not produce enough physicians to keep up with demand. According to a report published by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) in 2016, a current deficit of 8,200 primary care doctors and 2,800 psychiatrists is expected to grow as the population grows and ages.25 The AAMC estimates\n\n19 Adams, Dan, “Mass. Tech Sector Flourishing with Challenges Ahead,” Boston Globe, March 13, 2015, available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/03/12/report-mass-tech-sector-flourishing-but-challengesahead/BMzslVy0k1zB4cZVSH6DrK/story.html, accessed March 10, 2017.\n20 “The Degree Gap: Honing in on College Access, Affordability and Completion in Massachusetts,” The Vision Project, June 2016, available at http://www.mass.edu/visionproject/_documents/2016%20The%20Degree%20Gap%20%20Vision%20Project%20Annual%20Report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 14.\n21 “The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 13.\n22 “The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 11, 2017, p. 14.\n23 McCabe, Kristen, “Foreign-Born Health Care Workers in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, June 27, 2012, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/foreign-born-health-care-workers-united-states#4, accessed March 10, 2017 (“Of the roughly 853,000 health care professionals employed as physicians and surgeons in 2010, more than onequarter (27 percent) were foreign born.”).\n24 Ross, Casey, and Max Blau, “US health care relies heavily on foreign workers. Trump's immigration ban is raising alarms,” STAT, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/30/trump-immigration-ban-health-workers/, accessed March 10, 2017.\n25 Dall, Tim, Terry West, Ritashree Chakrabarti, and Will Iacobucci, “The Complexities of Physician Supply and Demand: Projections from 2014 to 2025,” IHS Inc. and the Association of American Medical Colleges, April 5, 2016, available at https://www.aamc.org/download/458082/data/2016_complexities_of_supply_and_demand_projections.pdf, accessed March 11, 2017, p. 36.\n\n9\nADD-17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 19 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nthat the U.S. will face a shortage of up to 94,700 doctors by 2025. Almost a third of the shortage will be primary care physicians.26 More than 8,400 doctors working in the U.S. are from the two countries listed in the executive order – Syria and Iran.27\no The share of health care workers that are foreign-born was 5 percent in the 1960s and was as high as 30 percent by the 1990s.28\no Healthcare has the largest percentage of foreign-born and foreign-trained workers of any industry in the country.29\n• Data on older Medicare patients admitted to hospital in the U.S. showed that patients treated by graduates of foreign medical programs had lower mortality than patients cared for by U.S. graduates.30\n\ni. Massachusetts-Specific Facts\no “This year’s Boston Business Journal list of the 50 largest employers in Massachusetts, which excludes government jobs, totals more than 410,000 Bay State employees. Led by No. 1-ranked Partners Health Care System’s 67,600 Massachusetts employees, the 13 health care companies on the list alone comprise more than 172,366 (in some cases this includes per diem and temp workers) of those employees.”31\n\n26 Dall, Tim, Terry West, Ritashree Chakrabarti, and Will Iacobucci, “The Complexities of Physician Supply and Demand: Projections from 2014 to 2025,” IHS Inc. and the Association of American Medical Colleges, April 5, 2016, available at https://www.aamc.org/download/458082/data/2016_complexities_of_supply_and_demand_projections.pdf, accessed March 11, 2017, p. 37, Exhibit 22.\n27 Yasmin, Seema, “Trump Immigration Ban Can Worsen U.S. Doctor Shortage, Hurt Hospitals,” Scientific American, February 1, 2017, available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-immigration-ban-can-worsen-u-s-doctor-shortagehurt-hospitals/, accessed March 10, 2017 (“More than 8,400 doctors working in the U.S. are from two countries listed in the executive order—Syria and Iran—according to data from the American Medical Association.”).\n28 Carnevale, Anthony P., Nicole Smith, Artem Gulish, and Bennett H. Beach, “Healthcare Executive Summary,” Georgetown Public Policy Institute Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2012, available at https://cew.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Healthcare.ExecutiveSummary.090712.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 12.\n29 Carnevale, Anthony P., Nicole Smith, Artem Gulish, and Bennett H. Beach, “Healthcare Executive Summary,” Georgetown Public Policy Institute Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2012, available at https://cew.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Healthcare.ExecutiveSummary.090712.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 12 (“Healthcare has largest proportion of foreign-born and foreign-trained workers in the country. Foreign-born workers make up nearly a quarter (22 percent) of the healthcare workforce, nearly twice the national average.”).\n30 Tsugawa, Yusuke, Anupam B. Jena, E. John Orav, and Ashish K. Jha, “Quality of Care Delivered by General Internists in US Hospitals Who Graduated from Foreign versus US Medical Schools: Observational Study,” BMJ 356:j273, February 3, 2017, available at http://www.bmj.com/content/356/bmj.j273, accessed March 25, 2017.\n31 “The List: Health Care, Higher Ed Dominate Bay State’s Largest Employers,” Boston Business Journal, July 8, 2016, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2016/07/08/the-list-health-care-higher-ed-dominate-bay-state.html, accessed March 25, 2017.\n10\nADD-18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 20 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no “In 2016 almost 1 in 4 physicians in Massachusetts graduated from a foreign medical school, a likely sign they were born elsewhere.”32\n\nF. Impact of Visa Restrictions on American Employers\n\ni. Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on Risk and Instability of American Workforces\n• According to Microsoft, “[c]hanges to U.S. immigration policies that restrain the flow of technical and professional talent may inhibit our ability to adequately staff our research and development efforts.”33\n• The Computing Research Association, a non-profit organization representing computing professionals in academia, government laboratories, and other areas, noted that the proposed order “creates uncertainty and potential hardship among current students and researchers already here making important contributions and endangers our leadership role in a key field.”34\n\nii. Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on the Competitiveness of U.S. Firms\n• The proposed executive order could accelerate the rise of technology hubs abroad. Vancouver, London, and Singapore are “attractive alternatives to existing hubs in the West Coast of the United States.”35\n• Companies that are based abroad may put off opening offices in the United States:\no “Already, the number of billion-dollar technology start-ups, commonly called ‘unicorns,’ that are located outside the United States has been increasing significantly. Fifteen years ago, almost all were in the United States, while today 86 of the 191 unicorns are in countries such as China and India. We can expect this trend to accelerate because the\n\n32 “The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 15.\n33 Microsoft Corporation, Form 10-Q for the Quarter Ending December 31, 2016, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/000119312516441821/d15167d10q.htm, accessed April 14, 2017, p. 58.\n34 Wingfield, Nick and Mike Isaac, “Tech Industry Frets Over Possible Immigration Changes,” The New York Times, January 27, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/business/technology-h-1b-visa-immigration.html, accessed March 25, 2017.\n35 Waddell, Kaveh, “How Trump’s Immigration Rules Will Hurt the U.S. Tech Sector,” The Atlantic, February 1, 2017, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/how-trumps-immigration-rules-will-hurt-the-us-techsector/515202/, accessed March 11, 2017.\n11\nADD-19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 21 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTrump administration has just added fuel to the fire of innovation abroad and handicapped our own technology industry.”36\n• “In fiscal year 2012, fewer than 5% of those who obtained U.S. permanent resident status were professionals with advanced degrees, compared to over 9% of those granted permanent resident status in Canada…Only 14% of U.S. green cards authorizing permanent residence – and a path to citizenship – were granted for employment purposes in 2012, compared to the 62% of Canadian immigrants who were admitted for economic reasons….Immigrants want to come to the United States because they see opportunity in gaps in our economy that they have the skills to fill. Instead, many are choosing Canada.”37\n\niii. Outsourcing\n• Research points to an inverse relationship between temporary immigration and product outsourcing. When the number of H-1B visas issued by the U.S. government decreases, product outsourcing increases.38\n• Economic research on the effects of outsourcing on blue-collar and white-collar wages finds that outsourcing can decrease the wage of native-born white-collar workers when outsourcing industries are blue-collar worker intensive compared with non-outsourcing industries.39 Using U.S. product manufacturing data, outsourcing has been found to decrease the relative wage of white-collar workers in the 1970s.40\n\niv. Impact on Massachusetts\n• According to Jerry Rubin, president of the Jewish Vocational Service, many key industries in Boston, such as health care and food services, have labor shortages. “[With] the native-born\n\n36 Wadhwa, Vivek, “Why Trump’s Travel Ban Is So Harmful to the Tech Economy,” The Washington Post, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/01/30/why-trumps-travel-ban-is-so-harmful-tothe-tech-economy/?utm_term=.54c1ef2a182a, accessed March 27, 2017.\n37 Furchtgott-Roth, Diana, “U.S. Loses to Canada When It Comes to Immigration,” MarketWatch, October 18, 2013, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/in-immigration-us-loses-out-to-canada-2013-10-18, accessed March 25, 2017.\n38 Das, Simontini, Ajitava Raychaudhuri, and Saikat Sinha Roy, “Immigration versus Outsourcing: A Developing Country’s View,” Journal of Economic Development, 37:2, June 2012, available at http://www.jed.or.kr/full-text/37-2/5.pdf, accessed April 14, 2017, pp. 129-131.\n39 Hsu, Kuang-Chung, “Does Outsourcing Always Benefit Skilled Labor?” Review of International Economics, 19:3, August 2011, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00964.x/epdf, accessed April 14, 2017, p. 539554.\n40 Hsu, Kuang-Chung, and Hui-Chu Chiang, “The Impact of International Outsourcing on U.S. Workers’ Wages: Rethinking the Role of Innovation,” International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6:5, April 25, 2014, available at http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/view/33719/20417, accessed April 14, 2017, p. 1.\n12\nADD-20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 22 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\npopulation remaining relatively flat, the demand for bilingual workers soaring, and a large number of workers reaching retirement age, immigrants are essential to keep the economy from ‘grinding to a screeching halt.’”41\n• Immigration is a key source of growth for Boston’s labor supply. Between 1980 and 2010, the number of foreign-born workers in Boston has tripled, while the number of native-born workers grew by 4 percent.42 In 2015, 32 percent of working age people moving into the Boston area were immigrants who moved directly from abroad.43\n• “3,806 H-1B denials for tech workers in the metro area cost computer workers [in Boston in 2007 and 2008 cost] 3,176 potential new jobs and $72.9M in aggregate wage growth in the two years that followed. 964 H-1B denials for tech workers in the metro area cost computer workers [in Worcester in 2007 and 2008 cost] 761 potential new jobs and $14.7M in aggregate wage growth in the two years that followed.”44\n• “58% of Fortune 500 companies based in Massachusetts were founded by immigrants or their children. Those firms generate $136.8B in annual revenue, and employ 466,892 people globally.”45\n• In 2010, 17.9% of all business owners in Massachusetts were foreign-born.46\n• In 2013, 18.8% of business owners in the Boston metropolitan area were foreign-born.47\n\n41 Johnston, Katie. “MIT Study: Immigrants Vital to Boston’s Economy,” Boston Globe, May 17, 2017, available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/17/mit-study-immigrants-vital-bostoneconomy/l9PszENhVRsffVWvQVa1yO/story.html, accessed May 17, 2017.\n42 Johnston, Katie. “MIT Study: Immigrants Vital to Boston’s Economy,” Boston Globe, May 17, 2017, available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/17/mit-study-immigrants-vital-bostoneconomy/l9PszENhVRsffVWvQVa1yO/story.html, accessed May 17, 2017. This statistic was provided by Marilynn Johnson, author of “The New Bostonians: How Immigrants Have Transformed the Metro Area since the 1960s.”\n43 Osterman, Paul, William Kimball, and Christine Riordan, “Boston’s Immigrants: An Essential Component of a Strong Economy,” Jewish Vocational Service, May 10, 2017, available at https://jvsboston.org/images/pdf/Osterman%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed May 22, 2017, p. 7 and Table 5. This statistic was calculated using American Community Survey data.\n44 “The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 21.\n45 “The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 3 (“58% of Fortune 500 companies based in Massachusetts were founded by immigrants or their children. Those firms generate $136.8B in annual revenue, and employ 466,892 people globally”).\n46 Kallick, David Dyssegaard, “Immigrant Small Business Owners: A Significant and Growing Part of the Economy,” Fiscal Policy Institute, June 2012, available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/immigrant-small-business-owners-FPI-20120614.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 24 and Figure 24.\n47 “Interactive: the Impact of Immigrants on Main Street Business and Population in U.S. Metro Areas,” Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas Society/Council of the Americas, January 14, 2015, available at http://www.as-coa.org/articles/interactive-\n13\nADD-21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 23 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• From 2006 to 2010, new immigrant business owners in Massachusetts had total net business income of $2.8 billion, which makes up 14% of all net business income in the state.48\n\nimpact-immigrants-main-street-business-and-population-us-metro-areas, accessed March 10, 2017. The “Foreign Born Share of Business Owners” from the American Community Survey 2013 5-Year Data is 18.8% for the Boston-CambridgeQuincy, MA-NH Metropolitan Statistical Area. 48 Fairlie, Robert W., “Open for Business: How Immigrants are Driving Small Business Creation in the United States,” Partnership for a New American Economy, August 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/openforbusiness.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 33. This statistic was calculated using data from the American Community Survey, 2006-2010.\n14\nADD-22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 24 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nIII. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY\n\nAcademic and industry research have shown that immigration has a positive impact on innovation, productivity, and leadership.\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• Many iconic American brands are led by foreign-born CEOs. As of March 1, 2016, 10.8 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs were born outside of the U.S, and 14 percent of Fortune 100 CEOs were born outside of the U.S.\n• More than half of America’s startup companies valued at $1 billion dollars have immigrant founders, and many key members of management or product development teams in these startups are immigrants.\n• Many prominent American innovators, past and present, hail from countries directly targeted by the Executive Order. These individuals include Steve Jobs, Ali Hajimiri, and Joe Kiani.\n• Academic research shows that there is a positive spillover effect of immigrant inventors and college graduates on native-born inventors, indicating that immigrants boost the rate at which native-born inventors file patents.\n• Innovation from the native-born population increases with expansions of the H-1B program and the associated inflow of new workers.\n• The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in 2013 that immigration reform that allows for an increase in the number of noncitizens who could lawfully enter the United States permanently or temporarily would boost real GDP by 5.4 percent by 2033, and add 9 million workers to the labor force.\n\nA. Immigrants in Leadership Positions\n• “Some of the most iconic American brands – such as Microsoft, McDonald’s and U.S. Steel – are led by foreign-born CEOs.”49 o As of March 1, 2016, “10.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs were born outside of the U.S.”50\n\n49 “Immigrant CEOs of the Fortune 500,” Boardroom Insiders, 2016, available at http://info.boardroominsiders.com/get-ourfortune-500-immigrant-ceo-list-for-free, accessed February 22, 2017.\n50 “Immigrant CEOs of the Fortune 500,” Boardroom Insiders, 2016, available at http://info.boardroominsiders.com/get-ourfortune-500-immigrant-ceo-list-for-free, accessed February 22, 2017.\n15\nADD-23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 25 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no As of March 1, 2016, “14.0% of Fortune 100 CEOs were born outside of the U.S.”51\n• “Immigrants have started more than half (44 of 87) of America’s startup companies valued at $1 billion dollars or more and are key members of management or product development teams in over 70 percent (62 of 87) of these companies.”52\n• Immigrants are entrepreneurial and are job creators.\no Immigrants were nearly twice as likely to start new businesses as the native-born population as of 2015.53\n In 2014, 20.6% of entrepreneurs in the U.S. were immigrants, while making up only 13.2% of the U.S. population.54\n Immigrants accounted for about a quarter of founders of new high-tech companies with at least one million dollars in sales in 2006.55\n In Massachusetts, 29% of new high-tech companies with at least one million dollars in sales in 2006 had at least one key founder who was foreign-born.56\n\n51 “Immigrant CEOs of the Fortune 500,” Boardroom Insiders, 2016, available at http://info.boardroominsiders.com/get-ourfortune-500-immigrant-ceo-list-for-free, accessed February 22, 2017.\n52 Anderson, Stuart, “Immigrants and Billion Dollar Startups,” National Foundation for American Policy, March 2016, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Immigrants-and-Billion-Dollar-Startups.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March-2016.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 1 and Appendix 5. The article examines a list of billion dollar startups tracked by The Wall Street Journal available at http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/. The article also uses a mixture of company-provided information, company websites, CrunchBase, LinkedIn, and The Wall Street Journal to calculate the percent of immigrants who are key members of management or product development teams. For more information, see Appendix 5 of the cited article.\n53 “Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 1. This study was conducted using the 2013 American Community Survey 5-year data. See Kallick, David, “Bringing Vitality to Main Street: How Immigrant Small Businesses Help Local Economies Grow,” Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas Society/Council of the Americas, 2015, available at http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/ImmigrantBusinessReport.pdf, accessed March 21, 2017.\n54 “Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 2.\n55 Wadhwa, Vivek, et al., “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Part I,” Technical Report 23, Duke Science, Technology Innovation Papers, January 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 10, 2017, p.4. The authors used information provided by Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database, which contains information on U.S. companies with more than $1 million in sales, and 20 or more employees, and company branches with 50 or more employees.\n56 Wadhwa, Vivek, et al., “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Part I,” Technical Report 23, Duke Science, Technology Innovation Papers, January 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 10, 2017, p.4. The authors used information provided by Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database, which contains information on U.S. companies with more than $1 million in sales, and 20 or more employees, and company branches with 50 or more employees.\n16\nADD-24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 26 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no In 2016, 40.2% of Fortune 500 firms were founded by either an immigrant or the child of immigrants.57\no Businesses owned by immigrants employed over 5.9 million workers in 2007.58\n\nB. Innovators from Targeted Countries\n• Many prominent American innovators hail from countries directly targeted by the Executive Order. For example, o Steve Jobs (Syria), whose father, Abdul Fattah Jandali, was born in Homs, Syria, and immigrated to the United States to study in the 1950s.59 Jobs is a co-founder of Apple. o Ali Hajimiri (Iran), an academic, entrepreneur, and Fellow at the National Academy of Inventors, holds over 85 U.S. and European patents. Hajimiri is known for his research in “electronics and photonics integrated circuits, and their applications in various disciplines, including high-frequency and high-speed communications, sensing, imaging, and bio-sensing.” In 2002, Hajimiri co-founded Axiom Microdevices.60 o Joe Kiani (Iran), who is the founder, chairman, and CEO of Masimo Corporation has more than 575 issued and pending patents worldwide. Kiani is prominent in the healthcare technology industry, especially technology relating to sensors, signal processing, and patient monitoring devices. Kiani’s company Masimo Corporation pioneered products such as “Masimo Patient SafetyNetTM – the first remote monitoring and wireless clinician notification system designed to help hospitals improve patient safety and clinical outcomes by dramatically decreasing rescue events and costly ICU transfers.”61\n\n57 “Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 2.\n58 “Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 2.\n59 Baig, Edward C, “Steve Jobs' biological father was Syrian migrant, some note,” USA Today, November 16, 2015, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/baig/2015/11/16/steve-jobs-biological-father-syrian-migrant-somenote/75899450/, accessed March 19, 2017.\n60 “Ali Hajimiri,” Caltech High-Speed Integrated Circuits, available at http://chic.caltech.edu/hajimiri/, accessed March 19, 2017.\n61 “Company Overview of Masimo Corporation,” Bloomberg, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=541010&privcapId=31167, accessed March 19, 2017.\n17\nADD-25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 27 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nC. Impact of Immigrants on Patent Activity\n• Immigrants have a higher patenting rate than native-born individuals.62\no “Massachusetts’ immigrants also contribute to the state’s economic growth and competitiveness by earning patents on cutting-edge research and products. In 2011, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) earned [i.e., granted] almost 168 patents, placing it among the top 10 most productive [universities] in the country. More than 72 percent of those patents had at least one foreign-born inventor.”63\no At MIT, “the rate of patenting is higher for foreign-born students (34 percent) than for U.S.-born students (30 percent).”64\no “…immigrants comprise a large and vital component of U.S. innovation with 35.5 percent of U.S. innovators born outside the United States.”65 “Another 10 percent of innovators have at least one parent born abroad.”66\no “Over 17 percent of innovators are not even U.S. citizens, yet are nonetheless making invaluable contributions to U.S. innovation. Immigrants born in Europe or Asia are over five times more likely to have created an innovation in America than the average nativeborn U.S. citizen.”67\n\n62 Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 37. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.\n63 “The Contribution of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 22, 2017, p. 14. The article uses data from a publication from the same organization. See Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf.\n64 Granados, Samuel, “How Today’s Visa Restrictions Might Impact Tomorrow’s America,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2017, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/visas-impact/, accessed March 10, 2017, p.11.\n65 In their study, ITIF “surveyed more than 900 people who have made meaningful, marketable contributions to technologyintensive industries as award-winning innovators and international patent applicants.” Nager, Adams et al., “The Demographics of Innovation in the United States,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, February 2016, available at http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-of-innovation.pdf?_ga=1.211995860.1949709181.1488476922, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 5.\n66 Nager, Adams et al., “The Demographics of Innovation in the United States,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, February 2016, available at http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-ofinnovation.pdf?_ga=1.211995860.1949709181.1488476922, accessed March 10, 2017, pp. 1, 5. In their study, ITIF “surveyed more than 900 people who have made meaningful, marketable contributions to technology-intensive industries as award-winning innovators and international patent applicants.”\n67 Nager, Adams et al., “The Demographics of Innovation in the United States,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, February 2016, available at http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-ofinnovation.pdf?_ga=1.211995860.1949709181.1488476922, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 5. In their study, ITIF “surveyed more than 900 people who have made meaningful, marketable contributions to technology-intensive industries as awardwinning innovators and international patent applicants.”\n\n18\nADD-26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 28 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no “At the University of Illinois, for instance, nine out of 10 of the patents had at least one foreign national listed as an inventor, and almost 64% of patents had a foreign inventor who was not yet in a professorial role. This was despite the fact that in the fall of 2011, fewer than 47% of the graduate students studying STEM on Illinois’s two patentproducing campuses were in the U.S. on temporary visas.”68\n• In 2011, 76% of patents awarded to the Top 10 patent-producing U.S. universities had an inventor that was foreign-born.69\n\nD. Commercial Value of Immigrant Patents\n• Immigrants’ contributions to innovation as measured by patent activity have also had a direct positive impact on university revenue, as demonstrated by how the top 10 U.S. patent-producing universities earned nearly $450 million in patent licensure revenue in FY 2010.70\n• Patents filed by immigrants are more likely to be licensed or commercialized as compared to patents filed by native-born inventors, and patents that are licensed or commercialized are more likely to be beneficial to society.71\n\nE. Immigrants Patenting by Field\n• “Foreign nationals were listed as inventors on more than five out of six (84%) informationtechnology patents.”72\n\n68 “Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 7. The study pulled data on graduate students enrolled in each major to conduct calculations. The data were obtained from University of Illinois at Chicago, Office of Institutional Research.\n69 “Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 1. The study relies on data on patent assignees available from Patent Full-Text and Image Database maintained by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/. In most cases, when applying for a patent, inventors submit an oath or power of attorney form on which they indicate their citizenship. The study accessed these forms through the publicly-available Patent Application Information Retrieval, available at http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair.\n70 “Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 12. These figures were calculated using the results of the annual licensing survey from the Association of University Technology Managers.\n71 Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 37. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.\n72 “Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017,\n19\nADD-27\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 29 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• “Almost eight out of ten (79%) patents for pharmaceutical drugs or drug compounds were invented or co-invented by a scientist born abroad.”73\n• “Immigrants contributed to 75% of patents in the molecular biology and microbiology fields.”74\n• Immigrants make significant contributions to the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (“STEM”) fields.\no 99% of the patents from the top 10 patent-generating universities by foreign-born inventors were in STEM fields, an area that will have a shortfall of 230,000 qualified advanced-degree workers by the year 2018.75\no As an added benefit, “[e]very graduate with an advanced degree working in a STEMrelated field in the United States has been shown to create on average 2.62 additional jobs for native-born workers. Sending those people away doesn’t protect American jobs, it jeopardizes them.”76\n\nF. Spillover Effects on Innovation by Immigrants\n• Academic research shows that there is a positive spillover effect of immigrant inventors on native-born inventors, indicating that immigrants boost the rate at which native-born inventors file patents.77\n\np. 11. This statistic is based on data from the Patent Full-Text and Image Database maintained by the US Patent and Trademark Office, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm. 73 “Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 11. This statistic is based on data from the Patent Full-Text and Image Database and the publically available Patent Application Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) website, both of which are maintained by the US Patent and Trademark Office, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm, and http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair. 74 “Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 11. This statistic is based on data from the Patent Full-Text and Image Database maintained by the US Patent and Trademark Office, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm. 75 “Press Release: New Study Reveals Immigrants Are Behind More Than Three-Quarters of Patents From Top Ten PatentProducing American Universities,” New American Economy, June 26, 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/news/press-release-new-study-reveals-immigrants-behind-three-quarters-patents-topten-patent-producing-american-universities/, accessed March 10, 2017. 76 “Press Release: New Study Reveals Immigrants Are Behind More Than Three-Quarters of Patents From Top Ten PatentProducing American Universities,” New American Economy, June 26, 2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/news/press-release-new-study-reveals-immigrants-behind-three-quarters-patents-topten-patent-producing-american-universities/, accessed March 10, 2017. 77 Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 51. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.\n20\nADD-28\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 30 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no “The 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the population composed of immigrant college graduates, and the 0.7 percentage point increase in the share of postcollege immigrants,” each increased patenting per capita in the U.S. by 12 to 21 percent.78\no A 0.45 percentage point increase in immigrant scientists and engineers in the U.S. increased patenting per capita in the U.S. by 13 to 32 percent.79\no “Immigration could boost innovation indirectly through positive spillovers on fellow researchers, the achievement of critical mass in specialized research areas, and the provision of complementary skills such as management and entrepreneurship.”80\no The same positive spillover effect on patenting created through immigration may not be replicable by incentivizing the native-born population alone.81\no There is also support for small crowding-in effects on native-born patenting from immigration due to H-1B expansions.82\n\n78 Specifically, “The 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the population composed of immigrant college graduates, and the 0.7 percentage point increase in the share of post-college immigrants, each increased patenting per capita by about 12 percent based on least squares and 21 percent based on instrumental variables.” Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 51. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.\n79 Specifically, “The 0.45 percentage point increase in immigrant scientists and engineers increased patenting per capita by about 13 percent based on least squares and 32 percent based on instrumental variables.” Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 51. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.\n80 Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 31.\n81 Specifically, “One should be cautious in drawing the conclusion that innovation could be sustained by simultaneously subsidizing natives to study science and engineering and cutting immigration of scientists and engineers. The additional natives drawn into science and engineering might have lower inventive ability than the excluded immigrants, and such natives might have contributed more to the US economy outside science and engineering.” Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 52.\n82 “Overall, a 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponded with a 0.3%–0.7% increase in total invention for each standard deviation growth in city dependency [upon the H-1B program].” Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 475. This analysis was based on data from the Current Population Survey, in addition to patent records from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.\n21\nADD-29\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 31 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Additionally, there is evidence that native-born inventors’ patents were not displaced by immigrants that were admitted as a result of expansions in the H-1B visa program.83\n• Moser et al conclude that German Jewish emigres who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s increased patenting in the United States by 31 percent.84\no Inventor-level data suggest that this increase in patenting can be attributed to emigrants attracting U.S. inventors to their fields.85\no Data also indicate that the number of patents filed by native-born inventors who collaborated with immigrant professors increased substantially in the 1940s and 1950s, suggesting that “emigre professors helped to increase U.S. invention in the long run, by training a new group of younger US invention in the long run, who then continued to train other scientists.”86\n\nG. Impact of Visa Restrictions on Innovation and Patenting\n• Increases in high-skilled immigration due to expansions of the H-1B visa program are associated with higher levels of patent contributions from immigrants.\no “Total [science and engineering] employment and [the number of] invention [in the U.S.] increases with higher [H-1B] admissions”.87\n\n83 Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 475. This analysis was based on data from the Current Population Survey, in addition to patent records from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.\n84 Moser, Petra, et al. “German Jewish Émigrés and U.S. Invention.” The American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 10, 2014, pp. 3222–3255, available at www.jstor.org/stable/43495318, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3222. This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of patent records available through Google Patents, available at https://patents.google.com, in addition to faculty directories at German and Austrian universities, among other sources.\n85 Moser, Petra, et al. “German Jewish Émigrés and U.S. Invention.” The American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 10, 2014, pp. 3222–3255, available at www.jstor.org/stable/43495318, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3222. This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of patent records available through Google Patents, available at https://patents.google.com, in addition to faculty directories at German and Austrian universities, among other sources.\n86 Moser, Petra, et al. “German Jewish Émigrés and U.S. Invention.” The American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 10, 2014, pp. 3222–3255, available at www.jstor.org/stable/43495318, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3253. This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of patent records available through Google Patents, available at https://patents.google.com, in addition to faculty directories at German and Austrian universities, among other sources.\n87 Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 473.\n22\nADD-30\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 32 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no Innovation from the native-born population also increases with expansions of the H-1B program and the associated inflow of new workers.88\no Firms that employ H-1B workers show higher rates of innovation when the national H-1B admission levels increase.89\no In Massachusetts, if all Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) for H-1B visas filed by employers in 2014 had turned into visas, H-1B workers could have created an estimated 61,256 jobs for US-born workers by the year 2020.90\n\nH. Impact of Immigrant Students on Innovation and Patenting\n• Increase in the share of foreign graduate students and skilled immigrants have a positive and strong impact on the generation of new ideas in the United States.\no Patent quantity: increase in the presence of foreign graduate students provides a positive and significant impact on patenting activity at both universities and private firms, thereby contributing to American innovation.91\no Patent quality: increase in the share of skilled immigrants associated with a rise in number of granted patents at universities.92\n\n88 “Overall, a 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponded with a 0.3%–0.7% increase in total invention for each standard deviation growth in city dependency [upon the H-1B program].” Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 475.\n89 Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 503.\n90 “The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, pp. 2021. The data on visa demand are drawn primarily from the 2014 Annual Report produced by the Office of Foreign Labor Certification within the U.S. Department of Labor. The multipliers use to produce these estimates originate in a 2011 report released by Partnership for a New American Economy and the American Enterprise Institute.\n91 Chellaraj, Gnanaraj and Maskus, Keith E. and Mattoo, Aaditya, “The Contribution of Skilled Immigration and International Graduate Students to U.S. Innovation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3588, May 2005, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=744625, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3. This study used data from the U.S. Department of Education Education Statistics Quarterly, the Institute for International Education Open Doors, the National Science Foundation Science and Engineering Statistics, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the United States, and the Economic Report of the President.\n92 Chellaraj, Gnanaraj and Maskus, Keith E. and Mattoo, Aaditya, “The Contribution of Skilled Immigration and International Graduate Students to U.S. Innovation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3588, May 2005, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=744625, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3. This study used data from the U.S. Department of Education Education Statistics Quarterly, the Institute for International Education Open Doors, the National Science Foundation Science and Engineering Statistics, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the United States, and the Economic Report of the President.\n23\nADD-31\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 33 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Academic research found that there are significant and positive spillovers on overall patenting activity associated with an increase in the proportion of immigrant college graduates.93\no A “1 percentage point increase in immigrant college graduates’ population share increases patent per capita by 9-18 percent.”94\n\nI. Impact of Immigrants on Firms\n• Allowing for more H-1B visa holders benefits firms:\no Research suggests that when the H-1B visa cap is increased, firms that perform large amounts of research and development experience increased productivity and profits.95  For example, an increase in the cap on H-1B visas of 110,000 visas from 85,000 to 195,000 may lead to a 16% increase in firm profits. 96\n• An increase in the supply of foreign-born workers can improve firm outcomes.\no There is evidence that an increase in the supply of foreign-born workers in an area leads to increased productivity, faster growth of capital, and better export performance for firms in that area.97\n\n93 “For immigrant college graduates … a 1 percentage point increase in share increases patenting per capita by 8–10 percent in least squares and 12–18 percent in instrumental variables, more than the 6 percent based on the individual-level data (statistically significantly so in the case of the highest coefficient), and therefore implying positive spillovers.” Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 48. This study used data from the National Science Foundation National Survey of College Graduates, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the Harvard Business School Patent Data File.\n94 Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 31. This study used data from the National Science Foundation National Survey of College Graduates, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the Harvard Business School Patent Data File.\n95 Ghosh, Anirban, Anna Maria Mayda, and Francese Ortega, “The Impact of Skilled Foreign Workers on Firms: an Investigation of Publicy Traded U.S. Firms,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8684, November 2014, pp.1-47, available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp8684.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.1. This study uses data from the Foreign Labor Certification Data Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) Records, and Compustat.\n96 Ghosh, Anirban, Anna Maria Mayda, and Francese Ortega, “The Impact of Skilled Foreign Workers on Firms: an Investigation of Publicy Traded U.S. Firms,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8684, November 2014, pp.1-47, available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp8684.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.24. This study uses data from the Foreign Labor Certification Data Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) Records, and Compustat.\n97 Mitaritonna, Cristina, Gianluca Orefice, Giovanni Peri, “Immigrants and Firms’ Productivity: Evidence from France,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8063, March 2014, pp.1-38, available at http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp8063.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.1. The study uses data from the Declaration Annuelle des Donnetes Sociales (DADS) databases, the ONET Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system, and the Annual Business survey (EAE). See also, Perri, Giovanni, “The Effect of Immigration on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. States,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, No. 1, February 2012,\n24\nADD-32\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 34 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n These positive effects are especially potent for firms with fewer foreign-born employees prior to the increase.98\n• Immigrants promote more efficient allocation of tasks within firms.\no Academic literature suggests that immigrant workers lead to tasks being assigned more efficiently to both immigrant and native-born workers, increasing overall productivity.99\n• “[C]ities whose employers faced large numbers of denials in the H-1B visa lotteries experienced considerably less job creation and wage growth for American-born computer workers in the two years that followed.”100\n\nJ. Impact of Immigrants on Productivity\n• Considering earnings, patenting, commercializing and licensing patents, publishing books or papers and presenting at major conferences, immigrants on H-1B and J-1 visas outperformed native-born individuals.101\n• In 2015, immigrants contributed $2 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), which represents 11 percent of its total GDP.102\n\navailable at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00137#.WPBnuvnyuUk, accessed March 5, 2017, pp. 348-358. 98 Mitaritonna, Cristina, Gianluca Orefice, Giovanni Peri, “Immigrants and Firms’ Productivity: Evidence from France,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8063, March 2014, pp.1-38, available at http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp8063.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.1. The study uses data from the Declaration Annuelle des Donnetes Sociales (DADS) databases, the ONET Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system, and the Annual Business survey (EAE). See also, Perri, Giovanni, “The Effect of Immigration on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. States,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, No. 1, February 2012, available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00137#.WPBnuvnyuUk, accessed March 5, 2017, pp. 348-358. 99 Peri, Giovanni, “The Effect of Immigration on Productivity: Evidence From U.S. States,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, No. 1, February 2012, pp. 348-358, available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00137#.WPBnuvnyuUk, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 357. This study uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS), the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the National Economic Accounts. The author conjectures that “at least part of the positive productivity effects are due to an efficient specialization of immigrants and natives in manual-intensive and communication-intensive tasks, respectively (in which each group has a comparative advantage), resulting in a gain in overall efficiency” (see p. 357). 100 Peri Giovanni, Shish Kevin, Chad Sparber, and Angie Marek Zeitlin, “Closing Economic Windows: How H-1B Visa Denials Cost U.S.-Born Tech Workers Jobs and Wages During the Great Recession,” The Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2014, pp. 1-36, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/pnae_h1b.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.4. The study uses data from the U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, the U.S. Department of Labor, and the American Community Survey. 101 Murray, Sara, “H-1B, J-1 Immigrants More Productive Than Americans, Study Says,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2009, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/04/27/h-1b-j-1-immigrants-more-productive-than-americans-studysays/, accessed March 5, 2017. 102 “People on the Move: Global Migration’s Impact and Opportunity,” McKinsey Global Institute, December 2016, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Employment%20and%20Growth/\n25\nADD-33\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 35 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in 2013 that a reform that seeks to “revise laws governing immigration and the enforcement of those laws, allowing for a significant increase in the number of noncitizens who could lawfully enter the United States permanently or temporarily”103 would boost real GDP by 5.4 percent by 2033, and add 9 million workers to the labor force.104\no The CBO also finds that U.S. productivity would be about 0.7 percent higher in 2023 and about 1.0 percent higher in 2033 under a reform scenario described above.105\n• “The influx of immigrant college graduates in the 1990s increased U.S. GDP per capita by 1.4-2.4 percent.”106\n• The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) estimates that immigration reform that would seek to increase the growth of overall population and the workforce would increase GDP by 4.8 percent over 20 years.107\n\nGlobal%20migrations%20impact%20and%20opportunity/MGI-People-on-the-Move-Executive-summary-December2016.ashx, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 56. This study used data from McKinsey Global Institute, the OECD database, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, and others. 103 “The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,” Congressional Budget Office, June 2013, available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-20132014/reports/44346-Immigration.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 1. All data are from the Congressional Budget Office. 104 The CBO calculated these numbers by comparing their economic projections under immigration reform to their baseline economic projections for FY 2013 to 2023. See “The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,” Congressional Budget Office, June 2013, available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/44346-Immigration.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3; “The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023,” Congressional Budget Office, February 2013, available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017. Data are from the Congressional Budget Office. 105 “The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,” Congressional Budget Office, June 2013, available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-20132014/reports/44346-Immigration.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 1. All data are from the Congressional Budget Office. 106 Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 52. This study used data from the National Science Foundation National Survey of College Graduates, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the Harvard Business School Patent Data File. 107 The BPC study uses the CBO’s analysis on the economic impact of immigration reform bill S. 744 as a reference case in which they construct their model on. The BPC has enlisted the help of Macroeconomic Advisers, LLC, in order to assess the economic and budgetary impact of the reference case immigration reform. A description of their methodology and assumptions can be found in Appendix A of the article. See “Immigration Reform: Implications for Growth, Budgets, and Housing,” Immigration Task Force, Bipartisan Policy Center, October 2013, available at http://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC_Immigration_Economic_Impact.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017. This study used data from the Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration, the U.S. Census Bureau Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Single Year of Age and Sex for the United States, the U.S. Census Bureau National Population Projections Summary Tables, and the National Science Foundation Science and Engineering Indicators and Science and Engineering Doctorates\n26\nADD-34\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 36 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Skilled immigration leads to macroeconomic benefits related to employment and wages.\no “A one percentage point increase in the immigration share in the population increases income per person by about 6%.”108\no Over the long run, a 1% increase in immigration flow to a state has been associated with an up to 0.9% increase in income per worker in the state.109\n• 1,470 economists recently signed an open letter highlighting some of the benefits of immigration to innovation and productivity:\no “Immigration brings entrepreneurs who start new businesses that hire American workers.”110\no “Immigration brings young workers who help offset the large-scale retirement of baby boomers.”111\no “Immigration brings diverse skill sets that keep our workforce flexible, help companies grow, and increase the productivity of American workers.”112\no “Immigrants are far more likely to work in innovative, job-creating fields such as science, technology, engineering, and math that create life-improving products and drive economic growth.”113\n\n108 Ortega, Francesc and Giovanni Peri, “Openness and income: The roles of trade and migration,” Journal of International Economics, December 2013, pp. 231-251, available at http://giovanniperi.ucdavis.edu/uploads/5/6/8/2/56826033/ortega_peri_openness_and_income_2014.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.247 This study uses data from the NBER-UN dataset, and the International Trade database (BACI).\n109 Peri, Giovanni, “The Effect of Immigrants on U.S. Employment and Productivity,” Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2010-26, August 30, 2010, pp. 1-5, available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el201026.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.3 . This paper summarizes research by Peri (2009) and Perri and Sparber (2009).\n110 “An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April 12, 2017.\n111 “An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April 12, 2017.\n112 “An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April 12, 2017.\n113 “An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April 12, 2017.\n27\nADD-35\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 37 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nIV. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• The literature supports the idea that immigrants are more likely to start new businesses. The rates of immigration entrepreneurship are typically higher for high-tech sectors of the economy.\n• As of 2015, 14.6 percent of the Fortune 500 companies have a foreign-born CEO and 15.4 percent of the Fortune 500 Companies have a foreign-born founder. These percentages rise to 19.6 percent and 22.8 percent respectively when looking at high-tech industries.\n• Data from the Survey of Business Owners show high shares of business ownerships by immigrants, especially in sectors that involve high-tech industries, and among recently-started firms.\n\nA. The Impact of Immigrants on New Business Starts by Sector\nImmigrants are a vital part of new business growth and entrepreneurship, particularly among high-tech sectors such as engineering and technology.114 This section provides an overview of the literature that examines the prevalence of entrepreneurship and ownership in immigrant populations. Along with the prevalence rates in the data, ownership and new business start rates are calculated using publicly available sources. These analyses are consistent with the literature and further suggest that immigrant ownership has likely been increasing over the past decade. Using these prevalence measures and characteristics of immigrant owned firms, an estimate of the aggregate impact of new businesses, particularly those in high-tech sectors, founded by immigrants is determined for the U.S. economy.\nB. The Relationship between Entrepreneurship and Immigration Status, Particularly in High-Tech Sectors\ni. Literature Review\nThe literature supports the idea that immigrants are more likely to start new businesses. The rates of immigration entrepreneurship are typically higher for high-tech sectors of the economy. There are two measures used to evaluate immigrant entrepreneurship: the share of business founders and the business formation rate.\n\n114 Stangler, Dane and Jason Wiens, “The Economic Case for Welcoming Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” The Kauffman Foundation, September 8, 2015, available at http://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/resources/entrepreneurship-policy-digest/theeconomic-case-for-welcoming-immigrant-entrepreneurs, accessed March 7, 2017.\n28\nADD-36\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 38 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\na. Share of Business Founders\nThe literature supports the idea that the immigrant share of business founders is high relative to the share of immigrants in the labor force.\n• “To measure business startup activity, we use panel data created by matching consecutive months of the 2007-2011 Current Population Survey (CPS). Immigrants represent 24.9 percent of all new business owners in the United States.”115\n• “The immigrant share of new entrepreneurs rises dramatically in our sample from 16.7% in 1995 to 27.1% in 2008”116\n• “Immigrant entrepreneurs now account for 28.5 percent of all new entrepreneurs in the United States, up from just 13.3 percent in the 1997 Index. This is close to the two-decade high of 29.5 percent in the 2011 Index, reflecting the United States’ increasing population of immigrants but also the much higher Rate of New Entrepreneurs among immigrants.”117\nThese rates of immigrant ownership reported in the literature are higher than the share of immigrants in the labor force. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that foreign-born workers accounted for 16.5% of the labor force in 2014.118\nThe literature also supports the idea that the rate of entrepreneurship is even higher for high-tech businesses.\n• “We obtained responses from 2,054 engineering and technology companies founded in the U.S. from 1995 to 2005. Of these companies, 25.3% reported that at least one of their key founders was an immigrant.”119\n• “We analyzed Silicon Valley data by selecting zip codes in the following counties: Santa Clara, Alameda, San Mateo and Santa Cruz. We received responses from 126 companies that fit\n\n115 Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, \"Immigration and Entrepreneurship,\" CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 6.\n116 Kerr, Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, “Immigrant Entrepreneurship,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2016, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22385, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 15.\n117 Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,” The Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017, p. 6.\n118 “Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics – 2014”, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, May, 21, 2015, available at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/forbrn_05212015.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017.\n119 Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science, Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 11.\n29\nADD-37\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 39 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nthese criteria. Of these, 52.4% reported that their key founders were immigrants – significantly higher than the California average of 38.8%.”120\n• “What we have found thus far suggests that immigrants make a disproportionate contribution to biotechnology entrepreneurship in Massachusetts. According to the U.S. Census, foreign-born residents of Massachusetts are 14.4 percent of the total population. But we find that 25.7 percent of biotechnology firms have foreign-born founders.”121\n\nb. Business Formation Rate\nThe business formation rate is another metric to measure immigrant entrepreneurship. This is the percentage of people who become business owners from one month to the next. The literature shows that immigrants have a higher business formation rate than native-born individuals and that the rates have been increasing over time.\n• “Immigrants continue to be almost twice as likely as the native-born to become entrepreneurs, with the Rate of New Entrepreneurs being 0.52 percent for immigrants, as opposed to 0.27 percent for the native-born.”122\n• “The business formation rate per month among immigrants is 0.51 percent; that is, of 100,000 nonbusiness-owning immigrants, 510 start a business each month. This rate of business formation is higher than the nonimmigrant rate of 0.28 percent, or 280 of 100,000 U.S.-born nonbusiness owners per month.”123\n• “Business formation rates are even higher among immigrants than the nonimmigrant. The business formation rate per month among immigrants is 0.62 percent (or 620 out of 100,000). This monthly rate of business formation is much higher than the non-immigrant rate of 0.28 percent (or 280 of 100,000).”124\n\n120 Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science, Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 31.\n121 Monti, Daniel J., Laurel Smith-Doerr, and James McQuaid, “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry,” The Immigrant Learning Center, Inc., June, 2007, available at http://www.ilctr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/immigrants_in_biotechnology-updated.pdf, accessed March 6, 2017, p. 12.\n122 Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,” The Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017, p. 6.\n123 Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, \"Immigration and Entrepreneurship,\" CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 67.\n124 Fairlie, Robert W., “Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owners, and their Access to Financial Capital,” U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, May, 2012, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs396tot.pdf, accessed February 27, 2017, p. ii.\n\n30\nADD-38\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 40 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nSee Table IV.1 for a full set of data sources relied on in the literature and Table IV.2 for a full summary of the business formation estimates in the literature.\n\nStudy\n\nTable IV.1\n\nSummary of Data Sources\n\nRestricted Access\n\nU.S. Census\n\nIndependent\n\nAmerican\n\nCurrent\n\nBureau\n\nCommunity Population\n\nLongitudinal\n\nYear\n\nAuthor\n\nSurvey\n\nSurvey\n\nData125\n\nSurvey/ Manual Search\n\nImmigrant Entrepreneurship126\n\n2016 Kerr and Kerr\n\nThe Kauffman Index –\n\n2015 Fairlie,\n\nx\n\nStartup Activity National\n\nMorelix, et al\n\nTrends127\n\nImmigration and\n\n2014 Fairlie and\n\nx\n\nx\n\nEntrepreneurship128\n\nLofstrom\n\nImmigrant Entrepreneurs\n\n2012 Fairlie\n\nx\n\nand Small Business\n\nOwners 129\n\nHigh-Tech Immigrant Entrepreneurship in the United States130\n\n2009 Hart, Acs, and Tracy\n\nEstimating the Contribution 2008 Fairlie\n\nx\n\nof Immigrant Business\n\nOwners to the Economy131\n\nx x\n\n125 The Restricted Access Longitudinal Data include the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics database and the Longitudinal Business database.\n126 Kerr, Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, “Immigrant Entrepreneurship,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2016, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22385, accessed March 1, 2017.\n127 Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,” The Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017.\n128 Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, \"Immigration and Entrepreneurship,\" CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017.\n129 Fairlie, Robert W., “Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owners, and their Access to Financial Capital,” U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, May, 2012, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs396tot.pdf, accessed February 27, 2017.\n130 Hart, David M., Zoltan J. Acs, and Spencer L. Tracy, Jr., “High-tech immigrant Entrepreneurship in the United States,” U.S. Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, July, 2009, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs349tot_0.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017.\n131 Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at\n31\nADD-39\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 41 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable IV.1 (continued) Summary of Data Sources\n\nStudy\nEstimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the Economy133\nAmerica’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs134\nImmigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry135\nThe Impact of Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Professionals on U.S. Competitiveness136\nSilicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs137\n\nYear 2008 2007 2007 2006\n1999\n\nAuthor Fairlie\nWadhwa, Saxeian, et al. Monti, SmithDoerr, McQuaid Anderson and Platzer\nSaxeian\n\nAmerican Community\nSurvey\nx\n\nCurrent Population\nSurvey\nx\n\nRestricted Access U.S. Census Bureau Longitudinal Data132\n\nIndependent Survey/ Manual Search\n\nx x x\n\nhttps://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017. 132 The Restricted Access Longitudinal Data include the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics database and the Longitudinal Business database. 133 Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017. 134 Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science, Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017. 135 Monti, Smith, Laurel Smith-Doerr, and James McQuaid, “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry, June 2007, available at http://www.issuelab.org/resource/immigrant_entrepreneurs_in_the_massachusetts_biotechnology_industry_2007, accessed Match 4, 2017. 136 Anderson, Stuart and Michaela Platzer, “American Made: The Impact of Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Professionals on U.S. Competitiveness,” National Venture Capital Association, November, 2006, available at http://www.contentfirst.com/AmericanMade_study.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017. 137 Saxeian, AnnaLee, “Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Public Policy Institute of California, 1999, available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017.\n32\nADD-40\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 42 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable IV.2\n\nSummary of Results: Immigrant Share of Business Founders and Business Formation Rates\n\nStudy\n\nYear\n\nAuthors\n\nData Range\n\nSample\n\nImmigrant Share of Founders\n\nBusiness Formation Rate\n\nImmigrant Entrepreneurship\n\n2016 Kerr and Kerr\n\n2008\n\nThe 11 states present in the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics database by 1992138\n\n27.1% 139\n\nThe Kauffman Index – Startup Activity National Trends\nImmigration and Entrepreneurship\n\n2015 Fairlie, Morelix, et 2014\n\nU.S.\n\nal.\n\n2014 Fairlie and Lofstrom\n\n2007-2011 U.S.\n\n28.5% 140\n\n24.9% 141\n\nImmigrants: 0.51%142 Native-born: 0.28%\n\nImmigrant Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owners\n\n2012 Fairlie\n\nHigh-Tech Immigrant Entrepreneurship in the United States\n\n2009 Hart, Acs, and Tracy\n\n2010 2002-2006\n\nIndividuals ages 20-64 who do not own a business in the first survey month.\n\"High impact\" companies in the high-tech sector\n\nImmigrants: 0.62%143 Native-born: 0.28%\n16%144\n\n138 States include CA, CO, FL, ID, IL, LA, MD, NC, OR, WA, and WI. 139 Kerr, Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, “Immigrant Entrepreneurship,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2016,\navailable at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22385, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 15. 140 Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,”\nThe Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017, p. 13. 141 Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, \"Immigration and Entrepreneurship,\" CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 6. 142 Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, \"Immigration and Entrepreneurship,\" CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 7. 143 Fairlie, Robert W., “Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owners, and their Access to Financial Capital,” U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, May, 2012, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs396tot.pdf, accessed February 27, 2017, p. ii. 144 Hart, David M., Zoltan J. Acs, and Spencer L. Tracy, Jr., “High-tech immigrant Entrepreneurship in the United States,” U.S. Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, July, 2009, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs349tot_0.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017, p. 5.\n33\nADD-41\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 43 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable IV.2 (continued)\n\nSummary of Results: Immigrant Share of Business Founders and Business Formation Rates\n\nStudy\n\nYear\n\nAuthors\n\nData Range\n\nSample\n\nImmigrant Share of Founders\n\nBusiness Formation Rate\n\nEstimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the Economy\nAmerica’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs\n\n2008 Fairlie\n2007 Wadhwa, Saxeian, et al.\n\n1996-2007 1995-2005\n\nU.S.\nU.S. engineering and technology companies with > $1 million in sales or > 20 employees\n\nImmigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry\n\n2007 Monti, SmithDoerr, McQuaid\n\nThe Impact of Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Professionals on U.S. Competitiveness\nSilicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs\n\n2006 Anderson and Platzer\n1999 Saxeian\n\n2006 1990-2005\n\nBiotechnology companies founded in New England. Excludes subsidiaries of larger companies or multi-national corporations.\nU.S. venture capitalbacked public companies\n\n1980-1998\n\nPercentage of technology firms started between 1980 and 1998 with Indian or Chinese immigrant CEOs\n\n16.7% 145\n\nImmigrants: 0.35%146 Native-born: 0.27%\n\nU.S.: 25.3% 147 Silicon Valley: 52.4% 148\n25.7% 149\n\n25%150 24%151\n\n145 Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017, p. 18.\n146 Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017, p. 19.\n147 Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science, Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 11.\n148 Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science, Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 31.\n34\nADD-42\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 44 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nii. Descriptive Tables from Fortune 500 Companies\nThe literature has focused on all types of business, but there is also a publicly available dataset that provides ownership and founder information for Fortune 500 companies in particular. Highlighted below are statistics similar to those found in the literature, as well as some potential explanations for why the figures may be different for the Fortune 500.\n• As shown in Table IV.3, in the 2015 list of Fortune 500 firms, 14.6 percent were headed by foreign born CEOs and 15.4 percent were founded by foreign-born individuals. Of companies in the 2015 list in high-tech industries, 19.6 percent were headed by foreign-born CEOs, and 22.8 percent were founded by foreign-born individuals.\n• The percentage of Fortune 500 companies with a foreign-born founder is lower than the immigrant share of entrepreneurs reported in the literature using the recent Current Population Survey data. As shown in Table IV.2, estimates using Census data from the past decade range from 24.9 to 28.5 percent. However, the 15.4 percent share for Fortune 500 companies with a foreign-born founder (Table IV.3) is consistent with the estimates using older data. For example, data from 1996 to 2007 show immigrant entrepreneurship share of 16.7 percent152 (Table IV.2).\n• In 2015, Fortune 500 companies with foreign-born CEOs generated over $1.6 trillion in revenue, and those founded by foreign-born individuals generated over $1.8 trillion in revenue.153 These values are both larger than the entire GDP of Canada in 2015.154 Furthermore, in 2015, Fortune 500 companies with foreign-born CEOs employed over 4 million people worldwide and Fortune 500 companies founded by foreign-born individuals employed over 3.7 million people worldwide. Both of these numbers are larger than the entire population of Connecticut in 2015.155\n\n149 Monti, Smith, Laurel Smith-Doerr, and James McQuaid, “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry, June 2007, available at http://www.issuelab.org/resource/immigrant_entrepreneurs_in_the_massachusetts_biotechnology_industry_2007, accessed Match 4, 2017, p. 2.\n150 Anderson, Stuart and Michaela Platzer, “American Made: The Impact of Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Professionals on U.S. Competitiveness,” National Venture Capital Association, November, 2006, available at http://www.contentfirst.com/AmericanMade_study.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017, p. 13.\n151 Saxeian, AnnaLee, “Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Public Policy Institute of California, 1999, available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017, p. 23.\n152 Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017, p. 18.\n153 Fortune, “Fortune 500,” available at http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500/2015/, accessed March 2, 2017. 154 The World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2015,” available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf,\naccessed March 17, 2017. 155 United States Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates of Resident Population,” available at\nhttps://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmkhttps://factfinder.census.gov/faces\n35\nADD-43\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 45 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable IV.3 Percent of Foreign-Born CEOs and Founders among U.S. Fortune 500 Companies\n2015\n\nNotes: [1] High-tech industries include: Computers and Office Equipment, Health Care: Pharmacy and Other Services, Information Technology Services, Aerospace and Defense, Computer Software, Pharmaceuticals, Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components, Network and Other Communications Equipment, Electronics and Electrical Equipment, Computer Peripherals, Medical Products and Equipment, Scientific, Photographic and Control Equipment, Chemicals, and Energy. [2] Information on founders was sourced from Partnership for a New American Economy’s “The New American Fortune 500” and supplemented with information from online research on the country of origin for founders of companies that have been added to the list since 2010.\nSources: [1] Fortune, “Fortune 500,” available at http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500/2015/, accessed March 2, 2017. [2] Partnership for a New American Economy, “The 'New American' Fortune 500,” June 2011, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/new-american-fortune-500-june-2011.pdf, accessed March 2, 2017, Appendix A. [3] Biography, “Sergey Brin Biography,” November 2, 2016, available at http://www.biography.com/people/sergey-brin-12103333, accessed March 30, 2017. [4] Biography, “Rupert Murdoch Biography,” October 17, 2016, available at http://www.biography.com/people/rupert-murdoch-9418489, accessed March 30, 2017. [5] Viterbi, Andrew, “Reflections of an Educator, Researcher, and Entrepreneur,” 2016, available at http://www.biography.com/people/sergeybrin-12103333, accessed March 30, 2017. [6] Blagg, Deborah, “Kumar Mahadeva,” September 1, 2013, available at https://www.alumni.hbs.edu/stories/Pages/storybulletin.aspx?num=2208, accessed March 30, 2017. [7] Swartz, Jon, “SanDisk CEO Eli Harari Proves He’s No Flash in the Pan,” June 28, 2010 available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/profile/2010-06-27-sandisk-eli-harari_N.htm, accessed March 30, 2017. [8] McFadden, Robert, “Sidney Harman, Newsweek Chairman, Is Dead at 92,” April 13, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/media/14harman.html, accessed March 30, 2017. [9] Business Insider, “Meet the Richest Tech Tycoon in 14 Major Countries around the World,” July 19, 2014, available at http://www.businessinsider.in/small-business/tech/slidelist/38639795.cms, accessed March 30, 2017.\niii. Descriptive Tables from Survey of Business Owners, 2007 and 2012\nAnother publicly available data source cited but not used in the literature to determine foreign-born ownership rates is the Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO) conducted by the Census Bureau. This survey collects information on the characteristics of businesses and their owners. The survey defines business ownership as possessing at least 51% of a business’s stock or equity, sampling 1.75 million and 2.3 million nonfarm businesses with receipts of at least $1,000 that filed Internal Revenue Service tax forms in 2012 and 2007, respectively. Respondents include firms with no paid employees, in sectors 11 through 99 according to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), with the exceptions of NAICS 111,112, 482, 521, 525, 813, 814, and 92. The Census Bureau does\n/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmkInfoplease.com,%20“State%20Population%20by%20Rank,%202015, accessed March 17, 2017.\n36\nADD-44\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 46 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nnot claim the CBO data to be representative of all U.S. businesses. Data from the 2012 SBO are only provided as tabulated estimates of aggregate numbers and percentages of businesses in the United States; microdata are available only for the 2007 SBO.\nIt should be noted that analyses based on the SBO are not directly comparable to analyses based on datasets such as the CPS, which is employed in multiple studies on immigrant share of business founders (see Table IV.1). Major differences include: 1) business owners who are primarily wage and salary workers are included in the SBO, but excluded from the CPS; 2) the CPS data is collected at the individual level, whereas the SBO data is collected at the business level (thus multiple businesses owned by one individual count multiple times in the SBO but only once in the CPS); and 3) only the “majority owner” with at least 51% of a business is included in the SBO, while multiple “minority owners” with smaller shares of a business are included in the CPS.156\nIn 2012, approximately 14.4% of all businesses are estimated to be owned by immigrants (Table IV.4a); this is slightly lower than the percentage of foreign-born business owners (15.0%) reported in 2007 (Table IV.4b). The discrepancy may be due to a change in the immigrant-identifying question in the SBO: the 2007 survey identified foreign-born business owners, which included individuals born to Americans overseas and were hence U.S. citizens by birth; the question in the 2012 survey was modified to identify only business owners who were not U.S. citizens by birth. Both figures were higher than the percentage of foreign-born individuals157 in the general US population (12.9% in 2012, 12.6% in 2007),158 reflecting a higher share of business ownership among immigrants than those who are native-born.\n\n156 U.S. Census Bureau, “Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO): Methodology,” February 9, 2016, available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sbo/technical-documentation/methodology.html, accessed March 18, 2017; U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey (CPS): Methodology,” available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/technical-documentation/methodology.html, accessed March 30, 2017; Fairlie, Robert W. and Alicia M. Robb, “Entrepreneurship, Self-Employment and Business Data: An Introduction to Several Large, Nationally-Representative Datasets,” IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 4052, available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp4052.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, pp.8-10.\n157 U.S. Census Bureau, “About Foreign-Born Population”, available at https://www.census.gov/topics/population/foreignborn/about.html, accessed March 18, 2017. “Foreign-born” refers to individuals who are not US citizens at birth, including naturalized US citizens, lawful permanent residents, temporary migrants, humanitarian migrants, and unauthorized migrants.\n158 U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey – March 2012 Detailed Tables”, Characteristics of the Foreign-Born Population by Nativity and U.S. Citizenship Status Estimates Table 1.1, available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2012/demo/foreign-born/cps-2012.html, accessed March 18, 2017 and U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey – March 2007 Detailed Tables”, Characteristics of the Foreign-Born Population by Nativity and U.S. Citizenship Status Table 1.1, available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2007/demo/foreignborn/cps-2007.html, accessed March 18, 2017. The percentage of foreign-born individuals is calculated as (Total population – Native-born population)/Total population using data tables based on the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Surveys in 2012 and 2007.\n37\nADD-45\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 47 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nThe shares of foreign-born business owners are often even higher in sectors which involve “high tech” industries (NAICS Code 33, 42, 44, 51,54),159 at 18.0% and 16.4% for wholesale trade (42)160, and 15.1% and 18.0% in retail trade (44-45) in 2012 and 2007, respectively (Table IV.4a and Table IV.4b). Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturers are more broadly included in the manufacturing sector and biotech research is included in professional, scientific and technical services, thus it is harder to determine using these aggregate codes whether similar rates are apparent in these particular subsectors.\nTable IV.4a Survey of Business Owners 2012 – All Sectors Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Owners, by NAICS Sector\n\nNotes: [1] Numbers of businesses were estimates based on the sample of 1.75 million businesses that responded to the 2012 SBO. Approximately 0.8% all business owners did not report whether they were born US citizens. Business ownership is defined as having 51 percent or more of the stock or equity in the business. [2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of businesses that reported the owner's nativity status. [3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms.\nSource: United States Census, “2012 Survey of Business Owners,” available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.\n159 U.S. Census Bureau, “Census Explorer Q&A,” How do you define the “tech” jobs in the People, Education and Income Edition?, available at https://www.census.gov/censusexplorer/, accessed March 18, 2007. The page provides a hyperlink to a spreadsheet showing “list of codes used” to identify “tech” companies at https://www.census.gov/censusexplorer/naics_codes_used.xls, accessed March 18, 2007.\n160 Computer & peripheral equip & software wholesale (421430), Other electronic parts & equipment whsle (421690), Computer and computer peripheral equipment and software merchant wholesalers (423430),Other electronic parts and equipment merchant wholesalers (423690),Computer and software stores (443120).\n38\nADD-46\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 48 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable IV.4b Survey of Business Owners 2007 – All Sectors Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Owners, by NAICS Sector\n\nNotes: [1] Among all 2,165,680 businesses covered by the 2007 SBO, 1,503,184 (69.4%) had a majority owner, defined as an owner with 51% or more of the stock or equity in the business. The majority owner's nativity status was reported by 847,154 (56.4%) such businesses. [2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of businesses which had a majority owner and reported the owner's nativity status. [3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms. Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.\nThe higher share of immigrants in business ownership is even more apparent when examining recently founded firms. In the 2007 SBO, over 20 percent of businesses started within the 5 years prior to the survey were owned by foreign-born individuals (Table IV.5). These rates were even higher for trade and retail start-ups where one-third and one-quarter were owned by foreign born individuals, respectively; high-tech industries are directly involved in both sectors. In addition, as high as 36.7 percent of recently founded accommodation and food services businesses were owned by foreign-born individuals.\n39\nADD-47\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 49 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable IV.5 Survey of Business Owners 2007 – Companies Founded in or after 2003 Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Owners, by NAICS Sector\n\nNotes: [1] Among all 1,503,184 businesses with majority owners, 932,152 (62.0%) reported the year of establishment. A total of 300,666 (32.3%) such businesses were start-ups, defined as businesses founded within 5 years of the survey (2003 - 2007), among which 240,252 (80.0%) reported the majority owner's nativity status. [2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of start-ups with a majority owner whose nativity status was reported. [3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms. Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.\nSimilarly, when examining whether the founder of a business was foreign born, the percentage goes from 12 percent for the full sample (Table IV.6) to 17.3 percent for start-ups (Table IV.7).\n40\nADD-48\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 50 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable IV.6 Survey of Business Owners 2007 – Firms Owned by Founders Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Founding-Owners, by NAICS Sector\n\nNotes: [1] Among all 1,503,184 businesses with majority owners, 832,215 (54.8 percent) reported both the majority owner's founder and nativity statuses. [2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of businesses which had a majority owner and reported both the owner's founder and nativity statuses. [3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms. Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.\n41\nADD-49\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 51 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable IV.7 Survey of Business Owners 2007 – Companies Founded in or After 2003 by Current Owner\nPercentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Founding-Owners, by NAICS Sector\n\nNotes: [1] Among all 1,503,184 businesses with majority owners, 932,152 (62.0 percent) reported the year of establishment. A total of 300,666 (32.3 percent) such businesses were start-ups, defined as businesses founded within 5 years of the survey (2003 - 2007), among which 173,136 (57.6 percent) reported both the majority owner's founder and nativity statuses. [2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of start-ups which had a majority owner and reported both the owner's founder and nativity statuses. [3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms. Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.\n42\nADD-50\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 52 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nC. Impact of New Businesses Started by Immigrants\n\ni. Estimates of Sales, Employment, and Payroll Generated by Immigrant-Owned Firms in 2012\nTable IV.8 reports estimates of the impact of immigrant owned firms in the U.S. economy in 2012. The estimates are calculated as the product of the total value for the U.S.161 and the immigrant owned business share.162 For example,\nTotal sales generated by immigrant owned firms = total U.S. sales × percent of sales generated by immigrant owned firms\nAssumptions:\n• Fairlie and Loftstrom (2014) report the shares of total U.S. sales, employment, and payroll for immigrant owned firms using 2007 Survey of Business Owners data.163 Given the limitations of the 2012 Survey of Business Owner data, these same estimates cannot be calculated for 2012. Therefore, the following calculations assume that the immigrant owned firms’ shares were the same in 2012 as they were in 2007.\n• Fairlie and Loftstrom’s estimates of employment, payroll, and sales use data limited to, “businesses that are classified by the IRS as sole proprietorships, partnerships, 1120 corporations, or employers, and that have sales of $1000 or more. It also excludes publicly held and other firms not classifiable by owner status.”164 The following calculations extend the analysis to all U.S. firms reported in the Survey of Business Owners. The analysis assumes that the shares are the same for Fairlie and Loftstrom’s sample of businesses as for the whole population of U.S. businesses.\n\n161 Total U.S. sales, employment, and payroll are from the 2012 Survey of Business Owners available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF, accessed March 1, 2017.\n162 The immigrant owned businesses’ shares of sales employment, and payroll are taken from Fairlie and Loftstrom (2014), which used 2007 Survey of Business Owner data. Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, \"Immigration and Entrepreneurship,\" CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017.\n163 Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017.\n164 Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 8.\n43\nADD-51\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 53 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable IV.8 Estimated Impact of Immigrant Owned Businesses on the U.S. Economy in 2012\n\nMetric Total U.S. Immigrant Owned Business Share in 2007 Estimate for Immigrant Owned Businesses\n\nMeasure of 2012 Economic Impact\n\nSales, Receipts, or Value of Shipments (Millions)\n\nEmployment\n\n$33,536,848.8\n\n115,249,007\n\n10.0%\n\n9.9%\n\nPayroll (Millions)\n$5,236,446.1 8.8%\n\n$3,353,684.8\n\n11,409,652\n\n$460,807.3\n\nSources: [1] 2012 Survey of Business Owners. [2] Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed April 14, 2017.\n\nii. Regional Differences\nImmigrant owned firms’ contributions to the economy are even higher in some regions of the country. Using data from the 2000 Census, Fairlie (2008) showed that, “The total business income generated by immigrant business owners is $67 billion, 11.6 percent of all business income in the United States. Immigrant business owners generate nearly $20 billion or one-quarter of all business income in California, and nearly one-fifth of all business income in New York, Florida, and New Jersey.”165\n\n165 Fairlie, Robert, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” Small Business Office of Advocacy, November 2008, available at https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed April 14, 2017.\n44\nADD-52\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 54 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nV. REGIONAL IMPACT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• While immigration policy may be set at the national level, its importance is not distributed equally across the United States.\n• In terms of number of foreign-born individuals with graduate degrees, the top five states are California, New York, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. However, the states with the highest percentage of individuals with graduate degrees are Connecticut, Texas, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Kansas.\n• States such as California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois have the largest number of immigrants and immigrants from the six banned countries. States with the lowest number of immigrants are typically in the upper-plains and Appalachia regions of the United States.\n• States with relatively small immigrant populations – West Virginia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, and Montana – have experienced the largest percentage increases in the share of immigrants in their population and labor force.\n• Examination of labor certification and residence applications across states also reveals spatial differences.\no In 2016, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, and Massachusetts had the most applications for skilled employment visas per 1,000 persons.\no New Jersey, Washington, California, the District of Columbia, and Delaware had the most applications for permanent residence applications per 1,000 persons in 2016.\no The most applications for temporary agricultural work permits are made in California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Washington.\no The most applications for temporary non-agricultural work permits are made in Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas.\n• Finally, there are state-level differences in the fiscal effects of immigrants. Between 2011 and 2013, Alaska, the District of Columbia, Wyoming, New York, and California had the highest state and local expenditures per immigrant independent person.\n\nA. State-by-State Facts from the American Immigration Council\nTable V.1 presents data for each state on the percentage of the population that is foreign-born in 2013, the percentage of businesses owned by foreign-born individuals in 2010, and net business income from immigrant businesses in 2010. Tables V.2 to V.4 present data on each of these measures, respectively, by state ranking.\n\n45\nADD-53\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 55 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• California, New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Nevada were the states with the highest percentage of foreign-born individuals in 2013.\n• In 2010, the states with the highest percent of businesses owned by foreign-born individuals were California, New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Hawaii.\n• The net business income from foreign-born-owned businesses is highest in California by a substantial margin, followed by Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois.\n\n46\nADD-54\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 56 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable V.1 State-by-State Facts from American Immigration Council\n\nNotes: [1] These figures are reported by the U.S. Census Bureau for the year 2013. [2] These figures are reported by the Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas Society/Council of the Americas for the year 2010. [3] These figures represent total net business income of new immigrant business owners according to Robert Fairlie of the University of California, Santa Cruz for the year 2010. Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.\n47\nADD-55\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 57 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable V.2 States by Percent Foreign-Born\n\nNote: These figures are reported by the U.S. Census Bureau for the year 2013. Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.\n48\nADD-56\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 58 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable V.3 States by Percent of Foreign-Born Business Owners\n\nNote: These figures are reported by the Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas Society/Council of the Americas for the year 2010. Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.\n49\nADD-57\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 59 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable V.4 States by Income from Immigrant Businesses\n\nNote: These figures represent total net business income of new immigrant business owners according to Robert Fairlie of the University of California, Santa Cruz for the year 2010. Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.\n50\nADD-58\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 60 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nB. STEM Post-Baccalaureate Degrees by State and Student U.S. Residency Status\nTable V.5 reports statistics from the U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics on STEM post-baccalaureate degrees awarded by each state in 2009 by nationality.\n• The states with the highest percentage of individuals with graduate degrees are Connecticut, Texas, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Kansas.\n• The states with the highest percentage of foreign-born individuals with graduate degrees are California, New York, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.\n\n51\nADD-59\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 61 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable V.5 STEM Post-Baccalaureate Degrees by State and Student U.S. Residency Status\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Education, “Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS),” 2009 (compiled July 26, 2012). Taken from the following report: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Information Technology Industry Council, Partnership for a New American Economy, “Help Wanted: The Role of Foreign Workers in the Innovation Economy,” available at https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/31303e8c-d2be-47ca-a3db-f41649bcbb02.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017.\n52\nADD-60\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 62 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nC. H-1B Visa and Green Card Applications by State\nTable V.6 reports data on applications for skilled employment (e.g., H-1B Visas), and Table V.7 reports data on applications for permanent residence (i.e., Green Cards). Applications for H-1B visas and Green Cards can proxy for foreign-born individuals’ intent to immigrate to a specific state.\n• Skilled Employment:\no Table V.6 shows that the highest percentage growth in H-1B Visa applications occurred in Montana, followed by Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Georgia, and Vermont.\no None of these states appeared among the top five states for the metrics presented in Tables V.1 to V.5 above.\no New York, California, and Massachusetts are not included among the top ten states for H1B Visa applications.\no In 2016, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, and Massachusetts had the most applications for skilled employment visas per 1,000 persons.\n• Permanent Residence:\no Table V.7 shows that the highest percentage increases in employment-based Green Card applications occurred in Washington, South Carolina, Texas, Oregon, and North Carolina.\no With the exception of Texas, these states are not among the top five states based on the metrics presented in Tables V.1 to V.5 above.\no New Jersey, Washington, California, the District of Columbia, and Delaware had the most applications for permanent residence applications per 1,000 persons in 2016.\n\n53\nADD-61\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 63 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable V.6 Labor Condition Applications for Skilled Employment Visas (H-1B, H-1B1, E-3) by State\nFiscal Years 2010-2016\n\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th. Sources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\n54\nADD-62\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 64 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable V.7 Labor Certification Applications for Permanent Residence Applications by State\nFiscal Years 2010-2016\n\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th. Sources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\n55\nADD-63\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 65 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nD. Numbers and Fraction of Immigrant Populations by U.S. State, 2010-2015\nThe following table and maps present statistics for each state on the number of immigrants, the number of immigrants from the six banned countries, immigrants’ fraction of the population, immigrants’ fraction of the labor force, and the fraction of all immigrants from the six banned countries. In general, states such as California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois have the largest number of immigrants and immigrants from the six banned countries. States with the lowest number of immigrants are typically in the upperplains and Appalachia regions of the U.S.\nBelow, we summarize our findings on the states that have the highest and the lowest values of the each of aforementioned statistics over the 2010 to 2015 time period. We also present data on the Massachusetts. Figures V.1 to V.5 present these statistics for 2010-2015 spatially on a map of the United States.\n• All Immigrants: o Largest: California, New York, and Texas are the top 3 in terms of immigrant population. o Smallest: The bottom 3 are North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. In general, the upperplains, parts of Appalachia, and parts of New England are towards the bottom. o Massachusetts: 1,046,391\n• Immigrants from Six Banned Countries: o Largest: California has the largest number of immigrants from the 6 countries, by a large margin. o Smallest: Montana has no immigrants from the 6 countries. o Massachusetts: 11,350\n• Immigrants’ Fraction of the Population: o Largest: California, New York, and New Jersey are top the list. o Smallest: Parts of the upper-plains, the Midwest, and parts of Appalachia are towards the bottom. o Massachusetts: 15.6%\n• Immigrants’ Fraction of the Labor Force: o Largest: California, New York, and New Jersey top the list. Florida and Nevada are also high on this list. o Smallest: West Virginia, Montana, and Mississippi comprise the bottom three. o Massachusetts: 18.0%\n• Fraction of Six Banned Countries Relative to All Immigrants: o Largest: The upper-plains and the rust belt essentially have the highest percentage of immigrants from the 6 countries. Minnesota, West Virginia, Maine, South Dakota, and North Dakota make up the top 5. o Smallest: New Mexico, Florida, and Hawaii are the bottom three. o Massachusetts: 1.1%\n\n56\n\nADD-64\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 66 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable V.8 Numbers and Fractions of Immigrants, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n57\nADD-65\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 67 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure V.1 Number of Immigrants, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\nFigure V.2 Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries, 2010-2015\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n58\nADD-66\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 68 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure V.3 Immigrants’ Fraction of the Population, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\nFigure V.4 Immigrants’ Fraction of the Labor Force, 2010-2015\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n59\nADD-67\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 69 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure V.5 Fraction of 6 Banned Countries Relative to All Immigrants, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\nE. Percentage Changes of Immigrant Populations by State, 2005-2015 The percentage change in the “Number of Immigrants” corresponds to the percentage change in the total number of immigrants within the state over the 5 year interval (2005-2010 or 2010-2015). The percentage change in the “Number of Immigrants from the 6 Banned Countries” is calculated similarly, but only for immigrants from Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. The percentage change in “Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population” corresponds to the percentage change in the fraction of immigrants residing in the state over the 5 year interval. Note, this is a percentage increase relative to the fraction of immigrants in the base year – it is not a percentage point increase. The percentage change in “Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force” is calculated similarly, but its calculations are with respect to the fraction of immigrants in the labor force. The percentage change in the “Fraction of All Immigrants that come from 6 Banned Countries” corresponds to the percentage increase in the share of immigrants that come from Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. The fraction is calculated out of all immigrants in the state. Tables V.9 and V.10 present these summary statistics for each state in the periods 2005-2010 and 20102015. Below, we summarize our findings on the states that have the highest and the lowest values of the each of aforementioned statistics over the 2010 to 2015 time period. We also present data on the Massachusetts. Figures V.6 to V.10 present these statistics for 2010-2015 spatially on a map of the United States.\n60\nADD-68\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 70 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nPercentage Changes, 2005-2010: • Number of Immigrants: o Largest: Wyoming, Kentucky, Iowa, Alabama o Smallest or Most Negative: Montana, Michigan, New Hampshire o Massachusetts: +7.49% • Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries: o Largest: Alaska, Mississippi, Alabama, Maine, North Dakota o Smallest or Most Negative: Missouri, New Hampshire, Idaho o Massachusetts: +52.37% • Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population: o Largest: Kentucky, Iowa, Alabama, Vermont o Smallest or Most Negative: Colorado, Michigan, Idaho, Arizona, New Hampshire, Montana o Massachusetts: +1.65% • Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force: o Largest: Alabama, Wyoming, Iowa, South Dakota, Louisiana, Kentucky o Smallest or Most Negative: Colorado, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Arizona, West Virginia, Montana o Massachusetts: +3.24% • Fraction of All Immigrants that Come from 6 Banned Countries: o Largest: Alaska, Mississippi, North Dakota, Maine, Rhode Island, Delaware o Smallest or Most Negative: Iowa, District of Columbia, Arkansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, Idaho o Massachusetts: +41.75%\nPercentage Changes, 2010-2015: • Number of Immigrants: o Largest: North Dakota, West Virginia, Alaska, South Dakota, Delaware o Smallest or Most Negative: Vermont, Alabama, New Mexico, Maine o Massachusetts: +12.76% • Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries: o Largest: West Virginia, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Kansas, New Hampshire o Smallest or Most Negative: Iowa, Alaska, Oklahoma, Maine, Mississippi o Massachusetts: -6.39% • Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population: o Largest: West Virginia, North Dakota, Alaska, South Dakota, Delaware o Smallest or Most Negative: Hawaii, New Mexico, Alabama, Maine o Massachusetts: + 8.82%\n\n61\nADD-69\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 71 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force: o Largest: West Virginia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Alaska o Smallest or Most Negative: California, Hawaii, Alabama, Mississippi o Massachusetts: +8.85%\n• Fraction of All Immigrants that Come from 6 Banned Countries: o Largest: West Virginia, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin o Smallest or Most Negative: Maine, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Alaska, Mississippi o Massachusetts: -16.98%\n\n62\nADD-70\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 72 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable V.9 Percentage Change in Immigrants 2005-2010\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n63\nADD-71\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 73 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable V.10 Percentage Change in Immigrants 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n64\nADD-72\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 74 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure V.6 Percentage Change in Number of Immigrants, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\nFigure V.7 Percentage Change in Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n65\nADD-73\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 75 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure V.8 Percentage Change in Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\nFigure V.9 Percentage Change in Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n66\nADD-74\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 76 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nFigure V.10 Percentage Change in Fraction of All Immigrants that come from 6 Banned Countries, 2010-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\nF. Levels and Percentage Changes of Petitions for Skilled Workers, 2010-2016 The demand for foreign skilled labor can be measured by examining data on Labor Condition Applications (“LCA”). Whenever a U.S. company wants to hire a foreign worker through the H-1B, E-3, or H-1B1 visa programs, the petition needs to be certified by the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification (“OFLC”).\n• Temporary Agricultural Work Permits: o The most applications for temporary agricultural work permits are made in California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Washington.\n• Temporary Non-Agricultural Work Permits: o The most applications for temporary non-agricultural work permits (often used in resorts, among other areas) are made in Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas.\n67\nADD-75\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 77 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure V.11 Labor Condition Applications per 1000 Persons in Fiscal Year 2016\n\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.\nSources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\nFigure V.12 Annual Growth in Labor Condition Applications, Fiscal Years 2010-2016\n\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th. Sources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\n68\nADD-76\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 78 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nFigure V.13 Employment-Based Green Card Applications per 1000 People in Fiscal Year 2016\n\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th. Sources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\nFigure V.14 Annual Growth in Employment-Based Green Card Applications, Fiscal Years 2010-2016\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th. Sources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\n69\nADD-77\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 79 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure V.15 Agricultural Temporary Work Visa Certifications per 1000 Persons in FY 2016\n\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.\nSources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\nFigure V.16 Non-Agricultural Temporary Work Visa Certifications per 1000 Persons in FY 2016\n\nNote: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th. Sources: [1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.\n70\nADD-78\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 80 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nG. Fiscal Effects of Immigrant Generation, 2011-2013\nOne recent study considers the fiscal effects of immigration for the period 2011-2013. The authors use the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement in their analysis combined with data on state government expenditures and revenues. They note the importance of accounting for second generation immigrants separately, which differentiates it from some previous analyses. When second generation immigrants are of working age and treated as independent individuals, they contribute revenues that exceed costs. The analysis is done at the level of the “independent person unit,” which is defined as “one independent adult plus an assignment of any dependent children in whole or in part.”166 Tables V.11-V.13 summarize findings from this study.\n• For the United States as a whole, first generation independent person units cost the states on net about $1,600 each, while second generation independent person units contribute on net to state and local budgets about $1,700 each, and third-plus generation independent person units contribute on net to state and local budgets about $1,300 each.167\n• These estimates of the fiscal impact imply that the total annual aggregate impact of the first generation and their dependents, averaged across 2011-13, is a cost of $57.4 billion, while the second and third-plus generation individuals (and their children) create benefits of $30.5 billion and $223.8 billion, respectively. Note that the surplus revenues raised the amount to $197 billion, which equals the surplus across all 50 states. (Calculated by totaling the unrounded estimates of net fiscal effects by state multiplied by the average number of independent persons in each year.)168\n• This overall pattern is largely driven by the larger education costs for first generation independent person units, which include more children on average than units of the other two generations. By the second generation, immigrants are a net win for the states as a\n\n166 Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n167 Estimates are constructed from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC). First generation immigrants: individuals who were born abroad who are noncitizens or naturalized citizens. Second generation individuals: individuals who were born in the United States with at least one foreign-born parent. Third-plus generation individuals: individuals who were born in the United States with two native-born parents. The institutional portion of Medicaid spending ($72 billion) is excluded due to missing this population in our data, which widens the gap between aggregate U.S. revenues and expenditures. After, all but two states have positive budget balances (compared with seven negative-balance states when all expenditure flows are included). Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n168 Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n71\nADD-79\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 81 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nwhole, given that they have fewer children on average than first generation units and are contributing in revenues more than they cost in expenditures.169\n• Although per unit spending on the second generation independent person units is slightly more than it is on the third-plus generation units, the per unit net difference between revenues and expenditures is the most positive for second generation independent person units.170\n• The relative contribution or burden of any independent person unit is driven largely by that unit’s demographic and economic characteristics – most notably the number of dependents in the unit and the unit’s income levels. Because first generation units tend to have less income and more dependents than units in the second or third-plus generation, they are more costly to state and local governments. However, the children of immigrants who are being educated grow up to become second generation adults, the group that, in general (but not always), contributes the most, when assessed in terms of independent person units, to a given state’s fiscal health.171\n\n169 Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n170 Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n171 Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n72\nADD-80\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 82 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable V.11 State and Local Revenues per Independent Person Unit, by Immigrant Generation by State\n2011-2013\n\nSource: Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n73\nADD-81\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 83 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable V.12 State and Local Expenditures per Independent Person Unit, by Immigrant Generation by State 2011-2013\n\nSource: Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n74\nADD-82\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 84 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable V.13 Net Difference between State and Local Revenues and Expenditures Independent Person Unit by Immigrant\nGeneration by State 2011-2013\n\nSource: Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.\n75\nADD-83\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 85 of 165\n\nJune 2017\nVI. HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• From 2000 to 2010, over 75,000 non-citizens enlisted in the U.S. military.\n• Non-resident students earned 13.8 and 11.9 percent of the Master’s and Doctor’s degrees conferred in the 2013/14 school year, respectively. Furthermore, non-resident students were disproportionately more likely to get their degrees in a STEM field, with international students making up over 30 percent of the postbaccalaureate degrees in STEM fields. This finding is even more distinct when looking at degrees in mathematics and statistics, where 46.3 and 49.2 percent of Master’s and Doctor’s degrees, respectively, were given to non-residents.\n• International students during the 2015/16 school year contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 400,000 jobs.\n• Individuals from the six banned countries are more likely to have a bachelor’s degree, approximately twice as likely to have a post-baccalaureate’s degree, and four times as likely to have a doctoral degree relative to the native-born population.\n• Immigrants accounted for 31 percent of physicians from 2011-2015 while only making up 20 percent of the prime-working age population (ages 25-54).\n• Among native-born individuals aged 25 to 54, 0.1 percent work in an engineering occupation with a Doctor’s degree, compared to 0.5 percent of foreign-born individuals aged 25 to 54. This difference is even more pronounced when focused on the six banned countries, where 1.1 percent of 25 to 54 year olds work in engineering with a Doctor’s degree.\n\nA. Characteristics of High-Skilled Immigrants\ni. Education Levels\n• As shown in Figure VI.1, while prime-working aged foreign-born individuals are more likely than native-born individuals to have a high-school degree or less, foreign-born individuals are twice as likely to have a doctoral degree. One percent of native-born individuals aged 25 to 54 have a doctoral degree whereas two percent of foreign-born individuals do.\n• This difference is even more pronounced when looking at the six countries targeted by President Trump’s most recent ban. Individuals from the six banned countries are more likely to have a bachelor’s degree, approximately twice as likely to have a post-baccalaureate’s degree, and four times as likely to have a doctoral degree, relative to the native-born population.\n\n76\nADD-84\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 86 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• A recent study focusing on the immigration population in Boston found that 41 percent of immigrants have a college degree or higher.172 In comparison, the national average of foreign-born individuals with a college degree or higher is approximately 30 percent.\n\nFigure VI.1 Educational Attainment of 25 to 54 Year-Olds by Nativity Status\n2011-2015\n\nNotes: [1] “Some College” includes individuals that reported having attained an Associate’s degree as well as individuals that reported attending college without receiving a Bachelor’s degree. [2] “Post baccalaureate’s degree” includes individuals that reported having attained some sort of Master’s or professional degree beyond a Bachelor’s degree. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n172 Osterman, Paul, Kimball, William, and Christine Riordan, “Boston’s Immigrants: An Essential Component of a Strong Economy,” JVS, May 10, 2017, available at https://jvs-boston.org/images/pdf/Osterman%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed May 21, 2017, p. 4.\n77\nADD-85\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 87 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nii. Medical Professionals\n• As shown in Table VI.1, immigrants accounted for 31 percent of physicians from 2011-2015 while only making up 20 percent of the prime-working age population (ages 25-54).\n• While the majority of immigrants are located on the coasts of the U.S., foreign-born physicians are much more likely to locate in the center of the country. For example, only six percent of Ohio’s prime working age population is foreign-born, but 29 percent of Ohio’s physicians are foreign-born. Similarly, only six percent of Kentucky’s prime working age population is foreign-born, but 26 percent of the state’s physicians are foreign-born.\n\n78\nADD-86\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 88 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable VI.1 Foreign-Born Share of Physicians by State\n2011-2015\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n79\nADD-87\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 89 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Foreign-born individuals are also more likely to work in engineering or life sciences. 0.1 percent of native-born individuals aged 25 to 54 work in an engineering occupation with a Doctor’s degree compared to 0.5 percent of foreign-born individuals aged 25 to 54. This difference is even more pronounced when focused on the six banned countries, where 1.1 percent of 25 to 54 year olds work in engineering with a Doctor’s degree. Similarly, 0.4 percent of 25 to 54 year old nativeborn individuals work in the life sciences with a Doctor’s degree in comparison to 1.6 percent of foreign-born individuals and 1.4 percent of individuals born in the six banned countries.\nTable VI.2 Share of 25 to 54 Year-Olds Working in Engineering and Life Sciences\nby Education and Nativity Status 2011-2015\n\nNote: “Post baccalaureate’s degree” includes individuals that reported having attained some sort of Master’s or professional degree beyond a Bachelor’s degree. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\nB. Immigrants in the U.S. Military Immigrants are an important part of the U.S. military and have contributed in significant ways to the safety of the American people.\n• From 2000 to 2010, over 75,000 non-citizens enlisted in the U.S. military.173\n173 Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,” Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017, p. 21.\n80\nADD-88\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 90 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• From 2000 to 2010, the monthly average number of non-citizen enlisted accessions to the U.S. military was 582.8 per month, compared with an average of 14,795 per month among citizens. On average, non-citizen accessions comprised 3.8 percent of total accessions.174\n• The Navy has the largest proportion of non-citizen accessions with 5 percent. The Army and Marines have 3.8 and 4 percent, respectively. Non-citizen enlisted accessions in the Air Force and Coast Guard account for 2.2 and 1.7 percent, respectively.175\n\nTable VI.3 Non-citizen Accessions by Military Branch\n2000-2010\n\nNotes: [1] Non-citizens are defined as those who are not citizens at the time of enlistment. [2] Total accessions reflect the total number of accessions from FY 2000 to FY 2010. [3] The sum of individual branches does not equal the Total for “Non-citizen Accessions” due to rounding.\nSource: Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,” Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017, p. 2123.\n• Mexico is the largest source of non-citizen accessions for every service branch except for the Navy (for which the Philippines is the largest). Other top birth countries among non-citizen accessions are Jamaica, South Korea, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Colombia, and Haiti.176\n\n174 Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,” Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017, pp. 26-28.\n175 Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,” Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017, p. 28.\n176 Hattiangadi, et al., “Non-citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report,” Center for Naval Analyses, April 2005, available at https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0011092.A2.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017, pp. 23-24.\n81\nADD-89\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 91 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable VI.4 Top 5 Countries of Origin among Non-citizens by Military Branch\n1995-2003\n\nNotes: [1] Non-citizens are defined as those who are not citizens at the time of enlistment. [2] Countries are listed in descending order by the number of non-citizens from each country. [3] Data from the Coast Guard are not available. [4] Top 5 countries constituted the following share of total non-citizen accessions in each branch: Army - 39%; Air Force - 43%; Navy - 46%; Marine Corps - 43%.\nSource: Hattiangadi, et al., “Non-citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report,” Center for Naval Analyses, April 2005, available at https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0011092.A2.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017, pp. 23-24.\n• Only U.S. citizens are eligible for security clearance in the U.S. military. Therefore, non-U.S. citizens are generally not employed in duties that may require access to classified information.177 Furthermore, only U.S. citizens are permitted to become officers.178 These job limitations suggest that non-citizen members may have a higher casualty rate than citizen members. Indeed, a 2005 article from USA Today found that “[s]ome 142 non-citizen troops died in Iraq and Afghanistan. Non-citizens’ casualty rates represent 8% of the total despite being less than 3% of active duty military personnel.”179\nC. Immigrants Enrolled in U.S. Higher Education Institutions Immigrants and foreign students are vital components of U.S. institutions of higher education, especially in graduate degree programs and STEM fields.\n177 32 C.F.R. § 154.16.c –Security Clearance, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/32/154.16, accessed April 4, 2017.\n178 10 U.S.C § 532.a.1 - Qualifications for original appointment as a commissioned officer, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/532, accessed April 4, 2017.\n179 “Military Recruiting Slips Among Foreign Nationals,” USA Today, April 14, 2005, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-04-14-foreign-recruits_x.htm, accessed April 4, 2017.\n82\nADD-90\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 92 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\ni. Degrees Conferred in the U.S.\n• As shown in Table VI.5, during the 2013/14 school year, nearly two million Bachelor’s degrees were conferred at U.S. postsecondary institutions. Of those, only 3.7 percent were to nonresidents. However, the non-residents share of mathematics and statistics degrees was nearly 3 times higher, with non-residents making up 11.6 percent of the mathematics and statistics degrees in the U.S.\n• Non-resident students made up a much higher share of the Master’s and Doctor’s degrees conferred in 2013/14, 13.8 and 11.9 percent, respectively. Furthermore, non-resident students were disproportionately more likely to get their degrees in a STEM field, with international students making up over 30 percent of the post-baccalaureate degrees in STEM fields. This finding is even more notable when looking at degrees in mathematics and statistics, where 46.3 and 49.2 percent of Master’s and Doctor’s degrees, respectively, were earned by non-residents.\nTable VI.5 Degrees Conferred by Postsecondary Institutions by Field of Study and Native Status\n2013/14 School Year\n\nNote: STEM fields include fields classified as biological and biomedical studies; computer and information sciences; engineering; engineering technologies and engineering-related fields; mathematics and statistics; physical science technologies; psychology; and social sciences. Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, Fall 2014, Completions component, prepared September 2015, available at https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/, accessed April 4, 2017.\n83\nADD-91\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 93 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nii. Impact of Degrees Conferred in Massachusetts\n• As shown in Table VI.6, non-residents make up an even higher share of the degrees conferred in Massachusetts. For example, 7.4 percent of Bachelor’s degrees, 29.1 percent of Master’s degrees, and 20.8 percent of Doctor’s degrees at the ten largest four-year institutions in Massachusetts were earned by non-residents.\n• The share is even more pronounced at certain institutions. For example, 44.3 percent of Master’s degrees and 41.1 percent of Doctor’s degrees earned from Massachusetts Institute of Technology are earned by non-residents.\n\nTable VI.6 Degrees Conferred at Ten Largest Four-Year Institutions in Massachusetts\n2014/15 School Year\n\nSource: Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, available at https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/login.aspx?gotoReportId=5, accessed April 4, 2017.\niii. Economic Benefits of International Students • International students make up a significant portion of the student body at several leading\nuniversities, e.g. NYU (25%), USC (24%), Columbia (32%), Carnegie Mellon (40%), Cornell (21%), and Harvard (22%).180 In total, 1.044 million international students were enrolled in U.S. institutions during the 2015/16 school year.181 • International students also bring foreign money into the United States in the form of college enrollment expenses, including tuition and living expenses. During the 2015/16 school year,\n180 Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, available at https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/login.aspx?gotoReportId=5, accessed April 4, 2017.\n181 Institute of International Education, Open Doors Data, available at https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/OpenDoors/Data/International-Students/Enrollment-by-Institutional-Type, accessed April 4, 2017.\n84\nADD-92\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 94 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nof the 427,313 international undergraduate students, 81.2 percent relied primarily on personal and family funds to pay for their studies. During the same year, 57.6 percent of the 383,935 international graduate students also relied on personal and family funds.182\n• NAFSA, a nonprofit association dedicated to international education, estimated that international students during the 2015/16 school year contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 400,000 jobs.183 In Massachusetts specifically, 59,436 international students contributed $2.3 billion and supported over 31,500 jobs during the 2015/16 school year.184\n\n182 Institute of International Education, Open Doors Data, available at https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/OpenDoors/Data/International-Students/Primary-Source-of-Funding/2015-16, accessed April 4, 2017.\n183 NAFSA International Student Economic Value Tool, available at http://nafsa.org/economicvalue, accessed April 4, 2017. The economic value from international students studying in the U.S. is calculated as the expenses of enrollment (e.g., tuition and fees and room and board) plus living expenses for dependents minus any U.S. support given to the students. The number of jobs created equals the number of direct and indirect jobs created by the dollars brought into the U.S. by international students. Direct jobs are calculated as the economic value divided by the amount of dollars needed to support one U.S. job. Indirect jobs are jobs that are created and/or supported indirectly from the direct job’s existence. This is a multiplier effect in which the spending from a directly-supported job will help to indirectly create and/or support other jobs in the workplace. Baumgartner, Jason, “The Economic Value of International Student Enrollment to the U.S. Economy,” NAFSA, November 2016, available at https://istart.iu.edu/nafsa/files/docs/Methodology_Economic_Impact_2016_FINAL.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017.\n184 NAFSA International Student Economic Value Tool, available at http://www.nafsa.org/Policy_and_Advocacy/Policy_Resources/Policy_Trends_and_Data/NAFSA_International_Student_Eco nomic_Value_Tool/#stateData, accessed April 4, 2017. The economic value from international students studying in the U.S. is calculated as the expenses of enrollment (e.g., tuition and fees and room and board) plus living expenses for dependents minus any U.S. support given to the students. The number of jobs created equals the number of direct and indirect jobs created by the dollars brought into the U.S. by international students. Direct jobs are calculated as the economic value divided by the amount of dollars needed to support one U.S. job. Indirect jobs are jobs that are created and/or supported indirectly from the direct job’s existence. This is a multiplier effect in which the spending from a directly-supported job will help to indirectly create and/or support other jobs in the workplace. Baumgartner, Jason, “The Economic Value of International Student Enrollment to the U.S. Economy,” NAFSA, November 2016, available at https://istart.iu.edu/nafsa/files/docs/Methodology_Economic_Impact_2016_FINAL.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017.\n85\nADD-93\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 95 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nVII. AWARDS\n\nThe contribution of immigrants to the American society and economic growth is significant. Through immigration, the United States has been the beneficiary of world-class talent and groundbreaking research, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. The talents and achievements of immigrants to the U.S. and the massive contributions they have made to America and the world are evinced in the international and national recognitions immigrants have received.\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• 40 percent of the Nobel Prizes won by Americans in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics since 2000 were awarded to immigrants. In 2016, all six American winners of the Nobel Prize in economics and scientific fields were foreign-born.\n• Most Nobel Prizes earned by foreign-born scientists were awarded only after the Immigration and Nationality Act was passed in 1965, which eliminated discriminatory national origin quotas and increased employment-based green cards. Between 1901 and 1959, immigrants won 25 Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics, but won 79 prizes in these fields – more than three times as many – between 1960 and 2016.\n• From 2010 to 2015, four out of eight U.S. Turing Award recipients were first or second generation immigrants.\n• Since beginning in 1936, 63 percent of Fields Medal recipients affiliated with a United States research institution has been foreign born. Since 2002, all Fields Medal recipients affiliated with a U.S. research institution were foreign-born.\n• 40 percent of National Medal of Science recipients in Mathematics or Computer Science are foreign-born.\n• 42 percent of the researchers at the top seven U.S. cancer research centers are foreign-born.\n• 83 percent (33 of 40) of the finalists of the 2016 Intel Science Talent Search, the leading science competition for U.S. high school students, were the children of immigrants, and 75 percent of the finalists had parents who worked in America on H-1B visas.\n\n86\nADD-94\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 96 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nA. The Nobel Prize\n“Immigrants have been awarded 40 percent, or 31 of 78, of the Nobel Prizes won by Americans in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics since 2000. In 2016, all 6 American winners of the Nobel Prize in economics and scientific fields were immigrants.”185\nTable VII.1 American Nobel Prize Winners in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics by Nativity Status\n2000 – 2016\n\nSource: National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes”, NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed March 26, 2017.\n• “One can see the increasing influence and importance of immigrants on science in America over the past half century. Between 1901 and 1959, immigrants won 25 Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics, but won 79 prizes in these fields – more than three times as many – between 1960 and 2016.”186\n• “Most Nobel Prizes earned by foreign-born scientists were awarded only after the Immigration and Nationality Act was passed in 1965, which eliminated discriminatory national origin quotas and increased employment-based green cards.”187\n\n185 National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes,” NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed February 21, 2017.\n186 National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes,” NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed February 21, 2017.\n187 Vilcek Foundation, “Immigrant Nation, American Success: Achievements in STEM,” available at http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html, accessed February, 21, 2017.\n87\nADD-95\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 97 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nFigure VII.1 American Foreign-Born Nobel Prize Winners in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics\n1901-1959 and 1960-2016\n\nSource: National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes”, NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed March 26, 2017.\ni. Nobel Laureates Affiliated with Universities in Massachusetts • 37 percent of Nobel Prize winners who have been affiliated with (i.e., current or former full-time\nor visiting faculty or staff and alumni) the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are foreignborn.188 • 32 percent of Nobel Prize winners who are current faculty or alumni of Harvard University are foreign-born.189\n188 MIT, “Nobel Prize,” available at http://web.mit.edu/ir/pop/awards/nobel.html¸ accessed March 24, 2017; place of birth from biographies at Nobelprize.org, “Nobel Prize Facts,” available at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/facts/, accessed March 24, 2017.\n189 Harvard University, “Nobel Laureates,” available at http://www.harvard.edu/about-harvard/harvard-glance/honors/nobellaureates, accessed March 24, 2017.\n88\nADD-96\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 98 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• 75 percent of Nobel Prize winners who have been affiliated with Boston University are foreignborn.190\n\nB. MacArthur Fellowship\n• The MacArthur Fellowship is awarded to support individuals who have shown “exceptional creativity in their work and the prospect for still more in the future” across a wide range of fields, including the sciences, arts, and social sciences.191\n• Each year, between 20 and 25 Fellows are selected to receive a $625,000 grant paid over five years, with no strings attached.192,193 Fellows are selected on the criteria of being:\no On the precipice of great discovery or innovation;\no Financially limited from the fulfillment of their discovery or innovation; and\no A resident or a citizen of the United States, not holding elective office. • 25 percent of all MacArthur Fellows from 2000 to 2016 were foreign-born.194 In the same period,\n32 percent of the fellows working in the STEM fields were foreign-born (see Figure VII.2 below). • Three fellows are from countries banned in the executive order:195\no 2003: Nawal M. Nour (born in Sudan), obstetrician and gynecologist\no 2013: Dina Katabi (born in Syria), computer scientist\no 2014: Khaled Mattawa (born in Libya), a translator and poet\n\n190 Boston University, “Nobel Laureates,” available at https://www.bu.edu/provost/awards-publications/facultyachievement/national-awards-and-distinctions/nobel-laureates/, accessed March 24, 2017, and “List of Nobel Laureates by University Affiliation,” available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_by_university_affiliation accessed March 24, 2017.\n191 MacArthur Foundation, “MacArthur Fellows,” 2017, available at https://www.macfound.org/programs/fellows/strategy/, accessed March 20, 2017.\n192 MacArthur Foundation, “Directory of Fellows, 1981-2016,” 2017, available at https://www.macfound.org/media/fellows_pdf/Fellows_1981-2016_Feb_2017.pdf, accessed March 18, 2017. The grant amount was increased from $500,000 in 2013.\n193 MacArthur Foundation, “MacArthur Fellows,” 2017, available at https://www.macfound.org/programs/fellows/strategy/, accessed March 18, 2017.\n194 MacArthur Foundation, “Directory of Fellows, 1981-2016,” 2017, available at https://www.macfound.org/media/fellows_pdf/Fellows_1981-2016_Feb_2017.pdf, accessed March 18, 2017. Foreign-born recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to non-American parents. Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be native-born. Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.\n195 MacArthur Foundation, “Creativity on the Move - International,” 2016, available at https://www.macfound.org/maps/3/#, accessed March 20, 2017.\n89\nADD-97\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 99 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nFigure VII.2 Share of Foreign-Born among MacArthur Fellowship Recipients in STEM Fields\n2000-2016\n\nNotes: [1] Foreign-born recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to nonAmerican parents. [2] Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be native-born. Sources: [1] MacArthur Foundation, “Directory of Fellows, 1981-2016,” February 2017, available at https://www.macfound.org/media/fellows_pdf/Fellows_1981-2016_Feb_2017.pdf, accessed March 18, 2017. [2] Source documents for each foreign-born recipient’s birthplace are available upon request.\nC. Recognitions in Medicine\ni. Wolf Prize in Medicine • The aim of the Wolf Foundation is to award prizes to outstanding scientists and artists –\nirrespective of nationality, race, color, religion, sex, or political views – for achievements in the interest of mankind and friendly relations among peoples.196 Since 1978, prizes in the science field include Agriculture, Chemistry, Mathematics, Medicine, and Physics.197\n196 Wolf Foundation, “About,” available at http://www.wolffund.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3000&language=eng, accessed March 30, 2017.\n197 Wolf Foundation, “Prizes,” available at http://www.wolffund.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3020, accessed March 30, 2017.\n90\nADD-98\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 100 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• The Wolf Prize has been considered a significant predictor of the Nobel Prize, with more than a third of its recipients going on to win the Nobel Prize.198\n• 36.8 percent of all U.S.-affiliated scientists to have won the Wolf Prize are foreign-born. 40 percent of all U.S.-affiliated scientists to have won the Wolf Prize in the last 16 years are foreignborn.199\n\nii. Top Cancer Researchers\n• “The researchers at the top 7 cancer centers come from more than 50 countries. Among the 56 countries, the leading country of origin for cancer researchers is China, followed, in order, by India, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, Lebanon, South Korea, France, Japan, Israel, Australia, Greece, Spain, Brazil, Taiwan and Argentina. Researchers from China account for 21 percent of the foreign-born cancer researchers at the 7 centers (and 8 percent of all cancer researchers at the 7 centers). India was the country of origin for 10 percent of the foreign-born researchers, followed by Germany and Canada at 7 percent, and the United Kingdom at 6 percent.”200\n• Overall, 42 percent of the researchers at the top 7 cancer research centers are foreign-born, whereas only 13 percent of the U.S population is foreign-born.201\n\n198 Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, “Wolf Prizes in the Sciences and Arts Presented to Nine North Americans,” January 29, 2015, available at http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Health/Wolf-Prizes-in-the-sciences-and-arts-presented-to-nine-North-Americans389466, accessed March 30, 2017.\n199 Wolf Foundation, “About,” available at http://www.wolffund.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3000&language=eng, accessed March 30, 2017. Foreignborn recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories. Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be nativeborn. Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.\n200 Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of Immigrant to Cancer Research in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, February 2013, available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2013/03/nfap_contributions_im migrants_to_cancer_research.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017.\n201 Anderson, Stuart, “Immigrant Scientists Invaluable to the United States,” Frontlines, May/June 2015, available at https://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/ie_mayjun15_front_lines.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017.\n91\nADD-99\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 101 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable VII.2 Share of Foreign-Born Cancer Researchers at America’s Top Cancer Centers\n2010\n\nNote: The author conducted an analysis of 1,500 biographies of cancer researchers on staff at the seven comprehensive cancer centers that received the highest amount of P30 grants from the National Cancer Institute in 2010 based on cancer center website research and direct interviews with individual researchers and cancer center staff. Source: Anderson, Stuart, “Immigrant Scientists Invaluable to the United States,” Frontlines, May/June 2015, available at https://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/ie_mayjun15_front_lines.pdf, accessed March 27, 2017.\niii. Howard Hughes Investigators • The Investigator Program at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute provides long-term funding for\nresearchers in biomedical science. In 2015, at least 12 of the 26 appointed investigators (46 percent) were foreign-born.202\nD. Other Prizes in STEM\ni. Fields Medal • The Fields Medal is regarded as “mathematics’ closest analog to the Nobel Prize.”203 It is\nawarded every four years by the International Mathematical Union to one to four recipients under the age of 40.204\n202 The Vilcek Foundation, “Immigration Nation, American Success: Achievements in Stem,” available at http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html, accessed March 27, 2017.\n203 Wolfram MathWorld, “Fields Medal,” 2017, available at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/FieldsMedal.html, accessed March 20, 2017.\n204 Wolfram MathWorld, “Fields Medal,” 2017, available at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/FieldsMedal.html, accessed March 20, 2017.\n92\nADD-100\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 102 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Since its inception in 1936, 63 percent of Fields Medal recipients affiliated with a United States research institution have been foreign-born.205 Moreover, since 2002, all Fields Medal recipients affiliated with a U.S. research institution were foreign-born.206\n• In 2014, Maryam Mirzakhani, born in Iran, became the first woman to be awarded the Fields Medal since its inception in 1936.207 After two consecutive victories in the International Mathematical Olympiad, she started a Ph.D. program at Harvard University. She is currently a professor of mathematics at Stanford University.208\n\nFigure VII.3 Number of Fields Medalists Affiliated with a U.S. Institution at the Time of the Award\n2000-2016\n\nNote: Recipients' birthplaces were identified through Internet research. Sources: [1] “List of Fields Medalists,” Math Union, 2014, available at http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes/fields/prizewinners/, accessed March 20, 2017. [2] Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.\n205 “List of Fields Medalists,” Math Union, 2014, available at http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes/fields/prizewinners/, accessed March 20, 2017. Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be native-born. Source document for each foreign-born recipient’s birthplace is available upon request.\n206 “List of Fields Medalists,” Math Union, 2014, available at http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes/fields/prizewinners/, accessed March 20, 2017. Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be native-born. Source document for each foreign-born recipient’s birthplace is available upon request.\n207 Carey, Bjorn, “Stanford’s Maryam Mirzakhani Wins Fields Medal,” August 12, 2014, available at http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/august/fields-medal-mirzakhani-081214.html, accessed March 20, 2017.\n208 Carey, Bjorn, “Stanford’s Maryam Mirzakhani Wins Fields Medal,” August 12, 2014, available at http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/august/fields-medal-mirzakhani-081214.html, accessed March 20, 2017.\n93\nADD-101\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 103 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nii. Turing Award\n• The A. M. Turing Award recognizes major contributions of lasting importance to computing. It is sometimes referred to as the “Nobel Prize” of Computing.209\no Since the award’s creation in 1966, 11 of the 51 U.S. winners (22 percent) have been immigrants, and 14 of the 51 U.S. winners (27 percent) have been first or second generation immigrants.210\no From 2010 to 2015, 4 of the 8 U.S. Turing Award recipients (50%) were first or second generation immigrants. Figure VII.4 Share of Turing Award Recipients by Immigrant Generation 1966-2015\n\nNotes: [1] First-Generation immigrants are people born outside the United States and its surrounding territories to parents neither of whom was a U.S. citizen. [2] Second-Generation immigrants are people born in the United States or its surrounding territories, with at least one first-generation parent. [3] Recipients' parents whose birthplace could not be identified were assumed to have been born in the U.S.\nSources: [1] A.M. Turing Award, “Alphabetical Listing of A.M. Turing Award Winners,” available at http://amturing.acm.org/alphabetical.cfm, accessed March 20, 2017. [2] A.M. Turing award winner profiles for each recipient, available at http://amturing.acm.org, accessed March 20, 2017.\n209 Association for Computing Machinery, “A. M. Turing Award,” available at http://amturing.acm.org/, accessed February 21, 2017.\n210 Complete list of Turing Award winners is available at http://amturing.acm.org/alphabetical.cfm, accessed February 21, 2017. Data on award winners’ country of birth are available on each winner’s Turing Award profile.\n94\nADD-102\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 104 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\niii. National Medal of Science\n• The President’s National Medal of Science was established in 1959 as the President’s Award to individuals “deserving of special recognition by reason of their outstanding contributions to knowledge in the physical, biological, mathematical, or engineering sciences.”211 Successful candidates must be U.S. citizens or permanent residents who are applying for U.S. citizenship.212\n\nFigure VII.5 National Medal of Science Recipients by Nativity Status\n1962-2014\n\nSources: [1] National Science Foundation, “The President's National Medal of Science,” available at https://www.nsf.gov/od/nms/results.jsp, accessed March 27, 2017. [2] Recipient birthplaces were identified from their biographies available from National Science & Technology Medals Foundation, “Laureates,” available at https://www.nationalmedals.org/laureates, accessed March 27, 2017.\n• Of the 506 recipients of the National Medal of Science, 28 percent were foreign-born.213 More granularly,\n211 National Science Foundation, “National Medal of Science,” available at https://www.nsf.gov/od/nms/medal.jsp, accessed March 24, 2017.\n212 National Science Foundation, “Medal of Science Fact Sheet,” available at https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=100684, accessed March 24, 2017.\n213 National Science & Technology Medals Foundation, “Laureates,” 2017, available at https://www.nationalmedals.org/laureates/, accessed March 24, 2017.\n95\nADD-103\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 105 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no 41 percent of recipients in Mathematics or Computer Science were foreign-born; o 33 percent of recipients in Physics and Engineering were foreign-born; o 24 percent of recipients in Biology were foreign-born; o 13 percent of recipients in Chemistry were foreign-born; and o 13 percent of recipients in Behavioral and Social Science were foreign-born.\n\niv. Intel Science Talent Search\n• “The Intel Science Talent Search (Intel STS) is the nation's most prestigious pre-college science competition. Intel STS alumni have made extraordinary contributions to science and hold more than 100 of the world’s most coveted science and math honors, including the Nobel Prize and the National Medal of Science. Students are selected based upon their scientific research and also on their overall potential as future leaders of the scientific community.”214\n• Each year, Intel STS recognizes 300 students as semifinalists. From that pool, 40 finalists are invited to Washington D.C. to compete for the top prizes.215\n• “Previously known as the Westinghouse Science Talent Search or the ‘Junior Nobel Prize,’ more than 95 percent of winners of the Intel Science Talent Search (STS) traditionally have pursued science as a career, with 70 percent earning Ph.D.’s or M.D.’s.”216\n• A review of the finalists of Intel STS shows that children of immigrants are a “vital part of America’s future in science and mathematics.”217\no “83 percent (33 of 40) of the finalists of the 2016 Intel Science Talent Search, the leading science competition for U.S. high school students, were the children of immigrants.”218\n\n214 Student Science, “Intel STS 2016 Finalists,” 2015, available at https://student.societyforscience.org/intel-sts-2016-finalists, accessed March 20, 2017.\n215 Student Science, “Intel STS 2016 Finalists,” 2015, available at https://student.societyforscience.org/intel-sts-2016-finalists, accessed March 20, 2017.\n216 Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 3.\n217 Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 3. Research was conducted by the author through interviews with the finalists and their parents.\n218 Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 1.\n96\nADD-104\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 106 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no “Moreover, 75 percent – 30 out of 40 – of the finalists had parents who worked in America on H-1B visas. That compares to 7 children who had both parents born in the United States.”219\no “Parents who were international students were also more likely to have a child as a finalist than native-born parents. A total of 27 of the 40 children – 68 percent – had a parent who came to America as an international student.”220\no “At the 2016 Intel Science Talent Search, 7 of the 9 top awards were earned by the children of immigrants, including first place prizes for innovation and basic research.”221\n• The share of finalists with foreign-born parent(s) has been increasing over time. As shown in Figure VII.6 below, in 2004, 60 percent (24 of 40) of the finalists had at least one foreign-born parent. In 2011, 70 (28 of 40) percent had at least one foreign-born parent, and in 2016, 83 percent (33 out of 40) of the finalists had at least one foreign-born parent.\n\n219 Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 1.\n220 Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 1.\n221 Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 2.\n97\nADD-105\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 107 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure VII.6 Intel Science Talent Search Finalists by Nativity Status of Parents\n2004, 2011, and 2016\n\nNotes: [1] If a finalist had at least one parent who was born outside the U.S. and its territories, then he/she is defined as a “finalist with a foreign-born parent.” [2] The data are based on interviews with finalists and their parents by the National Foundation for American Policy.\nSource: Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 5.\nv. Breakthrough Prize\nThe Breakthrough Prize was founded by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs to honor and to support “important, primarily recent, achievements in the categories of Fundamental Physics, Life Sciences, and Mathematics.”222 The first prizes were awarded in 2012 in Fundamental Physics; prizes in Life Sciences and Mathematics began in 2013 and 2015, respectively.223 Laureates receive $3 million each in prize money.224\n222 “About,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at https://breakthroughprize.org/About, accessed March 20, 2017. 223 “Breakthrough Prizes Laureates 2012-2017,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at\nhttps://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2016, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2017, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2013, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2016, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2017, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2012, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2013, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2017, accessed March 20, 2017. 224 “About,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at https://breakthroughprize.org/About, accessed March 20, 2017.\n98\nADD-106\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 108 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• As shown in Figure VII.7 below, 43 percent of Breakthrough Prize winners who were affiliated with a U.S. institution at the time of the award were foreign-born. In Fundamental Physics, 60 percent of the U.S.-affiliated winners were foreign-born and in Mathematics, 67 percent of the winners were foreign-born.\nFigure VII.7 Share of Foreign-Born Breakthrough Prize Winners Affiliated with a U.S. Institution at the Time of the Award\n2012-2017\n\nNotes: [1] Foreign-born recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to non-American parents. [2] Recipients birthplaces were identified Internet research. If birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be nativeborn. Sources: [1] “Breakthrough Prizes Laureates 2012-2017,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2016, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2017, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2013, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2016, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2017, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2012, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2013, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2017, accessed March 20, 2017. [2] Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.\n99\nADD-107\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 109 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nvi. Simons Investigators\nThe Simons Foundation selects Investigators working in mathematics, physics, theoretical computer sciences, and mathematical modeling of living systems. Eleven of the sixteen Simons Investigators in 2014 were immigrants living in the U.S.225\n\nvii. Blavatnik Awards\nThe Blavatnik Awards are given in the life sciences, physical sciences, engineering, and chemistry. One out of three winners in 2014 was foreign-born. Six of nine winners and finalists were foreign-born in 2014.226\n\nE. Membership in the National Academy of Sciences\n• “Members are elected to the National Academy of Sciences [NAS] in recognition of their distinguished and continuing achievements in original research. Membership is a widely accepted mark of excellence in science and is considered one of the highest honors that a scientist can receive. U.S. immigrants constitute 29% of current NAS members in applied mathematics, 21% in Biochemistry, 37% in engineering sciences, and 36% in mathematics.”227\n\nF. Medal of Freedom\n• The Presidential Medal of Freedom is an award bestowed by the President of the United States that was established in 1963 by President John F. Kennedy. It replaced the Medal of Freedom previously established by President Harry S. Truman in 1945 to honor civilian service during World War II.228\n\n225 The Vilcek Foundation, “Immigration Nation, American Success: Achievements in STEM,” available at http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html, accessed March 11, 2017.\n226 The Vilcek Foundation, “Immigration Nation, American Success: Achievements in STEM,” available at http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html, accessed March 11, 2017.\n227 Hanson, Gordon, H. and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Talent, Immigration, and U.S. Economic Competitiveness,” Compete America Coalition, May 2013, available at https://gps.ucsd.edu/_files/faculty/hanson/hanson_publication_immigration_talent.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 14.\n228 National Archives, “Executive Order 9586 – The Medal of Freedom,” available at https://www.archives.gov/federalregister/codification/executive-order/09586.html, accessed March 27, 2017.\n100\nADD-108\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 110 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• It is the nation’s highest civilian honor presented to individuals who have made “especially meritorious contributions to the security or national interests of the United States, to world peace, or to cultural or other significant private endeavors.”229\n• Recipients have included individuals who have made significant contributions to wide range of areas, including the arts, business and economics, education, history, humanitarian service, law, media, military service, philanthropy, politics and government, religion, sports, and science and technology.\n• As shown in Figure VII.8 below, foreign-born recipients and second-generation immigrants accounted for 29 percent of all Presidential Medal of Freedom recipients since its inception and 28 percent of recipients in the area of science and technology.230\n• Between 1990 and 2016, over 29 percent of the recipients in the area of science and technology were foreign-born or second-generation immigrants. As a point of reference, in 2012, first- and second-generation immigrants accounted for about 24 percent of the U.S. adult population; this share was even lower in the previous decades in which the medal was awarded.231\n\n229 Obama White House, “The Presidential Medal of Freedom,” 2016, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/campaign/medal-of-freedom, accessed March 27, 2017.\n230 Science and Technology areas are medicine, science, space exploration, and computing. 231 Pew Research Center, “Second-Generation Americans,” February 7, 2013, available at\nhttp://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/07/second-generation-americans/, accessed March 27, 2017.\n101\nADD-109\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 111 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure VII.8 Share of Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipients by Nativity Status\nAll Years (1963-2016) and 1990-2016\n\nNotes: [1] Foreign-born recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to nonAmerican parents. Second-generation immigrants are defined as individuals born in the United States or its territories with at least one foreign-born parent. [2] Recipients birthplaces were identified Internet research. If birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be native-born. [3] Science & technology fields are defined as medicine, science, space exploration, and computing.\nSources: [1] United States Senate, \"Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipients,\" available at https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_column_table/Presidential_Medal_of_Freedom_Recipients.htm, accessed March 27, 2017. [2] Pew Research Center, “Second-Generation Americans,” February 7, 2013, available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/07/second-generation-americans/, accessed March 27, 2017. [3] Source document for each first- and second-generation immigrant’s birthplace and/or parent’s birth place is available upon request.\nG. The Carnegie Corporation Pride of America Honorees\n• “Every July 4th, Carnegie Corporation of New York salutes the legacy of Andrew Carnegie by recognizing an inspiring group of well-known naturalized citizens from all walks of life—the ‘Pride of America.’”232\n232 Carnegie Corporation of New York, “About,” 2015, available at http://greatimmigrants.carnegie.org/about/, accessed March 20, 2017.\n102\nADD-110\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 112 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• The 2016 honorees include:233\no The President of Johns Hopkins University, the Dean of the Stern School of Business at New York University, and the Provost and Chief Academic Officer of Carnegie Melon University.\no The CEO of Google, the Cofounder of Venmo, the Cofounder and CEO of Whatsapp, the CTO of Uber Technologies, the President and CEO of Sprint, and Chairman of the Americas of McKinsey & Company.\no A former U.S. Secretary of the Interior, a Brigadier General of the U.S. Army, a retired U.S. Army Captain, a Judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, and two U.S. ambassadors.\no Actors, journalists, scientists, industrialists, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, a Grammy Award-winning singer, an Olympic five-time gold medalist, an artist, a chef, a ballerina, an author, and others.\n\n233 Carnegie Corporation of New York, “2016 Great Immigrant Honorees: The Pride of America,” June 30, 2016, available at https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/2016-great-immigrants-pride-america/, accessed March 20, 2017.\n103\nADD-111\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 113 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nVIII. IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND TERRORISM\n\nContrary to popular belief, studies generally find that immigration may reduce crime rates over time. Empirical data also suggests that immigrants are no more likely to be criminals or to be radicalized than native-born Americans. Regrettably, the prevalence of this public belief makes immigrants, especially those with Islamic belief, more likely to be the victims of hate crime.\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• Studies find that immigration does not increase the crime rate. In the long run, immigration decreases the crime rate, especially the violent crime rate.\n• Academic literature shows that immigrants are less likely to be criminals than U.S. native-born population.\n• Investigation of the Annual Survey of Jails shows that overall, immigrants account for less than 5 percent of the total inmate population in the surveyed jail detention facilities.\n• The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”)234 shows that\no Among the 1,473 crimes reported in this dataset, immigrants account for less than 15 percent of the individuals that were radicalized in the United States.\no Individuals from the six countries in the Executive Order account for only 2.3 percent of the individuals that were radicalized in the United States.\n• UCR Hate Crime Data show that the percentage of total reported hate crimes that have been committed against Muslims in the United States and in Massachusetts spiked after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.\n\n234 Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”) includes a sample of individuals espousing Islamist, far right, far left, or single issue ideologies who have radicalized within the United States to the point of committing ideologically motivated illegal violent or non-violent acts, joining a designated terrorist organization, or associating with an extremist organization whose leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense. START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.\n104\nADD-112\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 114 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nA. Public Opinion A large portion of the American population believes that immigration increases crime across the United States. Compared to immigrants of other ethnicities, Latin American and Middle Eastern immigrants are believed to have a greater negative impact on the United States.\n• Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Survey (March/April 2015)235\no 50 percent of respondents say that immigrants in the United States are making crime worse nationally. 36 percent of respondents say that immigrants in the United States are making crime worse in their local communities.\no 34 percent of respondents say that immigrants in the United States are making social and moral values worse nationally.\no Only 20 percent of respondents viewed the impact of Middle Eastern immigrants as positive (compared to 26 percent for Latin American immigrants, 44 percent for European immigrants, and 47 percent for Asian immigrants).\no 49 percent of respondents think immigration should be decreased.\n• Pew Research Center Survey (September 2014)236\no 50 percent of respondents believe that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among believers (increased from 25 percent in 2002).\n• German Marshall Fund (2010)237\no 32 percent believe legal immigrants increase crime.\no 58 percent believe illegal immigrants increase crime.\n• Gallup Poll (June 2007)238\no 58 percent of respondents think immigration is making crime worse.\no 37 percent of respondents think immigration is making social and moral values worse.\n\n235 Pew Research Center, “Chapter 4: U.S. Public Has Mixed Views of Immigrants and Immigration,” in Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population Growth and Change Through 2065: Views of Immigration’s Impact on U.S. Society Mixed, September 2015, available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-28_modern-immigrationwave_REPORT.pdf, accessed February 22, 2017.\n236 Pew Research Center, “Growing Concern about Rise of Islamic Extremism at Home and Abroad,” September 2014, available at http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/09/9-10-14-Islamic-Extremism-release.pdf, accessed February 22, 2017.\n237 Bansak, Cynthia et al., “Frontiers of Immigration Research,” in Economics of Immigration, Routledge: New York: 2015.\n238 Gallup, “Immigration,” available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx, accessed February 22, 2017.\n\n105\nADD-113\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 115 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• National Identity Survey by International Social Survey Programme (1995 and 2003)239 o People in OECD countries believe immigrants increase crime rates (~30 percent in the United States).\n\nB. Immigration and Crime\n\ni. Existing Research Finds No Impact of Immigration on Increasing Crime\nExisting research and empirical evidence show little support of the public belief that immigration increased crime in the United States.\n• As illustrated in Figure VIII.1, between 2010 and 2014, the increase of the share of immigrants in the total U.S. population coincides with the decreasing trend in the rate of criminal offenses. This relationship is also present at the state level.\n• Figure VIII.2 plots the correlation coefficients between the rate of crime offences and the immigrant share for each state in the United States between 2010 and 2014. A negative correlation coefficient means that an increase in the immigrant share is correlated with a decrease in the crime rate. Among the 51 states, the correlation coefficient is negative for 42 states.\n\n239 Bianchi, Milo, Paolo Buonanno, and Paolo Pinotti. “Do Immigrants Cause Crime?” Journal of the European Economic Association 10(6), 2012: 1318-1347, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01085.x/full, accessed March 24, 2017, Figure 1.\n106\nADD-114\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 116 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nFigure VIII.1 Comparison of the Immigrant Share in the U.S. Population and Rate of Criminal Offenses\n2010 – 2014\n\nSources: [1] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Data: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race, Summarized Yearly, 2014,” Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36400.v1. [2] Brown, Anna, and Renee Stepler, “Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States,” 2005-2013 and 2014, available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-about-the-data/ and http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states/.\n107\nADD-115\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 117 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nFigure VIII.2 Correlation Coefficients between Rate of Crime Offenses and Immigrant Share in the United States\n2010 – 2014\n\nNote: The correlation coefficient is a measure that determines the degree to which two variables' movements are associated. The range of values for the correlation coefficient is -1.0 to 1.0. In particular, a negative correlation coefficient means that an increase in the immigrant share is correlated with a decrease in the crime rate.\nSources: [1] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Data: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race, Summarized Yearly, 2014,” Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36400.v1, accessed March 24, 2017. [2] Brown, Anna, and Renee Stepler, “Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States,” 2005-2013 and 2014, available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-about-the-data/ and http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states/, accessed March 24, 2017.\nThe academic literature finds that not only is there a lack of a positive relationship between immigration and crime, the empirical evidence generally indicates that immigration might actually reduce crime, especially violent crime, over time. Studies tend to support the observation of one sociologist, who noted, “Cities of concentrated immigration are some of the safest places around.” 240 The literature has found:\n• “[C]ities with high crime rates tend to have large numbers of immigrants. However, controlling for the demographic characteristics of the cities, recent immigrants appear to have no effect on crime rates.”241\n240 Sampson, Robert J., “Rethinking Crime and Immigration,” Contexts 7(1), Winter 2008: 28-31, available at https://contexts.org/articles/files/2008/01/contexts_winter08_sampson.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 30.\n241 Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. “Cross-city Evidence on the Relationship between Immigration and Crime,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 17(2), June 1998: 457-493, available at\n108\nADD-116\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 118 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• “After controlling for a host of demographic and economic characteristics, […] immigration does not increase crime rates, and some aspects of immigration lessen crime in metropolitan areas.”242\n• “[A] systematic, but small impact of immigration on crime.”243\n• “[C]ities with the largest increases in immigration between 1990 and 2000 experienced the largest decreases in homicide and robbery during the same time.”244\n• “Consistent with the revitalization thesis, results show that the increased size of the foreign-born population reduces lethal violence over time. Specifically, we find that neighborhoods with a larger share of immigrants have fewer total, non-Latino White, and Latino homicide victims.”245\n• As a response to President Trump’s campaign message, one study tested whether immigrants were responsible for the violent and drug-related crime in the United States. “Data uniformly show no association between immigrant population size and increased violent crime. However, there appears to be a small but significant association between undocumented immigrant populations and drug-related arrests. […] Results largely contradict the Trump Hypothesis: no evidence links Mexican or undocumented Mexican immigrants specifically to violent or drugrelated crime. Undocumented immigrant associations with drug-related crime are minimal, though significant. The Trump Hypothesis consequently appears to be biased toward rhetoric rather than evidence.” 246\n\nhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199822)17:3%3C457::AID-PAM4%3E3.0.CO;2-F/abstract, accessed March 24, 2017. 242 Reid, Lesley Williams, Harald E. Weiss, Robert M. Adelman, and Charles Jaret. “The Immigration–Crime Relationship: Evidence across US Metropolitan Areas.” Social Science Research 34(4), March 2005: 757-780, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X05000104, accessed March 24, 2017, 757. 243 Spenkuch, Jörg L, “Understanding the Impact of Immigration on Crime,” American Law and Economics Review 16(1), September 2013: 177-219, available at https://academic.oup.com/aler/article-abstract/16/1/177/135166/Understandingthe-Impact-of-Immigration-on-Crime?redirectedFrom=fulltext, accessed March 24, 2017, 177. 244 Wadsworth, Tim, “Is Immigration Responsible for the Crime Drop? An Assessment of the Influence of Immigration on Changes in Violent Crime between 1990 and 2000,” Social Science Quarterly 91(2), April 2010: 531-533, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00706.x/abstract, accessed March 24, 2017. 533. 245 Martinez, Ramiro, Jacob I. Stowell, and Matthew T. Lee, “Immigration and Crime in an Era of Transformation: A Longitudinal Analysis of Homicides in San Diego Neighborhoods, 1980–2000,” Criminology 48(3), August 2010: 797-829, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2010.00202.x/abstract, accessed March 24, 2017, 797. 246 Green, David, “The Trump Hypothesis: Testing Immigrant Populations as a Determinant of Violent and Drug‐Related Crime in the United States,” Social Science Quarterly 97(3), May 2016: 506-524, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ssqu.12300/abstract, accessed March 24, 2017, 506.\n109\nADD-117\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 119 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• These findings also largely carry over to studies conducted in Canada,247 the UK,248 and Italy.249\n\nii. Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Criminals than Native-Born Individuals\n• “No matter how you look at the issue, the inescapable conclusion is that immigrants are, on average, less prone to criminality than the U.S. native-born population.”250\no “According to an original analysis of data from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) conducted by the authors of this report, roughly 1.6 percent of immigrant males age 1839 are incarcerated, compared to 3.3 percent of the native-born. This disparity in incarceration rates has existed for decades, as evidenced by data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. In each of those years, the incarceration rates of the native-born were anywhere from two to five times higher than that of immigrants.”251\no “The 2010 Census data reveals that incarceration rates among the young, less educated Mexican, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan men who make up the bulk of the unauthorized population are significantly lower than the incarceration rate among native-born young men without a high-school diploma. In 2010, less-educated native-born men age 18-39 had an incarceration rate of 10.7 percent—more than triple the 2.8 percent rate among foreign-born Mexican men, and five times greater than the 1.7 percent rate among foreign-born Salvadoran and Guatemalan men.”252\n\n247 Zhang, Haimin, “Immigration and Crime: Evidence from Canada,” CLSRN Working Paper, April 2014 available at http://www.clsrn.econ.ubc.ca/workingpapers/CLSRN%20Working%20Paper%20no.%20135%20-%20Zhang.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.\n248 Bell, Brian, Francesco Fasani, and Stephen Machin, “Crime and Immigration: Evidence from Large Immigrant Waves,” Review of Economics and Statistics 95(4), 2013: 1278-1290, available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/59323/1/CEP_Bell_Fasani_Machin_Crime-and-immigration_2013.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.\n249 Bianchi, Milo, Paolo Buonanno, and Paolo Pinotti. “Do Immigrants Cause Crime?” Journal of the European Economic Association 10(6), 2012: 1318-1347, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01085.x/full, accessed March 24, 2017.\n250 Ewing, Walter A., Daniel E. Martínez, and Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States,” American Immigration Council Special Report, July 2015: 1-25, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_unit ed_states.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 4.\n251 Ewing, Walter A., Daniel E. Martínez, and Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States,” American Immigration Council Special Report, July 2015: 1-25, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_unit ed_states.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 1.\n252 Ewing, Walter A., Daniel E. Martínez, and Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States,” American Immigration Council Special Report, July 2015: 1-25, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_unit ed_states.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 1-2.\n110\nADD-118\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 120 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• For the male population ages 18 to 39 “the incarceration rate of the U.S.-born (3.51 percent) was four times the rate of the foreign-born (0.86 percent). The latter was half the 1.71 percent rate for non-Hispanic white natives, and thirteen times less than the 11.6 percent incarceration rate for native black men. The advantage for immigrants vis-à-vis natives applies to every ethnic group without exception. Almost all of the Asian immigrant groups have lower incarceration rates than the Latin American groups (the exception involves foreign-born Laotians and Cambodians, whose rate of 0.92 percent is still well below that for non-Hispanic white natives).”253\n• “[I]mmigrants are significantly less antisocial despite being more likely to have lower levels of income, less education, and reside in urban areas.”254\n• “[F]irst generation immigrants are less likely to be involved in serious offending and to evidence persistence in offending, and appear to be on a path toward desistance much more quickly than their peers.”255\n• The Investigation of the Annual Survey of Jails256 shows that, among most of the jail detention facilities, immigrants constitute only a small share of the total inmate population in the majority of the jail detention facilities between 2010 and 2014 (Table VIII.1). Over all, immigrants account for less than 5 percent of the total inmate population in the surveyed jail detention facilities.257 Around 50 percent of these immigrant inmates were likely to be detained due to immigration violation, as oppose to violation of other criminal codes.258\n\n253 Rumbaut, Rubén G., Roberto G. Gonzales, Golnaz Komaie, Charlie V. Morgan, and Rosaura Tafoya-Estrada, “Immigration and Incarceration: Patterns and Predictors of Imprisonment among First- and Second-Generation Young Adults,” Immigration and Crime: Ethnicity, Race, and Violence, 2006: 64-89, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2631709, accessed March 24, 2017, 64.\n254 Vaughn, Michael G., Christopher P. Salas-Wright, Matt DeLisi, and Brandy R. Maynard, “The Immigrant Paradox: Immigrants are Less Antisocial than Native-born Americans,” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 49(7), 2014:1129-1137, available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00127-013-0799-3, accessed March 24, 2017.\n255 Bersani, Bianca E., Thomas A. Loughran, and Alex R. Piquero, “Comparing Patterns and Predictors of Immigrant Offending among a Sample of Adjudicated Youth,” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 43(11), 2014: 1914-1933, available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10964-013-0045-z, accessed March 24, 2017.\n256 The Annual Survey of Jails gathered data from a nationally representative sample of local jails on jail inmate populations, jail capacity, and related information. U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Survey of Jails,” available at https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/go2300.html, accessed March 22, 2017.\n257 The total inmate population is 2,986,670. Among them, 148,752 of the total inmate population are non-citizens. 258 Among the 148,752 non-citizen inmates, 73,741 of them have U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement flag.\n111\nADD-119\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 121 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable VIII.1\n\nThe Proportion of Non-Citizens within Jail Detention Facilities\n\n2010 – 2014\n\nProportion of Non-Citizens in Facility\n\nCount of Facilities within Proportion Range\n\nAverage ICE Inmates as Proportion of Total in These\nFacilities\n\n1% or Less\n\n2,577\n\n0.29%\n\n1% to 10%\n\n1,334\n\n1.53%\n\n10% to 25%\n\n314\n\n6.83%\n\n25% to 50%\n\n118\n\n22.32%\n\n50% to 75%\n\n34\n\n39.78%\n\n75% to 100%\n\n32\n\n6.12%\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Survey of Jails,” available at https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/go2300.html, accessed March 22, 2017.\n• These statistics are consistent with the results of a study by U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Among their study sample, GAO found that “the criminal aliens had an average of 7 arrests, 65 percent were arrested at least once for an immigration offense[.]”259\n• “[Ruled] out deportation as an important mechanical factor for the observed differences in institutionalization” because “[f]irst, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act increased the list of criminal acts for which noncitizens must be detained.” And “[s]econd, the speed of removal of deportable aliens may critically affect immigrants’ institutionalization rates.” 260\n• “[T]he process of migration selects individuals who either have lower criminal propensities or are more responsive to deterrent effects than the average native. Immigrants who were already in the country reduced their relative institutionalization probability over the decades; and the newly arrived immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s seem to be particularly unlikely to be involved in criminal activity, consistent with increasingly positive selection along this dimension.” 261\n\n259 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Criminal Alien Statistics: Information on Incarcerations, Arrests, and Costs,” GAO11-187, March 2011: 1-64, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11187.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 19.\n260 Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. “Why Are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 13229, July 2007: 128, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13229.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.\n261 Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. “Why Are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 13229, July 2007: 128, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13229.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.\n112\nADD-120\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 122 of 165\n\nJune 2017\nC. Immigration and Terrorism\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\ni. The Link between Immigration and Terrorism is Unclear\nThere are fewer studies on the relationship between immigration and terrorism.\n• “[I]migrants stemming from terrorist-prone states moving to another country are indeed an important vehicle through which terrorism does diffuse. Having said that, the findings also highlight that migrant inflows per se actually lead to a lower level of terrorist attacks.”262\n• “[M]ore migration generally (i.e., when immigration is not necessarily linked to terrorism in the migrants’ countries of origin) into a country is associated with a lower level of terrorist attacks.”263\n\nii. Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Radicalized than Native-Born Individuals\nEmpirical analyses suggest that immigrants are no more likely to be criminals or to be radicalized than native-born individuals.\n• The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”)264 shows that, among the 1,473 crimes reported in this dataset, immigrants account for less than 15% of the individuals that were radicalized in the United States (Table VIII.2).\n\n262 Bove, Vincenzo, and Tobias Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of Politics 78(2), 2016: 572-588, available at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/684679, accessed March 24, 2017.\n263 Bove, Vincenzo, and Tobias Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of Politics 78(2), 2016: 572-588, available at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/684679, accessed March 24, 2017.\n264 Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”) includes a sample of individuals espousing Islamist, far right, far left, or single issue ideologies who have radicalized within the United States to the point of committing ideologically motivated illegal violent or non-violent acts, joining a designated terrorist organization, or associating with an extremist organization whose leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense. START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.\n113\nADD-121\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 123 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable VIII.2\n\nResidency Status of Individuals Radicalized in the United States 1948 – 2004265\n\nResidency Status\n\nNumber of Individuals\n\nPercent of Total\n\nBorn Citizen\n\n1,253\n\n85.06%\n\nNaturalized Citizen\n\n61\n\n4.14%\n\nLegal Permanent Resident\n\n41\n\n2.78%\n\nTemporary Resident\n\n9\n\n0.61%\n\nUndocumented Resident\n\n9\n\n0.61%\n\nUnknown\n\n100\n\n6.79%\n\nTotal\n\n1,473\n\n100.00%\n\nSource: START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.\n\n265 The years during which the 1,473 individuals’ activity first came to public attention. START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individualradicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.\n114\nADD-122\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 124 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Individuals from the six countries in the Executive Order account for only 2.3% of the individuals that were radicalized in the United States (Table VIII.3).\n\nTable VIII.3\n\nNumber of Individuals Radicalized in the United States by Country of Origin\n\nU.S. and the Six Countries in the Executive Order 1948 – 2004266\n\nCountry of Origin\n\nNumber of Individuals\n\nPercent of Total\n\nUnited States Somalia Yemen Iran Sudan Syria Libya\n\n1,253 25 5 1 1 1 0\n\n85.06% 1.70% 0.34% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.00%\n\nTotal\n\n1,473\n\n100.00%\n\nSource: START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.\n\nD. Immigrants Are More Likely to Be the Victims of Hate Crime\nThe academic research and empirical evidences shows that immigrants do not increase crime rates, nor are they more likely to be criminals or to be radicalized. If anything, the prevalence of negative public belief regarding immigrants, especially those with Islamic belief, makes these immigrants more likely to be the victims of hate crime.\n• “Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: greater chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; higher fertility; lower female labour force participation; and lower English proﬁciency.”267\n• “Literature prior to 9/11 indicated that the most frequently targeted minority groups that were victims of hate crimes were Blacks, followed by Jews … Following 9/11, however, there was a\n\n266 The years during which the 1,473 individuals’ activity first came to public attention. START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individualradicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.\n267 Gould, Eric D., and Esteban F. Klor. “The Long‐run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West.” The Economic Journal 126.597 (2016): 2064-2114, available at https://scholars.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/eklor/files/2015_ej.pdf, accessed April 3, 2017.\n\n115\nADD-123\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 125 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nsignificant rise in the number of attacks on individuals who were or perceived to be of Arab and/or Muslim descent.”268\n• “[C]ounties experiencing increases in general hate crime, far-right hate crime, and non-right-wing terrorism see associated increases in far-right hate crime, far-right terrorism, and far-right hate crime, respectively.”269\n• Figure VIII.3 and Figure VIII.4 show the percentage of total reported hate crimes that have been committed against Muslims in the United States and in Massachusetts, respectively. There was a noticeable spike after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.\n\nFigure VIII.3 Reported Hate Crimes against Muslims in the United States\n1992 - 2014\n\nNote: Anti-religous hate crimes include Anti-Jewish, Anti-Catholic, Anti-Protestant, Anti-Other Religions, Anti-Multi Religious, and AntiAthiesm/Agnosticism incidents. Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Hate Crime Data,” 2014, Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36397.v1, accessed March 1, 2017.\n268 Nelson, Matthew S., et al. “Hate Crimes in Post-9/11 Pennsylvania: Case Characteristics and Police Response Revisited.” Race and Justice 6.4 (2016): 303-324, available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alese_Wooditch/publication/284723886_Hate_Crimes_in_Post911_Pennsylvania_Case_Characteristics_and_Police_Response_Revisited/links/5657c2ee08ae4988a7b5831b.pdf, accessed April 3, 2017.\n269 Mills, Colleen E., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak. “Extreme Hatred Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are ‘Close Cousins’ or ‘Distant Relatives’.” Crime & Delinquency (2015): 0011128715620626, available at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0011128715620626, accessed April 3, 2017.\n116\nADD-124\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 126 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure VIII.4 Reported Hate Crimes against Muslims in the Massachusetts\n1992 - 2014\n\nNotes: [1] Anti-religious hate crimes include Anti-Jewish, Anti-Catholic, Anti-Protestant, Anti-Other Religions, Anti-Multi Religious, and Anti-Atheism/Agnosticism incidents. [2] There were no reported hate crimes in Massachusetts before 2000. Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Hate Crime Data,” 2014, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36397.v1, accessed March 1, 2017.\n117\nADD-125\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 127 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nIX. RHETORIC AND HATE INCIDENTS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• In the ten days following the election, Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) recorded 867 hate incidents, not including instances of online harassment. The number of incidents recorded peaked on November 9th, the day following the election.\n• SPLC reports that between 2015 and 2016, the number of hate groups in the U.S. increased from 892 to 917, an increase of 3 percent. In the same one year period, the number of anti-Muslim hate groups increased 197 percent - from 34 groups in 2015 to 101 in 2016.\n• According to SPLC’s online survey of over 10,000 K-12 educators:\no “Nine out of 10 educators who responded have seen a negative impact on students’ mood and behavior following the election; most of them worry about the continuing impact for the remainder of the school year.”\no “Eight in 10 report heightened anxiety on the part of marginalized students, including immigrants, Muslims, African Americans and LGBT students.”\no “Four in 10 have heard derogatory language directed at students of color, Muslims, immigrants and people based on gender or sexual orientation.”\no “Over 2,500 educators described specific incidents of bigotry and harassment that can be directly traced to election rhetoric. These incidents include graffiti (including swastikas), assaults on students and teachers, property damage, fights and threats of violence.\n• An analysis of President Trump’s tweets indicates that the number of tweets mentioning “Muslims,” “Mexicans,” and “immigrants” increased by 219 percent from 2014 to 2015, when he entered the presidential race.\n\n118\nADD-126\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 128 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nA. Hate Crimes and Bias Incidents\n• In the ten days following the election, Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) recorded 867 hate incidents, not including instances of online harassment.270 The number of incidents recorded peaked on November 9th, the day following the election.271\nFigure IX.1272 Number of Reported Hate Incidents in the Ten Days Following Election Day\n\n• In the first 34 days following the election, SPLC counted 1,094 hate instances.273\n270 Amend, Alex, Troy Dabney, Cassie Miller, Angbeen Saleem, Will Tucker, and Alexandra Werner-Winslow, “Ten Days After: Harassment and Intimidation in the Aftermath of the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, November 29, 2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-aftermath-election, accessed March 27, 2017.\n271 Amend, Alex, Troy Dabney, Cassie Miller, Angbeen Saleem, Will Tucker, and Alexandra Werner-Winslow, “Ten Days After: Harassment and Intimidation in the Aftermath of the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, November 29, 2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-aftermath-election, accessed March 27, 2017.\n272 Amend, Alex, Troy Dabney, Cassie Miller, Angbeen Saleem, Will Tucker, and Alexandra Werner-Winslow, “Ten Days After: Harassment and Intimidation in the Aftermath of the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, November 29, 2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-aftermath-election, accessed March 27, 2017.\n273 “Update: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Months Following the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, December 16, 2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-followingelection, accessed March 27, 2017.\n119\nADD-127\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 129 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• According to the SPLC, 37% of these 1,094 incidents “directly referenced either President-elect Trump, his campaign slogans, or his infamous remarks about sexual assault.”274\n• According to the SPLC, “there was even evidence that Trump’s attacks on Muslims during 2015 — when he called for a ban on Muslims entering the U.S., suggested a registry for Muslims already here, and proposed to surveil mosques — had had an effect that early. The FBI reported that anti-Muslim hate crimes went up by 67% in 2015, while other categories rose only slightly.”275\n\nB. Organized Hate Groups\n• The SPLC also noted a spike in the distribution of “white nationalist (47 reports), KKK (7), and antiSemitic posters and fliers [following the election]. In total, [the SPLC] captured 57 separate incidents with a spike coming on the first Monday following the election.”276\n• SPLC reports that between 2015 and 2016, the number of hate groups in the U.S. increased from 892 to 917, an increase of 3 percent.277 In the same one year period, the number of anti-Muslim hate groups increased 197 percent - from 34 groups in 2015 to 101 in 2016.278\nA study from FiveThirtyEight found a strong overlap between commenters who post in the r/The_Donald subreddit and other “hate-based” discussion pages. Using latent semantic analysis, an approach that measures the co-occurrence of commentators across several Reddit discussion pages, researchers found that when they filtered out commenters from the r/The_Donald who also commented on the most popular general political discussion pages (e.g., r/politics), the remaining commenter pool was most similar to a number of “hate-based” discussion pages with such as characteristics as “virulently misogynistic” and “open and enthusiastic racism.” No hate-based discussion pages resulted from performing the same process for discussion pages dedicated to other presidential candidates.279\n\n274 “Update: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Months Following the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, December 16, 2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-followingelection, accessed March 27, 2017.\n275 Potok, Mark, “The Trump Effect,” Intelligence Report, February 15, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2017/trump-effect, accessed March 27, 2017.\n276 “Update: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Months Following the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, December 16, 2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-followingelection, accessed March 27, 2017.\n277 Potok, Mark, “The Year in Hate and Extremism,” Intelligence Report, February 15, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism, accessed March 27, 2017.\n278 Potok, Mark, “The Year in Hate and Extremism,” Intelligence Report, February 15, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism, accessed March 27, 2017.\n279 Martin, Trevor, “Dissecting Trump’s Most Rabid Online Following,” FiveThirtyEight, March 23, 2017, available at https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/dissecting-trumps-most-rabid-online-following/, accessed March 28, 2017.\n120\nADD-128\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 130 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nC. Anxiety in K-12 Education\n• The SPLC also conducted an online survey with K-12 educators. More than 10,000 individuals responded, with the following results:280\n• “Nine out of 10 educators who responded have seen a negative impact on students’ mood and behavior following the election; most of them worry about the continuing impact for the remainder of the school year.”281\n• “Eight in 10 report heightened anxiety on the part of marginalized students, including immigrants, Muslims, African Americans and LGBT students.”282\n• “Four in 10 have heard derogatory language directed at students of color, Muslims, immigrants and people based on gender or sexual orientation.”283\n“Over 2,500 educators described specific incidents of bigotry and harassment that can be directly traced to election rhetoric. These incidents include graffiti (including swastikas), assaults on students and teachers, property damage, fights and threats of violence.”284\n\nD. President Trump’s Twitter Rhetoric\n• An analysis of President Trump’s tweets indicates that the number of tweets mentioning “Muslims,” “Mexicans,” and “immigrants” increased by 219 percent from 2014 to 2015, when he entered the presidential race.\n\n280 Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March 27, 2017.\n281 Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March 27, 2017.\n282 Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March 27, 2017.\n283 Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March 27, 2017.\n284 Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March 27, 2017.\n121\nADD-129\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 131 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• In addition, as shown in Table IX.1, President Trump’s tweets have focused more consistently on “Muslims” and “Islam” compared to “Mexican” and “Immigrant”.\n\nTable IX.1 Number of Trump’s Tweets over Time\n\nNote: Categories are identified by appearance of the key word. Source: “Trump Twitter Archive”, available at http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com, accessed March 27, 2017.\n• Using a time-series sentiment analysis of President Trump’s tweets, it is possible to identify spikes in negativity and positivity.285 We are able to measure sentiment through the AFINN dataset, which lists English words rated from negative five to positive five by Finn Årup Nielsen from the Technical University of Denmark. (see Figure VIII.2).286\no As shown in Figure VIII.2, the average sentiment of Trump’s tweets is negative in the month of March and the period of June to August of 2016. This negative sentiment corresponds with two of the three peaks in retweets over that year, with about 2.5 million retweets in March and about 4 million retweets in July. This pattern indicates the particularly pervasive nature of President Trump’s negative rhetoric.\n\n285 Textual data processed using the tidytext package in R. See: Silge J and Robinson D (2016). “tidytext: Text Mining and Analysis Using Tidy Data Principles in R,” available at http://doi.org/10.21105/joss.00037, accessed April 14, 2017.\n286 For example, see Nielsen, Finn Årup, “A new ANEW: Evaluation of a word list for sentiment analysis in microblogs”, Proceedings of the ESWC2011 Workshop on ‘Making Sense of Microposts’: Big things come in small packages 718 in CEUR Workshop Proceedings: 93-98. May, 2011, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1103.2903, accessed April 14, 2017.\n122\nADD-130\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 132 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nFigure IX.2 Analysis of Sentiment and Retweet of Trump’s Tweets\nJan 01, 2016 – Dec 31, 2016\n\nNote: Sentiment score of each month is calculated as the average of the sentiment score of each tweet posted by President Trump in that month. Sources: [1] “Trump Twitter Archive,” available at http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com, accessed March 27, 2017. [2] Nielsen, Finn Årup, “A new ANEW: Evaluation of a word list for sentiment analysis in microblogs”, Proceedings of the ESWC2011 Workshop on ‘Making Sense of Microposts’: Big things come in small packages 718 in CEUR Workshop Proceedings: 93-98. May, 201, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1103.2903, accessed April 14, 2017.\n123\nADD-131\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 133 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nX. PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES AND OTHER SELECTED COUNTRIES\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• Many of the immigrants from the countries affected by the Executive Order are well educated, have high income, and become U.S. citizens at a higher rate than the other foreign-born naturalized citizens.\n• Immigrants cluster in certain areas when moving to the U.S.\n• The share of a state’s population that is foreign born is positively correlated with the share of people in the state that believe that immigrants strengthen American society.\n• Immigrants from countries affected by the Executive Order spend more time on education and less time on housework and other work relative to a population of native-born U.S. population with similar characteristics.\n• Immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador spend more time on housework and less time on personal activities such as leisure and sports relative to a population of native-born U.S. population with similar characteristics.\n\nA. Overview of Immigrants from the Six Countries\n• Individuals Affected: The Executive Order issued by President Trump on March 6, 2017, suspends entry into the U.S. for 90 days of people without current visas from the following countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Additionally, the order bans refugees for 120 days and caps refugees at 50,000 people for 2017.287\no In 2015, green cards were issued to 31,258 individuals from these countries.288\no In 2015, there were nearly 65,000 temporary visits from the six targeted countries, including: recreational or business travelers (49,412); students enrolled on nonimmigrant visas (12,205); temporary workers on non-immigrant work visas and their families (883); Fiancés of U.S. citizens (669).\n\n287 Executive Order, “Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States,” March 6, 2017, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states, accessed April 7, 2017.\n288 Singhvi, Anjali, and Alicia Parlapiano, “Trump’s New Immigration Ban: Who is Barred and Who is Not,” The New York Times, March 6, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/trump-travel-bangroups.html?_r=0, accessed March 9, 2017.\n124\nADD-132\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 134 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no Individuals from these countries comprised 3.6 percent of new legal permanent residents from 1999 to 2015.\no The ban does not apply to U.S. citizens, dual nationals with a passport from a country not affected by the ban, diplomats, or government officials.\n• Education: Many immigrants from these six countries are well educated.289\no Approximately 90 percent of those people from Iran and Libya have at least a high school education.290\no Many immigrants from these countries have earned bachelor’s degrees and advanced degrees: Iran (54 percent), Libya (59 percent), Sudan (36 percent), and Syria (37 percent). The U.S. national average is approximately 30 percent.\n• Income: Immigrants from Iran have a median income greater than the U.S. median income ($54,645); the median income of immigrants from Syria and Libya is similar to the U.S. median. Immigrants from Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia earn a median income significantly below the U.S. median.\n• Arrival Dates: Nearly half of Iranian immigrants arrived in the U.S. before 1990, while about two thirds of Somalis and Sudanese have moved to the U.S. since 2000.\n• Citizenship: The majority of immigrants from these six countries become U.S. citizens at a rate above the overall percentage of foreign-born naturalized citizens (46.6 percent).\n\n289 Fessenden, Ford, et al., “Immigrants From Banned Nations: Educated, Mostly Citizens and Found in Every State,” The New York Times, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/politics/trumpimmigration-ban-demographics.html, accessed February 17, 2017.\n290 Fessenden, Ford, et al., “Immigrants From Banned Nations: Educated, Mostly Citizens and Found in Every State,” The New York Times, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/politics/trumpimmigration-ban-demographics.html, accessed February 17, 2017.\n125\nADD-133\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 135 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\ni. Department of Homeland Security Data – Summary Tables\n\na. Countries Covered Under Current Travel Ban\nTable X.1 Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Country of Birth\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nTable X.2 Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status\nby Broad Class of Admission and Country of Birth Fiscal Year 2015\n\nNotes: [1] D indicates that data are withheld by the DHS to limit disclosure. [2] A dash represents zero.\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\n\n126\nADD-134\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 136 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable X.3 Refugee Arrivals by Country of Nationality\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nNotes: [1] Libya did not appear in the DHS dataset. [2] D indicates that data are withheld by the DHS to limit disclosure. [3] A dash represents zero.\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nTable X.4 Individuals Granted Asylum Affirmatively by Country of Nationality\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nNotes: [1] D indicates that data are withheld by the DHS to limit disclosure. [2] A dash represents zero. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nTable X.5 Individuals Granted Asylum Defensively by Country of Nationality\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\nNote: Libya did not appear in the DHS dataset. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\n127\nADD-135\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 137 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable X.6 Persons Naturalized by Country of Birth\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nTable X.7 Aliens Apprehended by Country of Nationality\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\nNotes: [1] Beginning in 2008, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO. [2] Beginning in 2009, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO and administrative arrests conducted under the 287(g) program. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nb. Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador Table X.8\nPersons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Country of Birth Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\n128\nADD-136\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 138 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable X.9 Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by\nBroad Class of Admission and Country of Birth Fiscal Year 2015\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nTable X.10 Individuals Granted Asylum Affirmatively by Country of Nationality\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nTable X.11 Individuals Granted Asylum Defensively by Country of Nationality\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\n\n129\nADD-137\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 139 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable X.12 Persons Naturalized by Country of Birth\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nTable X.13 Aliens Apprehended by Country of Nationality\nFiscal Years 2006 to 2015\n\nNotes: [1] Beginning in 2008, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO. [2] Beginning in 2009, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO and administrative arrests conducted under the 287(g) program. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nB. Where Immigrants Move\ni. Summary • Immigrants cluster in certain geographical areas when moving to the U.S. • Data from the American Community Survey are used to examine immigrant populations by\nstate. Immigrants from Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya combined make up the largest share of the state immigrant population Minnesota (6.6 percent), followed by Michigan and West Virginia. • Immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala combined make up the largest share of the state immigrant population in New Mexico (68.9 percent), followed by Texas and Arizona.\n130\nADD-138\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 140 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nii. Literature Review\n• A review of the literature on immigration patterns finds:\no New immigrants to the United States are concentrated in the top Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). Three quarters of new immigrants are concentrated in the top 25 SMSAs.291\no More educated immigrants are more likely to live outside of these top 25 SMSAs, are more likely to move after initial settlement in the United States, and are generally less geographically concentrated.292\no Seventy-four percent of the U.S. immigrant population is clustered in six states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois.293\no Immigrants are more geographically concentrated when English is not the first language spoken at home.294\no Ninety-four percent of the foreign born in the U.S. live in urban areas.295\n\niii. Descriptive Tables from the American Community Survey\n• Data from the American Community Survey are used to summarize where immigrants move from the six countries included in the executive order, as well as immigrants from Mexico and Central America. The analysis counts all foreign-born residents of the United States as immigrants, even if they have since been naturalized.\n\n291 Bartel, Ann P., “Where Do the New U.S. Immigrants Live?” Journal of Labor Economics 7(4), pp. 371-391, available at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/298213, accessed February 25, 2017, p. 389.\n292 Bartel, Ann P., “Where Do the New U.S. Immigrants Live?” Journal of Labor Economics 7(4), pp. 371-391, available at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/298213, accessed February 25, 2017, p. 390.\n293 Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul W. Miller, “Where Immigrants Settle in the United States,” The Institute for the Study of Labor, August 2004, pp. 1-24 , available at http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1231, accessed February 25, 2017, p. 3.\n294 Chiswick, Barry R and Paul W. Miller, “Where Immigrants Settle in the United States,” The Institute for the Study of Labor, August 2004, pp. 1-24 , available at http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1231, accessed February 25, 2017, p. 12.\n295 Chiswick, Barry R and Paul W. Miller, “Where Immigrants Settle in the United States,” The Institute for the Study of Labor, August 2004, pp. 1-24, available at http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1231, accessed February 25, 2017, p. 6.\n131\nADD-139\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 141 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nTable X.14 Number of Immigrants by State Executive Order Six Countries\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n132\nADD-140\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 142 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Immigrants from Iran make up 0.9 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states:\nTable X.15 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Iran\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n• Immigrants from Libya make up 0.03 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states: Table X.16 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Libya\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n133\nADD-141\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 143 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Immigrants from Somalia make up 0.2 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states:\nTable X.17 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Somalia\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n• Immigrants from Sudan make up 0.09 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states:\nTable X.18 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Sudan\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n134\nADD-142\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 144 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Immigrants from Syria make up 0.2 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states:\nTable X.19 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Syria\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n• Immigrants from Yemen make up 0.12 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states: Table X.20 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Yemen\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n135\nADD-143\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 145 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Mexico and Central America are also major sources of immigrants to the United States.\nTable X.21 Number of Immigrants by State El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico\n\nNote: Tables for Central America include immigrant populations from El Salvador and Guatemala. These two countries make up the largest proportion of Central American immigrants coming to the U.S. (Migration Policy Institute, “Central American Immigrants in the United States,” September 25, 2015, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states, accessed March 4, 2017.) Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n136\nADD-144\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 146 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Immigrants from Mexico make up 26.8 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states:\nTable X.22 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Mexico\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n• Immigrants from El Salvador make up 2.9 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states:\nTable X.23 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, El Salvador\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n137\nADD-145\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 147 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Immigrants from Guatemala make up 2.1 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside predominately in the following ten states:\nTable X.24 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Guatemala\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n\n138\nADD-146\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 148 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\niv. Public Opinion on Immigration\n• A relationship can be seen between where immigrants move, and public opinion on immigration in those states. The foreign born share of a total state population is positively correlated with the share of state respondents that believe that immigrants strengthen American society.\n\nFigure X.1 Foreign Born Share of Total State Population vs. Public Opinion on Immigration\n\nSources: [1] U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017. [2] PRRI, 2015 Atlas of American Values, available at http://ava.publicreligion.org/, accessed March 15, 2017.\nC. How Immigrants Spend Their Time\ni. Summary • Immigrants from Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya spend more time on\neducation and less time on housework and other work relative to a population of native-born U.S. population with similar characteristics. Among working adults age 25 and older, immigrants from these countries work more and continue to invest more time in education compared to the native-born U.S. population.\n139\nADD-147\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 149 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador spend more time on housework and sleep and less time on personal activities such as leisure and sports relative to the nativeborn U.S. population.\n\nii. Descriptive Statistics from the 2003-2015 Current Population Survey and American Time Use Survey\n• Compared to a U.S. population of similar age, sex, and states of residence, immigrants from the six countries spend approximately four hours more per week on education. They spend approximately 0.13 hours (or 7 minutes) more per week on average on spiritual activities.\nFigure X.2 Hours per Week Spent on Activity Comparison of U.S. Immigrants from One of the Six Predominantly Muslim Countries Identified in the Executive Order to U.S.-Born Population\n\nNotes: [1] U.S.-born observations are weighted such that the age, sex, and state of residence composition of the U.S.-born population is equal to the immigrant population. [2] Results are based on 283 U.S. immigrants born in Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen; and 1,271 U.S.-born respondents. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey, 2003-2015, available at https://www.bls.gov/tus/data.htm, accessed March 15, 2017.\n140\nADD-148\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 150 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Among working age adults age 25 and older, immigrants from the six countries invest more time in education, work, and sleep compared to U.S.-born population of similar age, sex, and state residence. They spend approximately 4.0 hours less per week on personal activities such as leisure and sports.\n\nFigure X.3 Hours per Week Spent on Activity Comparison of U.S. Immigrants from One of the Six Predominantly Muslim Countries Identified in the Executive Order to U.S.-Born Population Working Population At Least 25 Years Old\n\nNotes: [1] U.S.-born observations are weighted such that the age, sex, and state of residence composition of the U.S.-born population is equal to the immigrant population. [2] Results are based on 168 U.S. immigrants born in Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen; and 637 U.S.-born respondents. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey, 2003-2015, available at https://www.bls.gov/tus/data.htm, accessed March 15, 2017.\n141\nADD-149\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 151 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Compared to a U.S. population of similar age, sex, and states of residence, immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador spend approximately 3.4 hours more per week on housework. They sleep more than three hours more than the U.S. population, but they spend 6.6 fewer hours on personal activities.\nFigure X.4 Hours per Week Spent on Activity Comparison of U.S. Immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, or El Salvador to U.S.-Born Population\n\nNotes: [1] U.S.-born observations are weighted such that the age, sex, and state of residence composition of the U.S.-born population is equal to the immigrant population. [2] Results are based on 7,326 U.S. immigrants born in Mexico, Guatemala, or El Salvador; and 19,243 U.S.-born respondents. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey, 2003-2015, available at https://www.bls.gov/tus/data.htm, accessed March 15, 2017.\n142\nADD-150\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 152 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nD. Appendix: Statistics Pertaining to Iraq\nAppendix Table X.1 Select Immigration Statistics for Iraq: 2006 to 2015\n\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\nAppendix Table X.2 Iraqi Born Persons: Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Broad Class of Admission: Fiscal Year\n2015\nSource: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.\n\n143\nADD-151\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 153 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\nAppendix Table X.3 Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Iraq\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.\n\n144\nADD-152\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 154 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nXI. THE IMPACT OF THE TRAVEL BAN ON THE U.S. TRAVEL INDUSTRY\n\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n• Flight bookings from January 28 to February 4, 2017, have dropped by 6.5 percent overall in comparison to the previous year:\no Bookings from the at-issue countries have dropped by 80 percent. Bookings from the Middle East have dropped by 23 percent.\n• Flight searches for the United States dropped by 17 percent on January 27, 2017, compared to Obama’s final two weeks in office.\no The decline in demand is not limited to the targeted countries. Demand in 103 of 122 countries studied showed a decline in searches for flights to the United States, with China being one of the largest drops (over 40 percent).\n• Spending by tourists (including general spending and airfare) from the Middle East has increased from 2.4 to 3.5 percent of total tourist spending in the United States from 2010 to 2015.\n• The tourism trade balance with the Middle East increased from a deficit of $1.1 billion in 2010 to a surplus of $2.4 billion in 2015.\nA. Changes in Travel Demand Before/After Travel Ban\ni. Flight Search Data\n• About Hopper:\no Hopper is a mobile application that uses predictive analysis of flight price data to provide users with deals on flights.296\no Hopper published two reports analyzing flight searches following the travel ban – one on February 7, 2017, and an updated analysis on February 23, 2017. They compared average daily flight search queries for flights to the US originating in 122 countries during the period starting three weeks prior to President Trump's inauguration (January 20, 2017) to February 1, 2017.\n\n296 “About,” Hopper, available at http://www.hopper.com/corp/about.html, accessed April 6, 2017. 145\nADD-153\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 155 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no Hopper collected the data – the results of consumer airfare searches – for the study from several unnamed “Global Distribution System partners.”297\n• Initial Findings: o “Flight search demand from international origins to the US has dropped 17% overall since Trump's inauguration and implementation of the travel ban, compared to the final weeks of the Obama presidency.”298 o “Flight search demand to the US has fallen in 94 of 122 origin countries.”299 o “Weekly search demand for flights to the US is down 33% from countries included in the travel ban.”300\n\nTable XI.1 Percentage Change in Flight Search Demand from Pre-Inauguration to Announcement and Implementation\nof Travel Ban\n\nBanned 301 Skipped302 Other\n\nBefore Inauguration: 12/29\n– 1/18 371,590\n1,542,859\n61,552,322\n\nAfter Travel Ban Announced: 1/26 – 2/1 247,616\n1,244,192\n50,898,344\n\nPercentage Change -33%\n-19%\n-17%\n\nSource: Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 7, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed February 21, 2017.\n\n297 Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 21, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed April 14, 2017; Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travelto-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.\n298 Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 7, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed February 21, 2017.\n299 Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 7, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed April 21, 2017.\n300 Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.\n301 Banned countries are Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. Hopper has no data for Yemen. 302 “Skipped” countries are selected Muslim-majority countries not affected by the travel ban: Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,\nIndonesia, Qatar, UAE, and Azerbaijan.\n146\nADD-154\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 156 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• Updated Findings:\no “Flight search demand was weakest on the day the travel ban was announced [on January 27]; down 17% compared to Obama's final two weeks in office.” 303\no Demand recovered slightly after the Executive Order was successfully challenged in multiple US District courts, but as of February 23 was still well below expected levels.304\no The decline in demand is not limited to the targeted countries. In fact, according to Hopper, 103 of 122 countries studied showed a decline in searches for flights to the United States, with China being one of the largest drops (over 40%).305\no The average decline in demand was about 22%.306\no Hopper also provides analysis comparing the change from expected daily demand in 2016 and 2017 respectively. That analysis shows that daily flight demand has remained below expectations for most of the days since the travel ban was announced. Notably, the change from expected daily demand was typically positive during the same period in 2016. 307\n\n303 Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.\n304 Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.\n305 Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.\n306 Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.\n307 Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.\n147\nADD-155\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 157 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable XI.2 Top 6 Countries with Largest Negative Percentage Change in Flight Search Demand\n\n12/29 – 1/18\n\n1/26 – 2/21 Percentage Change\n\nChina Bahrain Sudan Iraq Uganda Saudi Arabia\n\n20,194,053 99,747 13,312\n128,424 30,313\n331,335\n\n11,981,180 59,218 7,962 76,847 18,766\n206,082\n\n-40.7% -40.6% -40.2% -40.2% -38.1% -37.8%\n\nSource: Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017, available at https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/15EgtC4szaY32KUkpVRNOokkjntqmkE65ASaLylEX8PE/pubhtml, accessed April 3, 2017.\n\n• Kayak Data:\no Kayak is a technology company that searches travel websites, such as online travel agencies and airline, hotel, and car rental websites, to consolidate information for travelers.308\no Analyses of daily searches on Kayak for flights to the U.S. between equivalent periods in 2017 and 2016 show a decline in demand of 8.5% from the seven at-issue countries in the period immediately following the first executive order.\no Daily searches from Muslim-majority not at-issue countries declined by 15.3% in the same period.\n\n308 “About Kayak,” Kayak, available at https://www.kayak.com/about, accessed May 17, 2017. 148\nADD-156\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 158 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable XI.3\nPercentage Change in Daily Average Searches for Flights to the U.S. from 2016 to 2017\n\n1/1 - 1/19\n\n1/27 - 4/6\n\nSeven At-Issue Countries Other Muslim-Majority Countries Europe Russia\n\n22.6% 5.3% -3.6% -5.4%\n\n-8.5% -15.3% -2.1% -14.6%\n\nNotes: [1] The table shows the percentage change in the daily average searches for flights to the U.S. between equivalent periods in 2017 and 2016. [2] President Trump got sworn in on January 20, 2017. [3] President Trump signed the first travel ban executive order on January 27, 2017. [4] The Seven At-Issue Countries are Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. [5] The Other Muslim-Majority Countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.\nSource: Kayak Travel Data from January 1 - April 6, 2016; January 1 - April 6, 2017.\n\nii. Flight Booking Data • About ForwardKeys:\no ForwardKeys is a market research firm focused on the global travel industry.309 o ForwardKeys analyzes millions of travel booking transactions each day and publishes both\nhistorical data and predictions of future travel patterns.310\n309 “ForwardKeys – Who We Are,” ForwardKeys, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenuemanagement/article/forwarddata.html, accessed April 6, 2017.\n310 “ForwardKeys – Who We Are,” ForwardKeys, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenuemanagement/article/forwarddata.html, accessed April 6, 2017.\n149\nADD-157\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 159 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\no In February 2017, ForwardKeys published a study on the impact of the travel ban on air travel to the US based on data collected from over 200,000 travel agencies globally.311\no The study was covered by Reuters, who cited it as evidence that travel ban negatively impacted global demand for travel to the US.312\n• Initial Reports (as of February 4, 2017):\no Between January 28, 2017, and February 4, 2017 (the week following the initial travel ban) air travel bookings from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen decreased 80% compared to the same period in 2016.313\no The effect is not limited to the countries listed in the ban: net international air travel bookings were down 6.5% compared to the same period in 2016 while cancellations were up 12%.314\no As of February 4, airfare already booked for the following three months was 14.7% lower among the seven countries affected by the ban compared to the prior year.315\no Year-over-year booking trends from every region of the world were lower on February 4 than they had been on January 27.316\n• Additional Reports as of February 25, 2017:\no Following the suspension of the ban on February 4, 2017, flight bookings increased modestly, but decreased again following the announcement on February 17 that a new ban would be enacted. In the period from February 5 to February 16, total international\n\n311 “Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed April 3, 2017.\n312 “Trump Travel Restrictions Hit Demand for Visits to U.S.: Study,” Reuters, February 7, 2017, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-travel-idUSKBN15N007, accessed April 6, 2017.\n313 “Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed April 3, 2017.\n314 “Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed April 3, 2017.\n315 “Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed April 3, 2017.\n316 “Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed April 3, 2017.\n150\nADD-158\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 160 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nflight bookings to the US were 2.2% higher than they had been during the same period in 2016. However, following the announcement of the new ban, flight bookings from February 17 to February 25 were 4.0% lower compared to the same period in 2016.317\nTable XI.4 Percentage Change in Flight Bookings to the United States by Origin Region\nfrom 2016 to 2017\n\n1/28 – 2/4\n\n2/5 – 2/16\n\n2/17 – 2/25\n\nSeven At-Issue Countries\n\n-80%\n\n-1.1%\n\n-4.0%\n\nMiddle East & Africa Asia Pacific Europe The Americas Overall\n\n-23%\n-14% -7.5% 2.3% -6.5%\n\n-9.7%\n3.9% -0.2% 6.4% 2.2%\n\n-5.7%\n2.6% -3.8% -0.9% -4.0%\n\nSource: “Middle East Meltdown: US Travel to Islamic countries collapses in wake of Trump Ban,” ForwardKeys, March 6, 2017, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-onair-travels-to-the-USA-update.html, accessed April 3, 2017.\n\niii. Additional Sources\n• Emirates Airlines reported that booking rates to the United States fell 35% following the travel ban. Emirates noticed an “instantaneous” effect and had not fully recovered as of March 9, 2016. However, the chief executive of Qatar Airways stated that his airline had not experienced a decline in demand for flights to the US.318\n\n317 “Middle East Meltdown: US Travel to Islamic countries collapses in wake of Trump Ban,” ForwardKeys, March 6, 2017, available at http://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USAupdate.html, accessed April 3, 2017.\n318 “Emirates Airlines Concerned About Latest U.S. Travel Order,” CNBC, March 9, 2017, available at http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/emirates-airlines-concerned-about-latest-us-travel-order.html, accessed March 12, 2017.\n151\nADD-159\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 161 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• The Global Business Travel Association (GBTA) polled its members and found that 30% of companies expected to reduce overall business travel.319\n• According to the GBTA, for every 1% of annual decrease in business travel spending, the United States loses roughly 71,000 jobs, $5 billion in GDP, $3 billion in wages, and $1.2 billion in tax revenue.320\n• According to the GBTA, in the week following the travel ban, general uncertainty among travelers caused a loss of approximately $185 million in travel bookings.321\n• Cheapflights.com saw international searches for flights to the United States drop following the ban. 322\no From January 27 to January 29, search volume decreased 38% compared to the previous weekend.\no From February 10 to February 14, search volume decreased 16% compared to the average volume in January.\n• Swedish search engine Flygresor.se noted a 47% decline in searches for flights to the United States following the enactment of the travel ban, compared to the same period in 2016.323\n• A study by Tourism Economics (a research firm associated with Oxford Economics) found that Los Angeles County alone could potentially lose 800,000 international visitors in the next\n\n319 “Press Release: President Trump's Travel Ban Creates Likely Short- and Long-term Travel Disruption,” GBTA, February 2, 2017, available at http://www.gbta.org/PressReleases/Pages/rls_020217.aspx?Source=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Egbta%2Eorg%2Flists%2Fnew s%2FAllitems_all%2Easpx, accessed April 6, 2017.\n320 McCormick, Mike, “The Ruling on the Travel Ban: A Lose-Lose Scenario for Business Travel and the Economy,” GBTA, February 9, 2017, available at http://blog.gbta.org/2017/02/09/the-ruling-on-the-travel-ban-a-lose-lose-scenario-forbusiness-travel-and-the-economy/, accessed March 2, 2017.\n321 McCormick, Mike, “The Ruling on the Travel Ban: A Lose-Lose Scenario for Business Travel and the Economy,” GBTA, February 9, 2017, available at http://blog.gbta.org/2017/02/09/the-ruling-on-the-travel-ban-a-lose-lose-scenario-forbusiness-travel-and-the-economy/, accessed March 2, 2017.\n322 Vora, Shivani, “After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines,” New York Times, February 20, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html, accessed March 12, 2017.\n323 Vora, Shivani, “After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines,” New York Times, February 20, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html, accessed March 12, 2017.\n152\nADD-160\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 162 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nthree years due to the travel ban, which would amount to approximately $736 million in tourism-related spending. 324\n\nB. Statistics Regarding Travel and Tourism by Immigrants\n\ni. Air Travel\n\n• In 2015, 1,343,347 people visited the United States from the Middle East, representing a 9.6 percent increase from 2014. 325\n\nTable XI.5 Middle East Arrivals to the United States over Time\n\n2010\n\n2011\n\n2012\n\n2013\n\n2014\n\n2015\n\nNumber of Arrivals\n\n735,549 810,688 925,398 1,058,122 1,225,500 1,343,347\n\nAs % of Overseas Arrivals\n\n2.8%\n\n2.9%\n\n3.1%\n\n3.3%\n\n3.5%\n\n3.5%\n\n% Change from Prior Year\n\n10.5%\n\n10.2%\n\n14.1%\n\n14.3%\n\n15.8%\n\n9.6%\n\nSource: Monthly Arrivals to the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/research/monthly/arrivals/index.asp.\n\nii. Tourism Revenue\n• Tourism from the Middle East represented $8.67 billion of “exports” in 2015. The United States had a positive $2.36 billion net balance of trade with the Middle East for travel and tourism. 326\n\n324 Vora, Shivani, “After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines,” New York Times, February 20, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html, accessed March 12, 2017.\n325 “I-94 Program: 2015 Monthly Arrivals Data,” Table C – Section 2, U.S. Department of Commerce, ITA, National Travel and Tourism Office, June 2016, available at http://travel.trade.gov/view/m-2015-I-001/index.asp, accessed April 14, 2017.\n326 “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middleeast.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017.\n153\nADD-161\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 163 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\n• The 1.3 million tourists who visited the US from the Middle East in 2015 spent $8.1 billion during their visits (excluding airfare), amounting to roughly $6,200 per person.327\no This is about $3,000 more, per capita, than tourists from Europe, who spent approximately $3,200 per person (excluding airfare) in the United States in 2015.328\n• While the greatest number of tourists come from North America (Canada, Mexico), these tourists spend much less per visit than people who come from farther.329\n• European tourists, while still a large percentage of total arrivals, are decreasing in number.330\n• Spending by tourists (including general spending and airfare) from the Middle East has increased from 2.4% to 3.5% of total tourist spending in the United States from 2010 to 2015.\n331\no Excluding airfare, the percentage increased 2.7% to 4.0%. Middle Eastern visitors’ spending on airfare has decreased from 1.5% to 1.4% of total foreign spending on airfare to the United States.332\n\n327 “2015 Market Profile: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2015_Middle_East_Market_Profile.pdf, accessed April 6, 2017.\n328 “2015 Market Profile: Europe,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2015_Europe_Market_Profile.pdf, accessed April 6, 2017.\n329 Martin, Hugo, “Foreign Tourists’ Spending in U.S. Rises to New Record,” LA Times, February 22, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/22/business/la-fi-foreign-tourists-20130222, accessed April 6, 2017.\n330 Martin, Hugo, “Foreign Tourists’ Spending in U.S. Rises to New Record,” LA Times, February 22, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/22/business/la-fi-foreign-tourists-20130222, accessed April 6, 2017.\n331 “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middleeast.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017; “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: All Countries (Total),” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2006-2015-new.pdf, accessed April 21, 2017.\n332 “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middleeast.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017; “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: All Countries (Total),” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2006-2015-new.pdf, accessed April 21, 2017.\n154\nADD-162\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 164 of 165\n\nJune 2017\n\nThe Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.\n\nTable XI.6 Middle East Travel and Tourism Receipts as a Percentage of All International Travel and Tourism Receipts\n\n2010\n\n2011\n\n2012\n\n2013\n\n2014\n\n2015\n\nMiddle East Receipts: Overall\n\n2.4%\n\n2.7%\n\n2.6%\n\n3.2%\n\n3.5%\n\n3.5%\n\nMiddle East Receipts: Excluding Airfare\n\n2.7%\n\n3.0%\n\n2.9%\n\n3.6%\n\n4.0%\n\n4.0%\n\nMiddle East Receipts: Airfare\n\n1.5%\n\n1.5%\n\n1.5%\n\n1.5%\n\n1.4%\n\n1.4%\n\nSources: [1] “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade\nAdministration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middle-east.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017. [2] “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: All Countries (Total),” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2006-2015-new.pdf, accessed April 21, 2017.\n• New York City in particular will be affected by a declining volume in tourists from the Middle East. In 2015, 41% of all tourists originating in the Middle East visit New York City.333 Meanwhile, foreign tourists in the city spend about four times as much, on average, as domestic tourists.334\n\n333 “2015 Market Profile: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2015_Middle_East_Market_Profile.pdf, accessed April 6, 2017.\n334 McGeehan, Patrick, “New York Expects Fewer Foreign Tourists, Saying Trump is to Blame,” New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/nyregion/new-york-foreign-tourists-trump-policies.html?_r=0, accessed April 3, 2017.\n155\nADD-163\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 150-2\n\nFiled: 11/28/2017 Pg: 165 of 165\n\nwww.MassTLC.org\nADD-164\n\n\f", "Case 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 4 Filed 10/10/17 Page 1 of 2\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND\n\nEBLAL ZAKZOK, SUMAYA HAMADMAD, FAHED MUQBIL, JOHN DOE No. 1, and JANE DOES No. 2-3,\nPlaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ELAINE DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, and REX W. TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State,\nDefendant.\n\nCivil Action No. TDC-17-2969\n\nORDER It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs are granted leave to file the Motion for Preliminary Injunction proposed in Notice of Intent to File, ECF No. 3. As agreed upon by the parties, Plaintiffs’ Motion will be limited to joining the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to be filed by the Plaintiffs in TDC-17-0361 International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et. al. and filing a 10-page Supplement limited to issues not raised in the International Refugee Assistance Project Motion, such as standing and harm to Plaintiffs. That Supplement is due October 10, 2017 at 12:00 noon. Defendants will file a consolidated Response to the Motions filed in this case and in TDC-17-0361 International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump\n\n\fCase 1:17-cv-02969-TDC Document 4 Filed 10/10/17 Page 2 of 2\net. al. and TDC-17-2921 Iranian Alliances Across Borders et al. v. Trump et al. on the briefing schedule and within the parameters previously set forth in those cases. The Zakzok Plaintiffs will be permitted to file a separate Reply that need not be limited to issues raised in their Supplement, but which may not raise any new issues. That Reply must not exceed 10 pages and must be filed by October 14, 2017 at 12:00 noon.\n\nDate: October 10, 2017\n\n/s/ THEODORE D. CHUANG United States District Judge\n\n2\n\n\f", "Appeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 1 of 36\n\nNos. 17-2231(L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ________________________________\nINTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, a project of the Urban Justice Center, Inc., on behalf of itself and its clients; HIAS, INC., on behalf of itself and its clients;\nJOHN DOES #1 AND 3; JANE DOE #2; MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., on behalf of itself and its members; MUHAMMED METEAB; PAUL HARRISON; IBRAHIM AHMED MOHOMED; ARAB AMERICAN ASSOCIATION\nOF NEW YORK, on behalf of itself and its clients, Plaintiffs - Appellees,\nand ALLAN HAKKY; SAMANEH TAKALOO, Plaintiffs,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF STATE;\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ELAINE C. DUKE; in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; REX TILLERSON, in his official\ncapacity as Secretary of State; DANIEL R. COATS, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Defendants - Appellants.\n________________________________\n[Caption continued on inside cover] ________________________________\nAMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF\nDEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND REVERSAL\nChristopher J. Hajec Julie B. Axelrod Michael M. Hethmon Elizabeth A. Hohenstein Mark S. Venezia IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE 25 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 335 Washington, DC 20001 Phone: (202) 232-5590 litigation@irli.org\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 2 of 36\n\n________________________________\nNo. 17-2231(L) On Cross-Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,\nSouthern Division (8:17-cv-00361-TDC)\n___________________\nNo. 17-2232 (8:17-cv-02921-TDC) ________________________________\nIRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BORDERS; JANE DOE #1, JANE DOE #2, JANE DOE #3, JANE DOE #4, JANE DOE #5, JANE DOE #6, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\nv.\nDONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ELAINE C. DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security; KEVIN K.\nMCALEENAN, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JAMES MCCAMENT, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S.\nCitizenship and Immigration Services; REX TILLERSON; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants – Appellants. ________________________________\nNo. 17-2233 (1:17-cv-02969-TDC) ________________________________\nEBLAL ZAKZOK; SUMAYA HAMADMAD; FAHED MUQBIL; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3, Plaintiffs – Appellees,\n\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 3 of 36\n\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Amicus curiae the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI) is a 501(c)(3) not for profit charitable organization incorporated in the District of Columbia. IRLI has no parent corporation. It does not issue stock.\n\ni\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 4 of 36\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......................................................... i\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv\nINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE............................................................................1\nRULE 29(a)(4)(E) STATEMENT .............................................................................2\nARGUMENT .............................................................................................................2\nI. THE FEDERAL COURTS LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HEAR PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). ..............3\nA. Plaintiffs Lack A Cause Of Action Under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)........4\nB. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Under The APA. ....................................................................................6\nII. THE DISTRICT COURT FLOUTED CLEARLY-APPLICABLE PRECEDENT IN REACHING ITS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE HOLDING…. ........................................................................................................9\nIII. THE DISTRICT COURT’S REASONING LEADS TO MANY ABSURD CONSEQUENCES. .............................................................................................12\nA. A. Private Litigants Could Enjoin President Trump’s War Against The Islamic State. ....................................................................................................12\nB. The District Court’s Reasoning Pits The First Amendment Against Itself..................................................................................................................17\nC. The District Court’s Reasoning Implies That What Is Constitutional For One President Is Unconstitutional For Another...............................................19\nD. The District Court’s Reasoning Would Put The United States At The Mercy Of Foreign Threats. ..............................................................................22\nii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 5 of 36\n\nCONCLUSION ........................................................................................................24\n\niii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 6 of 36\n\nCASES\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nAlexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)……………………………………....4\n\nAm. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986)………………………………………………. 18\n\nBrown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 48 (1985)………………………………………...…17\n\nBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)………………………………………………17\n\nCatholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, 622 F. Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Cal. 2008)……………………………………....3\n\nChang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1988)…………………………..20\n\nCity of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)………………………………...6\n\nDalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994)………………………………………….7, 8\n\nDetroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Can., 189 F. Supp. 3d 85 (D.D.C. 2016)………………………………………..8, 9\n\nEmp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)………………………………………….2\n\nFleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994)……………………………………………..….14\n\nFranklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1994)………………………………..7, 9\n\nHagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)……………………………………………6\n\nHaitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992)………………………………………….…..7\n\nHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)…………………………….10, 16\n\nHawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2017)…………………………………....5 iv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 7 of 36\n\nIn re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App. 2010)……………………………….……21 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)…………………………..….9 King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100 (1928)…...………………………………6 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)………………………………...……10 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,\n511 U.S. 375 (1994)……………………………………………………..…..3 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)…………………………….…..20 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,\n508 U.S. 384 (1993)………………………………………………………..18 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993)………………………………………………6 Louhghalam v. Trump, No. 17-10154,\n2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 2017)…………………..…9 Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341 (B.I.A. 2010)…………………………...….1 Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016)…………………...…..1 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)…………………………………….......20 O’Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979)……………………………...…13 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001)..…………...…17 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,\n515 U.S. 819 (1995)………………………………………………………..18 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)…………………………..5 Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 16-5287\n(D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 28, 2016)………………………………………..……1\nv\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 8 of 36\n\nSnyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)…………………………………………....17 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896)…………………………………..……….20 Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540,\n2017 U.S. LEXIS 6367 (Oct. 24, 2017)………………………………….….5 Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)……………………………………...….13 Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2001)…………………………....8 United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995)………………………………………..3 United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159 (1805)…………………………………….…6 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)…………………………………………………………...….10 Victorian v. Miller, 796 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1986)….………………………………..3 Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,\n74 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D.D.C. 2014)…………………………………………..1 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)……………………………….…….14 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017)……………………………………...…4, 5 STATUTES 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)…………………………………………………………….….6 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)…………………………………………………….…..2, 5 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)……………………………………………………………….....7 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. Const., art. III, § 2……………………………………………………………21 U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 1…………………………………………………...….16\nvi\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 9 of 36\n\nU.S. Const. amend. I……………………………………………………….....passim\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\n82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017)……………………………………………………...…2\nAdam Withnall, Iraq Crisis: Isis Declares its Territories a New Islamic State with Restoration of Caliphate” in Middle East, Independent (June 30, 2014)…………………………..…..12\nBlack’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)...……………………………...………….14\nCaliph, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary……………………………………..12\nCode of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 5, 28 U.S.C.S. app…………………………………………………..21\nHolly Yan and Dakin Andone, Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017)………………….…...14\nMoloch, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary........…………………………........22\nPresident Donald Trump, Remarks in Joint Address to Congress (Feb. 28, 2017)……………………………………………………………..14\nRobert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393 (1996)………………21\nThe Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Wikipedia (June 8, 2017)……………..13\n\nvii\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 10 of 36\n\nINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The Immigration Reform Law Institute (“IRLI”) is a non-profit 501(c)(3) public interest law firm dedicated to litigating immigration-related cases on behalf of, and in the interests of, United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, and also to assisting courts in understanding and accurately applying federal immigration law. IRLI has litigated or filed amicus curiae briefs in a wide variety of cases, including Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 74 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D.D.C. 2014); Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 16-5287 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 28, 2016); and Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341 (B.I.A. 2010). IRLI submits this amicus curiae brief to assist this Court in understanding that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs-appellees’ statutory claims, and in drawing out the disastrous legal consequences of the constitutional holding of the court below. All of the parties have stated in writing that they consent to the filing of this amicus curiae brief.\n\n1\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 11 of 36\n\nRULE 29(a)(4)(E) STATEMENT No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and no person or entity, other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, has contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.\nARGUMENT The United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“the District Court”) found that most of the statutory claims of plaintiffs-appellees (“plaintiffs”) were unlikely to succeed. J.A. 1041-53. The District Court did find, however, that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that Presidential Proclamation 9645 (“the Proclamation”), found at 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017), violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) barring national-origin discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. J.A. 1034-40. In fact, the District Court and this Court lack jurisdiction to hear that claim. This portion of the INA provides no private right of action; neither is jurisdiction provided, nor sovereign immunity waived, by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which does not apply to presidential actions such as the Proclamation. The District Court went on to find that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims under the Establishment Clause. JA. 1053-76. In reaching this holding, the District Court defied a large body of United States Supreme Court\n2\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 12 of 36\n\nprecedents establishing that, in First Amendment challenges, courts should give no more than limited scrutiny to presidential directives in the area of war, foreign relations, and the admission of aliens. The District Court’s reasoning, moreover, carries with it a train of striking absurdities that unmistakably shows the wisdom of these same precedents.\nI. THE FEDERAL COURTS LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HEAR PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1152(A)(1)(A). Federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian\nLife Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They possess “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the presumption is that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Want of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and federal courts have an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and dismiss claims over which they lack jurisdiction. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995); see, e.g., Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, 622 F. Supp. 2d 865, 876, 883-85, 887-91 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing INA claims because Congress had not provided a private right of action and going on to consider constitutional claims); Victorian v. Miller, 796 F.2d 94, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding the\n3\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 13 of 36\n\ndismissal of appellants’ statutory claims because of a lack of a private right of action while considering their constitutional claims).\nCongress did not provide a private right of action for persons to sue under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Nor does the APA provide plaintiffs with a private right of action, or otherwise waive sovereign immunity.\nA. Plaintiffs Lack A Cause Of Action Under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created explicitly by Congress. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). “Statutory intent” to create a private right of action is “determinative,” and without it, a private right of action “does not exist and a court may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter or how compatible with the statute.” Id. at 286-87. Determining whether causes of action exist under the specified provisions of the INA begins and ends with the “text and structure” of the provisions themselves. Id. at 288. If the statute does not “evince Congress’ intent to create the private right of action asserted,” then “no such action will be created through judicial mandate.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017). When it comes to statutory rather than constitutional claims, federal courts must be even more careful to recognize only explicit causes of action. When Congress enacts a statute, “there are specific procedures and times for considering its terms and the proper means for its enforcement.” Id. at 1856. Therefore, it is “logical”\n4\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 14 of 36\n\nto assume that Congress will be “explicit if it intends to create a private cause of action.” Id.\nThe District Court found that the Proclamation violated § 1152(a)(1)(A) of the INA by discriminating on the basis of nationality. J.A. 1034-40. This provision reads: “[N]o person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”\nThis provision breathes not the slightest hint of congressional intent to confer a private right of action. Therefore, under Sandoval, no such private right of action may be created by the courts. Needless to say, neither plaintiffs nor the District Court adduced any occasion when a court has found a private right of action under this provision. The District Court did cite Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2017), a since-vacated opinion, Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6367 (Oct. 24, 2017), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on one case in which the Supreme Court considered, and rejected, claims under another section of the INA. J.A. 1029 (citing Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 768); Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 768 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187-88 (1993)). But the Supreme Court made no mention of a private right of action in Sale, or any other basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the claim the Court rejected, and thus cannot be taken to have set a jurisdictional\n5\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 15 of 36\n\nprecedent. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 (1974) (“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us”) (citing United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 172 (1805); King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 134-35 n.21 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).\nFederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction rather than common law courts free to fashion remedies at will for parties who have suffered statutory wrongs. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.”). The need for a private right of action before federal courts may hear statutory claims prevents exactly the kind of free-ranging analysis, not sanctioned by the intent of Congress, that the District Court engaged in here.\nB. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Statutory Claims Under The APA.\nThe APA does not provide a private right of action here, or otherwise confer jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1993) (“[U]nder § 701(a)(2) agency action is not subject to judicial review to the extent that such action is committed to agency discretion by law . . . . § 701(a)(2) makes it clear that review is not to be had in those rare circumstances where the relevant\n6\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 16 of 36\n\nstatute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute (law) can be taken to have committed the decisionmaking to the agency’s judgment absolutely.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) gives the president the widest discretion to suspend the entry of classes of aliens “in the national interest.” Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1507 (11th Cir. 1992).\nFurthermore, the Proclamation is unreviewable under the APA because it is the action of the president. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 468-77 (1994) (holding that decisions of the president’s subordinates about military base closings were not reviewable under the APA because the statute in that case conferred decision-making authority on the president, and, because the president is not an agency, the APA does not apply to actions of the president) (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796-01 (1994)). See id. at 477 (“Where a statute . . . commits decisionmaking to the discretion of the President, judicial review of the President’s decision is not available.”). Here, contrary to the District Court’s holding that the APA permitted that court to enjoin actions taken pursuant to the Proclamation by agencies, J.A. 1031, the Proclamation is an exercise of power delegated to the president, and thus presidential action, even when it is (as all\n\n7\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 17 of 36\n\npresidential actions must be) implemented by subordinates. As the United States\nDistrict Court for the District of Columbia has explained:\nFinally, an unreviewable presidential action must involve the exercise of discretionary authority vested in the President; an agency acting on behalf of the President is not sufficient by itself. Since the Constitution vests the powers of the Executive Branch in one unitary chief executive officer, i.e., the President, an agency always acts on behalf of the President. Nonetheless, there is a difference between actions involving discretionary authority delegated by Congress to the President and actions involving authority delegated by Congress to an agency. Courts lack jurisdiction to review an APA challenge in the former circumstances, regardless of whether the President or the agency takes the final action. However, “[w]hen the challenge is to an action delegated to an agency head but directed by the President, a different situation obtains: then, the President effectively has stepped into the shoes of an agency head, and the review provisions usually applicable to that agency's action should govern.” Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2351 (2001).\nDetroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Can., 189 F. Supp. 3d 85, 101-04 (D.D.C.\n2016); see also, e.g., Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28 (D.D.C. 2001)\n(“A court has subject-matter jurisdiction to review an agency action under the APA\nonly when a final agency action exists. Because the President is not a federal\nagency within the meaning of the APA, presidential actions are not subject to\nreview pursuant to the APA.”) (citing Dalton, 511 U.S. at 470) (other internal\ncitations omitted)).\nIndeed, a court considering a challenge to the precursor of the instant\nProclamation under the APA correctly concluded that the APA did not apply\nbecause the order in that case was the action of the president: 8\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 18 of 36\n\n[T]he Presidency is not an “agency” as defined in the APA, § 701(b)(1), and thus actions by the President are not subject to the APA . . . . Here, Congress has granted the President authority to suspend entry for any class of aliens if such entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). Pursuant to, and without exceeding, that grant of discretionary authority, the President issued EO 13,769 and suspended entry of aliens from the seven subject countries. The President’s action is thus unreviewable under the APA.\nLouhghalam v. Trump, No. 17-10154, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at 17-18 (D.\nMass. Feb. 3, 2017) (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-01 and Detroit Int’l Bridge,\n189 F. Supp. 3d at 104-05).\nAccordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court, and\nhold that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ § 1152(a)(1)(A) claims. And,\nas shown below, it should also reverse the ruling of the District Court that the\nProclamation probably violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment\nto the U.S. Constitution.\nII. THE DISTRICT COURT FLOUTED CLEARLY-APPLICABLE PRECEDENT IN REACHING ITS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE HOLDING.\nThe Constitution should not be interpreted to imperil the safety of the United\nStates, or its people, from foreign threats. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-\nMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (“[W]hile the Constitution protects against\ninvasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”). Also, the United States\nhas a right inherent in its sovereignty to defend itself from foreign dangers by\ncontrolling the admission of aliens. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 9\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 19 of 36\n\n338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty . . . inherent in [both Congress and] the executive department of the sovereign”). Accordingly, the ability of private litigants to challenge presidential exercises of alien-admission powers on grounds of individual rights protected in the Constitution is sharply limited. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 58889 (1952) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”). Thus, even if exercises of these powers were not non-justiciable political acts, they could receive no higher level of scrutiny from a court than a form of rational-basis review. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972) (“We hold that when the Executive exercises th[e] power [to exclude aliens] negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.”). In applying (indeed, misapplying) a much higher level of scrutiny to the Proclamation, the District Court erred egregiously.\n\n10\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 20 of 36\n\nThe District Court, taking Mandel’s holding that courts will not look behind “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” as authorizing judicial inquiry into whether a proffered reason for an exclusion was given in bad faith, looked behind the proffered reason for the Proclamation at statements President Trump had made as a candidate. J.A. 1055-56. Based on these statements, the court held that the proffered reason was a pretext for the president’s actual motivation: to exclude Muslims from this country. J.A. 1056. Then the court looked behind the proffered reason again, at those same campaign statements, and concluded that the Proclamation was primarily motivated by a desire to exclude Muslims, and therefore probably violated the Establishment Clause. J.A. 1056-76.\nIt is hard to imagine a more thorough evisceration of Mandel’s bar on looking behind proffered reasons for exclusion orders, at least when they are challenged under the Establishment Clause. In any given case where there is insufficient evidence of pretext, there also will be insufficient evidence that religion was the primary motive for a challenged decision. Thus, under the District Court’s rubric, courts will obey Mandel’s injunction not to look behind the proffered reason only when their so refraining will make no difference to the outcome of the case.\nIf, instead of seizing on the above means of gutting Mandel, the District Court had adequately considered the inherent right to sovereignty of the United\n11\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 21 of 36\n\nStates, and the separation of powers found in the structure of the Constitution, it would have found every reason to apply the Mandel line of cases straightforwardly — and so (as will be seen) avoid many unfortunate results.\nIII.THE DISTRICT COURT’S REASONING LEADS TO MANY ABSURD CONSEQUENCES. The District Court’s reasoning has innumerable absurd consequences that\nshow, without question, both how faulty that reasoning is and the wisdom of the contrary case law that the District Court brushed aside. A few of the more notable absurdities that court committed itself to are drawn out as follows:\nA. Private Litigants Could Enjoin President Trump’s War Against The Islamic State.\nIf its own statements are any indication, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS (“the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”) or ISIL (“the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”), is as much a religious group as a military force or aspiring state. It has declared its leader a caliph, that is, “a successor of Muhammad as . . . spiritual head of Islam,” Caliph, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caliph (last visited Nov. 6, 2017), and is dedicated to the forcible conversion of nonbelievers to its distinctive religious faith. E.g., Adam Withnall, Iraq Crisis: Isis Declares its Territories a New Islamic State with “Restoration of Caliphate” in Middle East, Independent (June 30, 2014), http://www.indepen dent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-\n12\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 22 of 36\n\ndeclares-new-islamic-state-in-middle-east-with-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-as-emirremoving-iraq-and-9571374.html (reporting on this declaration); The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Wikipedia (June 8, 2017), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant (“As caliph, [the leader of ISIL] demands the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide . . . ISIL has detailed its goals in its Dabiq magazine, saying it will continue to seize land and take over the entire Earth until its: ‘[b]lessed flag . . . covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam’”).\nMany authorities within mainstream Islam have rejected the religious teachings of the Islamic State. Id. But even if this group is, properly speaking, not Islamic, and its distinctive beliefs are (at best) a heretical deviation from true Islam, plainly it still is a religious group with a religious leader, and easily qualifies as a religion under the broad definition used for First Amendment purposes. See, e.g., O’Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (refusing to find that a sermon by the pope was less “religious” than a mass; “[s]uch a distinction would involve the government in the task of defining what was religious and what was non-religious speech or activity[,] an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional definition of religion.”) (footnote omitted); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (listing “religions in this\n13\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 23 of 36\n\ncountry,” including Secular Humanism, “which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God”); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) (defining religion as “any set of beliefs addressing matters of ultimate concern occupying a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally religious persons”) (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970)) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted); Black’s Law Dictionary 1293-94 (7th ed. 1999) (“In construing the protections under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, courts have construed the term religion quite broadly to include a wide variety of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.”).\nNevertheless, President Trump has not merely expressed animus against the Islamic State, but has vowed to eradicate it. President Donald Trump, Remarks in Joint Address to Congress (Feb. 28, 2017) (“As promised, I directed the Department of Defense to develop a plan to demolish and destroy ISIS . . . . We will work . . . . to extinguish this vile enemy from our planet.”).\nIslamic (in the true sense) or not, persons who bear allegiance to the caliph of the Islamic State may be residing in this country as citizens or lawful permanent residents; indeed, current events show that this is a high likelihood. Holly Yan and Dakin Andone, Who is New York terror suspect Sayfullo Saipov, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/01/us/sayfullo-saipov-new-york-\n14\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 24 of 36\n\nattack/index.html. Once President Trump’s order to the Department of Defense is complied with, and the president further orders the Department to implement its plan to destroy the Islamic State, these U.S. coreligionists of the Islamic State might have close family members placed in immediate peril by the latter order. They also might feel marginalized by its message of condemnation of the Islamic State. If the District Court’s reasoning were correct, these circumstances would be more than enough for them to have standing to challenge that order in court, under the Establishment Clause. See J.A. 1026 (holding that plaintiffs had standing because of their feelings of marginalization). Worse, if the District Court were correct, they would probably win their case. If the Proclamation probably violated the Establishment Clause because Donald Trump, during the election campaign, called for a temporary pause in entry to the country by Muslims, as the District Court held, J.A. 1056-76, what would a like-minded court make of President Trump’s vow, before a joint session of Congress, to “extinguish” the Islamic State “from our planet”? If calling for a temporary pause in Muslim entry reveals impermissible animus, surely announcing a war of extermination on a particular religious body does so even more. Yet no one believes that a federal court has the power to enjoin our nation’s military campaign against the Islamic State.\nThere is no helpful distinction for the District Court here between the president’s war-making power and his power to regulate the admission of aliens.\n15\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 25 of 36\n\nBoth involve the safety of the nation and its people, and the power to fight our enemies abroad would mean little without the power to prevent them from entering the country. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-89 (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power . . . .”).1 But even if the distinction could be made, it would not help the District Court; the proposition that the president could not block the admission of members of the Islamic State into the country without violating the Establishment Clause, in light of the animus revealed by his avowed intention to destroy that religious group, is an equallyabsurd result of the District Court’s reasoning.\nAlso, that no one (most likely) would bring a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s war on the Islamic State does not avert this absurdity. The logic of the District Court’s holding remains, like a fatal gas. The correct rule of law in this case cannot be one that implies that all of the members of the armed forces who are fighting the war on the Islamic State, and also their civilian superiors, are violating\n\n1 Another seeming defense against this reductio ad absurdum – namely, that a court would never enjoin a war, because to do so would be giving aid and comfort to the enemy in time of war, and thus, by definition, be treason, U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 — begs the question. A court as averse as the District Court to accepting that presidential determinations in this area are close to unreviewable could easily conclude that treason cannot lie if the underlying war is unconstitutional, as, of course, it would be if it violated the Establishment Clause.\n16\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 26 of 36\n\ntheir oaths to uphold the Constitution by prosecuting that war. Yet the District\nCourt’s reasoning implies just that.\nB.The District Court’s Reasoning Pits The First Amendment Against Itself.\nFree discussion of governmental affairs and the free exchange of ideas\nduring a political campaign are the heart of America’s democracy. Brown v.\nHartlage, 456 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1985). “Freedom of speech reaches its high-water\nmark in the context of political expression.” Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly,\n247 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 2001) rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).\nThe Free Speech Clause protects not just political speech by private citizens but\nsuch speech by political candidates running for public office. Id. at 53.\nThe candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day. Mr. Justice Brandeis’ observation that in our country “public discussion is a political duty,” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S. Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (concurring opinion), applies with special force to candidates for public office.\nBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976). See also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.\n443, 451-52 (2011) (“Speech on matters of public concern is at the heart of the\nFirst Amendment’s protection. The First Amendment reflects a profound national\ncommitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,\n17\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 27 of 36\n\nrobust, and wide-open. That is because speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. Accordingly, speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\nIn relying on the campaign statements of President Trump while a candidate, the District Court thus set the Establishment Clause against the Free Speech Clause in the latter’s most vital application. Yet both provisions are at the same level in the text of the First Amendment, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court has been at least as solicitous of free speech rights as of rights under the Establishment Clause. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (holding that a public university’s refusal to permit the funding of a student religious group on equal terms with other groups was viewpoint discrimination that violated the Free Speech Clause and was not required by the Establishment Clause; “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387, 397 (1993) (holding that a school district violated the Free Speech Clause by denying a group permission to show a film with a religious purpose on school premises); see also, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties\n\n18\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 28 of 36\n\nUnion of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 274 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that both clauses stand on equal ground).\nThe chilling effect of such judicial inquiry into campaign statements can easily be imagined; for example, candidates who oppose abortion, or support the State of Israel, might shrink from saying that their religion motivates their position, thus depriving the voters of potentially important information. Given the equal primacy of the Free Speech Clause (and also the Free Exercise Clause), it is absurdly contrary to democratic freedom that candidates for president (or other offices) must tread carefully from now on when commenting on a wide range of policy issues, including national security, for fear that courts will enjoin their actions if they are elected. Yet this chilling effect on core political speech is a clear result of the District Court’s holding.\nC. The District Court’s Reasoning Implies That What Is Constitutional For One President Is Unconstitutional For Another.\nThe District Court held that the Proclamation probably violated the Establishment Clause because statements by President Trump as a candidate revealed an impermissible anti-Muslim motivation. It follows that had the exact same proclamation, with exactly the same stated purpose, been issued by President Obama, it would not have violated the Establishment Clause (assuming that President Obama had made no statements the court could construe as revealing animus toward the Muslim religion). This is an absurd result, if only because a\n19\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 29 of 36\n\npresident might have a clear duty to protect the country against a pressing foreign threat, and whether that duty could be performed should not depend on whether the nation had, or did not have, a president who might feel illicit racial or religious animus against that threat, and enjoy his duty too much. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 745 (1982) (“‘In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint.’”) (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)); cf. Spalding, supra (“[P]ersonal motives cannot be imputed to duly authorized official conduct.”); see also Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 896 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to examine the president’s motives for declaring a national emergency during the Libyan crisis); but cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (stating in dicta that the internment of an American citizen of Japanese descent during World War II would have been unconstitutional if motivated by racial prejudice).\nThis result of the District Court’s holding is dangerous in another way, for it gives the impression, at least, that courts are taking political sides. Diminishing\n20\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 30 of 36\n\nthe power of a particular president, as opposed to others, because of his statements in the political arena seems perilously close to diminishing his power because of his politics — of which an onlooker could easily assume the court disapproves. It goes without saying that the appearance of such political partisanship in judging should be avoided in our democracy, since the Constitution gives the federal courts the power to decide “Cases” and “Controversies,” and no other power, U.S. Const., art. III, § 2 — certainly not political power. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 455 (1996) (surveying cases and commenting that, for the Supreme Court, “[j]udicial restraint preserves separation of powers by avoiding interference with the democratic political branches, which alone must determine nearly all public law matters.”) (footnotes omitted); In re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548, 576 (Tex. App. 2010) (Jennings, J., dissenting) (“Judges should decide the cases that come before them based upon the facts in evidence and the governing law, not upon their moral preferences, desires, or the dictates of their emotions. The obvious problem with results-oriented judging is that it . . . guts the rule of law . . . [and] produces bad consequences on a system-wide basis.”) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); cf. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 5, 28 U.S.C.S. app. (stating that federal judges should refrain from political activity).\n\n21\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 31 of 36\n\nD. The District Court’s Reasoning Would Put The United States At The Mercy Of Foreign Threats.\nThe following absurdity is wholly hypothetical, but nonetheless devastating to the District Court’s reasoning. Imagine a religion that, as a fundamental tenet, demanded the sacrifice of children to “the gods” on a regular basis. Suppose this religion, called Molochism,2 had followers around the world numbering in the billions, but as yet few in the United States. Even though the members of this religion in the United States would be (constitutionally) hampered in its exercise by neutral, generally-applicable laws against murder, see Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), they could still advance their religion, and eventually all of its practices, through the courts and through our immigration system — that is, if the tenor of the District Court’s reasoning became generally accepted, and domestic civil rights law applied to all immigration restrictions challenged by suitably-affected U.S. plaintiffs. Specifically, if Congress passed a law barring immigration by, say, those who believe they have an obligation to take innocent human life, it is likely that some members of Congress who voted for this ban would have made clear, if only in campaign statements, that it was aimed at Molochians. If U.S.-citizen Molochians felt marginalized by this law, they would\n\n2 After the ancient fire god to whom children were sacrificed. Moloch, MerriamWebster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Moloch (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).\n22\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 32 of 36\n\nhave standing to sue, under the District Court’s reasoning. And, under that same reasoning, the ban on such immigration would violate the Establishment Clause because it was improperly motivated by anti-Molochian animus.\nAfter the ban on immigration by those who believe they have an obligation to take innocent human life was, accordingly, permanently enjoined, let us suppose that the pace of continued Molochian immigration was very rapid, so rapid that a political uproar resulted, complete with anti-Molochian statements by leading politicians promising to stem the tide. At that point, a court of the District Court’s stripe might well conclude that any step with the predictable result of lowering Molochian immigration — even bringing all immigration to a near-standstill — would only be a transparent pretext for a measure that really pertained to an antiMolochian establishment of religion. Thus, by court order, actual or merely threatened, the door to heavy overall immigration would remain open, and Molochians could continue to come in. Over time, let us suppose, American Molochians would become so numerous that any ban on their immigration would become politically difficult, even if the courts would uphold one. Still later, suppose that Molochians became politically dominant, in part through sheer force of numbers, and were able to adjust U.S. laws to allow their full religious practices, including the long-deferred one of the sacrifice of children to the gods.\n\n23\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 33 of 36\n\nOf course, it is to be hoped that no series of events as horrific as this – the transformation of the United States into a country of legalized child sacrifice – would ever take place. Still, that the United States and its people would be without power to defend themselves against that disaster because of the Establishment Clause is absurd in the highest degree. As a matter of pure logic, such gross absurdity is fatal to the District Court’s reasoning.\nTo safeguard the vital right of the people of the United States, acting through the political process, to protect themselves and their interests by controlling the admission of aliens, this Court must reject the District Court’s holding and its rationale.\nCONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order should be reversed.\n\n24\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 34 of 36\n\nDATED: November 6, 2017.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Christopher J. Hajec Christopher J. Hajec Julie B. Axelrod Michael M. Hethmon Elizabeth A. Hohenstein Mark S. Venezia IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE 25 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 335 Washington, DC 20001 Telephone: (202) 232-5590 Fax: (202) 464-3590 litigation@irli.org\nAttorneys for Amicus Curiae\n\n25\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 35 of 36\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 29, 32(a)(5), and 32(a)(7), the foregoing amicus curiae brief is proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 point Times New Roman, and contains 5,750 words, excluding those sections identified in Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).\n\n/s/ Christopher J. Hajec Christopher J. Hajec Attorney for Amicus Curiae\n\n26\n\n\fAppeal: 17-2231 Doc: 72\n\nFiled: 11/06/2017 Pg: 36 of 36\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on November 6, 2017, the foregoing amicus curiae brief was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system.\n\n/s/ Christopher J. Hajec Christopher J. Hajec Attorney for Amicus Curiae\n\n27\n\n\f" ]	This lawsuit was filed on October 6, 2017 over Section 2 of President Trump’s Sep. 24, 2017 Proclamation ("Executive Order #3" or "EO-3") barring travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries. The plaintiffs were U.S. citizens or permanent residents who would not be able to reunite with their family members or who otherwise claimed injury as a direct result of EO-3. Specifically, the plaintiffs were a Syrian national and U.S. lawful permanent resident ("LPR"), a U.S. citizen of Syrian descent with a Syrian national sister currently outside of the U.S., an American citizen of Yemeni descent with a Yemeni national wife currently outside of the U.S., a U.S. citizen with a Syrian national wife currently outside of the U.S., an American citizen of Syrian descent with a Syrian national father currently outside of the U.S., and an American citizen with a Somali national fiancé currently outside of the U.S.. The plaintiffs, represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Brennan Center, and private counsel, filed a concurrent complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The complaint alleged that EO-3 violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants nationwide from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 across the nation. On October 12, the government responded to the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs replied on October 14. The case was assigned to Judge Theodore D. Chuang, who was also presiding over <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637">IRAP v. Trump</a>. He held a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction motion on October 16. The following day, Judge Chuang granted the motion in part, enjoining all defendants, with the exception of the President of the United States, from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 nationwide. On October 20, the defendants appealed Judge Chuang's decision to the Fourth Circuit (docket no. 17-2233) and requested that the Fourth Circuit stay the injunction pending resolution of the appeal. The defendants also requested accelerated processing of the appellate case, which the plaintiffs opposed the following day. Also on October 20, the Fourth Circuit consolidated this case with <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637">IRAP v. Trump</a> and <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16193">Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump</a>. From October 20 through October 25, the parties continued to file responses regarding the motion to accelerate processing of the case. On October 24, the States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and West Virginia filed an amicus brief in support of the government's motion to stay the district court's injunction. On October 27, the Iranian Alliances Across Borders and IRAP plaintiffs responded to the government's motion to stay the injunction pending appeal. Also on October 27, the government requested that the Court schedule oral argument for December 8, immediately after the current Ninth Circuit oral argument in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15626">Hawaii v. Trump</a>. On October 31, the Court granted this request. On October 30, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") responded to the plaintiffs' motion to stay. On November 1, the DOJ submitted its opening brief, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were not justiciable and that EO-3 fell well within the President's constitutional and statutory authority. Also on November 1, amici began filing briefs with the Court. On November 15, the plaintiffs filed their opening/response brief. The DOJ responded on November 22. On November 22, the court submitted a letter requesting that the DOJ supplement the record with two reports referenced in both the DOJ's opening brief and EO-3: a report submitted to the President on July 9, 2017, identifying "16 countries as having 'inadequate' information sharing practices and risk factors, and another 31 countries as 'at risk' of becoming inadequate," and a report submitted to the President on September 15, 2017, recommending that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from seven of the countries determined to have inadequate information sharing practices and risk factors. On November 24, the DOJ responded, noting that the requested reports contain classified information and requesting that any reviewing of the reports take place in camera and ex parte. This case is ongoing. Oral argument on the government's motion to stay the district court's injunction pending appeal is scheduled for December 8, and will be held en banc. Because this case was consolidated with <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16193">Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump</a> into <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637">IRAP v. Trump</a> on October 20, 2017, further updates on activity within this case can be found at <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637">IRAP v. Trump</a>.	This is a lawsuit filed against Section 2 of President Trump’s Sep. 24, 2017 Proclamation ("Executive Order #3" or "EO-3") barring travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries. The plaintiffs are US citizens or permanent residents who will not be able to reunite with their family members or who otherwise claim injury as a direct result of EO-3. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief: they asked the court to enjoin defendants nationwide from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 across the nation.	US citizens were denied being reunited with their families due to President Trump's 2016 Muslim-country travel ban. This case is ongoing. (D. Md.)
JI-NC-0001	[ "Law v. Britt\n\nJI-NC-001-001\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\nEASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA\n\nRALEIGH DIVISION\n\n- •\n\nANDRE LAW, et al., by their next friend Jeffrey M. Seigle,\nPlaintiffs,\n\nn\n'94\nL tt:: r •\n\nv.\nC. ROBIN BRITT, Secretary of Human Resources, et al,\nDefendants.\n\nNO. 93-300-CRT-BR\n\nConsolidated with\n\nANTWAN SIMPSON, Cumberland Regional Juvenile ) Detention Center, SHAUNE KIMBROUGH, Cumberland ) Regional Juvenile Detention Center, STEPHANIE HALL, )\nPitt Regional Juvenile Detention Center, JAIME PATTERSON, Cumberland Regional Juvenile Detention Center, KRIS SHONTEE DAVIS, Buncombe Regional Juvenile Detention Center, EDWARD WILLIAMS, New Hanover Regional Juvenile Detention Center, ALPHONS MITCHELL, New Hanover Regional Juvenile Detention Center, by their next friend Kathryn L. VandenBerg\nPlaintiffs,\n\nv.\n\nNO. 5:94-CT-581-BR2\n\nC. ROBIN BRITT, Secretary of Human Resources, etal,\nDefendants.\n\nSUBSTITUTE SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT\n\nPursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with permission of the court, plaintiffs amend their complaint to state, as follows:\n\n\fr\n\nr\n\nPreliminary Statement 1. This is a suit in equity for injunctive relief by juveniles detained by the New Hanover, Pitt, Cumberland, Leonard, Gaston, Buncombe and Wilkes Juvenile Detention Centers based on overcrowding, understaffing, inadequate medical care, lack of legally required programs and other conditions of confinement which deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. It is brought by the named individuals as a class action on behalf of all persons confined at the detention centers.\nJurisdiction 2. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1343 for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.\nParties 3. Antwan Simpson, Shaune Kimbrough and Stephanie Hall are United States citizens under the age of sixteen who, as of the date when the original complaint was filed, were detained at detention centers operated by the Division of Youth Services (DYS) of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources (DHR). 4. Jaime Patterson is a United States citizen under the age of sixteen who is being detained at the Cumberland Regional Juvenile Detention Center, operated by the Division of Youth Services of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources. 5. Kris Shontee Davis is a United States citizen under the age of sixteen who is being detained at the Buncombe Regional Juvenile Detention Center, operated by the Division of Youth Services of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources.\n\n\fr\n\nr\n\n6. Edward Williams is a United States citizen under the age of sixteen who is being detained at the New Hanover Regional Juvenile Detention Center, operated by the Division of Youth Services of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources.\n7. Alphons Mitchell is a United States citizen under the age of sixteen who is being detained at the New Hanover Regional Juvenile Detention Center, operated by the Division of Youth Services of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources.\n8. C. Robin Britt is Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources and is responsible for the activities of the Department, including the detention of juveniles. He is sued in his official capacity only.\n9. Gwendolyn C. Chunn is Director of the Division of Youth Services and is responsible for the care ofjuveniles committed to her custody by the courts. She is sued in her official capacity only.\n10. Tommie Clark is the Manager of Detention with supervisory responsibility over the DYS detention centers. He is sued in his official capacity only.\nFacts Supporting Claim 11. These six detention centers operated by DYS are designed to house no more than 103 children. Within the past year these centers have often had a population in excess of capacity, at times more than double their capacity. Although the detention centers are designed to house each child in an individual room, due to overcrowding many children have to sleep on mattresses on the floor of rooms. Confinement of more than one child to a room leads to conflicts and fights which are contrary to the goals and purposes of the detention centers and create a danger of serious injury to detained children.\n3\n\n\fr\n\nr\n\n12. Staffing is inadequate for the number of children detained. Inadequate staffing causes a reduction in services, such as curtailment of exercise periods and the educational programs, and causes children to be locked in their rooms for longer periods of time to facilitate security and control, all of which are contrary to the goals and purposes of the detention centers.\n13. Because of the vast overcrowding and understaffing, the medical care provided to plaintiffs is inadequate, posing a serious and substantial health hazard.\n14. The detention centers are used to house juveniles with a variety of different backgrounds and problems, from undisciplined children who have merely run away from home, to juveniles accused of serious or deadly felonies, both those who will be adjudicated by the juvenile court and some who may be bound over for trial as adults. The mixture of these groups in one facility, in combination with understaffing and overcrowding, creates a danger of assaults and other victimization of some juveniles by others. Although DYS officials have attempted to alleviate this problem by creating the Leonard Center especially for bound-over youth, the Leonard facilities are insufficient to house all bound-over youth.\n15. The lack of spaces in state training schools and other youth facilities and an overload of cases in the juvenile courts means that juveniles are often detained at the detention centers for longer periods of time than is consistent with purposes for which the juveniles are detained.\nClass Action Allegations 16. Although the impact of conditions on different children may vary, all juveniles at these detention centers suffer from the same conditions creating common questions of law and\n\n\fr\nfact for all putative class members. The population and identity of the detained children is constantly changing, and it would be impracticable to join each child in the lawsuit. The claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class, and the named plaintiffs will adequately protect the interests of the class. The defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, and prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications or of individual adjudications which would as a practical matter be dispositive of other class member claims.\nClaims 17. Plaintiffs and the plaintiff class are being deprived of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The purposes of incarceration ofjuveniles are to provide for their welfare and protection. Where those purposes are not served, the state has no justification for detaining juveniles, and their detention thus violates due process guarantees. 18. Plaintiffs and the plaintiff class are subjected to unreasonable seizure, punishment, and to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of their rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.\nRelief WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request: a) That the court enjoin defendants from detaining any greater number ofjuveniles at each Detention Center than it is designed to house; b) That the court enjoin defendants to employ adequate staff to provide a safe and secure environment for members of the class;\n\n\fr\nc) That the court enjoin defendants from detaining any juveniles unless and until defendants provide all legally required services, such as education, which provide the justification for detention of juveniles;\nd) That the court award costs and attorneys fees to plaintiffs, and provide such other relief as is just and proper.\n\nMarvin S p a r r o w U N.C. State Bar No. 11093\n\nCERTiFsCATE OF SERVICE I certify service of the forsgofog pieading by mailing a copy of same, postage prepaid, to afi attorneys of record and unrepresented parties.\nMARVIN SPy«R.0W\njb/wpdocs/ms/al2amco.wpd\n\nKathryn L. VandenBerg N.C. State Bar No. 18020 N.C. Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. Post Office Box 25397 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 (919) 856-2200\n\n1US\n\nJeffrey M. 124 Saint Mary's Street Raleigh, North Carolina (919)821-1187\n\n27603\n\n\f", "Law v. Britt\nO.:\n\nJI-NC-001-002\n\n/\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\nEASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA\n\n\n\n(WESTERN DIVISION)\n\nANDRE LAW, et al., Plaintiffs,\nV.\nC. ROBIN BRTTT, Secretary of Human Resources, et al.,\nDefendants.\nANTWAN SIMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs,\nv. C. ROBIN BRITT, et al.,\nDefendants.\n\nNo. 95-300-CT-BR Consolidated with: No. 5:94-CT-581-BR2\n\nSETTLEMENT\n\nThe Plaintiffs, the classmembers represented and the Defendants, desiring to avoid further protracted and costly litigation, do hereby agree as settlement of all claims set forth in the above-captioned consolidated actions, subject to the approval of the Court, as follows:\n\nI. POPULATION\n\nA. Capacity\n\n•'\n\n' 1. Defendants will attempt to maintain the population at each of the following centers\n\n(\"named centers\") at its operating capacity, defined as. follows: j\n\nBUNCOMBE\n\n- 14\n\nCUMBERLAND - 18\n\n\fGASTON\n\n-12\n\nNEW HANOVER -18\n\nPITT\n\n-14\n\nLEONARD\n\n- 5\n\nWAKE\n\n-14\n\nWILKES\n\n- 8\n\n2. Until these consolidated actions are dismissed, Defendants will document the daily populations for each named center. Each Tuesday, by 11:00 am, Defendants will make available to counsel for the Plaintiffs-the daily population count for each named center for the preceding week. For the purposes of this agreement, daily populations are those taken at 8:00 am. Average weekly population for each named center is the seven-day total daily populations beginning each Tuesday, divided by 7 and rounded down to a whole number.\n\n3. Defendants will take remedial action if the sum of the average weekly populations of the named centers is greater than 132 or if the average weekly population of any named center is above the following numbers:\n\nBUNCOMBE\n\n-18\n\nCUMBERLAND -23\n\nGASTON\n\n-17\n\nNEW HANOVER -23\n\nPITT\n\n-18\n\nLEONARD\n\n-11\n\nWAKE\n\n-18\n\nWILKES\n\n-13\n\nRemedial action means that each affected named center will identify juveniles who are no longer in need of secure custody and notify the Juvenile Court and the juvenile's counsel of this opinion and request that the State juvenile court consider this opinion in determining whether there is a need for continued secure custody; and will also notify the Senior Court Counselors in the named center's catchment area of the need to limit the center's population and request cooperation.\n\n4. If the sum of the average weekly populations or the stated average weekly populations for any named center exceeds the above levels for two consecutive weeks, counsel for the plaintiffs may petition the Court for appropriate relief under this agreement, which may include orders to release individual juveniles from detention.\n5. If the sum of the daily populations of the named centers does not exceed 123 on any day between September 15, 1995, and December 15, 1995, Defendants will be released from their obligationsregardingpopulation in this section of this Agreement, except that they will still attempt to maintain the population at capacity, as required\n\n\fby subsection A.I. above. It the population exceeds 123 on any day during the period September 15, 1995, and December 15, 1995, then Plaintiffs may petition the Court for an extension of the population control obligations under this section, for an additional six months. If an extension is granted by the Court, all provisions of this section will remain operative for six months or until such time as Defendants operate the named centers at a total population of 123 or less for ninety consecutive days. If the population remains at 123 or below for ninety consecutive days, then Defendants shall be released from their obligations under this section; if not, Plaintiffs may seek another six-month extension on the same terms.\nB. Alternatives To Detention\nThe North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Division of Youth Services (\"DYS\") will establish a population committee and will request representatives of the Administrative Office of the Courts to participate. The committee will explore alternatives to detention and make efforts to educate court personnel with the goal to detain only juveniles who cannot be safely managed elsewhere. The population committee will also explore, develop and recommend strategies to limit the population of detention facilities. The committee will consider information from risk assessments conducted on each juvenile entering secure detention by center staff which may be used to develop strategies regarding which juveniles need to be held in detention. This input will be forwarded to the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources, the Administrative Office of the Courts and to the Juvenile Code Revision Committee for appropriate legislative action.\nA Willis M classmember may only be released from secure custody by order of the juvenile court However, DYS will contact the local court and Willie M. Services staff to facilitate alternative placement as soon as possible DYS will begin this process within 72 hours of a Willie M. admission. DHR will continue its efforts to make placements for Willie ~MV ckssmembers as soon as possible after their admission to secure detention.\nDYS will conduct an automatic review of every juvenile who has been detained longer than 30 days, and will contact court counselors with a recommendation for alternative •placement and/or to expedite an alternative placement, if appropriate, based on the juvenile's behavior and progress while in detention.\n\nH, STAFFING\n\n•\n\nDefendants will make a good faith effort to add additional staff at the named centers,\n\nm . TRAINING\n\n\" •\n\nI\n\n• The DYS Staff Development Director will continue to plan and provide for training of new\n\n\\\n• -3-\n\n\femployees and continuing training as necessary. When required, DYS will contract with specialists in specific areas of training and will arrange for on-site training at least quarterly. DYS training program for new and current employees will include those subjects set forth in 12 NCAC 09B.0234. DYS will provide detention training in addition to that required by 12 NCAC 9B.0234 and will attempt to provide training of employees within four to six months of their employment. Prior to assumption of independent duties, new employees will receive training through on-the-job training or otherwise.\nDYS will specifically review its training dealing with juvenile suicide and provide present employees additional training if necessary.\n\nIV. MEDICAL CARE\n\nThere will be a full-time nurse coordinator for DYS housed in the DYS Central office. DYS will develop a medical plan to be implemented at each named center. The plan will include the following:\n\n1. Each named center shall contract with medical personnel (registered nurse, physicians assistant or family nurse practitioner) for a minimum of 20 hours per week per named center to provide medical services to detainees, including reviewing intake documents, monitoring medications, providing medical assessments as needed, and making appropriate referrals. The medical professional will meet with each new detainee within 72 hours of his or her arrival at a named center.\n\n2. Each named center shall make arrangements for emergency medical care.\n\n3. Each named center shall arrange for emergency dental care.\n\n:\n\n4. Detention staff will be specifically trained to perform a medical screening and mental health screening with heavy emphasis in suicide assessment at the time a juvenile is admitted and to make immediate referrals to appropriate providers.\n\n5. Medical personnel will review all intake screenings and will conduct further assessments as needed. Such assessments may include a medical history, a medical assessment including physical examination, a mental health assessment, appropriate screening for sexually transmitted diseases and vision, and tuberculosis testing.\n\n•6: Each employee of a named center shall be certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and first aid. Such certification shall be kept current.\n\n7. Medical personnel shall conduct sick call in response to complaints of juveniles and when staff refer juveniles for treatment. Each juvenile shall be allowed unimpeded access to sick call and cannot be prevented from attending sick call by staff.\n\\ -4-\n\n\f8. Medical personnel will monitor the storage and administration of all medications.\n\nV. MENTAL HEALTHCARE\n\nA. Mental Health Plan\n\nDYS shall develop a mental health plan that includes a contract with the local Area Mental Health Authority ('Authority/Authorities\") to be implemented at each named center. The plan shall include at least the following provisions:\n\n1. DYS mental health plan shall include provisions for \"emergency\" and \"nonemergency\" protocols which will be negotiated with the local Authorities.\"\n\n2. The contract with an Authority will provide for guidance and training to selected staff from the named detention centers on selecting a mental health screening protocol and conducting an initial interview. Training will also target non-verbal and verbal juvenile communication which demands immediate referral to the designated Authority professional.\n\n3. Upon admission, each juvenile will be given a mental health screening by staff, including a suicide assessment.\n\n4. Referrals will be made to the local Authority in accordance with the DYS contract\n\nwith the Authority for juveniles at risk of suicide or exhibiting signs, of depression.\n\nEach juvenile referred in a \"non-emergency\" status will be seen by a qualified mental\n\nhealth professional within five days. \"Emergency\" referrals will be seen immediately\n\nin accordance with the DYS contract with the local Authority.\n\ni\n\n\\\n\nB. Suicide Prevention Plan\n\n;\n\nThe DYS shall develop a suicide prevention plan, to include the following provisions:\n\n1. All suicidal gestures or remarks are to be taken seriously and not to be viewed as merely manipulative. All suicidal behavior will be treated therapeutically, not punitively.\n\n2. Each named center shaft arrange for emergency mental health services in accordance with the contract with the local Authority.\n\n• 3. Mechanical restraints shall not be used on juveniles at risk for suicide except in consultation with medical personnel.'\n\nI\n\n' ••\n\n4. Staff shall receive no less than four hours of training jba suicide prevention.\n\n\\\n\n• -5-\n\n\f5. Each juvenile shall be assessed for suicide risk upon admission to a named center.\n6. Staff shall conduct continuous identification and monitoring of juveniles at risk for suicide and make appropriate referrals to mental health providers.\n7. Suicide risks and attempts shall be dealt with as provided in the DYS Detention Policy Manual, Policy Number JDS 9.11.\n8. Voluntary or involuntary commitment to a mental health facility should be considered if a juvenile has made a suicide attempt or gesture.\n\nVI. BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT\n\nA. Behavior Management System\n\nThe DYS shall develop a consistent behavior management system to be implemented at each named center. The system shall attempt to manage behavior of juveniles through rewards and discipline. Implementation of the system will include training for staff.\n\nB. Crisis Management\n\nThe DYS shall develop a policy in crisis management, encompassing appropriate interventions to be used when a juvenile's behavior is out of control. Staff shall be trained in the use of appropriate interventions ranging from verbal intervention to a period of isolation.\n\nC. Disciplinary System\n\n^\n\nThere shall be a uniform disciplinary code which includes a list of major and minor infractions. The code shall be posted at each named center and are included in orientation materials for all juveniles.\nThe code shall include the following provisions:v\n\n1. Minor infractions which may or may not result in room confinement.\n\n2. Major infractions whicKi absent special circumstances, may result in no more than two days of room confinement. Confinement for a major infraction shall be reviewed, at a tninimnm< every 24 hours.\n\n' 3. For major infractions, there shall be developed a disciplinary procedure, which shall\n\ninclude notice and the opportunity for the juvenile to be heard by someone not\n\ninvolved in the incident.\n\n\"\n\n.\n\n\\\n\n-6-\n\n\\ .\n\n\f4. Juveniles placed in isolation as a result of a major infraction shall receive at least one hour of large muscle activity per day and, if behavior permits, may be allowed visitors.\nD. Use Of Isolation Xnd Mechanical Restraints\nThe DYS shall develop a uniform policy for the use of isolation and mechanical restraints to be implemented at each named center, which shall include, at a minimum, the following provisions:\n\n1. Isolation and mechanical restraints shall not be used as punishment but may be used for discipline and control of a juvenile who is out of control.\n2. Unit lock-down or wholesale isolation shall not be used, except in emergencies.\n3. No juvenile shall be held in mechanical restraints while in isolation unless he or she poses a threat to himself or herself or to others or to property.\n4. Metal restraints shall be used only for transportation purposes. Soft restraints have been purchased and will be used after staff training.\n5. No juvenile shall be held in mechanical restraints for more than one hour without the approval of the center director or his designee.\n6. Any child who is placed in mechanical restraints or in isolation shall be visually monitored at least every 15 minutes.\n7. Detailed and accurate records of every use of isolation or restraint shall be maintained by each named center. The records shall indicate the exact method and duration of isolation or restraint used, the reason for its use and accurate notations'of staff observations during 15 minute room checks.\n8. Each named center director, or his designee, shall review incident, isolation, and use of force reports monthly for the purpose of monitoring staff compliance with DYS isolation andrestraintpolicies. As a form of ongoing behavior management training, the director shall review with all staff any incidents of improper use of force, restraint or isolation. ..\n\nVH. EDUCATION\n\nThe DYS shall develop an educational plan to be implemented at each named center. The\n\n. plan shall include the following provisions:\n\n,\n\n\\ -7-\n\n\f1. Each named center shall employ a certified full-time teacher.\n\n2. Each juvenile who is detained for more than five consecutive days shall receive no less than five and one half hours of instruction per day unless the juvenile is in court or is being disciplined. Each juvenile detained more than thirty consecutive days will receive a course of instruction appropriate to his or her age, capacity and interests.\n\n3. If a named detention center teacher believes that a juvenile has demonstrated, after the\n\nfirst two weeks in detention, that he or she may be a student with identified special\n\neducation needs, the teacher must take immediate steps to contact the school where\n\nthe juvenile was last enrolled. Every attempt will be made to have the resource\n\nteacher from the juvenile's school forward appropriate educational guidance with\n\nmaterials. If a juvenile is believed to have special education needs and is expected\n\nto be in detention for thirty consecutive days or more, steps will be taken to have the\n\njuvenile assessed. The named detention center teacher will contact the DYS Chief of\n\nEducation to arrange for educational assessments and to establish a committee which\n\nwill function as a School-Based Committee and the Administrative Placement\n\nCommittee as provided for in Rule .1507 of Procedures Governing Programs and\n\nServices for Children with Special Needs published by the Division of Exceptional\n\nChildren's Services, North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. The teacher\n\nwill keep a confidential record of pertinent documentation with respect to special\n\neducational needs identification, the juvenile's Individualized Education Program\n\n(TEP\"), the juvenile's progress, and all services provided in accordance with the IEP.\n\nA juvenile's progress will be made available to both the juvenile's parents and the\n\njuvenile's school in his or her community. In the case of lack of information,\n\nproblems with parental consent and all other procedural matters, DYS will continue\n\nto rely on the guidance from the Division of Exceptional Children's Services, North\n\nCarolina Department of Public Instruction.\n\ni\n\n•\n\n4. The named centers will ensure that all education records andresultsof any educational tests and/or assessments are forwarded to training school or provided upon request to the juvenile's next placement, if any.\n\nADMISSION PROCEDURES\n\nA. Intake\n\n'\n\n'\n\nDYS shall develop intake procedures and standardized forms for use at all named centers. The procedure should include the following:\n\n. 1. Intake screening shall be conducted on each juvenile at the time he or she enters the named center. Screening shall be conducted by trained staff. I\n2. Intake screening shall include at a minimum the following areas:\n\\\n• -8-\n\n\fa. Medical screening as provided in TV above.\n\nb. Mental health screening as provided in V above.\n\nc. Risk assessment using the Broward Juvenile Detention Risk Assessment Instrument.\n\n3. Upon intake each juvenile shall be oriented to the physical plant and the operation of\n\nthe named center. Each juvenile shall be given a copy of the rules and regulations of\n\nthe named center, including access to health care, grievance procedure, and\n\ndisciplinary rules and procedure.\n\n-\n\n4. DYS will make a good faith effort to obtain each juvenile's medical and education records after admission to secure detention.\n\nB. Classification\n\nDYS will develop and implement a system for classifying juveniles admitted to a named center for the purpose of determining the juvenile's housing assignment. The classification system shall consider the juvenile's sex, age, physical size, offense, mental health history and status, etc. The classification system will be developed to attempt to prevent children from harming each other while sleeping in the same room; for example, aggressive children should not be housed with non-aggressive children, and children accused of sexual offenses should be housed in their own rooms.\n\nDC CONDITIONS\n\nBecause the design of the named centers does not allow the children access to a toilet or sink without the assistance of staff, staff shall receive special training/instruction on the need for prompt attention to requests to use the bathroom and will make regular rounds offering toilet and sink use when children are confined to their rooms.\n\nJuveniles shall only share rooms when necessary due to crowding or classification.\n\nEach juvenile shall be allowed to retain approved items of personal property in his or her room. With the named center's approval, juveniles may have age appropriate reading material maintained at the named center in their rooms.\n\nX. RECREATION/PROGRAMMING\n\nUnless restricted for health or security, each juvenile shall be allowed one hour of large-\n\nmuscle activity per day, rain or shine. •\n\n(\n\n{ •\n\n-9-\n\n\\ '\n\n\fExcept in exceptional circumstances, each juvenile shall be out of his or her room DO less than 13 hours per day, unless that juvenile has been assigned to isolation for disciplinary reasons.\nDYS shall:\n1. Have each center develop a recreation and programming schedule approved by DYS.\n2. Increase passive recreation opportunities.\n\nXL FAMILY SUPPORT/INTERACTION\n\nIn recognition of the important role to be played by family and community in the support of detained juveniles, DYS shall develop a policy regarding visitation, telephone use and mail that shall be implemented in each named center. The policy shall contain, at a minimum, the following provisions:\n\n1. Hours for visitation will be expanded and family members will, upon request, be informed of visiting times. Each named center shall have a total of at least five visiting hours per week. Reasonable accommodations will be made for visitors who are not able to come at regular hours.\n\n2. Each child shall be allowed to include on his or her visitation list adult family members, including, but not limited, to his or her parents, clergy, and other adults from the community who do not pose a threat to the safety and security of the facility.\n\n3. Children shall have access to a telephone from which they may place collect calls.\n\n4. Staff shall not open outgoing mail.\n\n\\\n\n5. Staff may open incoming mail for the limited purpose of preventing the introduction of contraband into the facility. In such an event, the mail shall be opened only in the presence of the child to whom it is addressed.\n\n6. Staff shall not open mail from attorneys or from ejected or appointed state officials for any reason.\n\n- 1 . Staff shall not read incoming or outgoing mail unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the mail contains contraband or the correspondence creates a substantial threat to the security, order and/or mission of the center.\n\n8. There £ha1! be no unreasonable restriction on the number of letters each child is\n\nallowed to send or receive. \"\n\n,•\n\n\\\n\n\f9. The named center shall provide each child with writing materials and postage.\n\n. PHYSICAL PLANT\nDYS shall conduct regular inspections of each named center. Each facility shall be maintained in accordance with applicable state and local codes.\n\nIMPLEMENTATION 1. This agreement will begin to be implemented upon approval by the Court.\n\n2. DYS will maintain documentation of its compliance with the provisions of this agreement, and Plaintiffs' counsel may inspect such documentation upon proper request and notice.\n\n3. Prior to dismissal of these consolidated actions and upon reasonable notice to Defendants, Plaintiffs' counsel may visit any named center not more than once every three months at Plaintiffs' expense.\n\n4. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of this agreement until its\n\nprovisions are fully implemented. When the provisions of this agreement are fully\n\nimplemented and Defendants have been released from the population control\n\nobligations of section LA., Plaintiffs shall dismiss this action with prejudice.\n\nPlaintiffs and Defendants consent to United States Magistrate Judge Alexander B.\n\nDenson being appointed to hear and decide any requests for relief or disputes\n\nregarding implementation and compliance under this agreement.\n\n'.\n\nXTV. ATTORNEYS FEES\nDefendants agree to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys, upon receipt and after review of time sheets and expense records, the sum $95,000.00 which shall represent full and complete satisfaction of all attorneys' fees, costs and expenses associated with these consolidated actions. Plaintiffs agree that no additional attorneys' fees, costs or expenses will be paid by Defendants unless Plaintiffs apply for and receive relief from the Court under this Settlement AgrcemenL\nXV. Plaintiffs will provide such notice of this agreement as the Court may direct.\n\n\fYUUIM btkviLtb\n\nhax:^-ur«u\n\nnar\n\nr J • -:\" n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nEASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CARt)JLEA (WESTERN DIVISION) LU C - ^5\n\nANDRE LAW, et al.,\n\n\"••••••'••'\n[I c ,- . -\n\n-•\n\n.-i\n\n»\n\n,\n\n••-•'- Li .\n\n)\n\nE ^ ; - ' f^'\"'7\"\n\n)\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nv.\n\n)\n\n)\n\nC. ROBIN BRITT, Secretary of Human )\n\nResources, et al.,\n\n)\n\n)\n\nDefendants.\n\n)\n\n\"•\"\"\n\n•\"\n\n••••-••!j'-\n\nNo. 93-300-CT-BR\n\nConsolidated with:\n\nANTWAN SIMPSON, et al., •\n\n)\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n)\n\nv.\n\n)\n\nNo. 5:94-CT-581-BR2\n\nC. ROBIN BRTTT, et al.,\n\n)\n\nDefendants.\n\n)\n\nORDER ON NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF CLASS\n\nIt is ordered that the following provisions regarding notice of settlement agreement to\n\nthe plaintiff class shall be accomplished:\n\n1. Within one week of the date of this Order, guardians ad litem for the two classes\n\nof juveniles shall make best efforts to contact class members and former class\n\nmembers who have been named as class representatives or interviewed as potential\n\nwitnesses in order to inform them of the settlement agreement and notify them of their\n\nright to contact the Court should they have any objections. Each such class member\n\nwill be given a copy of the settlement agreement and the Notice to Class Members\n\n(Attachment A.)\n\n'\n\n2. Within a week of the date of this Order, the Director'at each named center shall post a copy of the Notice to Cliss Members (Attachment A) in a conspicuous location\n\n\frax\n\n1'iar in\n\n. U0/CK4\n\nin the center, which shall remain posted for 30 days.\n\n3. For one month after the date of the Order, the Director of each named center shall maintain copies of the full settlement agreement, and shall provide a copy of it to any child class member upon request.\n\nSO ORDERED this2?- \"Say of\n\n, 1995.\n\nU. S. Magistrate Judge\n\n-2-\n\n\f", "CM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 1 of 11\n\nU.S. District Court Eastern District of North Carolina (Western Division)\nCIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:93-ct-00300\n\nCLOSED\n\nLaw, et al v. Britt, et al Assigned to: Judge W. Earl Britt Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff Andre Law\nPlaintiff Latonya Bostic\nPlaintiff Jaime Patterson\nPlaintiff Kris Shontee Davis\n\nDate Filed: 05/17/1993 Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question\nrepresented by Marvin Ray Sparrow Sparrow & Vandenberg Box 388 Durham, NC 27702 919-956-7924 Fax: 680-2092 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Marvin Ray Sparrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Kathryn L. VandenBerg jimison@aol.com PO Box 262 Hillsborough, NC 27278 919-245-1485 Fax: 245-1485 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nMarvin Ray Sparrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Kathryn L. VandenBerg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 2 of 11\n\nPlaintiff Edward Williams\nPlaintiff Alphons Mitchell\nV. Defendant Secretary of Human R C. Robin Britt\nDefendant Director of Div. of Gwendolyn C. Chunn Defendant Mgr. of Detention Ginger Heglar TERMINATED: 06/07/1993\n\nMarvin Ray Sparrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Kathryn L. VandenBerg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nMarvin Ray Sparrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by Kathryn L. VandenBerg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nMarvin Ray Sparrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by John R. Corne N.C. Department of Justice jcorne@ncdoj.com P.O. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602-0629 919-716-6800 Fax: 716-6755 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by John R. Corne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 3 of 11\n\nDefendant Director, Wake Regio Michael Bryant\nDefendant Tommie Clark Manager of Detention\nPlaintiff Shannon Price\n\nrepresented by John R. Corne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by John R. Corne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDate Filed 05/17/1993\n05/17/1993 05/19/1993 06/07/1993 06/07/1993 06/07/1993\n06/08/1993 06/14/1993\n06/14/1993\n06/14/1993 06/14/1993\n\n#\n\nDocket Text\n\n1 Complaint filed - pltf. alleges overcrowding, understaffing and other conditions of confinement which deprive pltf. of their constitutional rts; seek injunctive relief and atty. fees (bl) (Entered: 05/19/1993)\n\nSummons(es) issued for C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Ginger Heglar, Michael Bryant (bl) (Entered: 05/19/1993)\n\nCase submitted to: Nellie Kirkman (bl) (Entered: 05/19/1993)\n\n2 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic for class certification (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n\n3 Memorandum by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic in support of [2-1] motion for class certification (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n\n4 First Amended class action complaint by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, adding defendant Tommie Clark :amends [1-1] complaint (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n\nSummons(es) issued for Tommie Clark (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n\n5 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n\n6 Order granting [5-1] motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead and resetting answer due for 7/26/93 for C. Robin Britt, for Gwendolyn C. Chunn, for Michael Bryant signed by David W. Daniel, Clerk by Heathcoat, Deputy Clerk counsel to serve (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n\n7 Motion by Tommie Clark for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n\n8 Order granting [7-1] motion for an extension of time to answer or\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 4 of 11\n\n06/21/1993 06/24/1993\n07/26/1993 07/26/1993 07/26/1993 07/26/1993 08/23/1993 09/13/1993 09/24/1993\n10/12/1993\n10/14/1993 12/16/1993 01/07/1994 01/07/1994\n\notherwise plead and resetting answer due for 7/29/93 for Tommie Clark signed by David W. Daniel, Clerk by Heathcoat, Deputy Clerk counsel to serve (gm) (Entered: 06/18/1993)\n9 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark to extend time (fdc) (Entered: 06/24/1993)\n10 Order granting [9-1] motion to extend time, Response to motion reset to 8/23/93 for defendants Britt, Chunn and Bryant [2-1] motion for class certification , Response to motion reset to 8/30/93 for defendant Clark [21] motion for class certification signed by David W. Daniel cc to pltf & cnsl. . (fdc) (Entered: 06/24/1993)\n11 Answer by C. Robin Britt to first amended class action complaint (gm) (Entered: 07/30/1993)\n12 Answer by Gwendolyn C. Chunn to first amended class action complaint (gm) (Entered: 07/30/1993)\n13 Answer by Michael Bryant to first amended clase action complaint (gm) (Entered: 07/30/1993)\n14 Answer by Tommie Clark to first amended class action complaint (gm) (Entered: 07/30/1993)\n15 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Tommie Clark, Michael Bryant in opposition to [2-1] motion for class certification (gm) (Entered: 09/11/1993)\nMotion(s) submitted to Judge Britt: [2-1] motion for class certification submitted (gm) (Entered: 09/13/1993)\nIssued Notice of Hearing: on Motion for Class Certification set for Tuesday, Oct. 12, 1993 at 3 pm before J. Britt; cys: J. Britt, NCAG, Mr. Seigle, NCPLS, J. Todd, CtRptr and CtRm deputy (bl) (Entered: 09/24/1993)\nMiscellaneous hearing re: [0-0] notice hearing on Motion for Class Certification before Judge W. E. Britt on 10/12/93; cnsl present: Catherine Van Danbury, Jeffrey Seigle for pltfs; John Corney (not present) and Bob Currin - present. pltf. presents Exh. 1 to J. Britt (given a 14 day stay). Written order to follow hrg. (bl) (Entered: 10/13/1993)\n16 Order granting [2-1] motion for class certification signed by Judge Britt. OB Ref: #78,pg.214 cc to pltf & cnsl. (fdc) (Entered: 10/14/1993)\n17 Request for Discovery Stipulation: Stipulation on Discovery due by 1/8/94 (gm) (Entered: 12/16/1993)\n18 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant to stay entry of scheduling order (fdc) (Entered: 01/11/1994)\n19 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic to intervene by adding Shannon Price (fdc) (Entered: 01/11/1994)\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 5 of 11\n\n01/07/1994 01/11/1994 01/27/1994 02/04/1994\n02/04/1994 02/04/1994 02/14/1994 02/16/1994\n04/28/1994 04/28/1994 06/06/1994\n06/06/1994 08/18/1994\n\n20 Memorandum by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price in support of [19-1] motion to intervene by adding Shannon Price (fdc) (Entered: 01/11/1994)\nMotion(s) submitted:Judge Britt [19-1] motion to intervene by adding Shannon Price submitted, [18-1] motion to stay entry of scheduling order submitted (fdc) (Entered: 01/11/1994)\n21 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark in opposition to [19-1] motion to intervene by adding Shannon Price (fdc) (Entered: 01/28/1994)\n22 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark to dismiss , or in the alternative, for summary judgment with respect to Shannon Price's Motion to Intervene (bl) (Entered: 02/07/1994)\n23 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark in opposition to [19-1] motion to intervene by adding Shannon Price (bl) (Entered: 02/07/1994)\n23 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark in support of [22-1] motion to dismiss, [22-2] motion for summary judgment (bl) (Entered: 02/07/1994)\n24 Response by Shannon Price to [22-1] motion to dismiss, [22-2] motion for summary judgment and reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Intervene (bl) (Entered: 02/15/1994)\nMotion(s) submitted: [22-1] motion to dismiss submitted, [22-2] motion for summary judgment submitted, [19-1] motion to intervene by adding Shannon Price submitted, [18-1] motion to stay entry of scheduling order submitted (bl) (Entered: 02/16/1994)\n25 Order denying [19-1] motion to intervene by adding Shannon Price, denying [18-1] motion to stay entry of scheduling order signed by Judge Britt. OB Ref: #82,pg.113 cc to pltf & cnsl. (fdc) (Entered: 04/29/1994)\nTerminated motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (gm) (Entered: 06/02/1994)\n26 Order on Scheduling by Magistrate Judge Denson setting Discovery cutoff 8/31/94 Deadline for filing of all motions 9/30/94 Expert Witness List due on 7/29/94 Bench Trial scheduled for 1/3/95 , No of Interrogatories: 50, and No of Depositions: 10, Place of Trial: Raleigh Trial Judge: Judge Britt cc to NCPLS & cnsl. (fdc) (Entered: 06/06/1994)\n27 Joint Discovery Stipulation - signed by NCAG & NCPLS (bl) (Entered: 06/16/1994)\n28 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price to consolidate case with Simpson v. Britt, 5:94-CV-581-F(3) w/ attached memorandum in Support of Motion (bl) (Entered: 09/26/1994)\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 6 of 11\n\n08/18/1994 08/18/1994 08/19/1994 08/25/1994 08/26/1994 09/26/1994\n09/30/1994\n\n29 Motion by Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark , Michael Bryant for a Protective Order to Prohibit Pltfs'. Expert Witnesses from entering the Wake Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Limiting pltfs'. Request for Production of Documents, or, in the alterntive, Order disclosure of Education Records only upon consent of Juvenile's Parents and Limiting the Use and Disclosure of Education Recotds and Extending of the Discovery Period to Permit Depositions of Pltfs. Experts and the Time within which to file motions (bl) (Entered: 09/26/1994)\n30 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark in support of [29-1] motion for a Protective Order to Prohibit Pltfs'. Expert Witnesses from entering the Wake Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Limiting pltfs'. Request for Production of Documents, or, in the alterntive, Order disclosure of Education Records only upon consent of Juvenile's Parents and Limiting the Use and Disclosure of Education Recotds and Extending of the Discovery Period to Permit Depositions of Pltfs. Experts and the Time within which to file motions (bl) (Entered: 09/26/1994)\n31 Document filed by defendant C. Robin Britt, defendant Gwendolyn C. Chunn, defendant Michael Bryant, defendant Tommie Clark titled: Affidavit of Service (bl) (Entered: 09/26/1994)\n32 Response by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark to [28-1] motion to consolidate case with Simpson v. Britt, 5:94-CV-581-F(3) w/ attached memorandum in Support of Motion (bl) (Entered: 09/26/1994)\n33 Response by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price to [29-1] motion for a Protective Order to Prohibit Pltfs'. Expert Witnesses from entering the Wake Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Limiting pltfs'. Request for Production of Documents, or, in the alterntive, Order disclosure of Education Records only upon consent of Juvenile's Parents and Limiting the Use and Disclosure of Education Recotds and Extending of the Discovery Period to Permit Depositions of Pltfs. Experts and the Time within which to file motions (bl) (Entered: 09/26/1994)\nMotion(s) submitted: [29-1] motion for a Protective Order to Prohibit Pltfs'. Expert Witnesses from entering the Wake Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Limiting pltfs'. Request for Production of Documents, or, in the alterntive, Order disclosure of Education Records only upon consent of Juvenile's Parents and Limiting the Use and Disclosure of Education Recotds and Extending of the Discovery Period to Permit Depositions of Pltfs. Experts and the Time within which to file motions submitted, [28-1] motion to consolidate case with Simpson v. Britt, 5:94CV-581-F(3) w/ attached memorandum in Support of Motion submitted (bl) (Entered: 09/26/1994)\n34 Order granting [28-1] motion to consolidate case with Simpson v. Britt, 5:94-CV-581-F(3) and the clerk is directed to maintain all subsequent\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 7 of 11\n\n10/05/1994\n10/07/1994 10/07/1994 10/14/1994 10/14/1994 10/14/1994 10/14/1994 10/14/1994 10/19/1994 10/19/1994 10/19/1994 10/19/1994 10/19/1994 10/21/1994\n\npleadings the file for Law v. Britt, No. 93-300-CT-BR. All subsequent pleadings should reflect the caption and docket number of each case. All non-dispositive motions are hereby referred to US Magistrate Judge Alexander B. Denson signed by Judge Britt. OB Ref: 85, pg. 139 cc to all cnsl (gm) (Entered: 10/13/1994)\n35 Order denying [29-1] motion for a Protective Order to Prohibit plaintiff's education and detention experts from inspecting the juvenile detention centers, denying motion for protective order that the school records of the juveniles not be produced , denying motion that parental consent for production of juveniles' school records be required , and granting motion to depose plaintiffs' experts and to extending the motion filing deadline to November 10, 1994 the trial os the case is reschedulred for Janary 30, 1995 before Judge Britt in Raleigh signed by Magistrate Judge Denson. OB Ref: 85, pg. 172 cc to all cnsl (gm) (Entered: 10/13/1994)\n36 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark to dismiss state constitution education claim (gm) (Entered: 10/13/1994)\n37 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark in support of [36-1] motion to dismiss state constitution education claim (gm) (Entered: 10/13/1994)\n38 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic for preliminary injunction (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\n39 Memorandum by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic in support of [38-1] motion for preliminary injunction (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\nDeposition of Julia Anne Chessler (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\nDeposition of Michael R. Bryant (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\nDeposition of Gwendolyn C. Chunn (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\n40 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark in opposition to [2-1] motion for class certification (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\n41 First Amended Answer to Complaint by C. Robin Britt (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\n42 First Amended Answer to Complaint by Tommie Clark (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\n43 First Amended Answer to Complaint by Gwendolyn C. Chunn (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\n44 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark for protective order (gm) (Entered: 11/03/1994)\nIssued Notice of Hearing: Motion hearing before Judge W. E. Britt set for 2:30 pm in Courtroom#2 in Raleigh on 11/9/94 for hearing on Class Certification and [38-1] motion for preliminary injunction (gm) (Entered:\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 8 of 11\n\n10/31/1994 11/07/1994\n11/07/1994\n11/08/1994\n11/08/1994 11/08/1994\n11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994 11/09/1994\n\n11/07/1994)\n45 Response by C. Robin Britt, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark to [38-1] motion for preliminary injunction (gm) (Entered: 11/07/1994)\nCase submitted to: Judge Britt [0-0] notice hearing Motion hearing before Judge W. E. Britt set for 2:30 pm in Courtroom#2 in Raleigh on 11/9/94 for hearing on Class Certification and [38-1] motion for preliminary injunction submitted (gm) (Entered: 11/07/1994)\n46 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price to allow dismissal of state constitution education claim 1cc:Judge Britt (fs) (Entered: 11/08/1994)\nMotion(s) submitted: [46-1] motion to allow dismissal of state constitution education claim submitted to Judge Britt (fs) (Entered: 11/08/1994)\n47 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price for leave to file second amended complaint (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n48 Memorandum by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price in support of [47-1] motion for leave to file second amended complaint (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n49 Hearing brief by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n50 Declaration of Nellie Droes (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n51 Declaration of Jennavie Sargent (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n52 Declaration of Jaime Patterson (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n53 Declaration of Quentin Adams (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n54 Declaration of Kris Shontee Davis (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n55 Declaration of Terris Yanina Hull (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n56 Declaration of Marcus Antwain McKinney (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n57 Declaration of Edward Williams (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n58 Declaration of Michael E. Dupree (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n59 Declaration of Patricia F. Horan (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n60 Declaration of Alphons Mitchell (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n61 Memo from Gerry re: approximate dates of detention (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\nMotion hearing re: [38-1] motion for preliminary injunction and class certification. Motion hearing held before Judge W. E. Britt Court Reporter: Donna Tomawski Counsel for plaintiff: Marvin Sparrow and Jack Holtzman Counsel for defendant: John R. Corne Time: 45 minutes\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 9 of 11\n\n11/09/1994\n11/09/1994 11/10/1994 11/10/1994 11/16/1994 11/17/1994 11/22/1994 11/23/1994\n12/05/1994 12/14/1994 12/21/1994\n12/23/1994 12/23/1994 12/30/1994\n\nMotion to dismiss state constitution education claim is allowed. Action is certify as a class action. Motion for protective order is moot. Motion for preliminary injunction withdrawn. (gm) (Entered: 11/09/1994)\n62 Order granting [2-1] motion for class certification, withdrawing [38-1] motion for preliminary injunction, denying as moot [44-1] motion for protective order, reset bench trial before Judge W. E. Britt for 1/30/95 and setting status conference before Judge W. E. Britt for 1/3/95 signed Judge Britt. OB Ref: 86, pg. 130 cc to all counsel (gm) (Entered: 11/13/1994)\nTerminated motion to dismiss (gm) (Entered: 11/13/1994)\n63 Declaration of Sarah Joan Franklin (gm) (Entered: 11/13/1994)\n64 Substitute Second Amended complaint by Andre Law adding plaintiff Jaime Patterson, Kris Shontee Davis, Edward Williams, Alphons Mitchell :amends [1-1] complaint (gm) (Entered: 11/22/1994)\n65 Joint Class Stipulation (gm) (Entered: 11/22/1994)\nLetter to Judge Britt dated November 15, 1994 from: John R. Corne Re: motion for leave to amend complaint (gm) (Entered: 11/22/1994)\nCase submitted to: Judge Britt (gm) (Entered: 11/22/1994)\n66 Order granting [47-1] motion for leave to file second amended complaint the complaint is amended as set forth in the document captioned \"Substitute Second Amended Class Action Complaint\" filed on 10 November 1994 signed by Judge Britt. OB Ref: 86, p.214 1cc:NCAG, NCPLS (fs) Modified on 11/28/1994 (Entered: 11/28/1994)\n67 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price, Jaime Patterson, Kris Shontee Davis, Edward Williams, Alphons Mitchell for Expedited Response to an Interrogatory (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n68 Second Amended Answer to Complaint by C. Robin Britt : amends (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n69 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price, Jaime Patterson, Kris Shontee Davis, Edward Williams, Alphons Mitchell to compel Production of Documents with incorporated supporting Memorandum of Law (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\nCalendar issued for Pre-trial conference set at 10:00 am in Raleigh, 6th Floor Courtroom on 1/17/95 before USMJ Alexander B. Denson (gm) (Entered: 01/10/1995)\nCalendar issued for Bench trial set at 9:00 am in Raleigh, 7th Floor Courtroom #2 on 1/30/95 before Judge W. E. Britt (gm) (Entered: 01/10/1995)\n70 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark to continue Pre-Trial and Trial and Memorandum in Support w/attached affidavit (fdc) Modified on 01/06/1995 (Entered:\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 10 of 11\n\n01/03/1995 01/03/1995 01/03/1995 01/04/1995 01/04/1995 01/04/1995 01/11/1995 01/11/1995\n01/13/1995 01/18/1995 01/18/1995\n\n01/06/1995)\n71 Response by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price, Jaime Patterson, Kris Shontee Davis, Edward Williams, Alphons Mitchell to [70-1] motion to continue Pre-Trial and Trial and Memorandum in Support (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n72 Document filed by plaintiff Andre Law, plaintiff Latonya Bostic, plaintiff Shannon Price, plaintiff Jaime Patterson, plaintiff Kris Shontee Davis, plaintiff Edward Williams, plaintiff Alphons Mitchell titled:Memorandum Regarding Discovery of Notes of Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses. (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n73 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark to compel Production of Documents and Memorandum in Support (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n74 Order granting [70-1] motion to continue Pre-Trial and Trial reset bench trial before Judge W. E. Britt for 2/27/95 signed by Judge Britt. OB Ref: #87,pg.118 cc to NCPLS & cnsl. (fdc) Modified on 01/10/1995 (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n75 Order denying [73-1] motion to compel Production of Documents signed by Magistrate Judge Denson. OB Ref: #87,pg.119 cc to NCPLS & cnsl. (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n76 Document filed by defendant C. Robin Britt, defendant Gwendolyn C. Chunn, defendant Michael Bryant, defendant Tommie Clark titled:Statement of Agreement to Enter into Good Faith Settlement Negotiations. (fdc) (Entered: 01/06/1995)\n77 Joint Stipulation of Confidentiality by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Michael Bryant, Tommie Clark, Shannon Price, Jaime Patterson, Kris Shontee Davis, Edward Williams, Alphons Mitchell 1cc:Judge Denson by counsel (fs) (Entered: 01/11/1995)\n78 Order granting [69-1] motion to compel Production of Documents with incorporated supporting Memorandum of Law, Betty Nelson, Cheif Court Counslor of Wake Co. Juvenile Court is ORDERED to produce for inspection and copying all filed and records reguarding John W. no later than January 20, 1995 unless pltf's attorneys agree to a later date signed by Judge Denson. OB Ref: 87, p.142 1cc:all counsel (fs) (Entered: 01/11/1995)\n79 Motion by Andre Law, Latonya Bostic, Shannon Price, Jaime Patterson, Kris Shontee Davis, Edward Williams, Alphons Mitchell with memorandum in support to compel (gm) (Entered: 02/10/1995)\nPre-trial conference set at 10:30 a.m. on 2/13/95 in the U.S. Ctrm., 6th Floor, Cthse. & Fed. Bldg., Raleigh, N.C., before USMJ Alexander B. Denson. (fdc) (Entered: 01/31/1995)\nBench trial set at 9:00 a.m. on 2/27/95 in the U.S. Ctrm. No. 2, 7th Floor,\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 11 of 11\n\n02/09/1995 02/10/1995 02/10/1995\n02/10/1995\n02/10/1995 02/22/1995 12/23/1997 01/09/1998 01/20/1998\n\nCthse. & Fed. Bldg., Raleigh, N.C., before Judge W. E. Britt. (fdc) (Entered: 01/31/1995)\n80 Joint motion for approval of compromise and dismissal (gm) (Entered: 02/10/1995)\nMotion(s) submitted to Judge Britt: [80-1] joint motion for approval of compromise and dismissal submitted (gm) (Entered: 02/10/1995)\n81 Document filed by plaintiff Andre Law, plaintiff Latonya Bostic, defendant C. Robin Britt, defendant Gwendolyn C. Chunn, defendant Michael Bryant, defendant Tommie Clark, plaintiff Shannon Price, plaintiff Jaime Patterson, plaintiff Kris Shontee Davis, plaintiff Edward Williams, plaintiff Alphons Mitchell titled: Settlement Agreement (fs) (Entered: 02/10/1995)\n82 Order as this action has been settled, all pending motions are MOOT and denying [80-1] joint motion for approval of compromise and dismissal, denying [79-1] motion to compel, denying [67-1] motion for Expedited Response to an Interrogatory, denying [46-1] motion to allow dismissal of state constitution education claim signed by Judge Britt. OB Ref: 88, p.42 1cc:NCPLS, NCAG (fs) (Entered: 02/10/1995)\nCase closed non-permanent (fs) (Entered: 02/13/1995)\n83 Order, On Notice To Plaintiff Class signed by Magistrate Judge Denson. OB Ref: #88,pg.100 cys dist. (fdc) (Entered: 02/27/1995)\n84 Report of Completion of Settlement Monitoring and Voluntary dismissal with prejudice (gm) (Entered: 12/31/1997)\nCase submitted to: Judge Britt [84-1] dismiss/dismissal stipulation submitted (gm) (Entered: 01/09/1998)\n85 Order dismissing actions with prejudice signed by Judge Britt. OB Ref: 112, p. 123 cc: all counsel (gm) (Entered: 01/20/1998)\n\nPACER Service Center\nTransaction Receipt\n\nPACER Login: Description: Billable Pages:\n\n10/17/2005 18:37:29\n\nhs0328\n\nClient Code:\n\nDocket Report Search Criteria:\n\n7\n\nCost:\n\n5:93-ct-00300 0.56\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?919801499689616-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\f", "CM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 1 of 3\n\nCLOSED, Consolidated\nU.S. District Court Eastern District of North Carolina (Western Division)\nCIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:94-ct-00581\n\nSimpson, et al v. Britt, et al Assigned to: Judge W. Earl Britt Demand: $0 Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Civil Rights Violation\n\nDate Filed: 08/05/1994 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question\n\nPlaintiff Antwan Simpson\n\nrepresented by Marvin Ray Sparrow Sparrow & Vandenberg Box 388 Durham, NC 27702 919-956-7924 Fax: 680-2092 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nPlaintiff Shaune Kimbrough\n\nrepresented by Marvin Ray Sparrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nPlaintiff\nStephanie Hall themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated\n\nrepresented by Marvin Ray Sparrow (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nV. Defendant Secretary of Human R C. Robin Britt\nDefendant Director of Div. of Gwendolyn C.\n\nrepresented by John R. Corne N.C. Department of Justice jcorne@ncdoj.com P.O. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602-0629 919-716-6800 Fax: 716-6755 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by John R. Corne\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?952334175020893-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 2 of 3\n\nChunn Director of Division of Youth Services\nDefendant Tommie Clark Manager of Detention\n\n(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by John R. Corne (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDate Filed 08/05/1994 08/05/1994 08/05/1994 08/18/1994\n08/18/1994\n08/18/1994 08/22/1994 08/22/1994\n08/25/1994\n08/25/1994\n08/26/1994 09/07/1994\n\n#\n\nDocket Text\n\n1 Complaint filed, alleges civil rights violations in detention centers, seeks injunctive relief. (fdc) (Entered: 09/07/1994)\n\nSummonses issued for C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Tommie Clark (fdc) (Entered: 09/07/1994)\n\nFiling Fee Paid; FILING FEE $120 RECEIPT# 28486 (fdc) (Entered: 09/07/1994)\n\n2 Motion by Antwan Simpson, Shaune Kimbrough, Stephanie Hall with memorandum in support to consolidate with case No. 93-300-CRT-BR . (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n3 Motion by Antwan Simpson, Shaune Kimbrough, Stephanie Hall with memorandum in support for class certification . (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n4 Amended complaint by Antwan Simpson, Shaune Kimbrough, Stephanie Hall :amends [1-1] complaint. (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n5 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Tommie Clark to extend time to answer . (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n6 Order granting [5-1] motion to extend time to answer, set answer due for 9/29/94 for Tommie Clark, for Gwendolyn C. Chunn, for C. Robin Britt signed by Skinner, Dep.Clk. Cys. returned for service. (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n7 Memorandum by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Tommie Clark in opposition to [2-1] motion to consolidate with case No. 93-300-CRT-BR. (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n8 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Tommie Clark with memorandum in support to consolidate with case No. 93-300-CRT-BR . (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n9 Motion by C. Robin Britt, Gwendolyn C. Chunn, Tommie Clark to extend time . (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n\n10 Order granting [9-1] motion to extend time, response to motion reset to 10/19/94 for [3-1] motion for class certification - signed by Daniel,\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?952334175020893-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\fCM/ECF - NCED - Docket Report\n\nPage 3 of 3\n\n09/29/1994 09/29/1994 09/29/1994 09/30/1994\n09/30/1994 09/30/1994\n09/30/1994 01/18/1995\n01/18/1995\n01/20/1995 07/26/1995\n\nClerk. Cys. served. (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n11 Answer to Complaint by C. Robin Britt. (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n12 Answer to Complaint by Gwendolyn C. Chunn. (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n13 Answer to Complaint by Tommie Clark. (fdc) (Entered: 10/02/1994)\n14 Order granting [2-1] motion to consolidate with case No. 93-300-CRTBR & the clerk is directed to maintain all subsequent pleadings in case No. 93-300-CT-BR & all subsequent pleadings should reflect the caption & docket number of each case with this case to have the following docket number: 5:94-CT-581-BR2. All non-dispositive motions are hereby referred to USMJ Denson - signed by USDJ Britt. CRT OB Ref: 85, p. 139. Cys. served. (fdc) (Entered: 10/06/1994)\nTerminated document No. 8 as moot. (fdc) (Entered: 10/06/1994)\nCase reassigned to Judge W. E. Britt & consolidated with case No. 93300-CT-BR, with all non-dispositive motions to be referred to USMJ Denson. (fdc) (Entered: 10/06/1994)\nCase consolidated with 93-300-CRT-BR (gm) (Entered: 01/20/1995)\nPre-trial conference set at 10:30 a.m. on 2/13/95 in the U.S. Ctrm., 6th Floor, Cthse. & Fed. Bldg., Raleigh, N.C., before USMJ Alexander B. Denson. (fdc) (Entered: 01/31/1995)\nBench trial set at 9:00 a.m. on 2/27/95 in the U.S. Ctrm. No. 2, 7th Floor, Cthse. & Fed. Bldg., Raleigh, N.C., before Judge W. E. Britt. (fdc) (Entered: 01/31/1995)\nTerminated motion for class certification (gm) (Entered: 01/20/1995)\nCase closed - Non Permanent (gm) (Entered: 07/26/1995)\n\nPACER Service Center\nTransaction Receipt\n\nPACER Login: Description: Billable Pages:\n\n10/17/2005 18:36:49\n\nhs0328\n\nClient Code:\n\nDocket Report Search Criteria:\n\n2\n\nCost:\n\n5:94-ct-00581 0.16\n\nhttps://ecf.nced.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?952334175020893-L_280_0-1\n\n10/17/2005\n\n\f" ]	On May 17, 1993, juveniles detained in North Carolina detention centers filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against the Secretary of Human Resources and the various regional detention centers. The class consisted of all juveniles who were confined in the detention centers. Private counsel represented the class. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the conditions at the juvenile detention centers violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom from unreasonable seizure, punishment, and to cruel and unusual punishment. According to the complaint, the detention centers were overcrowded and inadequately staffed. The overcrowding and understaffing increased the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence. The health care, classification system, recreation, and educational programs were all inadequate. On September 30, 1994, the case was consolidated with Simpson v. Britt (Docket No. 94-00581). After discovery and negotiation, the parties reached a settlement agreement. On February 22, 1995, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Denson) approved a settlement agreement. The agreement provided for a reduction in the number of juveniles confined in the detention center, a good faith effort to provide additional staff, the development and implementation of a medical care plan, a mental health care plan, and the development and implementation of an educational plan. Additionally, a behavior management system was specifically outlined. The defendant was required to standardize intake procedures, develop and implement a classification system, provide recreation and programming, and develop and implement a policy regarding visitation, telephone use, and mail. The case was dismissed with prejudice on January 20, 1998.	null	null
PB-PA-0009	[ "Case 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 1 of 26\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\nFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n____________________________________________\n\n:\n\nLYKEH MUMFORD, by and through his next friend, :\n\nKatherina Mach; JOSEPH YALE, by and through :\n\nhis next friend, Pamela Zotynia; and KAREN LYN :\n\nBLAKELY, by and through her mother and next\n\n:\n\nfriend, Carol Blakely,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nv.\n\n:\n\nCivil Action No. 11-3312\n\n:\n\nDEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE :\n\nCOMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA; and :\n\nGARY ALEXANDER, in his official capacity as :\n\nActing Secretary of Public Welfare of the\n\n:\n\nCommonwealth of Pennsylvania,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nDefendants.\n\n:\n\n____________________________________________:\n\nAMENDED COMPLAINT\n\nI. Introduction\n\n1. Plaintiffs are individuals with intellectual disabilities who are unnecessarily\n\ninstitutionalized in psychiatri c hospitals, one of whom faces the imminent pros pect of\n\nunnecessary commitment to a state mental retardation institution.\n\n2. Plaintiffs are eligible for and enro lled in the Cons olidated Waiver, a\n\nMedical Assistance home and c ommunity-based waiver administ ered by Defenda nt,\n\nPennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW). The Consolidated Waiver provides\n\na full array of services for people with inte llectual disabilities, including residential and\n\nnon-residential supports that enable them to live in the community.\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 2 of 26\n3. Due to t heir changing needs, the services most recently provided to the Plaintiffs under the C onsolidated Waiver pr oved inadequate. This resulted in thei r psychiatric hospitalizations.\n4. Although Plaintiffs' community service needs may have changed, the Consolidated Waiver offers the resources and services they now need to return to the community, and it is Defendants' responsibility to assure that they receive those services.\n5. Defendants' policies and practices, however, have undermined the ability of Plaintiffs to receive the Consolidated Waiver services they need to promptly return to and remain in their communities.\n6. Defendants' policies and practices resu lt in the unnecessa ry institutionalization of Plaintiffs in vi olation of the in tegration mandates of Tile II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. I n addition, Defendant Alexander's actions and inactions violate Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the federal Medical Assistance statute, by de nying Plaintiffs services to which they are entitled, failing to provi de those services with reason able promptness, and failing to protect their health and welfare, to make av ailable feasible alternatives, and to allow Plaintiffs to choose between institutional and community services. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. II. Jurisdiction and Venue\n7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1343(a)(4).\n2\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 3 of 26\n8. Plaintiffs' claims are a uthorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 , 1983, 12133, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.\n9. Venue is appropriate in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b) since a substantial part of the events that gave rise to these claims arose in this District. III. Parties\n10. Plaintiff Lykeh Mumford is a 32-year -old resident of Phil adelphia, Pennsylvania who has an intellectual disability and a diagno sis of intermittent explosive disorder. Mr. M umford brings this lawsui t by and through his ne xt friend, Katherina Mach.\n11. Plaintiff Joseph Yale is a 26-yea r-old resident of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania who has an intellectual d isability and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. Mr. Y ale brings th is lawsuit by and through his next friend, Pamela Zotynia.\n12. Plaintiff Karen Lyn Blakely is a 42-y ear-old resident of P hiladelphia, Pennsylvania who has an intellectual disab ility and has been diag nosed with bipolar disorder. Ms. Blakel y brings this lawsuit by and through her mother and ne xt friend, Carol Blakely.\n13. Defendant Department of Public Welfare is the Commonwealth agency that is responsible to provide services to Pe nnsylvanians with intellectual disabilities under the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 P.S. § 4201(1). DPW als o arranges for and funds the provision of hom e and community-based mental retardatio n services so that people with intellectual disabilities can liv e in the communi ty with non-\n3\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 4 of 26\ndisabled persons. In addition, D PW is the single state agency that has responsibility to implement Pennsylvania's Medical Ass istance Program, including services provided to individuals with intellectual disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5); 55 Pa. Code § 101.1(e).\n14. Defendant Gary Alexander is the Acting Secretary of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Penns ylvania. Mr. Alexande r administers DPW and, as such, he is responsible to assure that Pennsylvania' s Medical Assistance program is operated in compliance with federal law. M r. Alexander is sued in his offici al capacity only for actions and omissions under color of state law. IV. Factual Background\nA. Medical Assistance, HCBS Waivers, and the Consolidated Waiver 15. Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Title XIX), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., establishes the federal Medical Assistance program. 16. Medical Assistance is a cost-sharing arrangem ent under which t he federal government reimburses more than 50 percent of the expenditures incu rred by states that elect to furnish Medical Assistance to i ndividuals whose inc ome and resources are insufficient to cover the costs of their medical care. 17. The purpose of Medical Assistance is to provide medi cal services to eligible individuals, including services to help such individuals \"attain or retain capability for independence or self-care ....\" 42 U.S.C. § 1396. 18. States are not re quired to participate in the Medical Assistance program, but, if they choose to do s o, they must adopt a \"state plan\" that delineates the standards for determining eligibility and identifies the extent of Medical Assistance benefits.\n4\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 5 of 26\n19. Pennsylvania has chosen to participat e in the Medical Assistance p rogram and has adopted a State Medical Assistance Plan.\n20. Title XIX delineates the types of medica l services that can be funded under a state's Medical Assistance plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d. Certain types of services are mandatory (e.g., inpatient hos pital services, physicia ns' services, and nursing facilities) and must be included in every state' s Medical Assistance plan. O ther types of services are optional ( e.g., hospice care, dental c are, and m edications), and ea ch state has discretion to choose whether to cover any particular optional service.\n21. Many home and community -based services for people with dis abilities (such as habilitation for individuals with in tellectual disabilities, behavioral therapy, vocational supports, and c ommunity integration services) cannot be covered either as mandatory or optional services under Title XIX.\n22. Title XIX permits a state to obtain a home and community-based services (HCBS) waiver from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c). HCBS waivers allow states to include in their stat e plans as \"Medical Assistance\" home and community-based services for individuals who, without such care, would require institutionalization in an intermed iate care facility for persons with mental retardation, nursing facilities, or hospitals.\n23. HCBS waivers allow states to \"w aive\" three specific Title XIX requirements that apply t o mandatory and optional services -- the statewideness requirement (which requires the state to a ssure the availability of services in all geographic areas); the comparab ility requirement (which requir es the state to assure that\n5\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 6 of 26\nall eligible persons have access to services in the same amount, duration, and scope); and income and resource rules. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(3).\n24. By waiving the \"comparability\" requirement, states can limit the number of persons who will be allowed to participate in an HCBS waiver and can establish qualifications for eligibility based on age, di sability, or other criteria. Waiver of the comparability requirement also a llows states to provide Medi cal Assistance services to HCBS waiver participants in a different amount, duration, or scope than is available to other Medical Assistance participants.\n25. A state can provide servic es in HCBS waivers that are not identified in Title XIX as approved mandat ory or optional services ( e.g., habilitation, respite care, home and vehicle modifications , and vocational supports). 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(4)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 440.180.\n26. In sum, the purpose of Title XIX 's HCBS waivers is to en courage states to provide services to assist individuals with disabilities to avoid ins titutionalization. 42 C.F.R. § 441.300. As long as community-based services vis-à-vis institutional services are cost-neutral, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D), the prefer ence is to prov ide services in the community.\n27. Pennsylvania has received approval from CMS to operate multiple HCBS Waivers, including the Consolidated Waiver for individuals with intellectual disabilities.\n28. DPW, the single state agency designate d by Pennsylvania to administer its Medical Assistance program, has delegated res ponsibility to administer the Consolidate d Waiver to its Office of Developmental Programs (ODP).\n6\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 7 of 26\n29. The Consolidated Waiver, establishe d in 1986, provi des services to Pennsylvanians with intellectual disabilities age 3 and older.\n30. The Consolidated Waiver is the la rgest HCBS Waiver in the Commonwealth, both in terms of the number of individuals served and expenditures.\n31. The Consolidated Waiver limits the nu mber of individuals who can receive services. Currently, the limit is approximately 17,000 persons.\n32. The Consolidated Waiver is the pr imary funding s ource for communitybased mental retardation services in Pennsylvania.\n33. The Consolidated Waiver offers a broad range of community-based mental retardation services, depe nding on t he participant=s needs, including: residential habilitation; home and community-based habilitation; licensed day habilitation; supported employment, prevocational, and transitional work services; behavioral supports; respite; homemaker/chore services; home and vehi cle accessibility adaptations; supports coordination; nursing services; and transportation.\n34. DPW contracts with local Administra tive Entities (AEs) to perform operational and adm inistrative functions to implement the Conso lidated Waiver. In most instances, the AEs are the County Mental Health/Men tal Retardation (MH/MR) Programs.\n35. Once an individual is approved to participate in the Cons olidated Waiver, he or she and his or her S upport Team (including involv ed family or guardian and Supports Coordinator) work to develop an Individual Support Plan (ISP) to i dentify the supports and services the individual needs to live in the community.\n7\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 8 of 26\n36. The ISP, which must be approved by the AE, is th e document that authorizes the home and community-based services that the individual will receive under the Consolidated Waiver.\n37. The services and supports identified in an ISP are based on the individual' s current clinical and medical needs assess ed pursuant to t he ODP-approved needs assessment instrument.\n38. When an individual's service needs change (e.g., he or she needs a different type of service, m ore of a service, or less of a service), his or her ISP is am ended to reflect the change and the AE authorizes the new or different services.\n39. For individuals who are enrolled in th e Consolidated Waiver, there is no monetary cap on services. Participants are en titled to receive any serv ices they need that are available under the Waiver and that are necessary for their health and welfare.\n40. Consolidated Waiver par ticipants who are institutionalized are at risk of termination from the Waiver if they do not receive any services funded by the Waiver for a certain time period. Once a person is term inated from the Cons olidated Waiver, he or she must reapply and will be placed on a waiti ng list for services. Currently, there are thousands of Pennsylvanians on the \"emergency\" waiting list for Waiver services, and, as a result, a person who is terminated from th e Consolidated Waiver may have to wait years to be re-enrolled.\n41. DPW's ODP has recently im plemented policies and practices that have the effect of denyi ng Consolidated Waiver par ticipants prompt access to the services they need for their health and welfare.\n8\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 9 of 26\n42. ODP requires that its Central Office approve development of any new oneperson residential programs. Recently, how ever, multiple requests submitted to ODP's Central Office for de velopment of s uch programs have neither been a pproved nor disapproved, and no one at ODP has been willing to make such decisions. This has resulted in delays in approval for new programs.\n43. DPW is not payi ng adequate r ates for ineligible expenses incurred in residential habilitation programs.\na. Title XIX does not allow federal re imbursement for room and board costs for residential programs (such as mortgage payments, home insurance, and food).\nb. Historically, DPW has used state funds to allow residential providers to finance those expenses. These are called \"ineligible expenses.\"\nc. The ineligible expenses paid by the state, toget her with payment by residents of a portion of their Supplemental Se curity Income or Social Security disability benefits, had been sufficient to allow providers to fund those ineligible costs.\nd. Recently, DPW expanded the definition of in eligible expenses, shifting many costs from those formerly eligib le for Medical Assi stance matching funds to ineligible costs. This in cludes, for example, the time spen t by staff in the residential home preparing meals.\ne. ODP has not increased its payments to providers for the expanded ineligible expenses while it has reduced the providers' eligible expe nses to reflect the unavailability of Medical Assist ance matching funds to pay ce rtain previously eligible expenses.\n9\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 10 of 26\nf. At the same time, ODP concluded that it was overpaying providers of residential habilitation services for ineligible expenses, proposing to reduce those costs by $27 million annually.\ng. This proposed re duction, together with the already inade quate payments for ineligibl e costs, has m ade providers reluctant to de velop new residential programs.\n44. Providers' hesitation in developing new programs has been compounded by the inadequate and unstable rates for program s that serve people with more challenging needs. On information and belief, ODP has im plemented a \"high cost rate development policy\" by which ODP determines rates for new residential programs that are \"high cost.\" In addition, ODP has implemented an \"outlier rate adjustment policy\" by which ODP has reduced rates for exi sting high-cost programs after those rates were negotiated by providers. Neither of these policies is written, and ODP ha s not informed the providers or the public as to the standards that are us ed in setting high cost rates for new programs or reducing rates for existi ng high cost program s. Thes e policies have effectively narrowed rate ranges, m inimizing incentives for providers to serv e individuals with complex needs.\n45. On information and belief, ODP has not increased its rates for residential habilitation services sufficient to cover the cost increases for those services for many years. As providers' costs go up and rates do not, pr oviders have made cuts in their programs. There are many fixed costs that th e providers cannot reduce. Providers also cannot reduce costs for direct car e staff that are required by the individuals' ISPs. As a\n10\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 11 of 26\nresult, many providers have cut clinical sta ff who had expertise to address clients in the providers' programs with chall enging behavioral issues. Clinical staff can be an important resource for direct care staff to consult when issues arise. As clinical staff have been terminated by providers due to costs constraints, direct care staff do not have access to the expertise they need to assist them to provide appropriate care for these individuals in their homes and communities.\n46. People with intellectual disabilities wh o also have diag noses of mental illness, including the Plaintiffs, need serv ices for both of their disabilities. DPW separates the provision of these services between ODP and D PW's Office of Ment al Health and Substance Abuse Services (OMH SAS). There is a lack of coor dination between ODP and OMHSAS, resulting in barriers to accessing the services the Plaintiffs need from both systems.\nB. Plaintiffs' Unmet Service Needs and Unnecessary Institutionalization 47. Plaintiff Lykeh Mumford has an in tellectual disability and has been diagnosed with pervasive developmental disorder and impulse control disorder. 48. Mr. Mumford has been enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver since 2008. 49. Until January 2011, Mr. Mu mford lived in the commu nity in the homes of his mother and grandm other. Mr. Mum ford received 14. 5 hours daily of home and community habilitation services during weekdays and 12 hours daily during weekends. 50. While living in the comm unity, Mr. Mum ford enjoyed participating i n community activities, including taking walks, swimming, bike riding, playing basketball,\n11\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 12 of 26\nskating, and table hockey. He also enjoyed having morning coffee in the park and going to the community center and the library.\n51. Mr. Mumford has ha d instances of aggressiveness toward his fam ily and self-injurious behaviors stemming from his disabilities.\n52. Mr. Mumford's grandmother, due to her adva ncing age, can no longer support him in her home. Mr. Mumford's mother cannot handle his behavioral issues.\n53. In January 2011, Mr. Mu mford was admitted to a private psychiatric hospital. Mr. Mumford's treating professionals at the psychiat ric hospital have determined that he no longer needs hospitalization, but he cannot return to live with his family.\n54. On information and belief, DPW's Medical Assistance program has paid for Mr. Mumford's institutionalization at the psychiatric hospital.\n55. The private psychiatric hospital has threatened to file a petition to involuntarily commit Mr. Mumf ord to a state mental retardation institution since his treating professionals at the h ospital concluded that he does not need psychiatri c treatment or medication.\n56. It is medically necessary for Mr. Mu mford to receive ha bilitation services in a structured residential community placement, but DPW has failed to provide him with those services.\n57. Mr. Mumford's AE currently provides 1:1 staff support for Mr. Mumford at the inpatient psychiatric hospital.\n58. Mr. Mumford's AE, which contracts with DPW to arrange for services, has only sought to place Mr. Mumford in an exis ting program. Those efforts h ave proven\n12\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 13 of 26\nunsuccessful because providers either are unabl e to meet his needs or because providers have no appropriate vacancies. As of mid-May 2011, DPW had not authorized the AE to request that provi ders develop a new progr am designed specifically to meet Mr. Mumford's unique needs.\n59. Mr. Mumford is unnecessarily institu tionalized in a private psychiatric hospital and is at risk of extended unnecessa ry institutionalization in a state mental retardation institution. Mr. Mumford receives inadequate habilitation services at the psychiatric hospital, which are necessary due to his intellectual disability to assist him to acquire, retain, and im prove his com munication, personal adjustm ent, relationship development, socialization, and adaptive skills ne eded to enable him to live in the community. As a result of his unneces sary institutionalization, Mr. Mum ford is segregated from community life and is at ri sk of termination fro m the Cons olidated Waiver.\n60. Plaintiff Joseph Yale has an intelle ctual disability and a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder.\n61. Mr. Yale has been enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver since May 2010. 62. Mr. Yale has been admitted to private and state psychiatric hospitals nearly 20 times. Hos pitalizations are not unus ual for individuals with dual diagnoses of intellectual disabilities and mental illness, particularly where the individual does not have access to an array of community supports and services. 63. Until August 2010, Mr. Ya le lived with family in the com munity in between his frequent hospitalizations.\n13\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 14 of 26\n64. After he was enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver, Mr. Yale was placed in a residential habilitation program in an apartment with 1:1 st affing for approximately six weeks between August and October 2010.\n65. In or ar ound October 2010, Mr. Yale was involuntarily committed to a private psychiatric hospital af ter incidents of self-injuri ous behavior, aggression, and property damage. This was not intended to be a permanent placement.\n66. It is medically necessary for Mr. Ya le to receive residential habilitation services in the community in a highly structured setting.\n67. On information and belief, DPW's Medical Assistance program has paid for Mr. Yale's institutionalization at the psychiatric hospital.\n68. A provider, Resources fo r Human Development (RHD), has submitted a budget to serve Mr. Yale and the budget was reviewed by the former Deputy Secretary of ODP in March 2011. ODP reject ed the budget. A m eeting was held betwee n RHD and ODP staff on March 23, 2011. On April 8, 2011, RHD s ubmitted answers to ODP' s follow-up questions. RHD made several attempts since then to schedule another meeting to review its new budget subm issions for Mr. Yale. In May 2011, DPW informed RHD that it would have to complete new forms.\n69. On or around June 2, 2011, ne gotiations between DP W and RH D had reached an impasse.\n70. On or around June 2, 2011, the privat e psychiatric hospital where Mr. Yale had been institutionalized re ferred Mr. Yale for involu ntary commitment to Clarks\n14\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 15 of 26\nSummit State Hospital, a state-operated psyc hiatric hospital, and a commitment hearing has been scheduled for June 10, 2011.\n71. Mr. Yale does not need to be institutionalized in a state psychiatric hospital. He has been referred for co mmitment solely due to the breakdown in negotiations between DPW and RHD, not due to psychi atric symptoms that require commitment to a state psychiatric hospital.\n72. RHD is still willing to provide commun ity residential habilitation s ervices to Mr. Yale if it is able to reach agreement with DPW on the rate.\n73. While living in the community, Mr. Ya le enjoyed going to the movies, playing sports, weightlifting, and shopping.\n74. Mr. Yale has been institutionalized an d segregated from society for more than seven months as he aw aits development of a reside ntial habilitation program. Mr. Yale receives no habilitation s ervices at th e private psychiatric hos pital, which are necessary due to his intellectual disability to assist him to acquire, retain, and improve his communication, personal a djustment, relationship development, socialization, and adaptive skills need ed to enable him to live in the community. He is at risk of institutionalization in a state psychiatric ho spital and termination from the Consolidated Waiver.\n75. Plaintiff Karen Lyn Blakely has an intellectual disability and a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.\n76. Ms. Blakely is enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver.\n15\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 16 of 26\n77. Ms. Blakely received residential habilita tion services in Philadelphia until November 2009. At t hat time, Ms. Blakely's mother rem oved her from the residential habilitation program where she was living because staff scalded Ms. Blakely with hot water after a behavioral incident.\n78. Ms. Blakely's mother took her hom e in Novem ber 2009. W hile she was living with her mother, Ms. Blakely received limited supports and services.\n79. Beginning in February 2010, Ms. Blake ly's behavioral issues becam e increasingly difficult and she became physically aggressive toward her mother.\n80. Ms. Blakely was admitted three times to private psychiatric hospitals in Philadelphia. The l ast admission was on June 29, 2010, and she has rem ained hospitalized since that date.\n81. After her most recent admission to a psychiatric hospital, the staff took Ms. Blakely off all of he r medications to detoxify her system. This resulted in marked improvement in Ms. Blakely's functional abilities and behavior.\n82. Ms. Blakely's treatment team at the ps ychiatric hospital has concl uded that she no longer needs inpatient psychiatric treatment.\n83. Ms. Blakely's AE identified a reside ntial habilitation provider, Keystone, which was able and willing to serve her in the summer of 2010. I n May 2011, however, Keystone informed the AE that it could not serve Ms. Blakely be cause of an issue with rates. The AE attempted to work with DPW to resolve that issue, but the effort proved fruitless.\n16\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 17 of 26\n84. A respite care provider rescinded its offer to provide community services to Ms. Blakely pending th e development of a permanent residential habilitation program after Keystone withdrew its offer to serve Ms. Blakely.\n85. The psychiatric hospi tal has stated that it intends to file a petition to involuntarily commit Ms. Blakel y to a state-operated mental retardation institution since she no l onger needs psychiatric care. It wo uld be difficult for her mother to visit Ms. Blakely in such a facility due to their distance from her home.\n86. Ms. Blakely is an energetic, talkative, engaging person who enjoys living in the community.\n87. Ms. Blakely has been institutionalized and segregated from society for nearly a year while she awaits development of a residentia l habilitation program. Ms. Blakely receives no habilitation s ervices at the psychiatric hospital, which are necessary due to her intellectual disability to assist him to acquire, retain, and improve his communication, personal a djustment, relationship development, socialization, and adaptive skills needed to enable him to live in the commun ity. Ms. Blakely is at risk of institutionalization in a state mental reta rdation institution and termination from th e Consolidated Waiver.\nC. Irreparable Harm 88. Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable ha rm as a result of Defenda nt's actions and inactions that give rise to this case. 89. Plaintiffs are unnecessarily institu tionalized and segregated from the community.\n17\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 18 of 26\n90. Plaintiffs are at risk of losing thei r eligibility for the C onsolidated Waiver and their entitlement to community mental re tardation services available under that Waiver if they continue to be institutionalized. V. Claims\nA. Count I -- Americans with Disabilities Act 91. Paragraphs 1 through 90 are incorporated by referenc e as if fully set forth herein. This Count is brought solely against Defendant Alexander in his official capacity for acts and omissions under color of state law. 92. Plaintiffs have intellectual disabilities, impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activ ities, including but not limite d to, caring for themselves, learning, concentrating, and thinking. As such, they are persons with disabilities protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A), 12102(2)(A). 93. Plaintiffs are eligible for community -based mental retardation services, including services under the Co nsolidated Waiver, and, as such, are qualified persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 94. DPW, operated and adm inistered by Defendant Alexander, is a public entity subject to the requirements of Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). 95. Defendant Alexander violat es the integration manda te of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). Plaintiffs want community mental retardation services and the community is the most integrated setting appropriate to meet their needs. Yet, Defendant has failed to provide them with mental retardation services in\n18\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 19 of 26\nthe community. As a result, Plaintiffs ar e unnecessarily segregated in psyc hiatric institutions and are at risk of continue d unnecessary instituti onalization in those institutions or in state mental retardation institutions.\n96. The provision of com munity residential habilitation services to Plaintiffs will not fundamentally alter Defe ndant's programs, services or activities. As enrollees in the Consolidated Waiver, Plaintiffs currently have an entitlement to those services. As such, providing them with thos e services will not result in displacement of others from services or their jumping ahead of others on a waiting list.\n97. Defendant Alexander violates Tit le II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35. 130(b)(3), by us ing methods of administration that subject Plaintiffs to discrimination through unnecessary segrega tion and institutionalization, including, but not limited to: (a) failing to streamline th e approval process for developm ent of new programs; (b) failing to develop a rate structur e that is sufficient a nd stable to enable providers to devel op new pr ograms; and (c) failing to effectively coor dinate mental health services for individu als with dual diagnoses of mental illness and mental retardation.\nB. Count II -- Rehabilitation Act 98. Paragraphs 1 through 97 are incorporated by referenc e as if fully set forth herein. This Count is brought solely against Defendant DPW. 99. Plaintiffs have intellectual disabilities, impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activ ities, including but not limite d to, caring for themselves,\n19\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 20 of 26\nlearning, concentrating, and thinking. As such, they are persons with disabilities protected by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B).\n100. Plaintiffs are eligible for community -based mental retardation services, including services under the Co nsolidated Waiver, and, as such, are qualified persons with disabilities pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.\n101. DPW is a recipient of federal financial assistance and, as such, is s ubject to the requirements of Section 504 of the RA. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).\n102. Defendant DPW violates the integra tion mandate of S ection 504 of t he RA, 29 U. S.C. § 794 and 28 C.F.R. § 41. 51(d). Pla intiffs want com munity mental retardation services and the community is the most integrated setting appropriate to meet their needs. Yet, DPW has failed to provide th em with mental retardation services in the community. As a result, Plaintiffs are unnecessarily segregated in psychiatric institutions and are at risk of continued unnecessary in stitutionalization in those institutions or in state mental retardation institutions.\n103. The provision of com munity residential habilitation services to Plaintiffs will not fundamentally alter Defe ndant's programs, services or activities. As enrollees in the Consolidated Waiver, Plaintiffs currently have an entitlement to those services. As such, providing them with thos e services will not result in displacement of others from services or their jumping ahead of others on a waiting list.\n104. Defendant DPW violates Section 504 of the RA, 29 U. S.C. § 794 and 28 C.F.R. § 41. 51(b)(3), by using methods of adm inistration that subject P laintiffs to discrimination through unnecessary segrega tion and institutionalization, including, but\n20\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 21 of 26\nnot limited to: (a) failing to streamline th e approval process for development of new programs; (b) failing to develop a rate structur e that is sufficient a nd stable to enable providers to devel op new pr ograms; and (c) failing to effectively coor dinate mental health services for individu als with dual diagnoses of mental illness and mental retardation.\nC. Count III -- Title XIX: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A) and 1983 105. Paragraphs 1 through 104 are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. This Count is brought solely against Defendant Alexander for acts and omissions in his official capacity under color of state law. 106. Under Title XIX, states that particip ate in the Medical Assistance program must make Medical Assistance benefits av ailable to eligible persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). 107. \"Medical Assistance\" benefits include, at the opti on of the state, HCB S Waiver services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1). 108. Pennsylvania participates in the Medical Assistance program and has chosen in its State Plan to cover HCBS Wa iver services approved by CMS, including the Consolidated Waiver. 109. Plaintiffs are eligible for Medical Assistance benefits and are enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver. 110. Plaintiffs are entitled to receive all se rvices under the Consolidated Waiver which they need, including residential habilitation services.\n21\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 22 of 26\n111. It is clinically and medically necessary for Plaintiffs to receive appropriate residential habilitation services. Defendant Alexander has failed to provide Plaintiffs with those services and, instead, they are unnecessarily institutionalized.\n112. Defendant's policies and practices have impeded the prom pt provision of appropriate community services to Plaintiffs, including residential habilitation services.\n113. Defendant's policies and practices ar e intended solely to reduc e expenditures for services provided to individuals, like Pl aintiffs, with complex needs, regardless of their clinical and medical needs.\n114. Defendant has failed to assure that Pl aintiffs receive appropriate services under the Consolidated Waiver to enable them to live in the community.\n115. Defendant Alexander's acts and om issions under color of state law violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A) and 1983.\nD. Count IV -- Title XIX: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8) and 1983 116. Paragraphs 1 through 115 are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. This Count is brought solely against Defendant Alexander for acts and omissions in his official capacity under color of state law. 117. Title XIX mandates that states which participate in the Medical Assistance program must \"provide that all indi viduals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have the opportunity to do so, and that all such assistanc e shall be f urnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible indivi duals.\" 42 U.S. C. § 1396a(a)(8).\n22\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 23 of 26\n118. Title XIX requires states to adopt time standards f or the provision of services to avoid unreasonable delays. In addition, Title XI X does not permit states to delay furnishing Medical Assistance due to th e state agency's administrative procedures. 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a).\n119. Defendant Alexander has established no timelines for the provi sion of residential habilitation services under the Consolidated Waiver.\n120. Defendant Alexander has vi olated Plaintiffs' right to receive residential habilitation services under the Consolidated Waiver with r easonable promptness, as th e Plaintiffs have been institutionalized and aw aiting such community services for periods ranging from two to seven months with no end in sight.\n121. Defendant Alexander's acts and om issions under color of state law violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8) and 1983.\nE. Count V -- Title XIX: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c) and 1983 122. Paragraphs 1 through 121 are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. This Count is brought solely against Defendant Alexander for acts and omissions in his official capacity under color of state law. 123. Title XIX requires that each HCBS Waiver must include \"necessary safeguards (including adequate standards for pr ovider participation) ... to protect the health and welfare of individu als provided services under the [W]aiver ....\" 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(A). This requires a state \"to provide all people enrolled in the [W]aiver with the opportunity for access to a ll needed services covered by the [W]aiver and under t he Medicaid State plan. ... The opportunity for access pertains to all services available\n23\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 24 of 26\nunder the [W]aiver that an enro llee is determined to need on the basis of an assessment and a written plan of care/support.\" CMS, Olmstead Update No. 4 (Jan. 10, 2001). \"Once in the [W]aiver, an en rolled individual enjoys protection against arbitrary or inappropriate restrictions, and the State assume s an obligation to assure the individual's health and welfare.\" Id.\n124. Plaintiff's health and welfare has been jeopardized by De fendant's implementation of the Consolid ated Waiver. As enrollees in the Consolidated Waiver, Plaintiffs are entitled to receive residen tial habilitation services , and Defendant has determined that they need those services. Yet, Defenda nt has i mposed arbitrary and inappropriate restrictions on access to those services, which has resulted in their inability to receive appropriate commun ity residential habilitation serv ices and their unnecessary institutionalization.\n125. Title XIX also requires states to in form individuals eligible for HCBS Waiver services of their feasib le alternatives available under the Waiver so that they can choose both among s uch available services and between HCBS Waiver services and institutionalization. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C).\n126. Defendant has violat ed Title XIX by failing to a llow Plaintiffs to choose among available feasible alternatives and to choose between Consolidat ed Waiver services and institutionalization. Defend ant's policies and practices have made community residential habilitation services e ffectively unavailable to Plaintiffs, forcing them to be institutionalized.\n24\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 25 of 26\n\n127. Defendant Alexander's acts and om issions under color of state law violate\n\n42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c) and 1983.\n\nVI. Relief Requested\n\n128. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court:\n\na. retain jurisdiction over this action;\n\nb. declare that Defendants' actions and inactions violate the AD A and\n\nRA, Title XIX, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;\n\nc. issue appropriate injunctive relie f to enjoin Defendants from\n\ncontinuing to violate Plainti ffs' rights under the ADA, RA, T itle XIX, and 42 U.S. C. §\n\n1983, and to take appropriate steps to remedy those violations;\n\nd. issue such other relief as m ay be just, equitable, and appr opriate,\n\nincluding an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation e xpenses, and c osts as\n\navailable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205 and 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).\n\nRespectfully\n\nsubmitted,\n\nDated: June 3, 2011\nDisability Philadel 215-\n\nBy: /s/ Robert W. Meek Robert W. Meek PA 27870 Mark J. Murphy PA 38564 Robin Resnick PA 46980 Rights Network of PA 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 500 phia, PA 19107-4705 238-8070\nCounsel for Plaintiffs\n25\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 3 Filed 06/03/11 Page 26 of 26\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI, Robert W. Meek, hereby certify that tr ue and correct copi es of Plaintiffs'\nAmended Complaint were served as follows on this 3rd day of June, 2011:\nBy First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid and By Email: Barry N. Kramer\nChief Deputy Attorney General Office of Attorney General\n21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107\nBy First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid and By Email: Kathleen A. Grogan\nSenior Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel Department of Public Welfare 3rd Floor West, Health & Welfare Building\nHarrisburg, PA 17120\n/s/ Robert W. Meek Robert W. Meek\n\n\f", "Case 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 8 Filed 06/10/11 Page 1 of 1\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \n FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA \n\n\nLYKEH MUMFORD, et a1.\nPlaintiffs,\nY.\nDEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al.\nDefendants.\n\nCIVIL ACTION\nNO. 11-3312 Judge Joel H. Slomsky\n\nSTIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PRELIMINARY INJ1JNCTI01S:\nAND NOW, this 10th day of June, 2011, pursuant to the Stipulation of me Parties, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order shall be withdravm. 2. Defendants shall take all necessary steps to prevent the transfer of Joseph Yale to\na state-operated psychiatric hospital for 90 days from the date of entry of this ORDER.\n3. Defendants shall not terminate Plaintiff Yale from the Consolidated Waiver pending placement in an appropriate community-based program.\n\nBY THE COURT:\n\nlO/lO 39'i1d\n\n9(;1£UL£1(; £S:£1 110(;/01/90\n\n\f", "Case 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 16 Filed 10/18/11 Page 1 of 5 Case 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 15 Filed 10/05/11 Page 2_o_f6_ _\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVA\n\nLYKEH MUMFORD, by and through his next friend, Katherina Mach; JOSEPH YALE, by and through his next friend, Pamela Zotynia; and KAREN LYN BLAKELY, by and through her mother and next friend, Carol Blakely,\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\nv.\n\n: Civil Action No. 11-3312\n\nDEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE CO:M:MONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA; and GARY ALEXANDER, in his official capacity as Secretary of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of : Pennsy lvania,\n\nDefendants.\n\nSETTLEMENT AGREEMENT I. Introduction\nWHEREAS Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit that alleged that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Title XIX of the Social Security Act by failing to provide Plaintiffs with appropriate residential habilitation services that resulted in their institutionalization in psychiatric hospitals;\nWHEREAS Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in June 2011 to require Defendants to provide them with\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 16 Filed 10/18/11 Page 2 of 5 Case 2:11-cv-03312-.JHS Document 15 Filed 10/05/11 Page 3 of 6\nappropriate residential habilitation services and to bar their commitment to state institutions;\nWHEREAS Plaintiffs Mumford and Yale have been placed in residential habilitation programs;\nWHEREAS, a provider, Keystone Human Services (Keystone)~ has assured Defendants that it is developing a residential habilitation program for Plaintiff Blakely and it is anticipated that she will be discharged from the psychiatric hospital to that program no later than January 15,2012;\nWHEREAS Defendants deny all liability; WHEREAS the parties desire to resolve this matter amicably; NOW, THEREFORE, Plaintiffs and Defendants enter into this Settlement Agreement. II. Defendants' Obligations 1. Defendants will assure that Plaintiff Blakely is discharged to an appropriate residential habilitation program provided by Keystone no later than January 15,2012. 2. Defendants will maintain ongoing contact with Keystone Human Services prior to Plaintiff Blakely's discharge to assure that Keystone is working diligently to develop the residential program for Plaintiff Blakely in a timely fashion. Defendants will promptly notify Plaintiffs' counsel if any impediments, obstacles~ or barriers arise that may delay Plaintiff Blakely's discharge from the psychiatric hospital.\n2 \n\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 16 Filed 10/18/11 Page 3 of 5 Case 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 15 Filed 10/05/11 Page 4 of 6\n3. Defendants will not accept Plaintiff Blakely for admission to a stateoperated intermediate care facility for persons with mental retardation and will oppose any efforts by third-parties to involuntarily commit Plaintiff Blakely to a state-operated or private intermediate care facility for persons with mental retardation.\n4. Defendants will oppose any efforts by third-parties to involuntarily commit Plaintiff Blakely to a psychiatric hospital unless the parties have first explored alternatives to commitment to a psychiatric hospital and DPW treating professionals determine that she meets the standard for involuntary commitment pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act.\n5. Defendants will inform Keystone that it is responsible to communicate with Plaintiff Blakely's mother, her Administrative Entity, and designated DPW staff before it initiates any effort to involuntarily commit Plaintiff Blakely to a psychiatric hospital or mental retardation facility.\n6. Defendants will not terminate or disenroll Plaintiff Blakely from the Consolidated Waiver. IlL Jurisdiction, Approval, Enforcement, Reinstatement, and Attorneys' Fees\n1. The parties will jointly request that the District Court approve this Settlement Agreement and retain continuing jurisdiction. If the District Court declines this request, this Agreement will be null and void and the matter will be reinstated by the District Court for appropriate resolution.\n2. The Settlement Agreement is not nor is it to be construed as a consent\ndecree. Plaintiffs may not seek a remedy of contempt of court for any violation of the\n3 \n\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 16 Filed 10/18/11 Page 4 of 5 Case 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 15 Filed 10/05/11 Page 5 of 6\nAgreement. Plaintiffs, however, may file a motion for specific performance to enforce Paragraphs II.2 through II.6 of the Agreement at any time until this case is dismissed.\n3. If Plaintiff Blakely is not discharged to an appropriate residential habilitation program by January 15,2012 andlor does not remain in that placement for at least thirty (30) days after her discharge, this case will be reinstated by the District Court for appropriate resolution.\n4. If Plaintiff Blakely is discharged to an appropriate residential habilitation program by January 15, 2012 and remains in that placement for at least thirty (30) days after her discharge, the parties will file a Stipulation of Dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(A)(ii) by February 29, 2012 to dismiss all claims by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants.\n5. Defendants will pay to Plaintiffs' counsel, the Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania, the sum of $25,000.00 for attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs no later than thirty (30) days after the Court dismisses this matter.\n6. If this case is reinstated pursuant to Paragraph IlI.3 of this Agreement, Plaintiffs may petition the District Court for payment of attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs incurred since the inception of this litigation, provided, however, that Plaintiffs will reduce their request by the sum of $25,000 to reflect the payment made pursuant to this Agreement. Nothing in this Paragraph should be construed to entitle Plaintiffs to recovery of attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs.\n4 \n\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 16 Filed 10/18/11 Page 5 of 5 Case 2: 11-cv-03312-JHS Document 15 Filed 10/05/11 Page 6 of 6\n\n/J\nDated: October -? ,2012\n\nBy:\nDisability Rights Network of Pennsylvania 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19107-4705 (215) 238-8070\nCounsel for Plaintiffs\n\nDated: October'1 2012\n\nBy: Barry N. Kramer Chief Deputy Attorney General Office of Attorney General 21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107-3603 (215) 560-1581\nCounsel for Defendants\n\nAPPROVED: A-I'ID J() ote i)(;\"\"f!.E\"]) : o c...-h9 be-r- I 8'1 '\"?-P II\n\n5 \n\n\n\f", "Case 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 1 of 35\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\nFOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n____________________________________________\n\n:\n\nLYKEH MUMFORD, by and through his next friend, :\n\nKatherina Mach; JOSEPH YALE, by and through :\n\nhis next friend, Pamela Zotynia; and KAREN LYN :\n\nBLAKELY, by and through her mother and next\n\n:\n\nfriend, Carol Blakely,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nv.\n\n: Civil Action No. 11-3312\n\n:\n\nDEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE :\n\nCOMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA; and :\n\nGARY ALEXANDER, in his official capacity as :\n\nActing Secretary of Public Welfare of the\n\n:\n\nCommonwealth of Pennsylvania,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nDefendants.\n\n:\n\n____________________________________________:\n\nPLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION\n\nPursuant to Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 65, Plaintiffs, through their counsel,\n\nsubmit this Motion for a Temporary Restrain ing Order and Pr eliminary Injunction.\n\nPlaintiffs initially seek a temporary restra ining order to require Defendants to take\n\nappropriate steps to p revent the commitment of Plaintiffs Yale and Bla kely to state-\n\noperated institutions and not to terminate Plaintiffs from the C onsolidated Waiver\n\nprogram. Plaintiffs then seek a prelimin ary injunction to enjoin Defendant to take\n\nimmediate steps to assure that all Plaintiffs receive clin ically appropriate community\n\nresidential habilitation services to which they are entitled. In support of this Motion,\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 2 of 35\n\nPlaintiffs submit the accom panying Memorandum of Law and Exhibits, whic h are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.\n\nRespectfully\n\nsubmitted,\n\nDated: June 9, 2011\nDisability Philadel (215)\n\nBy: /s/ Robert W. Meek Robert W. Meek PA 27870 Mark J. Murphy PA 38564 Robin Resnick PA 46980 Rights Network of PA 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 500 phia, PA 19107-4705 238-8070\nCounsel for Plaintiffs\n\n2\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 3 of 35\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n____________________________________________\n\n:\n\nLYKEH MUMFORD, by and through his next friend, :\n\nKatherina Mach; JOSEPH YALE, by and through :\n\nhis next friend, Pamela Zotynia; and KAREN LYN :\n\nBLAKELY, by and through her mother and next\n\n:\n\nfriend, Carol Blakely,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nPlaintiffs,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nv.\n\n:\n\n:\n\nDEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE :\n\nCOMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA; and :\n\nGARY ALEXANDER, in his official capacity as :\n\nActing Secretary of Public Welfare of the\n\n:\n\nCommonwealth of Pennsylvania,\n\n:\n\n:\n\nDefendants.\n\n:\n\n____________________________________________:\n\nCivil Action No. 11-3312\n\nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING\nORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION\nPlaintiffs, through their counsel, submit this Memorandum of Law in support of\ntheir Motion for a Te mporary Restraining Order and Prelim inary Injunction to enjoin\nDefendant's violations of the Americans w ith Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and\nTitle XIX of the Social Security Act. As described below, Plain tiffs satisfy all the\nprerequisites for issuance of such injunctive relief.\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 4 of 35\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Defendants' Limitations on Access to Residential Habilitation\nServices Under the Medical Assistance Consolidated Waiver. Pennsylvania participates in the joint federal-state Medical Assistance progra m under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Title XIX), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. See Pennsylvania v. United States , No. 10-2840, 2011 W L 991402 at 1 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2011) (not for publication). Th e federal governm ent pays m ore than 50 percent of the costs of services furnis hed by Pennsylvania under Title XIX. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v. U.S. Dep' t of Health & Human Ser vices, Civil Action N o. 1:08-CV791, 2010 WL 1390835 at 1 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010). Under Title XIX, certain delineated services are mandatory (e.g., inpatient hospital services, physicians' services, and nursing fa cilities) while other delineated services are \"optional\" (e.g., dental care and medications) so that the state may, but is not required, t o provide them to Medical Assista nce recipients. See Pennsylvania Pharm acists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 533 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 821 (2002); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003). Title XIX also permits a state to obtai n a home and community-based services (HCBS) waiver from the federal Centers for Medicare and Medica id Services (CMS). 42 U.S. C. § 1396n(c). HCBS waivers \"‘provide[] Medicaid reim bursement to States for the provision of community-based services to individuals wh o would otherwise requi re institutional care, upon a showing that the average annual cost of such services is not more than the annual cost of institutional services.’\" Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare, 2010 WL 1390835\n2\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 5 of 35\nat 1 (quoting Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999)). 1 Through HCBS waivers, states can access federal Medical Assistance funds for services that could not otherwise be funded under Title XIX. See Radaszewski, 381 F.3d at 601; McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(4)(B); 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.180.\nCMS has authorized Pennsylvania's De partment of Public Welfare (DPW), administered by Defendant Alexander, to operate multiple HCBS waivers. See DPW, Support Services Waivers, available at http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/foradults/healthcare medicalassistance/ supportserviceswaivers/index.htm. DPW' s Office of Developmental Programs (ODP) has responsibility to admini ster several of Pennsyl vania's HCBS Waivers that provide services to people wi th intellectual disabilities (formerly called mental retardation), including the \"Consolidated Waiver.\" See DPW, Consolidated Waiver for Individuals with Mental Retardation, available at http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/ learnaboutdpw/waiverinformation/consolidatedwaiverforindividualswithmentalretardatio n/indexhtm; Consolidated Waiver at 10 (published in Developmental Programs Bulletin # 00-09-04, Att. C (July 1, 2009), available at http://services.dpw.state.pa.us/olddpw/ bulletinsearch.aspx?AttachmentId=4486 (excerpts submitted as Exh. A).\n\n1 HCBS waivers allow the federal\n\ngovernment to waive certain Medical\n\nAssistance requirements, including limiting the number of eligible persons a nd changing\n\nfinancial eligibility criteria. See Radaszewski ex rel. R adaszewski v. Maram , 383 F.3d\n\n599, 601 (7th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c)(3), (9).\n\n3\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 6 of 35\nThe Consolidated Waiver authorizes DP W to provide an array of hom e and community-based services to i ndividuals with intellectual disa bilities over the age of 3. Consolidated Waiver at 15. These servic es include: licensed residential habilitation services (which provide up to 24-hour supe rvision and suppor ts to people in group homes, family living arrangem ents, and ot her small, licensed programs to assist them with self-care, communication, therapeutic activities, pers onal adjustment, relationship development, socialization, and use of community res ources); community habilitation (which assists partici pants to acquire, ma intain, or improve se lf-help, domestic, socialization, and adaptive skills necessary to live successfully in the community); respite care (which provides relief to caregivers); various types of voc ational programs and supports; nursing care and therapies; behavi oral supports; home and vehicle accessibility modifications; assistive technology; and transportation. Id. at 30-31. The Consolidate d Waiver can offer services to approximately 17,000 Pennsylvanians with intellectual disabilities. Id. at 18.\nOnce an individual is approved to participate in the Consolidat ed Waiver, he and his Support Team (including involved family members, guardian (if applicable), supports coordinator, and provider staff) work to develop an Individual Support Plan (ISP). See DPW, ODP Bulletin # 00-10-12, Att. 1 at 4 (July 1, 2010) (ISP Manual), available at http://services.dpw.state.pa.us/olddpw/bulletinsearch.aspx?AttachmentId=4638. The ISP identifies the specific types of services and supports the individual needs to live in the community based on t he assessment of the i ndividual's clinical and m edical needs using\n4\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 7 of 35\nan assessment tool de veloped by ODP. Id. The IS P must be reviewed at least annually and more frequently if the individual's needs change during the year. Id. at 62.\nFor individuals who are enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver, there is no monetary cap on services. Consolidated Waiver at 16. The individua l thus is entitled to receive any services he or she needs that are ava ilable under t he Waiver and are necessary for their health and welfare.\nIndividuals who are enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver are at risk of termination from the Waiver if they do not receive any Waiver-funded services for a certain period of time. See Consolidated Waiver at 26-27. Once a person is terminated from the Waiver, he or she must re-apply for services. Cu rrently, there are more than 5, 000 Pennsylvanians with intellectual disabilities on th e \"emergency\" waiting list for community services. See Pennsylvania Waiting List Campaign, available at http://www.pawaitinglist campaign.org/. As a result, a person w ho is term inated from the Cons olidated Waiver may have to wait years to be re-admitted for services.\nRecently, DPW has implemente d policies and propos ed policies practices that impede the development of new residential ha bilitation programs, particularly those that serve one or two individuals who have complex medical or challenging behavioral health needs that may cost more to operate than other types of residential program s. See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 3 (Exh. B); McNelis Decl. ¶ 3 (Exh. I).\nFirst, DPW has recently changed its policy th at results in a decrease in payments to residential habilitation provid ers for \"ineligible costs.\" In eligible costs are costs for \"room and board\" that are not eligible for federal matchi ng funds under Title XIX.\n5\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 8 of 35\nMitchell Decl. ¶ 4; McNelis Decl. ¶ 4. Thes e ineligible costs are paid by state funds plus a portion of the residents' Social Security disability or S upplemental Security Income benefits. Id. DPW recently expanded the definition of ineligible costs, excluding many costs previously eligible for federal matching funds, such as time sp ent by staff for meal preparation. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 4; McNelis Decl . ¶ 4. The end result is an increase in the ineligible costs for community residential programs. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 4; McNelis Decl. ¶ 4. However, ODP has not increased its payments to providers for the increased ineligible expenses while it has reduced payments for \"eligible\" expenses (that is expenses eligible for federal matching funds) to reflect the shift in expenses from eligible to ineligible. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 4; McNelis Decl. ¶ 4.\nSecond, DPW has proposed an overall reduction in current payments for ineligible expenses by $27 million annu ally based on an erroneous de termination that community residential habilitation providers had been overcharging for those expenses. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5; McNelis Decl. ¶ 5. According to a survey of 63 provider s in May 2011, this reduction will cause the surveyed providers to be reimbursed $24 million less annually to cover their ineligible costs. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5; McNelis Decl. ¶ 5; PAR Survey (Exh. C). ODP intends to implement this reduction by capping ineligible expenses paid to providers for residential habilitation services at $7,0 00 per person. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5; McNelis Decl. ¶ 5. This sum, plus 72 percent of each resident's Supplemental Security Income or Social Security Disability benefits, will be the provider's only reimbursement for all room and board expenses listed on the ODP cost report. See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5; McNelis Decl. ¶ 5. According to the provid er survey, the proposed re duction will decrease by more\n6\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 9 of 35\n\nthan 50 percent the amount of ineligible costs that ODP reimburses to operate one-person programs. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5; McNelis Decl. ¶ 5; PAR Survey. 2 Providers simply will\n\nno longer be able to operate these programs. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5; McNelis Decl. ¶ 5. As\n\nfor new program s, ODP's proposed reduction i n payments for inelig ible expenses has\n\nmade providers hesitant and, at worst, unwilling to develop those programs because their\n\ncosts are not likely to be covered. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5; McNelis Decl. ¶ 5.\n\nThird, ODP has im plemented a \"high co st rate developm ent\" policy a nd an\n\n\"outlier rate adjustment\" policy. Mitchell De cl. ¶ 6; McNelis Decl. ¶ 6. These policies\n\nresult in rates that are both inadequate\n\nand unst able for com munity residential\n\nrehabilitation programs that serve people with complex need s. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 6 ;\n\nMcNelis Decl. ¶ 6. The \"high cost\" policy determines rates for new programs that have\n\nhigher costs while the \"outlier\" policy has been used to reduce rates for existing high-cost\n\nprograms after ODP has already negotiated the ra tes with providers. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 6;\n\nMcNelis Decl. ¶ 6. Neither of these polic ies is written, and OD P has not inf ormed\n\nproviders or the public as to the standards that it uses to determine rates for these\n\nprograms. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 6; McNelis Decl. ¶ 6. In practice, the policies have narrowed\n\nthe rate ranges and resulted in extreme disinc entives for provi ders to serve individua ls\n\nwith complex needs. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 6; McNelis Decl. ¶ 6.\n\n2 The impact of the reduction is plainly evident in the case of Plaintiff Yale. Mr. Yale's prior provider, which served him in a one-person program, received $64.34 per day for \"ineligible expenses\" associated with that program , or $23,484 annually. See Yale ISP at 28 (Exh. D). DP W's proposal would require a pr ovider to offer him similar services while being reimbursed for room and board expenses at less than one-third of the prior rate.\n7\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 10 of 35\nFinally, ODP is not increasing its rate s for community residential habilitation services to keep pace with necessary cost increases. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 7; McNelis Decl. ¶ 7. As providers' costs increase, the rates do not. Id. The result is that providers have had to reduce their expenses. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 7; McNelis Decl. ¶ 7. Providers cannot reduce expenses for direct care staff that are mandate d by their clients' ISPs nor can they reduce fixed costs. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 7; McNelis Decl. ¶ 7. Instead, providers have t aken or plan to take serious measures, including reduction in clinical staff necessary to support people with complex needs, moving individuals, or not investing in necessary infrastructure or training. Mitchell Decl. ¶ 7; McNelis Decl. ¶ 7.\nB. Defendants' Actions and Inactions Have Resulted in the Unnecessary Institutionalization of Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Lykeh Mumford is a 32-year-ol d Philadelphian who has an intellectual disability and been diag nosed with pervasive developmenta l disorder (a diagnosis on the autism spectrum), and impulse control disorder. Beilharz Decl. ¶ 2 (Exh. E). Enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver in 2008, Mr. Mumfor d lived in the homes of his mother or grandmother until January 2011. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. During that period, Mr. Mumford received 14.5 hours daily of home a nd community habilitation servi ces (non-residential) during weekdays and 12 hours daily on weekends. Id. ¶ 4. While living in the community, Mr. Mumford enjoyed ta king walks, swimming, bike riding, playi ng basketball, having morning coffee in the park, and going to the community center and library. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Mumford's grandmother, due to her ad vancing age, became unable to support him in her hom e, particularly due to instan ces of aggressiveness to others and self-\n8\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 11 of 35\ninjurious behaviors. Beilharz Decl. ¶ 6. His mother also was una ble to handle hi s behavioral issues. Id. ¶ 7.\nIn January 2011, Mr . Mumford was admitted to a pr ivate psychiatric hospital in Philadelphia. Beilharz Decl. ¶ 8. Mr. Mu mford's treating physicians at t hat facility eventually determined that he no longer needs inpatient psychiatric care, but his family is unwilling and unable to take him back home. Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. The hos pital, therefore, threatened to file a petition to involuntar ily commit Mr. Mumford to a state mental retardation institution pursuant to 50 P.S. § 4406. Id. ¶ 11.\nAccording to treating professionals, Mr. Mumford can live in the community if he receives residential habilitation services in a structured setting. See Beilharz Decl. ¶ 12. DPW, however, has been unab le to identify a provider wh o is willing to offer those services to Mr. Mumford. See id. ¶ 13. Mr. Mumford's Administrative Entity (AE), with which DPW contracts to arrange for C onsolidated Waiver services, had only sought t o place Mr. Mumford in an existing residential habilitation program. Id. ¶ 14. Those efforts were uns uccessful as the providers e ither were unable to meet Mr. Mumford's needs or had no appropriate vacancies. Id.3 As a result, Mr. Mumford remain s unnecessarily institutionalized in the ps ychiatric hospital where he is segregated from\n3 On June 7, 2011, Pl aintiffs’ counsel was advised that DPW had identified a provider willing to provide re sidential habilitation services to Mr. Mumford, and it was expected he would be discharged to t hat program by the e nd of June. Give n these assurances, Plaintiffs do no t seek a tem porary restraining or der on be half of Mr. Mumford. However, Plaintiffs continue t o pursue pr eliminary injunctive relief on his behalf given that D PW’s arrangements with providers have sometimes fallen apa rt. Meek Decl. ¶ 8 (Exh. G). If Mr. Mumford is di scharged as expected, Plaintiffs will so advise the Court.\n9\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 12 of 35\nsociety. Id. ¶ 15. Moreover, Mr. Mumford is at risk of continue d unnecessary segregation and institutionali zation if he is committed to a state mental retardation institution. Id. ¶ 16. Mr. Mum ford's continued institutionalization also jeopardizes his ability to maintain his enrollment in the Consolidated Waiver. Id. ¶ 17.\nPlaintiff Joseph Yale is a 26-year-old Luzerne C ounty resident w ho has an intellectual disability and a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. Pasqualicchio Decl. ¶ 2 (Exh. F). Mr. Yale's inability to secure appropriat e treatment has resulted in his admissions to private and state psyc hiatric hospitals nearly 20 tim es. Id. ¶ 3. Between institutionalizations, Mr. Yale lived with his family. Id. ¶ 4. Mr. Yale enjoyed goi ng to the movies, playing sports, and shopping when he lived in the community. Id. ¶ 5.\nMr. Yale was enrolled in the Consolidated Waiver in May 2010, giving him access to a wide array of services that the Waiver o ffers. Pasqualicchio Decl. ¶ 6. In or around August 2010, after enrolling in the Consolidated Waiver, Mr. Yale lived in a residential habilitation program in an apar tment with 1:1 staffing. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Yale was involuntarily committed to a private psychiat ric hospital in or ar ound October 2010 due to incidents of self-injurious behavior, aggression, and property damage. Id. ¶ 8.\nMr. Yale's treating professiona ls have recommended his pl acement in a community residential habilita tion program with 2:1 staffi ng between 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Pasqualicchio Decl. ¶ 9. It is anticipated that th is staffing level will be able to be decreased to 1:1 within a few months after he adjusts to a new environment. Id.\nIn March 2011, Resources for Human De velopment (RHD), a provider, submitted to ODP a budget to serve Mr. Yale in such a program. See Pasqualicchio Decl. ¶ 10.\n10\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 13 of 35\n\nODP rejected that budget. Id. At a meeting between ODP and RHD on March 23, 2011,\n\nODP requested additional information, which RHD submitted on April 8. Id. RHD\n\nmade several attempts since then to schedul e another meeting with ODP to review the\n\nbudget for Mr. Yale, but OD P did not respond to t hose submissions. Id. ¶ 11. Instead,\n\nODP asked RHD to submit new budget forms. Id.\n\nOn or around June 2, 2011, the negotia tions between RHD and ODP reached an\n\nimpasse. Pasqualicchio Decl. ¶ 12. The pr ivate psychiatric hospital then referred Mr.\n\nYale for involuntary commitment to Clarks Summit State Hospital, a state-operated\n\npsychiatric hospital, and a commitment hearing now is scheduled fo r June 14, 2011. See\n\nid. ¶ 13; Meek Decl. ¶ 6 (Exh. G). Mr.\n\nYale is being referred for commitmen t\n\nproceedings solely due to the breakdown in negotiations between ODP and RHD, and not\n\nbecause Mr. Yale is experiencing psychi atric symptoms that requir e involuntary\n\ncommitment to a state psychiatric hospital. See Pasqualicchio Decl. ¶ 13. RHD rem ains\n\nwilling to provide community residential reha bilitation services to Mr. Yale, presumably\n\nif it can successfully negotiate a rate with ODP. See id. ¶ 12.\n\nMr. Yale has been institutionalized and s egregated from society for more than\n\neight months as he awaits the development of an approp riate residential habilitation\n\nprogram. See Pasqualicchio Decl. ¶ 14. Mr. Yale does not appea r to be receiving a ny\n\nhabilitation services for his intellectual di sability in the psychiatric hos pital. Id. ¶ 15 .\n\nMr. Yale's continued eligibility for Consolidated Waiver services is at risk if he does not\n\nreturn to the community. Id. ¶ 17.\n\n11\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 14 of 35\nPlaintiff Karen Lyn Blakely is a nearly 43-year-old Philade lphian who has an intellectual disability and has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Blakely Decl. ¶ 1 (Exh. H). Ms. Blakely, who is enrolled in th e Consolidated Waiver, received residential habilitation services in a one-pers on program between 2005 an d November 2009. Id. ¶¶ 4, 12. Ms. Blakely is an energetic, talkativ e, engaging person who enjoys living in the community. Id. ¶ 17.\nIn November 2009, Ms. Blakel y's mother removed her from the com munity residential habilitation program, and took her into her own hom e after Ms. Blakely sustained second-degree burns when staff in the pr ogram threw hot wat er on her in response to a be havioral incident. Blakel y Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Ms. B lakely received only limited community s ervices and supports when s he lived wi th her mother. Id. ¶ 6 . Beginning in Fe bruary 2010, M s. Blakely's behavioral issues becam e worse and s he became physically assaultive toward her mother. Id. ¶ 7. Ms. Blakely was admitted in private psychiatric hospitals twice for brief periods. Id. ¶ 8. Ms. Blakely again was admitted to the psychiatric hos pital on June 29, 2010, and sh e has remained there since that time. Id. ¶ 9.\nAfter she was admitted to the psychiatric hospital in June 2010, her treating physicians took her off all medications to detoxify her system. Blakely Decl. ¶ 10. This resulted in marked improvement in he r behavior and functional abilities. Id. Ms. Blakely's treatment team at the psychiatric hospital has concluded that she no longer needs inpatient psychiatric treatment. Id. ¶ 11. Ms. Blakely' s AE,, the organization that contracts with DPW to arrange for Consolidated Waiver services for Philadelphians with\n12\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 15 of 35\nintellectual disabilities, identified a community residential habilitation provider in 2010 who was able and willing to provider her with services. Id. ¶ 13. In May 2011, however, that provider withdrew its proposal to provide community residential habilitation services to Ms. Blakely due to a rate issue. Id. ¶ 14. Efforts by the AE to resolve that issue with DPW proved unavailing. Id. Ms. Blakely cannot return to live with her mother because her mother cannot physically meet her needs. Id. ¶ 16.\nMs. Blakely remains unnecessarily institu tionalized in the psychiatric hospital where she does not have opportunities to engage in commun ity life. Blakely Decl. ¶ 17. The psychiatric hospital has threatened to file a petition to commit Ms. Blakely to a stateoperated mental retardation institution. Id. ¶ 18. M s. Blakely does not need to be institutionalized in such a fac ility and, if she were, it would be difficult for her mother to visit her. Id. Ms. Bl akely's continued insti tutionalization also threatens her continued eligibility for services under the Consolidated Waiver. See id. ¶ 19.\nARGUMENT PLAINTIFFS SATISFY THE STANDARDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER\nAND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. \"‘A temporary restraining or der is a ‘s tay put’ equitable rem edy that has its essential purpose the preservation of the stat us quo while the m erits of the cause are explored through litigation.’\" EXL Laboratories, LLC v. Egolf , Civil Action No. 10 6282, 2010 WL 5000835 at 3 (E.D . Pa. Dec. 27, 2010) (quoting J.O. v. Orange Tw p., Bd. of Educ. , 287 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2002)). The standards fo r issuance of a temporary restraining order are the same as those for issuance of a preliminary injunction.\n13\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 16 of 35\nId.; accord Ball v. Famiglio , Civil Action No. 1:cv- 08-0700, 2011 W L 1304614 at 3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2011). 4 The standard for assessing whether a preliminary injunction should be granted is well-settled. The court must consider whether: (1) the moving party has a likelihood of s uccess on the merits; (2 ) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors issuance of a preliminary injunction. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella , 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010). An examination of each of these factors demons trates that the issuance of injunctive relief is warranted and appropriate in this case.\nA. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits. Plaintiffs allege that Defenda nts Alexander and D PW have vi olated their right s under, respectively, the Americans wit h Disabilities Act (ADA) and Re habilitation Act (RA) by failing to provide them with services in the commun ity. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Alexander' s failure to af ford them prompt access to appropriate community residential habilitation services to which they are entitled violates various provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the federal Medical Assistance statute. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on these claims.\n4 Although the Court may issue a tempor ary restraining order without written or oral notice to the opposing party, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), Plaintiffs in this ca se provided advance notice of Defendants' counsel. Meek Decl. ¶¶ 2-6 (Exh. G).\n14\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 17 of 35\n1. Defendants Have Violated the Integration Mandates of the ADA and RA.\nTitle II of the ADA prohibits public entities, such as DPW, from excluding persons with disabilities from participating in or denying the benefits of services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminating against such individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This provision \"largely mirrors Section 504 of the [Rehabilitation Act (RA)],\" 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), w hich applies to federally- funded programs, and thus t he Third Circuit has \"construed t he provisions of the RA a nd the A DA similarly in light of t heir close similarity of language and purpose.\" Frederick L. v. Dep't of Public Welfare , 364 F.3d 487, 491 (3d Cir. 2004) (Frederick L. I).5\n\"The ADA['s] and RA' s anti-discrimination principles culminate in their integration mandates [28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(d), 41.51(d), respectively], which direct states to administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified indi viduals with disabilities.\" Frederick L. I, 364 F.3d at 491. The integration mandate requires the provision of services to persons with disabilities in \">a setting that enables individuals with disab ilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible.’\" Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, p. 450 (1998)). \"In short, where appropriate for the patient , both the AD A and RA favor integrated, community-based treatment over institutionalization.\" Id. at 492.\n\n5 Since the ADA and RA are construe\n\nd similarly, Plaintiffs' subsequent\n\nreferences to the \"ADA\" will mean both the ADA and RA.\n\n15\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 18 of 35\nIn Olmstead v. L.C. , 527 U.S. 581 ( 1999), the Su preme Court interpreted the ADA's integration mandate. It unequivocally held that unnecessa ry institutionalization and isolation of indi viduals with disabilities constitutes discrimination under the ADA. Id. at 600; accord Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995). The Court concluded that th e ADA's prohibition on discrimination may require that states provide services to pe rsons with dis abilities in community settings rather than in institutions. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587. The C ourt recognized, however, that the public entity's obligations are \"not boundless.\" Id. at 603. Writing for a plurality, Justice Ginsburg noted that the integration mandate is qualified by the ADA's \"reasonable modification\" and \"fundamental alteration\" provisions, 28 C. F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), which provide that a public entity n eed not make modifications th at would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. Id. at 603.\nOlmstead identified three elements in an in tegration mandate case: (1) that community placement is appropriate for the indi vidual; (2) that the transfer to a more integrated setting is not oppose d by the individual; and (3) that the placement in a more integrated setting can be re asonably accommodated. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587, 607; accord Frederick L. I, 364 F.3d at 492; Benjamin v. Dep't of Public Welfare, Civil Action No. 09-cv-1182, 2011 WL 1261542 at 5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011). Plaintiffs can readily establish each of the elements on which they have the burden of proof.\nThe treatment professionals have determined that Plaintiffs ca n, with appropriate services and supports, live in the community, which is more in tegrated than the inpatient psychiatric hospitals where they now reside or state-operated institutions to which\n16\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 19 of 35\nPlaintiffs may be committed. See discussion, supra, at 9-13; see also Benjamin, 2011 WL 1261542 at 6 (\"There is no dispute that community placement would be appropriate for an individual [residing in a state ment al retardation instituti on] with appropriate supports and services ....\"). In addition, Plai ntiffs through their participation in this litigation evidence that they ar e not opposed to receiving co mmunity services. Finally, Plaintiffs' need for co mmunity services can be reasonabl y accommodated. Plaintiffs are enrolled in the Cons olidated Waiver, which entitles them to appropriate community residential habilitation services. Defendant s need only provide Pl aintiffs with the community services they al ready are authorized to re ceive and w hich have been determined by Defendants' agents to be clinically necessary and appropriate.\nCourts have granted preliminary injunctions in similar recent ADA cases. In Peter B. v. Sanford , Civil Action No. 6:10-767-JMC-BHH, 2010 WL 5912259 (D.S.C. Nov. 24, 2010) (Report and Rec ommendation), adopted, 2011 WL 824584 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2011), three individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities received services under an HCBS waiver. The st ate amended its waiver in 2009 due to budget constraints, reducing the number of hours that eligible persons, including the plaintiffs, could receive for certain covered s ervices. Id. at 2. The court held t hat plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that th e state's service caps violated the ADA' s integration mandate since the plaintiffs ha d been living in the community, wanted t o continue to do so, and their needs could be reasonably accommodated by reinstating their full services. Id. at 6.\n17\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 20 of 35\nIn Marlo M. ex rel. Parris v. Cansler , 679 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E. D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2010), two adults with intellectual disabilities had been receiving s ervices in one-person homes. They were notified that the fundin g for those program s would be term inated, forcing them into group homes or institutions. Id. at 637. The court granted a preliminary injunction to enjoin the termina tion of those progra ms, finding that the termination of t he plaintiffs' programs would likely violate the AD A's integration mandate. Id. at 638.\nSimilarly, in Cota v. Maxwell-Jolly , 688 F. Supp. 2d 980 ( N.D. Cal. 2010), t he court granted a prelim inary injunction to prevent the state fro m implementing budgetmotivated changes to the elig ibility standards for its Adu lt Day Health Care Program. The court held that the elig ibility changes were likely to violate the ADA' s integration mandate because the plaintiffs needed the services to avoid institutionalization and wanted to remain in their own homes and communities. Id. at 994. The cour t rejected the state's argument that the state's budget crisis justifie d the program changes, noting that the mere fact th at alterations in a progra m or service required financial outlays does not constitute a fundamental alteration. Id. at 995; see also Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep't of Public Welfare , 402 F.3d 374, 380 (3d C ir. 2005) (increased expenditures alone are not suffi cient to establish a fundamental alteration defense); Frederick L. I, 364 F.3d at 495-96 (same).\nBall v. Rodgers, Civil Action No. 00-67-TUC-EHC, 2009 WL 1395423 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2009), likewise determined that a state's failure to assure the provision of HCBS waiver services to which the plaintiffs were entitled likely violated the plaintiffs' rights\n18\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 21 of 35\nunder the ADA. Id. at 5. In that case, a shortage of attendant care worke rs to provide the plaintiffs with personal care services preve nted them from receiving all of t he services that they needed and which had been authorized by their care plans. Id. As a result, the plaintiffs were thr eatened with institutionalization or forced into institutions to receive necessary care. Id. The court concl uded that the state' s \"failure to preve nt unnecessary gaps in service and proper ly monitor the HC BS program improperly discriminated against persons with disabilities by limiting thei r ability to maintain their social and economic i ndependence and de priving them of a real choice bet ween home and institutional care.\" Id.\nFinally, the court in Cruz v. Dudek , Civil A ction No. 10-23048-CIV, 2010 WL 4284955 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2010), granted a preliminary injunction to require the state to provide services to two individuals with spinal cord injuries who had been wait-listed for services in an HCBS waiver. The court he ld that the plaintiffs were at risk of institutionalization if they did not receive HCBS waiver services. Id. at 12-13. \"Requiring institutionalization of persons befo re they can receive assistance which will enable them to reside in th e community runs counter to th e express provi sions of the integration mandate ....\" Id. at 14.\nLike the courts in Peter B., Marlo M., Cota, Ball, and Cruz, this Court shoul d conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succee d on the merits of their claims under the ADA and RA. Indeed, they are much more than likely to succeed. Messrs. Mumford and Yale and Ms. Blakely are not merely at risk of unnecessary instituti onalization. They are unnecessarily institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals where they have been confined for\n19\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 22 of 35\nmonths without a ppropriate services to meet thei r habilitation need s. Moreover, Defendants would not have to create new types of programs for Plaintiffs, take Plaintiffs off the waiting list ahead of ot hers, or change their elig ibility standards to provide appropriate and necessa ry community residential habilita tion services to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, as enrollees in th e Consolidated Waiver currently are elig ible for and entitled to such services. 6 Defendants' failure to provide Pl aintiffs Mumford, Yale, and Blakel y with the community residential habilitation s ervices to which they are entitled, resulting in their institutionalization, plainly violates the ADA's integration mandate.\n2. Defendant Alexander Has Violated the Federal Medical Assistance Statute and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. States, like Penns ylvania, that choose to participate in th e Medical Assistance program must comply with the requirements of Title XIX and its implementing regulations. Pennsylvania v. United States, 2011 WL 991 402 at 1; Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F. 3d at 533. Defenda nt Alexander has failed to com ply with three requirements of Title XIX: (1) the requirem ent to provide eligib le recipients with services to which they are entitled; (2) the requirement to provide eligible recipients with Medical Assistance services with reasonabl e promptness; and (3) the requirem ent to protect the health and welfare of persons re ceiving HCBS waiver services, to pr ovide\n6 Decisions that suggest that Penns ylvania need only develop and im plement a viable integration plan to o ffer community services in th e future to persons who are unnecessarily institutionalized, see Frederick L. v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 422 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 2005); Benjamin, 2011 WL 1261542 at 6, 8-9, are not relevant in this case given that the Plaintiffs have a current statutory entitlement to community services under the Consolidated Waiver and are not on a waiting list.\n20\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 23 of 35\nthem with a choice of feasible alternatives, and to provide them w ith a choice between institutional and HCBS waiver services.\na. Defendant Alexander Has Failed to Provide Plaintiffs with Community Residential Habilitation\nServices to Which They Are Entitled. As the Supreme Court recognized m ore than two decades ago: \"An indi vidual is entitled to Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria esta blished by the state in which he lives.\" Schweiker v. Gray Panthers , 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981) (emphasis added). Title XIX unequivocally provides: \"A State plan fo r medical assistance mu st -- ... provide -- for making medical assistance available to -- ... all individuals\" who fall within specified eligibility categories. 42 U.S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). This creates an entitlement to Medical Assistance services. See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman , 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2004). \"Medical assistance\" includes HCBS waiv ers, such as the Consolidated Waiver, for persons like the Plaintiffs who are enrolled in those waiv ers. 42 U.S. C. § 1396n(c); Boulet v. Celluci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 76-77 (D. Mass. 2000). As the court explaine d in Boulet: \"[O]nce a state opts to implement a waiver program and sets out eligibility requirements for that program, eligible individuals are entitled to those services and to the associated protections of the Medicaid Act.\" Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (emphasis added). In Kerr v. Holsinger, Civil Action No. 03-68-H, 20 04 WL 882203 (E.D. Ky. Mar . 25, 2004), for instan ce, the plaintiffs challenged Ke ntucky's revised standard f or eligibility for nursing f acility and HCBS waiver services in response to a budget crisis.\n21\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 24 of 35\n\nAs a result, plaintiffs lost their eligibility for those servic es despite no change in their\n\nmedical needs. The court held that th\n\ne state's actions viol ated 42 U.S.C. §\n\n1396a(a)(10)(A) by denyi ng the plaintiffs medically necessary services. Id. at 8- 9.\n\nReducing benefits based only on budget concerns violates Title XIX by \"exposing reci-\n\npients to ‘whimsical and arbitrary’ decisions which the Act seeks to avoid.\" Id. at 9.\n\nIt is undisputed that Messrs. Mum ford and Yale and Ms. Blakely are enrolled in\n\nand, therefore, eligible for and entitled to Medical Assistance services available under the\n\nConsolidated Waiver. The y have been de termined to need co mmunity residential\n\nhabilitation services. Yet, DPW has failed to a ssure that Plaintiffs receive those services to which they are entitled in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A) and 1983.7\n\nb. Defendant Alexander Has Violated Title XIX's Reasonable Promptness Mandate by Failing to Timely Provide Plaintiffs with Community Residential Habilitation Services.\n\nTitle XIX requires that states mu st \"provide that all individua ls wishing to make\n\napplication for medical assistance under the plan shall have the opportunity to do so, and\n\nthat such assistance shall be furnishe d with reasona ble promptness to all eligible\n\nindividuals.\" 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). Title XIX 's reasonable promptness mandate\n\n7 Defendant cannot conte nd that it has no obligation to pay for res idential habilitation services sim ply because Medical Assi stance does not pr ovide federal m atching funds for room and boar d services. As the Boulet Court observed, such an argum ent \"is distracting at best and misleading at worst.\" Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 75. The fact that room and board for residen tial habilitation services must be paid by non-Medical Assistance sources, does not mean that Plain tiffs are not entitled to those services. Id. So, too, inadequate state appr opriations do not excuse non-co mpliance with Title XIX. Id. at 77 (citing Doe 1-13 ex rel. Doe, Sr. 1-13 v. C hiles, 136 F.3d at 709, 720 (11th Cir. 1998)).\n22\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 25 of 35\napplies to HCBS Waiver services. See Susan J. v. Riley , 254 F.R.D. 439, 451-52 (M.D. Ala. 2008); Lewis v. New Mex ico Dep't of He alth, 275 F. S upp. 2d 1319, 1343-44 (D.N.M. 2003); Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 78; McMillan v. McCrimon, 807 F. Supp. 475, 480-82 (C.D. Ill. 1992).\nTitle XIX's reasonable promptness mandate requires DPW to adopt time standards for the provision of services to avoid unreasonable delays. See Kirk T. v. Houstoun, Civil Action No. 99-3253, 2000 WL 830731 at 3 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2000). Moreover, states may not de lay furnishing Medical Assistance due to its adm inistrative procedures. 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a); Lewis, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. Stat es likewise cannot excuse their failure to provide a specific type of available and ne cessary HCBS waiver services simply on the basis that other types of wa iver services have been furnished to the individuals. Boulet, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 79; see also Doe v. Kidd, No. 10-1191, 2011 WL 1058542 at 6-7 (4th Cir. M ar. 24, 2011) (holding that state violated reasonable promptness mandate by failing t o timely offer plaintiff options to en able her to receive the type of service deemed to be appropriate and, instead, provided her with an entirely different service). Nor is inadequate fundi ng an excuse to avoi d compliance with the reasonable promptness mandate. Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 79-80.\nCommunity residential habilitation services are Medical Assistance services for individuals enrolled i n the Cons olidated Waiver, such as Pl aintiffs. As such, they are entitled to receive such servi ces with reasonable prom ptness. Yet, Mr. Mumford has been without appropriate co mmunity residential habilitation services since at least January 2011 when he was admitte d to a ps ychiatric hospital. Even before that, he was\n23\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 26 of 35\nliving at home without suffi cient supports and services , ultimately resulting in his psychiatric hospitalization. Mr . Yale has been in a psychiatric hospital -- without appropriate community residential habilitation services -- for eight months. Ms. Blakely has been institutionalized in a psychiatri c hospital without access to appropriate community residential habilitation services fo r nearly a year. Like Mr. Mumford, Ms. Blakely's lack of access to community resi dential habilitation services predates her institutionalization since she was living at home with her mother without appropriate services before she was admitted to the psychiatric hospital.\nPlaintiffs' lack of timely access to appr opriate community residential habilitation services is not sur prising since D PW has ad opted no ti me standards by w hich it m ust assure that individuals recei ve such services. Moreover, it appears that the delay in furnishing Plaintiffs with n ecessary residential habilitation services is due to DPW' s administrative policies and practices that ha ve made it more burdensome for providers to promptly develop, receive approval for, and im plement community residential habilitation services for individuals, like Pl aintiffs, who have ch allenging behavioral health needs. While DPW cer tainly is entitled to assure that services are not undul y costly, it cannot use its efforts to impose cost controls to jus tify its utter failure to timely provide Plaintiffs with essentia l services they need, particul arly when the alternative has been months of institutionalizat ion. Defendants' failure to promptly afford Plaintiffs community residential habilitation services violates 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8) and 1983.\n24\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 27 of 35\nc. Defendant Alexander Has Failed to Protect Plaintiffs' Health and Welfare and to Afford Them a Real Choice Among Services. Title XIX requires that each HCBS waiv er include \"necessary safeguards ... to\nprotect the health and welfare of individuals provided services under the waiver ....\" 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(A). As th e Health Care Financing Administration (the predecessor of CMS) explained, this requires a state\nto provide all people enrolle d in the waiv er with the opportunity for access to all ne eded services covered by t he waiver and under the Medicaid State plan. ... The opportunity for access pertains to all servic es available under the waiver that an enrollee is determined to nee d on the basis of an assessment and a written plan of care/support.\n * * Once in the waiver, an enrolled individual enjoys pr otection against arbitrary or inappr opriate restrictions, and the State assumes an obligation to assure the indivi dual's health and welfare.\nHCFA, Olmstead Update No. 4 at 5, 6 (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://www.cms.gov/ smdl/downloads/smd011001a.pdf.\nPlaintiffs' health and welfare has been jeopardized by Defe ndant Alexander's\nimplementation of the Consolidated Waiver. Community residential habilitation services are available under the Consolidated Waiver. Plaintiffs Mumford, Yale, and Blakely, who are enrolled in the Consolidated Waive r, have been assessed by professionals and determined to need co mmunity residential rehabilitation se rvices. Yet, Plaintiffs have\nbeen institutionalized in psychi atric hospitals unnecessarily for months as they await access to community residential rehabilitation services appropriate to meet their complex\n25\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 28 of 35\nneeds. Plaintiffs appear to be hostage to DPW's inappropriate policies and practices that have effectively restricted the pr ompt development of higher-cost com munity residential rehabilitation programs require d to serve individuals with challenging needs in the community. In the e nd, whatever the cause of the delays in the devel opment of community residential rehabilitation services for Messrs. Mumford and Yale and Ms. Blakely, the bottom line is that D efendant Alexander's failure to provide them with those services has actively underm ined their hea lth and wel fare by caus ing their unnecessary institutionalization in psychiatric hospitals where they do not receive appropriate habilitation services necessary fo r their intellectual disabilities. Defendant' s actions and inactions thus violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c)(2)(A) and 1983.\nTitle XIX also requires that states inform individuals eligible for an HCBS waiver of their feasible service alte rnatives available under the wa iver so that they can choose both among such available services an d between HCBS waiver s ervices and institutionalization. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C). In Cramer v. Ch iles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999), the cour t held that Florida violated this provision through the enactment of legislation t hat reduced fundi ng for services, effect ively eliminating any choice between institutional and waiver services. Id. at 1352-53.\nDefendant Alexander has violated T itle XIX's choice requirements for HCBS waiver services. Plaintiffs Mumford, Yale , and Bla kely have not been informed o f feasible alternatives for community residential hab ilitation services under the Consolidated Waiver. Indeed, it appears th at DPW ha s not ident ified any com munity residential habilitation provider to serve Ms. Blakely. The lack of feasible waiver options\n26\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 29 of 35\nfor Plaintiffs has forced them to be institu tionalized, essentially stripping them of their right to choose Cons olidated Waiver services rather than institutional services and of their right to choose among qu alified providers of community r esidential habilitation services in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c)(2)(C).\nB. Plaintiffs Are Suffering and Will Continue to Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent Injunctive Relief. Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order to require Defendants to tak e appropriate steps necessary to prevent the commitment of Plai ntiffs Yale and Blakely t o, respectively, to a state psychiatric hospital and state mental reta rdation institution. Plaintiff Yale has a commitment hearing sche duled for June 14, 20 11, Meek Decl. ¶ 6, solely because DPW was unable to reach ag reement on the rate to pay a community residential habilitation provider that wa s ready and willing to provide community services to him. Plaintiff Blakely has been threatened with invo luntary commitment to state mental retardation centers if she do es not shortly receive necessary community residential habilitation services. Such commitments are not c linically necessary and will cause further irreparable harm to Plaintiffs by moving them to yet another setting t hat cannot provide them with the services they need. Defendants can intercede with the state courts to assure them that commitment is neither necessary nor appropriate and that Defendants are working t o secure prom pt alternative commun ity placements for Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also ask that the te mporary restraining or der bar Defendants from terminating them from the Cons olidated Waiver. This relief w ill preserve the status quo pending disposition of the prel iminary injunction motion by not transferrin g Plaintiffs\n27\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 30 of 35\nfrom one inappropriate institution to another. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to\nenjoin Defendants to provide appropriate community residen tial habilitation services to\nPlaintiffs -- services which are clinically necessary a nd to whic h they have a n\nentitlement.\n\"An injunction is appropriate only where there exists a th reat of irreparable harm\nsuch that legal remedies are ren dered inadequate.\" Anderson v. Davila , 125 F.3d 148,\n163 (3d Cir. 1997); accord West Virginia University Hos pitals, Inc. v. Rendell , Civil\nAction No. 1:CV-09-1684, 2009 W L 3241849 at 13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2009).\nIrreparable harm is plainly established in this case.\nIn enacting t he ADA, Congress made a determ ination that as between tw o\nappropriate settings -- an in stitution or the community -- the community is the better\nchoice per se because people with disabilities should live in integrated settings just as do\nnon-disabled people. As the Olmstead Court explained:\nRecognition that unjustified ins titutional isolation of persons with disabilities is discrimi nation reflects two evident judgments. First, institutiona l placement of persons who can handle and be nefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unw orthy of par ticipating in community life. [citations omitted]. Second, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals , including family relations, so cial contacts, work options, economic independence, educational adva ncement, and cultural enrichment.\nOlmstead, 527 U.S. at 600-01 (em phasis added). Plaintiffs' unnecessary in stitutional-\nization in psyc hiatric hospitals thus is sufficient to create irreparable harm. Moreover,\nthe mere risk of unnecessary institutionalization is sufficient to create irreparable harm. 28\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 31 of 35\nSee Marlo M. , 679 F. Supp. 2d 635 at 638; Cruz, 2010 WL 4284955 at 15. Accordingly, the threat to pursue proceedi ngs against Plaintiffs to commit them to stateoperated institutions also constitutes irreparable harm.\nMoreover, courts have specifically held that inability to acce ss necessary Medical Assistance benefits and concom itant potential health problems create irreparable harm . See Todd ex rel. Todd v. Sorrell , 841 F.2d 87, 88 (4th Cir. 1988); Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491, 498 ( 2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 909 ( 1981); Peter B., 2010 WL 5922259 at 9; Crawley v. Ahmed, Civil Action No. 08-14040, 2009 WL 1384147 at2728 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2009); Kerr, 2004 WL 882203 at 9. Plaintiffs have not only been denied community residen tial habilitation services that are clinically necessary, but they are at risk of los ing their entitlement to the Consolidated Waiv er entirely if they remain unnecessarily institutio nalized. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' and class members' inability to access vital Medical Assistance benefits and potential loss of their entitlement to Consolidated Waiver serv ices is sufficient to estab lish irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction.8\n\n8 Even if the harm to Plaintiffs\n\nand class mem bers could som ehow be\n\ncompensated by m oney damages, the Eleventh Amendment bars an award of monetary\n\ndamages against the Defendant for m ost of Pl aintiffs' claims. This is s ufficient to\n\nestablish irreparable harm. See Temple University v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 215 (3d Ci r.\n\n1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032 ( 1992); Crawley, 2009 WL 1384 147 at 28; West\n\nVirginia University Hospitals, Inc., 2009 WL 3241849 at 13-14.\n\n29\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 32 of 35\nC. Any Harm to Defendant Due to Issuance of the Injunction Does Not Outweigh the Harm to Plaintiffs Absent Such Relief. Issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the commitment or transfer of Plaintiffs Yale and Blakely to inappropriate state institutions will not impose any harm on Defendants. It will merely preserve the status quo. Issuance of a preliminary injunction to re quire Defendants to provide Plaint iffs with appropriate community re sidential habilitation services will not harm Defendants, either. The Commonwea lth, in choosing to participat e in the Medical Assistance program, has willingly agreed to comply w ith the requirements of that program. Defendants' interest, therefore, is to assure that they provi de eligible persons with the services to which they are entitled under the Medical Assist ance program in accordance with federal law. See Libbie Rehabilitation Center v. Shal ala, 26 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 1998); Hill v. O'Bannon, 554 F. Supp. 190, 198 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Even assuming arguendo that the Defendants must sp end resources to remedy the violations of Plaintiffs' rights, such costs are not sufficient to justify a denial of otherwise appropriate injunctive relief. See Eder v. Beal , 609 F.2d 695, 701 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1979). Defendants' failure to comply with the ADA, RA, and Title XIX has resulted in Plaintiffs' inability to access essential serv ices they need to live in the community and resulted in their unnecessary institutionalization. As one court wrote in similar circumstances: \"The harm to the Commonwealth if [a preliminar y injunction were] granted, while it may not have been ne gligible, was m easured only in money and w as inconsequential by\n30\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 33 of 35\ncomparison\" to the harm suffered by the Plaintiffs. Todd, 841 F.2d at 88; see also Marlo M., 679 F. Supp. 2d at 638; Kerr, 2004 WL 882203 at 10.\nD. Injunctive Relief Is In the Public Interest. The public interest will be served by t he issuance of injunctiv e relief that upholds the integration mandates of the ADA and RA. Peter B., 2010 WL 5912259 at 12; Cruz, 2010 WL 4284955 at 16; Marlo M., 679 F. Supp. 2d at 638. So, too, the public will benefit if Defendant Alexander complies with his obligations under Title XIX and affords prompt services to Pl aintiffs. See Crawley, 2009 W L 1384147 at *29; Olson v. Wing , 281 F. Supp. 2d 476, 489 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 66 Fe d. Appx. 275 (2d C ir. 2003); Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 998 F. Supp. 146, 159 (D.R.I. 1998).\nCONCLUSION For all the reasons set forth above, Plainti ffs respectfully request that the Court : (1) issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo by requiring Defendants to take appropriate steps to prevent the co mmitment of Plaintiffs Yale and Blakely t o state institutions and by barring Defenda nts from terminating Plaintiffs from the Consolidated Waiver, and (2) gr anting a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants to immediately assure that Plaintiffs promptly receive the community residential habilitation services that are clinically necessary.\n31\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 34 of 35\n\nRespectfully Dated: June 9, 2011\nDisability Philadel (215)\n\nsubmitted,\nBy: /s/ Robert W. Meek Robert W. Meek PA 27870 Mark J. Murphy PA 38564 Robin Resnick PA 46980 Rights Network of PA 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 500 phia, PA 19107-4705 238-8070\nCounsel for Plaintiffs\n\n32\n\n\fCase 2:11-cv-03312-JHS Document 4 Filed 06/09/11 Page 35 of 35\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI, Robert W. Meek, hereby certify that true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' Motion\nfor a Prelim inary Injunction, Memorandum of Law and Exhi bits in S upport of t hat\nMotion, and proposed Order were served as follows on the following on June 9, 2011:\nBy Email and Hand Delivery Barry N. Kramer\nChief Deputy Attorney General Office of Attorney General\n21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103\nBy Email and First Class Mail Kathleen A. Grogan\nSenior Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel Department of Public Welfare 3rd Floor West, Health & Welfare Building\nHarrisburg, PA 17120\n/s/ Robert W. Meek Robert W. Meek\n\n\f", "Case: 2:11-cv-3312 As of: 11/25/2012 11:58 PM EST 1 of 3\nCLOSED,STANDARD\nUnited States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:11−cv−03312−JHS\n\nMUMFORD et al v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA et al Assigned to: HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act\nPlaintiff\n\nDate Filed: 05/20/2011 Date Terminated: 10/18/2011 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 446 Civil Rights: Americans with Disabilities − Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question\n\nLYKEH MUMFORD BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND, KATHERINA MACH\n\nrepresented by ROBERT W. MEEK DISABILITIES LAW PROJECT 1315 WALNUT STREET SUITE 500 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107 215−238−8070 Fax: 215−772−3126 Email: rmeek@drnpa.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nPlaintiff\nJOSEPH YALE BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND, PAMELA ZOTYNIA\n\nrepresented by ROBERT W. MEEK (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nPlaintiff\nKAREN LYN BLAKELY BY AND THROUGH HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, CAROL BLAKELY\n\nrepresented by ROBERT W. MEEK (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nV. Defendant DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA\nDefendant GARY ALEXANDER IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\nrepresented by BARRY N. KRAMER PA OFFICE OF ATTY GENERAL 21 SOUTH 12TH STREET THIRD FLOOR PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107 215−560−1581 Fax: 215−560−1031 Email: bkramer@attorneygeneral.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nrepresented by BARRY N. KRAMER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDate Filed\n\n# Docket Text\n\n\fCase: 2:11-cv-3312 As of: 11/25/2012 11:58 PM EST 2 of 3\n\n05/20/2011\n05/20/2011 05/31/2011 06/03/2011 06/03/2011 06/09/2011\n06/09/2011 06/09/2011 06/09/2011\n06/10/2011 06/21/2011 06/21/2011\n07/21/2011 08/05/2011\n\n1 COMPLAINT against GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 043578.), filed by LYKEH MUMFORD, JOSEPH YALE. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Case Management Track Form, # 3 Designation Form)(mima, ) (Entered: 05/20/2011)\nSummons Issued as to GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA. Two Forwarded To: Counsel on May 20, 2011 (mima, ) (Entered: 05/20/2011)\n2 SUMMONS Returned Executed by LYKEH MUMFORD, JOSEPH YALE re: Lan Do served Summons and Complaint upon All Defendants by On DPW &PA AG's Office. All Defendants. (MEEK, ROBERT) (Entered: 05/31/2011)\n3 AMENDED COMPLAINT against GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA, filed by LYKEH MUMFORD, JOSEPH YALE, KAREN LYN BLAKELY.CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.(kk, ) (Entered: 06/06/2011)\n2 Summons Issued as to GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA. Forwarded To: PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL on 6/6/2011 (kk, ) (Entered: 06/06/2011)\n4 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by KAREN LYN BLAKELY, LYKEH MUMFORD, JOSEPH YALE.Memorandum of Law, Certificate of Service. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Proposed TRO, # 11 Proposed PI Order)(MEEK, ROBERT) (Entered: 06/09/2011)\n5 NOTICE of Appearance by BARRY N. KRAMER on behalf of GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA with Cert of Service(KRAMER, BARRY) (Entered: 06/09/2011)\n6 NOTICE by GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA Kathy Grogan, Esquire, Entry of Appearance (KRAMER, BARRY) (Entered: 06/09/2011)\n7 ORDER THAT A HEARING AND ORAL ARGUMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (DOC. NO.4) SHALL BE HELD ON 6/10/2011 03:00 PM IN COURTROOM BEFORE HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY ON 6/9/2011. 6/9/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 06/09/2011)\n8 STIPULATION AND ORDER THAT THE PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER SHALL BE WITHDRAWN; ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY ON 6/10/2011. 6/10/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 06/10/2011)\n9 ANSWER to 3 Amended Complaint by GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA with Affirmative Defenses, Certificate of Service. (KRAMER, BARRY) Modified on 6/23/2011 (nd, ). (Entered: 06/21/2011)\n10 ORDER THAT A PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SHALL BE HELD ON 8/3/2011 04:00 PM IN JUDGE CHAMBERS BEFORE HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY, ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY ON 6/21/2011. 6/21/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(kk, ) (Entered: 06/21/2011)\n11 Discovery Plan by All Parties.(MEEK, ROBERT) (Entered: 07/21/2011)\n12 SCHEDULING ORDER THAT THE PARTIES SHALL APPEAR FOR A HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. NO. 4) ON 9/21/2011, AT 11:00 AM, IN COURTROOM TO BE DETERMINED. ALL FACT DISCOVERY IS DUE BY 9/15/2011. ALL\n\n\fCase: 2:11-cv-3312 As of: 11/25/2012 11:58 PM EST 3 of 3\n\n08/05/2011 08/05/2011 09/06/2011\n10/05/2011 10/18/2011 02/29/2012\n\nMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DAUBERT MOTIONS ARE DUE BY 12/8/2011. NO LATER THAN 1/5/2012, THE PARTIES SHALL FILE THEIR PRETRIAL MEMORANDA. ALL MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND ANY OTHER PRETRIAL MOTIONS SHALL BE FILED NO LATER THAN 1/19/2012. A FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE IS SET FOR 2/3/2012, AT 3:00 PM IN CHAMBERS (ROOM 5614). THIS CASE WILL BE LISTED FOR TRIAL ON 2/10/2012, AT 9:30 AM, IN A COURTROOM TO BE DETERMINED. ALL FURTHER DEADLINES AND INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS OUTLINED HEREIN. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY ON 8/4/2011. 8/5/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(amas) (Entered: 08/05/2011)\nSet/Reset Hearings: MISCELLANEOUS HEARING SET FOR 9/21/2011 11:00 AM IN COURTROOM BEFORE HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY. (amas, ) (Entered: 08/05/2011)\n13 Minute Entry for proceedings held before HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY: TELEPHONE STATUS CONFERENCE held on 8/3/2011. (amas) (Entered: 08/05/2011)\n14 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: DISCOVERY DUE BY 9/30/2011, PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING SET FOR 10/21/2011 10:00 AM BEFORE HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY. 9/6/2011 ENTERED AND COPIES E−MAILED.(stwe, ) (Entered: 09/06/2011)\n15 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT by GARY ALEXANDER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA. (KRAMER, BARRY) (Entered: 10/05/2011)\n16 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOEL H. SLOMSKY'S APPROVAL. (kk, ) (Entered: 10/19/2011)\n17 STIPULATION of Dismissal by GARY ALEXANDER, KAREN LYN BLAKELY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA, LYKEH MUMFORD, JOSEPH YALE. (MEEK, ROBERT) (Entered: 02/29/2012)\n\n\f" ]	The plaintiffs in this case are three individuals with dual diagnoses of mental illness and intellectual disability. They receive services and support in order to remain in the community through Pennsylvania Medicaid's Consolidated Waiver program. After each plaintiff experienced a change in his/her condition (i.e. a specific episode caused by mental illness that necessitated increased care), the plaintiffs were briefly institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals. The disruption in services created a range problems when the plaintiffs sought to resume waiver services. The level of care offered under the waiver was allegedly insufficient, which put the plaintiffs at risk of future institutionalization. In addition, the plaintiffs faced numerous administrative challenges in securing services. One of the plaintiffs could not be discharged from an institutionalization without a promise of more extensive services than could be put in place under the waiver. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on May 20, 2011. The complaint alleged that the state placed the plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C. The complaint also alleged violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and that the insufficient waiver services amount to violations of the Medicaid Act. Although the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the case was resolved before any decision was necessary. Two of the three plaintiffs were moved to community placements with sufficient support services, while the state had taken some steps to ensure that the third plaintiff would be moved in a timely fashion. Judge Joel H. Slomsky approved the parties' stipulation of dismissal and settlement on October 18, 2011.	This was a challenge to the insufficiency of Pennsylvania Medicaid's Consolidated Waiver program for individuals with both mental illness and intellectual disabilities. The case was dismissed after each of the three plaintiffs began to receive adequate services in the community.	null

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