| # Swarm Arena environment card |
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| ## Research question |
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| Can small language-model agents learn decentralized communication and joint |
| allocation policies that close the gap to a centralized oracle under partial |
| observation? The benchmark isolates that question in a fast symbolic 4v4 game; |
| it does not claim to simulate real network security. |
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| ## Game |
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| - Two teams of four agents act simultaneously on a connected graph. |
| - Node identifiers are randomly assigned and do not reveal ownership. |
| - Nodes have an owner, value, critical flag, fortification level, exposure state, |
| compromise state, and symmetric adjacency. |
| - Each agent has a position, a private timestamped knowledge map, and 0–4 resource. |
| - Remote observations become stale. Adjacent node identifiers are known, but an |
| unseen neighbor must be scanned before its state is visible. |
| - Episodes use a fixed horizon (eight turns by default) or end when a team controls |
| no nodes. |
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| ### Actions |
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| `SCAN`, `PROBE`, `CAPTURE`, `FORTIFY`, `RECOVER`, `TRANSFER`, and `WAIT` are the |
| only actions. The environment enumerates the complete legal action set for each |
| agent every turn. |
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| Resolution order is fixed and independent of dictionary or worker order: |
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| 1. validate all actions against the pre-turn state; |
| 2. transfer resources (available to the receiver next turn because legality is |
| fixed before resolution); |
| 3. recover and fortify; |
| 4. scan and probe; |
| 5. capture; |
| 6. refresh local observations and advance the clock. |
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| This creates genuine simultaneous coordination. Multiple probes can remove |
| multiple shield levels, a probe can enable a teammate's same-turn capture, and a |
| simultaneous fortification can block insufficient probing. Opposing captures of |
| a neutral node are contested rather than resolved by iteration order. |
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| ## Reward |
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| Reward is zero-sum. It is the change in weighted node control and resource |
| opportunity, plus symmetric information gain and invalid-action penalties. |
| Critical, exposed, fortified, and compromised states have explicit symmetric |
| values. No model-written text is passed to a learned reward model. |
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| Action redundancy is not inferred from matching target strings. Evaluation uses |
| a leave-one-agent-out counterfactual: an action is redundant only if replacing it |
| with `WAIT` does not reduce team reward. This avoids falsely penalizing useful |
| multi-probe or multi-fortify coordination. |
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| ## Communication protocol |
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| The primary benchmark uses machine-checkable semantic broadcasts: |
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| ```json |
| { |
| "facts": [ |
| {"node": "V42", "owner": "RED", "status": "EXPOSED", "value": 3, "critical": true, "observed_turn": 3} |
| ], |
| "intent": {"type": "CAPTURE", "target": "V42"}, |
| "request_resource": 0 |
| } |
| ``` |
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| Facts must exactly match the sender's timestamped observation, intentions must be |
| legal for the sender, and the entire response must match the schema. Extra prose, |
| extra keys, fabricated state, future timestamps, and out-of-range action IDs fail. |
| Natural-language communication can be added as a separate experiment, but it is |
| not mixed into the primary score because semantic text grading would introduce |
| false positives and negatives. |
|
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| ## Evaluation design |
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| The frozen manifest contains 60 cases: |
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| - 20 graphs with 12 nodes; |
| - 20 topology-OOD graphs with 13 nodes; |
| - 20 topology-OOD graphs with 14 nodes; |
| - balanced coverage of balanced, aggressive, and defensive opponent policies. |
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| Every case is tested with generated, dropped, reference, and shuffled messages. |
| The generated condition is repeated under three action-order permutations. The |
| report records strict protocol rates, exact oracle regret, optimal-outcome rate, |
| counterfactual redundancy, communication effects, topology/policy slices, and |
| 95% intervals. The manifest hash is included in every result. |
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| The oracle enumerates every legal four-agent joint action against the specified |
| opponent. A rollout is optimal when its realized reward matches the best reward; |
| it is not required to reproduce one arbitrary canonical assignment. This avoids |
| false negatives when several joint actions are equally good. |
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| ## Data isolation and reproducibility |
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| - Evaluation seeds are reserved in code and rejected by the SFT splitter. |
| - SFT rows are split by whole procedural seed, never by agent-level row. |
| - Node names, action order, topology, state, resources, and observations vary by |
| deterministic seed. |
| - Dataset rows carry generator, prompt, and dataset versions plus a content hash. |
| - An independent audit reconstructs states and rechecks every protocol target, |
| solver label, split, action position, duplicate ID, and leakage sentinel. |
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| ## Required baselines before research claims |
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| Report random-legal, local deterministic, no-message, shuffled-message, |
| reference-message, base-model, SFT, and MARL policies. The centralized oracle is |
| an upper bound, not a deployable policy. A claim about learned coordination |
| requires improvement over the local and no-message baselines, degradation under |
| shuffled messages, and consistency across topology and opponent-policy slices. |
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