func string | target int64 | cwe list | project string | commit_id string | hash float64 | size int64 | message string | is_vulnerable string | cwe_id_extracted string | cwe_details string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
uint32_t cli_bcapi_debug_print_str(struct cli_bc_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *str, uint32_t len)
{
cli_event_fastdata(EV, BCEV_DBG_STR, str, strlen((const char*)str));
cli_dbgmsg("bytecode debug: %s\n", str);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | clamav-devel | 3d664817f6ef833a17414a4ecea42004c35cc42f | 139,374,214,074,759,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | fix recursion level crash (bb #3706).
Thanks to Stephane Chazelas for the analysis. | Safe | 189 | null |
static __always_inline u64 __kvm_lapic_get_reg64(char *regs, int reg)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(reg != APIC_ICR);
return *((u64 *) (regs + reg));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 00b5f37189d24ac3ed46cb7f11742094778c46ce | 173,012,068,010,393,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | KVM: x86: Avoid theoretical NULL pointer dereference in kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast()
When kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast() is called with APIC_DEST_SELF
shorthand, 'src' must not be NULL. Crash the VM with KVM_BUG_ON()
instead of crashing the host.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <... | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
dissect_rpcap_error (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset)
{
proto_item *ti;
gint len;
len = tvb_captured_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
if (len <= 0)
return;
col_append_fstr (pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ": %s",
tvb_format_text_wsp ... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | wireshark | 2c13e97d656c1c0ac4d76eb9d307664aae0e0cf7 | 39,031,642,767,239,986,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu> | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static int Get_Alignement()
{
#if defined(HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS)
if (hasNEON()) {
return 16;
}
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SSE2_INTRINSICS)
if (hasSSE2()) {
return 16;
}
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_BLIT_GLYPH_64)
return 8;
#elif defined(HAVE_BLIT_GLYPH_32)
return 4;
#else
return 1;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
] | SDL_ttf | db1b41ab8bde6723c24b866e466cad78c2fa0448 | 143,781,354,118,341,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | More integer overflow (see bug #187)
Make sure that 'width + alignment' doesn't overflow, otherwise
it could create a SDL_Surface of 'width' but with wrong 'pitch' | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
int al,i,ok;
long n;
unsigned char *p;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
* change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
*/
#endif
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
a,
b,
SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
64... | 0 | [] | openssl | ee2ffc279417f15fef3b1073c7dc81a908991516 | 127,184,393,462,865,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 69 | Add Next Protocol Negotiation. | Safe | null | null |
static void make_tx_response(struct xenvif *vif,
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
s8 st)
{
RING_IDX i = vif->tx.rsp_prod_pvt;
struct xen_netif_tx_response *resp;
int notify;
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->tx, i);
resp->id = txp->id;
resp->status = st;
if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_extr... | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | net-next | e9d8b2c2968499c1f96563e6522c56958d5a1d0d | 113,029,763,152,148,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | xen-netback: disable rogue vif in kthread context
When netback discovers frontend is sending malformed packet it will
disables the interface which serves that frontend.
However disabling a network interface involving taking a mutex which
cannot be done in softirq context, so we need to defer this process to
kthread c... | Safe | 399 | null |
int mp_cmp (mp_int * a, mp_int * b)
{
return fp_cmp(a, b);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-203"
] | wolfssl | 1de07da61f0c8e9926dcbd68119f73230dae283f | 98,314,078,561,424,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Constant time EC map to affine for private operations
For fast math, use a constant time modular inverse when mapping to
affine when operation involves a private key - key gen, calc shared
secret, sign. | Safe | 326 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-326", "vulnerability_type": "Inadequate Encryption Strength", "description": "The product stores or transmits sensitive data using an encryption scheme that is theoretically sound, but is not strong enough for the level of protection required.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Bypass Pro... |
static int decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data, int *got_frame, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
FFV1Context *f = avctx->priv_data;
RangeCoder *const c = &f->slice_context[0]->c;
int i, ret;
uint8_t keystate = 128;
const... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | FFmpeg | d893253fcd93d11258e98857175e93be7d158708 | 231,946,786,763,686,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 143 | avcodec/ffv1dec: Fix out of array read in slice counting
Fixes: test-201710.mp4
Found-by: 连一汉 <lianyihan@360.cn> and Zhibin Hu
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit c20f4fcb74da2d0432c7b54499bb98f48236b904)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
wrap_process(PushFilter *mp, const uint8 *data, int len)
{
int res;
if (mp->op->push != NULL)
res = mp->op->push(mp->next, mp->priv, data, len);
else
res = pushf_write(mp->next, data, len);
if (res > 0)
return PXE_BUG;
return res;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | postgres | 1dc75515868454c645ded22d38054ec693e23ec6 | 174,732,786,723,506,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Fix buffer overrun after incomplete read in pullf_read_max().
Most callers pass a stack buffer. The ensuing stack smash can crash the
server, and we have not ruled out the viability of attacks that lead to
privilege escalation. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Marko Tiikkaja
Security: CVE-2015-0243 | Safe | 120 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-120", "vulnerability_type": "Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')", "description": "The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "... |
gf_filter_pck_unref(pck);
}
ds->nb_sap_in_queue = 0;
}
ds->forced_period_switch = GF_FALSE;
}
void dasher_context_update_period_end(GF_DasherCtx *ctx)
{
u32 i, count;
if (!ctx->mpd) return;
count = gf_list_count(ctx->current_period->streams);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_DashStream *ds = gf_list_get(c... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | ea1eca00fd92fa17f0e25ac25652622924a9a6a0 | 212,685,496,232,601,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | fixed #2138 | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
_evbuffer_chain_unpin(struct evbuffer_chain *chain, unsigned flag)
{
EVUTIL_ASSERT((chain->flags & flag) != 0);
chain->flags &= ~flag;
if (chain->flags & EVBUFFER_DANGLING)
evbuffer_chain_free(chain);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | libevent | 20d6d4458bee5d88bda1511c225c25b2d3198d6c | 246,434,672,263,204,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.0
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum.
This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop
if we ... | Safe | 189 | null |
AsciiHiiToLower (
IN CHAR8 *ConfigString
)
{
ASSERT (ConfigString != NULL);
//
// Convert all hex digits in range [A-F] in the configuration header to [a-f]
//
for (; *ConfigString != '\0'; ConfigString++) {
if ( *ConfigString >= 'A' && *ConfigString <= 'Z') {
*ConfigString = (CHAR8... | 0 | [] | edk2 | 764e8ba1389a617639d79d2c4f0d53f4ea4a7387 | 234,944,418,634,695,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | MdeModulePkg/String.c: Zero memory before free (CVE-2019-14558)
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1611
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@in... | Safe | null | null |
static int super_90_validate(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
mdp_disk_t *desc;
mdp_super_t *sb = page_address(rdev->sb_page);
__u64 ev1 = md_event(sb);
rdev->raid_disk = -1;
clear_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags);
clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
clear_bit(Bitmap_sync, &rdev->flags);
clear_bit(WriteMost... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16 | 241,597,962,424,543,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 121 | md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the fun... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
bool CParaNdisTX::SendMapped(bool IsInterrupt, PNET_BUFFER_LIST &NBLFailNow)
{
if(!ParaNdis_IsSendPossible(m_Context))
{
NBLFailNow = RemoveAllNonWaitingNBLs();
if (NBLFailNow)
{
DPrintf(0, (__FUNCTION__ " Failing send"));
}
}
else
{
bool SentOutSo... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | kvm-guest-drivers-windows | 723416fa4210b7464b28eab89cc76252e6193ac1 | 32,148,748,839,390,473,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 | NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com> | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static void __core_cmd_anal_fcn_allstats(RCore *core, const char *input) {
RAnalFunction *fcn;
SdbKv *kv;
RListIter *iter;
SdbListIter *it;
RList *dbs = r_list_newf ((RListFree)sdb_free);
Sdb *d = sdb_new0 ();
ut64 oseek = core->offset;
bool isJson = strchr (input, 'j') != NULL;
char *inp = r_str_newf ("*%s",... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-908"
] | radare2 | 4d3811681a80f92a53e795f6a64c4b0fc2c8dd22 | 66,997,831,081,897,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 90 | Fix segfault in adf (#16230) | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
static void __init parse_id(char *id)
{
unsigned int vendor_id = 0, device_id = 0, flags = 0, i = 0;
char *token, *name = NULL;
if ((token = strsep(&id, ":")) != NULL)
name = token;
/* name now points to a null terminated string*/
if ((token = strsep(&id, ":")) != NULL)
vendor_id = simple_strtoul(token, NULL,... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 5593523f968bc86d42a035c6df47d5e0979b5ace | 301,226,002,413,095,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
TEST(ExprMatchTest, OptimizingAnAlreadyOptimizedCloneIsANoop) {
const boost::intrusive_ptr<ExpressionContextForTest> expCtx(new ExpressionContextForTest());
BSONObj expression = fromjson("{$expr: {$eq: ['$a', 4]}}");
// Create and optimize an ExprMatchExpression.
std::unique_ptr<MatchExpression> singly... | 0 | [] | mongo | ee97c0699fd55b498310996ee002328e533681a3 | 60,235,958,401,409,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | SERVER-36993 Fix crash due to incorrect $or pushdown for indexed $expr. | Safe | null | null |
MagickExport MagickBooleanType CompressImageColormap(Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantizeInfo
quantize_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick | 5294966898532a6bd54699fbf04edf18902513ac | 316,146,034,357,717,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1156 | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_user_polexpire *up = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p = &up->pol;
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err = -ENOENT;
struct... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5 | 106,772,567,308,759,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 68 | xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()
The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info le... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
void AppLayerProtoDetectPPRegister(uint8_t ipproto,
const char *portstr,
AppProto alproto,
uint16_t min_depth, uint16_t max_depth,
uint8_t direction,
... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | suricata | 8357ef3f8ffc7d99ef6571350724160de356158b | 329,743,632,865,997,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by sti... | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static void mem_cgroup_destroy(struct cgroup *cont)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = mem_cgroup_from_cont(cont);
kmem_cgroup_destroy(cont);
mem_cgroup_put(memcg);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 | 299,578,031,778,002,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad(... | Safe | 264 | null |
static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
unsigned char *tmp, int num)
{
int ret;
ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL,0,NU... | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | openssl | e5420be6cd09af2550b128575a675490cfba0483 | 34,024,540,341,992,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | Make CBC decoding constant time.
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be eas... | Safe | 310 | null |
ip_unset_variable2(self, varname, index, flag)
VALUE self;
VALUE varname;
VALUE index;
VALUE flag;
{
VALUE argv[3];
VALUE retval;
StringValue(varname);
if (!NIL_P(index)) StringValue(index);
argv[0] = varname;
argv[1] = index;
argv[2] = flag;
retval = tk_funcall(ip_uns... | 0 | [] | tk | ebd0fc80d62eeb7b8556522256f8d035e013eb65 | 207,604,454,354,409,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | tcltklib.c: check argument
* ext/tk/tcltklib.c (ip_cancel_eval_core): check argument type and
length.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@51468 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e | Safe | null | null |
relpTcpSetDHBits(relpTcp_t *pThis, int bits)
{
ENTER_RELPFUNC;
RELPOBJ_assert(pThis, Tcp);
pThis->dhBits = bits;
LEAVE_RELPFUNC;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | librelp | 2cfe657672636aa5d7d2a14cfcb0a6ab9d1f00cf | 82,334,913,780,991,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | unify error message generation | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
TPMS_TAGGED_POLICY_Unmarshal(TPMS_TAGGED_POLICY *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
{
TPM_RC rc = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
rc = TPM_HANDLE_Unmarshal(&target->handle, buffer, size);
}
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
rc = TPMT_HA_Unmarshal(&target->policyHash, buffer, size, NO);
}
... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | libtpms | 5cc98a62dc6f204dcf5b87c2ee83ac742a6a319b | 49,808,533,879,895,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | tpm2: Restore original value if unmarshalled value was illegal
Restore the original value of the memory location where data from
a stream was unmarshalled and the unmarshalled value was found to
be illegal. The goal is to not keep illegal values in memory.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
int go7007_snd_init(struct go7007 *go)
{
static int dev;
struct go7007_snd *gosnd;
int ret;
if (dev >= SNDRV_CARDS)
return -ENODEV;
if (!enable[dev]) {
dev++;
return -ENOENT;
}
gosnd = kmalloc(sizeof(struct go7007_snd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (gosnd == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&gosnd->lock);
gos... | 1 | [
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 9453264ef58638ce8976121ac44c07a3ef375983 | 73,757,393,635,106,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 | media: go7007: fix a miss of snd_card_free
go7007_snd_init() misses a snd_card_free() in an error path.
Add the missed call to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> | Vulnerable | 401 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-401", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime", "description": "The product does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, making the memory unavailable for reallocation and reuse.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "Memory Leak", "imp... |
int StreamBase::Shutdown(v8::Local<v8::Object> req_wrap_obj) {
Environment* env = stream_env();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(env->isolate());
if (req_wrap_obj.IsEmpty()) {
if (!env->shutdown_wrap_template()
->NewInstance(env->context())
.ToLocal(&req_wrap_obj)) {
return UV_EB... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | node | 4f8772f9b731118628256189b73cd202149bbd97 | 205,924,379,616,797,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | src: retain pointers to WriteWrap/ShutdownWrap
Avoids potential use-after-free when wrap req's are synchronously
destroyed.
CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8265
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/issues/227
Refs: https://hackerone.com/bugs?subject=nodejs&report_id=988103
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
static void stab_kfree_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
kfree(container_of(head, struct qdisc_size_table, rcu));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | net | 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e | 122,486,493,413,509,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
... | Safe | 264 | null |
void AuthorizationManagerImpl::invalidateUsersFromDB(OperationContext* opCtx, StringData dbname) {
CacheGuard guard(opCtx, this);
_updateCacheGeneration_inlock(guard);
_userCache.invalidateIf(
[&](const UserName& user, const User*) { return user.getDB() == dbname; });
_recachePinnedUsers(guard,... | 0 | [
"CWE-613"
] | mongo | e55d6e2292e5dbe2f97153251d8193d1cc89f5d7 | 223,328,757,132,480,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | SERVER-38984 Validate unique User ID on UserCache hit | Safe | 613 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-613", "vulnerability_type": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\"", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Bypass Protect... |
static int ext4_freeze(struct super_block *sb)
{
int error = 0;
journal_t *journal;
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return 0;
journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
/* Now we set up the journal barrier. */
jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal);
/*
* Don't clear the needs_recovery flag if we failed to flush
* the ... | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11 | 147,066,566,696,596,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
int btrfs_map_sblock(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, enum btrfs_map_op op,
u64 logical, u64 *length,
struct btrfs_bio **bbio_ret)
{
return __btrfs_map_block(fs_info, op, logical, length, bbio_ret, 0, 1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 09ba3bc9dd150457c506e4661380a6183af651c1 | 20,379,885,399,638,624,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | btrfs: merge btrfs_find_device and find_device
Both btrfs_find_device() and find_device() does the same thing except
that the latter does not take the seed device onto account in the device
scanning context. We can merge them.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.c... | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
if(pData->fdErrFile != -1) {
close(pData->fdErrFile);
pData->fdErrFile = -1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | rsyslog | 80f88242982c9c6ad6ce8628fc5b94ea74051cf4 | 72,164,380,455,374,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | bugfix: double-free in omelasticsearch
closes: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=461
Thanks to Marius Ionescu for providing a detailled bug report | Safe | 399 | null |
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok;
X509 *x;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
ok = X509_che... | 1 | [] | openssl | d65b8b2162f33ac0d53dace588a0847ed827626c | 37,848,012,038,591,927,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Backport OCSP fixes. | Vulnerable | null | null |
static int button_install_check_event_source(Button *b) {
int r;
assert(b);
/* Install a post handler, so that we keep rechecking as long as the lid is closed. */
if (b->check_event_source)
return 0;
r = sd_event_add_post(b->manager->event, &b->check_event_sour... | 0 | [
"CWE-772",
"CWE-401"
] | systemd | b2774a3ae692113e1f47a336a6c09bac9cfb49ad | 220,629,429,581,451,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | bus_open leak sd_event_source when udevadm trigger。
On my host, when executing the udevadm trigger, I only receive the change event, which causes memleak | Safe | 772 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-772", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime", "description": "The product does not release a resource after its effective lifetime has ended, i.e., after the resource is no longer needed.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Resource Consumption ... |
QPDFWriter::QPDFWriter(QPDF& pdf, char const* description,
FILE *file, bool close_file) :
pdf(pdf)
{
init();
setOutputFile(description, file, close_file);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-835"
] | qpdf | 8249a26d69f72b9cda584c14cc3f12769985e481 | 25,442,369,446,902,755,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Fix infinite loop in QPDFWriter (fixes #143) | Safe | 399 | null |
LogVWrite(int verb, const char *f, va_list args)
{
return LogVMessageVerb(X_NONE, verb, f, args);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-863"
] | xserver | da15c7413916f754708c62c2089265528cd661e2 | 18,141,733,944,757,885,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | LogFilePrep: add a comment to the unsafe format string.
CVE-2018-14665 also made it possible to exploit this to access
memory. With -logfile forbidden when running with elevated privileges
this is no longer an issue.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
(cherry... | Safe | 863 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-863", "vulnerability_type": "Incorrect Authorization", "description": "The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.", "severity": "High", "category": "AuthZ", "impact": ["Read Application Data",... |
njs_string_prototype_split(njs_vm_t *vm, njs_value_t *args, njs_uint_t nargs,
njs_index_t unused)
{
size_t size;
uint32_t limit;
njs_int_t ret;
njs_utf8_t utf8;
njs_bool_t undefined;
njs_value_t *this, *separator, *value;
njs_value_t ... | 0 | [] | njs | 36f04a3178fcb6da8513cc3dbf35215c2a581b3f | 339,004,142,693,243,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 155 | Fixed String.prototype.replace() with byte strings.
This closes #522 issue on Github. | Safe | null | null |
GF_Err fdpa_box_size(GF_Box *s)
{
u32 i;
GF_FDpacketBox *ptr = (GF_FDpacketBox *)s;
ptr->size += 5;
for (i=0; i<ptr->header_ext_count; i++) {
ptr->size += 1;
if (ptr->headers[i].header_extension_type > 127) {
ptr->size += 3;
} else {
ptr->size += 1 + ptr->headers[i].data_length;
}
}
return GF_OK; | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 388ecce75d05e11fc8496aa4857b91245007d26e | 117,505,190,759,164,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | fixed #1587 | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
static int iscsi_check_acceptor_state(struct iscsi_param *param, char *value,
struct iscsi_conn *conn)
{
u8 acceptor_boolean_value = 0, proposer_boolean_value = 0;
char *negoitated_value = NULL;
if (IS_PSTATE_ACCEPTOR(param)) {
pr_err("Received key \"%s\" twice, protocol error.\n",
param->name);
return ... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | target-pending | cea4dcfdad926a27a18e188720efe0f2c9403456 | 127,357,760,228,612,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 131 | iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication ke... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
TEST_F(HttpConnectionManagerImplTest, FrameFloodError) {
InSequence s;
setup(false, "");
EXPECT_CALL(*codec_, dispatch(_)).WillOnce(Invoke([&](Buffer::Instance&) -> void {
conn_manager_->newStream(response_encoder_);
throw FrameFloodException("too many outbound frames.");
}));
EXPECT_CALL(response_e... | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 197,353,681,865,539,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the Heade... | Safe | 400 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-400", "vulnerability_type": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.", "severity": "High", "category": "Resource Exhaustion", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU... |
currentbuffer(dns_message_t *msg) {
isc_buffer_t *dynbuf;
dynbuf = ISC_LIST_TAIL(msg->scratchpad);
INSIST(dynbuf != NULL);
return (dynbuf);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | bind9 | 6ed167ad0a647dff20c8cb08c944a7967df2d415 | 84,001,334,462,687,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Always keep a copy of the message
this allows it to be available even when dns_message_parse()
returns a error. | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
static int seek_eof_information (WavpackContext *wpc, int64_t *final_index, int get_wrapper)
{
int64_t restore_pos, last_pos = -1;
WavpackStreamReader64 *reader = wpc->reader;
int alt_types = wpc->open_flags & OPEN_ALT_TYPES;
uint32_t blocks = 0, audio_blocks = 0;
void *id = wpc->wv_in;
WavpackH... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | WavPack | 4bc05fc490b66ef2d45b1de26abf1455b486b0dc | 301,561,354,257,661,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 147 | fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
void rfbProcessClientAuthType(rfbClientPtr cl)
{
CARD32 auth_type;
int n, i;
AuthCapData **p;
AuthCapData *c;
/* Read authentication type selected by the client */
n = ReadExact(cl, (char *)&auth_type, sizeof(auth_type));
if (n <= 0) {
if (n == 0)
rfbLog("rfbProcessClientAuthType: client gone\n... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | turbovnc | cea98166008301e614e0d36776bf9435a536136e | 262,161,294,729,323,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | Server: Fix two issues identified by ASan
1. If the TLSPlain and X509Plain security types were both disabled, then
rfbOptPamAuth() would overflow the name field in the secTypes
structure when testing the "none" security type, since the name of
that security type has less than five characters. This issue was
... | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
cpu_attach_domain(struct sched_domain *sd, struct root_domain *rd, int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct sched_domain *tmp;
for (tmp = sd; tmp; tmp = tmp->parent)
tmp->span_weight = cpumask_weight(sched_domain_span(tmp));
/* Remove the sched domains which do not contribute to scheduling. */
for (tmp =... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] | linux | f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64 | 278,068,328,846,784,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confus... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_prstatus params;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
int policy;
int retval = -EINVAL;
if (len < sizeof(params))
goto out;
len = sizeof(params);
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, optv... | 0 | [
"CWE-617",
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 2dcab598484185dea7ec22219c76dcdd59e3cb90 | 104,722,696,496,721,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 | sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
Alexander Popov reported that an application may trigger a BUG_ON in
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf if the socket tx buffer is full, a thread is
waiting on it to queue more data and meanwhile another thread peels off
the association being used by the first thread.
This patch replaces ... | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
static int __init atl2_init_module(void)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "%s - version %s\n", atl2_driver_string,
atl2_driver_version);
printk(KERN_INFO "%s\n", atl2_copyright);
return pci_register_driver(&atl2_driver);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8 | 100,702,488,000,672,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are i... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
hook_infolist_get (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *infolist_name,
void *pointer, const char *arguments)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
struct t_infolist *value;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) plugin;
if (!infolist_name || !infolist_name[0])
retur... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | weechat | efb795c74fe954b9544074aafcebb1be4452b03a | 59,315,220,283,239,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | core: do not call shell to execute command in hook_process (fix security problem when a plugin/script gives untrusted command) (bug #37764) | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
ofputil_capabilities_mask(enum ofp_version ofp_version)
{
/* Handle capabilities whose bit is unique for all OpenFlow versions */
switch (ofp_version) {
case OFP10_VERSION:
case OFP11_VERSION:
return OFPC_COMMON | OFPC_ARP_MATCH_IP;
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION:
return ... | 0 | [
"CWE-772"
] | ovs | 77ad4225d125030420d897c873e4734ac708c66b | 82,571,935,744,498,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | ofp-util: Fix memory leaks on error cases in ofputil_decode_group_mod().
Found by libFuzzer.
Reported-by: Bhargava Shastry <bshastry@sec.t-labs.tu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org> | Safe | 772 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-772", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime", "description": "The product does not release a resource after its effective lifetime has ended, i.e., after the resource is no longer needed.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Resource Consumption ... |
static uint8_t arcmsr_hbaA_abort_allcmd(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_ABORT_CMD, ®->inbound_msgaddr0);
if (!arcmsr_hbaA_wait_msgint_ready(acb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE
"arcmsr%d: wait 'abort all outstanding command' timeout\n"
, ... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 7bc2b55a5c030685b399bb65b6baa9ccc3d1f167 | 84,499,330,864,556,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Sig... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
set_streams_blocked_on_circ(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan,
int block, streamid_t stream_id)
{
edge_connection_t *edge = NULL;
int n = 0;
if (circ->n_chan == chan) {
circ->streams_blocked_on_n_chan = block;
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
edge = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_... | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-617"
] | tor | 56a7c5bc15e0447203a491c1ee37de9939ad1dcd | 331,569,613,563,017,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 | TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
parse_copy_decompress_rrset(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
struct rrset_parse *pset, struct regional* region,
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* pk)
{
struct packed_rrset_data* data;
pk->rk.flags = pset->flags;
pk->rk.dname_len = pset->dname_len;
if(region)
pk->rk.dname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc(
regio... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | unbound | 6c3a0b54ed8ace93d5b5ca7b8078dc87e75cd640 | 102,992,443,494,507,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | - Fix Out of Bound Write Compressed Names in rdata_copy(),
reported by X41 D-Sec. | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
static int cgw_remove_job(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct cgw_job *gwj = NULL;
struct hlist_node *nx;
struct rtcanmsg *r;
struct cf_mod mod;
struct can_can_gw ccgw;
u8 limhops = 0;
int err = 0;
if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*r))
r... | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | net | 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e | 136,901,293,798,857,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
... | Safe | 264 | null |
void llhttp_pause(llhttp_t* parser) {
if (parser->error != HPE_OK) {
return;
}
parser->error = HPE_PAUSED;
parser->reason = "Paused";
} | 0 | [
"CWE-444"
] | node | af488f8dc82d69847992ea1cd2f53dc8082b3b91 | 272,882,902,041,924,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | deps: update llhttp to 6.0.4
Refs: https://hackerone.com/reports/1238099
Refs: https://hackerone.com/reports/1238709
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs-private/llhttp-private/pull/6
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs-private/llhttp-private/pull/5
CVE-ID: CVE-2021-22959
CVE-ID: CVE-2021-22960
PR-URL: https://github.com/node... | Safe | 444 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-444", "vulnerability_type": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n entities such as a client and server, but it does ... |
static inline int ohci_put_td(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, struct ohci_td *td)
{
return put_dwords(ohci, addr, (uint32_t *)td, sizeof(*td) >> 2);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | qemu | 95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb | 42,109,502,807,606,174,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Message-id: 5899a02e.45ca240a.6c373.93c1@mx.google.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> | Safe | 835 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-835", "vulnerability_type": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')", "description": "The product contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)", "DoS:... |
GF_Err fdpa_box_read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_FDpacketBox *ptr = (GF_FDpacketBox *)s;
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 3);
ptr->info.sender_current_time_present = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptr->info.expected_residual_time_present = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptr->info.session_close_bit = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 77510778516803b7f7402d7423c6d6bef50254c3 | 75,214,790,626,631,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 | fixed #2255 | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
pad_heap (MonoDynamicStream *sh)
{
if (sh->index & 3) {
int sz = 4 - (sh->index & 3);
memset (sh->data + sh->index, 0, sz);
sh->index += sz;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | mono | 4905ef1130feb26c3150b28b97e4a96752e0d399 | 80,510,589,971,770,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Handle invalid instantiation of generic methods.
* verify.c: Add new function to internal verifier API to check
method instantiations.
* reflection.c (mono_reflection_bind_generic_method_parameters):
Check the instantiation before returning it.
Fixes #655847 | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
void unprotectClient(client *c) {
if (c->flags & CLIENT_PROTECTED) {
c->flags &= ~CLIENT_PROTECTED;
if (c->conn) {
connSetReadHandler(c->conn,readQueryFromClient);
if (clientHasPendingReplies(c)) clientInstallWriteHandler(c);
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | redis | 5674b0057ff2903d43eaff802017eddf37c360f8 | 156,705,679,575,557,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of memory (CVE-2021-32675)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
T... | Safe | 770 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-770", "vulnerability_type": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling", "description": "The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.", "severity": "Hi... |
SProcShmCreatePixmap(client)
ClientPtr client;
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
swapl(&stuff->pid, n);
swapl(&stuff->drawable, n);
swaps(&stuff->width, n);
swaps(&stuff->height, n);
swapl(&stuff->sh... | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | xserver | be6c17fcf9efebc0bbcc3d9a25f8c5a2450c2161 | 180,369,885,436,067,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | CVE-2007-6429: Always test for size+offset wrapping. | Safe | 189 | null |
*/
xmlNodePtr
xmlXPathNextDescendant(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr cur) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->context == NULL)) return(NULL);
if (cur == NULL) {
if (ctxt->context->node == NULL)
return(NULL);
if ((ctxt->context->node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) ||
(ctxt->context->node->type ==... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libxml2 | 91d19754d46acd4a639a8b9e31f50f31c78f8c9c | 240,677,006,695,277,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | Fix the semantic of XPath axis for namespace/attribute context nodes
The processing of namespace and attributes nodes was not compliant
to the XPath-1.0 specification | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int date_to_ISO8601 (time_t value, char *buf, int length) {
struct tm *tm, tmbuf;
tm = php_gmtime_r(&value, &tmbuf);
if (!tm) {
return 0;
}
#if 0 /* TODO: soap seems to favor this method. xmlrpc the latter. */
return strftime (buf, length, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", tm);
#else
return strftime(buf... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | php-src | 88412772d295ebf7dd34409534507dc9bcac726e | 274,233,648,857,395,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Fix bug #68027 - fix date parsing in XMLRPC lib | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
Type_handler::make_num_distinct_aggregator_field(MEM_ROOT *mem_root,
const Item *item) const
{
return new(mem_root)
Field_double(NULL, item->max_length,
(uchar *) (item->maybe_null ? "" : 0),
item->maybe_null ? 1 : 0... | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | server | eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1 | 34,446,722,176,879,255,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size.
Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations.
It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes... | Safe | 120 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-120", "vulnerability_type": "Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')", "description": "The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "... |
static int vhost_vdpa_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
{
struct vhost_vdpa *v;
struct vhost_dev *dev;
struct vhost_virtqueue **vqs;
int nvqs, i, r, opened;
v = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct vhost_vdpa, cdev);
opened = atomic_cmpxchg(&v->opened, 0, 1);
if (opened)
return -EBUSY;
nvqs = v->... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | f6bbf0010ba004f5e90c7aefdebc0ee4bd3283b9 | 179,534,040,261,640,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 | vhost-vdpa: fix use-after-free of v->config_ctx
When the 'v->config_ctx' eventfd_ctx reference is released we didn't
set it to NULL. So if the same character device (e.g. /dev/vhost-vdpa-0)
is re-opened, the 'v->config_ctx' is invalid and calling again
vhost_vdpa_config_put() causes use-after-free issues like the
foll... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
R_API RGraph *r_core_anal_importxrefs(RCore *core) {
RBinInfo *info = r_bin_get_info (core->bin);
RBinObject *obj = r_bin_cur_object (core->bin);
bool lit = info? info->has_lit: false;
bool va = core->io->va || r_config_get_b (core->config, "cfg.debug");
RListIter *iter;
RBinImport *imp;
if (!obj) {
return NU... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | radare2 | 10517e3ff0e609697eb8cde60ec8dc999ee5ea24 | 278,067,361,084,889,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | aaef on arm/thumb switches causes uaf ##crash
* Reported by peacock-doris via huntr.dev
* Reproducer: poc_uaf_r_reg_get | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
static void ring_buffer_wakeup(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_buffer *rb;
rcu_read_lock();
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (rb) {
list_for_each_entry_rcu(event, &rb->event_list, rb_entry)
wake_up_all(&event->waitq);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | tip | 7bdb157cdebbf95a1cd94ed2e01b338714075d00 | 132,482,634,875,851,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | perf/core: Fix a memory leak in perf_event_parse_addr_filter()
As shown through runtime testing, the "filename" allocation is not
always freed in perf_event_parse_addr_filter().
There are three possible ways that this could happen:
- It could be allocated twice on subsequent iterations through the loop,
- or leake... | Safe | 401 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-401", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime", "description": "The product does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, making the memory unavailable for reallocation and reuse.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "Memory Leak", "imp... |
BIGNUM *BN_secure_new(void)
{
BIGNUM *ret = BN_new();
if (ret != NULL)
ret->flags |= BN_FLG_SECURE;
return (ret);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | 38,336,803,791,955,637,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | Safe | 310 | null |
zzip_disk_new(void)
{
ZZIP_DISK* disk = malloc(sizeof(disk));
if (! disk) return disk;
zzip_disk_init (disk, 0, 0);
return disk;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | zziplib | 596d9dfce2624e849417d4301e8d67935608aa5e | 140,147,948,677,789,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | memdisk
(.) | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static void evtchn_fifo_bind_to_cpu(struct irq_info *info, unsigned cpu)
{
/* no-op */
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | e99502f76271d6bc4e374fe368c50c67a1fd3070 | 48,885,548,937,508,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events
In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.
In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events... | Safe | 400 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-400", "vulnerability_type": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.", "severity": "High", "category": "Resource Exhaustion", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU... |
Pl_AES_PDF::disableCBC()
{
this->cbc_mode = false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qpdf | dc92574c10f3e2516ec6445b88c5d584f40df4e5 | 83,391,605,789,054,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix some pipelines to be safe if downstream write fails (fuzz issue 28262) | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
void *netdev_adjacent_get_private(struct list_head *adj_list)
{
struct netdev_adjacent *adj;
adj = list_entry(adj_list, struct netdev_adjacent, list);
return adj->private; | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971 | 111,536,648,255,775,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsul... | Safe | 400 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-400", "vulnerability_type": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.", "severity": "High", "category": "Resource Exhaustion", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU... |
static int DefragMfIpv6Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ... | 0 | [
"CWE-358"
] | suricata | 4a04f814b15762eb446a5ead4d69d021512df6f8 | 301,714,219,664,905,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 | defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Safe | 358 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-358", "vulnerability_type": "Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard", "description": "The product does not implement or incorrectly implements one or more security-relevant checks as specified by the design of a standardized algorithm, protocol, or technique.", "severity": null, "category": ... |
bool memory_region_access_valid(struct uc_struct *uc, MemoryRegion *mr,
hwaddr addr,
unsigned size,
bool is_write,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
if (mr->ops->valid.accepts
&& !mr->ops->valid... | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | unicorn | 3d3deac5e6d38602b689c4fef5dac004f07a2e63 | 118,287,379,490,342,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | Fix crash when mapping a big memory and calling uc_close | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
void conv_encode_header_full(gchar *dest, gint len, const gchar *src,
gint header_len, gboolean addr_field,
const gchar *out_encoding_)
{
const gchar *cur_encoding;
const gchar *out_encoding;
gint mimestr_len;
gchar *mimesep_enc;
gint left;
const guchar *srcp = src;
guchar *destp = dest;
gboolean use_base... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | claws | d390fa07f5548f3173dd9cc13b233db5ce934c82 | 336,337,308,298,043,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 179 | Make sure we don't run out of the output buffer. Maybe fixes bug #3557 | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
bool off_is_neg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
bool ptr_is_dst_reg = p... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda | 318,337,036,351,136,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
static void scrub_free_parity(struct scrub_parity *sparity)
{
struct scrub_ctx *sctx = sparity->sctx;
struct scrub_page *curr, *next;
int nbits;
nbits = bitmap_weight(sparity->ebitmap, sparity->nsectors);
if (nbits) {
spin_lock(&sctx->stat_lock);
sctx->stat.read_errors += nbits;
sctx->stat.uncorrectable_err... | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 09ba3bc9dd150457c506e4661380a6183af651c1 | 287,516,017,059,252,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | btrfs: merge btrfs_find_device and find_device
Both btrfs_find_device() and find_device() does the same thing except
that the latter does not take the seed device onto account in the device
scanning context. We can merge them.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.c... | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
void png_print_chunk(unsigned type, unsigned char* data, unsigned size)
{
char tag[5];
unsigned i;
be_uint32_write(tag, type);
tag[4] = 0;
cout << tag << setw(8) << size;
switch (type) {
case ADV_MNG_CN_MHDR :
cout << " width:" << be_uint32_read(data+0) << " height:" << be_uint32_read(data+4) << " frequen... | 1 | [
"CWE-125"
] | advancecomp | 7894a6e684ce68ddff9f4f4919ab8e3911ac8040 | 124,378,843,411,209,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 158 | Fix a buffer overflow caused by invalid chunks | Vulnerable | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
static void unpaired_callback(uint16_t index, uint16_t length,
const void *param, void *user_data)
{
const struct mgmt_ev_device_unpaired *ev = param;
struct btd_adapter *adapter = user_data;
struct btd_device *device;
char addr[18];
if (length < sizeof(*ev)) {
btd_error(adapter->dev_id, "Too small device ... | 0 | [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
] | bluez | b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055 | 202,757,327,260,239,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | adapter: Fix storing discoverable setting
discoverable setting shall only be store when changed via Discoverable
property and not when discovery client set it as that be considered
temporary just for the lifetime of the discovery. | Safe | 862 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-862", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.", "severity": "High", "category": "AuthZ", "impact": ["Read Application Data", "Read Files or Directories", "Modify A... |
flatpak_dir_collect_deployed_refs (FlatpakDir *self,
const char *type,
const char *name_prefix,
const char *arch,
const char *branch,
G... | 0 | [
"CWE-74"
] | flatpak | fb473cad801c6b61706353256cab32330557374a | 126,534,470,970,336,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | dir: Pass environment via bwrap --setenv when running apply_extra
This means we can systematically pass the environment variables
through bwrap(1), even if it is setuid and thus is filtering out
security-sensitive environment variables. bwrap ends up being
run with an empty environment instead.
As with the previous c... | Safe | 74 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-74", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutra... |
TfLiteStatus Eval(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) {
auto* params = reinterpret_cast<TfLiteSVDFParams*>(node->builtin_data);
OpData* op_data = reinterpret_cast<OpData*>(node->user_data);
const TfLiteTensor* input;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context, GetInputSafe(context, node, kInputTensor, &input));
const T... | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
] | tensorflow | 6841e522a3e7d48706a02e8819836e809f738682 | 15,610,367,532,227,025,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 126 | Prevent division by 0
PiperOrigin-RevId: 370995582
Change-Id: I670ffaf52d1ff8823ec31ea5f438f9125b402223 | Safe | 369 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-369", "vulnerability_type": "Divide By Zero", "description": "The product divides a value by zero.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not extracted"} |
miniwget_getaddr(const char * url, int * size,
char * addr, int addrlen, unsigned int scope_id)
{
unsigned short port;
char * path;
/* protocol://host:port/path */
char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1];
*size = 0;
if(addr)
addr[0] = '\0';
if(!parseURL(url, hostname, &port, &path, &scope_id))
retur... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703"
] | miniupnp | 3a87aa2f10bd7f1408e1849bdb59c41dd63a9fe9 | 336,927,675,502,916,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | miniwget.c: fixed potential buffer overrun | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
AVCodec *avcodec_find_decoder_by_name(const char *name)
{
AVCodec *p;
if (!name)
return NULL;
p = first_avcodec;
while (p) {
if (av_codec_is_decoder(p) && strcmp(name, p->name) == 0)
return p;
p = p->next;
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | FFmpeg | e5c7229999182ad1cef13b9eca050dba7a5a08da | 301,795,665,604,204,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | avcodec/utils: set AVFrame format unconditional
Fixes inconsistency and out of array accesses
Fixes: 10cdd7e63e7f66e3e66273939e0863dd-asan_heap-oob_1a4ff32_7078_cov_4056274555_mov_h264_aac__mp4box_frag.mp4
Found-by: Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk and Gynvael Coldwind
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
domain_context_mapping(struct dmar_domain *domain, struct device *dev)
{
struct domain_context_mapping_data data;
struct pasid_table *table;
struct intel_iommu *iommu;
u8 bus, devfn;
iommu = device_to_iommu(dev, &bus, &devfn);
if (!iommu)
return -ENODEV;
table = intel_pasid_get_table(dev);
if (!dev_is_pci(... | 0 | [] | linux | d8b8591054575f33237556c32762d54e30774d28 | 6,353,416,057,711,302,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | iommu/vt-d: Disable ATS support on untrusted devices
Commit fb58fdcd295b9 ("iommu/vt-d: Do not enable ATS for untrusted
devices") disables ATS support on the devices which have been marked
as untrusted. Unfortunately this is not enough to fix the DMA attack
vulnerabiltiies because IOMMU driver allows translated reques... | Safe | null | null |
void ImapModelOpenConnectionTest::acceptSsl(const QList<QSslCertificate> &certificateChain, const QList<QSslError> &sslErrors)
{
model->setSslPolicy(certificateChain, sslErrors, true);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | trojita | 25fffa3e25cbad85bbca804193ad336b090a9ce1 | 5,301,263,145,027,015,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | IMAP: refuse to work when STARTTLS is required but server sends PREAUTH
Oops, we cannot send STARTTLS when the connection is already authenticated.
This is serious enough to warrant an error; an attacker might be going after a
plaintext of a message we're going to APPEND, etc.
Thanks to Arnt Gulbrandsen on the imap-p... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
static int prepare_timeout(const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout,
struct timespec *ts)
{
if (copy_from_user(ts, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!timespec_valid(ts))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | f991af3daabaecff34684fd51fac80319d1baad1 | 171,432,518,780,935,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has bee... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
static int __length_question(const unsigned char *data, int maxlen)
{
const unsigned char *start;
unsigned b;
if (!data)
return -1;
start = data;
while (1) {
if (maxlen <= 0)
return -1;
b = *data++;
if (b == 0)
break;
if ((b & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
/* It's a "compressed" name. */
data++; /* skip... | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | uclibc-ng | 0f822af0445e5348ce7b7bd8ce1204244f31d174 | 209,020,770,572,855,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | libc/inet/resolv.c: add __hnbad to check DNS entries for validity…
… using the same rules glibc does
also call __hnbad in some places to check answers | Safe | 79 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-79", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')", "description": "The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.", ... |
psutil_pid_exists(long pid) {
int ret;
// No negative PID exists, plus -1 is an alias for sending signal
// too all processes except system ones. Not what we want.
if (pid < 0)
return 0;
// As per "man 2 kill" PID 0 is an alias for sending the signal to
// every process in the process ... | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | psutil | 3a9bccfd2c6d2e6538298cd3892058b1204056e0 | 304,985,250,441,622,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | psutil/_psutil_posix.c: better clear variables to ensure they are NULL (#1624) | Safe | 415 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-415", "vulnerability_type": "Double Free", "description": "The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.", "severity": "High", "category": "Double-free", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands"], "languages": [null, "C", "C++"], "example": "Example not extracted"... |
PackLinuxElf32::check_pt_dynamic(Elf32_Phdr const *const phdr)
{
unsigned t = get_te32(&phdr->p_offset), s = sizeof(Elf32_Dyn) + t;
unsigned filesz = get_te32(&phdr->p_filesz), memsz = get_te32(&phdr->p_memsz);
if (s < t || file_size < (off_t)s
|| (3 & t) || (7 & (filesz | memsz)) // .balign 4; 8==siz... | 1 | [
"CWE-415"
] | upx | d9288213ec156dffc435566b9d393d23e87c6914 | 155,518,923,930,320,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | More checking of PT_DYNAMIC and its contents.
https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/206
modified: p_lx_elf.cpp | Vulnerable | 415 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-415", "vulnerability_type": "Double Free", "description": "The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.", "severity": "High", "category": "Double-free", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands"], "languages": [null, "C", "C++"], "example": "Example not extracted"... |
int vrend_renderer_copy_transfer3d(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_transfer_info *info,
uint32_t src_handle)
{
struct vrend_resource *src_res, *dst_res;
src_res = vrend_renderer_ctx_res_lookup(ctx, src_handle);
dst_res = vrend_rende... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | virglrenderer | cbc8d8b75be360236cada63784046688aeb6d921 | 262,323,891,316,678,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | vrend: check transfer bounds for negative values too and report error
Closes #138
Signed-off-by: Gert Wollny <gert.wollny@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Velikov <emil.velikov@collabora.com> | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_lookup(struct net *net,
const struct flowi *fl,
u16 family, u8 dir, u32 if_id)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
pol = xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_SUB, fl, family,
dir, if_id);
if (pol != NULL)
return pol;... | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | f85daf0e725358be78dfd208dea5fd665d8cb901 | 231,776,760,817,298,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | xfrm: xfrm_policy: fix a possible double xfrm_pols_put() in xfrm_bundle_lookup()
xfrm_policy_lookup() will call xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() to get a refcount of
pols[0]. This refcount can be dropped in xfrm_expand_policies() when
xfrm_expand_policies() return error. pols[0]'s refcount is balanced in
here. But xfrm_bundle_look... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
int __init l2cap_init(void)
{
int err;
err = l2cap_init_sockets();
if (err < 0)
return err;
hci_register_cb(&l2cap_cb);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(bt_debugfs))
return 0;
l2cap_debugfs = debugfs_create_file("l2cap", 0444, bt_debugfs,
NULL, &l2cap_debugfs_fops);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 | 314,710,451,142,785,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Bluetooth: Verify that l2cap_get_conf_opt provides large enough buffer
The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len
as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user
and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the
actual packet.
To prevent an... | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
int create_history_entry(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *hist_key, int n_key_data,
krb5_key_data *key_data, osa_pw_hist_ent *hist)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keyblock key;
krb5_keysalt salt;
int i;
hist->key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(... | 0 | [
"CWE-522",
"CWE-255"
] | krb5 | af0ed4df4dfae762ab5fb605f5a0c8f59cb4f6ca | 230,932,461,493,040,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | Return only new keys in randkey [CVE-2014-5351]
In kadmind's randkey operation, if a client specifies the keepold
flag, do not include the preserved old keys in the response.
CVE-2014-5351:
An authenticated remote attacker can retrieve the current keys for a
service principal when generating a new set of keys for th... | Safe | 522 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-522", "vulnerability_type": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "description": "The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Gain Privile... |
struct Sass_Context* ADDCALL sass_compiler_get_context(struct Sass_Compiler* compiler) { return compiler->c_ctx; } | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | libsass | 8f40dc03e5ab5a8b2ebeb72b31f8d1adbb2fd6ae | 108,220,480,653,521,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | Optimize line_begin/end search in `handle_error`
There is no need to advance by UTF-8 code points when searching for an
ASCII character, because UTF-8 is a prefix-free encoding. | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
static int fts3PoslistPhraseMerge(
char **pp, /* IN/OUT: Preallocated output buffer */
int nToken, /* Maximum difference in token positions */
int isSaveLeft, /* Save the left position */
int isExact, /* If *pp1 is exactly nTokens befor... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | sqlite | c72f2fb7feff582444b8ffdc6c900c69847ce8a9 | 65,216,132,494,428,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 107 | More improvements to shadow table corruption detection in FTS3.
FossilOrigin-Name: 51525f9c3235967bc00a090e84c70a6400698c897aa4742e817121c725b8c99d | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
String *Item::val_string_from_int(String *str)
{
longlong nr= val_int();
if (null_value)
return 0;
str->set_int(nr, unsigned_flag, &my_charset_numeric);
return str;
} | 0 | [] | server | b000e169562697aa072600695d4f0c0412f94f4f | 123,653,391,686,400,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST, COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
based on:
commit f7316aa0c9a
Author: Ajo Robert <ajo.robert@oracle.com>
Date: Thu Aug 24 17:03:21 2017 +0530
Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST,
COL), NAME_CONST('NAME'... | Safe | null | null |
update_vsge_alive_count(virtual_server_group_entry_t *vsge, virtual_server_t *vs, bool up)
{
unsigned *alive_p;
if (vsge->is_fwmark) {
if (vs->af == AF_INET)
alive_p = &vsge->fwm4_alive;
else
alive_p = &vsge->fwm6_alive;
}
else if (vs->service_type == IPPROTO_TCP)
alive_p = &vsge->tcp_alive;
else if (... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | keepalived | 26c8d6374db33bcfcdcd758b1282f12ceef4b94f | 294,727,399,933,681,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | Disable fopen_safe() append mode by default
If a non privileged user creates /tmp/keepalived.log and has it open
for read (e.g. tail -f), then even though keepalived will change the
owner to root and remove all read/write permissions from non owners,
the application which already has the file open will be able to read... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
struct socket_smack *ssp;
ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
if (ssp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7 | 87,004,718,242,131,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is ... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
tx_error (struct net_device *dev, int tx_status)
{
struct netdev_private *np;
long ioaddr = dev->base_addr;
int frame_id;
int i;
np = netdev_priv(dev);
frame_id = (tx_status & 0xffff0000);
printk (KERN_ERR "%s: Transmit error, TxStatus %4.4x, FrameId %d.\n",
dev->name, tx_status, frame_id);
np->stats.tx_err... | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 1bb57e940e1958e40d51f2078f50c3a96a9b2d75 | 178,529,724,140,302,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the... | Safe | 284 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-284", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.", "severity": null, "category": "Authorization", "impact": ["Varies by Context"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not ex... |
FunctionState::FunctionState(HGraphBuilder* owner,
CompilationInfo* info,
TypeFeedbackOracle* oracle,
InliningKind inlining_kind)
: owner_(owner),
compilation_info_(info),
oracle_(oracle),
call_context_(NULL),
... | 0 | [] | node | fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21 | 305,855,708,456,427,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | deps: backport 5f836c from v8 upstream
Original commit message:
Fix Hydrogen bounds check elimination
When combining bounds checks, they must all be moved before the first load/store
that they are guarding.
BUG=chromium:344186
LOG=y
R=svenpanne@chromium.org
Review URL: https://coderevie... | Safe | null | null |
static int ZEND_FASTCALL ZEND_IS_IDENTICAL_SPEC_CV_CONST_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
zend_op *opline = EX(opline);
is_identical_function(&EX_T(opline->result.u.var).tmp_var,
_get_zval_ptr_cv(&opline->op1, EX(Ts), BP_VAR_R TSRMLS_CC),
&opline->op2.u.constant TSRMLS_CC);
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE();
} | 0 | [] | php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 228,758,759,039,807,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus | Safe | null | null |
static int dxtory_decode_v2_rgb(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *pic,
const uint8_t *src, int src_size)
{
GetByteContext gb;
GetBitContext gb2;
int nslices, slice, slice_height;
uint32_t off, slice_size;
uint8_t *dst;
int ret;
bytestream2_init(&gb, src, src_s... | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | FFmpeg | a392bf657015c9a79a5a13adfbfb15086c1943b9 | 271,600,640,671,208,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | avcodec/dxtory: fix src size checks
Fixes integer overflow
Fixes out of array read
Fixes: d104661bb59b202df7671fb19a00ca6c-asan_heap-oob_d6429d_5066_cov_1729501105_dxtory_mic.avi
Found-by: Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk and Gynvael Coldwind
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
TIFFWriteDirectoryTagSubifd(TIFF* tif, uint32* ndir, TIFFDirEntry* dir)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFWriteDirectoryTagSubifd";
uint64 m;
int n;
if (tif->tif_dir.td_nsubifd==0)
return(1);
if (dir==NULL)
{
(*ndir)++;
return(1);
}
m=tif->tif_dataoff;
if (!(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF))
{
uint32* o... | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | libtiff | de144fd228e4be8aa484c3caf3d814b6fa88c6d9 | 154,195,850,575,983,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | TIFFWriteDirectorySec: avoid assertion. Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2795. CVE-2018-10963 | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.