func string | target int64 | cwe list | project string | commit_id string | hash float64 | size int64 | message string | is_vulnerable string | cwe_id_extracted string | cwe_details string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static int __init logi_dj_init(void)
{
int retval;
dbg_hid("Logitech-DJ:%s\n", __func__);
retval = hid_register_driver(&logi_djreceiver_driver);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = hid_register_driver(&logi_djdevice_driver);
if (retval)
hid_unregister_driver(&logi_djreceiver_driver);
return retval;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | ad3e14d7c5268c2e24477c6ef54bbdf88add5d36 | 174,268,451,441,036,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which ... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int chmd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys, struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mschmd_header *chm, int entire)
{
unsigned int section, name_len, x, errors, num_chunks;
unsigned char buf[0x54], *chunk = NULL, *name, *p, *end;
struct mschmd_file *fi, *link = NULL;
off_t offset... | 1 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | libmspack | 2f084136cfe0d05e5bf5703f3e83c6d955234b4d | 213,711,263,970,224,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 260 | length checks when looking for control files | Vulnerable | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int lua_ap_os_escape_path(lua_State *L)
{
char *returnValue;
request_rec *r;
const char *path;
int partial = 0;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
path = lua_tostring(L, 2);
if (lua_isboo... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | httpd | 78eb3b9235515652ed141353d98c239237030410 | 294,524,043,895,534,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id... | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static void io_req_free_batch_finish(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
struct req_batch *rb)
{
if (rb->to_free)
__io_req_free_batch_flush(ctx, rb);
if (rb->task) {
atomic_long_add(rb->task_refs, &rb->task->io_uring->req_complete);
put_task_struct_many(rb->task, rb->task_refs);
rb->task = NULL;
}
} | 0 | [] | linux | 0f2122045b946241a9e549c2a76cea54fa58a7ff | 18,854,494,038,796,868,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | io_uring: don't rely on weak ->files references
Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.
W... | Safe | null | null |
static int err_pkt(git_pkt **out, const char *line, size_t len)
{
git_pkt_err *pkt;
size_t alloclen;
/* Remove "ERR " from the line */
line += 4;
len -= 4;
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, sizeof(git_pkt_progress), len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, alloclen, 1);
pkt = git__malloc(alloclen);
GITERR_CHE... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | libgit2 | 66e3774d279672ee51c3b54545a79d20d1ada834 | 261,663,167,049,144,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | smart_pkt: verify packet length exceeds PKT_LEN_SIZE
Each packet line in the Git protocol is prefixed by a four-byte
length of how much data will follow, which we parse in
`git_pkt_parse_line`. The transmitted length can either be equal
to zero in case of a flush packet or has to be at least of length
four, as it also... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
void HValueMap::ResizeLists(int new_size, Zone* zone) {
ASSERT(new_size > lists_size_);
HValueMapListElement* new_lists =
zone->NewArray<HValueMapListElement>(new_size);
memset(new_lists, 0, sizeof(HValueMapListElement) * new_size);
HValueMapListElement* old_lists = lists_;
int old_size = lists_size_;... | 0 | [] | node | fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21 | 182,194,865,727,817,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | deps: backport 5f836c from v8 upstream
Original commit message:
Fix Hydrogen bounds check elimination
When combining bounds checks, they must all be moved before the first load/store
that they are guarding.
BUG=chromium:344186
LOG=y
R=svenpanne@chromium.org
Review URL: https://coderevie... | Safe | null | null |
int fuse_fs_ioctl(struct fuse_fs *fs, const char *path, int cmd, void *arg,
struct fuse_file_info *fi, unsigned int flags, void *data)
{
fuse_get_context()->private_data = fs->user_data;
if (fs->op.ioctl) {
/*
if (fs->debug)
fprintf(stderr, "ioctl[%llu] 0x%x flags: 0x%x\n",
(unsigned long long) ... | 0 | [] | ntfs-3g | fb28eef6f1c26170566187c1ab7dc913a13ea43c | 158,274,188,570,185,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Hardened the checking of directory offset requested by a readdir
When asked for the next directory entries, make sure the chunk offset
is within valid values, otherwise return no more entries in chunk. | Safe | null | null |
update_entry_async_data_free (UpdateEntryAsyncData *data)
{
if (data->domain != NULL)
g_object_unref (data->domain);
if (data->entry != NULL)
g_object_unref (data->entry);
g_slice_free (UpdateEntryAsyncData, data);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | libgdata | 6799f2c525a584dc998821a6ce897e463dad7840 | 92,801,732,157,252,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | core: Validate SSL certificates for all connections
This prevents MitM attacks which use spoofed SSL certificates.
Note that this bumps our libsoup requirement to 2.37.91.
Closes: https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671535 | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static void follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (!nd->root.mnt)
set_root(nd);
while(1) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
if (nd->path.dentry == nd->root.dentry &&
nd->path.mnt == nd->root.mnt) {
break;
}
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
/* rare case of legitimate dge... | 1 | [
"CWE-254"
] | linux | 397d425dc26da728396e66d392d5dcb8dac30c37 | 38,465,018,502,199,864,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file ... | Vulnerable | 254 | null |
void __init rtas_initialize(void)
{
unsigned long rtas_region = RTAS_INSTANTIATE_MAX;
u32 base, size, entry;
int no_base, no_size, no_entry;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_RTAS_FILTER
int i;
#endif
/* Get RTAS dev node and fill up our "rtas" structure with infos
* about it.
*/
rtas.dev = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "rtas"... | 0 | [
"CWE-862"
] | linux | bd59380c5ba4147dcbaad3e582b55ccfd120b764 | 197,825,192,045,955,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 | powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace
A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve
information and update various things.
The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more
RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall,
which al... | Safe | 862 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-862", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Authorization", "description": "The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.", "severity": "High", "category": "AuthZ", "impact": ["Read Application Data", "Read Files or Directories", "Modify A... |
aes128_encrypt_cbc(const unsigned char *key, int keysize, unsigned char iv[16],
const unsigned char *input, size_t length, unsigned char *output)
{
return openssl_enc(EVP_aes_128_cbc(), key, iv, input, length, output);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-119"
] | OpenSC | 360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad | 15,282,041,528,212,736,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems. | Safe | 415 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-415", "vulnerability_type": "Double Free", "description": "The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.", "severity": "High", "category": "Double-free", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands"], "languages": [null, "C", "C++"], "example": "Example not extracted"... |
static irqreturn_t b43_interrupt_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct b43_wldev *dev = dev_id;
irqreturn_t ret;
if (unlikely(b43_status(dev) < B43_STAT_STARTED))
return IRQ_NONE;
spin_lock(&dev->wl->hardirq_lock);
ret = b43_do_interrupt(dev);
mmiowb();
spin_unlock(&dev->wl->hardirq_lock);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-134"
] | wireless | 9538cbaab6e8b8046039b4b2eb6c9d614dc782bd | 235,285,516,325,332,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | b43: stop format string leaking into error msgs
The module parameter "fwpostfix" is userspace controllable, unfiltered,
and is used to define the firmware filename. b43_do_request_fw() populates
ctx->errors[] on error, containing the firmware filename. b43err()
parses its arguments as a format string. For systems with... | Safe | 134 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-134", "vulnerability_type": "Use of Externally-Controlled Format String", "description": "The product uses a function that accepts a format string as an argument, but the format string originates from an external source.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["Read Memory", "Modify Memory", ... |
static int gather_hugetlb_stats(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct numa_maps *md;
struct page *page;
if (!pte_present(*pte))
return 0;
page = pte_page(*pte);
if (!page)
return 0;
md = walk->private;
gather_stats(page, md, pte_dirty(*pte... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce | 14,323,425,808,672,788,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.bl... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
static int msg_cache_check (const char *id, body_cache_t *bcache, void *data)
{
CONTEXT *ctx;
POP_DATA *pop_data;
int i;
if (!(ctx = (CONTEXT *)data))
return -1;
if (!(pop_data = (POP_DATA *)ctx->data))
return -1;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
/* keep hcache file if hcache == bcache */
if (strcmp (HC_FNAME ... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | mutt | 6aed28b40a0410ec47d40c8c7296d8d10bae7576 | 40,682,010,428,070,467,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Sanitize POP bcache paths.
Protect against bcache directory path traversal for UID values.
Thanks for Jeriko One for the bug report and patch, which this commit
is based upon. | Vulnerable | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu(RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu) {
RBinDwarfDIE *tmp;
if (!cu || cu->capacity == 0 || cu->capacity != cu->length) {
return -EINVAL;
}
tmp = (RBinDwarfDIE*)realloc(cu->dies,
cu->capacity * 2 * sizeof(RBinDwarfDIE));
if (!tmp) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset ((ut8*)tmp + cu->capacity, 0... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | d37d2b858ac47f2f108034be0bcecadaddfbc8b3 | 104,744,922,958,616,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | Fix #10465 - Avoid string on low addresses (workaround) for corrupted dwarf (#10478) | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = (struct f2fs_inode_info *) foo;
inode_init_once(&fi->vfs_inode);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
] | linux | b9dd46188edc2f0d1f37328637860bb65a771124 | 268,305,501,111,918,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | f2fs: sanity check segment count
F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> | Safe | 284 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-284", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.", "severity": null, "category": "Authorization", "impact": ["Varies by Context"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not ex... |
nfs_alloc_no_seqid(struct nfs_seqid_counter *arg1, gfp_t arg2)
{
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | b4487b93545214a9db8cbf32e86411677b0cca21 | 13,580,919,237,815,456,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow
Move the buffer size check to decode_attr_security_label() before memcpy()
Only call memcpy() if the buffer is large enough
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@starlab.io>
[Trond: clean u... | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
static void ram_block_add(RAMBlock *new_block, Error **errp)
{
const bool noreserve = qemu_ram_is_noreserve(new_block);
const bool shared = qemu_ram_is_shared(new_block);
RAMBlock *block;
RAMBlock *last_block = NULL;
ram_addr_t old_ram_size, new_ram_size;
Error *err = NULL;
old_ram_size = l... | 0 | [
"CWE-908"
] | qemu | 418ade7849ce7641c0f7333718caf5091a02fd4c | 70,823,831,779,073,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 | softmmu: Always initialize xlat in address_space_translate_for_iotlb
The bug is an uninitialized memory read, along the translate_fail
path, which results in garbage being read from iotlb_to_section,
which can lead to a crash in io_readx/io_writex.
The bug may be fixed by writing any value with zero
in ~TARGET_PAGE_M... | Safe | 908 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-908", "vulnerability_type": "Use of Uninitialized Resource", "description": "The product uses or accesses a resource that has not been initialized.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["Read Memory", "Read Application Data", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart"], "languages": [null], "example"... |
hook_focus_get_data (struct t_hashtable *hashtable_focus1,
struct t_hashtable *hashtable_focus2)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
struct t_hashtable *hashtable1, *hashtable2, *hashtable_ret;
const char *focus1_chat, *focus1_bar_item_name, *keys;
char **list_keys, *new_key;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | weechat | efb795c74fe954b9544074aafcebb1be4452b03a | 303,223,770,501,580,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 117 | core: do not call shell to execute command in hook_process (fix security problem when a plugin/script gives untrusted command) (bug #37764) | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
switch (recv_into_rbuf (h)) {
case -1: SET_NEXT_STATE (%.DEAD); return 0;
case 1:
save_reply_state (h);
SET_NEXT_STATE (%.READY);
return 0;
case 0:
offset = be64toh (h->sbuf.sr.payload.offset_hole.offset);
length = be32toh (h->sbuf.sr.payload.offset_hole.length);
assert (cmd); /* guaran... | 1 | [] | libnbd | 2c1987fc23d6d0f537edc6d4701e95a2387f7917 | 307,013,863,921,947,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | lib: Fix stack corruption with structured reply containing negative offset.
Because of improper bounds checking, when receiving a structured reply
some offset/lengths sent by the server could cause libnbd to execute
arbitrary code under control of a malicious server.
A structured reply segment containing (for example... | Vulnerable | null | null |
Header::insert (const char name[], const Attribute &attribute)
{
if (name[0] == 0)
THROW (IEX_NAMESPACE::ArgExc, "Image attribute name cannot be an empty string.");
AttributeMap::iterator i = _map.find (name);
if (i == _map.end())
{
Attribute *tmp = attribute.copy();
try
{
_map[name] = tmp;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | openexr | e79d2296496a50826a15c667bf92bdc5a05518b4 | 186,727,526,021,470,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | fix memory leaks and invalid memory accesses
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <peterh@wetafx.co.nz> | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
void Item_func_case_simple::print(String *str, enum_query_type query_type)
{
Item **pos;
str->append(STRING_WITH_LEN("case "));
args[0]->print_parenthesised(str, query_type, precedence());
str->append(' ');
print_when_then_arguments(str, query_type, &args[1], when_count());
if ((pos= Item_func_case_simple::... | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8 | 87,859,468,564,676,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see ... | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept(void)
{
return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | 9581d442b9058d3699b4be568b6e5eae38a41493 | 176,083,426,292,677,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-... | Safe | 400 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-400", "vulnerability_type": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.", "severity": "High", "category": "Resource Exhaustion", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU... |
xmlCleanupEncodingAliases(void) {
int i;
if (xmlCharEncodingAliases == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0;i < xmlCharEncodingAliasesNb;i++) {
if (xmlCharEncodingAliases[i].name != NULL)
xmlFree((char *) xmlCharEncodingAliases[i].name);
if (xmlCharEncodingAliases[i].alias != NULL)
xmlFree((char *) xmlCh... | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | libxml2 | 69f04562f75212bfcabecd190ea8b06ace28ece2 | 105,266,332,859,860,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Fix an off by one error in encoding
this off by one error doesn't seems to reproduce on linux
but the error is real. | Safe | 189 | null |
void CLASS rollei_load_raw()
{
uchar pixel[10];
unsigned iten = 0, isix, i, buffer = 0, todo[16];
isix = raw_width * raw_height * 5 / 8;
while (fread(pixel, 1, 10, ifp) == 10)
{
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
checkCancel();
#endif
for (i = 0; i < 10; i += 2)
{
todo[i] = iten++;
todo[i + ... | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] | LibRaw | d7c3d2cb460be10a3ea7b32e9443a83c243b2251 | 302,623,705,536,471,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Secunia SA75000 advisory: several buffer overruns | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
pevt_build_string (const char *input, char **output, int *max_arg)
{
struct pevt_stage1 *s = NULL, *base = NULL, *last = NULL, *next;
int clen;
char o[4096], d, *obuf, *i;
int oi, ii, max = -1, len, x;
len = strlen (input);
i = g_malloc (len + 1);
memcpy (i, input, len + 1);
check_special_chars (i, TRUE);
le... | 0 | [
"CWE-22"
] | hexchat | 15600f405f2d5bda6ccf0dd73957395716e0d4d3 | 227,169,852,916,904,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 189 | Sanitize network name for scrollback files
This prevents using invalid chars on Windows or creating directories | Safe | 22 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-22", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')", "description": "The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product ... |
int mdvi_dopage(DviContext *dvi, int pageno)
{
int op;
int ppi;
int reloaded = 0;
again:
if(dvi->in == NULL) {
/* try reopening the file */
dvi->in = fopen(dvi->filename, "rb");
if(dvi->in == NULL) {
mdvi_warning(_("%s: could not reopen file (%s)\n"),
dvi->filename,
strerror(errno));
... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | evince | d4139205b010ed06310d14284e63114e88ec6de2 | 100,341,094,752,700,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 101 | backends: Fix several security issues in the dvi-backend.
See CVE-2010-2640, CVE-2010-2641, CVE-2010-2642 and CVE-2010-2643. | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
acquire_mountpoint(char **mountpointp)
{
int rc, dacrc;
uid_t realuid, oldfsuid;
gid_t oldfsgid;
char *mountpoint = NULL;
/*
* Acquire the necessary privileges to chdir to the mountpoint. If
* the real uid is root, then we reacquire CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. If
* it's not, then we change the fsuid to the real ui... | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-668"
] | cifs-utils | 8acc963a2e7e9d63fe1f2e7f73f5a03f83d9c379 | 107,187,288,262,021,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 62 | mount.cifs: fix verbose messages on option parsing
When verbose logging is enabled, invalid credentials file lines may be
dumped to stderr. This may lead to information disclosure in particular
conditions when the credentials file given is sensitive and contains '='
signs.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
pkcs11rsa_createctx_verify(dst_key_t *key, unsigned int maxbits,
dst_context_t *dctx) {
CK_RV rv;
CK_MECHANISM mech = { 0, NULL, 0 };
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] =
{
{ CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, (CK_ULONG) sizeof(keyClass) },
{ CKA_KEY_... | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | bind9 | 8d807cc21655eaa6e6a08afafeec3682c0f3f2ab | 277,915,845,795,878,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 174 | Fix crash in pk11_numbits() when native-pkcs11 is used
When pk11_numbits() is passed a user provided input that contains all
zeroes (via crafted DNS message), it would crash with assertion
failure. Fix that by properly handling such input. | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime,
int is_client)
{
tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity,
key_li... | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | tor | 638fdedcf16cf7d6f7c586d36f7ef335c1c9714f | 230,736,407,005,939,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | Don't send a certificate chain on outgoing TLS connections from non-relays | Safe | 264 | null |
apr_status_t h2_task_init(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
{
h2_task_logio_add_bytes_in = APR_RETRIEVE_OPTIONAL_FN(ap_logio_add_bytes_in);
h2_task_logio_add_bytes_out = APR_RETRIEVE_OPTIONAL_FN(ap_logio_add_bytes_out);
return APR_SUCCESS;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-444"
] | mod_h2 | 825de6a46027b2f4c30d7ff5a0c8b852d639c207 | 135,287,734,439,321,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | * Fixed keepalives counter on slave connections. | Safe | 444 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-444", "vulnerability_type": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')", "description": "The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent\n (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two\n entities such as a client and server, but it does ... |
gst_qtdemux_handle_esds (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, QtDemuxStream * stream,
GNode * esds, GstTagList * list)
{
int len = QT_UINT32 (esds->data);
guint8 *ptr = esds->data;
guint8 *end = ptr + len;
int tag;
guint8 *data_ptr = NULL;
int data_len = 0;
guint8 object_type_id = 0;
const char *codec_name = NULL;... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gst-plugins-good | d0949baf3dadea6021d54abef6802fed5a06af75 | 312,907,492,287,364,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 291 | qtdemux: Fix out of bounds read in tag parsing code
We can't simply assume that the length of the tag value as given
inside the stream is correct but should also check against the amount of
data we have actually available.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=775451 | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
void add_icv(unsigned char *input, int len, int offset)
{
unsigned long crc = 0xFFFFFFFF;
int n=0;
for( n = offset; n < len; n++ )
crc = crc_tbl[(crc ^ input[n]) & 0xFF] ^ (crc >> 8);
crc = ~crc;
input[len] = (crc ) & 0xFF;
input[len+1] = (crc >> 8) & 0xFF;
input[len+2] = ... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | aircrack-ng | 091b153f294b9b695b0b2831e65936438b550d7b | 73,239,622,961,079,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Aireplay-ng: Fixed tcp_test stack overflow (Closes #14 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2417 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(epoll_create1, int, flags)
{
int error;
struct eventpoll *ep = NULL;
/* Check the EPOLL_* constant for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(EPOLL_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
if (flags & ~EPOLL_CLOEXEC)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Create the internal data structure ("struct eventpoll").
*/
error = ep_alloc(&... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 28d82dc1c4edbc352129f97f4ca22624d1fe61de | 183,401,452,461,297,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitel... | Vulnerable | null | null |
static inline bool addrconf_qdisc_ok(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return !qdisc_tx_is_noop(dev);
} | 0 | [] | net | 4b08a8f1bd8cb4541c93ec170027b4d0782dab52 | 267,553,045,331,336,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | ipv6: remove max_addresses check from ipv6_create_tempaddr
Because of the max_addresses check attackers were able to disable privacy
extensions on an interface by creating enough autoconfigured addresses:
<http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2012/q4/292>
But the check is not actually needed: max_addresses protects the
kerne... | Safe | null | null |
double Item_singlerow_subselect::val_real()
{
DBUG_ASSERT(fixed == 1);
if (forced_const)
return value->val_real();
if (!exec() && !value->null_value)
{
null_value= FALSE;
return value->val_real();
}
else
{
reset();
return 0;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | server | 3c209bfc040ddfc41ece8357d772547432353fd2 | 308,111,277,219,184,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | MDEV-25994: Crash with union of my_decimal type in ORDER BY clause
When single-row subquery fails with "Subquery reutrns more than 1 row"
error, it will raise an error and return NULL.
On the other hand, Item_singlerow_subselect sets item->maybe_null=0
for table-less subqueries like "(SELECT not_null_value)" (*)
Th... | Safe | 89 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-89", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "description": "The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes spec... |
perf_cpu_notify(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
unsigned int cpu = (long)hcpu;
switch (action & ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN) {
case CPU_UP_PREPARE:
case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
perf_event_init_cpu(cpu);
break;
case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
perf_event_exit_cpu(cpu);
break;... | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b | 97,906,305,020,979,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
... | Safe | 284 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-284", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.", "severity": null, "category": "Authorization", "impact": ["Varies by Context"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not ex... |
ComputeIndexAttrs(IndexInfo *indexInfo,
Oid *typeOidP,
Oid *collationOidP,
Oid *classOidP,
int16 *colOptionP,
List *attList, /* list of IndexElem's */
List *exclusionOpNames,
Oid relId,
char *accessMethodName,
Oid accessMethodId,
bool amcanorder,
bool is... | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | postgres | 5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a | 107,176,244,545,169,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 265 | Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed aga... | Safe | 362 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-362", "vulnerability_type": "Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')", "description": "The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resour... |
XML_SetEndNamespaceDeclHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_EndNamespaceDeclHandler end) {
if (parser != NULL)
endNamespaceDeclHandler = end;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-611"
] | libexpat | c4bf96bb51dd2a1b0e185374362ee136fe2c9d7f | 59,832,245,635,578,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | xmlparse.c: Fix external entity infinite loop bug (CVE-2017-9233) | Safe | 611 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-611", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference", "description": "The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into it... |
CtPtr ProtocolV2::handle_auth_bad_method(ceph::bufferlist &payload) {
ldout(cct, 20) << __func__
<< " payload.length()=" << payload.length() << dendl;
if (state != AUTH_CONNECTING) {
lderr(cct) << __func__ << " not in auth connect state!" << dendl;
return _fault();
}
auto bad_method = AuthBadMethod... | 0 | [
"CWE-323"
] | ceph | 20b7bb685c5ea74c651ca1ea547ac66b0fee7035 | 162,537,604,717,484,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | msg/async/ProtocolV2: avoid AES-GCM nonce reuse vulnerabilities
The secure mode uses AES-128-GCM with 96-bit nonces consisting of a
32-bit counter followed by a 64-bit salt. The counter is incremented
after processing each frame, the salt is fixed for the duration of
the session. Both are initialized from the sessio... | Safe | 323 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-323", "vulnerability_type": "Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption", "description": "Nonces should be used for the present occasion and only once.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["Bypass Protection Mechanism", "Gain Privileges or Assume Identity"], "languages": [null], "example": "E... |
static int nfs_mount_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned len)
{
struct rpc_t rpc_pkt;
debug("%s\n", __func__);
memcpy(&rpc_pkt.u.data[0], pkt, len);
if (ntohl(rpc_pkt.u.reply.id) > rpc_id)
return -NFS_RPC_ERR;
else if (ntohl(rpc_pkt.u.reply.id) < rpc_id)
return -NFS_RPC_DROP;
if (rpc_pkt.u.reply.rstatus ||
r... | 0 | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-703"
] | u-boot | 5d14ee4e53a81055d34ba280cb8fd90330f22a96 | 234,710,151,178,492,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | CVE-2019-14196: nfs: fix unbounded memcpy with a failed length check at nfs_lookup_reply
This patch adds a check to rpc_pkt.u.reply.data at nfs_lookup_reply.
Signed-off-by: Cheng Liu <liucheng32@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Fermín Serna <fermin@semmle.com>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com> | Safe | 120 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-120", "vulnerability_type": "Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')", "description": "The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "... |
static int ntop_interface_engage_release_host_alert(lua_State* vm, bool engage) {
NetworkInterface *ntop_interface = getCurrentInterface(vm);
char *host_ip;
u_int16_t vlan_id = 0;
char buf[64];
Host *h;
int alert_severity;
int alert_type;
char *alert_json, *engaged_alert_id;
AlertsManager *am;
int r... | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | ntopng | 01f47e04fd7c8d54399c9e465f823f0017069f8f | 176,599,488,124,215,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 | Security fix: prevents empty host from being used | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
uint32_t translateZeroToUnlimited(uint32_t limit) {
return (limit != 0) ? limit : std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-674"
] | envoy | 4b6dd3b53cd5c6d4d4df378a2fc62c1707522b31 | 11,771,530,171,033,829,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | CVE-2022-23606
Avoid closing other connections to prevent deep recursion when a large number of idle connections are closed at the start of a pool drain, when a connection is closed.
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <yavlasov@google.com> | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
DECLARESepPutFunc(putRGBUAseparate16bittile)
{
uint16 *wr = (uint16*) r;
uint16 *wg = (uint16*) g;
uint16 *wb = (uint16*) b;
uint16 *wa = (uint16*) a;
(void) img; (void) y;
while (h-- > 0) {
uint32 r2,g2,b2,a2;
uint8* m;
for (x = w; x-- > 0;) {
a2 = img->Bitdepth16To8[*wa++];
m = img->UaToAa+(a2<<8);
... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libtiff | f94a29a822f5528d2334592760fbb7938f15eb55 | 323,741,214,103,286,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | * libtiff/tif_getimage.c: fix out-of-bound reads in TIFFRGBAImage
interface in case of unsupported values of SamplesPerPixel/ExtraSamples
for LogLUV / CIELab. Add explicit call to TIFFRGBAImageOK() in
TIFFRGBAImageBegin(). Fix CVE-2015-8665 reported by limingxing and
CVE-2015-8683 reported by zzf of Alibaba. | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
notify_netactivity (void)
{
if (netactivity_cb)
netactivity_cb ();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-352"
] | gnupg | 4a4bb874f63741026bd26264c43bb32b1099f060 | 39,037,330,584,121,476,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | dirmngr: Avoid possible CSRF attacks via http redirects.
* dirmngr/http.h (parsed_uri_s): Add fields off_host and off_path.
(http_redir_info_t): New.
* dirmngr/http.c (do_parse_uri): Set new fields.
(same_host_p): New.
(http_prepare_redirect): New.
* dirmngr/t-http-basic.c: New test.
* dirmngr/ks-engine-hkp.c (send_re... | Safe | 352 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-352", "vulnerability_type": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)", "description": "The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor. ", "severity": "Medium", "c... |
static void read_binary_datetime(MYSQL_TIME *tm, uchar **pos)
{
uint length= net_field_length(pos);
if (length)
{
uchar *to= *pos;
tm->neg= 0;
tm->year= (uint) sint2korr(to);
tm->month= (uint) to[2];
tm->day= (uint) to[3];
if (length > 4)
{
tm->hour= (uint) to[4];
... | 0 | [] | mysql-server | 3d8134d2c9b74bc8883ffe2ef59c168361223837 | 209,395,208,172,899,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | Bug#25988681: USE-AFTER-FREE IN MYSQL_STMT_CLOSE()
Description: If mysql_stmt_close() encountered error,
it recorded error in prepared statement
but then frees memory assigned to prepared
statement. If mysql_stmt_error() is used
to get error information, it will resu... | Safe | null | null |
vim_free(void *x)
{
if (x != NULL && !really_exiting)
{
#ifdef MEM_PROFILE
mem_pre_free(&x);
#endif
free(x);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 9f1a39a5d1cd7989ada2d1cb32f97d84360e050f | 294,698,471,499,607,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | patch 8.2.4040: keeping track of allocated lines is too complicated
Problem: Keeping track of allocated lines in user functions is too
complicated.
Solution: Instead of freeing individual lines keep them all until the end. | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
queue_fake_message (FlatpakProxyClient *client, GDBusMessage *message, ExpectedReplyType reply_type)
{
Buffer *buffer;
client->last_serial++;
client->serial_offset++;
g_dbus_message_set_serial (message, client->last_serial);
buffer = message_to_buffer (message);
g_object_unref (message);
queue_outgoing_... | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-436"
] | flatpak | 52346bf187b5a7f1c0fe9075b328b7ad6abe78f6 | 171,500,907,885,885,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the ... | Safe | 284 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-284", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.", "severity": null, "category": "Authorization", "impact": ["Varies by Context"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not ex... |
bool DL_Dxf::in(const std::string& file, DL_CreationInterface* creationInterface) {
FILE *fp;
firstCall = true;
currentObjectType = DL_UNKNOWN;
fp = fopen(file.c_str(), "rt");
if (fp) {
std::locale oldLocale = std::locale::global(std::locale("C")); // use dot in numbers
while (readD... | 0 | [
"CWE-191"
] | qcad | 1eeffc5daf5a06cf6213ffc19e95923cdebb2eb8 | 154,228,252,174,589,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | check vertexIndex which might be -1 for broken DXF | Safe | 191 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-191", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)", "description": "The product subtracts one value from another, such that the result is less than the minimum allowable integer value, which produces a value that is not equal to the correct result.", "severity": null, "category": "Inte... |
static struct wireless_dev *brcmf_cfg80211_add_iface(struct wiphy *wiphy,
const char *name,
unsigned char name_assign_type,
enum nl80211_iftype type,
u32 *flags,
struct vif_params *params)
{
struct wireless_dev *wdev;
int err;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "enter: %s type %... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c | 74,943,859,252,220,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm) {} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 71b3c126e61177eb693423f2e18a1914205b165e | 256,327,621,738,711,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
star... | Safe | 362 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-362", "vulnerability_type": "Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')", "description": "The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resour... |
int RAND_poll(void)
{
int ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
/* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-330"
] | openssl | 1b0fe00e2704b5e20334a16d3c9099d1ba2ef1be | 231,486,771,319,634,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | drbg: ensure fork-safety without using a pthread_atfork handler
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.
The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork... | Safe | 330 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-330", "vulnerability_type": "Use of Insufficiently Random Values", "description": "The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["Other", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "Other", "By... |
ldns_rdf2native_int8(const ldns_rdf *rd)
{
uint8_t data;
/* only allow 8 bit rdfs */
if (ldns_rdf_size(rd) != LDNS_RDF_SIZE_BYTE) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(&data, ldns_rdf_data(rd), sizeof(data));
return data;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | ldns | 070b4595981f48a21cc6b4f5047fdc2d09d3da91 | 216,881,050,684,326,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | CAA and URI | Safe | 415 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-415", "vulnerability_type": "Double Free", "description": "The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.", "severity": "High", "category": "Double-free", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands"], "languages": [null, "C", "C++"], "example": "Example not extracted"... |
static int mlx5_ib_dct_query_qp(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_qp *mqp,
struct ib_qp_attr *qp_attr, int qp_attr_mask,
struct ib_qp_init_attr *qp_init_attr)
{
struct mlx5_core_dct *dct = &mqp->dct.mdct;
u32 *out;
u32 access_flags = 0;
int outlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(query_dct_out);
void *dctc;
int e... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00 | 303,792,310,877,787,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 | IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int parse_eth_type_from_nlattrs(struct sw_flow_match *match,
u64 *attrs, const struct nlattr **a,
bool is_mask, bool log)
{
__be16 eth_type;
eth_type = nla_get_be16(a[OVS_KEY_ATTR_ETHERTYPE]);
if (is_mask) {
/* Always exact match EtherType. */
eth_type = htons(0xffff);
} else if (!... | 0 | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | cefa91b2332d7009bc0be5d951d6cbbf349f90f8 | 203,582,854,039,465,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | openvswitch: fix OOB access in reserve_sfa_size()
Given a sufficiently large number of actions, while copying and
reserving memory for a new action of a new flow, if next_offset is
greater than MAX_ACTIONS_BUFSIZE, the function reserve_sfa_size() does
not return -EMSGSIZE as expected, but it allocates MAX_ACTIONS_BUFS... | Safe | 362 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-362", "vulnerability_type": "Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')", "description": "The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resour... |
static inline void blk_queue_bounce(struct request_queue *q, struct bio **bio)
{
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | c3e2219216c92919a6bd1711f340f5faa98695e6 | 78,926,991,963,440,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | block: free sched's request pool in blk_cleanup_queue
In theory, IO scheduler belongs to request queue, and the request pool
of sched tags belongs to the request queue too.
However, the current tags allocation interfaces are re-used for both
driver tags and sched tags, and driver tags is definitely host wide,
and doe... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
Exit_status process_event(PRINT_EVENT_INFO *print_event_info, Log_event *ev,
my_off_t pos, const char *logname)
{
char ll_buff[21];
Log_event_type ev_type= ev->get_type_code();
my_bool destroy_evt= TRUE;
DBUG_ENTER("process_event");
print_event_info->short_form= short_form;
Exit_st... | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] | mysql-server | 3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390 | 117,856,759,753,335,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 539 | WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macr... | Safe | 284 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-284", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.", "severity": null, "category": "Authorization", "impact": ["Varies by Context"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not ex... |
bool is_basic_value(Type type_arg) const
{
return basic_const_item() && type() == type_arg;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772 | 246,787,359,034,917,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc.... | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
njs_generate_switch_case_after(njs_vm_t *vm, njs_generator_t *generator,
njs_parser_node_t *branch)
{
njs_int_t ret;
njs_parser_node_t *node;
njs_generator_patch_t *patch;
njs_vmcode_equal_jump_t *equal;
njs_generator_switch_ctx_t *ctx;
ctx = generator... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-754"
] | njs | 404553896792b8f5f429dc8852d15784a59d8d3e | 279,744,600,154,420,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | Fixed break instruction in a try-catch block.
Previously, JUMP offset for a break instruction inside a try-catch
block was not set to a correct offset during code generation
when a return instruction was present in inner try-catch block.
The fix is to update the JUMP offset appropriately.
This closes #553 issue on G... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
static void sco_conn_ready(struct sco_conn *conn)
{
struct sock *parent;
struct sock *sk = conn->sk;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
sco_conn_lock(conn);
if (sk) {
sco_sock_clear_timer(sk);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
} else {
parent = sco_ge... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86 | 105,580,483,850,842,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. ... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
ofputil_decode_flow_stats_request(struct ofputil_flow_stats_request *fsr,
const struct ofp_header *oh,
const struct tun_table *tun_table,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map)
{
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initia... | 0 | [
"CWE-772"
] | ovs | 77ad4225d125030420d897c873e4734ac708c66b | 136,953,203,867,117,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | ofp-util: Fix memory leaks on error cases in ofputil_decode_group_mod().
Found by libFuzzer.
Reported-by: Bhargava Shastry <bshastry@sec.t-labs.tu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org> | Safe | 772 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-772", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime", "description": "The product does not release a resource after its effective lifetime has ended, i.e., after the resource is no longer needed.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Resource Consumption ... |
static inline int ext4_handle_is_aborted(handle_t *handle)
{
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle))
return is_handle_aborted(handle);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11 | 181,323,500,211,825,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
static Image *ReadPDFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BeginXMPPacket "<?xpacket begin="
#define CMYKProcessColor "CMYKProcessColor"
#define CropBox "CropBox"
#define DefaultCMYK "DefaultCMYK"
#define DeviceCMYK "DeviceCMYK"
#define EndXMPPacket "<?xpacket end="
#define MediaBo... | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-399",
"CWE-401"
] | ImageMagick | 306c1f0fa5754ca78efd16ab752f0e981d4f6b82 | 320,327,085,933,232,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 518 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1454 | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
GF_Box *dvcC_box_new()
{
GF_DOVIConfigurationBox *tmp = (GF_DOVIConfigurationBox *)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_DOVIConfigurationBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_DOVIConfigurationBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DVCC;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 77510778516803b7f7402d7423c6d6bef50254c3 | 98,544,604,260,293,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | fixed #2255 | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
void Parser::shift(int objNum) {
if (inlineImg > 0) {
if (inlineImg < 2) {
++inlineImg;
} else {
// in a damaged content stream, if 'ID' shows up in the middle
// of a dictionary, we need to reset
inlineImg = 0;
}
} else if (buf2.isCmd("ID")) {
lexer->skipChar(); // skip cha... | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | poppler | 0868c499a9f5f37f8df5c9fef03c37496b40fc8a | 163,427,796,676,118,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Parser::makeStream: Fix potential integer overflow | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
int LibRaw::is_phaseone_compressed()
{
return (load_raw == &LibRaw::phase_one_load_raw_c || load_raw == &LibRaw::phase_one_load_raw);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-129"
] | LibRaw | 89d065424f09b788f443734d44857289489ca9e2 | 41,855,303,510,577,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | fixed two more problems found by fuzzer | Safe | 129 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-129", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Validation of Array Index", "description": "The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.", "severity"... |
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_NumPatterns(ModPlugFile* file)
{
if(!file) return 0;
return openmpt_module_get_num_patterns(file->mod);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-295"
] | openmpt | 927688ddab43c2b203569de79407a899e734fabe | 145,307,437,598,489,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buff... | Safe | 120 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-120", "vulnerability_type": "Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')", "description": "The product copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "... |
static int uni16_to_x8(unsigned char *ascii, wchar_t *uni, int uni_xlate,
struct nls_table *nls)
{
wchar_t *ip, ec;
unsigned char *op, nc;
int charlen;
int k;
ip = uni;
op = ascii;
while (*ip) {
ec = *ip++;
if ( (charlen = nls->uni2char(ec, op, NLS_MAX_CHARSET_SIZE)) > 0) {
op += charlen;
} e... | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 279,959,175,313,039,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <s... | Safe | null | null |
has_schema_privilege_id(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Oid schemaoid = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
text *priv_type_text = PG_GETARG_TEXT_P(1);
Oid roleid;
AclMode mode;
AclResult aclresult;
roleid = GetUserId();
mode = convert_schema_priv_string(priv_type_text);
if (!SearchSysCacheExists1(NAMESPACEOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(sc... | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | postgres | fea164a72a7bfd50d77ba5fb418d357f8f2bb7d0 | 125,847,660,353,254,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Shore up ADMIN OPTION restrictions.
Granting a role without ADMIN OPTION is supposed to prevent the grantee
from adding or removing members from the granted role. Issuing SET ROLE
before the GRANT bypassed that, because the role itself had an implicit
right to add or remove members. Plug that hole by recognizing tha... | Safe | 264 | null |
static void iscsi_notify_host_removed(struct iscsi_cls_session *cls_session)
{
iscsi_session_failure(cls_session->dd_data, ISCSI_ERR_INVALID_HOST);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | ec98ea7070e94cc25a422ec97d1421e28d97b7ee | 19,049,607,185,495,672,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | scsi: iscsi: Ensure sysfs attributes are limited to PAGE_SIZE
As the iSCSI parameters are exported back through sysfs, it should be
enforcing that they never are more than PAGE_SIZE (which should be more
than enough) before accepting updates through netlink.
Change all iSCSI sysfs attributes to use sysfs_emit().
Cc:... | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
Http::Status ServerConnectionImpl::dispatch(Buffer::Instance& data) {
if (runtime_lazy_read_disable_ && active_request_ != nullptr &&
active_request_->remote_complete_) {
// Eagerly read disable the connection if the downstream is sending pipelined requests as we
// serially process them. Reading from t... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | envoy | fe7c69c248f4fe5a9080c7ccb35275b5218bb5ab | 65,157,779,650,894,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | internal redirect: fix a lifetime bug (#785)
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Wilk <alyssar@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <mklein@lyft.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Rao <pcrao@google.com> | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
xmlXPtrLocationSetDel(xmlLocationSetPtr cur, xmlXPathObjectPtr val) {
int i;
if (cur == NULL) return;
if (val == NULL) return;
/*
* check against doublons
*/
for (i = 0;i < cur->locNr;i++)
if (cur->locTab[i] == val) break;
if (i >= cur->locNr) {
#ifdef DEBUG
xmlGener... | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | libxml2 | f5048b3e71fc30ad096970b8df6e7af073bae4cb | 310,161,417,239,542,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | Hardening of XPath evaluation
Add a mechanism of frame for XPath evaluation when entering a function
or a scoped evaluation, also fix a potential problem in predicate
evaluation. | Safe | 415 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-415", "vulnerability_type": "Double Free", "description": "The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.", "severity": "High", "category": "Double-free", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands"], "languages": [null, "C", "C++"], "example": "Example not extracted"... |
add_done_cb (NMConnectionEditor *editor, gint response, GError *error, gpointer user_data)
{
ActionInfo *info = (ActionInfo *) user_data;
NMConnection *connection;
const char *message = _("An unknown error ocurred.");
connection = nm_connection_editor_get_connection (editor);
switch (response) {
case GTK_RESPON... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | network-manager-applet | 8627880e07c8345f69ed639325280c7f62a8f894 | 317,080,227,395,646,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | editor: prevent any registration of objects on the system bus
D-Bus access-control is name-based; so requests for a specific name
are allowed/denied based on the rules in /etc/dbus-1/system.d. But
apparently apps still get a non-named service on the bus, and if we
register *any* object even though we don't have a nam... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
int OSD::get_num_op_threads()
{
if (cct->_conf->osd_op_num_threads_per_shard)
return get_num_op_shards() * cct->_conf->osd_op_num_threads_per_shard;
if (store_is_rotational)
return get_num_op_shards() * cct->_conf->osd_op_num_threads_per_shard_hdd;
else
return get_num_op_shards() * cct->_conf->osd_op_... | 0 | [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] | ceph | 5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468 | 295,712,301,112,584,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific ... | Safe | 287 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-287", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Authentication", "description": "When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.", "severity": "High", "category": "authentification", "impact": ["Read Application Data", "Gain Privileges ... |
skip_past_nul(int fd)
{
char *end;
char smallbuf[128];
do {
int nread = cli_readn(fd, smallbuf, sizeof(smallbuf));
if (nread <= 0)
return FALSE;
end = memchr(smallbuf, '\0', nread);
if (end) {
if (lseek(fd, 1 + (end-smallbuf) - nread, SEEK_CUR) < 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
} ... | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | clamav-devel | d21fb8d975f8c9688894a8cef4d50d977022e09f | 331,821,296,570,031,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | libclamav/vba_extract.c: fix error path double free (bb#2486) | Safe | 399 | null |
int __pmd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud, unsigned long address)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
pmd_t *new = pmd_alloc_one(mm, address);
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
smp_wmb(); /* See comment in __pte_alloc */
ptl = pud_lock(mm, pud);
#ifndef __ARCH_HAS_4LEVEL_HACK
if (!pud_present(*pud)) {
mm_inc_nr_pmds(mm);
p... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux | 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb | 324,203,019,234,977,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage ... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int ldb_kv_add_internal(struct ldb_module *module,
struct ldb_kv_private *ldb_kv,
const struct ldb_message *msg,
bool check_single_value)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
int ret = LDB_SUCCESS;
unsigned int i;
bool valid_dn = false;
/* Check the new DN i... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | samba | 3c1fbb18321f61df44d7b0f0c7452ae230960293 | 210,214,718,696,411,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 113 | CVE-2018-1140 ldb_tdb: Check for DN validity in add, rename and search
This ensures we fail with a good error code before an eventual ldb_dn_get_casefold() which
would otherwise fail.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzil... | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
int kernel_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
struct kvec *vec, size_t num, size_t size)
{
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
if (!sock->ops->sendmsg_locked)
return sock_no_sendmsg_locked(sk, msg, size);
iov_iter_kvec(&msg->msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, vec, num, size);
return sock->ops-... | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 6d8c50dcb029872b298eea68cc6209c866fd3e14 | 258,218,318,474,533,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereferenc... | Safe | 362 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-362", "vulnerability_type": "Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')", "description": "The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resour... |
//! Convert pixel values from RGB to YCbCr color spaces \newinstance.
CImg<Tuchar> get_RGBtoYCbCr() const {
return CImg<Tuchar>(*this,false).RGBtoYCbCr(); | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 250,418,727,127,533,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
char *ha_partition::update_table_comment(const char *comment)
{
return (char*) comment; /* Nothing to change */
} | 0 | [] | mysql-server | be901b60ae59c93848c829d1b0b2cb523ab8692e | 190,306,986,774,931,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Bug#26390632: CREATE TABLE CAN CAUSE MYSQL TO EXIT.
Analysis
========
CREATE TABLE of InnoDB table with a partition name
which exceeds the path limit can cause the server
to exit.
During the preparation of the partition name,
there was no check to identify whether the complete
path name for partition exceeds the max ... | Safe | null | null |
HTTP_CB(on_message_complete) {
HandleScope scope;
if (num_fields_)
Flush(); // Flush trailing HTTP headers.
Local<Value> cb = handle_->Get(on_message_complete_sym);
if (!cb->IsFunction())
return 0;
Local<Value> r = Local<Function>::Cast(cb)->Call(handle_, 0, NULL);
if (r.IsEmp... | 0 | [] | node | 7b3fb22290c3b6acb497ca85cf2f1648d75c8154 | 289,675,137,185,855,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | typo in node_http_parser | Safe | null | null |
u_savedel(linenr_T lnum, long nlines)
{
if (undo_off)
return OK;
return (u_savecommon(lnum - 1, lnum + nlines,
nlines == curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count ? 2 : lnum, FALSE));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | vim | 3eb1637b1bba19519885dd6d377bd5596e91d22c | 23,294,799,093,846,687,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | patch 8.0.0377: possible overflow when reading corrupted undo file
Problem: Possible overflow when reading corrupted undo file.
Solution: Check if allocated size is not too big. (King) | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
static int __ocfs2_extend_allocation(struct inode *inode, u32 logical_start,
u32 clusters_to_add, int mark_unwritten)
{
int status = 0;
int restart_func = 0;
int credits;
u32 prev_clusters;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ocfs2_dinode *fe = NULL;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct ocfs2_alloc_contex... | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 28f5a8a7c033cbf3e32277f4cc9c6afd74f05300 | 285,393,369,016,707,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 151 | ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the ... | Safe | 401 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-401", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime", "description": "The product does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, making the memory unavailable for reallocation and reuse.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "Memory Leak", "imp... |
static inline void r_write_be32(void *dest, ut32 val) {
r_write_be16 (dest, val >> 16);
r_write_at_be16 (dest, val >> 0, sizeof (ut16));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | radare2 | 1ea23bd6040441a21fbcfba69dce9a01af03f989 | 8,353,380,950,463,369,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix #6816 - null deref in r_read_* | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-295"
] | mbedtls | a1098f81c252b317ad34ea978aea2bc47760b215 | 336,339,956,455,358,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | Add bounds check before signature length read | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct sg_fd *sfp = container_of(work, struct sg_fd, ew.work);
struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
/* Cleanup any responses which were never read(). */
while (sfp->headrp)
sg_finish_rem_req(sfp->headrp);
if (sfp->reserve.bufflen > 0) {
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT... | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | fdc81f45e9f57858da6351836507fbcf1b7583ee | 237,410,856,887,053,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | sg_start_req(): use import_iovec()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
static int ZEND_FASTCALL ZEND_BW_NOT_SPEC_TMP_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
zend_op *opline = EX(opline);
zend_free_op free_op1;
bitwise_not_function(&EX_T(opline->result.u.var).tmp_var,
_get_zval_ptr_tmp(&opline->op1, EX(Ts), &free_op1 TSRMLS_CC) TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(free_op1.var);
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE(... | 0 | [] | php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 99,705,597,087,025,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus | Safe | null | null |
sc_get_iasecc_driver(void)
{
return sc_get_driver();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | OpenSC | 8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa | 132,410,616,793,433,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
theme_adium_scroll_down (EmpathyChatView *view)
{
webkit_web_view_execute_script (WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW (view), "alignChat(true);");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | empathy | 739aca418457de752be13721218aaebc74bd9d36 | 188,948,304,178,877,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | theme_adium_append_message: escape alias before displaying it
Not doing so can lead to nasty HTML injection from hostile users.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=662035 | Safe | 79 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-79", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')", "description": "The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.", ... |
static int mov_write_traf_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov,
MOVTrack *track, int64_t moof_offset,
int moof_size)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
int i, start = 0;
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "traf");
mov... | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
] | FFmpeg | 2c0e98a0b478284bdff6d7a4062522605a8beae5 | 44,835,738,388,128,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael N... | Safe | 369 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-369", "vulnerability_type": "Divide By Zero", "description": "The product divides a value by zero.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not extracted"} |
static void server_cache_hostname(Server *s) {
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
char *x;
assert(s);
t = gethostname_malloc();
if (!t)
return;
x = strappend("_HOSTNAME=", t);
if (!x)
return;
free(s->hostname_field);
... | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | systemd | 084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f | 266,893,482,190,456,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | journald: do not store the iovec entry for process commandline on stack
This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under
control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack
allocation for it.
CVE-2018-16864
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855
The ... | Safe | 770 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-770", "vulnerability_type": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling", "description": "The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.", "severity": "Hi... |
moffset(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, const struct buffer *b,
int32_t *op)
{
size_t nbytes = b->flen;
int32_t o;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
o = CAST(int32_t, (ms->offset + sizeof(char)));
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
o = CAST(int32_t, (ms->o... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | file | d65781527c8134a1202b2649695d48d5701ac60b | 213,303,396,135,962,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 136 | PR/62: spinpx: limit size of file_printable. | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
gs_window_get_monitor (GSWindow *window)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (GS_IS_WINDOW (window), -1);
return window->priv->monitor;
} | 0 | [] | gnome-screensaver | a5f66339be6719c2b8fc478a1d5fc6545297d950 | 126,643,103,342,429,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Ensure keyboard grab and unlock dialog exist after monitor removal
gnome-screensaver currently doesn't deal with monitors getting
removed properly. If the unlock dialog is on the removed monitor
then the unlock dialog and its associated keyboard grab are not
moved to an existing monitor when the monitor removal is pr... | Safe | null | null |
reshape_position_store(struct mddev *mddev, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct md_rdev *rdev;
unsigned long long new;
int err;
err = kstrtoull(buf, 10, &new);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (new != (sector_t)new)
return -EINVAL;
err = mddev_lock(mddev);
if (err)
return err;
err = -EBUSY;
if (mddev->per... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16 | 109,611,557,914,759,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the fun... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
static gg_action_t gg_handle_tls_negotiation(struct gg_session *sess, struct gg_event *e, enum gg_state_t next_state, enum gg_state_t alt_state, enum gg_state_t alt2_state)
{
int valid_hostname = 0;
#ifdef GG_CONFIG_HAVE_GNUTLS
unsigned int status;
int res;
gg_debug_session(sess, GG_DEBUG_MISC, "// gg_watch_fd() ... | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | libgadu | 6516e57766b4fa39d1c5b37379ea72a330598a13 | 127,106,323,162,369,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 206 | Poprawna weryfikacja certyfikatu za pomocą GnuTLS. | Safe | 310 | null |
static long aac_compat_do_ioctl(struct aac_dev *dev, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
long ret;
mutex_lock(&aac_mutex);
switch (cmd) {
case FSACTL_MINIPORT_REV_CHECK:
case FSACTL_SENDFIB:
case FSACTL_OPEN_GET_ADAPTER_FIB:
case FSACTL_CLOSE_GET_ADAPTER_FIB:
case FSACTL_SEND_RAW_SRB:
case FSACTL_GET_PCI_INFO:
... | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | f856567b930dfcdbc3323261bf77240ccdde01f5 | 333,300,713,577,988,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torv... | Safe | 284 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-284", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Access Control", "description": "The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.", "severity": null, "category": "Authorization", "impact": ["Varies by Context"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not ex... |
bool cond_is_datetime_is_null(Item *cond)
{
if (cond->type() == Item::FUNC_ITEM &&
((Item_func*) cond)->functype() == Item_func::ISNULL_FUNC)
{
return ((Item_func_isnull*) cond)->arg_is_datetime_notnull_field();
}
return false;
} | 0 | [] | server | ff77a09bda884fe6bf3917eb29b9d3a2f53f919b | 3,933,408,599,222,017,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | MDEV-22464 Server crash on UPDATE with nested subquery
Uninitialized ref_pointer_array[] because setup_fields() got empty
fields list. mysql_multi_update() for some reason does that by
substituting the fields list with empty total_list for the
mysql_select() call (looks like wrong merge since total_list is not
used a... | Safe | null | null |
Field_longstr::cmp_to_string_with_same_collation(const Item_bool_func *cond,
const Item *item) const
{
return item->cmp_type() == STRING_RESULT &&
charset() == cond->compare_collation();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 14,209,407,002,350,775,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
_gcry_register_pk_ecc_progress (void (*cb) (void *, const char *,
int, int, int),
void *cb_data)
{
progress_cb = cb;
progress_cb_data = cb_data;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | libgcrypt | bf76acbf0da6b0f245e491bec12c0f0a1b5be7c9 | 5,587,810,695,897,974,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | ecc: Add input validation for X25519.
* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_decrypt_raw): Add input validation.
* mpi/ec.c (ec_p_init): Use scratch buffer for bad points.
(_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point): New.
--
Following is the paper describing the attack:
May the Fourth Be With You: A Microarchitectural Side Channel Attack
on Rea... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
void kvm_arch_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
free_cpumask_var(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_free(vcpu);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
] | linux | 0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8 | 32,536,742,716,099,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per... | Safe | 369 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-369", "vulnerability_type": "Divide By Zero", "description": "The product divides a value by zero.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not extracted"} |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.