func string | target int64 | cwe list | project string | commit_id string | hash float64 | size int64 | message string | is_vulnerable string | cwe_id_extracted string | cwe_details string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TEST_F(ZNCTest, ModpythonVCString) {
if (QProcessEnvironment::systemEnvironment().value(
"DISABLED_ZNC_PERL_PYTHON_TEST") == "1") {
return;
}
auto znc = Run();
znc->CanLeak();
InstallModule("test.py", R"(
import znc
class test(znc.Module):
def OnUser... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | znc | 64613bc8b6b4adf1e32231f9844d99cd512b8973 | 72,598,529,378,975,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917 | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
void FIPS_drbg_set_reseed_interval(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int interval)
{
dctx->reseed_interval = interval;
} | 0 | [] | openssl | 200f249b8c3b6439e0200d01caadc24806f1a983 | 228,374,941,055,808,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Remove Dual EC DRBG from FIPS module. | Safe | null | null |
static inline int paravirt_pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return PVOP_CALL1(int, mmu.pgd_alloc, mm);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-276"
] | linux | cadfad870154e14f745ec845708bc17d166065f2 | 337,741,477,322,326,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | x86/ioperm: Fix io bitmap invalidation on Xen PV
tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() wasn't wired up properly through the pvop
machinery, so the TSS and Xen's io bitmap would get out of sync
whenever disabling a valid io bitmap.
Add a new pvop for tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() to fix it.
This is XSA-329.
Fixes: 22fe5b0439dd ("... | Safe | 276 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-276", "vulnerability_type": "Incorrect Default Permissions", "description": "During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data", "Modify Application Data"], "languages": [null], "exam... |
void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* We are a ZOMBIE and nobody can enqueue itself on
* pi_state... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 48fb6f4db940e92cfb16cd878cddd59ea6120d06 | 150,789,850,530,146,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | futex: Remove unnecessary warning from get_futex_key
Commit 65d8fc777f6d ("futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in
get_futex_key()") removed an unnecessary lock_page() with the
side-effect that page->mapping needed to be treated very carefully.
Two defensive warnings were added in case any assumption was missed ... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
static int ESS_add_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc)
{
ASN1_STRING *seq = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *pp = NULL;
int len;
len = i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(sc, NULL);
if (!(pp = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len)))
{
TSerr(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p ... | 0 | [] | openssl | c7235be6e36c4bef84594aa3b2f0561db84b63d8 | 139,233,012,257,609,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification.
Submitted by: Zoltan Glozik <zglozik@opentsa.org>
Reviewed by: Ulf Moeller | Safe | null | null |
static ssize_t clear_refs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task;
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int type;
int rv;
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1)
count = sizeo... | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 | 4,309,956,720,546,959,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad(... | Safe | 264 | null |
static void fdctrl_handle_powerdown_mode(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
fdctrl->pwrd = fdctrl->fifo[1];
fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1];
fdctrl_to_result_phase(fdctrl, 1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | defac5e2fbddf8423a354ff0454283a2115e1367 | 324,040,273,288,827,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | hw/block/fdc: Prevent end-of-track overrun (CVE-2021-3507)
Per the 82078 datasheet, if the end-of-track (EOT byte in
the FIFO) is more than the number of sectors per side, the
command is terminated unsuccessfully:
* 5.2.5 DATA TRANSFER TERMINATION
The 82078 supports terminal count explicitly through
the TC pin a... | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
rvbd_probe_decode_version_type(const guint8 vt, guint8 *ver, guint8 *type)
{
if (vt & PROBE_VERSION_MASK) {
*ver = PROBE_VERSION_1;
*type = vt >> 4;
} else {
*ver = PROBE_VERSION_2;
*type = vt >> 1;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-354"
] | wireshark | 7f3fe6164a68b76d9988c4253b24d43f498f1753 | 56,310,037,003,154,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | TCP: do not use an unknown status when the checksum is 0xffff
Otherwise it triggers an assert when adding the column as the field is
defined as BASE_NONE and not BASE_DEC or BASE_HEX. Thus an unknown value
(not in proto_checksum_vals[)array) cannot be represented.
Mark the checksum as bad even if we process the packet... | Safe | 354 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-354", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value", "description": "The product does not validate or incorrectly validates the integrity check values or \"checksums\" of a message. This may prevent it from detecting if the data has been modified or corrupted in transmission.", "s... |
bool val_native_from_item(THD *thd, Item *item, Native *to)
{
DBUG_ASSERT(is_fixed());
null_value= item->val_native(thd, to);
DBUG_ASSERT(null_value == item->null_value);
return null_value;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8 | 102,045,457,290,038,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see ... | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
static void tm_unavailable(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (user_mode(regs)) {
current->thread.load_tm++;
regs->msr |= MSR_TM;
tm_enable();
tm_restore_sprs(¤t->thread);
return;
}
#endif
pr_emerg("Unrecoverable TM Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, re... | 0 | [] | linux | 5d176f751ee3c6eededd984ad409bff201f436a7 | 232,497,261,634,991,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | powerpc: tm: Enable transactional memory (TM) lazily for userspace
Currently the MSR TM bit is always set if the hardware is TM capable.
This adds extra overhead as it means the TM SPRS (TFHAR, TEXASR and
TFAIR) must be swapped for each process regardless of if they use TM.
For processes that don't use TM the TM MSR ... | Safe | null | null |
bool Binary::has_nx() const {
if (!header().has(HEADER_FLAGS::MH_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION)) {
LIEF_INFO("Heap could be executable");
}
return !header().has(HEADER_FLAGS::MH_ALLOW_STACK_EXECUTION);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | LIEF | 7acf0bc4224081d4f425fcc8b2e361b95291d878 | 40,159,539,514,789,952,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Resolve #764 | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
static OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_write_jp2c(opj_jp2_t *jp2,
opj_stream_private_t *cio,
opj_event_mgr_t * p_manager)
{
OPJ_OFF_T j2k_codestream_exit;
OPJ_BYTE l_data_header [8];
/* preconditions */
assert(jp2 != 00);
assert(cio != 00);
... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | openjpeg | 4edb8c83374f52cd6a8f2c7c875e8ffacccb5fa5 | 150,368,411,460,426,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | Add support for generation of PLT markers in encoder
* -PLT switch added to opj_compress
* Add a opj_encoder_set_extra_options() function that
accepts a PLT=YES option, and could be expanded later
for other uses.
-------
Testing with a Sentinel2 10m band, T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2,
coming from S2A_MSIL1C_20... | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static InputObject *newInputObject(request_rec *r)
{
InputObject *self;
self = PyObject_New(InputObject, &Input_Type);
if (self == NULL)
return NULL;
self->r = r;
self->init = 0;
self->done = 0;
self->buffer = NULL;
self->size = 0;
self->offset = 0;
self->length = 0;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | mod_wsgi | d9d5fea585b23991f76532a9b07de7fcd3b649f4 | 7,734,935,130,267,538,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | Local privilege escalation when using daemon mode. (CVE-2014-0240) | Safe | 264 | null |
void LibRaw::x3f_load_raw()
{
// already in try/catch
int raise_error=0;
x3f_t *x3f = (x3f_t*)_x3f_data;
if(!x3f) return; // No data pointer set
if(X3F_OK == x3f_load_data(x3f, x3f_get_raw(x3f)))
{
x3f_directory_entry_t *DE = x3f_get_raw(x3f);
x3f_directory_entry_header_t *DEH = &DE->header;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | LibRaw | 8682ad204392b914ab1cc6ebcca9c27c19c1a4b4 | 50,483,854,138,083,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 113 | 0.18.17 | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
int kvm_arch_update_irqfd_routing(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
{
return static_call(kvm_x86_update_pi_irte)(kvm, host_irq, guest_irq, set);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637 | 169,267,762,598,537,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it di... | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
pkcs11rsa_destroyctx(dst_context_t *dctx) {
CK_BYTE garbage[ISC_SHA512_DIGESTLENGTH];
CK_ULONG len = ISC_SHA512_DIGESTLENGTH;
pk11_context_t *pk11_ctx = dctx->ctxdata.pk11_ctx;
if (pk11_ctx != NULL) {
(void) pkcs_C_DigestFinal(pk11_ctx->session, garbage, &len);
isc_safe_memwipe(garbage, sizeof(garbage));
pk1... | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | bind9 | 8d807cc21655eaa6e6a08afafeec3682c0f3f2ab | 295,644,335,121,677,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Fix crash in pk11_numbits() when native-pkcs11 is used
When pk11_numbits() is passed a user provided input that contains all
zeroes (via crafted DNS message), it would crash with assertion
failure. Fix that by properly handling such input. | Safe | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
static void sit_add_v4_addrs(struct inet6_dev *idev)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr * ifp;
struct in6_addr addr;
struct net_device *dev;
int scope;
ASSERT_RTNL();
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
memcpy(&addr.s6_addr32[3], idev->dev->dev_addr, 4);
if (idev->dev->flags&IFF_POINTOPOINT) {
addr.s6_addr32[0] ... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | 8a47077a0b5aa2649751c46e7a27884e6686ccbf | 47,615,048,803,987,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 68 | [NETLINK]: Missing padding fields in dumped structures
Plug holes with padding fields and initialized them to zero.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
int token,
struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
{
crypt_token_info token_info;
const char *type;
int r;
if (!params)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Requesting LUKS2 keyring token %d.", token);
if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED... | 0 | [
"CWE-345"
] | cryptsetup | 0113ac2d889c5322659ad0596d4cfc6da53e356c | 86,272,317,830,125,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.
An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt par... | Safe | 345 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-345", "vulnerability_type": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity", "description": "The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Varies by Context", "Unexpected Sta... |
static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct compat_user *dummy32 = NULL;
__u32 tmp = (__u32) data;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
/*
* psw, gprs, acrs and orig_gpr2 are stored on t... | 0 | [
"CWE-264",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | dab6cf55f81a6e16b8147aed9a843e1691dcd318 | 134,132,421,831,346,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 | s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the add... | Safe | 264 | null |
int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;... | 1 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 | 299,616,069,918,492,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 294 | ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-a... | Vulnerable | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
static int snd_ctl_elem_lock(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_id __user *_id)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
int result;
if (copy_from_user(&id, _id, sizeof(id)))
return -EFAULT;
down_write(&ca... | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 6ab55ec0a938c7f943a4edba3d6514f775983887 | 194,062,343,850,955,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | ALSA: control: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in get_ctl_id_hash()
Since the user can control the arguments provided to the kernel by the
ioctl() system call, an out-of-bounds bug occurs when the 'id->name'
provided by the user does not end with '\0'.
The following log can reveal it:
[ 10.002313] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
void CLASS android_tight_load_raw()
{
uchar *data, *dp;
int bwide, row, col, c;
bwide = -(-5*raw_width >> 5) << 3;
data = (uchar *) malloc (bwide);
merror (data, "android_tight_load_raw()");
for (row=0; row < raw_height; row++) {
if (fread (data, 1, bwide, ifp) < bwide) derror();
for (dp=data, col=... | 0 | [
"CWE-129"
] | LibRaw | 89d065424f09b788f443734d44857289489ca9e2 | 283,016,877,462,635,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | fixed two more problems found by fuzzer | Safe | 129 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-129", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Validation of Array Index", "description": "The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.", "severity"... |
static int samldb_extended_allocate_rid(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
struct dsdb_extended_allocate_rid *exop;
int ret;
exop = talloc_get_type(req->op.extended.data,
struct dsdb_extended_allocate_rid);
if (!exop) {
ldb_set_e... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | samba | 0a3aa5f908e351201dc9c4d4807b09ed9eedff77 | 249,474,140,391,528,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | CVE-2022-32746 ldb: Make use of functions for appending to an ldb_message
This aims to minimise usage of the error-prone pattern of searching for
a just-added message element in order to make modifications to it (and
potentially finding the wrong element).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
void *nft_set_elem_init(const struct nft_set *set,
const struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl,
const u32 *key, const u32 *key_end,
const u32 *data, u64 timeout, u64 expiration, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct nft_set_ext *ext;
void *elem;
elem = kzalloc(set->ops->elemsize + tmpl->len, gfp);
if (elem == NULL)
return NULL;
... | 0 | [
"CWE-665"
] | linux | ad9f151e560b016b6ad3280b48e42fa11e1a5440 | 196,126,219,133,614,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | netfilter: nf_tables: initialize set before expression setup
nft_set_elem_expr_alloc() needs an initialized set if expression sets on
the NFT_EXPR_GC flag. Move set fields initialization before expression
setup.
[4512935.019450] ==================================================================
[4512935.019456] BUG: ... | Safe | 665 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-665", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Initialization", "description": "The product does not initialize or incorrectly initializes a resource, which might leave the resource in an unexpected state when it is accessed or used.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["Read Memory", "Read Appli... |
bool parse_method(struct pool *pool, char *s)
{
json_t *val = NULL, *method, *err_val, *params;
json_error_t err;
bool ret = false;
char *buf;
if (!s)
goto out;
val = JSON_LOADS(s, &err);
if (!val) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "JSON decode failed(%d): %s", err.line, err.text);
goto out;
}
method = json_object_g... | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | bfgminer | c80ad8548251eb0e15329fc240c89070640c9d79 | 20,670,034,528,049,558,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 69 | Stratum: extract_sockaddr: Truncate overlong addresses rather than stack overflow
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick@dejavusecurity.com> for finding this! | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
void Zone::adjust_segment_bytes_allocated(int delta) {
segment_bytes_allocated_ += delta;
isolate_->counters()->zone_segment_bytes()->Set(segment_bytes_allocated_);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | node | fcb9145e291e8cb82164bc1fe3db1c1dae219b55 | 21,606,843,915,309,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | deps: backport 3a9bfec from v8 upstream
Some of the logic from `zone.cc` is found in `zone-inl.h` in this
release stream.
Original commit message:
Fix overflow issue in Zone::New
When requesting a large allocation near the end of the address space,
the computation could overflow and erroneously *not* grow the... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
void license_decrypt_platform_challenge(rdpLicense* license)
{
CryptoRc4 rc4;
license->PlatformChallenge->data = (BYTE*) malloc(license->EncryptedPlatformChallenge->length);
license->PlatformChallenge->length = license->EncryptedPlatformChallenge->length;
rc4 = crypto_rc4_init(license->LicensingEncryptionKey, LIC... | 0 | [] | FreeRDP | f1d6afca6ae620f9855a33280bdc6f3ad9153be0 | 23,639,898,567,303,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | Fix CVE-2014-0791
This patch fixes CVE-2014-0791, the remaining length in the stream is checked
before doing some malloc(). | Safe | null | null |
struct sk_buff *skb_udp_tunnel_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features,
bool is_ipv6)
{
__be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
const struct net_offload **offloads;
const struct net_offload *ops;
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct sk_buff *(*gso_inner_segment)(struct sk_... | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971 | 15,162,368,960,083,047,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsul... | Safe | 400 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-400", "vulnerability_type": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.", "severity": "High", "category": "Resource Exhaustion", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU... |
free_config_peers(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
peer_node *curr_peer;
if (ptree->peers != NULL) {
for (;;) {
UNLINK_FIFO(curr_peer, *ptree->peers, link);
if (NULL == curr_peer)
break;
destroy_address_node(curr_peer->addr);
destroy_attr_val_fifo(curr_peer->peerflags);
free(curr_peer);
}
free(ptre... | 0 | [
"CWE-19"
] | ntp | fe46889f7baa75fc8e6c0fcde87706d396ce1461 | 171,148,032,055,935,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | [Sec 2942]: Off-path DoS attack on auth broadcast mode. HStenn. | Safe | 19 | null |
void Curl_getoff_all_pipelines(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn)
{
if(!conn->bundle)
return;
if(conn->bundle->multiuse == BUNDLE_PIPELINING) {
bool recv_head = (conn->readchannel_inuse &&
Curl_recvpipe_head(data, conn));
bool send_head... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | curl | 81d135d67155c5295b1033679c606165d4e28f3f | 132,147,005,232,296,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
hexValue(const FileInfo *file, const widechar *digits, int length) {
int k;
unsigned int binaryValue = 0;
for (k = 0; k < length; k++) {
unsigned int hexDigit = 0;
if (digits[k] >= '0' && digits[k] <= '9')
hexDigit = digits[k] - '0';
else if (digits[k] >= 'a' && digits[k] <= 'f')
hexDigit = digits[k] - '... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | liblouis | 2e4772befb2b1c37cb4b9d6572945115ee28630a | 120,417,685,212,878,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | Prevent an invalid memory writes in compileRule
Thanks to Han Zheng for reporting it
Fixes #1214 | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
png_decompress_chunk(png_structrp png_ptr,
png_uint_32 chunklength, png_uint_32 prefix_size,
png_alloc_size_t *newlength /* must be initialized to the maximum! */,
int terminate /*add a '\0' to the end of the uncompressed data*/)
{
/* TODO: implement different limits for different types of chunk.
*
... | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-369"
] | libpng | 8a05766cb74af05c04c53e6c9d60c13fc4d59bf2 | 294,731,316,747,051,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 156 | [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278) | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
int fuse_fs_symlink(struct fuse_fs *fs, const char *linkname, const char *path)
{
fuse_get_context()->private_data = fs->user_data;
if (fs->op.symlink)
return fs->op.symlink(linkname, path);
else
return -ENOSYS;
} | 0 | [] | ntfs-3g | fb28eef6f1c26170566187c1ab7dc913a13ea43c | 83,428,208,188,360,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Hardened the checking of directory offset requested by a readdir
When asked for the next directory entries, make sure the chunk offset
is within valid values, otherwise return no more entries in chunk. | Safe | null | null |
set_indent(
int size, // measured in spaces
int flags)
{
char_u *p;
char_u *newline;
char_u *oldline;
char_u *s;
int todo;
int ind_len; // measured in characters
int line_len;
int doit = FALSE;
int ind_done = 0; // measured in spaces
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
... | 0 | [
"CWE-122"
] | vim | b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9 | 57,566,652,044,048,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 307 | patch 8.2.3402: invalid memory access when using :retab with large value
Problem: Invalid memory access when using :retab with large value.
Solution: Check the number is positive. | Safe | 122 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-122", "vulnerability_type": "Heap-based Buffer Overflow", "description": "A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().", "severity": "... |
static int rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **tb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
int i, err;
if (!netlink_strict_get_check(skb))
return nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
err ... | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-190",
"CWE-326"
] | linux | 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 | 171,649,380,964,533,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe ... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
perhaps_add_new_callers (cgraph_node *node, ipcp_value<valtype> *val)
{
ipcp_value_source<valtype> *src;
profile_count redirected_sum = profile_count::zero ();
for (src = val->sources; src; src = src->next)
{
struct cgraph_edge *cs = src->cs;
while (cs)
{
if (cgraph_edge_brings_value_p (cs, s... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | gcc | a09ccc22459c565814f79f96586fe4ad083fe4eb | 234,722,209,907,408,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | Avoid segfault when doing IPA-VRP but not IPA-CP (PR 93015)
2019-12-21 Martin Jambor <mjambor@suse.cz>
PR ipa/93015
* ipa-cp.c (ipcp_store_vr_results): Check that info exists
testsuite/
* gcc.dg/lto/pr93015_0.c: New test.
From-SVN: r279695 | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static int ZEND_FASTCALL ZEND_IS_NOT_IDENTICAL_SPEC_VAR_CONST_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
zend_op *opline = EX(opline);
zend_free_op free_op1;
zval *result = &EX_T(opline->result.u.var).tmp_var;
is_identical_function(result,
_get_zval_ptr_var(&opline->op1, EX(Ts), &free_op1 TSRMLS_CC),
&opline->op2.u.... | 0 | [] | php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 259,542,548,561,951,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus | Safe | null | null |
dissect_kafka_alter_replica_log_dirs_request_topic(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, kafka_api_version_t api_version _U_)
{
proto_item *subti, *subsubti;
proto_tree *subtree, *subsubtree;
int topic_start, topic_len;
sub... | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | wireshark | f4374967bbf9c12746b8ec3cd54dddada9dd353e | 14,553,294,998,269,122,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | Kafka: Limit our decompression size.
Don't assume that the Internet has our best interests at heart when it
gives us the size of our decompression buffer. Assign an arbitrary limit
of 50 MB.
This fixes #16739 in that it takes care of
** (process:17681): WARNING **: 20:03:07.440: Dissector bug, protocol Kafka, in pac... | Safe | 401 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-401", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime", "description": "The product does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, making the memory unavailable for reallocation and reuse.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "Memory Leak", "imp... |
bool run(OperationContext* opCtx,
const string& dbname,
const BSONObj& cmdObj,
BSONObjBuilder& result) {
AuthorizationManager* authzManager = getGlobalAuthorizationManager();
result.append("cacheGeneration", authzManager->getCacheGeneration());
return t... | 0 | [
"CWE-613"
] | mongo | 6dfb92b1299de04677d0bd2230e89a52eb01003c | 191,832,496,424,234,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | SERVER-38984 Validate unique User ID on UserCache hit
(cherry picked from commit e55d6e2292e5dbe2f97153251d8193d1cc89f5d7) | Safe | 613 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-613", "vulnerability_type": "Insufficient Session Expiration", "description": "According to WASC, \"Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.\"", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Bypass Protect... |
void *addReplyDeferredLen(client *c) {
/* Note that we install the write event here even if the object is not
* ready to be sent, since we are sure that before returning to the
* event loop setDeferredAggregateLen() will be called. */
if (prepareClientToWrite(c) != C_OK) return NULL;
trimReplyUnus... | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | redis | 5674b0057ff2903d43eaff802017eddf37c360f8 | 313,179,264,076,991,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of memory (CVE-2021-32675)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
T... | Safe | 770 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-770", "vulnerability_type": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling", "description": "The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.", "severity": "Hi... |
int64_to_str_back(char *ptr, gint64 value)
{
if (value < 0) {
ptr = uint64_to_str_back(ptr, -value);
*(--ptr) = '-';
} else
ptr = uint64_to_str_back(ptr, value);
return ptr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | wireshark | d5f2657825e63e4126ebd7d13a59f3c6e8a9e4e1 | 137,672,259,663,486,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | epan: Limit our bits in decode_bits_in_field.
Limit the number of bits we process in decode_bits_in_field, otherwise
we'll overrun our buffer. Fixes #16958. | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
png_read_start_row(png_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, ... | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
] | libpng | 2dca15686fadb1b8951cb29b02bad4cae73448da | 132,003,844,260,448,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 290 | [libpng16] Moved chunk-length check into a png_check_chunk_length() private
function (Suggested by Max Stepin). | Safe | 369 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-369", "vulnerability_type": "Divide By Zero", "description": "The product divides a value by zero.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example not extracted"} |
static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
const char *caller)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p);
int rc;
smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_task(p, ... | 1 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7 | 310,304,804,443,206,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is ... | Vulnerable | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
TEST(QueryProjectionTest, IdExclusionProjectionPreservesOtherFields) {
auto proj = createProjection("{}", "{_id: 0}");
ASSERT_TRUE(proj.isFieldRetainedExactly("a"));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-732"
] | mongo | cd583b6c4d8aa2364f255992708b9bb54e110cf4 | 44,278,112,056,775,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | SERVER-53929 Add stricter parser checks around positional projection | Safe | 732 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-732", "vulnerability_type": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource", "description": "The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["Read... |
static void tcp_remove_reno_sacks(struct sock *sk, int acked)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (acked > 0) {
/* One ACK acked hole. The rest eat duplicate ACKs. */
tp->delivered += max_t(int, acked - tp->sacked_out, 1);
if (acked - 1 >= tp->sacked_out)
tp->sacked_out = 0;
else
tp->sacked_out -= a... | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | net | 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 | 309,906,498,430,577,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
s... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
void set_type(const Column_definition &other)
{
set_handler(other.type_handler());
length= other.length;
char_length= other.char_length;
decimals= other.decimals;
flags= other.flags;
pack_length= other.pack_length;
key_length= other.key_length;
unireg_check= other.unireg_check;
i... | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 80,573,883,971,220,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
Bool TY_(FixDocType)( TidyDocImpl* doc )
{
Lexer* lexer = doc->lexer;
Node* doctype = TY_(FindDocType)( doc );
uint dtmode = cfg( doc, TidyDoctypeMode );
uint guessed = VERS_UNKNOWN;
Bool hadSI = no;
/* Issue #167 - found doctype, and doctype is default VERS_HTML5, set VERS_HTML5 and return yes... | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | tidy-html5 | c18f27a58792f7fbd0b30a0ff50d6b40a82f940d | 221,996,289,900,301,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 82 | Issue #217 - avoid len going negative, ever... | Safe | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
static int l2tp_ip6_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct sock *sk;
u32 session_id;
u32 tunnel_id;
unsigned char *ptr, *optr;
struct l2tp_session *session;
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = NULL;
int length;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, 4))
goto discard;
/* Point to L2TP header */
... | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 32c231164b762dddefa13af5a0101032c70b50ef | 111,126,456,491,071,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 94 | l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bin... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
static void nfs4_open_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
/* If this request hasn't been cancelled, do nothing */
if (data->cancelled == 0)
goto out_free;
/* In case of error, no cleanup! */
if (data->rpc_status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
goto out_f... | 1 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9 | 273,786,875,280,630,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> | Vulnerable | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
void updateHandshakeState(QuicServerConnectionState& conn) {
// Zero RTT read cipher is available after chlo is processed with the
// condition that early data attempt is accepted.
auto handshakeLayer = conn.serverHandshakeLayer;
auto zeroRttReadCipher = handshakeLayer->getZeroRttReadCipher();
auto zeroRttHea... | 1 | [
"CWE-617",
"CWE-703"
] | mvfst | a67083ff4b8dcbb7ee2839da6338032030d712b0 | 181,509,801,354,210,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 | Close connection if we derive an extra 1-rtt write cipher
Summary: Fixes CVE-2021-24029
Reviewed By: mjoras, lnicco
Differential Revision: D26613890
fbshipit-source-id: 19bb2be2c731808144e1a074ece313fba11f1945 | Vulnerable | 617 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-617", "vulnerability_type": "Reachable Assertion", "description": "The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.", "severity": null, "category": "assertion failure", "im... |
static const URI_CHAR * URI_FUNC(ParseQueryFrag)(URI_TYPE(ParserState) * state,
const URI_CHAR * first, const URI_CHAR * afterLast,
UriMemoryManager * memory) {
if (first >= afterLast) {
return afterLast;
}
switch (*first) {
case _UT('!'):
case _UT('$'):
case _UT('%'):
case _UT('&'):
case _UT('('):
case... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | uriparser | cef25028de5ff872c2e1f0a6c562eb3ea9ecbce4 | 285,972,431,416,792,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | Fix uriParse*Ex* out-of-bounds read | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
PackLinuxElf32armLe::~PackLinuxElf32armLe()
{
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | upx | ef336dbcc6dc8344482f8cf6c909ae96c3286317 | 82,016,965,951,049,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Protect against bad crafted input.
https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/128
modified: p_lx_elf.cpp | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
void mg_mqtt_sub(struct mg_connection *c, struct mg_str *topic, int qos) {
static uint16_t s_id;
uint8_t qos_ = qos & 3;
uint32_t total_len = 2 + (uint32_t) topic->len + 2 + 1;
mg_mqtt_send_header(c, MQTT_CMD_SUBSCRIBE, 2, total_len);
if (++s_id == 0) ++s_id;
mg_send_u16(c, mg_htons(s_id));
mg_send_u16(c,... | 0 | [
"CWE-552"
] | mongoose | c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945 | 135,088,080,709,259,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload() | Safe | 552 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-552", "vulnerability_type": "Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties", "description": "The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Files or Directories", "Modify Files or Dire... |
static inline void __xfrm_state_put(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
refcount_dec(&x->refcnt);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 | 291,471,250,497,162,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | xfrm: clean up xfrm protocol checks
In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only m... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
default_erase(void)
{
int result;
if (over_strike
&& VALID_STRING(key_backspace)
&& strlen(key_backspace) == 1) {
result = key_backspace[0];
} else {
result = CERASE;
}
return result;
} | 0 | [] | ncurses | 790a85dbd4a81d5f5d8dd02a44d84f01512ef443 | 331,853,107,190,409,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | ncurses 6.2 - patch 20200531
+ correct configure version-check/warnng for g++ to allow for 10.x
+ re-enable "bel" in konsole-base (report by Nia Huang)
+ add linux-s entry (patch by Alexandre Montaron).
+ drop long-obsolete convert_configure.pl
+ add test/test_parm.c, for checking tparm changes.
+ improve parameter-ch... | Safe | null | null |
int bond_create(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
struct net_device *bond_dev;
struct bonding *bond;
struct alb_bond_info *bond_info;
int res;
rtnl_lock();
bond_dev = alloc_netdev_mq(sizeof(struct bonding),
name ? name : "bond%d", NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
bond_setup, tx_queues);
if (!bond_dev) {
pr... | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 105cd17a866017b45f3c45901b394c711c97bf40 | 339,570,789,476,265,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | bonding: fix null dereference in bond_ipsec_add_sa()
If bond doesn't have real device, bond->curr_active_slave is null.
But bond_ipsec_add_sa() dereferences bond->curr_active_slave without
null checking.
So, null-ptr-deref would occur.
Test commands:
ip link add bond0 type bond
ip link set bond0 up
ip x s... | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
static int mov_read_jp2h(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
return mov_read_extradata(c, pb, atom, AV_CODEC_ID_JPEG2000);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-834"
] | FFmpeg | 9cb4eb772839c5e1de2855d126bf74ff16d13382 | 75,203,641,530,748,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> | Safe | 399 | null |
int udf_add_aext(struct inode *inode, struct extent_position *epos,
struct kernel_lb_addr *eloc, uint32_t elen, int inc)
{
int adsize;
struct short_ad *sad = NULL;
struct long_ad *lad = NULL;
struct allocExtDesc *aed;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (!epos->bh)
ptr = iinfo->i_... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | 23b133bdc452aa441fcb9b82cbf6dd05cfd342d0 | 327,169,284,052,401,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 128 | udf: Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors
Check length of extended attributes and allocation descriptors when
loading inodes from disk. Otherwise corrupted filesystems could confuse
the code and make the kernel oops.
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
CC: stable@vger.kernel... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
u64 snmp_fold_field64(void __percpu *mib, int offt, size_t syncp_offset)
{
u64 res = 0;
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
res += snmp_get_cpu_field64(mib, cpu, offt, syncp_offset);
}
return res;
} | 0 | [] | net | 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 | 81,526,670,270,637,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(s... | Safe | null | null |
static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ll *saddr = (struct sockaddr_ll *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *dev;
__be16 proto;
unsigned char *addr;
int ifindex, err, reserve = 0;
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet... | 0 | [
"CWE-909"
] | linux-2.6 | 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f | 119,231,407,729,418,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 165 | net: packet: fix information leak to userland
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of ... | Safe | 909 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-909", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Initialization of Resource", "description": "The product does not initialize a critical resource.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["Read Memory", "Read Application Data", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example no... |
int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ret = -1, i;
BN_CTX *ctx;
const BIGNUM *order;
BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const EC_POINT *pub_key;
/* chec... | 0 | [
"CWE-203"
] | openssl | 0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a | 107,326,947,762,425,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 119 | Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private ke... | Safe | 203 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-203", "vulnerability_type": "Observable Discrepancy", "description": "The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as wheth... |
static ssize_t slab_attr_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct slab_attribute *attribute;
struct kmem_cache *s;
int err;
attribute = to_slab_attr(attr);
s = to_slab(kobj);
if (!attribute->show)
return -EIO;
err = attribute->show(s, buf);
return err; | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux | f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | 209,194,791,131,677,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle ... | Safe | 189 | null |
lyd_new_yangdata(const struct lys_module *module, const char *name_template, const char *name)
{
const struct lys_node *schema = NULL, *snode;
if (!module || !name_template || !name) {
LOGARG;
return NULL;
}
schema = lyp_get_yang_data_template(module, name_template, strlen(name_templat... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libyang | 32fb4993bc8bb49e93e84016af3c10ea53964be5 | 66,300,853,156,844,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | schema tree BUGFIX do not check features while still resolving schema
Fixes #723 | Vulnerable | 119 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-119", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer", "description": "The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations ... |
ConvertToUnicodeText (
OUT EFI_STRING StringDest,
IN CHAR8 *StringSrc,
IN OUT UINTN *BufferSize
)
{
UINTN StringSize;
UINTN Index;
ASSERT (StringSrc != NULL && BufferSize != NULL);
StringSize = AsciiStrSize (StringSrc) * 2;
if (*BufferSize < StringSize || Stri... | 0 | [] | edk2 | 764e8ba1389a617639d79d2c4f0d53f4ea4a7387 | 134,496,354,482,093,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | MdeModulePkg/String.c: Zero memory before free (CVE-2019-14558)
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1611
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@in... | Safe | null | null |
struct razer_report razer_chroma_standard_get_device_mode(void)
{
return get_razer_report(0x00, 0x84, 0x02);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | openrazer | 7e8a04feb378a679f1bcdcae079a5100cc45663b | 96,874,277,233,951,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix oob memcpy in matrix_custom_frame methods
Adjust row_length if it exeeds the arguments array | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
int mnt_optstr_remove_option_at(char **optstr, char *begin, char *end)
{
size_t sz;
if (!optstr || !begin || !end)
return -EINVAL;
if ((begin == *optstr || *(begin - 1) == ',') && *end == ',')
end++;
sz = strlen(end);
memmove(begin, end, sz + 1);
if (!*begin && (begin > *optstr) && *(begin - 1) == ',')
... | 0 | [
"CWE-552",
"CWE-703"
] | util-linux | 57202f5713afa2af20ffbb6ab5331481d0396f8d | 241,082,039,641,657,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | libmount: fix UID check for FUSE umount [CVE-2021-3995]
Improper UID check allows an unprivileged user to unmount FUSE
filesystems of users with similar UID.
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> | Safe | 552 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-552", "vulnerability_type": "Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties", "description": "The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Files or Directories", "Modify Files or Dire... |
static ssize_t input_dev_show_modalias(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct input_dev *id = to_input_dev(dev);
ssize_t len;
len = input_print_modalias(buf, PAGE_SIZE, id, 1);
return min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | cb222aed03d798fc074be55e59d9a112338ee784 | 264,464,487,934,238,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Input: add safety guards to input_set_keycode()
If we happen to have a garbage in input device's keycode table with values
too big we'll end up doing clear_bit() with offset way outside of our
bitmaps, damaging other objects within an input device or even outside of
it. Let's add sanity checks to the returned old keyc... | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
long Tags::Tag::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (size == 0) // 0 length tag, read anoth... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | libvpx | 34d54b04e98dd0bac32e9aab0fbda0bf501bc742 | 319,635,805,982,951,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
changelog:
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/libwebm-1.0.0.27-351-g9f23fbc..libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
Change-Id: I28a6b3ae02a53fb1f2029eee11e9449afb94c8e3 | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base)
{
struct hlist_head heads[LVL_DEPTH];
int levels;
if (!time_after_eq(jiffies, base->clk))
return;
timer_base_lock_expiry(base);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&base->lock);
/*
* timer_base::must_forward_clk must be cleared before running
* timers so that any ti... | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-330"
] | linux | f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4 | 283,255,593,752,920,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity
This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.
Note that depending on some network devices'... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
GF_Err trpy_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_TRPYBox *ptr = (GF_TRPYBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->nbBytes);
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | gpac | d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c | 288,885,474,235,666,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183) | Safe | 400 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-400", "vulnerability_type": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption", "description": "The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.", "severity": "High", "category": "Resource Exhaustion", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU... |
void qdisc_class_hash_destroy(struct Qdisc_class_hash *clhash)
{
qdisc_class_hash_free(clhash->hash, clhash->hashsize);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-909"
] | linux-2.6 | 16ebb5e0b36ceadc8186f71d68b0c4fa4b6e781b | 97,135,059,029,197,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | tc: Fix unitialized kernel memory leak
Three bytes of uninitialized kernel memory are currently leaked to user
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | Safe | 909 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-909", "vulnerability_type": "Missing Initialization of Resource", "description": "The product does not initialize a critical resource.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["Read Memory", "Read Application Data", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart"], "languages": [null], "example": "Example no... |
int udp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
switch(cmd)
{
case SIOCOUTQ:
{
int amount = atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
case SIOCINQ:
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned long amount;
amount = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_que... | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux-2.6 | 1e0c14f49d6b393179f423abbac47f85618d3d46 | 140,853,893,734,833,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | [UDP]: Fix MSG_PROBE crash
UDP tracks corking status through the pending variable. The
IP layer also tracks it through the socket write queue. It
is possible for the two to get out of sync when MSG_PROBE is
used.
This patch changes UDP to check the write queue to ensure
that the two stay in sync.
Signed-off-by: He... | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
static avifBool avifParseImageSpatialExtentsProperty(avifProperty * prop, const uint8_t * raw, size_t rawLen)
{
BEGIN_STREAM(s, raw, rawLen);
CHECK(avifROStreamReadAndEnforceVersion(&s, 0));
avifImageSpatialExtents * ispe = &prop->u.ispe;
CHECK(avifROStreamReadU32(&s, &ispe->width));
CHECK(avifROSt... | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] | libavif | 0a8e7244d494ae98e9756355dfbfb6697ded2ff9 | 207,389,867,676,695,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Set max image size to 16384 * 16384
Fix https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24728 and
https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24734. | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
/* Helper function used to add an associative array of warnings and errors to a zval */
static void zval_from_error_container(zval *z, timelib_error_container *error)
{
int i;
zval *element;
add_assoc_long(z, "warning_count", error->warning_count);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(element);
array_init(element);
for (i = 0; i < ... | 0 | [] | php-src | bb057498f7457e8b2eba98332a3bad434de4cf12 | 281,509,042,959,228,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | Fix #70277: new DateTimeZone($foo) is ignoring text after null byte
The DateTimeZone constructors are not binary safe. They're parsing the timezone
as string, but discard the length when calling timezone_initialize(). This
patch adds a tz_len parameter and a respective check to timezone_initialize(). | Safe | null | null |
BSONObj Command::filterCommandRequestForPassthrough(const BSONObj& cmdObj) {
BSONObjBuilder bob;
for (auto elem : cmdObj) {
const auto name = elem.fieldNameStringData();
if (name == "$readPreference") {
BSONObjBuilder(bob.subobjStart("$queryOptions")).append(elem);
} else if ... | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | mongo | 5c7c6729c37514760fd34da462b6961a2e385417 | 206,333,584,436,662,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | SERVER-38275 ban explain with UUID | Safe | 20 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-20", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Input Validation", "description": "The product receives input or data, but it does\n not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the\n properties that are required to process the data safely and\n correctly.", "severity": "High", "ca... |
PJ_DEF(void) pj_scan_get_unescape( pj_scanner *scanner,
const pj_cis_t *spec, pj_str_t *out)
{
register char *s = scanner->curptr;
char *dst = s;
pj_assert(pj_cis_match(spec,0)==0);
/* Must not match character '%' */
pj_assert(pj_cis_match(spec,'%')==0);
/* EOF is detected implicitly *... | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | pjproject | 077b465c33f0aec05a49cd2ca456f9a1b112e896 | 184,763,409,583,448,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 | Merge pull request from GHSA-7fw8-54cv-r7pm | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
static void napi_reuse_skb(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__skb_pull(skb, skb_headlen(skb));
skb_reserve(skb, NET_IP_ALIGN - skb_headroom(skb));
skb->vlan_tci = 0;
skb->dev = napi->dev;
skb->skb_iif = 0;
napi->skb = skb;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b | 258,423,549,018,973,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN... | Safe | 264 | null |
doset()
{
char buf[BUFSZ], buf2[BUFSZ];
int i, pass, boolcount, pick_cnt, pick_idx, opt_indx;
boolean *bool_p;
winid tmpwin;
anything any;
menu_item *pick_list;
int indexoffset, startpass, endpass;
boolean setinitial = FALSE, fromfile = FALSE;
int biggest_name = 0;
tmpwin = create_nhwindow(NHW_MENU);
start_... | 0 | [
"CWE-269"
] | NetHack | 612755bfb5c412079795c68ba392df5d93874ed8 | 293,278,838,098,053,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 193 | escapes() revamp
Partial rewrite of escapes(), mostly changing its if-then-else
logic so that end-of-string can be checked once instead for each case.
The previous version had a bug if the input string ended with backslash
and one decimal digit (due to being lumped together with the handling
for trailing \X or \O... | Safe | 269 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-269", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Privilege Management", "description": "The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.", "severity": "Medium", "category": null, "impact": ["Gain Privileges or Assume Ide... |
gs_main_arg_fopen(const char *fname, void *vminst)
{
gs_main_set_lib_paths((gs_main_instance *) vminst);
return lib_fopen(&((gs_main_instance *)vminst)->lib_path,
((gs_main_instance *)vminst)->heap, fname);
} | 0 | [] | ghostpdl | 407cc61e87b0fd9d44d72ca740af7d3c85dee78d | 116,319,610,456,022,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | "starting_arg_file" should only apply once.
The "starting_arg_file == true" setting should apply to the *first* call to
lib_file_open() in the context of a given call to runarg(). Previously, it
remained set for the entire duration of the runarg() call, resulting in the
current directory being searched for any resourc... | Safe | null | null |
TEST_F(RouterTest, UpstreamPerTryTimeout) {
NiceMock<Http::MockRequestEncoder> encoder;
Http::ResponseDecoder* response_decoder = nullptr;
EXPECT_CALL(cm_.thread_local_cluster_.conn_pool_, newStream(_, _))
.WillOnce(Invoke(
[&](Http::ResponseDecoder& decoder,
Http::ConnectionPool::Ca... | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | 18871dbfb168d3512a10c78dd267ff7c03f564c6 | 326,199,877,712,789,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | [1.18] CVE-2022-21655
Crash with direct_response
Signed-off-by: Otto van der Schaaf <ovanders@redhat.com> | Safe | 703 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-703", "vulnerability_type": "Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions", "description": "The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.", "severity": null, "category": null, "impact": ["Read Application Data"... |
static int mon_text_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct mon_bus *mbus;
struct mon_reader_text *rp;
int rc;
mutex_lock(&mon_lock);
mbus = inode->i_private;
rp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mon_reader_text), GFP_KERNEL);
if (rp == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err_alloc;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rp->e_li... | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | a5f596830e27e15f7a0ecd6be55e433d776986d8 | 69,824,825,765,865,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | usb: usbmon: Read text within supplied buffer size
This change fixes buffer overflows and silent data corruption with the
usbmon device driver text file read operations.
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Noring <noring@nocrew.org>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by... | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
static inline void vmsvga_cursor_define(struct vmsvga_state_s *s,
struct vmsvga_cursor_definition_s *c)
{
QEMUCursor *qc;
int i, pixels;
qc = cursor_alloc(c->width, c->height);
assert(qc != NULL);
qc->hot_x = c->hot_x;
qc->hot_y = c->hot_y;
switch (c->bpp) {
case 1:
... | 0 | [] | qemu | fa892e9abb728e76afcf27323ab29c57fb0fe7aa | 143,789,060,302,136,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | ui/cursor: fix integer overflow in cursor_alloc (CVE-2021-4206)
Prevent potential integer overflow by limiting 'width' and 'height' to
512x512. Also change 'datasize' type to size_t. Refer to security
advisory https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4206/ for more information.
Fixes: CVE-2021-4206
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matt... | Safe | null | null |
static int sfb_dump(struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sfb_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
struct nlattr *opts;
struct tc_sfb_qopt opt = {
.rehash_interval = jiffies_to_msecs(q->rehash_interval),
.warmup_time = jiffies_to_msecs(q->warmup_time),
.limit = q->limit,
.max = q->max,
.bin_size = q... | 0 | [
"CWE-330"
] | linux | 55667441c84fa5e0911a0aac44fb059c15ba6da2 | 169,033,866,306,311,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | net/flow_dissector: switch to siphash
UDP IPv6 packets auto flowlabels are using a 32bit secret
(static u32 hashrnd in net/core/flow_dissector.c) and
apply jhash() over fields known by the receivers.
Attackers can easily infer the 32bit secret and use this information
to identify a device and/or user, since this 32bi... | Safe | 330 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-330", "vulnerability_type": "Use of Insufficiently Random Values", "description": "The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["Other", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "Other", "By... |
static int partitions_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &partitions_op);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux-stable | 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84 | 110,047,249,719,659,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
======================================... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
void pop_args() { args_stack.pop_back(); } | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | cpp-peglib | b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e | 22,396,599,545,230,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | Fix #122 | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
R_API int r_cmd_alias_set_str(RCmd *cmd, const char *k, const char *v) {
RCmdAliasVal val;
val.data = (ut8 *)strdup (v);
if (!val.data) {
return 1;
}
val.is_str = true;
val.is_data = true;
/* No trailing newline */
int len = strlen (v);
while (len-- > 0) {
if (v[len] == '\r' || v[len] == '\n') {
val.da... | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | radare2 | 0052500c1ed5bf8263b26b9fd7773dbdc6f170c4 | 153,200,830,387,882,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Fix heap OOB read in macho.iterate_chained_fixups ##crash
* Reported by peacock-doris via huntr.dev
* Reproducer 'tests_65305'
mrmacete:
* Return early if segs_count is 0
* Initialize segs_count also for reconstructed fixups
Co-authored-by: pancake <pancake@nopcode.org>
Co-authored-by: Francesco Tamagni <mrm... | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
MONGO_EXPORT double mongo_count( mongo *conn, const char *db, const char *ns, const bson *query ) {
bson cmd;
bson out = {NULL, 0};
double count = -1;
bson_init( &cmd );
bson_append_string( &cmd, "count", ns );
if ( query && bson_size( query ) > 5 ) /* not empty */
bson_append_bson( &cm... | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | mongo-c-driver-legacy | 1a1f5e26a4309480d88598913f9eebf9e9cba8ca | 291,643,931,575,110,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | don't mix up int and size_t (first pass to fix that) | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
static void vhost_net_buf_init(struct vhost_net_buf *rxq)
{
rxq->head = rxq->tail = 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | e2b3b35eb9896f26c98b9a2c047d9111638059a2 | 50,742,051,714,271,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | vhost_net: batch used ring update in rx
This patch tries to batched used ring update during RX. This is pretty
fit for the case when guest is much faster (e.g dpdk based
backend). In this case, used ring is almost empty:
- we may get serious cache line misses/contending on both used ring
and used idx.
- at most 1 p... | Safe | 787 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-787", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Write", "description": "The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": "High", "category": "Memory Corruption", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Rest... |
static int dcbnl_getpfccfg(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nlattr *data[DCB_PFC_UP_ATTR_MAX + 1], *nest;
u8 value;
int ret;
int i;
int getall = 0;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_PFC_CFG])
return -EINVAL;
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfccfg)
... | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0 | 220,479,382,663,300,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs... | Safe | 399 | null |
GF_Err BM_ParseCommand(GF_BifsDecoder *codec, GF_BitStream *bs, GF_List *com_list)
{
u8 go, type;
GF_Err e;
go = 1;
e = GF_OK;
GF_SceneGraph *cur_graph = codec->current_graph;
GF_Proto *cur_proto = codec->pCurrentProto;
codec->LastError = GF_OK;
while (go) {
type = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
switch (type) {
... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | gpac | c535bad50d5812d27ee5b22b54371bddec411514 | 200,406,588,652,508,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | fixed #2194 | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
MOCK_IMPL(smartlist_t *,
list_authority_ids_with_downloads, (void))
{
smartlist_t *ids = smartlist_new();
digestmap_iter_t *i;
const char *digest;
char *tmp;
void *cl;
if (trusted_dir_certs) {
for (i = digestmap_iter_init(trusted_dir_certs);
!(digestmap_iter_done(i));
i = digestmap_it... | 0 | [] | tor | 1afc2ed956a35b40dfd1d207652af5b50c295da7 | 46,562,889,946,133,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Fix policies.c instance of the "if (r=(a-b)) return r" pattern
I think this one probably can't underflow, since the input ranges
are small. But let's not tempt fate.
This patch also replaces the "cmp" functions here with just "eq"
functions, since nothing actually checked for anything besides 0 and
nonzero.
Related... | Safe | null | null |
xmlCreateZMemBuff( int compression ) {
int z_err;
int hdr_lgth;
xmlZMemBuffPtr buff = NULL;
if ( ( compression < 1 ) || ( compression > 9 ) )
return ( NULL );
/* Create the control and data areas */
buff = xmlMalloc( sizeof( xmlZMemBuff ) );
if ( buff == NULL ) {
xmlIOErrMemory("... | 0 | [
"CWE-134"
] | libxml2 | 4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9 | 54,511,962,788,192,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports. | Safe | 134 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-134", "vulnerability_type": "Use of Externally-Controlled Format String", "description": "The product uses a function that accepts a format string as an argument, but the format string originates from an external source.", "severity": "High", "category": null, "impact": ["Read Memory", "Modify Memory", ... |
static void first_valueFinalizeFunc(sqlite3_context *pCtx){
struct NthValueCtx *p;
p = (struct NthValueCtx*)sqlite3_aggregate_context(pCtx, sizeof(*p));
if( p && p->pValue ){
sqlite3_result_value(pCtx, p->pValue);
sqlite3_value_free(p->pValue);
p->pValue = 0;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | sqlite | 75e95e1fcd52d3ec8282edb75ac8cd0814095d54 | 224,735,450,180,267,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | When processing constant integer values in ORDER BY clauses of window
definitions (see check-in [7e4809eadfe99ebf]) be sure to fully disable
the constant value to avoid an invalid pointer dereference if the expression
is ever duplicated. This fixes a crash report from Yongheng and Rui.
FossilOrigin-Name: 1ca0bd982ab11... | Safe | 476 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-476", "vulnerability_type": "NULL Pointer Dereference", "description": "The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.", "severity": "Medium", "category": "NPD", "impact": ["DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands", "Read Memory", "Modify Memory... |
ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
char *buf)
{
cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap,
"attempting to determine the owner state");
if (rc)
return 0;
rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.owned);
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 1309d7afbed112f0e8e90be9af975550caa0076b | 96,291,443,251,181,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also re... | Safe | 200 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-200", "vulnerability_type": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", "description": "The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.", "severity": "High", "category": "Information Disclosure", "impact": ["Re... |
static int read_private_key(RSA *rsa)
{
int r;
sc_path_t path;
sc_file_t *file;
const sc_acl_entry_t *e;
u8 buf[2048], *p = buf;
size_t bufsize, keysize;
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I0012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to sel... | 1 | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-119"
] | OpenSC | 360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad | 273,441,930,739,679,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 | fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems. | Vulnerable | 415 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-415", "vulnerability_type": "Double Free", "description": "The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.", "severity": "High", "category": "Double-free", "impact": ["Modify Memory", "Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands"], "languages": [null, "C", "C++"], "example": "Example not extracted"... |
char *fmt(const char *format, ...)
{
static char buf[8][1024];
static int bufidx;
int len;
va_list args;
bufidx++;
bufidx &= 7;
va_start(args, format);
len = vsnprintf(buf[bufidx], sizeof(buf[bufidx]), format, args);
va_end(args);
if (len>sizeof(buf[bufidx])) {
fprintf(stderr, "[html.c] string truncated: ... | 0 | [] | cgit | 02a545e63454530c1639014d3239c14ced2022c6 | 290,790,344,037,366,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | Add support for cloning over http
This patch implements basic support for cloning over http, based on the
work on git-http-backend by Shawn O. Pearce.
Signed-off-by: Lars Hjemli <hjemli@gmail.com> | Safe | null | null |
static void lsr_read_fraction_12(GF_LASeRCodec *lsr, GF_Node *elt, u32 tag, const char *name)
{
GF_FieldInfo info;
u32 i, count;
GF_LSR_READ_INT(lsr, count, 1, name);
if (!count) return;
lsr->last_error = gf_node_get_attribute_by_tag(elt, tag, GF_TRUE, 0, &info);
count = lsr_read_vluimsbf5(lsr, "name");
for (i... | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | gpac | faa75edde3dfeba1e2cf6ffa48e45a50f1042096 | 127,776,082,558,666,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | fixed #2213 | Safe | 190 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-190", "vulnerability_type": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound", "description": "The product performs a calculation that can\n produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic\n assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than\n the original value. This occurs whe... |
TfLiteRegistration* Register_LOG_SOFTMAX_REF() {
static TfLiteRegistration r = {
activations::LogSoftmaxInit, activations::LogSoftmaxFree,
activations::LogSoftmaxPrepare,
activations::LogSoftmaxEval<activations::kReference>};
return &r;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tensorflow | 1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35 | 269,406,254,822,249,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | [tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors.
As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages.
We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages o... | Safe | 125 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-125", "vulnerability_type": "Out-of-bounds Read", "description": "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.", "severity": null, "category": "OOB read", "impact": ["Read Memory", "Bypass Protection Mechanism", "DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart", "Varies by Context"... |
static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
void *context)
{
struct p54u_priv *priv = context;
struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev;
struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf;
int err;
if (firmware) {
priv->fw = firmware;
err = p54u_start_ops(priv);
} else {
err = -ENOENT;
dev_... | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 6e41e2257f1094acc37618bf6c856115374c6922 | 7,078,931,777,118,056,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | p54usb: Fix race between disconnect and firmware loading
The syzbot fuzzer found a bug in the p54 USB wireless driver. The
issue involves a race between disconnect and the firmware-loader
callback routine, and it has several aspects.
One big problem is that when the firmware can't be loaded, the
callback routine tri... | Safe | 416 | {"cwe_id": "CWE-416", "vulnerability_type": "Use After Free", "description": "The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. An... |
void nm_walk(NM self, void (*cb)(int, nm_addr *, nm_addr *)) {
int domain;
nm_addr neta, mask;
while(self) {
neta.s6 = s6_of_u128(self->neta);
mask.s6 = s6_of_u128(self->mask);
if(is_v4(self)) {
domain = AF_INET;
neta.s.s_addr = htonl(
net... | 0 | [] | netmask | 29a9c239bd1008363f5b34ffd6c2cef906f3660c | 33,886,120,902,428,146,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | bump version to 2.4.4
* remove checks for negative unsigned ints, fixes #2
* harden error logging functions, fixes #3 | Safe | null | null |
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