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| pretty_name: "From GGUF to Native MLX: A Reproducible Fable Migration and the Memory Policy That Blocked It" | |
| license: mit | |
| language: | |
| - en | |
| tags: | |
| - apple-silicon | |
| - mlx | |
| - quantization | |
| - speculative-decoding | |
| - local-deployment | |
| - memory-policy | |
| - deployment-report | |
| task_categories: | |
| - text-generation | |
| size_categories: | |
| - n<1K | |
| configs: | |
| - config_name: default | |
| data_files: results/processed/evidence.json | |
| # From GGUF to Native MLX | |
| A reproducible migration of the TURBO-Fable 27B checkpoint to native MLX on an | |
| Apple M4 Max, the speculative-decoding measurements that bounded it, and the | |
| serving-runtime memory policy that blocked real agent traffic. | |
| **Chengyi Xu and Nexora** — Nexora Research, October 2026. | |
| - Paper: [`paper/main.pdf`](paper/main.pdf) (7 pages) | |
| - Source: [`paper/main.tex`](paper/main.tex) | |
| - Evidence: [`results/processed/evidence.json`](results/processed/evidence.json) | |
| - Protocol: [`protocol.md`](protocol.md) | |
| ## What this report establishes | |
| 1. **A bounded, verifiable conversion.** A mixed-precision MLX artifact was | |
| produced from the pinned BF16 parent without materializing the checkpoint: | |
| 128-row chunks, 3.08 GB peak resident memory, 493 s conversion body time. | |
| All 686 non-quantized tensors matched the pinned sanitizer element by | |
| element; sampled rows of six real modules matched official quantization | |
| byte for byte; all 2,180 tensor names and shapes matched. | |
| 2. **Speculation helps, but not enough, and not everywhere.** On one | |
| 8,159-token prompt, DFlash2 reached 8.40 tok/s against 5.34 plain | |
| (1.57× decode, ~13% on the whole request) in the best of four interleaved | |
| conditions. A newer kernel generation and a wider prefill both erased the | |
| gain. Stock MLX-VLM MTP gave 6.05 against 5.08. **No condition reached | |
| 20 tok/s.** | |
| 3. **Both real agent sessions timed out.** MTP depth 3 and DFlash2 each ran | |
| ~900 s with 25,778-token initial input, made 4 and 6 tool calls, left the | |
| injected defect unfixed, and failed the independent gate and full suite. | |
| 4. **The blocking failure was policy, not the model.** A serving-runtime | |
| system-memory guard refused an ~25k-token prefill because macOS held | |
| 16.7 GiB compressed and free pages sat under a 1.7 GiB floor. Disabling | |
| that documented guard — leaving the 36 GiB engine budget intact — turned | |
| the identical 25,676-token request into a completed reply in 359.85 s, | |
| with no prompt, tool or budget reduction. | |
| 5. **Twelve protocol checks pass.** OpenAI Chat Completions, OpenAI Responses | |
| and Anthropic Messages each answered on both the native backend and the | |
| Magpie gateway, streaming and non-streaming, with exact markers and | |
| terminal stream events. | |
| ## What this report does not claim | |
| - **No peer review.** This is a deployment engineering report. | |
| - **No ranked intelligence.** We did not measure reasoning or coding accuracy | |
| beyond one injected-defect task, which failed. | |
| - **No 20 tok/s floor.** No configuration reached it. | |
| - **No near-limit context qualification.** 262,144 is allocation metadata | |
| here; the largest recorded actual request is 32,014 tokens. | |
| - **No equivalence claim** between the MLX quantization and the BF16 parent, | |
| or between the MLX artifact and the GGUF release. Layout and sampling were | |
| verified; task accuracy was not. | |
| - **No endorsement of ``uncensored``/``Heretic`` use.** Those are provenance | |
| labels; no refusal-removal or harmful-generation evaluation was performed. | |
| ## Reproducing the evidence | |
| ```bash | |
| python3 code/export_evidence.py results/processed/evidence.json | |
| python3 code/test_export_evidence.py | |
| cd paper && SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=1761696000 tectonic --untrusted main.tex | |
| ``` | |
| `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` is required for a byte-identical rebuild: without it the | |
| PDF embeds the build timestamp and its SHA-256 changes on every run. With it | |
| the PDF is reproducible, which is what makes `SHA256SUMS` meaningful. | |
| The exporter is whitelist-only. It reads finite scalars and enumerated flags, | |
| rejects any string carrying a private path or credential marker, and refuses | |
| to write an artifact whose serialized form contains one. Prompts, tool output, | |
| repository source, agent transcripts and absolute local paths are excluded by | |
| construction, and the test suite proves that a poisoned input is refused. | |
| ## Artifact contents | |
| ``` | |
| paper/main.tex LaTeX source | |
| paper/main.pdf built paper, 7 pages | |
| paper/nexora-paper.sty | |
| code/export_evidence.py whitelist-only exporter | |
| code/test_export_evidence.py contract tests | |
| results/processed/evidence.json | |
| protocol.md | |
| SHA256SUMS | |
| ``` | |
| ## Licence and citation | |
| Code and text: see [`LICENSE`](LICENSE). The model weights are governed by | |
| their upstream licences and are **not** redistributed here. | |
| Citation metadata: [`CITATION.cff`](CITATION.cff). | |