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- # 2. Rekonstruktionstechniken für umfangreiche Texte: Wir interpretieren einen Klassiker
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- John Stuart Mill argumentiert im zweiten Kapitel von *Über die Freiheit* für ein weitreichendes Recht auf Meinungs- und Diskussionsfreiheit. Bereits in den ersten Zeilen nennt Mill seine zentrale These. Nicht nur eine undemokratische, auch eine demokratische Regierung, die "niemals daran [denkt], ihre Zwangsgewalt anders als in Übereinstimmung mit dem zu gebrauchen, was sie für die Volksstimme hält", darf nicht die freie Meinungsäußerung durch Zwangsgewalt beschränken (wir zitieren mit Sigel "ÜdF" nach der Ausgabe von @SchefczykSchmidtPetri2014 unter Angabe der Seitennummer sowie, falls zutreffend, der Absatznummer im zweiten Kapitel):
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- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
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- > Die Gewalt selbst ist unrechtmäßig. Die beste Regierung hat nicht mehr Anspruch darauf als die schlechteste. Sie ist ebenso schädlich oder schädlicher, wenn sie im Einklang mit der öffentlichen Meinung geübt wird als im Widerspruch zu dieser. Wenn die gesamte Menschheit einer Meinung wäre und nur ein Einziger hätte eine entgegengesetzte, so verfügte die Menschheit über kein besseres Recht, diesem ein Schweigen aufzuerlegen, als er, wenn er die erforderliche Macht besäße, der ganzen Menschheit. (ÜdF, S.\ 324, 1)
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- :::
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- Im Laufe von *Über die Freiheit* wird deutlich, dass Mill dabei nicht nur Regierungshandeln, sondern auch das Handeln nicht-staatlicher Akteure vor Augen hat. Wir versuchen daher, den Text zu interpretieren als eine Argumentation für die These
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- \tafel{}
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- ```argdown
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- [Zensurverbot]: Es ist falsch, Personen daran zu hindern, frei ihre Meinung zu äußern.
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- ```
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- \mymnote{Zur Vertiefung}
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- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
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- Liest man das zweite Kapitel im Kontext der weiteren Kapitel von *Über die Freiheit*, so wird deutlich, dass Mill die These als ein *prima facie* Verbot versteht, welches Ausnahmen zulässt. Denn das [`[Zensurverbot]`]{.the} lässt sich präzisier deuten als ein Spezialfall des allgemeinen Prinzips der Nicht-Schädigung, das Mill in der Einleitung als übergeordnetes Beweisziel der Abhandlung ausgibt und demzufolge ``der einzige Zweck, der rechtfertigt, Macht über irgendein Mitglied einer zivilisierten Gemeinschaft gegen seinen Willen auszuüben, der ist, die Schädigung anderer zu verhüten.'' (ÜdF, S. 316)
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- :::
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- Mills Argumentation zugunsten der These [`[Zensurverbot]`]{.the} erstreckt sich über das gesamte zweite Kapitel (ca. 18.000 Wörter) und ist deutlich umfangreicher als die Pro-Kontra-Liste (ca. 700 Wörter), die wir Kapitel\ 1 analysiert haben.
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- \mymnote{Maxime}
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- ::: {.def custom-style="Definition"}
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- Einer der ersten Schritte bei der argumentativen Analyse eines umfangreichen Textes sollte darin bestehen, eine strukturierte Inhaltsangabe zu erstellen.
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- :::
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- Entsprechend dieser Maxime beginnen wir unsere Analyse des Textes damit, uns einen Überblick über dessen gedankliche Struktur zu verschaffen. Im Abschnitt\ 2.1. erstellen wir eine argumentative Inhaltsangabe und zeigen, welche zentralen Interpretationsfragen sich dabei bereits beantworten lassen. Unsere Textgliederung verwenden wir in Abschnitt\ 2.2., um Mills zentrales Argument für das [`[Zensurverbot]`]{.the} so zu rekonstruieren, dass der Aufbau des Textes verständlich wird. In den weiteren Abschnitten 2.3.--2.5. analysieren wir zwei ausgewählte Passagen, an denen sich Besonderheiten der Rekonstruktion umfangreicher Texte anschaulich machen lassen. So verdeutlicht die Analyse von Mills epistemischer Argumentation in Abschnitt 2.3. exemplarisch, wie sich eine umfangreiche argumentative Textpassage (a) als dialektische Argumentation, die aus vielen ineinandergreifenden Argumenten besteht, und (b) als dialektische Entwicklung eines einzigen zentralen Arguments interpretieren und rekonstruieren lässt. Schließlich diskutieren wir in Abschnitt 2.3. entlang Mills religionshistorischer Überlegungen, welche argumentativen Funktionen Beispiele besitzen können, und spielen in Abschnitt 2.5. dann verschiedene Interpretationsszenarien durch. In diesem Zusammenhang präsentiere ich ferner einige weiterführende Hinweise zur Rekonstruktion nicht-deduktiver Begründungen.
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- ## 2.1. Wir verschaffen uns einen Überblick
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- Das zweite Kapitel in "Über die Freiheit" ist nicht durch Zwischenüberschriften in Unterabschnitte gegliedert. Allerdings gibt Mill an verschiedenen Stellen Hinweise zum Aufbau der Argumentation. Ein erster solcher Hinweis findet sich zu Beginn, gleich nachdem die zentrale These eingeführt wurde:
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- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
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- > Ist die [unterdrückte] Meinung richtig, so nimmt man [den Menschen] die Gelegenheit, Irrtum durch Wahrheit zu ersetzen; ist sie unrichtig, so verlieren sie, was fast ebenso wertvoll ist, die deutlichere Auffassung und den lebendigeren Eindruck der Wahrheit, die aus der Konfrontation mit dem Irrtum entspringen.
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- >
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- > Es ist notwendig, diese beiden Hypothesen gesondert zu betrachten, da ihnen verschiedene Argumentationslinien entsprechen. Wir können niemals sicher sein, dass die Meinung, die wir zu unterdrücken suchen, falsch ist, und wären wir dessen sicher, so wäre ihre Unterdrückung noch immer ein Übel. (ÜdF, S.\ 324f., 1)
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- :::
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- Mill will hier zwei Fälle unterscheiden und kündigt an, diese gesondert zu diskutieren. (Allerdings werden die zwei Fälle verschiedentlich charakterisiert, nämlich teils mit Blick auf den faktischen Wahrheitsstatus der unterdrückten Meinung, teils in Bezug auf unseren Wissensstand).
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- _Fall I_: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist richtig / wir sind uns nicht sicher, dass sie falsch ist.
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- _Fall II_: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist falsch / wir sind uns sicher, dass sie falsch ist.
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- Einen zweiten Hinweis zur Struktur der Argumentation gibt die abschließende Zusammenfassung des Gedankengangs.
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- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
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- > Wir haben jetzt erkannt, dass für das geistige Wohlergehen der Menschheit (von dem all ihr anderes Wohlergehen abhängt) die Freiheit der Meinung und die Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung notwendig ist, und zwar aus vier Gründen, die wir nun kurz rekapitulieren werden.
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- >
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- > _Erstens_, wenn eine Meinung zum Schweigen gezwungen wird, so kann diese Meinung, soweit wir sicher wissen können, doch wahr sein. [...]
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- >
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- > _Zweitens_, selbst wenn die zum Schweigen gebrachte Meinung ein Irrtum sein mag, so kann sie doch, und sehr häufig verhält es sich so, ein Körnchen Wahrheit enthalten [...].
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- >
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- > _Drittens_, selbst wenn die allgemein akzeptierte Meinung nicht nur wahr, sondern sogar die ganze Wahrheit ist, so wird sie doch, sofern [...] sie nicht tatsächlich auch angefochten wird, von den meisten derer, die sie annehmen, nur in der Weise eines Vorurteils aufrechterhalten, mit wenig Verständnis oder Gefühl für ihre vernünftigen Gründe. Und nicht allein dies, sondern, _viertens_, die Bedeutung der Lehre selbst wird Gefahr laufen, verloren zu gehen oder geschwächt zu werden und ihres lebenswichtigen Einflusses auf den Charakter und die Handlungsweise beraubt zu werden [...]. (ÜdF, S.\ 366, 40-43)
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- :::
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- Zerfällt der Gedankengang also in zwei oder aber in vier zentrale Teile?
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- Im fortlaufenden Text leitet Mill neu beginnende Abschnitte jeweils mit entsprechenden Bemerkungen ein (z.B. "Wir wollen nun zum zweiten Teil der Argumentation übergehen.", ÜdF, S.\ 346, 21). Achtet man insbesondere auf diese Hinweise, ergibt sich als Grobgliederung des zweiten Kapitels folgende Struktur:
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- \tafel{}
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- ```xml
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- A. Einleitung: Klärung der These und Skizze der Argumentation.
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- [S. 323-325, 1-2]
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- B. Fall i: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist (möglicherweise) wahr.
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- [S. 325-346, 3-20]
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- C. Fall ii: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist (sicher) falsch.
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- [S. 346-358, 21-33]
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- D. Fall iii: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist partiell wahr.
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- [S. 358-365, 34-39]
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- E. Schluss: Zusammenfassung der Argumentation und Diskussionsregeln [S. 366-368, 40-44]
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- ```
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- Damit spitzt sich das Interpretationsproblem aber weiter zu. Denn diese Gliederung scheint zu keiner der oben zitierten Regieanweisungen zu passen: Eingangs werden zwei Fälle (I und II) unterschieden, abschließend werden vier zentrale Argumente zusammengefasst -- aber der Text selbst gliedert sich in drei Abschnitte (Fälle i, ii, und iii). Wie können wir die jeweiligen Passagen denn dann wohlwollend, als widerspruchsfrei und zueinander passend, interpretieren? (Machen wir uns kurz klar: das Interpretationsproblem entsteht nur dadurch, dass wir das Prinzip des Wohlwollens (siehe S.\ XXX) bereits bei der Strukturierung eines Textes berücksichtigen.)
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- Erst die Detailgliederung des Kapitels löst dieses Problem auf und gibt uns ein stimmiges Bild. Man erstellt eine Detailgliederung, d.h. ein möglichst feingliedriges tabellarisches Inhaltsverzeichnis eines Textes, indem man nach sorgfältiger und in der Regel mehrfacher (!) Lektüre Abschnitte und Unterabschnitte markiert und mit eigenen, aussagekräftigen Überschriften versieht [s. @BrunHirschHadorn2014, S. 53ff.]. In der folgenden Detailgliederung sind bereits die argumentativen Funktionen der Unterabschnitte angedeutet, soweit diese aus der bloßen Lektüre hervorgehen.
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- \mymnote{Maxime}
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- ::: {.def custom-style="Definition"}
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- Dient eine strukturierte Inhaltsangabe der argumentativen Analyse eines umfangreichen Textes, so sollten in ihr -- soweit aus der sorgfältigen Lektüre bereits ersichtlich -- die mutmaßlichen argumentativen Funktionen der jeweiligen Abschnitte kenntlich gemacht werden. Die argumentative Textgliederung ist dabei, ähnlich wie die erste Setzung der zentralen These, eine Interpretationshypothese, die im weiteren Verlauf der Rekonstruktion teilweise modifiziert oder gänzlich verworfen werden kann.
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- :::
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- Der erste größere Abschnitt behandelt den _Fall I_. Dieser Abschnitt zerfällt selbst in zwei Teile: Im ersten Teil (B.1.) entfaltet Mill eine ganz allgemeine Argumentation für seine These, im zweiten Teil (B.2.) diskutiert Mill den Fall der Unterdrückung religiöser Überzeugungen.
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- \tafel{}
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- ```xml
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- B. Fall I: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist (möglicherweise) wahr.
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- [S. 325-346, 3-20]
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- B.1. Allgemeine Argumentation [S. 325-331, 3-10]
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- B.1.1. Unfehlbarkeitsargument für Meinungsfreiheit
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- [S. 325, 3]
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- B.1.2. Einschub Kulturkritik [S. 325-326, 4]
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- B.1.3. Einwand "Praktische Sicherheit" gegen
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- Unfehlbarkeitsargument [S. 326-327, 5]
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- B.1.4. Entkräftung des Einwands "Praktische Sicherheit"
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- [327, 6]
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- B.1.5. These und Argumentation: Freie Diskussion als
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- Triebfeder epistemischen Fortschritts [S. 327-329, 7]
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- B.1.6. Fortschrittsargument für Meinungsfreiheit
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- [S. 329, 8]
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- B.1.7. Ausnahmefälle-Einwand und dessen Entkräftung
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- [S. 329-330, 9]
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- B.1.8. Nützlichkeitseinwand gegen Meinungsfreiheit
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- [S. 330, 10]
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- B.1.9. Entkräftung des Nützlichkeitseinwands
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- [S. 330-331, 10]
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- B.2. Argumentation in Bezug auf Spezialfall religiöser
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- Unterdrückung [S. 331-346, 11-20]
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- B.2.1. Einleitende Bemerkungen zur Argumentation
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- [S. 331-332, 11]
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- B.2.2. Historischer Fall: Sokrates [S. 332-333, 12]
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- B.2.3. Historischer Fall: Jesus [S. 333-334, 13]
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- B.2.4. Historischer Fall: Marc Aurel [S. 334-336, 14]
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- B.2.5. Feuerprobeneinwand gegen Meinungsfreiheit
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- [S. 336, 15]
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- B.2.6. Erste Entgegenung Feuerprobe [S. 336-337, 16]
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- B.2.7. Zweite Entgegenung Feuerprobe [S. 337-338, 17]
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- B.2.8. Kritik: Zeitgenössische Fälle der
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- Meinungsunterdrückung [S. 339-340, 18]
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- B.2.9. Kritik: Zeitgenössische Formen der
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- Meinungsunterdrückung [S. 341-343, 19]
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- B.2.10. Ineffektivität und Schädlichkeit der Unter-
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- drückung "ketzerischer" Überzeugungen [S. 344-345, 20]
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- B.2.11. Historisches Fortschrittsargument: Epochen
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- geistiger Blüte [S. 345-346, 20]
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- ```
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- Der zweite größere Abschnitt ist _Fall II_ gewidmet. Nach kurzen einleitenden Bemerkungen behandelt Mill hier zwei verschiedene Argumentationen: eine epistemische (C.2.) und eine motivationale Begründung (C.3.). Schließlich erörtert er einen gewichtigen Einwand (C.4.).
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- \tafel{tafel:dg3}
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- ```xml
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- C. Fall II: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist (sicher) falsch. [S. 346-358, 21-33]
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- C.1. Einleitende Bemerkung [S. 346, 21]
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- C.2. Epistemische Argumentation [S. 346-350, 22-25]
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- C.2.1. Argument: Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe [S. 346, 22]
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- C.2.2. Argument geistiger Vervollkommnung [S. 346-347, 23]
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- C.2.3. Geometrie-Einwand und dessen Entkräftung
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- [S. 347-348, 23]
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- C.2.4. Argument: Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gegen-Gründe
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- [S. 348-349, 23]
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- C.2.5. Einwand "Erkenntnis unnütz" [S. 349, 24]
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- C.2.6. Entkräftung des Einwands mit Verweis auf
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- freie Gelehrtendiskussion [S. 349-350, 25]
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- C.3. Motivationale Argumentation [S. 350-355, 26-30]
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- C.3.1. Argument: Freie Diskussion hält Meinungen
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- lebendig [S. 350-351, 26]
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- C.3.2. Illustration und Präzisierung des Arguments am
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- Beispiel des Zusammenhangs von religiösen Überzeu-
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- gungen und praktischer Lebensführung [S. 351-354, 27-28]
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- C.3.3. Historischer Beleg: Lebendigkeit des frühen
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- Christentums [S. 354-355, 29]
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- C.3.4. Nützlichkeitsargument: Freie Diskussion schützt
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- vor Unheil [S. 355, 30]
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- C.4. Problem der Konsenserzeugung durch epistemischen
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- Fortschritt [S. 355-358, 31-33]
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- C.4.1. Einstimmigkeitseinwand: Konsensuale Erkenntnis
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- ist möglich [S. 355-356, 31]
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- C.4.2. Entkräftung des Eistimmigkeitseinwands und
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- Konzession [S. 356, 32]
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- C.4.3. Einschub: Diskursive Didaktik als Ersatz für
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- echte Meinungsverschiedenheit [S. 356-358, 33]
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- ```
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- Den _Fall III_ (die unterdrückte Meinung ist partiell wahr), der in der anfänglichen Regieanweisung gar nicht unterschieden wurde, führt Mill erst zu Beginn des dritten größeren Abschnitts ein. Im Kern wird dann ein epistemisches Argument präsentiert, illustriert und verteidigt.
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- ```xml
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- D. Fall III: Die unterdrückte Meinung ist partiell wahr. [S. 358-365, 34-39]
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- D.1. Einleitende Bemerkung [S. 358, 34]
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- D.2. Epistemisches Argument: Verbesserung von Überzeugungen
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- durch Ergänzung und partielle Korrektur [S. 358-359, 34]
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- D.3. Illustratives Beispiel aus der Ideengeschichte:
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- Rousseau [S. 359-360, 35]
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- D.4. Illustratives Beispiel: Parteienwettstreit [S. 360-361, 36]
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- D.5. Ausnahmeeinwand "Es gibt ganze Wahrheiten" und dessen
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- Entkräftung am Beispiel der christlichen Ethik [S. 361-365, 37-38]
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- D.6. Konzession: Sektierertum als ungewünschte Nebenfolge
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- freier Diskussion [S. 365, 39]
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- ```
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- Der Schlussteil, schließlich, gliedert sich wie folgt.
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- \tafel{}
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- ```xml
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- E. Schluss [S. 366-368, 40-44]
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- E.1. Zusammenfassung der Argumentation [S. 366, 40-43]
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- E.2. Erörterung der Regeln gelingender Diskussion [S. 366-368, 44]
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- ```
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- Die vier hauptsächlichen Gr��nde, von denen Mill in der Zusammenfassung E.1. spricht (s. obiges Zitat), finden sich wie folgt im Text wieder. Der erstgenannte Grund bezieht sich auf die in B.1. entwickelte Argumentation. Der zweitgenannte Grund ist das epistemische Argument aus Abschnitt D. Und bei den Gründen, die Mill an dritter und vierter Stelle anführt, handelt es sich um das epistemische bzw. das motivationale Argument aus Abschnitt C. Mill fasst die Argumente also nicht in der Reihenfolge zusammen, in der sie im Text präsentiert werden.
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- So ergibt sich ein stimmiges Gesamtbild des Gedankengangs.
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- ## 2.2. Wir nutzen unsere Textgliederung zur Rekonstruktion des zentralen Arguments
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- Ganz wesentlich für die Argumentation scheint somit die Unterscheidung der Fälle _I_, _II_ und _III_ zu sein. Begründungen mit Fallunterscheidungen lassen sich häufig als Schlüsse der Form "Allgemeines Dilemma" rekonstruieren.
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- \mymnote{Maxime}
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- :::{.def custom-style="Definition"}
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- Wird in einer Begründung eine Fallunterscheidung gemacht, so sollte geprüft werden, ob sich die Begründung als "Allgemeines Dilemma" aussagenlogisch rekonstruieren lässt, d.h. als ein Argument der Form
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- ```argdown
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- (1) *A* oder *B* oder ... oder *C*.
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- (2) Wenn *A*, dann *K*.
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- (3) Wenn *B*, dann *K*.
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- ...
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- (4) Wenn *C*, dann *K*.
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- ----
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- (5) *K*
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- ```
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- Bringen wir das zentrale Fallunterscheidungs-Argument in diese Form, so ergibt sich (durch bloßes Einsetzen) eine erste Rekonstruktion, die nun schrittweise überarbeitet werden kann. Im Bild des hermeneutischen Kleeblatts (siehe S.\ XXX), das diesen Rekonstruktionsprozess veranschaulicht und systematisiert, starten wir im Zentrum des Kleeblatts.
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- \tafel{}
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- ```argdown
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- <Zentrale Fallunterscheidung>
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- (1) Die unterdrückte Meinung ist (möglicherweise) wahr, oder die unterdrückte Meinung ist (sicher) falsch, oder die unterdrückte Meinung ist partiell wahr.
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- (2) Wenn die unterdrückte Meinung (möglicherweise) wahr ist, dann gilt: @[Zensurverbot].
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- (3) Wenn die unterdrückte Meinung (sicher) falsch ist, dann gilt: @[Zensurverbot].
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- (4) Wenn die unterdrückte Meinung partiell wahr ist, dann gilt: @[Zensurverbot].
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- ----
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- (5) [Zensurverbot]: Es ist falsch, Personen daran zu hindern, frei ihre Meinung zu äußern (ganz gleich worin diese Meinung besteht).
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- ```
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- Das ist aber eine völlig missglückte Rekonstruktion. Zunächst: Den Ausdruck "die unterdrückte Meinung" muss man hier als Kennzeichnung einer bestimmten Meinung verstehen, sodass in allen Prämissen auf ein und dieselbe Meinung Bezug genommen wird, wobei das Argument aber offen lässt, um welche Meinung genau es sich handelt. So weit, so gut. Doch nun wird deutlich, dass die Prämissen (2)--(4), deren Dann-Teile universelle Aussagen darstellen, völlig unplausibel sind und die Grundidee der Fallunterscheidung nicht einfangen können -- im hermeneutischen Kleeblatt bewegen wir uns gerade auf der Schlaufe "Prämissen und Konklusion". Machen wir das an Prämisse (2) klar. Vereinfacht gesagt behauptet (2): Wenn *eine bestimmte* Meinung wahr ist, dann darf *keine Meinung* (egal ob wahr oder falsch) unterdrückt werden. Das ist abwegig. Im Konsequens sollte natürlich nur über die Fälle geurteilt werden, auf die die Antezedens-Bedingungen zutreffen: Wenn *eine bestimmte* Meinung wahr ist, dann darf *diese bestimmte Meinung* nicht unterdrückt werden. Dazu muss das zentrale Argument modifiziert und prädikatenlogisch analysiert werden, womit wir die erste Schlaufe im hermeneutischen Kleeblatt abschließen und uns erneut in dessen Mitte befinden:
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- \tafel{}
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- ```argdown
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- <Zentrale Fallunterscheidung>
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- (1) Eine unterdrückte Meinung ist i. (möglicherweise) wahr, oder ii. (sicher) falsch, oder iii. partiell wahr.
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- (2) Wenn eine unterdrückte Meinung (möglicherweise) wahr ist, dann gilt: Jede Handlung, die darauf abzielt, Personen daran zu hindern, frei *diese Meinung* zu äußern, ist falsch.
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- (3) Wenn eine unterdrückte Meinung (sicher) falsch ist, dann gilt: ...
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- (4) Wenn eine unterdrückte Meinung partiell wahr ist, dann gilt: ...
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- ----
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- (5) [Zensurverbot]: Es ist falsch, Personen daran zu hindern, frei ihre Meinung zu äußern (ganz gleich worin diese Meinung besteht).
265
- ```
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- Das Argument ist, genau genommen, noch nicht deduktiv gültig (Schlaufe "Begründungsbeziehung" im hermeneutischen Kleeblatt). Die Prämissen quantifizieren über allen unterdrückten Meinungen, während die Konklusion das Zensurverbot in bezug auf jedwede Meinung (ganz gleich ob unterdrückt oder nicht) behauptet. Tatsächlich können wir die Einschränkungen auf unterdrückte Meinungen in den Prämissen ohne weiteres aufheben. Die Prämissen büßen dadurch nichts an Plausibilität ein.
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- Ferner hilft uns diese Rekonstruktion, die eingangs diagnostizierte Mehrdeutigkeit der Fallunterscheidung wohlwollend aufzulösen. Denn die Prämisse (1) wird begrifflich wahr (Schlaufe "Prämissen und Konklusion" im hermeneutischen Kleeblatt), wenn wir die Fälle I und II _nicht_ epistemisch charakterisieren und wie folgt präzisieren.
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- \tafel{}
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- ```argdown
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- <Zentrale Fallunterscheidung>
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- (1) Eine Meinung ist i. gänzlich wahr, oder ii. gänzlich falsch, oder iii. partiell wahr.
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- (2) Wenn eine Meinung gänzlich wahr ist, dann gilt: Jede Handlung, die darauf abzielt, Personen daran zu hindern, frei *diese Meinung* zu äußern, ist falsch.
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- (3) Wenn eine Meinung gänzlich falsch ist, dann gilt: ...
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- (4) Wenn eine Meinung partiell wahr ist, dann gilt: ...
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- ----
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- (5) [Zensurverbot]: Jede Handlung, die darauf abzielt, Personen daran zu hindern, frei ihre Meinung zu äußern, ist falsch (ganz gleich worin diese Meinung besteht).
281
- ```
282
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- Das so rekonstruierte Argument ist deduktiv gültig (Schlaufe "Begründungsbeziehung" im hermeneutischen Kleeblatt).
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- \mymnote{Logisch-semantische Analyse}
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- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
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- Die [`<Zentrale Fallunterscheidung>`]{.arg} realisiert das folgende prädikatenlogische Schlussmuster:
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- ```argdown
292
- (1) (x): Wenn Fx, dann ( Gx v Hx v Ix )
293
- (2) (x)(y): Wenn Fx & Gx & Jy & Ryx, dann Ky
294
- (3) (x)(y): Wenn Fx & Hx & Jy & Ryx, dann Ky
295
- (4) (x)(y): Wenn Fx & Ix & Jy & Ryx, dann Ky
296
- ----
297
- (5) (x)(y): Wenn Fx & Jy & Ryx, dann Ky
298
-
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- /*
300
- | F#: # ist eine Meinung
301
- | G#: # ist gänzlich wahr
302
- | H#: # ist gänzlich falsch
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- | I#: # ist partiell wahr
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- | J#: # ist eine Handlung
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- | R#•: # zielt darauf ab, Personen daran zu hindern,
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- frei ihre Meinung, dass •, zu äußern
307
- | K#: # ist falsch (verboten)
308
- */
309
- ```
310
- :::
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- Außerdem verdeutlicht dieses Argument, wie die verschiedenen Abschnitte des Kapitels argumentativ ineinandergreifen (Schlaufe "Dialektische Funktion" im hermeneutischen Kleeblatt). Jede der Prämissen (2), (3) und (4) spannt eine Teildebatte auf und wird in einem eigenen Abschnitt in Mills Kapitel (nämlich B., C. und D.) gesondert begründet und verteidigt.
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- ## 2.3. Wir rekonstruieren eine dialektische Argumentation
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- <!--Detailrekonstruktion der epistemischen Begründung: Dialektische Argumentation oder dialektische Entwicklung eines Arguments?-->
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- Die argumentative Detailanalyse eines umfangreichen Textes ist ungleich schwieriger als die Rekonstruktion einer vorgefertigten Pro-Kontra-Liste, in der Argumente bereits auf ihren Kerngedanken kondensiert sind. Welche charakteristischen Probleme sich bei der Detailrekonstruktion eines Textes stellen, und welche Lösungsstrategien es dafür gibt, vergegenwärtigen wir uns exemplarisch anhand der Rekonstruktion der Passagen C.2.1.-C.2.4. (s. Tafel\ \ref{tafel:dg3}).
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- Das Argument "Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe" präsentiert Mill in dem folgenden Absatz (C.2.1.):
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- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
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- > Es gibt eine Klasse von Menschen (glücklicherweise sind sie nicht mehr ganz so zahlreich wie früher), die denkt, es sei ausreichend, wenn jemand ohne Zweifel anzumelden dem beipflichtet, was sie für wahr halten, obgleich er keinerlei Kenntnis von den Gründen dieser Meinung hat und selbst gegen die oberflächlichsten Einwände keine tragfähige Verteidigung vorbringen könnte. Wenn es solche Personen erst einmal schaffen, dass ihre Überzeugung von Autoritäten gelehrt wird, dann denken sie natürlich, dass nichts Gutes, aber einiger Schaden entstehen könnte, wenn man erlaubte, diese in Frage zu stellen. Wo ihr Einfluss vorherrscht, da machen sie es fast unmöglich, eine hergebrachte Meinung klug und bedacht zu verwerfen, wenngleich sie immer noch voreilig und unwissend zurückgewiesen werden kann. Denn die Diskussion gänzlich auszuschließen ist selten möglich, und wenn der Einstieg in diese erst einmal gemacht worden ist, dann pflegen Meinungen, die sich nicht auf Überzeugung gründen, beim geringsten Anschein eines Argumentes zu weichen. Abgesehen jedoch von dieser Möglichkeit — nämlich anzunehmen, dass die wahre Meinung im Geist wohnt, aber als ein Vorurteil darin wohnt, als ein Glaube, der von Argumenten unabhängig und ihnen gar nicht zugänglich ist — , ist _dies_ nicht die Art und Weise, wie die Wahrheit von einem vernünftigen Wesen erfasst werden sollte. _Das_ heißt nicht, die Wahrheit zu erkennen. Eine Wahrheit, die _derart_ aufgenommen wird, ist nur ein Aberglaube mehr, der sich bloß zufällig an die Worte klammert, die eine Wahrheit aussprechen. (ÜdF, S.\ 346, 22; kursiv GB)
328
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329
- :::
330
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331
- Aus dem Kontext ist klar: Hier soll dafür argumentiert werden, dass eine Meinung, auch wenn sie falsch ist, nicht unterdrückt werden darf. Doch es ist nicht ganz einfach, in dem Text ein Argument für diese Aussage zu entdecken.
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- In den letzten Sätzen der zitierten Passage wird eine bestimmte Art und Weise der Überzeugungsbildung kritisiert: *so* sollten vernünftige Wesen die Wahrheit nicht erfassen, es handelt sich dabei gar nicht um Erkenntnis etc. Worin besteht die hier kritisierte Art und Weise der Überzeugungsbildung? Worauf beziehen sich die kursiv gesetzten Wörter "dies", "das" und "derart" im zitierten Text? -- Mutmaßlich kritisiert Mill, eine wahre Meinung zu akzeptieren, obgleich man "keinerlei Kenntnis von den Gründen dieser Meinung hat und selbst gegen die oberflächlichsten Einwände keine tragfähige Verteidigung vorbringen könnte" (siehe auch Vertiefungs-Kasten).
334
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- \mymnote{Zur Vertiefung}
336
-
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- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
338
-
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- Diese Interpretation stößt aber bei genauerer Lektüre des Textes auf Schwierigkeiten. Denn Mill schränkt die Kritik ein:
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- > Abgesehen jedoch von dieser Möglichkeit — [...] — , ist _dies_ nicht die Art und Weise, wie die Wahrheit von einem vernünftigen Wesen erfasst werden sollte.
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- Die Einschränkung besteht darin, dass Mill "von dieser Möglichkeit" absieht. Die Möglichkeit, von der abgesehen wird, gehört nicht zur von Mill kritisierten Form der Überzeugungsbildung. Der Einschub in Gedankenstrichen erläutert, was mit "dieser Möglichkeit" gemeint ist:
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- > — nämlich anzunehmen, dass die wahre Meinung im Geist wohnt, aber als ein Vorurteil darin wohnt, als ein Glaube, der von Argumenten unabhängig und ihnen gar nicht zugänglich ist —
346
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347
- Das bedeutet nun aber, dass Mill diese Art und Weise der Überzeugungsbildung gerade *nicht* kritisiert -- entgegen unserer obigen Interpretation. Aber was wird dann kritisiert? Verurteilt Mill vielleicht, Meinungen voreilig und "beim geringsten Anschein eines Argumentes" zu verwerfen? Das hat aber doch nichts mit "Aberglaube" zu tun...
348
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349
- Stößt man bei der argumentativen Analyse eines übersetzten Textes auf derartige Schwierigkeiten, ist es unbedingt empfehlenswert, den Originaltext oder -- in Ermangelung geeigneter Sprachkenntnisse -- eine alternative Übersetzung zu konsultieren!
350
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351
- Im englischen Original heißt es:
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353
- > [The received opinion] may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly, for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not founded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waving, however, this possibility---assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument---this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being.
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- Im Originaltext ist die Wendung "Waving, however, this possibility" mehrdeutig und kann so verstanden werden, dass sie sich auf den vorher _oder_ auf den anschließend beschriebenen Fall bezieht. Die deutsche Übersetzung, mit der wir arbeiten, löst diese Mehrdeutigkeit zugunsten der zweiten Interpretation auf und erzeugt dadurch überhaupt erst unsere Rekonstruktionsschwierigkeiten. Nehmen wir hingegen an, dass das, wovon abgesehen werden soll, die zuvor erwähnte Unmöglichkeit Diskussionen völlig zu unterbinden ist, so beschreibt der Einschub in Gedankenstrichen genau den Fall, der im Weiteren als irrational und als bloßer Aberglaube kritisiert wird. Folgende Übersetzung macht diese Interpretation transparent.
356
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- > Denn die Diskussion gänzlich auszuschließen ist selten möglich, und wenn der Einstieg in diese erst einmal gemacht worden ist, dann pflegen Meinungen, die sich nicht auf Überzeugung gründen, beim geringsten Anschein eines Argumentes zu weichen. Ungeachtet dieser Möglichkeit gilt jedoch: anzunehmen, dass die wahre Meinung im Geist wohnt, aber als ein Vorurteil darin wohnt, als ein Glaube, der von Argumenten unabhängig und ihnen gar nicht zugänglich ist, ist nicht die Art und Weise, wie die Wahrheit von einem vernünftigen Wesen erfasst werden sollte.
358
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- Im vorliegenden Fall können wir also die Interpretationsschwierigkeit mittels Rückgriff auf den Originaltext ausräumen. Das gelingt aber freilich nicht immer. Häufig sind Unstimmigkeiten und Widersprüche eines Textes nicht bloß der Übersetzung geschuldet. Dann besteht eine wichtige Interpretationsentscheidung darin, festzulegen, welche Textstellen zwecks einer konsistenten Rekonstruktion ausgespart werden.
360
-
361
- :::
362
-
363
- Damit ergibt sich als erste Rekonstruktion:
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365
- \tafel{tafel:keog-1}
366
- ```argdown
367
- <Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe>
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- (1) Eine Meinung ist nur dann rationale Erkenntnis, wenn man die Begründung dieser Meinung kennt und die Meinung gegen Einwände verteidigen kann.
370
- ----
371
- (2) Falsche Meinungen sollten nicht unterdrückt werden.
372
- ```
373
-
374
- Das Argument ist so selbstverständlich noch nicht deduktiv gültig. In der zitierten Passage stellt Mill noch zahlreiche weitere Behauptungen auf: dass es eine Klasse von Menschen gibt, die auf Zustimmung erpicht sind, dass solche Leute einen schädlichen Einfluss haben, dass Diskussionen aber niemals gänzlich unterbunden werden können ... Doch _keine_ dieser Aussagen hilft, die Kluft zwischen Prämisse (1) und Konklusion (2) zu überbrücken. All diese Aussagen sind für die Begründung der Konklusion irrelevant und in dieser Hinsicht eine bloße Abschweifung -- sie finden sich daher zu Recht in der Rekonstruktion des Gedankengangs nicht wieder.
375
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376
- \mymnote{Maxime}
377
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378
- :::{.def custom-style="Definition"}
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- Texte enthalten in aller Regel redundante und argumentativ irrelevante Passagen, in denen bereits rekonstruierte Argumente und Thesen bloß wiederholt oder in denen Aussagen ohne jedwede argumentative Funktion getroffen werden. Es ist zulässig und folgerichtig, solche Passagen in der Argumentanalyse auszusparen. (Einen Textabschnitt als redundant oder irrelevant zu betrachten, ist selbst eine Interpretationsentscheidung, die im Laufe des Rekonstruktionsprozesses revidiert werden kann.)
381
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382
- :::
383
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384
- Wie lässt sich der Schluss auf die Konklusion aber dann reparieren? Unterstellt man die grundlegende Norm, dass rationaler Wissenserwerb möglich sein sollte, so kann das Argument wie folgt verstanden werden:
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- \tafel{tafel:keog-2}
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- ```argdown
388
- <Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe>
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-
390
- (1) Die Bedingungen, die rationalen Wissenserwerb überhaupt erst möglich machen, sollten erfüllt sein.
391
- (2) Rationaler Wissenserwerb setzt voraus, dass man die Begründung wahrer Meinungen kennt und diese Meinungen gegen Einwände verteidigen kann.
392
- (3) Man kennt nur dann die Begründung wahrer Meinungen und kann diese Meinungen nur dann gegen Einwände verteidigen, wenn falsche Meinungen nicht unterdrückt werden.
393
- --
394
- Kettenschluss und Modus barbara
395
- --
396
- (4) Falsche Meiunungen sollten nicht unterdrückt werden.
397
- ```
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399
- Gemäß (2) und (3) ist es eine Bedingung rationaler Erkenntnis, dass falsche Meinungen nicht unterdrückt werden. Mit dem allgemeinen Prinzip (1) folgt daher die Konklusion.
400
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401
- \mymnote{Logisch-semantische Analyse}
402
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403
- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
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- Aus (2) und (3) folgt
406
-
407
- ```argdown
408
- (3') Rationaler Wissenserwerb setzt voraus, dass falsche Meinungen nicht unterdrückt werden.
409
- ```
410
-
411
- Folgende Reformulierung macht transparent, wie (1) auf (3') angewendet werden kann.
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- ```argdown
414
- (1) Für jeden Sachverhalt S gilt: Wenn rationaler Wissenserwerb voraussetzt, dass S besteht, dann sollte S bestehen.
415
- ```
416
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417
- <!-- ÜBUNG: <Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe> Wie muss die Zwischenkonklusion aus (2) und (3) lauten, damit mit Praktischem Syllogismus auf (4) geschlossen werden kann? Reformulieren Sie Prämisse (2), sodass transparent wird, wie die Z-Konklusion per Kettenschluss folgt! -->
418
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419
- :::
420
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421
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422
- Gehen wir weiter, zum Unterabschnitt C.2.2. Das [`<Argument geistiger Vervollkommnung>`]{.arg} wird in einer kurzen Passage umrissen (s. ÜdF, S. 346f., 23).
423
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- ![Passage C.2.2. mit argumentativer Textannotation](./abb/Mill_3.2.2.pdf){width=100%}
425
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426
- Die Markierungen und Randnotizen illustrieren die Methode der argumentativen Textannotation nach @BrunHirschHadorn2014 [S.\ 212f.]. Alle argumentativ relevanten Aussagen werden nummeriert, Konklusionen unterstrichen, Prämissen in spitze Klammern gesetzt. Am Rand notiert man die inferentielle Struktur der Argumentation als Baumdiagramm mit Aussagennummern. In unserem Fall zeigt die Textannotation: hier ist jeder Satz argumentativ relevant. Der so entschlüsselte Text lässt sich leicht in ein deduktiv gültiges Argument bringen.
427
-
428
- \tafel{}
429
- ```argdown
430
- <Argument geistiger Vervollkommnung>
431
-
432
- (1) Der Verstand und das Urteilsvermögen aller Menschen soll ausgebildet werden.
433
- (2) Verstand und Urteilsvermögen lassen sich am besten üben am Beispiel von Meinungen höchstiger Wichtigkeit.
434
- (3) Die geeignetste Übung für Verstand und Urteilsvermögen ist die Einsicht in die Gründe seiner Meinungen.
435
- (4) Sollte eine Fähigkeit bei jedem Menschen ausgebildet werden, so sollte jeder die dafür geeignetste Übung an best-geeignetsten Beispielen durchführen.
436
- ----
437
- (5) Jeder Mensch sollte die Gründe seiner wichtigsten Überzeugungen einsehen.
438
- (6) Menschen können nur dann die Gründe ihrer wichtigsten Überzeugungen einsehen, wenn falsche Meinungen nicht unterdrückt werden.
439
- ----
440
- (7) Falsche Meinungen sollten nicht unterdrückt werden.
441
- ```
442
-
443
- Die Zwischenkonklusion (5) folgt aus dem allgemeinen Prinzip (4), dessen Antezedens-Bedingungen mit (1)-(3) erfüllt sind. Aus (5) und (6) folgt die Konklusion (7) dann mit Praktischem Syllogismus (siehe auch logisch-semantische Analyse).
444
-
445
- \mymnote{Logisch-semantische Analyse}
446
-
447
- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
448
-
449
- Die logische Form der Prämisse (4) wird in der folgenden Reformulierung transparent:
450
-
451
- ```argdown
452
- (4) Wenn (i) eine Fähigkeit x bei jedem Menschen ausgebildet werden sollte und (ii) y die dafür geeignetste Übung ist und (iii) sich diese Fähigkeit am besten an Beispielen z einüben lässt, so sollte jeder Übung y an Beispielen z durchführen.
453
- ```
454
-
455
- Diese universelle Aussage lässt sich so spezialisieren, dass die Antezedensbedingungen (i), (ii) und (iii) den Prämissen (1), (2) und (3) entsprechen. Daher folgt die Zwischenkonklusion (5) aus (1)-(4) mit Allspezialisierung und Modus ponens.
456
-
457
- Der Schluss von (5) und (6) auf (7) ist ein "klassischer" praktischer Syllogismus der folgenden Form.
458
-
459
- ```argdown
460
- <Praktischer Syllogismus>
461
-
462
- (1) Es ist geboten, dass Sachverhalt Z. /*Zwecksetzungsprämisse*/
463
- (2) Sachverhalt N ist eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, dass Z besteht. /*Notwendigkeitsprämisse*/
464
- ----
465
- (3) Sachverhalt N ist geboten.
466
- ```
467
-
468
- Schlüsse dieser Form sind (material) deduktiv gültig.
469
-
470
- :::
471
-
472
- An das [`<Argument geistiger Vervollkommnung>`]{.arg} schließt bei Mill eine sich über zwei Seiten erstreckende Passage (C.2.3.-C.2.4.) an, in der Einwände und Erwiderungen einander Schlag auf Schlag folgen. Die Kerngedanken dieser verschiedenen Argumente aufgreifend, können wir den dialektisch dichten Abschnitt als eine Gründehierarchie rekonstruieren, deren Aufbau der Textchronologie entspricht.
473
-
474
- \tafel{tafel:grdhier-323f}
475
- ```argdown
476
- <Argument geistiger Vervollkommnung>
477
- <- <Erkenntnis durch Belehrung>: Man kann die Gründe seiner Meinung sehr wohl ohne freie Diskussion einsehen, nämlich indem man über die relevanten Gründe belehrt wird.
478
- <+ <Geometrie>: Man erwirbt Wissen über geometrische Sachverhalte, indem man die Beweise studiert, ohne eine Gegenposition frei und kontrovers zu diskutieren.
479
- <- <Sonderfall Mathematik>: Bei der Mathematik handelt es sich um einen Sonderfall, insofern es praktisch keine Einwände, sondern nur Beweise gibt. Bereits in den Naturwissenschaften muss man Pro- und Kontra-Gründe zur Kenntnis nehmen und abwägen; erst recht gilt dies für jede praktische Deliberation.
480
-
481
- <Kein Wissen ohne Gegengründe>: Wer zwar die Gründe für eine These kennt, aber nicht imstande ist, die Argumente der gegnerischen Seite zu widerlegen, oder nicht einmal weiß, worin sie bestehen, sollte keiner von beiden Meinungen den Vorzug geben und sich vernünftigerweise eines Urteils enthalten.
482
- <- <Belehrung über Gegengründe>: Man kann die Gründe für und Einwände gegen seine Meinungen sowie deren Entkräftungen sehr wohl ohne freie Diskussion einsehen, nämlich indem man über die relevanten Argumente belehrt wird.
483
- <- <Belehrung ohne Wucht>: Um die Einwände gegen seine Überzeugungen wirklich zu erkennen und deren Gewicht adäquat einschätzen zu können, muss man die "ganze Wucht der Schwierigkeiten fühlen", auf welche die eigene Ansicht trifft. Das setzt voraus, die Einwände in ihrer glaubwürdigsten und überzeugendsten Form kennenzulernen. Und dazu genügt es nicht, die gegnerischen Argumente von seinen eigenen Lehrern zu hören, stattdessen muss man sie von Personen hören, die tatsächlich an sie glauben, die sie im Ernst verteidigen und ihr Äußerstes dafür geben.
484
- <+ <Holismus-Argument>: Man überschaut nur dann die Erklärungs- und Rechtfertigungsbeziehungen in seinem Überzeugungssystem, man erkennt nur dann, dass Tatsachen, die sich dem Anschein nach widersprechen, miteinander vereinbar sind, und man sieht nur dann, dass von zwei scheinbar gleich starken Gründen dem einen und nicht dem anderen der Vorzug zu geben ist, wenn man neben den Gründen auch die Einwände gegen eine These und deren Entkräftungen kennt. Das setzt voraus, sich beiden Seiten gleichermaßen und unparteiisch zuzuwenden.
485
- ```
486
-
487
- Hier stellen sich nun eine ganze Reihe von Fragen, z.B.: Wie beziehen sich diese Gründe auf die zentrale These des Abschnitts? Welche Verbindungen bestehen zwischen den zwei bisher unverknüpften Teilen der Gründehierarchie? Wie kommt das Argument [`<Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe>`]{.arg} aus Unterabschnitt C.2.1. ins Spiel?
488
-
489
- Das sind typische Fragen an eine Gründehierarchie, mit denen wir aus Kapitel\ 1 vertraut sind, und wir wissen, was als nächstes zu tun ist. Nämlich: weitere Thesen und Argumente ergänzen; Konklusionen explizieren und so Gründe in Argumente überführen; dialektische Beziehungen zwischen Argumenten anpassen; einzelne Argumente detailliert rekonstruieren. <!--tafel:grdhier-323f Probieren Sie das doch mal, als Übung!-->
490
-
491
- Der bisherigen Rekonstruktion liegt die Interpretationshypothese zugrunde, dass Mill in den Unterabschnitten C.2.1.-C.2.4. eine dialektische Argumentation entfaltet, d.h. dass hier verschiedene Argumente vorgetragen werden, die sich stützend und angreifend aufeinander beziehen.
492
-
493
- Ein alternativer Interpretationsansatz ist es, in der umfangreichen Passage nicht eine komplexe, in viele Teilargumente zerfallende Argumentation, sondern ein einziges Argument zu sehen, mit dem die zentrale These des Abschnitts sehr differenziert und umsichtig begründet wird und das _dialektisch entwickelt_ wird. Nicht die Argumentation selbst, sondern die Präsentation eines Arguments vollzieht sich im Wechselspiel von Einwand und Entkräftung [s. @betz_theorie_2010, S. 186f.].
494
-
495
- Das epistemische Master-Argument für die These, dass falsche Meinungen nicht unterdrückt werden dürfen, stellt sich am Ende der Passage C.2.1.-C.2.4. wie folgt dar:
496
-
497
- \tafel{}
498
- ```argdown
499
- <Das epistemische Master-Argument>
500
-
501
- (1) Man erkennt höchstens dann, dass eine Meinung gut begründet ist, wenn man die Rechtfertigungs- und Erklärungsbeziehungen innerhalb seines Überzeugungssystems, die für eine bestimmte Meinung relevant sind, überblickt.
502
- (2) Die Rechtfertigungs- und Erklärungsbeziehungen innerhalb seines Überzeugungssystems, die für eine bestimmte Meinung relevant sind, überblickt man nur dann, wenn man sämtliche Gründe, die für und gegen diese Meinung sprechen, kennt und deren Gewicht adäquat einschätzen kann.
503
- (3) Abgesehen von mathematischen Einsichten kennt man nur dann sämtliche Gründe, die für und gegen eine Meinung sprechen, und kann deren Gewicht nur dann adäquat einschätzen, wenn man insbesondere die Einwände in ihrer glaubwürdigsten und überzeugendsten Form kennengelernt hat.
504
- (4) Man lernt Einwände nur dann in ihrer glaubwürdigsten und überzeugendsten Form kennen, wenn man sie von Personen hört, die tatsächlich an sie glauben, die sie im Ernst verteidigen und ihr Äußerstes dafür geben.
505
- (5) Man hört Einwände gegen eine Meinung nur dann von Personen, die tatsächlich an sie glauben, die sie im Ernst verteidigen und ihr Äußerstes dafür geben, wenn diese Meinung frei diskutiert wird.
506
- ----
507
- (6) Abgesehen von mathematischen Einsichten erkennt man höchstens dann, dass eine Meinung gut begründet ist, wenn diese Meinung frei diskutiert wird.
508
- (7) Erkennt man nur dann, dass eine Meinung gut begründet ist, wenn diese Meinung frei diskutiert wird, so ist die freie Diskussion dieser Meinung eine Bedingung, die ihre rationale Erkennntis überhaupt erst möglich macht.
509
- (8) Für jede Meinung gilt: Die Bedingungen, die rationale Erkennntis dieser Meinung überhaupt erst möglich machen, sollten erfüllt sein.
510
- ----
511
- (9) Abgesehen von mathematischen Einsichten sollten alle Meinungen frei diskutiert werden.
512
- ```
513
-
514
- Das Argument ist deduktiv gültig (s. logisch-semantische Analyse). Es vereint zahlreiche Gedanken, die sich in der Gründehierarchie auf verschiedene Argumente verteilen. Und es bringt die argumentative Kernfunktion der komplexen Passage C.2.1.-C.2.4. auf den Punkt.
515
-
516
- \mymnote{Logisch-semantische Analyse}
517
-
518
- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
519
-
520
- Die Prämissen (1)-(5) sind ineinander verkettete Aussagen über notwendige Bedingungen der Art:
521
-
522
- ```argdown
523
- (1) Eine Meinung ist F nur dann, wenn sie G ist.
524
- (2) Eine Meinung ist G nur dann, wenn sie H ist.
525
- ...
526
- ```
527
-
528
- dabei spricht allerdings Prämisse (3) nur über nicht-mathematische Meinungen.
529
-
530
- ```argdown
531
- ...
532
- (3) Eine Meinung der Art non-M ist H nur dann, wenn sie I ist.
533
- (4) Eine Meinung ist I nur dann, wenn sie J ist.
534
- (5) Eine Meinung ist J nur dann, wenn sie K ist.
535
- ----
536
- (6) Eine Meinung der Art non-M ist F nur dann, wenn sie K ist.
537
- ```
538
-
539
- Da sich aus den Prämissen (1), (2), (4) und (5) sofort die jeweiligen Einschränkungen auf non-M-Meinungen ergeben, folgt (6) per Transitivität allquantifizierter Subjunktion aus (1)-(5).
540
-
541
- Dem zweiten Teilargument liegt dann diese gültige Schlussform (der Prädikatenlogik zweiter Stufe) zugrunde:
542
-
543
- ```argdown
544
- ...
545
- (6) Eine Meinung der Art non-M ist F nur dann, wenn sie K ist.
546
- (7) Ist eine Meinung nur F, wenn sie K ist, so ist K selbst, in Bezug auf diese Meinung, eine Eigenschaft der Art *A* .
547
- (8) Alle Eigenschaften der Art *A* in bezug auf eine Meinung sollten auf diese Meinung auch zutreffen.
548
- ----
549
- (9) Eine Meinung der Art non-M sollte die Eigenschaft K besitzen.
550
- ```
551
-
552
- :::
553
-
554
-
555
- Welcher der zwei Rekonstruktionsansätze -- dialektische Argumentation oder Master-Argument -- liefert die bessere Analyse des Abschnitts C.2.1.-C.2.4.? Das lässt sich gar nicht pauschal beantworten. Denn es hängt erstens davon ab, wie überzeugend sich die zwei alternativen Rekonstruktionen im Detail ausführen lassen und wie gut sie sich in die Gesamtanalyse des Textes einfügen. Dafür ist aber, zweitens, nicht zuletzt ausschlaggebend, welche Ziele man mit der Rekonstruktion überhaupt verfolgt. Ist das Interesse etwa ein rein systematisches, so kann es vorteilhaft sein, die argumentative Quintessenz eines Abschnitts in Form eines einzigen Arguments zusammenzufassen. Versucht man aber, den Aufbau eines Gedankengangs in all seinen Verästelungen nachzuvollziehen, so ist eher die feingliedrige Rekonstruktion des Abschnitts als dialektische Argumentation angezeigt.
556
-
557
-
558
-
559
-
560
- <!--
561
- (1) (2)
562
- ┗━┳━┛
563
- (3) (4)
564
- ┗━┳━┛
565
- (5)
566
-
567
- 1 2
568
- ┗┳┛
569
- 3 4
570
- ┗┳┛
571
- 5
572
-
573
- -->
574
-
575
-
576
-
577
- ## 2.4. Wir analysieren Beispiele mit Blick auf ihre argumentative Funktion
578
- <!--2.3. Illustrieren und argumentieren mit Beispielen -- zur Funktion der religionshistorischen Ausführungen-->
579
-
580
- Beispiele können in Texten ganz verschiedene Funktionen besitzen und demenstprechend lassen sich Textstellen, in denen Beispiele geschildert werden, häufig ganz unterschiedlich interpretieren. Wie wertvoll die genaue Analyse von Beispielen für das argumentative Verständnis eines Textes ist, führen wir uns im Folgenden vor Augen. Im Abschnitt C.3. (s. Tafel\ \ref{tafel:dg3}) bringt Mill detaillierte religionshistorische Beispiele an. Wir werden zunächst sehen, wie diese Beispiele wesentlich zur Klärung des *mehrdeutigen* [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} beitragen und dessen Rekonstruktion anleiten können. Dabei dienen die Beispiele der Erläuterung eines Arguments. Anschließend legen wir uns die Frage vor, ob die religionshistorischen Fallbeispiele auch eine eigenständige argumentative Funktion besitzen.
581
-
582
- Im Unterabschnitt C.3.1. bringt Mill das zweite zentrale Argument für die These, dass die Äußerung und Diskussion falscher Meinungen nicht unterdrückt werden darf (s. Tafel\ \ref{tafel:dg3}). Ausbleibende freie Diskussion ist nicht nur ein "geistiges Übel", wie das epistemische Argument nachweist, sondern auch ein "moralisches Übel" -- ein "moral evil":
583
-
584
- <!--ÜBUNG: geistiges vs. moralisches Übel: Thesendifferenzierung-->
585
-
586
- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
587
-
588
- > Tatsache ist jedoch, dass bei Fehlen einer Diskussion nicht nur die Gründe der Meinung vergessen werden, sondern allzu oft auch die Bedeutung der Meinung selbst. Die Worte, die sie zum Ausdruck bringen, hören auf, Ideen anzuregen, oder inspirieren nur zu einem kleinen Teil die Ideen, die sie ursprünglich mitzuteilen bestimmt waren. Statt einer anschaulichen Vorstellung und eines lebendigen Glaubens bleiben nur einige auswendig gelernte Phrasen übrig; oder, falls doch ein Teil bestehen bleibt, dann ist es bloß die Schale und Hülse der Bedeutung, während die feinere Essenz verloren gegangen ist. (ÜdF, S.\ 351, 26)
589
-
590
- :::
591
-
592
- Die Grundidee lässt sich in erster Näherung als praktischer Syllogismus einfangen:
593
-
594
- \tafel{tafel:arg-bed}
595
- ```argdown
596
- <Argument aus der Bedeutung>
597
-
598
- (1) Wahre Meinungen sollten Bedeutung haben, Ideen anregen und lebendig sein.
599
- (2) Meinungen haben nur dann Bedeutung, regen Ideen an und sind lebendig, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
600
- (3) Eine wahre Meinung wird nur dann frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert, wenn die Äußerung der falschen Gegenmeinung nicht unterdrückt wird.
601
- ----
602
- (4) Die Äußerung falscher Meinungen sollte nicht unterdrückt werden.
603
- ```
604
-
605
- Unter logischen Gesichtspunkten ist der Schluss -- entgegen dem ersten Anschein -- nicht trivial (s. logisch-semantische Analyse).
606
-
607
- \mymnote{Logisch-semantische Analyse}
608
-
609
- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
610
-
611
- Aus den Prämissen (2) und (3) folgt transparent die folgende Zwischenkonklusion (2'), sodass sich die deduktive Gültigkeit von [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} auf die Gültigkeit des folgenden Schluss reduziert (in dem ein Prädikat "ohne Beschränkung der Allgemeinheit" vereinfacht wurden):
612
-
613
- ```argdown
614
- (1') Wahre Meinungen sollten Bedeutung haben.
615
- /*
616
- (x): Fx & Gx –> 0Hx
617
- F#: # ist eine Meinung
618
- G#: # ist wahr
619
- H#: # hat Bedeutung
620
- 0%: Es sollte der Fall sein, dass %
621
- */
622
- (2') Wahre Meinungen haben nur dann Bedeutung, wenn die Äußerung der falschen Gegenmeinung nicht unterdrückt wird.
623
- /*
624
- (x): Fx & Gx & Hx –> Ix
625
- I#: die Äußerung der falschen Gegenmeinung von # wird nicht unterdrückt
626
- */
627
- ----
628
- (4) Die Äußerung falscher Meinungen sollte nicht unterdrückt werden.
629
- ```
630
-
631
- Aus (1') und (2') folgt per "allquantifiziertem praktischen Syllogismus" die Zwischenkonklusion (3'), die sich -- wie unten angegeben -- auf zweierlei Weise analysieren lässt. <!--Dieser Schluss setzt voraus, dass wir das Konditional in (2') als strikte Implikation interpretieren.-->
632
-
633
- ```argdown
634
- (1') ...
635
- (2') ...
636
- ----
637
- (3') Für jede wahre Meinungen gilt: Die Äußerung der falschen Gegenmeinung sollte nicht unterdrückt wird.
638
- /*
639
- (x): Fx & Gx –> 0Ix
640
- */
641
- /*
642
- (x)(y): Fx & Gx & Fy & ¬Gy & Rxy –> 0¬Jy
643
- R#+: + ist die Gegenmeinung von #
644
- J#: die Äußerung von # wird unterdrückt
645
- */
646
- ```
647
-
648
- (3') ist nicht mit der intendierten Konklusion (4) identisch (vgl. "Jeder in einem Atommeiler verbaute Stahlträger darf nicht rosten" vs. "Alle Stahlträger dürfen nicht rosten"). Der Schluss auf (4) macht sich zu Nutze, dass jede falsche Meinung die Gegenmeinung zu einer wahren Meinung ist.
649
-
650
- ```argdown
651
- (3') ...
652
- (3'') Jede falsche Meinungen ist die Gegenmeinung einer wahren Meinung.
653
- /*
654
- (y)(Ex): Fy & ¬Gy –> Fx & Gx & Rxy
655
- */
656
- ----
657
- (4) Die Äußerung falscher Meinungen sollte nicht unterdrückt werden.
658
- /*
659
- (y): Fy & ¬Gy –> 0¬Jy
660
- */
661
- ```
662
-
663
- Der Schluss aus (3') und (3'') auf (4) ist gültig und beruht auf dem folgenden prädikatenlogischen Schlussprinzip.
664
-
665
- ```argdown
666
- (1) (x)(Ey): Ax –> Rxy
667
- (2) (x)(y): Ax & Rxy –> Bx
668
- ----
669
- (3) (x): Ax –> Bx
670
- ```
671
-
672
- <!--
673
-
674
- ```argdown
675
- (1) Wahre Meinungen sollten Bedeutung haben, Ideen anregen und lebendig sein.
676
- // (x): Fx & Gx -> 𝐎Hx
677
- (2) Meinungen haben nur dann Bedeutung, regen Ideen an und sind lebendig, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
678
- // (x): Fx & Hx ☐-> Ix
679
- (3) Eine Meinung wird nur dann frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert, wenn die Äußerung keiner Gegenmeinung unterdrückt wird.
680
- // (x): Fx & Ix ☐-> ¬(Ey): Fy & Rxy & Jy
681
- --
682
- Aus (1)-(3)
683
- --
684
- (4) Es sollte nicht der Fall sein, dass die Äußerung einer Gegenmeinung zu einer wahren Meinung unterdrückt wird.
685
- // (x): Fx & Gx -> 𝐎¬(Ey): Fy & Rxy & Jy
686
- (5) Jede falsche Meinung ist die Gegenmeinung einer wahren.
687
- // (y): Fy & ¬Gy -> (Ex): Fx & Gx & Rxy
688
- ----
689
- (6) Die Äußerung falscher Meinungen sollte nicht unterdrückt werden.
690
- // (y): Fy & ¬Gy -> 𝐎¬Jy
691
- ```
692
-
693
- Der Schluss auf (6) wird hier transparenter:
694
-
695
- ```argdown
696
- (1) *Annahme um des Arguments willen:* Es gibt eine falsche Meinung, sie heiße *a*, deren Äußerung unterdrückt werden darf.
697
- // Fa & ¬Ga & ¬𝐎¬Ja
698
- (2) Jede falsche Meinung ist die Gegenmeinung einer wahren.
699
- // (y): Fy & ¬Gy -> (Ex): Fx & Gx & Rxy
700
- ----
701
- (3) Es gibt eine wahre Meinung, sie heiße *b*, deren Gegenmeinung *a* ist.
702
- // Fb & Gb & Rba
703
- (4) Es sollte nicht der Fall sein, dass die Äußerung einer Gegenmeinung zu einer wahren Meinung unterdrückt wird.
704
- // (x): Fx & Gx -> 𝐎¬(Ey): Fy & Rxy & Jy
705
- ----
706
- (5) Fb & Gb -> 𝐎¬(Ey): Fy & Rby & Jy
707
- ----
708
- (6) 𝐎¬(Ey): Fy & Rby & Jy
709
- ----
710
- (7) 𝐎(y): Fy & Rby -> ¬Jy
711
- --
712
- Aus (1),(3),(7)
713
- --
714
- (8) 𝐎¬Ja
715
- --
716
- Widerspruch zu (1)
717
- --
718
- (9) Es gibt keine falsche Meinung, deren Äußerung unterdrückt werden darf.
719
- ----
720
- (10) Die Äußerung falscher Meinungen sollte nicht unterdrückt werden.
721
- // (y): Fy & ¬Gy -> 𝐎¬Jy
722
- ```
723
- -->
724
- :::
725
-
726
- Der Gehalt des Gedankengangs ist in der ersten Analyse, die sich nah am Text orientiert, noch unbestimmt. Was genau meint Mill, wenn er von der Bedeutung, der Lebendigkeit und der Ideen-Anregung spricht? Verschleiert die Mehrdeutigkeit den Gedankengang, verdeckt womöglich gar dessen Schwächen; oder nutzt Mill Mehrdeutigkeit hier geschickt als ein sprachliches Mittel, mit dem die Vielschichtigkeit des Arguments effizient angedeutet werden kann? Um das zu entscheiden, müssen wir die Unbestimmtheit auflösen.
727
-
728
- \mymnote{Maxime}
729
-
730
- ::: {.def custom-style="Definition"}
731
-
732
- Unbestimmtheit und Mehrdeutigkeit sind in der Argumentanalyse aufzulösen. Dabei sollte man ausgehend von jeder Option zur Auflösung (d.h., ausgehend von jeder Interpretationsmöglichkeit) gesondert versuchen, den Gedanken wohlwollend zu rekonstruieren. Ergibt sich in keiner Interpretationsmöglichkeit ein gutes Argument, so verdeckt die Unbestimmtheit eine Schwäche der Begründung; ergibt sich je nach Interpretation jedoch ein anderes, gleichermaßen gutes Argument, markiert die Mehrdeutigkeit nur die Vielschichtigkeit des Gedankengangs.
733
-
734
- :::
735
-
736
- Ein erster Blickwinkel, aus dem man das Argument verstehen kann, ist die sprachphilosophische Perspektive. Demgemäß behauptete Mill, dass Meinungen ohne freie Diskussion genauso wenig Bedeutung wie die sinnlosen Zeichenketten "Kein Wechtfing hat eine Klanse" oder "Gestern war es kälter als draußen" besitzen. Meinungsäußerungen sind nur noch Worthülsen, mit denen keine lebendigen Ideen korrespondieren. Zugespitzt könnte man sagen: Es handelt sich nur noch um Scheinmeinungen.
737
-
738
- Doch diese bedeutungstheoretische Rekonstruktion macht nicht verständlich, warum das Argument Mill zufolge zeigt, dass freie Diskussion ein "moralisches Übel" ist, und nicht bloß ein "geistiges". "Moralisch" verwendet Mill hier in einem allgemeinen Sinne von "praktisch, das Handeln betreffend". Und Scheinmeinungen sind zunächst ein geistiges, kein praktisches Problem.
739
-
740
- Neben der sprachphilosophischen Lesart lässt sich das Argument allerdings auch psychologisch deuten: Meinungen hören auf, anregend und stimulierend zu sein, wenn man sie nicht frei diskutiert. Hierbei handelt es sich schon eher um ein praktisches Problem.
741
-
742
- Das mehrschichtige [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} wird in (C.3.1.) nur kurz präsentiert. Allerdings folgt darauf eine längere Passage (Unterabschnitte C.3.2. und C.3.3.), die die kurz skizzierte, ganz allgemein gehaltene Begründung sehr ausführlich am Beispiel des religiösen Glaubens illustrieren.
743
-
744
- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
745
-
746
- > Unter Christentum verstehe ich hier [...] die Maximen und Gebote des Neuen Testaments. Diese werden von allen bekennenden Christen als heilig erachtet und als Gesetz anerkannt. Und doch ist es kaum zu viel gesagt, dass nicht ein Christ unter tausend seine individuelle Lebensführung anhand dieser Gesetze ausrichtet oder überprüft. [...] Sie glauben sie, wie Leute an etwas glauben, was sie stets gelobt und nie diskutiert gehört haben. Aber im Sinn jenes lebendigen Glaubens, der die Lebensführung bestimmt, glauben sie an jene Lehren nur bis zu dem Punkt, bis zu dem es üblich ist, nach ihnen zu handeln. [...] Diese Lehren haben keinen Einfluss auf gewöhnliche Gläubige, sind keine Macht in ihrem Geist. [...] Wann immer die Lebensführung betroffen ist, sehen sich die Menschen nach Herrn A.\ und Herrn B.\ um, um sich von ihnen anweisen zu lassen, wie weit man im Gehorsam gegenüber Christus zu gehen hat. (ÜdF, S.\ 353f., 28)
747
-
748
- :::
749
-
750
- Versteht man diese Ausführungen zum religiösen Glauben als Erläuterungen des abstrakten Arguments, so wird deutlich, dass Mill weniger eine sprachphilosophische als vielmehr eine motivationale Lesart vor Augen hat. Denn die hier geschilderten religiösen Überzeugungen, als Beispiele für Meinungen ohne Bedeutung, sind natürlich nicht im engeren Sinne bedeutungslos (wie die Zeichenkette "Kein Wechtfing hat eine Klanse"). Es ist durchaus verständlich, was es heißt, dass man seine Feinde lieben solle. Nein, das charakteristische Merkmal der religiösen Meinungen ist, dass sie keinen Einfluss auf die Lebensführung haben. Die Lebendigkeit und die Bedeutung ("meaning") einer Meinung besteht dementsprechend in ihrer motivationalen Kraft und handlungspraktischen Wirksamkeit.
751
-
752
- Fassen wir die Diskussion des religiösen Glaubens in den Unterabschnitten C.3.2. und C.3.3. als Erläuterung und Präzisierung der allgemein gehaltenen Begründung in C.3.1. auf, so spricht viel für eine motivationale Deutung des Arguments. (An dieser Stelle nur andeuten kann ich, dass sich die sprachphilosophische und motivationale Lesart des Arguments in C.3.1. möglicherweise vereinen lassen, da sie vermittels Mills bedeutungstheoretischer und handlungstheoretischer Hintergrundannahmen eng miteinander zusammenhängen [s. @KuenzleSchefczyk2009, S.\ 30ff.]). <!-- ÜBUNG -->
753
-
754
- Soweit zur klärenden und erläuternden Funktion der Beispiele. Mit Beispielen kann man aber nicht nur illustrieren, sondern auch auf vielfältige Weise argumentieren (s. Vertiefungskasten). Hat Mills ausführliche Diskussion religiöser Überzeugungen also zudem eine eigenständige argumentative Funktion, die über die bloße Klärung des Arguments in C.3.1. hinausgeht?
755
-
756
- \mymnote{Zur Vertiefung}
757
-
758
- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
759
-
760
- Beispiele können zu ganz verschiedenen argumentativen Zwecken angeführt werden.
761
-
762
- Ein Beispiel kann etwa, als _Gegenbeispiel_, eine allgemeine Aussage widerlegen.
763
-
764
- ```argdown
765
- (1) Wickie der Wal ist ein Tier und kann sprechen.
766
- ----
767
- (2) Es ist falsch, dass kein Tier sprechen kann.
768
- ```
769
-
770
- Beispiele können auch als Vergleichsobjekte in _Analogieargumenten_ dienen.
771
-
772
- ```argdown
773
- (1) Niemand versteht den Plot des letzten Films von D.L.
774
- (2) Dieser Film ähnelt in jeder für seine Verständlichkeit relevanten Hinsicht dem letzten Film von D.L.
775
- ----
776
- (3) Niemand versteht den Plot dieses Films.
777
- ```
778
-
779
- Oder sie werden als _paradigmatische Fälle_ verwendet.
780
-
781
- ```argdown
782
- (1) Norbert kann prädikatenlogisch schlussfolgern.
783
- (2) Hinsichtlich seiner kognitiven Fähigkeiten ist Norbert ein typischer Viertklässler.
784
- ----
785
- (3) Viertklässler können prädikatenlogisch schlussfolgern.
786
- ```
787
-
788
- Auch in Argumenten *a fortiori* wird mit Beispielen operiert.
789
-
790
- ```argdown
791
- (1) Sirius ist der hellste Stern am Himmel.
792
- (2) Selbst Sirius ist bei Tage nicht zu sehen.
793
- ----
794
- (3) Kein Stern ist bei Tage zu sehen.
795
- ```
796
-
797
- Diese vier Argumente sind deduktiv gültig bzw. lassen sich leicht um weitere Prämissen ergänzen, sodass dies der Fall ist. <!-- Übung -->
798
-
799
- Häufig werden Beispiele allerdings auch angeführt als _Belege_ für eine Aussage, zur _induktiven Stützung_, als _empirische Bestätigung_. In einem solchen "Schluss" folgt die Konklusion nicht bereits logisch-begrifflich aus den sie stützenden Prämissen. Inwieweit sich derartige Bestätigungen einer These gleichwohl als deduktive Argumente rekonstruieren lassen -- und welche Alternativen es dazu gibt, verfolgen wir im Weiteren am Beispiel von Mills religionshistorischen Ausführungen. Unsere Frage lautete: Besitzen die religionshistorischen Beispielfälle eine eigenständige argumentative Funktion?
800
-
801
- :::
802
-
803
- In diesem Zusammenhang ist folgende Textstelle aus Unterabschnitt C.3.3. aufschlussreich, in der Mill die beispielhafte Erörterung religiöser Meinungen vertieft, indem er die Situation des Christentums im 18. Jahrhundert mit der der frühen Christen kontrastiert:
804
-
805
- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
806
-
807
- > Nun können wir aber sehr sicher sein, dass sich die Sache zur Zeit der ersten Christen nicht so, sondern völlig anders verhielt. Wäre es so wie bei uns gewesen, dann hätte sich das Christentum niemals von einer obskuren Sekte verachteter Hebräer zur Religion des Römischen Reiches entwickelt. Als ihre Feinde sagten: »Seht, wie diese Christen einander lieben!« (eine Bemerkung, die heutzutage kaum einer machen würde), hatten diese sicherlich ein viel lebhafteres Gefühl von der Bedeutung ihres Glaubens, als sie es seither jemals gehabt haben. Und diesem Grund ist es wahrscheinlich hauptsächlich geschuldet, dass das Christentum jetzt so wenig Fortschritte in der Ausweitung seines Wirkungsgebiets macht und nach achtzehn Jahrhunderten immer noch nahezu nur auf Europäer und die Nachfahren von Europäern beschränkt ist. (ÜdF, S.\ 354, 29)
808
-
809
- :::
810
-
811
- Gerade in dieser Gegenüberstellung können die Beispiele nun als historische Belege für das [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} -- und dort insbesondere für die Prämisse (2) -- gewertet werden (s.\ Tafel\ \ref{tafel:arg-bed}). Die Interpretationshypothese, dass die Beispiele eine derartige argumentative Funktion erfüllen, lässt sich prüfen, indem man versucht, den Text entsprechend zu rekonstruieren. Das Argument skizzieren wir zunächst wie folgt:
812
-
813
- \tafel{tafel:historischerbeleg-skizz}
814
- ```argdown
815
- <Beleg durch Religionsgeschichte>: Der Glaube der frühen Christen hat ihre Lebensführung bestimmt und ist schließlich zu einer Staatsreligion geworden. Im 19. Jahrhundert hat der christliche Glaube keine motivationale Kraft mehr und breitet sich auch nicht aus. Das bestätigt: Meinungen haben nur dann Bedeutung, regen Ideen an und sind lebendig, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
816
- +> <Argument aus der Bedeutung>
817
- ```
818
-
819
- Warum bestätigt der religionshistorische Befund die sehr allgemeine These? Wieso besteht eine Begründungsbeziehung zwischen den spezifischen Prämissen und der generellen Konklusion? Solange wir diese Fragen nicht beantworten können, haben wir den Kerngedanken des Arguments letztlich nicht verstanden. Im folgenden Abschnitt untersuchen wir daher genauer, ob die religionshistorischen Fallbeispiele auch eine eigenständige argumentative Funktion besitzen, und rekonstruieren die Überlegung aus Tafel\ \ref{tafel:historischerbeleg-skizz} im ersten Anlauf als einfachen Schluss auf die beste Erklärung. Die Rekonstruktion dieses Arguments als deduktiver Schluss (s. rekonstruktiver Deduktivismus, S.\ XXX) wirft indes Probleme auf. Daran anknüpfend illustrieren wir drei anspruchsvolle und weiterführende Rekonstruktionstechniken, mit denen sich gehaltserweiternde Begründungen, wie etwa die Bestätigung einer Hypothese durch Einzelbelege, angemessen analysieren lassen.
820
-
821
- ## 2.5. Wir rekonstruieren einen Schluss auf die beste Erklärung
822
-
823
- Wie hängen also im [`<Beleg durch Religionsgeschichte>`]{.arg} Prämissen und Konklusion zusammen? Zwischen Prämissen und Konklusion scheint jedenfalls eine Erklärungsbeziehung zu bestehen. Die Konklusion _erklärt_, warum die Prämissen der Fall sind. Diese Einsicht gibt einen Wink, wie die Begründungsbeziehung rekonstruiert werden könnte, nämlich als sogenannter Schluss auf die beste Erklärung. In der einfachsten Form besitzen Schlüsse auf die beste Erklärung zwei Prämissen, die erste Prämisse stellt den zu erklärenden Sachverhalt fest, die zweite Prämisse identifiziert die beste Erklärung der zu erklärenden Tatsache.
824
-
825
- \tafel{}
826
- ```argdown
827
- (1) [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund]: Der Glaube der frühen Christen hat ihre Lebensführung bestimmt und ist schließlich zu einer Staatsreligion geworden; im 19. Jahrhundert hat der christliche Glaube keine motivationale Kraft mehr und breitet sich auch nicht aus.
828
- (2) Die beste Erklärung von @[Ideengeschichtlicher Befund] ist, dass Meinungen nur dann Bedeutung haben, Ideen anregen und lebendig sind, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
829
- --
830
- Schluss auf die beste Erklärung
831
- --
832
- (3) [Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]: Meinungen haben nur dann Bedeutung, regen Ideen an und sind lebendig, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
833
- ```
834
-
835
- Die implizite Prämisse (2) ist eine ziemlich starke Behauptung -- und steht sogar im Widerspruch zu Zugeständnissen, die Mill im Text macht.
836
-
837
- ::: {.small custom-style="Zitat"}
838
-
839
- > Es gibt zweifellos *viele* Gründe, warum [solche] Lehren, die das entscheidende Merkmal einer Sekte sind, mehr von ihrer Lebenskraft bewahren als diejenigen, die allen anerkannten Sekten gemeinsam sind [...]. Aber ein Grund ist sicher der, dass diese besonderen Lehren mehr in Frage gestellt und häufiger gegen offene Leugner verteidigt werden müssen. (ÜdF, S.\ 354f., 29; kursiv GB)
840
-
841
- :::
842
-
843
- Anstatt zu behaupten, dass das Prinzip [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} die beste Erklärung für den historischen Befund ist, sollte Prämisse (2), um ihrer Plausibilität willen, nur schwächer behaupten, dass [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} _Teil_ einer entsprechenden besten Erklärung ist.
844
-
845
- Mit dieser Modifikation wird das rekonstruierte Argument zwar insgesamt glaubhafter, aber immer noch nicht deduktiv gültig. Dazu muss die Schlussregel des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung als Prämisse eingefügt und der bisherigen Rekonstruktion angepasst werden.
846
-
847
- \tafel{tafel:sadbe1}
848
- ```argdown
849
- (1) [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund]
850
- (2) Bestandteil der besten Erklärung des in @[Ideengeschichtlicher Befund] beschriebenen Sachverhalts ist die Annahme, dass Meinungen nur dann Bedeutung haben, Ideen anregen und lebendig sind, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
851
- (3) Ist die Annahme, dass A, Bestandteil der besten Erklärung einer Tatsache E, so gilt A.
852
- ----
853
- (4) [Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]: Meinungen haben nur dann Bedeutung, regen Ideen an und sind lebendig, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
854
- ```
855
-
856
- In dieser Rekonstruktion taucht aber eine weitere Schwierigkeit auf: Das als Prämisse (3) ergänzte Schlussprinzip ist unhaltbar, da durch unzählige Gegenbeispiele widerlegt. Verbrennung konnte man sich im 18. Jahrhundert nur unter der Annahme erklären, dass es Phlogiston gibt. Lange Zeit war die beste Erklärung für die Kraterform des Nördlinger Ries die Annahme, dass es durch vulkanische Aktivität entstanden ist. Dass ich im Spiel fünfzehnmal die Eins würfele, kann ich mir nur damit erklären, dass der Würfel nicht fair ist -- dabei war es bloß Zufall. Manchmal ist die zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt beste Erklärung falsch und tatsächlich die zweit- oder drittbeste Erklärung richtig.
857
-
858
- Es gibt drei Möglichkeiten, auf diese Schwierigkeit zu reagieren:
859
-
860
- - *Strategie 1*: Verteidigung der Rekonstruktion mit falscher Schlussprämisse,
861
- - *Strategie 2*: Abschwächung der Schlussprämisse,
862
- - *Strategie 3*: Zwei-Ebenen-Analyse des Bestätigungsschlusses.
863
-
864
- Gemäß der ersten Strategie (die Georg Brun erdacht hat) verteidigt man die Rekonstruktion wie folgt: Die Schlussprämisse (3) ist offenkundig falsch. Das macht die Rekonstruktion aber nicht problematisch, insbesondere verletzt die Analyse nicht das Prinzip des Wohlwollens. Vielmehr ist es so, dass wir in zahlreichen Kontexten (und so auch Mill in Abschnitt C.3.3.) offenkundig falsche allgemeine Prinzipien unseren Überlegungen als "Default-Prinzipien" oder "Normalfall-Annahmen" zugrunde legen. Das Schlussprinzip des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung unterstellen wir, weil dies _alles in allem_ epistemisch zweckmäßig ist und in der Regel zu wahren Konklusionen führt. Und erst wenn andere Argumente gegenläufige Ergebnisse liefern, geben wir die allgemeine Schlussprämisse auf. Die Rekonstruktion in Tafel\ \ref{tafel:sadbe1} ist daher nicht defekt, sondern spiegelt eine Eigentümlichkeit des gehaltserweiternden Argumentierens mit empirischen Befunden wieder.
865
-
866
- Demgegenüber gesteht die zweite Rekonstruktionsstrategie zu, dass das Argument modifiziert und die Schlussprämisse abgeschwächt werden muss. Dazu reicht es nicht, die Antezedensbedingungen von (3) zu stärken (z.B.: um die Bedingung zu ergänzen, dass Tatsache E nicht bloßem Zufall geschuldet und erklärungsbedürftig ist). Denn auch gegen so geänderte Prinzipien finden sich Gegenbeispiele, solange im Konsequens behauptet wird, die erklärende Annahme sei wahr. Deshalb muss das Konsequens von (3) modifiziert werden. Anstatt dort zu behaupten, die Erklärung sei wahr, ließe sich etwa sagen, die erklärende Annahme sei wahrscheinlich wahr oder es sei vernünftig, die Erklärung als richtig zu unterstellen.
867
-
868
- \tafel{tafel:sadbe2}
869
- ```argdown
870
- ...
871
- (3) Ist die Annahme, dass A, Bestandteil der besten Erklärung einer Tatsache E, so ist vernünftig, A als wahr zu unterstellen.
872
- ----
873
- (4) Es ist vernünftig, als wahr zu unterstellen, dass Meinungen nur dann Bedeutung haben, Ideen anregen und lebendig sind, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
874
- ```
875
-
876
- Mit der Konsequens-Abschwächung von (3) ändert sich aber auch ganz analog die Konklusion des Arguments. Das wiederum heißt, dass die Konklusion nicht mehr mit der Prämisse (2) des [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} übereinstimmt und der Schluss auf die beste Erklärung daher jenes Argument -- gemäß unserer Definition dialektischer Beziehungen (Verweis\ XXX) -- gar nicht stützt. Auch das ist allerdings kein unüberwindliches Problem (s.\ Vertiefungskasten).
877
-
878
- \mymnote{Zur Vertiefung}
879
-
880
- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
881
-
882
- Denn vielleicht deutet die Schwierigkeit, auf die wir hier stoßen, nur darauf hin, dass wir die dialektischen Beziehungen in Kapitel 1 (S. XXX) ohnehin zu eng definiert haben. Definiert man hingegen, dass ein Argument\ A ein Argument\ B genau dann stützt, wenn die Konklusion von Argument\ A
883
-
884
- (i) mit einer Prämisse von Argument\ B identisch ist _oder_
885
- (ii) in Bezug auf eine Prämisse von Argument\ B behauptet, dass es vernünftig ist, diese Prämisse als wahr anzunehmen;
886
-
887
- so stützt der Schluss auf die beste Erklärung das [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg}. Um die Position eines Proponenten in einer komplexen Debatte zu bewerten, den Begründungsstatus einer These zu bestimmen oder die eigenen Überzeugungen auf Stimmigkeit zu prüfen -- kurz: um die komplexe Argumentation zu evaluieren [siehe etwa @BrunBetzRaU2016, S. 62-67; und @betz_theorie_2010] -- ist es dann geboten, in der Rekonstruktion zwischen der einfachen dialektischen Stützung (i) und der Meta-Stützung (ii) zu unterscheiden.
888
-
889
- Allerdings ist diese Erweiterung der dialektischen Beziehungen nicht einmal zwingend geboten, um die Interpretationsschwierigkeit zu beseitigen. Die in Tafel\ \ref{tafel:sadbe2} angeführte Rekonstruktion, gemäß der der Schluss auf die beste Erklärung das [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} _nicht_ stützt, lässt sich wie folgt verteidigen: In einem logischen Sinne besteht zwischen dem Schluss auf die beste Erklärung und dem [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} tatsächlich keine dialektische Beziehung. Gleichwohl muss, wenn man sich eine Meinung bezüglich der These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} bildet, der Schluss auf die beste Erklärung genauso zur Kenntnis genommen werden wie ein Stützungsargument, dessen Konklusion mit der These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} identisch ist. Denn die Konklusion des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung äußerst sich ja explizit zur rationalen Meinungsbildung bezüglich dieser Aussage. Ganz allgemein gilt, dass eine vernünftige Meinungsbildung bezüglich einer Aussage *p* zweierlei berücksichtigt: erstens alle inferentiellen Beziehungen, in denen die Aussage *p* zu anderen Aussagen steht, sowie zweitens alle Argumente, die für oder gegen normativ-doxastische Aussagen *über* die Aussage *p* sprechen. Rekonstruktionspraktisch bedeutet dies, dass es unproblematisch ist, eine komplexe, vielschichtige Argumentation um die These *p* als zwei miteinander unverbundene Argumentkarten zu rekonstruieren, nämlich
890
-
891
- - als eine Argumentkarte (auf der "Objektebene"), in der die Aussage *p* als Prämisse und Konklusion in Argumenten fungiert und die die inferentiellen Beziehungen zwischen der Aussage *p* und weiteren Aussagen expliziert, sowie
892
- - als eine Argumentkarte (auf der "Metaebene") mit Argumenten für und gegen normativ-doxastische Aussagen, die sich zur rationalen Meinungsbildung bezüglich *p* äußern und insofern über die Aussage *p* sprechen.
893
-
894
- Die Evaluation der Argumentation und insbesondere die rationale Meinungsbildung berücksichtigt dann beide Karten.
895
-
896
- :::
897
-
898
- Damit zur dritten, oben unterschiedenen Strategie, der Zwei-Ebenen-Analyse des Bestätigungsschlusses. Warum fällt es uns eigentlich so schwer, Mills Diskussion der religionshistorischen Beispiele zu rekonstruieren? Eine Diagnose lautet: Weil wir versuchen, diese Überlegungen als ein Argument rekonstruieren, dessen inferentielle Funktion (abgebildet durch die dialektischen Beziehungen in der Karte) seiner dialektischen Funktion (Begründung einer bestimmten Aussage) entspricht. Vereinfacht gesagt: Wir rekonstruieren die Begründung so, dass die zu begründende Aussage die Konklusion des Arguments ist. Dieses Vorgehen ist üblich und für gewöhnlich auch zweckmäßig, aber eben nicht zwingend. Stattdessen kann man nämlich -- auf der ersten Ebene -- die *inferentiellen Beziehungen*, in denen die Aussagen über die historischen Beispiele stehen, losgelöst von intendierten Begründungsbeziehungen rekonstruieren, ohne dabei problematische implizite Prämissen zu unterstellen. Anschließend lässt sich dann -- auf der zweiten Ebene -- ausmachen, welche (womöglich vielfältigen) *Begründungsbeziehungen* in dem so rekonstruierten inferentiellen Netz bestehen. Setzen wir diese dritte Strategie um!
899
-
900
- Welche unstrittigen, leicht zu rekonstruierenden inferentiellen Beziehungen bestehen zwischen den Aussagen, die uns hier interessieren? Folgen vielleicht aus der allgemeinen These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} -- bei entsprechender Anwendung auf die jeweilige historische Situation -- die speziellen Befunde, wie die folgende Skizze andeutet?
901
-
902
- \tafel{tafel:igbele_grdhr1}
903
- ```argdown
904
- [Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]: Meinungen haben nur dann Bedeutung, regen Ideen an und sind lebendig, wenn sie frei und uneingeschränkt diskutiert werden.
905
- +> <Brückenargument 1>
906
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 1]: Der Glaube der frühen Christen hat ihre Lebensführung bestimmt.
907
- +> <Brückenargument 2>
908
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 2]: Der Glaube der frühen Christen ist schließlich zu einer Staatsreligion geworden.
909
- +> <Brückenargument 3>
910
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 3]: Im 19. Jahrhundert hat der christliche Glaube keine motivationale Kraft mehr.
911
- +> <Brückenargument 4>
912
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 4]: Im 19. Jahrhundert breitet sich der christliche Glaube nicht aus.
913
- ```
914
-
915
- Die Brückenargumente 3 und 4 lassen sich unter Hinzunahme weiterer impliziter Prämissen, die in Einklang mit dem Text stehen, wohlwollend rekonstruieren. Das gilt jedoch nicht für die Brückenargumente 1 und 2; die ideengeschichtliche Befunde zum frühen Christentum folgen nicht einfach aus der These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the}. <!--tafel:igbele_grdhr1 ÜBUNG-->
916
-
917
- In welchen Beziehungen stehen die Befunde 1 und 2 denn dann zur allgemeinen These? Freilich, sie folgen aus der stärkeren These, dergemäß freie Diskussion notwendig _und_ hinreichend für Bedeutung ist. Doch diese These ist inhaltlich fragwürdig und konfligiert mit Mills expliziten Zugeständnissen, weshalb wir sie nicht in die Rekonstruktion aufnehmen.
918
-
919
- Um die argumentative Funktion der Befunde 1 und 2 zu verstehen, müssen wir etwas weiter ausholen und nochmals zu den Befunden 3 und 4 zurückkehren: Die Befunde 3 und 4 werden -- logisch betrachtet -- nicht nur von der These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} impliziert, sondern natürlich auch von unzähligen weiteren allgemeinen Prinzipien, etwa:
920
-
921
- \tafel{}
922
- ```argdown
923
- [Christliche Ethik übermenschlich]: Gemäß der christlichen Ethik zu handeln ist eine motivationale Überforderung und widerspricht den Gesetzen der menschlichen Psyche.
924
-
925
- [Mangelnder missionarischer Eifer]: Dem Christentum fehlt es an inhärentem missionarischem Eifer, ohne den eine Religion nicht zum 'Mainstream' werden kann.
926
- ```
927
-
928
- Beide Alternativhypothesen implizieren den Befund\ 3 bzw. den Befund\ 4 -- die Konjunktion der beiden Prinzipien nimmt in der inferentiellen Struktur die gleiche Stellung ein wie Mills These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} und es ist daher nicht ersichtlich, wie die Gesamtargumentation zwar für die intendierte These aber nicht für die alternativen Prinzipien spricht.
929
-
930
- Hier treten nun Befund 1 und 2 auf den Plan. Denn diese zwei ideengeschichtlichen Befunde widersprechen den Alternativprinzipien [`[Christliche Ethik übermenschlich]`]{.the} und [`[Aggressor verdrängt Pazifist]`]{.the}. Unter geeigneten, plausiblen Zusatzprämissen folgt aus den Prinzipien die Negation des jeweiligen Befundes. <!-- Übung --> Die historischen Beispiele falsifizieren die Alternativprinzipien (gegeben geeignete Hintergrundannahmen). Es ergibt sich als dialektische Struktur:
931
-
932
- \tafel{tafel:igbele_grdhr2}
933
- ```argdown
934
- [Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]
935
- +> <Brückenargument 3>
936
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 3]
937
- +> <Brückenargument 4>
938
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 4]
939
-
940
- [Christliche Ethik übermenschlich]
941
- +> <Brückenargument 5>
942
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 3]
943
- +> <Brückenargument 6>
944
- -> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 1]
945
-
946
- [Mangelnder missionarischer Eifer]
947
- +> <Brückenargument 7>
948
- +> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 4]
949
- +> <Brückenargument 8>
950
- -> [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 2]
951
- ```
952
-
953
- Somit gilt *auf der ersten Ebene* (dargestellt in Tafel\ \ref{tafel:igbele_grdhr2}): Von den drei allgemeinen Prinzipien impliziert die These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} zwei ideenhistorische Befunde, die Alternativprinzipien jeweils nur einen. Außerdem wird einzig Mills These nicht durch einen ideenhistorischen Befund widerlegt. Daher zeigt unsere Rekonstruktion -- und nun wechseln wir auf die *zweite Ebene* --, dass die ideenhistorischen Belege die These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} _bestätigen_, insofern nämlich diese These als einzige geeignet ist, die empirischen Befunde inferentiell zu vernetzen und so zu systematisieren. Damit schließen wie die Rekonstruktion Mills religionshistorischer Überlegungen als Zwei-Ebenen-Argumentation zugunsten der These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} ab.
954
-
955
- \mymnote{Zur Vertiefung}
956
-
957
- ::: {.vert custom-style="Zur Vertiefung"}
958
-
959
- In der oben vorgetragenen Analyse unterstellen wir, dass eine allgemeine These dadurch bestätigt wird, dass sich eine spezielle Folgerung der These als korrekt herausstellt. Diese Auffassung steht in Einklang sowohl mit der rawlsschen Methode des Überlegungsgleichgewichts [vgl. @Pfister2013, S. 135f.] als auch mit dem Konzept der "hypothetisch-deduktiven" Bestätigung. Zwar ist das "hypothetisch-deduktive" Modell der Bestätigung in der wissenschaftstheoretischen Literatur nicht unumstritten (denn aus dem einfachem HD-Modell scheinen sich verschiedene Paradoxien zu ergeben, wie etwa die sogenannte Tacking-Paradoxie, derzufolge ein empirischer Beleg für die Hypothese *H* auch die Konjunktion von *H* und einer beliebigen Aussage *C*, und damit die beliebig gewählte Aussage *C* stützt, und es ist eine offene Frage, ob und wie sich diese Paradoxien auflösen lassen [@Schurz2008, S.\ 106ff.]). Gleichwohl gehört der HD-Ansatz zum methodologischen Selbstverständnis vieler praktizierender Wissenschaftler und beschreibt einen Großteil der argumentativen Praxis in den empirischen Wissenschaften zutreffend [s. @Zimring:2019, S.\ 51ff.].
960
-
961
- :::
962
-
963
- Fassen wir die Abschnitte\ 2.4.--2.5. zusammen: Wir haben gesehen, wie die religionshistorischen Beispiele einerseits dazu dienen, einen vagen Gedankengang verständlicher zu machen und so dessen Rekonstruktion anzuleiten. Außerdem hat sich gezeigt, dass sich die Beispiele als eigenständige Begründungen, nämlich als Belege der allgemeinen These [`[Keine Bedeutung ohne Diskussion]`]{.the} verstehen lassen. Wir haben drei grundsätzliche Strategien zur Analyse solcher nicht-deduktiver Begründungen unterschieden: Argument mit falscher Schlussprämisse (Strategie 1); abgeschwächte Schlussprämisse (Strategie 2); Zwei-Ebenen-Analyse (Strategie 3). Jeder dieser Ansätze führt in unserem Fall zu plausiblen Rekonstruktionen. Dabei hängen die verschiedenen Strategien systematisch miteinander zusammen: die Zwei-Ebenen-Analyse rechtfertigt anhand ihrer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der inferentiellen Beziehungen auf der ersten Ebene die Behauptung auf der Meta-Ebene, dass eine bestimmte Aussage die beste Erklärung für die vorliegenden Belege ist. Deshalb lässt sich die Rekonstruktion als Schluss auf die beste Erklärung (mit abgeschwächter Schlussprämisse) deuten als eine reduzierte Rekonstruktion derjenigen Überlegung, die in der Zwei-Ebenen-Analyse auf der Meta-Ebene stattfindet. Das Argument mit falscher Schlussprämisse (Strategie 1) schließlich korrespondiert eng mit dem entsprechenden Meta-Argument (Strategie 2) und kann folglich als eine effektive Heuristik betrachtet werden.
964
-
965
- Welche der systematisch zusammenhängenden Strategien am geeignetsten ist, hängt abermals vom Kontext der Argumentation, in den sich die Analyse einfügen soll, von den konkreten Zielen der Argumentationsanalyse sowie weiteren rein pragmatischen Gesichtspunkten (z.B. Adressaten der Analyse, Umfangsbegrenzung) ab. Wenn etwa die Beispiele, die als begründende Belege gedeutet werden, nicht im Zentrum der Gesamtargumentation stehen und deren Begründungsfunktion nicht zwingend aus dem Text hervorgeht, spricht vieles dafür, es bei einer einfachen Rekonstruktion als Schluss auf die beste Erklärung (Strategie 1 oder 2) zu belassen. Wenn hingegen die zentrale These ganz wesentlich durch exemplarische Belege begründet wird -- wie das in wissenschaftlichen Kontroversen häufig der Fall ist -- und das Rekonstruktionsziel darin besteht, diese Begründungsbeziehungen genau zu verstehen, dann sollten die inferentiellen Beziehungen zwischen der zentralen These, rivalisierenden Gegenthesen und den Beobachtungsaussagen (d.h., den Befunden) erstens _en detail_ rekonstruiert und zweitens auf der Meta-Ebene evaluiert werden.
966
-
967
-
968
-
969
-
970
-
971
- ## Fragen zum Weitermachen
972
-
973
- **(1)** Eingangs setzen wir als zentrale These Mills
974
-
975
- ```argdown
976
- [Zensurverbot]: Es ist falsch, Personen daran zu hindern, frei ihre Meinung zu äußern.
977
- ```
978
- ohne dies ausführlich zu begründen. In welcher Hinsicht kann diese These präzisiert, eingeschränkt und differenziert werden? Welche dieser Thesendifferenzierungen sind ggf. erforderlich und welche der entsprechend differenzierten Aussagen können Mill zugeschrieben werden? Ist angesichts der Tatsache, dass Mill in Kapitel 2 einerseits epistemische und andererseits moralische Überlegungen anführt, insbesondere eine Differenzierung bezüglich der Art des Verbotes angezeigt? Argumentiert Mill in Kapitel 2 dann überhaupt für *eine* zentrale These?
979
-
980
- **(2)** Mill nennt am Ende von Kapitel 2 als zentrales Ergebnis die Einsicht, dass "für das geistige Wohlergehen der Menschheit (von dem all ihr anderes Wohlergehen abhängt) die Freiheit der Meinung und die Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung notwendig" (Üdf, S. 366, 40) ist. Was ändert sich an der Rekonstruktion, wenn wir diese These als zentrale These setzen? Wie könnte man ausgehend von dieser These für das [`[Zensurverbot]`]{.the} oder eine entsprechend differenzierte These (s.\ **(1)**) argumentieren?
981
-
982
- **(3)** Wie lässt sich der oben nachvollzogene, schrittweise Prozess der Interpretation und Rekonstruktion des Arguments [`<Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe>`]{.arg} (s. Tafeln\ \ref{tafel:keog-1}-\ref{tafel:keog-2}) im Bild des hermeneutischen Kleeblatts beschreiben?
983
-
984
- **(4)** Das Argument [`<Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe>`]{.arg} (s. Tafel\ \ref{tafel:keog-2}) lässt sich alternativ so rekonstruieren, dass die Konklusion (4) mit praktischem Syllogismus aus (1) sowie einer Zwischenkonklusion aus (2) und (3) erschlossen wird. Wie lautet diese Zwischenkonklusion aus (2) und (3)? Und wie muss Prämisse (2) reformuliert werden, sodass transparent wird, wie die Zwischenkonklusion per Kettenschluss folgt?
985
-
986
- **(5)** In Bezug auf die in Tafel\ \ref{tafel:grdhier-323f} skizzierte Gründehierarchie stellen sich etliche Fragen: Wie beziehen sich diese Gründe auf die zentrale These des Abschnitts? Welche Verbindungen bestehen zwischen den zwei bisher unverknüpften Teilen der Gründehierarchie? Wie kommt das Argument [`<Keine Erkenntnis ohne Gründe>`]{.arg} aus Unterabschnitt C.2.1. ins Spiel? --- Welche weiteren Fragen stellen sich? --- Und wie sind diese Fragen im Lichte einer detaillierten Argumentanalyse und Rekonstruktion zu beantworten?
987
-
988
- **(6)** Wie lässt sich der oben nachvollzogene, schrittweise Prozess der Interpretation und Rekonstruktion des [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} im Bild des hermeneutischen Kleeblatts beschreiben?
989
-
990
- **(7)** Zusätzlich zu den erwähnten Problemen einer sprachphilosophischen Interpretation des [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} (s. Tafel\ \ref{tafel:arg-bed}) stellt sich diese Schwierigkeit: In der sprachphilosophischen Lesart wird Prämisse (1), derzufolge wahre Meinungen bedeutungsvoll sein sollten, höchst unplausibel. Denn wahre Meinung sind zwangsläufig bedeutungsvoll; bedeutungslose Meinungen (Scheinmeinungen, die in Scheinsätzen artikuliert werden) sind weder wahr noch falsch. Wie kann man das sprachphilosophisch verstandene [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} rekonstruieren, sodass diesem Einwand Rechnung getragen wird?
991
-
992
- **(8)** Angenommen wir machen die zwei Lesarten von [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} in zwei gesonderten und geeignet reformulierten Argumenten explizit und schreiben Mill eine pragmatistische Bedeutungstheorie zu, derzufolge -- grob gesagt -- die Bedeutung eines Satzes u.a. darin besteht, dass sein Gebrauch konsistent und in eine außersprachliche Praxis eingebettet ist. Welche inferentiellen Beziehungen etabliert eine solche Bedeutungstheorie zwischen den zwei differenzierten Argumenten? Wie lassen sich diese Beziehungen selbst als weitere Argumente rekonstruieren? Wie genau muss dafür die Bedeutungstheorie präzisiert werden? Welche weiteren Annahmen gehen in die Argumente ein?
993
-
994
- **(9)** Unsere sprachphilosophische Lesart des [`<Argument aus der Bedeutung>`]{.arg} lautete: Ohne freie Diskussion sind Meinungsäußerungen bedeutungsleere Worthülsen. Eine alternative sprachphilsophische Lesart dazu ist: Ohne freie Diskussion *verkennt* man die Bedeutung seiner Überzeugungen. Lässt sich ausgehend von dieser Interpretationsidee eine wohlwollendere Rekonstruktion erstellen, die womöglich auch Mills Text besser gerecht wird?
995
-
996
- **(10)** Im Vertiefungskasten zum Argumentieren mit Beispielen finden sich vier Argumente. Welche davon sind nicht deduktiv gültig? Welche Prämissen können in den ungültigen Argumenten ergänzt werden, sodass die Konklusion jeweils deduktiv folgt? Lassen sich zu diesem Zweck auch plausible universelle Prämissen ergänzen? Wie allgemein können solche Prämissen formuliert werden, ohne an Plausibilität einzubüßen?
997
-
998
- **(11)** Welche Prämissen gehen in die Brückenargumente 3 und 4 in der in Tafel\ \ref{tafel:igbele_grdhr1} skizzierten Argumentkarte ein? Warum lassen sich die Brückenargumente 1 und 2 nicht gleichermaßen plausibel rekonstruieren?
999
-
1000
- **(12)** Wie lassen sich die Brückenargumente 6 und 8 in der in Tafel\ \ref{tafel:igbele_grdhr2} skizzierten Argumentkarte rekonstruieren?
1001
-
1002
- **(13)** Betrachten wir Mills religionshistorische Argumentation aus heutiger Perspektive und nehmen als weiteren Befund an:
1003
-
1004
- ```argdown
1005
- [Ideengeschichtlicher Befund 5]: Obgleich in einigen weltoffenen und liberalen Metropolen des 20. Jahrhunderts völlig frei und uneingeschränkt öffentlich über atheistische und religiöse Gegenthesen zur christlichen Lehre diskutiert wurde, hat der christliche Glaube dort keine nennenswerte motivationale Kraft entfaltet.
1006
- ```
1007
-
1008
- Wie fügt sich dieser Befund in die Argumentation Mills, insbesondere in die dialektische Struktur in Tafel\ \ref{tafel:igbele_grdhr2} ein? Falsifiziert dieser Befund Mills These? Oder wird Mills These bestätigt? Welche (womöglich in der Rekonstruktion noch gar nicht genannte) These wird von Befund 5 gestützt und wie steht diese gestützte These wiederum zu Mills These?
1009
-
1010
-
1011
-
1012
- <!--
1013
- ::: {.def custom-style="Definition"}
1014
- A **cold** is when ...
1015
- :::
1016
- -->
1017
-
1018
-
1019
-
1020
- <!--
1021
-
1022
- ```argdown
1023
- (1) Premise // (1)
1024
- (2) Premise // ┇ (2)
1025
- ---- // ┗━┳━┛
1026
- (3) Conclusion // (3)
1027
- (4) Premise // ┇ (4)
1028
- ---- // ┗━┳━┛
1029
- (5) Conclusion // (5)
1030
- ```
1031
-
1032
- -->
1033
-
1034
- <!--
1035
-
1036
- ```argdown
1037
- (1) Premise // (1)
1038
- (2) Premise // (2)
1039
- ---- // ┇
1040
- (3) Conclusion // ┗(3)
1041
- (4) Premise // (4)
1042
- ---- // ┇
1043
- (5) Conclusion // ┗ (5)
1044
- ```
1045
- -->
1046
-
1047
-
1048
- <!--
1049
-
1050
- ```argdown
1051
- (1) Premise // 1
1052
- (2) Premise // 2 ┃
1053
- (3) Premise // 3 ┃
1054
- ---- // ┃ ┃
1055
- (4) Conclusion // ┗>4
1056
- ---- // ┃
1057
- (5) Conclusion // ┗>5
1058
- ```
1059
-
1060
-
1061
- ```argdown
1062
- (1) Premise // 1
1063
- (2) Premise // 2 ┃
1064
- (3) Premise // ┃ 3 ┃
1065
- ---- // ┗━┳━┛ ┃
1066
- (4) Conclusion // 4 ┃
1067
- ---- // ┗━┳━┛
1068
- (5) Conclusion // 5
1069
-
1070
-
1071
-
1072
-
1073
- ```argdown
1074
- (1) Premise // 1
1075
- (2) Premise // 2 ┃
1076
- (3) Premise // ┃ 3 ┃
1077
- ---- // ┗┳┛ ┃
1078
- (4) Conclusion // 4 ┃
1079
- ---- // ┗┳━┛
1080
- (5) Conclusion // 5
1081
-
1082
-
1083
- -->
1084
-
1085
-
1086
- <!--
1087
- (1) (2)
1088
- ┗━┳━┛
1089
- (3) (4)
1090
- ┗━┳━┛
1091
- (5)
1092
-
1093
- 1 2
1094
- ┗┳┛
1095
- 3 4
1096
- ┗┳┛
1097
- 5
1098
-
1099
- -->
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
1
- **Critical thinking is the ability to think clearly and rationally about what
2
- to do or what to believe.** It includes the ability to engage in reflective
3
- and independent thinking. Someone with critical thinking skills is able to do
4
- the following :
5
-
6
- * understand the logical connections between ideas
7
- * identify, construct and evaluate arguments
8
- * detect inconsistencies and common mistakes in reasoning
9
- * solve problems systematically
10
- * identify the relevance and importance of ideas
11
- * reflect on the justification of one's own beliefs and values
12
-
13
- Critical thinking is not a matter of accumulating information. A person with a
14
- good memory and who knows a lot of facts is not necessarily good at critical
15
- thinking. A critical thinker is able to deduce consequences from what he
16
- knows, and he knows how to make use of information to solve problems, and to
17
- seek relevant sources of information to inform himself.
18
-
19
- Critical thinking should not be confused with being argumentative or being
20
- critical of other people. Although critical thinking skills can be used in
21
- exposing fallacies and bad reasoning, critical thinking can also play an
22
- important role in cooperative reasoning and constructive tasks. Critical
23
- thinking can help us acquire knowledge, improve our theories, and strengthen
24
- arguments. We can use critical thinking to enhance work processes and improve
25
- social institutions.
26
-
27
- Some people believe that critical thinking hinders creativity because it
28
- requires following the rules of logic and rationality, but creativity might
29
- require breaking rules. This is a misconception. Critical thinking is quite
30
- compatible with thinking "out-of-the-box", challenging consensus and pursuing
31
- less popular approaches. If anything, critical thinking is an essential part
32
- of creativity because we need critical thinking to evaluate and improve our
33
- creative ideas.
34
-
35
- * * *
36
-
37
- ## §1. The importance of critical thinking
38
-
39
- **Critical thinking is a domain-general thinking skill**. The ability to think
40
- clearly and rationally is important whatever we choose to do. If you work in
41
- education, research, finance, management or the legal profession, then
42
- critical thinking is obviously important. But critical thinking skills are not
43
- restricted to a particular subject area. Being able to think well and solve
44
- problems systematically is an asset for any career.
45
-
46
- **Critical thinking is very important in the new knowledge economy.** The
47
- global knowledge economy is driven by information and technology. One has to
48
- be able to deal with changes quickly and effectively. The new economy places
49
- increasing demands on flexible intellectual skills, and the ability to analyse
50
- information and integrate diverse sources of knowledge in solving problems.
51
- Good critical thinking promotes such thinking skills, and is very important in
52
- the fast-changing workplace.
53
-
54
- **Critical thinking enhances language and presentation skills**. Thinking
55
- clearly and systematically can improve the way we express our ideas. In
56
- learning how to analyse the logical structure of texts, critical thinking also
57
- improves comprehension abilities.
58
-
59
- **Critical thinking promotes creativity**. To come up with a creative solution
60
- to a problem involves not just having new ideas. It must also be the case that
61
- the new ideas being generated are useful and relevant to the task at hand.
62
- Critical thinking plays a crucial role in evaluating new ideas, selecting the
63
- best ones and modifying them if necessary
64
-
65
- **Critical thinking is crucial for self-reflection**. In order to live a
66
- meaningful life and to structure our lives accordingly, we need to justify and
67
- reflect on our values and decisions. Critical thinking provides the tools for
68
- this process of self-evaluation.
69
-
70
- **Good critical thinking is the foundation of science and democracy**. Science
71
- requires the critical use of reason in experimentation and theory
72
- confirmation. The proper functioning of a liberal democracy requires citizens
73
- who can think critically about social issues to inform their judgments about
74
- proper governance and to overcome biases and prejudice.
75
-
76
- ## §2. The future of critical thinking
77
-
78
- In January 2016, the World Economic Forum issued a report "The Future of
79
- Jobs". It says:
80
-
81
- > The Fourth Industrial Revolution, which includes developments in previously
82
- > disjointed fields such as artificial intelligence and machine-learning,
83
- > robotics, nanotechnology, 3-D printing, and genetics and biotechnology, will
84
- > cause widespread disruption not only to business models but also to labour
85
- > markets over the next five years, with enormous change predicted in the
86
- > skill sets needed to thrive in the new landscape.
87
-
88
- The top three skills that supposed to be most relevant are thinking skills
89
- related to critical thinking, creativity, and their practical application.
90
- These are the cognitive skills that our website focuses on.
91
-
92
- ## §3. For teachers
93
-
94
- * The ideas on this page were discussed in a blog post on edutopia. The author uses the critical thinking framework here to apply to K-12 education. Very relevant to school teachers!
95
-
96
- __next tutorial
97
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1
- _Literal meaning_ is a property of linguistic expressions. Roughly speaking,
2
- the literal meaning of a complex sequence of words is determined by its
3
- grammatical properties and the meanings that are conventionally assigned to
4
- those words. The literal meaning of a statement should be distinguished from
5
- its _conversational implicature_ \- the information that is implicitly
6
- conveyed in a particular conversational context, distinct from the literal
7
- meaning of the statement.
8
-
9
- For example, suppose we ask Lily whether she wants to go to the cinema and she
10
- replies, "I am very tired." Naturally we would infer that Lily does not want
11
- to go to the cinema. But this is not part of the literal meaning of what is
12
- said. Rather, the information that she does not want to go is conveyed in an
13
- implicit manner. Similarly, suppose we hear Lala says, "Po likes books". We
14
- might perhaps take Lala to be saying that Po likes to read. But this is only
15
- the conversational implicature, and not part of the literal meaning of what is
16
- being said. It might turn out that Po hates reading and she likes books only
17
- because she regards them as good investment. But even if this is the case,
18
- Lala's assertion is still true.
19
-
20
- One important point illustrated by this example is that when we want to find
21
- out whether a statement is true, it is its literal meaning that we should
22
- consider, and not its conversational implicature. This is particularly
23
- important in the legal context. The content of a contract is typically given
24
- by the literal meaning of the terms of the contract, and if there is a dispute
25
- about the contract ultimately it is normally settled by looking at the literal
26
- meaning of the terms, and not by what one or the other party thinks was
27
- implied implicitly.
28
-
29
- Consider the following reference letter written for a student. Go through each
30
- of the sentence and explain why it is not part of its literal meaning that the
31
- student is a good student or a hardworking one.
32
-
33
- > Edward's abilities must be seen to be believed. The amount of material he
34
- > knows will surprise you. It would be very hard to find someone as capable as
35
- > he is. He has left a deep impression on all the teachers in the department.
36
- > You will be fortunate if you can get him to work for you.
37
-
38
- When we want to distinguish between the literal meaning of two statements, one
39
- method is to think of situations where one statement is true, and the other
40
- one is false, or to think of the different implcations that they might have.
41
- Apply this method to each of these pairs of sentences.
42
-
43
- 1. I shall try to come.
44
- I shall come.
45
-
46
- 2. This is the oldest building on campus.
47
- This is one of the oldest buildings on campus.
48
-
49
- 3. Amy convinced Betty to go to the party.
50
- Amy encouraged Betty to go to the party.
51
-
52
- 4. Superman will die very soon.
53
- Superman might die very soon.
54
-
55
- 5. It can be proved to be true.
56
- It cannot be proved to be false.
57
-
58
- 6. Honesty is Tim's biggest virtue.
59
- Loyalty is Tim's biggest virtue.
60
-
61
- Consider these two clauses which might appear as part of a rental agreement.
62
- How would you explain their differences in literal meaning? Think about their
63
- different implications with regard to your rights and duties.
64
-
65
- 1. You may terminate the contract after 12 months by giving 2 months notice.
66
- 2. After 12 months, you can give 2 months notice and terminate the contract.
67
-
68
- answer
69
-
70
- __The second statement says that notice to terminate the contract can be given
71
- only after 12 months. So in effect the minimum duration of the contract is 14
72
- months. This is different with the first statement, which says that the
73
- contract can be terminated after 12 months, provided that 2 months notice has
74
- been given. There is no requirement that the notice has to be given only after
75
- 12 months, so the minimum duration of the contract is 12 months, provided that
76
- notice is given after 10 months (or earlier in common practice). This is
77
- something to watch out for when you sign a rental contract in the future!
78
-
79
- __next tutorial
80
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
1
- ## §1. Controlled trials
2
-
3
- As we saw in the previous section, the fact that two things are correlated
4
- does not by itself show that one causes the other. To establish causal claims,
5
- statisticians use a method called the _controlled trial_. For example, suppose
6
- you wish to know whether a particular medicine is effective at curing
7
- baldness. What you wish to know is whether taking the medicine causes hair to
8
- grow. To establish this, you divide your test subjects into two groups, chosen
9
- at random (to avoid bias). Half the subjects (the treatment group) are given
10
- the medicine. The other half (the control group) are given a _placebo_ , which
11
- looks just like the medicine but contains no active ingredients. You can then
12
- measure the hair growth in the two groups and compare the results. If the
13
- medicine is effective, then the difference between the two groups should be
14
- large enough that you can reject the null hypothesis that the medicine works
15
- no better than the placebo, at your chosen significance level.
16
-
17
- The important point here is the _random_ assignment of patients to the two
18
- groups. The only factor that differs between the groups in a _systematic_ (as
19
- opposed to random) way is the treatment, so if there is a difference in hair
20
- growth, then either the medicine caused it, or it was the result of pure
21
- chance (sampling error). As long as the probability that the result was due to
22
- chance is small enough (smaller than the chosen significance level), we can
23
- conclude that the medicine was the cause.
24
-
25
- Controlled trials are difficult to perform in many areas. For example, one
26
- cannot perform a controlled trial to test whether smoking causes cancer in
27
- humans, because one cannot take two groups at random and force one group to
28
- smoke for twenty years! Instead, the groups that are studied are self-selected
29
- --some people choose to smoke and some choose not to. There is always the
30
- possibility that those people who choose to smoke have some other factor in
31
- common that causes cancer. This makes it much more difficult to establish
32
- causation in this area. However, controlled trials on animals can be used, and
33
- these strongly support a causal link.
34
-
35
- 1. The trial for the baldness treatment described above is a _blind_ trial. This means that the patients do not know whether they are in the treatment group or the control group--this is why the patients in the control group are given a placebo. Blind trials are used wherever possible. Why might this be important? answer
36
-
37
- __The importance of blind trials is to make sure that no factor varies
38
- systematically between the treatment group and the control group other than
39
- the treatment itself. If the patients know which group they are in, then this
40
- knowledge itself constitutes a systematic difference between the two groups.
41
- This might not seem like an important difference, but in fact simply believing
42
- that you are being treated can have a measurable effect for a wide range of
43
- medical conditions. Patients who are given a placebo to take often show a
44
- measurable improvement compared to patients who are given nothing at all. This
45
- is called the _placebo effect_.
46
-
47
- 2. A _double blind_ trial is one in which neither the patient nor the doctor knows whether the patient is in the treatment group or the control group. The doctor doesn't know whether the tablets they give to the patient are genuine or placebos. Why might this be important? answer
48
-
49
- __Again, the importance here is to rule out any factors which might vary
50
- systematically between the treatment group and the control group. It has been
51
- shown that if the doctor knows whether the patient is in the treatment group
52
- or the control group, this knowledge can unconsciously alter their behaviour
53
- towards the patient and their perception of the patient's condition. In this
54
- case, if the doctor knows which group the patient is in, this might
55
- unconsciously influence their perception of slight changes in hair growth or
56
- of the severity of side effects. This makes the data provided by the doctor
57
- less reliable.
58
-
59
- 3. Reread the excerpt from the _South China Morning Post_ in the previous question set. Would it be possible to conduct a controlled trial to determine whether superstitious beliefs cause neurosis, depression and low IQ? answer
60
-
61
- __No, a controlled trial is unlikely to be possible in this case. We can't
62
- assign people randomly to two groups and make one group believe in
63
- superstitions. Hence the two groups (superstitious and non-superstitious) are
64
- self-selecting, and this introduces the possibility of bias. It may be that
65
- people with a predisposition to neurosis, depression or low IQ are more likely
66
- to end up in the superstitious group than in the non-superstitious group. This
67
- is why the correlation reported in the newspaper article does not establish a
68
- causal link.
69
-
70
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
71
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_101.txt DELETED
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1
- One very interesting aspect of statistics is the use of probability in
2
- explaining scientific methodology. In particular, the _Bayesian approach_
3
- provides a powerful framework to explain confirmation and many other aspects
4
- of scientific reasoning.
5
-
6
- On the Bayesian approach, probability is used to measure _degrees of belief_.
7
- Belief does not come in an all-or-nothing manner. If it has been raining
8
- heavily the past week, and the clouds have not cleared, you might believe it
9
- is going to rain today as well. But you might not be certain that your belief
10
- is true, as it is possible that today turns out to be a sunny day. Still, you
11
- might decide to bring an umbrealla when you leave home, since you think it is
12
- more likely to rain than not. The Bayesian framework is a theory about how we
13
- should adjust our degrees of belief in a rational manner. In this theory, the
14
- probability of a statement, P(S), indicates the _degree of belief_ an agent
15
- has in the truth of the statement S. If you are certain that S is true, then
16
- P(S)=1. If you are certain that it is false, then P(S)=0. If you think S is
17
- just as likely to be false as it is to be true, then P(S)=0.5.
18
-
19
- One important aspect of the theory is that rational degrees of belief should
20
- obey the laws of probability theory. For example, one law of probability is
21
- that P(S) = 1 - P(not-S). In other words, if you are absolutely certain that S
22
- is true, then P(S) should be 1 and P(not-S)=0. It can be shown that if your
23
- system of degree of belief deviates from the laws of probability, and you are
24
- willing bet according to your beliefs, then you will be willing to enter into
25
- bets where you will lose money no matter what.
26
-
27
- What is interesting, in the present context, is that
28
-
29
- Here, P(H) measures your degree of belief in a hypothesis when you do not know
30
- the evidence E, and the conditional probability P(H|E) measures your degree of
31
- belief in H when E is known. We might then adopt these definitions :
32
-
33
- 1. E _confirms_ or supports H when **P(H|E) > P(H)**.
34
- 2. E _disconfirms_ H when **P(H|E) < P(H)**.
35
- 3. 3\. E is _neutral_ with respect to H when **P(H|E) = P(H)**.
36
-
37
- As an illustration, consider definition #1. Suppose you are asked whether Mary
38
- is married or not. Not knowing her very well, you don't really know. So if H
39
- is the statement "Mary is married", then P(H) is around 0.5. Now suppose you
40
- observe that she has got kids and has a ring on her finger, and living with a
41
- man. This would provide evidence supporting H, even though it does not prove
42
- that H is true. The evidence increases your confidence in H, so indeed P(H|E)
43
- > P(H). On the other hand, knowing that Mary likes ice-cream probably does not
44
- make a difference to your degree of belief in H. So P(H|E) is just the same as
45
- P(H), as in definition #3.
46
-
47
- One possible measure of the amount of confirmation is the value of
48
- P(H|E)-P(H). The higher the value, the bigger the confirmation. The famous
49
- Bayes theorem says :
50
-
51
- P(H|E) = P(E|H)xP(H)/P(E)
52
-
53
- So, using Bayes theorem, the amount of confirmation of hypothesis H by
54
- evidence E
55
-
56
- = P(H|E) - P(H)
57
- = P(E|H) x P(H)/P(E) - P(H)
58
- = P(H) { P(E|H) / P(E) - 1 }
59
-
60
- Notice that all else being equal, the degree of confirmation increases when
61
- P(E) decreases. In other words, if the evidence is rather unlikely to happen,
62
- this provides a higher amount of confirmation. This accords with the intuition
63
- that surprising predictions provide more confirmation than commonplace
64
- predictions. So this intuition can actually be justified within the Bayesian
65
- framework. Bayesianism is the project of trying to make sense of scientific
66
- reasoning and confirmation using the Bayesian framework. This approach holds a
67
- lot of promise, but this is not to say that it is uncontroversial.
68
-
69
- If you want to read more on this topic, here are some advanced readings:
70
-
71
- * Howson and Urbach. _Scientific Reasoning : The Bayesian Approach_.
72
- * Entry on "Bayesian Epistemology" in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_.
73
-
74
- __previous tutorial
75
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_102.txt DELETED
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
1
- Values are standards or ideals with which we evaluate actions, people, things,
2
- or situations. Beauty, honesty, justice, peace, generosity are all examples of
3
- values that many people endorse. In thinking about values it is useful to
4
- distinguish them into three kinds:
5
-
6
- * **Personal values** : values endorsed by an individual. For example, some people regard family as their most important values, and structure their lives so that they can spend more time with their family. Other people might value success instead, and give less time to their families in order to achieve their goals.
7
- * **Moral values** : values that help determine what is morally right or wrong, e.g. freedom, fairness, equality, etc, well-being. Those which are used to evaluate social institutions are sometimes also known as **political values**.
8
- * **Aesthetic values** : values associated with the evaluation of artwork or beauty.
9
-
10
- __next tutorial
11
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_103.txt DELETED
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
1
- In reasoning about value, the distinction between _instrumental and intrinsic
2
- value_ is of fundamental importance. But first we need to understand the
3
- distinction between _means and ends_.
4
-
5
- ## §1. Means and ends
6
-
7
- Ends are goals. Means are ways, methods, instruments, or tools to achieve
8
- goals. If you desire (or want) something, then that which you desire is an end
9
- (or a goal) of yours. Ends of yours are just that which you desire. Suppose
10
- you desire owning a dog. Then, owning a dog is an end of yours. Note that one
11
- and the same thing can be an end as well as a means to promote something else.
12
- For instance, you might want to own a dog because you want a companion. Then
13
- owning a dog is not only an end of yours. It is also a means to achieve a
14
- further end, namely having a companion.
15
-
16
- 1. What ends do you have?
17
- 2. Do you have some ends which are also means to promote your other ends?
18
- 3. Mary wants a dollar coin for using a public phone to call John's home phone in order to wake him up in the middle of the night. (i) What ends does Mary have? (ii) What corresponding means does she have for those ends of hers?
19
-
20
- ## §2. Desiring something as a means vs. desiring something as an end-in-
21
- itself
22
-
23
- As we have seen, you may desire X (which is an end of yours) because you
24
- believe that X is a means to promote some other ends of yours. In that case,
25
- we say that you desire X as a means to promote some other ends. But you may
26
- desire X regardless of whether you believe that X is a means to promote your
27
- any other ends - i.e., you simply desire X for its own sake. In that case, we
28
- say that you desire X as an end-in-itself. Note that a person may desire one
29
- and the same thing as a means and also as an end-in-itself. For instance, you
30
- may desire freedom as a means (e.g., to promote happiness) but at the same
31
- time you may also desire freedom as an end-in-itself, regardless of whether it
32
- promotes your any other ends. Finally, you may desire X as a means to promote
33
- Y because you desire Y and believe that X is a means to promote Y. But in
34
- reality, X may not be a means (or an effective means) to promote Y. In that
35
- case, we say that your desire of X is based on a false belief about it.
36
-
37
- 1. Is there anything which you desire as an end-in-itself?
38
- 2. Is there anything which you desire as an end-in-itself and also desire as a means to promote some other ends?
39
-
40
- Read the passage and answer the questions below:
41
-
42
- > John wants to visit Mary because he wants to borrow her car for the weekend
43
- > and he believes that he will have the car for the weekend if he visits her
44
- > and asks. Unfortunately, Mary's car is staying at the garage over the
45
- > weekend to be repaired and John does not know that. But even if he knew
46
- > that, he would still want to visit Mary. For he also thinks that if he
47
- > visits her, then he can play with her dog, which is something he wants to
48
- > do. But Mary's dog died last week. When John finds that out, he will be very
49
- > upset because he really likes Mary's dog. The company of Mary's dog is one
50
- > of the few things that he wants for their own sake.
51
-
52
- (a) What ends does John have? (b) Among John's various ends, which one(s) does
53
- John desire as a means to promote some other ends? (c) Among John's various
54
- ends, which one(s) does John desire as an end-in-itself? (d) Which desire(s)
55
- of John's is based on a false belief?
56
-
57
- ## §3. Having value as a means vs. having value as an end-in-itself
58
-
59
- Just as there are two ways in which someone may desire something, there are
60
- also two ways in which something may have value (or may be valuable). If X has
61
- value because it is a means to promote some end Y, then we say that X has
62
- value (or is valuable) as a means to promote Y. But if X has value regardless
63
- of whether it is a means to promote anything else, then we say that it has
64
- value (or is valuable) as an end-in-itself.
65
-
66
- Now, we are ready to define two different kinds of value. Their definitions
67
- are as follows:
68
-
69
- * Something has _instrumental value_ if and only if it has value as a means to promote some ends.
70
- * Something has _intrinsic value_ (or non-instrumental value) if and only if it has value regardless of whether it is also useful as a means to promote some other ends.
71
-
72
- Note that one and the same thing something may have instrumental value as well
73
- as intrinsic value. The two very different notions can be true of the same
74
- object.
75
-
76
- Some examples:
77
-
78
- * Money has instrumental value. It has value as a means to deliver something else, such as food, clothing, shelter, and education. But it is quite clear that money does not have intrinsic (i.e., non-instrumental) value. For it has no value once it ceases to be a means of getting us something else.
79
- * Certain fruits, for another example, have instrumental value for bats who feed on them. They are means of brings nutrition (and perhaps also pleasure of taste) to the bats who feed on them. But it is not widely agreed that fruits have intrinsic value. It is unlikely that they have value as ends-in-themselves - i.e., value regardless of whether they are means for achieving something else.
80
- * We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire knowledge. But in addition to any such value, it is a common view in modern moral philosophy that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value - i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for serving other ends. The intrinsic value of persons is often taken as the moral foundation of basic human rights regardless of occupation, economic status, social class, nationality, race, gender, etc.
81
- * The notions "instrumental value" and "intrinsic value" may also apply to objects of environmental concern. For example, wild plants of a certain species may have instrumental value because they provide the ingredients for some medicine or serve as aesthetic objects for human observers. But if the plants also have some value in themselves independently of their prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plants also have intrinsic value.
82
-
83
- 1. What things do you think are instrumentally valuable? And why do you think that?
84
- 2. What things do you think are intrinsically valuable?
85
- 3. For each of the following things, say whether you think it is instrumentally valuable, intrinsically valuable, both, or neither: (a) friendship, (b) health, (c) wealth, (d) youth, (e) fame, (f) beauty, (g) romantic love, (h) knowledge, (i) wisdom, (j) physical pleasure, and (k) power.
86
- 4. Is there anything which you desire as an end-in-itself (see Q4 above) but do not think of it as intrinsically valuable (i.e., valuable as an end-in-itself)?
87
-
88
- ## §4. A few more points
89
-
90
- Finally, there are a few more points to make about intrinsic value and
91
- instrumental value.
92
-
93
- * As the intrinsically valuable is that which is valuable as an end in itself, it is commonly agreed in moral philosophy that something's possession of intrinsic value generates some moral duty (or moral obligation) on the part of moral agents (i.e., those who are capable of moral reflection and choice) to protect it or at least to refrain from damaging it. For this reason, intrinsic value is also often called "moral value".
94
- * The notion "value" is often used as a close synonym of "good" (or "goodness") which is another basic notion in ethics. For instance, when people say that happiness is an intrinsic value (or intrinsically valuable), they may as well say that happiness is intrinsically good. Since the notion "goodness" is just as fundamental as "value", if someone does not know what the term "value" means, it is very likely that he or she does not know what the term "good' means. Hence, it is not very informing to define value as that which is good. For your information, there is actually a huge philosophical literature in the 20th century devoted to the analysis and the study of the meaning of the notion "value" (or "good"). But we will not discuss them here. It suffices to know that it is not an easy thing to define "value".
95
-
96
- (Written by Norva Lo)
97
-
98
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
99
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_104.txt DELETED
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
1
- The following are descriptive statements. they purport to describe facts :
2
-
3
- > * This is a sharp knife.
4
- > * Sam lied.
5
- > * Mozart and Beethoven are composers.
6
- > * Tom is dying painfully.
7
- > * Ann believes that freedom of speech is important.
8
- >
9
-
10
- These, however, are statements about values :
11
-
12
- > * This knife is a very useful kitchen tool.
13
- > * It was wrong for Sam to lie.
14
- > * Mozart is a greater composer than Beethoven.
15
- > * It is better for Tom to die than to be alive.
16
- > * Freedom of speech should be protected.
17
- >
18
-
19
- Philosophers usually distinguish between two kinds of values : _instrumental
20
- values_ and _intrinsic values_. Instrumental values are sometimes also called
21
- " _extrinsic values_ ". Something is supposed to have instrumental value when
22
- it is not valued for its own sake, but because it contributes to some further
23
- purpose, or because it helps bring about something else of value. So a
24
- particular kitchen knife might be said to be very valuable in this
25
- instrumental sense - it is valued not for its own sake but because it can be
26
- used to satisfy certain culinary purposes that we treasure.
27
-
28
- For further discussion on the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic
29
- values, you can read these two articles :
30
-
31
- > * A less technical article on our web site.
32
- > * The entry on "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value" in The Stanford
33
- > Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
34
- >
35
-
36
- ## §1. Morality is normative and not purely descriptive
37
-
38
- Here are some examples of moral claims :
39
-
40
- > * There is nothing wrong with torture.
41
- > * A democratic society should not enact unjust laws.
42
- > * Abortion is permissible under certain situations.
43
- > * We should not discriminate against homosexuals.
44
- > * It was wrong for the police to play music to drown out the protest.
45
- >
46
-
47
- When we think about values, very often we are thinking about morality. What is
48
- distinctive about moral claims is that they are normative and not purely
49
- descriptive. They talk about right or wrong actions, what should or should not
50
- happen. However, although a moral claim is not _purely_ descriptive, it can
51
- include some descriptive elements. For example, the last moral claim above
52
- implies the factual claim that the police did play music to drown out a
53
- protest. This is the descriptive element, and the normative component lies in
54
- the additional value judgement on what has been done.
55
-
56
- Notice also that descriptive claims about moral beliefs in themselves are not
57
- normative. A few years back a survey in Hong Kong drew the conclusion that
58
- many young people think there is nothing wrong with corruption. This
59
- conclusion is a statement about the a moral belief shared by many young
60
- people. But the conclusion is a purely descriptive statement that does not
61
- evaluate the shared belief.
62
-
63
- ## §2. The fact-value gap
64
-
65
- Corresponding to the normative vs. descriptive distinction is the "is-ought"
66
- gap. What this means is that what is the case need not be what should be the
67
- case. Just because something is a matter of fact, it does not follow that it
68
- is something that is right, something that ought to happen. More precisely, it
69
- is a mistake to infer any moral claim purely on the basis of certain
70
- descriptive claims.1 Because this mistake is not uncommon, there is actually a
71
- name for it. It is called the _naturalistic fallacy_. Here are some examples :
72
-
73
- > * There is nothing wrong being selfish. Everybody is selfish.
74
- > * Homosexuality (or cloning, etc.) is wrong because it is unnatural.
75
- > * Woman should stay at home and look after children because this is the
76
- > tradition.
77
- > * Animals eat each other in the wild. So we can eat them too.
78
- > * In nature, only the fittest survive. Simiarly, in human society only the
79
- > strongest will survive and this is the way it should be.
80
- >
81
-
82
- Many things can be said in response to these arguments. Just because many
83
- people are selfish does not mean that they are right. Many people used to
84
- think that slavery is acceptable, but we now think they were wrong. Plenty of
85
- things that are unnatural are not regarded as wrong, such as contraception or
86
- cosmetic surgery. Animals might eat their young or their old, but it does not
87
- mean that we should do the same to each other. Finally, some people end up in
88
- unfortunate circumstances through no fault of their own. Animals might not
89
- care about this, but it does not follow that human beings should act the way
90
- many animals do. In all these cases, we note that there are missing gaps in
91
- the original arguments : you need to assume that unnatural things are wrong,
92
- or that certain things which occur in nature or are widely accepted are
93
- morally correct. The purely factual premises are not sufficient to establish
94
- the normative conclusions, these additional bridging assumptions are needed.
95
-
96
- This is not to say that facts are not needed to draw conclusions about right
97
- or wrong. To show that someone should be convicted of murder, you need to at
98
- least show that the accused did cause the death of the victim. But causing the
99
- death of a victim in itself does not show that something wrong has been done.
100
- Similarly, empirical facts relating to the effect of alcohol are needed in
101
- order to support the prohibition of drink driving. For example, you might
102
- introduce a version of the "harm principle", which says that something should
103
- be prohibited when it is likely to cause harm to innocent people. Harming
104
- innocent people is very likley if we allow driving under the influence of
105
- alcohol, so according to the principle it should be prohibited. In general
106
- then, if you want to argue that something is right or wrong, you need not just
107
- descriptive statements about facts but also additional moral principles.
108
-
109
- Footnote:
110
-
111
- 1\. For purported exceptions, see the discussion of Prior and Geach in Karmo
112
- (1988) "Some Valid (but no sound) Arguments Trivially Span the 'Is'-'Ought'
113
- Gap" in _Mind_ Vol. XCVII, pp.252-257.
114
-
115
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
116
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_105.txt DELETED
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
1
- ## §1. Does morality depend on God?
2
-
3
- It is not uncommon to think that morality depends on the existence of God. For
4
- example, some people suggest that there is no right or wrong without God, or
5
- that atheists who do not believe in God can have no objective basis for their
6
- values, and that their lives are entirely meaningless. Some people even think
7
- that the existence of a moral conscience supports the existence of God.
8
-
9
- It is not clear how these claims are to be substantiated. One reason why
10
- someone might think that morality depends on God is that he or she accepts,
11
- explicitly or implicitly, _the divine command theory of morality_. This theory
12
- says that right or wrong, and good or bad, are given by the commands of God.
13
- The rules of morality, on this view, are simply the rules that God requires us
14
- to follow. So if there is no God to command us, there is no morality.
15
-
16
- ## §2. The Euthyphro problem
17
-
18
- However, there is a powerful objection to the divine command theory. This
19
- objection derives from a discussion of Socrates in one of Plato's dialogues.
20
-
21
- The objection runs as follows. Suppose we have an action X that is morally
22
- right. We can then ask, is it the case that X is right because God commands
23
- it, or is it the case that God commands X because X is right?
24
-
25
- If it is the latter, then morality does not depend on God. So someone who
26
- subscribes to the divine command theory would probably say that the former
27
- explanation is the correct explanation of why X is right, that X is right
28
- because this is what God requires. The problem with this answer is that
29
- morality then becomes dependent on the arbitrary will of God. So if God says
30
- that we should torture innocent babies for fun, that becomes right and that is
31
- what we should do. If God says that we should be dishonest then again this is
32
- what we should do. But morality presumably is not this arbitrary.
33
-
34
- Of course, someone might reply that God is good and morally perfect and so he
35
- would not command such a thing. But if morality does depend on God, there is
36
- no reason why God cannot issue such commands, since there are no additional
37
- moral constraints on what he should command. The only reason why God will does
38
- not require us to torture innocent babies is that there are independent
39
- reasons why those things are wrong, and God knows this. But then morality does
40
- not depend on God's commands after all.
41
-
42
- ## §3. God and the meaning of life
43
-
44
- The Euthyphro problem is often presented as an argument against the divince
45
- command theory of morality. However, a similar argument can be given to show
46
- that other values, including the values that make life meaningful, cannot be
47
- solely based on God's commands.
48
-
49
- If the meaning of life depends again on God's commands only, this would have
50
- the consequence that if God says that doing X constitutes a meaningful life,
51
- then this is what we should do. For example, perhaps God says that a
52
- meaningful life is to watch TV commercials for 24 hours a day for everyday of
53
- our life. Then this is how we should live our lives. But of course we would
54
- think it is absurd that a meaningful life can be achieved in such a manner. So
55
- again we have to conclude that what makes a life meaningful cannot be solely
56
- determined by God's commands.
57
-
58
- ## §4. Comments
59
-
60
- It is important to note that these arguments are not arguments against the
61
- existence of God. All they show is that even if God exists, meaning and
62
- morality cannot be entirely constituted by God's commands. More generally,
63
- these arguments tell us that the basis of moral values and meaning are not
64
- determined by any authority. We have to exercise our own rational judgment to
65
- determine how we should live our lives and what values to adopt. There is no
66
- way to find out what is meaningful and what is moral without using our own
67
- critical reflection.
68
-
69
- Evaluate the follow response to the Euthyphro problem:
70
-
71
- > "If God asks us to torture innocent babies or to watch TV commercials all
72
- > day long, there must be some hidden purpose which perhaps we cannot
73
- > understand. So even if God were to command these things, we should not infer
74
- > that such commands are wrong."
75
-
76
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
77
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_106.txt DELETED
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
1
- ## §1. What is moral relativism?
2
-
3
- Moral relativism says that (1) there are no objective normative facts, and (2)
4
- what is right or wrong is relative to particular societies or persons, or
5
- moral frameworks or perspectives. For example, clitoridectomy, the mutilation
6
- of the sexual organ of a young female, is practiced in certain communities in
7
- Africa and the Middle East. It causes a lot of pain and often has long term
8
- psychological and health consequences. Should such a practice be banned? A
9
- relativist will say that clitoridectomy is only wrong when see from a Western
10
- liberal perspective. But it is quite alright relative to certain African or
11
- Middle Eastern traditional belief systems. There is no objective answer as to
12
- whether it is right or wrong, whether it should or should not be banned.
13
- Before continuing, you might want to try out this test :
14
-
15
- * Are you moral beliefs consistent?
16
-
17
- ## §2. Non-interventionist moral relativism is inconsistent
18
-
19
- Some people are attracted to moral relativism because they think it represents
20
- toleration and liberal thinking. A moral relativist might think that we should
21
- not interfere with other people's lives or moral values. He might think that
22
- if there is no objective fact to determine whether abortion is acceptable,
23
- then we should not interfere with a woman's request to have an abortion.
24
-
25
- This is actually an inconsistent position. If there are really no objective
26
- moral truths, then there is no objective answer as to whether something should
27
- or should not be allowed. It is inconsistent to say that there are no
28
- objective facts that determine whether something ought to be done or not, and
29
- at the same time claim that abortion ought to be allowed, since to make the
30
- latter claim is to claim that something indeed ought to be allowed.
31
-
32
- When this inconsistency is pointed out, some moral relativists might say that
33
- they are only affirming non-interference from their own perspective. But the
34
- problem is that from other perspectives, interference might not be undesirable
35
- and might even be necessary, and the relativist would then have no way to
36
- engage the other party in a rational discussion as to what the right thing to
37
- do is. For example, someone might think that abortion is wrong relative to his
38
- moral theory, and that all violent means are justified in order to prevent
39
- women from having abortions, including the killing of doctors and nurses who
40
- might participate in such matters. For a moral relativist, such a position is
41
- just as valid as thinking that abortion should be protected, and so no reason
42
- can be given to stop any such violent campaign against abortion. The obvious
43
- conclusion is that it would be a big mistake to think that moral relativism
44
- supports any kind of liberal moral outlook. Under relativism, any non-liberal
45
- or absurd position is just as valid as any other.
46
-
47
- ## §3. Do not confuse moral contextualism with relativism
48
-
49
- Notice that moral relativism should not be confused with the claim that what
50
- is right or wrong depends on the context. For example, a moral realist might
51
- refuse to judge whether abortion is right or wrong because she thinks that
52
- abortion is permissible under certain situations (e.g. rape) but not
53
- permissible under other situations, say when a woman is 8 months pregnant out
54
- of her own freewill. But this is not relativism, for it is supposed to be an
55
- objective fact that abortion is permissible in cases of rape. A moral
56
- relativist will however insist that it is still a relative matter whether
57
- abortion is permissible in such a situation.
58
-
59
- Contextualism urges us to be cautious with regard to moral claims. Is lying
60
- wrong? That depends on the situation. Lying to young children is sometimes of
61
- no big consequence. Is killing always wrong? Perhaps not when you have to kill
62
- somone attacking you out of self-defense. Generalizations about morality
63
- should take into account special situations. But being cautious about general
64
- moral claims is not the same thing as accepting moral relativism.
65
-
66
- Can you think of any exceptions to these claims?
67
-
68
- 1. If someone has committed a murder, then that person should be given a fair trial.
69
- 2. Students should study hard and get a good grade.
70
- 3. We should never toture any innocent babies just for fun and for no other reason.
71
-
72
- ## §4. What is moral absolutism?
73
-
74
- _Moral absolutism_ is the view that some actions are morally required or
75
- morally prohibited regardless of the situation and the potential consequences.
76
-
77
- For example, the famous philosopher Kant is a moral absolutist with regard to
78
- telling the truth. He seems to think that lying is always wrong, no matter the
79
- consequences. In the essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie", Kant says that we
80
- should not lie, even if there is a murderer at the door asking you whether the
81
- innocent victim is in your house. The moral absolutist might say that perhaps
82
- one should also call the police or to warn the victim, but the bottom line is
83
- that one should never lie.
84
-
85
- Understandably, many people find Kant's position bizarre, and there are
86
- probably very few people who are moral absolutists with regard to lying. But
87
- moral absolutism with regard to other actions are not difficult to find. For
88
- example, many people would think that incest is wrong, even if the parties
89
- involved genuinely love each other. Others might also hold some form of moral
90
- absolutism with regard to abortion and homosexuality, believing (perhaps for
91
- religious reasons) that they are never justified.
92
-
93
- Consider also the 1987 _United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
94
- Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment_. The second paragraph of
95
- Article 2 says,
96
-
97
- > "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
98
- > of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
99
- > invoked as a justification of torture."
100
-
101
- Notice that this rule explicitly says that torture is never justified. A moral
102
- absolutist with regard to torture will agree with this rule. The absolutist
103
- would say that even in a situation when a terrorist has planted a bomb that is
104
- about to explode and kill many innocent people, it is still not permissible to
105
- torture the terrorist in order to extract information as to where the bomb is.
106
-
107
- ## §5. What is moral contextualism?
108
-
109
- The opposite of moral absolutism is _moral contextualism_. This is the view
110
- that the very same action can be right in one situation (context), but wrong
111
- in a different situation.
112
-
113
- Obviously, moral contextualism with regard to an action X is inconsistent with
114
- moral absolutism with regard to X. Unlike Kant, most of us would probably
115
- think that when a murderer wants to find out where a person is in order to
116
- kill him, we should lie if it would save that person's life. But we might also
117
- think it is wrong for government officials to lie to its citizens, e.g. about
118
- corruption. This would be to reject moral absolutism with regard to lying.
119
-
120
- Sometimes people say that morality is not black and white, and it is possible
121
- that moral contextualism is what some of them might have in mind. For certain
122
- actions described generally, it might be impossible to say whether they are
123
- right or wrong, and that it all depends on the details of the particular
124
- situation.
125
-
126
- Notice that both moral absolutism and contextualism agree that morality is
127
- objective. They both agree that there are cases where certain actions are
128
- objectively right or objectively wrong. _Moral relativism_ would deny this.
129
-
130
- The author Shickle wrote in a paper "On a supposed right to lie [to the
131
- public] from benevolent motives: communicating health risks to the public."
132
- the following passage:
133
-
134
- > There are three main categories of rationale for withholding information or
135
- > telling lies: if overwhelming harm can only be averted through deceit;
136
- > complete triviality such that it is irrelevant whether the truth is told; a
137
- > duty to protect the interests of others.
138
-
139
- Come up with your own examples for illustrating these three types of
140
- situations.
141
-
142
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
143
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_107.txt DELETED
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
1
- ## §1. Consistency in morality
2
-
3
- Consistency plays an extremely important role in moral reasoning. Whatever the
4
- basis of morality is supposed to be, presumably we should ensure that our
5
- moral beliefs are consistent. For example, consistency is an important
6
- requirement of justice and fairness. One of the most important principles in
7
- the rule of law is that we should treat like cases alike. If someone goes to
8
- prison for stealing, it would be inconsistent and wrong for us to let another
9
- thief walks free, if the two cases are alike in all relevant respects.
10
- Similarly, if we treat someone better than another person without
11
- justification, we might be criticized for being discriminatory.
12
-
13
- ## §2. The method of Reflective Equilibrium
14
-
15
- The famous political philosopher John Rawls describes a method known as "
16
- _reflective equilibrium_ " for striving towards consistency in our moral
17
- beliefs.
18
-
19
- We might depict the method with this diagram here :
20
-
21
- Some terminology :
22
-
23
- A _moral intuition_ is some particular belief or feeling that we might have as
24
- to whether a certain action is right or wrong in some situation. For example,
25
- if we find out that a baby has been murdered, we might think that this is
26
- terrible and feel quite bad about it.
27
-
28
- Given a moral intuition, the method of reflective equilibrium says that we
29
- should try to generalize and come up with a general _moral principle_ that
30
- explains this intuition. This requires the formulation of a rule that explains
31
- why we think it is wrong for someone to kill the baby. In this particular
32
- case, perhaps we might propose this rule:
33
-
34
- We should never kill any innocent people.
35
-
36
- This rule explains our intuition because we also believe that babies are
37
- innocent, and together with the moral principle they explain our intuition.
38
-
39
- According to the method of reflective equilibrium, we should try to ensure
40
- that our whole system of moral thinking is consistent, by coming up with many
41
- such moral principles, and checking that these principles are compatible with
42
- each other and consistent with the other intuitions we have. If they come into
43
- conflict then we should think carefully to see how they should be revised.
44
-
45
- As an illustration, consider the moral principle above that we should never
46
- kill any innocent people. Is this principle always true? Suppose a group of
47
- terrorists has hijacked a plane and is about the crash the plane into a
48
- building where there are a few thousand people. These people in the building
49
- are most likely going to die because there is not enough time to evaculate
50
- them. The only way to avoid this consequence is to shoot down the plane. But
51
- the plane includes a few innocent people and we would kill them as well when
52
- we destroy the plane. So what is the right thing to do in this situation?
53
-
54
- Mot people would probably agree that we should shoot down the plane if it is
55
- the only option available. It is of course terrible to have to kill the
56
- innocent victims on the plane, but this would be the right thing to do given
57
- the terrible situation. So we now have another moral intuition, but this time
58
- it is inconsistent with the principle that we should never kill the innocent.
59
- This tells us that the original principle would have to be modified. Perhaps a
60
- better formulation is as follows:
61
-
62
- We should never kill any innocent people, unless it is necessary to save a
63
- much larger number of innocent people, and there are no other alternatives
64
- available.
65
-
66
- Note that in this particular example we have choosen to revise the principle
67
- in order to keep our moral intuitions, but sometimes we might opt the other
68
- way and accept a principle and revise our intuitions instead. Many of our
69
- intuitions are a product of culture and upbringing, and many of them are
70
- perhaps unjustified. This process of reflective equilibrium can continue on
71
- and on. The point is not just to maximize consistency in our moral beliefs. It
72
- also helps us gain a deeper insight into our own moral thinking and come up
73
- with better reasons for our actions.
74
-
75
- 1. Continue the process of reflective equilibrium. Consider the principle just presented:
76
-
77
- We should never kill any innocent people, unless it is necessary to save a
78
- much larger number of innocent people, and there are no other alternatives
79
- available.
80
-
81
- Can you think of a situation where it might conflict with our moral intuition?
82
- In other words, can you think of a case where it might be wrong to follow such
83
- a principle?
84
-
85
- 2. Consider the plane hijack example again. Suppose someone thinks it is indeed wrong to shoot down the plane, and that we should maintain the first principle that we should never kill any innocent people. Think about how you might try to convince this person to change his mind. If you do agree with this person, what other consequences should you be ready to accept?
86
-
87
- ### Readings
88
-
89
- * An article on reflective equilibrium from the _Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_ \- a difficult philosophical article.
90
-
91
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
92
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_108.txt DELETED
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
1
- Do you know what your views on morality are? Do you think morality is
2
- relative? Whatever your views are, you should at least be consistent. Test the
3
- consistency of your beliefs by indicating whether you agree with the
4
- statements below :
5
-
6
- 1\. Everyone has the right to do what they want, as long as they do not harm
7
- other people.
8
-
9
- Agree Disagree
10
-
11
- 2\. What is morally right or wrong is relative to a perspective.
12
-
13
- Agree Disagree
14
-
15
- 3\. We should always respect other people's point of view.
16
-
17
- Agree Disagree
18
-
19
- 4\. An action can be right in some situations but wrong in other situations.
20
-
21
- Agree Disagree
22
-
23
- 5\. It is wrong to torture innocent babies just for fun.
24
-
25
- Agree Disagree
26
-
27
- Submit Restart
28
-
29
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
30
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_109.txt DELETED
@@ -1,510 +0,0 @@
1
- Everyone of us holds many beliefs. By and large, we hope that our beliefs are
2
- not irrational or unreasonable. And the more strongly we hold a set of
3
- beliefs, the stronger we hope that they are not irrational. Consistency is the
4
- minimum requirement of rationality. If we have a set of beliefs which are at
5
- odds with each other, rationality demands us to revise them so that the whole
6
- set becomes internally consistent. Most of us hold some beliefs on
7
- moral/ethical issues (e.g., such as whether suicide is morally wrong, or
8
- whether someone should be denied of the opportunity of education just because
9
- of his/her sex or skin color). Consistency plays one of the most important
10
- roles in moral reasoning (indeed reasoning of any kind). So if we do hold some
11
- moral beliefs, we should at least make sure that those beliefs are consistent
12
- with each other (putting aside for the moment the further question whether
13
- those beliefs are also true).
14
-
15
- Analogical arguments are very often used in moral reasoning (i.e., reasoning
16
- about moral issues), and they often help us think about the consistency of our
17
- moral outlook (i.e., the set of moral beliefs we hold). The basic idea of
18
- analogical arguments in moral reasoning is: treat similar case similarly. For
19
- example, suppose we are already convinced that action X (e.g., slapping a
20
- human baby for fun) is morally wrong. Also suppose we are convinced that
21
- action Y (e.g., lashing a dog for fun) is similar to X in many aspects
22
- relevant to deciding whether or not the action is morally wrong (e.g., both
23
- actions are infliction of pain on innocent beings, both are voluntary, and
24
- both are motivated by trivial self-interests, namely fun). Then, to be
25
- consistent, we should also think that Y is morally wrong to a similar extent
26
- to which X is wrong.
27
-
28
- In short, an analogical argument in ethics employs a presumably
29
- uncontroversial case X, to which we are supposed to agree to give a certain
30
- verdict, and a controversial case Y, to which we disagree about what verdict
31
- to give. The purpose of an analogical argument is to settle the controversy of
32
- Y, by comparing it with Y (which may be either a real case or a fictional
33
- case). What an analogical argument does is (1) to show that X and Y are
34
- analogous to each other (i.e., similar in many relevant aspects), and then (2)
35
- to point out that for the sake of consistency, the controversial case Y should
36
- receive a verdict similar to the one given to the uncontroversial case X.
37
- Analogical arguments in ethics often take the following basic form:
38
-
39
- > P1. Action X is morally wrong/permissible/unblamable/right/virtuous/etc..
40
- > [Presumably uncontroversial verdict for X]
41
- >
42
- > P2. Actions X and Y are analogous to each other. [Analogy between X and Y]
43
- >
44
- > C. Action Y is morally wrong/permissible/unblamable/right/virtuous/etc..
45
- > [From P1 & P2]
46
- >
47
- > Or
48
- >
49
- > P1. State-of-affairs X is morally good/bad/neutral. [Presumably
50
- > uncontroversial verdict for X]
51
- >
52
- > P2. States-of-affairs X and Y are analogous to each other. [Analogy between
53
- > X and Y]
54
- >
55
- > C. State-of-affairs Y is morally good/bad/neutral. [From P1 & P2]
56
- >
57
- > Or
58
- >
59
- > P1. Object X has/lacks intrinsic (i.e., non-instrumental) value/disvalue.
60
- > [Presumably uncontroversial verdict for X]
61
- >
62
- > P2. Objects X and Y are analogous to each other. [Analogy between X and Y]
63
- >
64
- > C. Object Y has/lacks intrinsic value/disvalue. [From P1 & P2]
65
-
66
- We may call P1 the evaluative premise because it employs evaluative terms,
67
- such as "morally wrong/permissible/unblamable/right/virtuous", "morally
68
- good/bad", and "intrinsic value/disvalue". We may call P2 the analogy-stating
69
- premise because it states an analogy without trying to evaluative what are
70
- being compared by the analogy. Finally, C is the evaluative conclusion of the
71
- analogical argument.
72
-
73
- Analogical arguments are often complex arguments, in which there are sub-
74
- arguments for P1 and P2. So in order to evaluate a complex analogical
75
- arguments, we will need to evaluate all its sub-arguments. Before looking at
76
- some concrete examples, we should bear in mind that there are at least two
77
- ways in which an analogical argument can be challenged.
78
-
79
- (1) An analogical argument can be challenged most directly by questioning the
80
- analogy-stating premise P2 - i.e., questioning whether the analogy drawn
81
- between X and Y is a good one. If P2 is unacceptable, then the argument fails
82
- to give good reasons for accepting conclusion C. The criteria for assessing an
83
- analogy includes (a) whether the aspects of the two cases being compared are
84
- relevant to the questions being asked about them (e.g., whether they are
85
- morally wrong), (b) whether the number of relevant similarities between the
86
- two cases are enough so that the conclusion drawn for the one case should be
87
- similar to that for the other case, and (c) whether there are relevant
88
- differences between the two cases which outweigh the relevant similarities
89
- between them so that the conclusion drawn for the one case should be different
90
- from that for the other.
91
-
92
- (2) Even if premise P2 is acceptable, the argument can still be challenged by
93
- questioning the evaluative premise P1 - i.e., questioning the evaluative
94
- verdict for the presumably uncontroversial case. If it could be shown that P1
95
- is actually doubtful, then the C is also doubtful.
96
-
97
- ## §1. An example
98
-
99
- Let us now look at a concrete example of an analogical argument in ethics (in
100
- this case, animal ethics).
101
-
102
- Consider the follows passage:
103
-
104
- > The relationship between small children and their parents is just like the
105
- > relationship between dogs and their owners. When a dog, and likewise a small
106
- > child, wants something badly and does not get it, he or she will repeatedly
107
- > make demands in ways that often irritate those who take care of them. For
108
- > instance, when a dog wants a walk but the owner is busy doing something
109
- > else, the dog will bark and bark and bark nonstop so that the owner gets the
110
- > message and the dog eventually gets a walk. Likewise, when a small child
111
- > wants a toy but the parent refuses to buy, the child will repeat his of her
112
- > demands nonstop by whinging, crying and yelling so the parent gets the
113
- > message and the child eventually gets the toy. The worse thing in both cases
114
- > is that dogs, and likewise small children, are not creatures that adults can
115
- > reason with: they simply don't listen or understand. That is why dog owners
116
- > are often irritated by and get angry with their dogs in just the same way
117
- > that parents are often irritated by and get angry with their small children.
118
- > Furthermore, dogs and likewise small children cannot really tell what is
119
- > right from what is wrong. It is dog owners and parents who are morally (as
120
- > well as legally) responsible for the bad behaviour of their dogs and small
121
- > children, respectively, if that causes damage to the interests of other
122
- > people. Finally, the worst thing that could happen to a dog, and likewise a
123
- > small child, is for it to be ignored: it is better to be cruel to it than to
124
- > be totally indifferent to it as if it doesn't exist. For the reasons given
125
- > above, it is morally permissible for dog owners to beat their dogs if that
126
- > is necessary for disciplining them. Therefore, likewise, it is morally
127
- > permissible for parents to beat their small children if that is necessary
128
- > for disciplining them.
129
-
130
- The above is a complex analogical argument, the basic structure of which is as
131
- follows.
132
-
133
- > P1. It is morally permissible for dog owners to beat their dogs if that is
134
- > necessary for disciplining them. [Evaluative premise, presumably acceptable]
135
- >
136
- > P2. The relationship between dogs and their owners is just like the
137
- > relationship between small children and their parents. [Analogy-stating
138
- > premise]
139
- >
140
- > C. It is morally permissible for parents to beat their small children if
141
- > that is necessary for disciplining them. [From P1 & P2]
142
-
143
- Is the above analogical argument good? You need to do at least two things in
144
- order to answer the question.
145
-
146
- (a) Decide whether the evaluative premise P1 is acceptable. In order to do
147
- that, it will be help to write out and evaluate the sub-argument for P1.
148
-
149
- (b) Do the same with the analogy-stating premise P2.
150
-
151
- Important Reflections : The demand of consistency tells us nothing about which
152
- ones of our inconsistent beliefs should be rid of. So an analogy (e.g., P2)
153
- can be used to argue for a claim (e.g., C) as well as for the opposite claim
154
- (e.g., not-C). For example, someone, who disapprove of parents beating their
155
- small children, can actually employ the same analogy to condemn dog owners
156
- beating their dogs in the following way:
157
-
158
- > P1*. It is morally impermissible (i.e., morally wrong) for parents to beat
159
- > their small children even if that is necessary for disciplining them.
160
- > [Evaluative premise, not-C]
161
- >
162
- > P2*. The relationship between dogs and their owners is just like the
163
- > relationship between small children and their parents. [Analogy-stating
164
- > premise, P2]
165
- >
166
- > C*. It is morally impermissible for dog owners to beat their dogs even if
167
- > that is necessary for disciplining them. [not-P1, from P1* & P2*]
168
-
169
- Suppose the analogy (i.e., P2 or P2*) is correct. Consistency only demands us
170
- to hold either (a) that beating a small child is morally as permissible as
171
- beating a dog or, on the other side of the same coin, (b) that beating a dog
172
- is morally as impermissible as beating a small child.
173
-
174
- In other words, we should hold either both P1 and C on the one hand or both
175
- P1* ( not-C) and C* ( not-P1) on the other hand. But the demand of consistency
176
- does not tell us which option to take. So what do we do? Answer: we compare
177
- the acceptability of evaluative premise P1 and the acceptability of evaluative
178
- premise P1* - i.e., we write out and evaluate the sub-arguments for P1 and P1*
179
- respectively. If P1 is more acceptable than P1*, then so is conclusion C more
180
- acceptable than conclusion C*, and vice versa.
181
-
182
- In the light of the above considerations of the logic of analogical arguments
183
- in ethics, one useful tip is as follows:
184
-
185
- If you want to construct a good analogical argument, then you need to (1) give
186
- a good sub-argument for your analogy-stating premise, and (2) make sure that
187
- your evaluative premise is more acceptable than the negation of your
188
- (evaluative) conclusion - otherwise, your opponents would have good reasons to
189
- reject your conclusion, which, by virtue of consistent, will further lead to
190
- the rejection of your evaluative premise.
191
-
192
- In short, an analogy can be used to settle a controversial case in ethics,
193
- but, on the other side of the same coin, it can also be used to unsettle a
194
- case which is originally thought to be uncontroversial. Considerations
195
- independent of the analogy (e.g., sub-arguments for P1 and not-C,
196
- respectively) are needed in deciding whether the analogy helps to settle or
197
- unsettles.
198
-
199
- 1. (a) State all the sub-arguments that you can think of for P1 and P1* respectively in the above two analogical arguments.
200
- 2. (b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise P2 (or P2*) above is true? Give reasons for your answer.
201
- 3. (c) Do you think it is morally permissible for dog owners to beat their dogs if that is necessary for disciplining them? Give reasons for your answer.
202
- 4. You (after consulting your tutor) may choose any of the following analogical arguments in ethics for tutorial discussion. In is important that you read the chosen arguments and get yourself familiarized with them before the tutorial so that you can have a more efficient tutorial discussion.
203
-
204
- ## §2. Racism/Sexism & Speciesism (An Argument for Animal Liberation)
205
-
206
- Consider the following passage:
207
-
208
- > Racism is the view that the interests (e.g., health, pleasure,
209
- > desire/preference-satisfaction) of members of one race (e.g., white people)
210
- > are morally more significant than the interests of members of other races
211
- > (e.g., colour people) just because the former are the interests of people
212
- > belonging to a particular racial group whereas the latter are not, so that
213
- > it is morally justified to promoted/protected the former in expense of the
214
- > latter whenever the two are in conflict each other. An example of racism is
215
- > that white babies receive better medical treatments than black babies from
216
- > government hospitals simply because the former belong to, but the latter do
217
- > not belong to, the white race. Sexism is the view that the interests members
218
- > of one sex (e.g., male human beings) are morally more significant than the
219
- > interests of members of another sex (e.g., female human beings) just because
220
- > the former are the interests of people belonging to a particular sex whereas
221
- > the latter are not, so that it is morally justified to promoted/protected
222
- > the former in expense of the latter whenever the two are in conflict each
223
- > other. An example of sexism is that boys receive, but girls do not receive,
224
- > school education simply because the former are male whereas the latter are
225
- > not. Speciesism, which has the same structure as racism and sexism, is the
226
- > view that the interests of members of one species (e.g., Homo sapiens or, in
227
- > other words, human beings) are morally more significant than the interests
228
- > of members of other species (e.g., non-human beings) just because the former
229
- > are the interests of beings belonging to a particular species whereas the
230
- > latter are not, so that it is morally justified to promoted/protected the
231
- > former in expense of the latter whenever the two are in conflict each other.
232
- > An example is speciesism is that nonhuman animals (e.g., mice, rabbits,
233
- > dogs, chimpanzees, ...etc.) are used in medical experiments (which cause
234
- > them immense suffering) but human beings (e.g., human infants) are not used
235
- > in such experiments simply because the former are do not, whereas the latter
236
- > do, belong to the species of Homo sapiens. Now, racism and sexism are both
237
- > morally unjustified. For how important an interest is (e.g., the interest in
238
- > receiving medical treatment) does not depend on the skin-colour or the sex
239
- > of the person to whom the interest belong. Black babies have just the same
240
- > interest in receiving good medical treatment as white babies. Girls have
241
- > just the same interest in receiving education as boys. Likewise, a dog has
242
- > just the same interest in avoiding pain (of same intensity and duration) as
243
- > a human infant. Pain is pain no matter whose pain it is. So the interest in
244
- > avoiding pain is same for everyone who is capable of suffering pain. In
245
- > short, species-membership is just as arbitrary a discriminating factor as
246
- > skin colour and sex in deciding how important an interest is. Hence, (to be
247
- > consistent, we should conclusion that) speciesism is as morally unjustified
248
- > as racism and sexism.
249
-
250
- The above is a complex analogical argument, the basic structure of which is as
251
- follows.
252
-
253
- > P1. Racism (or sexism) is morally unjustified. [Evaluative premise,
254
- > presumably acceptable]
255
- >
256
- > P2. Speciesism is analogous to racism (or sexism). [Analogy-stating premise]
257
- >
258
- > C. Speciesism is morally unjustified. [From P1 & P2]
259
-
260
- 1. Is the above analogical argument good? You need to do at least two things in order to answer the question.
261
- 2. (a) Decide whether the evaluative premise P1 is acceptable. In order to do that, it will be help to write out and evaluate the sub-argument for P1.
262
- 3. (b) Do the same with the analogy-stating premise P2. Please do that now!
263
- 4. Now, someone who maintains that speciesism is morally justified (don't we all think that human interests are morally more important than nonhuman ones!) can actually employ the same analogy to justify racism or sexism in the following way:
264
-
265
- > P1*. Speciesism is morally justified. [Evaluative premise, not-C]
266
- >
267
- > P2*. Speciesism is analogous to racism (or sexism). [Analogy-stating
268
- > premise, P2]
269
- >
270
- > C*. Racism (or sexism) is morally justified. [not-P1, from P1* & P2*]
271
-
272
- Suppose the analogy (between speciesism on the one hand and racism/sexism on
273
- the other hand, i.e., P2 or P2*) is correct, consistency only demands us to
274
- hold either (a) that speciesism is morally as unjustified as racism/sexism or,
275
- on the other side of the same coin, (b) that speciesism is morally as
276
- justified as racism/sexism. In other words, we hold either both P1 and C on
277
- the one hand or both P1* ( not-C) and C* ( not-P1) on the other hand. But the
278
- demand of consistency does not tell us which option to take.
279
-
280
- (a) State all the sub-arguments that you can think of for P1 and P1*
281
- respectively in the above two analogical arguments.
282
-
283
- (b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise P2 (or P2*) above is true? Give
284
- reasons for your answer.
285
-
286
- (c) Do you think speciesism is morally unjustified? Give reasons for your
287
- answer.
288
-
289
- ## §3. The Violinist & The Fetus (An Argument Defending Abortion)
290
-
291
- Consider the follows passage:
292
-
293
- > We grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. How does
294
- > the argument [against abortion] go from here? Something like this, I take
295
- > it. Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No
296
- > doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body;
297
- > everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger
298
- > and more stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to
299
- > her body , and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; and abortion
300
- > may not be performed.
301
- >
302
- > But now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find
303
- > yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious famous violinist. He has
304
- > been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers
305
- > has [...] kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system
306
- > was plugged into yours so that your kidneys could be used to extract poisons
307
- > from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells
308
- > you: "Look, we're sorry the Society of Lovers Lovers did this to you - we
309
- > would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it and
310
- > the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him.
311
- > But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered
312
- > from his ailment and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it morally
313
- > incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice
314
- > of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? [...
315
- > The story continues:] There you are, in bed with the violinist, and the
316
- > director of the hospital says to you: "It's all most distressing, and I
317
- > deeply sympathize, but you see this is putting an additional strain on your
318
- > kidneys, and you'll be dead within the month. But you have to stay where you
319
- > are all the same, because unplugging you would be directly killing an
320
- > innocent violinist, and that's murder, and that's impermissible." If
321
- > anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do
322
- > not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug
323
- > yourself from that violinist to save your life.
324
- >
325
- > (From J. J. Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion", Philosophy and Public Affairs
326
- > 1, no. 1 (1971)).
327
-
328
- The above analogical argument has the following form:
329
-
330
- > P1. It is morally permissible for agent A to perform action X under
331
- > circumstances C.
332
- >
333
- > P2. Agent B performing action Y under circumstances D is analogous to agent
334
- > A performing action X under circumstances C.
335
- >
336
- > C. It is morally permissible for agent B to perform action Y under
337
- > circumstances D. [From P1 & P2]
338
-
339
- In the above analogical argument: Action X is unplugging the person (who has
340
- been plugged to the violinist) from the violinist. Agent A is the person who
341
- has been plugged to the violinist. Circumstances C is (1) that the person did
342
- not volunteer to be plugged to the violinist - he or she was kidnapped, and
343
- (2) the person will die unless he or she is unplugged from the violinist.
344
-
345
- Answer the following questions:
346
-
347
- * What are action Y, agent B, and circumstances D?
348
- * Rewrite the argument according to your answers to (b).
349
- * Do you think premise P1 is true? Give reasons for your answer.
350
- * Do you think premise P2 is true? Give reasons for your answer.
351
- * Do you think conclusion C is true? Give reasons for your answer.
352
-
353
- Imagine the following situation: Some tapeworms are intelligent creatures
354
- having individual personalities just like you and me (i.e., they are persons),
355
- and raw fish (sashimi) is well know as a carrier of the eggs of those
356
- intelligent tapeworms. You have eaten some raw fish carrying those tapeworm
357
- eggs, which will develop into huge intelligent tapeworms inside your body in
358
- several month. There is a drug which, if you take it, can kill the eggs so
359
- that they will not develop in your body.
360
-
361
- (a) Do you think it is morally permissible for you to take the drug? Give
362
- reasons for your answer.
363
-
364
- (b) If your answers for (a) is yes, then do you also think that the use of the
365
- morning-after pill is morally permissible? Give reasons for your answer.
366
-
367
- (c) Use the fictional case above to formulate an analogical argument
368
- supporting the use of morning-after pill.
369
-
370
- ## §4. Animal Sexual Behaviour & Human Sexual Behaviour (An Argument Defending
371
- Human Sexual Infidelity)
372
-
373
- Consider the follows passage: We cannot blame men or women for sexual
374
- infidelity. Recent research has shown that animals cheat sexually all the
375
- time. Why should the situation be any different with humans? Female animals
376
- look for males who show signs of biological fitness, and will mate with such a
377
- male even if they are already bonded with another male. The same is also true
378
- of male animals. Just so it is with humans. As we should not blame animals for
379
- sexual infidelity, neither should we blame human beings for sexual infidelity.
380
-
381
- (a) Rewrite the above argument so that it contains an evaluative premise, an
382
- analogy-stating premise, and an evaluative conclusion.
383
-
384
- (b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise is true? Give reasons for your
385
- answer.
386
-
387
- (c) Do you think the evaluative premise is true? Give reasons for your answer.
388
-
389
- (d) Do you think the evaluative conclusion is acceptable? Give reasons for
390
- your answer.
391
-
392
- (e) If you find any fault in the above argument other than those that you have
393
- pointed out in your answers to (b), (c), and (d), please say what it is.
394
-
395
- ## §5. An argument from Aristotle
396
-
397
- Consider the follows passage from Aristotle:
398
-
399
- > It is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the
400
- > rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the
401
- > equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. the same
402
- > holds good for animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better
403
- > nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by
404
- > man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and
405
- > the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this
406
- > principle of necessity extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a
407
- > difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as is
408
- > the case of those business it is to use their body, and who can do nothing
409
- > better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as
410
- > for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who
411
- > can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational
412
- > principle enough to apprehend, but not to have such a principle, is a slave
413
- > by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend such a principle;
414
- > they obey their instinct. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame
415
- > animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the
416
- > needs of life. [...] It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free and
417
- > others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and
418
- > right.
419
- >
420
- > (Aristotle, Politics, book 1, chapters 4-5 (emphases added))
421
-
422
- The above passage from Aristotle actually contains three analogical arguments
423
- for three conclusions, namely (C1) it is morally justified for human beings
424
- (especially the male ones) to dominate nonhuman animals, (C2) it is morally
425
- justified for men to dominate women, and (C3) it is morally justified for
426
- those who are more rational to be masters and those who are less rational to
427
- be slaves.
428
-
429
- If C3 is true and if there is a standard and a corresponding test for
430
- rationality, then people who fail the test should all be the slaves of those
431
- who pass the test. Next, if C2 is true, then no woman should be allowed to
432
- hold a position (e.g., in business institutes, in the government, or whatever)
433
- which is more senior than some position held by a man. Finally, if C1 is true,
434
- then is nothing wrong human beings to use nonhuman animals in ways that are
435
- conducive to human interests (e.g., confining them in zoos, doing experiments
436
- on them, or hunting them for recreation).
437
-
438
- (a). Which group of beings in the world do you think is most benefited by
439
- Aristotle's three conclusions taken together?
440
-
441
- (b) Rewrite Aristotle's argument for C3 so that it contains an evaluative
442
- premise, an analogy-stating premise, and C3 as the evaluative conclusion.
443
-
444
- (c) Rewrite Aristotle's argument for C2 so that it contains an evaluative
445
- premise, an analogy-stating premise, and C2 as the evaluative conclusion.
446
-
447
- (d) Rewrite Aristotle's argument for C1 so that it contains an evaluative
448
- premise, an analogy-stating premise, and C1 as the evaluative conclusion Do
449
- you think the analogy-stating premise is true? Give reasons for your answer.
450
-
451
- (e) Evaluate the rewritten argument in (b).
452
-
453
- (f) Evaluate the rewritten argument in (c).
454
-
455
- (g) Evaluate the rewritten argument in (d).
456
-
457
- ## §6. Artifacts & Restored Natural Entities (An Argument Devaluing Restored
458
- Natural Entities)
459
-
460
- A natural area (e.g., a rainforest) may be damaged by human activity or
461
- natural disaster (e.g., open-pit mining or natural fire). A damaged natural
462
- area may be repaired or restored (e.g., by reintroducing to the area plant and
463
- animal species which were original there) so that it appears quite similar to
464
- how it looks like before the damage. We call this resulting area a "restored
465
- natural area". Now, consider the following passage:
466
-
467
- > When humans modify a natural area they create an artifact, a product of
468
- > human labour and human design. This restored natural area might resemble a
469
- > wild and unmodified natural system, but it is, in actuality, a product of
470
- > human thought [i.e., human intention], the result of human desire and
471
- > interests.
472
- >
473
- > The ethical importance of the distinction between artifacts and natural
474
- > entities is thus derived from the anthropocentric nature of artifacts, their
475
- > ontological reliance on human interests, plans and projects. In contrast to
476
- > natural entities, artifacts, as human instruments, are always a means to the
477
- > furtherance of some human end. [...] If the categorical imperative is
478
- > applied to a treatment of artifacts and natural entities, we find a crucial
479
- > difference: artifacts must be treated as means, for their existence and
480
- > value only exist in a dependent relationship with human aims and goals; but
481
- > natural entities, existing apart from human projects, can be considered as
482
- > ends-in-themselves.
483
- >
484
- > (From E. Katz, Nature As Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community,
485
- > Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield.)
486
-
487
- The analogical argument above can be reformulated as follows.
488
-
489
- > P1. Artifact have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.
490
- >
491
- > P2. Restored natural areas analogous to artifacts.
492
- >
493
- > C. Restored natural areas have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.
494
-
495
- (a) Do you think the evaluative premise P1 is acceptable? Give reasons for
496
- your answer.
497
-
498
- (b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise P2 is acceptable? Give reasons
499
- for your answer.
500
-
501
- (c) Do you think the evaluative conclusion is acceptable? Give reasons for
502
- your answer.
503
-
504
- Hint: You may consult: Yeuk-Sze Lo, "Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature
505
- as Subjects", Environmental Ethics 21(1999): 247-66.
506
-
507
- Written by Norva Lo
508
-
509
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
510
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_11.txt DELETED
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
1
- Lack of clarity in meaning can hinder good reasoning and obstruct effective
2
- communication. One way to make meaning clearer is to use definitions. A
3
- definition is made up of two parts - a _definiendum_ and a _definien_. The
4
- definiendum is the term that is to be defined, whereas the definien is the
5
- group of words or concepts used in the definition that is supposed to have the
6
- same meaning as the definiendum. For example, in defining "bachelor" to mean
7
- "an unmarried man", the word "bachelor" is the definiendum, and "an unmarried
8
- man" is the definien.
9
-
10
- We might divide definitions into four kinds. Let us look at them one by one.
11
-
12
- ## §1. Reportive definition
13
-
14
- A _reportive definition_ is sometimes also known as a lexical definition. It
15
- reports the existing meaning of a term. This includes the "bachelor" example
16
- above, or the definition of "prime number" as referring to _any integer
17
- divisible only by 1 and itself_. A reportive definition should capture the
18
- correct usage of the term that is defined.
19
-
20
- But how do we know what the correct meaning of a term is? Many people think
21
- that a dictionary is an authoritative guide to reportive definitions. This is
22
- actually a misconception, for various reasons.
23
-
24
- First, many words in the language are difficult, if not impossible to define.
25
- This includes for example color words which we learn from examples. A
26
- dictionary might explain "red" as the color of ripe tomatoes, but obviously
27
- this is not what "red" means. "Red" does not mean blue even if all tomatoes
28
- suddenly were to become blue when they ripe. Explaining 'red' as 'a certain
29
- shade of colour' is of course not enough to distinguish the colour red from
30
- other different colours.
31
-
32
- Also, the main aim of a general dictionary is often to give enough indication
33
- of the main usage of a word so that a speaker can use the word adequately in
34
- everyday life. Because of the limitation of space the definitions might not
35
- capture adequately the exact meanings of words. For example, the _Pocket
36
- Oxford Dictionary of Current English_ defines "religion" as "belief in a
37
- superhuman controlling power." Suppose a scientist discovers that there are
38
- evil but superhuman aliens on Mars who created us and control our destiny. The
39
- scientist would then believe in the existence of a superhuman controlling
40
- power. But if this scientist does not worship or submit to these beings,
41
- surely this does not mean she has a religion in the usual sense of the term.
42
-
43
- Finally, many technical words, such as "microwave", "hyper-inflation", and "a
44
- priori" are used in rather specialized ways. The entries in a general language
45
- dictionary might not be accurate enough when it comes to such terms. In such
46
- cases you should consult a special dictionary for the particular discipline in
47
- question.
48
-
49
- As an exercise, evaluate the following entries from _The Pocket Oxford
50
- Dictionary of Current English_ as reportive definitions.
51
-
52
- * Cat : Small soft-furred four-legged domesticated animal.
53
- * Magazine : Illustrated periodical publication containing articles, stories, etc. hint
54
- * Impress : Affect or influence deeply.
55
- * Cloud : Visible mass of condensed watery vapour floating high above the ground.
56
- * Swim : Propel the body through water with limbs, fins, or tail. hint
57
-
58
- What about this entry from the _Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary_?
59
-
60
- * SUGAR : A sweet crystallizable material that consists wholly or essentially of sucrose, is colorless or white when pure tending to brown when less refined, is obtained commercially from sugarcane or sugar beet and less extensively from sorghum, maples, and palms, and is important as a source of dietary carbohydrate and as a sweetener and preservative of other foods.
61
-
62
- ## §2. Stipulative definition
63
-
64
- A _stipulative definition_ is not used to explain the existing meaning of a
65
- term. It is used to assign a new meaning to a term, whether or not the term
66
- has already got a meaning. If the stipulative definition is accepted, then the
67
- term is used in the new way that is prescribed. For example, suppose a
68
- stipulative definition is proposed to define "MBA" to mean _married but
69
- available_. Accepting such a definition, we can then go about describing other
70
- people as MBAs.
71
-
72
- ## §3. Precising definition
73
-
74
- A _precising definition_ might be regarded as a combination of reportive and
75
- stipulative definition. The aim of a precising definition is to make the
76
- meaning of a term more precise for some purpose. For example, a bus company
77
- might want to give discounts to old people. But simply declaring that old
78
- people can get discounts will lead to many disputes since it is not clear how
79
- old should one be in order to be an old person. So one might define "old
80
- person" to mean _any person of age 65 or above_. This is of course one among
81
- many possible definitions of "old".
82
-
83
- Or consider a situation where two people are arguing whether animals such as
84
- birds or apes possess language. To resolve this dispute, we need to be more
85
- precise as to what is meant by "language". If by "language" we refer to any
86
- system of communication, then obviously birds and other animals do make use of
87
- languages. On the other hand, "language" might be used in a different sense,
88
- requiring a combinatorial syntax and semantics, allowing a user of the
89
- language to communicate information about non-existent objects or situations
90
- remote in time and space from the location of discourse. Used in such a way,
91
- the communication system of some animals might not qualify as a language. This
92
- example illustrates the use of precising definitions to resolve disputes that
93
- involve some key concepts whose meanings might not be clear enough.
94
-
95
- ## §4. Persuasive definition
96
-
97
- A _persuasive definition_ is any definition that attaches an emotive, positive
98
- or derogatory meaning to a term where it has none. For example, someone
99
- against abortion might offer the definition of "abortion" as the murder of an
100
- innocent person during pregnancy. This definition carries a negative
101
- connotation, as the term "murder" suggests that abortion is wrongful killing,
102
- and it also assumes that the aborted fetus is already a person. Such a
103
- definition is surely not appropriate in a fair debate on the moral legitimacy
104
- of abortion, even though it might be useful as a rhetorical tool.
105
-
106
- Evaluate these reportive definitions.
107
-
108
- 1. A square is a closed region with four straight sides of equal length.
109
- 2. To tell a lie is to say something that is false.
110
- 3. A gun is any device that shoots a projectile.
111
-
112
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
113
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1
- Utility, rights and virtues are the three main factors to consider in
2
- determining the morality of action. Different moral theories have different
3
- conceptions of how they are related. Here we focus on some of the more basic
4
- points.
5
-
6
- ## §1. Utility
7
-
8
- _Utility_ is a measure of the consequences of an action. A certain action
9
- might lead to a certain amount of happiness and a certain amount of suffering.
10
- The difference between the two - the net difference between the happiness and
11
- the suffering - is the utility of the action.
12
-
13
- * The utility of an action X depends on the happiness and suffering of _every person_ (and creature) affected by X.
14
- * When a person performs an action X, the utility of X depends only on its consequences and not the intention of the person.
15
- * An action X can have a higher utility than another action Y even if X produces no happiness. This would be the case if X brings about a lot less suffering than Y, even though Y does bring about some amount of happiness.
16
-
17
- Utility is obviously an important consideration in morality. When a government
18
- evaluates a certain policy, it would have to consider both the good and bad
19
- consequences of the policy. The utility to consider would include not just
20
- short-term utility but long-term utility. Rapid economic development might
21
- lead to a lot of happiness for the present generation, but in the long term a
22
- lot of suffering might result due to environmental pollution or valuable
23
- traditions being destroyed by market forces.
24
-
25
- The moral theory known as "utilitarianism" says that in any situation, the
26
- morally right thing to do is to act in such a way to maximize utility.
27
- However, many philosophers argue that maximizing utility might not always be
28
- right, and might lead to rights being violated. Discriminatory policies
29
- against homosexuals might create a lot of happiness for the conservative
30
- majority of a population, but if those policies cannot be morally justified,
31
- then perhaps they should not be implemented even if they bring about more
32
- utility.
33
-
34
- ## §2. Rights
35
-
36
- Rights then, function as utility trumps. They serve to protect certain
37
- interests which we deem to be so important that, all else being equal, they
38
- cannot be violated in the name of bringing about more utility. Here are a few
39
- points to note about rights:
40
-
41
- * Some rights are supposed to be absolute and others are not. Freedom of thought is supposed to be an absolute right, in the sense that there should be absolutely no limitation on what people should think and believe. Most other rights are however not absolute and can come into conflict with each other. Having the right to free speech does not mean we have the right to talk loudly in a library or the cinema. Similarly, the right to life does not entail that our lives should be protected at all costs, even when we are harming other people.
42
- * Just because I have a right to X, it does not immediately follow that other people or the government should provide me with X. I have the right to leave the country if I want to, but it does not mean the Government should provide me with an air ticket to leave the country if I have no money.
43
- * It is generally thought that some rights are basic and common to all human beings. The UN declaration of human rights says that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person". But the existence of many of our rights depend on social conventions and the legal system. Independent of government regulations, there is no objective standard to decide whether we should have a right to 6 years, 9 years, or some other number of years of free education.
44
- * Rights in general can be divided into four kinds: claim right, liberty, power, and immunity. See the next tutorial for further discussion.
45
-
46
- ## §3. Virtues
47
-
48
- Morality goes beyond simply the protection of rights. We have the duty of not
49
- violating other people's rights, but morality also recognizes that there are
50
- things we ought to do even if we are not required to do them. Virtuous actions
51
- belong to this category.
52
-
53
- Virtues are morally valuable character traits like courage, integrity,
54
- honesty, fairness, generosity, etc. We are not required to be nice or helpful,
55
- and failure to do so need not violate anybody's rights. If an old lady is
56
- carrying a heavy bag, it might be argued that I have no duty to help her. Even
57
- if I don't help her, I have not violated any of her rights. But if there is
58
- nobody around to help out, it would reflect very badly on my character if I
59
- don't help her. So being a virtuous person often involves doing more than what
60
- is required of us.
61
-
62
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63
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_111.txt DELETED
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1
- ## §1. Hohfeld
2
-
3
- We talk a lot about rights in ordinary life and in politics and current
4
- affairs. We say that other people have violated our rights or that certain
5
- rights should be given more adequate protection. But what exactly do we mean
6
- by "right"? If we do not clarify this important concept, it is likely there
7
- will be confusion and misunderstanding.
8
-
9
- Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-1918) was the author of a few seminal essays on
10
- the analysis of rights. Hohfeld was writing mainly about legal rights, the
11
- rights that are prescribed by the legislation. However, his insightful
12
- analysis can be applied to rights in general. He published his theory in the
13
- groundbreaking article "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
14
- Judicial Reasoning" in the Yale Law Journal in 1913. He died 5 years later in
15
- 1918 at the age of 38.
16
-
17
- ## §2. Four types of rights
18
-
19
- Hohfeld proposed that rights can be classified into four categories. In the
20
- explanations below, A and B are persons and X is a situation:
21
-
22
- 1\. **Claim-rights** \- A has a claim-right against B with regard to X just in
23
- case B has a **duty** to A to bring about X.
24
-
25
- Example: B borrowed $100 from A. So A has a claim right against B that B
26
- returned $100 to A.
27
-
28
- 2\. **Privileges (liberties)** \- A has a privilege against B to X just in
29
- case B has **no claim right** against A not to X.
30
-
31
- Example: If A the right (against the Japanese Government) to stay in Japan,
32
- then this is a privilege. It means that the Japanese Government has no claim-
33
- right against A that he leaves the country. Or in other words, A has no duty
34
- to the Japanese Government that he leaves Japan.
35
-
36
- 3\. **Powers (authority rights)** \- A has a power over B with respect to X
37
- just in case he can change B's rights with regard to X.
38
-
39
- Example: The librarian has the power over a student with regard to the use of
40
- the library. Normally a student has the right to use the library. But if a
41
- student is noisy then the libarian has the power to take away that right and
42
- stop the student from using the library.
43
-
44
- 4\. **Immunities** \- A has an immunity against B with respect to X just in
45
- case B has no power over A's rights with respect to X.
46
-
47
- Example: Diplomats are supposed to have diplomatic immunity. If they have
48
- committed a crime in their host country, they are immune against arrests and
49
- legal prosecution. In other words, the police would have no power over them.
50
- (They can still be expelled though.)
51
-
52
- Notice that these four kinds of rights are related to each other, at least in
53
- the following ways:
54
-
55
- * **A claim-right corresponds to the absence of a privilege** \- Suppose A has a claim-right against B that B performs some action K. Then B does not have the privilege of not doing K. For example, if A lends $10 to B, then A has a claim-right against B that B gives $10 back to A. This implies that B does not have the privilege of not giving $10 to B.
56
- * **A power corresponds to the absence of an immunity** \- Suppose A has power over B with respect to a certain right of B. Then B lacks immunity against A with respect to that right. An example is that an employer has power over its employees with respect to their rights to enter the company building. The right to enter the building is granted by the employer, and can be taken away as the employer sees fit. This means that the employee lacks immunity against the employer with respect to such a right.
57
-
58
- ## §3. Bundles of rights
59
-
60
- In ordinary discussion we tend to think of all rights as having the same
61
- nature. The right to privacy, the right to freedom of religion, and property
62
- rights, are all taken to be rights of the same kind.
63
-
64
- Hohfeld's analysis is an important contribution because first of all, we see
65
- that there are four very different kinds of things within the category of
66
- rights. Second, his analysis enables us to see that the commonly accepted
67
- rights are actually bundles of different rights. To understand "the right to
68
- X" is to analyze this right as being composed of one or more of these four
69
- basic kinds of rights.
70
-
71
- Consider for example the right to a certain piece of property, which turns out
72
- to be a package of different rights. Ownership of a piece of land involves at
73
- least these rights:
74
-
75
- * Since the land is mine, I have certain privileges as to what to do with it, e.g. grow vegetables. In other words, I have no duty no to use it for growing vegetables.
76
- * I also have claim-rights against other people that they do not enter without permission, and that they do not interfere with the exercise of my privileges, etc.
77
- * Ownership also implies that I have a range of powers - the power to give someone else the privilege of using my land, and the power to transfer ownership by selling the land.
78
-
79
- ## §4. Further reading
80
-
81
- * A philosophical article on rights from _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_. See especially section 2.1.
82
- * There is a very detailed discussion of Hohfeld's analysis in the book _The Realm of Rights_ by Judith Jarvis Thomson.
83
-
84
- Consider the following four sentences. Which type of right is being mentioned
85
- in each case?
86
-
87
- 1. If you signed a contract with a company to sing in a concert, the company has a right to your performance of the contract.
88
- 2. I have the right to use foul language.
89
- 3. Since I am a Korean citizen, the Korean Government has the right to determine whether I have the duty to pay tax.
90
-
91
- Many companies issue coupons for customers to redeem certain special offers.
92
- For example, a coupon might enable the coupon holder to get a free meal at a
93
- restaurant. In such a situation, which of the four kinds of rights does the
94
- coupon provide to the customer against the restaurant?
95
-
96
- Also, very often such coupons contain clauses such as the following:
97
-
98
- > This company reserves the final right of decision on all matters concerning
99
- > the use of this coupon.
100
-
101
- Given such a clause, the company can suddenly decide and announce that the
102
- coupon is no longer valid. Which of Hohfeld's rights does this "final right"
103
- most closely resemble? answer
104
-
105
- In the UK Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, it is stated that:
106
-
107
- > [E]very worker shall have the right not to be - (a) excluded from membership
108
- > (b) expelled from membership, of a trade union ... by way of arbitrary
109
- > discrimination.
110
-
111
- What kind of rights are these according to Hohfeld's framework? Spell them out
112
- more fully, making explicit to whom these rights are directed _against_.
113
-
114
- Answer the following questions:
115
-
116
- 1. Peter does not have the privilege against the hotel to check out after 10am. What can we deduce about the claim-right of the hotel?
117
- 2. "Whenever I have the privilege of doing X, it follows logically that other people have the duty not to interfere with my action." Is this true? (Hint: think about the rules of soccer.)
118
- 3. Boy to girl: "I have the liberty of seeing other girls. So you do not have the right to ask me not to see other girls." What's wrong with this argument?
119
- 4. "The government agrees that I have the freedom of religion. But in order to become a full believer of the Dada religion, I have to travel to Iceland and worship the Strokkur geyser. So the government should buy me an air-ticket to Iceland." What is wrong with this argument?
120
- 5. Many rights have exceptions. The right of liberty and personal safety does not protect you from being attacked when you are threatening somebody else. Can you think of any right or liberty which does not have any exception?
121
-
122
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123
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
1
- Strategic thinking is a wide-raning subject. Here are a few important topics
2
- to think about. Naturally these topics overlap with each other.
3
-
4
- 1. General problem-solving skills - How do we go about analyzing a complex problem and break it into manageble parts? What is a good decision? How to improve our decision-making process? How do we become more creative and effective in solving problems?
5
- 2. Self-development - What kind of attitude or personality will help us come up with better strategies? What kind of thinking system or working habits would be useful?
6
- 3. Organizational strategies - How should organizations and businesses develop new stratgies? How should these strategies be developed and implmented? How do we make them more productive and more responsive to challenges and new opportunities?
7
- 4. Tactical thinking - How should we deal with challenges and competitions? What are the ways to maximize our impact? How do we protect ourselves and find new allies, and resist our enemies when facing confrontations?
8
-
9
- It is very important to think about whether we have good skills in these four
10
- areas. In this module we will discuss some of these issues. There is a
11
- separate module on creativity.
12
-
13
- __next tutorial
14
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_113.txt DELETED
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
1
- Solving problems require good critical and creative thinking. We need to be
2
- able to define the problem, analyse the nature of the problem, and come up
3
- with effective solutions. The ability to solve problems is a very important
4
- skill in the workplace.
5
-
6
- ## §1. Defining the problem
7
-
8
- When we are faced with a difficult problem, how should we go about solving it
9
- in an efficient and effective manner? An important starting point is knowing
10
- what the problem is. In school students are usually solving problems that are
11
- already well-formulated. Most problem sets and exam questions are like that.
12
- However, in everyday life and in the workplace, most of the time we have to
13
- identify the problem and formulate it correctly. In defining a problem there
14
- are these points to consider :
15
-
16
- * The formulation of a problem can indirectly influence us in the directions that we take in seeking solutions. So sometimes it might be useful to come up with alternative formulations of the problem, and consider how to best formulate a problem. For example, faced with an unhappy relationship on the verge of breakup, one might think of the problem as "why is she leaving me?", and focus on the faults and reasons of the other person. But thinking of the problem in terms of "what have I been doing wrong" might lead one to focus more on oneself and think about what one might do to rescue the relationship. Similarly, instead of focusing on how a business competitor is taking away business from one's own company, the real problem to focus on might be why one's own company is not doing enough to adapt to the new market.
17
- * If the problem concerns how a goal or target might be achieved, it is important to avoid vagueness and try to be more specific. If we are thinking about how to improve a company's profit, it would be useful to say more precisely how much of an increase we are looking for, in order to know whether the goal is realistic or not.
18
- * It is also important to think about whether the problem so-defined is real or not. What data is available to show that there is a real problem to be solved? For example a university might be concerned that student standards are dropping. It would be useful to have information available confirming that this is not a subjective judgment but an actual declining trend. Gathering more data about the problem can also help us understand how serious it is and which are the most important factors to consider in dealing with it.
19
-
20
- ## §2. Problem classification
21
-
22
- Having defined the problem, the next thing to do is to know what type of
23
- problem it is. Generally, a problem might be posed in the form of a question,
24
- and we might classify these questions into three kinds :
25
-
26
- * Empirical questions
27
- * Conceptual questions
28
- * Evaluative questions
29
-
30
- Empirical questions are questions concerning empirical facts, particular
31
- events or causal processes in the world. Here are some examples :
32
-
33
- * Who is the current president of the United States?
34
- * Did Germany participated in the First World War?
35
- * Can AIDS be transmitted through kissing?
36
- * Is the universe expanding?
37
-
38
- To answer an empirical question, we need observations or experiments, or
39
- solicit the help of experts in the relevant field, such as physics, biology,
40
- psychology, economics, history, etc. Very often these questions cannot be
41
- answered by sitting in the armchair. For example, consider the question of
42
- whether human beings evolved from other forms of animals. This is an empirical
43
- question to be answered by careful scientific study. We might have certain
44
- convictions or intuitions about the answer, and be inclined to believe one way
45
- or another. But these prior beliefs should be evaluated according to empirical
46
- data. Pure thinking is not going to help find the answer.
47
-
48
- On the other hand, pure thinking can help us answer conceptual questions. Here
49
- are some examples of conceptual questions :
50
-
51
- * Is rule of law sufficient for democracy?
52
- * Can a woman sexually harass a man?
53
- * Are there any married bachelors?
54
- * Is 981567 divisible by 3?
55
-
56
- To answer these questions, we appeal to logic and the meaning of words and
57
- concepts to arrive at the answers without engaging in experiments or
58
- observations. In other words, mere thinking is enough to answer these
59
- questions. Here, "mere thinking" refers to conceptual analysis and reasoning.
60
- For example, in answering the first question, we note that "rule of law" means
61
- the consistent use of due procedure and legal processes in a society where the
62
- legal principles are not arbitrarily applied or withheld. But we might note
63
- that the laws in a society where this is the case might nonetheless
64
- discriminate against certain social groups and provide them with inadequate
65
- political representation in the government. As long as these rules are not
66
- abused and are consistently applied, there is rule of law but no democracy.
67
- Using pure reasoning and our understanding of the concepts of "rule of law"
68
- and "democracy", we conclude that rule of law is not sufficient for democracy.
69
-
70
- Similarly, the other conceptual questions are questions which can be answered
71
- without empirical observations or scientific study.
72
-
73
- Finally, let us consider evaluative questions. Evaluative questions are
74
- questions which explicitly or implicitly invoke values and norms. These
75
- questions relate to value judgments about moral correctness or aesthetic
76
- values. Here are some examples :
77
-
78
- * Is abortion immoral?
79
- * Is Beethoven a more profound composer than Mozart?
80
- * Should the amount of unemployment benefits be raised?
81
-
82
- To answer this type of questions, we need to understand the distinction
83
- between intrinsic and instrumental values. Very briefly, intrinsic value is
84
- value that exists on its own. The intrinsic value of an object does not depend
85
- on its being used to satisfy some further end. But if something has value only
86
- because and in so far as it can be used to satisfy a further end, and would
87
- cease to have value if it fails to do so, then the value involved is
88
- instrumental value. (See here for further discussion.)
89
-
90
- ## §3. Mixed questions
91
-
92
- Conceptual questions might be regarded as the most basic kind of question
93
- among the three categories. This is because factual and evaluative questions
94
- can only be answered if we understand the relevant concepts invoked by the
95
- questions. For example, if we do not know what a black hole is, we cannot
96
- answer the question "Can light escape from a black hole?" Similarly, we need
97
- to know what abortion is if we want to find out whether abortion is immoral.
98
-
99
- Empirical questions are generally independent of evaluative questions. We do
100
- not have to consider any evaluative judgements if we want to answer an
101
- empirical question. However, the reverse is not true. To answer many
102
- evaluative questions, we need to know quite a few empirical facts. For
103
- example, to evaluate whether an action is morally right or wrong, we usually
104
- have to consider the consequences of the action, or the motives behind the
105
- action. Once we know these empirical facts, we can then apply the correct
106
- moral standards to judge whether the action is good or bad. Suppose we want to
107
- find out whether it was right for the US to drop two atomic bombs onto Japan.
108
- We have to consider empirical facts such as Japanese atrocities during the
109
- Second World War, the extent of the destruction caused by the atomic bombs,
110
- the number of innocent civilians killed as a result, and whether there are
111
- other alternative ways of ending the war. These are all empirical matters
112
- which are important to consider in answering the questions.
113
-
114
- Many disputes and controversies persist because of bad thinking, and bad
115
- thinking techniques might take the form of failure to understand the nature
116
- and type of the questions that have to be answered. The distinction between
117
- three types of questions discussed here is a simple and crucial part of the
118
- methodology in problem-solving.
119
-
120
- 1. Suppose "sexual harassment" is defined as any unwelcome sexual behavior or conduct which is offensive, humiliating or intimidating. How would you answer the question of whether telling sexual jokes constitutes sexual harassment?
121
- 2. Describe how you might answer the question of whether animals have languages.
122
-
123
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
124
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1
- Polya's 1971 book _How to solve it_ is a classic text on problem solving.
2
- According to Polya, most problem-solving strategies can be classified under
3
- four general principles:
4
-
5
- * Understand the nature of the problem.
6
- * Draw up a plan to solve the problem.
7
- * Try out the plan.
8
- * Monitor the outcome of the plan.
9
-
10
- Let us highlight some important points to consider when we have to apply these
11
- four principles:
12
-
13
- ### 1\. Understand the nature of the problem
14
-
15
- * Is the problem well-defined? Can the problem be analysed into smaller sub-problems?
16
- * What type of problem is it? (See the last tutorial on classifying problems.)
17
- * What information can we gather about the problem?
18
- * Have I / other people solve this problem before? What lessons might their experiences offer?
19
- * What are the constraints (time, money, resources, etc) in solving the problem?
20
-
21
- ### 2\. Draw up a plan
22
-
23
- * Determine the time and resources needed.
24
- * Carry out necessary preparations, e.g. research, coordination, etc.
25
- * For solving problems that require a complex plan, write down the plan in a systematic manner.
26
-
27
- ### 3\. Try out the plan
28
-
29
- * Monitor progress to make sure that things go according to plan.
30
- * Record errors or special considerations for future review.
31
-
32
- ### 4\. Monitor the outcome of the plan
33
-
34
- * This is the part of problem-solving that most people tend to ignore. One way for us to improve is to review past experiences and understand why we succeed or fail. So it is important to monitor our own performance review the whole exercise in order that we can do even better in the future.
35
-
36
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
37
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1
- Many problems involve complex systems or processes. We might be asked to
2
- explain how they work, or perhaps acquire a better understanding of them so
3
- that we know how they can be improved. In this module we discuss analytical
4
- methods that help us understanding complex systems and processes.
5
-
6
- The basic and simple idea behind is simply to understand the function and
7
- behavior of a complex object in terms of its components and their interaction.
8
-
9
- ## §1. Analysing a complex input-output process
10
-
11
- In the commercial or industiral environment, process analysis is a basic part
12
- of quality management and strategic development. Here, a process is seen as a
13
- procedure composing of many steps which convert one or more inputs into one or
14
- more outputs. In a factory production line, the inputs might be raw materials
15
- or electronic components, and the output might be a particular product such as
16
- a computer.
17
-
18
- To carry out a process analysis, we identify the different parts of the
19
- process, and draw a diagram showing how one part of the process leads to
20
- another part of the process. To begin the analysis, we might divide the whole
21
- process into its major parts, and then we can carry out further analysis on
22
- the larger parts and show how they are composed for different activities and
23
- tasks. This process of decomposition allows us to see how the process is
24
- organized :
25
-
26
- One way to draw a systematic diagram of a complex process is to use
27
- _flowcharts_. You can refer to these notes to find out more about flowcharts.
28
-
29
- ## §2. Analysing a complex system
30
-
31
- The same decomposition method can be used in understanding a complex system.
32
- For example, a computer is composed of different part, including memory,
33
- processor, display, and interface components such as keyboard and mouse. To
34
- understand how a computer works, we identify the functions of different
35
- components, and see how they interact with each other.
36
-
37
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38
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1
- Charts and diagrams play an extremely important role in displaying information
2
- and assisting reasoning. They help us visualize complex processes, or make
3
- explicit the structure of problems and tasks. On this page we introduce some
4
- common visual tools.
5
-
6
- ## §1. Flowcharts
7
-
8
- A flowchart is a diagram constructed from connected shapes representing a
9
- process or a plan. Here is an example of a simple flowchart illustrating the
10
- process of going to school.
11
-
12
- Flowcharts have two main functions. First, a flowchart can be used to analyse
13
- a complex process, by breaking down the process into individual steps or
14
- components. The diagram can then be used :
15
-
16
- * as a basis for further discussion of the process
17
- * to identify points where data can be collected and analysed
18
- * to identify bottlenecks and inefficiencies
19
- * to explain the process to other people
20
-
21
- A flowchart can also be used to define a process or project to be implemented.
22
- Such a diagram is useful because :
23
-
24
- * it spells out clearly the steps that have to be implemented
25
- * it provides the basis for identifying potential problems
26
- * responsibilities for different parts of the process can be clearly defined
27
-
28
- The modern flowchart originated in computer science as a tool for representing
29
- algorithms and computer programs, but the use of flowcharts has extended to
30
- the representation of all other kinds of processes.
31
-
32
- ### Notation
33
-
34
- In a standard flowchart, different shapes have different conventional
35
- meanings. The meanings of some of the more common shapes are as follows:
36
-
37
- | The terminator symbol represents the starting or ending point of the
38
- system.
39
- ---|---
40
- | A box indicates some particular operation.
41
- | This represents a printout, such as a document or a report.
42
- | A diamond represents a decision or branching point. Lines coming out from
43
- the diamond indicates different possible situations, leading to different sub-
44
- processes.
45
- | It represents material or information entering or leaving the system. An
46
- input might be an order from a customer. An output can be a product to be
47
- delievered.
48
- | This symbol would contain a letter inside. It indicates that the flow
49
- continues on a matching symbol containing the same letter somewhere else on
50
- the same page.
51
- | As above, except that the flow continues at the matching symbol on a
52
- different page.
53
- | Identifies a delay or a bottleneck.
54
- | Lines represent the sequence and direction of a process.
55
-
56
- For further information about standard notation, please refer to :
57
-
58
- * International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), ISO 5807 _Information processing -- Documentation symbols and conventions; program and system flowcharts_.
59
- * American National Standard, ANSI X3.6-1970, _Flowchart Symbols and their Usage in Information Processing_.
60
-
61
- ### Deployment flowcharts
62
-
63
- One type of flowchart which is quite useful in project planning is _deployment
64
- flowchart_. A deployment flowchart is just a flowchart drawn inside a table
65
- with different columns, e.g.
66
-
67
- The table is divided into columns representing the parties responsible for
68
- implementing the process. Different parts of the process are placed in the
69
- column for which the relevant party is in charge. The diagram reveals clearly
70
- how responsibilities for the sub-processes are distributed.
71
-
72
- ### Hints for drawing flowcharts
73
-
74
- * Write down the title of the flowchart. Identify the process that is shown.
75
- * Make sure that the starting and ending points of the process can be easily located.
76
- * Avoid crossing flow-lines if possible.
77
- * Use informative labels in your diagram.
78
- * The amount of details in a flowchart depends on the level of analysis required.
79
-
80
- ### Analysing flowcharts
81
-
82
- In a management context the following considerations should be taken into
83
- account in reviewing a flowchart:
84
-
85
- * Where are the labor intensive processes?
86
- * Where would possible delays and hiccups most likely occur?
87
- * Are there places particularly suited for quality control?
88
- * Are there duplicated or redundant processes?
89
- * Is it possible to streamline any process or reduce the number of operations?
90
- * Has any process been omitted?
91
-
92
- ## §2. Decision trees
93
-
94
- A decision tree diagram is a diagram that represents the possible consequences
95
- of a series of decisions in some situation. Here is a simple example :
96
-
97
- More sophisticated decision tree diagrams can represent the probabilities of
98
- different possible outcomes. Special methods can then be employed to calculate
99
- the overall probabilities of possible final outcomes, to help estimate risks
100
- and assist decision making.
101
-
102
- A decision tree diagram functions not just as a map for making decisions. It
103
- is also very useful in laying out the different positions on some complicated
104
- theoretical issue. Depending on how one might answer certain crucial
105
- questions, a decision tree diagram can help the user identify the theoretical
106
- consequences of the assumptions that he or she accepts. For example, here we
107
- have a very simple tree diagram on the topic of consciousness.
108
-
109
- ## §3. Cause and effect diagrams
110
-
111
- There are two main types of cause and effect diagrams - Bayesian causal nets,
112
- and fishbone diagrams. Bayesian causal nets are rather similar to decision
113
- tree diagrams. For more details, please visit this page.
114
-
115
- * * *
116
-
117
- It is hard to describe systematically the art of using diagrams to present
118
- relevant information accurately and succintly. But here are a few simple
119
- reminders on interpreting and presenting charts containing statistical
120
- information:
121
-
122
- * Misleading diagrams
123
-
124
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125
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_117.txt DELETED
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
1
- (Image from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis)
2
-
3
- SWOT is an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.
4
- These four factors are used to analyze an individual, product, or
5
- organization. Strengths and weaknesses correspond to the good and bad aspects
6
- that are relatively internal to the entity in question. Opportunities and
7
- threats correspond to the positive features and potential problems in the
8
- external environment.
9
-
10
- To carry out a SWOT analysis is to draw a table like the one above, and list
11
- the relevant points in the appropriate boxes.
12
-
13
- The SWOT framework offers a systematic approach for assessing an organization,
14
- especially when formulating future plans. When a company is deciding how to
15
- expand its business or face off competitors, it might start with a SWOT
16
- analysis. It is perhaps one of the most popular and practical strategic
17
- thinking tools in business and management. But what is also noteworthy is that
18
- the tool is equally applicable to individuals. Many people live a busy life
19
- with little time for reflection. SWOT is a useful tool we can use now and then
20
- to step back and look at the bigger picture, to review where we are in life
21
- and where we want to go.
22
-
23
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24
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
1
- The McKinsey 7S Framework is a management tool invented by business
2
- consultants Robert Waterman, Jr. and Tom Peters. It is a useful tool for
3
- analyzing a company. We have included this tool here because we think it can
4
- also be quite useful for planning some perersonal project.
5
-
6
- The diagram above provides a list of issues we need to consider in order to
7
- achieve our goals:
8
-
9
- 1. Strategy: What is the plan and timeline? What do we need to do or achieve at different stages?
10
- 2. Structure: This is more about the organizational structure of the company, such as how employees should be grouped together to achieve the goals. So if you have a team of people, this is about who is in charge and who is responsible for what.
11
- 3. Systems: What kind of resources do you need? Money? Hardware? What kind of working habits should you adopt? Which tools would improve your productivity when you work on this project?
12
- 4. Staff: Is there anyone who can help you? Who has done this before and can give you some advice?
13
- 5. Style: If you will end up with a product that you hope other people will use, e.g. a book, a new design, etc, how are you going to promote it? What about the presentation and publicity efforts? How do you maximize the impact of your ideas?
14
- 6. Skills: Do you have the knowledge required to achieve your goals? What else do you need to learn? Is there a weak spot and do you need to do something about it?
15
-
16
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
17
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
1
- Making good decisions is crucial if we want to be successful in our projects.
2
- According to many CEOs, decision-making is the top management skill. But what
3
- makes a good decision? Many people think a good decision if one that has a
4
- good outcome. But of course, you can get a good outcome just because you are
5
- lucky, and you might not be so lucky next time.
6
-
7
- So it is quite important to focus on the _process_ of making a decision.
8
- Improving the quality of the decision-making process itself can make good
9
- outcomes more likely in the long run.
10
-
11
- So what kind of decision-making process is more reliable? Some people say you
12
- should "trust your gut" and not think too much when you make decisions. On the
13
- other hand, many writers have also argued that you should not let your
14
- emotions take over your brain, and that we should make decisions rationally
15
- and in a cool-headed way, and avoid being biased by our emotions. So who is
16
- right and who is wrong?
17
-
18
- The truth, of course, is likely to be complicated. First of all, there are all
19
- types of decisions being made by different people under different situations
20
- about different things. Furthermore, reasoning and emotions interact in
21
- complex ways. Think of the pros and cons method of making decisions, where we
22
- decide by listing the good and bad points of a course of action. Careful
23
- reasoning is needed to come up with these points, but what makes them good or
24
- bad for us very often depends on our emotions. For example, someone might be
25
- trying to decide whether to go to the museum and he lists as one of the cons
26
- that it will be boring. But what makes it boring for him surely has something
27
- to do with his feelings and emotions. In other words, we often do appeal to
28
- our emotions in determining the pros and cons.
29
-
30
- The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio made an interesting discovery a while back
31
- about emotions and decision-making. He found out that some patients with brain
32
- damage in the areas involved in processing emotions ended up not being able to
33
- make even simple decisions. These patients don't seem to feel emotions but can
34
- reason well and can describe the pros and cons on both sides of a decision.
35
- Yet they would think and think and not being able to make up their mind, even
36
- on a simple task such as deciding what to eat. It would appear that emotions
37
- are crucial in helping us come to a decision.
38
-
39
- This is not the same as saying that we should make decisions blindly based on
40
- our gut feelings. Acting impulsively is dangerous, and we can easily regret
41
- our decisions. Scientists also tell us that gut feelings are often not very
42
- reliable. If they are reliable, it is more because they are the products of
43
- years of training and experience in some domain where there are learnable
44
- regularities. In other words, unless you are an expert, following your gut
45
- without thinking is usually not a good decision-making strategy.
46
-
47
- However, we do need to listen to our feelings because we often have to live
48
- with the decisions that we have made. Some of our deep-seated emotional
49
- reactions might come from those aspects of our personality that we are not
50
- able to change. For example, perhaps for some reason we just hate somebody's
51
- voice. If we cannot overcome this feeling, it might be unwise to develop a
52
- romantic relationship with this person, even if he or she might be perfect in
53
- all other respects. As the philosopher and scientist Blaise Pascal has said,
54
- "the heart has its reasons which reason does not know."
55
-
56
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57
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_12.txt DELETED
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
1
- The criteria for evaluating definitions depends on the kind of definition we
2
- are considering. With reportive definition, it is important that the
3
- definition provided correctly captures the usage of the term that is defined.
4
- In particular, this means that the definition should be neither too wide (or
5
- too broad) nor too narrow.
6
-
7
- * A definition is too wide if the definiens applies to things that the definiendum does not apply to. In other words, the definition includes things that it should not. For example, defining a chair as a piece of furniture for sitting is too wide because a bench is not a chair but it satisfies the definition.
8
- * A definition is too narrow if the definiens fails to include things to which the definiendum applies. In other words, the definition fails to include things that it should. Consider the definition of religion as any belief system that includes worshiping a god who created the universe. This definition is too narrow since it excludes religions that do not postulate a creator, such as Jainism and certain versions of Buddhism and Daoism.
9
- * it is important to note that a definition can be both too wide and too narrow, e.g. chair = a piece of furniture for sitting which has four legs.
10
-
11
- In giving a stipulative definition, since we are introducing a new meaning,
12
- the question of whether the definition is too broad or too narrow does not
13
- arise. But it is important that the definien should avoid circularity,
14
- inconsistency and obscurity.
15
-
16
- * An example of a circular definition: temperature is the physical quantitiy that is measured by a thermometer. This definition might help someone understand what the word "temperature" means in English, but it is circular as a definition. This is because there is no way to explain what a thermometer is without using the concept of temperature.
17
-
18
- Title 22, Chapter 38, section 2656f(d) of the United States Code contains this
19
- definition of terrorism:
20
-
21
- > the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence
22
- > perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
23
- > clandestine agents;
24
-
25
- Discuss some of the inadequacies of this definition as a general definition of
26
- terrorism. hints
27
-
28
- Discuss the adequacies of these definitions.
29
-
30
- 1. Chemistry is the academic discipline that studies chemical processes.
31
- 2. Humans are rational animals.
32
- 3. A religion is any system of belief that accepts an almighty and perfect God.
33
- 4. Time is the quantity that is measured by clocks.
34
-
35
- Some more definitions for you to think about. These are a bit more difficult.
36
-
37
- 1. Sports is any activity whose primary purpose is the exercise of physical skills. (Philosopher David Papineau)
38
- 2. Art is the expression or application of human creative skill and imagination, typically in a visual form such as painting or sculpture, producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or emotional power.
39
- 3. Playing a game is the "voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles". (Bernard Suits)
40
-
41
- See the explanations of "biscuits" and "cookies" below. If we take them as
42
- providing definitions, there is something seriously wrong. What is it? hint
43
-
44
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45
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_120.txt DELETED
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1
- One very practically useful method of making decisions is to use a pros and
2
- cons list. "Pros" are the good reasons or good consequences that are in favor
3
- of the decision. "Cons" are the opposite, i.e. the disadvantages or bad points
4
- about the decision.
5
-
6
- When you have to decide whether to carry out a course of action, get a piece
7
- of paper and write down in two columns the pros and cons of the decision. Try
8
- to be comprehensive so you will end up with a clear picture of what is at
9
- stake. The general idea is that if there are more pros than cons, then you go
10
- ahead and carry out the proposed action. If there are more cons than pros,
11
- then you refrain from doing it. If it is a tie, then you can proceed either
12
- way.
13
-
14
- Benjamin Franklin was a very famous American politician, scientist, and
15
- author. He invented the lightning rod, bifocal lens, used a kite to conduct
16
- electricity from clouds, helped set up the University of Pennsylvania,
17
- contributed to the US Declaration of Independence, and accomplished lots of
18
- other things. You would expect that such a amazing person must have been very
19
- good at making decisions. The British scientist Joseph Priestley, who
20
- discovered oxygen, actually asked Franklin for advice about making decisions,
21
- and Franklin wrote this letter in replying providing the first ever
22
- description of the pros and cons method:
23
-
24
- To Joseph Priestley
25
- London, September 19, 1772
26
-
27
- Dear Sir,
28
-
29
- In the Affair of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I
30
- cannot for want of sufficient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if
31
- you please I will tell you how.
32
-
33
- When these difficult Cases occur, they are difficult chiefly because while we
34
- have them under Consideration all the Reasons pro and con are not present to
35
- the Mind at the same time; but sometimes one Set present themselves, and at
36
- other times another, the first being out of Sight. Hence the various Purposes
37
- or Inclinations that alternately prevail, and the Uncertainty that perplexes
38
- us.
39
-
40
- To get over this, my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into
41
- two Columns, writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then during
42
- three or four Days Consideration I put down under the different Heads short
43
- Hints of the different Motives that at different Times occur to me for or
44
- against the Measure. When I have thus got them all together in one View, I
45
- endeavour to estimate their respective Weights; and where I find two, one on
46
- each side, that seem equal, I strike them both out: If I find a Reason pro
47
- equal to some two Reasons con, I strike out the three. If I judge some two
48
- Reasons con equal to some three Reasons pro, I strike out the five; and thus
49
- proceeding I find at length where the Ballance lies; and if after a Day or two
50
- of farther Consideration nothing new that is of Importance occurs on either
51
- side, I come to a Determination accordingly.
52
-
53
- And tho' the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic
54
- Quantities, yet when each is thus considered separately and comparatively, and
55
- the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less likely to
56
- take a rash Step; and in fact I have found great Advantage from this kind of
57
- Equation, in what may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra.
58
-
59
- Wishing sincerely that you may determine for the best, I am ever, my dear
60
- Friend,
61
-
62
- Yours most affectionately
63
-
64
- B. Franklin
65
-
66
- Source: Mr. Franklin: A Selection from His Personal Letters. Contributors:
67
- Whitfield J. Bell Jr., editor, Franklin, author, Leonard W. Labaree, editor.
68
- Publisher: Yale University Press: New Haven, CT 1956.
69
-
70
- There are a few noteworthy points in this letter:
71
-
72
- 1. The whole exercise is carried out within a few days. Of course, sometimes we need to decide quickly. But often it is useful to spend more time thinking carefully about a difficult and important decision. It gives our mind a better understanding of the situation, and helps us come up with a more comprehensive list of pros and cons. In addition, this avoids acting impulsively in a rush.
73
- 2. Franklin realized that some reasons are more weightly than others and this should be taken into account. Just because an action has 5 pros and 3 cons does not mean that we must go ahead. Perhaps some of the cons are very serious. This should be taken into account.
74
- 3. Franklin also admitted that this is not a precise mathmatical method. But having every relevant consideration in front of us can be very helpful nonetheless. It might also be a good idea to keep the pieces of paper that we used to make such decisions. We can then review our track record periodically to see if we are prone to biases and can try to correct our mistakes and do better in the future.
75
-
76
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77
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1
- Formal decision theory might be considerd to be a branch of mathematics. It
2
- provides a more precise and systematic study of the formal or abstract
3
- properties of decision-making scenarios. Game theory concerns situations where
4
- the decisions of more than two parties are involved. Decision theory considers
5
- only the decisions of a single individual. Here we discuss only some very
6
- basic aspects of decision theory.
7
-
8
- The decision situations we consider are cases where a decision maker has to
9
- choose between a list of mutually exclusive decisions. In other words, from
10
- among the alternatives, one and only one choice can be made. Each of these
11
- choices might have one or more possible consequences that are beyond the
12
- control of the decision maker, which again are mutually exclusive.
13
-
14
- Consider an artificial example where someone, say Linda, is thinking of
15
- investing in the stock market. Suppose she is considering four alternatives :
16
- investing $8000, investing $4000, investing $2000, or not investing at all.
17
- These are the four choices that are within her control. The consequences of
18
- her investment, in terms of her profit or loses, are dependent on the market
19
- and beyond her control. We might draw up a _payoff table_ as follows :
20
-
21
- Choices | Profit
22
- ---|---
23
- | Strong market | Fair market | Poor market
24
- invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400
25
- invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200
26
- invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100
27
- invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50
28
-
29
- Although the possible returns of the investment are beyond the control of the
30
- decision maker, the decision maker might or might not be able or willing to
31
- assign probabilities to them. If no probabilities are assigned to the possible
32
- consequences, then the decision situation is called " _decision under
33
- uncertainty_ ". If probabilities are assigned then the situation is called "
34
- _decision under risk_ ". This is a basic distinction in decision theory, and
35
- different analyses are in order.
36
-
37
- ## §1. Decision under uncertainty
38
-
39
- ### Maximin
40
-
41
- The Maximin decision rule is used by a pessimistic decision maker who wants to
42
- make a conservative decision. Basically, the decision rule is to consider the
43
- worst consequence of each possible course of action and chooses the one thast
44
- has the least worst consequence.
45
-
46
- Applying this rule to the payoff table above, the maximin rule implies that
47
- Linda should choose the last course of action, namely not to invest anything.
48
-
49
- Choices | Profit
50
- ---|---
51
- | Strong market | Fair market | Poor market
52
- invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400
53
- invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200
54
- invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100
55
- invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50
56
-
57
- Maximin tells Linda to consider the worst possible consequence of her possible
58
- choices. These are indicated by the orange boxes here. Among the worst
59
- consequences of the four choices, the last one is the best of the worst. So
60
- that would be choice to make.
61
-
62
- ### Maximax
63
-
64
- Choices | Profit
65
- ---|---
66
- | Strong market | Fair market | Poor market
67
- invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400
68
- invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200
69
- invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100
70
- invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50
71
-
72
- Whereas minimax is the rule for the pessimist, maximax is the rule for the
73
- optimist. A slogan for maximax might be "best of the best" - a decision maker
74
- considers the best possible outcome for each course of action, and chooses the
75
- course of action that corresponds to the best of the best possible outcomes.
76
- So in Linda's case if she employs this rule she would look at the first column
77
- and picks the fist course of action and invest $8000 since it gives her the
78
- largest possible return.
79
-
80
- ### Minimax regret
81
-
82
- This rule is for minimizing regrets. Regret here is understood as proportional
83
- to the difference between what we actually get, and the better position that
84
- we could have got if a different course of action had been chosen. Regret is
85
- sometimes also called "opportunity loss".
86
-
87
- Choices | Regret
88
- ---|---
89
- | Strong market | Fair market | Poor market
90
- invest $8000 | 0 | 0 | 350
91
- invest $4000 | 400 | 100 | 150
92
- invest $2000 | 600 | 150 | 50
93
- invest $1000 | 700 | 175 | 0
94
-
95
- In applying this decision rule, we list the maximum amount of regret for each
96
- possible course of action, and select the course of action that corresponds to
97
- the minimum of the list. In the example we have been considering, the maximum
98
- regret for each course of action is coloured orange, and the minimum of all
99
- the selected values is 350. So applying the minimax regret rule Linda should
100
- invest $8000.
101
-
102
- ## §2. Decision Making Under Risk
103
-
104
- When we are dealing with a decision where the possible outcomes are given
105
- specific probabilities, we say that this a case of decision making under risk.
106
- In such situations the _principle of expected value_ is used. We calculate the
107
- expected value associated with each possible course of action, and select the
108
- course of action that has the higest expected value. To calculate the expected
109
- value for a course of action, we multiple each possible payoff associated with
110
- that course of action with its probability, and sum up all the products for
111
- that course of action.
112
-
113
- Choices | Profit | expected value
114
- ---|---|---
115
- | Strong market
116
- (probability = 0.1) | Fair market
117
- (probability = 0.5) | Poor market
118
- (probability = 0.4) |
119
- invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400 | $800x0.1+$200x0.5+(-$400)x0.4
120
- = **$20**
121
- invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200 | $400x0.1+$100x0.5+(-$200)x0.4
122
- = **$10**
123
- invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100 | $200x0.1+$50x0.5+(-$100)x0.4
124
- = **$5**
125
- invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50 | $100x0.1+$25x0.5+(-$50)x0.4
126
- = **$2.5**
127
-
128
- Since the first course of action has the highest expected value, the principle
129
- of utility implies that Linda should invest $8000. For further discussion
130
- about expected value, see the corresponding section in statistical reasoning.
131
-
132
- In the example here, it is assumed that the probabilities assigned to
133
- different market conditions are independent of Linda's decisions. Is this a
134
- reasonable assumption to make? answer
135
-
136
- __previous tutorial
137
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_122.txt DELETED
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
1
- Fallacies are mistakes of reasoning, as opposed to making mistakes that are of
2
- a factual nature. If I counted twenty people in the room when there were in
3
- fact twenty-one, then I made a factual mistake. On the other hand, if I
4
- believe that there are round squares, I am believing something that is
5
- inconsistent. This is a mistake of reasoning, and a fallacy, since I should
6
- not have believed something inconsistent if my reasoning is good.
7
-
8
- In some discussion, a fallacy is taken to be an undesirable kind of argument
9
- or inference. For example, a certain textbook explains "fallacy" as "an
10
- unreliable inference". In our view, this definition of fallacy is rather
11
- narrow, since we might want to count certain mistakes of reasoning as
12
- fallacious even though they are not presented as arguments. For example,
13
- making a contradictory claim seems to be a case of fallacy, but a single claim
14
- is not an argument. Similarly, putting forward a question with an
15
- inappropriate presupposition might also be regarded as a fallacy, but a
16
- question is also not an argument. In both of these situations though, the
17
- person is making a mistake of reasoning since he is doing something that goes
18
- against one or more principles of correct reasoning. This is why we would like
19
- to define fallacies more broadly as violations of the principles of critical
20
- thinking, whether or not the mistakes take the form of an argument.
21
-
22
- The study of fallacies is an application of the principles of critical
23
- thinking. Being familiar with typical fallacies can help us avoid them. We
24
- would also be in a position to explain other people's mistakes. There are
25
- different ways of classifying fallacies. Broadly speaking, we might divide
26
- fallacies into four kinds.
27
-
28
- > * Fallacies of inconsistency: cases where something inconsistent or self-
29
- > defeating has been proposed or accepted.
30
- > * Fallacies of inappropriate presumption: cases where we have an
31
- > assumption or a question presupposing something that is not reasonable to
32
- > accept in the relevant conversational context.
33
- > * Fallacies of relevance: cases where irrelevant reasons are being invoked
34
- > or relevant reasons being ignored.
35
- > * Fallacies of insufficiency: cases where the evidence supporting a
36
- > conclusion is insufficient or weak.
37
- >
38
-
39
- We shall discuss these fallacies in the next few tutorials.
40
-
41
- __next tutorial
42
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_123.txt DELETED
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
1
- Fallacies of inconsistency are cases where something inconsistent, self-
2
- contradictory or self-defeating is presented.
3
-
4
- ## §1. Inconsistency
5
-
6
- Here are some examples:
7
-
8
- * "One thing that we know for certain is that nothing is ever true or false." - If there is something we know for certain, then there is at least one truth that we know. So it can't be the case that nothing is true or false.
9
- * "Morality is relative and it is just a matter of opinion, and so it is always wrong to impose our opinions on other people." - But if morality is relative, it is also a relative matter whether we should impose our opinions on other people. If we should not do that, there is at least one thing that is objectively wrong.
10
- * "All general claims have exceptions." - This claim itself is a general claim, and so if it is true, it must also have an exception itself. This implies that not all general claims have exceptions. So the claim itself is inconsistent.
11
-
12
- ## §2. Self-defeating claims
13
-
14
- A self-defeating statement is a statement that strictly speaking is not
15
- logically inconsistent, but is near enough in that it is obviously false when
16
- being asserted. Consider these examples:
17
-
18
- * Very young children are fond of saying "I am not here" when they are playing hide-and-seek. The statement itself is not logically inconsistent, since it is logically possible for the child not to be where she is. What is impossible is to _utter the sentence as a true sentence_ (unless it is used for example in a telephone recorded message.)
19
- * Someone who says, "I cannot speak any English."
20
- * Here is an actual example. A TV programme in Hong Kong was critical of the Government. When the Hong Kong Chief Executive Mr. Tung was asked about it, he replied , "I shall not comment on such distasteful programs." Mr. Tung's remark was not logically inconsistent, because what it describes is a possible state of affairs. But it is nonetheless self-defeating because calling the program "distasteful" is to pass a comment!
21
-
22
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
23
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_124.txt DELETED
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
1
- Fallacies of relevance are of two kinds:
2
-
3
- ## §1. Taking irrelevant considerations into account
4
-
5
- This includes defending a conclusion by appealing to irrelevant reasons, e.g.
6
- inappropriate appeal to pity, popular opinion, tradition, authority, etc. An
7
- example would be when a student failed a course and asked the teacher to give
8
- him a pass instead, because "his parents will be upset". Since grades should
9
- be given on the basis of performance, the reason being given is quite
10
- irrelevant.
11
-
12
- Similarly, suppose somone criticizes the Democratic Party's call for direct
13
- elections in Hong Kong as follows : "These arguments supporting direct
14
- elections have no merit because they are advanced by Democrats who naturally
15
- stand to gain from it." This is again fallacious because whether the person
16
- advancing the argument has something to gain from direct elections is a
17
- completely different issue from whether there ought to be direct elections.
18
-
19
- ## §2. Failing to take relevant considerations into account
20
-
21
- For example, it is not unusual for us to ignore or downplay criticisms because
22
- we do not like them, even when those criticisms are justified. Or sometimes we
23
- might be tempted into making snappy decisions thinking that our decisions are
24
- the best when in fact we should be investigating the situation more carefully
25
- and doing more research.
26
-
27
- Of course, if we fail to consider a relevant fact simply because we are
28
- ignorant of it, then this lack of knowledge does not constitute a fallacy.
29
-
30
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
31
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_125.txt DELETED
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
1
- Fallacies of insufficiency are cases where insufficient evidence is provided
2
- in support of a claim. Probably most common fallacies fall within this
3
- category. Here are a few popular types:
4
-
5
- ## Limited sampling
6
-
7
- * Momofuku Ando, the inventor of instant noodles, died at the age of 96. He said he ate instant noodles everyday. So instant noodles cannot be bad for your health.
8
- * A black cat crossed my path this morning, and I got into a traffic accident this afternoon. Black cats are really unlucky.
9
-
10
- In both cases the observations are relevant to the conclusion, but a lot more
11
- data is needed to support the conclusion, e.g. Studies show that many other
12
- people who eat instant noodles live longer, and those who encounter black cats
13
- are more likely to suffer from accidents.
14
-
15
- ## Appeal to ignorance
16
-
17
- * We have no evidence showing that he is innocent. So he must be guilty.
18
-
19
- If someone is guilty, it would indeed be hard to find evidence showing that he
20
- is innocent. But perhaps there is no evidence to point either way, so lack of
21
- evidence is not enough to prove guilt.
22
-
23
- ## Naturalistic fallacy
24
-
25
- * Many children enjoy playing video games, so we should not stop them from playing.
26
-
27
- Many naturalistic fallacies are examples of fallacy of insufficiency.
28
- Empirical facts by themselves are not sufficient for normative conclusions,
29
- even if they are relevant.
30
-
31
- There are many other kinds of fallacy of insufficiency. See if you can
32
- identify some of them.
33
-
34
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
35
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_126.txt DELETED
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
1
- Fallacies of inappropriate presumption are cases where we have explicitly or
2
- implicitly made an assumption that is not reasonable to accept in the relevant
3
- context. Some examples:
4
-
5
- * Many people like to ask whether human nature is good or evil. This presupposes that there is such a thing as human nature and that it must be either good or bad. But why should these assumptions be accepted and are they the only options available? What if human nature is neither good nor bad? Or what if good or bad nature applies only to individual human beings?
6
- * Consider the question "Have you stopped being an idiot?" Whether you answer "yes" or "no", you admit that you are, or have been, an idiot. Presumably you do not want to make any such admission. We can point out that this question has a false assumption.
7
- * "Same-sex marriage should not be allowed because by definition a marriage should be between a man and a woman." This argument assumes that only a heterosexual conception of marriage is correct. But this begs the question against those who defend same-sex marriages and is not an appropriate assumption to make when debating this issue.
8
-
9
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
10
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_127.txt DELETED
@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
1
- Here are some examples of common fallacies:
2
-
3
- ### _ad hominem_
4
-
5
- A theory is discarded not because of any evidence against it or lack of
6
- evidence for it, but because of the person who argues for it. Example:
7
-
8
- A: The Government should enact minimum-wage legislation so that workers are
9
- not exploited.
10
- B: Nonsense. You say that only because you cannot find a good job.
11
-
12
- ### _ad ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance)_
13
-
14
- The truth of a claim is established only on the basis of lack of evidence
15
- against it. A simple obvious example of such fallacy is to argue that unicorns
16
- exist because there is no evidence against such a claim. At first sight it
17
- seems that many theories that we describe as scientific involve such a
18
- fallacy. E.g. the first law of thermodynamics holds because so far there has
19
- not been any negative instance that would serve as evidence against it. But
20
- notice, as in cases like this, there is evidence for the law, namely positive
21
- instances. Notice also that this fallacy does not apply to situations where
22
- there are only two rival claims and one has already been falsified, then we
23
- may justly establish the truth of the other even if we cannot find evidence
24
- for or against it.
25
-
26
- ### _ad misericordiam (appeal to pity)_
27
-
28
- In offering an argument, pity is appealed to. Usually this happens when people
29
- argue for special treatment on the basis of their need. E.g. a student argues
30
- that the teacher should let him/her pass the examination because he/she needs
31
- it in order to graduate. Of course, pity might be a relevant consideration in
32
- certain conditions, as in contexts involving charity.
33
-
34
- ### _ad populum (appeal to popularity)_
35
-
36
- The truth of a claim is established only on the basis of its popularity and
37
- familiarity. This is the fallacy committed by many commercials. Surely you
38
- have heard of commercials implying that we should buy a certain product
39
- because it has made to the top of a sales rank, or because the brand is the
40
- city's "favourite".
41
-
42
- ### Affirming the consequent
43
-
44
- Inferring that P is true solely because Q is true and it is also true that if
45
- P is true, Q is true.
46
-
47
- The problem with this type of reasoning is that it ignores the possibility
48
- that there are other conditions apart from P that might lead to Q. For
49
- example, if there is a traffic jam, a colleague may be late for work. But if
50
- we argue from his being late to there being a traffic jam, we are guilty of
51
- this fallacy - the colleague may be late due to a faulty alarm clock.
52
-
53
- Of course, if we have evidence showing that P is the only or most likely
54
- condition that leads to Q, then we can infer that P is likely to be true
55
- without committing a fallacy.
56
-
57
- ### Begging the question ( _petito principii_ )
58
-
59
- In arguing for a claim, the claim itself is already assumed in the premise.
60
- Example: "God exists because this is what the Bible says, and the Bible is
61
- reliable because it is the word of God."
62
-
63
- ### Complex question or loaded question
64
-
65
- A question is posed in such a way that a person, no matter what answer he/she
66
- gives to the question, will inevitably commit him/herself to some other claim,
67
- which should not be presupposed in the context in question.
68
-
69
- A common tactic is to ask a yes-no question that tricks people to agree to
70
- something they never intended to say. For example, if you are asked "Are you
71
- still as self-centred as you used to be?", then no matter you answer "yes" or
72
- "no", you are bound to admit that you were self-centred in the past. Of
73
- course, the same question would not count as a fallacy if the presupposition
74
- of the question is indeed accepted in the conversational context.
75
-
76
- ### Composition (opposite of division)
77
-
78
- The whole is assumed to have the same properties as its parts. Anne might be
79
- humorous and fun-loving and an excellent person to invite to the party. The
80
- same might be true of Ben, Chris and David considered individually. But it
81
- does not follow that it will be a good idea to invite all of them to the
82
- party. Perhaps they hate each other and the party will be ruined.
83
-
84
- ### Denying the antecedent
85
-
86
- Inferring that Q is false just because if P is true, Q is also true, but P is
87
- false.
88
-
89
- This fallacy is similar to the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Again the
90
- problem is that some alternative explanation or cause might be overlooked.
91
- Although P is false, some other condition might be sufficient to make Q true.
92
-
93
- Example: If there is a traffic jam, a colleague may be late for work. But it
94
- is not right to argue in the light of a smooth traffic that the colleague will
95
- not be late. Again, his alarm clock may have stopped working.
96
-
97
- ### Division (opposite of composition)
98
-
99
- The parts of a whole is assumed to have the same properties of the whole. It
100
- is possible that, on a whole, a company is very effective, while some of its
101
- departments are not. It would be inappropriate to assume they all are.
102
-
103
- ### Equivocation
104
-
105
- Putting forward an argument where a word changes meaning without having it
106
- pointed out. For example, some philosophers argue that all acts are selfish.
107
- Even if you strive to serve others, you are still acting selfishly because
108
- your act is just to satisfy your desire to serve others. But surely the word
109
- "selfish" means differently in the premise and the conclusion - when we say a
110
- person is selfish we usually mean that he does not strive to serve others. To
111
- say that a person is selfish because he is doing something he wants, even when
112
- what he wants is to help others, is to use the term "selfish" with a different
113
- meaning.
114
-
115
- ### False dilemma
116
-
117
- Presenting a limited set of alternatives when there are others that are worth
118
- considering in the context. Example: "Every person is either my enemy or my
119
- friend. If he/she is my enemy I should hate him/her. If he/she is my friend I
120
- should love him/her. So I should either love him/her or hate him/her."
121
- Obviously, the conclusion is too extreme because most people are neither your
122
- enemy nor your friend.
123
-
124
- ### Gambler's fallacy
125
-
126
- Assumption is made to take some independent statistics as dependent. The
127
- untrained mind tends to think that, e.g. if a fair coin is tossed five times
128
- and the results are all heads, then the next toss will more likely be a tail.
129
- It will not be, however. If the coin is fair, the result for each toss is
130
- completely independent of the others. Notice the fallacy hinges on the fact
131
- that the final result is not known. Had the final result been known already,
132
- the statistics would have been dependent.
133
-
134
- ### Genetic fallacy
135
-
136
- Thinking that because X dervies from Y, and Y has a certain property, X must
137
- have the same property also. Example: "His father is a criminal, so he must
138
- also be up to no good."
139
-
140
- ### _Non sequitur_
141
-
142
- A conclusion is drawn which does not follow from the premise. This is not a
143
- specific fallacy but a very general term for a bad argument. So a lot of the
144
- examples above and below can be said to be non sequitur.
145
-
146
- ### _Petito principii_
147
-
148
- Latin word for question begging.
149
-
150
- ### _Post hoc, ergo propter hoc_ (literally, "after this, therefore because of
151
- this")
152
-
153
- Inferring that X must be the cause of Y just because X is followed by Y.
154
-
155
- For example, having visited a graveyard, I fell ill and infer that graveyards
156
- are spooky places that cause illnesses. Of course, this inference is not
157
- warranted since this might just be a coincidence. However, a lot of
158
- superstituous beliefs commit this fallacy.
159
-
160
- ### Red herring
161
-
162
- Within an argument some irrelevant issue is raised which diverts attention
163
- from the main subject. The function of the red herring is sometimes to help
164
- express a strong, biased opinion. The red herring (the irrelevant issue)
165
- serves to increase the force of the argument in a very misleading manner.
166
-
167
- For example, in a debate as to whether God exists, someone might argue that
168
- believing in God gives peace and meaning to many people's lives. This would be
169
- an example of a red herring since whether religions can have a positive effect
170
- on people is irrelevant to the question of the existence of God. The good
171
- psychological effect of a belief is not a reason for thinking that the belief
172
- is true.
173
-
174
- ### Slippery slope
175
-
176
- Arguing that if an opponent were to accept some claim C1, then he or she has
177
- to accept some other closely related claim C2, which in turn commits the
178
- opponent to a still further claim C3, eventually leading to the conclusion
179
- that the opponent is committed to something absurd or obviously unacceptable.
180
-
181
- This style of argumentation constitutes a fallacy only when it is
182
- inappropriate to think if one were to accept the initial claim, one must
183
- accept all the other claims.
184
-
185
- An example: "The government should not prohibit drugs. Otherwise the
186
- government should also ban alcohol or cigarettes. And then fatty food and junk
187
- food would have to be regulated too. The next thing you know, the government
188
- would force us to brush our teeth and do exercises everyday."
189
-
190
- ### Straw man
191
-
192
- Attacking an opponent by attributing to him/her an implausible position that
193
- is easily defeated when this is not actually the opponent's position.
194
-
195
- Example: When many people argue for more democracy in Hong Kong, a typical
196
- reply is to say that this is not warranted because it is wrong to think that
197
- democracy is the solution to all of Hong Kong's problems, or to say that one
198
- should not blindly accept democracy. But those who support democracy never
199
- suggest that democracy can solve _all_ problems (e.g. pollution), and they
200
- might also agree that _blindly_ accepting something is rarely correct, whether
201
- it is democracy or not. Those criticisms attack implausible "strawman"
202
- positions and do not address the real arguments for democracy.
203
-
204
- ### Suppressed evidence
205
-
206
- Where there is contradicting evidence, only confirming evidence is presented.
207
-
208
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
209
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_128.txt DELETED
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
1
- ##### Answer
2
-
3
- ×
4
-
5
- Modal body text goes here.
6
-
7
- Identify any fallacy in each of these passages. If no fallacy is committed,
8
- select "no fallacy involved".
9
-
10
- * * *
11
-
12
- [Q1] Mr. Lee's views on Japanese culture are wrong. This is because his
13
- parents were killed by the Japanese army during World War II and that made him
14
- anti-Japanese all his life.
15
-
16
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
17
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
18
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
19
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
20
- generalization
21
-
22
- * * *
23
-
24
- [Q2] Every ingredient of this soup is tasty. So this must be a very tasty
25
- soup.
26
-
27
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
28
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
29
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
30
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
31
- generalization
32
-
33
- * * *
34
-
35
- [Q3] Smoking causes cancer because my father was a smoker and he died of lung
36
- cancer.
37
-
38
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
39
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
40
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
41
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
42
- generalization
43
-
44
- * * *
45
-
46
- [Q4] Professor Lewis, the world authority on logic, claims that all wives cook
47
- for their husbands. But the fact is that his own wife does not cook for him.
48
- Therefore, his claim is false.
49
-
50
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
51
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
52
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
53
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
54
- generalization
55
-
56
- * * *
57
-
58
- [Q5] If Catholicism is right, then no women should be allowed to be priests.
59
- Catholicism is wrong. Therefore, some women should be allowed to be priests.
60
-
61
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
62
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
63
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
64
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
65
- generalization
66
-
67
- * * *
68
-
69
- [Q6] God does not exist because every argument for the existence of God has
70
- been shown to be unsound.
71
-
72
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
73
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
74
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
75
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
76
- generalization
77
-
78
- * * *
79
-
80
- [Q7] The last three times I have had a cold I took large doses of vitamin C.
81
- On each occasion, the cold cleared up within a few days. So vitamin C helped
82
- me recover from colds.
83
-
84
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
85
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
86
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
87
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
88
- generalization
89
-
90
- * * *
91
-
92
- [Q8] The union's case for more funding for higher education can be ignored.
93
- For it is put forward by the very people - university staff - who would
94
- benefit from the increased money.
95
-
96
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
97
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
98
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
99
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
100
- generalization
101
-
102
- * * *
103
-
104
- [Q9] Children become able to solve complex problems and think of physical
105
- objects objectively at the same time that they learn language. Therefore,
106
- these abilities are caused by learning a language.
107
-
108
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
109
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
110
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
111
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
112
- generalization
113
-
114
- * * *
115
-
116
- [Q10] If cheap things are no good then this cheap watch is no good. But this
117
- watch is actually quite good. So some good things are cheap.
118
-
119
- Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
120
- Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
121
- question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
122
- Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
123
- generalization
124
-
125
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
126
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_129.txt DELETED
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
1
- Please answer this question first before proceeding
2
-
3
- Namibia is a country in Africa. Do you know how big is Namibia's population?
4
- Is it above or below 100 million? Before you continue any further, write down
5
- your estimate of the population.
6
-
7
- * * *
8
-
9
- In this tutorial we will discuss cognitive biases. These are certain pervasive
10
- thinking habits which are likely to threaten objectivity or to lead to errors
11
- in reasoning. They are, however, often very common and difficult to get rid of
12
- them. Psychologists are interested in cognitive biases because they might tell
13
- us about human nature and how our brain is organised. Cognitive biases are
14
- obviously also relevant to many other areas, such as economics, management,
15
- advertising, education, and politics.
16
-
17
- Back to the question about Namibia. Here is the answer:
18
-
19
- answer
20
-
21
- __The population of Namibia population was around 2.5M in 2017. However, many
22
- people would probably give an estimate that is much higher. In fact, these
23
- estimates are likely to be of the same order of magnitude as the 100 million
24
- figure mentioned in the question. But the question of course does not assume
25
- that the correct answer has to be close to that figure. You can try asking
26
- your friends the same question, but change the 100 million figure to a smaller
27
- number, e.g. 5 million. You will probably find that the average estimate will
28
- become smaller as well. This phenomenon is known as the anchoring effect,
29
- where a piece of information act as an anchor around which people make
30
- decisions by making minor adjustments to the anchoring information. The
31
- anchoring effect can be very important in bargaining or advertising.
32
-
33
- Notice that a cognitive bias need not be a fallacy. The anchoring phenomenon
34
- just discussed does not seem to be a case where we have made an erroneous
35
- deduction. It is just that somehow our attempt to make a guess has been
36
- unconsciously influenced.
37
-
38
- Cognitive biases are certain pervasive thinking habits which are likely to
39
- lead to errors in reasoning, but which seem to be a very common part of human
40
- psychology. The study of cognitive biases is a very important part of
41
- cognitive science and psychology, and relevant to many other areas, such as
42
- economics, management and education.
43
-
44
- ## §1. Some examples of cognitive biases
45
-
46
- * _Confirmation bias_ : The tendency to look for information that confirms our existing preconceptions, making it more likely to ignore or neglect data that disconfirms our beliefs. For example, when we compare ourselves with others we are more likely to remember other people's mistakes and less likely to think of our own.
47
- * _Framing bias_ : The tendency to be influenced by the way in which a problem is formulated even though it should not affect the solution. Example: Whether a patient decides to go ahead with a surgery can be affected by whether the surgery is described in terms of success rate or rate of failure, even though both numbers provide the same information.
48
- * _Overconfidence effect_ (the above-average effect): Many people tend to over-estimate their abilities. Surveys across most areas of expertise indicate that more than half of the people think that they are better than the other half with respect to that expertise. For example, more than 50% of the population might think that they have above-average intelligence, but they cannot all be right. So many people tend to over-estimate their abilities and lack insight into their real performance.
49
-
50
- ## §2. Biases relating to probability
51
-
52
- Many cognitive biases are related to judgments and reasoning about probability
53
- and statistics. Here are some examples:
54
-
55
- * _Clustering illusion_ : The tendency to attribute patterns and underlying causes to random events when there are none.
56
- * _Gambler's fallacy_ : The error of thinking that a random event can be influenced by past random events. Example: Thinking that because a certain number has just come up in a lottery, it is less likely (or more likely) to come up in the next round.
57
-
58
- ## §3. Other resourecs
59
-
60
- * Here is a nice poster about some common cognitive biases: http://www.businessinsider.com.au/cognitive-biases-that-affect-decisions-2015-8
61
-
62
- Here is a YouTube video about cognitive biases. There are many others in the
63
- channel:
64
-
65
- __previous tutorial
66
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_13.txt DELETED
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
1
- Definitions are very important in formulating contracts, rules and legal
2
- documents. Here are some interesting real legal disputes about definitions.
3
-
4
- ## §1. A definition worth US$3.5 billion
5
-
6
- > NEW YORK - An overflow crowd gathered at the normally sleepy Second Circuit
7
- > Court of Appeals to hear an extended argument on the meaning of the word
8
- > "occurrence." Interest in the question was intensified by the fact that $3.5
9
- > billion could be riding on the answer.
10
- >
11
- > The three-judge court sitting in Manhattan was hearing arguments in the
12
- > World Trade Center insurance litigation in which Larry Silverstein, who
13
- > holds a 99-year lease for the buildings that were destroyed in the Sept. 11,
14
- > 2001, terror attacks, is claiming that he is entitled to recover $7.1
15
- > billion from the 22 insurers of the properties, twice the ostensible policy
16
- > limit, on the ground that the attack of the center was two occurrences, not
17
- > one. Otherwise, he would be stuck with the $3.55 face value of the policies.
18
- > - 23 July 2003
19
- >
20
- > [From Forbes, 07.23.03]
21
- >
22
- > NEW YORK - A federal appeals court in a ruling issued today, substantially
23
- > affirmed the position taken by the insurance industry that Silverstein
24
- > Properties, the leaseholder to the devastated World Trade Center, likely can
25
- > claim no more than the $3.5 billion insurance policy limit.
26
- >
27
- > While the appeals court did allow for a jury trial concerning the
28
- > interpretation of certain terms in the contracts with 22 insurers, the court
29
- > largely upheld the insurers' claim that Silverstein itself advocated a
30
- > definition that would preclude its theory that the attack on the buildings
31
- > should be considered two "occurrences" allowing for two separate insurance
32
- > claims. The decision leaves in doubt Silverstein's financial ability to
33
- > rebuild the Ground Zero site. - 26 Sept 2003.
34
-
35
- ## §2. Judge: Fetuses do not count in carpool lanes
36
-
37
- > 11 Jan 2006 PHOENIX (AP) - Fetuses do not count as passengers when it comes
38
- > to determining who may drive in the carpool lane, a judge ruled. Candace
39
- > Dickinson was fined $367 for improper use of a carpool lane, but contended
40
- > the fetus inside her womb allowed her to use the lane. Motorists who use the
41
- > lanes normally must carry at least one passenger during weekday rush hours.
42
- > Municipal Judge Dennis Freeman rejected Dickinson's argument Tuesday,
43
- > applying a "common sense" definition in which an individual is someone who
44
- > occupies a "separate and distinct" space in a vehicle. "The law is meant to
45
- > fill empty space in a vehicle," the judge said. Sgt. Dave Norton stopped
46
- > Dickinson's car Nov. 8. When asked how many people were in the car,
47
- > Dickinson said two, pointing to "her obvious pregnancy," the officer said. -
48
- > ©The Associated Press
49
-
50
- ## §3. Definition: The Clinton Affair [Not for children!]
51
-
52
- THIS SECTION IS NOT SUITABLE FOR CHILDREN!
53
-
54
- When Bill Clinton was US President, he was accused of lying under oath about
55
- his affair with Monica Lewinsky. In particular he was accused of lying about
56
- the fact that he had sexual relations with Monica when he received oral sex in
57
- the White House office.
58
-
59
- According to Clinton, when he denied that he has engaged in sexual relations,
60
- this is the definition of "sexual relations" that he uses. The definition is
61
- actually taken from a particular court case :
62
-
63
- > A person engages in 'sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in
64
- > or causes contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
65
- > buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire
66
- > of any person.
67
-
68
- Here is Clinton's explanation why he did not engage in sexual relations :
69
-
70
- > If the deponent [the person who is testifying] is the person who has oral
71
- > sex performed on him, then the contact is with -- not with anything on that
72
- > list, but with the lips of another person. It seems to be self-evident that
73
- > that's what it is. . . . Let me remind you, sir, I read this carefully. ...
74
- > any person, reasonable person would recognize that oral sex performed on the
75
- > deponent falls outside the definition.
76
-
77
- Suppose we accept the above definition of sexual relations. Should we then
78
- accept Clinton's argument that he did not engage in sexual relations when he
79
- received oral sex? Or should we say that receiving oral sex also counts as
80
- engaging in sexual relations? If you are a lawyer trying to argue for the
81
- second position, how would you go about defending your position?
82
-
83
- ## §4. Is a hot dog a sandwich?
84
-
85
- This doesn't actually involve a court case, but the British Sandwich
86
- Association has said that a hot dog is not a sandwich.
87
-
88
- The US Merriam-Webster dictionary says it is: “Given that the definition of
89
- sandwich is ‘two or more slices of bread or a split roll having a filling in
90
- between’, there is no sensible way around it,”
91
-
92
- So who is right? What is a sandwich? Read more at:
93
- https://inews.co.uk/distractions/offbeat/hot-dog-not-sandwich-says-british-
94
- sandwich-body
95
-
96
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
97
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_130.txt DELETED
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
1
- For many people, creativity is something reserved for scientists or artists.
2
- But this is to ignore the fact that we are faced with countless problems in
3
- our daily life, and it is precisely creative thinking that helps us come up
4
- with solutions to these problems. We need to make use of our creativity
5
- whether we are thinking about how to earn more money or how to make our our
6
- loved ones happier.
7
-
8
- Many people also seem to think that creativity is a matter of waiting for
9
- inspirations. How inspiring ideas come about is however regarded as a rather
10
- mysterious process, and it is just a fact that some people are more creative
11
- than others. But it would be a mistake to think that creativity is a passive
12
- state of mind. While it is true that there is no special algorithm for
13
- creativity, there are thinking skills that can be taught and things one can do
14
- to enhance one's creativity. But to begin with, we need to understand these
15
- three basic principles that underlie creativity.
16
-
17
- ## Principle one : New ideas are composed of old elements
18
-
19
- Critical thinking is mainly about correct thinking. Creativity is mainly about
20
- alternative possibilities - how to come up with new and useful ideas. A new
21
- idea might be a new theory, a new product, a new solution to a problem, or a
22
- conception for a piece of art.
23
-
24
- To come up with something new is to produce something that is distinctive and
25
- special. The practical implication here is that in order to be creative we
26
- must be ready to deviate from the ordinary and the traditional. Many people
27
- have the habit of following instructions and are afraid of challenging the
28
- status quo or exploring anything new. This implies a certain courageous
29
- exploratory attitude and curiosity in one's character.
30
-
31
- But where do new ideas come from? The simple answer is that new ideas are
32
- actually old ones rearranged in a new way. So there is a sense in which it is
33
- true that "there is nothing new under the sun." This applies not just to the
34
- creation of concepts or theories but also the launching of new fashion or
35
- cultural trends.
36
-
37
- How do we generate new ideas from old ones? Roughly speaking, ideas are
38
- usually composed of diffrent elements, and we look for new combination of
39
- ideas by joining different ideas together, deleting some elements, or
40
- replacing some elements by other ones. Consider the idea of a mobile phone.
41
- This idea is of course the combination of the idea of wireless information
42
- transmission and the idea of a telephone.
43
-
44
- The first principle also has a practical implication - the ingredients for
45
- creativity depends on the store of ideas that are available for recombination.
46
- If you have a limited domain of knowledge, you will have fewer resources to
47
- draw from in forming new ideas. This is why intellectual curiosity and a wide
48
- knowledge base can significantly enhance one's creativity - one has in one's
49
- possession more concepts, theories and experience to choose from. This is also
50
- why it can be useful to try to solve a problem by consulting other people with
51
- different expertise.
52
-
53
- So creativity does not come from a vacuum or sheer determination. We have to
54
- start by absorbing lots and lots of ideas before we can come up with one
55
- ourselves. As the famous comedian John Cleese says:
56
-
57
- > You say, "I'm going to write something completely new and original and very
58
- > funny." You can't do it. It's like trying to fly a plane without having any
59
- > lessons. You've got to start somewhere and the best way to start is by
60
- > copying something that is really good. John Cleese, comedian
61
-
62
- ## Principle two : Not all new ideas are on a par
63
-
64
- Creativity is not simply a matter of coming up with new ideas. The kind of
65
- creativity that is valued is the ability to come up with new and _useful_
66
- ideas, ideas that serve an important need or creates a new trend that makes an
67
- impact.
68
-
69
- Creativity might be divided into _cognitive_ and _artistic_ creativity.
70
- Artistic creativity consists in the creation of artwork and expressing one's
71
- ideas and emotions through various forms of art. Critical thinking as such is
72
- not opposed to artistic creativity, but the enhancement of critical thinking
73
- skills obviously might not improve one's artistic creativity. However,
74
- critical thinking is a necessary condition for cognitive creativity. Cognitive
75
- creativity is a matter of coming up with solutions to practical or theoretical
76
- problems. This includes for example creating a new scientific theory, or
77
- lauching a new commercial product.
78
-
79
- Cognitive creativity has two parts - the generation of new ideas, and the
80
- evaluation and modification of new ideas. When we need new ideas to solve a
81
- problem, critical thinking is necessary to help determine the relevance and
82
- effectiveness of the idea. To build a rocket that flies to the moon, one
83
- should not violate logic or the laws of physics. The evaluation of any
84
- proposal to solve a problem must involve good critical thinking.
85
-
86
- It is sometimes suggested that creativity often requires going against the
87
- usual conventions, and that new and important ideas might be lost if one is
88
- too critical. But good critical thinking does not mean that one must always be
89
- critical. If experience tells us that it is useful to brainstorm, that
90
- sometimes it might be productive to suspend one's critical judgment and list
91
- out new ideas before evaluating them, then it is of course rational to do so.
92
- This is certainly not inconsistent with the principles of critical thinking.
93
- It is thus a serious misconception to regard critical thinking and cognitive
94
- creativity as opposed to each other.
95
-
96
- ## Principle three : Creativity is enhanced by the ability to detect
97
- connections between ideas
98
-
99
- Our store of ideas provides the ingredients to generate new ones, but it is
100
- important to remember that useful ideas might come from unexpected sources. A
101
- successful marketing campaign might appeal to certain psychological studies
102
- and relate to particular trends in the society. This involves seeing a
103
- connection between the subject matter one is interested in (the marketing
104
- exercise) and other subjects (sociology and psychology) which might seem
105
- somewhat remote.
106
-
107
- As a concrete example, consider the so-called "fastskin" swimsuits that was
108
- introduced by the company Speedo around 1996. One of the key consideration in
109
- designing a swimsuit for athletes is to reduce the total amount of drag over
110
- the surface of the swimsuit. The company's researchers noticed that sharks are
111
- able to move very fast in water in part because of V-shaped ridges.
112
- Researchers designed swimwear fabric emulating sharkskin that produced less
113
- drag and turbulence. At the Sydney Olympics in 2000, 28 of 33 Olympic Gold
114
- Medal winners wore this type of swimsuit, testifying to its success.
115
-
116
- So if we want to be creative, we must be ready to explore connections between
117
- different areas. First, this means we should have a wide knowledge base.
118
- Creative people are usually people who read widely, who have a great sense of
119
- curiosity, and are often willing to explore topics which do not bring about
120
- immediate benefits. Second, we should ensure that our learning processes
121
- should aim at a deep understanding of the connections between key concepts.
122
- Studying is not simply remembering bits and pieces of unrelated information.
123
- We should make sure that we look at the information we have from different
124
- angles, reformulate them systematically in a way to achieve better
125
- understanding.
126
-
127
- Here is a nice quote from Steve Jobs, co-founder of Apple Computers:
128
-
129
- > Creativity is just connecting things. When you ask creative people how they
130
- > did something, they feel a little guilty because they didn't really do it,
131
- > they just saw something. It seemed obvious to them after a while. That's
132
- > because they were able to connect experiences they've had and synthesize new
133
- > things. And the reason they were able to do that was that they've had more
134
- > experiences or they have thought more about their experiences than other
135
- > people. From "Steve Jobs: The Next Insanely Great Thing" WIRED
136
- > (http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.02/jobs_pr.html)
137
-
138
- Famous scientist and author Isaac Asimov also talks about the importance of
139
- detecting connections between ideas. He wrote a special report about
140
- creativity where he says:
141
-
142
- > The history of human thought would make it seem that there is difficulty in
143
- > thinking of an idea even when all the facts are on the table. Making the
144
- > cross-connection requires a certain daring. It must, for any cross-
145
- > connection that does not require daring is performed at once by many and
146
- > develops not as a “new idea,” but as a mere “corollary of an old idea.”
147
- >
148
- > It is only afterward that a new idea seems reasonable. To begin with, it
149
- > usually seems unreasonable. It seems the height of unreason to suppose the
150
- > earth was round instead of flat, or that it moved instead of the sun, or
151
- > that objects required a force to stop them when in motion, instead of a
152
- > force to keep them moving, and so on.
153
- >
154
- > A person willing to fly in the face of reason, authority, and common sense
155
- > must be a person of considerable self-assurance. Since he occurs only
156
- > rarely, he must seem eccentric (in at least that respect) to the rest of us.
157
- > A person eccentric in one respect is often eccentric in others.
158
- >
159
- > Consequently, the person who is most likely to get new ideas is a person of
160
- > good background in the field of interest and one who is unconventional in
161
- > his habits. (To be a crackpot is not, however, enough in itself.) From
162
- > https://www.technologyreview.com/s/531911/isaac-asimov-asks-how-do-people-
163
- > get-new-ideas/
164
-
165
- __next tutorial
166
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_131.txt DELETED
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
1
- There is of course no precise procedure that would guarantee creativity. But
2
- the following informal procedure is quite useful, and lots of people have
3
- working routines which are very similar. It might look very simple, but
4
- success does not come from one single application but a repetition of the
5
- procedure again and again over a long period of time.
6
-
7
- ### Step 1 - Research
8
-
9
- A Hong Kong student once asked the Nobel laureate John Nash for advice on
10
- getting ideas for his thesis, and the reply was, "Have you done your reading?"
11
-
12
- When we need to come up with an idea to solve a problem, it would be helpful
13
- to do some research to see what other people have thought about the topic. If
14
- there are already good solutions that can be used, then we don't have to waste
15
- our time to reinvent the wheel. But even if the problem has not been solved,
16
- we need to find out more about existing approaches and what their limitations
17
- are. When you are starting your research, collect as much information as you
18
- can, without worrying too much about their relevance.
19
-
20
- Some useful things to do:
21
-
22
- * Obtain relevant information from the scientific literature or experts.
23
- * Study the history of the problem.
24
- * Do case studies of people who have dealt with similar problems.
25
- * Think about analogous situations.
26
- * Talk to the people who are involved.
27
-
28
- ### Step 2 - Explore the connections between ideas
29
-
30
- When you are gathering your data you are doing some preliminary study to learn
31
- more about the problem you have to solve. While you are doing this, or after
32
- you have collected a lot of material, you need to examine and reflect on what
33
- you have, in order to rank the importance of the different pieces of
34
- information that you have, and to investigate whether there are special
35
- connections between the ideas. Creativity often takes the form of using some
36
- idea from one field and apply it to another one.
37
-
38
- ### Step 3 - Relax and wait
39
-
40
- Very likely we have had experiences where an idea suddenly pops up while we
41
- are taking the shower, or after a good night's sleep. When we are sorting out
42
- the connections between ideas it is important that we are persistent and spend
43
- an extended period of time in order that we keep lots of different ideas in
44
- the mind, some of which remain in the background and some of which might enter
45
- into unconscious thinking processes. After a period of hardwork it is
46
- sometimes necessary to pull back and relax, to do something relaxing and
47
- different to stimulate the mind. Or it might perhaps be a case of allowing
48
- ourselves to forget about the less important ideas so that the more relevant
49
- ones float to the top. But whatever the mechanisms are, it does seem to be
50
- important to allow time for ideas to gestate. If we still can't think of
51
- anything, then we might have to do more research and think about connections
52
- further.
53
-
54
- ### Step 4 - Apply, review and followup
55
-
56
- Once we have obtained some ideas that seem to work, we need to examine them
57
- carefully to check that they indeed can help solve our problem. We have to
58
- think about whether they can be improved further and we need to see how they
59
- are to be implemented. Even when they have proved to be successful, we should
60
- review the whole process to see how we can do better next time.
61
-
62
- ## §1. An example
63
-
64
- Andrew Wiles is famous for proving Fermat's Last Theorem. In this TV interview
65
- he talks about his research routine which echoes what has been said in this
66
- tutorial:
67
-
68
- > NOVA: On a day-to-day basis, how did you go about constructing your proof?
69
- >
70
- > Wiles: I used to come up to my study, and start trying to find patterns. I
71
- > tried doing calculations which explain some little piece of mathematics. I
72
- > tried to fit it in with some previous broad conceptual understanding of some
73
- > part of mathematics that would clarify the particular problem I was thinking
74
- > about. Sometimes that would involve going and looking it up in a book to see
75
- > how it's done there. Sometimes it was a question of modifying things a bit,
76
- > doing a little extra calculation. And sometimes I realized that nothing that
77
- > had ever been done before was any use at all. Then I just had to find
78
- > something completely new; it's a mystery where that comes from. I carried
79
- > this problem around in my head basically the whole time. I would wake up
80
- > with it first thing in the morning, I would be thinking about it all day,
81
- > and I would be thinking about it when I went to sleep. Without distraction,
82
- > I would have the same thing going round and round in my mind. The only way I
83
- > could relax was when I was with my children. Young children simply aren't
84
- > interested in Fermat. They just want to hear a story and they're not going
85
- > to let you do anything else.
86
- >
87
- > NOVA: Usually people work in groups and use each other for support. What did
88
- > you do when you hit a brick wall?
89
- >
90
- > Wiles: When I got stuck and I didn't know what to do next, I would go out
91
- > for a walk. I'd often walk down by the lake. Walking has a very good effect
92
- > in that you're in this state of relaxation, but at the same time you're
93
- > allowing the sub-conscious to work on you. And often if you have one
94
- > particular thing buzzing in your mind then you don't need anything to write
95
- > with or any desk. I'd always have a pencil and paper ready and, if I really
96
- > had an idea, I'd sit down at a bench and I'd start scribbling away.
97
- >
98
- > From http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/proof/wiles.html (Nov 2000)
99
-
100
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
101
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_132.txt DELETED
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
1
- The recipe in the last tutorial is a very general outline of what we can do to
2
- come up with new ideas. But more specifically, if creativity involves
3
- manipulating ideas, what are the different methods available which would help
4
- us come up with ideas to be tested? Here we present some heuristics that might
5
- be helpful.
6
-
7
- ## Feature list
8
-
9
- A feature list for an object or process is simply a list of its main features.
10
- Having obtained such a list, one can examine the features one by one and
11
- consider how it might be changed. For instance, a typical table has a fixed
12
- round or rectangular flat top that rests on one or more supporting pole. An
13
- exotic designer table might instead have movable multi-level worktops of
14
- irregular shapes supported by a wired frame.
15
-
16
- ## Analogy
17
-
18
- The use of analogies might help us imagine new features. By comparing X with Y
19
- we can consider whether special features of Y might have analogues in X.
20
- Thinking of an airplane as a bird leads us to see whether the evolutionary
21
- solutions for aviation in birds might be applied to the building of aircrafts.
22
- Similarly, a new kind of swiming suit designed to reduce drag for swimming
23
- competitors was actually inspired by shark skins.
24
-
25
- ## Search
26
-
27
- Sometimes solving a problem is a matter of searching through a long list of
28
- possible solutions. It then becomes important to find a systematic search
29
- method. When Edison was designing the electric light bulb, a crucial task was
30
- the search of a suitable filament which conducts electricity well enough to
31
- give off light, but which will not burn up or melt as a result. It became very
32
- important for him to classify the different types of material (e.g. ceramic or
33
- metallic) that was being tested in order to narrow down the search. When we
34
- have a large search space we should divide the space into portions to that the
35
- search can be done systematically, and device tests of represenative samples
36
- from different regions to eliminate unlikely candidates.
37
-
38
- ## Perspective shift
39
-
40
- When dealing with a problem that involves people, one might consider the
41
- problem from the different perspectives of the parties involved. Suppose we
42
- are trying to improve the effiency of a company, we can imagine how we might
43
- deal with the problem from the CEO's point of view, or from the perspective of
44
- the sales department. Taking different perspectives in turn might help us
45
- appreciate difficulties or opportunities which we have not thought of before.
46
-
47
- Perspective shift involves also thinking about different ways of formulating a
48
- problem. Sometimes when we are dealing with a difficulty we might be fixated
49
- on one particular aspect. Trying to formulate the problem differently can help
50
- us discover new approaches. For example, a developer working on a site might
51
- be faced with the difficulty of having to clear and remove a significant
52
- amount of topsoil from the site. Instead of seeing this as a source of
53
- expenses, the developer might try to see the problem from a different
54
- perspective. He might discover for example that the quality of the soil is
55
- actually quite suitable for farming purposes, and so someone might actually be
56
- willing to pay some money to purchase the soil. So sometimes we do need to
57
- leave aside our preconceptions for the time being and explore alternative ways
58
- of looking at a situation. As Einstein said when he was asked what single
59
- event was most helpful in developing his theory of relativity, he replied:
60
- "Figuring out how to think about the problem."
61
-
62
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
63
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_133.txt DELETED
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
1
- Many books and courses on creativity are about teaching individuals to become
2
- more creative. But in modern society, we often do not work alone but have to
3
- cooperate with other people in solving complex problems. Most big companies
4
- organise projects around teams of people with special expertise. Research in
5
- science and technology is increasingly done by teams of people. Science papers
6
- with multiple authors are cited more often than papers with single authors.
7
- This is also a growing trend in humanities research as well.
8
-
9
- Brainstorming is perhaps the most well-known creative thinking technique for
10
- groups. The term was made popular by advertising executive Alex Osborn in his
11
- 1953 book _Applied Imagination_. The basic idea is for a group of people to
12
- meet together and try to come up with as many new ideas as possible. The most
13
- important requirement is to encourage the production of ideas by withholding
14
- criticisms or negative feedback.
15
-
16
- However, the usefulness of brainstorming is often exaggerated because it does
17
- not always work:
18
-
19
- * If the objectives of the exercise are unclear, or the discussion is not very structured, the ideas produced might be too diffused and not practically useful.
20
- * Some people might be reluctant to present their ideas because they are worried about how others might judge them, even if they are not criticized.
21
- * A group might fixate on the first perceived solution and spends less effort to explore other alternatives.
22
- * It has been suggested that because it takes time to discuss ideas one by one, sometimes people forget their new ideas or give up talking about them.
23
- * There is the danger that group discussion will be dominated by more vocal individuals.
24
-
25
- Because of the above problems, it is quite possible for a brainstorming group
26
- to produce fewer ideas than what the individuals would produce on their own.
27
- The effectiveness of brainstorming depends crucially on how it is implemented.
28
- A better way would be for give individuals some time to write their ideas down
29
- first, or to break up a group into smaller sub-groups for a preliminary
30
- discussion. Ideas can then be collected and discussed openly and perhaps
31
- anonymously, giving more emphasis on how to make them work rather than why
32
- they are mistaken.
33
-
34
- Another well-known potential pitfall with group creativity is that of
35
- groupthink. This is the danger that a close-knit group with a uniform culture
36
- is unlikely to challenge its own ideas and is very set in its ways. Innovative
37
- breakthroughs become more difficult. A special effort to bring in new people
38
- or rotate group membership might be necessary. Asking team members to take up
39
- opposite roles to debate with each other might also help.
40
-
41
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
42
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_134.txt DELETED
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
1
- Creativity is a high-valued trait. Education is supposed to help students
2
- become more creative and better at solving problems. Businesses are willing to
3
- pay a high premium to hire creative individuals. But is there a dark side to
4
- creativity?
5
-
6
- Empirical research indicates that there are statisical links between
7
- creativity and personality traits such as introversion, emotional sensitivity,
8
- openness to new experience, and impulsivity. In more extreme cases, creativity
9
- is often present together with emotional disorders, especially in the area of
10
- creative arts. (See Akinola and Mendes (2008) "The Dark Side of Creativity:
11
- Biological Vulnerability and Negative Emotions Lead to Greater Artistic
12
- Creativity” _Pers Soc Psychol Bull_ 34(12):1677-1686.)
13
-
14
- Along a similar theme, in his famous book _Creating Minds_ , Harvard
15
- psychologist Howard Gardner reviewed the lives of famous creative people such
16
- as Einstein, Freud, and Picasso. He claimed that a commonality among his
17
- subjects is that they all seem to be involved in some kind of a Faustian
18
- bargain, having to make a big sacrifice in some area in order to engage in
19
- their creative pursuits:
20
-
21
- > …the creators became embedded in some kind of a bargain, deal, or Faustian
22
- > arrangement, executed as a means of ensuring the preservation of his or her
23
- > unusual gifts. In general, the creators were so caught up in the pursuit of
24
- > their work mission that they sacrificed all, especially the possibility of a
25
- > rounded personal existence… unless this bargain has been compulsively
26
- > adhered to, the talent may be compromised or even irretrievably lost. And,
27
- > indeed, at times when the bargain is relaxed, there may well be negative
28
- > consequences for the individual’s creative output.
29
-
30
- More recently, Professor of business administration Francesca Gino and
31
- behavioral economist Dan Ariely have done experiments linking creativity with
32
- dishonesty. It was found that people with creative personalities tend to be
33
- more dishonest and more willing to cheat. In fact, in one experiment
34
- creativity turns out to be a better predictor of unethical behaviour than
35
- intelligence! (Gino and Ariely (2012) "The dark side of creativity: original
36
- thinkers can be more dishonest". _J Pers Soc Psychol_ 102(3):445-59.)
37
-
38
- Creativity that leads to success is often achieved as a result of very focused
39
- work over a long period of time. This would usually imply making significant
40
- sacrifices in other areas. In addition, perhaps it takes a certain kind of
41
- personality to be able to sustain that level of intense devotion to a project.
42
- Stubbornness and grit enable us to persist through failures and stick to our
43
- goals, and a willingness to break existing rules and be different underlies
44
- the courage to explore new territories. There is a lot more research that can
45
- be done on the connections between creativity, personality, and other
46
- psychological factors. But it should be clear that becoming a creative person
47
- is not just a matter of learning some rules of thinking. There are lots of
48
- other psychological factors involved.
49
-
50
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
51
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_135.txt DELETED
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
1
- If you read more about the stories of people famous for their creativity, you
2
- will come across some common themes. There is no special shortcut or magic
3
- formula to follow. It is often a matter of focusing on a task, and having the
4
- discipline and persistence to become really good at it over a long period of
5
- time. This is a short and fun 3-minute video about creativity and success:
6
-
7
- * * *
8
-
9
- * * *
10
-
11
- A talk by the famous comedian John Cleese:
12
-
13
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
14
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_136.txt DELETED
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
1
- These are quotes on creativity from famous people which illustrate many of the
2
- principles discussed in our tutorials. You might be able to find some
3
- recurrent themes being mentioned. Hope you will find them interesting and
4
- inspiring.
5
-
6
- > People are wrong who think my art comes easily to me. I assure you, nobody
7
- > has devoted so much time and thought to composition as I. There is not a
8
- > famous master whose music I have not studied over and over.
9
- >
10
- > Mozart
11
-
12
- > The best way to have a good idea is to have lots of ideas.
13
- >
14
- > Linus Pauling, physicist
15
-
16
- > It is worth mentioning, for future reference, that the creative power which
17
- > bubbles so pleasantly in beginning a new book quiets down after a time, and
18
- > one goes on more steadily. Doubts creep in. Then one becomes resigned.
19
- > Determination not to give in, and the sense of an impending shape keep one
20
- > at it more than anything.
21
- >
22
- > Virginia Woolf, writer
23
-
24
- > It is better to have enough ideas for some of them to be wrong, than to be
25
- > always right by having no ideas at all.
26
- >
27
- > Edward de Bono, writer
28
-
29
- > Genius was 1 percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration.
30
- >
31
- > Thomas Edison, inventor
32
-
33
- > The secret to creativity is knowing how to hide your sources.
34
- >
35
- > Albert Einstein, physicist
36
-
37
- > The first draft of anything is shit.
38
- >
39
- > Ernest Hemingway
40
-
41
- > Richard Feynman was fond of giving the following advice on how to be a
42
- > genius. You have to keep a dozen of your favorite problems constantly
43
- > present in your mind, although by and large they will lay in a dormant
44
- > state. Every time you hear or read a new trick or a new result, test it
45
- > against each of your twelve problems to see whether it helps. Every once in
46
- > a while there will be a hit, and people will say, "How did he do it? He must
47
- > be a genius!"
48
- >
49
- > Gian-Carlo Rota, Indiscrete Thoughts
50
-
51
- > After so many years, I've learned that being creative is a full-time job
52
- > with its own daily patterns. That's why writers, for example, like to
53
- > establish routines for themselves. The most productive ones get started
54
- > early in the morning, when the world is quiet, the phones aren't ringing,
55
- > and their minds are rested, alert, and not yet polluted by other people's
56
- > words. They might set a goal for themselves -- write fifteen hundred words,
57
- > or stay at their desk until noon -- but the real secret is that they do this
58
- > every day. In other words, they are disciplined. Over time, as the daily
59
- > routines become second nature, discipline morphs into habit.
60
- >
61
- > It's the same for any creative individual, whether it's a painter finding
62
- > his way each morning to the easel, or a medical researcher returning daily
63
- > to the laboratory. The routine is as much a part of the creative process as
64
- > the lightning bolt of inspiration, maybe more. And this routine is available
65
- > to everyone.
66
- >
67
- > Creativity is a habit, and the best creativity is a result of good work
68
- > habits.
69
- >
70
- > Twyla Tharp, choreographer and dancer The Creative Habit
71
-
72
- > This is the extraordinary thing about creativity: If just you keep your mind
73
- > resting against the subject in a friendly but persistent way, sooner or
74
- > later you will get a reward from your unconscious.
75
- >
76
- > John Cleese, comedian
77
-
78
- __previous tutorial
79
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_14.txt DELETED
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
1
- Consider the following dialogue:
2
-
3
- Teacher A: Cindy is the best student in class.
4
- Teacher B: No, she is not. Betty is better because Betty has more A grades.
5
- Teacher A: No. Cindy is the best because her average grade is higher than
6
- Betty's.
7
- Teacher B: You are wrong. Betty is the best!
8
- Teacher A: YOU are wrong! Cindy is the best!
9
-
10
- So who is right and who is wrong? In a way, both teachers are correct because
11
- they seem to be operating with two different definitions of 'the best
12
- students'. For teacher A, the best student is the one with the highest average
13
- grade. For teacher B, the best student is someone who has the highest number
14
- of A grades. Obviously, the student who satisfies the first definition need
15
- not be the same as the student who satisfies the second definition. This is an
16
- example of what we might call a purely _verbal dispute_ , where the apparent
17
- disagreement is not due to disagreement with regard to the facts, but it has
18
- to do with the different understanding of the meaning of a key term or
19
- concept.
20
-
21
- Verbal disputes are often contrasted with _factual disputes_ , where
22
- disagreements have to do with different opinions about facts and not meaning.
23
- If someone thinks Sydney is the capital of Australia and others disagree, then
24
- the disagreement is a factual one.
25
-
26
- There are two main ways to resolve a purely verbal dispute once the different
27
- meanings of a key term is pointed out. First, the different parties might
28
- agree to disagree with regard to the usage of the term. Thus, teachers A and B
29
- might agree that they have provided two different precising definitions of
30
- 'the best student', and that both are legitimate, and they can agree that
31
- Cindy is the best student under one interpretation, and that Betty is the best
32
- student under a different interpretation.
33
-
34
- However, there are situations in which the parties involved have to pick one
35
- particular interpretation. For example, perhaps there is just one prize to be
36
- given to the best student, and so there is a need to choose between the two
37
- definitions in order to decide whether Cindy or Betty should get the prize. So
38
- this is the second way in which a verbal dispute involving two definitions
39
- might be resolved - we choose to adopt a particular definition by considering
40
- very carefully the function that it is supposed to serve. In the example under
41
- discussion, if you have to choose between the definitions offered by teachers
42
- A and B, whose definition will you pick and why?
43
-
44
- Can you give your own examples of factual and verbal disputes?
45
-
46
- __previous tutorial __next tutorial
47
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data/en/crtw_15.txt DELETED
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
1
- The concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions help us understand and
2
- explain the different kinds of connections between concepts, and how different
3
- states of affairs are related to each other.
4
-
5
- ## §1. Necessary conditions
6
-
7
- To say that X is a _necessary condition_ for Y is to say that **it is
8
- impossible to have Y without X**. In other words, the absence of X guarantees
9
- the absence of Y. A necessary condition is sometimes also called "an essential
10
- condition". Some examples :
11
-
12
- * Having four sides is necessary for being a square.
13
- * Being brave is a necessary condition for being a good soldier.
14
- * Not being divisible by four is essential for being a prime number.
15
-
16
- To show that X is not a necessary condition for Y, we simply find **a
17
- situation where Y is present but X is not**. Examples :
18
-
19
- * Being rich is not necessary for being happy, since a poor person can be happy too.
20
- * Being Chinese is not necessary for being a Hong Kong permanent resident, since a non-Chinese can becoming a permanent resident if he or she has lived in Hong Kong for seven years.
21
-
22
- Additional remarks about necessary conditions :
23
-
24
- * We invoke the notion of a necessary condition very often in our daily life, even though we might be using different terms. For example, when we say things like "life requires oxygen", this is equivalent to saying that the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for the existence of life.
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- * A certain state of affairs might have more than one necessary condition. For example, to be a good concert pianist, having good finger techniques is a necessary condition. But this is not enough. Another necessary condition is being good at interpreting piano pieces.
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- ## §2. Sufficient conditions
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- To say that X is a _sufficient condition_ for Y is to say that **the presence
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- of X guarantees the presence of Y**. In other words, it is impossible to have
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- X without Y. If X is present, then Y must also be present. Again, some
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- examples :
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- * Being a square is sufficient for having four sides.
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- * Being divisible by 4 is sufficient for being an even number.
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- To show that X is not sufficient for Y, we come up with cases where X is
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- present but Y is not. Examples :
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- * Loving someone is not sufficient for being loved. A person who loves someone might not be loved by anyone perhaps because she is a very nasty person.
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- * Loyalty is not sufficient for honesty because one might have to lie in order to protect the person one is loyal to.
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- Additional remarks about sufficient conditions :
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- * Expressions such as "If X then Y", or "X is enough for Y", can also be understood as saying that X is a sufficient condition for Y.
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- * Some state of affairs can have more than one sufficient condition. Being blue is sufficient for being colored, but of course being green, being red are also sufficient for being coloured.
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- ## §3. Four possibilities
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- Given two conditions X and Y, there are four ways in which they might be
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- related to each other:
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- 1. X is necessary but not sufficient for Y.
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- 2. X is sufficient but not necessary for Y.
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- 3. X is both necessary and sufficient for Y. (or "jointly necessary and sufficient")
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- 4. X is neither necessary nor sufficient for Y.
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- This classification is very useful in when we want to clarify how two concepts
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- are related to each other. Here are some examples :
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- * Having four sides is necessary but not sufficient for being a square (since a rectangle has four sides but it is not a square).
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- * Having a son is sufficient but not necessary for being a parent (a parent can have only one daughter).
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- * Being an unmarried man is both necessary and sufficient for being a bachelor.
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- * Being a tall person is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a successful person.
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- Rewrite these claims in terms of necessary and / or sufficient conditions :
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- 1. You must pay if you want to enter. answer
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- 2. A cloud chamber is needed to observe subatomic particles. answer
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- 3. If something is an electron it is a charged particle. answer
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- 4. I will pay for lunch if and only if you pay for dinner. answer
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- Suppose Tom is a tall but unsuccessful person. Does it show that (a) being
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- tall is not sufficient for being successful, or (b) being tall is not
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- necessary for being successful? answer
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- Discuss how these conditions are related to each other and explain your
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- answers :
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- 1. not being poor, being rich answer
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- 2. being an even number, being divisible by 2 answer
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- 3. being an intelligent student, being the most intelligent student answer
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- 4. having ten dollars, having more than five dollars answer
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- 5. the presence of the rule of law, being a just society answer
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- 6. giving money to another person in exchange for a favour, corruption
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- 7. taking place on a weekday, not being held on Saturday
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