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destitute, persecuted, and stateless men and women simply be-
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cause they are foreigners? In Walzer's view the community is
bound by a prindple of mutual aid and he rightly notes that
this prindple may have wider effects when applied to a community
than when applied to an individual, because so many
benevolent actions are open to a community that will only
marginally affect its members. To take a stranger into one's
family is something that we might consider goes beyond the
requirement of mutual aid; but to take a stranger, or even many
strangers, into the community is far less burdensome.
In Walzer's view, a nation with vast unoccupied lands - he
takes Australia as his example, though by assumption rather
than by any examination of Australia's water and soil resources
- may indeed have an obligation in mutual aid to take in people
from densely populated, famine-stricken lands of Southeast
Asia. The choice for the Australian community would then be
to give up whatever homogeneity their sodety possessed, or to
retreat to a small portion of the land they occupied, yielding
the remainder to those who needed it.
Although not accepting any general obligation on affluent
nations to admit refugees, Walzer does uphold the popular prindple
of asylum. In accordance with this prindple, any refugee
who manages to reach the shores of another country can claim
asylum and cannot be deported back to a country in which he
may be persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or
political opinion. It is interesting that this prindple is so widely
supported, while the obligation to accept refugees is not. The
distinction drawn may reflect some of the prindples discussed
in previous chapters of this book. The prindple of proximity
clearly plays a role - the person seeking asylum is just physically
closer to us than those in other countries. Perhaps our stronger
support for asylum rests in part on the distinction between an
act (deporting a refugee who has arrived here) and an omission
(not offering a place to a refugee in a distant camp). It could
also be an instance of the difference between doing something
to an identifiable individual, and doing something that we know
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Insiders and Outsiders·
will have the same effect on someone, but we will never be
able to tell on whom it has this effect. A further factor is probably
the relatively small number of people who are actually able to
arrive in order to seek asylum, in contrast to the much larger
number of refugees of whose existence we are aware, although
they are far from us. This is the 'drops in the ocean' argument
that was discussed in connection with overseas aid. We can,
perhaps, cope with all the asylum seekers, but no matter how
many refugees we admit, the problem will still be there. As in
the case of the parallel argument against giving overseas aid,
this overlooks the fact that in admitting refugees, we enable
spedfic individuals to live decent lives and thus are doing something
that is worthwhile, no matter how many other refugees
remain whom we are unable to help.
Moderately liberal governments, prepared to heed at least
some humanitarian sentiments, act much as Walzer suggests
they should. They hold that communities have a right to dedde
whom they will admit; the claims of family reunion come first,
and those of outsiders from the national ethnic group - should
the state have an ethnic identity - next. The admission of those
in need is an ex gratia act. The right of asylum is usually respected,
as long as the numbers are relatively small. Refugees,
unless they can appeal to some spedal sense of political affinity,
have no real claim to be accepted, and have to throw themselves
on the charity of the receiving country. All of this is in general
agreement with immigration policy in the Western democrades.
As far as refugees are concerned, the ex gratia approach is the
current orthodoxy.
THE FALLACY OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
The current orthodoxy rests on vague and usually unargued
assumptions about the community's right to determine its membership.
A consequentialist would hold, instead, that immigration
policy should be based squarely on the interests of all those
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affected. Where the interests of different parties conflict, we
should be giving equal consideration to all interests, which
would mean that more pressing or more fundamental interests
take precedence over less fundamental interests. The first step
in applying the principle of equal consideration of interests is
to identify those whose interests are affected. The first and most
obvious group is the refugees themselves. Their most pressing
and fundamental interests are clearly at stake. Life in a refugee
camp offers little prospect of anything more than a bare subsistence,
and sometimes hardly even that. Here is one observer's
impression of a camp on the Thai-Cambodian border in 1986.
At the time the camp was home for 144,000 people:
The visit of a foreigner causes a ripple of excitement. People
gather round and ask eamestly about the progress of their case
for resettlement, or share their great despair at continual rejection
by the selection bodies for the various countries which will accept
refugees .... People wept as they spoke, most had an air of quiet
desperation .... On rice distribution day, thousands of girls and
women mill in the distribution area, receiving the weekly rations
for their family. From the bamboo observation tower the ground
below was just a swirling sea of black hair and bags of rice hoisted
onto heads for the walk home. A proud, largely farming people,
forced to become dependent on UN rations of water, tinned fish
and broken rice, just to survive.
Most of these people could hope for no significant change in