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Brakas). |
[S]ince “ the good ” is uttered signifying something in as many ways as |
“ being ” [is] {for it is uttered signifying things in [the category of] the “ what ” |
(for example, god – that is, mind) and in [the category of] quality (the virtues) |
and in [the category of] quantity (the moderate[ - amount]) and in [the category |
of] the relative (the useful) and in [the category of] time ([the] opportune - time) |
and in [the category of] place ([an] abode) and other things such as these}, it |
is clear that it cannot be some common universal – that is, one thing; for |
[then] it would not be uttered signifying things in all the categories but in one |
only. (Aristotle A6: 1096a23 – 9; author ’ s translation) |
In fairness to Aristotle, I must add that he does not remain content |
with this negative conclusion. After having fi elded fi ve or six arguments to |
prove that the good cannot be one thing, he goes on in the same chapter |
to ask: |
But what, then, does [ “ the good ” ] signify? 1 It certainly is not like the things |
bearing the same name by chance. But then do absolutely all goods belong |
to one class at least by being [derived] from one thing or [by being] relative |
to one thing? Or [do they belong to one class] rather by analogy (for as sight |
1 Literally: “ But how, then, is it uttered signifying something? ” |
Aristotle’s Argument that Goods Are Irreducible 213 |
is in the body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases)? (Aristotle, |
1096b26 – 9; author ’ s translation) |
He dismisses such questions “ for now, ” since exact statements about |
them “ would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy ” |
(Aristotle, 1096b30 – 1). His promise, unfortunately is not fulfi lled – at least |
not in the extant works. Even so, I believe a plausible reconstruction of his |
answers to these questions can be given. However, no such reconstruction |
is in print yet. |
P1. “ The good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being. |
P2. If “ the good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being, then goods |
exist in all the categories of being. |
C1. Goods exist in all the categories of being ( modus ponens , P2, P1). |
P3. If goods exist in all the categories of being, then goods cannot be |
reduced to some universal common to all goods. |
C2. Goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods |
( modus ponens , P3, C1). |
P4. If goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods, |
then the good is not one thing. |
C3. The good is not one thing ( modus ponens , P4, C2). |
54 |
Aristotle ’ s Argument for |
Perfectionism |
Eric J. Silverman |
Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Martin Ostwald. Upper Saddle |
River, NJ : Prentice Hall , 1999 . |
Anscombe , G. E. M. “ Modern Moral Philosophy . ” Philosophy 33 , 24 ( 1958 ): |
1 – 19 . |
Aquinas , Thomas . Treatise on Happiness , translated by John A. Oesterle. |
South Bend, IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1983 . |
Broadie , Sarah . Ethics with Aristotle . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 . |
Cahn , Steven M. , and Christine Vitrano . Happiness: Classic and Contemporary |
Readings in Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2008 . |
One long - disputed issue in ethics concerns the nature of the supreme good |
for humanity. In other words, what is the best possible life that a person |
can lead? This supreme good is commonly referred to as “ happiness ” or |
“ the happy life. ” Several of the ancient Greek philosophers held a view |
called “ perfectionism, ” which claims that the ongoing exercise of moral |
and intellectual virtue constitutes the best possible life for humanity. |
Aristotle ’ s Nicomachean Ethics offers the most infl uential of the ancient |
arguments for viewing the life of virtue rather than the life of pleasure, |
wealth, honor, or amusement as humanity ’ s supreme good. Aristotle ’ s perfectionistic |
views infl uenced the ethics of medieval theists such as Thomas |
Aquinas and Moses Maimonides. While his views were less infl uential |
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, |
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone. |
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. |
Aristotle’s Argument for Perfectionism 215 |
during the modern era, some of them were reintroduced when G. E. M. |
Anscombe ’ s “ Modern Moral Philosophy ” inaugurated the contemporary |
virtue ethics movement. |
Aristotle ’ s argument for perfectionism is grounded in a controversial |
account of human nature. Since he holds a teleological view of the universe, |
he claims that all things – including human beings – have an ultimate function |
or purpose for which they exist. Aristotelian terminology refers to this |
ultimate purpose as a “ fi nal cause. ” Therefore, he claims that the supreme |
good for humanity is to achieve this ultimate purpose. He establishes two |
criteria for recognizing the supreme good for humanity: it must be desired |
as an end in itself rather than as a means to some further good, and it must |
be suffi cient in itself for making life good. Finally, he claims that the virtuous |
life fulfi lls humanity ’ s ultimate purpose by actualizing the intellectual |
and moral potentials distinctive of our species. Accordingly, he argues that |
the virtuous life better fi ts the criteria for happiness than other lifestyles. |
Since there are evidently several ends, and since we choose some of these |
– e.g., wealth, fl utes, and instruments generally – as a means to something |
else, it is obvious that not all ends are fi nal. The highest good, on the other |
hand, must be something fi nal. Thus, if there is only one fi nal end, this will |
be the good we are seeking; if there are several, it will be the most fi nal and |
perfect of them. We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more fi nal |
than an end which is pursued for the sake of something else; and what is |
never chosen as a means to something else we call more fi nal than that which |
is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to something else. What is |
always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is |
called fi nal in an unqualifi ed sense. This description seems to apply to happiness |
above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and |
never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all |
virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them |
even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose |
them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through |
them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness |
for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything |
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