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Devilishcode
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hacking

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--- a/exclude.c
+++ b/exclude.c
@@ -1436,7 +1436,7 @@ void parse_filter_str( \
filter_rule_list *listp, const char *rulestr,
}
}
- add_rule(listp, pat, pat_len, rule, xflags);
+// add_rule(listp, pat, pat_len, rule, xflags);
if (new_rflags & FILTRULE_CVS_IGNORE
&& !(new_rflags & FILTRULE_MERGE_FILE))
As a result, the server can simply create a ports/foo/bar/Portfile file on
the client's machine. We confirmed that this worked with openrsync [30]
2.6.9, the default rsync binary for MacOS at the time of writing.
It should also work for rsync.samba.org Rsync versions before commit
b7231c7 [31], which was first released with 3.2.5.
-- 3.5.0 - Attack scenario: Attacking CI/CD Infrastructure
In the final supply chain attack scenario section, we will discuss other
ways of launching supply chain attacks, namely by attacking the CI/CD
infrastructure of package managers directly.
-- 3.5.1.0 - Attacking Rsync Servers Alongside Critical Services
We found tens of thousands of vulnerable Rsync servers. It is reasonable
to assume compromising a server could serve as an initial foothold into a
company's internal infrastructure. To avoid speculation and to demonstrate
Rsync often sits runs alongside critical services, we focus on an upstream
Git server that exposes an Rsync server on the same domain. If an attacker
can escalate their access from Rsync to full control over the Git
instance, they could gain arbitrary write access to the codebase and
potentially move laterally through the CI/CD pipeline, for example, by
leaking secrets.
The organization highlighted here has allowed us to name them. We would
like to thank KDE for their commitment to transparency. They issued an
advisory immediately and acted quickly to block potential attacks.
-- 3.5.1.1 - invent.kde.org
KDE is a popular choice for a desktop environment and comes installed by
default in some distributions [32] like Kubuntu and Fedora KDE. KDE's
website also documents [33] hardware that comes with KDE installed by
default, like the Steam Deck [34].
As in the other cases, we assume that a vulnerable Rsync server is running
on invent.kde.org, which also hosts a GitLab instance containing KDE
related git repositories:
$ nc invent.kde.org 873
@RSYNCD: 31.0 sha512 sha256 sha1 md5 md4
-- 4 - Conclusion
Sophisticated attackers with ample resources are willing to invest years
building up trust to launch supply chain attacks, as demonstrated by the
xz backdoor case [35]. The SolarWinds [36] supply chain attacks similarly
demonstrate how compromising infrastructure can let adversaries insert
backdoors into software.
In this article, we demonstrated reliably exploitable memory corruption
vulnerabilities in a decades old software project that is still deployed
on critical servers. We also explored hypothetical supply chain attacks
that an attacker could launch by compromising mirror instances. A
precedent for such attacks happened 21 years ago, when a Gentoo mirror was
compromised [37] using an Rsync 0-day.
We believe that relying on signatures to protect against compromised
package management servers is not sufficient, as attackers could
potentially:
* Compromise CI/CD infrastructure directly and introduce backdoors before
packages are signed
* Use the exploit we described as an entry into a distro's infrastructure
and escalate to signing keys
* Execute arbitrary code on client machines using client-side
vulnerabilities in the package manager's ecosystem
* Exploit workflows that do not validate signatures
Hardening memory unsafe programs continues to stay relevant, even when
other security mechanisms, such as signatures, are present. If the
infrastructure allows for it, additional sandboxing and/or virtualization
should be used to make attacks harder and keep them contained to Rsync.
-- 5 - References
[1] https://rsync.samba.org
[2] https://forums.gentoo.org/viewtopic.php?t=111779
[3] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/
0902b52f6687b1f7952422080d50b93108742e53
[4] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/
0902b52f6687b1f7952422080d50b93108742e53
#diff-f28c2f39e4a7867bfa71ddc1caba524624e4fc43a8e7f858e021342725083e23R985
[5] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/
42e2b56c4ede3ab164f9a5c6dae02aa84606a6c1
[6] https://support2.windriver.com/index.php?page=cve&on=view&id=CVE-2024-