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card that supports DES and extended the Kerberos library to use that card
to perform client-side cryptography and key management.
To support smart card authentication on Windows, we extended the Windows
Graphical Identification and Authentication (GINA) to support the Pluggable
Authentication Method (PAM) and developed a smart card PAM module.
We built a VFS layer for the smart card's ISO 7816 hierarchical file
system, allowing smart card files and directories to be navigated and
updated through a POSIX interface.
We implemented ISO 7816 IP tunnel endpoints on UNIX and JavaCard,
implemented TCP and IP on JavaCard, and implemented a web server on top of
that.
We designed and implemented a middleware layer that supports remote access
to physically secure smart cards and extended Kerberos V5 and SSH to use
that infrastructure for client-side key management and cryptography.
We built handsome hardware that allows a Palm Pilot to connect to a smart
card and developed Palm Pilot software to use the smart card as a key
store.
We designed and implemented personal secure boot, an extension to GRUB that
stores software component hashes on a smart card and uses the hashes to
ensure component integrity at boot time.
We open-sourced all the software that we developed under a very permissive
license.
We also used the funds to support travel and to evangelize the smart card
way. I joined IFIP WG 8.8 as Co-Vice Chair to help organize smart card
conferences in Louvain-la-Neuve, Chicago, Bristol, San Jose, Toulouse, and
Tarragona; ran smart card demos at CCC in a field outside Berlin; and
taught a graduate seminar in smart cards at Michigan, flying in European
experts as guest speakers. CITI also made a major showing at HAL 2001 (Me,
Jim Rees, Charles Antonelli, Andy Adamson, Dros Adamson, Dug Song, Niels
Provos, Olga Kornievskaia; some CITI sons and lovers tagged along, too) and
organized a well-attended smart card hacking workshop there.
--[ 6 - Aftermath (and airing of grievances)
CITI's burst of smart card research lasted only a few years, for reasons,
some of them the usual ones, like money drying up and students graduating.
We had good relationships with our industry partners in the Dallas suburbs,
but the center of gravity for smart card R&D was in France -- which we
loved because we were forced to travel to beautiful French cities for
meetings -- but it was hard to make an impact in that crowd, which was
excited about explosive growth in SIMs and not that interested in a smart
card that communicated with TCP/IP and web protocols. (We honestly could
not understand that.)
Also, none of us is fluent in French, alas. When we tried to get some
attention by nominating ourselves for the CARTES '2000 Innovation Award,
well, the nomination had to be in French. We submitted it in English. You
can imagine how the French jury responded. (They didn't.) Adding insult to
injury, when CARTES got around to recognizing an Internet smart card, the
award went to a group that did its TCP and IP processing off-card, merely
tunneling application layer payloads through ISO 7816. >:(
But it wasn't just our big egos. Hardware limitations were a big reason.
CITI had a vision of the smart card as the trust anchor of a personal
computing environment and built stepping stones toward that vision: a
Kerberos single sign-on for UNIX and Windows you could carry in your
wallet, a UNIX file system for secure storage of personal records, TCP/IP
for reliable end-to-end communication, even a web server, for what it's
worth! When we started, conventional wisdom held that all this -- on an
eight-bit microprocessor running at 3.57 MHz with 200 bytes of RAM -- was
impossible.
At that point, it wasn't clear what to do next to achieve our vision: we
needed more cycles, more storage, more bandwidth. So we waited for smart
cards to get better but unlike every other computer technology smart cards
got no faster, no more capable. They never did, really.
Nonetheless, smart cards did succeed -- wildly, and essentially
contemporaneously: mobile phone technologies exploded in the new
millennium, with smart card SIMs the mechanism for low-level mobile phone
identification and authentication. And it turns out that is all that a
smart card really needs to do, with high-performance trust management now
built directly into smartphone silicon. Soon, eSIMs and NFC payments will
obsolete smart cards altogether.
--[ 7 - Dodging the Feds
So back to that tense meeting with the Secret Service. I told them all we
had learned about the MCard and its vulnerabilities. Our guests were
businesslike and intelligent, and the briefing was over in an hour.
Then it was time for a lab tour, the high point of which was the lunchroom.
As we approached the cowering, trembling vending machines, I asked the head
fed if he would care for a demo. His enthusiasm was unvarnished: he would
love a demo! I pulled a white card out of my pocket and offered it with
outstretched arm.
He paused. Smiled.
No demonstration would be necessary. He left us with some Secret Service