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--[ Table of contents
0. Intro
1. Overview of (C)V2X & its associated technologies
1.1 V2X & CV2X
1.2 DSRC & ITS-G5
1.3 RSU/OBU
2. Tested Devices
2.1 Models
2.2 Chipsets & Notable In-Circuit Components
2.3 Notable Physical Interfaces
2.4 Notable Firmware/Software
3. Attack Surface
3.1 Lack of Everything
3.2 Hardware
3.3 Pre-Embedded Operating System (EOS) (BIOS/Bootloader/Kernel)
3.4 Firmware/EOS
4. Achieving Root
4.1 Simple and Useful
4.2 Quickest
4.3 Troubleshooting
5. Batch 1 of Vulnerabilities: Multiple Paths to Persistent Backdoors
5.1 Insecure SPI Flash Permissions Allow Persistent Firmware
Modification - CVE-2025-25733
5.2 Persistent Privilege Escalation via Modifiable EEPROM (SPD Write
Disable Not Set) - CVE-2025-25732
5.3 Lack of SPI Protected Ranges Enables Unauthorized Flash
Modification - CVE-2025-25735
5.4 Improper Access Control in EFI Boot Environment Allows Persistent
Firmware Modification - CVE-2025-25734
5.5 Improper SMM Lock Configuration - CVE-2025-25738
5.6 Unauthorized ADB Root Shell Access to Cellular Modem -
CVE-2025-25736
5.7 Weak or Unset Default BIOS Supervisor/User Passwords Allow
Unauthorized Firmware Access - CVE-2025-25737
6. Phase 2: Onto the (C)V2X Client/Server Stack
6.1 Can I have some more? RJ45 Port + Second USB + ?
6.2 Android/iOS Applications
6.3 RSU Server Stack
6.4 Remote Exploits
7. Random Nuggets
7.1 Sniffing, Outdated Components, Certificates & Keys, External
(Web Services) Oh my!
8. References
9. Raw Output
--[ 0. Introduction
Roadside Units (RSUs) play a critical role in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
communication, guiding autonomous vehicles, managing traffic flow, and even
assisting pedestrians. However, these units are often installed in public
locations with minimal physical security — the units I have are secured by
just four screws — making them highly vulnerable to physical attacks. Unlike
traditional cyber threats that require remote exploitation, an attacker with
brief physical access can stealthily gain persistent complete control
without any need for soldering or physical modifications. Once compromised,
an RSU becomes an invisible tool for manipulating V2X systems, with
potentially catastrophic consequences.
The risks are not theoretical, as more and more RSUs are deployed worldwide.
Past hacks on roadside LED signs, often left unprotected, have shown how
easily public infrastructure can be tampered with. However, while a hacked
LED sign might display prank messages, a compromised RSU poses far greater
dangers. Attackers could mislead autonomous vehicles, disrupt traffic
signals, or even manipulate pedestrian safety systems. For example, a
visually impaired person relying on a V2X-enabled crossing alert could be
given false information, stepping into traffic at the wrong time. In fact,
the vendor of these RSUs has already developed an Android and iOS
application that assists visually impaired folks with crossing the street
safely [1]. Similarly, emergency vehicles could be rerouted into congestion,
or fake hazard warnings could create unnecessary panic and detours.
As smart transportation systems become more widespread, securing RSUs
against stealthy local threats is no longer optional -- it is essential for
public safety and the integrity of connected infrastructure.
This paper explores some of the physical and local vulnerabilities found in
Kapsch TrafficCom RSUs, highlighting how easily they can be compromised and
the far-reaching impact of such attacks. This paper presents results from
phase 1 of a multi-phased approach to reverse engineer these units; the goal
of Phase 1 was gaining root access. I'll also discuss what my plans are for
Phase 2. I was not expecting to have seven CVEs published -- CVE-2025-25732,
CVE-2025-25733, CVE-2025-25734, CVE-2025-25735, CVE-2025-25736,
CVE-2025-25737, CVE-2025-25738. However, due to the low attack complexity
and never hearing back from the vendor after multiple attempts to contact
them, here we are.
Few things to note, I tried to keep general concepts/explanations, that
aren't unique to these devices, brief. I've included commands, outputs,
reproduction steps, etc. as much as I could. As I never heard back from the
vendor, there are a good chunk of things that I've left out, as I don't
want to be sued. That said, where applicable, I included some source code
snippets, paths, binary names, etc. and hope to eventually upload all the
custom drivers, scripts, source code, etc. that I found on these devices one
day. Check out my site or reach out for screenshots or further information.
Cela dit, entrons dans le vif du sujet!