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-Rsh:
Well in the case of having an account with rsh only, check your 'set'. If
SHELL is not /bin/sh, and you are able to run anything with a shell escape
(ex, ed, vi, write, mail...), you should be put into sh if you do a '!sh'.
If you have write permission on your .profile, change it, because rsh is
ran after checking profile.
-Humor:
On a system 5, do a:
$ cat "food in cans"
or on a csh, do:
% hey unix, got a match?
Well, I didn't say it was great.
Password hacking:
-Salt:
In a standard /etc/passwd file, passwords are 13 characters long. This is
an 11 char encrypted passwd and a 2 char encryption modifier (salt), which
is used to change the des algorithm in one of 4096<?> ways. Which means
there is no decent way to go and reverse hack it. Yet.
On normal system 5 Unix, passwords are supposed to be 6-8 characters long
and have both numeric and alphabetic characters in them, which makes a
dictionary hacker pretty worthless. However, if a user keeps insisting his
password is going to be 'dog,' usually the system will comply (depending on
version). I have yet to try it, but having the hacker try the normal
entry, and then the entry terminated by [0-9] is said to have remarkable
results, if you don't mind the 10-fold increase in time.
Final notes:
Yes, I have left a lot out. That seems to be the rage nowadays.. If you
have noticed something wrong, or didn't like this, feel free to tell me.
If you can find me.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Ho. Here ends part one. <Of one?>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Produced and directed by: Urvile & Necron 99
----------------------------------------------------------- (c) ToK inc., 1988
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 18, Phile #7 of 11
+--------------------------------------+
| "Unix System Security Issues" |
| Typed by: |
| Whisky |
| (from Holland, Europe) |
+--------------------------------------+
| From |
| Information Age |
| Vol. 11, Number 2, April 1988 |
| Written By: |
| Michael J. Knox and Edward D. Bowden |
+--------------------------------------+
Note: This file was sent to me from a friend in Holland. I felt
that it would be a good idea to present this file to the
UNIX-hacker community, to show that hackers don't always
harm systems, but sometimes look for ways to secure flaws
in existing systems. -- Jester Sluggo !!
There are a number of elements that have lead to the popularity of the Unix
operating system in the world today. The most notable factors are its
portability among hardware platforms and the interactive programming
environment that it offers to users. In fact, these elements have had much to
do with the successful evolution of the Unix system in the commercial market
place. (1, 2)
As the Unix system expands further into industry and government, the need to
handle Unix system security will no doubt become imperative. For example, the
US government is committing several million dollars a year for the Unix system
and its supported hardware. (1) The security requirements for the government
are tremendous, and one can only guess at the future needs of security in
industry.
In this paper, we will cover some of the more fundamental security risks in
the Unix system. Discussed are common causes of Unix system compromise in
such areas as file protection, password security, networking and hacker
violations. In our conclusion, we will comment upon ongoing effects in Unix
system security, and their direct influence on the portability of the Unix
operating system.
FILE AND DIRECTORY SECURITY
In the Unix operating system environment, files and directories are organized
in a tree structure with specific access modes. The setting of these modes,
through permission bits (as octal digits), is the basis of Unix system
security. Permission bits determine how users can access files and the type
of access they are allowed. There are three user access modes for all Unix
system files and directories: the owner, the group, and others. Access to
read, write and execute within each of the usertypes is also controlled by
permission bits (Figure 1). Flexibility in file security is convenient, but