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Towards the end of 1964 , the National Liberation Front commenced a series of large @-@ scale military operations against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , as ordered by the North Vietnamese government . As part of their Winter @-@ Spring Offensive , the Viet Cong unleashed its newly created 9th Division against the South Vietnamese forces at Bình Giã , fighting a large set @-@ piece battle for the first time . Over a period of four days , the Viet Cong 9th Division held its ground and mauled the best units the South Vietnamese army could send against them , only breaking after intense attack by U.S. bombers .
= = Background = =
In 1964 , the political establishment in South Vietnam was still in turmoil . Following the coup that ousted Ngô Đình Diệm , the military situation quickly worsened as the National Liberation Front ( NLF , also known as Viet Cong ) gained significant ground in the countryside because the Military Revolutionary Council which governed South Vietnam , lacked direction both in terms of policy and planning . Furthermore , General Dương Văn Minh , as the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council , and his civilian Prime Minister Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ favoured a political resolution instead of using military force , which brought them into conflict with the United States over the best strategy to end the Communist threat in South Vietnam . As a result , both men became increasingly unpopular among the military generals who held real political power in Saigon . On January 30 , 1964 , General Nguyễn Khánh successfully ousted Dương Văn Minh from the Military Revolutionary Council without firing a single shot . For much of the year , Khánh spent most of his efforts on consolidating political power , instead of fighting the Viet Cong .
In contrast to the political unrest in Saigon , the Communist leadership in North Vietnam were far more concerned about the best strategy to fight the South Vietnamese government and their American supporters . While all leaders in Hanoi shared the same goal of eventual reunification of their homeland , different factions within the Communist Party disagreed on the best method to achieve their desired goal . Members of North Vietnam 's Politburo were divided by the issues surrounding the Soviet strategy of peaceful co @-@ existence versus the Chinese strategy of supporting national liberation movements in emerging countries . Despite their differences of opinion , the Communist Party leadership ultimately made preparations for armed struggle in South Vietnam . From Hanoi 's perspective , the military regime in Saigon was able to hold out because the Communist main forces were still not ready to fight a conventional war , so North Vietnam must focus on the development of its military force in the shortest period of time . In the meantime , however , the war must be kept at its current level in order to prevent the full involvement of the United States military .
On October 11 , 1964 , the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam was ordered to carry out a series of military operations as part of the Communist winter @-@ spring offensive . The NLF Nam Bo ( Mekong Delta ) Regional Command established a sub @-@ command under the leadership of Trần Đình Xu , with Nguyễn Hòa as the deputy commander , and Lê Trọng Tấn as the political commissar . Their mission was to inflict damage on the regular units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ( ARVN ) and destroy the strategic hamlets constructed by the former Ngô Đình Diệm regime . The National Liberation Front in South Vietnam identified the regions of Bình Long @-@ Phước Long and Bà Rịa @-@ Long Khánh , along Route 14 , as the main targets for their offensive . Meanwhile , the Central Military Commission in Hanoi appointed General Nguyen Chi Thanh as the commander of North Vietnamese military operations in southern Vietnam . Other high @-@ ranking officers such as Major Generals Lê Trọng Tấn and Trần Độ , and Colonel Hoàng Cầm were sent to South Vietnam to supervise the military build @-@ up which would commence in November 1964 .
= = Prelude = =
In July 1964 , the 271st and 272nd Regiments of the People 's Liberation Armed Forces ( PLAF ) , began moving into the provinces of Bình Dương , Bình Long and Phước Long to carry out their mission . During the first phase of their campaign , the Viet Cong regiments overran several strategic hamlets at Xan Sang , Cam Xe , Dong Xa , and Thai Khai . Between August and September 1964 , Viet Cong regiments executed deep thrusts into Bình Dương and Châu Thành to apply additional pressure on South Vietnamese outposts situated on Route 14 . During the second phase of their campaign , the Viet Cong ambushed two South Vietnamese infantry companies and destroyed five armoured vehicles , which consisted of M24 Chaffee light tanks and M @-@ 113 APCs . The PLAF defeated regular South Vietnamese units at the strategic hamlets of Bình Mỹ and Bình Co .
Following the completion of the initial stages in their campaign , the Viet Cong forces were ordered to regroup and prepare for the next offensive in the Long Khánh region . Viet Cong soldiers from the two regiments were assembled in War Zone D , where they were trained to attack well @-@ fortified enemy strongholds . On November 20 , 1964 , the Viet Cong reached the Long Khánh battlefield , having completed a 200 kilometres march from War Zone D. On the battlefield the Viet Cong 186th Battalion ( from Military Region 5 ) , the 500th and 800th Battalions ( from Military Region 7 ) , and the 445th Company also joined the offensive . To kick @-@ start their offensive in the Baria @-@ Long Khánh region , the Viet Cong selected Bình Giã as their next target . Bình Giã was a small village located in Phước Tuy Province , about 67 kilometres away from South Vietnam 's capital of Saigon .
During the war about 6 @,@ 000 people lived in Bình Giã , and most of whom were staunchly anti @-@ communist . The inhabitants of Bình Giã were Roman Catholic refugees who had fled from North Vietnam in 1954 during Operation Passage to Freedom because of fears of Communist persecution . To prepare for their main battle , the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment was ordered to block Inter @-@ provincial Road No. 2 and 15 , and destroy any South Vietnamese units attempting to reach Bình Giã from the south @-@ western flank of the battlefield . In the days leading up to the battle , the Viet Cong often came out to harass the local militia forces . On December 9 , 1964 , the 272nd Regiment destroyed an entire South Vietnamese mechanised rifle company along Inter @-@ provincial Road No. 2 , destroying 16 M @-@ 113 APCs . On December 17 , the 272nd Regiment destroyed another six armoured vehicles on Inter @-@ provincial Road No. 15 .
= = Battle = =
During the early hours of December 28 , 1964 , elements of the Viet Cong 271st Regiment and the 445th Company , signaled their main attack on Bình Giã by penetrating the village 's eastern perimeter . There , they clashed with members of the South Vietnamese Popular Force militiamen , which numbered about 65 personnel . The South Vietnamese militia fighters proved no match for the Viet Cong and their overwhelming firepower , so they quickly retreated into underground bunkers , and called for help . Once the village was captured , Colonel Ta Minh Kham , the Viet Cong regimental commander , established his command post in the main village church and waited for fresh reinforcements , which came in the form of heavy mortars , machine guns and recoil @-@ less rifles . To counter South Vietnamese helicopter assaults , Colonel Kham 's troops set up a network of defensive fortifications around the village , with trenches and bunkers protected by land mines and barbed wire . The local Catholic priest , who was also the village chief , sent a bicycle messenger out to the Bà Rịa district headquarters to ask for a relief force . In response , the Bà Rịa district chief sent out elements of two Vietnamese Rangers battalions to retake Bình Giã . On December 29 , two companies of the ARVN 33rd Ranger Battalion and a company from the 30th Ranger Battalion were airlifted into area located west of Bình Giã , by helicopters from the U.S. 118th Aviation Company to face an enemy force of unknown size .
However , as soon as the soldiers from the 30th and 33rd Ranger Battalions arrived at the landing zone , they were quickly overwhelmed by the Viet Cong in a deadly ambush . The entire 30th Ranger Battalion was then committed to join the attack , but they too did not initially succeed in penetrating the strong Viet Cong defensive lines . Several more companies of the Rangers then arrived for an attack from multiple directions . Two companies of the 33rd Ranger Battalion advanced from the northeast . One of them came to the outskirts of the village but was unable to break through the enemy defenses . The other one , trying to outflank the enemy , had been lured into a kill zone in open terrain at the coffee plantation and were quickly obliterated in an ambush by the three VC battalions using heavy weapons . The two companies suffered a 70 percent casualty rate , and survivors were forced to retreat to the nearby Catholic church . The 30th Rangers had more success by assaulting from the western direction and succeeded in fighting their way into the village , aided by local residents . It however also suffered heavy losses , with the battalion commander and his American adviser severely wounded . The local civilians in Bình Giã retrieved weapons and ammunition from the dead Rangers , and hid the wounded government soldiers from the Viet Cong . The 38th Ranger Battalion , on the other hand , landed on the battlefield unopposed by the Viet Cong , and they immediately advanced on Bình Giã from the south . Soldiers from the 38th Rangers spent the whole day fighting but they could not break through their enemies ' defences to link up with the survivors hiding in the church , and fell back after calling in mortar fire to decimate Viet Cong fighters moving to encircle them .
The morning of December 30 , the 4th South Vietnamese Marine Battalion moved out to Biên Hòa Air Base , waiting to be airlifted into the battlefield . The 1 / 4th Marine Battalion was the first unit to arrive on the outskirts of Bình Giã , but the 1st Company commander decided to secure the landing zone , to wait for the rest of the battalion to arrive instead of moving on to their objective . After the rest of the 4th Marine Battalion had arrived , they marched towards the Catholic church to relieve the besieged Rangers . About one and a half hours later , the 4th Marine Battalion linked up with the 30th , 33rd and 38th Ranger Battalions , as the Viet Cong began withdrawing to the northeast . That afternoon the 4th Marine Battalion recaptured the village , but the Viet Cong was nowhere to be seen , as all their units had withdrawn from the village during the previous night , linking with other Viet Cong elements in the forest to attack the government relief forces . On the evening of December 30 , the Viet Cong returned Bình Giã and attacked from the south @-@ eastern perimeter of the village . The local villagers , who discovered the approaching Viet Cong , immediately sounded the alarm to alert the ARVN soldiers defending the village . The South Vietnamese were able to repel the Viet Cong , with support from U.S. Army helicopter gunships flown out from Vung Tau airbase .
While pursuing the Viet Cong , a helicopter gunship from the U.S. 68th Assault Helicopter Company was shot down and crashed in the Quảng Giao rubber plantation , about four kilometres away from Bình Giã , killing four of its crewmen . On December 31 , the U.S. Marines Advisory Group sent a team of four personnel , led by Captain Donald G. Cook , to Bình Giã to observe conditions on the battlefield . At the same time , the 4th Marine Battalion was ordered to locate the crashed helicopter and recover the bodies of the dead American crewmen . Acting against the advice of his American advisor , Major Nguyễn Văn Nho , commander of the 4th Marine Battalion , sent his 2 / 4th Marine Battalion company out to the Quảng Giao rubber plantation . Unknown to the 4th Marine Battalion , the Viet Cong 271st Regiment had assembled in the plantation . About one hour after they had departed from the village of Bình Giã , the commander of the 2 / 4th Marine Battalion reported via radio that his troops had found the helicopter wreckage , and the bodies of four American crewmen . Shortly afterwards , the Viet Cong opened fire and the 2 / 4th Marine Battalion was forced to pull back . In an attempt to save the 2nd Company , the entire 4th Marine Battalion was sent out to confront the Viet Cong . As the lead element of the 4th Marine Battalion closed in on the Quảng Giao plantation , they were hit by accurate Viet Cong artillery fire , which was soon followed by repeated human wave attacks . Having absorbed heavy casualties from the Viet Cong 's ambush , the 2 / 4th Marine Battalion had to fight their way out of the plantation with their bayonets fixed . During the entire ordeal , the company did not receive artillery support because the plantation was beyond the range of 105mm artillery guns based in Phước Tuy and Bà Rịa . They however escaped with the crucial support of the U.S. aircraft and helicopters whose rocket attacks forced the enemy to pull back and halted their attempt at pursuit .
In the morning of December 31 , the 4th Marines Battalion returned to the crash site with the entire force and the American graves were located and their corpses were dug up . At about 3 pm , a single U.S. helicopter arrived on the battlefield to evacuate the casualties , but they only picked up the bodies of the four American crewmen , while South Vietnamese casualties were forced to wait for another helicopter to arrive . At 4 pm , Major Nguyễn Văn Nho ordered the 4th Marine Battalion to carry their casualties back to the village , instead of continuing to wait for the helicopters . As the 4th Marine Battalion began their return march , three Viet Cong battalions , with artillery support , suddenly attacked them from three directions . The battalion 's commanding and executive officers were immediately killed and air support was not available . Two ARVN Marine companies managed to fight their way out of the ambush and back to Bình Giã , but the third was overrun and almost completely wiped out . The fourth company desperately held out at a hilltop against Viet Cong artillery barrages and large infantry charges , before slipping out through the enemy positions at dawn . The 4th Marines Battalion of 426 men lost a total of 117 soldiers killed , 71 wounded and 13 missing . Among the casualties were 35 officers of the 4th Marine Battalion killed in action , and the four American advisers attached to the unit were also wounded . Backed by U.S. Air Force bombers , on January 1 three battalions of ARVN Airborne reinforcements arrived , they were too late as most of the Viet Cong had already withdrawn from the battlefield .
= = Aftermath = =
The battle of Bình Giã reflected the Viet Cong 's growing military strength and influence , especially in the Mekong Delta region . It was the first time the National Liberation Front launched a large @-@ scale operation , holding its ground and fighting for four days against government troops equipped with armor , artillery and helicopters , and aided by U.S. air support and military advisers . The Viet Cong demonstrated that , when well @-@ supplied with military supplies from North Vietnam , they had the ability to fight and inflict damage even on the best ARVN units . For the first time in their history , the NLF was able to control a government stronghold for several days , and inflict heavy casualties on regular units of the South Vietnamese army in a large set @-@ piece battle .
The Viet Cong suffered light casualties with only 32 soldiers officially confirmed killed , and they did not leave a single casualty on the battlefield . In recognition of the 271st Regiment 's performance during the Bình Giã campaign , the NLF High Command bestowed the title ' Bình Giã Regiment ' on the unit to honour their achievement . Following the Bình Giã campaign , the NLF went on to occupy Hoài Đức District and the strategic hamlets of Đất Đỏ , Long Thành and Nhơn Trạch along Inter @-@ provincial Road No. 2 and 15 . They also expanded the Hát Dịch base area , which was located in Bà Rịa and Bình Thuận provinces , to protect the important sea transportation routes used by the Vietnam People 's Navy to supply Viet Cong units around the regions of the Mekong River .
Unlike their adversaries , the South Vietnamese military suffered heavily in their attempts to recapture the village of Bình Giã and secure the surrounding areas . The South Vietnamese and their American allies lost the total of about 201 personnel killed in action , 192 wounded and 68 missing . In just four days of fighting , two of South Vietnam 's elite Ranger companies were destroyed and several others suffered heavy losses , while the 4th Marine Battalion was rendered ineffective as a fighting force . At that stage of the war , Bình Giã was the worst defeat experienced by any South Vietnamese army . Despite the humiliating defeat inflicted on them , the South Vietnamese army stubbornly considered the battle as their victory and erected a monument at the site of the battle to acknowledge the sacrifices of the soldiers who had fallen to retake Bình Giã .
= = Order of battle ( ground forces ) = =
= = = Viet Cong = = =
271st Regiment ( renamed the 1st PLAF Regiment and became part of the 9th Division on 2 Sep 1965 )
272nd Regiment ( renamed the 2nd PLAF Regiment and became part of the 9th Division on 2 Sep 1965 )
186th Battalion
500th Battalion
514th Battalion
800th Battalion
445th Company
80th Artillery Detachment
= = = Army of the Republic of Vietnam = = =
1st Airborne Battalion
3rd Airborne Battalion
7th Airborne Battalion
4th Marine Battalion
29th Ranger Battalion
30th Ranger Battalion
33rd Ranger Battalion
35th Ranger Battalion
38th Ranger Battalion
Two artillery platoons and one section of M @-@ 24 tanks in support .
= June 1941 uprising in eastern Herzegovina =
In June 1941 , Serbs in eastern Herzegovina rebelled against the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia ( Croatian : Nezavisna Država Hrvatska , NDH ) , an Axis puppet state established during World War II on the territory of the defeated Kingdom of Yugoslavia . As the NDH imposed its authority , members of the fascist Ustaše ruling party began a campaign of persecution against Serbs throughout the country . In eastern Herzegovina , the Ustaše perpetrated a series of massacres and attacks against the majority Serb population commencing in the first week of June . Between 3 and 22 June 1941 , spontaneous clashes occurred between NDH authorities and groups of Serbs in the region .
The German invasion of the Soviet Union began on 22 June . Over the next two days , the sporadic revolts by Serbs against the NDH in eastern Herzegovina erupted into mass rebellion , triggered by Ustaše persecution , Serb solidarity with the Russian people , hatred and fear of the NDH authorities , and other factors . Serb rebels , under the leadership of both local Serbs and Montenegrins , attacked police , gendarmerie , Ustaše and Croatian Home Guard forces in the region . In the first few days , the rebels captured gendarmerie posts in several villages , set up roadblocks on the major roads and ambushed several military vehicles . On the night of 26 June , the rebels mounted a sustained attack on the town of Nevesinje in an attempt to capture it , but the garrison held out until the morning of 28 June when NDH troops broke through the rebel roadblocks .
On 28 June , the rebels ambushed a truckload of Italian soldiers , prompting the Italian Army commander in the NDH to warn the NDH government that he would take unilateral action to secure communication routes . A further gendarmerie post was destroyed by the rebels , and in the evening the rebels captured the village of Avtovac , looting and burning it , and killing dozens of non @-@ Serb civilians . The following day an Italian column cleared the rebels from Avtovac and relieved the hard @-@ pressed NDH garrison in the town of Gacko . From 3 July , an NDH force of over 2 @,@ 000 fanned out from Nevesinje , clearing towns , villages and routes of rebels . The rebel forces did not put up any significant opposition to the clearing operation , and either retreated into nearby Montenegro , or hid their weapons in the mountains and went home . By 7 July , NDH forces had regained full control of all towns and major transport routes in eastern Herzegovina .
= = Background = =
The Independent State of Croatia ( NDH ) was founded on 10 April 1941 , during the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers . The NDH consisted of most of modern @-@ day Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina , together with some parts of modern @-@ day Serbia . It was essentially an Italo – German quasi @-@ protectorate , as it owed its existence to the Axis powers , who maintained occupation forces within the puppet state throughout its existence . In the immediate aftermath of the Yugoslav surrender on 17 April , former Royal Yugoslav Army troops returned to their homes in eastern Herzegovina with their weapons . This was a significant security concern for the fledgling NDH government due to the proximity of the border with Montenegro , the close relationship between the people of eastern Herzegovina and Montenegro , and widespread banditry in the region . On the day after the surrender , the commander of the NDH armed forces , Vojskovođa ( Marshal ) Slavko Kvaternik issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of all weapons to NDH authorities by 24 April .
On 24 April , the NDH created five military command areas , including Bosnia Command and Adriatic Command , both of which were initially headquartered in Sarajevo . Each of the five military commands included several district commands . Adriatic Command included the districts of Knin and Sinj in the Dalmatian hinterland , and Mostar and Trebinje in eastern Herzegovina . The NDH began to mobilise soldiers for the Home Guard , with six battalions identified to join Adriatic Command . The battalions were mobilised from areas outside of eastern Herzegovina , and were to be ready by 20 May . The aggressive actions of the Ustaše fifth column during the Axis invasion made Serb civilian leaders in eastern Herzegovina apprehensive about the NDH , and they attempted to obtain Italian protection , and urged the Italians to annex eastern Herzegovina to the neighboring Italian @-@ occupied territory of Montenegro . A collaborationist " Interim Advisory Committee " of Montenegrin separatists was advocating the establishment of an " independent " Montenegrin state , and a similar committee of separatist Serbs was formed in eastern Herzegovina . A delegation from that committee arrived in Cetinje in Montenegro on 6 May to ask for Italian protection . Similarly , a delegation of Muslims from eastern Herzegovina travelled to Sarajevo , the historic Bosnian capital , to urge the NDH authorities to link eastern Herzegovina to that city .
Due to the poor response to the demand for the surrender of weapons , the deadline was extended several times until a date of 8 July was fixed . On 17 May , courts @-@ martial were established to try those that were arrested in possession of weapons , and those found guilty were immediately executed by firing squad . The precedent for this brutal repressive measure against Serbs had already been established by the Germans . It was clear from the outset that the NDH weapons laws were not being enforced as strictly against Croats as they were against Serbs . Securing the border between eastern Herzegovina and Montenegro was considered a high priority due to concerns that the Montenegrin Federalist Party had revived Montenegrin claims to parts of the NDH that had been promised to the Kingdom of Montenegro in the 1915 Treaty of London .
The Italians handed over the administration of eastern Herzegovina to the NDH government on 20 May 1941 , following the signing of the Treaties of Rome , which ceded formerly Yugoslav territory along the Adriatic coast to Italy . The Italians did not immediately withdraw all their troops from the region . The NDH moved quickly to establish its authority in the towns and districts of eastern Herzegovina , which included appointing mayors and prefects , the creation of local units of the Ustaše Militia , and deploying hundreds of gendarmes , Croatian Home Guards and Ustaše Militia units from outside eastern Herzegovina . These forces were brought in to maintain order . The academic Professor Alija Šuljak was appointed the Ustaše commissioner for eastern Herzegovina .
On 20 May , the recently formed Home Guard battalions began to deploy into the Adriatic Command area . On 27 May , 6 officers and 300 gendarmes of the Sarajevo @-@ based 4th Gendarmerie Regiment were deployed into parts of eastern Herzegovina . They established platoon strength posts in Nevesinje , Trebinje , Gacko and Bileća , with their headquarters also in Bileća . The Dubrovnik @-@ based 2nd Gendarmerie Regiment established posts in Stolac and Berkovići . The headquarters of Adriatic Command was transferred to Mostar in late May , and General Ivan Prpić was appointed as its commander .
By 29 May , the battalions of Adriatic Command were in their garrison locations : the 6th Battalion at Mostar , the 7th Battalion at Trebinje , and the 10th Battalion in the Dubrovnik area . The other two Adriatic Command battalions were deployed to Knin and Sinj far to the west . The 18th Battalion was allocated as a reserve and was garrisoned in Mostar . Main Ustaše Headquarters was tasked to recruit one battalion for duties within the Adriatic Command area . Home Guard battalions had a standard structure , consisting of a headquarters company , three infantry companies , a machine gun platoon and a communications section , while battalions of the Ustaše Militia consisted of a headquarters , three companies and a motorised section . Even after the establishment of NDH authorities in eastern Herzegovina , Italian forces maintained their presence in the region . The 55th Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Division Marche remained garrisoned in Trebinje , with the 56th Regiment based in Mostar . The 49th MVSN Legion ( Blackshirts ) were also stationed in Bileća . The Italians maintained a troop presence in Nevesinje until 17 June , and conducted almost daily motorised patrols throughout eastern Herzegovina .
The NDH authorities established new administrative sub @-@ divisions , organising the state into counties ( Croatian : velike župe ) and then districts ( Croatian : kotar ) . Eastern Herzegovina was covered by the counties of Hum and Dubrava . Hum County included the districts of Mostar and Nevesinje , and Dubrava County included the districts of Bileća , Gacko , Stolac , Ravno and Trebinje . The Župan ( county prefect ) of Hum was Josip Trajer with his seat in Mostar , and the Župan of Dubrava was Ante Buć , based in Dubrovnik .
According to the Yugoslav census of 1931 , the population of eastern Herzegovina comprised 4 per cent Croats , 28 per cent Muslims , and 68 per cent Serbs . According to Professor Jozo Tomasevich , the estimated population of the districts of Bileća , Gacko and Nevesinje was only around 1 @.@ 1 per cent Croat , so in those areas nearly all the NDH government appointments and local Ustaše units were staffed by Muslims , an ethnic group that made up about 23 @.@ 7 per cent of the local population . The poor Muslim peasants of eastern Herzegovina largely sided with the Ustaše . The NDH government immediately tried to strengthen their position by vilifying the Serbs , who , according to Tomasevich , comprised around 75 per cent of the population .
= = Prelude = =
The Ustaše began to impose the new laws on the Serb population of the NDH . On 28 May , a group of ten young Ustaše students from the University of Zagreb arrived in Trebinje and began removing signs written in the Cyrillic script used by Serbs . On 1 June , in several towns and villages in eastern Herzegovina , Serbs were shot and businesses belonging to Serb merchants and others were seized . On that day , the Ustaše students in Trebinje shot nine Serbs and arrested another fifteen , apparently due to their links to the inter @-@ war Chetnik Association . Differences began to appear between the brutal treatment of Serbs by the Ustaše and the more careful approach of the other NDH authorities such as the Home Guard , who were aware of the potential danger created by Ustaše methods . In early June , the NDH authorities began operations to confiscate weapons from the population , meeting with immediate resistance . On 1 June , the residents of the village of Donji Drežanj , near Nevesinje , refused to co @-@ operate with weapons collectors . In response , the Ustaše killed a number of Serbs and burned their homes .
On 3 June , there were several incidents in which armed villagers spontaneously retaliated against the local authorities . That afternoon , 20 Ustaše were entering Donji Drežanj to confiscate firearms when they were attacked by a group of armed villagers . The villagers withdrew after a short firefight , with one of their number being captured . Reinforcements from the Home Guard and gendarmerie soon arrived , along with more Ustaše who burned another 20 houses and shot a woman . On the night of 4 / 5 June , a group under the control of the Ustaše commissioner for the Gacko district , Herman Tonogal , killed 140 Serbs in the village of Korita , near Bileća , and threw their bodies into a nearby sinkhole . Another 27 Serbs from the village were killed between this massacre and 9 June , and over 5 @,@ 000 head of livestock were stolen and distributed to Muslim villages in the Gacko area for the exclusive use of the Ustaše . The estimated number of Serbs killed at Korita vary from 133 to 180 .
In the immediate aftermath , Serbs and Montenegrins from the local area attacked villages , and Adriatic Command sent the 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion from Bileća to reinforce the Ustaše . After a brief clash near Korita , during which the Ustaše and gendarmerie lost one killed and several wounded , the rebels withdrew across the nearby border into Montenegro . The 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion spent the night in the village of Stepen before establishing itself as the Avtovac garrison the following day . Due to its exposure to fire from rebels overlooking their location , the gendarmes were unable to re @-@ occupy their post in Stepen , which meant that the Stepen – Korita road was no longer secure . On 8 June , the district office in Gacko reported to Adriatic Command that they had taken 200 Serbs as hostages and issued a proclamation to the population to cease fighting and surrender their weapons . As this proclamation met with no response , on 10 June the Ustaše Commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina , Jure Francetić , had 19 hostages shot ( one escaped ) . On 12 June , the gendarmerie in Ravno shot four people on the orders of the Ustaše commissioner for Ljubinje . Such actions led to Serb peasants leaving their villages to seek safety in more remote areas , and Muslim villagers became increasingly nervous about their Serb neighbours .
In mid @-@ June , the commander of the 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion at Bileća wrote to Adriatic Command complaining about the activities of the Ustaše , referring to them as " armed scum and animals " who were dishonouring " honest Croats " . When the Italians heard that the Ustaše had burned two villages across the border in Montenegro , they sent an intelligence officer to Gacko to investigate the unrest . He did not accept the explanation of the gendarmerie commander in Gacko , who claimed that the violence was caused by " personal hatred and revenge " , and met with rebels . The rebels did not attack him or his security escort , and told him that the reason behind the rebellion was that " Croats and Turks are beating us and throwing us into a pit " . He concluded that the cause of the unrest was the attempt to disarm the Serb community .
On 17 and 18 June , Tonogal and Lieutenant Colonel Aganović , gendarmerie commander for eastern Herzegovina , made an attempt to calm the situation by visiting villages east of the Gacko – Avtovac road to re @-@ establish peace in the area . They received a written message from four villages that they did not acknowledge the NDH authorities , and wanted the message to be passed on to the Italians . The residents of the villages of Jasenik and Lipnik were willing to talk and return to work , but they asked that the gendarmerie not visit their villages , as this would tempt the Montenegrins to attack . Aganović assessed that while this was probably true , their request was insincere . The gendarmerie commander in Bileća believed that the reason for the rebellion was that the local Serbs were wedded to the idea of Greater Serbia , and did not accept that their villages were part of the NDH . This approach essentially meant that local Serbs wanted the NDH authorities to leave them alone and not impose on their lives . According to the historian Davor Marijan , this was a poor choice that gave the Ustaše an excuse to take radical action .
The response of the NDH authorities to resistance had been to burn down the villages where this had occurred , and there were mass shootings of Serbs , which escalated the level of violence even further . In late May and June , 173 Serbs had been rounded up , tortured and killed in Nevesinje , and in early June , another 140 Serbs had been killed at Ljubinje . In response , Serbs attacked Ustaše officials and facilities , and conducted raids themselves , killing Muslim villagers .
= = Uprising = =
The NDH authorities only had weak forces in eastern Herzegovina at the time the mass uprising occurred , roughly equal to two Croatian Home Guard battalions , as well as gendarmerie posts in some towns . This was barely adequate to guard important locations , and was insufficient for offensive action . Deployed forces consisted of one company of the 10th Battalion in Trebinje , the headquarters and a reinforced company of the 7th Battalion in Bileća ( the balance of the battalion being divided between Gacko and Avtovac ) , and a company of the 6th Battalion in Nevesinje . The remainder of the 10th Battalion was deploying to Trebinje at the time the rebellion broke out .
= = = 23 – 24 June = = =
The first indication that the situation had changed significantly was on 23 June , when a group of 200 Ustaše clashed with a group of rebels they estimated to number between 600 and 1 @,@ 000 . After an extended firefight near the village of Stepen , 5 km ( 3 @.@ 1 mi ) north of Korita , during which they suffered several casualties , the Ustaše also burned down four villages . They then entered two Muslim @-@ majority villages in the area and arrested 13 Serbs who had not been involved in the earlier fighting . The arrested Serbs were transported north to Avtovac and shot . That night , all adult Serbs above the age of 16 in Gacko , 4 @.@ 5 km ( 2 @.@ 8 mi ) northwest of Avtovac , were arrested , and 26 were immediately shot . The rest were transported 50 km ( 31 mi ) west to a camp in Nevesinje . Over the period 23 – 25 June , 150 Serbs from the village of Ravno , 30 km ( 19 mi ) southwest of Ljubinje , were arrested and killed at the gendarmerie post , and the remainder of the population fled to the hills .
On 23 and 24 June , spontaneous mass gatherings occurred at several villages in the Gacko and Nevesinje districts . These rallies were prompted by the news of the German invasion of the Soviet Union , and those attending them voted to fight against the Ustaše . Professor Marko Attila Hoare states that the full @-@ scale uprising resulted from the Ustaše retaliation against attempts of the Serbs of eastern Herzegovina to defend themselves , combined with the launching of the German invasion on 22 June . At dawn on 24 June , the area of Nevesinje descended into full @-@ scale revolt , with around 400 armed rebels engaging the Home Guard garrison . By 24 June , the uprising had reached a massive scale across eastern Herzegovina , with between 1 @,@ 500 and 3 @,@ 000 armed rebels in total , including some Montenegrins .
= = = 25 June = = =
On the morning of 25 June , the company of the 6th Battalion at Nevesinje reported that rebels were gathering to attack the town ; Nevesinje 's Ustaše commissioner claimed that the rebel force numbered 5 @,@ 000 , and were led by a former Yugoslav Army colonel . About 10 : 00 , the town was attacked from the south and southwest . In response , the Home Guard despatched two more companies of the 6th Battalion from Mostar to Nevesinje . That morning , reports also arrived from Bileća and Stolac that rebels were approaching the village of Berkovići from the north , and had captured the gendarmerie post at Gornji Lukavac . About 11 : 30 , the Ustaše commissioner for Stolac reported that 3 @,@ 000 Montenegrins had gathered between Nevesinje and Stolac , and he requested the immediate supply of 150 rifles for his men . A rebel attack on the gendarmerie post in the village of Divin near Bileća was repulsed around midday . A platoon of Home Guard reinforcements and weapons for the Ustaše arrived at Stolac in the afternoon , and Bileća was held throughout the day .
Reports of the uprising reached Kvaternik during 25 June , but he dismissed them and the reports of 5 @,@ 000 rebels , cancelling Adriatic Command 's redeployment of the 21st Battalion from Slavonski Brod as well as a request to the Italians for air reconnaissance support . He stated that the suppression of the uprising could be handled by local forces . Loss of communication with Nevesinje resulted in rumours that the town had fallen to the rebels . The gendarmerie post at Fojnica ( near Gacko ) was captured on the afternoon of 25 June , with the survivors escaping to Gacko . Newspapers reported rumours that Gacko and Avtovac had fallen to the rebels . Having already despatched a reinforced company towards Nevesinje from Sarajevo earlier in the day , Adriatic Command ordered the rest of the battalion to follow . The initial company group had already reached Kalinovik some 60 kilometres ( 37 mi ) from Nevesinje , and the rest of the battalion was expected to spend the night of 25 / 26 June there before arriving in Nevesinje around noon on 26 June . Kvaternik received an updated report on the situation in eastern Herzegovina during the night , and Prpić travelled from Sarajevo to Mostar to take control of operations , to find that information about the situation in eastern Herzegovina was unclear , but suggested that NDH forces could be facing serious difficulties .
= = = 26 June = = =
On the morning of 26 June , the company of the 6th Battalion that had been sent from Mostar continued towards Nevesinje , but almost immediately came under fire from a rebel group . With the assistance of Ustaše , the Home Guard were able to hold their ground , but they were unable to break through to Nevesinje . That afternoon , two aircraft of the Air Force of the Independent State of Croatia ( Croatian : Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske , ZNDH ) from Sarajevo conducted an armed reconnaissance over eastern Herzegovina , and discovered that NDH forces still held Nevesinje . They observed barricades across the Mostar – Nevesinje road , and strafed a group of 50 rebels north of Nevesinje near the village of Kifino Selo . Prpić bolstered the force on the Mostar – Nevesinje road with the 17th Battalion , recently arrived from Sarajevo , and sent his deputy , Colonel Antun Prohaska to command it . The 17th Battalion joined that force at 20 : 00 . About 17 : 00 , the company of the 11th Battalion reached Nevesinje from Kalinovik , and a further company of the battalion was despatched from Sarajevo , along with the battalion commander .
In the southern part of the area of operations around Stolac , the situation was significantly calmer than around Nevesinje , although a group of 200 Ustaše at Berkovići were falsely claiming that they were being surrounded by rebels at night . Despite this claim , they had suffered no casualties . Regardless , Prpić sent them ammunition and a platoon of the 18th Battalion . At 19 : 00 on 26 June , Francetić arrived at Prpić 's headquarters in Mostar to be briefed on the situation . He resolved that he would travel to Berkovići the following day and take personal command of the Ustaše unit there .