cve_id stringlengths 13 16 | cwe_ids stringclasses 400
values | cvss_vector stringclasses 256
values | cvss_is_v3 float64 0 1 ⌀ | repo_name stringlengths 3 45 | commit_msg stringlengths 3 19.3k ⌀ | commit_hash stringlengths 7 40 | git_url stringlengths 56 159 | file_path stringlengths 4 100 | func_name stringlengths 1 127 ⌀ | func_before stringlengths 10 83k ⌀ | abstract_func_before stringlengths 10 68.1k ⌀ | func_graph_path_before stringlengths 38 127 ⌀ | func stringlengths 8 83.3k | abstract_func stringlengths 8 68.4k | func_graph_path stringlengths 35 126 ⌀ | diff_func stringlengths 77 14.5k ⌀ | diff_line_info stringlengths 42 5.91k ⌀ | is_vul bool 2
classes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2018-9336 | ['CWE-415'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | OpenVPN/openvpn | Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a pr... | 1394192b210cb3c6624a7419bcf3ff966742e79b | https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/commit/1394192b210cb3c6624a7419bcf3ff966742e79b | src/openvpnserv/interactive.c | RegisterDNS | null | null | null | static DWORD WINAPI
RegisterDNS(LPVOID unused)
{
DWORD err;
DWORD i;
WCHAR sys_path[MAX_PATH];
DWORD timeout = RDNS_TIMEOUT * 1000; /* in milliseconds */
/* default path of ipconfig command */
WCHAR ipcfg[MAX_PATH] = L"C:\\Windows\\system32\\ipconfig.exe";
struct
{
WCHAR *argv0... | static DWORD VAR_0
RegisterDNS(LPVOID VAR_1)
{
DWORD VAR_2;
DWORD VAR_3;
WCHAR VAR_4[VAR_5];
DWORD VAR_6 = VAR_7 * 1000; /* COMMENT_0 */
/* COMMENT_1 */
WCHAR VAR_8[VAR_5] = L"C:\\Windows\\system32\\ipconfig.exe";
struct
{
WCHAR *argv0;
WCHAR *cmdline;
DWORD tim... | null | null | null | false |
CVE-2021-31916 | ['CWE-787'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | dm ioctl: fix out of bounds array access when no devices
If there are not any dm devices, we need to zero the "dev" argument in
the first structure dm_name_list. However, this can cause out of
bounds write, because the "needed" variable is zero and len may be
less than eight.
Fix this bug by reporting DM_BUFFER_FULL_... | 4edbe1d7bcffcd6269f3b5eb63f710393ff2ec7a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4edbe1d7bcffcd6269f3b5eb63f710393ff2ec7a | drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c | invalid_str | null | null | null | static int invalid_str(char *str, void *end)
{
while ((void *) str < end)
if (!*str++)
return 0;
return -EINVAL;
} | static int invalid_str(char *VAR_0, void *VAR_1)
{
while ((void *) VAR_0 < VAR_1)
if (!*VAR_0++)
return 0;
return -VAR_2;
} | torvalds/linux/4edbe1d7bcffcd6269f3b5eb63f710393ff2ec7a/dm-ioctl.c/non_vul/19.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2018-11693 | ['CWE-125'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:P | 0 | sass/libsass | Fix handling of unclosed interpolant in url
Fixes #2661 | af0e12cdf09d43dbd1fc11e3f64b244277cc1a1e | https://github.com/sass/libsass/commit/af0e12cdf09d43dbd1fc11e3f64b244277cc1a1e | src/parser.cpp | Parser::parse_almost_any_value | null | null | null | String_Schema_Obj Parser::parse_almost_any_value()
{
String_Schema_Obj schema = SASS_MEMORY_NEW(String_Schema, pstate);
if (*position == 0) return 0;
lex < spaces >(false);
Expression_Obj token = lex_almost_any_value_token();
if (!token) return 0;
schema->append(token);
if (*position == 0... | String_Schema_Obj Parser::parse_almost_any_value()
{
String_Schema_Obj VAR_0 = SASS_MEMORY_NEW(VAR_1, VAR_2);
if (*VAR_3 == 0) return 0;
VAR_4 < spaces >(false);
Expression_Obj VAR_5 = lex_almost_any_value_token();
if (!VAR_5) return 0;
VAR_0->append(VAR_5);
if (*VAR_3 == 0) {
VAR_0... | sass/libsass/af0e12cdf09d43dbd1fc11e3f64b244277cc1a1e/parser.cpp/non_vul/11.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2021-46914 | ['CWE-Other'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | torvalds/linux | commit debb9df311582c83fe369baa35fa4b92e8a9c58a upstream.
pci_disable_device() called in __ixgbe_shutdown() decreases
dev->enable_cnt by 1. pci_enable_device_mem() which increases
dev->enable_cnt by 1, was removed from ixgbe_resume() in commit
6f82b2558735 ("ixgbe: use generic power management"). This caused
unbalance... | be07581aacae7cd0a073afae8e8862032f794309 | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=be07581aacae7cd0a073afae8e8862032f794309 | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | ixgbe_irq_disable | null | null | null | static inline void ixgbe_irq_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
{
switch (adapter->hw.mac.type) {
case ixgbe_mac_82598EB:
IXGBE_WRITE_REG(&adapter->hw, IXGBE_EIMC, ~0);
break;
case ixgbe_mac_82599EB:
case ixgbe_mac_X540:
case ixgbe_mac_X550:
case ixgbe_mac_X550EM_x:
case ixgbe_mac_x550em_a:
IXGBE_WRITE... | static inline void ixgbe_irq_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *VAR_0)
{
switch (VAR_0->hw.mac.type) {
case VAR_1:
IXGBE_WRITE_REG(&VAR_0->hw, VAR_2, ~0);
break;
case VAR_3:
case VAR_4:
case VAR_5:
case VAR_6:
case VAR_7:
IXGBE_WRITE_REG(&VAR_0->hw, VAR_2, 0xFFFF0000);
IXGBE_WRITE_REG(&VAR_0->hw, IXGBE_EIMC_E... | torvalds/linux/be07581aacae7cd0a073afae8e8862032f794309/ixgbe_main.c/non_vul/22.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2018-14017 | ['CWE-125'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | radareorg/radare2 | Fix #10498 - Fix crash in fuzzed java files (#10511) | e9ce0d64faf19fa4e9c260250fbdf25e3c11e152 | https://github.com/radareorg/radare2/commit/e9ce0d64faf19fa4e9c260250fbdf25e3c11e152 | shlr/java/class.c | r_bin_java_get_item_name_from_cp_item_list | null | null | null | R_API char *r_bin_java_get_item_name_from_cp_item_list(RList *cp_list, RBinJavaCPTypeObj *obj, int depth) {
/*
Given a constant poool object Class, FieldRef, MethodRef, or InterfaceMethodRef
return the actual descriptor string.
@param cp_list: RList of RBinJavaCPTypeObj *
@param obj object to look up the name for
... | R_API char *r_bin_java_get_item_name_from_cp_item_list(RList *VAR_0, RBinJavaCPTypeObj *VAR_1, int VAR_2) {
/* COMMENT_0 */
... | null | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-11569 | ['CWE-125'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | fontforge | parsettf.c: Fix out of bounds read condition on buffer
Closes #3093 | 7bfec47910293bf149b8debe44c6f3f788506092 | https://github.com/fontforge/fontforge/commit/7bfec47910293bf149b8debe44c6f3f788506092 | fontforge/parsettf.c | FindLangEntry | null | null | null | static char *FindLangEntry(struct ttfinfo *info, int id ) {
/* Look for an entry with string id */
/* we prefer english, if we can't find english look for something in ascii */
struct ttflangname *cur;
char *ret;
for ( cur=info->names; cur!=NULL && cur->lang!=0x409; cur=cur->next );
if ( cur!=N... | static char *FindLangEntry(struct ttfinfo *VAR_0, int VAR_1 ) {
/* COMMENT_0 */
/* COMMENT_1 */
struct ttflangname *VAR_2;
char *VAR_3;
for ( VAR_2=VAR_0->names; VAR_2!=NULL && VAR_2->lang!=0x409; VAR_2=VAR_2->next );
if ( VAR_2!=NULL && VAR_2->names[VAR_1]==NULL ) VAR_2 = NULL;
if ( VAR_2=... | fontforge/7bfec47910293bf149b8debe44c6f3f788506092/parsettf.c/non_vul/72.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-20006 | ['CWE-787'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | aawc/unrar | 5.6.1.4: Use in-memory archive instead of file IO | 0ff832d31470471803b175cfff4e40c1b08ee779 | https://github.com/aawc/unrar/commit/0ff832d31470471803b175cfff4e40c1b08ee779 | archive.cpp | Archive::Tell | int64 Archive::Tell()
{
int64 QPos;
if (QOpen.Tell(&QPos))
return QPos;
return File::Tell();
} | int64 Archive::Tell()
{
int64 VAR_0;
if (VAR_1.Tell(&VAR_0))
return VAR_0;
return File::Tell();
} | aawc/unrar/0ff832d31470471803b175cfff4e40c1b08ee779/archive.cpp/vul/before/2.json | int64 Archive::Tell()
{
#ifdef USE_QOPEN
int64 QPos;
if (QOpen.Tell(&QPos))
return QPos;
#endif
#ifdef USE_ARCMEM
int64 APos;
if (ArcMem.Tell(&APos))
return APos;
#endif
return File::Tell();
} | int64 Archive::Tell()
{
#ifdef VAR_0
int64 VAR_1;
if (VAR_2.Tell(&VAR_1))
return VAR_1;
#endif
#ifdef VAR_3
int64 VAR_4;
if (VAR_5.Tell(&VAR_4))
return VAR_4;
#endif
return File::Tell();
} | aawc/unrar/0ff832d31470471803b175cfff4e40c1b08ee779/archive.cpp/vul/after/2.json | --- func_before
+++ func_after
@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
int64 Archive::Tell()
{
+#ifdef USE_QOPEN
int64 QPos;
if (QOpen.Tell(&QPos))
return QPos;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_ARCMEM
+ int64 APos;
+ if (ArcMem.Tell(&APos))
+ return APos;
+#endif
return File::Tell();
} | {'deleted_lines': [], 'added_lines': ['#ifdef USE_QOPEN', '#endif', '#ifdef USE_ARCMEM', ' int64 APos;', ' if (ArcMem.Tell(&APos))', ' return APos;', '#endif']} | true |
CVE-2021-41035 | ['CWE-440', 'CWE-250'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | eclipse-openj9/openj9 | Throw IAE when an InterfaceHandle thunk finds a non-public method
The interface dispatch implemented by InterfaceHandle is supposed to
throw IllegalAccessError (IAE) when the dispatched callee is not public,
just like the dispatch performed by invokeinterface. | c6e0d9296ff9a3084965d83e207403de373c0bad | https://github.com/eclipse-openj9/openj9/commit/c6e0d9296ff9a3084965d83e207403de373c0bad | runtime/compiler/env/VMJ9.cpp | TR_J9VMBase::getOSRFrameHeaderSizeInBytes | null | null | null | UDATA TR_J9VMBase::getOSRFrameHeaderSizeInBytes() {return sizeof(J9OSRFrame);} | UDATA TR_J9VMBase::getOSRFrameHeaderSizeInBytes() {return sizeof(VAR_0);} | eclipse-openj9/openj9/c6e0d9296ff9a3084965d83e207403de373c0bad/VMJ9.cpp/non_vul/497.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2019-20052 | ['CWE-401'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | tbeu/matio | Fix memory leak
As reported by https://github.com/tbeu/matio/issues/131 | a47b7cd3aca70e9a0bddf8146eb4ab0cbd19c2c3 | https://github.com/tbeu/matio/commit/a47b7cd3aca70e9a0bddf8146eb4ab0cbd19c2c3 | src/mat.c | SafeMul | null | null | null | int SafeMul(size_t* res, size_t a, size_t b)
{
if ( !psnip_safe_size_mul(res, a, b) ) {
*res = 0;
return 1;
}
return 0;
} | int SafeMul(size_t* VAR_0, size_t VAR_1, size_t VAR_2)
{
if ( !psnip_safe_size_mul(VAR_0, VAR_1, VAR_2) ) {
*VAR_0 = 0;
return 1;
}
return 0;
} | tbeu/matio/a47b7cd3aca70e9a0bddf8146eb4ab0cbd19c2c3/mat.c/non_vul/10.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2014-8559 | ['CWE-400'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| 946e51f2bf37f1656916eb75bd0742ba33983c28 | https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=946e51f2bf37f1656916eb75bd0742ba33983c28 | kernel/trace/trace_events.c | create_new_subsystem | null | null | null | static struct event_subsystem *
create_new_subsystem(const char *name)
{
struct event_subsystem *system;
/* need to create new entry */
system = kmalloc(sizeof(*system), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!system)
return NULL;
system->ref_count = 1;
/* Only allocate if dynamic (kprobes and modules) */
if (!core_kernel_data((... | static struct event_subsystem *
create_new_subsystem(const char *VAR_0)
{
struct event_subsystem *VAR_1;
/* COMMENT_0 */
VAR_1 = kmalloc(sizeof(*VAR_1), VAR_2);
if (!VAR_1)
return NULL;
VAR_1->ref_count = 1;
/* COMMENT_1 */
if (!core_kernel_data((unsigned long)VAR_0)) {
VAR_1->ref_count |= VAR_3;
VAR_1-... | torvalds/linux/946e51f2bf37f1656916eb75bd0742ba33983c28/trace_events.c/non_vul/29.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2022-0695 | ['CWE-400'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | radareorg/radare2 | Fix DoS in PE/QNX/DYLDCACHE/PSX parsers ##crash
* Reported by lazymio
* Reproducer: AAA4AAAAAB4= | 634b886e84a5c568d243e744becc6b3223e089cf | https://github.com/radareorg/radare2/commit/634b886e84a5c568d243e744becc6b3223e089cf | libr/util/buf.c | r_buf_new_slice | null | null | null | R_API RBuffer *r_buf_new_slice(RBuffer *b, ut64 offset, ut64 size) {
struct buf_ref_user u = { 0 };
u.parent = b;
u.offset = offset;
u.size = size;
return new_buffer (R_BUFFER_REF, &u);
} | R_API RBuffer *r_buf_new_slice(RBuffer *VAR_0, ut64 VAR_1, ut64 VAR_2) {
struct buf_ref_user VAR_3 = { 0 };
VAR_3.parent = VAR_0;
VAR_3.offset = VAR_1;
VAR_3.size = VAR_2;
return new_buffer (VAR_4, &VAR_3);
} | null | null | null | false |
CVE-2019-3459 | ['CWE-125'] | AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | torvalds/linux | The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len
as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user
and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the
actual packet.
To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that
the resultin... | 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 | net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | l2cap_chan_put | null | null | null | void l2cap_chan_put(struct l2cap_chan *c)
{
BT_DBG("chan %p orig refcnt %d", c, kref_read(&c->kref));
kref_put(&c->kref, l2cap_chan_destroy);
} | void l2cap_chan_put(struct l2cap_chan *VAR_0)
{
BT_DBG("chan %p orig refcnt %d", VAR_0, kref_read(&VAR_0->kref));
kref_put(&VAR_0->kref, VAR_1);
} | torvalds/linux/7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69/l2cap_core.c/non_vul/7.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2020-27671 | ['CWE-Other'] | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | xen-project/xen | IOMMU: hold page ref until after deferred TLB flush
When moving around a page via XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_range, deferring the TLB
flush for the "from" GFN range requires that the page remains allocated
to the guest until the TLB flush has actually occurred. Otherwise a
parallel hypercall to remove the page would only flush ... | 5777a3742d88ff1c0ebc626ceb4fd47f9b3dc6d5 | https://github.com/xen-project/xen/commit/5777a3742d88ff1c0ebc626ceb4fd47f9b3dc6d5 | xen/arch/arm/mm.c | xen_pt_update_entry | null | null | null | static int xen_pt_update_entry(mfn_t root, unsigned long virt,
mfn_t mfn, unsigned int flags)
{
int rc;
unsigned int level;
/* We only support 4KB mapping (i.e level 3) for now */
unsigned int target = 3;
lpae_t *table;
/*
* The intermediate page tables are re... | static int xen_pt_update_entry(mfn_t VAR_0, unsigned long VAR_1,
mfn_t VAR_2, unsigned int VAR_3)
{
int VAR_4;
unsigned int VAR_5;
/* COMMENT_0 */
unsigned int VAR_6 = 3;
lpae_t *VAR_7;
/* COMMENT_1 */
... | xen-project/xen/5777a3742d88ff1c0ebc626ceb4fd47f9b3dc6d5/mm.c/non_vul/1.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-0861 | ['CWE-416'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | torvalds/linux | Drivers can implement 'struct snd_pcm_ops.ioctl' to handle some requests
from ALSA PCM core. These requests are internal purpose in kernel land.
Usually common set of operations are used for it.
SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_INFO is one of the requests. According to code comment,
it has been obsoleted in the old days.
We can see ... | e11f0f90a626f93899687b1cc909ee37dd6c5809 | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=e11f0f90a626f93899687b1cc909ee37dd6c5809 | sound/core/pcm_lib.c | snd_pcm_hw_rule_ranges | null | null | null | static int snd_pcm_hw_rule_ranges(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
{
struct snd_pcm_hw_constraint_ranges *r = rule->private;
return snd_interval_ranges(hw_param_interval(params, rule->var),
r->count, r->ranges, r->mask);
} | static int snd_pcm_hw_rule_ranges(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *VAR_0,
struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *VAR_1)
{
struct snd_pcm_hw_constraint_ranges *VAR_2 = VAR_1->private;
return snd_interval_ranges(hw_param_interval(VAR_0, VAR_1->var),
VAR_2->count, VAR_2->ranges, VAR_2->mask);
} | torvalds/linux/e11f0f90a626f93899687b1cc909ee37dd6c5809/pcm_lib.c/non_vul/48.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-7395 | ['CWE-190'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | TigerVNC/tigervnc | Fix crash from integer overflow in SMsgReader::readClientCutText
The length sent by client is U32, but is converted into int. If it was bigger than 0x7fffffff the resulting int is negative, it passes the check against maxCutText and later throws std::bad_alloc from CharArray which takes down the whole server.
All the... | bf3bdac082978ca32895a4b6a123016094905689 | https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/commit/bf3bdac082978ca32895a4b6a123016094905689 | common/rfb/SMsgReader.cxx | SMsgReader::readFence | null | null | null | void SMsgReader::readFence()
{
rdr::U32 flags;
rdr::U8 len;
char data[64];
is->skip(3);
flags = is->readU32();
len = is->readU8();
if (len > sizeof(data)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Ignoring fence with too large payload\n");
is->skip(len);
return;
}
is->readBytes(data, len);
handler->fenc... | void SMsgReader::readFence()
{
rdr::U32 VAR_0;
rdr::U8 VAR_1;
char VAR_2[64];
VAR_3->skip(3);
VAR_0 = VAR_3->readU32();
VAR_1 = VAR_3->readU8();
if (VAR_1 > sizeof(VAR_2)) {
fprintf(VAR_4, "Ignoring fence with too large payload\n");
VAR_3->skip(VAR_1);
return;
}
VAR_3->readBytes(VAR_2,... | TigerVNC/tigervnc/bf3bdac082978ca32895a4b6a123016094905689/SMsgReader.cxx/non_vul/6.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-5377 | ['CWE-125'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H | 1 | gpac | fixed #2606 | 8e9d6b38c036a97020c462ad48e1132e0ddc57ce | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/8e9d6b38c036a97020c462ad48e1132e0ddc57ce | src/isomedia/box_code_base.c | rtp_hnti_box_del | null | null | null | void rtp_hnti_box_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_RTPBox *ptr = (GF_RTPBox *)s;
if (ptr->sdpText) gf_free(ptr->sdpText);
gf_free(ptr);
} | void rtp_hnti_box_del(GF_Box *VAR_0)
{
GF_RTPBox *VAR_1 = (GF_RTPBox *)VAR_0;
if (VAR_1->sdpText) gf_free(VAR_1->sdpText);
gf_free(VAR_1);
} | gpac/8e9d6b38c036a97020c462ad48e1132e0ddc57ce/box_code_base.c/non_vul/600.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2021-34141 | ['CWE-697'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | numpy | DEP: Remove deprecated numeric style dtype strings (#19539)
Finishes the deprecation, and effectively closes gh-18993
* Insecure String Comparison
* Finished Deprecations
* Breaks numpy types
* Removed elements in dep_tps
* Delete Typecode Comment
* Deleted for loop
* Fixed 80 characters or more i... | eeef9d4646103c3b1afd3085f1393f2b3f9575b2 | https://github.com/numpy/numpy/commit/eeef9d4646103c3b1afd3085f1393f2b3f9575b2 | numpy/core/src/multiarray/descriptor.c | arraydescr_protocol_typestr_get | null | null | null | NPY_NO_EXPORT PyObject *
arraydescr_protocol_typestr_get(PyArray_Descr *self, void *NPY_UNUSED(ignored))
{
char basic_ = self->kind;
char endian = self->byteorder;
int size = self->elsize;
PyObject *ret;
if (endian == '=') {
endian = '<';
if (!PyArray_IsNativeByteOrder(endian)) {
... | NPY_NO_EXPORT VAR_0 *
arraydescr_protocol_typestr_get(PyArray_Descr *VAR_1, void *NPY_UNUSED(ignored))
{
char VAR_2 = VAR_1->kind;
char VAR_3 = VAR_1->byteorder;
int VAR_4 = VAR_1->elsize;
PyObject *VAR_5;
if (VAR_3 == '=') {
VAR_3 = '<';
if (!PyArray_IsNativeByteOrder(VAR_3)) {
... | null | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-6903 | ['CWE-Other'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | iortcw | All: Merge some file writing extension checks | 11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998 | https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998 | MP/code/qcommon/common.c | Z_LogZoneHeap | null | null | null | void Z_LogZoneHeap( memzone_t *zone, char *name ) {
#ifdef ZONE_DEBUG
char dump[32], *ptr;
int i, j;
#endif
memblock_t *block;
char buf[4096];
int size, allocSize, numBlocks;
if ( !logfile || !FS_Initialized() ) {
return;
}
size = numBlocks = 0;
#ifdef ZONE_DEBUG
allocSize = 0;
#endif
Com_sprintf( buf, si... | void Z_LogZoneHeap( memzone_t *VAR_0, char *VAR_1 ) {
#ifdef VAR_2
char VAR_3[32], *VAR_4;
int VAR_5, VAR_6;
#endif
memblock_t *VAR_7;
char VAR_8[4096];
int VAR_9, VAR_10, VAR_11;
if ( !VAR_12 || !FS_Initialized() ) {
return;
}
VAR_9 = VAR_11 = 0;
#ifdef VAR_2
VAR_10 = 0;
#endif
Com_sprintf( VAR_8, sizeof... | iortcw/11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998/common.c/non_vul/43.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2021-21261 | ['CWE-74'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | flatpak | portal: Do not use caller-supplied variables in environment
If the caller specifies a variable that can be used to inject arbitrary
code into processes, we must not allow it to enter the environment
block used to run `flatpak run`, which runs unsandboxed.
This change requires the previous commit "context: Add --env-f... | cc1401043c075268ecc652eac557ef8076b5eaba | https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/cc1401043c075268ecc652eac557ef8076b5eaba | portal/flatpak-portal.c | update_monitor_get_data | null | null | null | static UpdateMonitorData *
update_monitor_get_data (PortalFlatpakUpdateMonitor *monitor)
{
return (UpdateMonitorData *)g_object_get_data (G_OBJECT (monitor), "update-monitor-data");
} | static UpdateMonitorData *
update_monitor_get_data (PortalFlatpakUpdateMonitor *VAR_0)
{
return (UpdateMonitorData *)g_object_get_data (G_OBJECT (VAR_0), "update-monitor-data");
} | flatpak/cc1401043c075268ecc652eac557ef8076b5eaba/flatpak-portal.c/non_vul/46.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-25193 | ['CWE-770'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | harfbuzz | [layout] Limit how far we skip when looking back
See comments. | 85be877925ddbf34f74a1229f3ca1716bb6170dc | https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/85be877925ddbf34f74a1229f3ca1716bb6170dc | src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh | pop_cur_done_glyphs | null | null | null | bool pop_cur_done_glyphs ()
{
if (!active_glyphs_stack)
return false;
active_glyphs_stack.pop ();
return true;
} | bool pop_cur_done_glyphs ()
{
if (!VAR_0)
return false;
VAR_0.pop ();
return true;
} | harfbuzz/85be877925ddbf34f74a1229f3ca1716bb6170dc/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh/non_vul/20.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2013-2905 | ['CWE-264'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | chromium | Posix: fix named SHM mappings permissions.
Make sure that named mappings in /dev/shm/ aren't created with
broad permissions.
BUG=254159
R=mark@chromium.org, markus@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17779002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d87... | afb848acb43ba316097ab4fddfa38dbd80bc6a71 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/afb848acb43ba316097ab4fddfa38dbd80bc6a71 | base/memory/shared_memory_posix.cc | SharedMemory::SharedMemory | null | null | null | SharedMemory::SharedMemory(SharedMemoryHandle handle, bool read_only,
ProcessHandle process)
: mapped_file_(handle.fd),
inode_(0),
mapped_size_(0),
memory_(NULL),
read_only_(read_only),
requested_size_(0) {
// We don't handle this case yet (note the ignored... | SharedMemory::SharedMemory(SharedMemoryHandle VAR_0, bool VAR_1,
ProcessHandle VAR_2)
: mapped_file_(VAR_0.fd),
inode_(0),
mapped_size_(0),
memory_(NULL),
read_only_(VAR_1),
requested_size_(0) {
/* COMMENT_0 */
/* COMMENT_1 */
NOTREACHED();
} | chromium/afb848acb43ba316097ab4fddfa38dbd80bc6a71/shared_memory_posix.cc/non_vul/0.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-9815 | ['CWE-284'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | 0 | xen-project/xen | arm: crash the guest when it traps on external abort
If we spot a data or prefetch abort bearing the ESR_EL2.EA bit set, we
know that this is an external abort, and that should crash the guest.
This is part of XSA-201.
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org... | f8c6a9334b251d2e78b0873a71b4d369908fb123 | https://github.com/xen-project/xen/commit/f8c6a9334b251d2e78b0873a71b4d369908fb123 | xen/arch/arm/traps.c | mode_string | null | null | null | static const char *mode_string(uint32_t cpsr)
{
uint32_t mode;
static const char *mode_strings[] = {
[PSR_MODE_USR] = "32-bit Guest USR",
[PSR_MODE_FIQ] = "32-bit Guest FIQ",
[PSR_MODE_IRQ] = "32-bit Guest IRQ",
[PSR_MODE_SVC] = "32-bit Guest SVC",
[PSR_MODE_MON] = "32-bit Mon... | static const char *mode_string(uint32_t VAR_0)
{
uint32_t VAR_1;
static const char *VAR_2[] = {
[VAR_3] = "32-bit Guest USR",
[VAR_4] = "32-bit Guest FIQ",
[VAR_5] = "32-bit Guest IRQ",
[VAR_6] = "32-bit Guest SVC",
[VAR_7] = "32-bit Monitor",
[VAR_8] = "32-bit Guest AB... | xen-project/xen/f8c6a9334b251d2e78b0873a71b4d369908fb123/traps.c/non_vul/8.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-6355 | ['CWE-190'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | virglrenderer | As the 'pkt_length' and 'offlen' can be malicious from guest,
the vrend_create_shader function has an integer overflow, this
will make the next 'memcpy' oob access. This patch avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
| 93761787b29f37fa627dea9082cdfc1a1ec608d6 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer/commit/?id=93761787b29f37fa627dea9082cdfc1a1ec608d6 | src/vrend_renderer.c | vrend_object_bind_blend | null | null | null | void vrend_object_bind_blend(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle)
{
struct pipe_blend_state *state;
if (handle == 0) {
memset(&ctx->sub->blend_state, 0, sizeof(ctx->sub->blend_state));
vrend_blend_enable(ctx, false);
return;
}
state = vrend_object_looku... | void vrend_object_bind_blend(struct vrend_context *VAR_0,
uint32_t VAR_1)
{
struct pipe_blend_state *VAR_2;
if (VAR_1 == 0) {
memset(&VAR_0->sub->blend_state, 0, sizeof(VAR_0->sub->blend_state));
vrend_blend_enable(VAR_0, false);
return;
}
VAR_2 = vrend_object... | virglrenderer/93761787b29f37fa627dea9082cdfc1a1ec608d6/vrend_renderer.c/non_vul/93.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-9520 | ['CWE-416'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | radareorg/radare2 | Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex | f85bc674b2a2256a364fe796351bc1971e106005 | https://github.com/radareorg/radare2/commit/f85bc674b2a2256a364fe796351bc1971e106005 | libr/config/config.c | r_config_save_char | null | null | null | R_API bool r_config_save_char(RConfigHold *h, ...) {
va_list ap;
char *key;
if (!h->list_char) {
h->list_char = r_list_newf ((RListFree) free);
if (!h->list_char) {
return false;
}
}
va_start (ap, h);
while ((key = va_arg (ap, char *))) {
RConfigHoldChar *hc = R_NEW0 (RConfigHoldChar);
if (!hc) {
... | R_API bool r_config_save_char(RConfigHold *VAR_0, ...) {
va_list VAR_1;
char *VAR_2;
if (!VAR_0->list_char) {
VAR_0->list_char = r_list_newf ((RListFree) VAR_3);
if (!VAR_0->list_char) {
return false;
}
}
va_start (VAR_1, VAR_0);
while ((VAR_2 = va_arg (VAR_1, char *))) {
RConfigHoldChar *VAR_4 = R_NEW... | null | null | null | false |
CVE-2022-27147 | ['CWE-416'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | gpac | fixed #2109 | 9723dd0955894f2cb7be13b94cf7a47f2754b893 | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/9723dd0955894f2cb7be13b94cf7a47f2754b893 | src/scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c | insert_node_def | null | null | null | static GFINLINE void insert_node_def(GF_SceneGraph *sg, GF_Node *def, u32 ID, const char *name)
{
NodeIDedItem *reg_node, *cur;
reg_node = (NodeIDedItem *) gf_malloc(sizeof(NodeIDedItem));
reg_node->node = def;
reg_node->NodeID = ID;
reg_node->NodeName = name ? gf_strdup(name) : NULL;
if (!sg->id_node) {
sg->... | static GFINLINE VAR_0 insert_node_def(GF_SceneGraph *VAR_1, GF_Node *VAR_2, u32 VAR_3, const char *VAR_4)
{
NodeIDedItem *VAR_5, *VAR_6;
VAR_5 = (NodeIDedItem *) gf_malloc(sizeof(NodeIDedItem));
VAR_5->node = VAR_2;
VAR_5->NodeID = VAR_3;
VAR_5->NodeName = VAR_4 ? gf_strdup(VAR_4) : NULL;
if (!VAR_1->id_node) {... | null | null | null | false |
CVE-2015-6563 | ['CWE-20'] | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N | 0 | openssh/openssh-portable | Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@ | d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b | https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b | monitor.c | monitor_permit | null | null | null | static void
monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
{
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type) {
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
return;
}
ent++;
}
} | static void
monitor_permit(struct mon_table *VAR_0, enum monitor_reqtype VAR_1, int VAR_2)
{
while (VAR_0->f != NULL) {
if (VAR_0->type == VAR_1) {
VAR_0->flags &= ~VAR_3;
VAR_0->flags |= VAR_2 ? VAR_3 : 0;
return;
}
VAR_0++;
}
} | openssh/openssh-portable/d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b/monitor.c/non_vul/7.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-12995 | ['CWE-835'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | CVE-2017-12995/Check for DNS compression pointers that don't point backwards.
This is what BIND 9.11.0-P2 does; it not only detects pointers that
loop, as "point backwards" means "point before anything we've processed
so far, including what we're processing right now", so the pointer can't
point to itself (as that's w... | 3a76fd7c95fced2c2f8c8148a9055c3a542eff29 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3a76fd7c95fced2c2f8c8148a9055c3a542eff29 | print-domain.c | ns_nskip | null | null | null | static const u_char *
ns_nskip(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp)
{
register u_char i;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return (NULL);
i = *cp++;
while (i) {
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == INDIR_MASK)
return (cp + 1);
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == EDNS0_MASK) {
int bitlen, bytelen;
if ((i & ~IN... | static const u_char *
ns_nskip(netdissect_options *VAR_0,
register const u_char *VAR_1)
{
register u_char VAR_2;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*VAR_1, 1))
return (NULL);
VAR_2 = *VAR_1++;
while (VAR_2) {
if ((VAR_2 & VAR_3) == VAR_3)
return (VAR_1 + 1);
if ((VAR_2 & VAR_3) == VAR_4) {
int VAR_5, VAR_6;
i... | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/3a76fd7c95fced2c2f8c8148a9055c3a542eff29/print-domain.c/non_vul/4.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2020-29534 | ['CWE-Other'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.
With that, we can grab proper references to the fi... | 0f2122045b946241a9e549c2a76cea54fa58a7ff | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=0f2122045b946241a9e549c2a76cea54fa58a7ff | kernel/fork.c | exec_mm_release | null | null | null | void exec_mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
futex_exec_release(tsk);
mm_release(tsk, mm);
} | void exec_mm_release(struct task_struct *VAR_0, struct mm_struct *VAR_1)
{
futex_exec_release(VAR_0);
mm_release(VAR_0, VAR_1);
} | torvalds/linux/0f2122045b946241a9e549c2a76cea54fa58a7ff/fork.c/non_vul/2.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-31618 | ['CWE-89'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | openlink/virtuoso-opensource | Fixed non-terminal in union branch is not supported (fixes #1136) | 030e47a29976709a50603e3f34e82278e5f462df | https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/commit/030e47a29976709a50603e3f34e82278e5f462df | libsrc/Wi/sqldf.c | dfe_body_len | null | null | null | int
dfe_body_len (df_elt_t * body)
{
int ctr = 0;
df_elt_t * elt = body->_.sub.first;
while (elt)
{
ctr++;
elt = elt->dfe_next;
}
return ctr;
} | int
dfe_body_len (df_elt_t * VAR_0)
{
int VAR_1 = 0;
df_elt_t * VAR_2 = VAR_0->_.sub.first;
while (VAR_2)
{
VAR_1++;
VAR_2 = VAR_2->dfe_next;
}
return VAR_1;
} | openlink/virtuoso-opensource/030e47a29976709a50603e3f34e82278e5f462df/sqldf.c/non_vul/163.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2015-3400 | ['CWE-200'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | FransUrbo/zfs | Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare. | 99aa4d2b4fd12c6bef62d02ffd1b375ddd42fcf4 | https://github.com/FransUrbo/zfs/commit/99aa4d2b4fd12c6bef62d02ffd1b375ddd42fcf4 | lib/libshare/nfs.c | libshare_nfs_init | null | null | null | void
libshare_nfs_init(void)
{
nfs_fstype = register_fstype("nfs", &nfs_shareops);
} | void
libshare_nfs_init(void)
{
VAR_0 = register_fstype("nfs", &VAR_1);
} | FransUrbo/zfs/99aa4d2b4fd12c6bef62d02ffd1b375ddd42fcf4/nfs.c/non_vul/13.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-8359 | ['CWE-787'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | grpc | Remove call from sibling list when it is not first child. | aab6992c006be6fb80df73fd9f218365099c016d | https://github.com/grpc/grpc/commit/aab6992c006be6fb80df73fd9f218365099c016d | src/core/lib/surface/call.c | cancel_with_error | null | null | null | static void cancel_with_error(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call *c,
status_source source, grpc_error *error) {
GRPC_CALL_INTERNAL_REF(c, "termination");
set_status_from_error(exec_ctx, c, source, GRPC_ERROR_REF(error));
grpc_transport_stream_op *op = grpc_make_transport_stream_op(
... | static void cancel_with_error(grpc_exec_ctx *VAR_0, grpc_call *VAR_1,
status_source VAR_2, grpc_error *VAR_3) {
GRPC_CALL_INTERNAL_REF(VAR_1, "termination");
set_status_from_error(VAR_0, VAR_1, VAR_2, GRPC_ERROR_REF(VAR_3));
grpc_transport_stream_op *VAR_4 = grpc_make_transport_strea... | grpc/aab6992c006be6fb80df73fd9f218365099c016d/call.c/non_vul/10.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-35848 | ['CWE-682', 'CWE-754'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | virtualsquare/picotcp | More checks for correct header sizes
Reported-by: "P. Amsuo, Purdue University" | 4b9a16764f2b12b611de9c34a50b4713d10ca401 | https://github.com/virtualsquare/picotcp/commit/4b9a16764f2b12b611de9c34a50b4713d10ca401 | modules/pico_ipv4.c | pico_ipv4_process_finally_try_forward | null | null | null | static void pico_ipv4_process_finally_try_forward(struct pico_stack *S, struct pico_frame *f)
{
struct pico_ipv4_hdr *hdr = (struct pico_ipv4_hdr *) f->net_hdr;
if ((pico_ipv4_is_broadcast(S, hdr->dst.addr)) || ((f->flags & PICO_FRAME_FLAG_BCAST) != 0)) {
/* don't forward broadcast frame, discard! */
... | static void pico_ipv4_process_finally_try_forward(struct pico_stack *VAR_0, struct pico_frame *VAR_1)
{
struct pico_ipv4_hdr *VAR_2 = (struct pico_ipv4_hdr *) VAR_1->net_hdr;
if ((pico_ipv4_is_broadcast(VAR_0, VAR_2->dst.addr)) || ((VAR_1->flags & VAR_3) != 0)) {
/* COMMENT_0 */
pico_frame_disca... | virtualsquare/picotcp/4b9a16764f2b12b611de9c34a50b4713d10ca401/pico_ipv4.c/non_vul/20.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-15951 | ['CWE-20'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unione... | 363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76 | security/keys/proc.c | proc_key_users_open | null | null | null | static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);
} | static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &VAR_0);
} | torvalds/linux/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76/proc.c/non_vul/1.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-37464 | ['CWE-327'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N | 1 | OpenIDC/cjose | use fixed authentication tag length of 16 octets in AES GCM decryption
see: https://github.com/cisco/cjose/issues/125
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@openidc.com> | 7325e9a5e71e2fc0e350487ecac7d84acdf0ed5e | https://github.com/OpenIDC/cjose/commit/7325e9a5e71e2fc0e350487ecac7d84acdf0ed5e | src/jwe.c | cjose_jwe_import_json | null | null | null | cjose_jwe_t *cjose_jwe_import_json(const char *cser, size_t cser_len, cjose_err *err)
{
cjose_jwe_t *jwe = NULL;
json_t *form = NULL;
json_t *protected_header = NULL;
if (NULL == cser)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
return NULL;
}
// allocate and initialize a ne... | cjose_jwe_t *cjose_jwe_import_json(const char *VAR_0, size_t VAR_1, cjose_err *VAR_2)
{
cjose_jwe_t *VAR_3 = NULL;
json_t *VAR_4 = NULL;
json_t *VAR_5 = NULL;
if (NULL == VAR_0)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(VAR_2, VAR_6);
return NULL;
}
/* COMMENT_0 */
if (!_cjose_jwe_malloc(sizeof(cj... | OpenIDC/cjose/7325e9a5e71e2fc0e350487ecac7d84acdf0ed5e/jwe.c/non_vul/36.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2014-1703 | ['CWE-399'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | chromium | Fix UAF in WebSocketDispatcherHost
If Send() fails in SendOrDrop(), then |message| will have been deleted,
but SendOrDrop() will still try to access its header fields.
Fixed.
BUG=338354
TEST=content_unittests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148263009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@... | 09b09312b9847e025249b9ba5bb2071dd77a19c3 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/09b09312b9847e025249b9ba5bb2071dd77a19c3 | content/browser/renderer_host/websocket_dispatcher_host.cc | WebSocketDispatcherHost::CreateWebSocketHost | null | null | null | WebSocketHost* WebSocketDispatcherHost::CreateWebSocketHost(int routing_id) {
return new WebSocketHost(routing_id, this, get_context_callback_.Run());
} | WebSocketHost* WebSocketDispatcherHost::CreateWebSocketHost(int VAR_0) {
return new WebSocketHost(VAR_0, this, VAR_1.Run());
} | chromium/09b09312b9847e025249b9ba5bb2071dd77a19c3/websocket_dispatcher_host.cc/non_vul/13.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2020-21913 | ['CWE-416'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | unicode-org/icu | ICU-20850 Use LocalMemory for cmd to prevent use after free | 657c326d4b8a6c4c6721957320fc8c3c68670cfb | https://github.com/unicode-org/icu/commit/657c326d4b8a6c4c6721957320fc8c3c68670cfb | icu4c/source/tools/pkgdata/pkgdata.cpp | pkg_installCommonMode | null | null | null | static int32_t pkg_installCommonMode(const char *installDir, const char *fileName) {
int32_t result = 0;
char cmd[SMALL_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE] = "";
if (!T_FileStream_file_exists(installDir)) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
uprv_mkdir(installDir, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
... | static int32_t pkg_installCommonMode(const char *VAR_0, const char *VAR_1) {
int32_t VAR_2 = 0;
char VAR_3[VAR_4] = "";
if (!T_FileStream_file_exists(VAR_0)) {
UErrorCode VAR_5 = VAR_6;
uprv_mkdir(VAR_0, &VAR_5);
if (U_FAILURE(VAR_5)) {
fprintf(VAR_7, "Error creating in... | unicode-org/icu/657c326d4b8a6c4c6721957320fc8c3c68670cfb/pkgdata.cpp/non_vul/11.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2012-1584 | ['CWE-189'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | taglib | Avoid uint overflow in case the length + index is over UINT_MAX | dcdf4fd954e3213c355746fa15b7480461972308 | https://github.com/taglib/taglib/commit/dcdf4fd954e3213c355746fa15b7480461972308 | taglib/toolkit/tbytevector.cpp | at | null | null | null | char at(int index) const
{
return v.at(v.size() - index - 1);
} | char at(int VAR_0) const
{
return VAR_1.at(VAR_1.size() - VAR_0 - 1);
} | taglib/dcdf4fd954e3213c355746fa15b7480461972308/tbytevector.cpp/non_vul/18.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-2451 | ['CWE-264'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | android | Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
| f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba | media/libstagefright/omx/OMX.cpp | OMX::signalEndOfInputStream | null | null | null | status_t OMX::signalEndOfInputStream(node_id node) {
return findInstance(node)->signalEndOfInputStream();
} | status_t OMX::signalEndOfInputStream(node_id VAR_0) {
return findInstance(VAR_0)->signalEndOfInputStream();
} | android/f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba/OMX.cpp/non_vul/25.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-11721 | ['CWE-119'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | ioquake/ioq3 | Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left. | d2b1d124d4055c2fcbe5126863487c52fd58cca1 | https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/d2b1d124d4055c2fcbe5126863487c52fd58cca1 | code/qcommon/msg.c | MSG_ReadByte | null | null | null | int MSG_ReadByte( msg_t *msg ) {
int c;
c = (unsigned char)MSG_ReadBits( msg, 8 );
if ( msg->readcount > msg->cursize ) {
c = -1;
}
return c;
} | int MSG_ReadByte( msg_t *VAR_0 ) {
int VAR_1;
VAR_1 = (unsigned char)MSG_ReadBits( VAR_0, 8 );
if ( VAR_0->readcount > VAR_0->cursize ) {
VAR_1 = -1;
}
return VAR_1;
} | ioquake/ioq3/d2b1d124d4055c2fcbe5126863487c52fd58cca1/msg.c/non_vul/31.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-39615 | ['CWE-119'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | GNOME/libxml2 | parser: Fix old SAX1 parser with custom callbacks
For some reason, xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal set the start and end element
SAX handlers to the internal DOM builder functions when XML_PARSE_SAX1
was specified. This means that custom SAX handlers could never work with
that flag because these functions would receive the ... | d0c3f01e110d54415611c5fa0040cdf4a56053f9 | https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/d0c3f01e110d54415611c5fa0040cdf4a56053f9 | parser.c | xmlParseCharDataComplex | null | null | null | static void
xmlParseCharDataComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar buf[XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE + 5];
int nbchar = 0;
int cur, l;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((cur != '<') && /* checked */
(cur != '&') &&
(IS_CHAR(cur))) /* test also done in xmlCurrentChar() */ {
if ((cur == ']') &... | static void
xmlParseCharDataComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr VAR_0) {
xmlChar VAR_1[VAR_2 + 5];
int VAR_3 = 0;
int VAR_4, VAR_5;
VAR_4 = CUR_CHAR(VAR_5);
while ((VAR_4 != '<') && /* COMMENT_0 */
(VAR_4 != '&') &&
(IS_CHAR(VAR_4))) /* COMMENT_1 */ {
if ((VAR_4 == ']') && (NXT(1) == ']') && (... | GNOME/libxml2/d0c3f01e110d54415611c5fa0040cdf4a56053f9/parser.c/non_vul/57.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2011-2723 | ['CWE-20'] | AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | Currently skb_gro_header_slow unconditionally resets frag0 and
frag0_len. However, when we can't pull on the skb this leaves
the GRO fields in an inconsistent state.
This patch fixes this by only resetting those fields after the
pskb_may_pull test.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-b... | 17dd759c67f21e34f2156abcf415e1f60605a188 | http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=commit;h=17dd759c67f21e34f2156abcf415e1f60605a188 | include/linux/netdevice.h | netif_oper_up | null | null | null | static inline int netif_oper_up(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return (dev->operstate == IF_OPER_UP ||
dev->operstate == IF_OPER_UNKNOWN /* backward compat */);
} | static inline int netif_oper_up(const struct net_device *VAR_0)
{
return (VAR_0->operstate == VAR_1 ||
VAR_0->operstate == VAR_2 /* COMMENT_0 */);
} | torvalds/linux/17dd759c67f21e34f2156abcf415e1f60605a188/netdevice.h/non_vul/74.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2021-3975 | ['CWE-416'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | libvirt | qemu: Add missing lock in qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF
qemuMonitorUnregister will be called in multiple threads (e.g. threads
in rpc worker pool and the vm event thread). In some cases, it isn't
protected by the monitor lock, which may lead to call g_source_unref
more than one time and a use-after-free problem eventua... | 1ac703a7d0789e46833f4013a3876c2e3af18ec7 | https://github.com/libvirt/libvirt/commit/1ac703a7d0789e46833f4013a3876c2e3af18ec7 | src/qemu/qemu_process.c | qemuProcessQMPInitMonitor | null | null | null | int
qemuProcessQMPInitMonitor(qemuMonitorPtr mon)
{
if (qemuMonitorSetCapabilities(mon) < 0) {
VIR_DEBUG("Failed to set monitor capabilities %s",
virGetLastErrorMessage());
return -1;
}
return 0;
} | int
qemuProcessQMPInitMonitor(qemuMonitorPtr VAR_0)
{
if (qemuMonitorSetCapabilities(VAR_0) < 0) {
VIR_DEBUG("Failed to set monitor capabilities %s",
virGetLastErrorMessage());
return -1;
}
return 0;
} | libvirt/1ac703a7d0789e46833f4013a3876c2e3af18ec7/qemu_process.c/non_vul/18.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-3750 | ['CWE-20'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | android | Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
| 54cb02ad733fb71b1bdf78590428817fb780aff8 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/54cb02ad733fb71b1bdf78590428817fb780aff8 | libs/binder/Parcel.cpp | unflatten_binder | null | null | null | status_t unflatten_binder(const sp<ProcessState>& proc,
const Parcel& in, sp<IBinder>* out)
{
const flat_binder_object* flat = in.readObject(false);
if (flat) {
switch (flat->type) {
case BINDER_TYPE_BINDER:
*out = reinterpret_cast<IBinder*>(flat->cookie);
... | status_t unflatten_binder(const sp<ProcessState>& VAR_0,
const Parcel& VAR_1, sp<IBinder>* VAR_2)
{
const flat_binder_object* VAR_3 = VAR_1.readObject(false);
if (VAR_3) {
switch (VAR_3->type) {
case VAR_4:
*VAR_2 = VAR_5<IBinder*>(VAR_3->cookie);
return ... | android/54cb02ad733fb71b1bdf78590428817fb780aff8/Parcel.cpp/non_vul/76.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2014-1438 | ['CWE-264'] | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | x86, fpu, amd: Clear exceptions in AMD FXSAVE workaround
Before we do an EMMS in the AMD FXSAVE information leak workaround we
need to clear any pending exceptions, otherwise we trap with a
floating-point exception inside this code.
Reported-by: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: h... | 26bef1318adc1b3a530ecc807ef99346db2aa8b0 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/26bef1318adc1b3a530ecc807ef99346db2aa8b0 | arch/x86/include/asm/fpu-internal.h | fpu_restore_checking | null | null | null | static inline int fpu_restore_checking(struct fpu *fpu)
{
if (use_xsave())
return fpu_xrstor_checking(&fpu->state->xsave);
else if (use_fxsr())
return fxrstor_checking(&fpu->state->fxsave);
else
return frstor_checking(&fpu->state->fsave);
} | static inline int fpu_restore_checking(struct fpu *fpu)
{
if (use_xsave())
return fpu_xrstor_checking(&fpu->state->xsave);
else if (use_fxsr())
return fxrstor_checking(&fpu->state->fxsave);
else
return frstor_checking(&fpu->state->fsave);
} | torvalds/linux/26bef1318adc1b3a530ecc807ef99346db2aa8b0/fpu-internal.h/non_vul/37.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2010-2713 | ['CWE-Other'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | GNOME/vte | Fix terminal title reporting
Fixed CVE-2003-0070 again.
See also http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=104612710031920&w=2 .
(cherry picked from commit 6042c75b5a6daa0e499e61c8e07242d890d38ff1) | 8b971a7b2c59902914ecbbc3915c45dd21530a91 | https://github.com/GNOME/vte/commit/8b971a7b2c59902914ecbbc3915c45dd21530a91 | src/vteseq.c | vte_sequence_handler_AL | null | null | null | static void
vte_sequence_handler_AL (VteTerminal *terminal, GValueArray *params)
{
vte_sequence_handler_al (terminal, params);
} | static void
vte_sequence_handler_AL (VteTerminal *VAR_0, GValueArray *VAR_1)
{
vte_sequence_handler_al (VAR_0, VAR_1);
} | GNOME/vte/8b971a7b2c59902914ecbbc3915c45dd21530a91/vteseq.c/non_vul/27.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-10132 | ['CWE-476'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | ArtifexSoftware/mujs | Fix 697381: check allocation when compiling regular expressions.
Also use allocator callback function. | fd003eceda531e13fbdd1aeb6e9c73156496e569 | https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/mujs/commit/fd003eceda531e13fbdd1aeb6e9c73156496e569 | regexp.c | incclasscanon | null | null | null | static int incclasscanon(Reclass *cc, Rune c)
{
Rune *p, r;
for (p = cc->spans; p < cc->end; p += 2)
for (r = p[0]; r <= p[1]; ++r)
if (c == canon(r))
return 1;
return 0;
} | static int incclasscanon(Reclass *VAR_0, Rune VAR_1)
{
Rune *VAR_2, VAR_3;
for (VAR_2 = VAR_0->spans; VAR_2 < VAR_0->end; VAR_2 += 2)
for (VAR_3 = VAR_2[0]; VAR_3 <= VAR_2[1]; ++VAR_3)
if (VAR_1 == canon(VAR_3))
return 1;
return 0;
} | ArtifexSoftware/mujs/fd003eceda531e13fbdd1aeb6e9c73156496e569/regexp.c/non_vul/3.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2022-3543 | ['CWE-401'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next | syzbot reported a sequence of memory leaks, and one of them indicated we
failed to free a whole sk:
unreferenced object 0xffff8880126e0000 (size 1088):
comm "syz-executor419", pid 326, jiffies 4294773607 (age 12.609s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........}... | 7a62ed61367b8fd01bae1e18e30602c25060d824 | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git/commit/?h=7a62ed61367b8fd01bae1e18e30602c25060d824 | net/unix/af_unix.c | unix_dgram_recvmsg | null | null | null | static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
const struct proto *prot = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot);
if (prot != &unix_dgram_proto)
return prot->recvmsg(sk, msg, size, flags, NULL);
#endif
return __unix... | static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct socket *VAR_0, struct msghdr *VAR_1, size_t VAR_2,
int VAR_3)
{
struct sock *VAR_4 = sock->sk;
#ifdef VAR_5
const struct proto *VAR_6 = READ_ONCE(VAR_4->sk_prot);
if (VAR_6 != &VAR_7)
return VAR_6->recvmsg(VAR_4, VAR_1, VAR_2, VAR_3, NULL);
#endif
return __unix_dgra... | kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next/7a62ed61367b8fd01bae1e18e30602c25060d824/af_unix.c/non_vul/85.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2022-25299 | ['CWE-552'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N | 0 | cesanta/mongoose | Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload() | c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945 | https://github.com/cesanta/mongoose/commit/c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945 | src/http.c | printdirentry | null | null | null | static void printdirentry(const char *name, void *userdata) {
struct printdirentrydata *d = (struct printdirentrydata *) userdata;
struct mg_fs *fs = d->opts->fs == NULL ? &mg_fs_posix : d->opts->fs;
size_t size = 0;
time_t t = 0;
char path[MG_PATH_MAX], sz[64], mod[64];
int flags, n = 0;
// LOG(LL_DEBUG... | static void printdirentry(const char *VAR_0, void *VAR_1) {
struct printdirentrydata *VAR_2 = (struct printdirentrydata *) VAR_1;
struct mg_fs *VAR_3 = VAR_2->opts->fs == NULL ? &VAR_4 : VAR_2->opts->fs;
size_t VAR_5 = 0;
time_t VAR_6 = 0;
char VAR_7[VAR_8], VAR_9[64], VAR_10[64];
int VAR_11, VAR_12 = 0;
... | cesanta/mongoose/c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945/http.c/non_vul/11.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2019-11599 | ['CWE-667'] | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes bel... | 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a | drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c | ib_uverbs_comp_event_fasync | null | null | null | static int ib_uverbs_comp_event_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file *comp_ev_file =
filp->private_data;
return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &comp_ev_file->ev_queue.async_queue);
} | static int ib_uverbs_comp_event_fasync(int VAR_0, struct file *VAR_1, int VAR_2)
{
struct ib_uverbs_completion_event_file *VAR_3 =
VAR_1->private_data;
return fasync_helper(VAR_0, VAR_1, VAR_2, &VAR_3->ev_queue.async_queue);
} | torvalds/linux/04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a/uverbs_main.c/non_vul/19.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2015-1241 | ['CWE-1021'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N | 0 | chromium | [Android] Thoroughly reset gesture detection upon page navigation
The current gesture reset logic on Android uses a cancellation event
synthesized from the active touch sequence. However, this fails to reset
detection for timeout-based events, e.g. delayed tap and double-tap,
just after the pointer has just been relea... | d47c1e4b6bb7e9b485f6dfede0236ddd5c823878 | https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/d47c1e4b6bb7e9b485f6dfede0236ddd5c823878 | content/browser/renderer_host/render_widget_host_view_android.cc | RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::DestroyDelegatedContent | null | null | null | void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::DestroyDelegatedContent() {
RemoveLayers();
frame_provider_ = NULL;
layer_ = NULL;
// This gets called when ever any eviction, loosing resources, swapping
// problems are encountered and so we abort any pending readbacks here.
AbortPendingReadbackRequests();
} | void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::DestroyDelegatedContent() {
RemoveLayers();
VAR_0 = NULL;
VAR_1 = NULL;
/* COMMENT_0 */
/* COMMENT_1 */
AbortPendingReadbackRequests();
} | chromium/d47c1e4b6bb7e9b485f6dfede0236ddd5c823878/render_widget_host_view_android.cc/non_vul/70.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2020-23258 | ['CWE-787', 'CWE-476'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | pcmacdon/jsish | Release "3.0.10": Fix issues #12, #13, and #14.
FossilOrigin-Name: 70747c8d1c4e7bf176bec8cfb9d3cac3e64a696e7df0b1e3712d3f6b952164c3 | 20ff8e2f6f66493b65f20c00c53d4f1e9f426631 | https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/20ff8e2f6f66493b65f20c00c53d4f1e9f426631 | src/jsiSqlite.c | jsi_DbOptionTypeStr | null | null | null | const char *jsi_DbOptionTypeStr(Jsi_OptionId typ, bool cname)
{
const Jsi_OptionTypedef* ti = Jsi_OptionTypeInfo(typ);
if (ti)
return (cname?ti->cName:ti->idName);
return NULL;
} | const char *jsi_DbOptionTypeStr(Jsi_OptionId VAR_0, bool VAR_1)
{
const Jsi_OptionTypedef* VAR_2 = Jsi_OptionTypeInfo(VAR_0);
if (VAR_2)
return (VAR_1?VAR_2->cName:VAR_2->idName);
return NULL;
} | pcmacdon/jsish/20ff8e2f6f66493b65f20c00c53d4f1e9f426631/jsiSqlite.c/non_vul/46.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2014-9939 | ['CWE-119'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | binutils-gdb |
Fix stack buffer overflows when parsing corrupt ihex files.
PR binutils/18750
* ihex.c (ihex_scan): Fixes incorrect escape sequence in error message
and stack overflow when char is signed and \200-\376 was in place of hex
digit; also fixes \377 was handled as EOF instead of "incorrect character".
(ihex_read_sect... | 7e27a9d5f22f9f7ead11738b1546d0b5c737266b | https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=7e27a9d5f22f9f7ead11738b1546d0b5c737266b | bfd/ihex.c | ihex_write_record | null | null | null | static bfd_boolean
ihex_write_record (bfd *abfd,
size_t count,
unsigned int addr,
unsigned int type,
bfd_byte *data)
{
static const char digs[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char buf[9 + CHUNK * 2 + 4];
char *p;
unsigned int chksum;
unsigned int i;
size_t total;
#define TOHEX(buf, v) \
((buf)... | static bfd_boolean
ihex_write_record (bfd *VAR_0,
size_t VAR_1,
unsigned int VAR_2,
unsigned int VAR_3,
bfd_byte *VAR_4)
{
static const char VAR_5[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char VAR_6[9 + VAR_7 * 2 + 4];
char *VAR_8;
unsigned int VAR_9;
unsigned int VAR_10;
size_t VAR_11;
#define TOHEX(VA... | binutils-gdb/7e27a9d5f22f9f7ead11738b1546d0b5c737266b/ihex.c/non_vul/0.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-46752 | ['CWE-Other'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | FRRouting/frr | bgpd: Handle MP_REACH_NLRI malformed packets with session reset
Avoid crashing bgpd.
```
(gdb)
bgp_mp_reach_parse (args=<optimized out>, mp_update=0x7fffffffe140) at bgpd/bgp_attr.c:2341
2341 stream_get(&attr->mp_nexthop_global, s, IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
(gdb)
stream_get (dst=0x7fffffffe1ac, s=0x7ffff0006e80, size=16) ... | b08afc81c60607a4f736f418f2e3eb06087f1a35 | https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/b08afc81c60607a4f736f418f2e3eb06087f1a35 | bgpd/bgp_attr.c | encap_hash_alloc | null | null | null | static void *encap_hash_alloc(void *p)
{
/* Encap structure is already allocated. */
return p;
} | static void *encap_hash_alloc(void *VAR_0)
{
/* COMMENT_0 */
return VAR_0;
} | FRRouting/frr/b08afc81c60607a4f736f418f2e3eb06087f1a35/bgp_attr.c/non_vul/20.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2017-0196 | ['CWE-200'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | chakra-core/ChakraCore | [CVE-2017-0196] Fixing an heap overread during slice.
The MissingItem check is happening on the array in a loop. It is possible that we get called into script and that mutates the array. So the Array's head is newly created with length.
However the loop is still performing over the old length.
Fixed this by checking t... | 065b7978c40ded35c356ced6cd922a40156c9c46 | https://github.com/chakra-core/ChakraCore/commit/065b7978c40ded35c356ced6cd922a40156c9c46 | lib/Runtime/Library/JavascriptArray.cpp | SegmentBTree::GetLazyCrossOverLimit | null | null | null | uint32 SegmentBTree::GetLazyCrossOverLimit()
{
#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG_CONFIG_OPTIONS
if (Js::Configuration::Global.flags.DisableArrayBTree)
{
return Js::JavascriptArray::InvalidIndex;
}
else if (Js::Configuration::Global.flags.ForceArrayBTree)
{
return AR... | uint32 SegmentBTree::GetLazyCrossOverLimit()
{
#ifdef VAR_0
if (Js::Configuration::Global.flags.DisableArrayBTree)
{
return Js::JavascriptArray::InvalidIndex;
}
else if (Js::Configuration::Global.flags.ForceArrayBTree)
{
return VAR_1;
}
#endif
... | chakra-core/ChakraCore/065b7978c40ded35c356ced6cd922a40156c9c46/JavascriptArray.cpp/non_vul/106.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2020-7105 | ['CWE-476'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | redis/hiredis | Safe allocation wrappers (#754)
Create allocation wrappers with a configurable OOM handler (defaults to abort()).
See #752, #747 | a15378861368a4267c2c2c73b90db2849f943ebd | https://github.com/redis/hiredis/commit/a15378861368a4267c2c2c73b90db2849f943ebd | adapters/libev.h | redisLibevWriteEvent | null | null | null | static void redisLibevWriteEvent(EV_P_ ev_io *watcher, int revents) {
#if EV_MULTIPLICITY
((void)loop);
#endif
((void)revents);
redisLibevEvents *e = (redisLibevEvents*)watcher->data;
redisAsyncHandleWrite(e->context);
} | static void redisLibevWriteEvent(EV_P_ VAR_0 *VAR_1, int VAR_2) {
#if VAR_3
((void)VAR_4);
#endif
((void)VAR_2);
redisLibevEvents *VAR_5 = (redisLibevEvents*)VAR_1->data;
redisAsyncHandleWrite(VAR_5->context);
} | null | null | null | false |
CVE-2015-8744 | ['CWE-20'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | qemu | net/vmxnet3: Refine l2 header validation
Validation of l2 header length assumed minimal packet size as
eth_header + 2 * vlan_header regardless of the actual protocol.
This caused crash for valid non-IP packets shorter than 22 bytes, as
'tx_pkt->packet_type' hasn't been assigned for such packets, and
'vmxnet3_on_tx_do... | a7278b36fcab9af469563bd7b | https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/a7278b36fcab9af469563bd7b9dadebe2ae25e48 | hw/net/vmxnet3.c | vmxnet3_setup_tx_offloads | null | null | null | static bool
vmxnet3_setup_tx_offloads(VMXNET3State *s)
{
switch (s->offload_mode) {
case VMXNET3_OM_NONE:
vmxnet_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, false, false, 0);
break;
case VMXNET3_OM_CSUM:
vmxnet_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, false, true, 0);
VMW_PKPRN("L4 CSO requested... | static bool
vmxnet3_setup_tx_offloads(VMXNET3State *VAR_0)
{
switch (VAR_0->offload_mode) {
case VAR_1:
vmxnet_tx_pkt_build_vheader(VAR_0->tx_pkt, false, false, 0);
break;
case VAR_2:
vmxnet_tx_pkt_build_vheader(VAR_0->tx_pkt, false, true, 0);
VMW_PKPRN("L4 CSO requested\n")... | qemu/a7278b36fcab9af469563bd7b/vmxnet3.c/non_vul/7.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2020-26247 | ['CWE-611'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | sparklemotion/nokogiri | feat: XML::Schema and RelaxNG creation accept optional ParseOptions
I'm trying out a new pattern, which is that the parsed object carries
around the ParseOptions it was created with, which should make some
testing a bit easier.
I'm also not implementing the "config block" pattern in use for
Documents, because I think... | 9c87439d9afa14a365ff13e73adc809cb2c3d97b | https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/commit/9c87439d9afa14a365ff13e73adc809cb2c3d97b | ext/nokogiri/xml_relax_ng.c | validate_document | null | null | null | static VALUE validate_document(VALUE self, VALUE document)
{
xmlDocPtr doc;
xmlRelaxNGPtr schema;
VALUE errors;
xmlRelaxNGValidCtxtPtr valid_ctxt;
Data_Get_Struct(self, xmlRelaxNG, schema);
Data_Get_Struct(document, xmlDoc, doc);
errors = rb_ary_new();
valid_ctxt = xmlRelaxNGNewValidCtxt(schema);
... | static VALUE validate_document(VALUE VAR_0, VALUE VAR_1)
{
xmlDocPtr VAR_2;
xmlRelaxNGPtr VAR_3;
VALUE VAR_4;
xmlRelaxNGValidCtxtPtr VAR_5;
Data_Get_Struct(VAR_0, VAR_6, VAR_3);
Data_Get_Struct(VAR_1, VAR_7, VAR_2);
VAR_4 = rb_ary_new();
VAR_5 = xmlRelaxNGNewValidCtxt(VAR_3);
if(NULL == VAR_5) {
... | sparklemotion/nokogiri/9c87439d9afa14a365ff13e73adc809cb2c3d97b/xml_relax_ng.c/non_vul/0.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2024-22050 | ['CWE-22'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 1 | boazsegev/iodine | update to facil.io 0.7.3 | 5558233fb7defda706b4f9c87c17759705949889 | https://github.com/boazsegev/iodine/commit/5558233fb7defda706b4f9c87c17759705949889 | ext/iodine/fio.c | fio_cluster_on_close | null | null | null | static void fio_cluster_on_close(intptr_t uuid, fio_protocol_s *pr_) {
cluster_pr_s *c = (cluster_pr_s *)pr_;
if (!fio_data->is_worker) {
/* a child was lost, respawning is handled elsewhere. */
fio_lock(&cluster_data.lock);
FIO_LS_FOR(&cluster_data.clients, pos) {
if (pos->obj == (void *)uuid) {
... | static void fio_cluster_on_close(intptr_t VAR_0, fio_protocol_s *VAR_1) {
cluster_pr_s *VAR_2 = (cluster_pr_s *)VAR_1;
if (!VAR_3->is_worker) {
/* COMMENT_0 */
fio_lock(&VAR_4.lock);
FIO_LS_FOR(&VAR_4.clients, VAR_5) {
if (VAR_5->obj == (void *)VAR_0) {
fio_ls_remove(VAR_5);
break;... | boazsegev/iodine/5558233fb7defda706b4f9c87c17759705949889/fio.c/non_vul/174.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2012-0855 | ['CWE-119'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | ffmpeg |
j2kdec: Check curtileno for validity
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
| 3eedf9f716733b3b4c5205726d2c1ca52b3d3d78 | http://git.videolan.org/?p=ffmpeg.git;a=commit;h=3eedf9f716733b3b4c5205726d2c1ca52b3d3d78 | libavcodec/j2kdec.c | decode_cblk | null | null | null | static int decode_cblk(J2kDecoderContext *s, J2kCodingStyle *codsty, J2kT1Context *t1, J2kCblk *cblk,
int width, int height, int bandpos)
{
int passno = cblk->npasses, pass_t = 2, bpno = cblk->nonzerobits - 1, y, clnpass_cnt = 0;
int bpass_csty_symbol = J2K_CBLK_BYPASS & codsty->cblk_styl... | static int decode_cblk(J2kDecoderContext *VAR_0, J2kCodingStyle *VAR_1, J2kT1Context *VAR_2, J2kCblk *VAR_3,
int VAR_4, int VAR_5, int VAR_6)
{
int VAR_7 = VAR_3->npasses, VAR_8 = 2, VAR_9 = VAR_3->nonzerobits - 1, VAR_10, VAR_11 = 0;
int VAR_12 = VAR_13 & VAR_1->cblk_style;
int VAR_1... | ffmpeg/3eedf9f716733b3b4c5205726d2c1ca52b3d3d78/j2kdec.c/non_vul/3.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2020-14394 | ['CWE-835'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L | 1 | qemu-project/qemu | hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Fix unbounded loop in xhci_ring_chain_length() (CVE-2020-14394)
The loop condition in xhci_ring_chain_length() is under control of
the guest, and additionally the code does not check for failed DMA
transfers (e.g. if reaching the end of the RAM), so the loop there
could run for a very long time or eve... | effaf5a240e03020f4ae953e10b764622c3e87cc | https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/effaf5a240e03020f4ae953e10b764622c3e87cc | hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | xhci_alloc_streams | null | null | null | static void xhci_alloc_streams(XHCIEPContext *epctx, dma_addr_t base)
{
assert(epctx->pstreams == NULL);
epctx->nr_pstreams = 2 << epctx->max_pstreams;
epctx->pstreams = xhci_alloc_stream_contexts(epctx->nr_pstreams, base);
} | static void xhci_alloc_streams(XHCIEPContext *VAR_0, dma_addr_t VAR_1)
{
assert(VAR_0->pstreams == NULL);
VAR_0->nr_pstreams = 2 << VAR_0->max_pstreams;
VAR_0->pstreams = xhci_alloc_stream_contexts(VAR_0->nr_pstreams, VAR_1);
} | qemu-project/qemu/effaf5a240e03020f4ae953e10b764622c3e87cc/hcd-xhci.c/non_vul/45.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2019-19242 | ['CWE-476'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | sqlite | Fix a problem that comes up when using generated columns that evaluate to a
constant in an index and then making use of that index in a join.
FossilOrigin-Name: 8b12e95fec7ce6e0de82a04ca3dfcf1a8e62e233b7382aa28a8a9be6e862b1af | 57f7ece78410a8aae86aa4625fb7556897db384c | https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/57f7ece78410a8aae86aa4625fb7556897db384c | src/expr.c | sqlite3ExprIsTableConstant | null | null | null | int sqlite3ExprIsTableConstant(Expr *p, int iCur){
return exprIsConst(p, 3, iCur);
} | int sqlite3ExprIsTableConstant(Expr *VAR_0, int VAR_1){
return exprIsConst(VAR_0, 3, VAR_1);
} | sqlite/57f7ece78410a8aae86aa4625fb7556897db384c/expr.c/non_vul/92.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2015-5069 | ['CWE-200'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | wesnoth | Disallow inclusion of .pbl files from WML (bug #23504)
Note that this will also cause Lua wesnoth.have_file() to return false
on .pbl files. | f8914468182e8d0a1551b430c0879ba236fe4d6d | https://github.com/wesnoth/wesnoth/commit/f8914468182e8d0a1551b430c0879ba236fe4d6d | src/filesystem.cpp | create_directory_if_missing_recursive | null | null | null | bool create_directory_if_missing_recursive(const std::string& dirname)
{
DBG_FS<<"creating recursive directory: "<<dirname<<'\n';
if (is_directory(dirname) == false && dirname.empty() == false)
{
std::string tmp_dirname = dirname;
// remove trailing slashes or backslashes
while ((tmp_dirname[tmp_dirname.size()... | bool create_directory_if_missing_recursive(const std::string& VAR_0)
{
VAR_1<<"creating recursive directory: "<<VAR_0<<'\n';
if (is_directory(VAR_0) == false && VAR_0.empty() == false)
{
std::string VAR_2 = VAR_0;
/* COMMENT_0 */
while ((VAR_2[VAR_2.size()-1] == '/' ||
VAR_2[VAR_2.size()-1] == '\\') &&
... | wesnoth/f8914468182e8d0a1551b430c0879ba236fe4d6d/filesystem.cpp/non_vul/6.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2018-18883 | ['CWE-476'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | xen-project/xen | x86/vvmx: Disallow the use of VT-x instructions when nested virt is disabled
c/s ac6a4500b "vvmx: set vmxon_region_pa of vcpu out of VMX operation to an
invalid address" was a real bugfix as described, but has a very subtle bug
which results in all VT-x instructions being usable by a guest.
The toolstack constructs a... | 35cd5ba367515ffbd274ca529c5e946447f4ba48 | https://github.com/xen-project/xen/commit/35cd5ba367515ffbd274ca529c5e946447f4ba48 | xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | load_vvmcs_host_state | null | null | null | static void load_vvmcs_host_state(struct vcpu *v)
{
int i, rc;
u64 r;
u32 control;
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_h2g_field); i++ )
{
r = get_vvmcs(v, vmcs_h2g_field[i].host_field);
__vmwrite(vmcs_h2g_field[i].guest_field, r);
}
rc = hvm_set_cr0(get_vvmcs(v, HOST_CR0), 1)... | static void load_vvmcs_host_state(struct vcpu *VAR_0)
{
int VAR_1, VAR_2;
u64 VAR_3;
u32 VAR_4;
for ( VAR_1 = 0; VAR_1 < ARRAY_SIZE(VAR_5); VAR_1++ )
{
VAR_3 = get_vvmcs(VAR_0, VAR_5[VAR_1].host_field);
__vmwrite(VAR_5[VAR_1].guest_field, VAR_3);
}
VAR_2 = hvm_set_cr0(get_v... | xen-project/xen/35cd5ba367515ffbd274ca529c5e946447f4ba48/vvmx.c/non_vul/51.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2022-0480 | ['CWE-770'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | torvalds/linux | User can create file locks for each open file and force kernel to allocate
small but long-living objects per each open file.
It makes sense to account for these objects to limit the host's memory
consumption from inside the memcg-limited container.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b009f4c7-f0ab-c0ec-8e83-918f47d677da@... | 0f12156dff2862ac54235fc72703f18770769042 | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?h=0f12156dff2862ac54235fc72703f18770769042 | fs/locks.c | posix_same_owner | null | null | null | static int posix_same_owner(struct file_lock *fl1, struct file_lock *fl2)
{
return fl1->fl_owner == fl2->fl_owner;
} | static int posix_same_owner(struct file_lock *VAR_0, struct file_lock *VAR_1)
{
return VAR_0->fl_owner == VAR_1->fl_owner;
} | torvalds/linux/0f12156dff2862ac54235fc72703f18770769042/locks.c/non_vul/30.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2010-4157 | ['CWE-190'] | AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | gdth_ioctl_alloc() takes the size variable as an int.
copy_from_user() takes the size variable as an unsigned long.
gen.data_len and gen.sense_len are unsigned longs.
On x86_64 longs are 64 bit and ints are 32 bit.
We could pass in a very large number and the allocation would truncate
the size to 32 bits and allocate ... | f63ae56e4e97fb12053590e41a4fa59e7daa74a4 | http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=commit;h=f63ae56e4e97fb12053590e41a4fa59e7daa74a4 | drivers/scsi/gdth.c | gdth_internal_cache_cmd | null | null | null | static int gdth_internal_cache_cmd(gdth_ha_str *ha, Scsi_Cmnd *scp)
{
u8 t;
gdth_inq_data inq;
gdth_rdcap_data rdc;
gdth_sense_data sd;
gdth_modep_data mpd;
struct gdth_cmndinfo *cmndinfo = gdth_cmnd_priv(scp);
t = scp->device->id;
TRACE(("gdth_internal_cache_cmd() cmd 0x%x hdrive %d\n... | static int gdth_internal_cache_cmd(gdth_ha_str *VAR_0, Scsi_Cmnd *VAR_1)
{
u8 VAR_2;
gdth_inq_data VAR_3;
gdth_rdcap_data VAR_4;
gdth_sense_data VAR_5;
gdth_modep_data VAR_6;
struct gdth_cmndinfo *VAR_7 = gdth_cmnd_priv(VAR_1);
VAR_2 = VAR_1->device->id;
TRACE(("gdth_internal_cache_cmd... | torvalds/linux/f63ae56e4e97fb12053590e41a4fa59e7daa74a4/gdth.c/non_vul/5.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2012-0789 | ['CWE-399'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | php/php-src | - Fixed bug #53502 (strtotime with timezone memory leak).
- Fixed bug #52062 (large timestamps with DateTime::getTimestamp and
DateTime::setTimestamp).
- Fixed bug #51994 (date_parse_from_format is parsing invalid date using 'yz'
format).
- Fixed bug #51223 (Seg fault while creating (by unserialization)
DatePerio... | 4c9fad8b362a7d2b6a94b4961e4b2dc037b2766d | https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/4c9fad8b362a7d2b6a94b4961e4b2dc037b2766d | ext/date/lib/parse_date.c | timelib_meridian_with_check | null | null | null | static timelib_sll timelib_meridian_with_check(char **ptr, timelib_sll h)
{
timelib_sll retval = 0;
while (!strchr("AaPp", **ptr)) {
++*ptr;
}
if (**ptr == 'a' || **ptr == 'A') {
if (h == 12) {
retval = -12;
}
} else if (h != 12) {
retval = 12;
}
++*ptr;
if (**ptr == '.') {
++*ptr;
if (**ptr != ... | static timelib_sll timelib_meridian_with_check(char **VAR_0, timelib_sll VAR_1)
{
timelib_sll VAR_2 = 0;
while (!strchr("AaPp", **VAR_0)) {
++*VAR_0;
}
if (**VAR_0 == 'a' || **VAR_0 == 'A') {
if (VAR_1 == 12) {
VAR_2 = -12;
}
} else if (VAR_1 != 12) {
VAR_2 = 12;
}
++*VAR_0;
if (**VAR_0 == '.') {
... | php/php-src/4c9fad8b362a7d2b6a94b4961e4b2dc037b2766d/parse_date.c/non_vul/21.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2022-3566 | ['CWE-362'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | 1 | torvalds/linux | setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM) and tcp_v6_connect() change icsk->icsk_af_ops
under lock_sock(), but tcp_(get|set)sockopt() read it locklessly. To
avoid load/store tearing, we need to add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
for the reads and writes.
Thanks to Eric Dumazet for providing the syzbot report:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in... | f49cd2f4d6170d27a2c61f1fecb03d8a70c91f57 | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=f49cd2f4d6170d27a2c61f1fecb03d8a70c91f57 | net/ipv4/tcp.c | tcp_inq_hint | null | null | null | static int tcp_inq_hint(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 copied_seq = READ_ONCE(tp->copied_seq);
u32 rcv_nxt = READ_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt);
int inq;
inq = rcv_nxt - copied_seq;
if (unlikely(inq < 0 || copied_seq != READ_ONCE(tp->copied_seq))) {
lock_sock(sk);
inq = tp->rcv_nxt - tp->... | static int tcp_inq_hint(struct sock *VAR_0)
{
const struct tcp_sock *VAR_1 = tcp_sk(VAR_0);
u32 VAR_2 = READ_ONCE(VAR_1->copied_seq);
u32 VAR_3 = READ_ONCE(VAR_1->rcv_nxt);
int VAR_4;
VAR_4 = VAR_3 - VAR_2;
if (unlikely(VAR_4 < 0 || VAR_2 != READ_ONCE(VAR_1->copied_seq))) {
lock_sock(VAR_0);
VAR_4 = VAR_1->r... | torvalds/linux/f49cd2f4d6170d27a2c61f1fecb03d8a70c91f57/tcp.c/non_vul/39.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-0414 | ['CWE-404'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | 1 | wireshark | eap: tweak conversation tracking to avoid breaking pinfo horribly
Looks like conversation_set_conv_addr_port_endpoints() from 66b441f3d is
designed with this use case in mind.
This should resolve issue #18622
| a8b16d74e1946c4d32bd6b880ab13b7850cc70be | https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/a8b16d74e1946c4d32bd6b880ab13b7850cc70be | epan/dissectors/packet-eap.c | dissect_eap_mschapv2 | null | null | null | static void
dissect_eap_mschapv2(proto_tree *eap_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset,
gint size)
{
proto_item *item;
gint left = size;
gint ms_len;
guint8 value_size;
guint8 opcode;
/* OpCode (1 byte), MS-CHAPv2-ID (1 byte), MS-Length (2 bytes), ... | static void
dissect_eap_mschapv2(proto_tree *VAR_0, tvbuff_t *VAR_1, packet_info *VAR_2, int VAR_3,
gint VAR_4)
{
proto_item *VAR_5;
gint VAR_6 = VAR_4;
gint VAR_7;
guint8 VAR_8;
guint8 VAR_9;
/* COMMENT_0 */
VAR_9 = tvb_get_guint8(VAR_1, VAR_3);
proto_tree_... | wireshark/a8b16d74e1946c4d32bd6b880ab13b7850cc70be/packet-eap.c/non_vul/10.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2015-7972 | ['CWE-399'] | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | xen-project/xen | libxl: adjust PoD target by memory fudge, too
PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk
crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value
is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing.
Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD me... | e294a0c3af9f4443dc692b180fb1771b1cb075e8 | https://github.com/xen-project/xen/commit/e294a0c3af9f4443dc692b180fb1771b1cb075e8 | tools/libxl/libxl.c | libxl_string_list_length | null | null | null | int libxl_string_list_length(const libxl_string_list *psl)
{
int i = 0;
if (*psl)
while ((*psl)[i])
i++;
return i;
} | int libxl_string_list_length(const libxl_string_list *VAR_0)
{
int VAR_1 = 0;
if (*VAR_0)
while ((*VAR_0)[VAR_1])
VAR_1++;
return VAR_1;
} | xen-project/xen/e294a0c3af9f4443dc692b180fb1771b1cb075e8/libxl.c/non_vul/50.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2023-5377 | ['CWE-125'] | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H | 1 | gpac | fixed #2606 | 8e9d6b38c036a97020c462ad48e1132e0ddc57ce | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/8e9d6b38c036a97020c462ad48e1132e0ddc57ce | src/isomedia/box_code_base.c | esds_box_write | null | null | null | GF_Err esds_box_write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u8 *enc_desc;
u32 descSize = 0;
GF_ESDBox *ptr = (GF_ESDBox *)s;
//make sure we write with no ESID and no OCRESID
if (ptr->desc) {
ptr->desc->ESID = 0;
ptr->desc->OCRESID = 0;
}
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return... | GF_Err esds_box_write(GF_Box *VAR_0, GF_BitStream *VAR_1)
{
GF_Err VAR_2;
u8 *VAR_3;
u32 VAR_4 = 0;
GF_ESDBox *VAR_5 = (GF_ESDBox *)VAR_0;
/* COMMENT_0 */
if (VAR_5->desc) {
VAR_5->desc->ESID = 0;
VAR_5->desc->OCRESID = 0;
}
VAR_2 = gf_isom_full_box_write(VAR_0, VAR_1);
if (VAR_2) return ... | gpac/8e9d6b38c036a97020c462ad48e1132e0ddc57ce/box_code_base.c/non_vul/447.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2011-0523 | ['CWE-264'] | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | gypsy | Fixes part of 33431
| 40101707cddb319481133b2a137294b6b669bd16 | http://cgit.freedesktop.org/gypsy/commit/?id=40101707cddb319481133b2a137294b6b669bd16 | src/gypsy-server.c | gypsy_server_error_quark | null | null | null | GQuark
gypsy_server_error_quark (void)
{
static GQuark quark = 0;
if (quark == 0) {
quark = g_quark_from_static_string ("gypsy-server-error-quark");
}
return quark;
} | GQuark
gypsy_server_error_quark (void)
{
static GQuark VAR_0 = 0;
if (VAR_0 == 0) {
VAR_0 = g_quark_from_static_string ("gypsy-server-error-quark");
}
return VAR_0;
} | gypsy/40101707cddb319481133b2a137294b6b669bd16/gypsy-server.c/non_vul/3.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2019-19012 | ['CWE-190', 'CWE-125'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | kkos/oniguruma | fix #164: Integer overflow related to reg->dmax in search_in_range() | 0463e21432515631a9bc925ce5eb95b097c73719 | https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/0463e21432515631a9bc925ce5eb95b097c73719 | src/regexec.c | onig_region_copy | null | null | null | extern void
onig_region_copy(OnigRegion* to, OnigRegion* from)
{
#define RREGC_SIZE (sizeof(int) * from->num_regs)
int i;
if (to == from) return;
if (to->allocated == 0) {
if (from->num_regs > 0) {
to->beg = (int* )xmalloc(RREGC_SIZE);
if (IS_NULL(to->beg)) return;
to->end = (int* )xmall... | extern void
onig_region_copy(OnigRegion* VAR_0, OnigRegion* VAR_1)
{
#define VAR_2 (sizeof(int) * from->num_regs)
int VAR_3;
if (VAR_0 == VAR_1) return;
if (VAR_0->allocated == 0) {
if (VAR_1->num_regs > 0) {
VAR_0->beg = (int* )xmalloc(VAR_2);
if (IS_NULL(VAR_0->beg)) return;
VAR_0->end... | kkos/oniguruma/0463e21432515631a9bc925ce5eb95b097c73719/regexec.c/non_vul/69.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2018-1000115 | ['CWE-400'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | 0 | memcached | disable UDP port by default
As reported, UDP amplification attacks have started to use insecure
internet-exposed memcached instances. UDP used to be a lot more popular as a
transport for memcached many years ago, but I'm not aware of many recent
users.
Ten years ago, the TCP connection overhead from many clients was ... | dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974 | https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974 | memcached.c | process_stats_conns | null | null | null | static void process_stats_conns(ADD_STAT add_stats, void *c) {
int i;
char key_str[STAT_KEY_LEN];
char val_str[STAT_VAL_LEN];
char conn_name[MAXPATHLEN + sizeof("unix:") + sizeof("65535")];
int klen = 0, vlen = 0;
assert(add_stats);
for (i = 0; i < max_fds; i++) {
if (conns[i]) {
... | static void process_stats_conns(ADD_STAT VAR_0, void *VAR_1) {
int VAR_2;
char VAR_3[VAR_4];
char VAR_5[VAR_6];
char VAR_7[VAR_8 + sizeof("unix:") + sizeof("65535")];
int VAR_9 = 0, VAR_10 = 0;
assert(VAR_0);
for (VAR_2 = 0; VAR_2 < VAR_11; VAR_2++) {
if (VAR_12[VAR_2]) {
... | memcached/dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974/memcached.c/non_vul/6.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-7031 | ['CWE-254', 'CWE-200'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | 0 | ceph | 13207: Rados Gateway: Anonymous user is able to read bucket with authenticated read ACL
Signed-off-by: root <rahul.1aggarwal@gmail.com> | 99ba6610a8f437604cadf68cbe9969def893e870 | https://github.com/ceph/ceph/commit/99ba6610a8f437604cadf68cbe9969def893e870 | src/rgw/rgw_op.cc | RGWGetACLs::execute | null | null | null | void RGWGetACLs::execute()
{
stringstream ss;
RGWAccessControlPolicy *acl = (!s->object.empty() ? s->object_acl : s->bucket_acl);
RGWAccessControlPolicy_S3 *s3policy = static_cast<RGWAccessControlPolicy_S3 *>(acl);
s3policy->to_xml(ss);
acls = ss.str();
} | void RGWGetACLs::execute()
{
stringstream VAR_0;
RGWAccessControlPolicy *VAR_1 = (!VAR_2->object.empty() ? VAR_2->object_acl : VAR_2->bucket_acl);
RGWAccessControlPolicy_S3 *VAR_3 = VAR_4<RGWAccessControlPolicy_S3 *>(VAR_1);
VAR_3->to_xml(VAR_0);
VAR_5 = VAR_0.str();
} | ceph/99ba6610a8f437604cadf68cbe9969def893e870/rgw_op.cc/non_vul/91.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-1636 | ['CWE-264'] | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | chromium | Fix SRI bypass by loading same resource twice in same origin.
This fixes a bug where the memory cache was bypassing subresource
integrity checks when a resource is loaded for a second time in the same
origin. The resource in the memory cache was correctly storing that an
integrity check had already been done so whene ... | 0979e9712439b056355af462d68fe5c6d9ee5466 | https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/0979e9712439b056355af462d68fe5c6d9ee5466 | third_party/WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp | PendingScript::PendingScript | null | null | null | PendingScript::PendingScript()
: m_watchingForLoad(false)
, m_startingPosition(TextPosition::belowRangePosition())
, m_integrityFailure(false)
{
} | PendingScript::PendingScript()
: m_watchingForLoad(false)
, m_startingPosition(TextPosition::belowRangePosition())
, m_integrityFailure(false)
{
} | chromium/0979e9712439b056355af462d68fe5c6d9ee5466/PendingScript.cpp/non_vul/2.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2014-4014 | ['CWE-264'] | AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | torvalds/linux | fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
rena... | 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 | fs/namei.c | kern_path_mountpoint | null | null | null | int
kern_path_mountpoint(int dfd, const char *name, struct path *path,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct filename s = {.name = name};
return filename_mountpoint(dfd, &s, path, flags);
} | int
kern_path_mountpoint(int VAR_0, const char *VAR_1, struct path *path,
unsigned int VAR_2)
{
struct filename VAR_3 = {.name = VAR_1};
return filename_mountpoint(VAR_0, &VAR_3, path, VAR_2);
} | torvalds/linux/23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03/namei.c/non_vul/33.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-5128 | ['CWE-254'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | 0 | chromium | Make sure api interceptors don't change the store target w/o storing
BUG=chromium:619166
R=verwaest@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#37152}
| 2c8ca9ad09281d4138ae363566051e45afd0838c | https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+/2c8ca9ad09281d4138ae363566051e45afd0838c | src/objects.cc | PropertyKeyToArrayLength | null | null | null | bool PropertyKeyToArrayLength(Handle<Object> value, uint32_t* length) {
DCHECK(value->IsNumber() || value->IsName());
if (value->ToArrayLength(length)) return true;
if (value->IsString()) return String::cast(*value)->AsArrayIndex(length);
return false;
} | bool PropertyKeyToArrayLength(Handle<Object> VAR_0, uint32_t* VAR_1) {
DCHECK(VAR_0->IsNumber() || VAR_0->IsName());
if (VAR_0->ToArrayLength(VAR_1)) return true;
if (VAR_0->IsString()) return String::cast(*VAR_0)->AsArrayIndex(VAR_1);
return false;
} | chromium/2c8ca9ad09281d4138ae363566051e45afd0838c/objects.cc/non_vul/610.json | null | null | false |
CVE-2016-2449 | ['CWE-264'] | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | 0 | android | Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
| b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | services/camera/libcameraservice/device3/Camera3Device.cpp | Camera3Device::setStreamingRequest | null | null | null | status_t Camera3Device::setStreamingRequest(const CameraMetadata &request,
int64_t* /*lastFrameNumber*/) {
ATRACE_CALL();
List<const CameraMetadata> requests;
requests.push_back(request);
return setStreamingRequestList(requests, /*lastFrameNumber*/NULL);
} | status_t Camera3Device::setStreamingRequest(const CameraMetadata &VAR_0,
int64_t* /* COMMENT_0 */) {
ATRACE_CALL();
List<const CameraMetadata> VAR_1;
VAR_1.push_back(VAR_0);
return setStreamingRequestList(VAR_1, /* COMMENT_0 */NULL);
} | android/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353/Camera3Device.cpp/non_vul/67.json | null | null | false |
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