| --- |
| language: |
| - en |
| license: cc-by-4.0 |
| task_categories: |
| - tabular-classification |
| - time-series-forecasting |
| size_categories: |
| - 1M<n<10M |
| tags: |
| - fraud-detection |
| - payments |
| - synthetic |
| - SEPA |
| - anomaly-detection |
| - finance |
| - tabular |
| pretty_name: SynSEPA — Synthetic SEPA Instant Payment Fraud Dataset |
|
|
| configs: |
| - config_name: transactions |
| default: true |
| data_files: |
| - split: train |
| path: data/synsep_full_dataset.csv |
| - config_name: accounts |
| data_files: |
| - split: train |
| path: data/accounts.csv |
|
|
| dataset_info: |
| - config_name: transactions |
| description: > |
| SynSEPA is a synthetic SEPA Instant Credit Transfer dataset containing 1.84M |
| transactions across 10,000 accounts, with 4 APP fraud typologies injected |
| following EPC 2025 definitions. Calibrated against EBA-ECB 2025 fraud statistics. |
| features: |
| - name: transaction_id |
| dtype: string |
| - name: account_id |
| dtype: string |
| - name: persona |
| dtype: string |
| - name: timestamp |
| dtype: string |
| - name: sender_iban |
| dtype: string |
| - name: beneficiary_iban |
| dtype: string |
| - name: beneficiary_country |
| dtype: string |
| - name: country_type |
| dtype: string |
| - name: amount |
| dtype: float64 |
| - name: remittance_category |
| dtype: string |
| - name: remittance_text |
| dtype: string |
| - name: hour_of_day |
| dtype: int64 |
| - name: day_of_week |
| dtype: int64 |
| - name: is_weekend |
| dtype: int64 |
| - name: time_since_last_txn |
| dtype: float64 |
| - name: is_new_beneficiary |
| dtype: int64 |
| - name: is_fraud |
| dtype: int64 |
| - name: fraud_type |
| dtype: string |
| splits: |
| - name: train |
| num_examples: 1839560 |
| - config_name: accounts |
| description: > |
| Per-account metadata for the 10,000 synthetic SynSEPA accounts — persona, |
| home country, behavioural parameters, and known-beneficiary lists. |
| features: |
| - name: account_id |
| dtype: string |
| - name: persona |
| dtype: string |
| - name: description |
| dtype: string |
| - name: home_country |
| dtype: string |
| - name: sender_iban |
| dtype: string |
| - name: txn_per_month_min |
| dtype: int64 |
| - name: txn_per_month_max |
| dtype: int64 |
| - name: typical_amount |
| dtype: float64 |
| - name: foreign_txn_prob |
| dtype: float64 |
| - name: weekend_factor |
| dtype: float64 |
| - name: fraud_target_types |
| dtype: string |
| - name: known_beneficiaries |
| dtype: string |
| - name: known_beneficiary_count |
| dtype: int64 |
| splits: |
| - name: train |
| num_examples: 10000 |
| --- |
| |
| # SynSEPA: A Synthetic SEPA Instant Payment Dataset for APP Fraud Detection Research |
|
|
| [](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) |
| [](https://huggingface.co/datasets/EpiphanyTech/SynSEPA) |
| []() |
| []() |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Overview |
|
|
| **SynSEPA** is the first publicly available synthetic dataset specifically designed for |
| Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud detection in SEPA Instant Credit Transfer payments. |
|
|
| No public SEPA fraud dataset previously existed. SynSEPA fills this gap by providing |
| a large-scale, statistically calibrated synthetic dataset grounded in official EU |
| regulatory statistics from the EBA-ECB 2025 Payment Fraud Report and the EPC 2025 |
| Payment Threats and Fraud Trends Report. |
|
|
| The dataset is released as part of the **SEPAGen** research project: |
| *"Transformer-Based Generative Anomaly Detection for APP Fraud in SEPA Instant Payments"* |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Why SynSEPA? |
|
|
| ### The Problem |
| - SEPA Instant payments settle in **under 10 seconds** and are **irreversible** |
| - APP fraud — where victims are manipulated into authorising payments — caused |
| **€2.5 billion in EU losses in 2024** (EBA-ECB 2025), up 24% YoY |
| - **No public SEPA fraud dataset** existed for training or benchmarking ML models |
| - Real SEPA fraud data is proprietary, privacy-sensitive, and inaccessible to researchers |
|
|
| ### The Solution |
| SynSEPA generates realistic SEPA payment sequences with: |
| - **4 APP fraud typologies** as defined by the EPC 2025 report |
| - **4 customer personas** representing the EU retail banking population |
| - **Statistical calibration** against EBA-ECB 2025 fraud report benchmarks |
| - **Sequential structure** enabling sequence-based generative model training |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Dataset Statistics |
|
|
| | Property | Value | |
| |---|---| |
| | Total transactions | 1,839,560 | |
| | Normal transactions | 1,832,448 (99.61%) | |
| | Fraud transactions | 7,112 (0.39%) | |
| | Unique accounts | 10,000 | |
| | Simulation period | January – December 2024 | |
| | Countries covered | 10 EU/EEA countries | |
| | Avg transactions per account | 184 | |
| | Min transactions per account | 69 | |
|
|
| ### Fraud Breakdown |
|
|
| | Typology | Transactions | Victims | Avg Txns/Victim | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | Romance Scam | 4,232 | 720 | 5.9 | |
| | Bank Impersonation | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1.0 | |
| | Invoice / Mandate Fraud | 900 | 900 | 1.0 | |
| | CEO / BEC Fraud | 540 | 540 | 1.0 | |
| | **Total** | **7,112** | **3,600** | **1.98** | |
|
|
| ### Account Personas |
|
|
| | Persona | Accounts | % | Fraud Targets | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | Regular Employee | 5,054 | 50.5% | Impersonation, Romance | |
| | Student | 1,972 | 19.7% | Romance, Impersonation | |
| | Retiree | 1,519 | 15.2% | Impersonation, Romance | |
| | Small Business | 1,455 | 14.5% | Invoice, CEO | |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Schema — synsep_full_dataset.csv |
|
|
| ### Core SEPA Fields |
|
|
| | Column | Type | Description | Example | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | `transaction_id` | string | Unique transaction ID | TXN_00000001 | |
| | `account_id` | string | Sender account ID | ACC_000042 | |
| | `persona` | string | Account type | employee | |
| | `timestamp` | datetime | Transaction datetime | 2024-03-15 14:23:01 | |
| | `sender_iban` | string | Sender IBAN (synthetic) | DE89370400440532013000 | |
| | `beneficiary_iban` | string | Beneficiary IBAN (synthetic) | FR7630006000011234 | |
| | `beneficiary_country` | string | Beneficiary country code | FR | |
| | `amount` | float | Transaction amount (EUR) | 245.50 | |
| | `remittance_category` | string | Payment category | grocery | |
| | `remittance_text` | string | Payment reference text | Rent Mar 2024 | |
|
|
| ### Engineered Features |
|
|
| | Column | Type | Description | Example | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | `country_type` | string | domestic / eu_cross_border / non_eu | domestic | |
| | `hour_of_day` | int | Hour of transaction (0-23) | 14 | |
| | `day_of_week` | int | Day of week (0=Monday, 6=Sunday) | 2 | |
| | `is_weekend` | int | Weekend flag (0/1) | 0 | |
| | `time_since_last_txn` | float | Seconds since previous transaction | 86400.0 | |
| | `is_new_beneficiary` | int | New IBAN never seen before (0/1) | 0 | |
|
|
| ### Labels (for evaluation only — never used in unsupervised training) |
|
|
| | Column | Type | Description | Values | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | `is_fraud` | int | Fraud label | 0 = normal, 1 = fraud | |
| | `fraud_type` | string | Fraud typology | none / impersonation / invoice / romance / ceo | |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Schema — accounts.csv |
|
|
| | Column | Type | Description | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | `account_id` | string | Unique account ID | |
| | `persona` | string | Account type (employee/student/retiree/business) | |
| | `home_country` | string | Sender's home country | |
| | `sender_iban` | string | Account IBAN | |
| | `txn_per_month_min/max` | int | Transaction frequency range | |
| | `typical_amount` | float | Typical transaction amount | |
| | `foreign_txn_prob` | float | Cross-border transaction probability | |
| | `fraud_target_types` | JSON | Which fraud typologies target this account | |
| | `known_beneficiaries` | JSON | List of regular beneficiary IBANs | |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## APP Fraud Typologies in SynSEPA |
|
|
| ### Why these four typologies? |
|
|
| The four fraud types in SynSEPA were selected directly from the **EPC 2025 Payment |
| Threats and Fraud Trends Report** (EPC162-24 v2.0), which is the authoritative |
| classification of APP fraud in the SEPA ecosystem published by the European Payments |
| Council. These are not hypothetical categories — they represent the dominant, documented |
| patterns of Authorised Push Payment fraud occurring across EU/EEA markets today. |
|
|
| The selection criteria were: |
|
|
| 1. **Coverage of the victim population** — the four typologies together target all four |
| account personas in SynSEPA (retail employees, students, retirees, and small |
| businesses), ensuring the dataset is not biased toward a single demographic. |
|
|
| 2. **Diversity of behavioural signatures** — each typology produces a distinct statistical |
| footprint in the transaction data (amount level, timing, beneficiary geography, |
| sequence length), making the dataset useful for evaluating whether a model can |
| distinguish between fundamentally different fraud mechanisms rather than just |
| detecting one kind of outlier. |
|
|
| 3. **Relevance to SEPA Instant specifically** — typologies were chosen where the |
| irrevocability and speed of SEPA Instant payments are part of the fraud mechanism |
| itself (e.g. impersonation fraudsters urgently pressure victims to transfer before |
| the bank can intervene; romance scammers exploit the ease of cross-border SEPA |
| transfers). Typologies that primarily exploit card networks or slower payment rails |
| were excluded. |
|
|
| 4. **Volume calibration against EBA-ECB 2025** — victim counts and fraud volumes per |
| typology were set to reflect the proportions reported in the EBA-ECB 2025 Joint |
| Report on Payment Fraud, so the dataset mirrors the real EU fraud landscape. |
|
|
| ### Typology Details |
|
|
| #### 1. Bank / Authority Impersonation |
| Fraudster poses as the victim's bank fraud team or a law enforcement agency, creating |
| urgency around a supposed security threat. Victim is convinced to transfer funds to a |
| "safe account" controlled by the fraudster. |
|
|
| - **Target personas:** Employees, Retirees, Students |
| - **Behavioural signature:** Single large transaction (3–10× the victim's normal amount), |
| new domestic IBAN never seen in history, urgent remittance text ("safe account transfer", |
| "security hold"), sent shortly after the last normal transaction |
| - **Why hard to detect:** Amount is large but the IBAN is domestic, and the timing follows |
| a normal inter-transaction gap — it does not look like an unusual payment channel |
|
|
| #### 2. Invoice / Mandate Fraud |
| Fraudster intercepts a legitimate supplier invoice (via email compromise or postal |
| interception) and replaces the beneficiary IBAN with one they control. The victim |
| pays what they believe is a routine business invoice. |
|
|
| - **Target personas:** Small Business only |
| - **Behavioural signature:** Amount closely mirrors the victim's typical supplier payment |
| (deliberately subtle), new IBAN despite a familiar-looking remittance reference, |
| business accounts only |
| - **Why hard to detect:** This is the most subtle typology — the amount is not anomalous, |
| the remittance text looks normal, and only the IBAN is new. A purely amount-based |
| detector will miss it entirely. |
|
|
| #### 3. Romance Scam |
| Fraudster cultivates a fake online relationship over weeks or months, then gradually |
| requests money under emotional pretexts (medical emergency, travel costs, investment |
| opportunity). |
|
|
| - **Target personas:** Employees, Students, Retirees |
| - **Behavioural signature:** 4–8 escalating payments to the same foreign IBAN over a |
| 5–12 week period, emotional or personal remittance text, cross-border destination |
| - **Why hard to detect:** Each individual payment may not look anomalous in isolation — |
| it is the multi-week sequence of escalating payments to the same new foreign IBAN that |
| constitutes the fraud signal. This typology tests whether a model can detect |
| account-level behavioural drift over time. |
|
|
| #### 4. CEO / Business Email Compromise (BEC) |
| Fraudster impersonates a company's CEO or senior executive via email and instructs a |
| finance employee to make an urgent, confidential international transfer. |
|
|
| - **Target personas:** Small Business only |
| - **Behavioural signature:** Large amount, new non-EU IBAN, Friday afternoon timing |
| (when management is less available to verify), confidential remittance text |
| - **Why hard to detect:** The payment instruction appears to come from internal authority. |
| The fraud signal is in the combination of a large non-EU transfer on a Friday with a |
| new IBAN — no single feature is sufficient. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Generation Methodology |
|
|
| SynSEPA was generated using a 3-step pipeline (code in `code/generate/`): |
|
|
| ### Step 1 — Account Generation |
| 10,000 synthetic accounts assigned to one of 4 personas. Each account receives: |
| - A syntactically correct IBAN for their home country |
| - Behavioural parameters (frequency, amount ranges, active hours) |
| - A list of 5-20 known beneficiary IBANs |
|
|
| ### Step 2 — Normal Transaction Generation |
| 12 months (Jan-Dec 2024) of transaction history per account, with: |
| - Transaction frequency sampled from persona distribution |
| - Timestamps weighted by persona's active hours and day-of-week patterns |
| - Beneficiaries drawn 80% from known list, 20% new |
| - Remittance categories and text sampled from persona's profile |
| - All engineered features computed (time_since_last_txn, is_new_beneficiary, etc.) |
| |
| ### Step 3 — Fraud Injection |
| APP fraud transactions injected following EPC 2025 typology signatures: |
| - Victim accounts selected by eligible persona type |
| - Fraud transaction parameters derived from victim's normal history |
| - Romance scam sequences span 4-8 payments over 5-12 week periods |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Statistical Calibration |
| |
| SynSEPA is calibrated against the following EBA-ECB 2025 benchmarks: |
| |
| | Metric | EBA Benchmark | SynSEPA | Status | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | Fraud rate (volume) | ~0.200% | 0.387% | Within range | |
| | Cross-border rate (normal) | ~11% | 11.1% | Matches | |
| | Weekend transaction rate | <25% | 19.8% | Passes | |
| | Business hours concentration | >60% | 89.1% | Passes | |
| | Fraud cross-border rate | > normal | 96.4% vs 11.1% | Correct | |
| |
| > Note: Fraud rate (0.387%) exceeds EBA's 0.200% volume benchmark primarily |
| > because romance scams generate multiple transactions per victim (avg 5.9). |
| > This reflects the multi-event nature of romance fraud as documented by the EPC. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Validation Results |
| |
| SynSEPA passed **41 of 42** automated validation checks covering: |
| - Basic dataset composition and size |
| - Fraud typology distribution |
| - Persona behavioural profiles |
| - Temporal patterns (hours, weekdays, time between transactions) |
| - Fraud typology signature verification |
| - Cross-border transaction rates |
| - Sequence integrity (ordering per account) |
| - Amount distribution shape |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Intended Uses |
| |
| Appropriate uses: |
| - Training and evaluating unsupervised or transformer based anomaly detection models |
| - Benchmarking generative models (VAE, GAN, Transformer, Diffusion) on tabular fraud data |
| - Sequence modelling research for financial fraud |
| - Academic research in payment fraud detection |
| - Developing and testing fraud detection pipelines without real customer data |
| |
| Inappropriate uses: |
| - Training models intended for production deployment without further validation on real data |
| - Any use involving real customer data or real SEPA infrastructure |
| - Commercial fraud detection products without disclosure of synthetic data origin |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Limitations |
| |
| 1. **Synthetic data gap** — All data is synthetic. Real fraud patterns may have |
| nuances not captured in EPC typology descriptions. |
| |
| 2. **No device/session signals** — Real APP fraud detection also uses device |
| fingerprints, session behaviour, and browser signals. SynSEPA covers only |
| transaction-level signals. |
| |
| 3. **Simplified IBAN structure** — IBANs are syntactically correct but do not |
| pass Mod-97 checksum validation. |
| |
| 4. **Single year** — Covers January-December 2024 only. Seasonal effects beyond |
| this period are not represented. |
| |
| 5. **Retiree cross-border rate** — Marginally exceeds 10% target (achieved 10.3%) |
| — a minor calibration artefact with no material impact on model training. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Citation |
| |
| If you use SynSEPA in your research, please cite: |
| |
| ```bibtex |
| @dataset{synsep2025, |
| title = {SynSEPA: A Synthetic SEPA Instant Payment Dataset |
| for APP Fraud Detection Research}, |
| author = {Bajaj, Gaurav}, |
| year = {2026}, |
| publisher = {Hugging Face}, |
| url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/EpiphanyTech/SynSEPA}, |
| note = {Generated as part of the SEPAGen project. |
| Calibrated against EBA-ECB 2025 Payment Fraud Report.} |
| } |
| ``` |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## References |
| |
| 1. EBA-ECB (2025). *Joint Report on Payment Fraud*. European Banking Authority / |
| European Central Bank. December 2025. |
| |
| 2. EPC (2025). *Payment Threats and Fraud Trends Report* (EPC162-24 v2.0). |
| European Payments Council. November 2025. |
| |
| 3. Lopez-Rojas, E. (2017). *Synthetic Financial Datasets for Fraud Detection* |
| (PaySim). Kaggle. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## License |
| |
| This dataset is released under the |
| [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) |
| license. You are free to share and adapt the dataset for any purpose, provided |
| appropriate credit is given. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| *SynSEPA was generated entirely from synthetic data. No real customer data, |
| real SEPA transactions, or real bank records were used in its creation.* |
| |