id stringlengths 5 9 | technique stringlengths 3 43 | subtechniqueid stringlengths 3 60 ⌀ | sentences stringlengths 1 871 |
|---|---|---|---|
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development debugging and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious |
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | process process creation command command execution |
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | there are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development debugging and reverse engineering |
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused |
t1129 | shared modules | null | adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules |
t1129 | shared modules | null | correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using api monitoring and suspicious dlls written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior |
t1129 | shared modules | null | legitimate software will likely only need to load routine bundled dll modules or windows system dlls such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious |
t1129 | shared modules | null | limiting dll module loads to %systemroot% and %programfiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths |
t1129 | shared modules | null | monitoring dll module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances since benign use of windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior |
t1129 | shared modules | null | process os api execution module module load |
t1129 | shared modules | null | the windows module loader can be instructed to load dlls from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary universal naming convention unc network paths |
t1132 | data encoding | null | a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server |
t1132 | data encoding | null | adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect |
t1132 | data encoding | null | analyze network data for uncommon data flows e |
t1132 | data encoding | null | analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used |
t1132 | data encoding | null | citation university of birmingham c2 |
t1132 | data encoding | null | command and control c2 information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system |
t1132 | data encoding | null | network traffic network traffic content |
t1132 | data encoding | null | processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious |
t1133 | external remote services | null | adversaries may leverage external facing remote services to initially access andor persist within a network |
t1133 | external remote services | null | application log application log content logon session logon session metadata network traffic network traffic flow |
t1133 | external remote services | null | collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns windows of activity and access outside of normal business hours |
t1133 | external remote services | null | follow best practices for detecting adversary use of valid accountst1078 for authenticating to remote services |
t1133 | external remote services | null | remote services such as vpns citrix and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations |
t1133 | external remote services | null | when authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service monitor for follow on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed api or application |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | logonuser citation microsoft logonuser duplicatetokenexcitation microsoft duplicatetokenex and impersonateloggedonusercitation microsoft impersonateloggedonuser |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | citation blackhat atkinson winchester token manipulation look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store ppid information such as the event header process id from data collected via event tracing for windows etw creator process idname from windows event logs and the processid and parentprocessid which a... |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | citation microsoft command line logging if an adversary is using a payload that calls the windows token apis directly analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity examination of running processes and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | detailed command line logging is not enabled by default in windows |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | if an adversary is using a standard command line shell analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command line activity |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | please see the referenced windows api pages for more information |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | process process creation process process metadata process os api execution user account user account metadata active directory active directory object modification command command execution |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local system account |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | specifically analysts should look for use of the runas command |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | the etw provided event header process id identifies the actual parent process |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | there are many windows api calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens e |
t1134 | access token manipulation | null | windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for collection and to identify potential systems of interest for lateral movement |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as lateral movement based on the information obtained |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | information may also be acquired through windows system management tools such as windows management instrumentationt1047 and powershellt1059 |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | monitor processes and command line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | normal benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon depending on the environment and how they are used |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | process process creation command command execution process os api execution |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | remote access tools with built in features may interact directly with the windows api to gather information |
t1135 | network share discovery | null | system and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment |
t1136 | create account | null | adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems |
t1136 | create account | null | citation microsoft user creation event perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary |
t1136 | create account | null | collect data on account creation within a network |
t1136 | create account | null | collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts |
t1136 | create account | null | event id 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a windows system and domain controller |
t1136 | create account | null | monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins |
t1136 | create account | null | monitor for processes and command line parameters associated with account creation such as net user or useradd |
t1136 | create account | null | user account user account creation process process creation command command execution |
t1136 | create account | null | with a sufficient level of access creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system |
t1137 | office application startup | null | adversaries may leverage microsoft office based applications for persistence between startups |
t1137 | office application startup | null | citation crowdstrike outlook formscitation outlook today home page microsoft has released a powershell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output |
t1137 | office application startup | null | citation microsoft detect outlook forms sensepost whose tool rulers0358 can be used to carry out malicious rules forms and homepage attacks has released a tool to detect ruler usage |
t1137 | office application startup | null | citation sensepost notruler |
t1137 | office application startup | null | collect events related to registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for office based persistence |
t1137 | office application startup | null | collect process execution information including process ids pid and parent process ids ppid and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from office processes |
t1137 | office application startup | null | exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously |
t1137 | office application startup | null | if winword |
t1137 | office application startup | null | many office related persistence mechanisms require changes to the registry and for binaries files or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts |
t1137 | office application startup | null | microsoft office is a fairly common application suite on windows based operating systems within an enterprise network |
t1137 | office application startup | null | non standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior |
t1137 | office application startup | null | process process creation command command execution windows registry windows registry key creation windows registry windows registry key modification file file creation file file modification module module load application log application log content |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | adversaries may use obfuscated files or informationt1027 to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | if scripts are used then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | if the functionality is contained within malware and uses the windows api then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or api calls |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | monitor the execution file paths and command line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions such as those for zip and rar archive tools and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | perform process and command line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutils0160 |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | process process creation file file modification script script execution |
t1140 | deobfuscatedecode files or information | null | they may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | additionally all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the librarymanaged preferencesusername directory |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | citation courier chrome extensions mac os |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | command command execution process process creation network traffic network connection creation windows registry windows registry key creation file file creation |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | however this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal expected and benign extensions |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | monitor for any new items written to the registry or pe files written to disk |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | on mac os monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool such as profiles install type=configuration |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a c2 server |
t1176 | browser extensions | null | that may correlate with browser extension installation |
t1185 | browser session hijacking | null | adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content modify user behaviors and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques |
t1185 | browser session hijacking | null | authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior |
t1185 | browser session hijacking | null | citation wikipedia man in the browser a specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies http sessions and ssl client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet |
t1185 | browser session hijacking | null | monitor for process injectiont1055 against browser applications |
t1185 | browser session hijacking | null | new processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk |
t1185 | browser session hijacking | null | process process modification process process access logon session logon session creation |
t1185 | browser session hijacking | null | this may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic |
t1187 | forced authentication | null | adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept |
t1187 | forced authentication | null | baseline smb traffic |
t1187 | forced authentication | null | citation us cert apt energy oct 2017 |
t1187 | forced authentication | null | file file access file file creation file file modification network traffic network traffic content network traffic network traffic flow |
t1187 | forced authentication | null | for internal traffic monitor the workstation to workstation unusual vs |
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