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8952
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https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/algerians-rally-gold-medal-hopeful-imane-khelif-amid-112641376
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en
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Algerians rally behind gold medal hopeful Imane Khelif amid gender misconceptions
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2024-08-07T14:04:38+00:00
|
Olympic boxer Imane Khelif has become a hometown hero in Algeria, a conservative, Muslim-majority country where attacks on her gender have been interpreted as attacks on the nation
|
en
|
https://s.abcnews.com/assets/dtci/images/favicon.ico
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ABC News
|
https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/algerians-rally-gold-medal-hopeful-imane-khelif-amid-112641376
|
AIN MESBAH, Algeria -- Relatives and neighbors erupted in cheers on Tuesday when Algeria's Imane Khelif advanced to the Olympic final in women’s boxing, winning a clear unanimous decision over Janjaem Suwannapheng of Thailand.
In Ain Mesbah, the rural cinder block-built town where the boxer was raised, legions of supporters convened on her uncle’s home to watch Khelif's match. With news camera lights shining on the gathering, they drank orange juice, waved flags and whistled as Khelif jumped around the ring in excitement about advancing to Friday’s gold medal match.
“Between the quarterfinals and the semifinals, we were on edge,” said Rachid Khelif, referencing the wave of uninformed speculation about his niece’s gender. “We were afraid that these attacks would affect her psychologically. But thank God, we saw Imane in a good state of mind.”
Few Algerians could have imagined that a 25-year-old welder's daughter from the drought-stricken Tiaret region could unite the population in such a way. But the Muslim-majority country has largely interpreted the backlash against Khelif as an attack on the nation rather than within the context of the debate underway in many Western nations about gender, sex and sports.
In the North African nation’s newspapers, on television and all over social media, Khelif has become a hometown hero, celebrated for her successes and defended amid misconceptions about her gender and scrutiny over her eligibility to compete.
“Imane Khelif, the last round against hate and racism!” read a Tuesday headline in leading Algerian daily Echourouk, which described her as “an iconic figure in national sport.”
Rifka, an Algerian social media influencer with 5.4 million Instagram followers, posted earlier this week showing himself traveling from Algiers to Paris to stream Khelif’s matches and reading headlines about Elon Musk's misconceptions about Khelif's gender.
“What? This man does not know Algerians,” he said.
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has called Khelif via telephone to cheer her on and backed her amid the criticisms.
“Thank you Imane Khelif for making all Algerians happy, with this strong and wonderful qualification for the final,” he wrote on X after her semifinal rout on Tuesday. “All Algerian women and men are with you.”
Khelif earlier this week said that the spread of misconceptions about her gender “harms human dignity” and, throughout the Olympics, both family members and Algeria's leading politicians echoed that description, describing the attacks against her as misguided.
Salah Goudjil, the speaker of Algeria's Senate, lauded Khelif on Tuesday evening for “her well-deserved qualification for the 2024 Olympic final, amid a hateful racist campaign.”
Khelif, who grew up with six siblings, was not always so embraced, however. In a pre-Olympics interview with Canal Algerie, she noted the challenges of growing up in a sheep farming community where many neighbors and family members were not accustomed to young girls pursuing certain sports.
“I come from a region and family that are conservative. Boxing was a sport for men only and the hardest thing for me was traveling between my village and the town where I trained,” she said, recounting how she sold bread in the street.
Apart from Khelif's aunt, the audience watching her match at her uncle's home was nearly all men. But young girls continue to train at her boxing gym in nearby Tiaret, the larger town she traveled to for training during her childhood.
A flag hangs on the wall behind the gym's boxing ring, next to signs reading “Don't Give Up” and “Try Again to Win."
“We tell Imane Khelif: Continue your career and pursue your dream, which is to win the gold medal,” said Yousra Messousa, a young girl who frequents the Tiaret gym. “Imane is a woman. She was born a girl, lived as a girl and boxes as a woman. Criticism and attacks don’t affect her.”
The controversy about Khelif's gender and eligibility stems from the Russian-dominated International Boxing Association’s decision to disqualify her and a boxer from Taiwan from last year’s world championships. The association said Khelif's disqualification — which came after she defeated a Russian opponent — was due to failing an unspecified eligibility test.
Its leaders and procedures have since come under fire from the International Olympic Committee, which a year ago banned the association after years of serious concerns about its financial transparency and competition governance.
The IOC has called the testing done on Khelif and Lin “ impossibly flawed,” and seemingly another part of a Russian-fueled defamation campaign directed at an Olympic Games from which its athletes are mostly banned from competing.
Such debates about gender identity may be animating the United States and Europe, but they're mostly foreign in Algeria. Abdelkader Bezaiz, a coach at Tiaret's boxing center, told The Associated Press, “it only strengthens Imane Khelif’s determination and will to prove that she is the boxing champion of these Paris Games.”
“All the Algerian people are happy. Everyone was waiting for this victory,” said Khelif's cousin, Walid Djobar. “I really hope she gets the gold medal and I have a feeling she's going to bring it home.”
___
This story has been corrected to show that Imane Khelif has six, not five, siblings.
___
AP Sports Writer Greg Beacham in Paris contributed to this report. Metz reported from Rabat, Morocco.
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8952
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https://daily.jstor.org/algerian-war-cause-celebre-anticolonialsm/
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en
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The Algerian War: Cause Célèbre of Anticolonialism
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2022-06-29T14:15:00+00:00
|
On July 5, 1962, Algeria declared its independence after 132 years of French occupation. The transition was chaotic and violent, but inspired revolutionaries worldwide.
|
en
|
JSTOR Daily
|
https://daily.jstor.org/algerian-war-cause-celebre-anticolonialsm/
|
The icon indicates free access to the linked research on JSTOR.
On July 5, 1962, Algeria—the country that is today the largest in Africa and the central country in the area of North Africa known as the Maghrib—celebrated the end of a seven-and-a-half-year-long war for its independence. At the time, the struggle was well known to the outside world. It had been the subject of Italian filmmaker Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 film “The Battle of Algiers.” Heroes such as Djamila Bouhired—the central character of the 1958 film by Egyptian film-maker Youssef Chahine —and real-world spokespeople such as Frantz Fanon were equally familiar to those abroad. One of the aims of the National Liberation Front (FLN), the group that had launched the Algerian Revolution on November 1, 1954, had been to internationalize the conflict, inscribe it in the context of the Cold War to gain support in the Eastern Bloc, and bring the case up for discussion at the United Nations so that France would lose support for its occupation. In this regard, the Algerian War was a success.
The Evian agreements of March 18, 1962 and the cease-fire they instituted, ended the war between the French army and the Algerian National Liberation Army (ALN) and began a “transitional period,” which ended with the referendum of self-determination on July 1, 1962. The resounding “yes” vote led to the transfer of sovereignty from the French to the Algerian authorities on July, 3 and to the official celebration of Independence on July 5. The date of July 5th had been deliberately chosen by the Algerian provisional Government as a historical reference to July 5, 1830, when the city of Algiers had surrendered to the French occupiers: it thus marked 1962 as a reversal of French occupation, which had lasted for 132 years. A few days after the founding of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, in September, Ahmed Ben Bella—its soon to be first president—declared that colonization had been “an accident in history,” and that Independence thus closed a digression, or a parenthesis, in the country’s history.
This timing of the accession to Independence meant that the French authorities were no longer (officially) present when the Algerians finally celebrated their newly gained freedom. The festivities were photogenic: many journalists photographed or filmed them, in the capital city, Algiers, and to a lesser extent in the rest of the country. According to many witnesses whom I interviewed for my book, Algérie, 1962, the Algerian authorities tried discouraging festivities from beginning before July 5, with very limited success. Many witnesses remember several days of festivities during which, they say, “even the women didn’t come back for the night” and during which revellers sometimes hopped onto a truck — lost in singing and chanting — and before they realized it, found themselves in cities far from home. Historian Ouarda Siari-Tengour insists that parties went on, almost without interruption, from the cease-fire of March 19 to the summer.
However, the celebrations were not entirely joyous, but contained a share of mourning and sadness. After the ceasefire, Algerian families began reuniting as combatants demobilized and left the maquis—the areas in which they had been fighting—or as political prisoners were freed from French prisons or detention camps and returned to their regions of origin. Their return was always an opportunity to celebrate; but those who returned were often bearers of bad news about other combatants or activists who had been killed during the war. Celebrations for the return of a child, a father, a sister, or of a neighbor often alternated in rapid succession with occasions for bereavement and mourning, and the invention of rituals performed in the absence of a body.
During the festivities, collective bereavement was expressed even with crowds marching together with their index fingers pointing towards the sky, in a gesture that, for Muslims, expresses the belief in the oneness of God. While everyone remembers some of the more joyous slogans of the time (“Tahiya al-Jazair!”, “Long live Algeria!”), they also sang: “May God have mercy on the martyrs,” thus expressing the massive collective mourning of those who died during war.
The process of ending the war and ending colonization was far from peaceful. In a colony where 10 % of the total population had been composed of French men and women (known as the “pieds-noirs”) who were accustomed to benefiting from superior rights to those of the native Algerian population, the approach of Independence and the promise of a Republic based on equal rights caused considerable anxiety. The cease-fire and the unavoidable approach of Independence fueled the violence of the pro-French Algeria Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS). The OAS aimed to derail the process of independence by launching last-ditch waves of violence against Algerians, as well as against the French who chose to leave the country and were accused of treason. By increasing the level of chaos, the OAS paradoxically accelerated the breakdown of French Algeria and the rapid departure of the French. Of the million pieds-noirs living in the country at the end of the war, 650,000 left the country in 1962 alone. In France, this exodus is the best-known aspect of the history of Algerian Independence, since most of them resettled in France. Their story is of course a tragic one of displacement and loss of the country in which most of them were born. Several associations in France today continue to promote this tragic vision of Algerian Independence.
In cities where the European population had been the largest, such as Algiers ( which became the capital in1962) or Oran, in the west of the country, OAS violence besieged Algerian neighborhoods with snipers and mortar shells. William Porter, the American consul to Algeria as well as the Swiss International Committee of the Red-Cross who visited these neighborhoods were appalled at the level of violence.
Violence and chaos also developed in the interstice between the two sovereignties. As the French army slowly retreated, Algerian locals and informal authorities formed under the leadership of the handfuls of combatants who had survived the end of the war inside the country. Forms of banditry appeared, as well as kidnappings and revengeful violence against those who were—rightly or wrongly—accused of having worked for the French army, or supporting French occupation. Such violence in particular against these so-called harkis, Algerian auxiliaries of the French Army, led many to leave Algeria for France.
Despite this new form of violence, the transitional period from the cease-fire in March to Independence in July marked the end of the war, and created opportunities for many of those who had supported the anticolonialist cause to travel to the country. American or British students, volunteers of NGOs, Lebanese, or Egyptian communists, and French anticolonialists could finally travel to Algeria to see it with their own eyes.
Algeria’s attractiveness for revolutionaries and activists did not begin with Independence: Even while it was waging its war for Independence, the FLN supported other Independence struggles. African leaders such as South-African Nelson Mandela or Angolese Mario de Andrade had trained on the FLN bases in Oujda, Morocco, at the beginning of 1962. Upon his liberation, in 1990, one of Mandela’s very first trips abroad included Algeria as a celebration of this link. Struggles in the rest of the world resonated with the Algerians too: during the celebrations of July 1962, various slogans referenced independent states yet to come, such as that of Mozambique, Angola, or Palestine. Cuba’s support of the Algerian Revolution eventually developed into technical assistance when the country sent its first medical brigade to Algeria in 1963. Algiers was progressively transforming into the Mecca of revolutionaries that it would represent in the 1960s and 1970s.
Not only did activists long to visit a country that was becoming a model for anticolonial struggles, but many also came to contribute to its success. In addition to being a cause célèbre of anticolonialism, Algeria became a land of experiments in socialism and self-management. In the context of the Cold War and with the support given by the Eastern Bloc to the struggle against colonization, the FLN had strong socialist influences that were made more visible in the FLN platform adopted in June 1962 during a meeting in Tripoli (Libya).
The rapid departure of the French left many industrial companies as well as farms without owners or managers, allowing them to put into place some of the objectives sketched out in the FLN platform adopted in June 1962 during a meeting in Tripoli (Libya). The platform called for the country’s rapid industrialization as well as agrarian reform that would give ownership of the land to those who farm it. But in the spring of 1962, without waiting for a permanent Algerian government to be put into place, workers spontaneously self-organized for the harvests, and self-management committees were created. René Dumont, a French agronomist interested in questions of development, traveled to Algeria in December 1962 and January 1961 on a mission for the Algerian government to analyze the situation and make suggestions as to how this spontaneous self-management could develop. Algeria appeared as a country-wide spontaneous experimentation that the rest of the world could learn from.
Much of the research about Algeria’s first years of Independence was produced by men and women who had travelled to Algeria in this effervescent and utopian time. Sociologists and political scientists described agriculture, industrialization, socialism, and the transformations that were being tested on a national scale as experiences that would inspire the rest of the world. In contrast, several of their books, written after their departure from Algeria, are infused with nostalgia or disappointed that the country had not remained the land of utopias.
Later, in the 1980s and the 1990s, fewer foreign authors would write about Algeria and much of the work would focus on the rise of Islamism and the question of the reemergence of violence within Algerian society. In the meantime, many of the articles produced during the early, heady days of independence are so connected to this revolutionary and anticolonial fervor that they are often treated as primary sources documenting the moment of independence, when Algeria was the center of the world.
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dbpedia
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https://www.toshibatec.com/global/algeria.html
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Toshiba Tec Worldwide
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2024-07-05T11:17:29+01:00
|
A potential far-right government in France will hinder the efforts for historical reconciliation between the two states, predict political experts.
|
en
|
/themes/custom/new_arab/fav.ico
|
The New Arab
|
https://www.newarab.com/news/how-will-france-algeria-relations-fare-under-french-far-right
|
For sixty-two years, Algeria struggled to move past its bloody history with France, and a memory accord with Paris was made in hopes to heal the wounds of colonisation. However, the rise of the far-right threatens to derail this process.
In the first round of French legislative elections, the far-right National Rally (RN) and its allies obtained nearly 33.34% of the vote, electing 39 deputies directly.
If they come first in the second round, scheduled for 7 July, Jordan Bardella, the party's controversial figure, will become the country's prime minister.
Bardella, who has garnered wide popularity in France with his nationalist rhetoric and a forced 'Casanova' image, has yet to announce a clear diplomatic agenda.
But a glance at the party's legacy paints a very grim picture of what Bradella's policy might be vis-à-vis Paris' former colony: Algeria.
National Front: nostalgia for French Algeria
"It's historically known that the National Front party is a political group that still harbours nostalgia for 'l'Algérie française' (French Algeria)," explained Donia Ismail, a Franco-Algerian journalist, to The New Arab.
'French Algeria' refers to the period from 1830 to 1962 when Algeria was under a brutal French colonial rule. Algeria was considered part of France rather than merely a colony during this time.
After Algeria fought and gained independence, several pieds-noirs—French settlers who had to leave North Africa post-independence—still fantasise about the glory of this period and what could have been if Algeria had never been liberated.
The RN's infamous founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, a proponent of 'French Algeria,' was a paratrooper during the Battle of Algiers in 1957 and was implicated in torture and war crimes based on several investigations over the years.
The French-Algeria fantasy has earned the movement popularity in localities of southern France with a high concentration of pieds-noirs, which will inevitably weigh on the connection between Paris and Algiers in the event of a Bardella government, explains Donia Ismail further.
"A National Rally (RN) government will poison relations with Algeria," anticipates also Madjid Benchikh, former dean of the Faculty of Law in Algiers.
Memory Accord in peril?
In 2022, Algeria and France established a joint commission, composed exclusively of historians, an initiative by President Emmanuel Macron for a "fair treatment" of the memory between the two states.
During the Algerian War of Independence, France killed between 300,000 and 1.5 million people, including both combatants and civilians.
Throughout 132 years of colonisation, France committed numerous war crimes, such as rape and torture, against both combatants and civilians, as documented by historians.
Algeria insists that the improvement of relations with France is tied to progress on the memory file, addressing four main issues: complete retrieval of archives, return of the skulls and remains of resistance fighters, compensation for victims of nuclear tests and clean-up of lands contaminated by nuclear radiation, and disclosure of the fate of the missing.
However, the RN has consistently rejected any effort at reconciliation with Algeria, first attempted by the left and then amplified by Emmanuel Macron.
In 2012, Marine Le Pen denounced as a "profoundly destructive, profoundly divisive gesture" François Hollande's decision, president at the time, to "recognise with lucidity the bloody repression" of the pro-FLN demonstration on 17 October 1961, in Paris, when French security forces killed several dozen Algerians, some of whom drowned in the Seine.
In 2021, when historian Benjamin Stora submitted his report on memorial reconciliation between France and Algeria to Macron, Louis Aliot, an RN member, exclaimed: "Shameful! Has Macron decided to declare a memorial war on French families who suffered greatly from FLN atrocities and their accomplices?"
Meanwhile, other party members like Nicolas Bay dare to argue "the undeniably positive aspects of colonisation." (Bay has recently joined Reconquête—Eric Zemmour's far-right party).
Under such circumstances, it is hard to see what would remain of the French president's attempt at memorial reconciliation.
Implementing the Stora report's recommendations involves various administrations such as the ministries of culture, education and defence, so an RN government would inevitably block any initiative.
Far-right to rewrite post-independence treaty
"The RN wants to rewrite history," points out journalist Donia-Ismail in her interview with TNA, referring to the party's promise to revise the 1968 Franco-Algerian Agreement.
Bardella and Le Pen alliance are considering questioning the 1968 Franco-Algerian Agreement, which grants Algerians a special status different from the common law for foreigners regarding travel, residence, and employment in France.
"We are going to review the 1968 agreement," declared Sébastien Chenu, vice-president of the far-right party, on French media BFM-TV on 27 June.
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https://pe.usps.com/text/imm/ab_003.htm
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en
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Postal Explorer
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Refer to Notice 123, Price List, for the applicable retail, Commercial Base, or Commercial Plus price.
Refer to Notice 123, Price List, for the applicable retail, Commercial Base, or Commercial Plus price.
See Exhibit 322.2 for individual country merchandise insurance limits. See Notice 123, Price List, for the fee schedule for Priority Mail Express International merchandise insurance coverage.
Refer to Notice 123, Price List, for the applicable retail, Commercial Base, or Commercial Plus price.
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Weight Limit: 3.5 oz. for letters and postcards;
15.994 oz. for large envelopes (flats).
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8952
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dbpedia
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2
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https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/north-africa/algeria
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en
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Human Rights Watch
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https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/favicon.ico
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https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/favicon.ico
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Algerian authorities continue to arrest and imprison peaceful activists, human rights defenders, and journalists for their critical expression. Some of them face terrorism-related charges based on an overbroad definition of terrorism. The authorities have dubiously labeled two political opposition groups, the Rachad Movement, and the Movement for the Self-Determination of the Kabylie region (MAK) as “terrorist organizations” in May 2021. The crackdown on opposition parties, independent civil society organizations, and media outlets connected to the “Hirak” pro-reform protest movement has intensified since President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was elected in 2019. Between June 2022 and April 2023, the authorities dissolved two prominent organizations, the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH) and Rassemblement Action Jeunesse (RAJ) as well as two media outlets, Radio M and Maghreb Emergent.
|
en
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/sites/default/files/favicon.ico
|
https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/north-africa/algeria
|
Algerian authorities continue to arrest and imprison peaceful activists, human rights defenders, and journalists for their critical expression. Some of them face terrorism-related charges based on an overbroad definition of terrorism. The authorities have dubiously labeled two political opposition groups, the Rachad Movement, and the Movement for the Self-Determination of the Kabylie region (MAK) as “terrorist organizations” in May 2021. The crackdown on opposition parties, independent civil society organizations, and media outlets connected to the “Hirak” pro-reform protest movement has intensified since President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was elected in 2019. Between June 2022 and April 2023, the authorities dissolved two prominent organizations, the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH) and Rassemblement Action Jeunesse (RAJ) as well as two media outlets, Radio M and Maghreb Emergent.
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8952
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https://www.decapoa.com/en/countries/algeria-labeling.php
|
en
|
Labeling in Algeria: conformity and quality
|
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All shipments that do not show correct labeling are blocked and rejected by Algerian customs, without the possibility of derogation. Required certifications.
|
en
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assets/img/favicon.png
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https://www.decapoa.com
|
In March 2011, the Algerian Ministry of Commerce published a note to all importers reminding them of the obligation to present proof of conformity of the products to be imported by means of a certificate of conformity or quality certificate for all exports to the country, to ensure that they meet the relevant legal and regulatory requirements that apply to them. This obligation is imposed by the Law 09-03 of 25/02/2009 relating to the protection of consumers and the prevention of fraud and by the Decree 05-467 of 12/12/2005, on the conditions and procedures for checking the conformity of imported goods at customs. The required Certificate of Conformity may also be referred to as the "Certificat de contrôle de qualité". This document must certify that the goods are in compliance with the regulations and technical standards of the country. The original copy of the certificate of conformity is required for each shipment and should be issued in the exporting country. This is a mandatory document. These provisions first of all establish that the mandatory label must be firmly attached to the packaging or printed on it. The indications (name under which the product is distributed, references of the manufacturer, of the importer, indication of the net content expressed in metric international units, methods of use of any precautions), must be reported clearly, legibly and using indelible ink. For the import of food, it is provided that if the volume or weight is less than 5 liters or 5 kg, any material for transport can be used except glass or transparent plastic that have the shape of bottles or jars. A note was published on the Algerian Ministry of Commerce website (March 2012) referring to the data of the importer indicated on the labels and packaging of goods destined for Algeria. This note became necessary after numerous shipments were found, and consequently blocked, in which the labels on the packaging reported incorrect data of the importer (name and address). These checks were carried out by the Quality and Fraud Control Service active on the Algerian border under the authority of the Ministry of Commerce. Therefore, starting from 1 July 2011, all shipments that do not report the correct data are blocked and rejected by Algerian customs, without the possibility of derogation. Consequently, exporters must ensure that they obtain the exact identity and relative references of the importer, and that the same data is indicated on the markings of the products being shipped, avoiding over-labeling, double labeling, company names and different addresses. Product packaging regulation is also present in product labeling legislation. With reference to the authorized languages relating to packaging and labeling, it is specified that all products sold at retail on the Algerian market must be accompanied by an information brochure in Arabic. Please note that all food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical products must be "halal", that is, in compliance with the precepts of the Muslim religion, and it is recommended that you obtain this certificate before exporting.
Note the following:
This website and the information contained therein have been developed and provided by the Studio Legale de Capoa for information purposes only.This website is not intended to be, and does not replace, legal assistance. Do not use any information contained in these pages as a source of legal advice.This website contains direct links to sites that have not been prepared by the Studio Legale de Capoa. These links are offered as a courtesy. Studio Legale de Capoa has no relationship with them, and their mention does not imply validation or approval. Studio Legale de Capoa is not responsible for the contents of all linked sites or for all links contained in linked sites.This website is not for advertising purposes. Studio Legale de Capoa does not intend to represent anyone seeking representation on the basis of the review of this website in any place where it does not comply with all laws and ethical rules. No lawyer-client relationship is established between the users of the site and the de Capoa Law Firm.
|
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| 55
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https://www.unicefusa.org/what-unicef-does/where-unicef-works/africa/algeria
|
en
|
UNICEF in Algeria
|
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en
|
/sites/default/files/favicon.svg
|
UNICEF USA
|
https://www.unicefusa.org/what-unicef-does/where-unicef-works/africa/algeria
|
Challenges for children in Algeria
Since its independence from France in 1962, Algeria has made enormous progress in promoting the rights of children.
UNICEF's mission in Algeria supports the country's efforts to advance progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals. As a strong government partner, UNICEF provides strategic insights, resources and technical expertise on matters pertaining to the well-being of children, especially the most vulnerable, including Sahrawi refugee children living in the southwestern province of Tindouf.
How UNICEF is helping children in Algeria
UNICEF programming in Algeria focuses on four areas: education, health care, child protection and social policy.
In health, UNICEF provides essential services like vaccinations and maternal care to help safeguard the well-being of mothers and children. Related priorities include:
collaborating with the Ministry of Health to improve access to quality health care services
assisting in widespread vaccination coverage by procuring digital monitoring devices, training health staff and organizing activities to increase awareness and efficacy of child immunization
supporting the launch of the new vaccination calendar by designing and printing new vaccination and health booklets for 1 million children
strengthening emergency response capabilities with a robust alert system for public health crises
engaging communities to increase awareness and participation in polio vaccination campaigns
upgrading oxygen systems in hospitals to enhance maternal and child health care services
In education, UNICEF is focused on:
collaborating with the Ministry of Education to enhance early childhood education standards
providing practical training sessions for teachers and developing digital resources for classrooms
implementing measures to identify and support students at risk of dropping out of school
expanding vocational training opportunities for vulnerable adolescents
promoting inclusive education practices for children with disabilities
integrating sports programs into school curricula
Safeguarding children's rights in Algeria
UNICEF also works in Algeria to help fortify child protection systems — playing a pivotal role in advocating for robust laws and policies aimed at shielding Algeria’s children from various forms of violence, abuse and exploitation. This work involves:
strengthening national capacities in developing and implementing child-friendly justice procedures and legal reform processes in line with international standards
training police on child rights and gender issues, as well as procedures on child abductions and disappearances, profiling techniques and cybercrime and computer investigations
providing technical expertise to help design child-friendly interview rooms
Through strategic partnerships with government agencies and civil society organizations, UNICEF also:
actively engages in policy dialogue and legislative advocacy to address gaps in child protection frameworks
continues to collaborate with the Algerian government to develop and strengthen child welfare services, establish reporting mechanisms for cases of abuse and provide support for victims
conducts training programs for Algerian professionals working with children, equipping them with skills and knowledge to identify and respond to cases of violence and exploitation more effectively
How UNICEF supports child refugees in Algeria
Among the world’s most vulnerable people are the Sahrawi refugees living in five refugee camps near the city of Tindouf in southwestern Algeria. Some have been there for nearly half a century, victims of a protracted and often forgotten crisis that began decades ago in Western Sahara — a war that forced people to flee in search of safety.
The region’s harsh climate and extreme weather conditions make it virtually impossible to grow food, making these refugees almost entirely dependent on humanitarian aid and food assistance for their survival.
UNICEF plays an important role in providing essential support to Sahrawi refugees, particularly children, in Tindouf. Collaborating closely with partners like UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) and the World Food Program, UNICEF contributed significantly to the development of a joint Sahrawi Refugee Response Plan, which focuses on enhancing inter-agency coordination and fundraising for Sahrawi children.
UNICEF's health care initiatives in Algeria — including timely vaccine procurement and midwife training — have improved access to health care and support for maternal and child nutrition. UNICEF has distributed school kits to thousands of Sahrawi children, supported teacher trainings and implemented literacy programs, among other measures that help ensure access to quality education.
Strong partnerships with government ministries, civil society organizations and UN agencies further underscore UNICEF's commitment to advancing child rights and social protection among the Sahrawi. Through its multifaceted approach, UNICEF continues to make a tangible impact on the lives of this vulnerable community.
Learn more about how UNICEF supports child refugees and other children on the move around the world.
UNICEF works in over 190 countries and territories to ensure children are healthy, educated, protected and respected. Unrestricted donations provide UNICEF with the flexibility to adapt to changing needs and deploy resources where and when they are needed most. Support UNICEF. Donate today.
|
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8952
|
dbpedia
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| 19
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https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/is-algeria-next-great-travel-destination-in-africa
|
en
|
Is Algeria the next great travel destination in Africa?
|
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[
"Henry Wismayer"
] |
2022-10-10T15:37:51.456000+00:00
|
Ancient fortified towns, Roman ruins, and Sahara sands make Africa’s largest country an undiscovered tourism giant hiding in plain sight.
|
en
|
Travel
|
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/is-algeria-next-great-travel-destination-in-africa
|
From the open roof of the watchtower, above the labyrinth of narrow alleys and serried rooftops, Ghardaïa appears as a rolling tableau of jumbled pastel cubes.
The only hints of modernity are the Tannoy speakers projecting from the mud-walled minarets at the summit of each hill. Otherwise, we could be looking at a scene from any century in the last 10.
Despite its proximity to Europe, and vast presence on the north coast of Africa–roughly the size of Alaska and Texas combined—Algeria and many of its most spectacular sights are little known to travelers outside of its borders.
“Algeria is one of the world’s hardest places to enter and among the least visited,” says Andrew Farrand, senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council, a foreign affairs think tank. “Of the two million or so official tourist arrivals each year, most are members of the Algerian diaspora coming home to visit family. Only a handful are foreign visitors.”
For those willing to negotiate the bureaucratic hurdles to get here, Algeria is arguably one of the most rewarding destinations that you can reach via a short-haul flight from mainland Europe. Today, vitally, it is also considered to be safe and relatively stable. Most foreign governments advise only against travel to its borders with Libya and Niger.
Legacy of French colonialism
The origins of Algeria’s anonymity lie in the recent past. Between 1830 and 1962, it was the most prized possession of the French empire . Independence came in 1962, but only after a bloody eight-year war between Algerian insurgents and French colonists which claimed between 400,000 and a million lives.
“France’s barbaric efforts to destroy Algerian culture bred deep anti-Western sentiment,” says Adel Hamaizia, a visiting fellow at Harvard University. “In the aftermath, the newly independent country was very motivated to rebuild and protect its religious and cultural identity .”
In the 1990s, as tourism to neighbors Morocco and Tunisia surged, Algeria was mired in what its people refer to as the “Black Decade,” when an Islamist insurgency instigated a bloody and protracted civil war. Anti-government protests toppled the administration of long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika as recently as April 2019.
Developing tourism
One legacy of this domestic upheaval is a prevailing attitude toward overseas visitors that is, if not actually hostile, then at least indifferent. The visa application process is Byzantine. Tourism promotion is non-existent. During my trip to the country in the spring, the only guidebook I could get my hands on was a second-hand Berlitz pocket-guide published in 1990.
The government’s disinterest in tourism, many observers argue, is due to the economic dominance of hydrocarbons. Algeria’s oil and gas sector comprises 20 percent of its GDP. Tourism, by contrast, accounts for barely 0.1 percent.
(Learn about this ancient Saudi Arabian city working to attract more tourists.)
“The oil curse infects everything,” says Farrand. “The industry gives the Algerian state the money it needs to avoid the hard work of developing more complex sectors like tourism.” According to recent reports, the spike in oil and gas prices as a result of the war in Ukraine has meant that Algeria exceeded its export targets for the first half of 2022 by 70 percent.
Wonders hidden in plain sight
Nevertheless, the rewards for coming here are many. Algeria is in several ways a giant hiding in plain sight. In the band of fertile land that hugs its Mediterranean coast are historic cities like Constantine, Oran, and the capital Algiers. Ancient Roman outposts like Djemila and Timgad (both UNESCO World Heritage sites) are among the best preserved archaeological destinations in North Africa. South, in the Saharan interior, the dune seas of the Great Ergs crash against the sandstone massifs of Hoggar and Tassili n’Ajjer.
“We’ve had record interest this autumn, but you can still go days in Algeria without seeing another tourist,” says Omar Zahafi, whose tour company, Fancyellow, caters almost exclusively to foreign visitors. “When we visit the Roman ruins and clients ask why there are no other people, I like to joke that I booked the site for them especially!”
Few places embody the tension between Algeria’s insularity and its tourist potential like Ghardaïa, the ancestral home of the Mozabites, Algeria’s fourth largest Berber tribe. A sprawling oasis town, 380 miles south of Algiers on the Trans Sahara Highway, it is a place where Algerian life is at its most traditional.
(Learn why Morocco is so full of music—and where you can hear it.)
It’s early afternoon in El Atteuf, one of five ksours, or hilltop citadels, that are collectively known as “the Pentapolis.” Once separate entities, the five walled towns have long since merged together into a labyrinthine conurbation that snakes along the desiccated valley of the M’Zab River. (Ghardaïa is both the name of the largest citadel and an unofficial shorthand for the whole region.) The French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir once likened it to “a Cubist painting, beautifully constructed.”
Like most places in Algeria, Ghardaïa is best explored with a guide. Indeed, in the ksours themselves, one is obligatory. Rules laid down by religious councils, which uphold a strict form of Ibadi Islam, permit entry to outsiders only at certain times of the day, and only in the company of a local chaperone. Some married women dress in the haik, a white garment that is wrapped around the body and head, leaving only a single eye exposed. Motorized transport is prohibited. Rubbish is still collected by donkey.
My guide, Hassissane Hadjsmael, a butcher with an impish air, leads us through the tranquil alleyways. In the middle of the day, when most of the valley’s inhabitants take a siesta, the lanes are populated only with gaggles of bashful children.
The citadel’s architectural consistency is a result of age-old norms of design and decoration. Up close, you can see that the walls are rendered in clay, then stippled with palm fronds to deflect the heat of the sun.
Hadjsmael gestures us through a low doorway and into a model interior now preserved as an unofficial museum. Inside is a pillared quadrangle with an open roof. Recesses on each side are bedecked in carpets. Most houses in the old towns have a similar footprint, albeit with some concessions to the 21st century. “My place is similar,” says Hadjsmael. “But I do have a big plasma TV.”
Change arrives slowly in Ghardaïa, but it does arrive. On the outskirts are the palmeries, groves of date palms whose fruits were once the backbone of the local economy. Now, its old summer homes are being converted into guesthouses.
In one of them, I meet travelers from Ohio sitting in a Berber tent set up in a shady courtyard. A musician, rakish in a dark green Tuareg turban, plucks at an oud under an olive tree heavy with fruit.
“You can tell that a lot of the people in Algeria are eager to share their country with the world,” says Katelyn Jarvis, an investment advisor from Cincinnati. “Nearly every interaction we’ve had has resulted in an invitation to visit peoples’ towns or to share a meal at their homes.”
Tourism is in its infancy here, but the hospitality is instinctive.
“I recently got my license to start hosting foreigners,” the guesthouse owner, Rostom Labchek, tells me. “I hope that more of them will come.”
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Annex 13 Declaration | #MobilityMinute
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Senior Manager Noman Khan discusses Algeria's Annex 13 Declaration, which is ideal for short-term foreign workers performing urgent and exceptional work and allows for shorter work authorization wait times. Noman also shares an overview of the process and requirements for entering Algeria through this program.
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en
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Fragomen - Immigration attorneys, solicitors, and consultants worldwide - Annex 13 Declaration | #MobilityMinute
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https://www.fragomen.com/insights/annex-13-declaration-or-mobilityminute.html
|
Fragomen is honored as a Gold winner at Step Two's 2024 Intranet and Digital Workplace Awards, recognizing the firm's "Immigration Knowledge Library."
Partners Julia Onslow-Cole, Bo Cooper and Edward Raleigh discuss the impact of global elections on the immigration landscape.
Partner Charlotte Wills discusses the future of the UK hospitality sector under the new Labour government.
Partner Julia Onslow-Cole shares how changes in immigration policy before and after elections can impact talent mobility.
This blog covers the implications of residency status changes in Switzerland and their complexities.
Partner Rahul Soni and Associate Nathalia Carneiro discuss the EB-5 program for Brazilian investors.
Senior Manager Ben Morgan, Manager Luigi Grecola and Assistant Manager Elena Pasini discuss Italy's introduction of a digital nomad visa program and outline the eligibility criteria, benefits and challenges.
Recognized as a WWL Thought Leader, Co-Chair Lance Kaplan shares his insights on leading a global firm in this Q&A.
Partner Rachel Beardsley and Associate Michelle Yang discuss new initiatives in the US aimed at improving technology in the agriculture sector.
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https://www.stimson.org/2024/lessons-learned-covering-the-iran-hostage-crisis/
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The "Algerian Connection": Lessons Learned from Covering the Iran Hostage Crisis • Stimson Center
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"Joaquin Matamis"
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2024-02-28T16:00:07+00:00
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Algeria's role in freeing 52 U.S. diplomats from captivity in Iran provides valuable insights for mediators seeking to free hostages today.
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en
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Stimson Center
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https://www.stimson.org/2024/lessons-learned-covering-the-iran-hostage-crisis/
|
Hostage-taking is an old practice that has become all too common in modern times as states and non-state actors try to advance a variety of goals.
All hostage situations differ in specific facts and context. Yet parallels can be drawn between the efforts to free Israeli hostages held by Hamas and the diplomacy that ended the most infamous hostage crisis in American memory – the seizure of 52 U.S. diplomats who were kept prisoner for 444 days in revolutionary Iran.
Algeria’s work as the intermediary in that crisis remains a model for conducting hostage diplomacy. The author, a journalist who covered that diplomacy for ABC News and later became a U.S. diplomat in the Middle East, learned much about the ingredients for successful hostage mediation from direct observation and discussions with Algerian diplomats at the time. The author also covered other hostage stories over the decades, including ones in which friends and colleagues were held captive, and served as an embassy spokesperson in several such crises. Following is an account of the author’s Algeria experience.
The usually opaque visages of the two Concorde passengers showed undisguised surprise as I entered the tightly spaced cabin. I had covered U.S.-Iran hostage negotiations for weeks in Algiers as part of an ABC News global cell preparing a documentary to air whenever the crisis would end. Chasing reliable tips, I boarded the supersonic Paris-to-Washington D.C. flight on Dec. 26, 1980.
More than a year had already passed since Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, 1979. Multiple efforts – diplomatic as well as military – had failed to secure the release of the U.S. hostages. Algeria’s government announced on Nov. 3, 1980, that it would serve as the intermediary between Iran and the U.S., which had severed diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic in the wake of the embassy seizure. It took 79 more days until the 52 Americans were finally freed in the last hours of Jimmy Carter’s presidency just before Ronald Reagan took the oath of office on Jan. 20, 1981.
On that first short trans-Atlantic flight, Algeria’s ambassador to the U.S., Redha Malek, and the Algerian ambassador to Iran, Abdulkarim Gheraib, agreed to speak briefly. Our initial Concorde conversation was the first of many with the ambassadors not only in the stratosphere but on three continents over subsequent decades. Following are some of the lessons conveyed, with their insights, taken from my notes, italicized.
An unbiased intermediary with connections to both adversaries is optimal. Algeria had diplomatic relations with both the U.S. and Iran and had not taken sides with either. We Algerians are completely dedicated to fulfilling our nation’s diplomatic mission as neutral intermediary, and mediator.
One chief intermediatory must take charge of negotiations. After a year of failed efforts, the U.S. and Iran had learned that “too many cooks spoil the broth.” We Algerians work together as one team. We are entrusted as messengers, unbiased interpreters to coordinate negotiations between two adversarial nations.
The intermediaries should be professional envoys who are credible, dedicated, trustworthy and ethical. In the global diplomatic arena, Algeria was known for professional diplomacy and geopolitical nonalignment. This made it possible for both the U.S. and Iran to accept Algeria as the trusted go-between.
The intermediaries should devote their full attention to the negotiations and be diplomatic, tenacious yet patient, detail-oriented, and precise. On Dec. 31, 1980, the author, after covering Algeria-U.S. meetings in Washington, was onboard another Concorde, following the two Algerians to Paris. This diplomatic mission is extremely delicate, requiring careful balance, our complete attention. We are hopeful our efforts will bring resolution. On the next day, New Year’s 1981, both Algerian diplomats flew to Iran to deliver messages from their meetings in Washington. Their focus on crisis resolution was total.
Other experts are needed to augment the main negotiators. By the beginning of January 1981, other diplomats, and specialists from both the U.S. and Iran made Algiers their base of operations. Algerian officials, led by Foreign Minister Mohamed-Seddik Benyahia and Ambassadors Gheraib and Malek, and Algerian Central Bank Chairman Mohammed Seghir Mostefai, worked separately with the Americans and Iranians. Negotiations centered on the U.S. demand for the release of all hostages and Iran’s demand for the release of a significant portion of monetary assets frozen in the U.S. after the embassy takeover.
The agreement details need to be precise, ideally requiring the release of all hostages at once, not phased to avoid last-minute glitches. On Jan. 19, 1981, the Algiers Accords for Hostages Release was signed separately by senior representatives of the U.S. and Iran. Then Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed the agreement in the U.S. ambassador to Algeria’s residence. Once the Iranians had also signed and Algeria confirmed the signatures, the signal was relayed to Iran to allow an Algerian plane with all American hostages on board to leave Tehran for Algiers.
Diplomacy resolved the crisis, not military action. On Tuesday, Jan. 20, 1981, at 3 a.m. an Air Algerie plane landed in Algiers with the 52 Americans for handover to U.S. officials and transfer to a U.S. Air Force plane. Global news media covered the historic moment at Algiers airport and subsequent coverage focused on the former hostages’ arrival at the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein, Germany.
In the U.S. and around the world, there was split-screen television live coverage of Reagan’s inauguration and the hostages’ release.
Two days later, still working as ABC News’ “Algerian Connection,” the author interviewed Ambassador Malek for our documentary at his ambassadorial residence in Washington. Diplomacy with diplomatic negotiations is always the ideal solution, not military action, or other violent confrontation. We believe our work has demonstrated the value of diplomacy in conflict. His concluding words about diplomatic work were important, but, unfortunately, not on camera.
Diplomacy can be covered as a dramatic news story. ABC News’ award-winning documentary “America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations” aired in four parts. The first was on Jan. 22, and the final three parts on Jan. 28 that year. Though Algeria’s role was given relatively little airtime in the final documentary, Algerian diplomacy was essential to the non-violent, successful conclusion to a story that had held world attention for 444 days and that continues to influence U.S. and global perceptions about Iran.
More than four decades later, Algeria’s model as a successful, neutral diplomatic intermediary still provides important lessons for hostage diplomacy today.
Elizabeth (Liz) Colton, Ph.D., a former Emmy Award-winning journalist, and later diplomat, currently teaches Diplomacy & the Media for UNITAR and partner international universities’ global online courses. She serves as board chair of Reporters Without Borders-Reporters Sans Frontieres RSF-USA/North America and also as a Diplomat & Journalist in Residence at Warren Wilson College.
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Algeria is a large oil and gas producer and exporter. In 2015, the country updated its Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Development Plan to 2030, and put greater focus on the deployment of large-scale renewables, including solar PV and ons
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/assets/front/images/favicon.ico
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IEA
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https://www.iea.org/countries/algeria
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Thank you for subscribing. You can unsubscribe at any time by clicking the link at the bottom of any IEA newsletter.
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8952
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dbpedia
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0
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https://www.decapoa.com/en/countries/algeria-labeling.php
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en
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Labeling in Algeria: conformity and quality
|
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"Labelling in Algeria"
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All shipments that do not show correct labeling are blocked and rejected by Algerian customs, without the possibility of derogation. Required certifications.
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en
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assets/img/favicon.png
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https://www.decapoa.com
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In March 2011, the Algerian Ministry of Commerce published a note to all importers reminding them of the obligation to present proof of conformity of the products to be imported by means of a certificate of conformity or quality certificate for all exports to the country, to ensure that they meet the relevant legal and regulatory requirements that apply to them. This obligation is imposed by the Law 09-03 of 25/02/2009 relating to the protection of consumers and the prevention of fraud and by the Decree 05-467 of 12/12/2005, on the conditions and procedures for checking the conformity of imported goods at customs. The required Certificate of Conformity may also be referred to as the "Certificat de contrôle de qualité". This document must certify that the goods are in compliance with the regulations and technical standards of the country. The original copy of the certificate of conformity is required for each shipment and should be issued in the exporting country. This is a mandatory document. These provisions first of all establish that the mandatory label must be firmly attached to the packaging or printed on it. The indications (name under which the product is distributed, references of the manufacturer, of the importer, indication of the net content expressed in metric international units, methods of use of any precautions), must be reported clearly, legibly and using indelible ink. For the import of food, it is provided that if the volume or weight is less than 5 liters or 5 kg, any material for transport can be used except glass or transparent plastic that have the shape of bottles or jars. A note was published on the Algerian Ministry of Commerce website (March 2012) referring to the data of the importer indicated on the labels and packaging of goods destined for Algeria. This note became necessary after numerous shipments were found, and consequently blocked, in which the labels on the packaging reported incorrect data of the importer (name and address). These checks were carried out by the Quality and Fraud Control Service active on the Algerian border under the authority of the Ministry of Commerce. Therefore, starting from 1 July 2011, all shipments that do not report the correct data are blocked and rejected by Algerian customs, without the possibility of derogation. Consequently, exporters must ensure that they obtain the exact identity and relative references of the importer, and that the same data is indicated on the markings of the products being shipped, avoiding over-labeling, double labeling, company names and different addresses. Product packaging regulation is also present in product labeling legislation. With reference to the authorized languages relating to packaging and labeling, it is specified that all products sold at retail on the Algerian market must be accompanied by an information brochure in Arabic. Please note that all food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical products must be "halal", that is, in compliance with the precepts of the Muslim religion, and it is recommended that you obtain this certificate before exporting.
Note the following:
This website and the information contained therein have been developed and provided by the Studio Legale de Capoa for information purposes only.This website is not intended to be, and does not replace, legal assistance. Do not use any information contained in these pages as a source of legal advice.This website contains direct links to sites that have not been prepared by the Studio Legale de Capoa. These links are offered as a courtesy. Studio Legale de Capoa has no relationship with them, and their mention does not imply validation or approval. Studio Legale de Capoa is not responsible for the contents of all linked sites or for all links contained in linked sites.This website is not for advertising purposes. Studio Legale de Capoa does not intend to represent anyone seeking representation on the basis of the review of this website in any place where it does not comply with all laws and ethical rules. No lawyer-client relationship is established between the users of the site and the de Capoa Law Firm.
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https://www.nbcolympics.com/news/french-born-kaylia-nemour-wins-historic-olympic-gold-algeria-suni-lee-claims-bronze
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en
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French-born Kaylia Nemour wins historic Olympic gold for Algeria; Suni Lee claims bronze
|
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2024-08-04T10:15:00
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For the first time in history, Algeria has not just an Olympic medalist in gymnastics – but a gold medalist. Kaylia Nemour (15.700), topped reigning world champion Qiu Qiyuan (15.500) and Suni Lee, who won bronze on the event in Tokyo. Lee now has six Olympic medals to her name.
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NBC Olympics
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https://www.nbcolympics.com/news/french-born-kaylia-nemour-wins-historic-olympic-gold-algeria-suni-lee-claims-bronze
|
For the first time in history, Algeria has not just an Olympic medalist in gymnastics — but a gold medalist.
Kaylia Nemour (15.700), who is also the first Olympic medalist in gymnastics from Africa, topped the reigning world champion from China, Qiu Qiyuan (15.500), and Tokyo Olympic bronze medalist Suni Lee (14.800). With the bronze on bars, Lee now has six Olympic medals to her name, with one more medal opportunity in the balance beam final on Aug. 5.
RESULTS
Nemour’s gold medal is a result the French Gymnastics Federation would have loved to have. Hopes were high for the reigning world team bronze medalists coming into its home Olympic Games, but when the chalk dust settled in Bercy Arena following qualifications, the team did not advance to the team final or any individual event finals.
Nemour is one of the top gymnasts from France, however, she won the gold medal with the letters ‘ALG’ on the side of her leotard.
Just over one year ago, Nemour probably didn’t see herself standing atop the podium in Paris.
Nemour, who trains roughly 150 miles from Paris, began competing for her father’s birth country of Algeria in 2023. This came after a long dispute with the French Gymnastics Federation.
In 2021, Nemour developed osteochondritis, a joint condition in her knees that required multiple surgeries which took her out of the sport for nearly a year. Although her personal doctor cleared her to compete, the French national team doctor — who had never examined her — refused to clear her.
With just one year to go until the Games, Nemour’s career came to a standstill.
With her final qualification opportunity for the Games quickly approaching, Nemour decided to switch her nationally to represent Algeria. However, the French federation did not approve the change, meaning Nemour wouldn’t be able to compete until July 2023.
That date fell after the African Championships, a crucial event for Nemour as she needed to compete in it to qualify for the world championships. Success there would then enable her to secure a spot at the Paris Olympics.
An online petition demanding the release of Nemour garnered over 6,000 signatures. In May 2023, six French gymnasts disclosed instances of abuse during their time on the national team. French Minister for Sport and the Olympic & Paralympic Games, Amelie Oudea-Castera, pledged to investigate the allegations. She also convened a meeting with the French Gymnastics Federation to address various issues within the sport, including Nemour's nationality dispute.
Subsequently, the Federation announced that Nemour could represent Algeria, clearing her to compete less than two weeks before the African Championships.
Nemour has made the absolute most of the opportunity. She first turned heads in her world championship debut in 2023 where she finished second on the uneven bars, becoming the first African gymnast to win a world medal.
In what is still considered a home Games for Nemour, she finished fifth in the all-around final in addition to bringing home the gold on the uneven bars.
"I am very, very, very happy with what I was able to do today," Nemour said. "I am still a little shocked ... It was my ultimate dream, years of work and hard work, details. I think it is really crazy and I am really honored to have been able to win this medal, its a first for me and for Algeria too. I hope I made them proud."
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https://www.cidob.org/en/publication/algerias-cautious-return-world-stage
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en
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Algeria’s cautious return to the world stage
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The sharp increase in gas prices and France’s withdrawal from Mali have boosted Algeria’s international profile. As Algeria returns cautiously to the world stage, the French and Algerian presidents are engaging in a serious strategic conversation. This dialogue is however complicated by France’s reluctance to address the question of contamination from nuclear tests carried out in the Sahara in the 1960s. The French military exit from Mali has seen regional countries – rather than the United States and France – taking the lead on enhancing security in the Sahel under the auspices of the Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), which groups the army chiefs of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Even so, Algeria is unlikely to be able to fully capitalise on France’s departure and regain the influence, indeed the swagger, it enjoyed internationally in the 1970s and 80s. The reason: Algeria’s failure to enact bold economic reforms, depriving the country of a much more vibrant economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington forced US and European leaders to build a new security framework along the arc of crisis that stretched from the Baltic through eastern Europe and the Middle East to Morocco, and eastwards as far as Afghanistan. The decade between these two momentous events witnessed a civil war in Algeria which isolated the country from its North African and European neighbours. In his 20 years in office from 1999 to 2019, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika failed to return Algeria to the prominence it enjoyed for a generation after independence in 1962, when it was an important player in forums such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Non-Aligned Movement, and a key broker in the release of the US diplomats held hostage in Tehran in 1981. Non-Alignment revisited Like other nations in the Global South, Algeria has begun to chart a course of its own. Until a year ago, the wheels of history had made Algeria’s refusal to align with either Russia or America – a bedrock of its foreign policy and military doctrine since the days of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), which was disbanded in 1962 – look rather quaint. This is less true since Turkey has increasingly mapped out a diplomatic, military and economic path distinct from that of NATO, of which it is a member, while Saudi Arabia has built up OPEC+ with Russia in open defiance of American wishes. The manner in which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman articulate their countries’ policies increasingly resembles the foreign policy music emanating from Algeria. This is not a revival of Non-Alignment, Bandung-style. It represents what is best described as the untethering of countries which were closely allied to the US. They are no longer prepared to do America’s bidding if they perceive their interests diverge from those of Washington. There are of course limitations, with Saudi Arabia, for example, remaining dependent on US security guarantees. The EU misread the role of gas in the energy transition The war in Ukraine has accelerated the reshuffling of economic, diplomatic and security pieces on the international relations chessboard. Algeria, like Saudi Arabia, is riding high because of soaring hydrocarbon prices – exports of oil and gas earned the country an estimated $60-70 bn in 2022. As the third-largest outside supplier of gas to the European Union (EU) after Russia and Norway, Algeria has garnered greater influence than at any time in recent memory, despite being unable to increase exports in the past year compared to 2021. Since the turn of the century, and irrespective of the energy scenario, the EU underestimated the role natural gas would play in its energy transition. As a result, it has been scrambling to find other sources of gas to replace Russia since the EU’s decision to cut imports because of the war in Ukraine. The EU decided to phase out oil imports from Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia cut gas to the EU unilaterally and erratically. The Europeans never announced a formal embargo on Russian gas and would arguably have continued to import gas from this source for a longer period, as, unlike oil, it is difficult to replace. Europe’s problem is compounded by the fact that non-Russian gas producers will not, for the next three years at least, have much extra supply capacity. In addition, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is even scarcer than piped gas.French regional influence declines Stability in the Sahel has been jeopardised by internal and cross-border conflicts since the fall of Libyan dictator Colonel Gaddafi in 2011. Western officials have long said that their forces in Mali, Niger and other Sahel countries were fighting Islamic radicals. But in the ten years since French armed forces intervened to save the Malian capital, Bamako, local observers, old French hands in the region and most recently Algerian president Abdelmadjid Tebboune,1 have pointed out that conflicts in the Sahel are more complex. The spread of radical Islam is only one of numerous problems that also include bad governance, conflicts between herders and settled farmers, drug running, drought and climate change. When the Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), the Sahel military committee, was created in 2010 at Algeria’s initiative, France brushed it aside – the Sahel region was a traditional French zone of influence. A decade after it saved the Mali regime, the France has exited with little to show for its military interventions since 2013. This intervention opened the door to the Russian mercenary Wagner Group, a major French own goal. In a rare criticism of Russian policy in Africa, Tebboune argued that Wagner’s money would be better spent on economic development than providing Mali with weapons. The ambassadors of Germany and the African Union, alongside representatives of the permanent UN Security Council members, were present at the meeting in Algiers which endorsed the role of CEMOC, Germany and the African Union.TheGerman presence symbolised the country’s re-engagement in Africa, also in Algeria, where Germany ranks as the third-largest supplier of arms, not least eight wheel-drive armoured vehicles which are partly manufactured in the north African country. France’s new-found willingness to pay greater heed to Algeria’s security concerns speaks of a renewed realism in Paris that encourages Algeria’s return to the northwest African region where the former colonial power’s influence is dwindling. China has become Algeria’s most important commercial partner and its second-largest weapons (drones) supplier, while also gaining market share in Tunisia, Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish companies are ever more present in Algeria and Tunisia. Meanwhile Russia, whose comeback as a global power has been helped by the numerous Western missteps in the Middle East since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, continues to provide two thirds of Algeria’s weapons, as it has since the 1970s. Strong disagreements between France and Italy over policy in Libya and the reluctant support of most EU countries for French operations in the Sahel since 2013 have reduced the diplomatic influence France and its EU partners once enjoyed in the broader northwest African region. The West misreads Algeria Algeria is perceived in some Western circles as an ally of Russia and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Yet to regard the country’s relations with the West as unflinchingly adversarial would be a “gross mischaracterisation”. After all, Algeria developed its key oil, gas, mechanical and cement industries with loans from Western governments and banks and exports the bulk of its hydrocarbons to Western countries.In 1960, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev told France’s General de Gaulle that he favoured Algeria remaining in the French rather than American sphere of influence after independence. The USSR did not sell weapons to those Algerians who were fighting for independence between 1954 and 1962. Yet France refused sell weapons to Algeria in the following decade because the new state brandished its Third World credentials as a champion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) which was viewed as “terrorist” at the time. Similarly, the EU refused to arm the Algerian military during the civil war in the 1990s. However, the US granted satellite access, which enabled Algerian security to prevent attacks on oil and gas fields by the Armed Islamic Group.2 Meanwhile Algeria’s continues to support the Polisario liberation movement in the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara and recognises the Saharan Arab Republic, alongside more than half the member states of the African Union. The international status of this territory is yet to be settled despite strenuous efforts by the United Nations who have tried to broker an agreement between the parties since 1975. This has put Algeria at odds with Morocco which continues to benefit from strong diplomatic support from the US, France and Spain. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia provide both diplomatic and financial support to the kingdom, whose security and economic ties with Israel are getting stronger every day.Algeria continues to object to outside powers, whoever they may be, intervening militarily in Africa. Since independence and despite its massive weapons purchases in Russia, it has refused to allow Russian ships access to the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir on its western coast.More surprisingly Algeria has failed to get offset clauses included in its weapons contracts. This is a policy that countries such as India have pursued for many years. It allows the buyer to build up his domestic know-how and manufacture spare parts. Algeria has recently shifted its position where German armoured vehicles are concerned. Italy and Turkey are believed to have recently offered offset clauses for weapons Algeria is buying from them. The Maghreb reappraises relations with France Algerian commanders feared, rightly as subsequent events were to demonstrate, that a UN Security Council-mandated intervention in Libya in 2011 to protect civilians that morphed into a campaign to topple Gaddafi would spark a flow of arms from Libyan arsenals to radical Islamic groups in Syria and the Sahel. Two years later, the Algerian high command redeployed the bulk of its troops from the border with Morocco to the country’s frontier with Libya, Niger and Mali in the south and the east following an attack in 2013 by the Libyan-based Islamist Armed Group – which is linked to Al Qaeda – on the eastern Algerian gas field of Tiguentourine. In addition, Algeria spent tens of billions of dollars on new air bases and defence systems. Events after 2011 seemed to vindicate Algeria’s conviction that regional conflicts require regional solutions – not just military but political too. Only time will tell whether the revival of CEMOC will offer a way out of the crisis. While Algeria has worked hard to remain outside the French, American and Russian spheres of influence, it must now contend with the presence of Russian Wagner mercenaries in Mali, complicating its efforts to find regional solutions with no external interference. At the same time, Algeria’s improved relationship with France may owe something to the fact France–Morocco relations are going through a rough patch. King Mohammed VI knows he (or his dynasty) will outlive the French president and gambles that the alliance between the two countries is strong enough to survive current difficulties. Yet, French elites seem to fail to appreciate the growing bitterness felt by their North African counterparts at being taken for granted; while many ordinary people in North Africa object to what they see condescending treatment by Paris, and not simply where visas are concerned. This growing hostility towards France is a feature of politics across northwest Africa. The resentment many North Africans feel about France’s “neo-colonial” behaviour complicates the formulation of a bold Maghreb policy in Brussels where France’s voice carries weight. It maybe that middle powers such as Algeria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are simply following Lord Palmerston’s characterisation of UK foreign policy in a speech to parliament in 1848: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and those interests it is my duty to follow.” The EU’s inability to agree on a common approach as European countries scrambled to source more gas from Mediterranean producers symbolised their lack of diplomatic and economic influence in the region. It marks the retreat of the EU from playing a decisive role in shaping relations between the two shores of the mare nostrum. Italy strengthens economic ties with Algeria With a gas crisis looming in the autumn of 2021, Italy, dependant on Russian gas imports, was quick off the mark to engage with gas producers in Africa and the Middle East. Italy’s first port of call was Algeria. Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), the Italian state energy company, ensured that, by the end of 2023, the throughput of Algerian gas via the TransMed pipeline would rise from 21 billion cubic metres (bcm) to 30 bn. As things stand today, Italy is expected to receive 31 bcm of Algerian gas this year. As a result, every spare molecule of Algerian gas is going to Italy and France. Algerian gas exports this year are likely to be flat or might even decline slightly for the second year running due to a constant increase in domestic consumption fuelled by highly subsidised prices and the absence of exploration for new sources of gas. To address this, ENI last year secured a $1.5 bn contract with its Algerian counterpart Sonatrach to explore and develop new sources of gas, hydrogen, ammonia and electricity from renewable resources. ENI has two strong cards to play in Algeria. Back in 1958–1962, the company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, played a crucial role in advising the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in its effort to gain independence from France when France was attempting to prevent Algeria from gaining control of recently discovered Saharan oil fields. This helped cement political trust. The second card is the building in 1983 of the first ever underwater gas pipeline from Algeria to Sicily, an engineering feat that is a tribute to the sophistication of Italy’s oil and gas industry. The ENI deal cements Italy’s role as the new Mediterranean gas hub to the detriment of Spain, whose relations with Algeria nosedived as a result of its changed position on Western Sahara. The crisis has cost Spain 85% of its exports to Algeria. Even so, Sonatrech ensured that its Iberian peninsula clients would receive all the gas they had contracted despite a decision a year ago to close the pipeline from Algeria to Spain. Spain’s decision weakened Madrid’s diplomatic hand just as the high price of gas enhanced Algeria’s leverage. Algeria has further strengthened its hand by insisting that a clause be inserted in all its gas export contracts which allows Sonatrach to change the currency in which it is paid (traditionally US dollars) to other currencies, most likely roubles and renminbi. In doing so, Algeria was hedging against the increasing US weaponisation of international sanctions. Algeria further insists that international companies that purchase its gas do not resell (typically for higher prices) to others. Algeria’s two vulnerabilities Irrespective of the quality of its army officer corps, the large amounts it spends on defence (with the budget expected to increase by 20% in 2023), and the quality of its diplomatic corps, Algeria’s cautious return to the world stage will be slowed by the incapacity – some would say unwillingness – of its senior military officers to embrace desperately needed reform of the country’s command economy. This allows civil servants, who do not understand modern economics and finance and are often corrupt, to stifle young entrepreneurs with a mass of out-of-date regulations. Similarly, the military’s refusal to allow even a modicum of free public debate increases Algeria’s vulnerability. This was evident with the arrest on Christmas Eve of Ihsane El Kadi, the founder of Radio M and editor of the magazine Maghreb Emergent. It reminded Algerians of the death in prison six years earlier of the journalist Mohamed Tamalt after a three-month hunger strike and three subsequent months in a coma. Tamalt’s was the first death in prison of an Algerian journalist since independence in 1962. Until 2016, the private press was remarkably diverse and openly oppositional within the limits and interests of various factions of the military/security apparatus. That safety valve has disappeared. The absence of bold reforms of the oil and gas sector and of a thriving private sector, as well as the repression of freedom of expression and the media, and the endless run of incompetent older ministers have produced a parody as the regime “gradually takes on the traits of it most vicious caricatures” (Mallet, 1996). The sheer absurdity of so many Algerian bureaucratic rules is elegantly captured in a recent book (Farrand, 2021). The days when Algeria could act as a surrogate for the revolutionary masses, proxy for the progressive state and a model for the developing world have vanished into the mists of history. Algeria has condemned itself to significantly reduced influence compared to the 1970s and 1980s. Its return to the world stage is cautious because its leaders lack the confidence, let alone the vision, of predecessors such as presidents Boumédiène and Chadli and the ability to regain the county’s erstwhile brash swagger. References Farrand, Andrew G. The Algerian Dream, Youth and the Quest for Dignity. Potomac, MD, USA: New Degree Press, 2021. Mallet, Robert. The Call from Algeria. University of California Press, 1996Notes:1- Interviewed in Le Figaro (30 December 2022).2- According to interviews by the author with Colonel Fodil Saidi, head of the Department of Documentation and External Security (DDSE) 1993–1994. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/284/en
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https://www.cidob.org/en/publication/algerias-cautious-return-world-stage
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The sharp increase in gas prices and France’s withdrawal from Mali have boosted Algeria’s international profile.
As Algeria returns cautiously to the world stage, the French and Algerian presidents are engaging in a serious strategic conversation. This dialogue is however complicated by France’s reluctance to address the question of contamination from nuclear tests carried out in the Sahara in the 1960s.
The French military exit from Mali has seen regional countries – rather than the United States and France – taking the lead on enhancing security in the Sahel under the auspices of the Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), which groups the army chiefs of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
Even so, Algeria is unlikely to be able to fully capitalise on France’s departure and regain the influence, indeed the swagger, it enjoyed internationally in the 1970s and 80s. The reason: Algeria’s failure to enact bold economic reforms, depriving the country of a much more vibrant economy.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington forced US and European leaders to build a new security framework along the arc of crisis that stretched from the Baltic through eastern Europe and the Middle East to Morocco, and eastwards as far as Afghanistan. The decade between these two momentous events witnessed a civil war in Algeria which isolated the country from its North African and European neighbours. In his 20 years in office from 1999 to 2019, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika failed to return Algeria to the prominence it enjoyed for a generation after independence in 1962, when it was an important player in forums such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Non-Aligned Movement, and a key broker in the release of the US diplomats held hostage in Tehran in 1981.
Non-Alignment revisited
Like other nations in the Global South, Algeria has begun to chart a course of its own. Until a year ago, the wheels of history had made Algeria’s refusal to align with either Russia or America – a bedrock of its foreign policy and military doctrine since the days of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), which was disbanded in 1962 – look rather quaint. This is less true since Turkey has increasingly mapped out a diplomatic, military and economic path distinct from that of NATO, of which it is a member, while Saudi Arabia has built up OPEC+ with Russia in open defiance of American wishes. The manner in which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman articulate their countries’ policies increasingly resembles the foreign policy music emanating from Algeria. This is not a revival of Non-Alignment, Bandung-style. It represents what is best described as the untethering of countries which were closely allied to the US. They are no longer prepared to do America’s bidding if they perceive their interests diverge from those of Washington. There are of course limitations, with Saudi Arabia, for example, remaining dependent on US security guarantees.
The EU misread the role of gas in the energy transition
The war in Ukraine has accelerated the reshuffling of economic, diplomatic and security pieces on the international relations chessboard. Algeria, like Saudi Arabia, is riding high because of soaring hydrocarbon prices – exports of oil and gas earned the country an estimated $60-70 bn in 2022. As the third-largest outside supplier of gas to the European Union (EU) after Russia and Norway, Algeria has garnered greater influence than at any time in recent memory, despite being unable to increase exports in the past year compared to 2021.
Since the turn of the century, and irrespective of the energy scenario, the EU underestimated the role natural gas would play in its energy transition. As a result, it has been scrambling to find other sources of gas to replace Russia since the EU’s decision to cut imports because of the war in Ukraine. The EU decided to phase out oil imports from Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia cut gas to the EU unilaterally and erratically. The Europeans never announced a formal embargo on Russian gas and would arguably have continued to import gas from this source for a longer period, as, unlike oil, it is difficult to replace. Europe’s problem is compounded by the fact that non-Russian gas producers will not, for the next three years at least, have much extra supply capacity. In addition, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is even scarcer than piped gas.
French regional influence declines
Stability in the Sahel has been jeopardised by internal and cross-border conflicts since the fall of Libyan dictator Colonel Gaddafi in 2011. Western officials have long said that their forces in Mali, Niger and other Sahel countries were fighting Islamic radicals. But in the ten years since French armed forces intervened to save the Malian capital, Bamako, local observers, old French hands in the region and most recently Algerian president Abdelmadjid Tebboune,1 have pointed out that conflicts in the Sahel are more complex. The spread of radical Islam is only one of numerous problems that also include bad governance, conflicts between herders and settled farmers, drug running, drought and climate change.
When the Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), the Sahel military committee, was created in 2010 at Algeria’s initiative, France brushed it aside – the Sahel region was a traditional French zone of influence. A decade after it saved the Mali regime, the France has exited with little to show for its military interventions since 2013. This intervention opened the door to the Russian mercenary Wagner Group, a major French own goal. In a rare criticism of Russian policy in Africa, Tebboune argued that Wagner’s money would be better spent on economic development than providing Mali with weapons. The ambassadors of Germany and the African Union, alongside representatives of the permanent UN Security Council members, were present at the meeting in Algiers which endorsed the role of CEMOC, Germany and the African Union.TheGerman presence symbolised the country’s re-engagement in Africa, also in Algeria, where Germany ranks as the third-largest supplier of arms, not least eight wheel-drive armoured vehicles which are partly manufactured in the north African country.
France’s new-found willingness to pay greater heed to Algeria’s security concerns speaks of a renewed realism in Paris that encourages Algeria’s return to the northwest African region where the former colonial power’s influence is dwindling. China has become Algeria’s most important commercial partner and its second-largest weapons (drones) supplier, while also gaining market share in Tunisia, Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish companies are ever more present in Algeria and Tunisia. Meanwhile Russia, whose comeback as a global power has been helped by the numerous Western missteps in the Middle East since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, continues to provide two thirds of Algeria’s weapons, as it has since the 1970s. Strong disagreements between France and Italy over policy in Libya and the reluctant support of most EU countries for French operations in the Sahel since 2013 have reduced the diplomatic influence France and its EU partners once enjoyed in the broader northwest African region.
The West misreads Algeria
Algeria is perceived in some Western circles as an ally of Russia and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Yet to regard the country’s relations with the West as unflinchingly adversarial would be a “gross mischaracterisation”. After all, Algeria developed its key oil, gas, mechanical and cement industries with loans from Western governments and banks and exports the bulk of its hydrocarbons to Western countries.
In 1960, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev told France’s General de Gaulle that he favoured Algeria remaining in the French rather than American sphere of influence after independence. The USSR did not sell weapons to those Algerians who were fighting for independence between 1954 and 1962. Yet France refused sell weapons to Algeria in the following decade because the new state brandished its Third World credentials as a champion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) which was viewed as “terrorist” at the time. Similarly, the EU refused to arm the Algerian military during the civil war in the 1990s. However, the US granted satellite access, which enabled Algerian security to prevent attacks on oil and gas fields by the Armed Islamic Group.2 Meanwhile Algeria’s continues to support the Polisario liberation movement in the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara and recognises the Saharan Arab Republic, alongside more than half the member states of the African Union. The international status of this territory is yet to be settled despite strenuous efforts by the United Nations who have tried to broker an agreement between the parties since 1975. This has put Algeria at odds with Morocco which continues to benefit from strong diplomatic support from the US, France and Spain. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia provide both diplomatic and financial support to the kingdom, whose security and economic ties with Israel are getting stronger every day.
Algeria continues to object to outside powers, whoever they may be, intervening militarily in Africa. Since independence and despite its massive weapons purchases in Russia, it has refused to allow Russian ships access to the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir on its western coast.
More surprisingly Algeria has failed to get offset clauses included in its weapons contracts. This is a policy that countries such as India have pursued for many years. It allows the buyer to build up his domestic know-how and manufacture spare parts. Algeria has recently shifted its position where German armoured vehicles are concerned. Italy and Turkey are believed to have recently offered offset clauses for weapons Algeria is buying from them.
The Maghreb reappraises relations with France
Algerian commanders feared, rightly as subsequent events were to demonstrate, that a UN Security Council-mandated intervention in Libya in 2011 to protect civilians that morphed into a campaign to topple Gaddafi would spark a flow of arms from Libyan arsenals to radical Islamic groups in Syria and the Sahel. Two years later, the Algerian high command redeployed the bulk of its troops from the border with Morocco to the country’s frontier with Libya, Niger and Mali in the south and the east following an attack in 2013 by the Libyan-based Islamist Armed Group – which is linked to Al Qaeda – on the eastern Algerian gas field of Tiguentourine. In addition, Algeria spent tens of billions of dollars on new air bases and defence systems.
Events after 2011 seemed to vindicate Algeria’s conviction that regional conflicts require regional solutions – not just military but political too. Only time will tell whether the revival of CEMOC will offer a way out of the crisis. While Algeria has worked hard to remain outside the French, American and Russian spheres of influence, it must now contend with the presence of Russian Wagner mercenaries in Mali, complicating its efforts to find regional solutions with no external interference.
At the same time, Algeria’s improved relationship with France may owe something to the fact France–Morocco relations are going through a rough patch. King Mohammed VI knows he (or his dynasty) will outlive the French president and gambles that the alliance between the two countries is strong enough to survive current difficulties. Yet, French elites seem to fail to appreciate the growing bitterness felt by their North African counterparts at being taken for granted; while many ordinary people in North Africa object to what they see condescending treatment by Paris, and not simply where visas are concerned. This growing hostility towards France is a feature of politics across northwest Africa. The resentment many North Africans feel about France’s “neo-colonial” behaviour complicates the formulation of a bold Maghreb policy in Brussels where France’s voice carries weight.
It maybe that middle powers such as Algeria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are simply following Lord Palmerston’s characterisation of UK foreign policy in a speech to parliament in 1848: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and those interests it is my duty to follow.” The EU’s inability to agree on a common approach as European countries scrambled to source more gas from Mediterranean producers symbolised their lack of diplomatic and economic influence in the region. It marks the retreat of the EU from playing a decisive role in shaping relations between the two shores of the mare nostrum.
Italy strengthens economic ties with Algeria
With a gas crisis looming in the autumn of 2021, Italy, dependant on Russian gas imports, was quick off the mark to engage with gas producers in Africa and the Middle East. Italy’s first port of call was Algeria. Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), the Italian state energy company, ensured that, by the end of 2023, the throughput of Algerian gas via the TransMed pipeline would rise from 21 billion cubic metres (bcm) to 30 bn. As things stand today, Italy is expected to receive 31 bcm of Algerian gas this year. As a result, every spare molecule of Algerian gas is going to Italy and France. Algerian gas exports this year are likely to be flat or might even decline slightly for the second year running due to a constant increase in domestic consumption fuelled by highly subsidised prices and the absence of exploration for new sources of gas. To address this, ENI last year secured a $1.5 bn contract with its Algerian counterpart Sonatrach to explore and develop new sources of gas, hydrogen, ammonia and electricity from renewable resources.
ENI has two strong cards to play in Algeria. Back in 1958–1962, the company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, played a crucial role in advising the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in its effort to gain independence from France when France was attempting to prevent Algeria from gaining control of recently discovered Saharan oil fields. This helped cement political trust. The second card is the building in 1983 of the first ever underwater gas pipeline from Algeria to Sicily, an engineering feat that is a tribute to the sophistication of Italy’s oil and gas industry.
The ENI deal cements Italy’s role as the new Mediterranean gas hub to the detriment of Spain, whose relations with Algeria nosedived as a result of its changed position on Western Sahara. The crisis has cost Spain 85% of its exports to Algeria. Even so, Sonatrech ensured that its Iberian peninsula clients would receive all the gas they had contracted despite a decision a year ago to close the pipeline from Algeria to Spain. Spain’s decision weakened Madrid’s diplomatic hand just as the high price of gas enhanced Algeria’s leverage.
Algeria has further strengthened its hand by insisting that a clause be inserted in all its gas export contracts which allows Sonatrach to change the currency in which it is paid (traditionally US dollars) to other currencies, most likely roubles and renminbi. In doing so, Algeria was hedging against the increasing US weaponisation of international sanctions. Algeria further insists that international companies that purchase its gas do not resell (typically for higher prices) to others.
Algeria’s two vulnerabilities
Irrespective of the quality of its army officer corps, the large amounts it spends on defence (with the budget expected to increase by 20% in 2023), and the quality of its diplomatic corps, Algeria’s cautious return to the world stage will be slowed by the incapacity – some would say unwillingness – of its senior military officers to embrace desperately needed reform of the country’s command economy. This allows civil servants, who do not understand modern economics and finance and are often corrupt, to stifle young entrepreneurs with a mass of out-of-date regulations.
Similarly, the military’s refusal to allow even a modicum of free public debate increases Algeria’s vulnerability. This was evident with the arrest on Christmas Eve of Ihsane El Kadi, the founder of Radio M and editor of the magazine Maghreb Emergent. It reminded Algerians of the death in prison six years earlier of the journalist Mohamed Tamalt after a three-month hunger strike and three subsequent months in a coma. Tamalt’s was the first death in prison of an Algerian journalist since independence in 1962. Until 2016, the private press was remarkably diverse and openly oppositional within the limits and interests of various factions of the military/security apparatus. That safety valve has disappeared.
The absence of bold reforms of the oil and gas sector and of a thriving private sector, as well as the repression of freedom of expression and the media, and the endless run of incompetent older ministers have produced a parody as the regime “gradually takes on the traits of it most vicious caricatures” (Mallet, 1996). The sheer absurdity of so many Algerian bureaucratic rules is elegantly captured in a recent book (Farrand, 2021). The days when Algeria could act as a surrogate for the revolutionary masses, proxy for the progressive state and a model for the developing world have vanished into the mists of history. Algeria has condemned itself to significantly reduced influence compared to the 1970s and 1980s. Its return to the world stage is cautious because its leaders lack the confidence, let alone the vision, of predecessors such as presidents Boumédiène and Chadli and the ability to regain the county’s erstwhile brash swagger.
References
Farrand, Andrew G. The Algerian Dream, Youth and the Quest for Dignity. Potomac, MD, USA: New Degree Press, 2021.
Mallet, Robert. The Call from Algeria. University of California Press, 1996
Notes:
1- Interviewed in Le Figaro (30 December 2022).
2- According to interviews by the author with Colonel Fodil Saidi, head of the Department of Documentation and External Security (DDSE) 1993–1994.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/284/en
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https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/19/algeria-labells-opposition-movements-as-terrorist-groups//
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Algeria labels opposition movements as terrorist groups
|
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2021-05-19T00:00:00
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Ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for 12 June, the Algerian authorities are facing the challenge of popular protests and calls for a boycott of the elections.
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Africanews
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https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/19/algeria-labells-opposition-movements-as-terrorist-groups/
|
Algerian authorities on Tuesday labelled separatist group MAK and an opposition movement as terrorist organisations.
The High Council for National Security said the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK) and the Rachad opposition group were illegal and terrorist entities.
In April, the MAK, was accused by the Algerian authorities of planning attacks during the anti-government protests in the streets of Algiers.
The Mak is based in Paris and wants to split the ethnic Berber region of Kabylie from the rest of Algeria. It is accused by Algerian authorities of having separatist aims and anti-Arab sentiment.
On Wednesday, the head of Mak Ferhat Mehenni denounced the Algerian government's "obsession" to qualify the organisation as a terrorist group.
Mehenni also denounced police holding him in custody for a few hours as part of an investigation for money laundering in an organised gang.
"The MAK is not a terrorist organization and will never commit acts of violence. If there is violence, it can only be done by the Algerian services," he said.
The Rachad group is based in London and is an opposition political movement, which calls for a regime change in Algeria.
Members of these groups will now be convicted under a new law that punishes any Algerian joining an organisation abroad that "damages the interests of the country".
Ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for 12 June, the Algerian authorities are facing the challenge of popular protests and calls for a boycott of the elections.
Dozens of journalists and activists have been arrested for supporting the popular protests and criticising the government, according to rights groups.
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Refer to Notice 123, Price List, for the applicable retail, Commercial Base, or Commercial Plus price.
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2
| 11
|
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/algeria
|
en
|
Algeria
|
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[] |
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[
"Middle East and North Africa(MNA)",
"Algeria(DZ)"
] | null |
[] | null |
Latest news and information from the World Bank and its development work in Algeria. Access Algeria’s economy facts, statistics, project information, development research from experts and latest news.
|
en
|
/content/dam/wbr-redesign/logos/wbg-favicon.png
|
World Bank
|
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/algeria
|
For the past 10 years, the partnership between the World Bank and Algeria has been based on advisory services, consisting of two cycles of Reimbursable Advisory Services running from 2011 to 2015 and 2016 to 2020. The current technical assistance projects, through advisory and analytical services and Trust Fund operations, seek to boost growth through economic diversification and promote sustainable development.
|
||||
8952
|
dbpedia
|
0
| 24
|
https://www.intertek.com/government/product-conformity/certificate-of-conformity-for-exports-to-algeria/
|
en
|
Certificate of Conformity for Exports to Algeria
|
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[] |
[] |
[
""
] | null |
[] | null |
In March 2011, the Algerian Ministry of Commerce published a note to all importers reminding them of the obligation to submit a proof of conformity by way of a <a title="certificate of conformity " href="/servicesdetail.
|
en
|
https://www.intertek.com/government/product-conformity/certificate-of-conformity-for-exports-to-algeria/
|
The Algerian Ministry of Commerce published a note in March 2011 to all importers reminding them of the obligation to submit proof of conformity by way of a certificate of conformity or certificate of quality for all exports to Algeria; this is to ensure that they meet legal and regulatory requirements that affect them.
This obligation is enforced by law 09-03, dated 25/02/2009, and decree 05-467 dated 12/12/2005, on conditions and procedures of conformity control of imported goods at customs.
Intertek can help exporters to Algeria comply with this notice by offering inspection services to obtain the necessary Certificate of Conformity.
The required Certificate of Conformity can also be referred as the “Certificat de contrôle de qualité”. The original copy of the Certificate of Conformity is needed for every shipment and should be issued in the country of export. It is a mandatory document for Algerian Customs clearance.
How To Arrange An Inspection
Firstly, contact your local Intertek office, details can be found within the contact us section of the site.
One of our export consultants will go through the inspection requirements with you and supply you on the same day with a quote for the work with details of our terms and conditions.
You will then need to supply us with your export documents: these may include a Certificate of Origin, Test Reports (if applicable), Letters of Credit, and the packing list.
Upon receipt, we will arrange a mutually convenient date, time, and location for the inspection to be carried out.
Your Certificate of Conformity will then be issued within a maximum of 24 hours of the inspection if the results are satisfactory.
|
||||||
8952
|
dbpedia
|
3
| 4
|
https://www.onthisday.com/countries/algeria
|
en
|
Algerian History Timeline - Important Dates & Events
|
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[] |
[
""
] | null |
[] | null |
Timeline of important dates and major events in the history of Algeria. Illustrated list of events and people from our today in history archives.
|
en
|
/apple-touch-icon.png
|
On This Day
|
https://www.onthisday.com/countries/algeria
|
Algerian History Timeline
Home
Countries
Algeria
Algeria: Algiers
|
||||
8952
|
dbpedia
|
1
| 68
|
https://www.banknotes.com/algerian-wine-label-mascara-unc.html
|
en
|
Algerian wine label "MASCARA" UNC
|
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Your source for collectible world banknotes, paper money, plastic and polymer currency notes, numismatic coins, philatelic stamps, old lottery tickets, wine and beer labels, presented in a free gallery and online store.
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https://www.banknotes.com/favicon.ico
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Banknotes.com™ - Banknote Collector's Shop and Museum - 世界の紙幣販売
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https://www.banknotes.com/algerian-wine-label-mascara-unc.html
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8952
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https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/book/9781557756916/ch08.xml
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VIII Achievements and Future Challenges
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Abstract For about twenty-five years following its independence in 1962, Algeria made significant progress toward developing its human and physical infrastructure, as well as a vigorous and diversified hydrocarbon sector. Income and gender inequalities were reduced, and a large degree of social cohesion was attained. The yearly flow of the petroleum rent and trade protection, however, shielded the Algerian economy from the inefficiencies inherent in its central planning of resources and in the one-party political system. Large investments in industrial development did little to create a diversified and competitive industrial base, while neglecting pressing housing needs, which reached crisis proportion.
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For about twenty-five years following its independence in 1962, Algeria made significant progress toward developing its human and physical infrastructure, as well as a vigorous and diversified hydrocarbon sector. Income and gender inequalities were reduced, and a large degree of social cohesion was attained. The yearly flow of the petroleum rent and trade protection, however, shielded the Algerian economy from the inefficiencies inherent in its central planning of resources and in the one-party political system. Large investments in industrial development did little to create a diversified and competitive industrial base, while neglecting pressing housing needs, which reached crisis proportion.
The hydrocarbon shield was shattered with the reverse oil shock in 1986 and again in 1988, which coincided with the first political demonstrations that hit Algeria’s cities. It then became clear to policymakers that Algeria could no longer sustain an inward-oriented command economy, which subsidized its public enterprises and remained fully dependent on oil revenues. A gradual process of liberalization and reform was launched, reorienting the institutional framework toward one more compatible with a market economy. In particular, agricultural production and land tenure were increasingly liberalized, and greater autonomy was given to public enterprises.
This process gathered some momentum with IMF- and Bank-supported reform programs in both 1989 and 1991. Nevertheless, throughout this period, reform lacked a comprehensive vision and was mostly reactive to pressure points. As a result, liberalization in some areas coincided with a tightening of restrictions in other areas, exacerbating distortions and generating shortages of both imports and domestic goods and services. Above all, these reforms lacked the political will to make a decisive break with past reliance on government as the major provider of employment, housing, food subsidies, and financing for public enterprises. They neither had the demand management underpinnings nor a broad measure of support by labor unions and managers in both the private and public sectors. Attempts at easing shortages with short-term external financing of imports only bloated external debt and precipitated a payments crisis at the end of 1993. Rising unemployment, an acute housing shortage, and growing civil strife added further gloom to Algeria’s economic prospects.
The reform program launched in April 1994, in a difficult social and political environment, marked a new beginning as well as a new consensual approach. Indeed, after the failure in attempting to develop market mechanisms while maintaining a massive presence of the state in the economy, policymakers came to acknowledge that a change of strategy was needed. There was a fundamental recognition that for Algeria to be able to address its acute social and political problems, it had to reinvigorate its economy and ensure high and sustained growth, but that this objective could only be achieved by abandoning central planning and establishing an outward-oriented and efficient market economy, conducive to private sector activity and integrated with the rest of the world. This recognition provided a unifying approach to the transition and reform process, which was well sequenced and comprehensive. The initial emphasis was to set the exchange rate at a more realistic level, realign relative prices, eliminate distortions through liberalization, and stabilize domestic demand. At the same time, the following structural reforms, to be implemented over two to three years, were set in motion: public enterprise reform and privatization, banking system restructuring, social safety net provisions, and the establishment of market mechanisms such as the use of indirect instruments of monetary policy and the creation of interbank markets for foreign exchange and bank refinancing.
Within three years, by the end of 1997, this reform program had achieved remarkable success in restoring financial stability and establishing the building blocks for a market economy. While Algeria has been a latecomer in the reform process relative to other countries in the region, it has adjusted faster (see Box 13 and Figure 16).
Inflation declined to 6 percent, and after a decade of declining per capita income, there were three consecutive years of positive growth in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
A market-oriented price system was established, eliminating price restrictions and generalized subsidies.
A surplus was achieved in the fiscal and external accounts (even when allowance is made for the increase in oil prices), with a substantial buildup of external reserves to seven months of imports by the end of 1997, and a reduction in the external debt service ratio from 83 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 1997.
The government’s disengagement from production and trading activities was accompanied by the establishment of a market-oriented banking system that imposed a tight budget constraint on its clients, including public enterprises (see Box 14).
In addition to the above-mentioned strong political will, several elements account for the successful implementation of the program.
The savings realized from the elimination of generalized food subsidies allowed the funding of a more efficient social safety net with a job-creation program, unemployment insurance, and cash transfers to the most disadvantaged groups. Budgetary appropriations for public housing were raised. The social components of the program were essential in gaining workers’ union support.
Both demand management and structural reforms were steadfastly implemented. Despite the succession of three prime ministers during this period, persistent civil strife, declining real wages, and large layoffs stemming from public enterprise restructuring, there was no weakening in public policy or wavering in the public commitment to reform. Continuity was maintained by an independent central bank, and follow up was exercised by a standing ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister with the sole responsibility of implementing the reform program. This whole process was supported by a dedicated civil service that ensured smooth policy coordination among the central bank, the ministry of finance, and other ministries and government agencies. Consequently, when slippages in credit policy occurred in the summer of 1995, corrective action was quickly taken.
A flexible exchange rate policy was pursued, which in Algeria’s case also played an important demand management role because of the large oil revenues that accrue to the budget. While the reduction in inflation may have taken longer, price competitiveness was preserved. Authorities successfully reduced inflation through strict demand management policies. As these policies firmly took hold in the budget and in wage negotiations, the exchange rate depreciation of the first two years gave way to a substantial degree of price stability in 1996 and 1997.
When oil prices increased sharply in 1996 and 1997, most of the oil windfall was saved. This reserve has helped cushion the recent oil price decline and will considerably ease repayment of rescheduled external debt beginning in 2000.
Comprehensive structural reforms with excellent coordination between the IMF, the World Bank, and the Algerian authorities took place. While the IMF concentrated its assistance on macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of prices and trade and the social safety net, the World Bank assisted in the restructuring of public enterprises, the audit and financial restructuring of banks, housing, and privatization. Without public enterprise and bank reform, neither macrostabilization nor liberalization could be sustained. All these aspects must be tackled simultaneously.
A broad consensus for reform through periodic negotiations among the government, management (of both public and private enterprises), and labor unions was established. Commitments under World Bank and IMF programs were made public and widely debated in the press, establishing Algeria’s full ownership of the reform program.
An appropriate sequencing of measures took account of the public’s concerns. While some prices were quickly liberalized, food and energy subsidies were phased out gradually over three years through gradual price increases. Private sector importers were phased in into sensitive areas, such as Pharmaceuticals and essential food staples, hitherto monopolized by the public sector.
Algeria benefited from large financial assistance from foreign donors and international institutions. About $22 billion was provided over a three-year period ($17 billion in debt rescheduling and $5 billion in new lending from international and regional institutions) to support external trade and payment liberalization, eliminate import shortages, and sustain per capita consumption. This infusion of external support eased the burden of adjustment considerably and restored the sustainability to Algeria’s external debt profile.
While Algeria made remarkable progress in macroeconomic stabilization and in establishing market mechanisms, other structural reforms proved more difficult to implement and, in some cases, more intractable.
The legacy of past government intervention in prices and external trade resulted in a string of quasi-fiscal deficits, which were financed by the banking system and could not be identified early on in the program. For instance, government food importing agencies could not service their external debt—which had more than doubled after the devaluation—from current operations, but had to rely on domestic or external bank financing. When such financing was sharply reduced in the context of stricter bank lending policies, these agencies defaulted and their bank loans were taken over by the treasury. A lesson for future IMF programs is to fully flesh out the external debt implications on the financial condition of banks and enterprises following a large devaluation.
The housing crisis proved difficult to address despite the best efforts of the authorities, the World Bank, and the IMF. This was partly due to the need to restructure the entire system of housing construction and financing, while ensuring a steady yearly delivery rate. The latter was essential to ease existing shortages and provide jobs. With the benefit of hindsight, greater progress would have required a high-level task force endowed with broad powers that superseded individual ministries to obtain and develop construction sites and to mobilize financing. The establishment of clear property rights in agriculture and in housing also proved elusive, which is understandable given 30 years of socialist legacy. The absence of such rights inhibits collateralization of bank financing, reduces incentives for investment, and limits bank intermediation. Indeed, the judicial system in Algeria is not yet geared to the norms of a market economy. It is slow and cumbersome in contractual disputes, and favors tenants over landlords.
Foreign direct investment outside the hydrocarbon sector, which is essential for modernizing the capital stock and for injecting best management practices, as well as domestic private sector investment have not been forthcoming to the extent anticipated. They have been inhibited by the civil strife which, in addition to the psychological impact, has exacted substantial costs. These costs include lost production, mostly in agriculture and industry; damage to infrastructure; costs associated with the provision of security services; higher transportation costs; cost of relocating plants to safer areas; and costs of uncollected taxes and rents in areas that lack security. It has also reduced labor mobility.
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https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/09/22/algeria-foreign-minister-ramtane-lamamra-morocco-relationship-intv-oneworld-vpx.cnn
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Algeria’s Foreign Minister speaks out after cutting diplomatic ties with Morocco
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2021-09-22T00:00:00
|
Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco earlier this year citing “hostile activities” as the decades-old conflict between the neighboring countries continues.The North African state accused Morocco of supporting two “terrorist groups”, including the Movement for the self-determination of Kabylie [MAK] group, who Algeria says were responsible for starting some of the deadliest wildfires the country has witnessed. Algeria’s Foreign Minster Ramtane Lamamra spoke to CNN’s Larry Madowo to discuss.
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CNN
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https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/09/22/algeria-foreign-minister-ramtane-lamamra-morocco-relationship-intv-oneworld-vpx.cnn
|
Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco earlier this year citing "hostile activities" as the decades-old conflict between the neighboring countries continues.The North African state accused Morocco of supporting two "terrorist groups", including the Movement for the self-determination of Kabylie [MAK] group, who Algeria says were responsible for starting some of the deadliest wildfires the country has witnessed. Algeria's Foreign Minster Ramtane Lamamra spoke to CNN's Larry Madowo to discuss.
|
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https://nesa-center.org/the-non-alignment-posture-of-algerias-foreign-policy/
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en
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The Non-Alignment Posture of Algeria’s Foreign Policy
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NESA Center Alumni Publication
By Dr. Arslan Chikhaoui, Chairman of Nordsudventures.com
25 July 2022
The map of geopolitical alliances is being reshaped following the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. With the potential development of a multi-polar world, Algeria is reaffirming its affiliations and defining its strategic and geo-economic areas of interest yet remains committed to its positions of non-alignment. It is clear that Algeria will continue to defend and promote the resolution of crises and conflicts of varying intensities, in particular, in the Arab World, Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean through political solutions rather than military ones. Inclusive dialogue and political reconciliation are the paths that Algeria will continue to advocate. Despite this new geopolitical dynamic, Algeria undoubtedly remains a key player in the processes of reconciliation and stability given its experience and its proven expertise over the past fifty years.
Since its independence in 1962, Algeria has mobilized and will certainly continue to deploy its diplomacy to promote the principles of self-determination, respect for borders inherited from colonial divisions, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-interventionism, and non-alignment posture. Its struggle for independence produced an uncompromising foreign policy against foreign interference. Faced with the new challenges of a rapidly changing region, issues of security, integration, and regional convergence, Algeria is in a phase of adapting and consolidating its foreign policy doctrine for its strategic repositioning on the international scene which is being “reshaped”.
The diplomatic dynamic initiated by Algeria since the Covid-19 health crisis with its economic diplomacy, proximity diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, civil society diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and multilateral diplomacy, shows its desire to position itself on the international scene as a key partner in the region without calling into question the fundamental doctrinal principles of its foreign, defense and security policy in the face of new emerging players such as China, India, and Turkey, who are shaking up the established order.
In the absence of a systematic alignment which would be synonymous with a denial of the doctrinal principles on which Algeria has built its foreign policy since its independence, or an intransigent opposition which would isolate it, Algeria seems to be moving more and more toward a policy of non-dogmatic interests.
Breathing new life into the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and defining new paradigms for its adaptation to the new era would be the approach for which Algeria seems to be opting. As a result, it clearly displays both its posture of non-alignment, as is the case of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis, but also its belonging to areas of strategic interest such as the Mediterranean, the Sahel, Africa, and the Arab World. The visit in June 2022 of Venezuelan President Maduro to Algiers and the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement between the two countries is a clear message of the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement. Algeria’s membership to this movement and its commitment to its objectives are enshrined in the founding act of the Algerian State, which is the Declaration of November 1954 to recover its independence from French colonialism.
Today, and taking into account a context carrying the risk of confrontation between the actors of world powers and for many African or Asian countries which refuse to choose to belong to one camp or another, Algeria is called upon to sponsor this movement of non-aligned countries which was born with the Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung in 1955. Algeria’s commitment is part of the logic of its geostrategic repositioning as a pivotal actor thanks to its attachment to the three demands defended by this movement, namely: decolonization, multilateralism, and economic development.
During his visit to Turkey in May 2022, Algerian President Tebboune stated that: “Our policy is Non-alignment and we are not going to give it up”. Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine politico-military crisis and despite the historical relations that bind it with Russia, Algeria has remained equidistant from the belligerents. As proof, at the end of March 2022, Algeria welcomed the visit of the US Secretary of State Blinken, followed in May by that of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov. On these occasions, Algerian President Tebboune declared that: “Russia and the United States are our friends, all the others are our friends, except the one with whom we have a problem because of Palestine. Whoever wants to judge us let him do it. We are trying as best we can to reinvigorate the Non-Aligned Movement. We see where the world is heading. Regardless of the number of poles, we are equidistant from all. Our commercial interests work with everyone, but when it comes to political interests and stability, we look first and foremost at our interests, the interests of the Algerian people.” Concomitantly, the Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army, General Chengriha, had also reaffirmed the neutrality of Algeria vis-à-vis international conflicts, when he received the Director General of the International Military Staff of NATO, General Wiermann: “On the international level, Algeria continues to adopt a policy of neutrality. Our country takes care to exclude itself from the tensions that oppose the different parties.” For his part, the President of the Senate (Upper House) Goudjil indicated to the Cuban Ambassador in Algiers, Vergara, the need to draw inspiration from the principles of the non-aligned countries and that the countries of the Third World will have to better prepare themselves for profound changes that the world is currently experiencing. The Speaker of the Upper House, during a recent telephone conversation with his Turkish counterpart Sentopa, also stressed: “the need to work together to develop a new concept of non-alignment which is adapted to the new international situation.”
All these concomitant political statements show that there is a consensus among the Algerian ruling elite on the issue of the non-alignment posture of Algeria and its desire to bring the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries up to date.
In addition, by organizing the meeting in Algiers of the Arab League scheduled for 01 November 2022 aligning with the celebration of the 68th anniversary of the outbreak of the revolution against French colonization and also the 44th anniversary of the Declaration of Algiers of November 15th, 1988 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) retained by the State of Palestine as its declaration of independence, marks the constancy of Algeria’s position for the self-determination and independence of the peoples. Moreover, by organizing the Mediterranean Games in June 2022, Algeria marks its membership of this strategic space in which it is one of the important players with regard to the issues and challenges that will be faced by the two shores bordering the Mediterranean Sea commonly referred to as “the Lake”. Conflicts and their malevolent corollaries around the Lake are becoming serious issues for the development of renewed, peaceful, and balanced cooperation between the northern and southern shores. The Mediterranean remains an issue at three levels: strategic, economic, and ecological. All this means that Algeria cannot be on the sidelines and clearly affirms it.
Algeria is gradually moving towards a new era where it is trying to adapt to the new global context. It displays it with some signals to the international community such as, for example, its adherence to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; its call for the resolution of low and medium intensity conflicts in Libya, Mali, and Yemen through inclusive political dialogue; and to offer its good offices as a facilitator with regard to its experience and expertise in this field (e.g. Iran-Iraq, Iran-USA, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and others); the implementation of Arab and African free trade agreements (GZALE and ZLECAf); its desire to revisit the Association Agreement with the European Union to adapt it to the new challenges; and resume dialogue with WTO for its possible accession to membership status. Algeria is already relying on privileged platforms to activate at the regional and sub-regional level (African Union, 5+5 Cooperation, CEMOC, Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative, Afripol) and intends to re-launch with new paradigms.
In short, the global geopolitical and geo-economic context is shifting and Algeria’s positions of principle remain irrevocably constant, which explains its commitment to energizing a new concept of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.
The views presented in this article are those of the speaker or author and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or its components.
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https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/algeria/
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The World Factbook
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Background
Algeria has known many empires and dynasties, including the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Amazigh dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. Under the Turks, the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping, from about 1500 until the French captured Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962.
Algeria's long-dominant political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since played a large role in politics, though it is falling out of favor with the youth and current President Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first-round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1991 legislative election led the Algerian military to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. An army crackdown on the FIS escalated into an FIS insurgency and intense violence from 1992-98 that resulted in over 100,000 deaths, many of which were attributed to extremist groups massacring villagers. The government gained the upper hand by the late 1990s, and FISâs armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in 2000. FIS membership is now illegal.
In 1999, Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA won the presidency with the backing of the military, in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud. He won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Widespread protests against his decision to seek a fifth term broke out in early 2019. BOUTEFLIKA resigned in April 2019, and in December 2019, Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the countryâs new president. A longtime FLN member, TEBBOUNE ran for president as an independent. In 2020, Algeria held a constitutional referendum on governmental reforms, which TEBBOUNE enacted in 2021. Subsequent reforms to the national electoral law introduced open-list voting to curb corruption. The new law also eliminated gender quotas in Parliament, and the 2021 legislative elections saw female representation plummet. The referendum, parliamentary elections, and local elections saw record-low voter turnout.
Demographic profile
For the first two thirds of the 20th century, Algeria's high fertility rate caused its population to grow rapidly. However, about a decade after independence from France in 1962, the total fertility rate fell dramatically from 7 children per woman in the 1970s to about 2.4 in 2000, slowing Algeria's population growth rate by the late 1980s. The lower fertility rate was mainly the result of women's rising age at first marriage (virtually all Algerian children being born in wedlock) and to a lesser extent the wider use of contraceptives. Later marriages and a preference for smaller families are attributed to increases in women's education and participation in the labor market; higher unemployment; and a shortage of housing forcing multiple generations to live together. The average woman's age at first marriage increased from about 19 in the mid-1950s to 24 in the mid-1970s to 30.5 in the late 1990s.
Algeria's fertility rate experienced an unexpected upturn in the early 2000s, as the average woman's age at first marriage dropped slightly. The reversal in fertility could represent a temporary fluctuation in marriage age or, less likely, a decrease in the steady rate of contraceptive use.
Thousands of Algerian peasants - mainly Berber men from the Kabylia region - faced with land dispossession and economic hardship under French rule migrated temporarily to France to work in manufacturing and mining during the first half of the 20th century. This movement accelerated during World War I, when Algerians filled in for French factory workers or served as soldiers. In the years following independence, low-skilled Algerian workers and Algerians who had supported the French (known as Harkis) emigrated en masse to France. Tighter French immigration rules and Algiers' decision to cease managing labor migration to France in the 1970s limited legal emigration largely to family reunification.
Not until Algeria's civil war in the 1990s did the country again experience substantial outmigration. Many Algerians legally entered Tunisia without visas claiming to be tourists and then stayed as workers. Other Algerians headed to Europe seeking asylum, although France imposed restrictions. Sub-Saharan African migrants came to Algeria after its civil war to work in agriculture and mining. In the 2000s, a wave of educated Algerians went abroad seeking skilled jobs in a wider range of destinations, increasing their presence in North America and Spain. At the same time, legal foreign workers principally from China and Egypt came to work in Algeria's construction and oil sectors. Illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Malians, Nigeriens, and Gambians, continue to come to Algeria in search of work or to use it as a stepping stone to Libya and Europe.
Since 1975, Algeria also has been the main recipient of Sahrawi refugees from the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara (today part of Morocco). More than 100,000 Sahrawis are estimated to be living in five refugee camps in southwestern Algeria near Tindouf.
Telecommunication systems
general assessment: Algeria has a steadily developing telecom infrastructure with growth encouraged by supportive regulatory measures and by government policies aimed at delivering serviceable internet connections across the country; mobile broadband is largely based on 3G and LTE, and the data rates are also low in global terms; LTE is available in all provinces, investment is required from the mobile network operators (MNOs) to improve the quality of service; the state has previously been hesitant to commit to 5G, instead encouraging the MNOs to undertake upgrades to LTE infrastructure before investing in commercial 5G services; in March 2022, the state is in the process of freeing up the requisite spectrum to enable the MNOs to launch 5G services sometime this year; fixed internet speeds remain slow (2022)
domestic: a limited network of fixed-lines with a teledensity of slightly less than 12 telephones per 100 persons has been offset by the rapid increase in mobile-cellular subscribership; mobile-cellular teledensity was approximately 106 telephones per 100 persons in 2020 (2021)
international: country code - 213; ALPAL-2 is a submarine telecommunications cable system in the Mediterranean Sea linking Algeria and the Spanish Balearic island of Majorca; ORVAL is a submarine cable to Spain; landing points for the TE North/TGN-Eurasia/SEACOM/SeaMeWe-4 fiber-optic submarine cable system that provides links to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; MED cable connecting Algeria with France; microwave radio relay to Italy, France, Spain, Morocco, and Tunisia; Algeria part of the 4,500 Km terrestrial Trans Sahara Backbone network which connects to other fiber networks in the region; Alcomstat-1 satellite offering telemedicine network (2020)
Military - note
the ANP is responsible for external defense but also has some internal security responsibilities; key areas of concern include border and maritime security, terrorism, regional instability, and tensions with Morocco; Algeria supports the pro-independence Polisario Front in Western Sahara and accuses Morocco of supporting the Algerian separatist Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK); border security and counterterrorism have received additional focus since the Arab Spring events of 2011 and the rise of terrorist threats emanating from Libya and the Sahel; the Army and Ministry of Defense (MND) paramilitary forces of the Gendarmerie and the border guards have beefed up their presence along the frontiers with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, and Mali to interdict and deter cross-border attacks by Islamic militant groups; the ANP and MND paramilitary forces have also increased counterterrorism cooperation with some neighboring countries, particularly Tunisia, including joint operations
the ANP has also played a large role in the countryâs politics since independence in 1962, including coups in 1965 and 1991; it was a key backer of BOUTEFLIKAâs election in 1999 and remained a center of power during his 20-year rule; the military was instrumental in BOUTEFLIKAâs resignation in 2019, when it withdrew support and called for him to be removed from office (2023)
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Square label. Illustration of flag of Algeria. Download high quality image with transparent background at PNG format
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Notification
Flag icon of Algeria is available in 3 sizes at PNG format.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War
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Algerian War
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War
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1954–1962 war of Algerian independence from France
Not to be confused with Algerian Civil War.
For other uses, see List of wars involving Algeria.
The Algerian War (also known as the Algerian Revolution or the Algerian War of Independence)[nb 1] was a major armed conflict between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) from 1954 to 1962, which led to Algeria winning its independence from France.[29] An important decolonization war, it was a complex conflict characterized by guerrilla warfare and war crimes. The conflict also became a civil war between the different communities and within the communities.[30] The war took place mainly on the territory of Algeria, with repercussions in metropolitan France.
Effectively started by members of the FLN on 1 November 1954, during the Toussaint Rouge ("Red All Saints' Day"), the conflict led to serious political crises in France, causing the fall of the Fourth Republic (1946–58), to be replaced by the Fifth Republic with a strengthened presidency. The brutality of the methods employed by the French forces failed to win hearts and minds in Algeria, alienated support in metropolitan France, and discredited French prestige abroad.[31][32] As the war dragged on, the French public slowly turned against it[33] and many of France's key allies, including the United States, switched from supporting France to abstaining in the UN debate on Algeria.[34] After major demonstrations in Algiers and several other cities in favor of independence (1960)[35][36] and a United Nations resolution recognizing the right to independence,[37] Charles de Gaulle, the first president of the Fifth Republic, decided to open a series of negotiations with the FLN. These concluded with the signing of the Évian Accords in March 1962. A referendum took place on 8 April 1962 and the French electorate approved the Évian Accords. The final result was 91% in favor of the ratification of this agreement[38] and on 1 July, the Accords were subject to a second referendum in Algeria, where 99.72% voted for independence and just 0.28% against.[39]
The planned French withdrawal led to a state crisis. This included various assassination attempts on de Gaulle as well as some attempts at military coups. Most of the former were carried out by the Organisation armée secrète (OAS), an underground organization formed mainly from French military personnel supporting a French Algeria, which committed a large number of bombings and murders both in Algeria and in the homeland to stop the planned independence.
The war caused the deaths of between 400,000 and 1.5 million Algerians,[40][24][22] 25,600 French soldiers,[15]: 538 and 6,000 Europeans. War crimes committed during the war included massacres of civilians, rape, and torture; the French destroyed over 8,000 villages and relocated over 2 million Algerians to concentration camps.[41][42] Upon independence in 1962, 900,000 European-Algerians (Pieds-noirs) fled to France within a few months for fear of the FLN's revenge. The French government was unprepared to receive such a vast number of refugees, which caused turmoil in France. The majority of Algerian Muslims who had worked for the French were disarmed and left behind, as the agreement between French and Algerian authorities declared that no actions could be taken against them.[43] However, the Harkis in particular, having served as auxiliaries with the French army, were regarded as traitors and many were murdered [fr] by the FLN or by lynch mobs, often after being abducted and tortured.[15]: 537 [44] About 20,000 Harki families (around 90,000 people) managed to flee to France, some with help from their French officers acting against orders, and today they and their descendants form a significant part of the population of Algerians in France.[citation needed]
Background
Main articles: French Algeria and French colonial empire
Conquest of Algeria
On the pretext of a slight to their consul, the French invaded Algeria in 1830.[15] Directed by Marshall Bugeaud, who became the first Governor-General of Algeria, the conquest was violent and marked by a "scorched earth" policy designed to reduce the power of the native rulers, the Dey, including massacres, mass rapes and other atrocities.[45][46] Between 500,000 and 1,000,000, from approximately 3 million Algerians, were killed in the first three decades of the conquest.[47][48] French losses from 1830 to 1851 were 3,336 killed in action and 92,329 dying in hospital.[49]
In 1834, Algeria became a French military colony. It was declared by the Constitution of 1848 to be an integral part of France and was divided into three departments: Alger, Oran and Constantine. Many French and other Europeans (Spanish, Italians, Maltese and others) later settled in Algeria.
Under the Second Empire (1852–1871), the Code de l'indigénat (Indigenous Code) was implemented by the sénatus-consulte of 14 July 1865. It allowed Muslims to apply for full French citizenship, a measure that few took since it involved renouncing the right to be governed by sharia law in personal matters and was widely considered to be apostasy. Its first article stipulated:
The indigenous Muslim is French; however, he will continue to be subjected to Muslim law. He may be admitted to serve in the army (armée de terre) and the navy (armée de mer). He may be called to functions and civil employment in Algeria. He may, on his demand, be admitted to enjoy the rights of a French citizen; in this case, he is subjected to the political and civil laws of France.[50]
Prior to 1870, fewer than 200 demands were registered by Muslims and 152 by Jewish Algerians.[51] The 1865 decree was then modified by the 1870 Crémieux Decree, which granted French nationality to Jews living in one of the three Algerian departments. In 1881, the Code de l'Indigénat made the discrimination official by creating specific penalties for indigènes and organising the seizure or appropriation of their lands.[51]
After World War II, equality of rights was proclaimed by the ordonnance of 7 March 1944 and later confirmed by the loi Lamine Guèye of 7 May 1946, which granted French citizenship to all subjects of France's territories and overseas departments, and by the 1946 Constitution. The Law of 20 September 1947 granted French citizenship to all Algerian subjects, who were not required to renounce their Muslim personal status.[52][dubious – discuss]
Algeria was unique to France because unlike all other overseas possessions acquired by France during the 19th century, Algeria was considered and legally classified to be an integral part of France.
Algerian Nationalism
Main articles: Algerian nationalism and Sétif and Guelma massacre
Both Muslim and European Algerians took part in World War II and fought for France. Algerian Muslims served as tirailleurs (such regiments were created as early as 1842[53]) and spahis; and French settlers as Zouaves or Chasseurs d'Afrique. US President Woodrow Wilson's 1918 Fourteen Points had the fifth read: "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." Some Algerian intellectuals, dubbed oulémas, began to nurture the desire for independence or, at the very least, autonomy and self-rule.[54]
Within that context, Khalid ibn Hashim, a grandson of Abd el-Kadir, spearheaded the resistance against the French in the first half of the 20th century and was a member of the directing committee of the French Communist Party. In 1926, he founded the Étoile Nord-Africaine ("North African Star"), to which Messali Hadj, also a member of the Communist Party and of its affiliated trade union, the Confédération générale du travail unitaire (CGTU), joined the following year.[55]
The North African Star broke from the Communist Party in 1928, before being dissolved in 1929 at Paris's demand. Amid growing discontent from the Algerian population, the Third Republic (1871–1940) acknowledged some demands, and the Popular Front initiated the Blum-Viollette proposal in 1936, which was supposed to enlighten the Indigenous Code by giving French citizenship to a small number of Muslims. The pieds-noirs (Algerians of European origin) violently demonstrated against it and the North African Party also opposed it, leading to its abandonment. The pro-independence party was dissolved in 1937, and its leaders were charged with the illegal reconstitution of a dissolved league, leading to Messali Hadj's 1937 founding of the Parti du peuple algérien (Algerian People's Party, PPA), which, no longer espoused full independence but only extensive autonomy. This new party was dissolved in 1939. Under Vichy France, the French State attempted to abrogate the Crémieux Decree to suppress the Jews' French citizenship, but the measure was never implemented.[citation needed]
On the other hand, the nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas founded the Algerian Popular Union (Union populaire algérienne) in 1938. In 1943, Abbas wrote the Algerian People's Manifesto (Manifeste du peuple algérien). Arrested after the Sétif and Guelma massacre of May 8, 1945, when the French Army and pieds-noirs mobs killed between 6,000 and 30,000 Algerians,[56][15]: 27 Abbas founded the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) in 1946 and was elected as a deputy. Founded in 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) created an armed wing, the Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army) to engage in an armed struggle against French authority. Many Algerian soldiers who served for the French Army in the First Indochina War had strong sympathy for the Vietnamese fighting against France and took up their experience to support the ALN.[57][58]
France, which had just lost French Indochina, was determined not to lose the next colonial war, particularly in its oldest and nearest major colony, which was regarded as a part of Metropolitan France (rather than a colony), by French law.[59]
War chronology
Beginning of hostilities
In the early morning hours of 1 November 1954, FLN maquisards (guerrillas) attacked military and civilian targets throughout Algeria in what became known as the Toussaint Rouge (Red All-Saints' Day). From Cairo, the FLN broadcast the declaration of 1 November 1954 written by the journalist Mohamed Aïchaoui calling on Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the "restoration of the Algerian state – sovereign, democratic and social – within the framework of the principles of Islam." It was the reaction of Premier Pierre Mendès France (Radical-Socialist Party), who only a few months before had completed the liquidation of France's tete empire in Indochina, which set the tone of French policy for five years. He declared in the National Assembly, "One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French. ... Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession." At first, and despite the Sétif massacre of 8 May 1945, and the pro-Independence struggle before World War II, most Algerians were in favor of a relative status-quo. While Messali Hadj had radicalized by forming the FLN, Ferhat Abbas maintained a more moderate, electoral strategy. Fewer than 500 fellaghas (pro-Independence fighters) could be counted at the beginning of the conflict.[60] The Algerian population radicalized itself in particular because of the terrorist acts of French-sponsored Main Rouge (Red Hand) group, which targeted anti-colonialists in all of the Maghreb region (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), killing, for example, Tunisian activist Farhat Hached in 1952.[60]
FLN
The FLN uprising presented nationalist groups with the question of whether to adopt armed revolt as the main course of action. During the first year of the war, Ferhat Abbas's Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA), the ulema, and the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) maintained a friendly neutrality toward the FLN. The communists, who had made no move to cooperate in the uprising at the start, later tried to infiltrate the FLN, but FLN leaders publicly repudiated the support of the party. In April 1956, Abbas flew to Cairo, where he formally joined the FLN. This action brought in many évolués who had supported the UDMA in the past. The AUMA also threw the full weight of its prestige behind the FLN. Bendjelloul and the pro-integrationist moderates had already abandoned their efforts to mediate between the French and the rebels.
After the collapse of the MTLD, the veteran nationalist Messali Hadj formed the leftist Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), which advocated a policy of violent revolution and total independence similar to that of the FLN, but aimed to compete with that organisation. The Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), the military wing of the FLN, subsequently wiped out the MNA guerrilla operation in Algeria, and Messali Hadj's movement lost what little influence it had had there. However, the MNA retained the support of many Algerian workers in France through the Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens (the Union of Algerian Workers). The FLN also established a strong organization in France to oppose the MNA. The "Café wars", resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths, were waged in France between the two rebel groups throughout the years of the War of Independence.
On the political front, the FLN worked to persuade—and to coerce—the Algerian masses to support the aims of the independence movement through contributions. FLN-influenced labor unions, professional associations, and students' and women's organizations were created to lead opinion in diverse segments of the population, but here too, violent coercion was widely used. Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from Martinique who became the FLN's leading political theorist, provided a sophisticated intellectual justification for the use of violence in achieving national liberation.[61][page needed] From Cairo, Ahmed Ben Bella ordered the liquidation of potential interlocuteurs valables, those independent representatives of the Muslim community acceptable to the French through whom a compromise or reforms within the system might be achieved.
As the FLN campaign of influence spread through the countryside, many European farmers in the interior (called Pieds-Noirs), many of whom lived on lands taken from Muslim communities during the nineteenth century,[62] sold their holdings and sought refuge in Algiers and other Algerian cities. After a series of bloody, random massacres and bombings by Muslim Algerians in several towns and cities, the French Pieds-Noirs and urban French population began to demand that the French government engage in sterner countermeasures, including the proclamation of a state of emergency, capital punishment for political crimes, denunciation of all separatists, and most ominously, a call for 'tit-for-tat' reprisal operations by police, military, and para-military forces. Colon vigilante units, whose unauthorized activities were conducted with the passive cooperation of police authorities, carried out ratonnades (literally, rat-hunts, raton being a racist term for denigrating Muslim Algerians) against suspected FLN members of the Muslim community.
By 1955, effective political action groups within the Algerian colonial community succeeded in convincing many of the Governors General sent by Paris that the military was not the way to resolve the conflict. A major success was the conversion of Jacques Soustelle, who went to Algeria as governor general in January 1955 determined to restore peace. Soustelle, a one-time leftist and by 1955 an ardent Gaullist, began an ambitious reform program (the Soustelle Plan) aimed at improving economic conditions among the Muslim population.
After the Philippeville massacre
The FLN adopted tactics similar to those of nationalist groups in Asia, and the French did not realize the seriousness of the challenge they faced until 1955, when the FLN moved into urbanized areas. An important watershed in the War of Independence was the massacre of Pieds-Noirs civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippeville (now known as Skikda) in August 1955. Before this operation, FLN policy was to attack only military and government-related targets. The commander of the Constantine wilaya/region, however, decided a drastic escalation was needed. The killing by the FLN and its supporters of 123 people, including 71 French,[63] including old women and babies, shocked Jacques Soustelle into calling for more repressive measures against the rebels. The French authorities stated that 1,273 guerrillas died in what Soustelle admitted were "severe" reprisals. The FLN subsequently claimed that 12,000 Muslims were killed.[15]: 122 Soustelle's repression was an early cause of the Algerian population's rallying to the FLN.[63] After Philippeville, Soustelle declared sterner measures and an all-out war began. In 1956, demonstrations by French Algerians caused the French government to not make reforms.
Soustelle's successor, Governor General Robert Lacoste, a socialist, abolished the Algerian Assembly. Lacoste saw the assembly, which was dominated by pieds-noirs, as hindering the work of his administration, and he undertook the rule of Algeria by decree. He favored stepping up French military operations and granted the army exceptional police powers—a concession of dubious legality under French law—to deal with the mounting political violence. At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new administrative structure to give Algeria some autonomy and a decentralized government. Whilst remaining an integral part of France, Algeria was to be divided into five districts, each of which would have a territorial assembly elected from a single slate of candidates. Until 1958, deputies representing Algerian districts were able to delay the passage of the measure by the National Assembly of France.
In August and September 1956, the leadership of the FLN guerrillas operating within Algeria (popularly known as "internals") met to organize a formal policy-making body to synchronize the movement's political and military activities. The highest authority of the FLN was vested in the thirty-four member National Council of the Algerian Revolution (Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne, CNRA), within which the five-man Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution, CCE) formed the executive. The leadership of the regular FLN forces based in Tunisia and Morocco ("externals"), including Ben Bella, knew the conference was taking place but by chance or design on the part of the "internals" were unable to attend.
In October 1956, the French Air Force intercepted a Moroccan DC-3 plane bound for Tunis, carrying Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohammed Boudiaf, Mohamed Khider and Hocine Aït Ahmed, and forced it to land in Algiers. Lacoste had the FLN external political leaders arrested and imprisoned for the duration of the war. This action caused the remaining rebel leaders to harden their stance.
France opposed Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's material and political assistance to the FLN, which some French analysts believed was the revolution's main sustenance. This attitude was a factor in persuading France to participate in the November 1956 attempt to seize the Suez Canal during the Suez Crisis.
During 1957, support for the FLN weakened as the breach between the internals and externals widened. To halt the drift, the FLN expanded its executive committee to include Abbas, as well as imprisoned political leaders such as Ben Bella. It also convinced communist and Arab members of the United Nations (UN) to put diplomatic pressure on the French government to negotiate a cease-fire. In 1957, it became common knowledge in France that the French Army was routinely using torture to extract information from suspected FLN members.[64] Hubert Beuve-Méry, the editor of Le Monde, declared in an edition on 13 March 1957: "From now on, Frenchman must know that they don't have the right to condemn in the same terms as ten years ago the destruction of Oradour and the torture by the Gestapo."[64] Another case that attracted much media attention was the murder of Maurice Audin, a member of the outlawed Algerian Communist party,[65] mathematics professor at the University of Algiers and a suspected FLN member whom the French Army arrested in June 1957.[64]: 224 Audin was tortured and killed and his body was never found.[64] As Audin was French rather than Algerian, his "disappearance" while in the custody of the French Army led to the case becoming a cause célèbre as his widow aided by the historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet determinedly sought to have the men responsible for her husband's death prosecuted.[64]
Existentialist writer, philosopher and playwright Albert Camus, native of Algiers, tried unsuccessfully to persuade both sides to at least leave civilians alone, writing editorials against the use of torture in Combat newspaper. The FLN considered him a fool, and some Pieds-Noirs considered him a traitor. Nevertheless, in his speech when he received the Nobel Prize in Literature, Camus said that when faced with a radical choice he would eventually support his community. This statement made him lose his status among left-wing intellectuals; when he died in 1960 in a car crash, the official thesis of an ordinary accident (a quick open-and-shut case) left more than a few observers doubtful. His widow claimed that Camus, though discreet, was in fact an ardent supporter of French Algeria in the last years of his life.[citation needed]
Battle of Algiers
To increase international and domestic French attention to their struggle, the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cities and to call a nationwide general strike and also to plant bombs in public places. The most notable instance was the Battle of Algiers, which began on September 30, 1956, when three women, including Djamila Bouhired and Zohra Drif, simultaneously placed bombs at three sites including the downtown office of Air France. The FLN carried out shootings and bombings in the spring of 1957, resulting in civilian casualties and a crushing response from the authorities.
General Jacques Massu was instructed to use whatever methods deemed necessary to restore order in the city and to find and eliminate terrorists. Using paratroopers, he broke the strike and, in the succeeding months, destroyed the FLN infrastructure in Algiers. But the FLN had succeeded in showing its ability to strike at the heart of French Algeria and to assemble a mass response to its demands among urban Muslims. The publicity given to the brutal methods used by the army to win the Battle of Algiers, including the use of torture, strong movement control and curfew called quadrillage and where all authority was under the military, created doubt in France about its role in Algeria. What was originally "pacification" or a "public order operation" had turned into a colonial war accompanied by torture.
Guerrilla war
During 1956 and 1957, the FLN successfully applied hit-and-run tactics in accordance with guerrilla warfare theory. Whilst some of this was aimed at military targets, a significant amount was invested in a terror campaign against those in any way deemed to support or encourage French authority. This resulted in acts of sadistic torture and brutal violence against all, including women and children. Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colonial farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside, in accordance with Mao's theories.
Although successfully provoking fear and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries' coercive tactics suggested that they had not yet inspired the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule. Gradually, however, the FLN gained control in certain sectors of the Aurès, the Kabylie, and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of Algiers and Oran. In these places, the FLN established a simple but effective—although frequently temporary—military administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit manpower.[66] But it was never able to hold large, fixed positions.
The loss of competent field commanders both on the battlefield and through defections and political purges created difficulties for the FLN. Moreover, power struggles in the early years of the war split leadership in the wilayat, particularly in the Aurès. Some officers created their own fiefdoms, using units under their command to settle old scores and engage in private wars against military rivals within the FLN.
French counter-insurgency operations
Despite complaints from the military command in Algiers, the French government was reluctant for many months to admit that the Algerian situation was out of control and that what was viewed officially as a pacification operation had developed into a war. By 1956, there were more than 400,000 French troops in Algeria. Although the elite airborne infantry units of the Troupes coloniales and the Foreign Legion bore the brunt of offensive counterinsurgency combat operations, approximately 170,000 Muslim Algerians also served in the regular French army, most of them volunteers. France also sent air force and naval units to the Algerian theater, including helicopters. In addition to service as a flying ambulance and cargo carrier, French forces utilized the helicopter for the first time in a ground attack role in order to pursue and destroy fleeing FLN guerrilla units. The American military later used the same helicopter combat methods in the Vietnam War. The French also used napalm.[67]
The French army resumed an important role in local Algerian administration through the Special Administration Section (Section Administrative Spécialisée, SAS), created in 1955. The SAS's mission was to establish contact with the Muslim population and weaken nationalist influence in the rural areas by asserting the "French presence" there. SAS officers—called képis bleus (blue caps)—also recruited and trained bands of loyal Muslim irregulars, known as harkis. Armed with shotguns and using guerrilla tactics similar to those of the FLN, the harkis, who eventually numbered about 180,000 volunteers, more than the FLN activists,[10] were an ideal instrument of counterinsurgency warfare.
Harkis were mostly used in conventional formations, either in all-Algerian units commanded by French officers or in mixed units. Other uses included platoon or smaller size units, attached to French battalions, in a similar way as the Kit Carson Scouts by the U.S. in Vietnam. A third use was an intelligence gathering role, with some reported minor pseudo-operations in support of their intelligence collection.[68] U.S. military expert Lawrence E. Cline stated, "The extent of these pseudo-operations appears to have been very limited both in time and scope. ... The most widespread use of pseudo type operations was during the 'Battle of Algiers' in 1957. The principal French employer of covert agents in Algiers was the Fifth Bureau, the psychological warfare branch. "The Fifth Bureau" made extensive use of 'turned' FLN members, one such network being run by Captain Paul-Alain Leger of the 10th Paras. "Persuaded" to work for the French forces included by the use of torture and threats against their family; these agents "mingled with FLN cadres. They planted incriminating forged documents, spread false rumors of treachery and fomented distrust. ... As a frenzy of throat-cutting and disemboweling broke out among confused and suspicious FLN cadres, nationalist slaughtered nationalist from April to September 1957 and did France's work for her."[69] But this type of operation involved individual operatives rather than organized covert units.
One organized pseudo-guerrilla unit, however, was created in December 1956 by the French DST domestic intelligence agency. The Organization of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counter-terrorists had as its mission to carry out false flag terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise.[70] But it seemed that, as in Indochina, "the French focused on developing native guerrilla groups that would fight against the FLN", one of whom fought in the Southern Atlas Mountains, equipped by the French Army.[71]
The FLN also used pseudo-guerrilla strategies against the French Army on one occasion, with Force K, a group of 1,000 Algerians who volunteered to serve in Force K as guerrillas for the French. But most of these members were either already FLN members or were turned by the FLN once enlisted. Corpses of purported FLN members displayed by the unit were in fact those of dissidents and members of other Algerian groups killed by the FLN. The French Army finally discovered the war ruse and tried to hunt down Force K members. However, some 600 managed to escape and join the FLN with weapons and equipment.[71][15]: 255–7
Late in 1957, General Raoul Salan, commanding the French Army in Algeria, instituted a system of quadrillage (surveillance using a grid pattern), dividing the country into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned territory. Salan's methods sharply reduced the instances of FLN terrorism but tied down a large number of troops in static defense. Salan also constructed a heavily patrolled system of barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. The best known of these was the Morice Line (named for the French defense minister, André Morice), which consisted of an electrified fence, barbed wire, and mines over a 320-kilometer stretch of the Tunisian border. Despite ruthless clashes during the Battle of the borders, the ALN failed to penetrate these defence lines.[citation needed]
The French military command ruthlessly applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas. Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject to aerial bombardment. FLN guerrillas that fled to caves or other remote hiding places were tracked and hunted down. In one episode, FLN guerrillas who refused to surrender and withdraw from a cave complex were dealt with by French Foreign Legion Pioneer troops, who, lacking flamethrowers or explosives, simply bricked up each cave, leaving the residents to die of suffocation.[72]
Finding it impossible to control all of Algeria's remote farms and villages, the French government also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels. In the three years (1957–60) during which the regroupement program was followed, more than 2 million Algerians[28] were removed from their villages, mostly in the mountainous areas, and resettled in the plains, where it was difficult to reestablish their previous economic and social systems. Living conditions in the fortified villages were poor. In hundreds of villages, orchards and croplands not already burned by French troops went to seed for lack of care. These population transfers effectively denied the use of remote villages to FLN guerrillas, who had used them as a source of rations and manpower, but also caused significant resentment on the part of the displaced villagers. Relocation's social and economic disruption continued to be felt a generation later.[citation needed] At the same time, the French tried to gain support from the civilian population by providing money, jobs and housing to farmers[42]
The French Army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from dependence on quadrillage to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive search-and-destroy missions against FLN strongholds. In 1959, Salan's successor, General Maurice Challe, appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance, but political developments had already overtaken the French Army's successes.[citation needed]
Fall of the Fourth Republic
Recurrent cabinet crises focused attention on the inherent instability of the Fourth Republic and increased the misgivings of the army and of the pieds-noirs that the security of Algeria was being undermined by party politics. Army commanders chafed at what they took to be inadequate and incompetent political initiatives by the government in support of military efforts to end the rebellion. The feeling was widespread that another debacle like that of Indochina in 1954 was in the offing and that the government would order another precipitate pullout and sacrifice French honor to political expediency. Many saw in de Gaulle, who had not held office since 1946, the only public figure capable of rallying the nation and giving direction to the French government.
After his time as governor general, Soustelle returned to France to organize support for de Gaulle's return to power, while retaining close ties to the army and the pieds-noirs. By early 1958, he had organized a coup d'état, bringing together dissident army officers and pieds-noirs with sympathetic Gaullists. An army junta under General Massu seized power in Algiers on the night of May 13, thereafter known as the May 1958 crisis. General Salan assumed leadership of a Committee of Public Safety formed to replace the civil authority and pressed the junta's demands that de Gaulle be named by French president René Coty to head a government of national unity invested with extraordinary powers to prevent the "abandonment of Algeria."
On May 24, French paratroopers from the Algerian corps landed on Corsica, taking the French island in a bloodless action. Subsequently, preparations were made in Algeria for Operation Resurrection, which had as its objectives the seizure of Paris and the removal of the French government. Resurrection was to be implemented in the event of one of three following scenarios: Were de Gaulle not approved as leader of France by the parliament; were de Gaulle to ask for military assistance to take power; or if it seemed that communist forces were making any move to take power in France. De Gaulle was approved by the French parliament on May 29, by 329 votes against 224, 15 hours before the projected launch of Operation Resurrection. This indicated that the Fourth Republic by 1958 no longer had any support from the French Army in Algeria and was at its mercy even in civilian political matters. This decisive shift in the balance of power in civil-military relations in France in 1958, and the threat of force, was the primary factor in the return of de Gaulle to power in France.
De Gaulle
Many people, regardless of citizenship, greeted de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the hostilities. On his trip to Algeria on 4 June 1958, de Gaulle calculatedly made an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all the inhabitants, declaring, "Je vous ai compris" ("I have understood you"). De Gaulle raised the hopes of the pied-noir and the professional military, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, with his exclamation of "Vive l'Algérie française [fr]" ("Long live French Algeria") to cheering crowds in Mostaganem. At the same time, he proposed economic, social, and political reforms to improve the situation of the Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle later admitted to having harbored deep pessimism about the outcome of the Algerian situation even then. Meanwhile, he looked for a "third force" among the population of Algeria, uncontaminated by the FLN or the "ultras" (colon extremists), through whom a solution might be found.
De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part. All Muslims, including women, were registered for the first time on electoral rolls to participate in a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958.
De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with decreased support among Muslims. In reaction, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, GPRA), a government-in-exile headed by Abbas and based in Tunis. Before the referendum, Abbas lobbied for international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recognized by Morocco, Tunisia, China, and several other African, Arab, and Asian countries, but not by the Soviet Union.
In February 1959, de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. He visited Constantine in October to announce a program to end the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France. De Gaulle's call on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elections was met with adamant refusal. "The problem of a cease-fire in Algeria is not simply a military problem", said the GPRA's Abbas. "It is essentially political, and negotiation must cover the whole question of Algeria." Secret discussions that had been underway were broken off.
From 1958 to 1959, the French army won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. In late July 1959, during Operation Jumelles, Colonel Bigeard, whose elite paratrooper unit fought at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, told journalist Jean Lartéguy, (source)
We are not making war for ourselves, not making a colonialist war, Bigeard wears no shirt (he shows his opened uniform) as do my officers. We are fighting right here right now for them, for the evolution, to see the evolution of these people and this war is for them. We are defending their freedom as we are, in my opinion, defending the West's freedom. We are here ambassadors, Crusaders, who are hanging on in order to still be able to talk and to be able to speak for.
— Col. Bigeard (July 1959)
During this period in France, however, popular opposition to the conflict was growing, notably in the French Communist Party, then one of the country's strongest political forces, which supported the Algerian Revolution. Thousands of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate brutality of the army against the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion, and a significant constituency supported the principle of national liberation. By 1959, it was clear that the status quo was untenable and France could either grant Algeria independence or allow real equality with the Muslims. De Gaulle told an advisor: "If we integrate them, if all the Arabs and the Berbers of Algeria were considered French, how could they be prevented from settling in France, where the living standard is so much higher? My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées".[73]
International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. Since 1955, the UN General Assembly annually considered the Algerian question, and the FLN position was gaining support. France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. In a 16 September 1959, statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination" as the third and preferred solution, which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.
Week of barricades
Convinced that de Gaulle had betrayed them, some units of European volunteers (Unités Territoriales) in Algiers led by student leaders Pierre Lagaillarde and Jean-Jacques Susini, café owner Joseph Ortiz, and lawyer Jean-Baptiste Biaggi staged an insurrection in the Algerian capital starting on 24 January 1960, and known in France as La semaine des barricades [fr] ("the week of barricades"). The ultras incorrectly believed that they would be supported by General Massu. The insurrection order was given by Colonel Jean Garde of the Fifth Bureau. As the army, police, and supporters stood by, civilian pieds-noirs threw up barricades in the streets and seized government buildings. General Maurice Challe, responsible for the army in Algeria, declared Algiers under siege, but forbade the troops to fire on the insurgents. Nevertheless, six rioters were killed during shooting on Boulevard Laferrière.
In Paris on 29 January 1960, de Gaulle called on his ineffective army to remain loyal and rallied popular support for his Algerian policy in a televised address:
I took, in the name of France, the following decision—the Algerians will have the free choice of their destiny. When, in one way or another – by ceasefire or by complete crushing of the rebels – we will have put an end to the fighting, when, after a prolonged period of appeasement, the population will have become conscious of the stakes and, thanks to us, realised the necessary progress in political, economic, social, educational, and other domains. Then it will be the Algerians who will tell us what they want to be.... Your French of Algeria, how can you listen to the liars and the conspirators who tell you that, if you grant free choice to the Algerians, France and de Gaulle want to abandon you, retreat from Algeria, and deliver you to the rebellion?.... I say to all of our soldiers: your mission comprises neither equivocation nor interpretation. You have to liquidate the rebellious forces, which want to oust France from Algeria and impose on this country its dictatorship of misery and sterility.... Finally, I address myself to France. Well, well, my dear and old country, here we face together, once again, a serious ordeal. In virtue of the mandate that the people have given me and of the national legitimacy, which I have embodied for 20 years, I ask everyone to support me whatever happens.[74]
Most of the Army heeded his call, and the siege of Algiers ended on 1 February with Lagaillarde surrendering to General Challe's command of the French Army in Algeria. The loss of many ultra leaders who were imprisoned or transferred to other areas did not deter the French Algeria militants. Sent to prison in Paris and then paroled, Lagaillarde fled to Spain. There, with another French army officer, Raoul Salan, who had entered clandestinely, and with Jean-Jacques Susini, he created the Organisation armée secrète (Secret Army Organization, OAS) on December 3, 1960, with the purpose of continuing the fight for French Algeria. Highly organized and well-armed, the OAS stepped up its terrorist activities, which were directed against both Algerians and pro-government French citizens, as the move toward negotiated settlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. To the FLN rebellion against France were added civil wars between extremists in the two communities and between the ultras and the French government in Algeria.
Beside Pierre Lagaillarde, Jean-Baptiste Biaggi was also imprisoned, while Alain de Sérigny was arrested, and Joseph Ortiz's FNF dissolved, as well as General Lionel Chassin's MP-13. De Gaulle also modified the government, excluding Jacques Soustelle, believed to be too pro-French Algeria, and granting the Minister of Information to Louis Terrenoire, who quit RTF (French broadcasting TV). Pierre Messmer, who had been a member of the Foreign Legion, was named Minister of Defense, and dissolved the Fifth Bureau, the psychological warfare branch, which had ordered the rebellion. These units had theorized the principles of a counter-revolutionary war, including the use of torture. During the Indochina War (1947–54), officers such as Roger Trinquier and Lionel-Max Chassin were inspired by Mao Zedong's strategic doctrine and acquired knowledge of convince the population to support the fight. The officers were initially trained in the Centre d'instruction et de préparation à la contre-guérilla (Arzew). Jacques Chaban-Delmas added to that the Centre d'entraînement à la guerre subversive Jeanne-d'Arc (Center of Training to Subversive War Joan of Arc) in Philippeville, Algeria, directed by Colonel Marcel Bigeard. The French army officers' uprising was due to a perceived second betrayal by the government, the first having been Indochina (1947–1954). In some aspects the Dien Bien Phu garrison was sacrificed with no metropolitan support, order was given to commanding officer General de Castries to "let the affair die of its own, in serenity" ("laissez mourir l'affaire d'elle même en sérénité"[75]).
The opposition of the UNEF student trade-union to the participation of conscripts in the war led to a secession in May 1960, with the creation of the Fédération des étudiants nationalistes (FEN, Federation of Nationalist Students) around Dominique Venner, a former member of Jeune Nation and of MP13, François d'Orcival and Alain de Benoist, who would theorize in the 1980s the "New Right" movement. The FEN then published the Manifeste de la classe 60.
A Front national pour l'Algérie française (FNAF, National Front for French Algeria) was created in June 1960 in Paris, gathering around de Gaulle's former Secretary Jacques Soustelle, Claude Dumont, Georges Sauge, Yvon Chautard, Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour (who later competed in the 1965 presidential election), Jacques Isorni, Victor Barthélemy, François Brigneau and Jean-Marie Le Pen. Another ultra rebellion occurred in December 1960, which led de Gaulle to dissolve the FNAF.
After the publication of the Manifeste des 121 against the use of torture and the war,[76] the opponents to the war created the Rassemblement de la gauche démocratique (Assembly of the Democratic Left), which included the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) socialist party, the Radical-Socialist Party, Force ouvrière (FO) trade union, Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens trade-union, UNEF trade-union, etc., which supported de Gaulle against the ultras.
End of the war
De Gaulle convoked the first referendum on the self-determination of Algeria on 8 January 1961, which 75% of the voters (both in France and Algeria) approved and de Gaulle's government began secret peace negotiations with the FLN. In the Algerian départements 69.51% voted in favor of self-determination.[77] The talks that began in March 1961 broke down when de Gaulle insisted on including the much smaller Mouvement national algérien (MNA), which the FLN objected to.[78] Since the FLN was the by far stronger movement with the MNA almost wiped out by this time, the French were finally forced to exclude the MNA from the talks after the FLN walked out for a time.[78]: 88
The generals' putsch in April 1961, aimed at canceling the government's negotiations with the FLN, marked the turning point in the official attitude toward the Algerian war. Leading the coup attempt to depose de Gaulle were General Raoul Salan, General André Zeller, General Maurice Challe, and General Edmond Jouhaud.[78]: 87–97 Only the paratroop divisions and the Foreign Legion joined the coup, while the Air Force, Navy and most of the Army stayed loyal to General de Gaulle, but at one moment de Gaulle went on French television to ask for public support with the normally lofty de Gaulle saying "Frenchmen, Frenchwomen, help me!"[78]: 89 De Gaulle was now prepared to abandon the Pied-Noirs, which no previous French government was willing to do. The army had been discredited by the putsch and kept a low profile politically throughout the rest of France's involvement with Algeria. The OAS was to be the main standard bearer for the Pied-Noirs for the rest of the war.
Talks with the FLN reopened at Évian in May 1961; after several false starts, the French government decreed that a ceasefire would take effect on March 18, 1962. A major difficulty at the talks was de Gaulle's decision to grant independence only to the coastal regions of Algeria, where the bulk of the population lived, while hanging onto the Sahara, which happened to be rich in oil and gas, while the FLN claimed all of Algeria.[78] During the talks, the Pied-Noirs and Muslim communities engaged in a low level civil war with bombings, shootings, throat-cutting and assassinations being the preferred methods.[78]: 90 The Canadian historian John Cairns wrote at times it seemed like both communities were "going berserk" as everyday "murder was indiscriminate".[78]: 90
On 29 June 1961, de Gaulle announced on TV that fighting was "virtually finished" and afterwards there were no major battles between the French Army and the FLN. During the summer of 1961 the OAS and the FLN engaged in a civil war, in which the greater numbers of the Muslims predominated.[78]: 90 To pressure de Gaulle to give up claims to the Sahara, the FLN organized demonstrations by Algerians living in France during the fall of 1961, which the French police crushed.[78]: 91 At a demonstration on 17 October 1961, Maurice Papon ordered an attack that became a massacre of Algerians. On 10 January 1962, the FLN started a "general offensive" to pressure the OAS in Algeria, staging a series of attacks on the Pied-Noirs communities.[78]: 91 On 7 February 1962, the OAS attempted to assassinate Culture Minister André Malraux with a bomb in his apartment building; it failed to kill him, but left a four-year girl in the adjoining apartment blinded by shrapnel.[79] The incident did much to turn French opinion against the OAS.
On 20 February 1962, a peace accord was reached granting independence to all of Algeria.[78]: 87 In their final form, the Évian Accords allowed the Pied-Noirs equal legal protection with Algerians over a three-year period. These rights included respect for property, participation in public affairs, and a full range of civil and cultural rights. At the end of that period, however, all Algerian residents would be obliged to become Algerian citizens or be classified as aliens with the attendant loss of rights. The agreement also allowed France to establish military bases in Algeria even after independence (including the nuclear test site of Regghane, the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir and the air base of Bou Sfer) and to have privileges vis-à-vis Algerian oil.
The OAS started a campaign of spectacular terrorist attacks to sabotage the Évian Accords, hoping that if enough Muslims were killed, a general pogrom against the Pied-Noirs would break out, leading the French Army to turn its guns against the government.[78]: 87 Despite ample provocation with OAS lobbing mortar shells into the casbah of Algiers, the FLN gave orders for no retaliatory attacks.[78]: 87 In the spring of 1962, the OAS turned to bank robbery to finance its war against both the FLN and the French state, and bombed special units sent by Paris to hunt them down.[78]: 93 Only eighty deputies voted against the Évian Accords in the National Assembly. Cairns wrote that the fulminations of Jean-Marie Le Pen against de Gaulle were only "...the traditional verbal excesses of third-rate firebrands without a substantial following and without a constructive idea".[78]
Following the cease fire, tensions developed between the Pied-Noirs community and their former protectors in the French Army. An OAS ambush of French troops on 20 March was followed by 20,000 gendarmes and soldiers being ordered to occupy the predominantly-Pied-Noir district of Bab El Oued in Algiers.[15]: 524 A week later, French soldiers from the 4th Tirailleur Regiment (an 80% Muslim unit with French officers)[80] opened fire on a crowd of Pied-Noir demonstrators in Algiers, killing between 50 and 80 civilians.[81] Total casualties in these three incidents were 326 killed and wounded amongst the Pied-Noirs and 110 French military personnel dead or injured.[15]: 524–5 A journalist who saw the massacre on 26 March 1962, Henry Tanner, described the scene: "When the shooting stopped, the street was littered with bodies, of women, as well as men, dead, wounded or dying. The black pavement looked grey, as if bleached by fire. Crumpled French flags were lying in pools of blood. Shattered glass and spent cartridges were everywhere".[78]: 94 A number of shocked Pied-Noir screamed that they were not French anymore.[78]: 95 One woman screamed "Stop firing! My God, we're French..." before she was shot down.[78]: 95 The massacre served to greatly embitter the Pied-Noir community and led to a massive surge of support for the OAS.[78]: 95
In the second referendum on the independence of Algeria, held in April 1962, 91 percent of the French electorate approved the Evian Accords. On 1 July 1962, some 6 million of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5 million cast their ballots. The vote was nearly unanimous, with 5,992,115 votes for independence, 16,534 against, with most Pied-Noirs and Harkis either having fled or abstaining.[82] De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country on 3 July. The Provisional Executive, however, proclaimed 5 July, the 132nd anniversary of the French entry into Algeria, as the day of national independence.
During the three months between the cease-fire and the French referendum on Algeria, the OAS unleashed a new campaign. The OAS sought to provoke a major breach in the ceasefire by the FLN, but the attacks now were aimed also against the French army and police enforcing the accords as well as against Muslims. It was the most wanton carnage that Algeria had witnessed in eight years of savage warfare. OAS operatives set off an average of 120 bombs per day in March, with targets including hospitals and schools. On June 7, 1962 the University of Algiers Library was burned by the OAS. This cultural devastation was commemorated by Muslim countries issuing postage stamps commemorating the tragic event. These included Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.[83]
During the summer of 1962, a rush of Pied-Noirs fled to France. Within a year, 1.4 million refugees, including almost the entire Jewish community, had joined the exodus. Despite the declaration of independence on 5 July 1962, the last French forces did not leave the naval base of Mers El Kébir until 1967. (The Evian Accords had permitted France to maintain its military presence for fifteen years, so the withdrawal in 1967 was significantly ahead of schedule.[15]) Cairns writing from Paris in 1962 declared: "In some ways the last year has been the worse. Tension has never been higher. Disenchantment in France at least has never been greater. The mindless cruelty of it all has never been more absurd and savage. This last year, stretching from the hopeful spring of 1961 to the ceasefire of 18 March 1962 spanned a season of shadow boxing, false threats, capitulation and murderous hysteria. French Algeria died badly. Its agony was marked by panic and brutality as ugly as the record of European imperialism could show. In the spring of 1962 the unhappy corpse of empire still shuddered and lashed out and stained itself in fratricide. The whole episode of its death, measured at least seven and half years, constituted perhaps the most pathetic and sordid event in the entire history of colonialism. It is hard to see how anybody of importance in the tangled web of the conflict came out looking well. Nobody won the conflict, nobody dominated it."[78]: 87
Strategy of internationalisation of the Algerian War led by the FLN
At the beginning of the war, on the Algerian side, it was necessary to compensate for military weakness with political and diplomatic struggle. In the asymmetric conflict between France and the FLN at this time, victory seemed extremely difficult.[84]
The Algerian revolution began with the insurrection of November 1, when the FLN organized a series of attacks against the French army and military infrastructure, and published a statement calling on Algerians to get involved in the revolution. This initial campaign had limited impact: the events remained largely unreported, especially by the French press (only two newspaper columns in Le Monde and one in l'Express), and the insurrection all but subsided. Nevertheless, François Mitterrand, the French Minister of the Interior, sent 600 soldiers to Algeria.
Furthermore, the FLN was weak militarily at the beginning of the war. It was created in 1954 and had few members, and its ally the ALN was also underdeveloped, having only 3,000 men badly equipped and trained, unable to compete with the French army. The nationalist forces also suffered from internal divisions.
As proclaimed in the statement of 1954, the FLN developed a strategy to avoid large-scale warfare and internationalize the conflict, appealing politically and diplomatically to influence French and world opinion.[85] This political aspect would reinforce the legitimacy of the FLN in Algeria, which was all the more necessary since Algeria, unlike other colonies, had been formally incorporated as a part of metropolitan France. The French counter-strategy aimed to keep the conflict internal and strictly French to maintain its image abroad. The FLN succeeded, and the conflict rapidly became international, embroiled with the tensions of the Cold War and the emergence of the Third World.
Firstly, the FLN exploited the tensions between the American-led Western Bloc and the Soviet-led Communist bloc. FLN sought material support from the Communists, goading the Americans to support of Algerian independence to keep the country on the western side. Furthermore, the FLN used the tensions within each bloc, including between France and the US and between the USSR and Mao's China. The US, which generally opposed colonisation, had every interest in pushing France to give Algeria its independence.[86]
Secondly, the FLN could count on Third World support. After World War II, many new states were created in the wave of decolonization: in 1945 there were 51 states in the UN, but by 1965 there were 117. This upturned the balance of power in the UN, with the recently decolonized countries now a majority with great influence. Most of the new states were part of the Third-World movement, proclaiming a third, non-aligned path in a bipolar world, and opposing colonialism in favor of national renewal and modernization.[87] They felt concerned in the Algerian conflict and supported the FLN on the international stage. For example, a few days after the first insurrection in 1954, Radio Yugoslavia (Third-Worldist) begun to vocally support the struggle of Algeria;[88] the 1955 Bandung conference internationally recognized the FLN as representing Algeria;[89] and Third-World countries brought up the Algerian conflict at the UN general assembly.[90] The French government grew more and more isolated.
After the Battle of Algiers greatly weakened the FLN, it was forced to accept more direct support from abroad. Financial and military support from China helped to rebuild the ALN to 20 000 men.[90] The USSR competed with China, and Khrushchev intensified moral support for the Algerian rebellion, which in turn pushed the USA to react.[90] In 1958, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (PGAR) was created, naming official representatives to negotiate with France.[91] Tense negotiations lasted three years, eventually turning to Algeria's advantage. The PGAR was supported by the Third World and the communist bloc, while France had few allies. Under pressure from the UN, the USA, and a war-weary public, France eventually conceded in the Evian agreements. According to Matthew Connelly, this strategy of internationalization became a model for other revolutionary groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization of Yasser Arafat, and the African National Congress of Nelson Mandela.[89]
Role of women
Women participated in a variety of roles during the Algerian War. The majority of Muslim women who became active participants did so on the side of the National Liberation Front (FLN). The French included some women, both Muslim and French, in their war effort, but they were not as fully integrated, nor were they charged with the same breadth of tasks as the women on the Algerian side. The total number of women involved in the conflict, as determined by post-war veteran registration, is numbered at 11,000, but it is possible that this number was significantly higher due to underreporting.[92]
Urban and rural women's experiences in the revolution differed greatly. Urban women, who constituted about twenty percent of the overall force, had received some kind of education and usually chose to enter on the side of the FLN of their own accord.[93] Largely illiterate rural women, on the other hand, the remaining eighty percent, due to their geographic location in respect to the operations of FLN often became involved in the conflict as a result of proximity paired with force.[93]
Women operated in a number of different areas during the course of the rebellion. "Women participated actively as combatants, spies, fundraisers, as well as nurses, launderers, and cooks",[94] "women assisted the male fighting forces in areas like transportation, communication and administration"[92]: 223 the range of involvement by a woman could include both combatant and non-combatant roles. Eveline Safir Lavalette was a notable contributor to the Revolution as a distributor of pamphlets for the FLN's underground newspaper. While most women's tasks were non-combatant, their less frequent, violent acts were more noticed. The reality was that "rural women in maquis rural areas support networks"[95] contained the overwhelming majority of those who participated; female combatants were in the minority.
Perhaps the most famous incident involving Algerian women revolutionaries was the Milk Bar Café bombing of 1956, when Zohra Drif and Yacef Saâdi planted three bombs: one in the Air France office in the Mauritania building in Algiers,[96] which did not explode, one in a cafeteria on the Rue Michelet, and another at the Milk Bar Café, which killed 3 young women and injured multiple adults and children.[97] Algerian Communist Party-member Raymonde Peschard was initially accused of being an accomplice to the bombing and was forced to flee from the colonial authorities.[98] In September 1957, though, Drif and Saâdi were arrested and sentenced to twenty years hard labor in the Barbarossa prison.[99] Drif was pardoned by Charles de Gaulle on the anniversary of Algerian independence in 1962.[100]
Exodus of the Pieds-Noirs and Harkis
Pieds-Noirs (including indigenous Mizrachi and Sephardi Jews) and Harkis accounted for 13% of the total population of Algeria in 1962. For the sake of clarity, each group's exodus is described separately here, although their fate shared many common elements.
Pieds-noirs
Pied-noir (literally "black foot") is a term used to name the European-descended population (mostly Catholic), who had resided in Algeria for generations; it is sometimes used to include the indigenous Maghrebi Jewish population as well, which likewise emigrated after 1962. Europeans arrived in Algeria as immigrants from all over the western Mediterranean (particularly France, Spain, Italy and Malta), starting in 1830. The Jews arrived in several waves, some coming as early as 600 BC and during the Roman period, known as the Maghrebi Jews or Berber Jews. The Maghrebi Jewish population was outnumbered by the Sephardic Jews, who were driven out of Spain in 1492, and was further strengthened by Marrano refugees from the Spanish Inquisition through the 16th century. Algerian Jews largely embraced French citizenship after the décret Crémieux in 1871.
In 1959, the pieds-noirs numbered 1,025,000 (85% of European Christian descent, and 15% were made up of the indigenous Algerian population of Maghrebi and Sephardi Jewish descent), and accounted for 10.4% of the total population of Algeria. In just a few months in 1962, 900,000 of them fled, the first third prior to the referendum, in the largest relocation of population to Europe since the Second World War. A motto used in the FLN message to the pieds-noirs was "a suitcase or a coffin" ("La valise ou le cercueil"), repurposing a slogan first coined years earlier by pied-noir "ultras" when rallying the European community to their hardcore line.
The French government claimed not to have anticipated such a massive exodus; it estimated that a maximum of 250–300,000 might enter metropolitan France temporarily. Nothing was planned for their move to France, and many had to sleep in the streets or abandoned farms on their arrival. A minority of departing pieds-noirs, including soldiers, destroyed their property before departure, to protest and as a desperate symbolic attempt to leave no trace of over a century of European presence, but the vast majority of their goods and houses were left intact and abandoned. A large number of panicked people camped for weeks on the docks of Algerian harbors, waiting for a space on a boat to France. About 100,000 pieds-noirs chose to remain, but most of those gradually left in the 1960s and 1970s, primarily due to residual hostility against them, including machine-gunning of public places in Oran.[101]
Harkis
The so-called Harkis, from the Algerian-Arabic dialect word harki (soldier), were indigenous Muslim Algerians (as opposed to European-descended Catholics or indigenous Algerian Maghrebi Jews) who fought as auxiliaries on the French side. Some of these were veterans of the Free French Forces who participated in the liberation of France during World War II or in the Indochina War. The term also came to include civilian indigenous Algerians who supported a French Algeria. According to French government figures, there were 236,000 Algerian Muslims serving in the French Army in 1962 (four times more than in the FLN), either in regular units (Spahis and Tirailleurs) or as irregulars (harkis and moghaznis). Some estimates suggest that, with their families, the indigenous Muslim loyalists may have numbered as many as 1 million.[102][103]
In 1962, around 90,000 Harkis took refuge in France, despite French government policy against this. Pierre Messmer, Minister of the Armies, and Louis Joxe, Minister for Algerian Affairs, gave orders to this effect.[104] The Harkis were seen as traitors by many Algerians, and many of those who stayed behind suffered severe reprisals after independence. French historians estimate that somewhere between 50,000 and 150,000 Harkis and members of their families were killed by the FLN or by lynch mobs in Algeria, often in atrocious circumstances or after torture.[15]: 537 The abandonment of the "Harkis" both the lack of recognition of those who died defending French Algeria and the neglect of those who escaped to France, remains an issue that France has not fully resolved—although the government of Jacques Chirac made efforts to recognize the suffering of these former allies.[105]
Death toll
Death toll estimates vary. Algerian historians and the FLN estimated that nearly eight years of revolution caused 1.5 million Algerian deaths.[24][106][107] Some other French and Algerian sources later put the figure at approximately 960,000 dead, while French officials and historians estimated it at around 350,000,[108][109] but this was regarded by many[who?] as an underestimate. French military authorities listed their losses at nearly 25,600 dead (6,000 from non-combat-related causes) and 65,000 wounded. European-descended civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 (including 3,000 dead) in 42,000 recorded violent incidents. According to French official figures during the war, the army, security forces and militias killed 141,000 presumed rebel combatants.[15]: 538 But it is still unclear whether this includes some civilians.
More than 12,000 Algerians died in internal FLN purges during the war. In France, an additional 5,000 died in the "café wars" between the FLN and rival Algerian groups. French sources also estimated that 70,000 Muslim civilians were killed, or abducted and presumed killed, by the FLN.[15]: 538
Martin Evans citing Gilert Meyinier implies at least 55,000 to up to 60,000 non-Harki Algerian civilians were killed during the conflict without specifying which side killed them.[21] Rudolph Rummel attributes at least 100,000[22] deaths in what he calls democide to French repression; and estimates an additional to 50,000 to 150,000 democides committed by Algerian independence fighters.[23] 6,000 to 20,000 Algerians were killed[56] in the 1945 Sétif and Guelma massacre which is considered by some historians to have been a cause of the war.[110]
Horne estimated Algerian casualties during the span of eight years to be around 1 million.[111][112] Uncounted thousands of Muslim civilians died in French Army ratissages, bombing raids, or vigilante reprisals. The war uprooted more than 2 million Algerians, who were forced to relocate in French camps or to flee into the Algerian hinterland, where many thousands died of starvation, disease, and exposure. One source estimates 300,000 Algerians civilians perished of starvation, depredation, and disease inside and outside the camps.[113]
In addition, large numbers of Harkis were murdered when the FLN settled accounts after independence,[6]: 13 with 30,000 to 150,000 killed in Algeria in post-war reprisals [fr].[15]: 538
Lasting effects in Algerian politics
After Algeria's independence was recognised, Ahmed Ben Bella quickly became more popular and thereby more powerful. In June 1962, he challenged the leadership of Premier Benyoucef Ben Khedda; this led to several disputes among his rivals in the FLN, which were quickly suppressed by Ben Bella's rapidly growing support, most notably within the armed forces. By September, Bella was in de facto control of Algeria and was elected premier in a one-sided election on September 20, and was recognised by the U.S. on September 29. Algeria was admitted as the 109th member of the United Nations on October 8, 1962. Afterward, Ben Bella declared that Algeria would follow a neutral course in world politics; within a week he met with U.S. President John F. Kennedy, requesting more aid for Algeria with Fidel Castro and expressed approval of Castro's demands for the abandonment of Guantanamo Bay. Bella returned to Algeria and requested that France withdraw from its bases there. In November, his government banned political parties, providing that the FLN would be the only party allowed to function overtly. Shortly thereafter, in 1965, Bella was deposed and placed under house arrest (and later exiled) by Houari Boumédiènne, who served as president until his death in 1978. Algeria remained stable, though in a one-party state, until a violent civil war broke out in the 1990s.
For Algerians of many political factions, the legacy of their War of Independence was a legitimization or even sanctification of the unrestricted use of force in achieving a goal deemed to be justified. Once invoked against foreign colonialists, the same principle could also be turned with relative ease against fellow Algerians.[114] The FLN's struggle to overthrow colonial rule and the ruthlessness exhibited by both sides in that struggle were mirrored 30 years later by the passion, determination, and brutality of the conflict between the FLN government and the Islamist opposition. The American journalist Adam Shatz wrote that much of the same methods employed by the FLN against the French such as "the militarization of politics, the use of Islam as a rallying cry, the exaltation of jihad" to create an essentially secular state in 1962, were used by Islamic fundamentalists in their efforts to overthrow the FLN regime in the 1990s.[73]
Atrocities and war crimes
French atrocities and use of torture
Massacres and torture were frequent from the beginning of the colonization of Algeria, which started in 1830.[48] Atrocities committed against Algerians by the French army during the war included indiscriminate shootings into civilian crowds (such as during the Paris massacre of 1961), execution of civilians when rebel attacks occurred,[115] bombings of villages suspected of helping the FLN,[42] rape,[116] disembowelment of pregnant women,[117] imprisonment without food in small cells (some of which were small enough to impede lying down),[118] throwing detainees from helicopters and into the sea with concrete on their feet, and burying people alive.[119][120][121][122] Torture methods included beatings, mutilations, burning, hanging by the feet or hands, torture by electroshock, waterboarding, sleep deprivation and sexual assaults.[116][119][123][124][125]
During the war, the French military relocated entire villages to centres de regroupements (regrouping centres), which were built for forcibly displaced civilian populations, in order to separate them from FLN guerilla combatants. Over 8,000 villages were destroyed.[41][42][126] Over 2 million Algerians were resettled in regrouping internment camps, with some being forced into labour.[27][127]
A notable instance of rape was that of Djamila Boupacha, a 23-years old Algerian woman who was arrested in 1960, accused of attempting to bomb a cafe in Algiers. Her confession was obtained through torture and rape. Her subsequent trial affected French public opinion about the French army's methods in Algeria after publicity of the case by Simone de Beauvoir and Gisèle Halimi.[128]
Torture was also used by both sides during the First Indochina War (1946–54).[129][91][130] Claude Bourdet denounced acts of torture in Algeria on 6 December 1951, in the magazine L'Observateur, rhetorically asking, "Is there a Gestapo in Algeria?" D. Huf, in his seminal work on the subject, argued that the use of torture was one of the major factors in developing French opposition to the war.[131] Huf argued, "Such tactics sat uncomfortably with France's revolutionary history, and brought unbearable comparisons with Nazi Germany. The French national psyche would not tolerate any parallels between their experiences of occupation and their colonial mastery of Algeria." General Paul Aussaresses admitted in 2000 that systematic torture techniques were used during the war and justified them. He also recognized the assassination of lawyer Ali Boumendjel and the head of the FLN in Algiers, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, which had been disguised as suicides.[132] Marcel Bigeard, who called FLN activists "savages", claimed torture was a "necessary evil".[133][134] To the contrary, General Jacques Massu denounced it, following Aussaresses's revelations and, before his death, pronounced himself in favor of an official condemnation of the use of torture during the war.[135]
Bigeard's justification of torture has been criticized by Joseph Doré, archbishop of Strasbourg, Marc Lienhard, president of the Lutheran Church of Augsbourg Confession in Alsace-Lorraine, and others.[136] In June 2000, Bigeard declared that he was based in Sidi Ferruch, a torture center where Algerians were murdered. Bigeard qualified Louisette Ighilahriz's revelations, published in the Le Monde newspaper on June 20, 2000, as "lies." An ALN activist, Louisette Ighilahriz had been tortured by General Massu.[137] However, since General Massu's revelations, Bigeard has admitted the use of torture, although he denies having personally used it, and has declared, "You are striking the heart of an 84-year-old man." Bigeard also recognized that Larbi Ben M'Hidi was assassinated and that his death was disguised as a suicide.
In 2018 France officially admitted that torture was systematic and routine.[138][139][140]
Camp de Thol, one of the French concentration camps for Algerians used during the war.[141]
Marcel Bigeard's troops were accused of practicing "death flights", whose victims were called crevettes Bigeard (fr), "Bigeard shrimp".[142]
"Gégène", a device used by the French forces to generate electricity; electrodes would then be attached to the victim's body parts for electric torture
Algerian use of terror
Specializing in ambushes and night raids to avoid direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colonial farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. At first, the FLN targeted only Muslim officials of the colonial regime; later, they coerced, maimed, or killed village elders, government employees, and even simple peasants who refused to support them. Throat slitting and decapitation were commonly used by the FLN as mechanisms of terror.[15]: 134–5 Some other atrocities were committed by the more militant sections of the FLN as collective reprisals against the pieds-noirs population in response to French repression. The more extreme cases occurred in places like the town of Al-Halia, where some European residents were raped and disemboweled, while children had been murdered by slitting their throats or banging their heads against walls.[143]
During the first two and a half years of the conflict, the guerrillas killed an estimated 6,352 Muslim and 1,035 non-Muslim civilians.[15]: 135
Historiography
Although the opening of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after a 30-year lock-up enabled some new historical research on the war, including Jean-Charles Jauffret's book, La Guerre d'Algérie par les documents (The Algerian War According to the Documents), many remain inaccessible.[144] The recognition in 1999 by the National Assembly permitted the Algerian War to enter the syllabi of French schools. In France, the war was known as "la guerre sans nom" ("the war without a name") while it was being fought. The government variously described the war as the "Algerian events", the "Algerian problem" and the "Algerian dispute"; the mission of the French Army was "ensuring security", "maintaining order" and "pacification" but was never described as fighting a war. The FLN were referred to as "criminals", "bandits", "outlaws", "terrorists" and "fellagha" (a derogatory Arabic word meaning "road-cutters" but often mistranslated as "throat-cutters" in reference to the FLN's frequent method of execution, which made people wear the "Kabylian smile" by cutting their throats, pulling their tongues out, and leaving them to bleed to death).[145] After reports of the widespread use of torture by French forces started to reach France in 1956–57, the war become commonly known as la sale guerre ("the dirty war"), a term that is still used today and reflects the very negative memory of the war in France.[145]: 145
Lack of commemoration
As the war was officially a "police action", no monuments were built for decades to honour the about 25,000 French soldiers killed in the war, and the Defense Ministry refused to classify veterans as veterans until the 1970s.[64]: 219 When a monument to the Unknown Soldier of the Algerian War was erected in 1977, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in his dedication speech, refused to use the words war or Algeria but instead used the phrase "the unknown soldier of North Africa".[64]: 219 A national monument to the French war dead was not built until 1996 and, even then spoke only of those killed fighting in Afrique du nord and was located in a decrepit area of Paris rarely visited by tourists, as if to hide the monument.[64]: 226 Further adding to the silence were the vested interests of French politicians. François Mitterrand, the French president 1981 to 1995, had been the Interior Minister from 1954 to 1955 and the Justice Minister from 1955 to 1957, when he had been deeply involved in the repression of the FLN, and it was only after Mitterrand's death in 1996, that his French Socialist Party started to become willing to talk about the war and, even then, remained very guarded about his role.[64]: 232 Likewise, de Gaulle had promised in the Évian Agreements that the pieds-noirs could remain in Algeria, but after independence, the FLN freely violated the accords and led to the entire pied-noir population fleeing to France, usually with only the clothes they were wearing, as they had lost everything they had in Algeria, a circumstance further embarrassing the defeated nation.[64]: 232
English-language historiography
One of the first books about the war in English, A Scattering of Dust by the American journalist Herb Greer in 1962, depicted very favorably the Algerian struggle for independence.[146][147] Most work in English in the 1960s and 1970s were the work of left-wing scholars, who were focused on explaining the FLN as a part of a generational change in Algerian nationalism and depicted the war as a reaction to intolerable oppression and/or an attempt by the peasants, impoverished by French policies, to improve their lot.[146]: 222–5 One of the few military histories of the war was The Algerian Insurrection, by the retired British Army officer Edgar O'Ballance, who wrote with unabashed admiration for French high command during the war and saw the FLN as a terrorist group. O'Ballance concluded that the tactics which won the war militarily for the French lost the war for them politically.[146]: 225–6
In 1977, the British journalist Alistair Horne published A Savage War of Peace, regarded by some authors as the leading book written on the subject in English, though written from a French, rather than Algerian perspective.[146]: 226 Fifteen years after the end of the war, Horne was accused of not being concerned about "right or wrong" but rather about "cause and effect."[146]: 217–35 Living in Paris at the time of the war, Horne had condemned French intervention during the Suez Crisis and the French bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef in 1958. He'd argued that the "inflexibility" of the FLN had won Algeria independence, creating a sense of Algerian national identity, and leading the Front to rule over authoritarian but "progressive" FLN regime.[146]: 217–35
In a 1977 column published in The Times Literary Supplement reviewing the book A Savage War of Peace, Iraqi-born British historian Elie Kedourie attacked Horne as an "apologist for terrorism" and accused him of engaging in the "cosy pieties" of bien-pensants. Kedorie condemned the Western intellectuals who excuse terrorism when committed by Third World revolutionaries.[146]: 217–35 Kedourie claimed that far from a mass movement, the FLN were a "small gang" of "murderous intellectuals" who used brutal, terrorist tactics against the French citizens and military, and against any Muslim loyal to the French. He further claimed that the Front had been beaten by 1959.[146]: 217–235 Kedourie charged that de Gaulle had cynically sacrificed the colons and the harkis, as he had chosen to disregard his constitutional oath as president to protect all Frenchmen and ensure that "the French withdrew and handed over power to the only organized body of armed men who were on the scene - a civilized government, thus, acting for all the world like the votary of some Mao or Ho, in the barbarous belief that legitimacy comes from the power of the gun".[146]: 227
In 1992, American historian John Ruedy, the focus of whose research was the history of the Maghreb and French colonialism in Algeria, published Modern Algeria: Origins and Development of a Nation.[146]: 232–3 Ruedy wrote that under French rule the traditional social structure had been so completely destroyed that when the FLN launched its independence struggle in 1954, the only way of asserting one's interests was through "the law of the gun," which explains why the FLN was so violent not only in regards to its enemies but also within the movement. The FLN, thus, according to Ruedy, formed the basis of an "alternative political culture," based on "brute force" that has persisted ever since.[146]: 233
In film
Before the war, Algeria was a popular setting for French films; the British professor Leslie Hill having written: "In the late 1920s and 1930s, for instance, North Africa provided film-makers in France with a ready fund of familiar images of the exotics, mingling, for instance, the languid eroticism of Arabian nights with the infinite and hazy vistas of the Sahara to create a powerful confection of tragic heroism and passionate love".[145]: 147 During the war itself, French censors banned the entire subject of the war.[145]: 147–8 Since 1962, when film censorship relating to the war eased, French films dealing with the conflict have consistently portrayed the war as a set of conflicting memories and rival narratives (which ones being correct are left unclear), with most films dealing with the war taking a disjointed chronological structure in which scenes before, during and after the war are juxtaposed out of sequence with one film critic referring to the cinematic Algeria as "an ambiguous world marked by the displacements and repetitions of dreams".[145]: 142–58 The consistent message of French films dealing with the war is that something horrible happened, but what happened, who was involved and why are left unexplained.[145]: 142–158 Atrocities, especially torture by French forces are acknowledged, the French soldiers who fought in Algeria were and are always portrayed in French cinema as the "lost soldiers" and tragic victims of the war who are more deserving of sympathy than the FLN people they tortured, which are almost invariably portrayed as vicious, psychopathic terrorists, an approach to the war that has raised anger in Algeria.[145]: 151–6
Reminders
From time to time, the memory of the Algerian War surfaced in France. In 1987, when SS-Hauptsturmführer Klaus Barbie, the "Butcher of Lyon", was brought to trial for crimes against humanity, graffiti appeared on the walls of the banlieues, the slum districts in which most Algerian immigrants in France live, reading: "Barbie in France! When will Massu be in Algeria!"[64]: 230 Barbie's lawyer, Jacques Vergès, adopted a tu quoque defence that asked the judges "is a crime against humanity is to be defined as only one of Nazis against the Jews or if it applies to more seriously crimes... the crimes of imperialists against people struggling for their independence?". He went on to say that nothing that his client had done against the French Resistance that was not done by "certain French officers in Algeria" who, Vergès noted, could not be prosecuted because of de Gaulle's amnesty of 1962.[64]: 230 In 1997, when Maurice Papon, a career French civil servant was brought to trial for crimes against humanity for sending 1600 Jews from Bordeaux to be killed at Auschwitz in 1942, it emerged over the course of the trial that on 17 October 1961, Papon had organized a massacre of between 100 and 200 Algerians in central Paris, which was the first time that most French had ever heard of the massacre.[64]: 231 The revelation that hundreds of people had been killed by the Paris Sûreté was a great shock in France and led to uncomfortable questions being raised about what had happened during the Algerian War.[64]: 231 The American historian William Cohen wrote that the Papon trial "sharpened the focus" on the Algerian War but not provide "clarity", as Papon's role as a civil servant under Vichy led to misleading conclusions in France that it was former collaborators who were responsible for the terror in Algeria, but most of the men responsible, like Guy Mollet, General Marcel Bigeard, Robert Lacoste, General Jacques Massu and Jacques Soustelle, had actually all been résistants in World War II, which many French historians found to be very unpalatable.[64]: 231
On 15 June 2000, Le Monde published an interview with Louisette Ighilahriz, a former FLN member who described in graphic detail her torture at the hands of the French Army and made the sensational claim that the war heroes General Jacques Massu and General Marcel Bigeard had personally been present when she was being tortured for information.[64]: 233 What made the interview very touching for many French people was that Ighilahriz was not demanding vengeance but wished to express thanks to Dr. François Richaud, the army doctor who extended her much kindness and who, she believed, saved her life by treating her every time she was tortured. She asked if it were possible for her to see Dr. Richaud one last time to thank him personally, but it later turned out that Dr. Richaud had died in 1997.[64]: 233 As Ighilahriz had been an attractive woman in her youth, university-educated, secular, fluent in French and fond of quoting Victor Hugo, and her duties in the FLN had been as an information courier, she made for a most sympathetic victim since she was a woman who did not come across as Algerian.[64]: 234 William Cohen commented that had she been an uneducated man who had been involved in killings and was not coming forward to express thanks for a Frenchman, her story might not had resonated the same way.[64]: 234 The Ighiahriz case led to a public letter signed by 12 people who been involved in the war to President Jacques Chirac to ask October 31 be made a public day of remembrance for victims of torture in Algeria.[64]: 234
In response to the Ighilahriz case, General Paul Aussaresses gave an interview on 23 November 2000 in which he candidly admitted to ordering torture and extrajudicial executions and stated he had personally executed 24 fellagha. He argued that they were justified, as torture and extrajudicial executions were the only way to defeat the FLN.[64]: 235 In May 2001, Aussaresses published his memoirs, Services spéciaux Algérie 1955–1957, in which presented a detailed account of torture and extrajudicial killings in the name of the republic, which he wrote were all done under orders from Paris; that confirmed what had been long suspected.[64]: 239 As a result of the interviews and Aussaresses's book, the Algerian War was finally extensively discussed by the French media, which had ignored the subject as much as possible for decades, but no consensus emerged about how to best remember the war.[64]: 235 Adding to the interest was the decision by one war veteran, Georges Fogel, to come forward to confirm that he had seen Ighiahriz and many others tortured in 1957, and the politician and war veteran Jean Marie Faure decided in February 2001 to release extracts from the diary that he had kept and showed "acts of sadism and horror" that he had witnessed.[64]: 235 The French historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet called that a moment of "catharsis" that was "explainable only in near-French terms: it is the return of the repressed".[64]: 235–6
In 2002, Une Vie Debout: Mémoires Politiques by Mohammed Harbi, a former advisor to Ben Bella, was published in which Harbi wrote: "Because they [the FLN leaders] weren't supported at the moment of their arrival on the scene by a real and dynamic popular movement, they took power of the movement by force and they maintained it by force. Convinced that they had to act with resolution in order to protect themselves against their enemies, they deliberately chose an authoritarian path".[73]
Continued controversy in France
The Algerian War remains a contentious event. According to the historian Benjamin Stora, one of the leading historians on the war, memories concerning the war remain fragmented, with no common ground to speak of:
There is no such thing as a history of the Algerian War; there is just a multitude of histories and personal paths through it. Everyone involved considers that they lived through it in their own way, and any attempt to understand the Algerian War globally is immediately rejected by protagonists.[148]
Even though Stora has counted 3,000 publications in French on the war, there still is no work produced by French and Algerian authors co-operating with each other. Though according to Stora, there can "no longer be talk about a 'war without a name', a number of problems remain, especially the absence of sites in France to commemorate" the war. Furthermore, conflicts have arisen on an exact commemoration date to end the war. Although many sources as well as the French state place it on 19 March 1962, the Évian Agreements, others point out that massacres of harkis and the kidnapping of pieds-noirs took place later. Stora further points out, "The phase of memorial reconciliation between the two sides of the sea is still a long way off".[148] That was evidenced by the National Assembly's creation of the law on colonialism on 23 February 2005 that asserted that colonialism had overall been "positive".
Alongside a heated debate in France, the February 23, 2005, law had the effect of jeopardising the treaty of friendship that President Chirac was supposed to sign with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, which was no longer on the agenda. Following that controversial law, Bouteflika has talked about a cultural genocide, particularly referring to the 1945 Sétif massacre. Chirac finally had the law repealed by a complex institutional mechanism.
Another matter concerns the teaching of the war as well as of colonialism and decolonization, particularly in French secondary schools.[149] Hence, there is only one reference to racism in a French textbook, one published by Bréal publishers for terminales students, those passing their baccalauréat. Thus, many are not surprised that the first to speak about the October 17, 1961 massacre were music bands, including hip-hop bands such as the famous Suprême NTM (les Arabes dans la Seine) or politically-engaged La Rumeur. Indeed, the Algerian War is not even the subject of a specific chapter in the textbook for terminales[144] Henceforth, Benjamin Stora stated:
As Algerians do not appear in an "indigenous" condition, and their sub-citizens status, as the history of nationalist movement, is never evoked as their being one of great figures of the resistance, such as Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas. They neither emerge nor are being given attention. No one is explaining to students what colonization has been. We have prevented students from understanding why the decolonization took place.[144]
Socioeconomic situation of French Algerians
In Metropolitan France in 1963, 43% of French Algerians lived in bidonvilles (shanty towns).[150] Thus, Azouz Begag, the delegate Minister for Equal Opportunities, wrote an autobiographic novel, Le Gone du Chaâba, about his experiences while living in a bidonville in the outskirts of Lyon. It is impossible to understand the third-generation of Algerian immigrants to France without recalling the bicultural experience. An official parliamentary report on the "prevention of criminality", commanded by Interior Minister Philippe de Villepin and made by the deputy Jacques-Alain Bénisti, claimed, "Bilingualism (bilinguisme) was a factor of criminality".(sic[151]). Following outcries, the definitive version of the report finally made bilingualism an asset, rather than a fault.[152]
French recognition of historical use of torture
After having denied or downplayed its use for 40 years, France has finally recognized its history of torture, but there was never an official proclamation about it. General Paul Aussaresses was sentenced following his justification of the use of torture for "apology of war crimes". As they occurred during wartime, France claimed torture to be isolated acts, instead of admitting its responsibility for the frequent use of torture to break the insurgents' morale, not, as Aussaresses had claimed, to "save lives" by gaining short-term information which would stop "terrorists".[153] The state now claims that torture was a regrettable aberration because of the context of the exceptionally-savage war. However, academic research has proved both theses to be false. "Torture in Algeria was engraved in the colonial act; it is a 'normal' illustration of an abnormal system", wrote Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, who discussed the phenomena of "human zoos."[154] From the enfumades (slaughter by smoke inhalation) of the Darha caves in 1844 by Aimable Pélissier to the 1945 riots in Sétif, Guelma and Kherrata, the repression in Algeria used the same methods. Following the Sétif massacres, other riots against the European presence occurred in Guelma, Batna, Biskra, and Kherrata that resulted in 103 deaths among the pieds-noirs. The suppression of the riots officially saw 1500 other deaths, but N. Bancel, P. Blanchard and S. Lemaire estimate the number to be between 6000 and 8000.[155]
INA archives
Note: concerning the audio and film archives from the Institut national de l'audiovisuel (INA), see Benjamin Stora's comments on their politically-oriented creation.[148]
Cinq Colonnes à la une, Rushes Interview Pied-Noir, ORTF, July 1, 1962
Cinq Colonnes à la une, Rétrospective Algérie, ORTF, June 9, 1963 (concerning these INA archives, see also Benjamin Stora's warning about the conditions of creation of these images)
Contemporary publications
Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 1961.
Leulliette, Pierre, St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper, Houghton Mifflin, 1964.
Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 1964.
Jouhaud, Edmond. O Mon Pays Perdu: De Bou-Sfer a Tulle. Paris: Librarie Artheme Fayard, 1969.
Maignen, Etienne Treillis au djebel – Les Piliers de Tiahmaïne Yellow Concept, 2004.
Derradji, Abder-Rahmane, The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics, The Edwin Mellen Press, New York, 1997.
Feraoun, Mouloud, Journal 1955–1962, University of Nebraska Press, 2000.
Pečar, Zdravko, Alžir do nezavisnosti. Beograd: Prosveta; Beograd: Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, 1967.
Other publications
English-language
Aussaresses, General Paul. The Battle of the Casbah, New York: Enigma Books, 2010, ISBN 978-1-929631-30-8.
Horne, Alistair (1978). A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. Viking. ISBN 978-0-670-61964-1.
Maran, Rita (1989). Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War, New York: Prager Publishers.
Windrow, Martin. The Algerian War 1954–62. London: Osprey Publishing, 1997. ISBN 1-85532-658-2
Arslan Humbaraci. Algeria: a revolution that failed. London: Pall mall Press Ltd, 1966.
Samia Henni: Architecture of Counterrevolution. The French Army in Northern Algeria, gta Verlag, Zürich 2017, ISBN 978-3-85676-376-3
Pečar, Zdravko, Algeria to Independence. Currently being translated into English by Dubravka Juraga at: Zdravko Pečar: Alžir do nezavisnosti
French language
Translations may be available for some of these works. See specific cases.
Benot, Yves (1994). Massacres coloniaux, La Découverte, coll. "Textes à l'appui", Paris.
Jauffret, Jean-Charles. La Guerre d'Algérie par les documents (first tome, 1990; second tome, 1998; account here)
Rey-Goldzeiguer, Annie (2001). Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie, La Découverte, Paris.
Robin, Marie-Monique. Escadrons de la mort, l'écol
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ALGERIA. AFRICA CUP OF NATIONS 2017. self adhesive team box labels.
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NEW SELF ADHESIVE MACHINE PRINTED HIGH QUALITY TEAM BOX LABELS DESIGNED TO FIT THE WHITE TEAM BOXES WE SELL. THERE ARE FIVE MACHINE CUT LABELS ON ONE A4 SHEET. YOU GET: 2 LABELS (ONE FOR EACH END OF THE BOX), 2 SIDE LABELS FOR THE TWO SIDES OF THE BOX AND THE LARGE LABEL FOR THE TOP OF THE BOX. THE MEASUREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: END LABELS 88mm x 26mm, SIDE LABELS 210mm x 26mm AND THE TOP LABEL IS 210mm X 88mm. THESE LABELS WILL ALSO FIT OUR EARLY AND MID 70'S REPRO SUBBUTEO BOXES. THEY ARE VERY EASY TO APPLY AS THEY ARE PRE-CUT AND HAVE SELF ADHESIVE BACKING. JUST PEEL OFF THE LABEL AND APPLY TO YOUR BOX. PERFECT FOR CUSTOMISING YOUR BOXES. WE HAVE OVER 600 DIFFERENT ENGLISH, SCOTTISH, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL TEAM BOX LABELS IN STOCK COVERING MOST OF THE TOP TEAMS FROM AROUND THE WORLD.
NEW SELF ADHESIVE MACHINE PRINTED HIGH QUALITY TEAM BOX LABELS DESIGNED TO FIT THE WHITE TEAM BOXES WE SELL. THERE ARE FIVE MACHINE CUT LABELS ON ONE A4 SHEET. YOU GET: 2 LABELS (ONE FOR EACH END OF THE BOX), 2 SIDE LABELS FOR THE TWO SIDES OF THE BOX AND THE LARGE LABEL FOR THE TOP OF THE BOX. THE MEASUREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: END LABELS 88mm x 26mm, SIDE LABELS 210mm x 26mm AND THE TOP LABEL IS 210mm X 88mm. THESE LABELS WILL ALSO FIT OUR EARLY AND MID 70'S REPRO SUBBUTEO BOXES. THEY ARE VERY EASY TO APPLY AS THEY ARE PRE-CUT AND HAVE SELF ADHESIVE BACKING. JUST PEEL OFF THE LABEL AND APPLY TO YOUR BOX. PERFECT FOR CUSTOMISING YOUR BOXES. WE HAVE OVER 600 DIFFERENT ENGLISH, SCOTTISH, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL TEAM BOX LABELS IN STOCK COVERING MOST OF THE TOP TEAMS FROM AROUND THE WORLD.
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https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/algerians-rally-gold-medal-hopeful-imane-khelif-amid-112641376
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Algerians rally behind gold medal hopeful Imane Khelif amid gender misconceptions
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2024-08-07T14:04:38+00:00
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Olympic boxer Imane Khelif has become a hometown hero in Algeria, a conservative, Muslim-majority country where attacks on her gender have been interpreted as attacks on the nation
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https://s.abcnews.com/assets/dtci/images/favicon.ico
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ABC News
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https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/algerians-rally-gold-medal-hopeful-imane-khelif-amid-112641376
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AIN MESBAH, Algeria -- Relatives and neighbors erupted in cheers on Tuesday when Algeria's Imane Khelif advanced to the Olympic final in women’s boxing, winning a clear unanimous decision over Janjaem Suwannapheng of Thailand.
In Ain Mesbah, the rural cinder block-built town where the boxer was raised, legions of supporters convened on her uncle’s home to watch Khelif's match. With news camera lights shining on the gathering, they drank orange juice, waved flags and whistled as Khelif jumped around the ring in excitement about advancing to Friday’s gold medal match.
“Between the quarterfinals and the semifinals, we were on edge,” said Rachid Khelif, referencing the wave of uninformed speculation about his niece’s gender. “We were afraid that these attacks would affect her psychologically. But thank God, we saw Imane in a good state of mind.”
Few Algerians could have imagined that a 25-year-old welder's daughter from the drought-stricken Tiaret region could unite the population in such a way. But the Muslim-majority country has largely interpreted the backlash against Khelif as an attack on the nation rather than within the context of the debate underway in many Western nations about gender, sex and sports.
In the North African nation’s newspapers, on television and all over social media, Khelif has become a hometown hero, celebrated for her successes and defended amid misconceptions about her gender and scrutiny over her eligibility to compete.
“Imane Khelif, the last round against hate and racism!” read a Tuesday headline in leading Algerian daily Echourouk, which described her as “an iconic figure in national sport.”
Rifka, an Algerian social media influencer with 5.4 million Instagram followers, posted earlier this week showing himself traveling from Algiers to Paris to stream Khelif’s matches and reading headlines about Elon Musk's misconceptions about Khelif's gender.
“What? This man does not know Algerians,” he said.
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has called Khelif via telephone to cheer her on and backed her amid the criticisms.
“Thank you Imane Khelif for making all Algerians happy, with this strong and wonderful qualification for the final,” he wrote on X after her semifinal rout on Tuesday. “All Algerian women and men are with you.”
Khelif earlier this week said that the spread of misconceptions about her gender “harms human dignity” and, throughout the Olympics, both family members and Algeria's leading politicians echoed that description, describing the attacks against her as misguided.
Salah Goudjil, the speaker of Algeria's Senate, lauded Khelif on Tuesday evening for “her well-deserved qualification for the 2024 Olympic final, amid a hateful racist campaign.”
Khelif, who grew up with six siblings, was not always so embraced, however. In a pre-Olympics interview with Canal Algerie, she noted the challenges of growing up in a sheep farming community where many neighbors and family members were not accustomed to young girls pursuing certain sports.
“I come from a region and family that are conservative. Boxing was a sport for men only and the hardest thing for me was traveling between my village and the town where I trained,” she said, recounting how she sold bread in the street.
Apart from Khelif's aunt, the audience watching her match at her uncle's home was nearly all men. But young girls continue to train at her boxing gym in nearby Tiaret, the larger town she traveled to for training during her childhood.
A flag hangs on the wall behind the gym's boxing ring, next to signs reading “Don't Give Up” and “Try Again to Win."
“We tell Imane Khelif: Continue your career and pursue your dream, which is to win the gold medal,” said Yousra Messousa, a young girl who frequents the Tiaret gym. “Imane is a woman. She was born a girl, lived as a girl and boxes as a woman. Criticism and attacks don’t affect her.”
The controversy about Khelif's gender and eligibility stems from the Russian-dominated International Boxing Association’s decision to disqualify her and a boxer from Taiwan from last year’s world championships. The association said Khelif's disqualification — which came after she defeated a Russian opponent — was due to failing an unspecified eligibility test.
Its leaders and procedures have since come under fire from the International Olympic Committee, which a year ago banned the association after years of serious concerns about its financial transparency and competition governance.
The IOC has called the testing done on Khelif and Lin “ impossibly flawed,” and seemingly another part of a Russian-fueled defamation campaign directed at an Olympic Games from which its athletes are mostly banned from competing.
Such debates about gender identity may be animating the United States and Europe, but they're mostly foreign in Algeria. Abdelkader Bezaiz, a coach at Tiaret's boxing center, told The Associated Press, “it only strengthens Imane Khelif’s determination and will to prove that she is the boxing champion of these Paris Games.”
“All the Algerian people are happy. Everyone was waiting for this victory,” said Khelif's cousin, Walid Djobar. “I really hope she gets the gold medal and I have a feeling she's going to bring it home.”
___
This story has been corrected to show that Imane Khelif has six, not five, siblings.
___
AP Sports Writer Greg Beacham in Paris contributed to this report. Metz reported from Rabat, Morocco.
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Algeria label-me Map
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5/29/24 - Teachers and Parents - Keep your kids sharp during the summer with the ad-free, full-content, unlimited students, subscription version of MrNussbaum.com. Use the code SUMMERFUN for 15 percent off! Click "Sign up" in the upper right corner. Join thousands of teachers, parents, and students who enjoy the site with no distractions and tons more content and options! Only $24.65 per year.
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https://www.aljazeera.com/where/algeria/
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Today's latest from Al Jazeera
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Stay on top of Algeria latest developments on the ground with Al Jazeera’s fact-based news, exclusive video footage, photos and updated maps.
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Al Jazeera
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https://www.aljazeera.com/where/algeria/
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Content Feed
Algeria’s Imane Khelif will face China’s Yang Liu on Friday for a chance to win the country’s first women’s boxing gold.
The attacks against the Algerian boxer reflect the West’s distorted notions of race and womanhood.
quotes
Khelif beats Thailand’s Janjaem Suwannapheng by unanimous decision to have a shot at winning gold in Friday’s final.
The 17-year-old outscored China’s Qiu Qiyuan and USA’s Sunisa Lee in the uneven bars final for Algeria’s first medal.
An emotional Khelif comfortably beat Hungary’s Luca Anna to enter the welterweight semis and ensure a podium finish.
The 17-year-old breakout gymnast is favourite for gold in Sunday’s final ahead of Nina Derwael and Sunisa Lee.
The fighter under scrutiny won her opening bout when opponent Angela Carini from Italy quits after 46 seconds.
How media was used as a political weapon in the anticolonial struggle during the Algerian war of independence.
play-arrowVideo Duration 47 minutes 18 seconds 47:18
Football became a means of resistance to French colonial rule in Algeria and a counter to British colonialism in Sudan.
play-arrowVideo Duration 44 minutes 55 seconds 44:55
Kamira, a key member of the resistance fighting to end French occupation, carried intelligence to mountainous hideouts.
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https://parallelnarratives.com/timeline-algeria-since-1945/
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Timeline: Algeria Since 1945
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2011-02-19T18:28:00+00:00
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May 8, 1945. While France celebrates VE Day, Muslim protesters in Sétif organize to demand Algerian independence. What begins as a march becomes a massacre: the protesters murder more than 100 European settlers, or pieds-noirs, and French armed forces retaliate by killing (according to various estimates) between 1,000 and 45,000 Muslims. November 1, 1954. Emboldened…
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Parallel Narratives
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https://parallelnarratives.com/timeline-algeria-since-1945/
|
May 8, 1945. While France celebrates VE Day, Muslim protesters in Sétif organize to demand Algerian independence. What begins as a march becomes a massacre: the protesters murder more than 100 European settlers, or pieds-noirs, and French armed forces retaliate by killing (according to various estimates) between 1,000 and 45,000 Muslims.
November 1, 1954. Emboldened by the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) launches armed revolts throughout Algeria and issues a proclamation calling for a sovereign Algerian state. The French are unimpressed but deploy troops to monitor the situation:
In the early morning hours of All Saints’ Day, November 1, 1954, guerrillas of the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale — FLN) launched attacks in various parts of Algeria against military installations, police posts, warehouses, communications facilities, and public utilities. From Cairo, the FLN broadcast a proclamation calling on Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the “restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam.” The French minister of interior, socialist François Mitterrand, responded sharply that “the only possible negotiation is war.” It was the reaction of Premier Pierre Mendès-France that set the tone of French policy for the next five years. On November 12, he declared in the National Assembly: “One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French… Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession.”
As the FLN campaign spread through the countryside, many European farmers in the interior sold their holdings and sought refuge in Algiers, where their cry for sterner countermeasures swelled. Colon vigilante units, whose unauthorized activities were conducted with the passive cooperation of police authorities, carried out ratonnades (literally, rat-hunts; synonymous with Arab-killings) against suspected FLN members of the Muslim community. The colons demanded the proclamation of a state of emergency, the proscription of all groups advocating separation from France, and the imposition of capital punishment for politically motivated crimes.
1955. The FLN begins targeting civilians, inciting a mob that kills more than 120 people in Philippeville. Between 1,200 and 12,000 Muslims are killed in retaliation by French troops and by pied-noir “vigilante committees.” Jacques Soustelle, then governor-general of French Algeria, resolves not to compromise with the revolutionaries.
An important watershed in the War of Independence was the massacre of civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippeville in August 1955. Before this operation, FLN policy was to attack only military and government-related targets. The wilaya commander for the Constantine region, however, decided a drastic escalation was needed. The killing by the FLN and its supporters of 123 people, including old women and babies, shocked Jacques Soustelle, the French governor general, into calling for more repressive measures against the rebels. The government claimed it killed 1,273 guerrillas in retaliation; according to the FLN, 12,000 Muslims perished in an orgy of bloodletting by the armed forces and police, as well as colon gangs. After Philippeville, all-out war began in Algeria.
By 1956 France had committed more than 400,000 troops to Algeria. Although the elite airborne units and the Foreign Legion received particular notoriety, approximately 170,000 of the regular French army troops in Algeria were Muslim Algerians, most of them volunteers. France also sent air force and naval units to the Algerian theater.
During 1956 and 1957, the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale–ALN), the FLN’s military arm, successfully applied hit-and- run tactics according to the classic canons of guerrilla warfare. Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside. Kidnapping was commonplace, as were the ritual murder and mutilation of captured French military, colons of both genders and every age, suspected collaborators, and traitors. At first, the revolutionary forces targeted only Muslim officials of the colonial regime; later, they coerced or killed even those civilians who simply refused to support them.
Although successful in engendering an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries’ coercive tactics suggested that they had not as yet inspired the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule. Gradually, however, the FLN/ALN gained control in certain sectors of the Aurès, the Kabylie, and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of Algiers and Oran. In these places, the ALN established a simple but effective — although frequently temporary — military administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit manpower. But it was never able to hold large fixed positions. Muslims all over the country also initiated underground social, judicial, and civil organizations, gradually building their own state.
September 30, 1956. The FLN attempts to draw international attention to the conflict by targeting urban areas. The Battle of Algiers begins when three women plant bombs in public venues. Algiers erupts into violence.
Late in 1957, General Raoul Salan, commanding the French army in Algeria, instituted a system of quadrillage, dividing the country into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned territory. Salan’s methods sharply reduced the instances of FLN terrorism but tied down a large number of troops in static defense. Salan also constructed a heavily patrolled system of barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco.
At the same time, the French military ruthlessly applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas. Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject to aerial bombardment. The French also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels — or, according to the official explanation, to protect them from FLN extortion. In the three years (1957-60) during which the regroupement program was followed, more than 2 million Algerians were removed from their villages, mostly in the mountainous areas, and resettled in the plains, where many found it impossible to reestablish their accustomed economic or social situations. Living conditions in the camps were poor.
May 1958. A mob of pieds-noirs, angered by the French government’s failure to suppress the revolution, storms the offices of the governor-general in Algiers. With the support of French army officers, they clamor for Charles de Gaulle to be installed as the leader of France. The French National Assembly approves. De Gaulle is greeted in Algeria by Muslims and Europeans alike.
In France, the feeling was widespread that another debacle like that of Indochina was in the offing and that the government would order another precipitate pullout and sacrifice French honor to political expediency. Many saw in Charles de Gaulle the only public figure capable of rallying the nation and giving direction to the French government. Europeans as well as many Muslims greeted de Gaulle’s return to power, in June 1958, as the breakthrough needed to end the hostilities. De Gaulle’s political initiatives threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent Algeria.
Meanwhile, the French army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from dependence on quadrillage to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive search-and-destroy missions against ALN strongholds. Within the next year, Salan’s successor, General Maurice Challe, appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance. In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. But political developments had already overtaken the French army’s successes.
During 1958-59, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of French society. International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. In September 1959, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand on Algeria and uttered the words “self-determination” in a speech. Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, with backing by elements of the French army, staged insurrections in January 1960 and April 1961. De Gaulle was now prepared to abandon the colons, the group that no previous French government could have written off.
April 1961. A few prominent generals in the French army in Algeria, clinging to a hope of preserving Algérie française, attempt to overthrow de Gaulle. This “generals’ putsch” is unsuccessful.
Talks with the FLN reopened at Evian in May 1961; after several false starts, the French government decreed that a cease-fire would take effect on March 19, 1962. In their final form, the Evian Accords allowed the colons equal legal protection with Algerians over a three year period. These rights included respect for property, participation in public affairs, and a full range of civil and cultural rights. At the end of that period, however, Europeans would be obliged to become Algerian citizens or be classified as aliens with the attendant loss of rights. The French electorate approved the Evian Accords by an overwhelming 91 percent vote in a referendum held in June 1962.
March–June 1962. Despairing pieds-noirs in the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) mount terrorist attacks against civilians (Muslim and French). The FLN and the OAS ultimately conclude a truce.
On July 1, 1962, some 6 million of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5 million cast their ballots in the referendum on independence. The vote was nearly unanimous. De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country on July 3. The Provisional Executive, however, proclaimed July 5, the 132nd anniversary of the French entry into Algeria, as the day of national independence.
The FLN estimated in 1962 that nearly eight years of revolution had cost 300,000 dead from war-related causes. Algerian sources later put the figure at approximately 1.5 million dead, while French officials estimated it at 350,000. The actual figure of war dead may be far higher than the original FLN and official French estimates, even if it does not reach the 1 million adopted by the Algerian government. Uncounted thousands of Muslim civilians lost their lives in French army ratissages, bombing raids, and vigilante reprisals. The war uprooted more than 2 million Algerians, who were forced to relocate in French concentration camps or to flee to Morocco, Tunisia, and into the Algerian hinterland, where many thousands died of starvation, disease, and exposure. Additional pro-French Muslims were killed when the FLN settled accounts after independence.
1962 – Algeria gains independence from France.
1963 – Ahmed Ben Bella elected as first president.
1965 – Col Houari Boumedienne overthrows Ben Bella, pledges to end corruption.
1976 – Boumedienne introduces a new constitution which confirms commitment to socialism and role of the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the sole political party. Islam is recognised as state religion.
1976 December – Boumedienne is elected president and is instrumental in launching a programme of rapid industrialisation.
1978 – Boumedienne dies and is replaced by Col Chadli Bendjedid, as the compromise candidate of the military establishment.
1986 – Rising inflation and unemployment, exacerbated by the collapse of oil and gas prices lead to a wave of strikes and violent demonstrations.
Ban on parties lifted
1988 – Serious rioting against economic conditions.
1989 – The National People’s Assembly revokes the ban on new political parties and adopts a new electoral law allowing opposition parties to contest future elections.
1989 – Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) founded and over 20 new parties licensed.
1990 – The FIS wins 55 per cent of the vote in local elections.
1991 – Government announces parliamentary elections in June 1991 and plans changes to electoral system including restrictions on campaigning in mosques. FIS reacts by calling general strike. State of siege declared, elections postponed. FIS leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj arrested and jailed.
1991 December – In the first round of general elections the FIS wins 188 seats outright, and seems virtually certain to obtain an absolute majority in the second round.
Military takes over
1992 4 January – The National People’s Assembly is dissolved by presidential decree and on 11 January President Chadli, apparently under pressure from the military leadership, resigns. A five-member Higher State Council, chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf, takes over.
Street gatherings banned, violent clashes break out on 8 and 9 February between FIS supporters and security forces. A state of emergency is declared, the FIS is ordered to disband and all 411 FIS-controlled local and regional authorities are dissolved.
Boudiaf assassinated
1992 29 June – Boudiaf assassinated by a member of his bodyguard with alleged Islamist links. Violence increases and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerges as the main group behind these operations.
1994 – Liamine Zeroual, a retired army colonel, is appointed chairman of the Higher State Council.
1995 – Zeroual wins a five-year term as president of the republic with a comfortable majority.
1996 – Proposed constitutional changes approved in a referendum by over 85 per cent of voters.
1997 – Parliamentary elections won by the newly-created Democratic National Rally, followed by the moderate Islamic party, Movement of Society for Peace.
Militants ignore concord
1998 – President Zeroual announces his intention to cut short his term and hold early presidential elections.
1999 – Former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika elected as president after all opposition candidates withdraw from race, saying they had received inadequate guarantees of fair and transparent elections.
1999 – Referendum approves Bouteflika’s law on civil concord, the result of long and largely secret negotiations with the armed wing of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Thousands of members of the AIS and other armed groups are pardoned.
2000 – Attacks on civilians and security forces continue, and are thought to be the work of small groups still opposed to the civil concord. Violence is estimated to have claimed over 100,000 lives in Algeria since 1992.
2001 April/May – Scores of demonstrators are killed in violent clashes between security forces and Berber protesters in the mainly Berber region of Kabylie following the death of a teenager in police custody.
2001 May – The mainly Berber party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy, withdraws from the government in protest against the authorities’ handling of riots in Kabylie.
Berber concessions
2001 October – Government agrees to give the Berber language official status, as part of a package of concessions.
2001 November – Several hundred people are killed as floods hit Algiers.
2002 March – President Bouteflika says the Berber language, Tamazight, is to be recognised as a national language.
2002 June – Prime Minister Ali Benflis’s National Liberation Front (FLN) wins general elections marred by violence and a low turnout. They are boycotted as a sham by four parties – two of which represent Berbers.
2003 21 May – More than 2,000 people are killed and thousands are injured by a powerful earthquake in the north. The worst-hit areas are east of Algiers.
2003 June – Leader of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Abassi Madani and his deputy Ali Belhadj are freed after serving 12-year sentences.
2004 April – President Bouteflika is re-elected to a second term in a landslide poll victory.
2005 January – Authorities announce the arrest of rebel Armed Islamic Group (GIA) head Nourredine Boudiafi and the killing of his deputy and declare the group to be virtually dismantled.
Government makes deal with Berber leaders, promising more investment in Kabylie region and greater recognition for Tamazight language.
2005 March – Government-commissioned report says security forces were responsible for the disappearances of more than 6,000 citizens during the 1990s civil conflict.
Amnesty backed
2005 September – Reconciliation referendum: Voters back government plans to amnesty many of those involved in post-1992 killings.
2005 November – Opposition parties keep their majority in local elections in the mainly-Berber Kabylie region, held as part of a reconciliation process.
2006 March – Six-month amnesty begins, under which fugitive militants who surrender will be pardoned, except for the most serious of crimes. The authorities free a first batch of jailed Islamic militants.
2006 May – Algeria is to pay back all of its $8bn debt to the Paris Club group of rich creditor nations, in a move seen as reflecting its economic recovery.
2006 September – Leader of the banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Rabah Kebir returns from self-imposed exile and urges rebels still fighting the state to disarm.
2006 December – Roadside bomb hits a bus carrying staff of a US oil firm, killing one man. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) claims responsibility and shortly afterwards calls for attacks against French nationals.
Algiers attacks
2007 January – Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat renames itself the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb.
2007 February – Seven bombs go off almost simultaneously east of Algiers, killing six.
2007 March-April – Army steps up offensive against Islamist militants to stamp out a surge in attacks.
2007 March – Three Algerians and a Russian are killed in a roadside attack on a bus carrying workers for a Russian gas pipeline construction company.
2007 April – 33 people are killed and more than 200 are injured in two bomb blasts in Algiers, one of them near the prime minister’s office. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claims responsibility.
2007 May – Parliamentary elections: dozens are killed in the run-up, in a wave of fighting between the military and armed groups. Pro-government parties retain their absolute majority in parliament.
2007 July – A suicide bomber targets a military barracks near Bouira, killing at least nine people.
2007 September – At least 50 people are killed in a series of bombings. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claims responsibility for the attacks.
Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri urges north Africa’s Muslims to ”cleanse” their land of Spaniards and French.
2007 December – Double car bombing in Algiers hits a UN building and a bus full of students, killing dozens of people.
2008 June – Four Christian converts from Islam receive suspended jail sentences for worshipping illegally.
President Bouteflika brings back twice former premier Ahmed Ouyahia as new prime minister, replacing Abdelaziz Belkhadem.
2008 August – About 60 people are killed in bombings in towns east of Algiers. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claims responsibility.
2008 November – Parliament approves constitutional changes allowing President Bouteflika to run for a third term.
2009 April – President Bouteflika wins third term at the polls.
2009 July – Nigeria, Niger and Algeria sign an agreement to build a $13bn pipeline to take Nigerian gas across the Sahara to the Mediterranean.
2009 November – Disturbances mar two international association football matches between Egypt and Algeria , leading to diplomatic tensions between the two countries.
2010 April – Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger set up joint command to tackle threat of terrorism.
2011 January – Major protests break out over food prices and unemployment, with two people being killed in clashes with security forces. The government orders cuts to the price of basic foodstuffs.
2011 February – President Abdelaziz Bouteflika says the 1992 state of emergency laws will be repealed in the “very near future”, without specifying a date.
Wikipedia Timeline:
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https://www.algeria-cgny.org/overview-economy/
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Ranked as the third most important economy in the MENA region and a leader in the Maghreb, Algeria is one of a handful of countries that have achieved 20% poverty reduction in the past two decades. The Algerian Government took significant steps to improve the wellbeing of its people by implementing social policies in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Among other major achievements, the country’s oil boom has enabled the authorities to clear Algeria’s debt, invest in infrastructure projects and improve the country’s Human Development Indicators.
Algeria has made significant gains in each of the key Human Development Indicators (HDI). The country’s position is now 83rd out of 188 countries, which ranks it among the highly developed cohort in the latest Human Development Report.
The still largely positive results of shared prosperity have contributed to Algeria’s overall socioeconomic stability. However, the continued depressed worldwide oil prices have necessitated changes in country economic models and have triggered a domino effect of reforms in the MENA oil exporting countries to adapt to the new scenario.
On the economic front, Algeria’s economic growth decelerated in 2017 due to a slight decline in hydrocarbon production and continued modest non-hydrocarbon growth, showing a slight upturn from 2.3 % in 2016 to 2.5 % in 2017.
Despite the decline in the current account deficit, its overall level remained high, given the modest growth of the economy. Imports increased slightly, by 2.7 % in 2017 while exports decreased significantly, by 16.5%. Overall, the current account balance (-14.7 percent of GDP) is indicative of the lack of adjustment of imports to the large reduction in export revenues since 2014.
Aware of the numerous challenges that its economy faces, Algerian authorities have launched a development strategy to revitalize the process intended to diversify the national economy starting with the non-oil sector while deepening the reforms needed for the structural transformation of the economy to adapt to the macro-economic changes brought about by globalization.This policy aims to move toward sustainable growth, create jobs, by regulating industry activities, developing investments, upgrading local businesses.
With regard to its numerous significant potentialities and as part of broad economic diversification efforts, Algeria is working to attract more private sector investment – both domestic and foreign –, to reduce the country’s import bill and stepping up local production .
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Newly Updated Renewable Energy Program in Algeria
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2015-04-16T08:00:00-04:00
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<p>On February 24, 2015, Algeria's Minister of Energy announced the adoption of Algeria's updated development program for renewable energies. The program increases the targeted installed capacity from renewable sources by 2030 from 12 gigawatts ("GW") to 22 GW, with a view to diversifying Algeria's power production by increasing generation from sustainable sources and preserving fossil fuel resources.</p>
<p>This new target emphasizes Algeria's significant solar potential and takes advantage of the recent drop in production costs for solar photovoltaic and wind power infrastructures, while primarily satisfying domestic energy demand essentially through three sources of renewable energy: solar photovoltaic power (13.5 GW), solar concentration power (2 GW), and wind power (5 GW). These new targets represent a nearly 400 percent increase in the targeted installed capacity for solar photovoltaic power and wind power, compared to the development program's initial objectives in 2011. </p>
<p>In addition to installed capacity for domestic consumption, Algeria's development program also targets up to 10 GW of installed capacity from renewable sources for export purposes, for which the Algerian government is seeking reliable partners willing to provide financing for the projects as well as the required interconnections with the Algerian grid.</p>
<p>Renewable power projects will be subject to a specific regime based on a 20-year power purchase agreement ("PPA") with one of the four distribution grid operators, all subsidiaries of the state-owned Sonelgaz Group, and preferential regulatory feed-in tariffs applicable to the produced electricity. Projects with installed capacity of more than 1 megawatt ("MW") will be eligible on an "open-door" basis. Producers will apply with the Algerian energy regulator, the <i>Commission de Régulation de l'Electricité et du Gaz</i> ("CREG"), for authorization to benefit from the feed-in tariff. To qualify, producers must satisfy a number of criteria, including holding an operation authorization and a certificate of guaranteed origin for key materials, such as solar PV panels, both of which will be granted or delivered by the CREG. Finally, authorizations such as building permits as well as environmental impact assessments will be required.</p>
<p>The preferential feed-in tariffs will be guaranteed for the 20-year term of the PPA. Base tariffs will range from 12.75 Algerian dinars per kilowatt hour ("DZD/kWh") to 15.94 DZD/kWh (0.12 euros per kilowatt hour ("€/kWh") to 0.15 €/kWh based on prevailing exchange rates) for solar photovoltaic projects. For wind power projects, the base tariff will range from 10.48 DZD/kWh to 13.10 DZD/kWh (0.10 €/kWh to 0.12 €/kWh based on prevailing exchange rates) depending on whether the installed capacity of the production facility is over 5 MW or comprises between 1 MW and 5 MW. </p>
<p>Following an initial five-year phase during which the base tariffs will apply according to the potential operating hours of the power plant, the applicable feed-in tariff will be revised for each project to adjust it, based on its effective operating hours during the initial five-year phase. The feed-in tariff applicable to facilities with a low production time will be increased up to 15 percent, while the feed-in tariff applicable to facilities with a high production time will be reduced up to 15 percent, in accordance with regulatory reevaluation rates.</p>
<p>The subsidized feed-in tariffs will be financed through a National Fund for Renewable Energies and Cogeneration (<i>Fonds National pour les Energies Renouvelables et la Cogénération</i>), established by a 1 percent tax levy on the state's oil revenues, and through other resources or contributions, including a premium paid by end-users.</p>
<p>The liberalization of the Algerian power sector started in 2002, with the passing of Law No. 02-01 of February 5, 2002, which established principles governing the unbundling of the electricity production, transmission, distribution, and supply sectors, and the promotion of power generation from renewable energy sources. Even so, Law No. 02-01 has not yet been fully implemented, and despite the liberalization of the Algerian power production sector, the Algerian state-owned electricity company remains the main, if not the exclusive, actor in the Algerian power sector. Similar dynamics exist in the renewable power sector where the Sonelgaz Group is acting through its subsidiary, <i>Shariket Kahraba wa Taket Moutadjadida</i> (Company of Electricity and Renewable Energy).</p>
<p>A number of elements about the terms and procedures applicable to renewable energy projects remain to be further detailed later this year, including the forms and templates for the PPA, grid connection, and grid injection agreements, which are required to implement the preferential feed-in tariff scheme.</p>
<p><b>Lawyer Contacts</b></p>
<p>For further information, please contact your principal Firm representative or one of the lawyers listed below. General email messages may be sent using our "Contact Us" form, which can be found at <a href="https://www.jonesday.com">www.jonesday.com</a>.</p>
<p><b>Laurent Vandomme<br /></b>Paris<br />+33.1.56.59.39.31<br /><a href="mailto:lvandomme@jonesday.com">lvandomme@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>Denis Bandet<br /></b>Paris<br />+33.1.56.59.46.91<br /><a href="mailto:dsbandet@jonesday.com">dsbandet@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>Etienne Dinner<br /></b>Paris<br />+33.1.56.59.39.68<br /><a href="mailto:edinner@jonesday.com">edinner@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>Fabien Hecquet<br /></b>Paris<br />+33.1.56.59.46.29<br /><a href="mailto:fhecquet@jonesday.com">fhecquet@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>R. Todd Johnson<br /></b>Silicon Valley<br />+1.650.739.3999<br /><a href="mailto:rtjohnson@jonesday.com">rtjohnson@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>Javade Chaudhri<br /></b>Washington<br />+1.202.879.7651<br /><a href="mailto:jchaudhri@jonesday.com">jchaudhri@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>Arman Galledari<br /></b>Dubai / London<br />+971.4.709.8401 / +44.20.7039.5265<br /><a href="mailto:agalledari@jonesday.com">agalledari@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>Michael E. Arruda<br /></b>Hong Kong<br />+852.3189.7376<br /><a href="mailto:marruda@jonesday.com">marruda@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p><b>Stephen J. DeCosse<br /></b>Tokyo<br />+81.3.6800.1819<br /><a href="mailto:sdecosse@jonesday.com">sdecosse@jonesday.com</a></p>
<p>Jones Day publications should not be construed as legal advice on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general information purposes only and may not be quoted or referred to in any other publication or proceeding without the prior written consent of the Firm, to be given or withheld at our discretion. To request reprint permission for any of our publications, please use our "Contact Us" form, which can be found on our website at www.jonesday.com. The mailing of this publication is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Firm.</p>
|
en
|
/favicon.ico
|
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2015/04/newly-updated-renewable-energy-program-in-algeria
|
On February 24, 2015, Algeria's Minister of Energy announced the adoption of Algeria's updated development program for renewable energies. The program increases the targeted installed capacity from renewable sources by 2030 from 12 gigawatts ("GW") to 22 GW, with a view to diversifying Algeria's power production by increasing generation from sustainable sources and preserving fossil fuel resources.
This new target emphasizes Algeria's significant solar potential and takes advantage of the recent drop in production costs for solar photovoltaic and wind power infrastructures, while primarily satisfying domestic energy demand essentially through three sources of renewable energy: solar photovoltaic power (13.5 GW), solar concentration power (2 GW), and wind power (5 GW). These new targets represent a nearly 400 percent increase in the targeted installed capacity for solar photovoltaic power and wind power, compared to the development program's initial objectives in 2011.
In addition to installed capacity for domestic consumption, Algeria's development program also targets up to 10 GW of installed capacity from renewable sources for export purposes, for which the Algerian government is seeking reliable partners willing to provide financing for the projects as well as the required interconnections with the Algerian grid.
Renewable power projects will be subject to a specific regime based on a 20-year power purchase agreement ("PPA") with one of the four distribution grid operators, all subsidiaries of the state-owned Sonelgaz Group, and preferential regulatory feed-in tariffs applicable to the produced electricity. Projects with installed capacity of more than 1 megawatt ("MW") will be eligible on an "open-door" basis. Producers will apply with the Algerian energy regulator, the Commission de Régulation de l'Electricité et du Gaz ("CREG"), for authorization to benefit from the feed-in tariff. To qualify, producers must satisfy a number of criteria, including holding an operation authorization and a certificate of guaranteed origin for key materials, such as solar PV panels, both of which will be granted or delivered by the CREG. Finally, authorizations such as building permits as well as environmental impact assessments will be required.
The preferential feed-in tariffs will be guaranteed for the 20-year term of the PPA. Base tariffs will range from 12.75 Algerian dinars per kilowatt hour ("DZD/kWh") to 15.94 DZD/kWh (0.12 euros per kilowatt hour ("€/kWh") to 0.15 €/kWh based on prevailing exchange rates) for solar photovoltaic projects. For wind power projects, the base tariff will range from 10.48 DZD/kWh to 13.10 DZD/kWh (0.10 €/kWh to 0.12 €/kWh based on prevailing exchange rates) depending on whether the installed capacity of the production facility is over 5 MW or comprises between 1 MW and 5 MW.
Following an initial five-year phase during which the base tariffs will apply according to the potential operating hours of the power plant, the applicable feed-in tariff will be revised for each project to adjust it, based on its effective operating hours during the initial five-year phase. The feed-in tariff applicable to facilities with a low production time will be increased up to 15 percent, while the feed-in tariff applicable to facilities with a high production time will be reduced up to 15 percent, in accordance with regulatory reevaluation rates.
The subsidized feed-in tariffs will be financed through a National Fund for Renewable Energies and Cogeneration (Fonds National pour les Energies Renouvelables et la Cogénération), established by a 1 percent tax levy on the state's oil revenues, and through other resources or contributions, including a premium paid by end-users.
The liberalization of the Algerian power sector started in 2002, with the passing of Law No. 02-01 of February 5, 2002, which established principles governing the unbundling of the electricity production, transmission, distribution, and supply sectors, and the promotion of power generation from renewable energy sources. Even so, Law No. 02-01 has not yet been fully implemented, and despite the liberalization of the Algerian power production sector, the Algerian state-owned electricity company remains the main, if not the exclusive, actor in the Algerian power sector. Similar dynamics exist in the renewable power sector where the Sonelgaz Group is acting through its subsidiary, Shariket Kahraba wa Taket Moutadjadida (Company of Electricity and Renewable Energy).
A number of elements about the terms and procedures applicable to renewable energy projects remain to be further detailed later this year, including the forms and templates for the PPA, grid connection, and grid injection agreements, which are required to implement the preferential feed-in tariff scheme.
Lawyer Contacts
For further information, please contact your principal Firm representative or one of the lawyers listed below. General email messages may be sent using our "Contact Us" form, which can be found at www.jonesday.com.
Laurent Vandomme
Paris
+33.1.56.59.39.31
lvandomme@jonesday.com
Denis Bandet
Paris
+33.1.56.59.46.91
dsbandet@jonesday.com
Etienne Dinner
Paris
+33.1.56.59.39.68
edinner@jonesday.com
Fabien Hecquet
Paris
+33.1.56.59.46.29
fhecquet@jonesday.com
R. Todd Johnson
Silicon Valley
+1.650.739.3999
rtjohnson@jonesday.com
Javade Chaudhri
Washington
+1.202.879.7651
jchaudhri@jonesday.com
Arman Galledari
Dubai / London
+971.4.709.8401 / +44.20.7039.5265
agalledari@jonesday.com
Michael E. Arruda
Hong Kong
+852.3189.7376
marruda@jonesday.com
Stephen J. DeCosse
Tokyo
+81.3.6800.1819
sdecosse@jonesday.com
Jones Day publications should not be construed as legal advice on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general information purposes only and may not be quoted or referred to in any other publication or proceeding without the prior written consent of the Firm, to be given or withheld at our discretion. To request reprint permission for any of our publications, please use our "Contact Us" form, which can be found on our website at www.jonesday.com. The mailing of this publication is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Firm.
|
|||||
8952
|
dbpedia
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3
| 84
|
https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2022
|
en
|
Algeria: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report
|
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2022-02-23T19:34:00
|
See the Freedom in the World 2022 score and learn about democracy and freedom in Algeria.
|
en
|
/sites/default/files/favicon.ico
|
Freedom House
|
https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2022
|
The president, who is directly elected for up to two five-year terms, remains the dominant figure in the executive branch, though some authority was shifted to the prime minister under constitutional reforms adopted in 2020. In 2008, term limits were removed, allowing Abdelaziz Bouteflika to serve four terms, but they were reinstated in 2016 when Parliament passed a constitutional reform package. Bouteflika’s decision to seek another term, which would have been his fifth, sparked the Hirak protests in 2019. Bouteflika resigned that April after losing the support of the armed forces.
Bouteflika ally Abdelkader Bensalah, the head of Parliament’s upper house, served as interim president during a transitional period, and a presidential election was held in December 2019. Former prime minister Abdelmajid Tebboune won in the first round with 58 percent of the vote, defeating four other candidates. Abdelaziz Belaïd, a 2014 presidential candidate and the only contestant who had not served in cabinet posts under Bouteflika, won 7 percent. The Constitutional Council reported a turnout of just under 40 percent, and one outside expert suggested a figure as low as 20 percent. Protesters called the election a sham and orchestrated a boycott. Outside observers were not allowed to enter the country to monitor the poll.
The president nominates the prime minister after consulting with the parliamentary majority. Abdelaziz Djerad, who became prime minister in 2019, resigned in June 2021. Tebboune named Finance Minister Ayman Benabderrahmane as Djerad’s successor later that month.
The 407 members of the National People’s Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, are directly elected to five-year terms, which can only be renewed once under the 2020 constitutional reforms. Parliament was dissolved in February 2021 and early elections were held in June. The ruling FLN won 98 seats, while the allied RND won 58. The MSP won 65 seats, the Future Front won 48, and the moderate Islamist El Binaa Movement won 39. No other party won more than 10 seats, though 84 independent lawmakers were elected.
The MSP and the El Binaa Movement alleged that the elections were marred by fraud, while the Hirak boycotted the polls. Nationwide turnout stood at 23 percent. Preliminary turnout figures in Bejaïa and Tizi Ouzou stood at under 1 percent. The Independent National Authority for Elections (ANIE) reported that over 360 polling facilities were shuttered nationwide due to looting and other disruptions.
The president appoints one-third of the members of the upper house, the Council of the Nation, which has 144 members serving six-year terms. The other two-thirds are indirectly elected by local and provincial assemblies. Half of the chamber’s mandates are renewed every three years. The FLN secured 29 of the 48 indirectly elected seats at stake in December 2018, with the RND and smaller factions or independents taking the remainder. Upper-house elections due in December 2021 were delayed to 2022.
Local and regional elections were held amid low turnout in late November 2021. The FLN and RND won the most town-hall seats and a plurality of regional-assembly seats, while the El Binaa Movement and the MSP did poorly.
Algeria’s elections, which were previously administered by the Interior Ministry, were often subject to government interference, but pressure from protesters in 2019 forced the government to establish the ANIE. However, the slate of presidential candidates that was ultimately announced ahead of the December 2019 presidential election was dominated by Bouteflika-era officials, raising doubts about the efficacy of the electoral reforms. The absence of international election monitors drew criticism from Algerian civil society.
Constitutional reforms were approved by voters in a 2020 referendum that was marred by low turnout. Reform-package opponents, including Hirak activists, had called for a boycott after being prevented from campaigning for a “no” vote or airing their views on state media.
The Interior Ministry must approve political parties before they can operate legally. Parties cannot form along explicitly ethnic lines. The FIS, which swept the 1990 local and 1991 national elections that preceded Algeria’s decade-long civil war, remains banned. Since the Hirak emerged in 2019, the authorities have intensified their repression of opposition groups, especially parties espousing separatism, Islamist groups, and parties perceived as closely aligned to the Hirak.
In April 2021, the Interior Ministry accused the opposition Union for Change and Progress of operating without its sanction and petitioned the courts to suspend it in May. That same month, the government sought to provisionally suspend the Socialist Workers’ Party. Both parties, which have supported the Hirak, remained active at year’s end.
In May 2021, the High Security Council declared the Rachad, an organization that includes former FIS members, and the MAK terrorist organizations. The same body accused the Rachad and the MAK of involvement in the August murder of activist Djamel Bensmaïl. In September, the National Gendarmerie announced that 30 people, including 7 MAK members, were detained during an investigation into forest fires that affected several provinces in August; the government ultimately blamed the MAK for causing those fires. Also in September, police arrested 27 MAK members in Kherrata and Beni Ourtilane, accusing them of “attempting to sow discord and terror.”
Since Bouteflika’s resignation, the military has maintained its long-standing influence on decision making, with General Ahmed Gaïd Salah playing a key role until his death in 2019. The military has since remained the most influential political actor in Algeria, thanks to its lack of accountability and vast resources.
Allegations and scandals involving corruption and financial influence in the selection of political candidates, as well as vote-buying during elections, have surfaced in recent years. After Bouteflika’s resignation, Gaïd Salah initiated an anticorruption campaign targeting entrepreneurs and officials linked with the former administration, which he claimed was aimed at reducing the improper influence of these groups on domestic political decisions.
No specific ethnic or religious group dominates the main state institutions, which tend to include both Arabs and Amazigh (Berber) officials. Kabylie-based parties associated with the Amazigh community, like the Rally for Culture and Democracy and the Socialist Forces Front, have controlled a handful of municipalities, but their activities are often curtailed by the military, and some ethnic Berbers have been targeted by the authorities for mobilizing in support of their political interests.
Women remain reluctant to run for office, are often unable to secure meaningful influence within Parliament, and are more likely to lose intraparty debates. Women won only 8 percent of lower-house seats in the June 2021 elections.
LGBT+ people are politically marginalized and have little practical ability to advocate for their political interests.
Inadequate anticorruption laws, a lack of official transparency, low levels of judicial independence, and bloated bureaucracies contribute to widespread corruption at all levels of government. The anticorruption investigations that do occur are often used to settle scores between factions within the regime. The constitutional reforms passed in 2020 included provisions for an Authority for Transparency and for the Prevention of and Fight against Corruption, as well as a ban on combining roles in public office and private business.
Bouteflika’s former political and economic allies received harsh prison sentences after his 2019 resignation as part of Gaïd Salah’s anticorruption campaign. In January 2021, an Algiers court upheld corruption-related prison sentences issued against former prime ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal in 2019. Ouyahia and Sellal reportedly received additional prison time in September 2021 but received effective reductions in December.
In August 2021, Mohamed Abdellah, a former border guard, was extradited from Spain on terrorism charges; Abdellah accused the Algerian authorities of targeting him for denouncing corruption within the border patrol before fleeing to Spain in 2018.
Algeria lacks access-to-information legislation. There is considerable opacity surrounding official decision-making procedures, the publication of official acts is rarely timely, and rules on asset disclosure by government officials are weak and poorly enforced. The 2020 constitutional revision introduced a requirement for all appointed and elected officials to declare their assets at the beginning and end of their terms, and obliges the public administration to justify its decisions within a time period to be determined by law. While the revised constitution nominally guarantees the right to access information, it includes vague exceptions for “the rights of others, the legitimate interests of businesses, and the requirements of national security.”
Although some newspapers are privately owned and some journalists remain aggressive in their coverage of government affairs, most papers rely on government agencies for printing and advertising, encouraging self-censorship. Authorities sometimes block distribution of independent news outlets that are based abroad or online. In 2020, for example, the websites of Maghreb Emergent, Radio M, and Interlignes became unavailable to Algerian users. Viewers can access unlicensed private television channels located in Algeria but legally based abroad, though these are subject to government crackdowns. In August 2021, the Communications Ministry ordered privately owned Lina TV to stop broadcasting, saying the station was unaccredited.
In 2020, Parliament approved a law criminalizing “fake news” that undermines public order and security; offenders can receive one- to five-year sentences. Under a 2020 decree, news sites must be directed by Algerian nationals and based physically in Algeria, report income sources, and keep an archive of at least six months. Websites in French or other foreign languages must be approved by a special authority for online media.
Authorities use these and other legal mechanisms to restrict media activity. Journalists and bloggers are frequently subjected to brief detentions, short jail terms, suspended sentences, or fines for offenses including defamation and “undermining national unity.” In addition, journalists covering demonstrations or who are close to the Hirak have been arbitrarily arrested and interrogated. In May 2021, Radio M and Maghreb Emergent editor in chief Ihsane El Kadi was placed under court supervision over charges including “undermining national unity.” In June, El Kadi was briefly detained ahead of that month’s legislative elections. In September, journalists Hassan Bouras and Mohamed Mouloudj were placed in custody over their alleged links to the Rachad and the MAK.
Foreign outlets are also subject to government interference. In June 2021, the government withdrew France 24’s authorization to operate in Algeria, alleging that the outlet engaged in “repeated hostility” towards national institutions. In July, the Communications Ministry revoked the accreditation of Saudi outlet Al Arabiya.
Algeria’s population is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. Members of religious minorities, including Christians and non-Sunni Muslims, suffer from state persecution and interference. Authorities have cracked down on the small Ahmadi minority, claiming that its members denigrate Islam, threaten national security, and violate laws on associations. Religious communities may only gather to worship at state-approved locations.
Accusations of nonbelief or blasphemy can draw criminal punishments. In early 2021, Hamid Soudad, a Christian, was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and a 100,000-Algerian-dinar ($740) fine for “blasphemy.” In April, Saïd Djabelkheir, an expert on Islam, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for commenting on Islamic texts. Djabelkheir remained free as he sought an appeal.
Proselytizing by non-Muslims is illegal. In March 2021, an Oran court upheld a prison sentence and a fine against a Christian pastor and his friend for proselytizing.
Authorities have engaged in a crackdown on the Algerian Protestant Church (EPA) since 2017, though the EPA had been legally recognized in 1974. In June 2021, a court in Oran ordered the closure of three Protestant churches.
Private discussion and the public expression of personal views are relatively unhindered when they do not focus on certain sensitive topics, but social media users are subject to prosecution for critical comments that touch on the government or religion. The government monitors internet activity in the name of national security and does not disclose information about the program’s targets or range, which is thought to be extensive.
The authorities are known to prosecute social media users, particularly Hirak supporters. In January 2021, activist Walid Kechida received a three-year prison term and a 500,000-dinar ($3,700) fine for posting satirical content on Facebook. In August, two Facebook users were arrested for aiming to espouse pro-Rachad views on the social network. In October, Mohad Gasmi, a Hirak supporter and activist for the unemployed, was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment over his social media activity; Gasmi had been charged with “praising terrorism.”
Legal restrictions on freedom of assembly remain in place but are inconsistently enforced. Hirak protests were sometimes tolerated by the authorities, though they used force and engaged in arbitrary arrest to preempt or disrupt some rallies.
Hirak organizers suspended their activities in March 2020 as the novel coronavirus spread worldwide, but protests resumed in February 2021. In May, the Interior Ministry banned unauthorized rallies and required that permits include start and stop times for protests as well as the names of organizers. The government also used terrorism charges to impede the Hirak; in April, the public prosecutor in Oran charged 15 supporters, including journalist Saïd Boudour, with terrorism. The case against four of the defendants was moved to an antiterrorism court in Algiers in September.
Police also engaged in mass arrests as protests continued, with officers regularly arresting scores of people during events. The National Committee for the Liberation of Detainees (CNLD) reported that over 1,000 people were arrested for participating in nationwide protests held on May 14. While many protesters were quickly released, some remained in detention for long periods; in November, the CNLD reported that protesters and activists were among the 231 people who remained in detention.
The 2012 law on associations effectively restricts the formation, funding, and activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Permits and receipts of application submission are required to establish and operate NGOs, but organizations often face considerable delays and bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to obtain such documents, leaving them in a legally precarious position.
In May 2021, the Interior Ministry moved to dissolve the Youth Action Rally, an NGO that has supported the Hirak, citing its alleged violation of the law on associations. In October, an administrative court ruled in favor of its dissolution.
NGOs must notify the government of staffing changes and submit detailed reports on their funding; those that accept foreign funding without government approval risk fines or imprisonment.
The country’s main labor federation, the General Union of Algerian Workers, has been criticized for its close relationship to the government and for its failure to advocate for workers’ interests.
Workers require government approval to establish new unions, and this is difficult to obtain in practice, leaving many unions without legal status. Authorities routinely clamp down on independent unions. The Autonomous National Union of Electricity and Gas Workers, an independent union that represents workers at the National Society for Electricity and Gas, a public utility, has been repeatedly harassed by the authorities in recent years. In June 2021, Ramzi Derder, a National Federation of Informal Workers member, was arrested on charges including terrorism.
A 2006 reconciliation law gave immunity to Islamist and state perpetrators of serious crimes during the civil war, while compensating families of those who were subject to such crimes, which included forced disappearances. The reconciliation law also criminalized public discussion on the fate of the disappeared.
Allegations of torture have decreased since the civil war’s end, but human rights activists still accuse the police of using excessive force and abusing detainees. In February 2021, Walid Nekiche, a student, accused security officers of sexually assaulting and torturing him after his 2019 arrest, prompting prosecutors to open a preliminary investigation. In May, Nekiche criticized the investigation’s pace.
Prison conditions are poor; in 2020, the online outlet Algérie Part reported that inmates at Algiers’ Harrach prison faced significant overcrowding and poor hygiene.
Terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State militant group, continue to operate in Algeria. However, attacks have grown less frequent in recent years. In January 2021, five people were killed and three were injured by a roadside bomb in Tébessa Province. AQIM reportedly claimed responsibility for placing the explosive but denied targeting civilians.
Officials have made gradual efforts to address the Amazigh community’s cultural demands. Tamazight, the Berber language, became a national language in 1995, allowing it to be taught officially in schools serving Amazigh areas. Tamazight received the status of an official language nationwide through a 2016 constitutional amendment, meaning it could be used in administrative documents. The 2020 constitutional revisions made it impossible to change the status of Tamazight as a national language. However, Arabic remains the prevailing language of government.
The constitution guarantees gender equality, but women continue to face both legal and societal discrimination. Many women receive lower wages than men in similar positions, and there are few women in company leadership positions. Sexual harassment, while punishable with fines and jail time, is nevertheless common in workplaces. NGOs dedicated to women’s rights have become more vocal as part of the Hirak, calling for a renewed commitment to the constitutional promise of gender equality.
LGBT+ people face discrimination and violence, and many LGBT+ activists have fled the country. Same-sex sexual activity is punishable with prison sentences as long as two years. While prosecutions for such acts have declined in recent years, LGBT+ Algerians face mistreatment at the hands of police and discrimination by health providers and employers. In 2020, 2 people received prison terms and another 42 received suspended sentences after they were arrested at a clandestine gay wedding in Constantine.
About 175,000 Sahrawis from Western Sahara live in refugee camps in the Tindouf area, near the border with Morocco. The camps have been present since 1975, in a remote desert region with limited job opportunities. About 90,000 of the residents are considered “vulnerable” by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as they rely on humanitarian assistance for food, water, and education.
Sub-Saharan African migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, are subject to racial discrimination in Algeria and are often arbitrarily arrested and deported from the country—or simply abandoned at the southern desert borders—without being given the opportunity to challenge the actions in court. In the first quarter of 2021, Algeria sent nearly 3,800 West African migrants to areas near the border with Niger. Algerian authorities sent scores of migrants to the border with Niger after it reopened in July. In September, as diplomatic tensions rose between Algiers and Rabat, Algeria deported about 40 Moroccan migrants to Morocco.
Women do not enjoy equal rights in marriage and divorce under the family code, which is based on Islamic law. Among other provisions, women must obtain a male guardian’s permission to marry, and the father is the legal guardian of his children. No law addresses spousal rape.
Domestic violence is common, and the laws against it are weak; for example, cases can be dropped if the victim forgives the alleged abuser. Women’s rights groups report that between 100 and 200 women are killed in domestic abuse incidents each year. In late January 2021, public-television journalist Tinhinane Laceb was killed by her spouse in their Algiers home.
The weak rule of law, government involvement in the economy, and bureaucratic obstacles pose major barriers to economic opportunity and social mobility. Laws against unsafe or abusive working conditions are poorly enforced.
A 2009 law criminalized all forms of trafficking in persons, and Algeria reported its first conviction under the law in 2015. In recent years, the government has made an effort to enforce the ban through prosecutions and has provided protection for victims, though not systematically. Undocumented sub-Saharan African migrants are particularly susceptible to labor exploitation, including through the practice of debt bondage, as well as sexual exploitation.
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https://www.buzzi.com/en/algeria
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en
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Buzzi SpA
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https://www.buzzi.com/algeria
|
In 2008, within a privatization program promoted by the local government, aimed at opening the economy to foreign investors, Buzzi acquired a 35% stake in the share capital of two companies, which respectively own the cement plants of Hadjar Soud (located about 30 km from Annaba) and Sour El Ghozlane (located about 130 km South of Algiers).
The production units in which Buzzi invested have an overall production capacity of more than 2 million tons/year of cement, can boast a large availability of raw materials, adequate manufacturing equipment and a good operating profitability.
Currently in Algeria 699 people are employed.
Société des Ciments de Hadjar Soud
Route Nationale 44 Bekkouche - Lakhdar
Daira de Ben Azzouz, Wilaya de Skikda
Tel. +213 38 77 64 03
Fax +213 38 77 97 24
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https://global.fujifilm.com/en/all-regions/af/dz
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https://www.impacteurope.net/insights/algerian-market
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en
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The Algerian Market
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2024-04-30T12:00:00+00:00
|
First, some context. At Impact Europe, we have a few central missions. Making more capital impact capital, for instance, and connected to that, making more people impact people. Getting them to take collective action. And in doing so, taking impact wider and higher.
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en
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/sites/www.evpa.ngo/files/imp.png
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https://www.impacteurope.net/insights/algerian-market
|
First, some context. At Impact Europe, we have a few central missions. Making more capital impact capital, for instance, and connected to that, making more people impact people. Getting them to take collective action. And in doing so, taking impact wider and higher.
This last part of our mission statement can sometimes take us to unexpected places. It has nudged us to establish new partnerships over the course of Collaborate For Impact. As you may know, that is the name of our EU-funded market building programme geared towards impact communities, incubators, and social entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe. And just last year, during our flagship event Impact Week in Torino, we formally launched Impact Together!, our most recent market building project in the MENA-region. More specifically, we have spread our wings to cover nascent partnerships in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan.
These forays outside of our familiar European borders are learning experiences, both for the local partners we selected and for us as an organization. While we call these projects ‘market building projects’, the truth is that we are greeted by different existing economies with their own sets of policies, incentives, and characteristics when it comes to impact investing and social entrepreneurship.
It is no different in Algeria, a country with many ambitious young start-ups and great forward potential. In what follows, we zoom in on the state of their national market, trying to paint a picture of the social economy there, today.
A bird's eye view
Let’s set the scene first. Algeria is a very large country. In fact, at some 2.3 million square kilometers in surface area, it is effectively the largest country of Africa. It counts about 43 million inhabitants that are spread quite unevenly. The cities house the large majority, with an estimated 90 percent of the population living in about 12 percent of available territory. Traditionally, the country’s economy has been largely reliant on hydrocarbons, being the sixth-largest gas exporter in the world.
When it comes to the social economy in the country, data is fairly limited. In terms of numbers, an estimate made in 2016 during the Euromed Summit, the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Social Economy, put the number of social entrepreneurs at around 7.700, employing an estimated 168.000 people. These numbers include farming cooperatives, mutual associations and various other organisations. While indicative of scale, these numbers don't tell the whole story about social entrepreneurship in Algeria. A pioneering study commissioned by the British Council and conducted by the Algerian consultancy firm BH Advisory and Social Enterprise UK in 2021 can serve as a baseline in this respect. Some key findings from this report are …
... that most social enterprises have emerged recently (66% in the last three years)
... social enterprises are mostly in their start-up or growth stages (76%)
... they mostly use personal financing to launch their enterprises
... they often have a regional reach and serve sectors like arts and crafts, culture and leisure and environment
... they have a better track record at creating jobs for women than other businesses, with 64% having at least gender parity in their workforces
These numbers are indicative of a growing interest in social entrepreneurship, and point towards possible advantages of this approach to generate social and environmental impact.
It is worth noting the initial challenge of this study, when considering this data. While principles of solidarity and mutuality have their place in Algerian culture, there is no actual consensus on what constitutes a social enterprise. The study by the British Council offers a few selection criteria: the enterprise should put impact first, it should generate an income, and this income should not be used to increase shareholders’ wealth.
The truth is, though, that the exercise in defining the essential characteristics of a social enterprise is a crucial next step in advancing their potential. Some enterprises might qualify as a social enterprise unknowingly – in fact, this was the case for over one third of respondents in the British Council study. Others may in fact be less of a social enterprise and more a traditional business with some degree of corporate social responsibility (CSR).
In absence of a legal framework, there is no great impetus for enterprises to insist on either qualification. Social enterprises are largely bound to the same obligations and tax demands as traditional for-profit enterprises, while often struggling to access conventional finance. Unsurprisingly, a majority of respondents in the British Council study indicate that regulations and administrative burdens are “significant barriers” to their activities, while over one quarter testifies to a lack of access to finance. For lack of a better legal form, they tend to register as sole traders (individual business owners) or limited liability companies (LLC). Unregistered businesses, too, are a significant part of the Algerian economy. The World Bank estimated them to account for about 29% of Algerian GDP between 2010 and 2018.
Start-ups on the rise
While there is no specific support for social enterprises, there have been several programmes in recent history that have benefited small-to-medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups as a whole. Ever since the nineties, the Algerian government has been supporting SMEs through three different agencies that target different demographics. A specific focus of these agencies is to reduce unemployment through the creation of new enterprises. The incentives offered by these agencies are largely financial in nature: non-interest bearing loans, facilitation of obtaining bank loans, tax benefits and interest rate subsidies.
The ANGEM, or National Agency for Management of Microcredits, can serve as an example here. Established in 1999, it has since supported a tremendous amount of entrepreneurs through micro-credits and loans. According to their official numbers, they have extended around 915.000 loans over a period of 24 years, creating an estimated 1.420.000 jobs in the process. With the inclusion of craftsmen, home-based women entrepreneurs and agricultural enterprises, it is fair to say that these measures have benefited social entrepreneurs, even if they were not specifically targeted.
The European Union, too, has been implementing programmes in Algeria that have helped support local development in various ways. Some examples include the PAP ENPARD Programme in 2014, aimed at improving life in rural areas of Algeria, or a more recent UNDP Programme focused around economic inclusion.
Some of the greatest advancements, though, have come even more recently. Under impulse of the Ministry for Start-ups and Knowledge Economy, led by minister Yacine Oualid, Algeria has been increasingly profiling itself as a hub for innovation and technological ambition. A first relevant measure came in the form of a certification label for start-ups, incubators and other innovative projects, created in September 2020. Labelled start-ups benefit from tax exemptions during their first five years, while also potentially benefiting from financing through the Algerian Startup Fund. In a recent interview at the African Startup Conference in Algeria, Oualid stated that around 560 million euros have been invested by the fund since its inception.
Algerian Minister Yacine Oualid in interview with TechCabal at the end of 2023.
From start-up to impact
While this is great for start-ups in the broad sense, it does not resolve some of the specific vulnerabilities of social enterprises and start-ups. As quoted in the Pioneer’s Post, Oualid admits that “in a free-market economy, being a social entrepreneur is like being in the middle of a jungle.”
To bridge this gap and to clear the jungle branches, private support in the form of incubation, mentorship and networking are essential. Impact Europe has been collaborating on this front with Sylabs, one of the first private Algerian startup accelerators in the country. Abdellah Malek founded Sylabs in December 2015 to help unlock the full potential of Algerian youth and to help promote entrepreneurship.
“Today, we are running a range of different programmes," says Malek, "including an ideation bootcamp, that helps social entrepreneurs develop impactful ideas, as well as more specialized guidance in developing a business plan and measuring their impact”. These types of learning opportunities are essential in making sure social enterprises go beyond the start-up stage and become sustainable businesses. Sylabs pays attention to involving Algerians in more rural regions, too, as they are often the most in need of such training and guidance. Most existing opportunities are focused Algiers and a few other big cities, creating an imbalance in knowledge and participation.
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https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/algeria-third-day-of-exam-shutdowns
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en
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Algeria: Third Day of Exam Shutdowns
|
https://pulse.internetsociety.org/favicon.ico
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https://pulse.internetsociety.org/favicon.ico
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“It’s immature what they are doing. I could not get any work done today which will definitely cost me much,” Ahmed, an Algerian freelancer graphic designer, told The New Arab on Sunday.
Many like Ahmed, missed deadlines for their projects or received a scolding frombosses overseas who did not believe that a country can shut down the internet over a high school exam.
“I wrote a long email explaining to my American boss that I could not work today or give an early notice because the internet was nationwide shut in my country. He thought I was not being serious,” Amira, an Algerian web designer, told TNA.
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https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/algeria-bloody-past-and-fractious-factions
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en
|
Algeria: Bloody Past and Fractious Factions
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https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/algeria-bloody-past-and-fractious-factions
|
By David B. Ottaway
Riding the regional political wave, Algeria’s leading Islamic party proclaimed on New Year’s Day 2012 that it intended to become the primary political force in the Arab world’s second most populous country. But unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the declaration in Algeria did not mark the first attempt by Islamist politicians to take power. Algeria has had the longest—and darkest—experience with Islamist politics, dating back a generation. As a result, the North African country is far more anxious about what might happen if Islamist parties try again.
Algeria’s Islamists arrived at the cusp of power in 1992, when the Islamic Salvation Front was on the verge of winning a parliamentary election in a field of more than fifty parties. On the eve of a runoff vote, however, the Algerian military led a coup against the long-standing president, aborted the election, and arrested Islamist political leaders. With nonviolent Islamist leaders imprisoned, the coup soon spawned an extremist insurgency and a tough military counterinsurgency that plunged the country into civil war for the rest of the decade. More than 100,000 people died in the process.
So, still scarred by the so-called Black Decade, Algeria did not witness a popular pro-democracy uprising in 2011, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Yet in some ways, Algeria is way ahead of other Arab countries, where Islamic parties only recently won political office for the first time.
To co-opt Islamist sentiment, Algeria’s military appointed members of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), a moderate offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, to cabinet jobs in 1995. The movement has held as many as seven ministries ever since. In 2004, it even became part of an alliance with two secular parties that has kept the military-backed president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999.
Although Algeria’s more moderate Islamists have now had a share in the country’s governance for seventeen years, their failure to affect the military government’s policies has reduced the Islamists’ popularity considerably. Algerian Islamists have thus already experienced both the temptations and the pitfalls of serving in governments they do not control. The movement has been criticized for a meager record of accomplishments. In 2009, an MSP faction broke away after charging that the party had nothing to show for fourteen years in government.
Political Islam in Algeria has its own special history. Unlike Islamists elsewhere in North Africa, Algeria’s Islamists have been deeply fragmented. Some belong to mystical indigenous Sufi orders. Others cleave either to Saudi Arabia’s strict Wahhabism, which is one brand of Salafism, or to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Several hundred Algerian Islamists have followed al Qaeda’s call to violent jihad. But the various branches lack dynamic leadership. No towering Islamic figure, such as Tunisia’s Sheikh Rachid al Ghannouchi, has emerged to unite Algerian Islamists in their quest for power.
The Algerian military, which has dominated power since 1965, has also masterfully manipulated the myriad Islamic parties and politicians. And even moderate Islamists have been tainted by the blood-drenched insurgency of their extremist brethren. In 2012, a generation later, diehard Islamist remnants remained in several remote outposts.
The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, which brought Islamist parties into powerful positions in Tunisia and Egypt and even in Morocco’s monarchy, led Algeria’s Islamists to think they, too, might finally achieve a political breakthrough. But it didn’t happen. Algeria’s Islamists were trounced by secular pro-government parties in the 2012 parliamentary elections. In 2014, ailing President Bouteflika won a landslide victory—and a fourth term in office. Algeria seemed stuck in a time warp with no sign of political change in sight.
The Beginning
Algerian Islamists have struggled to revive their cause since French colonial rule systematically suppressed Islam, education in Arabic, and the mere notion of an Algerian identity. Algeria was declared part of France and French culture forever. French arrogance so infuriated a small core of Algerian intellectuals that in 1931 they formed the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars led by Sheikh Abelhamid Ben Badis. He had received religious instruction in Tunis and Cairo, where in 1928 Hassan al Banna had launched the Muslim Brotherhood to promote Islamic reforms in Egypt.
Ben Badis framed the new movement in a few succinct words. “Islam is my religion, Arabic my language, and Algeria my country,” he pronounced. With other Muslim scholars, he began preaching that Algeria could never be part of France because of its different culture, religion, and language.
Ben Badis died in 1940, fourteen years before secular Algerian nationalists launched their war for independence from France. But he is credited with spearheading the revival of Muslim and Arab identity that is a central tenet of Islamists to this day. Among his associates in the Association of Muslim Scholars were Sheikh Abdellatif Soltani (1904–1983) and Sheikh Ahmed Sahnoun (1907–2003), who began planting the seeds for the Algerian Muslim Brotherhood in 1953.
Islamic groups did not play a leadership role in Algeria’s eight-year war for independence. None of the National Liberation Front’s nine major leaders was an Islamist. And the war’s main goals were to restore the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state with only a secondary reference to Islamic principles. Yet Islam was widely used to rally supporters in the rural areas. Guerrillas were called mujahideen, or holy warriors. And those who died for independence were dubbed choudaha, or religious martyrs.
After independence in July 1962, the first Algerian government under Ahmed Ben Bella lurched radically to the left, largely under the influence of Algerian and French communists and Trotskyites, who flocked to Algiers to guide its burgeoning socialist revolution. Leftist labor union activists and Algerian communists still play an active role in politics through their own Workers’ Party.
The first sign of Islamic protest surfaced in 1964 with the creation of the religious association al Qiyam, which means “Islamic values.” It was led by three Islamists: Soltani, Sahnoun, and Abbasi Madani. The latter would play a major role in the Islamists’ first quest for power between 1988 and 1992.
After only three years of independence, the Algerian military, led by Colonel Houari Boumediene toppled Ben Bella, threw out foreign communists, and promised a “return to the sources.” Educated only in Arab countries, Boumediene promoted Islamic values, Arabic education, and Arabic culture with the help of thousands of imported Egyptian teachers, many of them Muslim Brotherhood members. But he insisted on tight state control over the process of Islamization. And he replaced communist-inspired socialism with military-backed state socialism.
Al Qiyam leaders soon had a falling out with Boumediene, particularly over their opposition to his land reform program. He banned their activities in 1966 and their organization four years later.
Boumediene’s death in 1978 sparked a new phase of Islamic activism. His successor, Chadli Bendjedid, tolerated the Islamists’ campaign against foreign ways, whether communism, the French language, alcohol, or Western dress for women. But the strategy soon backfired, especially on university campuses. Young Arabic-speaking Islamists found it difficult to obtain jobs because they did not speak French. Algiers even witnessed violent student clashes pitting Arabic speakers against French speakers.
The trouble came to a head in November 1982, when Islamists at the University of Algiers beheaded a leftist opponent with a sword. Bendjedid ordered the police to round up hundreds of students. In reaction, 100,000 Islamists turned out for the biggest rally ever held on the downtown Algiers campus to hear Sheikhs Soltani, Sahnoun, and Madani present a proposal to set up an Islamic state.
Madani was thrown into jail, and the other two sheikhs were placed under house arrest. The event marked a turning point in the open confrontation between Islamists and the military.
The first Islamist figure to take to the mountains to pursue an Islamic state by armed force was Mustapha Bouyali, a national liberation war veteran and visionary imam preaching at an Algiers mosque against the Western-inspired iniquities of Algerians. Bouyali launched his own holy war in early 1982 and convinced several hundred others to join his Armed Islamic Movement (MIA). Bouyali’s insurrection lasted until 1987, when he was found and killed while hiding in the Algiers casbah. But the MIA lived on as an inspiration to other hardline Islamists.
Islamist influence continued to grow significantly throughout the 1980s as the military government sought to expand its popular base. Thousands of new mosques sprang up across the country, and cities and towns were given Arabic names.
In 1984, the National Assembly passed a family code based mostly on Sharia, or Islamic law. The code deprived Algerian women of many of the rights they had previous enjoyed; it also legalized polygamy. A new National Charter adopted in 1986 stressed Islam’s central role in the life of the nation.
The Algiers Spring
The Islamist challenge to the military government started coming to a head during riots in Algiers in October 1988. The riots led to the collapse of Algeria’s single-party system, which had been dominated by the National Liberation Front ever since independence. Islamists did not cause the riots. They were actually touched off by jobless youth and other malcontents, who attacked government buildings and offices.
Unrest then spread from the capital to other major cities. But Islamists quickly seized the turmoil to rally supporters, organize mass demonstrations, and directly challenge the military government. Shocked by the breadth and size of the burgeoning popular uprising, Bendjedid ordered the army into the cities to restore order. Estimates of the death toll from the military crackdown varied from 170 to 500.
After restoring order, Bendjedid launched a series of reforms, starting with a new constitution in early 1989 that allowed a free press and multiple political parties. In a fateful gamble, the military authorized the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as one of the more than fifty new parties.
The FIS’s leaders were Madani, head of the defunct al Qiyam association, and Ali Belhadj, a rabble-rousing cleric from Kouba, a working-class district in downtown Algiers. Both were puritanical Salafis, but Belhadj was outspoken in his regard of manmade democracy as anathema to divine rule.
From the start, the FIS encompassed a hodgepodge of militant Islamists. They included veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, known as Algerian Afghans; Saudi-influenced Salafis; and adherents to a homegrown school of Islamic thinking called the Djaz’ara.
Other more moderate Islamic parties also had their debut during this “Algiers Spring.” The local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood registered as Hamas, totally unrelated to the radical Palestinian group by the same name. Algeria’s Hamas was led by Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah, who had taken over the movement after its founder, Sheikh Soltani, died in 1984.
A third Islamic party, Ennahda, was established by a highly respected scholar, Sheikh Abdallah Djaballah. He was also a Muslim Brother, although he wanted to remain independent of the Brotherhood’s headquarters in Cairo.
Of the three legal Islamic parties, the radical but then nonviolent Front scored the biggest gains. In mid-1990, local elections polarized the country between Islamists and secularists when the Islamic Salvation Front won a stunning 54 percent of the vote. The ruling National Liberation Front garnered only 28 percent.
The Front captured 70 percent of the vote in the three largest cities of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. It also swept 856 out of all 1,541 municipalities. And it gained a majority in thirty-one of the forty-eight assemblies at the wilaya, or provincial, level. By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Ennahda Party gained only 5 percent of the popular vote.
The results put the military in a quandary about whether to go ahead with parliamentary elections. Communists, leftist labor unions, and secular parties also showed little enthusiasm as they watched the Front-dominated municipal councils demand rule under Islamic law. Front leaders Madani and Belhadj took turns threatening a holy war if elections were canceled, and they held massive rallies calling for an Islamic state. Both were arrested for promoting a nationwide strike in June 1990.
Still, the military government did hold a first round of two-part parliamentary elections on December 26, 1991. The elections confirmed the likelihood of a full Islamic Salvation Front takeover. The Front won 188 out of 231 seats compared with only 15 seats for the ruling National Liberation Front.
Secularist parties, labor unions, and women reacted by forming a National Committee for the Safeguard of Algeria. They urged the military to call off the final round of elections scheduled for January 16, 1992. So did France and the United States, which feared that, once in power, the FIS would never hold another election.
The second round was never held. Under military pressure, Bendjedid resigned on January 11, 1992. Three days later, a military-appointed State High Council took power. The opening shots of civil war rang out on February 8 during clashes between the military and Front supporters at mosques across the country. On March 4, the State High Council outlawed the Front and kept Madani and Belhadj in jail.
The Black Decade
The following eight years witnessed an ever more ruthless struggle between the military and jihadi Islamists from a plethora of armed groups. The moribund Armed Islamic Movement was revived. FIS radicals split off to form the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The Front’s more moderate members set up their own Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).
Toward the end of the 1990s, diehard Islamists opposed to all peace efforts formed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the forerunner of the local al Qaeda branch. Tens of thousands of Afghan war veterans, jobless youth, disaffected Arabic-educated students, and plain criminals joined one of the extremist groups.
All sides participated in the bloodshed. Hallmarks of the brutal insurrection included throat-slitting and decapitation of moderate Islamists and secular intellectuals, journalists, and politicians. The disparate Islamist factions massacred each other’s supporters and carried out attacks on the military. In turn, secret security force units perpetrated extrajudicial killings of even innocent villagers in a bid to discredit one Islamic group or another.
Each year, the holy month of Ramadan became a pretext for the worst slaughters. The GIA ordered all foreigners to leave the country and assassinated more than fifty who dared to stay.
The most horrific example of GIA attacks on foreigners involved the killing in May 1996 of seven Cistercian Trappist monks at the Tibhirine Monastery outside the town of Medea, which lies south of Algiers. (The 2010 film Of Gods and Men dramatized the event.)
The GIA even took its war to Paris, where bombs went off at subway stations and on train lines. In December 1994, four GIA terrorists hijacked an Air France civilian airliner with the intent of crashing it into the Eiffel Tower, foreshadowing tactics used in the 9/11 attacks in the United States. (The Air France hijackers were killed by French commandos while the aircraft refueled in Marseille.)
Against this backdrop of unending violence, some moderate Islamists joined secularist parties to seek a peaceful resolution of the civil war. In January 1995, two FIS leaders and Ennahda’s Sheikh Djaballah joined three secular parties, including the ruling National Liberation Front, in signing a peace pact negotiated by the Rome-based Catholic Sant’Egidio Order. The Rome Accords called for a national conference to negotiate a transition back to civilian rule, the return of the army to its barracks, and an end to the ban on FIS political activities.
The military immediately rejected the accords. It instead held a presidential election to replace the military’s five-member State High Council in November 1995. Islamists involved in the insurrection vehemently opposed the plan.
But the Muslim Brotherhood’s Hamas opted to participate and selected its leader, Nahnah, to run against the military’s General Liamine Zeroual. Nahnah captured 25 percent of the vote against Zeroual’s 60 percent. As a reward for participating, the military gave Hamas two cabinet posts in the new government, which was formed on the last day of 1995.
For the first time in the history of Algeria—and the rest of North Africa—the Muslim Brotherhood had gained a foothold in government.
Islamists in Government
Even in the face of escalating violence, the military next organized parliamentary elections in June 1997. This time, two Muslim Brotherhood–inspired parties agreed to participate: Hamas, now renamed the Movement of Society for Peace, and Ennahda.
The movement won 1.6 million votes, or 14.8 percent, catapulting it into the National Assembly for the first time with sixty-nine deputies. It came in second behind the National Rally for Democracy, the new government party taking over from the National Liberation Front, which captured 3.5 million votes, or 34 percent, and thus 156 seats, well short of a majority in the 380-seat assembly. Ennahda came in fourth with 915,000 votes, or 8.7 percent, giving it thirty-four seats. Together, the two moderate Islamic parties took 23.5 percent of the vote compared to only 14.3 percent for the long-ruling National Liberation Front.
Forced to form a coalition government, the military chose to include the Movement of Society for Peace in an alliance with two secular parties. This time, the MSP was put in charge of seven ministries or agencies: industry, small and medium-sized enterprises, transportation, tourism, environment, fisheries, and artisanal production. Conspicuously absent from the list was any ministry dealing with security.
The MSP has remained the principal Islamic faction supporting the military government ever since. When General Zeroual retired in 1999, the Islamist party immediately backed Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the military’s choice to replace Zeroual. Since 2004, the movement has been part of a three-party alliance that repeatedly endorsed his reelection.
A national liberation war veteran and former foreign minister, Bouteflika is credited with finally ending Algeria’s civil war. He first struck a peace deal with the smallest armed Islamist group, the AIS, and then offered an amnesty from prosecution to all the others. The so-called civil accord was approved in a referendum held in September 2000 by 98.6 percent of the vote, on a turnout of 85 percent.
In 2005, the civil accord was followed by the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which provided compensation to the families of 25,000 victims of the civil war, including the 5,800 “disappeared,” who were widely believed to be military victims. Altogether, between 100,000 and 200,000 Algerians died during the Black Decade, compared with some 1 million victims during the war for independence.
The Price for Participation
The MSP strategy of participation has come at considerable cost to its popularity and credibility. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, it won only a little more than 500,000 votes, or 7 percent of the total cast. Its number of deputies dropped from sixty-nine to thirty-eight. But its main Islamic rival, Ennahda, did well. Ennahda garnered 705,000 votes, or 9.5 percent, and jumped from zero to forty-three seats in the National Assembly.
In the next parliamentary elections, held in 2007, both Islamists and the military government lost legitimacy. Only 35 percent of Algeria’s 18.7 million voters bothered to go to the polls. The movement won slightly more votes (552,000) than in 2002, an increase that parlayed into fifty-two seats. But Ennahda plummeted in popularity, winning fewer than 200,000 votes. The number of its deputies dropped from forty-three to just five. The Islamists combined won a mere 13 percent of the turnout.
Presidential elections in April 2009 starkly illustrated the declining popularity of both the regime and the MSP. Before the poll, Bouteflika manipulated the National Assembly to revise the constitution and allow him to run for a third term. He also engineered a successful revolt to oust Djaballah from leadership of al Islah, the party Djaballah had founded in 1999 after leaving Ennahda. This move neutralized the one Islamic opposition figure sufficiently popular to threaten Bouteflika. The MSP, however, continued to support the president.
The main question hanging over the 2009 presidential election was the turnout. Public cynicism about government manipulation of elections, parties, and poll figures reached new heights. Bouteflika was declared the winner with 90 percent of the vote, on a 75 percent turnout. The opposition, however, claimed that only 16 percent of the electorate voted.
As later disclosed in a WikiLeaks cable, the U.S. embassy in Algiers described the election as “carefully choreographed and heavily controlled” and estimated the turnout at “25 to 30 percent at most.” Making the election even less representative of the political landscape, the Workers’ Party’s Trotskyite leader, Louisa Hanoune, came in second. The one Islamist candidate to participate received just 1 percent of the vote.
The election fallout for the Movement of Society for Peace was immediate. Within two months, a faction within the MSP led by Abdelmajid Menasra broke away to form the Movement for Preaching and Change, which criticized MSP leader Soltani for serving as a minister while also remaining party leader. Another faction that remained within the MSP felt the movement should withdraw from the government and go into open opposition. In response, Soltani resigned, but four other MSP ministers remained in the government. The military rewarded the MSP by refusing to allow the breakaway party to operate.
The Arab Spring
The uprisings of early 2011 caught both the military and Algeria’s Islamists by surprise. Bouteflika, at age 74, had by then become an absentee president because of serious health problems. He rarely spoke in public—just three times during all of 2011. Since the president had no sons, vice president, or other obvious successor, public unease was already growing about who would lead the country next.
The political vacuum became visible when street protests over rising food prices, housing shortages, and unemployment broke out in Algiers in January 2011, sparking violent confrontations with the police. At least three protesters died, more than 800 others were injured, and more than 1,000 were arrested. Imitating the Tunisian street vendor whose self-immolation sparked the Arab Spring, an unemployed youth set himself on fire on January 13 after the mayor refused to provide either a job or housing.
A secular opposition party tried repeatedly to mobilize demonstrations in Algiers, but security forces quickly quashed them. Islamists, traumatized by events during the Black Decade, were nowhere to be seen.
The government responded quickly to head off a repeat of the October 1988 riots. It was financially well placed to pacify discontent because of the country’s oil wealth and high oil prices. Algeria’s foreign reserves stood at $155 billion at the start of 2011; they increased to $186 billion by September—sufficient to cover four years of imports. Food subsidies and civil servants’ salaries were increased, the latter by 34 percent.
In early February, Bouteflika lifted the nineteen-year state of emergency. On April 15, he announced constitutional reforms to “strengthen democracy.” They included a new media law permitting private television and radio stations, as well as a revision in the election law to allow parties to register more easily. The government also set new parliamentary elections for May 2012.
After the yearlong unrest, the MSP made its dramatic move. On New Year’s Day 2012, party chief Sheikh Soltani announced the movement was quitting the three-party alliance supporting President Bouteflika. Sheikh Soltani declared that 2012 would be “the year of political competition … and not that of alliance.”
Soltani then denounced the coalition for “political mediocrity” that served neither the country nor its people. He also said that the MSP would keep its four ministers in the cabinet. The moves were an attempt to face the public over the movement’s long record of support for the highly unpopular military but without breaking completely with the government.
The 2011 uprisings across North Africa radically changed the MSP’s political calculations and strategy. It formed the Algerian Green Alliance with two other Islamic parties to run in the May 2012 parliamentary elections. Together, they expected to win at least a plurality of votes--and seats. But secular Algerians were in no mood to see Islamists come to power. The two main pro-government secular parties--the National Liberation Front and the National Rally for Democracy--won 288 seats, or 62 percent of the total 462 seats. The Green alliance captured only 48 seats--four less than the MSP alone had held in the previous assembly. Two other small Islamic parties won an additional 11 seats.
MSP Vice President Abderrazak Makri warned that the government had missed its “historic chance” to begin a peaceful transformation toward true democracy. But neither the government nor the Algerian public appeared to be swayed.
In the 2014 presidential election, President Bouteflika won 82 percent of the vote, even though he was so ill that he never campaigned and made only one brief speech. He won 4.5 million fewer votes than in the 2009 election, however. The MSP and other Islamic parties boycotted the election, leaving a former prime minister, Ali Benflis, as the main challenger. He came in a distant second with only 12 percent of the vote.
In mid-2014, Algeria’s opposition parties responded to their defeat by creating a broad coalition, including both secularists and Islamists, called the Coordination for Liberties and Democratic Transition. The coalition’s goal was to hold a national conference, with a government delegation, to generate movement toward greater democracy. But the government showed no interest. It instead launched a counter-proposal to discuss unspecified changes to the constitution.
Key Positions
By early 2015, Algeria had seven Islamist parties or informal factions. Three parties—Ennahda, al Islah, and the MSP—had already participated in a presidential or parliamentary election. All three were rooted in Muslim Brotherhood thinking and differed mainly over whether to seek changes in the political system from within or outside the military government.
But two of the potentially strongest Islamic contenders did not run in the 2012 elections. The military continued to ban the Islamic Salvation Front from politics, while the large but quiescent Salafi community showed no interest in politics. So Algeria’s active Islamist spectrum was defined by seven groups with diverse positions.
The Movement of Society for Peace
The MSP is the Islamic group that has consistently supported military rule, participation in government, and cooperation with secular parties since 1995. Its strategy has been to win more power by showing the military that it is responsible and trustworthy while gaining practical experience in governance.
Its political program carefully straddles all the hot-button issues. It avoids mention of an Islamic state or the Muslim Sharia as the law of the land. Its stated goal is a “modern Algerian state in conformity with the spirit of Islamic principles,” but which also endorses democracy and “a republican regime.” It recognizes the special Amazigh (Berber) origins of Algeria but also stresses that the country belongs to the Islamic and Arab worlds.
The MSP policy toward women also treads carefully. It endorses women’s right to education and work, even suggesting reduced hours to allow time for raising families. But the policy does not mention revising the Islamic-inspired Family Code of 1984, and the movement has shown no support for special quotas for women in the National Assembly.
Its economic policy straddles the capitalist-socialist divide. The MSP endorses state control of “strategic public sectors” and a social welfare state including cash payments even to unemployed university graduates. But it also supports promotion of small and medium-sized private enterprises and private investment to reduce Algeria’s dependence on the state-run oil sector. At the same time, it demands the creation of an Islamic banking system that forbids interest on loans.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the MSP’s foreign policy is the prominence given to the Palestinian issue, which the movement describes as “the central cause of the nation.” The MSP calls for the reconquest of “all Palestinian territory” from Israel and for an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The program makes no mention of the 2002 Arab Peace Plan, which offered Israel normalization of relations in return for a resolution of the Palestinian issue.
The National Front for Change
The National Front for Change is led by Abdelmajid Menasra, who broke away from the MSP in 2009 after rejecting continued participation in government. Along with MSP leader Soltani, Menasra had been one of the first two Islamists to hold cabinet posts beginning in the mid-1990s. He subsequently became disenchanted over the lack of “real democracy” and the “empty reforms” by successive military governments. Menasra claims to have recruited away 50 percent of MSP members. His party has also called for an amnesty for former FIS members and has appealed to them to join the National Front for Change.
Menasra has said that the kind of popular uprising that occurred in Egypt and Tunisia is not the right strategy for Algerian Islamists. He has launched a petition campaign dubbed “One Million for Popular Reform” to pressure the Bouteflika regime to hold transparent elections, write a new constitution, increase freedoms, and launch new economic projects to reduce unemployment.
Ennahda
Founded by Sheikh Abdallah Djaballah in 1990, Ennahda has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement. It has supported participation in the political process but not in the military government. It is not related to Tunisia’s Ennahda Party and has maintained its independence from the Brotherhood’s headquarters in Cairo.
In 2012, Ennahda leader Fateh Rebiai described his Islamism as “anchored in Algerian society.” The party saw a sharp decline in its popularity after ousting Djaballah in 1997, who then created the rival al Islah Party. In the last parliamentary elections in 2007, Ennahda won just 3 percent of the vote and five seats. Rebiai did not compete in the 2009 presidential race.
Al Islah
Known also as the Movement for National Reform, al Islah is the successor to the nearly defunct Ennahda and was created by Abdallah Djaballah in 1999. After a dissident faction expelled Djaballah in 2006, al Islah struggled to define itself or attract support. Its leader, Mohamed Djahid Younsi, won only 177,000 votes, barely 1 percent, in the 2009 presidential election. Al Islah has since gone through several other leaders. Bouteflika adopted many of al Islah’s proposed political reforms after the Arab Spring broke out in Tunisia and Egypt.
The Justice and Development Front
Launched in August 2011, the Justice and Development Front is the third party founded by Sheikh Djaballah after his ouster from both Ennahda and al Islah. A respected Islamic scholar, Djaballah is extremely conservative on social issues. His dislike of the former colonial power is such that he refuses to speak French.
Djaballah was a signatory of the 1995 Rome Accords, which rejected violence, called for national reconciliation, and recognized Islam, Arabism, and Amazigh (Berber) as central characteristics of the Algerian identity. Djaballah has prided himself on refusing to cooperate with the military regime. A highly effective orator, he probably will present the greatest challenge to both the MSP and the military regime.
The Movement for Liberty and Social Justice
Founded in 2007, this movement is led by former FIS leaders, most of whom now live in exile. They have been seeking, without success, to convince the military that their members have forsworn violence and truly embraced multiparty democracy. They claim inspiration from the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars, which was popular in the 1930s. One of the movement’s cofounders is Anwar Haddam, who was elected in 1991 to the National Assembly before the military canceled the elections. He currently lives in exile near Washington, D.C.
The movement’s political platform is extremely vague. It calls simply for more freedoms, the rule of law, an end to corruption, and respect for minority and women’s rights without specifics. It proclaims the need for a “realistic foreign policy” centered on cooperation with other countries of the Maghreb (Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian problem based on a two-state solution with both entities having mixed populations of Arabs and Jews.
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
Founded in 1998, toward the end of the Black Decade, the GSPC broke away from the GIA with between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters. The GSPC goal is to establish an Islamic state through force of arms. Throughout the 2000s, the GSPC carried out an array of violent activities, including guerrilla warfare against the army, attacks on foreigners, suicide bombings, and the abduction of tourists in the Sahara Desert.
Its leader is Abdelmalek Droukdal, also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud. In 2006, he pledged allegiance to al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. Droukdal then became head of the Algerian branch of al Qaeda in the Maghreb. Only a few hundred Algerians answered his call to jihad, which is aimed mainly against Algeria’s military-backed government. His followers operated from bases both in the Sahara Desert and in the mountains less than 60 miles east of Algiers.
The Future
The military regime has regularly rigged the election process. Despite President Bouteflika’s ailing health, military hardliners, known as the “eradicators” for their role in the Islamic insurgency of the 1990s, still control Algerian political life. General Mohammed “Toufik” Mediène, the regime’s éminence grise and chief of the all-powerful Security and Intelligence Service since 1990—was still at his post in late 2014, although reportedly exercising less influence.
The Movement of Society for Peace boasted that it could win the 2012 parliamentary election. But even in an alliance with two other Islamist parties, it won just six percent of the vote. All of Algeria’s Islamic parties together could claim less than 15 percent of the total. The Arab Spring produced no upsurge in support for the Islamists. Nor did secular opposition parties gain traction. So the military faced no pressure to consider a larger role for either the Islamists or the secular opposition.
By early 2015, the military, largely through its Security and Intelligence Department, seemed poised to dominate Algeria’s political life well into the future, even after Bouteflika.
David B. Ottaway, a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, lived in Algiers from 1962 to 1966. A former Middle East correspondent for The New York Times and The Washington Post, he coauthored, “Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution” with his wife Marina Ottaway. He visited Algeria again in 2009 and 2010.
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Algerian boxer Imane Khelif advances to gold medal match
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2024-08-06T00:00:00
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Algerian boxer Imane Khelif is advancing to the gold medal match amid a week of scrutiny over her gender.
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https://www.ktre.com/2024/08/06/algerian-boxer-imane-khelif-advances-gold-medal-match/
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PARIS (AP) — Boxer Imane Khelif of Algeria advanced to the gold-medal bout in the women’s welterweight division at the Paris Olympics on Tuesday night, moving one win away from what she calls the best response to the worldwide scrutiny she has faced over misconceptions about her gender.
With one more victory, Khelif would win Algeria’s second boxing gold medal and its first in women’s boxing.
Khelif defeated Janjaem Suwannapheng of Thailand 5:0 in the semifinals at Roland Garros, where the crowd roared for her and chanted her name repeatedly during her three-round fight. Khelif has won three consecutive bouts in Paris, and she will win either a gold or a silver medal when she completes the tournament on Friday against Yang Liu of China.
Khelif has thrived inside the ring in Paris amid criticism and stigmatization outside of it. The trouble has stemmed from the Olympic-banished International Boxing Association’s decision to disqualify her and fellow Paris medalist Lin Yu-ting of Chinese Taipei from the world championships last year for allegedly failing an eligibility test.
The controversy has become one of the biggest stories of the Paris Olympics, but it isn’t causing any negative effects on her performances in the ring.
“I don’t care about that,” Khelif said through an interpreter. “I wish to be ready and show a good standard, show my talent, because I want to entertain everyone.”
Khelif had already clinched Algeria’s first medal in women’s boxing before she stepped into the ring to rousing roars at Court Philippe Chatrier. She then controlled her bout with Suwannapheng, who took a standing 8-count late in the third after absorbing a series of punches.
“I had heard about the news regarding her, but I wasn’t following it closely,” Suwannapheng said. “She is a woman, but she is very strong.”
Khelif has won every round on every judge’s card in her two fights that have gone the distance in Paris. She has made the most important tournament run of her international career while under the most pressure she has ever faced.
“I am very happy,” Khelif said. “I’ve worked eight years for these Olympics, and I’m very proud of this moment. I would like to thank the support from people back home.”
The ending of Khelif’s first bout in Paris propelled her into the center of a worldwide divide over gender identity and safety regulations in sports. Her first opponent, Angela Carini of Italy, tearfully quit after just 46 seconds, saying she was in too much pain from Khelif’s punches.
Carini’s abandonment of the fight led to comments from the likes of former U.S. President Donald Trump, “Harry Potter” writer J.K. Rowling and others falsely claiming Khelif was a man or transgender. Carini later apologized for her decision.
In an interview Sunday with SNTV, a sports video partner of The Associated Press, Khelif said the wave of hateful scrutiny she is facing “harms human dignity” and called for an end to bullying athletes.
Khelif also said she felt the “best response” to the uproar around her would be to win a gold medal — and now she’s one win away.
After sharing a hug with Suwannapheng and holding open the ropes for her opponent in a traditional boxing gesture of sportsmanship, Khelif celebrated by running furiously in place while pumping her fists as the crowd roared for her again. The celebration was more joyous than her cathartic finish to her quarterfinal victory over Hungary’s Anna Luca Hamori, when she slammed her palm on the canvas as she teared up.
Khelif received her post-fight medical check and was headed out of the Roland Garros arena when she was mobbed by fans near the exit. They hugged Khelif, demanded selfies and waved Algerian flags while she made her way backstage.
Khelif received cheers that echoed through the famed tennis arena from the moment she entered to face Suwannapheng. Roland Garros welcomed a prominent turnout from Algerian fans voicing their national pride in a boxer whose negative spotlight has been taken quite personally in her country.
Both fighters came out aggressively, trading punches from distance. Khelif was more accurate while winning the first round on all five cards, and she repeated the performance in the second.
The fight got more physical in the third, with Suwannapheng pushing forward to make a comeback. The bout was stopped for a standing 8-count late in the third when Suwannapheng absorbed a few head punches in succession, although Suwannapheng appeared to shrug as if it wasn’t necessary — as is often the case in Olympic boxing, where referees can stop a bout for relatively minor reasons.
“I tried to use my speed, but my opponent was just too strong,” Suwannapheng said.
The 25-year-old Khelif is on the best run of her amateur career at the Olympics. She has performed solidly at the international level and even won some regional tournaments, but Khelif has never been a dominant fighter on the world stage until her two strong performances — and 46 seconds of easy work against a third — to reach the final in Paris.
The IOC and its president, Thomas Bach, have repeatedly defended the Olympic eligibility of Khelif and Lin while condemning the IBA as incompetent and biased.
Khelif and Lin were disqualified by the IBA in the middle of last year’s world championships over what it claimed were failed eligibility tests for the women’s competition. The IBA has been banished from the Olympics since before the Tokyo Games, and the body struggled to articulate the reasoning for its decisions on Khelif and Lin at a news conference Monday.
Lin also has clinched a medal and advanced to the Olympic semifinals. She fights Esra Yildiz Kahraman of Turkey on Wednesday night.
Algeria’s Olympic team has reacted forcefully to the criticism and negative attention around Khelif, and the fan turnout in Roland Garros reflected the seriousness with which the accusations have been received in her home country and in its French diaspora.
Chinese Taipei has reacted with equal condemnation of the IBA’s claims and the worldwide swirl of scrutiny. Sports officials on Tuesday said they are considering legal action against the IBA after sending a letter protesting “the International Boxing Association’s continued publication of false information, obscuring the facts, and attempting to interfere with the normal conduct of the event regardless of the rights and interests of athletes.”
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AP Olympics: https://apnews.com/hub/2024-paris-olympic-games
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Beauty of Algeria
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A country of virgin sites
Algeria is often claimed to be the crossroads of three worlds Mediterranean, Arab and African. It is also known as the “Balcony of the Mediterranean”. The interior of the country presents plenty of opportunities for sport and leisure activities.
Algeria is a country with geographical contrasts, with great differences, from the green valleys in between steep mountains in the north to some of the most extensive sand dune regions of all Sahara.
In the northern part of the vast territory, a littoral band with exotic beaches stretched endlessly for 1,200 km, mountains covered with snow sometimes until new shoots come out in early spring, and a vast desert that preserves its treasures, the unique fauna and flora that are protected by the desert. In the Sahara, the Hoggar Mountains peak culminates at 3,000 meters, and in the Tassili, one can admire the biggest open-air museum in the world, tracing back the origins of the humanity.
According to the latest report distributed by several environmental organizations, such the World Organization for the Protection of the Environment and World Wide Fund for Nature, Algeria is among the best 10 countries in the world in terms of natural beauty and diversity.
Although Algeria is so much less a tourist destination than its North African neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia. A great number of travelers to Algeria come here mainly for the desert, in which there are several oases as well as the mountains of Hoggar and Tassili N'Ajjer. With a desert this big, the oases are like small islands of a large ocean. The most famous of these is M'zab, where the inhabitants are “Ibadi”.
The mountains of Algeria represent both an obstacle and a protection. Berbers in the mountains have preserved their cultures and language, and the landscape here is stunning. Mountains are high enough to catch snow in winter, and Chréa is the main ski resort.
During summer, the coast of Algeria attracts regional tourists, and there are several nice beach resorts.
The greatest cities like Algiers, Oran and Annaba owes a lot to the French period. Many quarters of these cities will make you wonder if you are in France proper.
Algiers:
Algeria is above all Algiers, its capital, a window that reflects thousands of places to be discovered and rediscovered. The Algiers bay is one of the most beautiful in the world and offers and interesting perspective on modern Algerian life. The legendary Kasbah, a UNESCO heritage, an historic site of the struggle for liberation, is in itself an extraordinary tourism route. For amateurs in art, Algiers offers seven magnificent art galleries.
Mediterranean Crossroad Algiers, "white city", this cosmopolitan capital, with a rich history, is also a Mediterranean crossroad. In Algiers, more than anywhere else, the influence of the Mediterranean is omnipresent. The beautiful El Jaza’ir bay is but a proof of the increasing influence of "la Grande bleue" (the Mediterranean), which has in the past played a major role in the history of the country. In addition, every corner of the city shows a great deal of its history or of its histories.
For more you can read the article of The Guardian :“Algiers, North Africa’s White Lady”
http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2010/sep/04/algiers-city-break-algeria
Oran:
Oran’s history is similarly colourful, having been the stopping point on the trade route between Spain and Morocco, due to its convenient geographic location. That legacy is reflected in the city’s altogether European feel, with evidence of a Spanish and French colonial past never far away. Tour the soaring Sacré-Cœur cathedral – now a library – or get involved with the numerous events going on at the Palais de la Culture.
Constantine: Algeria's City of Bridges
Algeria’s third city, Constantine, is one of the grand spectacles of the north, made by nature but embellished by man. Over time, the Oued Rhumel carved out a deep gorge around an outcrop of rock, creating a natural fortress that was already occupied in Neolithic times. Since then Constantine (Cirta as it was known in antiquity) has always been a city of political, cultural and economic significance.
The French writer Alexandre Dumas called it ‘a fantastic city, something like Gulliver’s flying island’. The sense of fantasy has still not left it, for however much building has gone on around, the heart of Constantine remains on that upland shelf, reached by bridges. It is a cosmopolitan place which, over the centuries, has attracted traders, as well as invaders, from around the Mediterranean including Jews from France and Spain, Ottoman Turks, Genoese and others.
The city has been selected by the Arab League Organization to be the capital of Arab culture in 2015.
Unfortunately Algeria has major but untapped potential for tourism. The reason behind that fact is that Algeria is slowly healing from years of regional civil war and national unrest (during the 90s). With a police among the best trained to stake out terrorists, Algeria now emerge as no more dangerous than anywhere else.
After having been neglected for many years, destination Algeria has experienced a renewed interest. The Algerian Government is trying to set up a conductive strategy for developing tourism by the year 2015 because there are lots of potentials and Algeria can boast of many assets.
Algeria has 174 zones of tourist expansion spread all over the country and which are concerned by the tourism investment. For this reason, the Ministry of tourism invites all national or foreign organizations to invest in this very profitable market.
According to forecasts of the Ministry of tourism, by the year 2015, tourist flow will pass to 3.1 million visitors against 1.6 million in 2004 and the cumulate payments of the tourist activity would be in 2015 of more than 6 billion dollars for the country.
However, in this Tourism promotion venture priority is given to Djanet and Tamanrasset as they happen to be the preferred location for foreign tourists due to its striking ecosystem. In order to meet this tall by 2015, the Tourism Department has come up with a well thought-out strategic plan with numerous lucrative incentives.
The improvement of security issues and the current economic boom will help in developing national and international investment in Algerian tourism over the medium and long term. Growing tourism in southern Algeria, the return of international airlines (Air France, Eagle Azure, British Airways, Alitalia, Lufthansa, Qatar Airways), the opening of a new international airport in Algiers in 2006 and declaration of investment intentions by major hotel groups indicate a healthy future for the sector.
UNESCO Sites of Algeria
Algeria has seven sites inscribed on UNESCO's World Heritage list: Beni Hammad, Djemila, the M'Zab Valley, the Tassili, Timgad, Tipasa and the casbah of Algiers.
M'Zab: Ghardaia & Beni Isguen
Ghardaia is one of the pentapolis towns of the Saharan M'Zab Valley, one of Algeria's UNESCO World Heritage sites. In the walled settlement of Beni Isguen - normally closed to foreigners - the local women, clad entirely in white, reveal only one eye to the outside world.
Djemila
Djemila - ancient Cuicul - is one of North Africa's most monumental sites. Founded by Nerva, Djemila's wheel-rutted streets are lined with two fora and a clutch of elaborate houses, churches and temples. Equally impressive is Djemila's stunning museum of mosaics.
Tipasa
Tipasa, nestling undisturbed amongst palm trees on the shores of the Mediterranean, once served as an inspiration to Albert Camus. Phoenician, Roman, palaeo-Christian and Byzantine ruins vie for attention alongside the nearby Mauritanian mausoleum.
Timgad
Timgad, the "Pompeii of Africa", was constructed under Trajan as a bulwark against the unruly Berbers. With its immense library, colonnaded streets, myriad temples and imposing arch of Trajan, Timgad is the embodiment of Roman urban planning.
Tassili
Algeria's mountainous Tassili region, bordering Libya to the east and Niger to the south, is distinguished by its towering dunes of sand, its sheer-sided canyons, its beguiling "forests of rock" and over 15,000 rock carvings and paintings.
Algiers Casbah
The casbah of Algiers remains one of the world's most mythical labyrinths: "a masterpiece of architecture and town planning" according to Le Corbusier, the casbah's huddled houses tumble down the hill-side before seemingly spilling over into the sea.
Beni Hammad
Situated in a mountainous site of extraordinary beauty, the ruins of the first capital of the Hammadid emirs, founded in 1007 and demolished in 1152, provide an authentic picture of a fortified Muslim city crowned by one of North Africa's largest mosques.
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2022-01-25T02:42:33+00:00
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Discover (and save!) your own Pins on Pinterest.
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Pinterest
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https://www.pinterest.com/pin/algerian-wine-label--1125968648793431/
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8952
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https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/algeria-enduring-failure-politics
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Algeria: The Enduring Failure of Politics
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In Algeria, power has never been generated through the political process of which political parties are a part. Rather, it has consistently emerged from the barrel of a gun since the country emerged victorious from the 1954-62 war for independence from France. Although numerous political parties do exist, power remains solidly in the hands of the military-civilian elite that came to power upon independence.
The struggle for political change created many parties but no new leadership or an alternative source of power have materialized.
Algeria tried twice to change the nature of its political system. The first attempt led to a ten-year, incredibly violent war that lasted through the 1990s and failed to change the source of power in the country. The second, peaceful attempt started in 2019 with thousands of demonstrators taking to the streets, week after week, first to protest the decision by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run for a fifth term, and later to fight for free elections that could give the opposition a fair chance. The Hirak, as the movement came to be called, succeeded in preventing Bouteflika from standing for election again, but not in dislodging the old military-civilian regime that has controlled the country since 1962. The struggle for political change created many parties but no new leadership or an alternative source of power have materialized.
Between Radical Islam and the Military
Algeria was ruled by a single party from independence in 1962 until the approval of a new constitution in 1989, which introduced multi-party politics and ended the monopoly of the Front of National Liberation (FLN from the French name). Originally a front of pro-independence organizations, the FLN remained poorly institutionalized and played second fiddle to the military. During the long presidency of Houari Boumediene, the country’s second president, who came to power in through a military coup in 1965, the party never held a congress and its central committee rarely met. Boumediene’s power base was the military, although the FLN, as the symbol of national Liberation, provided legitimacy.
After Boumediene’s death in 1978, President Chadli Benjedid sought to lead Algeria away from a political life run by the military/security apparatus and the aging leadership of the war for independence. Important outward changes took place under his leadership, first and foremost the formation and registration of a multiplicity of political parties. The process was swift: by early 1991, thirty-three parties were registered. It was a familiar scenario in the region. There were far too many non-descript secular parties with little to differentiate them from each other besides the ambitions of their founders; Islamist parties also emerged rapidly—three were registered, but the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS from the French name Front Islamique de Salut) quickly became dominant. In addition, organizations that had fought covertly for decades for the rights of the Berber population became part of the Algerian legal political spectrum. The most important was the Front des Forces Socialistes, in existence since 1963 and still led by an aging veteran of the war for independence. The rise of Islamist parties, again a common development in Arab countries, was the result not only of broader regional trends but also of the attempt – that began with independence – to revive part of the Algerian culture that the French had done their best to erase over 130 years of colonial domination.
Despite this unfavorable constellation of political parties, President Benjedid moved swiftly toward elections, starting at the local and regional level. In municipal elections of 1990, the FIS won fifty-four percent of the vote, almost double the percentage going to FLN. The new secular parties fared poorly. The secular establishment was rattled, particularly as the FIS emphasized its intention to increase the pace of Arabization in the educational system and reduce the French cultural influence.
Despite widespread misgivings in the country, Benjedid accepted the FIS victory, which led the party to control 46 percent of municipalities (including over ninety percent of those with a population over 50,000), and all four major cities. The president also went ahead with plans to hold new parliamentary elections in December 1991, with a run-off election to be held in early January in the jurisdictions where no party received the majority of the vote. The first round of elections showed the FIS was about to replicate the victory in the 1990 municipal elections. At that point, the military intervened and cancelled the second round of voting. Chadli Benjedid resigned in protest. He was replaced by a series of civilian presidents, but the military had made the point that it retained ultimate control. The FIS was disbanded.
The period that followed the elections was the darkest in the history of a country that had known many dark moments before. On the political side, Algeria was in turmoil, governed by a succession of three short-lived presidents named by the High Council of State (HCE), a military dominated governing body created in 1992. In January 1994, the HCE appointed a fourth president, retired General Lamine Zeroual. Nearly two years later, in November 1995, the first presidential elections since 1991 confirmed Zeroual as the country’s president.
The political instability of the period pales in significance compared to the violence that paralyzed the country from 1992 until 1999. Normal life became impossible in both cities and rural areas.
The political instability of the period pales in significance compared to the violence that paralyzed the country from 1992 until 1999. Normal life became impossible in both cities and rural areas. Although by 1995 at least one wing of the political class, and even the military, had become convinced that only a negotiated solution could put an end to the violence, as had parts of the Islamist movements, hardliners on both sides prevented an accord from being reached until 2005.
For a brief moment before the military intervention, it appeared that the political process might usher in a new regime. It happened at the local and provincial levels, but when it came to national politics and control of the legislature, a political victory was not sufficient to generate the power to dislodge the old regime. Could it have worked if a party other than a non-Islamist one had been close to victory? Of course, we will never know whether the old regime was motivated by genuine fear of fundamentalist rule or simply by the desire to maintain control. Furthermore, the possibility of a victory by secular parties never really existed. But facts are clear: change through a political process proved impossible.
Ending the Conflict
The slow progress was due not only to the gulf between the regime and the Islamists, but also to the divisions that existed within the ruling establishment and among Islamist movements themselves. The ruling establishment was divided between the so-called eradicators, who believed Islamists must be eliminated physically by the use of force, and the conciliators, who were convinced that the war could only be terminated by a negotiated solution. On the other side, the Islamist camp that had emerged after the dissolution of the FIS in 1992 and the arrest of its leaders was even more complicated.
This is not the place to examine this camp in detail. Suffice it to say that the coup of 1992 was a severe blow for those in the FIS who had chosen to fight for an Islamist state through elections and other political means, encouraging instead those who saw violence as the only path to reach those goals. The FIS thus was replaced by an armed group, the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut or AIS), which used violence but eventually entered into negotiations with the government. But more radical organizations also emerged, most importantly the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé or GIA), which had split from the FIS early on because of its embrace of electoral politics. It constituted a much more intractable problem, both because of the extreme violence it was willing to use against the civilian population and because it rejected negotiations. Toward the end of the conflict, when most Islamists were enticed to lay down arms by the promise of amnesty, the die-hards in all organizations formed a new group called Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC from the French name), which never surrendered.
When Zeroual suddenly resigned as president in September 1998, an agreement remained elusive, although a truce of sorts had been reached.
With a great deal of intransigence on both sides, negotiations proved hard and prolonged. An attempted mediation by the Italian Sant’Egidio community in 1995 failed to a large extent because of the divisions within the Islamist camp. (Sant’Egidio had a track record of successful mediations, particularly in Mozambique). The AIS, and behind it the FIS leaders, were amenable to talks, but the GIA remained more focused on armed action than a political agreement. When Zeroual suddenly resigned as president in September 1998, an agreement remained elusive, although a truce of sorts had been reached.
New presidential elections were held in April 1999 and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, an FLN stalwart and former foreign minister, was elected president unopposed after all other candidates withdrew. It was a triumph for the old political establishment. Bouteflika had fought during the liberation war, become foreign minister in 1963 and held that post until Boumediene’s death in 1979. He then spent some years abroad but returned to Algeria in 1987, immediately rejoining the FLN Central Committee.
Bouteflika was determined to end the conflict at all costs. Burying all issues of responsibility and guilt by both Islamist extremists and security forces, he chose to offer blanket amnesty to all who agreed to lay down arms. Shortly after the election, he submitted to parliament a “civil harmony” law (Loi sur la Concorde Civil), which he defined as the political expression of the agreement reached by the Algeria military and AIS/FIS. It was duly approved. The law was then submitted to a referendum in which an unlikely 98.6 percent of the voters approved, with an equally unlikely 85 percent participating – or so the government claimed.
The figures were undoubtedly inflated, but the law was popular. The general amnesty it granted suited the security forces as well as the AIS/FIS, both of which bore responsibility for the violence and brutality inflicted on the population. The law, inevitably, was severely criticized by human rights organizations and advocates of transitional justice, who wanted people responsible for the violence to be brought to justice or at least for the country to engage in a “truth and reconciliation” process that would acknowledge the atrocities that had been committed. It is not clear to this writer whether either of those choices would have brought about reconciliation rather than prolonging the conflict.
Bouteflika’s election marked the failure of the first attempt by Algerians to move on from the legacy of the war of independence and the iron grip of the military-civilian elite rooted in that experience. The death of Boumediene and Benjedid’s reopening of political life to the parties and processes was the first step in that attempt to move the political system away from that legacy. The effort degenerated in horrendous violence and war, and when peace finally returned, the old military-civilian establishment was still there, symbolized by the aging Bouteflika. The second attempt would be equally unsuccessful.
Return to Normal Politics and the Political Parties
With the election of Bouteflika and the approval of the civil harmony law, Algeria settled down to a semblance of normality, though small extremist groups continued to operate in remote areas. Part of the return to normality was the restoration of the role of political parties, which had been totally sidelined during the war. From January 1992 until June 1997 Algeria had no elected parliament. When elections were called, parties once again proliferated, with 39 organizations presenting candidates in the elections, the majority of them winning no seats. The FIS of course was not in the running, although two other Islamist parties were, including the Movement of Society for Peace (formerly Hamas), which won the second largest number of seats (69), ahead of the FLN (62). The winner of the election was the RND (Ressemblement National Democratique), which won 156 seats. Although the RND was a new party formed before the elections, its victory was not an indication of political renewal. Its leader Ahmed Ouyahia was a member of the political establishment, although he was too young to belong to the first generation of post-independence leaders. After a distinguished diplomatic career, in 1994 he had been named cabinet director by President Zeroual, becoming Prime Minister the following year. The continuity was confirmed when Ouahyia, short of the majority needed to form the government, promptly entered into a coalition with FLN
For the next two decades, Algerian politics was uneventful. Both presidential and parliamentary elections were held regularly every five years as prescribed by the constitution, although the low and decreasing voters’ turnout indicated the population did not believe the vote was significant. Bouteflika was re-elected in 2004, 2009, and 2014, despite having suffered a debilitating stroke in 2013. In 2019, he announced he would run for a fifth time in 2019.
But more important than the ups and downs of the main parties was the constant decrease in voter turnout, from a respectable 65 percent of registered voters in 1997 to a dismal 22 percent in 2021.
Parliamentary elections saw the FLN reestablish its position as the largest party, and the RND and the MSP maintain significant number of seats, despite the emergence of new organizations. But more important than the ups and downs of the main parties was the constant decrease in voter turnout, from a respectable 65 percent of registered voters in 1997 to a dismal 22 percent in 2021.
Yet, despite the clear signs of disenchantment with the political status quo, Algerians did not appear willing to rise up against it. Even as many countries in the Arab world erupted in opposition to their government in 2011, Algerians remained quiescent, leading to much speculation that the violence of the 1990s had somehow inoculated the country against further rebellion. It had not. Algerians rose up in 2019 after a second wave of discontent exploded in the Arab world.
The Hirak: A New Hope, Once Again Dashed
The announcement in February 2019 that President Ahmed Bouteflika would again run for president was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back of citizens’ forbearance. Bouteflika’s candidacy was ludicrous. His health was failing, he had not been seen in public for two years, and even then, he was in a wheelchair. To make things worse, it was clear that he would win the election as he had the four preceding ones, because he was simply the figurehead for a political-military establishment that had an iron grip on the country. This time, people took to the streets.
The Hirak—as the movement came to be called (the word in Arabic meaning “movement”)—was different from those the Arab world had known in 2011. First, it was initially focused on a narrow and attainable political goal: stopping Bouteflika’s candidacy. Second, Algerian protesters, like those who took to the streets in the same period in Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq, had learned some lessons from the 2011 protest, particularly about the difficulty of sustaining activism over time. The huge crowds that marked the beginning of the 2011 uprisings had proved unsustainable. Most people could not afford to stay away from jobs and families for long, and the ordinary pressures of daily life quickly reduced the ranks of protesters.
From the beginning, Algerians set about to routinize protests, concentrating on Friday marches for adults and Tuesday ones for students. As a result, they sustained high levels of participation for months. But they had no success in winning over to their cause credible, experienced representatives capable of negotiating with the authorities—the need for such leadership was another hard lesson from 2011. They tried but failed.
The Hirak was successful in attaining the first goal, that of preventing Bouteflika from running again, but failed completely in shaking the grip of the old military-civilian establishment, which was the protesters’ ultimate intention. On April 2, after weeks of relentless demonstrations, President Bouteflika not only renounced his candidacy but also resigned as president without serving out the rest of his fourth term. Whether or not he had wanted to resign, the establishment he represented concluded that he had become a liability, much as the security-political establishment had done in 2011 in Egypt when it forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign. General Ahmed Gaid Salah, another veteran of the war of independence and close to Bouteflika took his place for the remainder of the term and called for elections on July 4.
Protesters knew that the resignation of Bouteflika itself was a pyrrhic victory, and demonstrations continued, initially focusing on another narrow goal, to obtain a postponement of the elections in order to have time to organize. Elections were postponed until December, but this was the Hirak’s last victory. The December elections showed the old establishment was as strongly in control as ever. All five candidates whose credentials were accepted by the election authority were members of the establishment. The winner, 74-year old Abdel Majid Tebboune, had been prime minister and was particularly close to the military and security forces—he confirmed this by keeping the defense portfolio for himself after the elections. Tebboune received 53 percent of the vote and officials put the turnout at 39 percent of registered voters, although other estimates concluded it was much lower.
The Hirak continued its protests during the entire election period, claiming that the country needed to overturn the entire political system before going to the polls, but to no avail. Months of protest and organizing thus ended in defeat since the election put in office a new president but not a new political class and did nothing to change the political system.
The attempt to dislodge the political class in power since 1962 by political action had failed for the second time.
Despite the defeat, the Hirak did not surrender immediately, continuing its cycle of protests. But opposition activity decreased over time and Algerians returned to quiescence, although the president never acquired widespread acceptance, let alone popularity. The attempt to dislodge the political class in power since 1962 by political action had failed for the second time.
Conclusion
There are essentially two ways in which new regimes are established in a country, either by the power of the gun or by a political process where new organizations develop and gain enough support to defeat the incumbents or convince them to give up power. Political parties have no role in the former process but are crucial to the latter.
The FLN, and particularly the military wing of that organization, came to power by the barrel of a gun. More precisely it exhausted France’s military and political resources to the point where the government concluded that the effort to hold on to Algeria was no longer justified, even if a million French citizens lived there. Once France gave up, the Algerian military leaders were quickly able to convert their military ascendancy into political power, particularly in the absence of any other organized political forces. The country’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, was a civilian, one of the historical leaders captured by the French early in the war when they hijacked their plane. In 1965, he was overthrown by his own military before he had time to build a political base of the support and Houari Boumediene came to power.
The death of Boumediene appeared to offer an opening for political forces, but the hope was dashed when the military seized control again in 1992. The ensuing decade of war did not succeed in creating a new generation of either political or military leaders. After 2019, the attempt by the Hirak to generate power through popular mobilization and eventually a democratic political process similarly ended in failure. Confronted with the determination of the old regime, neither street movements nor new political parties could make a difference. The grip of the military-civilian class that emerged from the war of independence has so far proven unshakable.
The views expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not reflect an official position of the Wilson Center.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria
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Country in North Africa
This article is about the country. For other uses, see Algeria (disambiguation).
Algeria,[d] officially the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria,[e] is a country in the Maghreb region of North Africa. It is bordered to the northeast by Tunisia; to the east by Libya; to the southeast by Niger; to the southwest by Mali, Mauritania, and Western Sahara; to the west by Morocco; and to the north by the Mediterranean Sea. The capital and largest city is Algiers, located in the far north on the Mediterranean coast.
Inhabited since prehistory, Algeria has been at the crossroads of numerous cultures and civilizations, including the Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantine Greeks, and Turks. Following a succession of Islamic Arab and Berber dynasties between the eighth and 15th centuries, the Regency of Algiers was established in 1516 as a largely independent tributary state of the Ottoman Empire. After nearly three centuries as a major power in the Mediterranean, the country was invaded by France in 1830 and formally annexed in 1848, though it was not fully conquered and pacified until 1903. French rule brought mass European settlement that displaced the local population, which was reduced by up to one-third due to warfare, disease, and starvation.[10] The Sétif and Guelma massacre in 1945 catalysed local resistance that culminated in the outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954. Algeria gained its independence in 1962. The country descended into a bloody civil war from 1991 to 2002.
Spanning 2,381,741 square kilometres (919,595 sq mi), Algeria is the world's tenth-largest nation by area, and the largest nation in Africa.[11] It has a semi-arid climate, with the Sahara desert dominating most of the territory except for its fertile and mountainous north, where most of the population is concentrated. With a population of 44 million, Algeria is the tenth-most populous country in Africa, and the 32nd-most populous country in the world. Algeria's official languages are Arabic and Tamazight; French is used in media, education, and certain administrative matters. Sunni Islam is the official religion and practised by 99 percent of the population.[12]
Algeria is a semi-presidential republic composed of 58 provinces (wilayas) and 1,541 communes. It is a regional power in North Africa and a middle power in global affairs. The country has the second-highest Human Development Index in continental Africa and one of the largest economies in Africa, due mostly to its large petroleum and natural gas reserves, which are the sixteenth and ninth-largest in the world, respectively. Sonatrach, the national oil company, is the largest company in Africa and a major supplier of natural gas to Europe. The Algerian military is one of the largest in Africa, with the highest defence budget on the continent and among the highest in the world (ranks 22nd globally).[13] Algeria is a member of the African Union, the Arab League, the OIC, OPEC, the United Nations, and the Arab Maghreb Union, of which it is a founding member.
Name
Other forms of the name are: Arabic: الجزائر, romanized: al-Jazāʾir, Algerian Arabic: الدزاير, romanized: al-dzāyīr, French: Algérie. It is officially the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria[14] (Arabic: الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية, romanized: al-Jumhūriyah al-Jazāʾiriyah ad-Dīmuqrāṭiyah ash‑Shaʿbiyah; French: République algérienne démocratique et populaire, abbreviated as RADP). ⵜⴰⴳⴷⵓⴷⴰ ⵜⴰⵣⵣⴰⵢⵔⵉⵜ ⵜⴰⵎⴰⴳⴷⴰⵢⵜ ⵜⴰⵖⴻⵔⴼⴰⵏⵜ[15][16][f] Tagduda tazzayrit tamagdayt taɣerfant.[18]
Etymology
Algeria's name derives from the city of Algiers, which in turn derives from the Arabic al-Jazāʾir (الجزائر, "the islands"), referring to four small islands off its coast,[19] a truncated form of the older Jazāʾir Banī Mazghanna (جزائر بني مزغنة, "islands of Bani Mazghanna").[20][21][page needed][22][page needed] The name was given by Buluggin ibn Ziri after he established the city on the ruins of the Phoenician city of Icosium in 950.[23] It was employed by medieval geographers such as Muhammad al-Idrisi and Yaqut al-Hamawi.
Algeria took its name from the Regency of Algeria[24][25][26] or Regency of Algiers,[27] when Ottoman rule was established in the central Maghreb in early 16th century. This period saw the installation of a political and administrative organization which participated in the establishment of the Algerian: وطن الجزائر (watan el djazâïr, country of Algiers) and the definition of its borders with its neighboring entities on the east and west.[28] The Ottoman Turks who settled in Algeria referred both to themselves[29][30][31] and the peoples as "Algerians".[32][24] Acting as a central military and political authority in the regency, the Ottoman Turks shaped the modern political identity of Algeria as a state possessing all the attributes of sovereign independence, despite still being nominally subject to the Ottoman sultan.[33] Algerian nationalist, historian and statesman Ahmed Tewfik El Madani regarded the regency as the "first Algerian state" and the "Algerian Ottoman republic".[30][35][36]
History
Main article: History of Algeria
Prehistory and ancient history
Around ~1.8-million-year-old stone artifacts from Ain Hanech (Algeria) were considered to represent the oldest archaeological materials in North Africa.[37] Stone artifacts and cut-marked bones that were excavated from two nearby deposits at Ain Boucherit are estimated to be ~1.9 million years old, and even older stone artifacts to be as old as ~2.4 million years.[37] Hence, the Ain Boucherit evidence shows that ancestral hominins inhabited the Mediterranean fringe in northern Africa much earlier than previously thought. The evidence strongly argues for early dispersal of stone tool manufacture and use from East Africa, or a possible multiple-origin scenario of stone technology in both East and North Africa.
Neanderthal tool makers produced hand axes in the Levalloisian and Mousterian styles (43,000 BC) similar to those in the Levant.[38][39] Algeria was the site of the highest state of development of Middle Paleolithic Flake tool techniques.[40] Tools of this era, starting about 30,000 BC, are called Aterian (after the archaeological site of Bir el Ater, south of Tebessa).
The earliest blade industries in North Africa are called Iberomaurusian (located mainly in the Oran region). This industry appears to have spread throughout the coastal regions of the Maghreb between 15,000 and 10,000 BC. Neolithic civilization (animal domestication and agriculture) developed in the Saharan and Mediterranean Maghreb perhaps as early as 11,000 BC[41] or as late as between 6000 and 2000 BC. This life, richly depicted in the Tassili n'Ajjer paintings, predominated in Algeria until the classical period. The mixture of peoples of North Africa coalesced eventually into a distinct native population that came to be called Berbers, who are the indigenous peoples of northern Africa.[42]
From their principal center of power at Carthage, the Carthaginians expanded and established small settlements along the North African coast; by 600 BC, a Phoenician presence existed at Tipasa, east of Cherchell, Hippo Regius (modern Annaba) and Rusicade (modern Skikda). These settlements served as market towns as well as anchorages.
As Carthaginian power grew, its impact on the indigenous population increased dramatically. Berber civilisation was already at a stage in which agriculture, manufacturing, trade, and political organisation supported several states. Trade links between Carthage and the Berbers in the interior grew, but territorial expansion also resulted in the enslavement or military recruitment of some Berbers and in the extraction of tribute from others.
By the early 4th century BC, Berbers formed the single largest element of the Carthaginian army. In the Revolt of the Mercenaries, Berber soldiers rebelled from 241 to 238 BC after being unpaid following the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War.[43] They succeeded in obtaining control of much of Carthage's North African territory, and they minted coins bearing the name Libyan, used in Greek to describe natives of North Africa. The Carthaginian state declined because of successive defeats by the Romans in the Punic Wars.[44]
In 146 BC the city of Carthage was destroyed. As Carthaginian power waned, the influence of Berber leaders in the hinterland grew. By the 2nd century BC, several large but loosely administered Berber kingdoms had emerged. Two of them were established in Numidia, behind the coastal areas controlled by Carthage. West of Numidia lay Mauretania, which extended across the Moulouya River in modern-day Morocco to the Atlantic Ocean. The high point of Berber civilisation, unequalled until the coming of the Almohads and Almoravids more than a millennium later, was reached during the reign of Masinissa in the 2nd century BC.
After Masinissa's death in 148 BC, the Berber kingdoms were divided and reunited several times. Masinissa's line survived until 24 AD, when the remaining Berber territory was annexed to the Roman Empire.
For several centuries Algeria was ruled by the Romans, who founded many colonies in the region. Algeria is home to the second-largest number of Roman sites and remains after Italy. Rome, after getting rid of its powerful rival Carthage in the year 146 BC, decided a century later to include Numidia to become the new master of North Africa. They built more than 500 cities.[45] Like the rest of North Africa, Algeria was one of the breadbaskets of the empire, exporting cereals and other agricultural products. Saint Augustine was the bishop of Hippo Regius (modern-day Annaba, Algeria), located in the Roman province of Africa. The Germanic Vandals of Geiseric moved into North Africa in 429, and by 435 controlled coastal Numidia.[46] They did not make any significant settlement on the land, as they were harassed by local tribes.[citation needed] In fact, by the time the Byzantines arrived Leptis Magna was abandoned and the Msellata region was occupied by the indigenous Laguatan who had been busy facilitating an Amazigh political, military and cultural revival.[46][47] Furthermore, during the rule of the Romans, Byzantines, Vandals, Carthaginians, and Ottomans the Berber people were the only or one of the few in North Africa who remained independent.[48][49][50][51] The Berber people were so resistant that even during the Muslim conquest of North Africa they still had control and possession over their mountains.[52][53]
The collapse of the Western Roman Empire led to the establishment of a native Kingdom based in Altava (modern-day Algeria) known as the Mauro-Roman Kingdom. It was succeeded by another Kingdom based in Altava, the Kingdom of Altava. During the reign of Kusaila its territory extended from the region of modern-day Fez in the west to the western Aurès and later Kairaouan and the interior of Ifriqiya in the east.[54][55][56][57][58][59]
Middle Ages
Main article: Medieval Muslim Algeria
After negligible resistance from the locals, Muslim Arabs of the Umayyad Caliphate conquered Algeria in the early 8th century.
Large numbers of the indigenous Berber people converted to Islam. Christians, Berber and Latin speakers remained in the great majority in Tunisia until the end of the 9th century and Muslims only became a vast majority some time in the 10th.[60] After the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate, numerous local dynasties emerged, including the Rustamids, Aghlabids, Fatimids, Zirids, Hammadids, Almoravids, Almohads and the Zayyanids. The Christians left in three waves: after the initial conquest, in the 10th century and the 11th. The last were evacuated to Sicily by the Normans and the few remaining died out in the 14th century.[60]
During the Middle Ages, North Africa was home to many great scholars, saints and sovereigns including Judah Ibn Quraysh, the first grammarian to mention Semitic and Berber languages, the great Sufi masters Sidi Boumediene (Abu Madyan) and Sidi El Houari, and the Emirs Abd Al Mu'min and Yāghmūrasen. It was during this time that the Fatimids or children of Fatima, daughter of Muhammad, came to the Maghreb. These "Fatimids" went on to found a long lasting dynasty stretching across the Maghreb, Hejaz and the Levant, boasting a secular inner government, as well as a powerful army and navy, made up primarily of Arabs and Levantines extending from Algeria to their capital state of Cairo. The Fatimid caliphate began to collapse when its governors the Zirids seceded. To punish them the Fatimids sent the Arab Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym against them. The resultant war is recounted in the epic Tāghribāt. In Al-Tāghrībāt the Amazigh Zirid Hero Khālīfā Al-Zānatī asks daily, for duels, to defeat the Hilalan hero Ābu Zayd al-Hilalī and many other Arab knights in a string of victories. The Zirids, however, were ultimately defeated ushering in an adoption of Arab customs and culture. The indigenous Amazigh tribes, however, remained largely independent, and depending on tribe, location and time controlled varying parts of the Maghreb, at times unifying it (as under the Fatimids). The Fatimid Islamic state, also known as Fatimid Caliphate made an Islamic empire that included North Africa, Sicily, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, the Red Sea coast of Africa, Tihamah, Hejaz and Yemen.[61][62][63] Caliphates from Northern Africa traded with the other empires of their time, as well as forming part of a confederated support and trade network with other Islamic states during the Islamic Era.
The Berber people historically consisted of several tribes. The two main branches were the Botr and Barnès tribes, who were divided into tribes, and again into sub-tribes. Each region of the Maghreb contained several tribes (for example, Sanhadja, Houara, Zenata, Masmouda, Kutama, Awarba, and Berghwata). All these tribes made independent territorial decisions.[64]
Several Amazigh dynasties emerged during the Middle Ages in the Maghreb and other nearby lands. Ibn Khaldun provides a table summarising the Amazigh dynasties of the Maghreb region, the Zirid, Ifranid, Maghrawa, Almoravid, Hammadid, Almohad, Merinid, Abdalwadid, Wattasid, Meknassa and Hafsid dynasties.[65] Both of the Hammadid and Zirid empires as well as the Fatimids established their rule in all of the Maghreb countries. The Zirids ruled land in what is now Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Spain, Malta and Italy. The Hammadids captured and held important regions such as Ouargla, Constantine, Sfax, Susa, Algiers, Tripoli and Fez establishing their rule in every country in the Maghreb region.[66][67][68] The Fatimids which was created and established by the Kutama Berbers[69][70] conquered all of North Africa as well as Sicily and parts of the Middle East.
Following the Berber revolt numerous independent states emerged across the Maghreb. In Algeria the Rustamid Kingdom was established. The Rustamid realm stretched from Tafilalt in Morocco to the Nafusa mountains in Libya including south, central and western Tunisia therefore including territory in all of the modern day Maghreb countries, in the south the Rustamid realm expanded to the modern borders of Mali and included territory in Mauritania.[71][72][73]
Once extending their control over all of the Maghreb, part of Spain[74] and briefly over Sicily,[75] originating from modern Algeria, the Zirids only controlled modern Ifriqiya by the 11th century. The Zirids recognized nominal suzerainty of the Fatimid caliphs of Cairo. El Mu'izz the Zirid ruler decided to end this recognition and declared his independence.[76][77] The Zirids also fought against other Zenata Kingdoms, for example the Maghrawa, a Berber dynasty originating from Algeria and which at one point was a dominant power in the Maghreb ruling over much of Morocco and western Algeria including Fez, Sijilmasa, Aghmat, Oujda, most of the Sous and Draa and reaching as far as M'sila and the Zab in Algeria.[78][79][80][81]
As the Fatimid state was at the time too weak to attempt a direct invasion, they found another means of revenge. Between the Nile and the Red Sea were living Bedouin nomad tribes expelled from Arabia for their disruption and turbulency. The Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym for example, who regularly disrupted farmers in the Nile Valley since the nomads would often loot their farms. The then Fatimid vizier decided to destroy what he could not control, and broke a deal with the chiefs of these Bedouin tribes.[82] The Fatimids even gave them money to leave.
Whole tribes set off with women, children, elders, animals and camping equipment. Some stopped on the way, especially in Cyrenaica, where they are still one of the essential elements of the settlement but most arrived in Ifriqiya by the Gabes region, arriving 1051.[83] The Zirid ruler tried to stop this rising tide, but with each encounter, the last under the walls of Kairouan, his troops were defeated and the Arabs remained masters of the battlefield. The Arabs usually did not take control over the cities, instead looting them and destroying them.[77]
The invasion kept going, and in 1057 the Arabs spread on the high plains of Constantine where they encircled the Qalaa of Banu Hammad (capital of the Hammadid Emirate), as they had done in Kairouan a few decades ago. From there they gradually gained the upper Algiers and Oran plains. Some of these territories were forcibly taken back by the Almohads in the second half of the 12th century. The influx of Bedouin tribes was a major factor in the linguistic, cultural Arabization of the Maghreb and in the spread of nomadism in areas where agriculture had previously been dominant.[84] Ibn Khaldun noted that the lands ravaged by Banu Hilal tribes had become completely arid desert.[85]
The Almohads originating from modern day Morocco, although founded by a man originating from modern day Algeria[86] known as Abd al-Mu'min would soon take control over the Maghreb. During the time of the Almohad Dynasty Abd al-Mu'min's tribe, the Koumïa, were the main supporters of the throne and the most important body of the empire.[87] Defeating the weakening Almoravid Empire and taking control over Morocco in 1147,[88] they pushed into Algeria in 1152, taking control over Tlemcen, Oran, and Algiers,[89] wrestling control from the Hilian Arabs, and by the same year they defeated Hammadids who controlled Eastern Algeria.[89]
Following their decisive defeat in the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 the Almohads began collapsing, and in 1235 the governor of modern-day Western Algeria, Yaghmurasen Ibn Zyan declared his independence and established the Kingdom of Tlemcen and the Zayyanid dynasty. Warring with the Almohad forces attempting to restore control over Algeria for 13 years, they defeated the Almohads in 1248 after killing their Caliph in a successful ambush near Oujda.[90]
The Zayyanids retained their control over Algeria for 3 centuries. Much of the eastern territories of Algeria were under the authority of the Hafsid dynasty,[91] although the Emirate of Bejaia encompassing the Algerian territories of the Hafsids would occasionally be independent from central Tunisian control. At their peak the Zayyanid kingdom included all of Morocco as its vassal to the west and in the east reached as far as Tunis which they captured during the reign of Abu Tashfin.[92][93][94][95][96][97]
After several conflicts with local Barbary pirates sponsored by the Zayyanid sultans,[98] Spain decided to invade Algeria and defeat the native Kingdom of Tlemcen. In 1505, they invaded and captured Mers el Kébir,[99] and in 1509 after a bloody siege, they conquered Oran.[100] Following their decisive victories over the Algerians in the western-coastal areas of Algeria, the Spanish decided to get bolder, and invaded more Algerian cities. In 1510, they led a series of sieges and attacks, taking over Bejaia in a large siege,[101] and leading a semi-successful siege against Algiers. They also besieged Tlemcen. In 1511, they took control over Cherchell[102] and Jijel, and attacked Mostaganem where although they were not able to conquer the city, they were able to force a tribute on them.
Early modern era
Main article: Regency of Algiers
In 1516, the Turkish privateer brothers Aruj and Hayreddin Barbarossa, who operated successfully under the Hafsids, moved their base of operations to Algiers. They succeeded in conquering Jijel and Algiers from the Spaniards with help from the locals who saw them as liberators from the Christians, but the brothers eventually assassinated the local noble Salim al-Tumi and took control over the city and the surrounding regions. Their state is known as the Regency of Algiers. When Aruj was killed in 1518 during his invasion of Tlemcen, Hayreddin succeeded him as military commander of Algiers. The Ottoman sultan gave him the title of beylerbey and a contingent of some 2,000 janissaries. With the aid of this force and native Algerians, Hayreddin conquered the whole area between Constantine and Oran (although the city of Oran remained in Spanish hands until 1792).[103][104]
The next beylerbey was Hayreddin's son Hasan, who assumed the position in 1544. He was a Kouloughli or of mixed origins, as his mother was an Algerian Mooresse.[105] Until 1587 Beylerbeylik of Algiers was governed by Beylerbeys who served terms with no fixed limits. Subsequently, with the institution of a regular administration, governors with the title of pasha ruled for three-year terms. The pasha was assisted by an autonomous janissary unit, known in Algeria as the Ojaq who were led by an agha. Discontent among the ojaq rose in the mid-1600s because they were not paid regularly, and they repeatedly revolted against the pasha. As a result, the agha charged the pasha with corruption and incompetence and seized power in 1659.[103]
Plague had repeatedly struck the cities of North Africa. Algiers lost between 30,000 and 50,000 inhabitants to the plague in 1620–21, and had high fatalities in 1654–57, 1665, 1691 and 1740–42.[106]
The Barbary pirates preyed on Christian and other non-Islamic shipping in the western Mediterranean Sea.[106] The pirates often took the passengers and crew on the ships and sold them or used them as slaves.[107] They also did a brisk business in ransoming some of the captives. According to Robert Davis, from the 16th to 19th century, pirates captured 1 million to 1.25 million Europeans as slaves.[108] They often made raids on European coastal towns to capture Christian slaves to sell at slave markets in North Africa and other parts of the Ottoman Empire.[109] In 1544, for example, Hayreddin Barbarossa captured the island of Ischia, taking 4,000 prisoners, and enslaved some 9,000 inhabitants of Lipari, almost the entire population.[110] In 1551, the Ottoman governor of Algiers, Turgut Reis, enslaved the entire population of the Maltese island of Gozo. Barbary pirates often attacked the Balearic Islands. The threat was so severe that residents abandoned the island of Formentera.[111] The introduction of broad-sail ships from the beginning of the 17th century allowed them to branch out into the Atlantic.[112]
In July 1627 two pirate ships from Algiers under the command of Dutch pirate Jan Janszoon sailed as far as Iceland,[113] raiding and capturing slaves.[114][115][116] Two weeks earlier another pirate ship from Salé in Morocco had also raided in Iceland. Some of the slaves brought to Algiers were later ransomed back to Iceland, but some chose to stay in Algeria. In 1629, pirate ships from Algeria raided the Faroe Islands.[117]
In 1659, the Janissaries stationed in Algiers, also known commonly as the Odjak of Algiers; and the Reis or the company of corsair captains rebelled, they removed the Ottoman viceroy from power, and placed one of its own in power. The new leader received the title of "Agha" then "Dey" in 1671, and the right to select passed to the divan, a council of some sixty military senior officers. Thus Algiers became a sovereign military republic. It was at first dominated by the odjak; but by the 18th century, it had become the dey's instrument. Although Algiers remained nominally part of the Ottoman Empire,[103] in reality they acted independently from the rest of the Empire,[118][119] and often had wars with other Ottoman subjects and territories such as the Beylik of Tunis.[120]
The dey was in effect a constitutional autocrat. The dey was elected for a life term, but in the 159 years (1671–1830) that the system was in place, fourteen of the twenty-nine deys were assassinated. Despite usurpation, military coups and occasional mob rule, the day-to-day operation of the Deylikal government was remarkably orderly. Although the regency patronised the tribal chieftains, it never had the unanimous allegiance of the countryside, where heavy taxation frequently provoked unrest. Autonomous tribal states were tolerated, and the regency's authority was seldom applied in the Kabylia,[103] although in 1730 the Regency was able to take control over the Kingdom of Kuku in western Kabylia.[121] Many cities in the northern parts of the Algerian desert paid taxes to Algiers or one of its Beys.[122]
Barbary raids in the Mediterranean continued to attack Spanish merchant shipping, and as a result, the Spanish Empire launched an invasion in 1775, then the Spanish Navy bombarded Algiers in 1783 and 1784.[104] For the attack in 1784, the Spanish fleet was to be joined by ships from such traditional enemies of Algiers as Naples, Portugal and the Knights of Malta. Over 20,000 cannonballs were fired, but all these military campaigns were doomed and Spain had to ask for peace in 1786 and paid 1 million pesos to the Dey.
In 1792, Algiers took back Oran and Mers el Kébir, the two last Spanish strongholds in Algeria.[123] In the same year, they conquered the Moroccan Rif and Oujda, which they then abandoned in 1795.[124]
In the 19th century, Algerian pirates forged affiliations with Caribbean powers, paying a "license tax" in exchange for safe harbor of their vessels.[125]
Attacks by Algerian pirates on American merchantmen resulted in the First and Second Barbary Wars, which ended the attacks on U.S. ships in 1815. A year later, a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet, under the command of Lord Exmouth bombarded Algiers to stop similar attacks on European fishermen. These efforts proved successful, although Algerian piracy would continue until the French conquest in 1830.[126]
French colonization (1830–1962)
Main articles: French Algeria and Algerian War
See also: French North Africa
Under the pretext of a slight to their consul, the French invaded and captured Algiers in 1830.[127][128] According to several historians, the methods used by the French to establish control over Algeria reached genocidal proportions.[129][130][131] Historian Ben Kiernan wrote on the French conquest of Algeria: "By 1875, the French conquest was complete. The war had killed approximately 825,000 indigenous Algerians since 1830."[132] French losses from 1831 to 1851 were 92,329 dead in the hospital and only 3,336 killed in action.[133][134] In 1872, The Algerian population stood at about 2.9 million.[135][unreliable source?] French policy was predicated on "civilising" the country.[136] The slave trade and piracy in Algeria ceased following the French conquest.[107] The conquest of Algeria by the French took some time and resulted in considerable bloodshed. A combination of violence and disease epidemics caused the indigenous Algerian population to decline by nearly one-third from 1830 to 1872.[137][138][unreliable source?] On 17 September 1860, Napoleon III declared "Our first duty is to take care of the happiness of the three million Arabs, whom the fate of arms has brought under our domination."[139] During this time, only Kabylia resisted, the Kabylians were not colonized until after the Mokrani Revolt in 1871.[citation needed]
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote and never completed an unpublished essay outlining his ideas for how to transform Algeria from an occupied tributary state to a colonial regime, wherein he advocated for a mixed system of "total domination and total colonization" whereby French military would wage total war against civilian populations while a colonial administration would provide rule of law and property rights to settlers within French occupied cities.[140]
From 1848 until independence, France administered the whole Mediterranean region of Algeria as an integral part and département of the nation. One of France's longest-held overseas territories, Algeria became a destination for hundreds of thousands of European immigrants, who became known as colons and later, as Pied-Noirs. Between 1825 and 1847, 50,000 French people emigrated to Algeria.[141][142] These settlers benefited from the French government's confiscation of communal land from tribal peoples, and the application of modern agricultural techniques that increased the amount of arable land.[143] Many Europeans settled in Oran and Algiers, and by the early 20th century they formed a majority of the population in both cities.[144]
During the late 19th and early 20th century, the European share was almost a fifth of the population. The French government aimed at making Algeria an assimilated part of France, and this included substantial educational investments especially after 1900. The indigenous cultural and religious resistance heavily opposed this tendency, but in contrast to the other colonized countries' path in central Asia and Caucasus, Algeria kept its individual skills and a relatively human-capital intensive agriculture.[145]
During the Second World War, Algeria came under Vichy control before being liberated by the Allies in Operation Torch, which saw the first large-scale deployment of American troops in the North African campaign.[146]
Gradually, dissatisfaction among the Muslim population, which lacked political and economic status under the colonial system, gave rise to demands for greater political autonomy and eventually independence from France. In May 1945, the uprising against the occupying French forces was suppressed through what is now known as the Sétif and Guelma massacre. Tensions between the two population groups came to a head in 1954, when the first violent events of what was later called the Algerian War began after the publication of the Declaration of 1 November 1954. Historians have estimated that between 30,000 and 150,000 Harkis and their dependents were killed by the National Liberation Front (FLN) or by lynch mobs in Algeria.[147] The FLN used hit and run attacks in Algeria and France as part of its war, and the French conducted severe reprisals. In addition, the French destroyed over 8,000 villages[148] and relocated over 2 million Algerians to concentration camps.[149]
The war led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Algerians and hundreds of thousands of injuries. Historians, like Alistair Horne and Raymond Aron, state that the actual number of Algerian Muslim war dead was far greater than the original FLN and official French estimates but was less than the 1 million deaths claimed by the Algerian government after independence. Horne estimated Algerian casualties during the span of eight years to be around 700,000.[150] The war uprooted more than 2 million Algerians.[151]
The war against French rule concluded in 1962, when Algeria gained complete independence following the March 1962 Evian agreements and the July 1962 self-determination referendum.
The first three decades of independence (1962–1991)
The number of European Pied-Noirs who fled Algeria totaled more than 900,000 between 1962 and 1964.[152] The exodus to mainland France accelerated after the Oran massacre of 1962, in which hundreds of militants entered European sections of the city and began attacking civilians.
Algeria's first president was the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) leader Ahmed Ben Bella. Morocco's claim to portions of western Algeria led to the Sand War in 1963. Ben Bella was overthrown in 1965 by Houari Boumédiène, his former ally and defence minister. Under Ben Bella, the government had become increasingly socialist and authoritarian; Boumédienne continued this trend. However, he relied much more on the army for his support, and reduced the sole legal party to a symbolic role. He collectivised agriculture and launched a massive industrialisation drive. Oil extraction facilities were nationalised. This was especially beneficial to the leadership after the international 1973 oil crisis.
Boumédienne's successor, Chadli Bendjedid, introduced some liberal economic reforms. He promoted a policy of Arabisation in Algerian society and public life. Teachers of Arabic, brought in from other Muslim countries, spread conventional Islamic thought in schools and sowed the seeds of a return to Orthodox Islam.[153]
The Algerian economy became increasingly dependent on oil, leading to hardship when the price collapsed during the 1980s oil glut.[154] Economic recession caused by the crash in world oil prices resulted in Algerian social unrest during the 1980s; by the end of the decade, Bendjedid introduced a multi-party system. Political parties developed, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a broad coalition of Muslim groups.[153]
Civil War (1991–2002) and aftermath
Main article: Algerian Civil War
In December 1991 the Islamic Salvation Front dominated the first of two rounds of legislative elections. Fearing the election of an Islamist government, the authorities intervened on 11 January 1992, cancelling the elections. Bendjedid resigned and a High Council of State was installed to act as the Presidency. It banned the FIS, triggering a civil insurgency between the Front's armed wing, the Armed Islamic Group, and the national armed forces, in which more than 100,000 people are thought to have died. The Islamist militants conducted a violent campaign of civilian massacres.[155][failed verification] At several points in the conflict, the situation in Algeria became a point of international concern, most notably during the crisis surrounding Air France Flight 8969, a hijacking perpetrated by the Armed Islamic Group. The Armed Islamic Group declared a ceasefire in October 1997.[153]
Algeria held elections in 1999, considered biased by international observers and most opposition groups[156] which were won by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. He worked to restore political stability to the country and announced a "Civil Concord" initiative, approved in a referendum, under which many political prisoners were pardoned, and several thousand members of armed groups were granted exemption from prosecution under a limited amnesty, in force until 13 January 2000. The AIS disbanded and levels of insurgent violence fell rapidly. The Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group, continued a terrorist campaign against the Government.[153]
Bouteflika was re-elected in the April 2004 presidential election after campaigning on a programme of national reconciliation. The programme comprised economic, institutional, political and social reform to modernise the country, raise living standards, and tackle the causes of alienation. It also included a second amnesty initiative, the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which was approved in a referendum in September 2005. It offered amnesty to most guerrillas and Government security forces.[153]
In November 2008, the Algerian Constitution was amended following a vote in Parliament, removing the two-term limit on Presidential incumbents. This change enabled Bouteflika to stand for re-election in the 2009 presidential elections, and he was re-elected in April 2009. During his election campaign and following his re-election, Bouteflika promised to extend the programme of national reconciliation and a $150-billion spending programme to create three million new jobs, the construction of one million new housing units, and to continue public sector and infrastructure modernisation programmes.[153]
A continuing series of protests throughout the country started on 28 December 2010, inspired by similar protests across the Middle East and North Africa. On 24 February 2011, the government lifted Algeria's 19-year-old state of emergency.[157] The government enacted legislation dealing with political parties, the electoral code, and the representation of women in elected bodies.[158] In April 2011, Bouteflika promised further constitutional and political reform.[153] However, elections are routinely criticised by opposition groups as unfair and international human rights groups say that media censorship and harassment of political opponents continue.
On 2 April 2019, Bouteflika resigned from the presidency after mass protests against his candidacy for a fifth term in office.[159]
In December 2019, Abdelmadjid Tebboune became Algeria's president, after winning the first round of the presidential election with a record abstention rate – the highest of all presidential elections since Algeria's democracy in 1989. Tebboune is accused of being close to the military and being loyal to the deposed president. Tebboune rejects these accusations, claiming to be the victim of a witch hunt. He also reminds his detractors that he was expelled from the Government in August 2017 at the instigation of oligarchs languishing in prison.[160]
Geography
Main article: Geography of Algeria
Since the 2011 breakup of Sudan, and the creation of South Sudan, Algeria has been the largest country in Africa, and the Mediterranean Basin. Its southern part includes a significant portion of the Sahara. To the north, the Tell Atlas forms with the Saharan Atlas, further south, two parallel sets of reliefs in approaching eastbound, and between which are inserted vast plains and highlands. Both Atlas tend to merge in eastern Algeria. The vast mountain ranges of Aures and Nememcha occupy the entire northeastern Algeria and are delineated by the Tunisian border. The highest point is Mount Tahat (3,003 metres or 9,852 feet).
Algeria lies mostly between latitudes 19° and 37°N (a small area is north of 37°N and south of 19°N), and longitudes 9°W and 12°E. Most of the coastal area is hilly, sometimes even mountainous, and there are a few natural harbours. The area from the coast to the Tell Atlas is fertile. South of the Tell Atlas is a steppe landscape ending with the Saharan Atlas; farther south, there is the Sahara desert.[162]
The Hoggar Mountains (Arabic: جبال هقار), also known as the Hoggar, are a highland region in central Sahara, southern Algeria. They are located about 1,500 km (932 mi) south of the capital, Algiers, and just east of Tamanghasset. Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba are Algeria's main cities.[162]
Climate and hydrology
Main article: Climate of Algeria
In this region, midday desert temperatures can be hot year round. After sunset, however, the clear, dry air permits rapid loss of heat, and the nights are cool to chilly. Enormous daily ranges in temperature are recorded.
Rainfall is fairly plentiful along the coastal part of the Tell Atlas, ranging from 400 to 670 mm (15.7 to 26.4 in) annually, the amount of precipitation increasing from west to east. Precipitation is heaviest in the northern part of eastern Algeria, where it reaches as much as 1,000 mm (39.4 in) in some years.
Farther inland, the rainfall is less plentiful. Algeria also has ergs, or sand dunes, between mountains. Among these, in the summer time when winds are heavy and gusty, temperatures can go up to 43.3 °C (110 °F).
Fauna and flora
Main article: Wildlife of Algeria
The varied vegetation of Algeria includes coastal, mountainous and grassy desert-like regions which all support a wide range of wildlife. Many of the creatures constituting the Algerian wildlife live in close proximity to civilisation. The most commonly seen animals include the wild boars, jackals, and gazelles, although it is not uncommon to spot fennecs (foxes), and jerboas. Algeria also has a small African leopard and Saharan cheetah population, but these are seldom seen. A species of deer, the Barbary stag, inhabits the dense humid forests in the north-eastern areas. The fennec fox is the national animal of Algeria.[166]
A variety of bird species makes the country an attraction for bird watchers. The forests are inhabited by boars and jackals. Barbary macaques are the sole native monkey. Snakes, monitor lizards, and numerous other reptiles can be found living among an array of rodents throughout the semi arid regions of Algeria. Many animals are now extinct, including the Barbary lions, Atlas bears and crocodiles.[167]
In the north, some of the native flora includes Macchia scrub, olive trees, oaks, cedars and other conifers. The mountain regions contain large forests of evergreens (Aleppo pine, juniper, and evergreen oak) and some deciduous trees. Fig, eucalyptus, agave, and various palm trees grow in the warmer areas. The grape vine is indigenous to the coast. In the Sahara region, some oases have palm trees. Acacias with wild olives are the predominant flora in the remainder of the Sahara. Algeria had a 2018 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 5.22/10, ranking it 106th globally out of 172 countries.[168]
Camels are used extensively; the desert also abounds with venomous and nonvenomous snakes, scorpions, and numerous insects.
Government and politics
Main article: Politics of Algeria
Elected politicians have relatively little sway over Algeria. Instead, a group of unelected civilian and military "décideurs" ("deciders"), known as "le pouvoir" ("the power"), actually rule the country, even deciding who should be president.[169][170] The most powerful man might have been Mohamed Mediène, the head of military intelligence, before he was brought down during the 2019 protests.[171] In recent years, many of these generals have died, retired, or been imprisoned. After the death of General Larbi Belkheir, previous president Bouteflika put loyalists in key posts, notably at Sonatrach, and secured constitutional amendments that made him re-electable indefinitely, until he was brought down in 2019 during protests.[172]
The head of state is the President of Algeria, who is elected for a five-year term. The president is limited to two five-year terms. The most recent presidential election was planned to be in April 2019, but widespread protests erupted on 22 February against the president's decision to participate in the election, which resulted in President Bouteflika announcing his resignation on 3 April.[173] Abdelmadjid Tebboune, an independent candidate, was elected as president after the election eventually took place on 12 December 2019. Protestors refused to recognise Tebboune as president, citing demands for comprehensive reform of the political system.[174] Algeria has universal suffrage at 18 years of age.[4] The President is the head of the army, the Council of Ministers and the High Security Council. He appoints the Prime Minister who is also the head of government.[175]
The Algerian parliament is bicameral; the lower house, the People's National Assembly, has 462 members who are directly elected for five-year terms, while the upper house, the Council of the Nation, has 144 members serving six-year terms, of which 96 members are chosen by local assemblies and 48 are appointed by the president.[176] According to the constitution, no political association may be formed if it is "based on differences in religion, language, race, gender, profession, or region". In addition, political campaigns must be exempt from the aforementioned subjects.[177]
Parliamentary elections were last held in May 2017. In the elections, the FLN lost 44 of its seats, but remained the largest party with 164 seats, the military-backed National Rally for Democracy won 100, and the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Movement of the Society for Peace won 33.[178]
Foreign relations
Main article: Foreign relations of Algeria
Algeria is included in the European Union's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which aims at bringing the EU and its neighbours closer. Giving incentives and rewarding best performers, as well as offering funds in a faster and more flexible manner, are the two main principles underlying the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) that came into force in 2014. It has a budget of €15.4 billion and provides the bulk of funding through a number of programmes.
In 2009, the French government agreed to compensate victims of nuclear tests in Algeria. Defence Minister Hervé Morin stated that "It's time for our country to be at peace with itself, at peace thanks to a system of compensation and reparations," when presenting the draft law on the payouts. Algerian officials and activists believe that this is a good first step and hope that this move would encourage broader reparation.[179]
Tensions between Algeria and Morocco in relation to the Western Sahara have been an obstacle to tightening the Arab Maghreb Union, nominally established in 1989, but which has carried little practical weight.[180] On 24 August 2021, Algeria announced the break of diplomatic relations with Morocco.[181]
Military
Main article: Military of Algeria
The military of Algeria consists of the People's National Army (ANP), the Algerian National Navy (MRA), and the Algerian Air Force (QJJ), plus the Territorial Air Defence Forces.[12] It is the direct successor of the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale or ALN), the armed wing of the nationalist National Liberation Front which fought French colonial occupation during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62).
Total military personnel include 147,000 active, 150,000 reserve, and 187,000 paramilitary staff (2008 estimate).[182] Service in the military is compulsory for men aged 19–30, for a total of 12 months.[183] The military expenditure was 4.3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012.[12] Algeria has the second-largest military in North Africa with the largest defence budget in Africa ($10 billion).[184] Most of Algeria's weapons are imported from Russia, with whom they are a close ally.[184][185]
In 2007, the Algerian Air Force signed a deal with Russia to purchase 49 MiG-29SMT and 6 MiG-29UBT at an estimated cost of $1.9 billion. Russia is also building two 636-type diesel submarines for Algeria.[186]
Algeria is the 90th most peaceful country in the world, according to the 2024 Global Peace Index.[187]
Human rights
Main article: Human rights in Algeria
Algeria has been categorised by the US government funded Freedom House as "not free" since it began publishing such ratings in 1972, with the exception of 1989, 1990, and 1991, when the country was labelled "partly free."[188] In December 2016, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor issued a report regarding violation of media freedom in Algeria. It clarified that the Algerian government imposed restrictions on freedom of the press; expression; and right to peaceful demonstration, protest and assembly as well as intensified censorship of the media and websites. Due to the fact that the journalists and activists criticise the ruling government, some media organisations' licenses are cancelled.[189]
Independent and autonomous trade unions face routine harassment from the government, with many leaders imprisoned and protests suppressed. In 2016, a number of unions, many of which were involved in the 2010–2012 Algerian Protests, have been deregistered by the government.[190][191][192]
Homosexuality is illegal in Algeria.[193] Public homosexual behavior is punishable by up to two years in prison.[194] Despite this, about 26% of Algerians think that homosexuality should be accepted, according to the survey conducted by the BBC News Arabic-Arab Barometer in 2019. Algeria showed the highest LGBT acceptance compared to other Arab countries where the survey was conducted.[195]
Human Rights Watch has accused the Algerian authorities of using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to prevent pro-democracy movements and protests in the country, leading to the arrest of youths as part of social distancing.[196]
Administrative divisions
Algeria is divided into 58 provinces (wilayas), 553 districts (daïras)[197] and 1,541 municipalities (baladiyahs). Each province, district, and municipality is named after its seat, which is usually the largest city.
The administrative divisions have changed several times since independence. When introducing new provinces, the numbers of old provinces are kept, hence the non-alphabetical order. With their official numbers, currently (since 1983) they are:[12]
# Wilaya Area (km2) Population map # Wilaya Area (km2) Population 1 Adrar 402,197 439,700 30 Ouargla 211,980 552,539 2 Chlef 4,975 1,013,718 31 Oran 2,114 1,584,607 3 Laghouat 25,057 477,328 32 El Bayadh 78,870 262,187 4 Oum El Bouaghi 6,768 644,364 33 Illizi 285,000 54,490 5 Batna 12,192 1,128,030 34 Bordj Bou Arréridj 4,115 634,396 6 Béjaïa 3,268 915,835 35 Boumerdes 1,591 795,019 7 Biskra 20,986 730,262 36 El Taref 3,339 411,783 8 Béchar 161,400 274,866 37 Tindouf 58,193 159,000 9 Blida 1,696 1,009,892 38 Tissemsilt 3,152 296,366 10 Bouïra 4,439 694,750 39 El Oued 54,573 673,934 11 Tamanrasset 556,200 198,691 40 Khenchela 9,811 384,268 12 Tébessa 14,227 657,227 41 Souk Ahras 4,541 440,299 13 Tlemcen 9,061 945,525 42 Tipaza 2,166 617,661 14 Tiaret 20,673 842,060 43 Mila 9,375 768,419 15 Tizi Ouzou 3,568 1,119,646 44 Ain Defla 4,897 771,890 16 Algiers 273 2,947,461 45 Naâma 29,950 209,470 17 Djelfa 66,415 1,223,223 46 Ain Timouchent 2,376 384,565 18 Jijel 2,577 634,412 47 Ghardaia 86,105 375,988 19 Sétif 6,504 1,496,150 48 Relizane 4,870 733,060 20 Saïda 6,764 328,685 49 El M'Ghair 8,835 162,267 21 Skikda 4,026 904,195 50 El Menia 62,215 57,276 22 Sidi Bel Abbès 9,150 603,369 51 Ouled Djellal 11,410 174,219 23 Annaba 1,439 640,050 52 Bordj Baji Mokhtar 120,026 16,437 24 Guelma 4,101 482,261 53 Béni Abbès 101,350 50,163 25 Constantine 2,187 943,112 54 Timimoun 65,203 122,019 26 Médéa 8,866 830,943 55 Touggourt 17,428 247,221 27 Mostaganem 2,269 746,947 56 Djanet 86,185 17,618 28 M'Sila 18,718 991,846 57 In Salah 131,220 50,392 29 Mascara 5,941 780,959 58 In Guezzam 88,126 11,202
Economy
Main article: Economy of Algeria
Algeria's currency is the dinar (DZD). The economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country's socialist post-independence development model. On June, 2024 The World Bank's 2024 report marks a turning point for Algeria, which joins the select club of upper-middle-income countries. This economic rise, the result of an ambitious development strategy, places the country in the same category as emerging powers such as China, Brazil and Turkey [198][199][200] In recent years, the Algerian government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy.[12] These restrictions are just starting to be lifted off recently although questions about Algeria's slowly-diversifying economy remain.[citation needed]
Algeria has struggled to develop industries outside hydrocarbons in part because of high costs and an inert state bureaucracy. The government's efforts to diversify the economy by attracting foreign and domestic investment outside the energy sector have done little to reduce high youth unemployment rates or to address housing shortages.[12] The country is facing a number of short-term and medium-term problems, including the need to diversify the economy, strengthen political, economic and financial reforms, improve the business climate and reduce inequalities among regions.[158]
A wave of economic protests in February and March 2011 prompted the Algerian government to offer more than $23 billion in public grants and retroactive salary and benefit increases. Public spending has increased by 27% annually during the past five years. The 2010–14 public-investment programme will cost US$286 billion, 40% of which will go to human development.[158]
Thanks to strong hydrocarbon revenues, Algeria has a cushion of $173 billion in foreign currency reserves and a large hydrocarbon stabilisation fund. In addition, Algeria's external debt is extremely low at about 2% of GDP.[12] The economy remains very dependent on hydrocarbon wealth, and, despite high foreign exchange reserves (US$178 billion, equivalent to three years of imports), current expenditure growth makes Algeria's budget more vulnerable to the risk of prolonged lower hydrocarbon revenues.[201]
Algeria has not joined the WTO, despite several years of negotiations but is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area,[202] the African Continental Free Trade Area,[203] and has an association agreement with the European Union.[204][205]
Turkish direct investments have accelerated in Algeria, with total value reaching $5 billion. As of 2022, the number of Turkish companies present in Algeria has reached 1,400. In 2020, despite the pandemic, more than 130 Turkish companies were created in Algeria.[206]
Oil and natural resources
See also: Mining industry of Algeria
Algeria, whose economy is reliant on petroleum, has been an OPEC member since 1969. Its crude oil production stands at around 1.1 million barrels/day, but it is also a major gas producer and exporter, with important links to Europe.[207] Hydrocarbons have long been the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 60% of budget revenues, 30% of GDP, and 87.7%[208] of export earnings. Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the sixth-largest gas exporter. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that in 2005, Algeria had 4.5 trillion cubic metres (160×10^12 cu ft) of proven natural gas reserves.[209] It also ranks 16th in oil reserves.[12]
Non-hydrocarbon growth for 2011 was projected at 5%. To cope with social demands, the authorities raised expenditure, especially on basic food support, employment creation, support for SMEs, and higher salaries. High hydrocarbon prices have improved the current account and the already large international reserves position.[201]
Income from oil and gas rose in 2011 as a result of continuing high oil prices, though the trend in production volume is downward.[158] Production from the oil and gas sector in terms of volume continues to decline, dropping from 43.2 million tonnes to 32 million tonnes between 2007 and 2011. Nevertheless, the sector accounted for 98% of the total volume of exports in 2011, against 48% in 1962,[210] and 70% of budgetary receipts, or US$71.4 billion.[158]
The Algerian national oil company is Sonatrach, which plays a key role in all aspects of the oil and natural gas sectors in Algeria. All foreign operators must work in partnership with Sonatrach, which usually has majority ownership in production-sharing agreements.[211]
Access to biocapacity in Algeria is lower than world average. In 2016, Algeria had 0.53 global hectares of biocapacity per person within its territory, much less than the world average of 1.6 global hectares per person.[213] In 2016, Algeria used 2.4 global hectares of biocapacity per person – their ecological footprint of consumption. This means they use just under 4.5 times as much biocapacity as Algeria contains. As a result, Algeria is running a biocapacity deficit. In April 2022, diplomats from Italy and Spain held talks after Rome's move to secure large volume of Algerian gas stoked concerns in Madrid.[214] Under the deal between Algeria's Sonatrach and Italy's Eni, Algeria will send an additional 9 billion cubic metres of gas to Italy by next year and in 2024.[215]
Research and alternative energy sources
Algeria has invested an estimated 100 billion dinars towards developing research facilities and paying researchers. This development program is meant to advance alternative energy production, especially solar and wind power.[216] Algeria is estimated to have the largest solar energy potential in the Mediterranean, so the government has funded the creation of a solar science park in Hassi R'Mel. Currently, Algeria has 20,000 research professors at various universities and over 780 research labs, with state-set goals to expand to 1,000. Besides solar energy, areas of research in Algeria include space and satellite telecommunications, nuclear power and medical research.
Labour market
The overall rate of unemployment was 10% in 2011, but remained higher among young people, with a rate of 21.5% for those aged between 15 and 24. The government strengthened in 2011 the job programs introduced in 1988, in particular in the framework of the program to aid those seeking work (Dispositif d'Aide à l'Insertion Professionnelle).[158]
Despite a decline in total unemployment, youth and women unemployment is high.[201]
Tourism
Main article: Tourism in Algeria
The development of the tourism sector in Algeria had previously been hampered by a lack of facilities, but since 2004 a broad tourism development strategy has been implemented resulting in many hotels of a high modern standard being built.
There are several UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Algeria[217] including Al Qal'a of Beni Hammad, the first capital of the Hammadid empire; Tipasa, a Phoenician and later Roman town; and Djémila and Timgad, both Roman ruins; M'Zab Valley, a limestone valley containing a large urbanized oasis; and the Casbah of Algiers, an important citadel. The only natural World Heritage Site is the Tassili n'Ajjer, a mountain range.
Transport
Main article: Transport in Algeria
Two trans-African automobile routes pass through Algeria:
Cairo-Dakar Highway
Algiers-Lagos Highway
The Algerian road network is the densest in Africa; its length is estimated at 180,000 km (110,000 mi) of highways, with more than 3,756 structures and a paving rate of 85%. This network will be complemented by the East-West Highway, a major infrastructure project currently under construction. It is a three-way, 1,216-kilometre-long (756 mi) highway, linking Annaba in the extreme east to the Tlemcen in the far west. Algeria is also crossed by the Trans-Sahara Highway, which is now completely paved. This road is supported by the Algerian government to increase trade between the six countries crossed: Algeria, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Tunisia.
Demographics
Main article: Demographics of Algeria
Algeria has a population of an estimated 44 million, of which the majority, 75%[218] to 85% are ethnically Arab.[12][219][220] At the outset of the 20th century, its population was approximately four million.[221] About 90% of Algerians live in the northern, coastal area; the inhabitants of the Sahara desert are mainly concentrated in oases, although some 1.5 million remain nomadic or partly nomadic. 28.1% of Algerians are under the age of 15.[12]
Between 90,000 and 165,000 Sahrawis from Western Sahara live in the Sahrawi refugee camps,[222][223] in the western Algerian Sahara desert.[224] There are also more than 4,000 Palestinian refugees, who are well integrated and have not asked for assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[222][223] In 2009, 35,000 Chinese migrant workers lived in Algeria.[225]
The largest concentration of Algerian migrants outside Algeria is in France, which has reportedly over 1.7 million Algerians of up to the second generation.[226]
Ethnic groups
Main article: Ethnic groups in Algeria
Arabs and indigenous Berbers as well as Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantine Greeks, Turks, various Sub-Saharan Africans, and French have contributed to the history and culture of Algeria.[228] Descendants of Andalusi refugees are also present in the population of Algiers and other cities.[229] Moreover, Spanish was spoken by these Aragonese and Castillian Morisco descendants deep into the 18th century, and even Catalan was spoken at the same time by Catalan Morisco descendants in the small town of Grish El-Oued.[230]
Centuries of Arab migrations to the Maghreb since the seventh century shifted the demographic scope in Algeria. Estimates vary based on different sources. The majority of the population of Algeria is ethnically Arab, constituting between 75%[218][231] and 80%[232][233] to 85%[234][12][235] of the population. Berbers who make up 15%[12] to 20%[233][232] of the population are divided into many groups with varying languages. The largest of these are the Kabyles, who live in the Kabylie region east of Algiers, the Chaoui of Northeast Algeria, the Tuaregs in the southern desert and the Shenwa people of North Algeria.[236][page needed] During the colonial period, there was a large (10% in 1960)[237] European population who became known as Pied-Noirs. They were primarily of French, Spanish and Italian origin. Almost all of this population left during the war of independence or immediately after its end.[238]
Languages
Main article: Languages of Algeria
Modern Standard Arabic and Berber are the official languages.[239] Algerian Arabic (Darja) is the language used by the majority of the population. Colloquial Algerian Arabic has some Berber loanwords which represent 8% to 9% of its vocabulary.[240]
Berber has been recognised as a "national language" by the constitutional amendment of 8 May 2002.[241] Kabyle, the predominant Berber language, is taught and is partially co-official (with a few restrictions) in parts of Kabylie. Kabyle has a significant Arabic, French, Latin, Greek, Phoenician and Punic substratum, and Arabic loanwords represent 35% of the total Kabyle vocabulary.[242] In February 2016, the Algerian constitution passed a resolution that made Berber an official language alongside Arabic. Algeria emerged as a bilingual state after 1962.[243] Colloquial Algerian Arabic is spoken by about 83% of the population and Berber by 27%.[244]
Although French has no official status in Algeria, it has one of the largest Francophone populations in the world,[245] and French is widely used in government, media (newspapers, radio, local television), and both the education system (from primary school onwards) and academia due to Algeria's colonial history. It can be regarded as a lingua franca of Algeria. In 2008, 11.2 million Algerians could read and write in French.[246] In 2013, it was estimated that 60% of the population could speak or understand French.[247] In 2022, it was estimated that 33% of the population was Francophone.[248]
The use of English in Algeria, though limited in comparison to the previously mentioned languages, has increased due to globalization.[249][250] In 2022 it was announced that English would be taught in elementary schools.[251]
Religion
Main article: Religion in Algeria
Islam is the predominant religion in Algeria, with its adherents, mostly Sunnis, accounting for 99% of the population according to a 2021 CIA World Factbook estimate,[12] and 97.9% according to Pew Research in 2020.[252] There are about 290,000 Ibadis in the M'zab Valley in the region of Ghardaia.
Prior to independence, Algeria was home to more than 1.3 million Christians (mostly of European ancestry).[253] Most of the Christian settlers left to France after the country's independence.[254][255] Today, estimates of the Christian population range from 20,000 to 200,000.[256] Algerian citizens who are Christians predominantly belong to Protestant denominations, which have seen increased pressure from the government in recent years including many forced closures.[256]
According to the Arab Barometer in 2018–2019, the vast majority of Algerians (99.1%) continue to identify as Muslim.[257] The June 2019 Arab Barometer-BBC News report found that the percentage of Algerians identifying as non-religious has grown from around 8% in 2013 to around 15% in 2018.[258] The Arab Barometer December 2019, found that the growth in the percentage of Algerians identifying as non-religious is largely driven by young Algerians, with roughly 25% describing themselves as non-religious.[259] However, the 2021 Arab Barometer report found that those who said they were not religious among Algerians has decreased, with just 2.6% identifying as non-religious. In that same report, 69.5% of Algerians identified as religious and another 27.8% identifying as somewhat religious.[257][260]
Algeria has given the Muslim world a number of prominent thinkers, including Emir Abdelkader, Abdelhamid Ben Badis, Mouloud Kacem Naît Belkacem, Malek Bennabi and Mohamed Arkoun.
Health
Main article: Health in Algeria
In 2018, Algeria had the highest numbers of physicians in the Maghreb region (1.72 per 1,000 people), nurses (2.23 per 1,000 people), and dentists (0.31 per 1,000 people). Access to "improved water sources" was around 97.4% of the population in urban areas and 98.7% of the population in the rural areas. Some 99% of Algerians living in urban areas, and around 93.4% of those living in rural areas, had access to "improved sanitation". According to the World Bank, Algeria is making progress toward its goal of "reducing by half the number of people without sustainable access to improved drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015". Given Algeria's young population, policy favours preventive health care and clinics over hospitals. In keeping with this policy, the government maintains an immunisation program. However, poor sanitation and unclean water still cause tuberculosis, hepatitis, measles, typhoid fever, cholera and dysentery. The poor generally receive healthcare free of charge.[261]
Health records have been maintained in Algeria since 1882 and began adding Muslims living in the south to their vital record database in 1905 during French rule.[262]
Education
Since the 1970s, in a centralised system that was designed to significantly reduce the rate of illiteracy, the Algerian government introduced a decree by which school attendance became compulsory for all children aged between 6 and 15 years who have the ability to track their learning through the 20 facilities built since independence, now the literacy rate is around 92.6%.[263] Since 1972, Arabic is used as the language of instruction during the first nine years of schooling. From the third year, French is taught and it is also the language of instruction for science classes. The students can also learn English, Italian, Spanish and German. In 2008, new programs at the elementary appeared, therefore the compulsory schooling does not start at the age of six anymore, but at the age of five.[264] Apart from the 122 private schools, the Universities of the State are free of charge. After nine years of primary school, students can go to a high school or to an educational institution. The school offers two programs: general or technical. At the end of the third year of secondary school, students pass the exam of the baccalaureate, which allows once it is successful to pursue graduate studies in universities and institutes.[265]
Education is officially compulsory for children between the ages of six and 15. In 2008, the illiteracy rate for people over 10 was 22.3%, 15.6% for men and 29.0% for women. The province with the lowest rate of illiteracy was Algiers Province at 11.6%, while the province with the highest rate was Djelfa Province at 35.5%.[266]
Algeria has 26 universities and 67 institutions of higher education, which must accommodate a million Algerians and 80,000 foreign students in 2008. The University of Algiers, founded in 1879, is the oldest, it offers education in various disciplines (law, medicine, science and letters). Twenty-five of these universities and almost all of the institutions of higher education were founded after the independence of the country.
Even if some of them offer instruction in Arabic like areas of law and the economy, most of the other sectors such as science and medicine continue to be provided in French and English. Among the most important universities, there are the University of Sciences and Technology Houari Boumediene, the University of Mentouri Constantine, and University of Oran Es-Senia. The University of Abou Bekr Belkaïd in Tlemcen and University of Batna Hadj Lakhdar occupy the 26th and 45th row in Africa.[267] Algeria was ranked 119th in the Global Innovation Index in 2023.[268][269]
Culture
Main article: Culture of Algeria
Modern Algerian literature, split between Arabic, Tamazight and French, has been strongly influenced by the country's recent history. Famous novelists of the 20th century include Mohammed Dib, Albert Camus, Kateb Yacine and Ahlam Mosteghanemi while Assia Djebar is widely translated. Among the important novelists of the 1980s were Rachid Mimouni, later vice-president of Amnesty International, and Tahar Djaout, murdered by an Islamist group in 1993 for his secularist views.[270]
Malek Bennabi and Frantz Fanon are noted for their thoughts on decolonization; Augustine of Hippo was born in Tagaste (modern-day Souk Ahras); and Ibn Khaldun, though born in Tunis, wrote the Muqaddima while staying in Algeria. The works of the Sanusi family in pre-colonial times, and of Emir Abdelkader and Sheikh Ben Badis in colonial times, are widely noted. The Latin author Apuleius was born in Madaurus (Mdaourouch), in what later became Algeria.
Contemporary Algerian cinema is varied in terms of genre, exploring a wider range of themes and issues. There has been a transition from cinema which focused on the war of independence to films more concerned with the everyday lives of Algerians.[271]
Media
Main article: Media of Algeria
Art
Algerian painters, like Mohammed Racim and Baya, attempted to revive the prestigious Algerian past prior to French colonisation, at the same time that they have contributed to the preservation of the authentic values of Algeria. In this line, Mohamed Temam, Abdelkhader Houamel have also returned through this art, scenes from the history of the country, the habits and customs of the past and the country life. Other new artistic currents including the one of M'hamed Issiakhem, Mohammed Khadda and Bachir Yelles, appeared on the scene of Algerian painting, abandoning figurative classical painting to find new pictorial ways, to adapt Algerian paintings to the new realities of the country through its struggle and its aspirations. Mohammed Khadda[272] and M'hamed Issiakhem have been notable in recent years.[272]
Literature
Main articles: Algerian literature and List of Algerian writers
The historic roots of Algerian literature go back to the Numidian and Roman African era, when Apuleius wrote The Golden Ass, the only Latin novel to survive in its entirety. This period had also known Augustine of Hippo, Nonius Marcellus and Martianus Capella, among many others. The Middle Ages have known many Arabic writers who revolutionised the Arab world literature, with authors like Ahmad al-Buni, Ibn Manzur and Ibn Khaldoun, who wrote the Muqaddimah while staying in Algeria, and many others.
Albert Camus was an Algerian-born French Pied-Noir author. In 1957, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in literature.
Today Algeria contains, in its literary landscape, big names having not only marked the Algerian literature, but also the universal literary heritage in Arabic and French.
As a first step, Algerian literature was marked by works whose main concern was the assertion of the Algerian national entity, there is the publication of novels as the Algerian trilogy of Mohammed Dib, or even Nedjma of Kateb Yacine novel which is often regarded as a monumental and major work. Other known writers will contribute to the emergence of Algerian literature whom include Mouloud Feraoun, Malek Bennabi, Malek Haddad, Moufdi Zakaria, Abdelhamid Ben Badis, Mohamed Laïd Al-Khalifa, Mouloud Mammeri, Frantz Fanon, and Assia Djebar.
In the aftermath of the independence, several new authors emerged on the Algerian literary scene, they will attempt through their works to expose a number of social problems, among them there are Rachid Boudjedra, Rachid Mimouni, Leila Sebbar, Tahar Djaout and Tahir Wattar.
Currently, a part of Algerian writers tends to be defined in a literature of shocking expression, due to the terrorism that occurred during the 1990s, the other party is defined in a different style of literature who staged an individualistic conception of the human adventure. Among the most noted recent works, there is the writer, the swallows of Kabul and the attack of Yasmina Khadra, the oath of barbarians of Boualem Sansal, memory of the flesh of Ahlam Mosteghanemi and the last novel by Assia Djebar nowhere in my father's House.
Music
Main article: Music of Algeria
Chaâbi music is a typically Algerian musical genre characterized by specific rhythms and of Qacidate (popular poems) in Arabic dialect. El Hadj M'Hamed El Anka is considered the greatest master of the art in modern times. He wrote over 350 songs and produced some 130 records before his death in 1978. Many of his pupils went on to be renowned musicians.[274] The Constantinois Malouf style is saved by musician from whom Mohamed Tahar Fergani is a performer.
Folk music styles include Bedouin music, characterized by the poetic songs based on long kacida (poems); Kabyle music, based on a rich repertoire that is poetry and old tales passed through generations; Shawiya music, a folklore from diverse areas of the Aurès Mountains. Rahaba music style is unique to the Aures. Souad Massi is a rising Algerian folk singer. Other Algerian singers of the diaspora include Manel Filali in Germany and Kenza Farah in France. Tergui music is sung in Tuareg languages generally, Tinariwen had a worldwide success. Finally, the staïfi music is born in Sétif and remains a unique style of its kind.
Modern music is available in several facets, Raï music is a style typical of western Algeria. Rap, a relatively recent style in Algeria, is experiencing significant growth.
Cinema
Main article: Cinema of Algeria
The Algerian state's interest in film-industry activities can be seen in the annual budget of DZD 200 million (EUR 1.3 million) allocated to production, specific measures and an ambitious programme plan implemented by the Ministry of Culture to promote national production, renovate the cinema stock and remedy the weak links in distribution and exploitation.
The financial support provided by the state, through the Fund for the Development of the Arts, Techniques and the Film Industry (FDATIC) and the Algerian Agency for Cultural Influence (AARC), plays a key role in the promotion of national production. Between 2007 and 2013, FDATIC subsidised 98 films (feature films, documentaries and short films). In mid-2013, AARC had already supported a total of 78 films, including 42 feature films, 6 short films and 30 documentaries.
According to the European Audiovisual Observatory's LUMIERE database, 41 Algerian films were distributed in Europe between 1996 and 2013; 21 films in this repertoire were Algerian-French co-productions. Days of Glory (2006) and Outside the Law (2010) recorded the highest number of admissions in the European Union, 3,172,612 and 474,722, respectively.[275]
Algeria won the Palme d'Or for Chronicle of the Years of Fire (1975), two Oscars for Z (1969), and other awards for the Italian-Algerian movie The Battle of Algiers.
Cuisine
Main article: Algerian cuisine
Algerian cuisine is rich and diverse as a result of interactions and exchanges with other cultures and nations over the centuries.[276] It is based on both land and sea products. Conquests or demographic movement towards the Algerian territory were two of the main factors of exchanges between the different peoples and cultures. The Algerian cuisine is a mix of Arab, Berber, Turkish and French roots.[277][276]
Algerian cuisine offers a variety of dishes depending on the region and the season, but vegetables and cereals remain at its core. Most of the Algerian dishes are centered around bread, meats (lamb, beef or poultry), olive oil, vegetables, and fresh herbs. Vegetables are often used for salads, soups, tajines, couscous, and sauce-based dishes. Of all the Algerian traditional dishes available, the most famous one is couscous, recognized as a national dish.[278]
Sports
Main article: Sport in Algeria
Various games have existed in Algeria since antiquity. In the Aures, people played several games such as El Kherba or El khergueba (chess variant). Playing cards, checkers and chess games are part of Algerian culture. Racing (fantasia) and rifle shooting are part of cultural recreation of the Algerians.[279]
Football is the most popular sport in the country. The Algerian national football team, known as the Desert Foxes, has a strong fan base and has achieved success both domestically and internationally.[280][281]
Algeria has a long history in other sports such as athletics, boxing, volleyball, handball and the study of martial arts.[282] Algerian athletes have competed in the Olympic Games and have won medals in various events.[283] Many sports clubs and organizations exist in Algeria to promote and develop sports among young people.[284] The Ministry of Youth and Sports in Algeria manages sport-related activities.[285]
See also
Algeria portal
Index of Algeria-related articles
Outline of Algeria
Explanatory notes
Citations
General bibliography
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What is the terrain and geography like in Algeria?
Overview
Algeria, the second-largest Arab/African country after Sudan, is nearly one-third the size of the continental U.S. It is situated on the Mediterranean coast of Africa about midway between Tangier and Tunis, opposite Majorca.
Its geography is a contrast with the mountainous, fertile terrain of the north and the great expanse of arid desert in the south. Ninety percent of the population lives on the fertile coastal strip that extends about 50 miles inland and stretches about 950 miles from Morocco in the west to Tunisia in the east. Algiers, Oran, and Annaba are located in this area along the coast.
South of this coastal plain rises the beautifully rugged hills and mountains of the Kabylie and the Aures. Behind the mountains lies the high plateau, a semiarid rangeland. Beyond, about 200 miles inland, is the vast Sahara Desert, which comprises 90% of the country.
From the sea, Algiers is a spectacular sight, rising sharply from the port area and business district to the residential areas along tree-covered hills. In sunlight, the white buildings of "Alger la Blanche" gleam against the blue Mediterranean below and the green pines above.
Architecturally, the city is European with a strong Mediterranean flavor. The Casbah, an ancient, congested quarter in the heart of the city, contains most of what remains of the Turkish city of the 16th-18th centuries. The largest country in Africa
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“Algeria’s long-term goals lack consensus among major political actors.”
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This report underscores a period of relative recovery for Algeria, although the sustainability of this recovery remains uncertain. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has kept oil and gas prices elevated, enabling the Algerian government to bolster its financial reserves.
A new government, led by Prime Minister Aymen Benabderrahmane – a seasoned economist, former central bank governor, and finance minister – assumed office on June 30, 2021. This administration has displayed a readiness to sever ties with European partners who oppose Algeria’s regional interests. For instance, in a recent dispute over Western Sahara with Madrid, Algeria suspended a 20-year-old friendship treaty and recalled its ambassador from Spain on March 19, 2022. This suggests that the government perceives the Ukraine war as an opportunity to enhance its global standing and exploit Europe’s gas demands. However, these actions, including the suspension with Spain and the breakdown of diplomatic relations with Morocco, have eroded Algeria’s credibility among long-standing partners.
Algeria’s economy continues to rebound from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Hirak protests. Oil production has returned to pre-pandemic levels, with the service sector and agricultural activity also experiencing a resurgence. Improved external balances have been driven by higher global hydrocarbon prices. Nevertheless, inflation remains high, standing at 9.4%. To safeguard purchasing power, the government has taken measures such as raising civil service salaries and introducing unemployment benefits. Nonetheless, this level of spending may pose a challenge if gas prices decline in the future.
To address these challenges and stimulate economic growth, Article 139 of the Finance Law 2021 has repealed the regulation that previously restricted foreign ownership, commonly known as the “51/49 rule,” for goods and services production. This revision also extends exceptions to cover activities such as importing raw materials, products, and merchandise for resale, as well as activities of strategic importance. However, these activities will still require a national resident shareholding participation of up to 51%.
In addition to its economic developments, Algeria is making strides in the startup sector. In December 2022, the country hosted the inaugural “African Startup Conference,” and the government has shown a commitment to supporting Algerian startups, emphasizing the importance of economic management and training for young entrepreneurs. The goal is to have one million project holders by 2023, with the establishment of the Algerian Startup Fund serving as a crucial step toward achieving this objective.
However, in the realm of freedom of speech, Algeria continues to face challenges. The number of arbitrary arrests of journalists has risen since the inception of the Hirak movement in 2019. Most recently, in December 2022, the prominent journalist Ihsane El-Kadi was arrested and charged with political reporting-related offenses. This incident garnered national and international condemnation, resulting in the suppression of newspapers, opposition parties, and movements. Presently, there are over 288 political prisoners, and thousands of individuals are entangled in lawsuits due to their involvement in the Hirak. Furthermore, anti-terror laws have been revised to specifically target dissenting voices.
Finally, in August 2022, during President Macron’s visit to Algeria, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune made a strategic decision to shift the primary foreign language taught in Algerian schools from French to English. This decision marks a significant departure from the country’s historical ties to France.
After enduring 132 tumultuous years as “Algérie française,” which encompassed Algeria’s colonial era (1830 – 1848) and its status as a part of France, this long chapter in the country’s history finally closed with the eight-year War of Independence and the concluding Évian Accords on March 18, 1962. Algeria’s journey toward political and economic liberalization commenced in the 1980s, instigated by the Kabylia social movement. The Berber spring protests, initially aimed at securing cultural recognition, soon gave rise to broader demonstrations against the one-party regime and its oppressive policies, as well as the looming economic crisis.
The regime’s resistance to reform created growing support for an Islamic role, but this move ultimately backfired. The decline in oil revenues further fueled unrest in the late 1980s, exacerbated by issues such as youth unemployment, housing shortages, and generational divides. The October 1988 riots, which resulted in 500 casualties, underscored the regime’s legitimacy crisis. In response, the regime introduced multipartyism in 1989.
However, the military-backed annulment of the legislative elections in January 1992, which had favored the Islamist “Front Islamique du Salut” (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front), reversed the short-lived democratization process. This precipitated a conflict that claimed 200,000 lives, severely curtailed political freedoms, and plunged the nation into a crippling debt crisis. Weary of the violence, a new constitution in 1996 paved the way for new parliamentary institutions, with legislative elections held in 1997. Despite heightened violence in 1997, a program of institution-building and restructuring commenced, including negotiations with Islamic armed groups.
In 1999, new presidential elections brought former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika to power. President Bouteflika sought to end the “décennie noire” (black decade) and quell the violence by implementing a Civil Concord Law in 1999, which included an amnesty plan that effectively halted the violence in 2002. This far-reaching amnesty was ratified as the “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation” in a 2006 referendum, garnering 97% support. Bouteflika embarked on rebuilding Algeria’s international reputation and reviving economic restructuring, aided by favorable gas prices. While new laws were introduced to promote foreign direct investment, particularly in hydrocarbons, they were subsequently curtailed due to nationalist objections. Noteworthy infrastructure projects, as well as initiatives for job creation and housing, were set in motion.
Although violence decreased in the new millennium, sporadic suicide attacks and kidnappings have occurred in recent years, especially in the Sahara and Kabylia regions. These incidents are sometimes orchestrated by criminal groups associated with remnants of the 1990s conflict, though their frequency has dwindled.
In 2001, protests against police violence and marginalization in the Berberophone Kabylia region led to the inclusion of Tamazight as a national language in the constitution. Alongside the establishment of the High Commission for Amazighté and the integration of Tamazight into the education system, these reforms addressed some demands of the Berberophone population. Tamazight attained official language status in the new 2016 constitution. Nevertheless, the deadly repression of the protest movement, resulting in 126 fatalities, fostered political alienation in the region and gave rise to a marginal separatist movement.
President Bouteflika’s contested re-election for a fourth term in 2014 was marked by the significant deterioration of his health following a stroke. The army’s agreement to cease interference in politics in 2003 and the constitutional amendment in 2008 expanded presidential powers. However, the 2016 constitution reversed this trend by reinstating presidential term limits and strengthening the legislature. Despite the president’s inability to speak in public due to his ailing health, the constitutional amendment was discredited when Bouteflika sought a fifth term in 2019. The question of his successor became central to the political crisis, and the overall governance of the country remained opaque.
It was the humiliation of having a president physically unfit to govern, combined with mounting frustration over widespread corruption, escalating repression, and deteriorating living conditions, that propelled millions of Algerians into the streets throughout 2019. This extraordinary peaceful pro-democracy movement, known as the Hirak, forced Bouteflika to resign on April 2, 2019, following the intervention of the late General Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaid Salah. After 13 months of continuous mobilization and two postponements of the presidential election, the COVID-19 pandemic finally halted the protests in March 2020. They resumed in February 2021 and were ultimately banned in May 2021.
The legitimacy of the nation-state in Algeria is rarely questioned. Although the Hirak movement called for significant changes in the political system, it did not challenge the legitimacy of the state itself. Instead, protesters peacefully marched to protect the state. The sense of national identity in Algeria remains strong and has been reaffirmed through the Hirak protest movement’s activities.
While there are no formal limitations on citizenship rights, Article 22 of the citizenship code outlines conditions under which citizenship can be forfeited. The Algerian government continues to combat certain religious extremist and separatist groups, such as those associated with the former Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and the Mouvement pour l’Autodétermination de la Kabylie (MAK), or Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie. However, the MAK remains on the fringes in the Berberophone Kabylia region. The 2016 and 2020 constitutions recognize Tamazight as an official national language, and the Amazigh New Year was designated an official holiday in 2018.
However, some minority groups are denied full citizenship rights. For instance, certain Syrian and sub-Saharan refugees and migrants in Algeria do not have access to citizenship, and policies deny certain rights, such as the ability to marry Algerian nationals, unless they have legal residency status. According to the Mixed Migration Review, an estimated 27,208 refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers were deported from Algeria in 2021. This trend continued in 2022, with over 14,000 people being pushed back across the border between January and May.
The Algerian administration is present in all 58 districts, providing basic public services such as water and sanitation through a public-private partnership. However, in 2021, Algeria experienced a severe water shortage for over six months in 20 districts due to drought and deficient infrastructure, which led to protests. Despite this, the Minister of Water Resources and Water Security, Karim Hasni, launched emergency programs to mitigate the effects of the water deficit, including the construction of over 600 boreholes.
In addition to gas and electricity, Algeria has made efforts to improve its infrastructure and housing options through collaborations and by launching major construction projects with Chinese and Turkish companies.
In 2020, as reported by the World Bank, 86% of households had access to basic sanitation, and 72% had access to safely managed water services. Additionally, 99.8% of households had access to electricity. The interior minister announced in October 2020 that there would be additional funding for the modernization of public services.
Algeria possesses the largest urban rail transport system in Africa, featuring tramways that are operational in Algiers, Oran, Sidi Bel Abbes, Constantine, Annaba, Setif, Ouargla, and soon Mostaganem in collaboration with Qatar and Kuwait. Over the past 15 years, the nation’s railway infrastructure has more than doubled, and a new international airport was inaugurated in Algiers in April 2019. Public transportation between regions was suspended on multiple occasions during the COVID-19 pandemic, impacting low-income individuals to a greater extent.
There have also been major construction projects in the education sector, with at least 15 new university campuses built in the last decade. Tertiary education is available in all 58 regions of the country. However, the quality is subject to criticism. Schools were closed between March and November 2020 due to COVID-19.
Access to health care facilities and medication is a major issue of discontent, particularly in disadvantaged regions such as the South. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed vulnerabilities in the health care system and inadequacies of crisis response mechanisms. Doctors on strike have pointed to insufficient essential equipment in remote areas, as well as a scarcity of personal protective equipment (PPE) and respirators in hospitals across the country.
In 2019, presidential elections were canceled due to the massive Hirak protests against the incumbent president’s plan to seek a fifth term. The elections were postponed from April 1 to July, and again to December 12, when Abdelmadjid Tebboune was elected with 58.13% of the vote. The elections took place in a highly contentious context, with all five candidates being former members of the previous president’s government. Many observers believed that the military predetermined the election results. The elections were intended to resolve the extraconstitutional situation of having an interim president and to enable the military to have a less public role that was less subject to criticism from society. However, the elections were not seen as free and fair, with a low voter turnout of only 39.88% due to calls to boycott and concerns about repression.
The official results and turnout numbers were also suspected of being manipulated, and there were reports of polling stations being blocked by opponents in the Kabylia region. A new electoral authority, the National Independent Election Authority (ANIE, Autorité nationale indépendante des élections), was established in mid-September 2019 but could not ensure free and fair elections.
Following Tebboune’s election, a commission of experts, including constitutional lawyers appointed by the president, drafted a new constitution. On November 1, 2020, a constitutional referendum was held, with only 23% of the electorate participating. Due to a severe repression campaign, there was no opportunity for free public debate, which prevented critics from gathering in public spaces and expressing themselves in public media.
Legislative elections in June 2021 appear to have been well managed by ANIE, although some opposition parties and activists raised concerns about the ANIE’s independence and its ability to ensure a truly fair and transparent election. The elections saw the lowest turnout in Algerian history, with under 23% of the eligible population participating, indicating high voter disaffection and deep distrust toward the regime. A total of 4,074 candidates competed for 407 seats in the National People’s Assembly (APN, Assemblée populaire nationale), which is the lower house of the Algerian parliament. The election was held in 58 multi-member districts, with each district electing between four and 18 members depending on its population size. The elections were marked by a high participation of independent candidates and support for youth participation, but there was a significant decrease in female deputies to only 32. The ruling parties National Liberation Front (FLN, Front de libération nationale) and National Democratic Rally (RND, Rassemblement national démocratique) emerged victorious, albeit with only a 6.24% and 4.31% share of votes, respectively, while the Islamist Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, Mouvement de la société pour la paix) came in second with 4.52%.
FLN and RND also dominated the municipal elections in November 2021, while the MSP and its spin-off party, Harakat al-bina al-watani (National Construction Movement), lost additional ground. The pro-Hirak party, Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS or Socialist Forces Front), also lagged behind. Turnout was approximately 35%.
Two-thirds of the current 174 deputies in APN’s upper chamber, the Council of the Nation, are indirectly elected by electoral colleges in 58 districts. These districts consist of deputies from local councils, while the remaining one-third is appointed by the president. The last elections were held on February 5, 2022. Both the FLN and RND remain dominant in this chamber, with eight women currently holding seats.
While constitutional rights pertaining to association and assembly are firmly established, they have been frequently violated, especially in the aftermath of the post-Hirak crackdown. Despite the initial tolerance exhibited by the army and police toward the nationwide Hirak protests in 2019, which endured for 54 weeks, access to the capital was progressively curtailed for residents in the surrounding regions. Subsequently, since April 2019, security forces have carried out numerous arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonments of peaceful demonstrators. In March 2020, authorities imposed a ban on mass protests and gatherings as part of their efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. It’s worth noting that prior to this ban, protesters had already been urging Algerians to stay at home to safeguard themselves from the virus. Nevertheless, gatherings of solidarity persisted outside of courts and prisons in support of political prisoners.
Overall, the government took advantage of the situation brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic to intensify repression and arrest hundreds of citizens and activists for their activities and statements on social media. Additionally, oppositional parties and unions, such as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Forces of the Democratic Alternative (FPAD), were prevented from holding public meetings.
In 2021 and 2022, there has been a significant reduction in political freedoms. Since the Hirak demonstrations resurged in February 2021, individuals and advocates have faced increased repression. Non-lethal force has been used as one of the repressive measures, resulting in the end of street protests in May 2021.
Algerian associations have called on the state to review the restrictions on the freedom of association imposed by the 2012 Law on Associations (No. 12-06). According to the Ministry of Interior, there are currently 110,000 active associations in Algeria. However, these local associations have been designated as “non-conform” and may be disbanded. Law 12-06 allows for creating certain local associations that the commune can register at the local level, but it also appears to increase the executive’s power over associations. The law’s implementation varies from region to region, and no legal guidelines have been established for its implementation, leaving it up to the administration’s discretion. Many associations have reported interference from authorities in their activities.
While Algeria’s constitution and international human rights agreements theoretically guarantee freedom of expression for its citizens, media outlets and organizations, these rights face significant practical limitations, particularly for individuals who voice controversial or unpopular opinions or criticize the government.
In 2019, a government-led repression campaign, spearheaded by then-Army Chief of Staff Gaid Salah, targeted activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens. For instance, journalist Khaled Drarni was arrested for his critical views on the government and his support for the Hirak movement expressed on social media.
Algeria’s media landscape is predominantly state-controlled, leading many journalists to engage in self-censorship. Journalists have been subject to arrests and imprisonment for their reporting, with the government employing defamation laws to penalize those expressing dissenting viewpoints. In 2020, the penal code was amended to increase prison sentences for defamation and introduce new penalties for spreading false information. Additionally, there have been allegations of the government using state media to disseminate false information about Hirak movement members. The pressure on independent press outlets has intensified, culminating in the closure of the French-language newspaper “Liberté” in April 2022. Indirect methods, such as the withdrawal of state-sponsored advertising, have been utilized to financially strangle free media organizations, leading to severe financial challenges. For instance, the French-language newspaper “El Watan” struggled to pay its employees for several months in 2022.
Numerous individuals and organization members have faced arrests or imprisonment for expressing critical opinions or participating in demonstrations. Presently, there are approximately 300 political prisoners in Algerian jails, many of whom were detained due to their involvement in the Hirak movement or for expressing their views on social media. Since the emergence of the Hirak movement in 2019, there has been a noticeable increase in the arbitrary arrests of journalists, contributing to Algeria’s declining ranking in the World Press Freedom Index. The most recent incident involved the arrest of veteran journalist El-Kadi Ihsane in December 2022, who faced accusations of receiving foreign funding, sparking widespread national and international condemnation.
In summary, the space for free speech in Algeria is rapidly diminishing, partly exacerbated by the government’s alleged exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to suppress dissenting voices.
The separation of powers is constitutionally guaranteed. In practice, however, the concentration of powers within the executive branch has led to concerns about the independence of the other branches of government, particularly the judiciary.
Under Bouteflika’s rule (1999 – 2019), power was informally shared among the army, presidency, and secret services. His removal in 2019 led to increased military involvement in governance. The subsequent election of Abdelmadjid Tebboune, believed to be the army’s choice, reduced the military’s public role, but power distribution remains opaque. While the separation of powers, limited presidential terms and the independence of the judiciary were key demands of the opposition, the November 2020 constitution reinforced the prerogatives of the president, while formally giving the army the possibility to intervene in politics.
In the past, the parliament (Assemblée Populaire Nationale, APN) has had a limited role in relation to the government, and there have been instances of interference with the independence of the judiciary. The APN has faced criticism for its failure to initiate or question legislative proposals from the government, and the judiciary has been accused of being under the control of the executive. The concentration of powers within the executive and the lack of transparency in power distribution among the three branches of government have raised concerns about the extent to which the separation of powers is respected in Algeria.
The judiciary’s handling of cases against political protesters unequivocally demonstrates the alarming extent of political instrumentalization, leaving no doubt that it is under complete control of the executive. The systematic manipulation of the judiciary against political opponents has not only undermined the principles of justice and fairness but has also instilled a widespread belief among Algerians that the independence of the judiciary is a mere illusion.
The ability and autonomy of the judiciary to perform its function in Algeria vary. While the constitution establishes the independence of the judiciary, certain legal provisions allow for interference from the executive branch, including the dismissal of judges, which infringes on the independence of judges.
Judges are appointed by the High Council of the Judiciary, led by the president and justice minister, raising questions about the impartiality of the process. Additionally, there have been several cases of independent judges subjected to disciplinary measures and lawyers persecuted for defending their clients or expressing their opinion.
The independence of the judiciary was a key demand of the Hirak protest movement amidst many protesters’ imprisonments and trials simply for demonstrating or criticizing the regime.
Citizens can appeal existing verdicts in one of 48 courts of appeal. There have been reports of corruption within the judiciary, which can undermine its ability to interpret and apply laws objectively. Lengthy delays in cases and extensions of pretrial detention, as well as instances of defendants not receiving fair trials, have raised concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system.
President Tebboune declared his aim to strengthen judicial independence, and the Ministry of Justice is working on a comprehensive reform to modernize the department through digitization. This will enhance the efficiency and transparency of Algeria’s justice system.
Algeria’s legal system allows for the prosecution and punishment of public officials who misuse their positions. However, concerns persist regarding the system’s effectiveness in holding accountable those responsible for power abuse and corruption. On November 15, 2022, the Court of Algiers issued sentences in a corruption case related to the acquisition of the Augusta refinery by Sonatrach. Former Sonatrach CEO Ould Kaddour received a 10-year prison sentence, while his adviser Ahmed El-Hachemi Mazighi was sentenced to four years in prison. Anissa Ouabdessalam, Kaddour’s wife, was given an 18-month suspended prison sentence. On December 29, 2022, the court of Sidi M’hamed (Algiers) sentenced Mohamed Loukal, former Minister of Finance (2019 – 2020), to seven years in prison for corruption charges relating to his tenure as CEO of the Banque Extérieure d’Algérie.
Instances of high-level officials facing corruption charges have raised concerns about judicial impartiality and transparency. Reports indicate that some officials were shielded from prosecution due to connections with powerful individuals or groups, such as businessmen Ali Haddad and Abdelmoumen Oueld Keddour. Haddad and Oueld Keddour received 18 and 15-year sentences, respectively, in 2020 related to their involvement with the Hirak movement.
Citizens’ trust in the government’s anti-corruption efforts has been low, as major corruption cases and abuse of power have often been overlooked. The 2016 Panama Papers leaks exposed offshore accounts held by government officials, revealing the nexus between political power and the business elite. However, following the Hirak protests, several senior politicians, ministers, a former prime minister, and prominent businessmen were arrested on corruption charges.
In January 2021, the late president’s brother, Said Bouteflika, was acquitted of conspiracy charges but still faces corruption charges. Many Algerians believe that the corruption cases against Bouteflika’s inner circle in 2019 primarily aimed to preserve the regime by sacrificing part of the former elite. While these trials have provided some reassurance to mobilized civil society, skepticism remains regarding their sincerity. Overall, the trials have exposed the widespread corruption during the Bouteflika era and the interplay of political and financial power.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika himself was never brought to trial.
Civil rights are guaranteed and protected by the constitution and international human rights agreements to which Algeria is a party. These rights include the right to life, liberty, and security; freedom of expression, association, and assembly; and the right to a fair trial and protection against discrimination. However, ongoing concerns exist regarding the extent to which these rights are respected in practice and the ability of citizens to seek redress for violations of their rights.
Recent years have witnessed significant limitations on the freedom of belief. Constitutional amendments in November 2020 substituted the right to freedom of belief with the right “to practice a religion.” In May 2021, political adversary Amira Bouraoui received a two-year prison sentence for “offending the Prophet,” while Islamic scholar Said Djabelkheir was sentenced to three years in prison for “offending” Islam through online posts in April 2021. Despite the subsequent provisional release or acquittal of both individuals, these cases underscore the political exploitation of religion.
Religious minorities face significant limitations and discrimination. Most churches and chaplaincies have been converted into mosques, and only a few historical monuments remain in their original form, such as the “Tombeau de la Chrétienne” (“tomb of the Christian woman”) in Tipaza, Notre Dame d’Afrique Basilica in Algiers and Sacré-Cœur Cathedral of Oran. However, several informal churches in Kabylia and Oran have been closed. The long-established NGO Caritas had to shut its doors in November 2022. While this case is indicative of the broader crackdown on civil society organizations, it has been perceived by Christian communities as a move against them specifically. Members of the Ahmadiyya faith community are subjected to persecution.
Algeria’s LGBTQ+ community faces legal and societal harassment because homosexuality is criminalized. Rights organizations have documented multiple instances of violence against LGBTQ+ individuals.
Summary expulsions of sub-Saharan migrants persist in Algeria, disregarding their rights and asylum-seeker status. To curb Mediterranean crossings, expulsions have risen since 2017, with migrants being transported to the Niger border and abandoned in the desert. Sub-Saharan migrants encounter uncertainty and arbitrary treatment.
Algeria’s party system is marked by fragmentation and instability. Parties often lack strong social roots and organizational structure. The system is dominated by the FLN and RND, who are driven by the pursuit of state resources and power.
Clientelism is prevalent in the Algerian party system, with numerous parties relying on patron-client relationships to cultivate support. This practice can generate instability and impede parties’ capacity to effectively articulate and aggregate societal interests.
Algeria’s political party system is highly divided, especially concerning the military’s political influence, government intervention in the economy, and political reform. This division hinders effective cooperation among parties and can lead to instability. Additionally, there is a noteworthy level of voter unpredictability, as many voters switch parties or choose not to vote, making it difficult for parties to secure long-term support and further exacerbating system instability.
Opposition parties in Algeria include the Islamic Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) and the Workers Party (PT, Parti des Travailleurs), led by Louisa Hanoune. She was arrested in 2019 after meeting with secret service representatives and the late president’s brother, Said Bouteflika, post-Hirak protests, but was released in early 2021. Berber parties include the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD, Rally for Culture and Democracy) and the social-democratic FFS, Algeria’s oldest opposition party. Weak yet united, opposition parties formed the Coordination Nationale pour la Transition démocratique (CNLT) in 2014, aiming for political transition. In response to the Hirak movement, some leftist and liberal parties created the Forces of the Democratic Alternative (FPAD, Pacte pour l’Alternative Démocratique), which advocated without success for a constituent assembly. Instead, the Ministry of Interior has sought to suppress a number of opposition parties, such as the RCD, the Union for Change and Progress (UCP, Union pour le changement et le progrès), the Socialist Workers’ Party (PST, Parti Socialiste des Travailleurs), and the Democratic and Social Movement (MDS, Mouvement Démocratique et Social).
Given the party system’s instability and fragmentation, there is a strong defiance toward political parties, even among regime-critical citizens. Thus, during the 2019 protests led by the Hirak movement, political representation through parties was largely rejected due to fear of co-optation.
A network of cooperative associations and interest groups mediates between society and the political system to some extent. Algeria’s spectrum of interest groups includes social movements, community organizations, unions, and professional associations. These groups represent various interests, including economic, social, cultural and political issues. However, the capacity of these groups to incorporate all social interests and avoid the dominance of a few strong interests is limited.
Efforts to promote women’s rights have been championed by organizations like Réseau Wassila (founded in 2000) and the Centre d’Information et de Documentation sur les Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme (CIDDEF, founded in 2002). The latter played a significant role in advocating for women’s quotas in parliament as early as 2011. During the Hirak movement, the FACE network (Femmes algériennes pour un changement vers l’égalité, Algerian women for a change toward equality) gained prominence for its grassroots “feminist squares” protests.
Certain associational movements have successfully influenced policy reforms, such as the NADA network for children’s rights (founded in 2004) and various Berber associations that played a role in the recognition of Tamazight in 2002.
However, due to the 2012 Law on Associations, several NGOs operate in a legal gray area while awaiting renewal of their accreditation by authorities. Some influential NGOs, like the Youth Action Rally (RAJ, Rassemblement Actions Jeunesse, dissolved in October 2021) and the Algerian League for Human Rights (LADDH, Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, dissolved in January 2023), have been recently dissolved.
Meanwhile, the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA, Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens) remains a powerful organization, predominantly influential in the public sector, despite the removal of its long-term secretary-general, Sidi Said, in the context of the Hirak movement. Additionally, there are several autonomous unions, and private sector groups like the Algerian Confederation of Citizen Employers (CAPC, Confédération algérienne du patronat citoyen) play a role in the ongoing contentious debate over draft amendments that are believed to restrict the right to strike.
The degree of cooperation between different interest groups is limited and often divided along ideological lines. Many struggle to find common ground on various issues. The regime employs authoritarian tactics, including co-optation, infiltration, and repression, to sow dissent among organizations, further impeding their effectiveness in mediating between society and the political system.
The civil war in the 1990s disrupted social capital and created enduring societal polarization. Additionally, the regime’s authoritarian persistence strategies, such as co-opting, infiltrating, and defaming civil society organizations, have further contributed to the erosion of trust, fostering distrust toward these organizations. According to Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s January 2021 study on trust in political institutions in the MENA region, trust in the national government in Algeria is fairly high, at 70%.
The most recent law regulating the establishment and operation of associations in Algeria, Law No. 12-06 of 2012, has been criticized for its potential to reinforce executive power over associations and for its inconsistent implementation across different regions. This may impact the ability of these associations to operate autonomously. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, non-state networks stepped in to fill the void left by the state’s inadequate response. They mobilized resources, including medical supplies, oxygen, and medication, with support from the diaspora. Similarly, in the aftermath of the destructive fires in the Kabylia region in 2021 and the eastern part of the country in 2022, solidarity caravans provided assistance to the affected population.
According to the Ministry of Interior’s website, there are 110,000 active associations in Algeria, but it is unclear how many are focused on these specific areas. Some examples of known environmental and cultural organizations in Algeria are Algérie nature et culture, Sahara conservation fund, BirdLife Algeria and others. A myriad of formal and informal social networks emerged during the Hirak, among them the “Collectif de la société civile,” the “Pacte pour la Transition Démocratique” and “Nidaa 22.”
Algeria ranks in the “high human development” category in UNDP’s Human Development Index, scoring 0.736 in 2020 and 0.745 in 2021. The loss due to inequality was 19.7% in 2021.
This inequality results primarily from regional differences. Southern regions, like the Sahara and Steppe, face limited economic opportunities and lack basic infrastructure, with many rural communities facing a lack of access to clean water, electricity and health care facilities. Over the past decade, significant protest movements have arisen, advocating for greater social justice and a fairer distribution of oil revenues.
Some 6.7% of the population were living below the national poverty line in 2022, a sharp increase from the 3.26% measured in 2021, though this share is expected to fall in the upcoming years. The Gini Index was estimated at 31.5 in 2017, indicating a moderate level of inequality. The poverty rate in Algeria was 21.9% in 2019 according to the World Bank.
Gender inequality in Algeria is evident in the economic realm, as women encounter substantial barriers to employment, education and health care. Houria Sekkal’s research reveals that 50.3% of women holding university degrees are unemployed, and only 7% are involved in entrepreneurial activities. The Gender Inequality Index (GII) was reported as 0.380 in 2020 by UNDP, indicating a moderate level of gender inequality.
Overall, these indicators suggest that significant parts of the population in Algeria are excluded from society due to poverty and inequality. While the country has made progress in reducing poverty and improving access to basic services in recent years, it still has a long way to go in addressing the underlying structural issues that contribute to social exclusion and inequality. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected less-privileged households more severely than affluent ones.
The 2022 Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation ranks Algeria 167th out of 186 countries as one of the world’s least free economies. This ranking reflects the challenges that Algeria faces as a rentier state in terms of creating a business-friendly environment, improving the rule of law and reducing corruption.
Some of the main challenges to competition include significant entry and exit barriers in product and factor markets, restrictions on foreign ownership, and discrimination based on ownership and size. This state of affairs underscores the lack of government interest in economic liberalization, despite pressures for reform. Moreover, entry barriers, state-owned enterprises, restrictions on foreign ownership, a large informal sector comprising approximately 50% of Algeria’s total economy (as economist Djilali Slimani indicated in November 2021), government-controlled price setting, and limitations on cross-border labor and capital movement hinder economic dynamics.
The Supplemental Finance Law of 2020 removed the “51/49 rule,” granting foreign investors additional opportunities, except in strategic industries such as defense, pharmaceuticals, energy, and mining. The law also abolished specific intervention rights of the Algerian state in foreign investors’ practices but maintained a prior authorization requirement in strategic sectors.
Price setting is largely determined by the government in Algeria, with restrictions on cross-border labor and capital movement, including currency convertibility. These factors curtail businesses’ ability to compete freely and fairly in the market.
The World Economic Forum’s 2020 Global Competitiveness Index ranks Algeria 116th out of 137 countries in terms of market efficiency, with high levels of corruption and a lack of transparency in the business environment cited as major factors.
In 2014, a new law ended the state’s monopoly in the broadcast sector, allowing Echorouk TV, Ennahar TV, and El Djazaïr TV to operate in close proximity to the government. The telecommunication sector has also been opened up, with the monopoly previously held by Algérie Télécom no longer in place. However, other sectors, such as air transport, oil and gas, still maintain effective monopolies.
Algeria’s economy is characterized by a high level of state intervention and a heavy reliance on hydrocarbons, which account for more than 95% of export revenues and 60% of government revenues. The government also holds a significant position in the nation’s economy by owning numerous enterprises, particularly in key sectors such as energy, banking and telecommunications.
The Competition Council (CC, Conseil de la Concurrence) – founded in 1995 but inactive between 2003 and 2013 due to a lack of mandate for its 12 members – serves as an autonomous administrative authority under the Minister of Trade. It will conduct studies, investigations, and provide judicial information related to competition. Critics point out multiple gaps and ambiguities in its practices, as well as a lack of efficiency. In January 2021, it once again halted its activities and has remained inactive since. The government has initiated reforms to restructure the CC’s structures and competencies.
Informal actors, often retired army generals and veterans of the War of Independence, hold a significant monopoly over certain economic sectors. However, the anti-corruption campaigns launched after Bouteflika’s forced dismissal in 2019 destabilized the monopoly of specific oligarchs, such as Ali Haddad, the Kounineff brothers, and Mahiedine Tahkout.
Overall, the basics of market-based competition in Algeria are weak, with significant barriers to entry and competition in many sectors and a lack of transparency in the business environment.
Foreign trade plays a significant role in Algeria’s economy, with natural gas and petroleum products being the main exports (98%). The government has implemented measures to control imports and support domestic producers; however, trade and investment policies are still less open than most other countries’ policies. Algeria has agreements with trade blocs such as the European Union and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), but progress has been slow and implementation remains a concern for domestic entrepreneurs and authorities.
Algeria has ratified several bilateral trade agreements, among them an EU Association Agreement in September 2005. It became a member of GAFTA in 2009 and ratified the African Continent Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) treaty in 2019. However, Algeria is not yet a member of the WTO.
There are quotas and regulations on certain types of imports, such as vehicles, agricultural products, and medicines, that can limit market access for foreign companies. Additionally, the government has been known to implement countervailing duties on imported products that are deemed to be subsidized, as well as anti-dumping measures, to protect domestic industries from injury. The government also maintains some level of control over imports and exports by implementing procedures and licenses.
However, the country has recently taken some steps toward liberalization. For instance, it has adopted measures to ease trade procedures and reduce customs bureaucracy in order to attract more foreign investment and boost trade. Notably, article 139 of the Finance Law 2021 confirms the elimination of the regulation that limits foreign ownership, commonly known as the “51/49 rule,” for the production of goods and services. Additionally, the exceptions have been expanded to include activities such as importing raw materials, products, and merchandise for resale, as well as activities of a strategic nature. However, these activities will still be subject to a national resident shareholding participation of up to 51%.
The banking system and capital market in Algeria have undergone various reforms in recent years to meet international standards and improve financial stability. According to the central bank, Banque d’Algérie (BA), as of 2021, the banking sector comprises 24 commercial banks, with 15 being public and nine private. The sector’s current capital adequacy ratio stands at 17.6% – above the minimum requirement of 10% set by the Basel Accords.
In terms of supervision, the BA oversees and regulates the operations of banks and other financial institutions. The bank also enacts several measures to promote transparency and the disclosure of financial information. As of 2021, the non-performing loan ratio in the banking sector stood at 7.5%, which is comparatively low in relation to other countries in the region.
The capital market in Algeria is still considered underdeveloped, characterized by a lack of liquidity, low trading volumes, and a limited number of listed companies. The Algiers Stock Exchange (ASE) is the only stock exchange in the country, and its market capitalization remains relatively low compared to other countries in the region.
Efforts to develop the capital market include the launch of the Alternative Stock Market in 2019 to enhance liquidity for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and increase retail investor participation. The government has also introduced measures to attract foreign investment, such as the creation of Special Investment Zones (ZSI) and the launch of the Euro-Algerian Bond in 2020.
The central bank, Banque d’Algérie (BA), has been tasked with maintaining monetary stability through various monetary policies. These policies include controlling inflation, managing foreign exchange rates, and promoting economic growth. The BA operates under the oversight of the Ministry of Finance but maintains a certain degree of independence.
The BA aims to control inflation, targeting 4% for 2021, using monetary and fiscal policies. However, recent years have seen volatile inflation, ranging from 3% to 7% between 2016 and 2020. In 2021, CPI inflation stood at 7.2%. The BA is developing a new monetary policy framework to better target inflation and ensure price stability.
Managing the dinar’s foreign exchange rate is another focus for the BA. The dinar has depreciated against the U.S. dollar due to reduced hydrocarbon exports and ongoing trade deficits. To support the dinar, the BA has intervened in the foreign exchange market by selling foreign currency. However, these interventions have decreased over time, resulting in significant dinar depreciation.
In terms of communication and transparency, the BA has been increasing its efforts to improve communication and transparency with the public and financial market actors. The BA regularly publishes reports and statements on its monetary policy and economic developments and holds press conferences to explain its decisions and plans.
The persistent decline in foreign exchange reserves, the volatility in the inflation rate, and the existence of a parallel black market remain areas of concern. Furthermore, the proposed bill – scheduled for January 2023 – aims to increase central bank autonomy, reducing political interference.
In recent years, the Algerian government has encountered significant economic challenges resulting from its heavy dependence on hydrocarbon exports and the subsequent decline in revenue. Consequently, this has resulted in substantial budget deficits and a rise in public debt, primarily due to plummeting oil prices. As a consequence, budget cuts have been implemented, particularly in capital expenditure. The total reserves have witnessed a decline from $194.7 billion in 2013 to $46.1 billion in 2021.
Yet, the rise in oil and gas prices and the strong increase in demand from Europe following the Russian war in Ukraine led to an overall balance of payments surplus of $11.830 billion in the first nine months of 2022, as reported by the BA. This is a significant improvement compared to the deficit of $2.477 billion at the end of September 2021. Additionally, Algeria’s external debt has decreased to 57% of GDP since 2022, after reaching a record $7.4 billion in 2021.
Despite those positive developments, the IMF warns against the mitigating effect of the announced increased social spending in the 2023 budget. The operating budget is projected to rise by 27%, which could potentially reverse the progress achieved in narrowing the deficit since 2018. This could also weaken the resilience of public finances and contribute to inflation pressures.
Banque d’Algérie announced in January 2023 that Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves were currently over $60 billion, equivalent to nearly 1.5 years of imported goods and services. In response, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune announced plans to increase civil servant salaries, pensions and unemployment benefits between 2023 and 2024. The amount involved will vary depending on pay grades, ranging from DZD 4,500 (approximately $33) to DZD 8,500 ($62) per year for salaried positions. Additionally, minimum retirement allowances will increase to DZD 15,000 ($110) per year for those earning less than DZD 10,000 and to DZD 20,000 ($146) for those earning DZD 15,000. Unemployment benefits will also rise from DZD 13,000 to DZD 15,000 net per month. While these sums may seem minimal, they nevertheless represent a significant contribution given the ongoing challenges the government faces in addressing the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
When the virus hit, the Algerian government implemented a series of measures to address the pandemic’s impact on the economy and the private sector. As listed in the IMF COVID Policy Response Tracker, the government in 2021 mobilized DZD 70 billion (approximately $5 million) to mitigate the health and economic impacts of COVID-19, with DZD 3.7 billion allocated for medical supplies, DZD 16.5 billion for bonus payments to health workers, and DZD 8.9 billion for the health sector’s development. Additionally, DZD 20 billion were allocated in support of the unemployed, and DZD 11.5 billion were provided to poor households. However, the numerous workers in the informal sector, who were also affected by the crisis, received no formal support.
Algeria’s welfare regime is primarily public, providing services such as health care, education, and social security through state-run institutions. Health care spending accounted for 6.2% of GDP in 2019. The government also finances social safety net programs and poverty reduction initiatives. Subsidies constitute 40% of the budget. Initially, targeted subsidies were planned due to the economic crisis and IMF pressure. However, the 2023 draft finance law reintroduced generalized subsidies with the increase in oil prices and aligned with the rentier state logic.
Life expectancy in Algeria was 77.1 years in 2020 and is expected to reach 77.5 in 2023. The neonatal mortality rate, at 15.65 per 1,000 births (WHO 2021), is considerably higher than in Egypt (10.02), Morocco (11.12), or Tunisia (11.54).
Equal opportunity is guaranteed by law, but corruption and favoritism based on regionalism hinder equal access to employment and public services. Free education is available nationwide, with enrollment rates in line with regional averages: 107.3% in primary, 99.6% in secondary, and 51.4% in tertiary education. Women have higher enrollment rates, particularly in tertiary education. Literacy rates have improved overall (81.4% in total as of 2018), yet men (87.4%) still have higher rates than women (75.3%). Family income influences the quality of education, with access to private schools and education abroad available to those who can afford it.
Barriers persist for women in the job market, as they make up only 17.7% of the labor force. Amendments to family law in 2005 improved women’s rights, but discrimination still exists in divorce and inheritance matters. In 2015, legislation was passed to strengthen sanctions against violence and discrimination targeting women. Quotas have been introduced since 2012 to increase women’s representation in elected assemblies, resulting in over 30% representation. However, the number of female parliamentarians decreased to only 7.9% by early 2023 due to changes in the 2020 election law during the 2021 election. LGBTQ+ individuals face discrimination in all areas of life.
Amazigh communities face challenges in accessing education in their native language or in French, which is often favored over Arabic. However, the 2011 constitutional amendment recognized Tamazight as an official language. Tensions in the M’zab region have eased since 2016, but the death of human rights activist Kamel Eddine Fekhar in 2019 during a hunger strike highlighted ongoing mistreatment by authorities.
The CNDDC represents the unemployed movement in Ouargla, advocating for better job opportunities, infrastructure, and education in the southern region. Corruption and clientelism are pervasive issues nationwide, but feelings of marginalization are particularly pronounced in the country’s southern regions.
Algeria’s economy has encountered various challenges in recent years. In its most recent report on Algeria’s economic situation, the World Bank (WB) projects that Algeria’s real GDP will grow by 2.3% in 2023, with the non-oil and gas segment contributing 3.1% and the oil and gas sector contributing 0.5%. The WB also anticipates that GDP growth will decelerate to 1.8% in 2024. According to the institution, GDP is expected to reach $197.9 billion in 2023 and $193.2 billion in 2024.
Algeria’s GDP recovered from the COVID-19 low of $145.0 billion in 2020 and reached $163.04 billion in 2021, returning to the previous level of $171.8 billion in 2019. GDP per capita (PPP) was $11,439 in 2020 but rebounded to $12,128 in 2021, almost reaching the pre-pandemic level. It experienced a 6.7% contraction in 2020 but grew by 1.8% in 2021. CPI inflation rose to 7.2% in 2021 and further increased to 9.3% in 2022, following only 2.4% in 2020 and 2.0% in 2019.
The unemployment rate was 11.6% in 2022, an improvement compared to 12.2% in 2020. Foreign direct investment was $1.97 billion in 2020 (0.8% of GDP). The current account balance was -$4.6 billion in 2021, after -$18.2 billion in 2020. Public debt jumped from 52.0% of GDP in 2020 to 62.8% of GDP. In 2013, it was 7.1% of GDP. Algeria’s government budget balance was -4.8% of GDP in 2020 and -4.2% of GDP in 2019. Algeria’s tax revenue was 13.4% of GDP in 2020 and 14.1% of GDP in 2019. Finally, Algeria’s gross capital formation was 39.8% of GDP in 2021, after 45.4% of GDP in 2020.
According to the World Bank, in 2019, the gross enrollment rate in primary education in Algeria was 99.1%, while in secondary education, it stood at 66.8%. The gross enrollment rate in tertiary education was 27.7% in the same year. Public spending on education accounted for 7.0% of GDP in 2020. The U.N. Education Index for 2021 remained unchanged at 0.675 compared to 2019.
Access to education is ensured, and literacy rates are relatively high, with 81.4% of the population being literate (2018). However, gender disparities exist, and the practice of pupils enrolling in private classes after regular school hours is increasingly widespread. This practice poses challenges in terms of equal opportunity and access to knowledge.
After President Tebboune’s respective announcements in September 2022, English will replace French as the first foreign language taught in primary schools. This move is seen as another step in Algeria’s emancipation from its former colonizer, France. Additionally, enhanced English skills will also assist young Algerians in pursuing careers in emerging technologies.
Five of Algeria’s research centers are among the top 50 in Africa. The country has a number of exchange agreements with international universities and student exchange programs for doctoral research in Europe and elsewhere. However, bureaucratic hurdles, notably the approval requirements of the Ministry of Higher Education and the Foreign Ministry, can limit opportunities and highlight authoritarian attempts to control knowledge production.
As for research and development (R&D), data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) shows that in 2018, Algeria’s R&D expenditure was 0.57% of GDP. Furthermore, in 2018, the number of researchers in Algeria was 11,826 per million inhabitants.
Algeria’s extreme environments hinder infrastructural development and impede state action in designated so-called disaster zones. Earthquakes occur regularly, with their frequency varying by region. In 2020, a 4.9-magnitude earthquake caused severe damage to local infrastructure in Eastern Algeria. However, repairs posed challenges due to limited access, and the government was unable to activate the Risk Fund in the declared disaster zone. The Algerian Red Crescent was the sole government presence on the ground.
Annual wildfires present an additional environmental concern, escalating as a result of climate change. Between August 17 and February 1, 2022, fires in forested and urban regions in eastern Algeria caused the loss of 43 lives and injured 200 individuals. Efforts to control and contain these fires have consistently encountered delays compared to previous years. Resource distribution becomes intricate, as the same vehicles are utilized for logistical purposes, such as transporting fire-resistant materials, in addition to supporting activities such as safeguarding the southern border and combating extremist groups.
Brain drain poses another significant challenge as Algeria experiences a growing exodus of highly qualified individuals to Europe and North America. For instance, in 2022 alone, approximately 1,200 doctors relocated to France. This emigration is fueled by the lack of promising opportunities within the country, creating a vicious cycle. The loss of skilled professionals further compounds the challenges faced by Algeria in various sectors, including health care, education, and research.
The country’s governance faces significant challenges stemming from a legacy of a centrally planned economy, a heavy bureaucracy, high corruption levels, and an authoritarian rentier-state logic. The presence of undemocratic actors, including the military, adds complexity.
Profound distrust and lack of support for the regime, evident through massive pro-democratic protests and continuous electoral boycotts, present structural challenges, particularly in light of impending reforms. The vast territory and conflicts in neighboring regions like the Sahel and Libya heighten security risks, complicating efforts to combat trafficking, terrorism and ensure regional integration and security cooperation. The unresolved conflict with Morocco further hampers these goals.
The people of Algeria express their opinions publicly through demonstrations and unofficial online channels. The government has not fully suppressed these voices, which helps counterbalance its increasing authoritarian tendencies. However, civil society and free discourse are not openly encouraged. Public life outside of state control exists, as demonstrated by the ongoing Hirak protests. Three civil society initiatives, all founded in 2019, have become particularly active:
The Civil Society Collective for a Democratic and Peaceful Transition (Collectif de la société civile pour une transition démocratique et pacifique) is a collective of civil society organizations and activists advocating for political and social reforms in the country. The group has been vocal in its opposition to the ruling government and its policies, calling for a more democratic and inclusive system.
The Forces of a Democratic Alternative (Forces du pacte de l’alternative démocratique, PAD) is a coalition of political parties, civil society organizations and activists, calling for a peaceful and democratic transition in the country. The pact proposes a road map that includes the establishment of an independent electoral authority and the release of political prisoners.
“Nidaa 22” (Call of 22) is a youth-led movement advocating for a more democratic and inclusive system. Its name represents February 22, 2019, the day when widespread demonstrations erupted throughout Algeria, ultimately resulting in the ousting of long-standing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
In recent years, however, the government has exerted more control over public discourse, leading to the imprisonment or charges against journalists and social media influencers. Repression against civil society organizations peaked in 2022/2023, casting doubt on the democratic achievements since 1989. The Hirak protests were banned in May 2021, and major civil society organizations like LADDH and RAJ were dissolved. Informal solidarity networks, evident during the COVID-19 pandemic and regional fires, remained strong.
While social trust exists at a micro level, the long-lasting societal polarization reflects the legacy of the 1990s conflict. Indigenous Amazigh organizations, such as Thajmaath, continue to maintain their long-standing presence in Kabylia’s villages. However, government repression has hindered civic engagement and active associations, thus limiting the development of a robust civil society culture.
Algeria is relatively homogeneous in terms of religion, and ethnic tensions are not a serious issue. However, political divisions, particularly those originating from the “Black Decade” in the 1990s, can still contribute to polarization. These profound divisions have influenced the perspectives of the younger generation and can impede social cohesion, as witnessed during the prolonged civil strife.
During the Hirak protest movement, which began in 2019, there was initially a unified bloc with a comprehensive set of objectives. However, as older generations assumed leadership roles within various sectors of the nationwide demonstrations, the movement fragmented into irreconcilable factions, reflecting the contradictory opposition movements against the government since the 1990s. These divisions present a challenge to achieving a unified national will, as evidenced by their impact on the Hirak movement.
It is worth noting that the Hirak protests were unique in that traditional divisions along ethnic, linguistic, and ideological lines could not be reignited despite government attempts at manipulation. The demonstrations remained inherently peaceful.
Additionally, the persistence of armed Islamist groups carrying out sporadic attacks against the military in mountainous regions of the North and East, as well as in border areas in the South, should be acknowledged. Although these groups have lost support from the local population, they continue to operate and maintain links to criminal networks in the Sahel region. In 2022, the Ministry of Defense reported disabling 39 terrorists, arresting 371 individuals supporting terrorist groups, and recovering a total of 623 weapons throughout the year.
After his election in 2019, President Tebboune announced his ambitions to build 1 million housing units to achieve one of his explicit aims: the right to housing for all Algerians – especially in rural regions, which have been relatively neglected. The construction rate considerably dropped in 2020, coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic and a 5.1% shrinkage in Algeria’s economy, but began trending upward again by the end of 2021 with a 3.5% growth in GDP. However, this upward growth was not reflected symmetrically in real estate transactions – 80% of which occur in informal market settings – owing to the highly regulated nature of the formal real estate market. By mid-2022, President Tebboune’s office had declared several investor-friendly policies in the housing market to increase competition in the formal real estate market. One such policy, issued in the Official Journal on July 31, 2022, simplified and digitized operations while also providing several tax benefits to investors. Under this model, 579,500 housing units shall be erected between 2021 and 2024. Pressures exerted by ideological factions in the political landscape, which denounce decentralization of the market, as well as those from bodies competing for resources like “Disaster Risk Management” responsible for reconstruction in natural disaster zones, prevent such programs from reaching completion in a shorter time – the latter being in proportion to the amount of damage done to infrastructure from forest fires, earthquakes, floods, and so on.
The COVID-19 restrictions, including the closure of borders, were sometimes implemented without warning, leaving thousands of citizens stranded abroad for months. Once the oil prices went up following the war on Ukraine, measures intended to diversify the economy and reduce the dependency on oil and gas exports, for instance, were halted. Although the government has demonstrated renewed steadfastness in pursuing self-sufficiency in recent years, the military hierarchy reduced the autonomy of the president.
Algeria’s public budget focuses to a large extent on military units, which likely impacts the government’s ability to use available resources efficiently. In 2022, the Ministry of Defense received $18 billion, following $9.23 billion in 2021 – already the largest defense budget on the African continent. Additionally, the Ministry of Moudjahidines (veterans of the liberation war) received $1.7 billion in 2021, ranking sixth before important ministries like Agriculture. For 2023, $23 billion were earmarked for the military budget, although the regime tries to obscure the exact utilization of these funds. Formal control organizations such as the Accountability Council (Conseil des responsabilités) also face their limits here.
These significant expenses contrast unfavorably with struggling revenues. In 2019, the International Crisis Group (ICG) pointed out inefficiencies in Algeria’s energy sector, which further hindered the economy. According to the World Bank, Algeria’s total reserves decreased from $194.7 billion in 2013 to $46.1 billion in 2021.
In 2020, there was a new impetus for change with the change in administration. In June 2020, the Algerian government passed the Supplementary Finance Law (SFL) in response to the impacts of COVID-19, which reallocated resources to the health sector, those who became unemployed, and poor households. Meanwhile, the regime is not offering incentives for the diaspora to invest in and/or cooperate with Algeria, thus depriving the country of important competencies. The recent crackdown on oppositional members of the diaspora acted as a further deterrent.
Still, the new government must strengthen human resource management, recruitment policies, training opportunities and the fight against corruption to improve resource efficiency.
Policy coordination improved as the Tebboune administration gained experience in its first two years of leadership. The war in Ukraine increased the price of natural resources, enabling Algeria to temporarily recover from its crisis-prone economy and strengthen its capabilities for intra-government coordination. However, regional insecurity and internal challenges, such as unemployment, housing, and public services, as well as the need to diversify the economy and respond to the population’s demands for political transition, present significant challenges.
A fragile regional security, combined with significant internal challenges, makes coordinating conflicting objectives into a coherent policy a major task. Addressing unemployment, lack of housing, improving public services, diversifying the economy, reconfiguring internal power dynamics following an internal regime crisis, stabilizing authoritarian rule after a massive popular contestation, regaining trust among crucial segments of society, and responding to external and internal pressure for economic reform all need to be handled, sometimes with conflicting outcomes.
Therefore, there is a need for coordination across the government and administration, and ministries often must be made aware of one another’s projects and remits. This can lead to issues such as corruption and protests. To address this, successful coordination should involve balancing trade-offs between policy goals, introducing horizontal coordination to mediate between different departments, and transparently assigning responsibilities to avoid negligence, redundancies, and friction between different government branches.
Algeria has taken steps to combat corruption through institutions like the National Anti-Corruption Association (ANLC, Autorité nationale de lutte contre la corruption) and the National Agency for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (ONPLC, Organe de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption). However, criticism has been leveled at the effectiveness of these measures in implementing anti-corruption policies and prosecuting cases, leaving their impact uncertain.
Audits of state spending are conducted but results are often undisclosed, making their exact findings and impact uncertain. This includes party financing, which is regulated, but the effectiveness in preventing corruption is uncertain.
The 2020 constitution established a newly formed “Supreme Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption,” which was in the process of becoming fully operational during the assessment period and is intended to replace the ANLC. Unlike the previous ANLC, the Supreme Authority will possess supervisory powers rather than solely consultative rights. Additionally, the Accountability Council (Conseil des responsabilités) will conduct audits of state finances.
Citizens and media formally have the right to access information, but limits in practice are omnipresent. Laws also promote transparency in public procurement and accountability of officeholders, but assessing effective consequences is difficult.
In conclusion, while the Algerian government has made some efforts to address corruption, the effectiveness of these measures remains questionable.
Algeria’s long-term goals lack consensus among major political actors. Its semi-presidential republic faces criticism for limited political pluralism, as the dominant party and its allies retain significant power. Calls for political reform and democratic freedoms faced resistance from the government, leading to restrictions on civil liberties, arbitrary arrests, censorship and the harassment of journalists and activists.
Key political actors in Algeria, including the military, government, pro-regime parties (FLN, RND), UGTA trade union, and influential businessmen, have supported the continuation of an authoritarian governance system. Despite hopes within the opposition during the Hirak uprising for dialogue and political transition, the regime has shown reluctance and crackdowns on the opposition, undermining democratic rights. This signifies a consensus among the ruling elite to reject political transition and maintain authoritarianism.
In terms of a market economy, Algeria has a mixed economy with a significant state presence in strategic sectors such as oil and gas, telecommunications and banking. The government has implemented a number of economic reforms aimed at reducing the state’s role in the economy and liberalizing certain sectors, but these reforms have been criticized for being insufficient and for not addressing structural issues such as corruption, bureaucracy, and lack of transparency.
In conclusion, it appears that there is a lack of consensus among major political actors in Algeria on democracy and a market economy as strategic, long-term goals. While some political actors may support greater democratic freedoms and economic liberalization, others may resist these changes or view them as threatening their power and interests.
Algeria boasts a multifaceted and diverse society, characterized by numerous divisions rooted in ethnic, class, political, regional, and religious distinctions. These divisions have frequently manifested themselves in internal conflicts, including the civil war of the 1990s, and have been manipulated by various political players for their personal advantages. Regrettably, the political leadership lacks a commitment to political pluralism and fails to effectively acknowledge and address these divisions and conflicts. Consequently, they are unable – perhaps, to some extent, unwilling – to foster a comprehensive consensus across cleavages and to moderate structural conflicts.
Over the past decade, divisions and cleavages in society have diminished. The coming together of the population during the Hirak protests, as well as inter-regional solidarity networks with political detainees, has impressively confirmed this trend. Attempts by certain elements of the regime in 2019 to target the Amazigh flag during the demonstrations or spread rumors and insults concerning the Berber inhabitants of Kabylia failed to divide Algerians. The Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK), primarily in the villages, signaled a persistent feeling of alienation among the fringes of the population but remained a small minority. Tensions in the M’zab region between Ibadite Berbers and Arabic-speaking populations have diminished, and the different populations united in peaceful demonstrations in 2019.
Online protests during the COVID-19 confinement continue to denounce regional inequalities, the lack of adequate infrastructure and proper equipment in hospitals, the state of the roads, nepotism in job distribution, and express a general sense of being neglected by the central state, particularly in the southern region of the country. The government’s attempts to address economic issues were, however, limited.
While the revised 2020 constitution in Algeria acknowledges the role of the Hirak protest movement in its preamble, it also reinforces the prerogatives of the executive and enshrines the political intervention of the army to “protect the interests of the nation.” Civil society activists and leading Hirak figures have criticized the insufficient consultation of a wider group and view it as a missed opportunity for more meaningful restructuring and as a potential source for a solution to the country’s crisis.
The constitution, drafted in the context of harsher repression against oppositional actors and citizens, provides for a number of so-called consultative councils that are to provide expertise to the state. Among them are the High Islamic Council (Haut Conseil Islamique), the High Council of Security (Haut Conseil de Sécurité), the National Council for Human Rights (Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme), the High Council of Youth (Conseil supérieur de la jeunesse), and the National Council for Scientific Research and Technology (Conseil national de la recherche scientifique et des technologies). The constitution also recognizes the role of the National Social, Economic, and Environmental Council (CNESE) as a consultant on policies of economic, social, and environmental development. In 2022, CNESE was involved in the country’s first-ever national consultation on children, as reported by UNICEF.
While the 1999 Civil Concord law and the 2006 Reconciliation Charter have contributed to bringing peace to Algeria, the amnesties given to state security forces and terrorists, and the imposed silence, are perceived as deeply unjust by many, particularly by the families of the 200,000 victims and the 8,000 “disappeared.” Compensation for victims has not allowed for genuine reconciliation, particularly for the families of the disappeared, who demand a right to know the truth. Cases brought to the French justice system for atrocities committed during the 1990s have created complex precedents for the Algerian government to ignore. The lack of a proper politics of “coming to terms with the past,” coupled with an instrumentalization of the 1990s trauma for the sake of authoritarian persistence, has not been conducive to reconciliation. Arguably, the 2019 demonstrations did more to reconcile Algerians with each other than any state actions in previous years.
In terms of reconciliation with the former colonial power France, the return in July 2020 of the remains of 24 fighters who were killed resisting French colonial forces in the 19th century, and whose skulls had been kept in Paris as war trophies, was an essential moment for Algeria. This was a cause for which Algerian and French intellectuals had campaigned for many years.
The political leadership in Algeria has traditionally been reluctant to accept external involvement in its development plans. This stance has been maintained with the Hirak demonstrations and fears of foreign interference and manipulation. However, given the recent economic challenges the country is facing, including COVID-19, the oil price crises and regional instability, the government has become more open to technical cooperation and a broader range of cooperation partners. However, this cooperation is not integrated into a consistent, long-term development strategy. Instead, the government’s use of international assistance has been criticized for being influenced by short-term expediencies and policy inconsistencies. There have also been allegations of rent-seeking behavior by some actors.
Algeria has a long-standing association agreement with the EU, signed in 2002 and in force since 2005. There are strong bilateral programs, such as the one with the German development agency GIZ on environmental protection and those with the United Kingdom and Ireland in the education sector. Additionally, Algeria is increasing its connections with the Anglo-Saxon world and strengthening the position of the English language within its education system.
Relations with certain Gulf states have generally improved, with increased economic investment from the Gulf and a significant Algerian expatriate population there. China also plays a significant role in Algeria’s economic and infrastructure development, as trade and investment with China continue to increase. However, the government has not taken advantage of Chinese expertise to train young people in Algeria; rather, it has chosen to employ Chinese workers.
The principles of non-interference in external affairs and a strong sense of sovereignty determine the Algerian regime’s foreign policy. However, the destabilization of the Sahel region has contributed to increased security cooperation with regional powers and the United States. Algeria has also agreed to strengthen cooperation with Russia in the energy sector, even further since the war in Ukraine.
The government has a mixed record as a credible and reliable partner in its international relations. As a member of multiple international organizations, Algeria has ratified a number of international treaties and conventions, but some organizations and governments have raised concerns about Algeria’s actual compliance with these agreements due to insufficient monitoring, particularly in areas such as human rights and labor standards. The recent dissolutions of the Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LADDH) and the Rassemblement Actions Jeunesse (RAJ), two of the most important human rights associations in Algeria, underscore these concerns.
Algeria signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in December 2000 but has not taken any further steps for ratification since then.
Algeria has been a significant and dependable partner in terms of energy supply and security cooperation, both in the fight against terrorism and in diplomatic efforts to address crises in its immediate vicinity. Most immediately, it has utilized its powerful military capabilities, recognized expertise in counter-terrorism, and diplomatic experience to mediate in the Malian conflict. However, Algeria’s credibility on the international stage has been partially called into question due to the simultaneous escalation of tensions with Morocco since summer 2021. This is particularly evident with Algeria’s decision in November 2021 to shut down the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline, which it jointly operated with Morocco and which led to Spain. Additionally, in June 2022, Algeria suspended a friendship agreement with Madrid due to Spain’s pro-Moroccan stance concerning the Western Sahara.
Between 2016 and 2020, Algeria spent around $34 billion on Russian weapons, establishing Russia as its primary supplier of arms. As tensions with Morocco continue to escalate, it has become increasingly crucial for the Algerian military to maintain these connections with Russia. In fact, reports indicate that the two nations’ armies conducted joint “counter-terrorism” exercises in November 2022 on Algeria’s western borders. This development is unsurprising, considering the agreement between Algiers and Moscow on matters like Western Sahara. Furthermore, statements made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggest that Algeria is actively seeking to strengthen its relations with Russia, despite the potential negative response from the international community. This situation raises concerns about Algeria’s inclination to align itself more closely with Russia’s strategic interests, potentially at the expense of other partners.
To sustain and promote Algeria’s current economic recovery, the government should prioritize diversifying the economy to reduce reliance on hydrocarbon exports. This goal can be achieved by encouraging investments in non-hydrocarbon sectors, particularly agriculture, services, and manufacturing. Additionally, the government should continue eliminating regulations limiting foreign ownership and provide support to startups and small businesses. These actions, along with support for SMEs and independent associations, as well as initiatives like training and international exchanges, can foster a more constructive relationship between the administration and citizens. Promoting foreign investment will also yield benefits in terms of employment, creativity, and economic development.
To address inflation, the government should consider implementing policies that boost domestic food production and reduce imports. Increasing subsidies for essential food items can protect the purchasing power of low-income households. Furthermore, structural reforms aimed at enhancing productivity and reducing costs in the public sector, such as streamlining public services and reducing bureaucracy, are crucial.
Regarding freedom of the press, the government should prioritize the protection of journalists and media outlets. This can be achieved by releasing arbitrarily detained journalists, creating a conducive environment for media operations, and ensuring that journalists can report news freely.
To bolster its global standing, the government should focus on strengthening international relations and expanding participation in global affairs. Building stronger ties with other countries, especially those in Africa, and leveraging its strategic position as a major hydrocarbon producer can lead to favorable trade and investment deals.
In terms of resource efficiency, the government should maximize the utilization of human, financial, and organizational resources. This involves implementing policies to enhance the efficiency of government administrative personnel. Measures may include reducing politically motivated dismissals, limiting new appointments of public servants, and establishing competitive recruiting procedures insulated from political influences. Additionally, the government should strive for transparent budget planning and implementation, maintain a balanced state budget, and manage state debt at a manageable level.
To improve administrative efficiency, the government should focus on modernizing and reforming the public administration. This includes implementing procedures and institutions that support “responsible” decentralization, granting local self-government legal and financial autonomy, and enabling public scrutiny of local administration activities.
In summary, the government should enact policies that prioritize economic diversification, address inflation, safeguard freedom of the press, enhance international relations, and strengthen the education system. By taking these steps, the government can sustain and promote the current economic recovery and enhance the overall well-being of the country. Additionally, focusing on English language instruction from an early age can boost the country’s competitiveness in the global market and create new opportunities for trade and investment.
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Algerian War, (1954–62) war for Algerian independence from France. The movement for independence began during World War I (1914–18) and gained momentum after French promises of greater self-rule in Algeria went unfulfilled after World War II (1939–45). In 1954 the National Liberation Front (FLN)
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Encyclopedia Britannica
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https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War
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Algerian War, (1954–62) war for Algerian independence from France. The movement for independence began during World War I (1914–18) and gained momentum after French promises of greater self-rule in Algeria went unfulfilled after World War II (1939–45). In 1954 the National Liberation Front (FLN) began a guerrilla war against France and sought diplomatic recognition at the UN to establish a sovereign Algerian state. Although Algerian fighters operated in the countryside—particularly along the country’s borders—the most serious fighting took place in and around Algiers, where FLN fighters launched a series of violent urban attacks that came to be known as the Battle of Algiers (1956–57). French forces (which increased to 500,000 troops) managed to regain control but only through brutal measures, and the ferocity of the fighting sapped the political will of the French to continue the conflict. In 1959 Charles de Gaulle declared that the Algerians had the right to determine their own future. Despite terrorist acts by French Algerians opposed to independence and an attempted coup in France by elements of the French army, an agreement was signed in 1962, and Algeria became independent. See also Raoul Salan.
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Climate Change Knowledge Portal
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The Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) provides global data on historical and future climate, vulnerabilities, and impacts.
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Overall risks from climate-related impacts are evaluated based on the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability of communities (susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to adapt), and exposure of human and natural systems. Changes in both the climate system and socioeconomic processes -including adaptation and mitigation actions- are drivers of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability (IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, 2014).
This section provides a summary of key natural hazards and their associated socioeconomic impacts in a given country. And it allows quick evaluation of most vulnerable areas through the spatial comparison of natural hazard data with development data, thereby identifying exposed livelihoods and natural systems.
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Algeria: Bloody Past and Fractious Factions
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By David B. Ottaway
Riding the regional political wave, Algeria’s leading Islamic party proclaimed on New Year’s Day 2012 that it intended to become the primary political force in the Arab world’s second most populous country. But unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the declaration in Algeria did not mark the first attempt by Islamist politicians to take power. Algeria has had the longest—and darkest—experience with Islamist politics, dating back a generation. As a result, the North African country is far more anxious about what might happen if Islamist parties try again.
Algeria’s Islamists arrived at the cusp of power in 1992, when the Islamic Salvation Front was on the verge of winning a parliamentary election in a field of more than fifty parties. On the eve of a runoff vote, however, the Algerian military led a coup against the long-standing president, aborted the election, and arrested Islamist political leaders. With nonviolent Islamist leaders imprisoned, the coup soon spawned an extremist insurgency and a tough military counterinsurgency that plunged the country into civil war for the rest of the decade. More than 100,000 people died in the process.
So, still scarred by the so-called Black Decade, Algeria did not witness a popular pro-democracy uprising in 2011, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Yet in some ways, Algeria is way ahead of other Arab countries, where Islamic parties only recently won political office for the first time.
To co-opt Islamist sentiment, Algeria’s military appointed members of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), a moderate offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, to cabinet jobs in 1995. The movement has held as many as seven ministries ever since. In 2004, it even became part of an alliance with two secular parties that has kept the military-backed president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999.
Although Algeria’s more moderate Islamists have now had a share in the country’s governance for seventeen years, their failure to affect the military government’s policies has reduced the Islamists’ popularity considerably. Algerian Islamists have thus already experienced both the temptations and the pitfalls of serving in governments they do not control. The movement has been criticized for a meager record of accomplishments. In 2009, an MSP faction broke away after charging that the party had nothing to show for fourteen years in government.
Political Islam in Algeria has its own special history. Unlike Islamists elsewhere in North Africa, Algeria’s Islamists have been deeply fragmented. Some belong to mystical indigenous Sufi orders. Others cleave either to Saudi Arabia’s strict Wahhabism, which is one brand of Salafism, or to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Several hundred Algerian Islamists have followed al Qaeda’s call to violent jihad. But the various branches lack dynamic leadership. No towering Islamic figure, such as Tunisia’s Sheikh Rachid al Ghannouchi, has emerged to unite Algerian Islamists in their quest for power.
The Algerian military, which has dominated power since 1965, has also masterfully manipulated the myriad Islamic parties and politicians. And even moderate Islamists have been tainted by the blood-drenched insurgency of their extremist brethren. In 2012, a generation later, diehard Islamist remnants remained in several remote outposts.
The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, which brought Islamist parties into powerful positions in Tunisia and Egypt and even in Morocco’s monarchy, led Algeria’s Islamists to think they, too, might finally achieve a political breakthrough. But it didn’t happen. Algeria’s Islamists were trounced by secular pro-government parties in the 2012 parliamentary elections. In 2014, ailing President Bouteflika won a landslide victory—and a fourth term in office. Algeria seemed stuck in a time warp with no sign of political change in sight.
The Beginning
Algerian Islamists have struggled to revive their cause since French colonial rule systematically suppressed Islam, education in Arabic, and the mere notion of an Algerian identity. Algeria was declared part of France and French culture forever. French arrogance so infuriated a small core of Algerian intellectuals that in 1931 they formed the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars led by Sheikh Abelhamid Ben Badis. He had received religious instruction in Tunis and Cairo, where in 1928 Hassan al Banna had launched the Muslim Brotherhood to promote Islamic reforms in Egypt.
Ben Badis framed the new movement in a few succinct words. “Islam is my religion, Arabic my language, and Algeria my country,” he pronounced. With other Muslim scholars, he began preaching that Algeria could never be part of France because of its different culture, religion, and language.
Ben Badis died in 1940, fourteen years before secular Algerian nationalists launched their war for independence from France. But he is credited with spearheading the revival of Muslim and Arab identity that is a central tenet of Islamists to this day. Among his associates in the Association of Muslim Scholars were Sheikh Abdellatif Soltani (1904–1983) and Sheikh Ahmed Sahnoun (1907–2003), who began planting the seeds for the Algerian Muslim Brotherhood in 1953.
Islamic groups did not play a leadership role in Algeria’s eight-year war for independence. None of the National Liberation Front’s nine major leaders was an Islamist. And the war’s main goals were to restore the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state with only a secondary reference to Islamic principles. Yet Islam was widely used to rally supporters in the rural areas. Guerrillas were called mujahideen, or holy warriors. And those who died for independence were dubbed choudaha, or religious martyrs.
After independence in July 1962, the first Algerian government under Ahmed Ben Bella lurched radically to the left, largely under the influence of Algerian and French communists and Trotskyites, who flocked to Algiers to guide its burgeoning socialist revolution. Leftist labor union activists and Algerian communists still play an active role in politics through their own Workers’ Party.
The first sign of Islamic protest surfaced in 1964 with the creation of the religious association al Qiyam, which means “Islamic values.” It was led by three Islamists: Soltani, Sahnoun, and Abbasi Madani. The latter would play a major role in the Islamists’ first quest for power between 1988 and 1992.
After only three years of independence, the Algerian military, led by Colonel Houari Boumediene toppled Ben Bella, threw out foreign communists, and promised a “return to the sources.” Educated only in Arab countries, Boumediene promoted Islamic values, Arabic education, and Arabic culture with the help of thousands of imported Egyptian teachers, many of them Muslim Brotherhood members. But he insisted on tight state control over the process of Islamization. And he replaced communist-inspired socialism with military-backed state socialism.
Al Qiyam leaders soon had a falling out with Boumediene, particularly over their opposition to his land reform program. He banned their activities in 1966 and their organization four years later.
Boumediene’s death in 1978 sparked a new phase of Islamic activism. His successor, Chadli Bendjedid, tolerated the Islamists’ campaign against foreign ways, whether communism, the French language, alcohol, or Western dress for women. But the strategy soon backfired, especially on university campuses. Young Arabic-speaking Islamists found it difficult to obtain jobs because they did not speak French. Algiers even witnessed violent student clashes pitting Arabic speakers against French speakers.
The trouble came to a head in November 1982, when Islamists at the University of Algiers beheaded a leftist opponent with a sword. Bendjedid ordered the police to round up hundreds of students. In reaction, 100,000 Islamists turned out for the biggest rally ever held on the downtown Algiers campus to hear Sheikhs Soltani, Sahnoun, and Madani present a proposal to set up an Islamic state.
Madani was thrown into jail, and the other two sheikhs were placed under house arrest. The event marked a turning point in the open confrontation between Islamists and the military.
The first Islamist figure to take to the mountains to pursue an Islamic state by armed force was Mustapha Bouyali, a national liberation war veteran and visionary imam preaching at an Algiers mosque against the Western-inspired iniquities of Algerians. Bouyali launched his own holy war in early 1982 and convinced several hundred others to join his Armed Islamic Movement (MIA). Bouyali’s insurrection lasted until 1987, when he was found and killed while hiding in the Algiers casbah. But the MIA lived on as an inspiration to other hardline Islamists.
Islamist influence continued to grow significantly throughout the 1980s as the military government sought to expand its popular base. Thousands of new mosques sprang up across the country, and cities and towns were given Arabic names.
In 1984, the National Assembly passed a family code based mostly on Sharia, or Islamic law. The code deprived Algerian women of many of the rights they had previous enjoyed; it also legalized polygamy. A new National Charter adopted in 1986 stressed Islam’s central role in the life of the nation.
The Algiers Spring
The Islamist challenge to the military government started coming to a head during riots in Algiers in October 1988. The riots led to the collapse of Algeria’s single-party system, which had been dominated by the National Liberation Front ever since independence. Islamists did not cause the riots. They were actually touched off by jobless youth and other malcontents, who attacked government buildings and offices.
Unrest then spread from the capital to other major cities. But Islamists quickly seized the turmoil to rally supporters, organize mass demonstrations, and directly challenge the military government. Shocked by the breadth and size of the burgeoning popular uprising, Bendjedid ordered the army into the cities to restore order. Estimates of the death toll from the military crackdown varied from 170 to 500.
After restoring order, Bendjedid launched a series of reforms, starting with a new constitution in early 1989 that allowed a free press and multiple political parties. In a fateful gamble, the military authorized the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as one of the more than fifty new parties.
The FIS’s leaders were Madani, head of the defunct al Qiyam association, and Ali Belhadj, a rabble-rousing cleric from Kouba, a working-class district in downtown Algiers. Both were puritanical Salafis, but Belhadj was outspoken in his regard of manmade democracy as anathema to divine rule.
From the start, the FIS encompassed a hodgepodge of militant Islamists. They included veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, known as Algerian Afghans; Saudi-influenced Salafis; and adherents to a homegrown school of Islamic thinking called the Djaz’ara.
Other more moderate Islamic parties also had their debut during this “Algiers Spring.” The local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood registered as Hamas, totally unrelated to the radical Palestinian group by the same name. Algeria’s Hamas was led by Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah, who had taken over the movement after its founder, Sheikh Soltani, died in 1984.
A third Islamic party, Ennahda, was established by a highly respected scholar, Sheikh Abdallah Djaballah. He was also a Muslim Brother, although he wanted to remain independent of the Brotherhood’s headquarters in Cairo.
Of the three legal Islamic parties, the radical but then nonviolent Front scored the biggest gains. In mid-1990, local elections polarized the country between Islamists and secularists when the Islamic Salvation Front won a stunning 54 percent of the vote. The ruling National Liberation Front garnered only 28 percent.
The Front captured 70 percent of the vote in the three largest cities of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. It also swept 856 out of all 1,541 municipalities. And it gained a majority in thirty-one of the forty-eight assemblies at the wilaya, or provincial, level. By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Ennahda Party gained only 5 percent of the popular vote.
The results put the military in a quandary about whether to go ahead with parliamentary elections. Communists, leftist labor unions, and secular parties also showed little enthusiasm as they watched the Front-dominated municipal councils demand rule under Islamic law. Front leaders Madani and Belhadj took turns threatening a holy war if elections were canceled, and they held massive rallies calling for an Islamic state. Both were arrested for promoting a nationwide strike in June 1990.
Still, the military government did hold a first round of two-part parliamentary elections on December 26, 1991. The elections confirmed the likelihood of a full Islamic Salvation Front takeover. The Front won 188 out of 231 seats compared with only 15 seats for the ruling National Liberation Front.
Secularist parties, labor unions, and women reacted by forming a National Committee for the Safeguard of Algeria. They urged the military to call off the final round of elections scheduled for January 16, 1992. So did France and the United States, which feared that, once in power, the FIS would never hold another election.
The second round was never held. Under military pressure, Bendjedid resigned on January 11, 1992. Three days later, a military-appointed State High Council took power. The opening shots of civil war rang out on February 8 during clashes between the military and Front supporters at mosques across the country. On March 4, the State High Council outlawed the Front and kept Madani and Belhadj in jail.
The Black Decade
The following eight years witnessed an ever more ruthless struggle between the military and jihadi Islamists from a plethora of armed groups. The moribund Armed Islamic Movement was revived. FIS radicals split off to form the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The Front’s more moderate members set up their own Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).
Toward the end of the 1990s, diehard Islamists opposed to all peace efforts formed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the forerunner of the local al Qaeda branch. Tens of thousands of Afghan war veterans, jobless youth, disaffected Arabic-educated students, and plain criminals joined one of the extremist groups.
All sides participated in the bloodshed. Hallmarks of the brutal insurrection included throat-slitting and decapitation of moderate Islamists and secular intellectuals, journalists, and politicians. The disparate Islamist factions massacred each other’s supporters and carried out attacks on the military. In turn, secret security force units perpetrated extrajudicial killings of even innocent villagers in a bid to discredit one Islamic group or another.
Each year, the holy month of Ramadan became a pretext for the worst slaughters. The GIA ordered all foreigners to leave the country and assassinated more than fifty who dared to stay.
The most horrific example of GIA attacks on foreigners involved the killing in May 1996 of seven Cistercian Trappist monks at the Tibhirine Monastery outside the town of Medea, which lies south of Algiers. (The 2010 film Of Gods and Men dramatized the event.)
The GIA even took its war to Paris, where bombs went off at subway stations and on train lines. In December 1994, four GIA terrorists hijacked an Air France civilian airliner with the intent of crashing it into the Eiffel Tower, foreshadowing tactics used in the 9/11 attacks in the United States. (The Air France hijackers were killed by French commandos while the aircraft refueled in Marseille.)
Against this backdrop of unending violence, some moderate Islamists joined secularist parties to seek a peaceful resolution of the civil war. In January 1995, two FIS leaders and Ennahda’s Sheikh Djaballah joined three secular parties, including the ruling National Liberation Front, in signing a peace pact negotiated by the Rome-based Catholic Sant’Egidio Order. The Rome Accords called for a national conference to negotiate a transition back to civilian rule, the return of the army to its barracks, and an end to the ban on FIS political activities.
The military immediately rejected the accords. It instead held a presidential election to replace the military’s five-member State High Council in November 1995. Islamists involved in the insurrection vehemently opposed the plan.
But the Muslim Brotherhood’s Hamas opted to participate and selected its leader, Nahnah, to run against the military’s General Liamine Zeroual. Nahnah captured 25 percent of the vote against Zeroual’s 60 percent. As a reward for participating, the military gave Hamas two cabinet posts in the new government, which was formed on the last day of 1995.
For the first time in the history of Algeria—and the rest of North Africa—the Muslim Brotherhood had gained a foothold in government.
Islamists in Government
Even in the face of escalating violence, the military next organized parliamentary elections in June 1997. This time, two Muslim Brotherhood–inspired parties agreed to participate: Hamas, now renamed the Movement of Society for Peace, and Ennahda.
The movement won 1.6 million votes, or 14.8 percent, catapulting it into the National Assembly for the first time with sixty-nine deputies. It came in second behind the National Rally for Democracy, the new government party taking over from the National Liberation Front, which captured 3.5 million votes, or 34 percent, and thus 156 seats, well short of a majority in the 380-seat assembly. Ennahda came in fourth with 915,000 votes, or 8.7 percent, giving it thirty-four seats. Together, the two moderate Islamic parties took 23.5 percent of the vote compared to only 14.3 percent for the long-ruling National Liberation Front.
Forced to form a coalition government, the military chose to include the Movement of Society for Peace in an alliance with two secular parties. This time, the MSP was put in charge of seven ministries or agencies: industry, small and medium-sized enterprises, transportation, tourism, environment, fisheries, and artisanal production. Conspicuously absent from the list was any ministry dealing with security.
The MSP has remained the principal Islamic faction supporting the military government ever since. When General Zeroual retired in 1999, the Islamist party immediately backed Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the military’s choice to replace Zeroual. Since 2004, the movement has been part of a three-party alliance that repeatedly endorsed his reelection.
A national liberation war veteran and former foreign minister, Bouteflika is credited with finally ending Algeria’s civil war. He first struck a peace deal with the smallest armed Islamist group, the AIS, and then offered an amnesty from prosecution to all the others. The so-called civil accord was approved in a referendum held in September 2000 by 98.6 percent of the vote, on a turnout of 85 percent.
In 2005, the civil accord was followed by the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which provided compensation to the families of 25,000 victims of the civil war, including the 5,800 “disappeared,” who were widely believed to be military victims. Altogether, between 100,000 and 200,000 Algerians died during the Black Decade, compared with some 1 million victims during the war for independence.
The Price for Participation
The MSP strategy of participation has come at considerable cost to its popularity and credibility. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, it won only a little more than 500,000 votes, or 7 percent of the total cast. Its number of deputies dropped from sixty-nine to thirty-eight. But its main Islamic rival, Ennahda, did well. Ennahda garnered 705,000 votes, or 9.5 percent, and jumped from zero to forty-three seats in the National Assembly.
In the next parliamentary elections, held in 2007, both Islamists and the military government lost legitimacy. Only 35 percent of Algeria’s 18.7 million voters bothered to go to the polls. The movement won slightly more votes (552,000) than in 2002, an increase that parlayed into fifty-two seats. But Ennahda plummeted in popularity, winning fewer than 200,000 votes. The number of its deputies dropped from forty-three to just five. The Islamists combined won a mere 13 percent of the turnout.
Presidential elections in April 2009 starkly illustrated the declining popularity of both the regime and the MSP. Before the poll, Bouteflika manipulated the National Assembly to revise the constitution and allow him to run for a third term. He also engineered a successful revolt to oust Djaballah from leadership of al Islah, the party Djaballah had founded in 1999 after leaving Ennahda. This move neutralized the one Islamic opposition figure sufficiently popular to threaten Bouteflika. The MSP, however, continued to support the president.
The main question hanging over the 2009 presidential election was the turnout. Public cynicism about government manipulation of elections, parties, and poll figures reached new heights. Bouteflika was declared the winner with 90 percent of the vote, on a 75 percent turnout. The opposition, however, claimed that only 16 percent of the electorate voted.
As later disclosed in a WikiLeaks cable, the U.S. embassy in Algiers described the election as “carefully choreographed and heavily controlled” and estimated the turnout at “25 to 30 percent at most.” Making the election even less representative of the political landscape, the Workers’ Party’s Trotskyite leader, Louisa Hanoune, came in second. The one Islamist candidate to participate received just 1 percent of the vote.
The election fallout for the Movement of Society for Peace was immediate. Within two months, a faction within the MSP led by Abdelmajid Menasra broke away to form the Movement for Preaching and Change, which criticized MSP leader Soltani for serving as a minister while also remaining party leader. Another faction that remained within the MSP felt the movement should withdraw from the government and go into open opposition. In response, Soltani resigned, but four other MSP ministers remained in the government. The military rewarded the MSP by refusing to allow the breakaway party to operate.
The Arab Spring
The uprisings of early 2011 caught both the military and Algeria’s Islamists by surprise. Bouteflika, at age 74, had by then become an absentee president because of serious health problems. He rarely spoke in public—just three times during all of 2011. Since the president had no sons, vice president, or other obvious successor, public unease was already growing about who would lead the country next.
The political vacuum became visible when street protests over rising food prices, housing shortages, and unemployment broke out in Algiers in January 2011, sparking violent confrontations with the police. At least three protesters died, more than 800 others were injured, and more than 1,000 were arrested. Imitating the Tunisian street vendor whose self-immolation sparked the Arab Spring, an unemployed youth set himself on fire on January 13 after the mayor refused to provide either a job or housing.
A secular opposition party tried repeatedly to mobilize demonstrations in Algiers, but security forces quickly quashed them. Islamists, traumatized by events during the Black Decade, were nowhere to be seen.
The government responded quickly to head off a repeat of the October 1988 riots. It was financially well placed to pacify discontent because of the country’s oil wealth and high oil prices. Algeria’s foreign reserves stood at $155 billion at the start of 2011; they increased to $186 billion by September—sufficient to cover four years of imports. Food subsidies and civil servants’ salaries were increased, the latter by 34 percent.
In early February, Bouteflika lifted the nineteen-year state of emergency. On April 15, he announced constitutional reforms to “strengthen democracy.” They included a new media law permitting private television and radio stations, as well as a revision in the election law to allow parties to register more easily. The government also set new parliamentary elections for May 2012.
After the yearlong unrest, the MSP made its dramatic move. On New Year’s Day 2012, party chief Sheikh Soltani announced the movement was quitting the three-party alliance supporting President Bouteflika. Sheikh Soltani declared that 2012 would be “the year of political competition … and not that of alliance.”
Soltani then denounced the coalition for “political mediocrity” that served neither the country nor its people. He also said that the MSP would keep its four ministers in the cabinet. The moves were an attempt to face the public over the movement’s long record of support for the highly unpopular military but without breaking completely with the government.
The 2011 uprisings across North Africa radically changed the MSP’s political calculations and strategy. It formed the Algerian Green Alliance with two other Islamic parties to run in the May 2012 parliamentary elections. Together, they expected to win at least a plurality of votes--and seats. But secular Algerians were in no mood to see Islamists come to power. The two main pro-government secular parties--the National Liberation Front and the National Rally for Democracy--won 288 seats, or 62 percent of the total 462 seats. The Green alliance captured only 48 seats--four less than the MSP alone had held in the previous assembly. Two other small Islamic parties won an additional 11 seats.
MSP Vice President Abderrazak Makri warned that the government had missed its “historic chance” to begin a peaceful transformation toward true democracy. But neither the government nor the Algerian public appeared to be swayed.
In the 2014 presidential election, President Bouteflika won 82 percent of the vote, even though he was so ill that he never campaigned and made only one brief speech. He won 4.5 million fewer votes than in the 2009 election, however. The MSP and other Islamic parties boycotted the election, leaving a former prime minister, Ali Benflis, as the main challenger. He came in a distant second with only 12 percent of the vote.
In mid-2014, Algeria’s opposition parties responded to their defeat by creating a broad coalition, including both secularists and Islamists, called the Coordination for Liberties and Democratic Transition. The coalition’s goal was to hold a national conference, with a government delegation, to generate movement toward greater democracy. But the government showed no interest. It instead launched a counter-proposal to discuss unspecified changes to the constitution.
Key Positions
By early 2015, Algeria had seven Islamist parties or informal factions. Three parties—Ennahda, al Islah, and the MSP—had already participated in a presidential or parliamentary election. All three were rooted in Muslim Brotherhood thinking and differed mainly over whether to seek changes in the political system from within or outside the military government.
But two of the potentially strongest Islamic contenders did not run in the 2012 elections. The military continued to ban the Islamic Salvation Front from politics, while the large but quiescent Salafi community showed no interest in politics. So Algeria’s active Islamist spectrum was defined by seven groups with diverse positions.
The Movement of Society for Peace
The MSP is the Islamic group that has consistently supported military rule, participation in government, and cooperation with secular parties since 1995. Its strategy has been to win more power by showing the military that it is responsible and trustworthy while gaining practical experience in governance.
Its political program carefully straddles all the hot-button issues. It avoids mention of an Islamic state or the Muslim Sharia as the law of the land. Its stated goal is a “modern Algerian state in conformity with the spirit of Islamic principles,” but which also endorses democracy and “a republican regime.” It recognizes the special Amazigh (Berber) origins of Algeria but also stresses that the country belongs to the Islamic and Arab worlds.
The MSP policy toward women also treads carefully. It endorses women’s right to education and work, even suggesting reduced hours to allow time for raising families. But the policy does not mention revising the Islamic-inspired Family Code of 1984, and the movement has shown no support for special quotas for women in the National Assembly.
Its economic policy straddles the capitalist-socialist divide. The MSP endorses state control of “strategic public sectors” and a social welfare state including cash payments even to unemployed university graduates. But it also supports promotion of small and medium-sized private enterprises and private investment to reduce Algeria’s dependence on the state-run oil sector. At the same time, it demands the creation of an Islamic banking system that forbids interest on loans.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the MSP’s foreign policy is the prominence given to the Palestinian issue, which the movement describes as “the central cause of the nation.” The MSP calls for the reconquest of “all Palestinian territory” from Israel and for an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The program makes no mention of the 2002 Arab Peace Plan, which offered Israel normalization of relations in return for a resolution of the Palestinian issue.
The National Front for Change
The National Front for Change is led by Abdelmajid Menasra, who broke away from the MSP in 2009 after rejecting continued participation in government. Along with MSP leader Soltani, Menasra had been one of the first two Islamists to hold cabinet posts beginning in the mid-1990s. He subsequently became disenchanted over the lack of “real democracy” and the “empty reforms” by successive military governments. Menasra claims to have recruited away 50 percent of MSP members. His party has also called for an amnesty for former FIS members and has appealed to them to join the National Front for Change.
Menasra has said that the kind of popular uprising that occurred in Egypt and Tunisia is not the right strategy for Algerian Islamists. He has launched a petition campaign dubbed “One Million for Popular Reform” to pressure the Bouteflika regime to hold transparent elections, write a new constitution, increase freedoms, and launch new economic projects to reduce unemployment.
Ennahda
Founded by Sheikh Abdallah Djaballah in 1990, Ennahda has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement. It has supported participation in the political process but not in the military government. It is not related to Tunisia’s Ennahda Party and has maintained its independence from the Brotherhood’s headquarters in Cairo.
In 2012, Ennahda leader Fateh Rebiai described his Islamism as “anchored in Algerian society.” The party saw a sharp decline in its popularity after ousting Djaballah in 1997, who then created the rival al Islah Party. In the last parliamentary elections in 2007, Ennahda won just 3 percent of the vote and five seats. Rebiai did not compete in the 2009 presidential race.
Al Islah
Known also as the Movement for National Reform, al Islah is the successor to the nearly defunct Ennahda and was created by Abdallah Djaballah in 1999. After a dissident faction expelled Djaballah in 2006, al Islah struggled to define itself or attract support. Its leader, Mohamed Djahid Younsi, won only 177,000 votes, barely 1 percent, in the 2009 presidential election. Al Islah has since gone through several other leaders. Bouteflika adopted many of al Islah’s proposed political reforms after the Arab Spring broke out in Tunisia and Egypt.
The Justice and Development Front
Launched in August 2011, the Justice and Development Front is the third party founded by Sheikh Djaballah after his ouster from both Ennahda and al Islah. A respected Islamic scholar, Djaballah is extremely conservative on social issues. His dislike of the former colonial power is such that he refuses to speak French.
Djaballah was a signatory of the 1995 Rome Accords, which rejected violence, called for national reconciliation, and recognized Islam, Arabism, and Amazigh (Berber) as central characteristics of the Algerian identity. Djaballah has prided himself on refusing to cooperate with the military regime. A highly effective orator, he probably will present the greatest challenge to both the MSP and the military regime.
The Movement for Liberty and Social Justice
Founded in 2007, this movement is led by former FIS leaders, most of whom now live in exile. They have been seeking, without success, to convince the military that their members have forsworn violence and truly embraced multiparty democracy. They claim inspiration from the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars, which was popular in the 1930s. One of the movement’s cofounders is Anwar Haddam, who was elected in 1991 to the National Assembly before the military canceled the elections. He currently lives in exile near Washington, D.C.
The movement’s political platform is extremely vague. It calls simply for more freedoms, the rule of law, an end to corruption, and respect for minority and women’s rights without specifics. It proclaims the need for a “realistic foreign policy” centered on cooperation with other countries of the Maghreb (Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian problem based on a two-state solution with both entities having mixed populations of Arabs and Jews.
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
Founded in 1998, toward the end of the Black Decade, the GSPC broke away from the GIA with between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters. The GSPC goal is to establish an Islamic state through force of arms. Throughout the 2000s, the GSPC carried out an array of violent activities, including guerrilla warfare against the army, attacks on foreigners, suicide bombings, and the abduction of tourists in the Sahara Desert.
Its leader is Abdelmalek Droukdal, also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud. In 2006, he pledged allegiance to al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. Droukdal then became head of the Algerian branch of al Qaeda in the Maghreb. Only a few hundred Algerians answered his call to jihad, which is aimed mainly against Algeria’s military-backed government. His followers operated from bases both in the Sahara Desert and in the mountains less than 60 miles east of Algiers.
The Future
The military regime has regularly rigged the election process. Despite President Bouteflika’s ailing health, military hardliners, known as the “eradicators” for their role in the Islamic insurgency of the 1990s, still control Algerian political life. General Mohammed “Toufik” Mediène, the regime’s éminence grise and chief of the all-powerful Security and Intelligence Service since 1990—was still at his post in late 2014, although reportedly exercising less influence.
The Movement of Society for Peace boasted that it could win the 2012 parliamentary election. But even in an alliance with two other Islamist parties, it won just six percent of the vote. All of Algeria’s Islamic parties together could claim less than 15 percent of the total. The Arab Spring produced no upsurge in support for the Islamists. Nor did secular opposition parties gain traction. So the military faced no pressure to consider a larger role for either the Islamists or the secular opposition.
By early 2015, the military, largely through its Security and Intelligence Department, seemed poised to dominate Algeria’s political life well into the future, even after Bouteflika.
David B. Ottaway, a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, lived in Algiers from 1962 to 1966. A former Middle East correspondent for The New York Times and The Washington Post, he coauthored, “Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution” with his wife Marina Ottaway. He visited Algeria again in 2009 and 2010.
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https://www.amazon.com/Minilabel-Rectangle-Self-Stick-Algerian-Stickers/dp/B00E63F3NQ
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Amazon.com
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Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: comparative analysis
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[
"Hajer Dahmani",
"Ines Fradi",
"Leila Achour",
"Mondher Toumi",
"Maghreb Research Group"
] |
2023-08-19T00:00:00
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In this paper, we outline and compare pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies for in-patent prescription medicines in three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and explore possible improvements in their pricing and reimbursement ...
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J Mark Access Health Policy. 2023; 11(1): 2244304.
PMCID: PMC10443953
PMID: 37614557
Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: comparative analysis
, a , b , c , d and Maghreb Research Group c , * , #
Hajer Dahmani
aDepartment of Pharmaceutical Quality Assessment, National Laboratory of Control of Medicines, Tunis, Tunisia
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Ines Fradi
bPharmacy, University of Pharmacy of Monastir Tunisia, Monastir, Tunisia
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Leila Achour
cMarket Access, Specialist Pharmacist in Clinical Pharmacy at CNGMO Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia
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Mondher Toumi
dProfessor in Public Health, Public Health Department, Aix Marseille University, Marseille, France
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Maghreb Research Group
cMarket Access, Specialist Pharmacist in Clinical Pharmacy at CNGMO Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia
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aDepartment of Pharmaceutical Quality Assessment, National Laboratory of Control of Medicines, Tunis, Tunisia
bPharmacy, University of Pharmacy of Monastir Tunisia, Monastir, Tunisia
cMarket Access, Specialist Pharmacist in Clinical Pharmacy at CNGMO Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia
dProfessor in Public Health, Public Health Department, Aix Marseille University, Marseille, France
CONTACT Hajer Dahmani rf.oohay@inamhadrejah Analytical development of medicines, National Laboratory of Control of Medicines Tunisia, France
*List of interviewees is illustrated in the appendix 1.
#The name of the interviewees: Pr Samir AHID, Dr Amine AISSAOUI. Dr Abdelkrim AYOUGIL. Dr Zied BELGHITH, Dr Mohamed BEN FRADJ. Dr Teyssir BEN HOURIA, Dr Rym CHAABANE, Dr Khaoula CHARGUI, Dr Ihsane ELJOUDANI, Dr Naoufel EL MALHOUF, Dr Imen NAFFETI, Dr Hajer FELFEL, Dr Nesrine GHOZZI, Dr Ahlem GZARA, Dr Sondes HAMIDA, Dr Karima HAMMAMI, Dr Mariem HEDHIBEL, Dr Mouna JAMALEDDINE, Dr Mouna KHARRAZ, Dr Mariem KHROUF, Dr Faten LEMKACHER, Dr Imene LIMAYEM, Dr M. MOUMEN, Dr Saddek OUSEDDIK, Dr Fadhila REBHI, Dr Wafa REKIK, Dr Redouane SOUALMI, Dr Fadela TAZI BEN DJELLOUN, Dr Amor TOUMI, Dr Amine ZAGHDOUDI, Dr Mohammed Wadie ZERHOUNI.
Copyright © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
ABSTRACT
Objectives
In this paper, we outline and compare pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies for in-patent prescription medicines in three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and explore possible improvements in their pricing and reimbursement systems.
Methods
The evidence informing this study comes from both an extensive literature review and a primary data collection from experts in the three studied countries.
Key findings
Twenty-six local experts where interviewed Intervieweesincluded ministry officials, representatives of national regulatory authorities, health insurance organizations, pharmaceutical procurement departments and agencies, academics, private pharmaceutical-sector actors, and associations. Results show that External Reference Pricing (ERP) is the dominant pricing method for in-patent medicines in the studied countries. Value-based pricing through Health Technology Assessment (HTA) is a new concept, recently used in Tunisia to help the reimbursement decision of some in-patent medicines but not yet used in the pricing of innovative medicines in the studied countries. Reimbursement decision is mainly based on negotiations set on Internal Reference Pricing (IRP).
Conclusion
Whereas each country has its specific regulations, there are many similarities in the pricing and reimbursement policies of in-patent medicines in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The ERP was found to be the dominant method to inform pricing and reimbursement decisions of in-patent medicines. Countries in the region can focus on the development of explicit value assessment systems and minimize their dependence on ERP over the longer-term. In this context, HTA will rely on local assessment of the evidence.
KEYWORDS: Pricing, reimbursement, in-patent-pharmaceuticals, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
Introduction
Access to health services and pharmaceuticals is a fundamental human right [1]; some countries incorporate it in their national constitution. Countries currently working towards universal health coverage and where a large part of pharmaceutical spending is still out of pocket are facing many challenges to achieving equitable access to affordable, safe, efficacious, and quality medicines. In this context, pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies have a substantial impact on controlling pharmaceutical costs of in-patent medicines – particularly innovative and expensive ones that also carry a significant financial burden for overall health expenditure.
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are North African countries (also called Maghreb countries) with specific economic status and fragmented health-care systems. These countries are classified according to the World Bank income categories as Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) [2]. The health-care environment in the region is subject to considerable epidemiological change (rising prevalence of non-communicable disease) [3] as well as economic and financial pressure (rising health-care costs and coverage challenges). Total health expenditure ranges between 5% and 7% of GDP in the three Maghreb countries (438 to 974 current PPP USD per Capita) [4]. The total health expenditure comprises the greatest proportion of GDP in Tunisia (7%) and the lowest proportion of GDP in Morocco (5%). However, government health expenditure represents the greatest proportion of GDP: 4% in Algeria, 4% in Tunisia, and only 2.5% in Morocco. Understandably, there is a significant difference between total and public (government) spending in health mostly covered through out-of-pocket (OOP) spending which is notable in the Maghreb countries. It ranges from 32,5% in Algeria to 54% of the total health expenditure in Morocco in 2017 ( ) [5].
Table 1.
Health expenditureAlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaCurrent HE (% GDP)6.45.27.2Current HE per capita (current PPP $)974.8438.1863.3Out of pocket expenditure per capita, PPP (current international $)317.3236.3337.7Out of pocket expenditure (% current HE)32.553.939.1Domestic General Government HE per capita (current PPP $)642.9188.0493.1Domestic General Government HE (% of GDP)4.22.34.1Domestic general Government HE (% current HE)66.04357External HE per capita (Current PPP $)0.21.03.7External HE (% current HE)0.00.20.4
As in other low- and middle-income countries, medicines account for a large share of the health expenditures in the studied countries [5]. Pharmaceutical spending ranges between 24% and 31% of the total health expenditure in the studied countries ( ) [5–8]. The patented pharmaceutical spending ranges from 41% to 52% of total pharmaceutical spending ( ) [5–8].
Table 2.
Pharmaceutical ExpenditureAlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaPharmaceutical spending, (US$)3.71.40.6Pharmaceutical spending (% of the GDP)2.3%1.4%1.5%Pharmaceutical spending (% of health spending)31.2%23.830.5%Patented pharmaceutical spending (% total spending)52%41.2%51%Total population (millions)44,1837,0812,26
In the challenging context, of increasing demand, raising innovation of the pharmaceutical industry associated with growing medicine prices, and the limited resource allocations for health budgets, there is a need for a better understanding of how pharmaceutical markets are organized and financed in the Maghreb countries.
Pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals has always had an important impact on health policy objectives, patients, wholesalers, pharmacists, doctors, health insurers, the pharmaceutical industry, and medicines availability. Papers describing pharmaceutical price setting or negotiating procedures and reimbursement systems that are implemented in the Maghreb region are very limited.
This study is the first one that describes and compares implemented regulations and procedures for pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement of in-patent medicines in three Maghreb countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. A better understanding of the pharmaceutical landscape will help to foster pharmaceutical policies aiming to achieve universal and equitable access to essential medicines.
Methods
This study was conducted to map available evidence on pricing and reimbursement policies of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The evidence informing this study comes from both (a) a literature review (LR), and (b) primary data collection from experts in the three studied countries.
The LR was based on an extensive review of peer-reviewed and grey literature, reports, analyses, national guidelines of health authorities web pages, related articles, reports, laws, and directives, with the objective to retrieve information relating to pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies and trends in the study countries.
To complete our literature review and validate our findings, a survey was conducted among pharmaceutical experts and stakeholders including government officials, representatives from regulatory authorities, insurance organizations, hospital pharmacy departments, procurement agencies, and private pharmaceutical-sector actors and associations. Interviews were conducted through face-to-face questionnaires (physically or via virtual platforms). The Stakeholder’s interview list is shown in Appendix 1.
In order to address the study objectives, a questionnaire was developed according to the LR outcome and was used during the interviews (Appendix 2). The questionnaire comprised three sections: a) Healthcare system and sources of financing; b) Pricing Policies and Price Setting for in-patent pharmaceuticals; c) Reimbursement and Coverage Decisions for in-patent pharmaceuticals. The identified outcomes of each section are detailed in .
Table 3.
Key themes of the questionnaireKey endpointsObjective of the framework theme and associated endpointsHealthcare system and sources of financing- Pharmaceutical financing:a) Governmentb) National health insuranceb) Private Health insuranced) Out of pocket (OOP) payments
a) Government
b) National health insurance
b) Private Health insurance
d) Out of pocket (OOP) paymentsIdentifies the sources of financing for pharmaceutical products, the coverage conditions and the extent of OOPsIn-patent medicines Pricing policiesPricing policies for in-patent pharmaceuticalsDiscusses current pricing approaches in Maghreb regionIn-patent medicines Reimbursement policies− Coverage policiesDiscusses current reimbursement approaches in Maghreb regionPricing and reimbursement policies repercussions− Price levels− Availability issues− Affordability issues− International repercussions
− Availability issues
− Affordability issues
− International repercussions- Examines the impact of in -patent pharmaceuticals pricing and reimbursement policies on their price levels.
- Examines the extent to which in-patent pharmaceuticals are available in Maghreb countries
- Examines whether in-patent pharmaceutical prices are in line with the purchasing capability of patients and/or health care givers.
- Assesses the extent to which there are repercussions of pricing and reimbursement policies in Maghreb region elsewhere in terms of launch decisions, launch delays, and price convergence.
The interviews were completed between March 2021 and July 2022. The responses were then evaluated and summarized to highlight key concepts and trends in each country.
Based on the results of the LR and the primary data collection, an analysis was undertaken to consolidate the information by mapping, describing, and reviewing the currently applied pricing and reimbursement mechanisms in the study target countries and providing practical suggestions on how to improve pricing and reimbursement policies.
Results
Official documents, legal texts, and published pricing guidelines were reviewed in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the national language [9–23]. Twenty-six local experts were interviewed. Interviewees included ministry officials, representatives of national regulatory authorities, health insurance organizations, pharmaceutical procure-ment departments and agencies, academics, private pharmaceutical-sector actors, and associations.
Pricing policies for in-patent pharmaceuticals
In Algeria, the authority responsible for setting pharmaceutical prices is the National Agency of Pharmaceutical Products (ANPP) under the supervision of the Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry (MPI). An inter-ministerial committee is responsible for price setting: The Intersectoral Economic Committee of Drugs (CEPS). It was created at the ANPP by decree [9,10].
This committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs, and the National Health Insurance ([9] [24] primary data collection Algeria 2022). Price negotiation and approval occur before the grant of the Marketing Authorization Application (MAA) (primary data collection Algeria 2022).
The main policy used for in-patent pharmaceutical pricing is External Reference Pricing (ERP). The list of benchmark countries is determined by the decision of the Minister in charge of the Pharmaceutical Industry and it includes Belgium, France, Greece, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, the UK, and the Country of origin (COO). The price is calculated based on the lowest Ex-factory price (5, primary data collection Algeria 2022).
Health Technology Assessment (HTA) has been recently used through medico-economic assessments. According to the Ministerial decree of 26 December 2020, the Economic Committee may now require pharmacoeconomic studies to inform pricing decisions. The Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry is responsible for medico-economic assessment, but this activity is still under development. The nature of the studies that may be required is primarily Budget Impact Analysis but cost-effectiveness studies can also be required [5] (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
The Ministry of Health is responsible for hospital medicines management along with the procurement body for the public sector, the Hospitals’ Central Pharmacy (PCH) (Primary data collection Algeria 2022). Access programs for low-income patients are rarely deployed in Algeria because of cultural aspects (Algerian culture rejects donations or the help of companies). Nevertheless, the PCH may request free units on each purchase as a discount [5] primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In the private sector, distributors and pharmacists' margins are controlled by decree ( ) [11].
Table 4.
Price rangeWholesaler’ marginPharmacist’ marginPharmacist packageALGERIA*<7.00 DA20%50%between 7.01 and 11.00 DA15%33%between 11.01 and 15.00 DA12%25%>15.00 DA10%20%MAROCCO**MPET ≤166 DH11%57%-166 < MPET ≤ 588 DH11%47%-588 < MPET ≤ 66 DH
66 DH2%-300 DHMPET >1766 DH2%-400 DHTUNISIA***<2.890 TND8%42.9%between 2.891 TND and 7.754 TND8%38.9%between 7.755 TND and 23.974 TND8%35.1%>23.974 TND.8%31.6%
In Morocco, the pricing regulations and objectives are clearly stated in the country’s legislation [12]. The authority responsible for setting pharmaceuticals prices is the Ministry of Health through an inter-ministerial committee where many representatives are involved, mainly the Directorate of Medicine and Pharmacy (DMP) and the National Health Insurance/Ministry of Health (ANAM). Although price setting is not mandatory to obtain marketing authorization, the marketing of medicine remains conditioned by the publication of its price in the Official Journal (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
The main policy used for pricing originator medicine newly introduced on the market is ERP. Seven countries are considered in the basket: Belgium, France, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, and the country of origin if different. The considered price is the average price of the basket for existing products and the lowest price for newly launched pharmaceuticals converted into dirhams according to the national regulations [5] (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
Pharmaceuticals’ prices are also controlled through regulated mark-ups in the supply distribution chain [12]. For locally manufactured drugs, the profit margins to be applied to the wholesale pharmaceutical establishment and to the dispensing pharmacist are defined in according to the MPET ranges. For imported medicines, an additional 10% importer margin is also applied [12].
There is a multi-source procurement in Morocco: public and private sources. This can lead to different prices, especially between the public and the private sector (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
It is worth noticing that in-patent pharmaceuticals’ prices are negotiated independently of their reimbursement (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Tunisia, the prices of medicines (in-patent and generics) are negotiated by the Marketing Authorization Committee called ‘Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical Specialties’, which sits in the National Regulatory Authority (The Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicines or DPM), MOH. Indeed, Tunisian regulations state that Marketing authorization should be granted only to medicines that are presumed to improve the medical service rendered, to bring savings on the cost of health, in particular, compared to marketed products with the same or similar therapeutic aim [13].
Pricing of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Tunisia combines ERP and Internal Reference Pricing (IRP) to derive the price of similar products in the same therapeutic class. External reference pricing is applied to all imported medicines (originator brands and generics) seeking approval for regulatory registration and marketing in Tunisia. When submitting Marketing Authorization (MA) application, manufacturers must submit available prices of the medicine at an ex-wholesaler level in six countries: Algeria, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, and Spain [14].
For originator brands and thereafter for most of the newly launched in-patent pharmaceuticals, price negotiation with the manufacturers is made by the Ministry of Health’s Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical Specialties based on the:
Initial rule: at least 12.5% lower than the wholesaler price in the product country of origin
Prices of the product in the reference countries
Prices of existing therapeutic analogs in Tunisia (IRP)
Further health technology assessments by foreign HTA agencies or pharmacoeconomic studies: the price is determined by the assessment of the value informed by the evidence and HTA opinions and price data existing in the models including the cost-efficiency ratio.
For innovative medicines, an access program for indigent patients is systematically required. In this case, an agreed-on quantity is freely made available by the manufacturer to cover the needs of low-income patients who do not have health insurance coverage. Thus, specific contracts are signed by the pharmaceutical company and the Minister of Health (DPM and PCT). The access program is implemented once the medication is covered by national insurance (CNAM) (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Once price negotiation is agreed on from both sides (Manufacturer and Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical Specialties), the marketing authorization is granted with a proposed price (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In Tunisia, the public and private sectors have distinct procurement and pricing mechanisms. In the public sector, medicine procurement is ensured and centralized by the PCT, the procurement agency under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. It procures medicines for public hospitals mostly through procurement processes including tendering when appropriate/possible. The PCT is also playing a major role in private-sector procurement as it is the sole authorized importer of medicines [15]. Therefore, for all imported medicines (public and private sectors) and for hospital medicines, the Medicines Purchasing Commission (CAM) of the PCT fixes the purchase price with suppliers. Locally manufactured products intended for the private sector can be distributed directly through wholesalers without the intervention of the PCT (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Retail Prices are then officially approved by the Ministry of Trade as the pricing regulation of medicines is stated in the law n° 36–2015 of 15 September 2015 on the reorganization of competition and prices which excludes essential products and services from the free pricing regime. Medicines are included in the list of products and services subject to the regime of price approval at all stages by the Ministry of Trade ([16] primary data collection Tunisia 2022). Price setting takes into consideration the agreed price by the MOH, currency exchange level, and mark-ups applied along the supply chain. While the wholesaler’s and pharmacists’ margins are set by a joint order of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Trade [17,18] ( ), the PCT (importer) margin is fixed by internal procedures approved by the PCT Board.
Eventually, wholesalers, pharmacists, and patients’ purchase prices are published by the PCT in the form of public circulars. The purchasing price by the PCT is confidential, while public prices are published in PCT website. PCT Commercial medicines margin is 10.5% in the private sector fixed by internal procedures. It is worth noticing that the price approved by the Ministry of Trade does not apply to the hospital sector where prices are set through tendering by the PCT (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
summarizes the criteria for price setting of in-patent pharmaceuticals in the studied countries.
Table 5.
AlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaPricingDirect price controlAll medicinesAll medicinesAll medicinesPrice negotiation/Marketing Authorization (MA)Price negotiation and approval prior to MAPrice negotiation and approval after MA grantPrice negotiation prior to MA, price approval after MAMargin controlsYesYesYesERP rulesLowest priceAverage priceLowest priceNumber of countries977Countries in the BasketBelgium, France, Greece, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, plus Country of origin (COO)Belgium, France, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, plus COOAlgeria, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Spain, plus COOPrice sourceEx-factory and retail prices in basket countriesEx-factory price in basket countriesWholesale price excluding taxSources of information for pricing decisionsManufacturers and public information sources (e.g., websites)Manufacturers and public information sources (e.g., websites)Manufacturers and public information sources (e.g., websites)IRP rules
Price of similar pharmaceuticals on the market-IRP--+Price approvalMinistry of Pharmaceutical and IndustryMinistry of HealthMinistry of TradeDecision taking committeesInter-ministerial committee = The Intersectoral Economic Committee of Drugs (CEPS).Inter-ministerial committee (the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance).Technical committee (DPM/MOH) and Committee of purchasing of medicines (CPT/MOH).
Price revision
In Algeria, in-patent pharmaceutical prices are revised every 5 years at the same time as MA renewal [19], but some events can trigger in-patent medicines’ price revision:
When the price changes in the country of origin or in key basket countries.
When the manufacturer asks for price revision. This can happen even 1 year after price homologation and MA. Price can be reviewed downward or upward.
When the price changes worldwide (downward) independently of ERP basket countries (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In Morocco, medicine price revision is performed by the economic service of the national regulatory body (DMP, MOH). Price revisions take place during the MA renewal, every 5 years. Some events can trigger in-patent pharmaceuticals’ price revision: (i) when price changes in key basket countries occur, (ii) when an originator loses its market exclusivity, (iii) When the manufacturer asks for price revision to have a more competitive price, (iv) there is a change in the pharmaceutical formula or packaging [5,12] (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
Following a global benchmark of medicine prices in Morocco with other countries, important price reductions were applied by the Ministry of Health to 320 and 1258 drugs, respectively, in 2013 and 2014 [12,25].
In Tunisia, the revision of retail prices is made by the Ministry of Trade (Department of Economic Studies and Price Competition) after consultation with the MOH (DPM). Revisions are only applied for locally manufactured pharmaceuticals upon request and generally every 5 years [15].
For the imported medicines, downward revision of the purchase prices may be applied by the Tunisian Central Pharmacy (PCT) every 5 years but not systematically. In this context, the downward price revision process and timelines are not described by law, and there is no systematic reduction of the originator brand price upon the registration of the first generic in the Tunisian pharmaceutical market (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
On the other hand, purchase prices by the PCT regularly increase without revision of the retail price by the Ministry of Trade. This practice is due to the compensation process by the PCT. This practice is applied to compensate for price increases of imported medicines resulting in exchange rate fluctuations. The exchange rate applied by the central pharmacy corresponds to the real exchange rate of the pricing operation (average day rate of the central bank BCT on the day of the first receipt of the product). Consequently, PCT will lose its profit margin and even sell below the purchase price at a loss. This loss is compensated by the Government and applies only to imported drugs and aims to maintain stable retail prices and therefore maintain the affordability of essential medicines to Tunisian patients (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
As the amount of PCT loss gets greater every year, it reached € 55 million (TND 210 million) in 2018 [26], several exceptions were applied to retail price revision for imported medicines (when purchasing costs increase or when the Tunisian currency drops) in the following cases:
Medicines classified as comfort (non-essential)
Medicines classified as intermediate with a price under 5 Tunisian dinars
Medicines having non-compensated equivalent. A list of 50 to 60 imported products was subject to price revision (decompensation) (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Some events can trigger pharmaceuticals’ purchasing price revision (after price approval by the Ministry of Trade), when price changes in the country of origin, suppliers are asked for a price reduction, namely for compensated products (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
For hospital products purchased by mutual agreement, the purchasing prices can be revised by the PCT (CAM) upon request. Price cuts and increases will be applied to hospitals through annual revisions of the PCT prices (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
To mitigate exchange rate fluctuations, price adjustments are implemented in Morocco (prices of imported in-patent pharmaceuticals and generics are revised when the exchange rate varies by more than 10%). Whereas in Algeria, there are no price adjustments to take into account exchange rate fluctuations [5] (primary data collection Algeria, Morocco 2022). In Tunisia, for the imported medicines, exchange rate fluctuations are charged by the PCT and not transferred to the retail prices. This practice called the ‘compensation’ rises the amount of its loss (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Reimbursement policies
In Algeria, access to the retail market is under the social security (ministry of labor) which is in charge of the reimbursement process for outpatient care. Algeria is a predominantly reimbursed market. The public sector provides free treatments (formulary listing) to all citizens, while 85% of the population is covered by social security for outpatient care. Access to treatment is mainly influenced by the reimbursement and enlisting. CNAS (‘Caisse Nationale des assurances sociales des Travailleurs Salariés’) covers working employees (social affiliates) through El Chifa card, CASNOS (‘Caisse Nationale des Assurances Sociales des Non Salariés’) covers self-employed persons, CNR (Caisse Nationale des Retraités) covers retired citizens, CNAC (Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Chomage) covers unemployed persons (Primary data collection Algeria 2022) [27]. El Chifa card covers about 80% of the medicines price [27,28].
The bodies that decide for the reimbursement of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Algeria are the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs through the reimbursement committee. The main actors involved in reimbursement decisions are the National Insurance Scheme, the National Regulatory Authority (ANPP), and health-care providers or the DGSS (hospital or special services directorate). Key opinion leaders and health-care professionals (experts) have a consultative role (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
Reimbursement decisions of in-patent molecules are based on prices resulting from ERP (set by the Pricing Committee), local comparators, unmet needs, and reimbursement status in reference countries. Negotiations can lead to three outcomes: (i) ERP-derived price is retained as a reimbursement price with or without prescribing conditions; (ii) a lower price is set for reimbursement based on budget impact assessments or comparative clinical benefit assessment, or (iii) a reference price for reimbursement is set based on the cheapest alternative product already on the market (IRP molecular or therapeutic basis) [5,29]. The reference prices list is published in the form of a positive list [30]. The reference price is revised when a new competitor (generic) is launched in the market (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
There are two possible percentages of reimbursement: 100% for NCDs medicines and 80% for other medicines (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
Concerning the off-label use of drugs, if a hospital obtains specific authorizations for temporary use of certain drugs, it can place a dedicated procurement order with the PCH to acquire the medication (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In Morocco, the compulsory health insurance system is fragmented with the existence of two main systems: the National Health Insurance (ANAM) and the funding system led by the government through fiscal resources (Primary data collection Morocco 2022) [31,32]. A high number of Moroccan citizens could benefit from a mandatory national health insurance plan known as the AMO (Assurance Maladie Obligatoire). The CNOPS or National Fund for Social Welfare Organizations is for the public sector, and the CNSS or National Social Security Fund is for the private sector. Indigent patients have access to medical assistance scheme set by the Ministry of Health as an assistance to vulnerable people (RAMED). Private health insurance also exists but it does not have a considerable contribution to healthcare funding. It is to be noticed that a coverage for the Royal Armed Forces exists and it has its specific schemes (Primary data collection Morocco 2022) [32,33].
Reimbursement decisions of in-patent pharmaceuticals are taken by the MOH through two committees: the Transparence Committee (CT) and The Commission for Economic and Financial Evaluation of Health Products (CEFPS), both of which sit in the ANAM.
The Transparency committee provides an opinion on the Medical Service Rendered (SMR) and/or the Improvement of the Medical Service Rendered (ASMR) of a medicinal product that has already obtained the MA. The CT involves Key opinion leaders (KOLs)/health-care professionals (experts) and scientific societies in its scientific assessment. Industry representatives can participate as observers (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
The CEFPS analyzes the economic and financial impacts of drugs with a favorable SMR by the CT and engages in one-to-one negotiations with the manufacturers to (i) make decisions regarding the inclusion or removal of medicines from the list of reimbursable drugs; (ii) set the reimbursement percentage and price (price revision if the reimbursement is proposed later by the company) (Primary data collection Morocco 2021) [34,35]. ERP prices are usually used as a starting point for negotiations to determine reimbursement of innovative drugs. Negotiations are usually based on IRP (molecular or therapeutic basis).
There are two possible percentages of reimbursement: 100% for NCDs medicines and 80% for other medicines (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
The reference price for reimbursement is set based on the highest price of registered medicines (Primary data collection Morocco 2022). The reference prices list is published in the form of a positive list (GMR or Guide des Médicaments Remboursables) [36]. The reference price is revised when a new competitor (generic) is launched in the market (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Morocco, off-label use of medicines without marketing authorization or prescriptions outside approved indications involves a process of derogation granted by the ANAM. These derogations are based on claims submitted by insured individuals and require a comprehensive medical dossier. A group of experts evaluates these claims and provides their opinions (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Tunisia, the funding system is fragmented with the existence of two main tiered social protection systems: the National Health Insurance (CNAM or Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie) and the Free Medical Assistance (AMG) led by the government. Both are based on the principles of insurance and assistance. 70% of the Tunisian citizens are covered by CNAM [37] that covers both affiliates from CNRPS (Caisse Nationale de Retraite et de Prévoyance Sociale) (public sector employees) and CNSS (Caisse Nationale de Securité Sociale) (private sector employees). Indigent patients have the right to the public facilities through AMG (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022). Two types of AMG exist for indigent patients: type 1 the patient is exempt from consultation and medication fees, while type 2 pays a token sum according to the criteria fixed by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The social security contribution is essentially oriented to the public sector subsidiaries despite an increasing contribution to private sector facilities. The reform of the social security with the creation of the CNAM aimed to transform the private sector [38–40].
The National Health Insurance (CNAM) is under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The reimbursement committee is the decision-making body for drug reimbursement and sits at the general directorate of social security (Ministry of Social Affairs). The CNAM and the Ministry of Health (DPM) are represented in this committee (Primary data collection, Tunisia 2022).
Reimbursement decisions of originator medicines are based on prices set at the time of the MA grant that serves as the starting negotiation price. Discount rates are usually requested to determine the reimbursement price. Negotiations can be based on IRP (molecular or therapeutic basis) (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In Tunisia, native HTA has been implemented by the National Instance of Evaluation and Accreditation in Health (INEAS), a public institution under the supervision of the Ministry of Health created in 2012 [41]. Since the HTA activity started in 2015, some studies have been carried out to help the reimbursement decision-making [20,21]. The INEAS economic guidelines on ‘Methodological choices for pharmaco-economic studies’ and ‘Methodological choices for the analysis of the budget impact’ have been recently published [22,23].
Currently, INEAS is informing the payer’s decision-making for the reimbursement of innovative medicines when requested by the CNAM. The strategic vision of INEAS is currently to focus on high-priced drugs (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Regarding the percentage of reimbursement; for NCDs medicines, there are 24 fully covered Diseases for which Medicines are reimbursed at 100% of their reference price; and for other outpatient medicines provided in the private health-care sector, different reimbursement rates are applied depending on the medicine classification into Vital medicines (100%), Essential medicines (85%), Intermediate medicines (40%), or Comfort medicines (0%). The classification of medicines is decided by the national regulatory body (DPM) at the time the MA is granted (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022). Reimbursement is made based on the reference price calculated according to the cheapest generic existing in the market, the lowest retail price of one tablet or unit [38] (primary data collection Tunisia 2022). It is worth noticing that similar dosage forms are considered generics. The reference prices list is published in the form of a positive list [42]. The reference price is revised annually (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In Tunisia, the process for the off-label use of drugs (also called ‘commande ferme’) begins with an appeal commission for reimbursement with the CNAM. If the initial decision is unfavorable, patients have the option to resort to the courts, and in some cases, they may subsequently obtain a favorable decision from the CNAM. Following this, patients are required to submit a request to the DPM for a specific marketing authorization. It is important to note that once the DPM receives the request, they are obligated to accept it. Then, the process is initiated allowing the patient to obtain the off-label medication (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
summarizes the reimbursement system in the studied countries.
Table 6.
AlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaReimbursement levels80%, 100% for NCDs medicines70%,100% for NCDs medicines- Medicines of the 24 fully covered NCDs 100% - Vital medicines 100%, - Essential medicines 85%, - Intermediate medicines 40% - Comfort medicines 0%Reference pricingyesYesyesReference pricing rules (IRP)Cheapest alternative product already on the market [24,27]Highest price of the registered medicines (primary data collection Morocco 2022).Lowest price of the registered medicines (Lowest retail price of 1 unit), Similar dosage forms are considered as generics (40, primary data collection Tunisia 2022)Revision of the reference priceWhen a new competitor is launched in the market: for retail products with a reference price that is revised.When a new competitor (generic) is launched in the market.AnnuallyGeneric – original differenceYesYesYesNegative and positive listPositive list (reference prices list published) [27]Positive list (GMR or Guide of Reimbursable Medicines and publication of reference prices list) [35]Positive list published on the CNAM website [39]Decision taking committeesReimbursement: the reimbursement committee, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social AffairsReimbursement: Transparence Committee (CT) and The Commission for Economic and Financial Evaluation of Health Products (CEFPS), Ministry of HealthReimbursement committee, Ministry of Social Affairs
Discussion
By reviewing official documents and interviewing stakeholders, our study provides a clearer understanding of the pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia ( , and ).
When pricing systems are reviewed in our study, it can be seen that even though there are similarities between the three countries, each studied country has its own particular scheme. Interestingly, prices are controlled for all medicines in the studied countries, though different Ministries are responsible for medicine prices approval (Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry in Algeria, Ministry of Health in Morocco and Ministry of Trade in Tunisia). Regarding the relationship between price negotiation and marketing authorization, while the pricing intervenes after the registration process in Morocco, price negotiation is still occurring before the MA is granted in Algeria and Tunisia.
As appears to be the case in the majority of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, currently ERP is the most used method of pricing across the Maghreb region for in-patent medicines, while IRP is mainly used for generic and biosimilar pricing [5]. However, additional criteria may apply for in-patent medicines, such as the prices of pharmaceuticals in the same therapeutic category (internal reference pricing – IRP). So finally, ERP is indicative and not the only policy used for setting prices of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Maghreb countries.
The reference basket countries to which the prices are benchmarked in the Maghreb region are relatively small comparatively to large baskets in some countries of the MENA region such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt (30 and 36, respectively) [5]. In the three studied countries, the reference list includes 4 to 5 European countries and 1 to 2 countries from Maghreb or MENA Region. In Algeria and Tunisia, the reference price is calculated based on the lowest price in the basket with the exception of Morocco, which uses the average price of the basket for existing products and the lowest price for newly launched pharmaceuticals. Regarding the comparator price, the ex-factory price is used in Morocco and Algeria, whereas the wholesaler price excluding VAT is applied in Tunisia.
Profit margins are fixed with different schemes along the pharmaceutical supply chain in the studied countries ( ). In the three countries, the different mark-up schemes are available to the public in Decrees. A regressive mark‐up structure, in which the mark‐up rate decreases as the price increases, is applied at different levels in the three countries. However, with the exception of Morocco, there is no cap on percentage margins for the high price medicines.
The range of the cumulative profit margins for wholesalers and retailers varies from 39.6% to 50.9% in Tunisia, from less than 24% to 68% in Morocco and from 30% to 70% in Algeria. The maximum cumulative mark-up is relatively high when compared to other MENA region countries such as Lebanon (32–40%), Qatar (40% for all medicines), and Jordan (39% for all pharmaceuticals) [5,43]. The minimum cumulative mark-up applied for the most expensive medicines is also relatively high in Algeria (30%) and Tunisia (38.5%).
In Morocco, from public stakeholders’ perspective, Moroccan current pricing policy leads to high prices when compared to other countries for in-patent and innovative medicines in private sector and unavailability of drugs in public sector [44] (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Algeria, access to innovative medicines remains very difficult because of willingness to pay and cost containment issues. Innovative medicines are perceived as very expensive and the only way to improve access to medicines is enlisting by the central pharmacy of hospitals (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In Tunisia, from public stakeholders’ perspective, current pricing policies can lead to high prices for in-patent and innovative medicines [20,45] (primary data collection Tunisia 2022). From the company's perspective, continuous discounts on in-patent medicines price from the stage of price setting to the reimbursement step lead to very low prices for a great number of products. This situation discourages the launch of innovative medicines in the Tunisian market (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In the three countries, access to innovative treatment is mainly influenced by the reimbursement. While the three countries have some similarities with respect to the reimbursement decision-making process, there are significant differences regarding the negotiations’ methods.
In Algeria and Morocco, like several countries in the MENA region, ERP prices set in the pricing process become the starting point for reimbursement price negotiations and often, ERP prices become reimbursement prices [5]. Whereas in Tunisia, considerable price reduction may be required for reimbursement (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
With regard to the use of HTA to inform pricing and coverage decisions, the evidence generally indicates an increased interest for pharmacoeconomic evaluations in the studied countries. Tunisia has already invested in an HTA agency to address the challenges of value assessment, Algeria started by requiring budget impact analysis and Morocco implemented a committee of transparence to inform reimbursement decisions. However, further significant investments in the development of human capabilities and in data generation processes are required to ensure formal value assessment systems are in operation in a systematic manner in the Maghreb countries.
In regard to our findings, some suggestions could be considered for possible improvements to innovative medicines access:
Review the entire pricing process to reduce response times and allow rapid access to innovative treatments by promoting the separation of MA and pricing.
Countries, especially low-income ones, could not rely only on ERP method for setting prices because reference price may be used to determine a maximum price, while the actual price that the country health system pays will be based on confidential discounts or rebates.
Including HTA when negotiating prices and reimbursement will allow stakeholders to reduce the cost and the out-of-pocket expenditure of patients.
Conclusion
Our study presents a number of findings relative to pricing and reimbursement policies for in-patent medicines in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Whereas each country has its specific regulations, pricing, and reimbursement policies of medicines, there are many similarities.
The ERP was found to be the dominant method to inform pricing and reimbursement decisions of in-patent pharmaceuticals, which may not be reflective of net prices.
As Healthcare expenditures will continue to rise all over the world because of the introduction of innovative and expensive therapies, there is a real need to have pricing and reimbursement policies for medicines that are based on more-formalized arrangements around value assessment that will rely on local assessment of the evidence.
Further investigations on how to improve operational procedures for transition from price-focused to value-focused policies in the studied countries are required. Moreover, a reflection on how to review the processes of the studied countries to implement innovative contracting and to use risk sharing to mitigate the high cost of new medicines is needed to ensure equity in access to new health technologies in the Maghreb region.
Acknowledgments
The authors are thankful to the experts and contributors who offered their insights and expertise on the topics of pricing and reimbursement in the Maghreb region through survey responses and virtual interviews. Contributors are part of a research group called “Maghreb Research Group.” This group includes experts and stakeholders from the public health sector (government officials, representatives from regulatory authorities, insurance organizations, pharmacy departments, procurement agencies) and from the private health sector (actors and associations). Contributors’ names and positions are illustrated in the appendix 1.
Appendix 1: Interviewees List (Maghreb Research Group)
Interviewee nameSectorInterviewee position Algeria Dr Mariem HEDHIBELPublic Pharmaceutical PricingMinistry of pharmaceutical industryDr Saddek OUSEDDIKPrivate Pharmaceutical SalesNorth Africa regional sales manager at BiologixDr Amine AISSAOUIPrivate Pharmaceutical Market Access and External affairsMarket Access and External affairs Head, Sanofi Algeria/Member in ALPIDr Redouane SOUALMIMarket access and public affairs/privateHead of Public and Governmental Affairs at Boehringer Ingelheim Algeria Morocco Pr Samir AHIDPharmaco-economics/PublicPresident of the Moroccan Society of health products economy (SMEPS) and Dean of the Pharmacy University Mohamed 6 (UM6SS).Dr Naoufel EL MALHOUFPharmaceutical Reimbursement and coverage/Public sectorPublic service manager, National Health Insurance (ANAM)Dr Fadela TAZI BEN DJELLOUNPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorExecutive Director of the LEEM (Les Entreprises du Medicament au Maroc)Dr Ihsane ELJOUDANIPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr Abdelkrim AYOUGILPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr M MOUMENPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr Khaoula CHARGUIPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr ZERHOUNI Mohammed WadiePharmaceutical Public sectorTeacher researcher, National University of Public Health Rabat/previously DMP Morocco Tunisia Dr Mariem KHROUFRegulatory/publicDirector of the DPMDr Nesrine GHOZZIRegulatory/publicPharmacist at the DPMDr Faten LEMKACHERPurchasing, pricing/publicDirector of purchasing department, PCTDr Mouna JAMALEDDINEHTA/publicHead of HTA department, INEAS TunisiaDr Imene LIMAYEMRegulatory/Pricing/Public sectorMember of the Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical SpecialtiesDr Hajer FELFELMarket access and pharmaco-economy/University of pharmacyUniversity Lecturer in Market access and pharmaco-economy, MA Assessor at the National Medicine Control LaboratoryDr Sondes HAMIDAReimbursement/publicPharmacist at the National Health Insurance (CNAM)Dr Rym CHAABANEReimbursement/publicNational Health Insurance (CNSS)Dr Fadhila REBHIPricing/publicTrade MinistryDr Mohamed BEN FRADJPricing/publicTrade MinistryDr Karima HAMMAMIPricing/publicMinistry of TradeDr Ahlem GZARAAdministrative/PublicDirectorDr Amor TOUMIRegulatory and pricing/public health/privateIndependent consultantDr Imen NAFFETIMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIRE*Dr Teyssir BEN HOURIAMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIREDr Wafa REKIKMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIREDr Zied BELGHITHMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIREDr Mouna KHARRAZCoverage and reimbursement/publicMinistry of Social affairsDr Amine ZAGHDOUDIMarket access and public affairs/privateCountry Operations and Public Affair Head Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco at Novartis Tunisia
Appendix 2. Pricing and reimbursement questionnaire
Important to notice: vaccines are not considered in this questionnaire.
Section 1: Healthcare system and sources of financing
1. Which country are you completing this survey for?
2. In your country, do you have Universal Health Coverage?
Yes
No
Other, please specify:
If yes, what are the sources of funding and in which percentage?
- Government (freely)
- National Health Insurance
- Private Health Insurance
- Other, please specify
3. In the case of Universal Health coverage, is it a unique (common) or a fragmented system?
4. In case of fragmented system:
- How many principal insurances do you have?
- What percentage of people does each insurance cover?
5. How are pharmaceuticals covered in your country?
A. Full coverage
- Yes
- No
B. Partial coverage
- Yes
- No
C. Other, please specify
6. What are pharmaceuticals’ coverage conditions in your country?
Section 2: Pricing Policies and Price Setting for in-patent pharmaceuticals
7. Are the pricing regulations and objectives clearly stated in your country’s legislation?
- Yes
- No
If yes please provide the law reference
8. For which type of pharmaceuticals prices are fixed:
(Please tick all that apply)
Public sector
Private sector
Reimbursed medicines
None of the above list
9. In your country, are pharmaceuticals’ prices controlled through distributor and pharmacist margins?
- Yes
- No
10. Which authority is responsible for setting pharmaceutical prices in your country?
(Please tick all that apply)
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Trade
Ministry of Industry and Economy
Social affairs
Other competent authority, please specify:
Please specify the authority (or the committee):
11. Which of the policies below are used for pricing of in-patent pharmaceuticals in your country?
(Please tick all that apply)
Cost-Plus Pricing
External Reference Pricing (ERP)
Internal reference pricing
Value-Based Pricing (HTA, pricing based on cost-effectiveness analysis …)
Other, please specify
12. If HTA is used for the pricing of in-patent pharmaceuticals:
- How the value is measured?
- Does it apply to all kinds of products?
13. In your country, is price setting mandatory to obtain MA?
- Yes
- No
14. Is it possible to launch a new pharmaceutical with a free fixed price, without reimbursement?
- Yes
- No
15. Following MA, can price setting take place subsequently to the launch of a new pharmaceutical with a reimbursement objective?
16. If manufacturers disagree with decisions made by competent authorities on the price of a new pharmaceutical, are there any provisions for an appeal?
Yes
No
If your answer is Yes:
- Is this applied in practice?
- Does this lead to tangible results?
17. How frequently are prices revised for in-patent pharmaceuticals in your country?
(Please tick all that apply)
Every five years
Two years after initial registration
Other, please specify:
18. Are there events which can trigger pharmaceuticals’ price revision?
(Please tick all that apply)
When price changes in the country of origin
When price changes in key basket countries (if ERP is applied)
When a new competitor is launched in the market
When the manufacturer asks for price revision
Loss of data protection/exclusivity
Other, please specify:
19. Which authority decides for price revision in your country (if different from the authority fixing the price)?
20. In your country, are in-patent pharmaceuticals’ prices negotiated in parallel with their reimbursement or independently?
- Yes
- No
Section 3: Reimbursement and Coverage Decisions for in-patent pharmaceuticals
21. Are the reimbursement regulations and objectives clearly stated in your country’s legislation?
- Yes
- No
If yes please provide the law reference
22. Which criteria influence reimbursement decisions for in-patent pharmaceuticals?
(Please tick all that apply)
Health Technology Assessment (HTA)
Managed Entry/Risk Sharing Agreements
Other countries’ evaluations (External Reference Reimbursement)
Other, please specify:
23. In your country, is there a Formulary Management at national, regional, or local level (a list of reimbursed pharmaceuticals and conditions for the access to these pharmaceuticals)
- Yes
- No
- If you answered Yes, how is it managed?
24. Is there a list of pharmaceuticals freely made available by the government?
Yes
No
If yes:
- Please provide a link:
- What is the target population?
25. In your country, which organism decides for the reimbursement of in-patent pharmaceuticals?
26. In your country, who are the main actors involved in reimbursement decisions
- National insurance scheme
- HTA agency unit
- National regulatory authority
- Health care provider (hospital)
- Key opinion leaders/health care professionals
- Scientific Societies, etc.
- Other (please specify):
27. In your country, are prices negotiated for reimbursement decision?
- Yes
- No
28. Which price is used for reimbursement of in-patent pharmaceuticals?
Please tick that apply
Initial price fixed or proposed for the medicine
A reference price based on the same therapeutic class (IRP)
Price reset after negotiations
29. Are Managed Entry Agreements (MEA) used in your country to facilitate reimbursement decision?
30. If you answered Yes in the previous question, when were MEA first introduced in your country? (Please insert the year in the space below)
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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[45] Fradi H, Ghozzi N, Miled S, et al. An analysis of the Tunisian medicines price policy. Utrecht WHO Winter Meeting 2019. [cited 2022 February 12]; Available from: http://www.pharmaceuticalpolicy.nl/assets/uploads/2016/10/Programme-Winter-Meeting-report-2019.pdf.
Articles from Journal of Market Access & Health Policy are provided here courtesy of Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI)
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https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/11/a-chronology-of-the-algerian-war-of-independence/305277/
|
en
|
A Chronology of the Algerian War of Independence
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[
"French government",
"Algeria",
"French Algeria",
"Dien Bien Phu",
"sovereign Algerian state",
"French National Assembly",
"French army officers",
"women plant bombs",
"Gaulle’s declaration",
"Algerian independence"
] | null |
[
"Christopher Hitchens"
] |
2006-11-01T17:00:00+00:00
|
The Atlantic covers news, politics, culture, technology, health, and more, through its articles, podcasts, videos, and flagship magazine.
|
en
|
https://cdn.theatlantic.com/_next/static/images/favicon-3888b0e329526a975703e3059a02b92d.ico
|
The Atlantic
|
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/11/a-chronology-of-the-algerian-war-of-independence/305277/
|
May 8, 1945. While France celebrates VE Day, Muslim protesters in Sétif organize to demand Algerian independence. What begins as a march becomes a massacre: the protesters murder more than 100 European settlers, or pieds-noirs, and French armed forces retaliate by killing (according to various estimates) between 1,000 and 45,000 Muslims.
November 1, 1954. Emboldened by the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) launches armed revolts throughout Algeria and issues a proclamation calling for a sovereign Algerian state. The French are unimpressed but deploy troops to monitor the situation.
August 1955. The FLN begins targeting civilians, inciting a mob that kills more than 120 people in Philippeville. Between 1,200 and 12,000 Muslims are killed in retaliation by French troops and by pied-noir “vigilante committees.” Jacques Soustelle, then governor-general of French Algeria, resolves not to compromise with the revolutionaries.
September 30, 1956. The FLN attempts to draw international attention to the conflict by targeting urban areas. The Battle of Algiers begins when three women plant bombs in public venues. Algiers erupts into violence.
May 1958. A mob of pieds-noirs, angered by the French government’s failure to suppress the revolution, storms the offices of the governor-general in Algiers. With the support of French army officers, they clamor for Charles de Gaulle to be installed as the leader of France. The French National Assembly approves. De Gaulle is greeted in Algeria by Muslims and Europeans alike.
September 1959. Increasingly convinced that French control of Algeria is untenable, de Gaulle pronounces that “self-determination” is necessary for Algeria. Pied-noir extremists are aghast. The FLN is wary of de Gaulle’s declaration.
April 1961. A few prominent generals in the French army in Algeria, clinging to a hope of preserving Algérie française, attempt to overthrow de Gaulle. This “generals’ putsch” is unsuccessful.
May 1961. The first round of negotiations between the French government and the FLN commences in Evian, but is not productive.
March 1962. After a second round of negotiations in Evian, the French government declares a cease-fire.
March–June 1962. Despairing pieds-noirs in the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) mount terrorist attacks against civilians (Muslim and French). The FLN and the OAS ultimately conclude a truce.
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https://unsdg.un.org/un-in-action/algeria
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UN in Action - Algeria
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https://www.etf.europa.eu/en/where-we-work/countries/algeria
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en
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Algeria
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2021-01-11T12:00:00+00:00
|
en
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/themes/contrib/etf_foundation/favicon.ico
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https://www.etf.europa.eu/en/where-we-work/countries/algeria
|
The European Training Foundation (ETF) cooperates with and complements the work of the European Commission and the European External Action Service, including responding to requests from the Delegation of the European Union to Algeria, in its support to the country. This includes input to EU policy monitoring mechanisms and wider human capital developments reported in the Torino Process.
The ETF’s work is focusing on closer cooperation with the Ministry of Vocational Education and Training (VET), mainly through its Institut national de Formation et d'Enseignement professionnels (INFEP), the national institute of vocational education and training. The VET ministry also coordinates the survey on the continuing professional development of VET teachers and the implementation of the Torino process. In support of the European Union Delegation to Algeria, the ETF has been involved in different stages of implementation of EU programmes addressing issues linked to human capital development and skills development. It is currently involved in providing content and methodological advice to the Programme d’Appui à l’Adéquation Formation-Emploi-Qualification (AFEQ).
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http://www.labelsandlabeling.com/europe/news/finishing-and-embellishment/nuova-gidue-installs-flexo-press-algeria
|
en
|
Nuova Gidue installs flexo press in Algeria
|
http://www.labelsandlabeling.com/europe/sites/labels/lnl/files/field_primary_image/Gidue%2520installs%2520another%2520flexo%2520press%2520in%2520Algeria.jpg
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[
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"labels",
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"L&L",
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2014-04-09T12:00:00+00:00
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The 370mm-wide press has eight flexographic print units, eight UV lamps, one die-cutting station, cold-foil and a full set of printing tools. Faycal Akouche, Concept Emballage’s general director, said: ‘Gidue MX press has been the best solution for a company like ours. We were looking for a press able to print high quality labels with short set-up times and waste and Gidue provided us exactly what we were looking for.’
|
en
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/europe/sites/labels/lnl/files/favicon_0.ico
|
http://www.labelsandlabeling.com/europe/news/finishing-and-embellishment/nuova-gidue-installs-flexo-press-algeria
|
The 370mm-wide press has eight flexographic print units, eight UV lamps, one die-cutting station, cold-foil and a full set of printing tools.
Faycal Akouche, Concept Emballage’s general director, said: ‘Gidue MX press has been the best solution for a company like ours. We were looking for a press able to print high quality labels with short set-up times and waste and Gidue provided us exactly what we were looking for.’
Nuova Gidue distributor Saverio Monopoli commented: ‘Since its launch, the MX press has demonstrated itself as a top entry level press, that provides high quality results and that no needs great investment in terms of price. It is a press dedicated to the production of labels and, thanks to its short web-path, it minimizes the set-up waste while high precision drive-belts guarantee a perfect printing register over time. The press requires no maintenance, no operator intervention and no specific greasing’.
Cristina Toffolo, Nuova Gidue's vice-president of marketing, concluded: ‘We are proud to have Concept Emballage in our clients portfolio and we hope to build a long-term relationship based on customer satisfaction and mutual growth in the packaging industry’.
|
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https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/is-algeria-next-great-travel-destination-in-africa
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en
|
Is Algeria the next great travel destination in Africa?
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[
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[
"Henry Wismayer"
] |
2022-10-10T15:37:51.456000+00:00
|
Ancient fortified towns, Roman ruins, and Sahara sands make Africa’s largest country an undiscovered tourism giant hiding in plain sight.
|
en
|
Travel
|
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/is-algeria-next-great-travel-destination-in-africa
|
From the open roof of the watchtower, above the labyrinth of narrow alleys and serried rooftops, Ghardaïa appears as a rolling tableau of jumbled pastel cubes.
The only hints of modernity are the Tannoy speakers projecting from the mud-walled minarets at the summit of each hill. Otherwise, we could be looking at a scene from any century in the last 10.
Despite its proximity to Europe, and vast presence on the north coast of Africa–roughly the size of Alaska and Texas combined—Algeria and many of its most spectacular sights are little known to travelers outside of its borders.
“Algeria is one of the world’s hardest places to enter and among the least visited,” says Andrew Farrand, senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council, a foreign affairs think tank. “Of the two million or so official tourist arrivals each year, most are members of the Algerian diaspora coming home to visit family. Only a handful are foreign visitors.”
For those willing to negotiate the bureaucratic hurdles to get here, Algeria is arguably one of the most rewarding destinations that you can reach via a short-haul flight from mainland Europe. Today, vitally, it is also considered to be safe and relatively stable. Most foreign governments advise only against travel to its borders with Libya and Niger.
Legacy of French colonialism
The origins of Algeria’s anonymity lie in the recent past. Between 1830 and 1962, it was the most prized possession of the French empire . Independence came in 1962, but only after a bloody eight-year war between Algerian insurgents and French colonists which claimed between 400,000 and a million lives.
“France’s barbaric efforts to destroy Algerian culture bred deep anti-Western sentiment,” says Adel Hamaizia, a visiting fellow at Harvard University. “In the aftermath, the newly independent country was very motivated to rebuild and protect its religious and cultural identity .”
In the 1990s, as tourism to neighbors Morocco and Tunisia surged, Algeria was mired in what its people refer to as the “Black Decade,” when an Islamist insurgency instigated a bloody and protracted civil war. Anti-government protests toppled the administration of long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika as recently as April 2019.
Developing tourism
One legacy of this domestic upheaval is a prevailing attitude toward overseas visitors that is, if not actually hostile, then at least indifferent. The visa application process is Byzantine. Tourism promotion is non-existent. During my trip to the country in the spring, the only guidebook I could get my hands on was a second-hand Berlitz pocket-guide published in 1990.
The government’s disinterest in tourism, many observers argue, is due to the economic dominance of hydrocarbons. Algeria’s oil and gas sector comprises 20 percent of its GDP. Tourism, by contrast, accounts for barely 0.1 percent.
(Learn about this ancient Saudi Arabian city working to attract more tourists.)
“The oil curse infects everything,” says Farrand. “The industry gives the Algerian state the money it needs to avoid the hard work of developing more complex sectors like tourism.” According to recent reports, the spike in oil and gas prices as a result of the war in Ukraine has meant that Algeria exceeded its export targets for the first half of 2022 by 70 percent.
Wonders hidden in plain sight
Nevertheless, the rewards for coming here are many. Algeria is in several ways a giant hiding in plain sight. In the band of fertile land that hugs its Mediterranean coast are historic cities like Constantine, Oran, and the capital Algiers. Ancient Roman outposts like Djemila and Timgad (both UNESCO World Heritage sites) are among the best preserved archaeological destinations in North Africa. South, in the Saharan interior, the dune seas of the Great Ergs crash against the sandstone massifs of Hoggar and Tassili n’Ajjer.
“We’ve had record interest this autumn, but you can still go days in Algeria without seeing another tourist,” says Omar Zahafi, whose tour company, Fancyellow, caters almost exclusively to foreign visitors. “When we visit the Roman ruins and clients ask why there are no other people, I like to joke that I booked the site for them especially!”
Few places embody the tension between Algeria’s insularity and its tourist potential like Ghardaïa, the ancestral home of the Mozabites, Algeria’s fourth largest Berber tribe. A sprawling oasis town, 380 miles south of Algiers on the Trans Sahara Highway, it is a place where Algerian life is at its most traditional.
(Learn why Morocco is so full of music—and where you can hear it.)
It’s early afternoon in El Atteuf, one of five ksours, or hilltop citadels, that are collectively known as “the Pentapolis.” Once separate entities, the five walled towns have long since merged together into a labyrinthine conurbation that snakes along the desiccated valley of the M’Zab River. (Ghardaïa is both the name of the largest citadel and an unofficial shorthand for the whole region.) The French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir once likened it to “a Cubist painting, beautifully constructed.”
Like most places in Algeria, Ghardaïa is best explored with a guide. Indeed, in the ksours themselves, one is obligatory. Rules laid down by religious councils, which uphold a strict form of Ibadi Islam, permit entry to outsiders only at certain times of the day, and only in the company of a local chaperone. Some married women dress in the haik, a white garment that is wrapped around the body and head, leaving only a single eye exposed. Motorized transport is prohibited. Rubbish is still collected by donkey.
My guide, Hassissane Hadjsmael, a butcher with an impish air, leads us through the tranquil alleyways. In the middle of the day, when most of the valley’s inhabitants take a siesta, the lanes are populated only with gaggles of bashful children.
The citadel’s architectural consistency is a result of age-old norms of design and decoration. Up close, you can see that the walls are rendered in clay, then stippled with palm fronds to deflect the heat of the sun.
Hadjsmael gestures us through a low doorway and into a model interior now preserved as an unofficial museum. Inside is a pillared quadrangle with an open roof. Recesses on each side are bedecked in carpets. Most houses in the old towns have a similar footprint, albeit with some concessions to the 21st century. “My place is similar,” says Hadjsmael. “But I do have a big plasma TV.”
Change arrives slowly in Ghardaïa, but it does arrive. On the outskirts are the palmeries, groves of date palms whose fruits were once the backbone of the local economy. Now, its old summer homes are being converted into guesthouses.
In one of them, I meet travelers from Ohio sitting in a Berber tent set up in a shady courtyard. A musician, rakish in a dark green Tuareg turban, plucks at an oud under an olive tree heavy with fruit.
“You can tell that a lot of the people in Algeria are eager to share their country with the world,” says Katelyn Jarvis, an investment advisor from Cincinnati. “Nearly every interaction we’ve had has resulted in an invitation to visit peoples’ towns or to share a meal at their homes.”
Tourism is in its infancy here, but the hospitality is instinctive.
“I recently got my license to start hosting foreigners,” the guesthouse owner, Rostom Labchek, tells me. “I hope that more of them will come.”
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https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/chronology_of_events_in_algeria_1954_1962-en-b0fbcd19-ae1a-444e-ac80-2ad8fcfe913c.html
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Chronology of events in Algeria (1954–1962)
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2017-01-03T00:00:00
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On 1 November 1954, the uprising in the Aurès mountains marks the beginning of the Algerian War. On 1 June 1958, General de Gaulle returns to power. On 18 March 1962, the Evian Accords mark the end of the war. On 3 July 1962, France recognises Algeria’s independence.
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Source: CVCE.
Copyright: All rights of reproduction, public communication, adaptation, distribution or dissemination via Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries. The documents available on this Web site are the exclusive property of their authors or right holders. Requests for authorisation are to be addressed to the authors or right holders concerned. Further information may be obtained by referring to the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site.
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https://nataal.com/the-wilaya-of-roots
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The Wilaya of Roots — nataal.com
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Lilia Yasmin chats to us about atlalfromghalbi, the Parisian label celebrating Algeria’s beauty
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https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5534a426e4b0ed810ce8f891/1432233483895-MHEFZ7X53IOWCE7Q4AXJ/favicon.ico?format=100w
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nataal.com
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https://nataal.com/the-wilaya-of-roots
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“I had this need to tell to share my vision of aesthetics because I always felt that I was not understood,” says atlalfromgalbi’s founder Lilia Yasmin. “I felt that North Africa and the Arabic worlds were absent from fashion, so my experiences in the industry plus my love of culture led me to create atlalfromgalbi - a label designed from the roots.”
The designer cut her teeth at Louis Vuitton where she worked on the strategy for Virgil Abloh’s menswear, and more recently at Balenciaga, before founding her label in 2019. A desire to highlight Algerian culture is its MO, which is reflected in the brand name – ‘galbi’ is Arabic for heart. “I want to express that our country has a singular beauty,” she enthuses. “The line of architecture, the faces of the population, the light and the plurality of the landscape needs and deserves to be shown and to be told. The energy of the country is my number one inspiration.”
The collections are unisex and tend to consist of impeccably cut athleisure silhouettes embroidered with Arabic or splashed with watercolour-style prints of the country. But the label is not without a sense of humour – one of the most popular designs is stitched with the words ‘Yves Saint L’Oran’. This reference to the fact that of one of France’s most famous designers was in fact born in the city of Oran, in the north west of Algeria, also alludes to the shared (if not always positive) history of the two countries.
The designer was born to Algerian parents in Paris, which is where she grew up. University took her to Italy – back to France – and on to the U.S, and it’s that time spent as an expat that made her want to reconnect with her heritage. “When I was away from home, I would use music, movies and literature to keep connected to my roots as it was the only way to remind myself of being back with my family,” she reveals. “I was walking down Madison Avenue with Cheb Hasni in my ears - this is the moment when the concrete idea of atlal and the Designed by the Roots motto came to me.”
The launch of her AW21 collection, Wilaya of Roots, was accompanied by a fashion film shot in Paris’ Grand Mosque, which, slap bang in the middle of the 5th arrondissement aka The Latin Quarter, is an expression of the pluralities of the city. It was captured by queer Algerian filmmaker Sarra Ryma. “I had the idea to present my couture collection on a digital runway. When I met Sarra, she already knew about the brand and the story I was telling with atlal, so we started to work together,” she says.
Ryma adds: “To pay tribute to this collection, it was important to mix the North African pictorial tradition with more modern poses and attitudes. We played with elements of decorations and accessories to build an oriental painting while creating a gap with the power of the models. Through these images, we agree to see beauty beyond gender, sexual orientation, religion or ethnic origins while digging from our common imagination.”
This celebration of cultures coming together is one of the things that connects these two artists. “Through my clothes, I want to share the wealth of multiculturalism that we have today thanks to our travels, heritages and histories, which build our identity,” says Yasmin. “The aim of the label is to spread our culture into fashion, to combine the modern and traditional into everyday style.”
This love letter to cultural diversity is sound tracked by the equally eclectic Acid Arab, a French collective of DJs and musicians who mix the likes of Rachid Taha and Sofiane Saidi with electronic music. “It was an honour for me to work with Acid Arab - they have way of expressing Algerian heritage through their music that is insane,” says Yasmin. “So, when I wrote to Hervé to ask for the rights to the music and he said that he loved the film and that we can go with the track Staifia - it meant the world to me.”
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dbpedia
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https://www.facebook.com/thebusinessyear/videos/algiers-is-the-capital-of-algeria-a-country-of-roughly-45-million-people-explore/876190717134200/
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Algiers is the capital of Algeria, a country of roughly 45 million people. Explore TBY’s #Africa coverage at www.thebusinessyear.com/africa #Economy...
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Algiers is the capital of Algeria, a country of roughly 45 million people. Explore TBY’s #Africa coverage at www.thebusinessyear.com/africa #Economy...
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de
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https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/yT/r/aGT3gskzWBf.ico
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https://www.facebook.com/thebusinessyear/videos/algiers-is-the-capital-of-algeria-a-country-of-roughly-45-million-people-explore/876190717134200/
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8952
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dbpedia
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https://ib-lenhardt.com/type-approval/algeria
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en
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ANF/ ARPCE Label and Certification
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All necessary radio certifications and label information for Algeria. Our experience guarantees you a cost-efficient certification process. Contact us!
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en
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https://ib-lenhardt.com/assets/ico/favicon.ico
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IB-Lenhardt AG
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https://ib-lenhardt.com/type-approval/algeria
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Download our comprehensive guide now, which shows you all the requirements for successful certification. Learn all about administrative and technical documents, as well as country-specific requirements.
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https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history-timeline/
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Global African History Timeline •
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2019-03-15T18:03:14+00:00
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https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history-timeline/
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5-2.5 million BCESkeletal remains uncovered suggest the Rift Valley in East Africa is home to the earliest human ancestors.Early Human AncestorsEthiopia1492-1600 4-2.7 million BCEHominid species Australopithicus afarensis lived in the Hadar region of Ethiopia, including "Lucy," the famous skeletal remains found in 1974.Early Human AncestorsEthiopia1492-1600 600,000 to 200,000 BCEPeriod of migration across the African continent and out of Africa to Asia and Europe. Fire is first used during this period.African Migrationn.a.1492-1600 6000-4000 BCESpread of agriculture across Africa. River societies emerge along the Nile, Niger, and Congo Rivers.African Migrationn.a.1492-1600 5000 BCE (ca.)Egyptian agriculturalists develop irrigation and animal husbandry to transform the lower Nile Valley. The rise in the food supply generates a rapidly increasing population. Agricultural surpluses and growing wealth allow specialization including glass making, pottery, metallurgy, weaving, woodworking, leather making, and masonry.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 4500 BCE (ca.)Egyptians begin using burial texts to accompany their dead into the afterlife. This is the first evidence of written texts anywhere in the world.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 4000 BCE (ca.)Egypt emerges as a centralized state and flourishing civilization.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 2700-1087 BCE (ca.)Period of the Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom, and New Kingdom of Ancient Egypt and Northeastern Africa.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 2500 BCE (ca.)Other civilizations emerge in Mesopotamia, northern China, Northeastern India.Early Civilizationsn.a.1492-1600 2500 BCE (ca.)Nubian state with its capital at Kerma emerges as a rival to Egypt.Ancient NubiaEgypt1492-1600 1500 BCE (ca.)Egyptian New Kingdom unites the Nile Valley including Nubia.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 1069 BCENubia briefly regains its independence from Egypt.Ancient NubiaEgypt1492-1600 1000-800 BCE (ca.)Bantu migration out of present-day eastern Nigeria spreads across Sub-Saharan Africa.African MigrationNigeria1492-1600 750-664 BCENubian Pharaohs rule the entire Nile Valley during the 25th Dynasty.Ancient NubiaEgypt1492-1600 500 (ca.)Bantu-speakers arrive in what is now South Africa with iron and domesticated cattle.African MigrationSouth Africa1492-1600 500 (ca.)Beginning of the trans-Saharan salt and gold trade in West Africa.West African CivilizationsMali1492-1600 500 BCEAxum emerges in Northeastern Africa. Axum eventually becomes the nation of Ethiopia.Ancient AxumEthiopia1492-1600 500 BCEAncient Nok culture emerges in what is now Nigeria.West African CivilizationsNigeria1492-1600 332 BCEEgypt is conquered by Alexander the Great. Ptolemy becomes the first ruler of a dynasty that will control Egypt until 283 BCE.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 300 BCE (ca.)Rulers of Nubia establish a new kingdom at Meroe. The Kingdom, which will be called Kush, will last there for more than nine centuries.Ancient KushSudan1492-1600 247-183 BCEHannibal rules Carthage. During his reign, Roman Italy is invaded.Ancient CarthageTunisia1492-1600 200 BCEAlexandria on the Mediterranean Sea is the scientific capital of the Hellenistic world, famous for its museum, university, and library.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 200 BCEThe State of Ghana begins to evolve in the West African Sudan. It is located in what is now Burkina Faso,West African EmpiresBurkina Faso1492-1600 200 BCESettlement is established at Jenne on the Niger River in West Africa.West African CivilizationsMali1492-1600 146 BCERome conquers Carthage and establishes its first significant presence on the African continent.Ancient CarthageTunisia1492-1600 160 BCETerence Afer (the African) is considered one of the the Roman Empire's finest Latin translators and poets.Ancient RomeItaly1492-1600 50 BCE-476 CESlavery is a major feature of the Roman Empire for several hundred years. Over two million slaves from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa are in Roman Italy at the end of the Republic.Roman SlaveryItaly1492-1600 47-30 BCECleopatra VIII Rules Egypt.Ancient EgyptEgypt1492-1600 23 BCERomans invade Kush, sack the capital at Napata.Ancient KushSudan1492-1600 1-33 ADLife and Era of Jesus Christ, beginnings of Christianity.Early ChristianityIsrael1492-1600 333Ezana, the ruler of Axum (Ethiopia) converts to ChristianityAncient AxumEthiopia1492-1600 350Ezana destroys Meroe, the capital of Kush.Ancient AxumSudan1492-1600 500-1400An extensive slave trade develops in Medieval Europe. The vast majority of the slaves originate in what is now Russia and eastern Europe but slaves come from every society on the continent. By 1300 a small number of slaves are of African origin.European SlaveryItaly1492-1600 540Ethiopian monks begin to translate the Bible into their own language.Early ChristianityEthiopia1492-1600 569Nubia is converted to Christianity. A cathedral is established at Faras to establish the Christian era in Nubia.Early ChristianityEgypt1492-1600 570Kingdom of Kanem-Bornu begins to emerge around Lake Chad in West Africa.West African EmpiresChad1492-1600 570-632Life and Era of the Prophet Muhammad, beginnings of Islam.Early IslamSaudi Arabia1492-1600 615Muslim refugees from Arabia given refuge in Axum (Ethiopia)Early IslamEthiopia1492-1600 620Beginning of trans-Indian trade as reflected by Chinese coins from the period found on the East Coast of Africa.East African TradeTanzania1492-1600 642Egypt is conquered and converted to Islam. New Islamic capital of Cairo is established.Muslim EgyptEgypt1492-1600 678Muslim Arab armies reach the Atlantic coast of North Africa.Early IslamMorocco1492-1600 690Sudanic city state of Gao is founded on the Niger River in West Africa.West African CivilizationMali1492-1600 694-95"African slaves near Basra (in modern Iraq) under Rabah Shir Zanji (the ""Lion of the Zanj"") rise in rebellion against their owners. "Middle Eastern SlaveryIraq1492-1600 700 (ca.)Arabs initiate a slave trade that sends sub-Saharan Africans to both Europe and Asia. An estimated 14 million Africans are sold between 700 and 1910.Arab Slaveryn.a.1492-1600 740Muslims from Arabia and Persia are trading on the East African coast.East African TradeSomalia1492-1600 740Islamized Africans (Moors) invade Spain and rule it until 1492.Early IslamSpain1492-1600 745Christian Nubians and Ethiopians invade and temporarily occupy Muslim Egypt.Early ChristianityEgypt1492-1600 750 (ca.)Islam is introduced into West Africa, reaching what is now the nation of Chad.Early IslamChad1492-1600 800 (ca.)Evidence suggests that African travelers may have come to the Americas before Europeans. One indication is the great stone carvings of the Olmec era in Mexico, bearing African facial features.African MigrationMexico1492-1600 850Beginning of the construction of the Citadel of Great Zimbabwe.Southern African EmpiresZimbabwe1492-1600 869-83Thousands of black slaves in what is now southern Iraq will take up arms against their masters in the Zanj Rebellion and declare their independence from the Abbasid Caliphate. They will control the region and operate as an independent state for fourteen years until troops from Baghdad finally conquer the region.Middle Eastern SlaveryIraq1492-1600 880Beta Israel (Falashas) settle in Ethiopia.Early JudaismEthiopia1492-1600 890Beginning of the Kingdom of Songhai.West African EmpiresMali1492-1600 908Permanent Arab trading settlements established in Somalia.East African TradeSomalia1492-1600 945Malayo-Indonesian raid from Madagascar is launched on East African coastal city of Sofala.East African CivilizationsMozambique1492-1600 975The Christian Kingdom of Axum is overrun by Muslims.Ancient AxumEthiopia1492-1600 992The Empire of Ghana captures Berber city of Awdaghost and gains control over trans-Saharan trade.West African EmpiresMauritania1492-1600 420Christian theologian Augustine of Hippo in North Africa argues for the equality of all human beings.Early ChristianityTunisia1492-1600 1055Awdaghost is overrun by the Almoravids.West African EmpiresMauritania1492-1600 1076Ghanaian Empire falls to the Almoravids, Ghana's political leaders convert to Islam.West African EmpiresBurkina Faso1492-1600 1100 (ca.)Stone-built Great Zimbabwe is the capital of the surrounding state of Zimbabwe.Southern African EmpiresZimbabwe1492-1600 1100 (ca.)Hausa city-states emerge in what is now Northern Nigeria.West African CivilizationsNigeria1492-1600 1150Tsaraki dan Gimimasu, the ruler of Kano, completes the wall around the city. Kano will become the largest and most significant of the Hausa city-states.West African CivilizationsNigeria1492-1600 1150Beginning of the Zagwe Dynasty in Ethiopia.Medieval EthiopiaEthiopia1492-1600 1200 (ca.)King Lalibela of Ethiopia begins construction of rock-cut churches.Medieval EthiopiaEthiopia1492-1600 1200 (ca)Slavery ends in England but continues in Ireland. Slavery flourishes among the European nations along the Mediterranean as well as all of North Africa.European SlaveryEngland1492-1600 1230The Empire of Mali emerges in West Africa under Sundiata.West African EmpiresMali1492-1600 1250Emergence of the Empire of Benin in present-day Nigeria. Benin is the first major centralized state in the West African Rain Forest.West African EmpiresNigeria1492-1600 1260Spanish slavery code prevents married couples from being separated, provides legal protection against mistreatment, and allows slaves to inherit property.Spanish SlaverySpain1492-1600 1260By this date the city of Timbuktu is the religious, commercial, and political center of the Empire of Mali.West African EmpiresMali1492-1600 1260Mansa Ule makes the first pilgrimage of a Mali ruler to Mecca.West African EmpiresSaudi Arabia1492-1600 1270Beginning of the Solomonid Dynasty in Ethiopia.Medieval EthiopiaEthiopia1492-1600 1300Muslim Merchants mainly of Arabic origin establish the Kingdom of Ifat in the Ethiopian highlands.Medieval EthiopiaEthiopia1492-1600 1324Pilgrimage of Mansa Musa, the most prominent ruler of Mali, to Mecca.West African EmpiresSaudi Arabia1492-1600 1340Building of the Great Mosque at Jenne in the Mali Empire.West African CivilizationsMali1492-1600 1364Norman navigators reach the mouth of the Senegal River. First known presence of Europeans in sub Saharan Africa.Exploration and DiscoverySenegal1492-1600 1390 (ca.)Kingdom of the Kongo emerges in central Africa.Central African EmpiresCongo1492-1600 1400Africans in Christian religious iconography proliferate across Europe, including Balthazar and the Saints, Maurice and GregoryAfricans in EuropeGermany1492-1600 1400By this date a flourishing slave trade exists in the Mediterranean World. Most of the slaving countries are Italian principalities such as Florence and Venice. Most of those enslaved are Greeks and Eastern Europeans. Between 1414 and 1423, ten thousand Eastern European slaves are sold in Venice alone.Italian SlaveryItaly1492-1600 1400 (ca.)Songhai breaks free of the Mali Empire.West African EmpiresMali1492-1600 1400 (ca.)Gold trade flourishes in the Zambezi River Valley and its Indian Ocean port, Sofala.East African TradeMozambique1492-1600 1400 (ca.)Beginning of the production of bronze statues in the Empire of Benin.West African CivilizationsNigeria1492-1600 1410Kano is the leading Hausa city-state. It has developed an Army which includes cavalry equipped with iron weaponry and armor.West African CivilizationsNigeria1492-1600 1415An ambassador from Malindi, a leading East African city-state, is sent to the royal court of the Chinese Emperor.East African TradeChina1492-1600 1427The Ethiopian emperor, Yeshaq, sends an envoy to the King of Aragon (Spain) to forge an alliance against the Muslims.Medieval EthiopiaSpain1492-1600 1431Ming admiral Zheng He reaches Malindi on the East African coast, initiates a period of regular commerce between the Swahili city-states on the east African coast and China.East African TradeKenya1492-1600 1433Taureg raiders conquer Timbuktu and briefly gain control over the western trans-Saharan trade routes.West African EmpiresMali1492-1600 1434The Portuguese establish trading outposts along the West African coast.West African TradeSenegal1492-1600 1441Antam Goncalvez of Portugal captures Africans in what is now Senegal and transports them to Lisbon, initiating direct European involvement in the African slave trade.West African Slave TradeSenegal1492-1600 1441Act of Union signed in Rome between the Church of Ethiopia and the Church of Rome.Medieval EthiopiaItaly1492-1600 1450Approximately 1,000 slaves per year are transported to Europe.Slavery in EuropeSpain1492-1600 1450 (ca.)Monomutapa Empire emerges in Southern Africa, breaks from and then absorbs the declining Zimbabwe Empire.Southern African EmpiresMozambique1492-1600 1450 (ca.)Sankore University and Mosque are founded at Timbuktu in the Songhai Empire.West African CivilizationsMali1492-1600 1453The Ottoman Turks capture Constantinople and thus divert the trade in Eastern European slaves away from the Mediterranean to Islamic markets. The Italians increasingly look to North Africa as their source for slaves.European SlaveryTurkey1492-1600 1460The Sultan of Bengal acquires 500 African slaves, dramatically increasing the slave trade on the Indian subcontinent.Africans in IndiaIndia1492-1600 1460Approximately 1,000 sub-Saharan African slaves are brought directly to Europe each year.European SlaverySpain1492-1600 1462Pope Pious II signs a papal bull with forbids enslavement of Africans recently converted to Christianity.Anti-Slavery CampaignItaly1492-1600 1468Empire of Songhai under Sunni Ali conquers Mali and becomes the largest state in West Africa.West African EmpiresMali1492-1600 1470By this point small vineyards and sugar plantations have emerged around Naples and on the island of Sicily with Africans as the primary enslaved people providing the labor on these estates.European SlaveryItaly1492-1600 1470The Portuguese begin trading along the Gold Coast of West Africa.West African TradeGhana1492-1600 1474Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella creat toe office of Mayor of the Africans in Seville.Africans in SpainSpain1492-1600 1474Ferdinand and Isabella, the rulers of Aragon and Castile (Modern Spain) create the office of Mayor of the Africans in Seville.Free Blacks in EuropeSpain1492-1600 1482The Portuguese build Fort Sao Jorge da Mina (El Mina) on the Gold Coast. The fort was the first permanent structure built by Europeans in subSaharan Africa.West African TradeGhana1492-1600 1486African slaves rebel in Bengal (India) and install their own leader, Firuz Shah as sultan. He rules for three years, 1487-1490.Africans in IndiaIndia1492-1600 1490Small populations of free and enslaved Africans extend for Sicily to Portugal.European SlaveryPortugal1492-1600 1491The Portuguese King establish diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Kongo and sends Catholic missionaries to the African ruler's court.Political AlliancesCongo1492-1600 1491Portuguese envoy Pero da Coviha reaches Sofala on the Indian Ocean. By 1500 the Portuguese will establish trading posts along the East African coast.East African TradeMozambique1492-1600 1492Christopher Columbus makes his first voyage to the New World opening a vast new empire for plantation slavery.Exploration and DiscoveryThe Bahamas1492-1600 1494The first Africans arrive in Hispaniola with Christopher Columbus. They are free persons.Africans in the New WorldDominican Republic1492-1600 1494Columbus claims Jamaica for the Spanish.Colonial ConquestJamaica1492-1600 1500Many sub-Saharan slaves are brought to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Sicily for Christianization before they are transported to the Americas.African Slavery in EuropeItaly1492-1600 1501The Spanish king allows the introduction of enslaved Africans into Spain's American colonies.Spanish SlaveryDominican Republic1492-1600 1506Nzinga Mbemba, King of the Kongo is baptized by Portuguese officials and becomes Afonso I, the first Catholic king of the Kongo (modern day Congo and Angola).Political AlliancesCongo1492-1600 1511The first enslaved Africans arrive in Hispaniola.Spanish SlaveryDominican Republic1492-1600 1513Thirty Africans accompany Vasco Nunez de Balboa on his trip to the Pacific Ocean.Exploration and DiscoveryPanama1492-1600 1517Bishop Bartolome de Las Casas petitions Spain to allow the importation of twelve enslaved Africans for each household immigrating to America's Spanish colonies. De Las Casas later regrets his actions and becomes an opponent of slavery.Spanish SlaverySpain1492-1600 1518King Charles I of Spain grants the first licenses to import enslaved Africans to the Americas.Spanish SlaveryColumbia1492-1600 1518The first shipload of enslaved Africans directly from Africa arrives in the West Indies. Prior to this time, Africans were brought first to Europe.Spanish SlaveryDominican Republic1492-1600 1518First African slaves shipped directly from West Africa (the Guinea Coast) to the West Indies, bypassing transshipment to Spain.African SlaveryGuinea1492-1600 1519Hernan Cortez begins his conquest of the Aztec Empire. Black Spaniards, including Juan Garrido are among the Conquistadors.Colonial ConquestMexico1492-1600 1520Marriage of St. Ursula to Prince Conan, a painting in a Lisbon monastery, depicts several African musicians performing for royalty.Art and LiteraturePortugal1492-1600 1520sEnslaved Africans are used as laborers in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Mexico.Spanish SlaveryCuba1492-1600 1521Santo Domingo Slave Revolt is the first black servile insurrection in the New World.Anti-Slavery ResistanceDominican Republic1492-1600 1524Spanish conqueror Francisco Pizarro overruns Ecuador and Peru. Among his conquering forces are free and enslaved Africans serving as sailors, soldiers, and laborers.Colonial ConquestPeru1492-1600 1526Spanish colonists led by Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon build the community of San Miguel de Guadape in what is now Georgia. They bring along enslaved Africans, considered to be the first in the present-day United States. These Africans flee the colony, however, and make their homes with local Indians. After Ayllon's death, the remaining Spaniards relocate to Hispaniola.Anti-Slavery ResistanceUnited States1492-1600 1527-1539Esteban, a Moroccan-born Muslim slave, explores what is now the Southwestern United States.Exploration and DiscoveryUnited States1492-1600 1529Pope Clement VII choses nineteen-year-old Alessandro de' Medici, the son of Lorenzo de' Medici, and a former African slave named Simonetta, to become the first Duke of Florence.PoliticsItaly1492-1600 1536Spaniard Pedro de Mendoza founds Buenos Aires. Among his party are a number of enslaved and free Africans.Colonial ConquestArgentina1492-1600 1536Alessandro de' Medici, the Duke of Florence, weds Margaret of Habsburg, the daughter of Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor and at the time the most powerful monarch in Europe.PoliticsItaly1492-1600 1537Alessandro de' Medici, the first Duke of Florence, is assassinated by his cousin, Lorenzino, who then flees to Venice.PoliticsItaly1492-1600 1538Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada founds Bogota. His party includes enslaved and free Africans.Colonial ConquestColumbia1492-1600 1540An African from Hernando de Soto's Expedition decides to remain behind to make his home among the Native Americans there.Exploration and DiscoveryUnited States1492-1600 1540Africans serve in the New Mexico Expeditions of Francisco Vasquez de Coronado and Hernando de Alarcon.Exploration and DiscoveryUnited States1492-1600 1540Juan Valiente, former slave and Indian fighter, receives a large estate near Santiago as a reward for his participation in campaigns against the Incas.Free Blacks in Colonial New SpainChile1492-1600 1542The Spanish Crown abolishes Indian slavery in its colonial possessions.EmancipationSpain1492-1600 1542By this date over thirty thousand Africans are in Hispaniola with 10% living in Maroon colonies in the interior of the island.Spanish SlaveryDominican Republic1492-1600 1543A Spanish royal decree prohibits the enslavement of Muslims in the West Indies who have converted to Christianity.Anti-Slavery CampaignDominican Republic1492-1600 1548Large numbers of African slaves are working in the sliver mines of Zacatecas.Spanish SlaveryMexico1492-1600 1548Free and enslaved black artisans in Peru manufacture swords, lances, and rosaries for the Spanish army.Spanish SlaveryPeru1492-1600 1549Father Manuel de Nobrega arrives in Bahia from Lisbon and soon afterwards protests the enslavement of Africans.Anti-Slavery CampaignBrazil1492-1600 1549Tome de Souza founds Sao Salvador in Bahia, Brazil. He is accompanied by a number of African slaves.Colonial ConquestBrazil1492-1600 1550The first slaves directly from Africa arrive in the Brazilian city of Salvador.Portuguese SlaveryBrazil1492-1600 1550By this date enslaved people have replaced gold as the principal object of European trade with Africa.The Slave Traden. a1492-1600 1550The first slave insurrection is recorded in Nicaragua.Nicaragua1492-1600 1550The first slave insurrection is recorded in Peru.Anti-Slavery ResistancePeru1492-1600 1552Venezuela records its first slave insurrection.Anti-Slavery ResistanceVenezuela1492-1600 1552Panama experiences its first slave insurrection. The resistance led by Bayano (or Vaino) leads to the founding of a maroon colony in eastern Panama. In 1570 the colonists establish the town of Santiago del Principe.Anti-Slavery ResistancePanama1492-1600 1560Africans outnumber Europeans 15 to 1 on the island of Hispaniola.Spanish SlaveryDominican Republic1492-1600 1562Englishman John Hawkins begins trading slaves across the Atlantic when he leaves what is now Sierra Leone with a shipment of 300 enslaved people bound for Hispaniola. This is the first major example of English participation in the slave trade.The English Slave TradeDominican Republic1492-1600 1565African farmers and artisans accompany Pedro Menendez de Aviles on the expedition that establishes the community of San Agustin (St. Augustine, Florida).Colonial ConquestUnited States1492-1600 1565Afro-Spanish scholar Juan Latino is appointed the grammar chairman at Cathedral School of Granada.EducationSpain1492-1600 1565Portuguese settlers, including African slaves, found Rio de Janeiro.Colonial ConquestBrazil1492-1600 1568Spanish trade between Mexico and the Philippines introduces enslaved Africans to the Philippines.Spanish SlaveryPhilippines1492-1600 1570Gaspar Yanga, Known as the Primer Libertador de America or the first liberator of the Americas, led colonial Mexico's first successful slave uprising and later established one of the New World's first black settlements.EmancipationMexico1492-1600 1570Afro-Spanish scholar Juan Latino publishes the first of three books of poetry.Art and LiteratureSpain1492-1600 1573Professor Bartolome de Albornoz of the University of Mexico writes against the enslavement and sale of Africans.Spanish SlaveryMexico1492-1600 1590A Moroccan army invades Songhai and captures Timbuktu the following year, 1591.West African EmpiresMali1492-1600 1590The Portuguese are defeated by the combined African armies of Matamba and Ndongo.Anti-Colonial ResistanceAngola1492-1600 1591Martin de Porres, a Roman Catholic priest, begins his missionary and medical work among the poor in Lima, Peru. On January 10, 1945, Fray Martin de Porres was officially named patron saint of social justice in Peru by Pope Pius XII, becoming the Americas first cannonized black clergy.Early ChristianityPeru1492-1600 1592Portuguese forces are defeated by the Zimba in the Zambezi Valley.Anti-Colonial ResistanceMozambique1492-1600 1598Isabel de Olvera, a free mulatto, accompanies the Juan Guerra de Resa Expedition which colonizes what is now New Mexico.Africans in Colonial New SpainUnited States1492-1600 1600 (ca.)The Buganda Kingdom emerges along the shore of Lake Victoria. Its principal rival is the neighboring state of Bunyoro.East African EmpiresUganda1601-1700 1602Ethiopian-born Malik Ambar seizes a vast area in the Deccan (the Indian interior). He founds the city of Khadki which will become his new capital, and rules this region until his death in 1626.Africans in IndiaIndia1601-1700 1609Fugitive slaves in Mexico, led by Yanga, sign a truce with Spanish colonial authorities and obtain their freedom and a town of their own.Anti-Slavery ResistanceMexico1601-1700 1610Dahomey emerges as the first of a series of slave-trading states along the West African coast.West African EmpiresBenin1601-1700 1615 (ca.)The Portuguese are exporting approximately 10,000 enslaved people per year to its Brazilian colony.Portuguese SlaveryBrazil1601-1700 1617The town of San Lorenzo de los Negros receives a charter from Spanish colonial officials in Mexico and becomes the first officially recognized free settlement for blacks in the New World.Africans in Colonial New SpainMexico1601-1700 1617The Dutch purchase Goree Island to establish their presence in the commerce of enslaved people.Dutch SlaverySenegal1601-1700 1620Black Catholic clergyman Martin de Porres founds an orphanage and foundling hospital in Lima Peru.Free Blacks in Colonial New SpainPeru1601-1700 1627Nzinga, Queen of Mbundu, is victorious in a war with Portugal.Anti-Colonial ResistanceAngola1601-1700 1630Fugitive slaves under Zumbi create the independent state of Palmares in the interior of Portuguese Brazil. Palmares continues until 1695 when the Portuguese regain control of the region.Anti-Slavery ResistanceBrazil1601-1700 1634The French establish St. Louis, their first settlement in what is now Senegal.Colonial ConquestSenegal1601-1700 1635Enslaved Africans brought in by Puritan settlers become the first blacks to reside in Bluefields, Nicaragua. Eventually Bluefields will become the largest settlement of persons of African ancestry in Central America.English SlaveryNicaragua1601-1700 1636Ethiopian Emperor Fasiladas establishes a new capital at Gondar.Political UnificationEthiopia1601-1700 1638France's North American colonies open to trade in enslaved Africans.Franch SlaveryColonial New France1601-1700 1644Queen Nzinga, supported by Dutch allies, captures Luanda from the Portuguese.Anti-Colonial ResistanceAngola1601-1700 1645The Portuguese take enslaved people from Mozambique to Brazil for the first time.Portuguese SlaveryBrazil1601-1700 1650The Sultan of Oman ends Portuguese control over the East African city-states.Anti-Colonial ResistanceKenya1601-1700 1650The French take control of the island of Grenada.Colonial ConquestGrenada1601-1700 1651The Swedes capture Carolusberg castle on the Gold Coast from the Dutch and establish their first slave trading center on the West African coast.Swedish SlaveryGhana1601-1700 1652The Dutch establish a naval supply station at the Cape of Good Hope. This supply station will become the first permanent white colony in Southern Africa.Colonial ConquestSouth Africa1601-1700 1657The Danes drive out the Swedes from Carolusberg castle and take control over the trade in enslaved people along that coastal area of West Africa.Danish SlaveryGhana1601-1700 1660The Dutch defeat the Khoisan people and claim the right of conquest as boers (farmers) expand their control beyond the Cape peninsula.Colonial ConquestSouth Africa1601-1700 1660The British take control of Jamaica.Colonial ConquestJamaica1601-1700 1661The British establish their first permanent settlement in Africa when they build Fort James at the mouth of the Gambia River.Colonial ConquestGambia1601-1700 1662The Portuguese defeat the Kingdom of the Kongo at the Battle of Ambuila.Colonial ConquestCongo1601-1700 1667A treaty between Great Britain and Holland gives Surinam to the Dutch in exchange for New York which is given to the British.Colonial AdministrationSurinam1601-1700 1670A French royal decree brings French shippers into the slave trade, with the rationale that the labor of enslaved Africans helps the growth of France's island colonies.French SlaveryColonial New France1601-1700 1670A French royal decree brings French shippers into the slave trade, with the rationale that the labor of enslaved Africans helps the growth of France's island colonies.French SlaveryFrance1601-1700 1670The French establish a trading station at Offa on the Dahomey coast.Colonial ConquestBenin1601-1700 1672King Charles II of England charters the Royal African Company, which dominates the slave trade to North America for the next half century.English SlaveryGreat Britain1601-1700 1675An estimated 100,000 Africans are enslaved in the British West Indies and another 5,000 are in British North America.English SlaveryGreat Britain1601-1700 1680The Ashanti Empire emerges in West Africa.West African EmpiresGhana1601-1700 1681The Changamire Empire emerges in southern Africa.Southern African EmpiresMozambique1601-1700 1684Changamire defeats a Portuguese army at the Battle of Maungwe. The battle initiates a military campaign between the Changamire Empire and Portugal which will continue until 1917.Anti-Colonial ResistanceMozambique1601-1700 1693All fugitive Africans who have escaped slavery in the British colonies and fled to Florida are granted their freedom by the Spanish monarchy.EmancipationUnited States1601-1700 1697The island of Hispaniola is divided between France which takes the western third, and Spain which retains the eastern two thirds.Colonial AdministrationDominican Republic1601-1700 1698The Omani Arabs take control of Mombasa in East Africa and the island of Zanzibar the following year.Colonial ConquestKenya1601-1700 1724The Black Code is enacted in New Orleans, French Territory, to control blacks and banish Jews.Racial RestrictionsColonial New France1701-1800 1730Little George Slave Revolt was one of the most significant uprisings of captured Africans on the high seas.Anti-Slavery ResistanceGuinea1701-1800 1731Dahomey is conquered by Oyo, a rising West African state.West African EmpiresBenin1701-1800 1734The Sultan of Bornu takes control of the neighboring state of Kanem, creating the Kanem-Bornu Empire in the central sudan region.Military ExpansionChad1701-1800 1734African-born scholar Anton Wilhelm Amo receives a doctorate degree from the University of Wittenberg in Germany where he defended his dissertation. After he is awarded his doctorate he lectures at the University of Halle in Germany. Amo is the first African to receive a doctorate and to teach at a university.EducationGermany1701-1800 1740The Lunda Kingdom emerges in central Africa.Southern African EmpiresAngola1701-1800 1747Oyo is the major military power along the West African coast from Dahomey to the Niger Delta.Military ExpansionNigeria1701-1800 1750The British take control of Grenada and introduce an economy dominated by slave labor.Colonial ConquestGrenada1701-1800 1750The French take control of the Seychelles Islands.Colonial ConquestThe Seychelles1701-1800 1750 (ca.)Escaped slaves from other Caribbean island settle on St. Vincent, intermarry with the indigenous Caribs and become the Garifuna (Black Caribs). The island is officially controlled by French settlers.Anti-Slavery ResistanceSt. Vincent & Grenadines1701-1800 1752The Sultanate of Darfur extends from Kanem Bornu in the west to the Nile Valley.Military ExpansionSudan1701-1800 1759Great Britain gains control over the Caribbean island of Dominica,Colonial ConquestDominica1701-1800 1760Abram Petrovich Hannibal,a former slave who later becomes the godson of Peter the Great, is appointed a general in the Russian Army. A trained engineer he oversaw various projects such as the construction of the Ladoga Canal and a number of Russian fortresses.EducationRussia1701-1800 1760Boers cross the Orange River to begin settlement in the interior of South Africa.Colonial ConquestSouth Africa1701-1800 1761Portugal abolishes slavery in mainland Portugal and its possessions in India.EmancipationIndia1701-1800 1772On June 22, Lord Chief Mansfield rules in the James Somerset case that an enslaved person brought to England becomes free and cannot be returned to slavery, laying the legal basis for the freeing of England's 15,000 slaves.Major Judicial DecisionsGreat Britain1701-1800 1772Slavery is declared illegal in England.EmancipatonGreat Britain1701-1800 1776Sultanate of Kilwa on the East African coast agrees to supply enslaved people from the interior for the French sugar plantations on Reunion and Mauritius. This agreement dramatically increases the slave trade in the region.East African Slave TradeKenya1701-1800 1779Joseph de Bologne\Le Chevalier de Saint-Georges, an Officer of the Royal Guard of King Louis XVI, was an accomplished composer who in 1779 began performing music with Queen Marie-Antoinette.18th Century MusicFrance1701-1800 1781Los Angeles is founded by fifty-four settlers including twenty-six of African ancestry.Africans in Colonial New SpainUnited States1701-1800 1783Approximately 3,000 black supporters of the British during the American Revolution were repatriated to British Canada at the end of the conflict.American RevolutionCanada1701-1800 1783British take control of St. Kitts & Nevis.Colonial ConquestSt. Kitts & Nevis1701-1800 1783British take control of St. Vincent & the Grenadines.Colonial ConquestSt. Vincent & Grenadines1701-1800 1784The Shelburne (Nova Scotia) Race Riot is caused by resentment over David George, a black Baptist preacher, baptizing white residents and organizing racially integrated churches.Racial ViolenceCanada1701-1800 1787Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade is founded in London.EmancipationGreat Britain1701-1800 1787Sierra Leone is founded by British abolitionists as a colony for emancipated slaves.EmancipationSierra Leone1701-1800 1791The Haitian Revolution begins.IndependenceHaiti1701-1800 1793Slavery is declared illegal in Upper Canada.EmancipationCanada1701-1800 1794The French Government abolishes slavery. The law is repealed by Napoleon in 1802.EmancipationFrance1701-1800 1795The British capture the Cape of Good Hope and Capetown from the Dutch.Colonial ConquestSouth Africa1701-1800 1796The French crush a revolt by the Garifuna in St Vincent. In the aftermath nearly 5,000 Black Caribs (Garifuna) migrate to Honduras and British Honduras.Colonial ConquestSt. Vincent1701-1800 1742Jacobus Ellisa Capitein, an African-born Dutch scholar, receives an advanced degree from the University of Leiden for his dissertation on slavery and Christian liberty.Free Blacks in EuropeThe Netherlands1701-1800 1789Child musical prodigy George Bridgetower of Great Britain gives his first public violin performance in Paris at the age of 10.Free Blacks in EuropeFrance1601-1700 1791The Haitian Revolution begins when Toussaint L'Overture leads slaves in Saint-Domingue in a rebellion against French rule.IndependenceHaiti1701-1800 1791Slaves on Dominica initiate an unsuccessful rebellion against English plantation owners.Anti-Slavery ResistanceDominica1701-1800 1792The British government grants a charter to the Sierra Leone Company which is founded by abolitionists for the purpose of establishing a free labor colony for former slaves on the west coast of Africa.Anti-Slavery CampaignSierra Leone1701-1800 1793The British government outlaws the importation of enslaved people into Upper Canada (Ontario). The law also frees the children of enslaved women when those children reach the ago of twenty-five.Anti-Slavery CampaignCanada1701-1800 1796Slaves revolt in Saint Lucia. The rebellion ends when the British agree to free those who lay down their weapons.Anti-Slavery ResistanceSaint Lucia1701-1800 1796After Maroons in Jamaica attempt to instigate a general rebellion of slaves on the island, the British capture 600 of them and ship them to Nova Scotia and eventually to Sierra Leone.Anti-Slavery ResistanceJamaica1701-1800 1797British troops in the Cape Colony wage war against the Xhosa, initiating a series of wars of expansion that will eventually result in their conquest of all of South Africa.Colonial ExpansionSouth Africa1701-1800 18011801: Haitian forces invade and occupy Santo Domingo (now the Dominican Republic) and occupy the Spanish colony until 1844International ConflictDominican Republic1801-1900 1804On January 1, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the successor to Toussaint L'Ouverture, declares Saint Dominque independent and renames it Haiti. It becomes the second independent nation in the western hemisphere (after the United States).Haitian RevolutionHaiti1801-1900 1804Usman Dan Fodio initiates a holy war (jihad) that established an Islamic theocratic state, the Sokoto Caliphate, in present day Northern Nigeria.West African EmpiresNigeria1801-1900 1807Great Britain abolishes the importation of enslaved Africans into its colonial possessions.The Slave TradeGreat Britain1801-1900 1807George Bridgetower, a former child prodigy who at 11 performs his first concert before a Paris audience, is elected to the British Royal Society of Musicians.19th Century Black MusicGreat Britain1801-1900 1811Spain abolishes slavery at home and in all colonies except Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo.EmancipationSpain1801-1900 1813Argentina abolishes slavery.EmancipationArgentina1801-1900 1814Mauritania becomes a French colony.Colonial ConquestMauritania1801-1900 1814Great Britain gains control of the Seychelles from France.Colonial AdministrationThe Seychelles1801-1900 1816Shaka Zulu becomes King of the Zulu nation and begins to create an empire in the southern African interior.Southern African EmpiresSouth Africa1801-1900 1819The Canadian government refuses to cooperate with the United States government in the apprehension of fugitive slaves living in Canada.Fugitive Slaves in CanadaCanada1801-1900 1820Rev. Daniel Coker of Baltimore leads eighty six African Americans who become the first black settlers to Liberia.African Americans in LiberiaLiberia1801-1900 1820The American Colonization Society's first shop, Mayflower of Liberia, arrives in Liberia.Black ColonizationLiberia1801-1900 1820Large numbers of British settlers begin arriving in the Cape Colony.Colonial ConquestSouth Africa1801-1900 1820New cash crops are introduced into central and southern Africa including cotton in Angola and cloves in Zanzibar. Shortly afterwards palm oil and groundnuts (peanuts) become important cash crops in West Africa.African EconomyAngola1801-1900 1821Ecuador adopts a gradual emancipation program.EmancipationEcuador1801-1900 1821Columbia adopts a gradual emancipation program.EmancipationColumbia1801-1900 1821Venezeula adopts a gradual emancipation program.EmancipationVenezeula1801-1900 1822Liberia founded by the American Colonization Society as a colony for emancipated slaves.EmancipationLiberia1801-1900 1823Chile abolishes slavery.EmancipationChile1801-1900 1824Mexico outlaws slavery. This act creates the incentive for Anglo Texans to fight for independence.Slavery in MexicoMexico1801-1900 1824Ira Aldridge, alumnus of the African Grove Theater, begins prominent acting career in London.Art and LiteratureGreat Britain1801-1900 1824The Federal Republic of Central America abolishes slavery.Political UnificationGuatemala1801-1900 1824Moshoeshoe brings together rival clans to establish the Kingdom of Sotho in Southern Africa.Southern African EmpiresSouth Africa1801-1900 1827Fourah Bay College is established in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The college is the first western-oriented institution of higher education on the African continent.EducationSierra Leone1801-1900 1828Shaka Zulu, the Zulu leader, is assassinated by his half brother, Dingane who then proclaims himself ruler of the Zulu Empire.Southern African EmpiresSouth Africa1801-1900 1829Mexican independence leader Vincente Guerrero of African and Indian ancestry becomes the second President of Mexico. Shortly afterwards he finally abolishes slavery in Mexico.EmancipationMexico1801-1900 1831Bolivia abolishes slavery.EmancipationBolivia1801-1900 1831Guyana becomes a British colony.Colonial ConquestGuyana1801-1900 1833The British Parliament abolishes slavery in the entire British Empire.EmancipationGreat Britain1801-1900 1834The British abolition of slavery in the Cape Colony prompts many boers to move further north into the interior of Southern Africa beyond the reach of British authority. Their migration eventually brings them into conflict with the Zulu nation and other indigenous African people.EmancipationSouth Africa1801-1900 1836John B. Russwurm is appointed Governor of the Cape Palmas district of Liberia by the American Colonization Society.African Americans in LiberiaLiberia1801-1900 1837Muhammad Bello, the Sultan of Sokoto, and son of Usman dan Fodio, dies. With a population of ten million, Sokoto at the time is the largest state in West Africa.West African EmpiresNigeria1801-1900 1837The first groundnuts (peanuts) are exported to the United States and Europe from Sierra Leone.African EconomySierra Leone1801-1900 1838Boers clash for the first time directly with the Zulu at the Battle of Blood River in Natal.Southern African EmpiresSouth Africa1801-1900 1840Sayyid Said, the Sultan of Oman, moves his capital to Zanzibar which will soon evolve into the largest slave-trading state in East Africa.East African Slave TradeZanzibar1801-1900 1842Uruguay abolishes slavery.EmancipationUruguay1801-1900 1844The British Governor of the Gold Coast forms an alliance with the Fante states along the coast against the Ashanti Empire.Colonial ConquestGhana1801-1900 1844New Orleans-born African American playwright Victor Sejour's first play, Diegarias, is performed at the Theatre Francais in Paris.Art and LiteratureFrance1801-1900 1845By this date the French have constructed the forts of Assinie, Bassam, and Dabou on the Slave Coast in what is now Cote d'Ivoire.Colonial ConquestCote d'Ivoire1801-1900 1846Tunisia abolishes slavery.EmancipationTunisia1801-1900 1847Sweden abolishes slavery.EmancipationSweden1801-1900 1847On July 26, Liberia becomes an independent nation. It's first president is Joseph Jenkins Roberts.IndependenceLiberia1801-1900 1848Denmark abolishes slavery.EmancipationDenmark1801-1900 1848Slavery is abolished in all French ColoniesEmancipationFrance1801-1900 1848France founds Gabon for the settlement of emancipated slaves.EmancipationGabon1801-1900 1848The French Assembly grants full voting rights to the inhabitants of Dakar and Rufisque, the two largest cities in the colony of Senegal. These inhabitants will govern themselves and send representatives to the French Assembly in Paris. This is the first time African colonial subjects will have a voice in the government of France. In 1872 similar rights will be granted to St. Louis and Goree Island.Colonial AdministrationSenegal1801-1900 1850Denmark sells its colony on the Gold Coast to the British and withdraws from Africa.Colonial AdministrationGhana1801-1900 1850Swahili-Arab traders extend trading routes for enslaved people and ivory across Lake Tanganyika into what is now the eastern Congo.East African Slave TradeTanzania1801-1900 1851The Liberian legislature authorizes the establishment of Liberia College which will eventually become the University of Liberia.EducationLiberia1801-1900 1851Columbia abolishes slavery.EmancipationColumbia1801-1900 1852The Hawaiian Kingdom abolishes slavery.EmancipationThe Hawaiian Kingdom1801-1900 1852Swahili traders from east Africa cross the continent and reach the Atlantic coastal state of Benguela.East African Slave TradeAngola1801-1900 1853The British allow the Gold Coast colony to have a legislative council. This is the first instance of the British providing limited self-government for their sub-Saharan colonial subjects.Colonial AdministrationGhana1801-1900 1853Mary Ann Shadd becomes the first woman of African ancestry to publish a newspaper anywhere in the world when she takes control of the Provincial Freeman in Chatham, Ontario.Anti-Slavery CampaignCanada1801-1900 1854Venezuela abolishes slavery.EmancipationVenezula1901-2000 1854Peru abolishs slavery.EmancipationPeru1801-1900 1854Al-Hajj Umar, a Muslim religious leader from Futa Toro (in present-day Senegal), initiates a jihad which captures much of the interior of west Africa including the Kingdom of Kaarta.West African EmpiresSenegal1801-1900 1854Quinine is used in in the Gold Coast for the first time in Africa to treat malaria.Health and MedicineGhana1801-1900 1855Ras Kassa unifies the warring states of Ethiopia and crowns himself Emperor Tewodros II.Political UnificationEthiopia1801-1900 1855Msiri, a Nyamwezi ivory and slave trader establishes a permanent interior state (called Nyamwezi) with a capital at Bunyeka.East African Slave TradeTanzania1801-1900 1855An estimated 4,000 fugitive slaves from Texas and the U.S. Southwest are living in and around the Mexican border town of Matamoras.EmancipationMexico1801-1900 1858Spain gains control over Equatorial Guinea.Colonial ConquestEquatorial Guinea1801-1900 1861The British establish a protectorate at the port of Lagos, the first step in creating the colony of Nigeria.Colonial ConquestNigeria1801-1900 1861Tukulor leader Al-Hajj Umar conquers the Kingdom of Segu.West African EmpiresBurkina Faso1801-1900 1861France gains control over Djibouti.Colonial ConquestDjibouti1801-1900 1863Slavery is abolished in all Dutch colonies.EmancipationThe Netherlands1801-1900 1863Al-Hajj Umar clashes with the French in the Senegal Valley and captures Timbuktu. The following year Umar is killed putting down a rebellion in Masina.West African EmpiresMali1801-1900 1863The French establish a protectorate over Porto Novo in Dahomey.Colonial ConquestBenin1801-1900 1864Former slave Samuel Crowther becomes the first African Anglican bishop. He is appointed to serve in what is now Nigeria.19th Century Black ReligionNigeria1801-1900 1865Samori Toure, the leader of the Mandinka, begins an empire in the upper Niger River basin.West African EmpiresMali1801-1900 1865Tippu Tip, a Swahili trader, gains control over the ivory and slave trade in the east African interior and becomes a rival to Msiri.East African Slave TradeTanzania1801-1900 1865The Dominican Republic is declared independent from Spain.IndependenceDominican Republic1801-1900 1866In November Mifflin W. Gibbs is elected to the Victoria, British Columbia City Council. He becomes the second black Canadian resident elected to office.PoliticsCanada1801-1900 1867Diamonds are found at Kimberley in the Orange Free State in what is now South Africa.African EconomySouth Africa1801-1900 1868Ethiopian Emperor Tewodros II is defeated by the British at the Battle of Aroge and subsequently commits suicide.International ConflictEthiopia1801-1900 1868Moshoeshoe, the King of Sotho in southern Africa requests British annexation of his kingdom to avoid being overrun by the Boers.Southern African EmpiresSouth Africa1801-1900 1868Antonio Maceo Grajales joins the Cuban independence movement eventually rising to the level of General in the insurgent army at the time of his death in 1896.Anti-Colonial CampaignCuba1801-1900 1869Slavery is abolished in Portugal's African colonies.EmancipationPortugal1801-1900 1869Gold is discovered at Tati in South Africa and in neighboring Botswana, setting off an international gold rush into the region.African EconomySouth Africa1801-1900 1869The Suez Canal is opened with Great Britain and France in control of the waterway.Colonial AdministrationEgypt1801-1900 1873Slavery is abolished in Puerto RicoEmancipationUnited States1801-1900 1873The British persuade the Sultan of Zanzibar to end the slave trade.East African Slave TradeZanzibar1801-1900 1873-74The Anglo-Ashanti War. After initial victories by the Ashanti, the British eventually prevail and force the Ashanti Emperor to surrender.Colonial ConquestGhana1801-1900 1879In the first Anglo-Zulu War the British suffer a crushing defeat at Isandlwana.Anti-Colonial ResistanceSouth Africa1801-1900 1880Samori Toure extends his conquests to include the west African gold fields and the upper Niger valley.West African EmpiresNiger1801-1900 1880Afro-French explorer Pierre de Brazza-Savorgnan negotiates a treaty with the Kingdom of the Kongo which relinquishes its claim to the north bank of the Congo River. He founds Brazzaville, the first settlement in the new colony.Colonial ConquestCongo-Brazzaville1801-1900 1881The Mahdist Revolution began on June 29 when a Sudanese Islamic cleric, Muhammad Ahmad, proclaimed himself the Mahdi.Islam in AfricaSudan1801-1900 1882Great Britain gains control over Egypt from the Ottoman Empire.Colonial ConquestEgypt1801-1900 1884Nehemiah Tile founds the Tembu National Church, the first of a series of African-controlled churches in South Africa, in the Transkei region of South Africa.African ReligionSouth Africa1801-1900 1884Germany acquires Namibia, Togo, and Cameroon as its first African colonies.Colonial ConquestNamibia1801-1900 1884European nations at the Berlin Conference reach agreement on the partition of Africa.Colonial ConquestGermany1801-1900 1885Germany establishes a protectorate over the Tanganyika coast.Colonial ConquestTanzania1801-1900 1885King Leopold of Belgium acquires the Congo, a vast area of nearly 905,000 square miles, as his personal possession. He calls the area the Congo Free State.Colonial ConquestCongo1801-1900 1885The French declare a protectorate over Madagascar.Colonial ConquestMadagascar1801-1900 1885Pan-Africanist intellectual Edward Wilmot Blyden campaigns unsuccessfully for President of Liberia. After his defeat he goes into self-imposed exile in neighboring Sierra Leone.PoliticsLiberia1801-1900 1885The Royal Niger Company, backed by the British Army, takes control of the Lower Niger and Benue River valleys. With that expansion they effectively rule half of what will eventually be the colony of Nigeria.Colonial ConquestNigeria1801-1900 1886Slavery is abolished in Cuba.EmancipationCuba1801-1900 1886City of Johannesburg is founded in South Africa.Colonial AdministrationSouth Africa1801-1900 1886The Comoros Islands become a French protectorate.Colonial ConquestComoros1801-1900 1887The British declare a protectorate over what is now Southern Nigeria.Colonial ConquestNigeria1801-1900 1888Slavery is abolished in Brazil.EmancipationBrazil1801-1900 1888The British help the Germans crush Muslim resistance on the East African coast.Colonial ConquestTanzania1801-1900 1889Italy gains control over Eritrea.Colonial ConquestEritrea1801-1900 1889Cecil Rhodes' British South African Company begins the colonize the African interior. White settlers name the colony Rhodesia.Colonial ConquestSouth Africa1801-1900 1889Menelik II becomes the Emperor of Ethiopia and initiates a campaign of expansion which will double the size of the empire.Political UnificationEthiopia1801-1900 1893Henry Ossawa Tanner paints The Banjo Lesson while living in France. The painting is eventually hailed as one of the major works of art of the late 19th Century.Art and LiteratureFrance1801-1900 1893French forces capture Timbuktu and destroy the Tukulor Empire.Colonial ConquestMali1801-1900 1893The French declare the Ivory Coast to be their colony.Colonial ConquestCote d'Ivoire1801-1900 1894Buganda is occupied by the British who begin to form the colony of Uganda.Colonial ConquestUganda1801-1900 1894The French conquer Dahomey.Colonial ConquestBenin1801-1900 1895Tananarive, the capital of Madagascar, surrenders to the French.Colonial ConquestMadagascar1801-1900 1896The Ethiopians, under Emperor Menelik II, defeat the Italians at the Battle of Adwa and becomes the only African nation to successfully resist European conquest during this period.Anti-Colonial ResistanceEthiiopia1801-1900 1896Sultan Khaled surrenders Zanzibar to the British.Colonial ConquestZanzibar1801-1900 1896British forces invade and occupy the Ashanti Empire.Colonial ConquestGhana1801-1900 1897Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis, a prominent 19th century Brazilian writer is a founder and the first President of the Brazilian Academy of Literature. He holds the post until his death in 1908.Art and LiteratureBrazil1801-1900 1897Zanzibar abolishes slavery.EmancipationZanzibar1801-1900 1897The British Army creates the West African Frontier Force, regiments of African soldiers led by British officers.Colonial ConquestNigeria1801-1900 1898Afro-English composer Samuel Coleridge-Taylor is commissioned at 23 to write his Ballade in A Minor for Britain19th Century Black MusicGreat Britain1801-1900 1898The French gain control over Guinea.Colonial ConquestGuinea1801-1900 1899The British and French establish joint rule over Sudan.Colonial AdministrationSudan1801-1900 1899Germany conquers Rwanda.Colonial ConquestRwanda1801-1900 1900The United States Pavilion at the Paris Exposition (April 14-Nov. 10) houses an exhibition on black Americans called the Exposition des Negres d'Amerique.Art and LiteratureFrance1801-1900 1900The first Pan African Conference, organized by Henry Sylvester Williams, a Trinidad attorney, meets in London in July.Pan AfricanismGreat Britain1801-1900 1900The British establish the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.Colonial AdministrationNigeria1801-1900 1900Beginning of large scale copper mining in the Katanga region of the Congo Free State.African EconomyCongo1801-1900 1900The first white settlers arrive in Kenya.Colonial ConquestKenya1801-1900 1901African American cyclist Marshall "Major" Taylor wins European Cycling championship in Paris, France.Black AthletesFrance1901-2000 1901The British annex the Ashanti Empire into their Gold Coast colony.Colonial ConquestGhana1901-2000 1903Meta Vaux Warrick, an African American sculptor, exhibits her work at the Paris Salon, Paris France.Art and LiteratureFrance1901-2000 1903Thousands of black workers from the Caribbean and Latin America arrive in the Canal Zone to help build the Panama Canal.Black LaborPanama1901-2000 1903Troops of the West African Frontier Force, led by British officers, take the city of Sokoto. Shortly afterwards the Sokoto Caliphate is annexed to Nigeria.Colonial ConquestNigeria1901-2000 1904France creates a federation of its West African colonies stretching from Chad and the Cameroons west to Senegal.Colonial AdministrationChad1901-2000 1904The Herero rise in rebellion against German forces in South West Africa (Namibia). The rebellion is crushed the following year.Anti-Colonial ResistanceNamibia1901-2000 1904Black South Africans are required for the first time to settle in Soweto, a township on the edge of Johannesburg. Soweto is the first and will eventually become the largest of the all-black townships near white South African cities under the new system of government-mandated residential segregation.Colonial AdministrationSouth Africa1901-2000 1905The Maji-Maji Uprising begins in German East Africa.Anti-Colonial ResistanceTanzania1901-2000 1906Britain, France, and Italy agree to recognize the independence of Ethiopia.IndependenceEthiopia1901-2000 1906Lagos is incorporated into the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.Colonial AdministrationNigeria1901-2000 1907German forces capture Abdallah Mapanda, the leader of the Maji-Maji Uprising in German East Africa (Tanganyika).Anti-Colonial ResistanceTanzania1901-2000 1907Nairobi is chosen as the capital of British East Africa.Colonial AdministrationKenya1901-2000 1907German forces defeat the Nama people, ending resistance to the conquest of South West AfricaColonial ConquestNamibia1901-2000 1908John Baxter "Doc" Taylor of the University of Pennsylvania becomes the first African American to win an Olympic Gold Medal. His event is the 4/400-meter medley at the London Games.African American AthletesGreat Britain1901-2000 1908On December 26, Jack Johnson defeats Canadian Tommy Burns in Sydney, Australia to become the first African American heavyweight boxing champion of the world.African American AthletesAustralia1901-2000 1908Leopold II transfers control of the Congo Free State to Belgium.Colonial AdministrationCongo1901-2000 1910The Union of South Africa is formed with the Afrikaners as the majority of the white population. The Union becomes a dominion of the British Empire.Colonial AdministrationSouth Africa1901-2000 1912The African National Congress (ANC) was formed in Bloemfontein, South Africa on January 18, 1912, when a group of Africans, Coloreds, and Indians convened a meeting to discuss their grievances against the colonial government.Anti-Colonial ResistanceSouth Africa1901-2000 1912The French establish a protectorate in Morocco.Colonial ConquestMorocco1901-2000 1913Mohandas Gandhi is arrested in South Africa for leading a protest against the treatment of Indians there.Anti-Colonial ResistanceSouth Africa1901-2000 1914The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) is founded in Kingston, Jamaica by Marcus and Amy Jacques Garvey.Pan AfricanismJamaica1901-2000 1914U.S. born pilot Eugene Jacques Bullard volunteers to serve with the French Air Force in World War I. He is the first black pilot to see combat in that conflict.African Americans in World War IFrance1901-2000 1914Blaise Diagne wins a seat in the French National Assembly in Paris, representing Dakar, Senegal. He also recruits Senegalese troops for the French Army during World War I. In 1934 he becomes the Deputy Minister of the Colonies in the French government.PoliticsSenegal1901-2000 1914The British Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria are combined to form the Colony of Nigeria, the most populous colony in Africa.Colonial AdministrationNigeria1901-2000 1915On July 28, the United States begins a 19 year occupation of Haiti, the longest in U.S. history.The United States in HaitiHaiti1901-2000 1915Invoking the name of U.S. abolitionist John Brown, John Chilembwe leads 200 followers in an unsuccessful revolt against British colonial rule in Nyasaland (now Malawi). Chilembwe and his followers kill three British subjects before he flees to Mozambique where he is killed ten days later by Portuguese-led African soldiers.Resistance to ColonialismMalawi1901-2000 1916In March the Tenth Cavalry is one of two cavalry units under the command of General John J. Pershing given the assignment to capture Mexican Revolutionary leader Francisco Pancho Villa. The Seventh Cavalry is the other. They are unsuccessful.African Americans and the MilitaryMexico1901-2000 1918The Ecole de Medecine de Dakar is founded in Dakar, Senegal. It eventually becomes Cheik Anta Diop University.EducationSenegal1901-2000 1919James Reese Europe's Army jazz band popularizes jazz in France and Western Europe20th Century Black MusicFrance1901-2000 1919The second Pan African Conference, led by W.E. B. DuBois, meets in Paris in February partly to help influence the post war Versailles Peace Conference.Pan AfricanismFrance1901-2000 1920Former German colonies of Togo, Cameroons, South West Africa, and Tanganyika in Africa are divided by the victorious French and British after World War I.Colonial AdministrationTogo1901-2000 1921Bessie Coleman, the first black female pilot, also becomes the first woman to receive an international pilots license when she graduates from the Federation Aeronautique International in France.Black WomenFrance1901-2000 1921The third Pan African Conference meets in London and Brussels.Pan AfricanismBelgium1901-2000 1922Senegelese boxer Louis Phal, also known as Battling Siki, defeats Georges Carpentier in Paris to win the world light heavyweight boxing title. Phal becomes the first African to win an international professional sports title.Black AthletesFrance1901-2000 1922Makerere University is founded as a vocational institute on the edge of Kampala, Uganda. It will become the largest university in East Africa.EducationUganda1901-2000 1922Egypt gains its independence from Great Britain on February 22. King Fuad I is the first head of state.IndependenceEgypt1901-2000 1923The fourth Pan African Congress meets in London and Lisbon.Pan AfricanismPortugal1901-2000 1923Abyssinia (Ethiopia) becomes the first African nation to join the League of Nations.International OrganizationsThe Netherlands1901-2000 1924Eugene ONeill's play The Emperor Jones opens in London with Paul Robeson in the title role.Art and LiteratureGreat Britain1901-2000 1924Achimota School is founded near Accra, The Gold Coast. Part of the institution eventually evolves into the University of Ghana.EducationGhana1901-2000 1924Iraq abolishes slavery.EmancipationIraq1901-2000 1924O Clarim da Alvorada (Clarion of Dawn) becomes of the first Afro-Brazilian newspapers. Founded in Sao Paulo, it will be a leading force in the growing black culture movement in Brazil.Civil RightsBrazil1901-2000 1924The Ligue Universelle pour la Defense de la Race Noire (LUDRN), a Pan African Association, is created on April 30 in Paris. The Ligue works to improve conditions for colonized Africans.Pan AfricanismFrance1901-2000 1925American-born Josephine Baker emerges as a popular entertainer in Paris after she appears in the musical La Revue Negre.Black EntertainmentFrance1901-2000 1926League of Nations Slavery Convention bounds all signatories to end the slave trade and slavery.EmancipationThe Netherlands1901-2000 1927Fifth Pan African Congress meets in New York City.Pan AfricanismUnited States1901-2000 1928Iran abolishes slavery.EmancipationIran1901-2000 1929The Aba Women's Riots in Aba, Nigeria, are the first direct revolt by Nigerians against British colonial rule.Anti-Colonial ResistanceNigeria1901-2000 1930Ras Tafari is crowned Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.Political UnificationEthiopia1901-2000 1931The Frente Negra Brasileira (Brazilian Black Front) is formed in the city of Sao Paulo.Civil RightsBrazil1901-2000 1934Abidjan is declared the capital of the French colony of Ivory Coast.Colonial AdministrationCote d'Ivoire1901-2000 1934American-born Robert Robinson becaue the first black city councilman in Moscow, Russia (The Soviet Union).PoliticsRussia1901-2000 1935On October 3, Italy invades Ethiopia.Italian Invasion of EthiopiaEthiopia1901-2000 1936Addis Ababa is conquered by Italian forces. Mussolini declares the conquest the foundation of a new Roman Empire.Italian Invasion of EthiopiaEthiopia1901-2000 1936Felix Eboue become Colonial Governor of Guadeloupe, French West Indies, the first person of African ancestry to hold the post in the French Colonial Empire. Eventually he will hold the same post in Chad and in 1940 becomes Governor General of French Equatorial Africa.Colonial AdministrationGuadeloupe1901-2000 1936On June 30, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie appeals unsuccessfully to the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, to assist his country in expelling the Italian invaders.Military InvasionEthiopia1901-2000 1937Approximately 80 African Americans are among the 3,000 U.S. volunteers who fight in the Spanish Civil War. One of them, Texas-born Oliver Law, commands the Lincoln Battalion. Law is killed in battle on July 9.Black InternationalismSpain1901-2000 1941Ethiopia with the assistance of British forces defeats the Italians and reestablishes its independence.Italian Invasion of EthiopiaEthiopia1901-2000 1942Slavery is abolished in the Ethiopian Empire.EmancipationEthiopia1901-2000 1942-43Nearly 100,000 African American noncombat soldiers are sent to Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Samoa and other areas of the Pacific to build roads, ports and airfields in the war against Imperial Japan. Black black soldiers with the 95th Engineer Regiment, for example, help construct the Alaska-Canadian (ALCAN) Highway in 1942.African Americans and the MilitaryNew Guinea1901-2000 1943African troops fight in both Allied and Axis armies in North, West, and East Africa.Black SoldiersLibya1901-2000 1943President Franklin Roosevelt travels to Liberia to Meet with Liberian President Edwin J. Barclay to lobby for its rubber and other natural resources for the Allied war effort. This marks the first trip by a U.S. President while in office to a sub-Saharan African nation.International DiplomacyLiberia1901-2000 1944Eilud Mathu becomes the first black member of the legislative council of Kenya.PoliticsKenya1901-2000 1944The 81st and 82nd West African Divisions and the 11th East African Division (British Army) fight the Japanese in Burma.Black SoldiersBurma1901-2000 1944Abdias do Nascimento founds the Teatro Nacional do Negro in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.Art and LiteratureBrazil1901-2000 1944Eric Eustace Williams publishes the influential Capitalism and Slavery which argues that the British abolition of slavery grew from the realization that wage labor had supplanted slave labor in the global capitalist marketplace.Art and LiteratureUnited States1901-2000 1944Soon after the Allied invasion at Normandy on D-Day, the U.S. Army organizes the Red Ball Express to bring need supplies from the coast to troops advancing across France toward Germay. Nearly 75% of the supply truck drivers are African American.African Americans and the MilitaryFrance1901-2000 1945The sixth Pan African Congress meets in Manchester, England.Pan AfricanismGreat Britain1901-2000 1945Madame E. T. Eboue is the first person of African ancestry to win a seat in the French Assembly.PoliticsFrance1901-2000 1946The Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) was the first French-speaking Pan African organization. Founded in 1946 in Bamako, Mali to provide a voice for colonized Africans in the French National Assembly in Paris, its various colonial sections by 1960 become the first political parties in Mali, Upper Volta, Chad and other newly independent French-speaking nations.Pan AfricanismMali1901-2000 1947Alioine Diop establishes Presence Africaine, a journal devoted to African culture, in Dakar, Senegal.Art and LiteratureSenegal1901-2000 1947The African National Congress (ANC) forms an alliance with the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal Indian Congress to oppose British and Afrikaner rule in South Africa.Anti-Colonial CampaignSouth Africa1901-2000 1948United Nations Article 4 bans slavery globally.EmancipationUnited States1901-2000 1948The Nationalist Party wins parliamentary elections in South Africa. Within a year it will make Apartheid the official policy of the government.ApartheidSouth Africa1901-2000 1948The University of Ibadan is established in the city of Ibadan, the second largest city in the colony of Nigeria. The university will be the first institution of higher education in Nigeria.EducationNigeria1901-2000 1948The University of the West Indies is established as the University College of the West Indies at Mona, Jamaica.EducationJamaica1901-2000 1950On September 22, Ralph Bunche becomes the first African American recipient of a Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation of a settlement between Arabs and Israelis in the 1947-48 Mideast Crisis.Humanitarian AwardsSweden1901-2000 1951On December 24, Libya gains its independence from Italy. Its first head of state is King Idris.IndependenceLibya1901-2000 1951The Algerian National Liberation Front begins a guerrilla campaign against the French. The campaign ends with Algerian independence in 1962.Anti-Colonial ResistanceAlgeria1901-2000 1952The Mau Mau Uprising begins in Kenya. The uprising ends in 1956 after more than 13,000 people are killed.Anti-Colonial ResistanceKenya1901-2000 1952Qatar abolishes slavery.EmancipationQatar1901-2000 1952Ethiopia gains control over Eritrea.Colonial ConquestEritrea1901-2000 1955Civil War begins in Sudan pitting the Muslim North against the Christian South.Civil WarSudan1901-2000 1956Eric Eustace Williams founds the People's National Movement in Trinidad.PoliticsTrinidad & Tobago1901-2000 1956On January 1, Sudan gains independence from Great Britain. Ismail al-Azhari is the first head of state.IndependenceSudan1901-2000 1956On March 20, Tunisia gains independence from France. The first head of state is Muhammad VIII al-Amin.IndependenceTunisia1901-2000 1956On April 7, Morocco gains its independence from France. The first head of state is Muhammad V.IndependenceMorocco1901-2000 1957On July 6, Althea Gibson becomes the first African American to win the Womens Singles Division of the British Tennis Championship at Wimbledon.African American AthletesGreat Britain1901-2000 1957On March 6, Ghana becomes the first sub-Saharan nation to gain independence when it is declared free by Great Britain. The first head of state is Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah.IndependenceGhana1901-2000 1957The Bahutu Manifesto drawn up by Rwandan Hutu intellectuals, called for Hutu ethnic and political solidarity and the political disfranchisement of the Tutsi people.Ethnic ConflictRwanda1901-2000 1958Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe publishes Things Fall Apart, his first critically acclaimed novel.Art and LiteratureNigeria1901-2000 1958Edson Arantes do Nascimento, 17 year-old Brazilian soccer star leads the Brazilian National Soccer team to its first World Cup championship in international competition in Stockholm, Sweden.Black AthletesBrazil1901-2000 1958Canadian native Willie O'Ree is the first black hockey player in the National Hockey League. He made his NHL debut on January 18, 1958 as a player for the Boston Bruins. Their opponent was the Montreal Canadiens.Black AthletesCanada1901-2000 1958On October 2, Guinea gains its independence from France. Sekou Toure is the first head of state.IndependenceGuinea1901-2000 1959The National Symphony Orchestra is founded in Accra, Ghana. It is the first in sub-Saharan Africa.20th Century Black MusicGhana1901-2000 1959South Africa writer Es'kia Mphahlele publishes his critically acclaimed autobiography Down Second Avenue.Art and LiteratureSouth Africa1901-2000 1960Albert John Lutuli, President of the African National Congress, wins the Nobel Peace Prize.Humanitarian AwardsSweden1901-2000 1960Track star Wilma Rudolph of Tennessee State University is the first woman to win three gold medals at the Olympic Games which are held that year in Rome.African American AthletesItaly1901-2000 1960Burkina Faso becomes independent from France. Its first head of state is Maurice Yameogo.IndependenceBurkina Faso1901-2000 1960Cote d'Ivoire is declared independent from France. Felix Houphouet-Boigny is the nation's first President.IndependenceCote d'Ivoire1901-2000 1960Chad becomes independent of France on August 11. Francois Tombalbaye is the first head of state.IndependenceChad1901-2000 1960Abebe Bikila, the barefoot Ethiopian runner, became the first African to win an Olympic gold medal. He competed at the games in Rome, Italy.Black AthletesItaly1901-2000 1960On June 26, Madagascar is declared independent by France. Philibert Tsiranana is the first head of state.IndependenceMadagascar1901-2000 1960On August 1 Benin is declared independent of France. Its first head of state is Hubert Maga.IndependenceBenin1901-2000 1960On August 3, Niger becomes independent of France. Hamani Diori is chosen as the first head of state.IndependenceNiger1901-2000 1960On June 20, Mali gains independence from France. Modibo Keita is the first head of state.IndependenceMali1901-2000 1960Senegal is declared independent by France on June 20. Leopold Senghor is the nation's first President.IndependenceSenegal1901-2000 1960On April 27, Togo gains its independence from France. The first head of state is Sylvanus Olympio.IndependenceTogo1901-2000 1960On January 1, Cameroon is granted independence by Great Britain and France. The first head of state is Ahmadou Ahidjo.IndependenceCameroon1901-2000 1960On June 30, Belgium grants independence to the Congo, (Leopoldville). Joseph Kasavubu is the first Head of State. Within weeks of that independence Katanga province secedes from the Congo prompting a four year civil war in that new nation and United Nations intervention.IndependenceCongo1901-2000 1960Nigeria gains its independence from Great Britain on October 1. Nnamdi Azikiwe is the first President of the nation but in a powersharing arrangement worked out by the British, Sir Abubakar Tafawa is the first Prime Minister.IndependenceNigeria1901-2000 1960On July 1, British and Italian Somaliland are united to form the nation of Somalia. Aden Abdullah Osman Daar is the first Head of State.IndependenceSomalia1901-2000 1960On March 21, 69 approximately 7,000 protestors gathered at the Sharpeville, South Africa police station to protest Apartheid pass laws. Police opened fire and 69 demonstrators were killed and 186 were wounded. In the aftermath the South African government banned a number of organizations including the African National Congress. The Sharpeville Massacre is considered the first major confrontation by black South Africans against Apartheid.Anti-Apartheid ResistanceSouth Africa1901-2000 1960South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is formed by Sam Nujoma and Herman Toivo ja Toivo.Anti-Colonial ResistanceNamibia1901-2000 1960The Central African Republic is granted independence from France on August 13. David Dacko becomes the first head of state.IndependenceCentral African Republic1901-2000 1960France grants independence to Congo-Brazzaville on August 15. Fulbert Youlou is the first head of state.IndependenceCongo-Brazzaville1901-2000 1960Gabon becomes independent of France on August 17. Leon M'ba is the first head of state.IndependenceGabon1901-2000 1960On November 28 Mauritania is declared independent of France. Moktar Ould Daddah is the first head of state.IndependenceMaurtania1901-2000 1961On January 18, Patrice Lumumba, the leader of the Congo independence movement is killed by troops of the secessionist Katanga province.Civil WarCongo1901-2000 1961The Nationalist struggle against Portuguese rule is launched in Angola. It continues until Angolan independence in 1974.Anti-Colonial ResistanceAngola1901-2000 1961On April 27, Sierra Leone gains its independence from Great Britain. Milton Margai is its first head of state.IndependenceSierra Leone1901-2000 1961An armed guerilla struggle begins in the Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. The struggle continues until both colonies are granted independence in 1975.Anti-Colonial ResistanceGuinea-Bissau1901-2000 1961On December 9, Tanganyika gains its independence from Great Britain. Julius Nyerere is the first head of state.IndependenceTanzania1901-2000 1962Yemen abolishes slavery.EmancipationYemen1901-2000 1962On July 3, Algeria is declared independent by France. Ahmed Ben Bella is its first head of state.IndependenceAlgeria1901-2000 1962Saudi Arabia abolishes slavery.EmancipationSaudi Arabia1901-2000 1962On July 1, Rwanda is granted independence by Belgium. Gregoire Kayibanda is its first head of state.IndependenceRwanda1901-2000 1962On July 1, Burundi is granted independence by Belgium. King Mwambutsa IV is the first head of state.IndependenceBurundi1901-2000 1963James Baldwin publishes The Fire Next Time while living in Paris.Art and LiteratureFrance1901-2000 1963Kenya gains independence from Great Britain on December 12. Jomo Kenyatta is the first head of state.IndependenceKenya1901-2000 1963The Organization of African Unity (OAU) founded in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, on May 23.International OrganizationsEthiopia1901-2000 1963The United Arab Emirates abolish slavery.EmancipationUnited Arab Emirates1901-2000 1964The Zanzibar Revolution of 1964 ends 120 years of Arab control of the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba Islands.IndependenceTanzania1901-2000 1964Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiongo publishes Weep Not, Child, the first major novel in English by an East African.Art and LiteratureKenya1901-2000 1964On December 10, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. receives the Nobel Peace Prize in Stockholm, Sweden.Humanitarian AwardsSweden1901-2000 1964On July 6, Malawi is declared independent by Great Britain. Hastings Kamuzu Banda is the first head of state.IndependenceMalawi1901-2000 1964Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere negotiates an agreement with newly independent Zanzibar to merge the two nations. Nyerere becomes President of the new nation of Tanzania.Political UnificationTanzania1901-2000 1964A Nationalist guerilla struggle against Portuguese rule is launched in Mozambique. It continues until Mozambique is declared independent in 1974.Anti-Colonial ResistanceMozambique1901-2000 1964On October 24, Zambia is declared independent by Great Britain. Kenneth Kaunda is the first head of state.IndependenceZambia1901-2000 1965Gambia gains independence from Great Britain on February 18. Dawda Kairaba Jawara is the first head of state.IndependenceGambia1901-2000 1965The white minority-controlled Rhodesian government declares its independence from Great Britain.IndependenceZimbabwe1901-2000 1966Nigerian novelist Flora Nwapa, publishes Efuru, one of the first novels in English by an African woman.Art and LiteratureNigeria1901-2000 1966First World Festival of Negro Arts (FESTAC) is held in Dakar, Senegal.Art and LiteratureSenegal1901-2000 1966Botswana gains independence from Great Britain on September 30. Seretse Khama is the first head of state.IndependenceBotswana1901-2000 1966Barbados gains independence from Great Britain on November 30. Errol Barrow is the first head of state.IndependenceBarbadoes1901-2000 1966The first military coup takes place in Nigeria, led by Igbo officers. It will lead directly to the Nigerian Civil War.Military DictatorshipNigeria1901-2000 1966Guyana gains its independence from Great Britain on May 26. Linden Forbes Sampson Burham is the first head of state.IndependenceGuyana1901-2000 1966Lesotho gains its independence from Great Britain on October 4. Leabua Jonathan is the first head of state.IndependenceLesotho1901-2000 1967The oil rich states of southeastern Nigeria secede and declare themselves the independent Republic of Biafra. Their action initiates the three year Nigerian Civil War.Civil WarNigeria1901-2000 1968Senegelese writer and film director Ousmane Sembene produces Mandabi, the first film in the Wolof language.Art and LiteratureSenegal1901-2000 1968Equatorial Guinea gain independence from Spain on October 12. Francisco Macias Nguema is the first head of state.IndependenceEquatorial Guinea1901-2000 1968Steve Biko founds the anti-Apartheid South Africa Students Organization (SASO). Eventually it becomes one of the largest black protest organizations in the nation.Anti-ApartheidSouth Africa1901-2000 1968Mauritius gains its independence from Great Britain on March 12.IndependenceMauritius1901-2000 1969Learie Constantine [Lord Constantine] becomes the first person of African ancestry to become a British peer.PoliticsGreat Britain1901-2000 1970The Nigerian Civil War ends with the surrender of the Republic of Biafra. Over one million Nigerians, mostly in the breakaway state of Biafra, die including many of starvation.Civil WarNigeria1901-2000 1970Oman abolishes slavery.EmancipationOman1901-2000 1970Josephine Hosten, a native of Grenada and a flight attendant became the first woman of African ancestry to will the Miss World pageant.Beauty PageantsGreat Britain1901-2000 1971General Idi Amin overthrows the government of President Milton Obote establishes a dictatorship in Uganda. Amin remains in power until 1986.Military DictatorshipUganda1901-2000 1972Uganda Asians are expelled from the nation by the dictator, General Idi Amin.Military DictatorshipUganda1901-2000 1972Nearly 150,000 Hutus are massacred by the Tutsi in Burundi.Ethnic ConflictBurundi1901-2000 1972Rosemary Brown of Vancouver becomes the first Afro-Canadian woman to be elected to public office when she wins a seat in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly.PoliticsCanada1901-2000 1972A famine begins in Ethiopia which in the next two years kills over 200,000 people.The EnvironmentEthiopia1901-2000 1973The Bahamas gains independence from Great Britain on July 10. Lynden Pindling is the first head of state.IndependenceThe Bahamas1901-2000 1973Guinea-Bissau gains its independence from Portugal on September 24. Luis Cabral is the first head of state.IndependenceGuinea-Bissau1901-2000 1974On October 30, Muhammad Ali defeats George Foreman in Kinshasa, Zaire to regain the world heavyweight championship.African American AthletesZaire1901-2000 1974The seventh Pan African Congress meets in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.Pan AfricanismTanzania1901-2000 1974Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie is deposed following a Marxist military coup led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.Military DictatorshipEthiopia1901-2000 1974Approximately 750,000 Portuguese colonists leave Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau and return to Portugal after that nation's decision to withdraw from all of its African colonies.African MigrationMozambique1901-2000 1974Greneda gains its independence from Great Britain on February 7. Sir Eric Matthew Gairy is the first head of state.IndependenceGrenada1901-2000 1975On June 25, Mozambique gain its independence from Portugal. Samora Machel is the first head of state.IndependenceMozambique1901-2000 1975Cape Verde wins its independence from Portugal on July 5.IndependenceCape Verde1901-2000 1975On November 11, Angola gains its independence from Portugal. Agostinho Neto is the first head of state. Angolan independence is followed by the Angolan Civil War, a twenty-seven year conflict between the Marxist government and South African-backed rebels. The war ends in February 2002 with the death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi.Civil WarAngola1901-2000 1975Surinam gains independence from the Netherlands on November 25. Johan Ferrier is the first head of state.IndependenceSurinam1901-2000 1975On July 12, Sao Tome & Principe gain indepenence from Portugal.IndependenceSao Tome & Principe1901-2000 1975Comoros is granted independence from France on July 6.IndependenceComoros1901-2000 1976On June 25, Seychelles gains independence from Great Britain. James Richard Marie Mancham is the first head of state.IndependenceSeychelles1901-2000 1976Cuban troops and military advisors from the Soviet Union are sent to assist the Angolan government in its campaign against South African-supported insurgents during the Angolan Civil War. Cuban troops remain in Angola until 1991.Military InterventionAngola1901-2000 1976The first Bantustans or homelands are created by the South African government to prevent black majority rule. These new quasi-independent states are intended to be the home of most of the blacks residing in South Africa.ApartheidSouth Africa1901-2000 1976Student-led riots break out in Soweto, the sprawling all-black township outside of Johannesburg, to protest Apartheid and continuing white minority rule.Anti-Apartheid ResistanceSouth Africa1901-2000 1976On July 3, Israeli commandos landed at Entebbe Airport outside Kampala and rescued 103 hostages held by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).Military InterventionUganda1901-2000 1977Janelle Commissiong, representing Trinidad & Tobago, was crowned Miss Universe at the pageant in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. She was the first woman of African descent to win the title.Beauty PageantsDominican Republic1901-2000 1977The First Congress of Black Culture in the Americas convenes in Columbia.Art and LiteratureColumbia1901-2000 1977On June 27, Djibouti gains its independence from France. Hassan Gouled Aptidon is the first head of state.IndependenceDjibouti1901-2000 1977President Jean-Bedel Bokassa declares the Central African Republic to be the Central African Empire and crowns himself Emperor Bokassa I.Military DictatorshipCentral African Republic1901-2000 1977War breaks out between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden region. The conflict will continue until 1988.International ConflictEthiopia1901-2000 1977Cuba sends troops to support the Marxist dictatorship in Ethiopia.Military InterventionEthiopia1901-2000 1978Dominica gains its independence from Great Britain on November 3. Patrick Roland John is the first head of state.IndependenceDominica1901-2000 1979Emperor Bokassa I is overthrown and a parliamentary government is restored in the Central African Republic.Military DictatorshipCentral African Republic1901-2000 1979On March 13, Maurice Bishop leads a coup and seizes control of the government of Grenada. He sets up a Marxist regime and is ousted and killed on October 19, 1983, six days before United States troops take control of the island.Military DictatorshipGrenada1901-2000 1979St. Vincent & Grenadines gain independence from Great Britain on September 19. R. Milton Cato is the first head of state.IndependenceSt. Vincent & Grenadines1901-2000 1980On April 18, black majority rule comes to Rhodesia which renames itself Zimbabwe. Canaan Banana is the first head of state.IndependenceZimbabwe1901-2000 1980A military coup led by Sgt. Samuel K. Doe ends 133 years of political domination by the Americo-Liberian elite in Liberia.Military DictatorshipLiberia1901-2000 1981Mauritania abolishes slavery.EmancipationMauritania1901-2000 1981Antigua & Barbuda gain independence from Great Britain on November 1. Vere Cornwall Bird is the first head of state.IndependenceAntigua & Barbuda1901-2000 1981Belize gains independence from Great Britain on September 21. George Cadle Price is the first head of state.IndependenceBelize1901-2000 1983The adoption of Islamic law in Sudan leads to renewed civil war between Muslims and Christians and generates widespread famine in the southern third of the nation.Civil WarSudan1901-2000 1983St. Kitts & Nevis gain independence from Great Britain. Dr. Kennedy Simmonds is the first head of state.IndependenceSt. Kitts & Nevis1901-2000 1983Abdias do Nascimento is elected to the Brazilian Congress in 1983 on a platform of promoting Afro-Brazilian rights.PoliticsBrazil1901-2000 1984Anglican Bishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu of South Africa is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Stockholm, Sweden.Humanitarian AwardsSweden1901-2000 1984In January Rev. Jesse Jackson travels to Syria to negotiate the release of U.S. Air Force pilot Robert Goodman who had been shot down over that country. Jackson returns to the U.S. with the freed pilot.Black InternationalismSyria1901-2000 1984Eritrea secedes from Ethiopia. The resulting conflict and ongoing drought cause severe food shortages. An estimated one million Ethiopians die as a consequence of the famine.Civil WarEritrea1901-2000 1985Live Aid Concert is held in Sydney, Australia and simultaneously in London, Philadelphia and Moscow to raise funds for Ethiopian famine relief.Humanitarian AidAustralia1901-2000 1985A State of Emergency is declared in South Africa in response to widespread anti-Apartheid rioting.Anti-Apartheid ResistanceSouth Africa1901-2000 1985The Zimbabwe government under President Robert Mugabe begins compulsory purchase of white-owned farms under the recently passed Land Acquisition Act.African EconomyZimbabwe1901-2000 1986Wole Soyinka of Nigeria becomes the first African to win a Nobel Prize in Literature.Art and LiteratureSweden1901-2000 1986The European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States impose economic sanctions against South Africa.Anti-Apartheid CampaignSouth Africa1901-2000 1989F.W. de Klerk replaces P.W. Botha as the President of South Africa. De Klerk immediately begins the dismantling of Apartheid. He also withdraws South African forces for Namibia paving the way for the colony's independence.Anti-Apartheid CampaignSouth Africa1901-2000 1990On February 11, Nelson Mandela, South Africa's leading anti-Apartheid opponent, is freed after 27 years in prison.Anti-Apartheid CampaignSouth Africa1901-2000 1990Namibia gains independence from South Africa on March 21. Sam Nujoma becomes the first head of state.IndependenceNamibia1901-2000 1990A civil war begins in Liberia initiated by Charles M. Taylor who challenged his former subordinate, Prince Johnson, for control of the nation. The conflict continues until 1996.Civil WarLiberia1901-2000 1991Afro-French skater Surya Bonaly wins the first of five European Figure Skating Championships.Black AthletesFrance1901-2000 1991Eritrean and Tigrean rebels attack Addis Ababa and cause the overthrow of Marxist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. Eritrea wins defacto independence.Civil WarEthiopia1901-2000 1991In May the Israeli government airlifts over 14,000 Ethiopian Jews to the nation of Israel. The Ethiopian Jews who call themselves Beta Israel, become the foundation for a population in 2010 of nearly 100,000 Jews of Ethiopian ancestry in Israel.International InterventionEthiopia1901-2000 1992The United States and the United Nations intervene in Somalia to end famine and civil war in that nation.International InterventionSomalia1901-2000 1993Eritrea breaks away from Ethiopia to become an independent nation on May 24. Its first head of state is Isaias Afewerki. Eritrea is the first African nation to gain its independence from another African nation.IndependenceEritrea1901-2000 1993On October 3-4 in the Battle of Mogadishu, U.S. forces were besieged by Somali soldiers loyal to General Mohammad Farrah Aidid. Nineteen U.S. troops and approximately 300 Somali soldiers died before U.S. troops withdrew from the area of the city controlled by General Aidid's troops.International InterventionSomalia1901-2000 1993In December Nelson Mandela and South African President F.W. de Klerk are jointly presented the Nobel Peace Prize in Stockholm, Sweden.Humanitarian AwardsSweden1901-2000 1994On April 27 South Africa holds its first non racially restricted election signaling the independence of the nation. Nelson Mandela becomes the country's first democratically elected President. He serves as President from May 10, 1994 to June 14, 1999.Anti-Apartheid CampaignSouth Africa1901-2000 1994Civil War in Rwanda between the majority Hutus and the ruling minority Tutsis becomes a massive genocide as nearly one million Tutsis are massacred by Hutus and nearly two million Rwandans flee to neighboring countries.Civil WarRwanda1901-2000 1994Emery Barnes becomes the first black speaker of the British Columbia Legislative Assembly.PoliticsCanada1901-2000 1995The United States withdraws from Somalia after the debacle at Mogadishu in 1993.International InterventionSomalia1901-2000 1995Benedita Souza da Silva Sampaio, is the first woman of African ancestry elected to the Brazilian Senate.PoliticsBrazil1901-2000 1995Nigeria is expelled from the British Commonwealth because of its human rights abuses including the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni political activists who bring international attention to the exploitation of the oil-producing Niger Delta.Military DictatorshipNigeria1901-2000 1996Ethiopian Fatuma Roba becomes the first African woman to become an Olympic marathon champion. She wins the gold medal at the Atlanta Games.Black AthletesUnited States1901-2000 1996John Taylor [Baron Taylor of Warwick] becomes the first person of African ancestry to sit in the British House of Lords.PoliticsGreat Britain1901-2000 1996Addisu Messele is the first person of African ancestry to be elected to the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament.PoliticsIsrael1901-2000 1996Celso Roberto Pitta do Nascimento becomes the firt black mayor of Sao Paulo, Brazil's largest city.PoliticsBrazil1901-2000 1997After 32 years in power, President Mobutu Sese Seko is ousted in Zaire by rebel leader Laurent Kabila who declares the nation the Democratic Republic of Congo.Military DictatorshipCongo1901-2000 1997Kofi A. Annan becomes the seventh Secretary General of the United Nations and the first African to hold the post. He remains Secretary General until 2007.International OrganizationsUnited States1901-2000 1998Terrorist bombing attacks at two U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania kill 250 people and injure another 6,000.TerrorismTanzania1901-2000 1999Mpule Kwelagobe of Botswana wins Miss Universe beauty pageant, becoming the first black African-born woman to hold the title.Beauty PageantsBotswana1901-2000 1999Civilian rule is reestablished in Nigeria after nearly three decades of military control of the national government.Military DictatorshipNigeria1901-2000 2001United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan receives the Nobel Peace Prize in Stockholm, Sweden.Humanitarian AwardsSweden2001- 2001World Conference Against Racism is held in Durban, South Africa.International DiplomacySouth Africa2001- 2002President Robert Mugabe wins disputed election and then arrests opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai on charges of treason. The country is expelled from the British Commonwealth.PoliticsZimbabwe2001- 2002On July 9, the African Union is formed with its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The African Union (AU) is the successor organization to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).International OrganizationsEthiopia2001- 2002Yvette Jarvis, a native of New York City, is the first person of African ancestry to be elected to the City Council of Athens, Greece.PoliticsGreece2001- 2003First Conference of legislators of African descent from the Americas and the Caribbean meet in Brasilia, Brazil.International DiplomacyBrazil2001- 2004Wangari Maathai becomes the first African woman to win a Nobel Prize. She is selected for her environmental work in her native Kenya.The EnvironmentKenya2001- 2005Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf becomes the first African woman to lead an African nation when she is elected president of LiberiaPoliticsLiberia2001- 2005On September 27, 2005 Michaelle Jean was installed as the 27th Governor General of Canada. As Governor General she is appointed by the Queen of England as Canada's titular Head of State.PoliticsCanada2001- 2006Portia Simpson-Miller, leader of the People's National Party of Jamaica, becomes the nation's first female prime minister.PoliticsJamaica2001- 2006Loria Raquel Dixon Brautigam is elected to the Nicaraguan National Assembly where she represents the North Atlantic Autonomous Region of Nicaragua. She is the first woman of African ancestry to sit in the Assembly.PoliticsNicaragua2001- 2006In September Mayann E. Francis, a career public servant, became the first Nova Scotian of African descent to become Lieutenant Governor of the province. She is the second woman to hold that post.PoliticsCanada2001- 2008Dean Oliver Barrow becomes the first black Prime Minister of Belize.PoliticsBelize2001- 2009On December 10 U.S. President Barack Obama receives the Nobel Peace Prize in Stockholm, Sweden.Humanitarian AwardsSweden2001- 2010On January 12, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake devastated the Haitian capital of Port-Au-Prince and much of the rest of the nation. Preliminary estimates of the dead exceeded 250,000, making this one of the worst earthquakes in terms of loss of life in the modern era.Natural DisasterHaiti2001- 2010The FIFA World Cup is held on the African continent for the first time when the games are played in Johannesburg, South Africa.Black AthletesSouth Africa2001- 2011South Sudan becomes an independent nation when it breaks away from Sudan.IndependenceSudan2001- 2013The Death and State Funeral of former South African President Nelson Mandela.PoliticsSouth Africa2001- 2014The worst Ebola epidemic in recent history sweeps across Central and West Africa, killing 11,000 people.PandemicsAfrica2001- 2015Boko Haram initiates terror attacks in Northern Nigeria. Eventually more than 2,000 people are killed.TerrorismNigeria2001- 2015Al-Shabaab carries out a mass shooting at a Nairobi, Kenya shopping mall, killing 148 people.TerrorismKenya2001- 2017Bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia attributed to al-Shabaab, kills 587 people in one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in modern history.TerrorismSomalia2001- 2017Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980, is ousted from power in a military coup.Military DictatorshipZimbabwe2001- 2018Epsy Campbell Barr is elected Vice President of Costa Rica.PoliticsCosta Rica2001- 2018Wedding of Prince Harry of Great Britain and Meghan Markle of the United States.England2001- 2019Omar al-Bashir, President of Sudan for 30 years, is ousted in a military coup.Military DictatorshipSudan2001- 2020COVID-19 pandemic begins, initiating a worldwide medical crisis that kills nearly two million people by the end of the year.Pandemics2001- 2020The murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis, Minnesota police officer sparks protests in 60 nations around the world.Racial ViolenceUnited States2001- 2021The COVAX vaccine-sharing initiative delivers its first vaccines, 600,000 doses to health care workers in Ghana.PandemicsGhana2001- 2021Tigray Defense forces seize the Tigrayan provincial capital of Mekelle, initiating the Ethiopian Civil War.Civil WarEthiopia2001- 2021Haitian President Jovenal Moise is killed by Colombian mercenaries in the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince.TerrorismHaiti2001- 2021Abdulrazk Gurmah, originally from Tanzania and now living in London, became only the second African since Wole Soyinka to win the Nobel Prize in 1986.Humanitarian AwardsEngland, Tanzania2001-
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The revival of Algerian olive cultivation
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Explore the Renaissance of Olive Cultivation in Algeria with Djazagro. Discover the Promising Future of Algerian Olive Oil. Join us to learn more about this thriving industry in Algeria.
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/-/media/Project/Comexposium-Master1/Master1-Djazagro/favicon-32.png?rev=f4b7da4e376b4c2b9b4f6d215760855e
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https://www.djazagro.com/en/news-trends/studies-trends/olive-oil-in-algeria
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Agricultural structure
In 2022, the Algerian olive-growing area will exceed 440,000 ha, representing an estimated 34% increase between 2012 and 2022.
The average farm covers 2.81 hectares, with 230 trees producing 221 quintals of fruit.
Of the 6 million olive trees in the Algerian orchard, over 5 million are in production, with a yield of 23 kg per tree. An expansion program is currently underway. It includes the creation of intensive olive groves and an increase in irrigated area. This project will almost double the size of the orchard, reaching 900,000 hectares under cultivation in Algeria by 2024.
Historically, olive growing has been highly concentrated in Kabylia and the north of the country. However, the project plans to extend this cultivation to other Algerian regions.
Algeria's food self-sufficiency policies are taking advantage of the opportunity to grow olive trees.
The famous cru de Tablazt in the Haute Soummam region, which won a medal at the 1910 Brussels World's Fair, the bitter Kabylie olive oils from the forest edges of the Bibans, the jade-green oils from the Illoula foothills, the heavy olive oils from Haute Kabylie with their fleeting aromas of pine and oak, the orange-pink oils from Seddouk, the golden-brown oils from the Babors coastline.
Long considered the best, olive oil from the orchards of Kabylie seems to be being dethroned by that of Jijel, with the Nutris company and its new olive oil factory, and even that of Sig with its specific variety, the sigoise, processed for decades by companies such as Sarl BHS - les Ravissantes.
A study** carried out by the consultancy firm PWC and Immar-Maghreb for PASA (Pôle Soummam en Algérie - 2022) reveals that:
99% of those surveyed also consume other vegetable oils (rapeseed, soya, etc.).
41% of Algerians consume olive oil
66% for its health benefits
38% for taste
35 % out of habit
28 % for beauty reasons
The price reaches 705 DA/l in Kabylie, but 813 DA/l in other regions of Algeria.
74% of customers buy olive oil through parallel channels
37% self-consumption
23% by donation (solidarity economy)
The production margin is reduced to 40%.
86% of customers believe that the oil they consume is of good quality, taste and smell.
However, 90% of the diaspora would like glass packaging, even if it means paying a little more, while Algerian consumers feel that the price is already too high and should be lowered.
The secret: quality olive oil
To stand out from the competition, you need to produce top-quality oil, free from defects. Algerian producers have understood this. They have banished ancestral methods to improve productivity, hygiene and quality.
Chemical composition, degree of acidity, taste, color. All these criteria can be used to determine exactly what makes a good olive oil. But for Algerian consumers, the country produces some of the best olive oil in the world.
Organic olive oil won a gold medal at the 2023 International Organic Olive Oil Competition in Geneva, Switzerland. This latest accolade comes on top of all the medals it has won in recent years in Tokyo (Japan), Berlin (Germany), Italy, Oslo (Norway) and twice in Dubai.
The Dahbia brand targets the organic market, with olives harvested in the morning and crushed in the afternoon.
A study** carried out by the consultancy firm PWC and Immar-Maghreb shows that opinions on labeling differ between the diaspora and nationals:
69% opted to indicate the region where the fruit was harvested, while others (64%) chose the region of production or quality.
Among residents surveyed, 57% are content to use a label indicating quality and region of crushing.
Algerian olive oil exports are booming. According to data from the Ministry of Trade, in 2021 these exports involved 600,000 liters mobilized by 78 operators to 19 countries, representing a value of US$2 million. By 2024, the target is US$5 million.
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Hire Label Designers from Algeria
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https://www.designcrowd.ca/designers/label/article
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https://www.designcrowd.ca/designers/label/article
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Browse freelance Label Designers from Algeria. Discover the world's best Label Designers and crowdsource your design today!
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8952
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dbpedia
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1
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https://www.wfsb.com/2024/08/06/algerian-boxer-imane-khelif-advances-gold-medal-match/
|
en
|
Algerian boxer Imane Khelif advances to gold medal match
|
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[
"Imane Khelif",
"boxer",
"female boxer",
"transgender",
"gender",
"Algeria",
"women's boxing",
"Olympics",
"Paris",
"Paris 2024",
"trans"
] | null |
[
"Associated Press"
] |
2024-08-06T00:00:00
|
Algerian boxer Imane Khelif is advancing to the gold medal match amid a week of scrutiny over her gender.
|
en
|
//webpubcontent.gray.tv/gray/arc-fusion-assets/images/favicons/wfsb/favicon.ico?d=427
|
https://www.wfsb.com
|
https://www.wfsb.com/2024/08/06/algerian-boxer-imane-khelif-advances-gold-medal-match/
|
PARIS (AP) — Boxer Imane Khelif of Algeria advanced to the gold-medal bout in the women’s welterweight division at the Paris Olympics on Tuesday night, moving one win away from what she calls the best response to the worldwide scrutiny she has faced over misconceptions about her gender.
With one more victory, Khelif would win Algeria’s second boxing gold medal and its first in women’s boxing.
Khelif defeated Janjaem Suwannapheng of Thailand 5:0 in the semifinals at Roland Garros, where the crowd roared for her and chanted her name repeatedly during her three-round fight. Khelif has won three consecutive bouts in Paris, and she will win either a gold or a silver medal when she completes the tournament on Friday against Yang Liu of China.
Khelif has thrived inside the ring in Paris amid criticism and stigmatization outside of it. The trouble has stemmed from the Olympic-banished International Boxing Association’s decision to disqualify her and fellow Paris medalist Lin Yu-ting of Chinese Taipei from the world championships last year for allegedly failing an eligibility test.
The controversy has become one of the biggest stories of the Paris Olympics, but it isn’t causing any negative effects on her performances in the ring.
“I don’t care about that,” Khelif said through an interpreter. “I wish to be ready and show a good standard, show my talent, because I want to entertain everyone.”
Khelif had already clinched Algeria’s first medal in women’s boxing before she stepped into the ring to rousing roars at Court Philippe Chatrier. She then controlled her bout with Suwannapheng, who took a standing 8-count late in the third after absorbing a series of punches.
“I had heard about the news regarding her, but I wasn’t following it closely,” Suwannapheng said. “She is a woman, but she is very strong.”
Khelif has won every round on every judge’s card in her two fights that have gone the distance in Paris. She has made the most important tournament run of her international career while under the most pressure she has ever faced.
“I am very happy,” Khelif said. “I’ve worked eight years for these Olympics, and I’m very proud of this moment. I would like to thank the support from people back home.”
The ending of Khelif’s first bout in Paris propelled her into the center of a worldwide divide over gender identity and safety regulations in sports. Her first opponent, Angela Carini of Italy, tearfully quit after just 46 seconds, saying she was in too much pain from Khelif’s punches.
Carini’s abandonment of the fight led to comments from the likes of former U.S. President Donald Trump, “Harry Potter” writer J.K. Rowling and others falsely claiming Khelif was a man or transgender. Carini later apologized for her decision.
In an interview Sunday with SNTV, a sports video partner of The Associated Press, Khelif said the wave of hateful scrutiny she is facing “harms human dignity” and called for an end to bullying athletes.
Khelif also said she felt the “best response” to the uproar around her would be to win a gold medal — and now she’s one win away.
After sharing a hug with Suwannapheng and holding open the ropes for her opponent in a traditional boxing gesture of sportsmanship, Khelif celebrated by running furiously in place while pumping her fists as the crowd roared for her again. The celebration was more joyous than her cathartic finish to her quarterfinal victory over Hungary’s Anna Luca Hamori, when she slammed her palm on the canvas as she teared up.
Khelif received her post-fight medical check and was headed out of the Roland Garros arena when she was mobbed by fans near the exit. They hugged Khelif, demanded selfies and waved Algerian flags while she made her way backstage.
Khelif received cheers that echoed through the famed tennis arena from the moment she entered to face Suwannapheng. Roland Garros welcomed a prominent turnout from Algerian fans voicing their national pride in a boxer whose negative spotlight has been taken quite personally in her country.
Both fighters came out aggressively, trading punches from distance. Khelif was more accurate while winning the first round on all five cards, and she repeated the performance in the second.
The fight got more physical in the third, with Suwannapheng pushing forward to make a comeback. The bout was stopped for a standing 8-count late in the third when Suwannapheng absorbed a few head punches in succession, although Suwannapheng appeared to shrug as if it wasn’t necessary — as is often the case in Olympic boxing, where referees can stop a bout for relatively minor reasons.
“I tried to use my speed, but my opponent was just too strong,” Suwannapheng said.
The 25-year-old Khelif is on the best run of her amateur career at the Olympics. She has performed solidly at the international level and even won some regional tournaments, but Khelif has never been a dominant fighter on the world stage until her two strong performances — and 46 seconds of easy work against a third — to reach the final in Paris.
The IOC and its president, Thomas Bach, have repeatedly defended the Olympic eligibility of Khelif and Lin while condemning the IBA as incompetent and biased.
Khelif and Lin were disqualified by the IBA in the middle of last year’s world championships over what it claimed were failed eligibility tests for the women’s competition. The IBA has been banished from the Olympics since before the Tokyo Games, and the body struggled to articulate the reasoning for its decisions on Khelif and Lin at a news conference Monday.
Lin also has clinched a medal and advanced to the Olympic semifinals. She fights Esra Yildiz Kahraman of Turkey on Wednesday night.
Algeria’s Olympic team has reacted forcefully to the criticism and negative attention around Khelif, and the fan turnout in Roland Garros reflected the seriousness with which the accusations have been received in her home country and in its French diaspora.
Chinese Taipei has reacted with equal condemnation of the IBA’s claims and the worldwide swirl of scrutiny. Sports officials on Tuesday said they are considering legal action against the IBA after sending a letter protesting “the International Boxing Association’s continued publication of false information, obscuring the facts, and attempting to interfere with the normal conduct of the event regardless of the rights and interests of athletes.”
___
AP Olympics: https://apnews.com/hub/2024-paris-olympic-games
|
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https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/%23iso:code:3166:DZ
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8952
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dbpedia
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2
| 64
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https://www.ganintegrity.com/country-profiles/algeria/
|
en
|
Algeria country risk report
|
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Learn about Algeria’s judicial system, police, public services, natural resources, land, tax & customs administration, and more.
|
en
|
https://www.ganintegrity.com/country-profiles/algeria/
|
The judiciary carries a high corruption risk for companies operating in Algeria. The courts are subject to political influence and are susceptible to corruption (HRR 2014). Firms do not perceive the courts as effective in settling disputes or in challenging government regulations (GCR 2015-2016). Algerians perceive the judiciary to be the most corrupt public institution, with almost three-quarters of surveyed households sharing this opinion (GCB 2013).
Foreign judgments are not recognized by the courts (ICS 2015) despite Algeria being a signatory of the New York Convention 1958 and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Companies face a moderate corruption risk when dealing with police. Impunity among police officers is believed to be a problem in Algeria, and authorities rarely disclose information on actions taken against police abuse (HRR 2014). Businesses consider the police to be moderately reliable in enforcing the law and in protecting business from crime (GCR 2015-2016). Most surveyed households believe corruption is widespread among the police (GCB 2013).
Algeria's public services sector carries a high corruption risk for companies. Local administrations are plagued by inefficiency, corruption, and patronage (BTI 2014). Inefficient government bureaucracy represents a major constraint for business, and policies and regulations are inconsistently applied in practice (ICS 2015). Indeed, bureaucracy in the country is opaque and lacks transparent oversight (HRR 2014), and bribes are sometimes used as a means to bypass bureaucracy and to avoid government interference (ICS 2014). It is more time-consuming to start a business in Algeria than in the rest of the region, but the process is less costly; the same applies for dealing with construction permits (DB 2016).
There is a high risk of corruption for companies dealing with Algeria's land authorities. Property rights are recognized and protected by law, but the effective protection of property rights is limited by lengthy court proceedings, the unpredictability of outcomes, political influence, and corruption (BTI 2014; ICS 2015). Companies complain about the difficulty of obtaining land; the government limits the ability of foreigners to purchase land in Algeria to avoid speculation (ICS 2015; BTI 2014). Registering property has also proved difficult for companies (BTI 2014).
The construction of Algeria's East-West Highway, which is dubbed the most expensive highway in the world (estimated at USD 13 billion), has been plagued by corruption since its start in 2006 (FitW 2015). In mid-2015, courts jailed 14 people connected to the case, including two former workers from the public works ministry, to two years in prison; an ex-intelligence officer to three years; while a former director of highways, Mohamed Khelladi, and a Chinese company advisor, Chani Mejdoub, were sentenced to ten years in jail and fined USD 35,000 for money laundering connected to the case. Seven international companies connected to the case were fined USD 55,000 each (World Highways, May 2015).
There is a high risk of corruption in Algeria's customs sector. The level of transparency within the border authorities is low, and demands for irregular payments are frequent (GETR 2014). Business executives perceive customs procedures as burdensome (GCR 2015-2016). Algeria has eased the process of trading across borders by upgrading the infrastructure at the port of Algiers, but the time and cost required to trade across borders remain higher than regional averages (DB 2016). Furthermore, companies report they routinely face delays of weeks and even months when clearing goods through customs (Export.gov, May 2015).
The Algerian public procurement sector carries a high corruption risk. Business executives contend that funds are often diverted to companies and individuals due to corruption and believe favoritism is widespread among procurement officials (GCR 2015-2016).
In 2015, the government launched a major corruption investigation into the state-owned company Sonatrach. The case involves the direct award of public contracts without open tenders, inflated contract prices and USD millions in bribes (US News, Feb. 2016). Several persons and companies connected to the case have been sentenced for embezzlement, money laundering, and bribery, among other offenses. The convicted include a former Sonatrach vice-president, Belkacem Boumediene, who was sentenced to five years in prison, and a former Sonatrach CEO, Mohamed Meziane, who received a five-year suspended sentence and a fine of USD 18,600. The latter's two sons, Mohamed Reda Meziane and Bachir Fawzi Meziane received six and five years in prison respectively. A former CEO of Credit Populaire d'Algerie, Meghaoui Hashemi, and his son were sentenced to five and six years in prison respectively (FCPA Blog, Feb. 2016). Several others also received prison sentences, and three companies (German Funkwerk Plettac, Italian Saipem Contracting Algeria and German-Algerian Contel-Funkwerk) were each fined between USD 37,000 and USD 47,000 (US News, Feb. 2016).
The government has generally not been effective in implementing anti-corruption laws. The Algerian Penal Code and Anti-Corruption Law criminalizes passive and active bribery, facilitation payments, illicit enrichment, abuse of power, kickbacks, and influence peddling. Punishments for the latter offense are higher when committed by government officials than by natural persons. Official corruption is punished by prison terms that range between two and ten years (ICS 2015). Money Laundering is regulated by the Law on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (in Arabic). Government officials are subject to disclosure laws and have to declare their assets within a month upon taking office if they gain substantial wealth and before leaving their positions, but the regulations are poorly enforced and very few officials have complied (HRR 2014). The Algerian legal framework provides for the protection of whistleblowers (ICS 2015).
Algeria has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Algeria is also a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, which combats money laundering and terrorist financing.
Freedoms of the speech and press are protected under Algeria's Constitution, but these freedoms are not protected in practice. The media is severely restricted (HRR 2014). Criminal and civil charges hinder journalists from engaging in critical reporting on government actions, and the government sometimes restricts foreign reporting by rejecting or severely delaying visas for foreign journalists (FotP 2015; FitW 2015). There is no freedom of information law in Algeria. The government monitors the internet and retains the right to block websites that are deemed "contrary to public order or decency" (FotP 2015). The media environment is described as "not free" (FotP 2015).
Algeria has strong traditions of civil society (BTI 2014). The government has consulted with NGOs when drafting some laws, and civil society's role in Algeria has gained increasing importance in recent years, particularly in regards to raising the public's general awareness of corruption issues (BTI 2014).
|
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8952
|
dbpedia
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1
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https://www.freeflagicons.com/country/algeria/square_label/
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en
|
Square label. Illustration of flag of Algeria
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[
"Redpixart LLC"
] | null |
Square label. Illustration of flag of Algeria. Download high quality image with transparent background at PNG format
|
en
|
/css/favicon.ico
| null |
Notification
Flag icon of Algeria is available in 3 sizes at PNG format.
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8952
|
dbpedia
|
0
| 47
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10443953/
|
en
|
Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: comparative analysis
|
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[] |
[] |
[
""
] | null |
[
"Hajer Dahmani",
"Ines Fradi",
"Leila Achour",
"Mondher Toumi",
"Maghreb Research Group"
] |
2023-08-19T00:00:00
|
In this paper, we outline and compare pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies for in-patent prescription medicines in three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and explore possible improvements in their pricing and reimbursement ...
|
en
|
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/coreutils/nwds/img/favicons/favicon.ico
|
PubMed Central (PMC)
|
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10443953/
|
J Mark Access Health Policy. 2023; 11(1): 2244304.
PMCID: PMC10443953
PMID: 37614557
Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: comparative analysis
, a , b , c , d and Maghreb Research Group c , * , #
Hajer Dahmani
aDepartment of Pharmaceutical Quality Assessment, National Laboratory of Control of Medicines, Tunis, Tunisia
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Ines Fradi
bPharmacy, University of Pharmacy of Monastir Tunisia, Monastir, Tunisia
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Leila Achour
cMarket Access, Specialist Pharmacist in Clinical Pharmacy at CNGMO Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia
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Mondher Toumi
dProfessor in Public Health, Public Health Department, Aix Marseille University, Marseille, France
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Maghreb Research Group
cMarket Access, Specialist Pharmacist in Clinical Pharmacy at CNGMO Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia
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aDepartment of Pharmaceutical Quality Assessment, National Laboratory of Control of Medicines, Tunis, Tunisia
bPharmacy, University of Pharmacy of Monastir Tunisia, Monastir, Tunisia
cMarket Access, Specialist Pharmacist in Clinical Pharmacy at CNGMO Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia
dProfessor in Public Health, Public Health Department, Aix Marseille University, Marseille, France
CONTACT Hajer Dahmani rf.oohay@inamhadrejah Analytical development of medicines, National Laboratory of Control of Medicines Tunisia, France
*List of interviewees is illustrated in the appendix 1.
#The name of the interviewees: Pr Samir AHID, Dr Amine AISSAOUI. Dr Abdelkrim AYOUGIL. Dr Zied BELGHITH, Dr Mohamed BEN FRADJ. Dr Teyssir BEN HOURIA, Dr Rym CHAABANE, Dr Khaoula CHARGUI, Dr Ihsane ELJOUDANI, Dr Naoufel EL MALHOUF, Dr Imen NAFFETI, Dr Hajer FELFEL, Dr Nesrine GHOZZI, Dr Ahlem GZARA, Dr Sondes HAMIDA, Dr Karima HAMMAMI, Dr Mariem HEDHIBEL, Dr Mouna JAMALEDDINE, Dr Mouna KHARRAZ, Dr Mariem KHROUF, Dr Faten LEMKACHER, Dr Imene LIMAYEM, Dr M. MOUMEN, Dr Saddek OUSEDDIK, Dr Fadhila REBHI, Dr Wafa REKIK, Dr Redouane SOUALMI, Dr Fadela TAZI BEN DJELLOUN, Dr Amor TOUMI, Dr Amine ZAGHDOUDI, Dr Mohammed Wadie ZERHOUNI.
Copyright © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
ABSTRACT
Objectives
In this paper, we outline and compare pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies for in-patent prescription medicines in three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and explore possible improvements in their pricing and reimbursement systems.
Methods
The evidence informing this study comes from both an extensive literature review and a primary data collection from experts in the three studied countries.
Key findings
Twenty-six local experts where interviewed Intervieweesincluded ministry officials, representatives of national regulatory authorities, health insurance organizations, pharmaceutical procurement departments and agencies, academics, private pharmaceutical-sector actors, and associations. Results show that External Reference Pricing (ERP) is the dominant pricing method for in-patent medicines in the studied countries. Value-based pricing through Health Technology Assessment (HTA) is a new concept, recently used in Tunisia to help the reimbursement decision of some in-patent medicines but not yet used in the pricing of innovative medicines in the studied countries. Reimbursement decision is mainly based on negotiations set on Internal Reference Pricing (IRP).
Conclusion
Whereas each country has its specific regulations, there are many similarities in the pricing and reimbursement policies of in-patent medicines in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The ERP was found to be the dominant method to inform pricing and reimbursement decisions of in-patent medicines. Countries in the region can focus on the development of explicit value assessment systems and minimize their dependence on ERP over the longer-term. In this context, HTA will rely on local assessment of the evidence.
KEYWORDS: Pricing, reimbursement, in-patent-pharmaceuticals, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
Introduction
Access to health services and pharmaceuticals is a fundamental human right [1]; some countries incorporate it in their national constitution. Countries currently working towards universal health coverage and where a large part of pharmaceutical spending is still out of pocket are facing many challenges to achieving equitable access to affordable, safe, efficacious, and quality medicines. In this context, pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies have a substantial impact on controlling pharmaceutical costs of in-patent medicines – particularly innovative and expensive ones that also carry a significant financial burden for overall health expenditure.
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are North African countries (also called Maghreb countries) with specific economic status and fragmented health-care systems. These countries are classified according to the World Bank income categories as Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) [2]. The health-care environment in the region is subject to considerable epidemiological change (rising prevalence of non-communicable disease) [3] as well as economic and financial pressure (rising health-care costs and coverage challenges). Total health expenditure ranges between 5% and 7% of GDP in the three Maghreb countries (438 to 974 current PPP USD per Capita) [4]. The total health expenditure comprises the greatest proportion of GDP in Tunisia (7%) and the lowest proportion of GDP in Morocco (5%). However, government health expenditure represents the greatest proportion of GDP: 4% in Algeria, 4% in Tunisia, and only 2.5% in Morocco. Understandably, there is a significant difference between total and public (government) spending in health mostly covered through out-of-pocket (OOP) spending which is notable in the Maghreb countries. It ranges from 32,5% in Algeria to 54% of the total health expenditure in Morocco in 2017 ( ) [5].
Table 1.
Health expenditureAlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaCurrent HE (% GDP)6.45.27.2Current HE per capita (current PPP $)974.8438.1863.3Out of pocket expenditure per capita, PPP (current international $)317.3236.3337.7Out of pocket expenditure (% current HE)32.553.939.1Domestic General Government HE per capita (current PPP $)642.9188.0493.1Domestic General Government HE (% of GDP)4.22.34.1Domestic general Government HE (% current HE)66.04357External HE per capita (Current PPP $)0.21.03.7External HE (% current HE)0.00.20.4
As in other low- and middle-income countries, medicines account for a large share of the health expenditures in the studied countries [5]. Pharmaceutical spending ranges between 24% and 31% of the total health expenditure in the studied countries ( ) [5–8]. The patented pharmaceutical spending ranges from 41% to 52% of total pharmaceutical spending ( ) [5–8].
Table 2.
Pharmaceutical ExpenditureAlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaPharmaceutical spending, (US$)3.71.40.6Pharmaceutical spending (% of the GDP)2.3%1.4%1.5%Pharmaceutical spending (% of health spending)31.2%23.830.5%Patented pharmaceutical spending (% total spending)52%41.2%51%Total population (millions)44,1837,0812,26
In the challenging context, of increasing demand, raising innovation of the pharmaceutical industry associated with growing medicine prices, and the limited resource allocations for health budgets, there is a need for a better understanding of how pharmaceutical markets are organized and financed in the Maghreb countries.
Pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals has always had an important impact on health policy objectives, patients, wholesalers, pharmacists, doctors, health insurers, the pharmaceutical industry, and medicines availability. Papers describing pharmaceutical price setting or negotiating procedures and reimbursement systems that are implemented in the Maghreb region are very limited.
This study is the first one that describes and compares implemented regulations and procedures for pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement of in-patent medicines in three Maghreb countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. A better understanding of the pharmaceutical landscape will help to foster pharmaceutical policies aiming to achieve universal and equitable access to essential medicines.
Methods
This study was conducted to map available evidence on pricing and reimbursement policies of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The evidence informing this study comes from both (a) a literature review (LR), and (b) primary data collection from experts in the three studied countries.
The LR was based on an extensive review of peer-reviewed and grey literature, reports, analyses, national guidelines of health authorities web pages, related articles, reports, laws, and directives, with the objective to retrieve information relating to pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies and trends in the study countries.
To complete our literature review and validate our findings, a survey was conducted among pharmaceutical experts and stakeholders including government officials, representatives from regulatory authorities, insurance organizations, hospital pharmacy departments, procurement agencies, and private pharmaceutical-sector actors and associations. Interviews were conducted through face-to-face questionnaires (physically or via virtual platforms). The Stakeholder’s interview list is shown in Appendix 1.
In order to address the study objectives, a questionnaire was developed according to the LR outcome and was used during the interviews (Appendix 2). The questionnaire comprised three sections: a) Healthcare system and sources of financing; b) Pricing Policies and Price Setting for in-patent pharmaceuticals; c) Reimbursement and Coverage Decisions for in-patent pharmaceuticals. The identified outcomes of each section are detailed in .
Table 3.
Key themes of the questionnaireKey endpointsObjective of the framework theme and associated endpointsHealthcare system and sources of financing- Pharmaceutical financing:a) Governmentb) National health insuranceb) Private Health insuranced) Out of pocket (OOP) payments
a) Government
b) National health insurance
b) Private Health insurance
d) Out of pocket (OOP) paymentsIdentifies the sources of financing for pharmaceutical products, the coverage conditions and the extent of OOPsIn-patent medicines Pricing policiesPricing policies for in-patent pharmaceuticalsDiscusses current pricing approaches in Maghreb regionIn-patent medicines Reimbursement policies− Coverage policiesDiscusses current reimbursement approaches in Maghreb regionPricing and reimbursement policies repercussions− Price levels− Availability issues− Affordability issues− International repercussions
− Availability issues
− Affordability issues
− International repercussions- Examines the impact of in -patent pharmaceuticals pricing and reimbursement policies on their price levels.
- Examines the extent to which in-patent pharmaceuticals are available in Maghreb countries
- Examines whether in-patent pharmaceutical prices are in line with the purchasing capability of patients and/or health care givers.
- Assesses the extent to which there are repercussions of pricing and reimbursement policies in Maghreb region elsewhere in terms of launch decisions, launch delays, and price convergence.
The interviews were completed between March 2021 and July 2022. The responses were then evaluated and summarized to highlight key concepts and trends in each country.
Based on the results of the LR and the primary data collection, an analysis was undertaken to consolidate the information by mapping, describing, and reviewing the currently applied pricing and reimbursement mechanisms in the study target countries and providing practical suggestions on how to improve pricing and reimbursement policies.
Results
Official documents, legal texts, and published pricing guidelines were reviewed in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the national language [9–23]. Twenty-six local experts were interviewed. Interviewees included ministry officials, representatives of national regulatory authorities, health insurance organizations, pharmaceutical procure-ment departments and agencies, academics, private pharmaceutical-sector actors, and associations.
Pricing policies for in-patent pharmaceuticals
In Algeria, the authority responsible for setting pharmaceutical prices is the National Agency of Pharmaceutical Products (ANPP) under the supervision of the Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry (MPI). An inter-ministerial committee is responsible for price setting: The Intersectoral Economic Committee of Drugs (CEPS). It was created at the ANPP by decree [9,10].
This committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs, and the National Health Insurance ([9] [24] primary data collection Algeria 2022). Price negotiation and approval occur before the grant of the Marketing Authorization Application (MAA) (primary data collection Algeria 2022).
The main policy used for in-patent pharmaceutical pricing is External Reference Pricing (ERP). The list of benchmark countries is determined by the decision of the Minister in charge of the Pharmaceutical Industry and it includes Belgium, France, Greece, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, the UK, and the Country of origin (COO). The price is calculated based on the lowest Ex-factory price (5, primary data collection Algeria 2022).
Health Technology Assessment (HTA) has been recently used through medico-economic assessments. According to the Ministerial decree of 26 December 2020, the Economic Committee may now require pharmacoeconomic studies to inform pricing decisions. The Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry is responsible for medico-economic assessment, but this activity is still under development. The nature of the studies that may be required is primarily Budget Impact Analysis but cost-effectiveness studies can also be required [5] (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
The Ministry of Health is responsible for hospital medicines management along with the procurement body for the public sector, the Hospitals’ Central Pharmacy (PCH) (Primary data collection Algeria 2022). Access programs for low-income patients are rarely deployed in Algeria because of cultural aspects (Algerian culture rejects donations or the help of companies). Nevertheless, the PCH may request free units on each purchase as a discount [5] primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In the private sector, distributors and pharmacists' margins are controlled by decree ( ) [11].
Table 4.
Price rangeWholesaler’ marginPharmacist’ marginPharmacist packageALGERIA*<7.00 DA20%50%between 7.01 and 11.00 DA15%33%between 11.01 and 15.00 DA12%25%>15.00 DA10%20%MAROCCO**MPET ≤166 DH11%57%-166 < MPET ≤ 588 DH11%47%-588 < MPET ≤ 66 DH
66 DH2%-300 DHMPET >1766 DH2%-400 DHTUNISIA***<2.890 TND8%42.9%between 2.891 TND and 7.754 TND8%38.9%between 7.755 TND and 23.974 TND8%35.1%>23.974 TND.8%31.6%
In Morocco, the pricing regulations and objectives are clearly stated in the country’s legislation [12]. The authority responsible for setting pharmaceuticals prices is the Ministry of Health through an inter-ministerial committee where many representatives are involved, mainly the Directorate of Medicine and Pharmacy (DMP) and the National Health Insurance/Ministry of Health (ANAM). Although price setting is not mandatory to obtain marketing authorization, the marketing of medicine remains conditioned by the publication of its price in the Official Journal (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
The main policy used for pricing originator medicine newly introduced on the market is ERP. Seven countries are considered in the basket: Belgium, France, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, and the country of origin if different. The considered price is the average price of the basket for existing products and the lowest price for newly launched pharmaceuticals converted into dirhams according to the national regulations [5] (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
Pharmaceuticals’ prices are also controlled through regulated mark-ups in the supply distribution chain [12]. For locally manufactured drugs, the profit margins to be applied to the wholesale pharmaceutical establishment and to the dispensing pharmacist are defined in according to the MPET ranges. For imported medicines, an additional 10% importer margin is also applied [12].
There is a multi-source procurement in Morocco: public and private sources. This can lead to different prices, especially between the public and the private sector (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
It is worth noticing that in-patent pharmaceuticals’ prices are negotiated independently of their reimbursement (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Tunisia, the prices of medicines (in-patent and generics) are negotiated by the Marketing Authorization Committee called ‘Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical Specialties’, which sits in the National Regulatory Authority (The Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicines or DPM), MOH. Indeed, Tunisian regulations state that Marketing authorization should be granted only to medicines that are presumed to improve the medical service rendered, to bring savings on the cost of health, in particular, compared to marketed products with the same or similar therapeutic aim [13].
Pricing of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Tunisia combines ERP and Internal Reference Pricing (IRP) to derive the price of similar products in the same therapeutic class. External reference pricing is applied to all imported medicines (originator brands and generics) seeking approval for regulatory registration and marketing in Tunisia. When submitting Marketing Authorization (MA) application, manufacturers must submit available prices of the medicine at an ex-wholesaler level in six countries: Algeria, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, and Spain [14].
For originator brands and thereafter for most of the newly launched in-patent pharmaceuticals, price negotiation with the manufacturers is made by the Ministry of Health’s Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical Specialties based on the:
Initial rule: at least 12.5% lower than the wholesaler price in the product country of origin
Prices of the product in the reference countries
Prices of existing therapeutic analogs in Tunisia (IRP)
Further health technology assessments by foreign HTA agencies or pharmacoeconomic studies: the price is determined by the assessment of the value informed by the evidence and HTA opinions and price data existing in the models including the cost-efficiency ratio.
For innovative medicines, an access program for indigent patients is systematically required. In this case, an agreed-on quantity is freely made available by the manufacturer to cover the needs of low-income patients who do not have health insurance coverage. Thus, specific contracts are signed by the pharmaceutical company and the Minister of Health (DPM and PCT). The access program is implemented once the medication is covered by national insurance (CNAM) (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Once price negotiation is agreed on from both sides (Manufacturer and Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical Specialties), the marketing authorization is granted with a proposed price (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In Tunisia, the public and private sectors have distinct procurement and pricing mechanisms. In the public sector, medicine procurement is ensured and centralized by the PCT, the procurement agency under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. It procures medicines for public hospitals mostly through procurement processes including tendering when appropriate/possible. The PCT is also playing a major role in private-sector procurement as it is the sole authorized importer of medicines [15]. Therefore, for all imported medicines (public and private sectors) and for hospital medicines, the Medicines Purchasing Commission (CAM) of the PCT fixes the purchase price with suppliers. Locally manufactured products intended for the private sector can be distributed directly through wholesalers without the intervention of the PCT (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Retail Prices are then officially approved by the Ministry of Trade as the pricing regulation of medicines is stated in the law n° 36–2015 of 15 September 2015 on the reorganization of competition and prices which excludes essential products and services from the free pricing regime. Medicines are included in the list of products and services subject to the regime of price approval at all stages by the Ministry of Trade ([16] primary data collection Tunisia 2022). Price setting takes into consideration the agreed price by the MOH, currency exchange level, and mark-ups applied along the supply chain. While the wholesaler’s and pharmacists’ margins are set by a joint order of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Trade [17,18] ( ), the PCT (importer) margin is fixed by internal procedures approved by the PCT Board.
Eventually, wholesalers, pharmacists, and patients’ purchase prices are published by the PCT in the form of public circulars. The purchasing price by the PCT is confidential, while public prices are published in PCT website. PCT Commercial medicines margin is 10.5% in the private sector fixed by internal procedures. It is worth noticing that the price approved by the Ministry of Trade does not apply to the hospital sector where prices are set through tendering by the PCT (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
summarizes the criteria for price setting of in-patent pharmaceuticals in the studied countries.
Table 5.
AlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaPricingDirect price controlAll medicinesAll medicinesAll medicinesPrice negotiation/Marketing Authorization (MA)Price negotiation and approval prior to MAPrice negotiation and approval after MA grantPrice negotiation prior to MA, price approval after MAMargin controlsYesYesYesERP rulesLowest priceAverage priceLowest priceNumber of countries977Countries in the BasketBelgium, France, Greece, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, plus Country of origin (COO)Belgium, France, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, plus COOAlgeria, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Spain, plus COOPrice sourceEx-factory and retail prices in basket countriesEx-factory price in basket countriesWholesale price excluding taxSources of information for pricing decisionsManufacturers and public information sources (e.g., websites)Manufacturers and public information sources (e.g., websites)Manufacturers and public information sources (e.g., websites)IRP rules
Price of similar pharmaceuticals on the market-IRP--+Price approvalMinistry of Pharmaceutical and IndustryMinistry of HealthMinistry of TradeDecision taking committeesInter-ministerial committee = The Intersectoral Economic Committee of Drugs (CEPS).Inter-ministerial committee (the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance).Technical committee (DPM/MOH) and Committee of purchasing of medicines (CPT/MOH).
Price revision
In Algeria, in-patent pharmaceutical prices are revised every 5 years at the same time as MA renewal [19], but some events can trigger in-patent medicines’ price revision:
When the price changes in the country of origin or in key basket countries.
When the manufacturer asks for price revision. This can happen even 1 year after price homologation and MA. Price can be reviewed downward or upward.
When the price changes worldwide (downward) independently of ERP basket countries (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In Morocco, medicine price revision is performed by the economic service of the national regulatory body (DMP, MOH). Price revisions take place during the MA renewal, every 5 years. Some events can trigger in-patent pharmaceuticals’ price revision: (i) when price changes in key basket countries occur, (ii) when an originator loses its market exclusivity, (iii) When the manufacturer asks for price revision to have a more competitive price, (iv) there is a change in the pharmaceutical formula or packaging [5,12] (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
Following a global benchmark of medicine prices in Morocco with other countries, important price reductions were applied by the Ministry of Health to 320 and 1258 drugs, respectively, in 2013 and 2014 [12,25].
In Tunisia, the revision of retail prices is made by the Ministry of Trade (Department of Economic Studies and Price Competition) after consultation with the MOH (DPM). Revisions are only applied for locally manufactured pharmaceuticals upon request and generally every 5 years [15].
For the imported medicines, downward revision of the purchase prices may be applied by the Tunisian Central Pharmacy (PCT) every 5 years but not systematically. In this context, the downward price revision process and timelines are not described by law, and there is no systematic reduction of the originator brand price upon the registration of the first generic in the Tunisian pharmaceutical market (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
On the other hand, purchase prices by the PCT regularly increase without revision of the retail price by the Ministry of Trade. This practice is due to the compensation process by the PCT. This practice is applied to compensate for price increases of imported medicines resulting in exchange rate fluctuations. The exchange rate applied by the central pharmacy corresponds to the real exchange rate of the pricing operation (average day rate of the central bank BCT on the day of the first receipt of the product). Consequently, PCT will lose its profit margin and even sell below the purchase price at a loss. This loss is compensated by the Government and applies only to imported drugs and aims to maintain stable retail prices and therefore maintain the affordability of essential medicines to Tunisian patients (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
As the amount of PCT loss gets greater every year, it reached € 55 million (TND 210 million) in 2018 [26], several exceptions were applied to retail price revision for imported medicines (when purchasing costs increase or when the Tunisian currency drops) in the following cases:
Medicines classified as comfort (non-essential)
Medicines classified as intermediate with a price under 5 Tunisian dinars
Medicines having non-compensated equivalent. A list of 50 to 60 imported products was subject to price revision (decompensation) (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Some events can trigger pharmaceuticals’ purchasing price revision (after price approval by the Ministry of Trade), when price changes in the country of origin, suppliers are asked for a price reduction, namely for compensated products (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
For hospital products purchased by mutual agreement, the purchasing prices can be revised by the PCT (CAM) upon request. Price cuts and increases will be applied to hospitals through annual revisions of the PCT prices (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
To mitigate exchange rate fluctuations, price adjustments are implemented in Morocco (prices of imported in-patent pharmaceuticals and generics are revised when the exchange rate varies by more than 10%). Whereas in Algeria, there are no price adjustments to take into account exchange rate fluctuations [5] (primary data collection Algeria, Morocco 2022). In Tunisia, for the imported medicines, exchange rate fluctuations are charged by the PCT and not transferred to the retail prices. This practice called the ‘compensation’ rises the amount of its loss (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Reimbursement policies
In Algeria, access to the retail market is under the social security (ministry of labor) which is in charge of the reimbursement process for outpatient care. Algeria is a predominantly reimbursed market. The public sector provides free treatments (formulary listing) to all citizens, while 85% of the population is covered by social security for outpatient care. Access to treatment is mainly influenced by the reimbursement and enlisting. CNAS (‘Caisse Nationale des assurances sociales des Travailleurs Salariés’) covers working employees (social affiliates) through El Chifa card, CASNOS (‘Caisse Nationale des Assurances Sociales des Non Salariés’) covers self-employed persons, CNR (Caisse Nationale des Retraités) covers retired citizens, CNAC (Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Chomage) covers unemployed persons (Primary data collection Algeria 2022) [27]. El Chifa card covers about 80% of the medicines price [27,28].
The bodies that decide for the reimbursement of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Algeria are the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs through the reimbursement committee. The main actors involved in reimbursement decisions are the National Insurance Scheme, the National Regulatory Authority (ANPP), and health-care providers or the DGSS (hospital or special services directorate). Key opinion leaders and health-care professionals (experts) have a consultative role (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
Reimbursement decisions of in-patent molecules are based on prices resulting from ERP (set by the Pricing Committee), local comparators, unmet needs, and reimbursement status in reference countries. Negotiations can lead to three outcomes: (i) ERP-derived price is retained as a reimbursement price with or without prescribing conditions; (ii) a lower price is set for reimbursement based on budget impact assessments or comparative clinical benefit assessment, or (iii) a reference price for reimbursement is set based on the cheapest alternative product already on the market (IRP molecular or therapeutic basis) [5,29]. The reference prices list is published in the form of a positive list [30]. The reference price is revised when a new competitor (generic) is launched in the market (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
There are two possible percentages of reimbursement: 100% for NCDs medicines and 80% for other medicines (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
Concerning the off-label use of drugs, if a hospital obtains specific authorizations for temporary use of certain drugs, it can place a dedicated procurement order with the PCH to acquire the medication (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In Morocco, the compulsory health insurance system is fragmented with the existence of two main systems: the National Health Insurance (ANAM) and the funding system led by the government through fiscal resources (Primary data collection Morocco 2022) [31,32]. A high number of Moroccan citizens could benefit from a mandatory national health insurance plan known as the AMO (Assurance Maladie Obligatoire). The CNOPS or National Fund for Social Welfare Organizations is for the public sector, and the CNSS or National Social Security Fund is for the private sector. Indigent patients have access to medical assistance scheme set by the Ministry of Health as an assistance to vulnerable people (RAMED). Private health insurance also exists but it does not have a considerable contribution to healthcare funding. It is to be noticed that a coverage for the Royal Armed Forces exists and it has its specific schemes (Primary data collection Morocco 2022) [32,33].
Reimbursement decisions of in-patent pharmaceuticals are taken by the MOH through two committees: the Transparence Committee (CT) and The Commission for Economic and Financial Evaluation of Health Products (CEFPS), both of which sit in the ANAM.
The Transparency committee provides an opinion on the Medical Service Rendered (SMR) and/or the Improvement of the Medical Service Rendered (ASMR) of a medicinal product that has already obtained the MA. The CT involves Key opinion leaders (KOLs)/health-care professionals (experts) and scientific societies in its scientific assessment. Industry representatives can participate as observers (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
The CEFPS analyzes the economic and financial impacts of drugs with a favorable SMR by the CT and engages in one-to-one negotiations with the manufacturers to (i) make decisions regarding the inclusion or removal of medicines from the list of reimbursable drugs; (ii) set the reimbursement percentage and price (price revision if the reimbursement is proposed later by the company) (Primary data collection Morocco 2021) [34,35]. ERP prices are usually used as a starting point for negotiations to determine reimbursement of innovative drugs. Negotiations are usually based on IRP (molecular or therapeutic basis).
There are two possible percentages of reimbursement: 100% for NCDs medicines and 80% for other medicines (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
The reference price for reimbursement is set based on the highest price of registered medicines (Primary data collection Morocco 2022). The reference prices list is published in the form of a positive list (GMR or Guide des Médicaments Remboursables) [36]. The reference price is revised when a new competitor (generic) is launched in the market (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Morocco, off-label use of medicines without marketing authorization or prescriptions outside approved indications involves a process of derogation granted by the ANAM. These derogations are based on claims submitted by insured individuals and require a comprehensive medical dossier. A group of experts evaluates these claims and provides their opinions (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Tunisia, the funding system is fragmented with the existence of two main tiered social protection systems: the National Health Insurance (CNAM or Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie) and the Free Medical Assistance (AMG) led by the government. Both are based on the principles of insurance and assistance. 70% of the Tunisian citizens are covered by CNAM [37] that covers both affiliates from CNRPS (Caisse Nationale de Retraite et de Prévoyance Sociale) (public sector employees) and CNSS (Caisse Nationale de Securité Sociale) (private sector employees). Indigent patients have the right to the public facilities through AMG (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022). Two types of AMG exist for indigent patients: type 1 the patient is exempt from consultation and medication fees, while type 2 pays a token sum according to the criteria fixed by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The social security contribution is essentially oriented to the public sector subsidiaries despite an increasing contribution to private sector facilities. The reform of the social security with the creation of the CNAM aimed to transform the private sector [38–40].
The National Health Insurance (CNAM) is under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The reimbursement committee is the decision-making body for drug reimbursement and sits at the general directorate of social security (Ministry of Social Affairs). The CNAM and the Ministry of Health (DPM) are represented in this committee (Primary data collection, Tunisia 2022).
Reimbursement decisions of originator medicines are based on prices set at the time of the MA grant that serves as the starting negotiation price. Discount rates are usually requested to determine the reimbursement price. Negotiations can be based on IRP (molecular or therapeutic basis) (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In Tunisia, native HTA has been implemented by the National Instance of Evaluation and Accreditation in Health (INEAS), a public institution under the supervision of the Ministry of Health created in 2012 [41]. Since the HTA activity started in 2015, some studies have been carried out to help the reimbursement decision-making [20,21]. The INEAS economic guidelines on ‘Methodological choices for pharmaco-economic studies’ and ‘Methodological choices for the analysis of the budget impact’ have been recently published [22,23].
Currently, INEAS is informing the payer’s decision-making for the reimbursement of innovative medicines when requested by the CNAM. The strategic vision of INEAS is currently to focus on high-priced drugs (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
Regarding the percentage of reimbursement; for NCDs medicines, there are 24 fully covered Diseases for which Medicines are reimbursed at 100% of their reference price; and for other outpatient medicines provided in the private health-care sector, different reimbursement rates are applied depending on the medicine classification into Vital medicines (100%), Essential medicines (85%), Intermediate medicines (40%), or Comfort medicines (0%). The classification of medicines is decided by the national regulatory body (DPM) at the time the MA is granted (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022). Reimbursement is made based on the reference price calculated according to the cheapest generic existing in the market, the lowest retail price of one tablet or unit [38] (primary data collection Tunisia 2022). It is worth noticing that similar dosage forms are considered generics. The reference prices list is published in the form of a positive list [42]. The reference price is revised annually (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In Tunisia, the process for the off-label use of drugs (also called ‘commande ferme’) begins with an appeal commission for reimbursement with the CNAM. If the initial decision is unfavorable, patients have the option to resort to the courts, and in some cases, they may subsequently obtain a favorable decision from the CNAM. Following this, patients are required to submit a request to the DPM for a specific marketing authorization. It is important to note that once the DPM receives the request, they are obligated to accept it. Then, the process is initiated allowing the patient to obtain the off-label medication (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
summarizes the reimbursement system in the studied countries.
Table 6.
AlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaReimbursement levels80%, 100% for NCDs medicines70%,100% for NCDs medicines- Medicines of the 24 fully covered NCDs 100% - Vital medicines 100%, - Essential medicines 85%, - Intermediate medicines 40% - Comfort medicines 0%Reference pricingyesYesyesReference pricing rules (IRP)Cheapest alternative product already on the market [24,27]Highest price of the registered medicines (primary data collection Morocco 2022).Lowest price of the registered medicines (Lowest retail price of 1 unit), Similar dosage forms are considered as generics (40, primary data collection Tunisia 2022)Revision of the reference priceWhen a new competitor is launched in the market: for retail products with a reference price that is revised.When a new competitor (generic) is launched in the market.AnnuallyGeneric – original differenceYesYesYesNegative and positive listPositive list (reference prices list published) [27]Positive list (GMR or Guide of Reimbursable Medicines and publication of reference prices list) [35]Positive list published on the CNAM website [39]Decision taking committeesReimbursement: the reimbursement committee, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social AffairsReimbursement: Transparence Committee (CT) and The Commission for Economic and Financial Evaluation of Health Products (CEFPS), Ministry of HealthReimbursement committee, Ministry of Social Affairs
Discussion
By reviewing official documents and interviewing stakeholders, our study provides a clearer understanding of the pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia ( , and ).
When pricing systems are reviewed in our study, it can be seen that even though there are similarities between the three countries, each studied country has its own particular scheme. Interestingly, prices are controlled for all medicines in the studied countries, though different Ministries are responsible for medicine prices approval (Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry in Algeria, Ministry of Health in Morocco and Ministry of Trade in Tunisia). Regarding the relationship between price negotiation and marketing authorization, while the pricing intervenes after the registration process in Morocco, price negotiation is still occurring before the MA is granted in Algeria and Tunisia.
As appears to be the case in the majority of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, currently ERP is the most used method of pricing across the Maghreb region for in-patent medicines, while IRP is mainly used for generic and biosimilar pricing [5]. However, additional criteria may apply for in-patent medicines, such as the prices of pharmaceuticals in the same therapeutic category (internal reference pricing – IRP). So finally, ERP is indicative and not the only policy used for setting prices of in-patent pharmaceuticals in Maghreb countries.
The reference basket countries to which the prices are benchmarked in the Maghreb region are relatively small comparatively to large baskets in some countries of the MENA region such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt (30 and 36, respectively) [5]. In the three studied countries, the reference list includes 4 to 5 European countries and 1 to 2 countries from Maghreb or MENA Region. In Algeria and Tunisia, the reference price is calculated based on the lowest price in the basket with the exception of Morocco, which uses the average price of the basket for existing products and the lowest price for newly launched pharmaceuticals. Regarding the comparator price, the ex-factory price is used in Morocco and Algeria, whereas the wholesaler price excluding VAT is applied in Tunisia.
Profit margins are fixed with different schemes along the pharmaceutical supply chain in the studied countries ( ). In the three countries, the different mark-up schemes are available to the public in Decrees. A regressive mark‐up structure, in which the mark‐up rate decreases as the price increases, is applied at different levels in the three countries. However, with the exception of Morocco, there is no cap on percentage margins for the high price medicines.
The range of the cumulative profit margins for wholesalers and retailers varies from 39.6% to 50.9% in Tunisia, from less than 24% to 68% in Morocco and from 30% to 70% in Algeria. The maximum cumulative mark-up is relatively high when compared to other MENA region countries such as Lebanon (32–40%), Qatar (40% for all medicines), and Jordan (39% for all pharmaceuticals) [5,43]. The minimum cumulative mark-up applied for the most expensive medicines is also relatively high in Algeria (30%) and Tunisia (38.5%).
In Morocco, from public stakeholders’ perspective, Moroccan current pricing policy leads to high prices when compared to other countries for in-patent and innovative medicines in private sector and unavailability of drugs in public sector [44] (Primary data collection Morocco 2022).
In Algeria, access to innovative medicines remains very difficult because of willingness to pay and cost containment issues. Innovative medicines are perceived as very expensive and the only way to improve access to medicines is enlisting by the central pharmacy of hospitals (Primary data collection Algeria 2022).
In Tunisia, from public stakeholders’ perspective, current pricing policies can lead to high prices for in-patent and innovative medicines [20,45] (primary data collection Tunisia 2022). From the company's perspective, continuous discounts on in-patent medicines price from the stage of price setting to the reimbursement step lead to very low prices for a great number of products. This situation discourages the launch of innovative medicines in the Tunisian market (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
In the three countries, access to innovative treatment is mainly influenced by the reimbursement. While the three countries have some similarities with respect to the reimbursement decision-making process, there are significant differences regarding the negotiations’ methods.
In Algeria and Morocco, like several countries in the MENA region, ERP prices set in the pricing process become the starting point for reimbursement price negotiations and often, ERP prices become reimbursement prices [5]. Whereas in Tunisia, considerable price reduction may be required for reimbursement (Primary data collection Tunisia 2022).
With regard to the use of HTA to inform pricing and coverage decisions, the evidence generally indicates an increased interest for pharmacoeconomic evaluations in the studied countries. Tunisia has already invested in an HTA agency to address the challenges of value assessment, Algeria started by requiring budget impact analysis and Morocco implemented a committee of transparence to inform reimbursement decisions. However, further significant investments in the development of human capabilities and in data generation processes are required to ensure formal value assessment systems are in operation in a systematic manner in the Maghreb countries.
In regard to our findings, some suggestions could be considered for possible improvements to innovative medicines access:
Review the entire pricing process to reduce response times and allow rapid access to innovative treatments by promoting the separation of MA and pricing.
Countries, especially low-income ones, could not rely only on ERP method for setting prices because reference price may be used to determine a maximum price, while the actual price that the country health system pays will be based on confidential discounts or rebates.
Including HTA when negotiating prices and reimbursement will allow stakeholders to reduce the cost and the out-of-pocket expenditure of patients.
Conclusion
Our study presents a number of findings relative to pricing and reimbursement policies for in-patent medicines in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Whereas each country has its specific regulations, pricing, and reimbursement policies of medicines, there are many similarities.
The ERP was found to be the dominant method to inform pricing and reimbursement decisions of in-patent pharmaceuticals, which may not be reflective of net prices.
As Healthcare expenditures will continue to rise all over the world because of the introduction of innovative and expensive therapies, there is a real need to have pricing and reimbursement policies for medicines that are based on more-formalized arrangements around value assessment that will rely on local assessment of the evidence.
Further investigations on how to improve operational procedures for transition from price-focused to value-focused policies in the studied countries are required. Moreover, a reflection on how to review the processes of the studied countries to implement innovative contracting and to use risk sharing to mitigate the high cost of new medicines is needed to ensure equity in access to new health technologies in the Maghreb region.
Acknowledgments
The authors are thankful to the experts and contributors who offered their insights and expertise on the topics of pricing and reimbursement in the Maghreb region through survey responses and virtual interviews. Contributors are part of a research group called “Maghreb Research Group.” This group includes experts and stakeholders from the public health sector (government officials, representatives from regulatory authorities, insurance organizations, pharmacy departments, procurement agencies) and from the private health sector (actors and associations). Contributors’ names and positions are illustrated in the appendix 1.
Appendix 1: Interviewees List (Maghreb Research Group)
Interviewee nameSectorInterviewee position Algeria Dr Mariem HEDHIBELPublic Pharmaceutical PricingMinistry of pharmaceutical industryDr Saddek OUSEDDIKPrivate Pharmaceutical SalesNorth Africa regional sales manager at BiologixDr Amine AISSAOUIPrivate Pharmaceutical Market Access and External affairsMarket Access and External affairs Head, Sanofi Algeria/Member in ALPIDr Redouane SOUALMIMarket access and public affairs/privateHead of Public and Governmental Affairs at Boehringer Ingelheim Algeria Morocco Pr Samir AHIDPharmaco-economics/PublicPresident of the Moroccan Society of health products economy (SMEPS) and Dean of the Pharmacy University Mohamed 6 (UM6SS).Dr Naoufel EL MALHOUFPharmaceutical Reimbursement and coverage/Public sectorPublic service manager, National Health Insurance (ANAM)Dr Fadela TAZI BEN DJELLOUNPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorExecutive Director of the LEEM (Les Entreprises du Medicament au Maroc)Dr Ihsane ELJOUDANIPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr Abdelkrim AYOUGILPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr M MOUMENPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr Khaoula CHARGUIPharmaceutical Regulatory, Market access/Private sectorMember of the LEEMDr ZERHOUNI Mohammed WadiePharmaceutical Public sectorTeacher researcher, National University of Public Health Rabat/previously DMP Morocco Tunisia Dr Mariem KHROUFRegulatory/publicDirector of the DPMDr Nesrine GHOZZIRegulatory/publicPharmacist at the DPMDr Faten LEMKACHERPurchasing, pricing/publicDirector of purchasing department, PCTDr Mouna JAMALEDDINEHTA/publicHead of HTA department, INEAS TunisiaDr Imene LIMAYEMRegulatory/Pricing/Public sectorMember of the Technical Committee of Pharmaceutical SpecialtiesDr Hajer FELFELMarket access and pharmaco-economy/University of pharmacyUniversity Lecturer in Market access and pharmaco-economy, MA Assessor at the National Medicine Control LaboratoryDr Sondes HAMIDAReimbursement/publicPharmacist at the National Health Insurance (CNAM)Dr Rym CHAABANEReimbursement/publicNational Health Insurance (CNSS)Dr Fadhila REBHIPricing/publicTrade MinistryDr Mohamed BEN FRADJPricing/publicTrade MinistryDr Karima HAMMAMIPricing/publicMinistry of TradeDr Ahlem GZARAAdministrative/PublicDirectorDr Amor TOUMIRegulatory and pricing/public health/privateIndependent consultantDr Imen NAFFETIMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIRE*Dr Teyssir BEN HOURIAMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIREDr Wafa REKIKMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIREDr Zied BELGHITHMarket access/privateMember of the SEPHIREDr Mouna KHARRAZCoverage and reimbursement/publicMinistry of Social affairsDr Amine ZAGHDOUDIMarket access and public affairs/privateCountry Operations and Public Affair Head Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco at Novartis Tunisia
Appendix 2. Pricing and reimbursement questionnaire
Important to notice: vaccines are not considered in this questionnaire.
Section 1: Healthcare system and sources of financing
1. Which country are you completing this survey for?
2. In your country, do you have Universal Health Coverage?
Yes
No
Other, please specify:
If yes, what are the sources of funding and in which percentage?
- Government (freely)
- National Health Insurance
- Private Health Insurance
- Other, please specify
3. In the case of Universal Health coverage, is it a unique (common) or a fragmented system?
4. In case of fragmented system:
- How many principal insurances do you have?
- What percentage of people does each insurance cover?
5. How are pharmaceuticals covered in your country?
A. Full coverage
- Yes
- No
B. Partial coverage
- Yes
- No
C. Other, please specify
6. What are pharmaceuticals’ coverage conditions in your country?
Section 2: Pricing Policies and Price Setting for in-patent pharmaceuticals
7. Are the pricing regulations and objectives clearly stated in your country’s legislation?
- Yes
- No
If yes please provide the law reference
8. For which type of pharmaceuticals prices are fixed:
(Please tick all that apply)
Public sector
Private sector
Reimbursed medicines
None of the above list
9. In your country, are pharmaceuticals’ prices controlled through distributor and pharmacist margins?
- Yes
- No
10. Which authority is responsible for setting pharmaceutical prices in your country?
(Please tick all that apply)
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Trade
Ministry of Industry and Economy
Social affairs
Other competent authority, please specify:
Please specify the authority (or the committee):
11. Which of the policies below are used for pricing of in-patent pharmaceuticals in your country?
(Please tick all that apply)
Cost-Plus Pricing
External Reference Pricing (ERP)
Internal reference pricing
Value-Based Pricing (HTA, pricing based on cost-effectiveness analysis …)
Other, please specify
12. If HTA is used for the pricing of in-patent pharmaceuticals:
- How the value is measured?
- Does it apply to all kinds of products?
13. In your country, is price setting mandatory to obtain MA?
- Yes
- No
14. Is it possible to launch a new pharmaceutical with a free fixed price, without reimbursement?
- Yes
- No
15. Following MA, can price setting take place subsequently to the launch of a new pharmaceutical with a reimbursement objective?
16. If manufacturers disagree with decisions made by competent authorities on the price of a new pharmaceutical, are there any provisions for an appeal?
Yes
No
If your answer is Yes:
- Is this applied in practice?
- Does this lead to tangible results?
17. How frequently are prices revised for in-patent pharmaceuticals in your country?
(Please tick all that apply)
Every five years
Two years after initial registration
Other, please specify:
18. Are there events which can trigger pharmaceuticals’ price revision?
(Please tick all that apply)
When price changes in the country of origin
When price changes in key basket countries (if ERP is applied)
When a new competitor is launched in the market
When the manufacturer asks for price revision
Loss of data protection/exclusivity
Other, please specify:
19. Which authority decides for price revision in your country (if different from the authority fixing the price)?
20. In your country, are in-patent pharmaceuticals’ prices negotiated in parallel with their reimbursement or independently?
- Yes
- No
Section 3: Reimbursement and Coverage Decisions for in-patent pharmaceuticals
21. Are the reimbursement regulations and objectives clearly stated in your country’s legislation?
- Yes
- No
If yes please provide the law reference
22. Which criteria influence reimbursement decisions for in-patent pharmaceuticals?
(Please tick all that apply)
Health Technology Assessment (HTA)
Managed Entry/Risk Sharing Agreements
Other countries’ evaluations (External Reference Reimbursement)
Other, please specify:
23. In your country, is there a Formulary Management at national, regional, or local level (a list of reimbursed pharmaceuticals and conditions for the access to these pharmaceuticals)
- Yes
- No
- If you answered Yes, how is it managed?
24. Is there a list of pharmaceuticals freely made available by the government?
Yes
No
If yes:
- Please provide a link:
- What is the target population?
25. In your country, which organism decides for the reimbursement of in-patent pharmaceuticals?
26. In your country, who are the main actors involved in reimbursement decisions
- National insurance scheme
- HTA agency unit
- National regulatory authority
- Health care provider (hospital)
- Key opinion leaders/health care professionals
- Scientific Societies, etc.
- Other (please specify):
27. In your country, are prices negotiated for reimbursement decision?
- Yes
- No
28. Which price is used for reimbursement of in-patent pharmaceuticals?
Please tick that apply
Initial price fixed or proposed for the medicine
A reference price based on the same therapeutic class (IRP)
Price reset after negotiations
29. Are Managed Entry Agreements (MEA) used in your country to facilitate reimbursement decision?
30. If you answered Yes in the previous question, when were MEA first introduced in your country? (Please insert the year in the space below)
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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Algeria country profile
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[
"BBC News",
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2011-07-12T07:14:55+00:00
|
Provides an overview of Algeria, including key dates and facts about this north African country.
|
en
|
BBC News
|
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118852
|
Algeria, a gateway between Africa and Europe, has been battered by violence over the past half-century.
There are conflicting reports about the death toll during the war against France for independence in the 1950s and early 60s. French historians estimate that up to 400,000 Algerians were killed, while the Algerian government says more than one million people died.
The country later endured a brutal internal conflict after when elections that Islamists appeared certain to win were cancelled in 1992; a low-level Islamist insurgency still affects Algeria.
The Sahara desert covers more than four-fifths of the land. Algeria is the continent's biggest country, and is the world's 10th largest.
Oil and gas reserves were discovered there in the 1950s, but most Algerians live along the northern coast.
Some key dates in Algeria's history:
c. 600BC - Carthaginians expand settlements along the North African coast.
4th Century BC - Berbers form the single largest element of the Carthaginian army.
241-238BC - Revolt of the Mercenaries: Berber soldiers rebel after being unpaid following Carthage's defeat by Rome in the First Punic War.
146BC - Carthage is destroyed by Roman forces under Scipio Africanus.
2nd Century BC - Emergence of the Berber kingdoms of Numidia and Mauretania.
24AD - Berber kingdoms become part of the Roman Empire.
429 - Germanic Vandals invade North Africa and set up kingdom based on Carthage.
477-578 - Rise of the Mauro-Roman kingdom, an independent Christian Berber kingdom centred in Altava.
533-34 - Byzantine forces under Belisarius drive out the Vandals as part of the Emperor Justinian's reconquest of the Western Roman Empire.
578-708 - Kingdom of Altava is a successor state to the previous Berber kingdom. It flourishes until the conquest of the area by the Umayyad Caliphate in the seventh and eighth centuries.
972-1148 - Zirids: a Berber dynasty from modern-day Algeria rules the central Maghreb from 972 to 1014 and the eastern Maghreb from 972 to 1148.
1050s-1147 - Almoravids: A Berber Muslim dynasty centered in the territory of present-day Morocco established an 11th Century empire over the western Maghreb (North Africa) and Al-Andalus (southern Spain) starting in the 1050s and lasting until its fall to the Almohads in 1147.
1121-1269 - Almohads: A North African Berber Muslim empire that at its height, controls much of the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa.
1235-1557 - Zayyanids: A Berber dynasty centred on the town of Tlemcen in northwest Algeria.
1509 - Spanish conquer Oran.
1512 - Turkish privateer brothers Oruç and Hayreddin - both known to contemporary Europeans as Barbarossa or "Red Beard" - operate successfully off Tunisia.
1519 - After a Spanish attempt to take Algiers, an assembly of Algerian notables asks the Ottoman Sultan Selim to make Algiers part of the Ottoman Empire. Hayreddin Barbarossa is named Beylerbey of Algiers, or emir of emirs. The province becomes key for the Turks who see it as the spearhead of Ottoman power in the western Mediterranean.
1681-88 - French-Algerian War: part of a wider campaign by France against the Barbary pirates - mainly Muslim pirates and privateers operating from North Africa to capture slaves for the Ottoman slave trade. In addition to seizing merchant ships, they raided coastal towns and villages in Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal but also in the British Isles, Netherlands, and Iceland.
1783-1784 - Following attacks on Spanish merchant shipping, the Spanish navy and allies bombard Algiers, destroying much of its fortifications.
1815 - The Second Barbary War: between the United States and the Barbary Coast states of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers.
1816 - Britain and the Netherlands bombard Algiers in a bid to force the local ruler to stop enslaving Europeans. However, this does not completely end until the French conquest of Algeria.
1830 - French conquest of Algeria. France invades and quickly takes Algiers and seizes other coastal communities. Additional military forces were brought in over the following years to quell resistance in the interior, and to encourage colonists to settle and farm.
1848 - Algeria becomes a department of France, an integral part of France itself. It is a destination for hundreds of thousands of European colonists. Many Europeans settle in Oran and Algiers, and formed a majority of the population in both cities by the early 20th Century - about a fifth of the total population of Algeria.
1939-1945 - The Collapse of France and the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa during World War Two encourages hopes for independence.
1945 - Pro-independence demonstrations in Setif. Thousands of Algerians are killed in suppression of ensuing unrest.
1954-1962 - Algerian War of Independence. A major armed conflict between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front or FLN which sees Algeria winning its independence from France. It is a complex conflict characterized by guerrilla warfare and war crimes. It also becomes a civil war between the different communities and within communities. Death totals vary between 400,000 and 1.5 million. Up to a million European colonists leave Algeria.
1962 - Algeria becomes independent.
1976 - Algerian, Moroccan armies clash over Western Sahara.
1989 - New constitution removes the one-party state and moves country away from socialism to western capitalism.
1991-2002 - Algerian Civil War: With the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)dominating the first of two rounds of legislative elections in 1991, and fearing the election of an Islamist government, the authorities cancel the elections. They ban the FIS, triggering a civil war between Algeria's armed forces and various Islamist rebel groups. Islamist militants conduct a violent campaign of civilian massacres. More than 100,000 people are thought to have died.
1999 - Abdelaziz Bouteflika becomes president and introduces national reconciliation policy.
2007 onwards - Islamist insurgency campaign in the Maghreb and Sahel by Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM, an Islamist militant organization that aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state.
2019 - President Bouteflika announces he will step down after street protests, driven by decade-long economic stagnation, unemployment, labour market segmentation and chronic corruption.
|
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8952
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dbpedia
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2
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https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria
|
en
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Algeria | Flag, Capital, Population, Map, & Language
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[
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[
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1998-08-12T00:00:00+00:00
|
Algeria, large, predominantly Muslim country of North Africa. Most of the population resides along the Mediterranean coast. Although an integral part of the Maghreb and the larger Arab world, Algeria also has a sizable Amazigh (Berber) population. The Sahara and its extreme climate dominate the country.
|
en
|
/favicon.png
|
Encyclopedia Britannica
|
https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria
|
The Tell
In succession from north to south are intermittent coastal folded massifs and coastal plains. Along with the Tell Atlas, High Plateau, and Saharan Atlas, they form a sequence of five geographically variegated zones that roughly parallel the coast.
The coastal ridges and massifs are indented with numerous bays and are often separated from each other by plains—such as the plains of Oran and Annaba—that extend inland. In the same way, the Tell Atlas is not continuous; in the west it forms two distinct ranges separated by interior plains. Thus, the Maghnia Plain separates the Tlemcen Mountains to the south from the Traras Mountains to the northwest. Similarly, the plains of Sidi Bel Abbès and Mascara are nestled between hill ranges to the north and south. The Dahra Massif forms a long range extending from the mouth of the Chelif River in the west to Mount Chenoua in the east; it is separated from the Ouarsenis Massif to the south by plains of the Chelif valley.
The relief as a whole, therefore, does not constitute a barrier to communications in the western Tell. However, this is not the case in the central Tell, where the Blida Atlas merges with the Titteri Mountains and the mountainous block of Great Kabylia (Grande Kabylie) joins with the Bibans and Hodna mountains to make north-south communications more difficult. Only the valley of the Wadi Soummam permits communication with the port of Bejaïa.
Farther east, from Bejaïa to Annaba, one mountain barrier follows another to separate the plains of Constantine from the sea. The lands south of the plains are dominated by the Hodna, Aurès, and Nemencha ranges. The plains themselves, which have long been used for growing cereal grains, have a distinct local topography and do not present the same features as the High Plateau, which extends westward from the Hodna Mountains into Morocco. The latter is broken by sabkhahs (lake beds encrusted with salt) and is much less favourable to agriculture because it receives less precipitation.
To the south of the High Plateau and the plains of Constantine runs the Saharan Atlas, which is formed from a series of ranges oriented southwest to northeast. These decline in elevation from the west, where Mount Aïssa reaches 7,336 feet (2,236 metres) in the Ksour Mountains, to lower summits in the Amour and Oulad Naïl mountains. Higher summits are again found in the Aurès Mountains, where the highest peak in northern Algeria, Mount Chelia, which reaches 7,638 feet (2,328 metres), is located.
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8952
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dbpedia
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3
| 13
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118852
|
en
|
Algeria country profile
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[
"BBC News",
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2011-07-12T07:14:55+00:00
|
Provides an overview of Algeria, including key dates and facts about this north African country.
|
en
|
BBC News
|
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118852
|
Algeria, a gateway between Africa and Europe, has been battered by violence over the past half-century.
There are conflicting reports about the death toll during the war against France for independence in the 1950s and early 60s. French historians estimate that up to 400,000 Algerians were killed, while the Algerian government says more than one million people died.
The country later endured a brutal internal conflict after when elections that Islamists appeared certain to win were cancelled in 1992; a low-level Islamist insurgency still affects Algeria.
The Sahara desert covers more than four-fifths of the land. Algeria is the continent's biggest country, and is the world's 10th largest.
Oil and gas reserves were discovered there in the 1950s, but most Algerians live along the northern coast.
Some key dates in Algeria's history:
c. 600BC - Carthaginians expand settlements along the North African coast.
4th Century BC - Berbers form the single largest element of the Carthaginian army.
241-238BC - Revolt of the Mercenaries: Berber soldiers rebel after being unpaid following Carthage's defeat by Rome in the First Punic War.
146BC - Carthage is destroyed by Roman forces under Scipio Africanus.
2nd Century BC - Emergence of the Berber kingdoms of Numidia and Mauretania.
24AD - Berber kingdoms become part of the Roman Empire.
429 - Germanic Vandals invade North Africa and set up kingdom based on Carthage.
477-578 - Rise of the Mauro-Roman kingdom, an independent Christian Berber kingdom centred in Altava.
533-34 - Byzantine forces under Belisarius drive out the Vandals as part of the Emperor Justinian's reconquest of the Western Roman Empire.
578-708 - Kingdom of Altava is a successor state to the previous Berber kingdom. It flourishes until the conquest of the area by the Umayyad Caliphate in the seventh and eighth centuries.
972-1148 - Zirids: a Berber dynasty from modern-day Algeria rules the central Maghreb from 972 to 1014 and the eastern Maghreb from 972 to 1148.
1050s-1147 - Almoravids: A Berber Muslim dynasty centered in the territory of present-day Morocco established an 11th Century empire over the western Maghreb (North Africa) and Al-Andalus (southern Spain) starting in the 1050s and lasting until its fall to the Almohads in 1147.
1121-1269 - Almohads: A North African Berber Muslim empire that at its height, controls much of the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa.
1235-1557 - Zayyanids: A Berber dynasty centred on the town of Tlemcen in northwest Algeria.
1509 - Spanish conquer Oran.
1512 - Turkish privateer brothers Oruç and Hayreddin - both known to contemporary Europeans as Barbarossa or "Red Beard" - operate successfully off Tunisia.
1519 - After a Spanish attempt to take Algiers, an assembly of Algerian notables asks the Ottoman Sultan Selim to make Algiers part of the Ottoman Empire. Hayreddin Barbarossa is named Beylerbey of Algiers, or emir of emirs. The province becomes key for the Turks who see it as the spearhead of Ottoman power in the western Mediterranean.
1681-88 - French-Algerian War: part of a wider campaign by France against the Barbary pirates - mainly Muslim pirates and privateers operating from North Africa to capture slaves for the Ottoman slave trade. In addition to seizing merchant ships, they raided coastal towns and villages in Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal but also in the British Isles, Netherlands, and Iceland.
1783-1784 - Following attacks on Spanish merchant shipping, the Spanish navy and allies bombard Algiers, destroying much of its fortifications.
1815 - The Second Barbary War: between the United States and the Barbary Coast states of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers.
1816 - Britain and the Netherlands bombard Algiers in a bid to force the local ruler to stop enslaving Europeans. However, this does not completely end until the French conquest of Algeria.
1830 - French conquest of Algeria. France invades and quickly takes Algiers and seizes other coastal communities. Additional military forces were brought in over the following years to quell resistance in the interior, and to encourage colonists to settle and farm.
1848 - Algeria becomes a department of France, an integral part of France itself. It is a destination for hundreds of thousands of European colonists. Many Europeans settle in Oran and Algiers, and formed a majority of the population in both cities by the early 20th Century - about a fifth of the total population of Algeria.
1939-1945 - The Collapse of France and the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa during World War Two encourages hopes for independence.
1945 - Pro-independence demonstrations in Setif. Thousands of Algerians are killed in suppression of ensuing unrest.
1954-1962 - Algerian War of Independence. A major armed conflict between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front or FLN which sees Algeria winning its independence from France. It is a complex conflict characterized by guerrilla warfare and war crimes. It also becomes a civil war between the different communities and within communities. Death totals vary between 400,000 and 1.5 million. Up to a million European colonists leave Algeria.
1962 - Algeria becomes independent.
1976 - Algerian, Moroccan armies clash over Western Sahara.
1989 - New constitution removes the one-party state and moves country away from socialism to western capitalism.
1991-2002 - Algerian Civil War: With the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)dominating the first of two rounds of legislative elections in 1991, and fearing the election of an Islamist government, the authorities cancel the elections. They ban the FIS, triggering a civil war between Algeria's armed forces and various Islamist rebel groups. Islamist militants conduct a violent campaign of civilian massacres. More than 100,000 people are thought to have died.
1999 - Abdelaziz Bouteflika becomes president and introduces national reconciliation policy.
2007 onwards - Islamist insurgency campaign in the Maghreb and Sahel by Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM, an Islamist militant organization that aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state.
2019 - President Bouteflika announces he will step down after street protests, driven by decade-long economic stagnation, unemployment, labour market segmentation and chronic corruption.
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Minority Rights Group
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https://minorityrights.org/country/algeria/
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Main languages: Arabic and Tamazight (Berber) are official languages, French is used in business and media.
Main religions: Islam
Main minority groups and indigenous peoples: Amazighs (Berbers) between 6.6 million and 9.9 million (20-30 per cent, including Kabyles, Shawiya/Chaoui, Mozabites and Tuareg), Saharawi 120,000, Black Algerians, sub-Saharan migrants, Ahmadis and Christians.
Algerians are primarily of Amazigh and Arab descent, but a considerable size of the population is of Black descent (10 per cent, according to unofficial statistics). The French population, approximately 10 per cent of the total in colonial times, has fallen to about 1 per cent today. Many other Europeans and almost all 150,000 Jews in Algeria left the country after independence. More than three million Algerians live abroad, mainly in France.
Amazigh languages were originally spoken from the Canary Islands to Western Egypt (a region called Tamazgha by Amazigh). Tamazgha thus designates a vast geographical area that stretches from the Canary Islands in Spain to the Siwa oasis in western Egypt and includes parts of the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger). These are the historical settlement areas of the Amazigh populations of North Africa.
Estimates of current Tamazight speakers in Algeria vary significantly from 17 per cent to 45-55 per cent of the population considering bi/trilingual speakers. The decline of Tamazight in Algeria (also in Morocco and Tunisia) was due to the spread of Arabic as the official language of religion and culture, and the rise of French as a prestige language during colonization, as well as assimilationist policies that prohibited the use of this language. For instance, conferences in Tamazight language were forbidden during the 1980s, which sparked revitalization movements across many regions. Varieties of Tamazight are often mutually intelligible, and numbers of speakers vary considerably according to the community: in Algeria, Taqbaylit (the Kabyle variety) has millions of speakers, while Chenoua (the Chaoui variety) has tens of thousands of speakers.
A law adopted in 1991 prevented the use of any language other than Arabic in several contexts. The Algerian Constitution of 1989 recognised Arabic as the sole national and official language. A significant change came about with the creation of the Haut Commissariat à l’Amazighité in 1995, whose objective was to promote the Amazigh language. Change came about because of strikes in the Kabylie region led by students and professors, who demonstrated against the enforcement of Arabic and French in teaching and learning sectors. Two further changes came about after the 2002 constitutional amendment, which made Tamazight the second national language, and finally in the 2016 Constitution, which states in Article 3 that Arabic is and will remain the official language while Article 4 further stipulates that ‘Tamazight is equally the national and official language’.
When plans for the teaching of Tamazight at school and university were introduced in 1995, the objective was to start the programme in 24 governorates and gradually reach the whole national territory (i.e., 48 governorates at the time, and 58 following a reform in February 2021). According to some sources, in 2017, Tamazight was taught as a subject in some schools in mostly Amazigh-speaking areas across 37 governorates. However, the 2008 Law on National Education (still valid today) guarantees the facultative character of Tamazight teaching and learning at school. Protests took place in 2017, because the allocation of state funding for the teaching of Tamazight was rejected by Parliament. Many commentators argue that these various legal guarantees have not been accompanied by sufficiently coherent efforts in language planning and other practical moves, such as the necessary allocation of funding to pay for an increase in the number of Amazigh-speaking teachers in primary, secondary and tertiary education.
Black Algerians, indigenous to southern Algeria, account for an estimated 10 per cent of the country’s total population as per a 2009 academic estimate. However, no official statistics exist. These Algerian citizens suffer from racial discrimination largely due to the institutionalisation of a ‘white Arab and Muslim only’ national policy.
Black Algerians suffer from endemic day-to-day racism, which includes stigmatisation when claiming national identity in northern Algeria at police roadblocks or airports, as well as racial slurs, such as kahlouche (‘blackie’) and abd (‘slave’). Black Algerian women appear to be particularly vulnerable to such acts of racial discrimination, as evidenced by events following the selection of Khadija Benhamou as Miss Algeria in January 2019. Indeed, the scale and magnitude of the attacks faced by Benhamou on social media following her nomination, notably claiming that she did not represent the beauty and identity of the country, bear witness to the prevalence of anti-Black racism in Algeria.
Algeria has many minorities, including linguistic minorities such as Amazighs. It also has numerous religious minorities, including Ibadis [1] , Christians, Jews and Ahmadis.
Generally speaking, all requests to register non-Muslim associations are deferred. In 2010, only one application for registration by a Jewish community was approved. The places of worship of the small Algerian Jewish community had been closed during the civil war in the 1990’s, for security reasons. Algerian Minister of Religious Affairs Mohamed Aïssa, in office from 2014 until 2019, declared in 2014 in Oran that ‘the places of worship for the Jews will reopen their doors’ but added that ‘for the moment the state does not plan to do this right away because the security of the worshippers could not be guaranteed’ – a positive stance that stood in stark contrast with that of his predecessors. Aïssa wanted to show that his ministry would not only deal with Islam but with all religions, provided that religious minorities submit to Algerian law, including Ordinance No. 06-03 of 2006, which governs the practice of faiths other than Islam.
Islam is unquestionably ‘the religion of the state’, as clearly stated in Article 2 of the 2020 Algerian Constitution. Article 73 of the 2016 Constitution affirmed that the President of the Republic must be Muslim and must take an oath ‘to respect and glorify the Islamic religion’. In the 2020 Constitution, the same oath is presented in Article 90. However, this does not prevent the presence and practice of other faiths. Ordinance No. 06-03 of 2006 expressly guarantees ‘the free exercise of worship’ and that ‘the State also guarantees tolerance and respect between different religions’.
The ‘free exercise of worship’ established by the 2006 legislation is nevertheless strictly regulated. It is subject to respect for ‘public order, morality and the fundamental rights and freedoms of third parties’. Above all, the collective exercise of worship is confined to the buildings assigned for this purpose by the Algerian authorities. This is especially problematic for Jews since no synagogue has reopened since the 1990s.
Religious groups suspected of attempting to convert Muslims are particularly vulnerable to spurious charges and find themselves under near-constant surveillance. This has resulted in the ongoing persecution of Ahmadis, Ibadis and evangelical Christians.
The former leader of the Ahmadi community, Mohamed Fali, was arrested on 28 August 2017, and charged with ‘raising funds without a permit’, ‘insulting the Prophet Muhammad’, and ‘forming an unauthorized association’. He was given a six-month suspended prison sentence based on these charges. The Algerian authorities seized his passport, and he was banned from leaving the country. After the beginning of the Hirak movement, Mohamed Fali asked to recover his passport and chose to leave the country. Scores of other Ahmadis have been imprisoned since June 2016 in a context where religious intolerance is espoused at the highest level, with government officials claiming that Ahmadis represent ‘a threat to the majority Sunni Muslim faith’.
Persecution against members of the Ahmadi community has continued, with the government still denying this group freedom of religion. Routinely prosecuted ‘for joining an unauthorized association’ and ‘collecting donations without permission’, members of this community have been denied recognition as Muslims by the competent ministry. On 15 December 2020, for instance, 31 followers of the Ahmadiyya faith were summoned to appear before the court in Tizi Ouzou (Kabylie). Charges brought against them under Article 96 of the Penal Code included ‘distribution of leaflets with the aim of undermining the national interest’, ‘occupation of a building to hold a religious service secretly without authorization’, and the ‘collection of funds and donations without authorization’, in application of Articles 5, 7, 12 and 13 of Ordinance No. 06-03 governing the exercise of religions other than Islam. In January 2020, the Prosecutor’s Office in Constantine brought seven Ahmadis in for questioning. Their passports were confiscated, and they were charged with forming an illegal association. While later acquitted, the authorities reportedly did not return their passports.
Since 2013, inter-communal clashes between Ibadi Mozabites (Amazighs) [2] and Sunni Maliki [3] Arabs in the Mzab Valley have led to dozens of deaths, the burning and looting of thousands of businesses and homes and the destruction of cultural heritage sites, including a UNESCO-classified Ibadi shrine.
The crisis in Ghardaia weaves the issue of ethnic and religious minorities with political and economic concerns felt elsewhere in the south. The Mozabites face structural discrimination in Arabization policies as well as attacks on their homes, religious symbols and businesses by Arab Maliki groups. More recently, takfiri preachers (i.e. those who make declarations of ex-communication) in the region have accentuated the stigmatisation of Mozabites as ‘Shi’a apostates’, justifying violent attacks on them. In July 2015, around a hundred Mozabite activists, the best known of whom was Kameleddine Fekhar, were arrested. Fekhar, a doctor and founder of an Amazigh rights organization, died while on hunger strike following further detention in 2019.
Security forces have continued to target Christians who have converted from Islam. On 31 July 2016, Slimane Bouhafs, an Algerian Christian, was arrested on charges related to expressing his Christian beliefs. He was originally sentenced to five years of imprisonment and given a heavy fine, but the sentence was reduced to three years on appeal and the fine was dropped. In July 2017, President Bouteflika granted Slimane a partial pardon, reducing the sentence by a further 16 months. Bouhafs was released from prison on 31 March, having served his twenty-month sentence. In August 2018, he sought asylum in Tunisia and was granted refugee status in September 2020 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Tunisia. In August 2021, eyewitnesses reported that cars with unknown license plates arrived at the house where the Algerian activist lived and took him to an undisclosed destination. It later transpired that Bouhafs had been handed over by the Tunisian authorities to their Algerian counterparts.
Since 2010, activists of the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (Mouvement pour l’autonomie de la Kabylie, MAK), which is a region near Algiers inhabited by Kabyles (Amazighs), regularly face arbitrary arrests and harassment by the police. Many of them have also been subject to employment loss and discrimination, bureaucratic discrimination, abductions and an array of other difficulties. Some activists have even seen their passports confiscated by the Ministry of the Interior. The movement was labelled a terrorist group by the Algerian authorities in May 2021. The MAK, whose president Ferhat Mehenni resides in France, is targeted by the Algerian courts and accused of being involved in starting fires, particularly in Kabylie during the summer of 2021.
On 21 April 2020, the Algerian Ministry of Justice presented a draft Law on Preventing and Combating Discrimination and Hate Speech before the specialized commission of the Assemblée Populaire Nationale (APN), and two days later it was adopted by the Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, another law amending the Penal Code was put before parliament almost simultaneously. The new legislation called for the creation of a National Observatory for the prevention of discrimination and hate speech, placed under the authority of the President of the Republic. Many consider it vague, giving judges a margin of interpretation that reinforces the impression that the judicial system is far from being independent.
Although there is no direct mention of Amazighs in the laws, they are the main target of hate speech in the media and on social networks in Algeria. There is also no mention of discrimination based on religion or of the word ‘minority’. The law carries a sentence of up to 10 years of imprisonment for anyone accused of authoring or supporting hate speech, online or offline, that is ‘likely to undermine security or public order’. The law also introduces two provisions into the Penal Code. Article 196-bis criminalizes the dissemination of false information ‘likely to undermine security or public order’. Vaguely worded, this provision can be broadly interpreted in the context of violations of freedom of expression. Article 95-bis foresees up to seven years of imprisonment and a fine for any individual or organization receiving funds from abroad with the objective of carrying out ‘actions likely to undermine the security of the State, the stability of its institutions, national unity, territorial integrity, the fundamental interests of Algeria or public security and order’.
In March 2021, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concern about the situation in Algeria, while calling on the government to put an end to the arbitrary arrests and detention of people who exercise their rights to freedom of opinion, expression and peaceful assembly. An OHCHR press briefing spoke of some 1,000 individuals who had been prosecuted for participating in the Hirak movement since demonstrations resumed in February 2021 or for posting social media messages critical of the government. According to Amnesty International, prosecutions were initially limited to those carrying the Amazigh flag during demonstrations; however, the crackdown against civil society has intensified since then.
On 24 August 2021, Kamira Nait Sid, Co-President of the Congrès Mondial Amazigh, was abducted from her home by security forces and held incommunicado for three days. Criminal charges were brought against her, including ‘membership of a terrorist organization’ and ‘undermining national unity and state security’ under Article 87-bis of the Penal Code. This Article authorizes penalties ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment and the death penalty.
In February 2022, Human Rights Watch reported that ‘at least 280 activists, many of whom are associated with Hirak’, are currently detained by Algerian authorities. These individuals are facing trial or have been convicted based on arbitrary charges, in violation of fundamental fair trial rights.
Article 37 of the Algerian Constitution of 2020 guarantees the principle of equality among all Algerian citizens, prohibiting any discrimination on the grounds of ‘birth, race, gender, opinion or any other personal or social condition or situation’. Article 295-bis of the Penal Code punishes with up to three years’ imprisonment ‘anyone who publicly incites hatred or discrimination against a person or a group of people because of their racial or ethnic affiliation ’, while Article 298-bis of the Penal Code makes it a punishable offense with up to six months’ imprisonment to “insult one or more persons belonging to an ethnic group or a particular religion’. Finally, Law no. 20-05 on the Prevention and Fight Against Discrimination and Hate Speech adopted in April 2020, provides a definition of discrimination under Article 2, which includes race and ethnic origin as prohibited grounds for discrimination.
These provisions raise several critical issues since they do not prohibit discrimination based on religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender identity; tend to be (ab)used by the government to unduly restrict free speech as previously mentioned; and thus, fail to address acts of discrimination appropriately and systematically, allowing rights violations of several segments of Algerian society to persist.
[1] The Amazigh community of Ghardaia, largely practicing the Ibadi branch of Islam, has also been subjected to discrimination for decades.
[2] The Mzab Valley (Ghardaia) Mozabites are Amazigh followers of the Ibadi school of Islamic jurisprudence, dominant in Oman and Zanzibar and with followers in Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.
[3] The Sunni Maliki school is the dominant school in Algeria.
Environment
Africa’s largest country, Algeria borders Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara. The country stretches from its 1,300 km Mediterranean coastline south through a varied topography to the Sahara Desert. Around 80 per cent of the country consists of the Sahara, where Algeria’s oil and natural gas reserves are located.
History
Amazighs (Berbers, pl. Imazighen) are the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa, isolated from the rest of Africa by the Sahara Desert. Jewish populations arrived in North Africa around the third century BCE. Waves of Arab migration into the region started in the mid-seventh century and brought cultural and religious changes, with most inhabitants converting to Islam. Intensified persecution in Spain in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries sparked a new Jewish migration into the region.
The area that is present-day Algeria became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517. The Ottomans allowed ethnically defined guilds to maintain a broad degree of autonomy over their peoples, but discriminated against Jews, who were targeted with special taxes.
North Africa was part of the trans-Saharan slave trade, being one of the major routes to the Mediterranean and the rest of the Ottoman Empire. While Black Algerians are indigenous to Algeria’s Sahara, slavery lasted 1,300 years (from the seventh through to the twentieth century) and profoundly shaped their place in Algerian society. The history of servitude has stigmatized Black Algerians, generating intense racial discrimination and marginalization.
The invasion of Algiers by France in 1830 resulted in the disappearance of a third of the Algerian population due to France’s policy of extermination in the country. The conquest faced resistance well into the early 1900s, starting with Emir Abdelkader and Ahmed Bey, and ending with the Tuareg in the south. In 1845, France created a three-tiered governance system for Algeria: one for European-majority areas that enjoyed self-government, mixed appointed and elected government for majority Muslim areas, and continued military rule for indigenous communes. In 1848, Paris declared Algeria to be an integral part of France, by which time European settlements were encouraged through the appropriation of rural land.
Amazighs and Arabs resisted oppressive French rule. In 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) launched a guerrilla war against France that lasted for almost eight years. French forces targeted civilians as well as fighters, and the conflict resulted in the deaths of around half a million Algerians.
Algeria’s independence in 1962 was accompanied by the emigration to France of around one million people, mostly from the European-descended population. Algerian-born people who fought with the French army or supported a French Algeria were known as pieds-noirs and Harkis. Post-independence, residual hostility towards both these groups resulted in violence and forced exile during the 1960s and 1970s. The FLN urged Jews to support independence and promised tolerance. Jews were sympathetic to nationalist interests even though many identified culturally with France. Attacks on Jews and the desecration of Jewish holy places in the late 1950s and 1960s led to large-scale emigration to France and Israel.
Colonel Houari Boumediene overthrew Algeria’s first President in 1965 and consolidated a one-party system under the FLN, strengthened by the army. Boumediene was an Arab nationalist who worsened the plight of Algeria’s remaining Jews. By 1970, there were fewer than 1,000 Jews left in the country. Military rule continued after his death in 1978.
High youth unemployment, inflation and corruption sparked massive popular unrest in the late 1980s. In December 1991, Algeria held the first round of what were probably the freest parliamentary elections the Arab world had seen up until that time. The populist Islamic Salvation Front party (FIS) won in a landslide. Three weeks later, the Algerian military staged a bloodless coup, arguing that if the FIS had been allowed to take power, those elections would have been Algeria’s last. The military dissolved parliament and suspended the Constitution. In March 1992 the military outlawed the FIS and imprisoned thousands of its members. This strengthened the position of Algeria’s radicals, such as the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), who argued that violence was the only solution. After only six months in office, military-installed President Mohamed Boudiaf was assassinated by one of his own bodyguards—an alleged Islamist. Fighting between the GIA and the Algerian military escalated into a full-blown civil conflict marked by insurgency, terrorism and state violence.
Defense Minister Liamine Zeroual was appointed President in 1994 and elected to office in 1995. Many Algerians assumed that the new administration would commence negotiations with Islamist opposition leaders, many of whom remained in detention. The President did so, but the talks collapsed. The Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), an armed wing of FIS, and the more radical GIA, took control of tracts of the high plateaus which lie behind the coastal strip.
In December 1996, the government-sanctioned a constitutional referendum outlawing religious parties, stripping power from Parliament, and allowing the President to rule by decree, arguing that it had been approved by 86 per cent of Algerians. No independent verification of the vote was allowed. Algerians were by then quickly losing their confidence in the military-backed government. In a climate of fear and violence, moderates of all persuasions were pushed to the margins of public life. Former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power in a flawed election in 1999, running unopposed after the withdrawal of all opposition candidates. Bouteflika introduced an amnesty for Islamist rebels that found some resonance; however, Islamist movements were still banned. Amnesty meant that Bouteflika offered neither ‘truth’ about past violence nor ‘reconciliation’ with the Concorde Civil, the President’s initiative to end the conflict. War-weary Algeria turned towards an unsteady peace, marred in the ensuing years by violence.
Meanwhile, post 9/11, attention focused on the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. This became Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an armed extremist group designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organization. The group traces its provenance to Algeria’s civil war in the 1990s and has in the past decade become an al-Qaeda affiliate with regional ambitions, operating in the Sahara and Sahel. This perceived threat has led the US government to strengthen military links with the Algerian government, through training and intelligence-gathering.
Governance
Algeria has a presidential form of government. Most Presidents have so far played a role in the independence movement and the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN). More importantly, the President has always either been a member of the military establishment or has been endorsed by the army. Formally, the President has substantial powers and may overrule other branches of government. In reaching decisions, he must nevertheless agree with the heads of the military and security apparatus. This makes the Algerian system different from those of other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, where the President personifies the system.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was in power for two decades (1999-2019) and was credited with the end of the Algerian civil war, also known as the Black Decade. His national reconciliation initiative did not provide, however, justice to the victims of the civil war. The Black Decade (1990-1999) was a brutal armed conflict between the ruling regime and the armed elements of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), an Islamist opposition party, over the course of which 150,000 Algerians died.
Bouteflika was re-elected four times, albeit in contested elections. The President wielded the main executive powers and was supported by the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. Since the 1997 elections, most cabinets have been coalitions established between the ‘institutional’ parties FLN and RND (Rassemblement National Démocratique, National Democratic Rally) with one or more Islamist and secular parties involved.
Following riots in Kabylie in 2001, which led to the killing of 130 people by the forces of the gendarmerie, President Bouteflika expressed a willingness to accommodate popular demands through constitutional and political reforms. Tamazight was recognized as a national language in 2002 and then as an official language in 2016.
In January 2018, the 12th of January was decreed as a national day. The date corresponds to the first day of the Amazigh year. This was perceived as a gesture of openness to and official recognition of the Amazigh dimension of Algeria.
The Preamble of the Algerian Constitution states that the fundamental components of the identity of the Algerian people are ‘Islam, Arabity and Amazighity’. The text of the Constitution stipulates in Article 223 that any constitutional revision cannot affect Tamazight as a national and official language.
In addition, Article 37 states: ‘Citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection thereof, without any discrimination on the grounds of birth, race, sex, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.’ Although race is mentioned as a ground of discrimination in the Constitution, the fact that the Preamble makes no reference to Algeria’s Black community or African roots can attest to the complete disregard or invisibility faced by this group.
Women constitute approximately 52 percent of the Algerian population but represent only an estimated 18 percent of the workforce. The increasing Islamization of Algerian society in the 1980s under the influence of rising Islamist political movements, led to the undermining of women’s role in Algerian society. This culminated in the introduction of a new Family Code in 1984 that placed women under the guardianship of men. This Code was revised in 2005, however, to reduce the legal dependence of women on men.
In December 2015, Algeria’s parliament adopted Law No. 15-19, criminalizing some forms of domestic violence in its Penal Code, including psychological and some economic abuse. The new law makes assault against a spouse or former spouse punishable by up to 20 years in prison and by a life sentence if the assault results in death.
A positive trend in politics has developed since 2012 when a 30 percent quota was introduced that led to the election of 146 women, equal to 31.6 percent of the vote in the Algerian Parliament. However, the number decreased to 117 in the 2017 elections.
Algeria ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 1996 and was ranked number 136 of 156 in the 2021 Global Gender Gap Index, with a negative trend compared with the previous years.
Hirak
The Algerian Hirak (meaning ‘movement’ in Arabic) began on 22 February 2019, as millions of Algerians began to protest peacefully in the streets of the country’s main cities, demanding that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika step down, and opposing his candidacy for a fifth Presidential term.
The discontent of many Algerians was due to Bouteflika’s absence from the political scene following a debilitating stroke in 2013. Since then, perception had grown across the country that Bouteflika was a puppet President, with figures from within his entourage holding the strings.
Algeria is a rentier state and one of Africa’s leading oil and gas producers; however, it remains one of the world’s least diversified economies as it depends heavily on external factors (international oil and gas prices). Since coming to power, Bouteflika’s regime has crushed political dissent and fostered the proliferation of corruption at all levels of state. This has led to an overreliance on oil revenues at the expense of the potential for development in other sectors. This has amplified national discontent.
Additional factors including high unemployment, economic stagnation following the decline of oil and gas export revenues in 2014, and social inequalities, have led the Algerian population to take to the streets. What started as a protest opposing Bouteflika’s candidature evolved into a national social movement demanding a complete overhaul of the political system.
Under army chief General Ahmed Gaid Salah, a member of Bouteflika’s regime, the military initially supported Bouteflika’s candidacy. However, following the protests, the armed forces intervened to end Bouteflika’s control. Since then, the military has refused to withdraw from public life and continues to be heavily involved in domestic politics.
Bouteflika announced his resignation on 2 April 2019, before the planned April elections that year. This followed the pressure of several weeks of peaceful protests held throughout the country. Many high-ranking politicians and businessmen within Bouteflika’s entourage have since been tried on corruption charges and imprisoned.
Senate President Abdelkader Bensalah replaced Bouteflika temporarily until new elections were to be held on 4 July. This date was, however, was postponed by General Salah to 12 December, to end several months of protests.
Since 22 February 2019, Algerians have been protesting peacefully every Friday on a regular basis and have continued to do so even after Bouteflika’s resignation. Human rights violations have been reported by NGOs, including the disproportionate use of force and arbitrary arrests by police.
On 19 June 2019, General Salah prohibited protestors from carrying the Amazigh flag during protests, criminalizing its use and leading to the arrest of hundreds of Algerians.
The absence of Black Algerians in the Hirak movement and the ongoing debate surrounding democratization, national identity and belonging in Algeria is evident. This is further worsened by the concentration of this population in the Saharan south of the country, which makes them not visible to other Algerian citizens.
Algerians continued protesting and making demands for an open and fair election, free from figures close to former President Bouteflika’s entourage. Nonetheless, the five presidential candidates include former prime ministers, a culture minister and a tourism minister.
The 12 December 2019 elections had a low turnout of 40 per cent and led to the appointment of Abdelmadjid Tebboune as President. Candidates belonging to the prior government were largely rejected by the population because they were perceived to be a perpetuation of the status quo. Since taking office, President Tebboune has undertaken several political and legislative reforms, including the adoption of a new Constitution in November 2020, albeit in a controversial popular referendum marked by a historically low voter turnout (24 per cent). Repression against peaceful Hirak activists, human rights defenders, journalists, bloggers and political opponents has increased, while laws have been passed since November 2020 that flagrantly violate fundamental rights, particularly targeting minority groups.
Covid-19
Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, Algeria has been among the most affected countries in Africa. Authorities began to implement containment measures in early March 2020. These included the closure of schools, universities, restaurants and shops, the cancellation of public and private events, and the shutdown of public transport and flights. A lockdown of affected areas was ordered, and a curfew was put in place in several cities, including the capital city, Algiers.
In fact, the country has suffered not only one but two recent shocks: the spread of Covid-19 and a sharp decline in oil prices. The government tried to protect salaries in the public sector and healthcare spending. Many efforts were also made to limit the spread of the coronavirus.
On 22 March 2020, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune prohibited any dissemination of country statistics on Covid-19, except from the Ministry of Health. This sowed doubt about the government’s willingness to manage the healthcare crisis in a transparent manner. A vaccination campaign in Algeria started on 29 January 2021 and as of 9 February 2022, Algeria had fully vaccinated only around 15 per cent of its total population. In a study conducted by MRG between November 2021 and March 2022, it was found that there were dramatically different levels of official information available in Tamazight (an official national language, albeit one that was recognized as such relatively recently), compared to Arabic (an official national language) and French (not an official national language). Amazigh social media users in Algeria were more likely to express no confidence in Covid-19 vaccines than the general population (28 per cent compared to 18 per cent). Among the Amazigh community in Algeria, conspiracy theories were the most frequently mentioned reservation: 25.3 per cent versus only 13 per cent of social media users from the general population, while in all other settings, there was doubt over vaccine safety. Both low levels of confidence and spread of conspiracy theories may have been influenced by a lack of information in Tamazight.
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2012-05-02T04:25:58+00:00
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2023-01-31T07:55:24-05:00
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Algeria’s Foreign Minister speaks out after cutting diplomatic ties with Morocco
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2021-09-22T00:00:00
|
Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco earlier this year citing “hostile activities” as the decades-old conflict between the neighboring countries continues.The North African state accused Morocco of supporting two “terrorist groups”, including the Movement for the self-determination of Kabylie [MAK] group, who Algeria says were responsible for starting some of the deadliest wildfires the country has witnessed. Algeria’s Foreign Minster Ramtane Lamamra spoke to CNN’s Larry Madowo to discuss.
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https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/09/22/algeria-foreign-minister-ramtane-lamamra-morocco-relationship-intv-oneworld-vpx.cnn
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Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco earlier this year citing "hostile activities" as the decades-old conflict between the neighboring countries continues.The North African state accused Morocco of supporting two "terrorist groups", including the Movement for the self-determination of Kabylie [MAK] group, who Algeria says were responsible for starting some of the deadliest wildfires the country has witnessed. Algeria's Foreign Minster Ramtane Lamamra spoke to CNN's Larry Madowo to discuss.
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[] |
[
""
] | null |
[] | null |
en
|
/apple-touch-icon.png
|
AP News
|
https://apnews.com/hub/algeria
|
The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business. More than half the world’s population sees AP journalism every day.
|
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8952
|
dbpedia
|
1
| 67
|
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/paris-2024-summer-olympics/heres-what-to-know-about-algeria-gymnast-kaylia-nemour-france-uneven-bars/5669677/
|
en
|
Here's what to know about Algerian gymnast Kaylia Nemour and why she lives in France but competed for another county
|
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[
"2024 Paris Olympics",
"Gymnastics"
] | null |
[
"NBC New York Staff, The Associated Press",
"NBC New York Staff",
"The Associated Press"
] |
2024-08-04T18:52:23
|
Kaylia Nemour won gold in the women's uneven bars final in Paris, making history by bringing home the first Olympic medal to Africa, but she lives and trains in...
|
en
|
NBC New York
|
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/paris-2024-summer-olympics/heres-what-to-know-about-algeria-gymnast-kaylia-nemour-france-uneven-bars/5669677/
|
Kaylia Nemour of Algeria delivered the country’s first Olympic gold medal in gymnastics, putting together a thrilling routine in the uneven bars final, and making history in the process.
Nemour also is the first African gymnast to win an Olympic medal.
Nemour is French and still trains in France but switched to compete for Algeria following a dispute with the French gymnastics federation and Nemour’s club of Avoine Beaumont, which has led the gymnast to embrace her father’s Algerian nationality.
The 17-year-old is a wonder on bars, swooping from one to the other with a series of releases and intricate hand maneuvers that are both athletically and technically demanding.
Nemour scored 15.7, tied for the highest score of the meet in any event.
She's the 2023 world uneven bars silver medalist and the 2023 African all-around champion.
Paris 2024 Summer Olympics
Watch all the action from the Paris Olympics live on NBC
China's Qiyuan Qiu finished second with a score of 15.500 and Team USA's Suni Lee won the bronze with a 14.800.
While Nemour competes under a different flag — she draped the Algerian banner behind her after clinching her victory — she was very much on home soil. A raucous ovation followed after she won the first-ever gymnastics medal for Algeria.
In women's gymnastics team qualifying, Nemour had the top score on the uneven bars with a 15.600.
She finished 32nd in qualifying for the balance beam.
|
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8952
|
dbpedia
|
1
| 71
|
https://www.repsol.com/en/about-us/repsol-worldwide/africa/algeria/index.cshtml
|
en
|
Repsol in Algeria – Find out about our projects in this country
|
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[
"Repsol worldwide"
] | null |
[] |
2024-04-17T00:00:00
|
Algeria has one of the largest natural gas reserves in the world. Repsol has been present in Algeria since 1973 with various upstream projects.
|
en
|
/content/dam/repsol-catalog/icons/favicon.png
|
REPSOL
|
https://www.repsol.com/en/about-us/repsol-worldwide/africa/algeria/index.cshtml
|
Repsol has been present in Algeria since 1973. Since 1991, Repsol has maintained a permanent office in Algiers to support its activity in the country and strengthen its links with authorities and institutions, including its relationship with Sonatrach, ALNAFT and ARH. Repsol has about 100 employees depending on the Algeria Business Unit.
Repsol is currently involved in the exploitation of four projects in production Menzel Ledjmet Nord (MLN), El-Merk, Ourhoud and Reggane.
Algeria is a strategic area for Repsol due to its natural resource potential and geographical proximity to Spain (one of the main recipients of Algerian gas).
Repsol's average production in Algeria in 2023 is more than 60,000 Boe/day (2 % of the Group's global net production), of which nearly 60% is gas. Repsol has proven reserves in Algeria of 50 million barrels (2% of Repsol's net proven reserves, calculated in barrels equivalent). The capital employed in Algeria at the end of December 2023 is 312 million dollars and the total investments of the last five years amount to 290 million dollars. Repsol is the sixth largest international company, in order of production, and the seventh largest in order of reserves.
Main figures, lines of action, and facilities map
The hydrocarbons activities are governed by this new law n°19-13 and its executive decrees (about 42 decrees). Notably however, all the existing contracts are under the old hydrocarbon law n°86-14. So far only 5 new contracts have been signed under this new law. The new Law seems to have attractive fiscal regime and contractual flexibility (especially for the new contracts) which covers:
Upstream activities
Downstream activities
HSE
The upstream activities include the activities of prospecting, exploration, appraisal, and exploitation of hydrocarbons; as well as processing facilities, compression, gathering system, storage and expedition facilities and site abandonment activities.
Upstream concession by which ALNAFT allows the national company the right to carry out exploration and exploitation activities on a perimeter, delivered by ALNAFT for an initial duration of 30 years.
Deed of Assignment: by which ALNAFT grants to the contracting parties (National Company & any pre-qualified person) the right to carry out research and exploitation activities within a defined perimeter.
Hydrocarbon contract: contract for upstream activities concluded between the national company and a pre-qualified Company, for a period of 30 years.
• Two (02) periods: Exploration Period (Max. 7 years) and an Exploitation Period (30 year less duration used for exploration).
|
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8952
|
dbpedia
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0
| 85
|
https://bsahashop.com/products/algerian-dried-mint-river-brand
|
en
|
Algerian Dried Mint - River Brand
|
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[] |
[] |
[
""
] | null |
[] | null |
Dried mint is a versatile ingredient but this whole leaf mint makes a wonderful addition when brewing loose green tea. Create an authentic glass of mint tea at home. Sold as whole leaf, looseleaf dried mint. Get this alongside a selection of North African products on bsaha!
|
en
|
BSAHA
|
https://bsahashop.com/products/algerian-dried-mint-river-brand
|
Algerian Dried Mint by River Brand
Dried mint is a versatile ingredient but this whole leaf mint makes a wonderful addition when brewing loose green tea. Create an authentic glass of mint tea Sold as whole leaf, looseleaf dried mint.
Product labels are in Arabic and French. Store away from sunlight in a cool, dry area.
Product of Algeria
Product Weight: 21g / .8 oz
Ingredients: Mint
|
|||
8952
|
dbpedia
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2
| 53
|
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/algeria_en
|
en
|
EU trade relations with Algeria
|
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[
"international trade"
] | null |
[] |
2024-06-14T12:00:00+00:00
|
Facts, figures and latest developments.
|
en
|
/profiles/contrib/ewcms/themes/ewcms_theme/images/favicons/ec/favicon.ico
|
Trade
|
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/algeria_en
|
The EU-Algeria Association Agreement was signed in April 2002 and entered into force in September 2005.
The agreement sets out a framework for the EU-Algeria relationship in all areas, including trade. It reciprocally liberalises trade in goods, with elements of asymmetry in favour of Algeria.
It aimed to establish an EU-Algeria free trade area, including the complete dismantling of tariffs, by September 2020 – a target that has been met, save for a few remaining tariffs that Algeria is yet to eliminate.
Trade picture
Algeria is the EU's 19th biggest trade partner, representing 1% of the EU’s total trade in goods in 2022.
The EU is Algeria's biggest trade partner and accounts for the majority of Algeria’s international trade (around 50% in 2021).
Total trade in goods between the EU and Algeria in 2022 amounted to €55.8 billion. The EU’s imports from Algeria amounted to €41.9 billion. Imports were dominated by mineral products (€38.7 billion, 93%). The EU’s exports to Algeria amounted to €13.9 billion and were dominated by machinery and appliances (€2.4 billion, 17.3%), closely followed by chemicals (€2.3 billion, 16.6%), and vegetables (€2.1 billion, 15.1%).
Two-way trade in services amounted to €2.6 billion in 2021. EU imports of services represented €1 billion, and exports were worth €1.6 billion.
The EU and Algeria
The Free Trade Area (FTA) of the EU-Algeria Association Agreement grants preferential treatment for Algerian exports to the EU. In January 2014, the EU implemented changes to its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which removes import duties from products coming into the EU from some developing countries. As a result, countries that already had preferential market access to the EU, like Algeria due to its FTA, stopped benefiting from the GSP treatment in 2014.
The EU and Algeria adopted on 13 March 2017 new Partnership Priorities in the framework of the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy. Together with the joint assessment of the implementation of the Association Agreement, also adopted in March 2017, they constituted the political framework that guided the dialogue of the EU and its Member States with Algeria until 2020. These Partnership Priorities in the context of EU-Algeria relations focused on a variety of areas, including trade and access to the EU single market, energy, the environment and sustainable development.
Bilateral trade between the two partners is primarily based on Algerian exports of oil and gas products. Algeria is the EU’s third largest supplier of natural gas, after Russia and Norway. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, gas imports from Russia to the EU have fallen significantly. This has primariliy been compensated for by a sharp increase in imports of liquified natural gas (LNG), particularly from the United States, but also via increased gas imports from Algeria and Norway.
In 2021, under the new EU Trade Policy Review, the EU has proposed a new sustainable investment initiative to interested partners in Africa and the Southern Neighbourhood. Fostering strategic interdependencies and enhancing the EU’s relations and economic integration with the Southern Neighbourhood is a strategic necessity for long-term stability.
Financial support
The European Neighbourhood Policy provides political and financial assistance to Algeria. The EU committed €125 million to bilateral assistance for Algeria for the period 2018-2020, under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). The funding supported cooperation priorities agreed with Algeria, namely: (i) economic governance and support for economic diversification; (ii) territorial development and participatory democracy; (iii) energy/environment and climate actions.
Under the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2021-2027, the EU will adopt a broad new financial cooperation instrument: the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). The NDICI is the basis of EU-Algeria cooperation.
More information on EU support is available from the Directorate-General for the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR).
Algeria in the Southern Neighbourhood
Algeria is one of the partners of the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine*, Syria and Tunisia). The EU established its privileged partnership with the Eastern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean back in 1995 with the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at the Barcelona Conference, aiming to establish an area of peace, stability and economic prosperity that upholds democratic values and human rights.
The 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Process in November 2020 was an opportunity to reflect on the strategic partnership with the region in light of the political, socioeconomic, financial and environmental challenges exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, and to reassess the EU’s partnership with Algeria and the other Southern Neighbourhood partner countries. Following consultations with partners, this reflection resulted in the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on ‘A renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood - A new Agenda for the Mediterranean‘ and the annexed 'Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours' in February 2021.
More information on the Southern Neighbourhood
The impact of trade component of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Algeria was assessed in the Ex-Post Evaluation of Trade Chapters of the Six Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with the EU’s Southern Neighbours, published by the Commission in 2021.
According to IMF and World Bank estimates, the Algerian government’s economic diversification plan, if linked to the creation of favourable conditions for the private sector and necessary adjustments to the education and training system, would boost economic growth substantially in the medium term, balancing the short-term costs of transition. Algeria would then be in a position to gain in competitiveness and to benefit from new markets, such as via the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
The pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation and the PEM Convention on rules of origin
The pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation system of origin was created in 2005. It brings together the EU, Algeria and other partners in Europe and the Mediterranean to support regional integration by creating a common system of rules of origin. Rules of origin are technical criteria which determine whether a specific product qualifies for duty-free or other preferential access under a given trade agreement.
Cumulation of origin means that a product coming from one partner country can be processed or added to a product of a second partner country and still be considered as an ‘originating product’ of that second partner country for the purposes of a particular trade agreement.
The pan-Euro-Mediterranean system allows for diagonal cumulation (i.e. cumulation between two or more countries) between the EU, EFTA countries, Türkiye, the Western Balkans, the Faroe Islands, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and any other country that signed the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. The system was originally based on a network of Free Trade Agreements with identical origin protocols.
These individual origin protocols are being progressively replaced by a reference to the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (PEM Convention), which was established in 2011 to provide a more unified framework for origin protocols. Algeria joined the Regional Convention in March 2017.
Committees and Dialogues
The EU and Algeria meet regularly to discuss issues and best practices and oversee the proper functioning of the Agreement.
Technical committee meetings - agendas and reports
Trading with Algeria
Importing into the EU from Algeria
EU trade defence measures on imports from Algeria
Exporting from the EU to Algeria
Trade defence measures in force in Algeria
Trade relations are part of the EU's overall political and economic relations with Algeria
Algeria is a member of the World Trade Organization
More information about EU co-operation programmes for Algeria
* This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
|
||||
8952
|
dbpedia
|
2
| 45
|
https://www.iwgia.org/en/algeria.html
|
en
|
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
|
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"indigenous",
"peoples",
"Amazigh",
"Tamazight",
"Kabylia",
"Chenwa",
"rights",
"language",
"constitution"
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[] |
2024-04-16T00:00:00
|
the Algerian government does not recognize the indigenous status of the Amazigh, there are no official statistics on the number of Amazigh peoples. However, the associations that defend and promote the Amazigh peoples estimate that the Tamazight-speaking population is around 11 million people or a third of the total population of Algeria.
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| null |
On the basis of demographic data drawn from the territories in which Tamazight-speaking populations live, associations defending and promoting the rights of Amazigh people estimate the Tamazight-speaking population to be around 12 million people, a third of Algeria’s total population.
The Amazigh peoples
Tamazight, the language of the Amazigh peoples
Main challenges for the Amazigh peoples
The Amazigh peoples face arbitrary arrests in different regions of the country. For example, in 2016, the total number of Mozarabic and Amazigh people in the M'zab region arrested and sent to jail normally without trial was around 140. In protest against their illegal detention and inhuman detention conditions, some prisoners of Mozabite resorted to repeated hunger strikes.
In Kabylia, traditional activities and events of the Amazigh organized by non-governmental organizations such as Yennayer, Amazigh Year Year or Amazigh Spring, have been interrupted, forbidden or prevented by force by the police. Members of the Amazigh World Congress (CMA) living in Kabylia have been arrested, interrogated and then released several times. In police custody, they were threatened with imprisonment and violence against their families if they do not stop their activism.
The obstacles in relation to free movement on the Algerian border with northern Mali and the Niger continue to impede traditional exchanges between indigenous populations and deprive them of family and community relations.
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https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/in-algeria-the-more-things-change-the-more-they-stay-the-same/
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en
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In Algeria, the More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
|
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2023-10-03T12:54:52+00:00
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More than four years have passed since the Hirak protest movement threatened to upend Algeria’s political and military leadership…
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en
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Arab Center Washington DC
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https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/in-algeria-the-more-things-change-the-more-they-stay-the-same/
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More than four years have passed since the Hirak protest movement threatened to upend Algeria’s political and military leadership structure. Since then, the country has been in a state of transition under an administration that, while prone to suppressing political expression and dissent, has opted for a more assertive foreign policy after years of isolationism. As the Ukraine crisis keeps energy prices high, Algeria’s economy, which is highly dependent on oil and gas, has been bolstered by a surge in energy revenues that is giving it room to secure domestic stability and be more engaged internationally.
However, Algeria’s economy remains highly centralized and excessively bureaucratic, which altogether stifles private enterprise and entrepreneurship that would stimulate job creation and economic diversification. Despite promising moves toward economic reform and the loosening of regulations, including new rules to stimulate investment and non-oil exports, Algeria’s past inability to stay the course is eliciting skepticism about whether it can, at this juncture, move beyond its archaic economic model to turn this temporary remission into sustainable development and durable growth—and in the process create the space for popular participation.
How the Regime Silenced the Hirak
When millions of Algerians from across the country demonstrated in early 2019 in opposition to a fifth term for then president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the tenuous premises of Algeria’s social contract seemed to unravel. It was as if an earthquake had shaken the country, as disciplined masses marched with renewed patriotism and the promise of a different future. Bouteflika’s resignation on April 2, 2019 injected fresh hope for democratic change and invigorated calls for a “civilian, not military state” and demands to further revamp the political system. The Hirak movement continued to stand out for its unity despite its diverse make-up, its endurance, and its nonviolent character, in stark contrast to the violence of the civil war of the 1990s.
The COVID-19 pandemic then removed any remaining uncertainty about the calculations of the regime, which seized on the (convenient) imperative of enforcing social isolation to gradually impose nationwide lockdowns. This gave authorities a new range of powers, including the right to ban street rallies and go after activists, forcing the Hirak to retreat. The state went to great lengths to crack down on dissent, arresting and imprisoning political activists. Authorities dissolved or suspended parties, prominent civil society groups, and media outlets for “undermining national security” or unity and for “spreading fake news,” and introduced laws constraining their ability to operate. The well-known civil society organization, Rassemblement Actions Jeunesse (Youth Action Rally) was dissolved in 2021 for violating the law governing civil society associations, and its members were arrested and prosecuted (though its head was able to flee to Switzerland to seek political asylum). The Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights, the oldest human rights organization in the country, was similarly shut down over dubious allegations of noncompliance with the associations law.
The Hirak movement continued to stand out for its unity despite its diverse make-up, its endurance, and its nonviolent character, in stark contrast to the violence of the civil war of the 1990s.
Receiving foreign funds without authorization would also now lead to up to 14 years of imprisonment. The government especially went after political parties that had supported the Hirak and sought to form a political opposition—the Democratic and Social Union, the Socialist Workers’ Party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy, and leaders and members of various other parties. The deplorable arrest and imprisonment of Ihsane El Kadi, who was director of Radio M and the last independent news site, Maghreb Emergent, and who was at the forefront of the Hirak, further illustrated this authoritarian thrust. Another activist, the leader of the Democratic and Social Union, Karim Tabbou, was also arrested in May 2023 for unknown reasons. A new press law further restricted the exercise of media activity, banned any media from getting foreign funds, and excluded dual nationals from ownership of media outlets.
The expansion of the criminalization of terrorism to acts that seek to “gain power or change the system of governance by unconstitutional means” ultimately brought into question the Hirak’s very demands for system-wide change. It also underscored the regime’s trepidation at the prospect of any renegotiation of the social contract that would move the country from the confines of its post-civil war parameters. The dramatic deterioration of the political climate since then, with the imprisonment of over 300 activists and critics has consequently pushed activists into exile, even despite bans on Hirak supporters leaving the country.
The Root Causes of the Protests
Algeria’s system of governance had allowed the regime, over time, to withstand domestic strife, as well as pressures for change. The end of the Black Decade—ten years of brutal civil war in the 1990s that pitted the army against an Islamist insurgency—came with the transfer of authority to a civilian government (led by Abdelaziz Bouteflika) and ushered in the phase of a civilian president selected by the army, but legitimized through a façade of democratic elections. This new normal, which became etched in the Algerian psyche, came with the certainty that turmoil and instability lead to chaos—and hence the implicit social contract that has enabled the regime to keep a lid on any unrest in exchange for its monopoly over the economy and the appearance of political legitimacy. The following decades thus saw the firming up of this elite that exercised, behind the scenes, actual power over the state, limiting the civilian government’s influence on decision-making and appeasing citizens through public spending (cash subsidies, free housing, employment, and other forms of patronage) to maintain stability. The facade of representation combined with social welfare programs and subsidies temporarily helped to counteract demands for greater participation and representation, such as the secessionism of the Kabylia region.
Algeria’s system of governance had allowed the regime, over time, to withstand domestic strife, as well as pressures for change.
Over time, the state fruitlessly attempted to spend its way out of crises without making structural changes, further entrenching Algerian economic interests and institutional rigidity. During the 2011 Arab Spring, it added new jobs and made interest-free loans in an unsuccessful attempt to foster youth entrepreneurship. When the oil market crashed in 2014, it drained the national coffers to stabilize its economy and pushed for deeply unpopular austerity reforms to shore up its national budget—and much of the infrastructure and social spending was lost to corruption among the Bouteflika-bred and sustained oligarchy.
The Hirak was, ultimately, the expression of accumulated grievances with the political and economic systems that had evolved out of the Algerian Civil War and its management of state resources. Bouteflika’s notable absence after a 2013 stroke that left him incapacitated (yet still presumably running the country), plus the perception of his cooptation by inner circle businessmen who formed extensive patronage networks, added to the disaffection that was aggravated by the absence of avenues for political participation or dissent. While the movement’s speed and size took the government by surprise, the outcry, rooted in the very environment of political stasis and near-complete centralization of power, seemed almost inevitable.
Algeria’s Diplomatic Rejuvenation
While Algeria’s economy suffers from old pains, its foreign policy has been invigorated under President Tebboune, who has opted for a more assertive regional and international diplomacy. Tunisian President Kais Saied’s visit to Algiers in July 2022 broke a longstanding stalemate with the subsequent reopening of land borders between the two countries, resulting in a tourism boon for Tunisia’s ailing economy. Algeria was then able to persuade Tunisia to reverse its neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict with Morocco. Tunisia invited Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front fighting for the territory’s independence, to an investment conference co-hosted with Japan in August 2022. In November 2022, Algeria then hosted the first post-pandemic Arab League summit in an attempt to cultivate Arab unity amid deep divisions and discord (tensions between Morocco and Algeria in particular, that severed diplomatic ties with each other in 2021, have been at an all-time high, especially after Israel’s recognition of Morocco’s claims of sovereignty over the Western Sahara).
Algeria has also made overtures to the BRICS bloc of nations. Relations with the bloc would open up alternative sources of foreign investment and access to loans, with the added possibility of decreasing the country’s dependence on dollar-denominated currency settlement systems. Indeed, the BRICS countries have been engaged in the creation of an alternative currency system (akin to a version of the Euro), turning even to the use of local currencies in their own bilateral trades in defiance of the hegemony of the American dollar. This would certainly bring Algiers closer to Beijing, with which it already has a comprehensive strategic partnership, and to Russia, which it has kept close in spite of its invasion of Ukraine, and from which it continues to import arms, wheat, and other agricultural products. Accession to BRICS would effectively help secure the combination of Algeria’s economic ambitions and regional interests, especially that Morocco does not appear to want to apply to be a member of the bloc.
Relations with the BRICS bloc of nations would open up alternative sources of foreign investment and access to loans, with the added possibility of decreasing the country’s dependence on the dollar.
When the Ukraine war broke out in February 2022, Algeria, which was sought out for its gas resources, benefited from the serendipitous boost in global oil and gas prices. Its energy earnings, expected to reach $50 billion this year, have improved the economy’s near-term outlook and could stimulate much-needed investment, not just in natural gas, but also in renewable energy, a very promising sector given the country’s photovoltaic potential. Algiers then sought to exploit the high European demand for its gas (as an alternative to Russian gas) and as a result negotiated gas deals with European buyers—including a major partnership with Italy, which is also investing in Algerian gas field development and green hydrogen production. Algeria’s ramping up of gas exports successfully helped Europe meet 90 percent of its full gas storage target. The question is whether Algeria will seek, now that it is an essential part of the effort to diversify energy sources to Europe, to translate this positive standing into more aggressive foreign policy stances, including to pressure Morocco to compromise on Western Sahara.
Internally, Algeria’s unexpected windfall from the Ukraine war is enabling the regime, as it increases production, to use socioeconomic welfare to keep its citizens in check and maintain domestic stability ahead of the 2024 presidential election. Algeria’s 2023 budget offers extraordinary spending of $98 billion, the largest in its history—and with it, subsidy and tax reforms have been halted and stipends to jobless youth (representing nearly two-thirds of the population and the biggest potential source of instability) have been introduced to try to placate a citizenry confronted with economic and social woes. The breathing room proffered by internal and external pressures has helped the regime reassert its control for now.
Much Work for a Democratic Future
Economic conditions in Algeria are worsening, despite the energy boom, as inflationary pressures rise and non-hydrocarbons sectors stagnate, producing severe impacts on people’s purchasing power and heightening citizens’ alienation. The prioritization of economic development in coastal and urban centers—where over 70 percent of the population lives and economic activity is concentrated—has produced enduring economic and social disparities between the urban (cosmopolitan/Mediterranean) and peripheral (traditionally conservative/parochial) regions, and has led to economic deterioration of the remote interior and uncontrolled border regions. The young population of this neglected interior, absent economic opportunities, is especially prone to radicalization given the myriad threats confronting it and increasing instability at the border, especially smuggling and jihadi recruitment with the growth of terrorist threats in the Sahel region. This creates a dangerous mix that mirrors the precursors to the radicalization and violence of the 1990s.
Meanwhile, the new and rejuvenated Algeria looks very much like the old one: an authoritarian state that is run by the same military caste, but that is noticeably more repressive. Thanks to the Ukraine crisis and resulting revenue windfalls, this very state has managed to avoid responding to popular exigencies by buying peace while doubling down on repression. Its leadership has embarked on a more confident foreign policy that, while taking into account the pressures of an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, seeks at the end of the day to rehabilitate its public image.
Hope for democratic change remains alive in Algeria. The Hirak may have died out, but its goals remain unfulfilled; the governmental and constitutional reforms that were ostensibly passed to address its grievances did little to respond to citizen demands to renegotiate an obsolete social contract. If history is any guide, the current model of safeguarding social peace through social spending is only likely to offer more than temporary reprieve as the promises of economic diversification—unfulfilled in the context of dismal economic conditions and an outdated economic model—continue to fuel the frustration and anger of a young citizenry with few outlets for demanding meaningful action from the government. And what this youth remembers today is not the Black Decade but the unprecedented mass movement from four years ago that rallied millions of Algerians against an antiquated ruling elite in demanding a voice and representation through a transition to democracy. So, while the regime may have prevailed in this instance, the idea that this young and savvy constituency will accept failure on the delivery of not just rights but of livelihood and development may be illusive. The system will continue to be tested and tried and, when faced with the next economic crunch, it may find itself compelled to look inward and make more tangible concessions to placate its population, if only to ensure that popular dissatisfaction does not undermine national stability.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Flickr/Gwenael Piaser
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https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/dd10d6bf-e14d-40b5-9ee6-37f978c87a01/3c3e6d27-44ed-4c50-9be5-88bb8f0eb9ca
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en
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Decolonisation: geopolitical issues and impact on the European integration process
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This subject file focuses on the interactions between the decolonisation process and the European integration process, with a particular emphasis on French and British decolonisation.
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https://www.cvce.eu/website-theme/images/cvce.ico
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https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/dd10d6bf-e14d-40b5-9ee6-37f978c87a01/3c3e6d27-44ed-4c50-9be5-88bb8f0eb9ca
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The Algerian powder keg
Algeria, annexed to France since 1834 and divided into administrative départements, was considered to be an inalienable part of French national territory. But after the end of the Second World War, the country witnessed a series of demonstrations by nationalists calling for independence. The existence of a powerful minority of European colonists (1 million out of a total of 9 million inhabitants in 1954) who were vehemently opposed to the creation of an Islamic Algerian Republic prevented the emergence of any amicable solution.
On 1 November 1954, Algeria was rocked by a series of thirty terrorist attacks. This was the first action by the National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN and its armed wing, the National Liberation Army (ALN), became increasingly radical, using guerrilla methods and terrorism to achieve their ends.
From 1956 onwards, the government of Guy Mollet in France, which had originally advocated a policy of negotiation, stepped up its military action in Algeria, sending a contingent of more than 400 000 conscript soldiers. France was militarily the stronger party, but it remained unable to restore order. Support for the FLN among the Algerian population continued to grow.
Despite France’s attempts to present the Algerian question as a domestic policy problem, the conflict took on an increasingly international dimension. Relations with Arab states became more and more tense, and the diplomatic offensives mounted by African and Asian countries forced the French Government to justify its Algerian policy to the United Nations General Assembly.
In France, the government was in a state of paralysis. Military spending widened the budget deficit, and the country was facing worsening financial difficulties. The Fourth Republic’s inability to restore order in Algeria ultimately brought about the collapse of the regime. Rioting in Algiers by supporters of French Algeria on 13 May 1958 led to the return to power of General de Gaulle. He was seen as the only man capable of avoiding civil war and restoring national unity.
But after the FLN formed the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) on 19 September 1958, General de Gaulle began to realise that nothing would be possible without negotiating with the nationalist movement. On 16 September 1959, de Gaulle took a first major step when he recognised the Algerians’ right to self-determination. In a decisive address, de Gaulle offered the Algerian people a choice between three possible solutions: secession, francisation (meaning integration or assimilation) or association. The General clearly hoped that the Algerians would not choose full independence but rather the option of remaining associated with France, the latter retaining its prerogatives over the Algerian economy, education system, defence and foreign affairs.
On 8 January 1961, 75 % of the French electorate voted in favour of the self-determination of the Algerian people in a referendum. Public opinion, which had initially favoured war, now chose the path of peace. Two months later, the government announced the opening of negotiations with the GPRA. Speaking at a press conference on 11 April 1961, General de Gaulle justified France’s withdrawal from Algeria for economic reasons.
But those who had fought for French Algeria and had engineered de Gaulle’s return to power felt betrayed. Their anger led to political crises, uprisings and power grabs. Back in January 1960, militants had staged a week of riots, known as the ‘week of barricades’. Then in April 1961, four generals (Challe, Salan, Zeller and Jouhaud) tried to repeat the coup of 13 May 1958, but this time against de Gaulle. The Algiers putsch failed when the conscript soldiers and the general public refused to follow the generals’ call.
Supporters of French Algeria went on to create the Secret Army Organisation (OAS), a civil-military terrorist movement that was formed from members of Algeria’s European population and members of the army to fight against Algerian independence. From 1961 to 1963, the OAS carried out a series of attacks in France and Algeria.
But they did not manage to prevent the signing of the Évian Accords on 18 March 1962 by the French Government and representatives of the FLN. These agreements granted sovereignty to Algeria and the French Sahara. France agreed to withdraw its troops after three years and secured trade cooperation with Algeria, thereby protecting its economic interests, particularly with regard to the area’s oil reserves.
Two referendums confirmed these decisions. On 8 April 1962, more than 90 % of the French electorate voted in favour of the Évian Accords. On 1 July 1962, 99.7 % of Algerians voted in favour of their country’s independence.
Algeria’s independence was solemnly proclaimed on 3 July 1962, and Ahmed Ben Bella became the first president of the new republic.
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https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/algeria-stop-using-bogus-terrorism-charges-to-prosecute-peaceful-activists-and-journalists/
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Algeria: Stop using bogus terrorism charges to prosecute peaceful activists and journalists
|
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2021-09-28T13:14:08+00:00
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The Algerian authorities are increasingly resorting to broadly worded terrorism-related charges to prosecute journalists, human rights defenders and political activists and to criminalize two political organizations by labelling them as “terrorists” in a new clampdown on dissent, Amnesty International said today. In June, the authorities amended the definition of “terrorism” to allow the prosecution of […]
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Amnesty International
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https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/algeria-stop-using-bogus-terrorism-charges-to-prosecute-peaceful-activists-and-journalists/
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The Algerian authorities are increasingly resorting to broadly worded terrorism-related charges to prosecute journalists, human rights defenders and political activists and to criminalize two political organizations by labelling them as “terrorists” in a new clampdown on dissent, Amnesty International said today.
In June, the authorities amended the definition of “terrorism” to allow the prosecution of peaceful activists and critical voices. Journalists Hassan Bouras and Mohamed Mouloudj are the latest to be subjected to this alarming new trend. Both face potential prosecution for their online publications criticizing the authorities and for their affiliation with two organisations, the unregistered political opposition group, Rachad, and the group Movement for the Self-determination of the Kabylie (MAK). They have been charged for terrorism-related offences, including under Article 87bis, which carries the death penalty and vaguely defines terrorism as any act “against state security, the integrity of the territory, the stability and normal functioning of state institutions.”
“The Algerian authorities have escalated their tactics to silence peaceful dissent by using terrorism-related charges to demonize and delegitimize peaceful activists and journalists. This is merely a smokescreen to hide their bitter repression of activism,” said Amna Guellali, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa.
“Amnesty International calls on the Algerian authorities to immediately release Hassan Bouras and Mohamed Mouloudj and drop these unfounded charges against them. It is abhorrent to see those seeking to exercise their right to freedom of expression prosecuted in such a systematic way.”
In May, the Algerian High Security Council labelled the two organisations as “terrorist” entities. Since then, dozens of individuals have been arrested and prosecuted under terrorism charges for their alleged ties to the two organizations, including human rights defenders and journalists Kaddour Chouicha, Said Boudour and Djamila Loukil along with 12 other civil society and political activists.
In June, the authorities broadened the definition of terrorism in Article 87bis of the Penal Code to include “attempting to gain power or change the system of governance by unconstitutional means.”
On 6 September, police arrested Hassan Bouras in the city of El Bayadh, west of Algeria, and on 12 September, Mohamed Mouloudj was arrested in Algiers. Police seized their phones and computers. Investigative judges from the Sidi M’hamed tribunal ordered their provisional detentions on 12 and 14 September, respectively, pending investigation into charges including “spreading fake news,” “harming national security” and committing “a terrorist act,”– a charge that carries the death penalty if convicted.
In Algiers, a judge tasked with prosecuting electronic crimes interrogated Bouras for his alleged links with Rachad and reviewed his Facebook profile. Amnesty International also reviewed several of his Facebook posts published in recent weeks and found nothing that called for violence or hatred. Instead, Bouras mostly used Facebook to comment on the latest developments in Algeria, including the oxygen crisis due to the surge in Covid-19 cases and the murder of activist Djamel Bensmail on 11 August, who was lynched by a mob during the fires in Kabylie.
According to his wife, police officers arrested Mohamed Mouloudj in front of the headquarters of the Liberté newspaper, where he works in Algiers. Police transferred him to the gendarmerie station in the eastern city of Tizi Ouzou, and held him in pre-charge detention for two days. The gendarmerie then presented him before the Sidi M’hamed tribunal in Algiers, where a judge ordered his pre-trial detention after reviewing his social media profile. They accused him of alleged ties with MAK and its president Ferhat Mehenni after he requested an interview with him in January 2021, although it did not happen.
Amnesty International reviewed Mouloudj’s most recent posts and found them to be comments about the latest events in the Kabylie region.
“There is nothing to suggest that either Hassan Bouras or Mohamed Mouloudj have done anything wrong other than exercise their right to express themselves freely. It is clear that the authorities are shamefully resorting to counter-terrorism legislation as a tactic to silence dissent”, said Amna Guellali.
Both journalists are now awaiting their trials. Bouras is detained in the prison of Kolea, near Algiers but hundreds of kilometres away from his family. Mouloudj is detained in El Harrach prison in Algiers.
Background
Hassan Bouras is a journalist, a political activist and a member of the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights, who has denounced government corruption in his home city El Bayadh. He was previously sentenced in November 2016 to one year in prison, which was reduced to six months on appeal, for denouncing security officers’ bribes, and spent three months in jail.
Mohamed Mouloudj is a journalist who joined national newspaper Liberté, one of the few remaining independent newspapers in Algeria, in 2012. He is the second Liberté journalist to be detained on baseless accusations after Rabah Kareche was arrested in April and sentenced to a year in prison in August, four months of which are suspended, for articles he published about a protest by Tuaregs in Tamanrasset, southern Algeria.
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Algeria is located in northern Africa, right next to Libya and above Mali, and spans across 2.5 million square miles. Algeria was originally part of the Ottoman empire, where it enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy. In the early 1800s Algeria was conquered by Imperial France and it remained a colony until after the …
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https://imuna.org/resources/country-profiles/algeria/
|
Algeria is located in northern Africa, right next to Libya and above Mali, and spans across 2.5 million square miles. Algeria was originally part of the Ottoman empire, where it enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy. In the early 1800s Algeria was conquered by Imperial France and it remained a colony until after the Algerian War (1954-1962). Algeria declared independence in July 1962. The freedoms enjoyed by the new republic lasted less than a year. In 1963 the military took over the government, and has retained power to this day. The government espouses Islam and no laws may be passed that do not adhere to its tenets. However, these measures are insufficient for a fraction of society. In the 1990s the government was engaged in a bloody civil war with militant Islamic factions. Protests occur with relative frequency. Despite ongoing efforts to liberalize society and improve the economy, the society is still characterized by a high cost of living, corruption, inadequate employment opportunities, sub-par housing, and a lack of political and societal freedoms. These challenges are pressing, given that more than a quarter of the population is under the age of 15.
|
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8952
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dbpedia
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3
| 33
|
https://www.embalgeria.nl/history-of-algeria/
|
en
|
ALGERIAN EMBASSY TO THE HAGUE
|
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[
""
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[
"Ambassade Algerie"
] |
2022-01-31T13:59:38+01:00
|
Algeria officially acceded to its independence on July 5, 1962 at the cost of heavy sacrifices made by its people throughout 132 years of French occupation of settlement, of exploitation, of oppression and of ongoing attempts to erase the cultural identity HISTORY OF ALGERIA
|
fr
|
ALGERIAN EMBASSY TO THE HAGUE -
|
https://www.embalgeria.nl/history-of-algeria/
|
The first berber kingdom (FROM THE END OF THE 3RD MILLENlUM B.C. TO THE END OF THE 7TH CENTURY A.D.)
Berber civilization emerges on the (written) historical landscape in the 6th Century B.C. in a Greco-Pheonician confrontation for the control of the Mediterranean.
For centuries Carthage imposed its supremacy over the entire Mediterranean Basin. Towards the end of the Carthaginian era and early Roman dominance, Berbers (Numidians) were divided into two major groups, Massyles and Massaesyli, and were led by their respective kings, Masinissa and Syphax. Syphax, king of the Massaesyli (Numidians) initially lived in western Algeria and was the most powerful Berber monarch during the Second Punic War. The two greatest powers of the Mediterranean, Carthage and Rome, were competing to win him over as an ally. His rival, Masinissa, king of the Massyles, ruled over his kingdom from 202 to 148 B.C. Cirta, later known as Constantine, was the capital of that kingdom.
Masinissa offered his services to Rome and was influential in the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. Syphax went into exile in Italy while his son Vermina inherited some parts of his father‘s kingdom. Heartened by his alliance with Rome, Masinissa decided to conquer all of Numidia which he turned into a unified kingdom. However, Rome could not tolerate the emergence of a Berber power. With Carthage eliminated this new power had to be eradicated. Roman hegemonic designs would be hampered by the tenacious Jugurtha, Masinissa‘s grandson and the son of Micipsa. Jugurtha hoped to reunite all of Numidia but he was imprisoned and sent to Italy. He died of starvation in Tullanium, the Rome prison where Vercingetorix had been strangled.
During the last century B.C. all of Maghreb was ruled by Roman public servants. The last two Massyle Kings, Juba from 25 B.C. to 23 A.D., and Ptolemy from 23 to 40 A.D., acted more as vassals of the various „Caesars“ than as truly autonomous princes. This bloody „Roman peace,“ that was forced on the Berber kingdom for a period of over four centuries, was marked by two major events.
The Roman occupation triggered a brutal reorganization of social structures, lifestyles and production processes. Not content with ending the first Berber political centralization effort, it also brought an end to structural benefits that had resulted from the emergence of villages initiated by Massinissa. Pushed back towards the desert, the population had no choice but to reluctantly resume a nomadic lifestyle. Confined behind the „limes,“ as Roman boundary lines were called, for nearly three centuries entire fragments of Berber society were disenfranchised from their right to a normal agrarian lifestyle and were compelled to lead an enforced Bedouin lifestyle, synonymous with constant uprooting and roaming.
Most of the 8th Century was defined by a sustained revolt against central Arabic government that originated from an oriental schism, the Kharijism. Beginning in 141 A.D., having joined this movement, central Maghreb had already earned its independence. The Maghreb was then controlled by Kharijite natives who were unified around a Persian family known as the Rostemides that would rule over Tahert, now known as Tiaret.
Two key elements defined the emergence of this dynasty, the refusal to submit to a Byzantine-based state geared to exploitation and inequity, and the refusal to submit to any foreign domination. While Zenete Berbers gradually spread onto the high plains, driven by Kharijism, the other branch, the Sanhadjas, inhabited the mountainous areas of central and eastern Algeria.
One of these tribes, the Kutamas, settled in Small Kabylie and sponsored a Shiite missionary, Abu‘Abdallah. Shiites believe that only Ali and his descendents, the sons of Fatima, are the Prophet‘s legitimate Caliphs. It all began in 893-894 A.D. at Makkah, when a number of Kutama chiefs met Abu ‚Abdallah, the Shiite missionary (dâ‘ia), while on a pilgrimage. The missionary won them over and accompanied them on their way back to the Maghreb. He settled in Ikjan, in the mountainous area separating the Setif plain from the Tellian Atlas.
He then assembled an army and attacked the fortresses built by the Aghlabides that faced the Kabylie and Aures mountains. After many assaults, the Kutamas, led by Abu ‚Abdallah, finally crushed the Aghlabides‘ army.
In the next few years, they would conquer Setif, Constantine, Bejaia and Kairouan in March 909 A.D. He then proceeded to seize Sijilmassa in southern Morocco, where ‚Ubayd Allah, a Fatimide Mahdi, was held prisoner. Once free ‚Ubayd Allah affirmed his Mahdi status and became Emir al-Mouminine, Commander of the Faithful.
During their three hundred-year history, from the early 10th Century to late 12th Century, the Fatimides inhabited the Maghreb for a mere sixty years. In 973 A.D. they settled in Egypt making Cairo their capital city. Before returning to the Orient the Fatimide Caliph entrusted his Sanhadja lieutenant, Ziri Ibn Manâd, with the governance of the Maghreb. He would go on to establish the Ziride dynasty.
While marching through ancient Numidia, the Zirides gave their former central Maghrebian realm to their Hammadide cousins. For a century and a half Hammadides ruled over Central Maghreb.
They established two successive capital cities. Built in 1007 A.D., the first capital of Kalaa of Beni Hammad was located at the Tellian heights overlooking the Hodna Steppe on a trading route between the Biskra region and the sea. Founded in 1607 A.D. the second capital of Bejaia (Bougie) became the main trading, political and cultural center of all Maghreb.
Three generations later, the Zirides had rejected Fatimide and Shiite suzerainty. In retaliation the Fatimide Caliph deployed nomadic Arab tribes, then stationed in Upper Egypt, to attack the Maghreb.
The Almohade Empire rose from a Sanhadja mountain tribe, the Masmoudas of the High Moroccan Atlas and from the religious reformer Ibn Toumert. Ibn Toumert became a Mahdi and established his base at Tinmall in 1124 A.D. amid the mountains. Following his death in 1130 A.D. his successor, ‚Abd el-Moumen, became Amir el Mou‘minin, Commander of the Faithful.
It was under his leadership that the Almohades set out to conquer the Maghreb. They first conquered the southwest by taking control of the gold route. Then they advanced northwards to secure Fès. They seized Marrakech, the Almoravide capital in 1146 A.D. Almohades armies kept marching eastwards.
The fall of Bejaia in 1151 A.D. signaled the end of the Hammadide kingdom.
The fall of Mahdia in 1160 A.D. marked the end of the Ziride kingdom and, importantly, it also led to the defeat of the Sicilian Normans who had occupied the city for the prior twelve years. Almohades carried this fight against the advance of the Christians into the Mediterranean and over to Spain (Andalusia), where they did their best to confine the „reconquista.“
The constant state of war maintained by the Almohades against Spain‘s Castilians would have a disastrous effect on the Maghrebian economy since the bulk of its resources were allocated to the war effort. Spanish sovereigns would eventually get the upper hand in this confrontation. Almohades were defeated in 1212 A.D. at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. Furthermore, the Almohade State was also unable to control internal dissension that was producing recurring rebellions.
As the Almohade Empire finally collapsed the Maghreb was once again fragmented, this time along a three-part axis, the Hafside kingdom of Ifriqiya (Tunisia and east Algeria) in the East, the Abdalwadides in central Maghreb with Tlemcen as its capital city, and Merinides in Morocco, in the west.
The Hafside kingdom extended from Algiers to Tripoli, with Bejaia, Constantine, Kairouan, Mahdia, Sfax and Tunis under its rule. Aghlabides could only claim one city, Tlemcen.
These cities were essentially Arabic centers and none of the sovereigns‘ traits could be said to be specifically of Berber heritage.
During their roughly three hundred-year history, from the early 10th Century to late 12th Century, the Fatimides inhabited the Maghreb for a mere sixty years or so.
|
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8952
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dbpedia
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0
| 82
|
https://pulse.internetsociety.org/shutdowns/algeria-begins-shutting-down-the-internet-during-exams
|
en
|
Algeria Begins Shutting Down The Internet During Exams
|
https://pulse.internetsociety.org/favicon.ico
|
https://pulse.internetsociety.org/favicon.ico
|
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“It’s immature what they are doing. I could not get any work done today which will definitely cost me much,” Ahmed, an Algerian freelancer graphic designer, told The New Arab on Sunday.
Many like Ahmed, missed deadlines for their projects or received a scolding frombosses overseas who did not believe that a country can shut down the internet over a high school exam.
“I wrote a long email explaining to my American boss that I could not work today or give an early notice because the internet was nationwide shut in my country. He thought I was not being serious,” Amira, an Algerian web designer, told TNA.
|
||||
8952
|
dbpedia
|
1
| 76
|
https://www.gallus-group.com/en/gallus/news/2024/03/05/algerian-printer-turns-to-gallus-labelmaster-to-advance-growth-and-unlock-new-opportunities-in-label-market
|
en
|
Algerian Printer Turns to Gallus Labelmaster to Advance Growth and Unlock New Opportunities in Label Market
|
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[
""
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[] |
2024-03-05T00:00:00
|
en
|
https://www.gallus-group.com/en/gallus/news/2024/03/05/algerian-printer-turns-to-gallus-labelmaster-to-advance-growth-and-unlock-new-opportunities-in-label-market
|
Gallus Group, a subsidiary of Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG (HEIDELBERG), today announces that specialty print company Eurl Imprimerie La Tulipe has broadened its capabilities with the acquisition of a Gallus Labelmaster 440. Marking the company’s first foray into the world of flexographic printing, the investment represents a step change in terms of business growth and market opportunity, bolstering and diversifying its existing portfolio of HEIDELBERG offset machines. Installed at the company’s headquarters in Sidi Bel Abbès, Algeria, the new Gallus Labelmaster will now enable Imprimerie La Tulipe to print on a wider range of substrates with best-in-class print quality – expanding its customer base and opening up new, profitable business development.
The strategic investment in Gallus’ Labelmaster technology is a key milestone in Imprimerie La Tulipe’s growth plan, and its commitment to delivering market-leading industrial packaging solutions for the pharmaceutical, agri-food and personal hygiene sectors. The wide-ranging capabilities of the Gallus installation has significantly strengthened the company’s offering to the Algerian labels market and equips the business to continue its advancement towards not just addressing shortages in niche packaging solutions across the Algerian market, but in leading these commercial print and packaging spaces country-wide.
Renowned for its unrivalled price-performance ratio, the Gallus Labelmaster series also brings the company superior print speeds of up to 200 meters per minute with unrivalled accuracy – driving productivity for Imprimerie La Tulipe and improving margins. The company’s new press setup includes eight flexographic printing stations, a cold foil unit and rotary die-cutter, as well as the ability to backside print on glue. Importantly, however, based on Gallus’ trademark modular system, the installation also provides the company with the ultimate flexibility to add, switch or remove units as needed into the future, delivering a critical level of responsiveness to adapt to business and market changes – ever important in today’s challenging industrial and economic landscape.
Established as a subsidiary of heritage print provider, Dib Printing, in order to specialize in reaching specific, niche corners of the print market, Imprimerie La Tulipe benefits from its rich, longstanding history in traditional printing technologies, as well as the expertise of its founder, Amine Dib, in hybrid and digital solutions. According to Dib, it was the team’s prior experience with HEIDELBERG, and its confidence in Gallus and HEIDELBERG’s combined expertise, that played a crucial role in the investment decision. “Together with our parent company, we have almost a half-century’s experience working with HEIDELBERG, achieving significant growth and success with its machines over the years,” he explains. “When it came to diversifying our portfolio and venturing into flexo, this made the decision very easy – there was simply no other label manufacturer we’d trust more than Gallus.”
With its unrivalled expertise in the label sector, complemented by HEIDELBERG’s global support network, Gallus provided a seamless installation for Imprimerie La Tulipe. Installed in the summer of 2023, the new Gallus Labelmaster 440 was up and running and at full capacity within a matter of weeks, and now serves as a core part of their day-to-day business processes.
“Being new to flexo technology, it was critical for us to choose a press that both integrated well with our current operations and was relatively quick and easy for our team to learn,” adds Dib. “The expert training and support provided by Gallus – as well as the intuitive HMI touch operation – not only guaranteed us a smooth transition into this new area but meant that we saw almost immediate results.”
Ideally positioned to unlock a smooth and profitable entry into the label segment, the Gallus Labelmaster 440 boasts a range of innovative performance features. It includes high levels of automation and cloud integration, enabling remote access and diagnostics – ultimately, equipping print providers with the tools to be future-ready, today.
“As ever, we’re delighted to be able to share our knowledge, insights and, importantly, our market-leading solutions with print houses such as Imprimerie La Tulipe. They are a great business, and one who shares our commitment to growth, innovation and evolution,” concludes Dario Urbinati, CEO, Gallus Group.
"Whilst we see the presence of digital technologies growing across the current landscape, the flexo market also continues to thrive. Investments such as this one are a key example of that – and a testament to its enduring potential. Here at Gallus, we are passionate about building a smart, connected printing industry in which conventional and digital machines interplay seamlessly. Flexo remains a core technology, delivering countless benefits and opportunities for businesses worldwide, complemented by the flexibility and adaptability of new, digital solutions. We eagerly anticipate supporting Imprimerie La Tulipe on this transformative journey and witnessing the positive impact the Gallus Labelmaster 440 will bring to the business and its customers."
|
|||||||
8952
|
dbpedia
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1
| 60
|
https://www.kjct8.com/2024/08/06/algerian-boxer-imane-khelif-advances-gold-medal-match/
|
en
|
Algerian boxer Imane Khelif advances to gold medal match
|
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[
"Imane Khelif",
"boxer",
"female boxer",
"transgender",
"gender",
"Algeria",
"women's boxing",
"Olympics",
"Paris",
"Paris 2024",
"trans"
] | null |
[
"Associated Press"
] |
2024-08-06T00:00:00
|
Algerian boxer Imane Khelif is advancing to the gold medal match amid a week of scrutiny over her gender.
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//webpubcontent.gray.tv/gray/arc-fusion-assets/images/favicons/kjct/favicon.ico?d=427
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https://www.kjct8.com
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https://www.kjct8.com/2024/08/06/algerian-boxer-imane-khelif-advances-gold-medal-match/
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PARIS (AP) — Boxer Imane Khelif of Algeria advanced to the gold-medal bout in the women’s welterweight division at the Paris Olympics on Tuesday night, moving one win away from what she calls the best response to the worldwide scrutiny she has faced over misconceptions about her gender.
With one more victory, Khelif would win Algeria’s second boxing gold medal and its first in women’s boxing.
Khelif defeated Janjaem Suwannapheng of Thailand 5:0 in the semifinals at Roland Garros, where the crowd roared for her and chanted her name repeatedly during her three-round fight. Khelif has won three consecutive bouts in Paris, and she will win either a gold or a silver medal when she completes the tournament on Friday against Yang Liu of China.
Khelif has thrived inside the ring in Paris amid criticism and stigmatization outside of it. The trouble has stemmed from the Olympic-banished International Boxing Association’s decision to disqualify her and fellow Paris medalist Lin Yu-ting of Chinese Taipei from the world championships last year for allegedly failing an eligibility test.
The controversy has become one of the biggest stories of the Paris Olympics, but it isn’t causing any negative effects on her performances in the ring.
“I don’t care about that,” Khelif said through an interpreter. “I wish to be ready and show a good standard, show my talent, because I want to entertain everyone.”
Khelif had already clinched Algeria’s first medal in women’s boxing before she stepped into the ring to rousing roars at Court Philippe Chatrier. She then controlled her bout with Suwannapheng, who took a standing 8-count late in the third after absorbing a series of punches.
“I had heard about the news regarding her, but I wasn’t following it closely,” Suwannapheng said. “She is a woman, but she is very strong.”
Khelif has won every round on every judge’s card in her two fights that have gone the distance in Paris. She has made the most important tournament run of her international career while under the most pressure she has ever faced.
“I am very happy,” Khelif said. “I’ve worked eight years for these Olympics, and I’m very proud of this moment. I would like to thank the support from people back home.”
The ending of Khelif’s first bout in Paris propelled her into the center of a worldwide divide over gender identity and safety regulations in sports. Her first opponent, Angela Carini of Italy, tearfully quit after just 46 seconds, saying she was in too much pain from Khelif’s punches.
Carini’s abandonment of the fight led to comments from the likes of former U.S. President Donald Trump, “Harry Potter” writer J.K. Rowling and others falsely claiming Khelif was a man or transgender. Carini later apologized for her decision.
In an interview Sunday with SNTV, a sports video partner of The Associated Press, Khelif said the wave of hateful scrutiny she is facing “harms human dignity” and called for an end to bullying athletes.
Khelif also said she felt the “best response” to the uproar around her would be to win a gold medal — and now she’s one win away.
After sharing a hug with Suwannapheng and holding open the ropes for her opponent in a traditional boxing gesture of sportsmanship, Khelif celebrated by running furiously in place while pumping her fists as the crowd roared for her again. The celebration was more joyous than her cathartic finish to her quarterfinal victory over Hungary’s Anna Luca Hamori, when she slammed her palm on the canvas as she teared up.
Khelif received her post-fight medical check and was headed out of the Roland Garros arena when she was mobbed by fans near the exit. They hugged Khelif, demanded selfies and waved Algerian flags while she made her way backstage.
Khelif received cheers that echoed through the famed tennis arena from the moment she entered to face Suwannapheng. Roland Garros welcomed a prominent turnout from Algerian fans voicing their national pride in a boxer whose negative spotlight has been taken quite personally in her country.
Both fighters came out aggressively, trading punches from distance. Khelif was more accurate while winning the first round on all five cards, and she repeated the performance in the second.
The fight got more physical in the third, with Suwannapheng pushing forward to make a comeback. The bout was stopped for a standing 8-count late in the third when Suwannapheng absorbed a few head punches in succession, although Suwannapheng appeared to shrug as if it wasn’t necessary — as is often the case in Olympic boxing, where referees can stop a bout for relatively minor reasons.
“I tried to use my speed, but my opponent was just too strong,” Suwannapheng said.
The 25-year-old Khelif is on the best run of her amateur career at the Olympics. She has performed solidly at the international level and even won some regional tournaments, but Khelif has never been a dominant fighter on the world stage until her two strong performances — and 46 seconds of easy work against a third — to reach the final in Paris.
The IOC and its president, Thomas Bach, have repeatedly defended the Olympic eligibility of Khelif and Lin while condemning the IBA as incompetent and biased.
Khelif and Lin were disqualified by the IBA in the middle of last year’s world championships over what it claimed were failed eligibility tests for the women’s competition. The IBA has been banished from the Olympics since before the Tokyo Games, and the body struggled to articulate the reasoning for its decisions on Khelif and Lin at a news conference Monday.
Lin also has clinched a medal and advanced to the Olympic semifinals. She fights Esra Yildiz Kahraman of Turkey on Wednesday night.
Algeria’s Olympic team has reacted forcefully to the criticism and negative attention around Khelif, and the fan turnout in Roland Garros reflected the seriousness with which the accusations have been received in her home country and in its French diaspora.
Chinese Taipei has reacted with equal condemnation of the IBA’s claims and the worldwide swirl of scrutiny. Sports officials on Tuesday said they are considering legal action against the IBA after sending a letter protesting “the International Boxing Association’s continued publication of false information, obscuring the facts, and attempting to interfere with the normal conduct of the event regardless of the rights and interests of athletes.”
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AP Olympics: https://apnews.com/hub/2024-paris-olympic-games
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https://timep.org/2021/02/09/algeria-the-arab-springs-late-bloomer/
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en
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Algeria: The Arab Spring’s Late Bloomer?
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2021-02-09T00:00:00
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When protests started throughout the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and early 2011, observers seemed to keep wondering: why are Algerians not protesting? But this is not entirely true.
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en
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https://timep.org/wp-content/themes/inkylab/public/images/faivcon.ico
|
The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy -
|
https://timep.org/2021/02/09/algeria-the-arab-springs-late-bloomer/
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When protests started throughout the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and early 2011, observers seemed to keep wondering: why are Algerians not protesting? But this is not entirely true. In 2010, nearly 10,000 localized protests and riots were recorded throughout the country: demonstrators, mostly the youth, were denouncing their poor living conditions due to rampant unemployment, lack of housing, food inflation, and widespread corruption.
Sparked by sudden increases of basic foods prices, in early January 2011 and throughout February a number of protests and strikes emerged throughout the country. Like Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor who ignited the Arab Spring by setting himself on fire, several men did so to protest their dire living conditions. Mohcin Bouterfi, a 37-year-old father died after setting himself on fire in front of his hometown’s town hall to protest the officials’ disregard for his repeated requests, as he was unemployed and seeking housing.
However, the protests were met with strong police presence and excessive violence, with hundreds of protesters arrested. In the capital, the police routinely used a 2001 decree forbidding demonstrations in Algiers—a text that is still in force to date. In February 2011, the state of emergency, which was in force since 1992, was lifted to ease tensions. The president also committed to revising the Constitution as a sign of political liberalization, but did not effectively do so until 2016. More importantly, the authorities announced the release of 20 billion euros to support a number of social and economic measures. For the time being, and thanks to its significant oil rent, the Algerian authorities managed to buy social peace in order to maintain the political status quo. In 2014, the contestation did not reach sufficient levels to impede Abdelaziz Bouteflika from running—and winning—a fourth term.
The birth of the “revolution of smiles”
It was after eight years into the start of the Arab Spring, on February 22, 2019, that the “Hirak” movement, also known as the “revolution of smiles” to echo the peacefulness of the protests, was born. Only a few days after Bouteflika announced his candidacy for a fifth presidential term, mass protests erupted throughout the country. Though he resigned on April 2, the movement continued, demanding the departure of the entire ruling class and a deep reform of the overall system. Unlike pre-2019 contestations, the protests shifted to more political demands, over the social and economic ones previously made.
The end of the Bouteflika regime was not the only victory won by the revolution of smiles. Unimaginably, the street brought a number of high-ranking officials and oligarchs—“El Issaba” or the “the gang”—to their knees; some were even arrested and prosecuted. Feelings of political paralysis seemed to have been swept away. But that was without reckoning with the role of the army, the backbone of the Algerian state and true holder of political power.
A political transition overseen by the army
Early on, the army sought to handle the political transition and take credit for the changes demanded by protesters, with the large political void making it fairly easy for the military to play the role of arbiter. As such, former chief of the National Armed Forces Ahmed Gaid Salah (who passed away few months later in December 2019) quickly forced Bouteflika out of office in April, claiming that the army would “meet the people’s demands” and remain the “anchor of stability.” Salah handled the installing of interim president Abdelkader Bensalah and vowed to organize presidential elections as soon as possible. But these cosmetic changes did nothing to please protesters who expected more than a mere sacrifice of certain political figures to save the regime. In the streets, people kept chanting “yetnahaw ga3,”—“they should all go.”
Initially planned for July 4, the presidential elections were postponed to December 12 due to public pressure. The protesters’ rejection of elections, which were perceived as a means by which the “system” could regenerate itself, was embodied in the turn-out of 40 percent, the lowest recorded in Algeria’s history. Abdelmajid Tebboune, who was seen as the military’s establishment preferred candidate, was elected president in the first round.
2020: a turning point
Despite Tebboune’s pledge to open a dialogue with demonstrators to “strengthen democracy, the rule of the law, and the respect of human rights” 10 months into the “Hirak,” protests continued unabated. On February 22, and after 53 uninterrupted Fridays of demonstrations, thousands took the streets to mark the one-year anniversary of the movement. The demands have remained the same, but the future of the “Hirak” becomes more uncertain: what now?
But a few weeks later, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Algeria: a windfall for the authorities, a curse for the revolution. After the government banned all public gatherings, as in other countries, Friday March 20 was the first on which streets remained empty in more than a year. Though authorities initially stated that they had no intention of exploiting the pandemic for political purposes, they have done nothing but the opposite.
Emboldened by the end of the protests, which they had tolerated for some months, the authorities carried out an unprecedented crackdown against peaceful dissidents, including demonstrators, political activists, and human rights defenders. Though in early January 2020, the authorities released about 70 activists, 80 others, including a number of prominent movement leaders, remained behind bars. Between March and June, over 200 individuals were arrested and prosecuted for “participation in unlawful assembly”, “insulting the president”, “undermining national unity,” and “harming the morale of the army”.
As of today, over 80 prisoners of conscience remain imprisoned according to the National Committee for the Liberation of Detainees (CNLD). Journalists and bloggers were not spared by the repression and the number of judicial proceedings against them has reached disturbing levels, gravely compromising press freedom in the country. On 15 September, prominent journalist Khaled Drareni was sentenced to two years in prison on appeal for “endangering the integrity of the national territory” on the basis of two social media posts.
Legal setbacks
The authorities also used the COVID-19 pandemic to further restrict their legal framework. In April, the government presented amendments to the Penal Code to the parliament, opting for a so-called “restricted” debate due to the pandemic. Only the Minister of Justice took the floor, before swiftly proceeding to a vote. The amendments entered into force a week later, bringing a further blow to freedom of expression and association in the country. Under the new text, anyone receiving foreign funding deemed to undermine “state security” or “national unity,” among others, could be punished with five to seven years in prison, a penalty that can be doubled if the funding is received by an association or organization. The new text also criminalizes the dissemination of “false information” without defining it, thus allowing the authorities to punish those publishing critical content or controversial information with one to three years in prison.
Last but not least, revised Article 144 of the Penal Code increases the penalty for “contempt”— defined as insulting a state official “with the intention of violating their honor, delicacy or the respect due to their authority”to up to three years in prison. In January of this year, Walid Kechida, founder of the “Hirak memes” Facebook page, was sentenced to three years of imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 dinars on the basis of this provision.
The introduction of a new constitution embodies authorities’ most recent attempt to pretend that the page of the former regime has been turned and been replaced with a “new Algeria.”The timing of the constitutional referendum, on November 1, is no coincidence: this date is symbolic, as it marks the anniversary of the start of the war of independence against France in 1954. But this did little to make Algerians enthusiastic about their new Constitution; less than 24 percent of voters participated, according to official figures.
Lacking any sort of legitimacy—as the amendments were initiated by the presidency instead of a constitutional assembly—the constitutional revision is far from ground-breaking. While it seemingly upholds a number of fundamental rights and freedoms, they remain severely restricted by legislation and mean little in the context of the increased crackdown on peaceful dissenting voices. Perhaps the most intriguing is the introduction of a broad provision stating that the “National People’s Army defends the vital and strategic interests of the country,” which is left to arbitrary interpretation. For the first time, the political role of the army is enshrined on paper, which does not bode well with repeated “Hirak” demands to establish a civil—not military—state.
Two years on, what is left of the “Hirak”?
Nearly two years into the start of the “revolution of smiles,” the Algerian people have paid a heavy price for speaking up. The repression, along with the authorities’ mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic and inability to address the economic and social crises, have heightened tensions that could very well bring Algerians back on the streets. But this time, it will likely for political and social and economic demands. With falling oil and gas prices, coupled with high import bills, will the authorities be able to sign a check to buy social peace like they used to? Nothing could be less certain.
But regardless of what the future holds and despite setbacks, the “revolution of smiles” is a milestone in Algerian history. The victories of the biggest protests since the independence from France were gained peacefully. The fear of plunging back into violence is now long gone and can no longer be used by the authorities to deter any form of dissent. At the onset of the “Hirak” movement, 37 percent of Algerians had been born after the civil war that ended two decades before and led to 200,000 deaths. Their memories are instead filled with images of people reappropriating the public space and uniting together, beyond any regional, political or ideological stances.
The pandemic gave the authorities an unexpected truce, and the authorities know that their attempts to feign reform have fooled no one. The “Hirak” will likely have to reinvent itself, but in any case, the power in place remains terrified of the streets and for the first time, fear has changed sides.
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https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Algeria.html
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en
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Algeria
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Information concerning Algeria's efforts to tackle money laundering, terrorism financing and the financing of weapons mass destruction.
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en
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https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Algeria.html
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Benin Follow-Up Report 2023
R.1 - Assessing risk & applying risk-based approach
LC
R.2 - National cooperation and coordination
LC
R.3 - Money laundering offence
LC
R.4 - Confiscation and provisional measures
PC
R.5 - Terrorist financing offence
PC
R.6 - Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing
LC
R.7 - Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation
LC
R.8 - Non-profit organisations
NC
R.9 - Financial institution secrecy laws
C
R.10 - Customer due diligence
PC
R.11 - Record keeping
LC
R.12 - Politically exposed persons
PC
R.13 - Correspondent banking
LC
R.14 - Money or value transfer services
PC
R.15 - New technologies
NC
R.16 - Wire transfers
PC
R.17 - Reliance on third parties
LC
R.18 - Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries
LC
R.19 - Higher-risk countries
NC
R.20 - Reporting of suspicious transactions
PC
R.21 - Tipping-off and confidentiality
C
R.22 - DNFBPs: Customer due diligence
PC
R.23 - DNFBPs: Other measures
PC
R.24 - Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons
NC
R.25 - Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements
NC
R.26 - Regulation and supervision of financial institutions
PC
R.27 - Powers of supervisors
C
R.28 - Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs
NC
R.29 - Financial intelligence units
C
R.30 - Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities
C
R.31 - Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities
C
R.32 - Cash couriers
PC
R.33 - Statistics
LC
R.34 - Guidance and feedback
PC
R.35- Sanctions
LC
R.36 - International instruments
LC
R.37 - Mutual legal assistance
C
R.38 - Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation
LC
R.39 - Extradition
LC
R.40 - Other forms of international cooperation
LC
|
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https://www.brookings.edu/articles/algeria-and-america-a-complicated-past-an-uncertain-future/
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en
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Algeria and America: A complicated past, an uncertain future
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2019-04-25T13:34:45+00:00
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The United States has had a complex relationship with the Algerians in the modern era; it’s unfortunately unlikely the Trump administration will be a helpful factor in Algeria’s quest for political reform.
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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/themes/brookings/assets/images/favicons/favicon.ico
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Brookings
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https://www.brookings.edu/articles/algeria-and-america-a-complicated-past-an-uncertain-future/
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The United States fought one of its first foreign wars against Algiers during James Madison’s administration to discourage Barbary piracy. After the French invaded and colonized the country, Americans largely lost interest in the region. Franklin Delano Roosevelt brought it back to the front burner in 1942 when American troops liberated Algeria from the Vichy French regime aligned with Nazi Germany. Tens of thousands of American GIs passed through Algiers and Oran to fight in Italy, including my father. The defeat of the Vichy helped indirectly to encourage the Arab nationalist movement in Algeria.
After the end of World War II, Washington acquiesced in the return of French colonialism. When France became a charter member of NATO, the alliance accepted Paris’ demands that Algeria be treated as a part of the mother country and not as a colony like Tunisia or Mali. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations accepted the French argument that due to the settlement of almost a million Europeans in Algeria, it was a permanent part of the French State. A violent independence movement revolted against France in the 1950s, and Bouteflika was one of its leaders.
Then Senator John F. Kennedy was the first American political figure to break with France and endorse Algerian independence during its long war for freedom. On July 3, 1957, Kennedy publicly called for the United States to support Algerian independence and oppose the French war to keep it. The speech, his first big foreign policy address, was entitled “Imperialism—The Enemy of Freedom.” The speech was a breakthrough moment for JFK, establishing him as a progressive cold warrior more in touch with what was then called the Third World than Eisenhower. The Algerians still remember Kennedy’s address.
After he became president in 1961, Kennedy worked to support Charles DeGaulle’s moves to give Algeria independence in the face of fierce resistance from the settlers and diehards in the French army. At the height of the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy welcomed the first Algerian prime minister to the White House for an official visit.
During the Cold War, Algeria was in the Soviet camp but maintained a working relationship with Washington. In 1980, Algeria successfully mediated the end of the Iranian hostage crisis. President Carter gave the Algerians much credit for helping bring home the Americans from Tehran.
In 1992, after elections brought an Islamist government to the brink of power, the army took over and instituted a reign of repression. George H.W. Bush’s administration stood quietly with the army, encouraged by the Saudis and other reactionaries in the region. The first Bush administration was very close to the House of Saud especially by 1992 after Desert Storm.
When Bouteflika came to power in 2000, both the Clinton and Bush administrations welcomed the change and Bouteflika’s moves to end the bloody civil war that had followed the army coup. Bill Clinton met him in Rabat at King Hassan’s funeral. George W. Bush welcomed Bouteflika to the White House. After 9/11, Algeria provided excellent intelligence on al-Qaida.
The Obama administration kept its own counsel as Bouteflika’s regime became an increasingly narrow police state run by a coalition of generals and oligarchs, called Le Pouvoir. After Bouteflika’s stroke in 2013, the Obama team did quiet contingency planning for dealing with his departure, but Le Pouvoir preferred an incapacitated figurehead to the potential upheaval of removing him.
The United States has an interest in a stable and nonviolent transformation of Algeria to a more open, transparent, and broad-based government. The continuation indefinitely of police states across the Arab world is a recipe for more terrorism and extremists. As a major Arab country with oil and gas reserves, a democratic Algeria could become a potent symbol for reform and free elections. Which is precisely why the reactionary states are worried.
Unfortunately, the Trump administration is in the pockets of the autocrats and absolute monarchies. The Saudis and Egyptians will encourage the administration to stand with the army and the oligarchs. Already they have persuaded the president to back the General Khalifa Haftar movement in Libya, which borders Algeria. And they are trying to buck up the army in Sudan.
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http://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr/en/revue/1962-end-war-algeria-0
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en
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1962: the end of the war in Algeria
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Why should the Algerian War not be remembered on the anniversary of the Évian ceasefire, on 19 March 1962? This is a question that has divided French veterans’ organisations since 19 March 1963. According to the National Federation of Veterans in Algeria and the Republican Association of Veterans, wars are remembered on the date of the ceasefire agreement that brings them to an end, as in the case of the two World Wars, remembered on 11 November (1918) and 8 May (1945). According to other organisations, however, 19 March should not be commemorated, because it did not put an end to the Algerian War but ushered in its worst period.
What was the content of the Évian Accords, signed on 18 March 1962 by representatives of the French Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), and how were they enforced on the ground by each side?
Putting an end to the war
The Évian Accords were the result of a long process of negotiations, initiated following the referendum of 8 January 1961, which mandated the French Government to prepare the self-determination of Algeria by creating an embryonic Algerian State. Negotiations with the GPRA lasted nearly 15 months. They were delayed by the “generals’ putsch” of 22 April 1961 in Algiers, then opened publicly in Évian on 20 May 1961, and were twice suspended, first by France in June, then by the GPRA in July. After several months of great uncertainty, the negotiation process was secretly resumed in November 1961, leading to preliminary agreements signed on 18 February 1961 in a chalet in Les Rousses, then renegotiated at Évian on 7 to 18 March 1962. During that time, French opponents to negotiations with the FLN (National Liberation Front) founded the OAS (Secret Army Organisation), the only organised force trying to prevent the agreements from being implemented by force.
The Évian Accords were, in the words of one of their French signatories, Robert Buron, “a very strange document”. Indeed, they comprised not only a ceasefire agreement between two armies, but also a procedure for the transition from French to Algerian sovereignty over a period of three to six months, as well as clauses setting out the broad outline of future cooperation between the two countries for the coming years. The Accords thus consisted of a number of documents: a bilateral ceasefire agreement, together with “government declarations concerning Algeria”, which were drawn up by common accord but published separately by the two parties.
Announcement of the ceasefire in Algeria, front page of L’Humanité, 19 March 1962. . © Bianchetti/Leemage/Leemage via AFP
The general declaration summed up the key aspects of the agreements. It set out the structure of government during the transition period (coexistence of a French high commissioner, with ultimate responsibility for maintaining law and order, and a majority-Muslim, provisional Algerian executive) and the guarantees of the referendum on self-determination which would ratify the Accords and create the Algerian State within a period of three to six months. It proclaimed the full sovereignty of the future State, guaranteed the freedom and security of its population (particularly the Algerian French), and set out the principles of cooperation between the two States, the resolution of military issues and the settlement of disputes. The statement of guarantees promised total impunity to all inhabitants for acts committed prior to the ceasefire and views expressed prior to the vote on self-determination, as well as total freedom of movement between the two countries. It granted the Algerian French the right to exercise their Algerian civic rights (with representation proportional to their number) for three years before choosing their permanent nationality, and guaranteed respect for their civil rights, religion, language and property, as well as those of other French nationals with foreign status. A statement of principle established economic and financial cooperation on a contractual basis of reciprocal interests. Other declarations set out the principles of cooperation for the exploration of mineral resources in the Sahara, respecting acquired rights, by means of a Franco-Algerian technical body; cultural cooperation aimed at developing education, vocational training and scientific research, and cultural exchanges; and technical cooperation, involving French officials being sent to Algeria and Algerian trainees sent to France. A declaration on military matters determined the reduction of French forces to 80 000 men one year after self-determination, and their complete evacuation two years later, with the exception of the Mers-el-Kebir and Bou Sfer naval and air bases, which were granted concessions for 15 years, the Saharan rocket and atomic-bomb testing sites for five years, and stop-over rights at some airfields for five years. A final declaration provided for the settlement of disputes by conciliation, arbitration or appeal to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
A chaotic implementation
On 19 March, France implemented the clauses of the Accords relating to the transition from French Algeria to Algerian Algeria, under French sovereignty embodied by High Commissioner Christian Fouchet, but in collaboration with a provisional Franco-Algerian executive appointed by common accord and presided over by former elected representative and FLN member Abderrahmane Farès. To begin with, France had to break by force the opposition of the OAS, which refused to recognise the Évian Accords in the name of the Algerian French and had sought to make them unenforceable by rejecting the ceasefire since the publication of the Les Rousses agreement. In its two strongholds, Algiers and Oran, the OAS increased its terrorist activity against the FLN, against the population of Algerian Muslims living under its authority, and against French security forces, who refused to side with it.
DesEuropean protesters opposed to Algerian independence march along Rue d’Isly, in Algiers, on 26 March 1962;
dozens were killed in the demonstration.
© AFP
The announcement of the ceasefire was set to unleash a decisive show of force, culminating in the brutal combing of the Bab-el-Oued neighbourhood by the French Army on 23 March, and the deaths of nearly 70 people when Algerian French Army marksmen opened fire on the crowd of French protesters on Rue d’Isly on 26 March. This was followed by a failed attempt to establish a counter-insurgency unit in the Ouarsenis region, in late March-early April 1962. The multiple arrests of OAS leaders in Algiers (first Roger Degueldre, then General Salan, nominal head of the whole organisation, on 20 April) did not halt the escalation of violence, which only ended with direct negotiations between Jean-Jacques Susin, Abderrahmane Farés, chairman of the Provisional Executive, and Chawki Mostefai, leader of the FLN delegation in that executive, culminating in a ceasefire on 17 June 1962. Meanwhile, the OAS of Oran, far better organised despite the arrest of its leader, General Jouhaud, on 25 March, continued its armed insurgency against the FLN and the French forces commanded by General Katz until late June 1962.
During this time, the FLN and its National Liberation Army (ALN) enforced the ceasefire in a very limited way. The number of French servicemen killed, wounded or abducted in Algeria after 19 March remained significant, as did the civilian victims of bombings and kidnappings. The ALN units which, according to Article 3 of the ceasefire agreement, were supposed to be “stabilised within the regions in which they currently operate(d)”, quickly moved out to extend their authority over the Algerian population, and the French Army, after attempting to oppose this by force, soon gave up.
Then, a few days after the ratification of the Évian Accords in metropolitan France by the referendum of 8 April 1962, the investiture of the Provisional Executive at Rocher Noir on 13 April and Michel Debré’s replacement by Georges Pompidou as head of the French Government on 14 April, a series of kidnappings of French civilians in Algiers, Oran and the surrounding areas began on 17 April, in what historian Jean Monneret has described as “silent terrorism”. Presented by the head of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers, Si Azzedine, as a necessary response to the anti-Algerian terrorism of the OAS, the vast majority of these kidnappings did not affect armed “killers” with the means to defend themselves: if they were targeted, it was indirectly, by causing terror among the French civilian population sheltering them, leading to a mass exodus.
Residents of the city of Oran watch as British Petroleum storage tanks burn following an attack by the OAS Delta commandos, 25 June 1962. © STF/UPI/AFP
Nearly two months after 19 March, on 14 May the Autonomous Zone of Algiers, commanded by Si Azzedine, overtly broke the Évian ceasefire with a series of terrorist attacks across the city of Algiers, together with the execution of all hostages previously taken. General de Gaulle was at last moved to act. The decisions of 23 May of the Committee for Algerian Affairs, signed by de Gaulle, state as follows: “The High Commissioner shall intervene to ensure that the Provisional Executive succeeds in putting a stop to the kidnappings and murders of Europeans currently taking place in Algiers. It shall fall to Mr Farès, in fact, to see to it that Si Azzedine ceases his activity in this area or is detained.” In reality, Si Azzedine got what he wanted: the installation of Algerian “Temporary Occasional Auxiliaries” (ATOs), chosen by the Autonomous Zone, in the European neighbourhoods of Algiers, and the expulsion of French police and service personnel who were hostile to his cause; the French Government, meanwhile, did not obtain the GPRA’s repudiation of the kidnappings.
Paving the way for independence
Seeing that the ceasefire was no longer being respected, on 15 May General de Gaulle decided to bring forward the date of the referendum on Algerian self-determination – which had been postponed due to the chaotic situation in the country – and thus the end of the transition period, to 1 July 1962, in order to force each party to take up their responsibilities as soon as possible. He obtained a positive result in Algiers, with the ceasefire agreement negotiated between the OAS and FLN, but not in Oran.
Meanwhile, the security of “French Muslims” engaged on the French side was guaranteed in theory by the “general declaration” and the “statement of guarantees”, which stated: “No one may be subjected to police or justice measures, disciplinary sanctions or any form of discrimination as a result of: - views expressed at the time of the events that took place in Algeria prior to the self-determination vote; - acts committed at the time of those same events prior to the date of declaration of the ceasefire.” Yet on 19 March itself, a massacre of harkis took place in Saint-Denis-du-Sig (Oranie). Everywhere, promises of pardon or “redemption” to those who paid their demobilisation benefits to the ALN were followed by abductions, abuses and torture intended by their perpetrators to be exemplary. But a directive from wilaya (military region) V dated 10 April 1962, intercepted by the French Army and divulged by the OAS, fuelled fears that there was worse to come, since it told the Algerian people to await independence for a chance to take their revenge. However, on 12 May Algerian affairs minister Louis Joxe and defence minister Pierre Messmer opposed the transfer to metropolitan France of all former auxiliaries not included in the general repatriation plan drawn up by the authorities, and threatened to send all those who arrived outside that plan back to Algeria. With this, they were violating the general declaration of the Évian Accords, according to which “no Algerian may be forced to leave Algerian territory or prevented from leaving it”, and the statement of guarantees, which affirmed the “freedom of movement between Algeria and France”. Moreover, Joxe had himself assured Parliament that no French person from Algeria would lose their citizenship without renouncing it voluntarily, but that they could only exercise it in France. To turn “French Muslims” away from French soil thus amounted to depriving them of their citizens’ rights, as well as putting their lives in danger.
“Yes” and “No” ballot papers used in the referendum on Algerian independence on 1 July 1962. © AFP PHOTO
Instability and violence
The referendum in Algeria on 1 July 1962 should not have interrupted the process set out in the Évian Accords, since the GPRA had endorsed it, inviting the Algerian people to vote “Yes” to the question, “Do you want Algeria to become an independent State that cooperates with France according to the terms set out in the declarations of 19 March 1962?” But the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA), gathered from 25 May to 7 June, had begun by unanimously voting the “Tripoli programme”, which described them as a “neo-colonialist platform” to be dismantled as quickly as possible: it thus amounted not only to a refusal to ratify the Accords, but to a deception towards the French Government – since the Tripoli programme was kept secret – and the Algerian people, who were being called upon to ratify the Évian Accords, not knowing that they had been rejected.
The sovereignty of the French State in Algeria was transferred on 3 July to the new State embodied by the Provisional Executive, prior to the election and meeting of an Algerian constituent assembly. But its chairman, Abderrahmane Farès, immediately handed over to the GPRA the powers of the Provisional Executive, all of whose members appointed by the GPRA had resigned on 30 June in protest at the total anarchy that reigned in the country. However, president Ben Khedda refused to accept Farès’s resignation, and insisted he carry on his job despite not having the authority to do so. The Force Locale (Local Force), created under the Évian Accords to provide law enforcement for the Provisional Executive, had been placed under the command of a former Algerian officer of the French Army, but on 3 May he said he was no longer in a position to perform his role, because “his numbers were diminishing like snow in the sun, his members deserting to join the ranks of the ALN, taking their weapons and bags with them”. What remained of the Local Force had disappeared by early July 1962.
The FLN, political winner of the Algerian conflict, was divided at the time of independence into two rival coalitions that recognised either what remained of the GPRA or the Political Bureau formed by Ben Bella, an ally of the general staff of Colonel Boumedienne’s ALN. Three months of clashes interspersed with negotiations weakened the former and led to the beginnings of a civil war between wilaya 4 (the Algiers region) and the forces assembled by Colonel Boumedienne, until a ceasefire enabled the election of a national assembly, in which the people were invited to ratify the single list of FLN candidates chosen by Ben Bella, who were elected on 20 September and invested Ben Bella’s government on the 29th.
Joyous demonstrations in Algiers following the proclamation of Algerian independence on 5 July 1962. © Photographe inconnu/ECPAD/Défense
These nearly three months of anarchy favoured the continued kidnapping and murder of French civilians (and some military), especially in Oran, where nearly 700 French people were killed or abducted on 5 July 1962, the day before the arrival of France’s first ambassador to Algeria, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney. Meanwhile, violence was unleashed against the former harkis and partisans of France, in the form of abductions often followed by torture and massacres. Official statistics reported the abduction of more than 3 000 French civilians and nearly 1 700 deaths and disappearances between 19 March and 31 December 1962, but no figures are available for the number of “French Muslim” victims.
Ambassador Jeanneney endeavoured to obtain Ben Bella’s compliance with the Évian Accords, but on 8 September 1962 he found out that the previously undisclosed text of the Tripoli programme was incompatible with the Accords. After countless violations, in December 1962 the French Government imposed the end of budgetary union between the French and Algerian treasuries, which enabled the Algerian State to have France pay off its huge deficit, made worse by the mass exodus of Algerian French. But a few months later, Algeria resumed its whittling away of the Évian Accords, culminating in the nationalisation of Saharan oil and gas in 1971.
“A fragile legal construction”
Ultimately, the Évian Accords had been no more than a fragile legal construction, whereby the French Government had wanted not only to end the war with the FLN, but also to determine the future of Franco-Algerian relations, yet without acknowledging its partner as legal representative of an Algerian State yet to be created. Although the three French ministers who took part in the Évian negotiations had agreed to sign the text of the Accords and initial the 93 pages together with the head of the GPRA delegation, Belkacem Krim, the French Government did not publish it as it was, but under the title “government declarations concerning Algeria”, with a different layout and different signatures. And it protested against the de jure recognition of the GPRA by the Soviet Government on 19 March. Thus, by not recognising its negotiating partner, the French Government had itself weakened the text of the Accords. Meanwhile, the GPRA had taken a more logical stance, proposing as early as 24 October 1961 that the French Government should recognise the GPRA without delay, before negotiating the remaining matters between States, and, after 18 March 1962, publishing the main tests of the Accords as the result of negotiations between two governments.
It is therefore understandable why, for more than three decades, successive French Governments have refused to commemorate 19 March 1962. Far from putting an end to the confrontations, the very limited enforcement of the ceasefire that accompanied the Accords nevertheless enacted the end of a cycle, paving the way for an independent Algeria.
Repatriates from Algeria on board the liner Ville-d’Alger, 20 June 1962. © Jean-Jacques Jordi
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8952
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dbpedia
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https://www.datacal.com/p-781-algerian-arabic-keyboard-labels.aspx
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Algerian (Arabic) Language Keyboard Labels
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The DataCal Algerian (Arabic) language keyboard labels are a high-quality, durable and economical solution to creating a Algerian (Arabic) bilingual keyboard.
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Available in blue and green letters on clear labels for light colored keyboards and white letters on clear labels for dark colored keyboards
Supports Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, U.A.E., and Yemen layouts
Includes two sets of number labels so you can elect to use Latin style numbers or Arabic language style numbers
Constructed with a hassle-free peel and stick application that can be removed if needed without fear of damaging the existing lettering
Designed to fit all standard desktop and laptop keyboards
Works for all versions Windows
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https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/barbary-wars
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Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations
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Barbary Wars, and
The Barbary States were a collection of North African states, many of which practiced state-supported piracy in order to exact tribute from weaker Atlantic powers. Morocco was an independent kingdom, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli owed a loose allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. The United States fought two separate wars with Tripoli (1801–1805) and Algiers (1815–1816), although at other times it preferred to pay tribute to obtain the release of captives held in the Barbary States.
The Barbary Wars
The practice of state-supported piracy and ransoming of captives was not wholly unusual for its time. Many European states commissioned privateers to attack each others’ shipping and also participated in the transatlantic slave trade. The two major European powers, Great Britain and France, found it expedient to encourage the Barbary States’ policy and pay tribute to them, as it allowed their merchant shipping an increased share of the Mediterranean trade, and Barbary leaders chose not to challenge the superior British or French navies.
Prior to independence, American colonists had enjoyed the protection of the British Navy. However, once the United States declared independence, British diplomats were quick to inform the Barbary States that U.S. ships were open to attack. In 1785, Dey Muhammad of Algiers declared war on the United States and captured several American ships. The financially troubled Confederation Government of the United States was unable to raise a navy or the tribute that would protect U.S. ships.
In contrast to the dispute with Algiers, U.S. negotiations with Morocco went well. Moroccan Sultan Sidi Muhammad had seized a U.S. merchant ship in 1784 after the United States had ignored diplomatic overtures. However, Muhammad ultimately followed a policy of peaceful trade, and the United States successfully concluded a treaty with Morocco in 1786. However, Congress was still unable to raise enough funds to satisfy the Dey of Algiers.
In an attempt to address the challenge posed by the Dey of Algiers, Thomas Jefferson, then U.S. Minister to France, attempted to build a coalition of weaker naval powers to defeat Algiers, but was unsuccessful. However, the Kingdom of Portugal was also at war with Algiers, and blocked Algerian ships from sailing past the Straits of Gibraltar. As a result, U.S. merchant ships in the Atlantic Ocean remained safe for a time and temporarily relieved the U.S. Government from the challenges posed by the Barbary States.
In 1793 a brief Portuguese-Algerian truce exposed American merchant ships to capture, forcing the United States, which had thus far only managed to conclude a treaty with Morocco, to engage in negotiations with the other Barbary States. In 1795, The U.S. Government dispatched diplomats Joel Barlow, Joseph Donaldson, and Richard O’Brien to North Africa and successfully concluded treaties with the states of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Under the terms of these treaties, the United States agreed to pay tribute to these states. The treaty with Algiers freed 83 American sailors.
The adoption of the Constitution in 1789 gave the U.S. Government the power to levy taxes and to raise and maintain armed forces, powers which had been lacking under the Articles of Confederation. In 1794, in response to Algerian seizures of American ships, Congress authorized construction of the first 6 ships of the U.S. Navy. In 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Qaramanli, citing late payments of tribute, demanded additional tribute and declared war on the United States. The United States successfully defeated Qaramanli’s forces with a combined naval and land assault by the United States Marine Corps. The U.S. treaty with Tripoli concluded in 1805 included a ransom for American prisoners in Tripoli, but no provisions for tribute.
In 1812, the new Dey of Algiers, Hajji Ali, rejected the American tribute negotiated in the 1795 treaty as insufficient and declared war on the United States. Algerian corsairs captured an American ship several weeks later. In accordance with an agreement between the Dey and British diplomats, the Algerian declaration was timed to coincide with the start of the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. The war with Britain prevented the U.S. Government from either confronting Algerian forces or ransoming U.S. captives in Algiers. Once the Treaty of Ghent ended war with Britain, President James Madison requested that Congress declare war on Algiers, with Congress authorizing the use of force on March 3, 1815. The U.S. Navy, greatly increased in size after the War of 1812, was able send an entire squadron, led by Commodore Stephen Decatur, to the Mediterranean.
When the U.S. naval expedition arrived in Algiers, a new ruler, Dey Omar, was in power. Omar wished to restore order after several years of political instability and was acutely aware that he could no longer count on British support against the Americans. Decatur had already defeated two Algerian warships and captured hundreds of prisoners of war, and was in a favorable position for negotiation. Dey Omar reluctantly accepted the treaty proposed by Decatur that called for an exchange of U.S. and Algerian prisoners and an end to the practices of tribute and ransom. Having defeated the most powerful of the Barbary States, Decatur sailed to Tunis and Tripoli and obtained similar treaties. In Tripoli, Decatur also secured from Pasha Qaramanli the release of all European captives. The U.S. Senate ratified Decatur’s Algerian treaty on December 5, 1815. Dey Omar repudiated the treaty, but another U.S. squadron arrived after a combined Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers, and U.S. commissioner William Shaler dictated terms of a new treaty which contained essentially the same provisions as the old one. Shaler concluded his negotiations on December 23, 1815, but the Senate, owing to an accidental oversight, did not ratify the treaty until February 11, 1822.
The Barbary States, although they did not capture any more U.S. ships, began to resume raids in the Mediterranean, and despite punitive British bombardments did not end their practices until the French conquest of Algeria in 1830.
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https://www.euromesco.net/publication/algeria-and-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-reactions-and-policies/
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Palestinian Conflict: Reactions and Policies : EuroMeSCo – Euro
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Since 7 October, the Middle East is the scene of a major military escalation between Hamas and Israel in the strip of Gaza. Thousands of innocent civilians were victims of the ongoing conflict while the entire region is facing the risk of an expanded war. To make matters worse, international organisations are warning of a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza as policy makers engage in shuttle diplomacy to revive the political process and prevent further deterioration of the situation. Algeria, like other states in the region, is following these events and standing by its historical pro-Palestinian position. As this war evolves over the next few weeks and months, its outcomes will shape Algiers’ foreign policy and rhetoric in addition to public sentiments regarding consequential geopolitical shifts and the security order in the region.
Introduction
On 7 October, Hamas launched a large-scale military operation against Israel. These attacks resulted in massive civilian casualties and triggered a wave of international condemnation especially from Western countries. On the other hand, countries in the European Union’s southern neighbourhood observed unfolding events with different perspectives. In Algeria, the ongoing war served as an opportunity for authorities to reiterate their position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and their support for the establishment of a Palestinian state in accordance with previous international resolutions and roadmaps including the Arab Peace Initiative. Moreover, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza received an important media coverage as Algerians took to the streets on 20 October to express their solidarity with the Palestinians and hold the international community and Arab states responsible. For Algiers, the latest episode of this conflict will constitute a strong motivation to embrace a harder anti-normalisation stand and step up diplomatic and logistical support for the Palestinian Authority. Popular distrust is also likely to increase regarding the reality of the rules-based order and the role of international organisations.
Official posture and diplomatic manoeuvres
Algeria’s relationship with Palestine is both historical and emotional. On 15 November 1988, leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat met in Algiers to announce the declaration of independence. Since then, Algerian authorities maintained a firm and solid political, financial, and diplomatic support for the PLO and advocated for an end to the Israeli occupation. In that sense, the Palestinian cause was always considered as a sacred dossier and the successive Algerian administrations rejected any concessions despite international pressure. In fact, current President Abdelmadjid Tebboune said in 2021 that Palestine is the “mother of all causes” and refused to join or endorse the Abraham Accords that, according to him and the majority of Algeria’s political class, fail to address the root causes of the conflict.
As news emerged about Hamas’ attacks, President Tebboune was swift to have a call with his Palestinian counterpart Mahmoud Abbas. As expected, other political leaders including at the Algerian parliament and across the political spectrum stood behind Algiers’ official position in condemning the Israeli occupation. Algeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement to condemn Israeli practices in Gaza and call upon the international community to “assume its responsibility”. This posture was further solidified in the wake of the attack on a Palestinian hospital which reportedly killed over 500 innocent civilians. Algerian authorities also sent urgent and significant humanitarian aid to Gaza through Egypt and refused to attend the Cairo Summit for Peace given the possible presence of an Israeli delegation. Algiers’ solidarity with Palestine extended to symbolic gestures including the suspension of the local football league and consulates’ celebrations of Algeria’s 69th anniversary of its liberation war.
Beyond momentary policies and acts of solidarity, it is safe to say that Algerian authorities will continue working on the Palestinian dossier. In October 2022 and prior to the Arab League summit, Algiers hosted reconciliation talks for Palestinian factions to end the ongoing divisions. While these efforts are unlikely to yield solid and durable Palestinian unity in the short-term, they showcase Algeria’s attachment to the cause. Furthermore, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf had multiple calls with his European counterparts to highlight Gaza’s urgent humanitarian needs and make the case for a renewed peace process in the Middle East. This diplomatic manoeuvring could be seen as a preview of Algiers’ foreign policy priorities ahead of its mandate at the United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC) which will begin in January. The Algerian diplomatic corps is expected to increase its lobbying for a full Palestinian membership at the United Nations (UN) which was declared as a major objective by President Tebboune.
Popular frustration and shifting geopolitics
Reactions to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza were also shared by the Algerian population. Following a general call coordinated by major political parties and civil society organisations, thousands of citizens marched across several cities and regions to condemn Israeli attacks and the perceived silence of the international community. Remarkably, these protests were the first since the COVID-19 pandemic and 2020 amendment of the constitution which put all demonstrations under strict state control. However, the Palestinian cause is one of the very few policy issues that enjoy consensus amongst all actors both within the Algerian political system and society. Also, protesters’ frustration was mainly directed at Western powers including the United States and European countries in line with a general sentiment across the region about what is seen as Western double standards.
The unfolding events in Gaza come amidst a renewed talk on normalisation processes between Israel and Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia. Average Algerians stand behind the government’s official rejection of the Abaraham Accords and protesters illustrated this attitude by calling upon Arab capitals that have relations with Tel Aviv to expel Israeli Ambassadors. While the impact on the normalisation agenda is still unclear in the short term, Algerians are likely to keep note of both Arab and Western reactions and develop a more radical perception about these peace agreements. Meanwhile, local Algerian media coverage has also focused on these reactions and built on popular anger to question the impartiality of Western media outlets. There is a feeling in Algeria and the broader region that Western media tend to disregard Palestinian suffering given the fast-paced nature of this conflict.
Ultimately, popular reactions and media criticism will not move beyond these gestures not to cross authorities’ red lines. However, the current momentum offers a strong communication asset for the Algerian political system and especially the current administration. As Algeria is entering pre-elections mode in preparation for the 2024 presidential race, Palestine is likely to be an important campaign topic particularly for the current leadership. The Tebboune administration will capitalise on its anti-normalisation, pro-liberation rhetoric and policies to gain popular approval and generate support for the government’s public discourse. Understanding the centrality and importance of the Palestinian cause across the social and political spectrums, Algerian authorities will benefit from the population’s endorsement for their foreign policy and unconditional support of Palestinian factions.
While talks on the Abraham Accords will probably pick up after the end of the ongoing war, the price for normalisation will increase, and the Palestinian cause will remain a critical component of any upcoming deal. For countries that uphold a firm anti-normalisation stance such as Algeria, authorities will be more sceptical about the prospects of a genuine and just peace process even if there is little they can do to stop the latter. Hence, Algiers will alternatively consider that there are more pressing reasons to continue its support for the Palestinians all while leading an anti-occupation campaign at international organisations, especially the UN. Authorities will also seek to push forward multilateral actions and engage regional stakeholders including states and organisations like the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. In fact, Foreign Minister Attaf’s recent mission in New York aimed at coordinating joint plans with these organisations and find an urgent solution that would serve the humanitarian needs of the people of Gaza.
Conclusion
This war was marked by the significant wave of official and popular support for Palestine and a growing impression about Western double standards in applying human rights. As highlighted by Arab speeches including that of Jordanian King Abdullah II, Arab nations are calling upon their Western partners to avoid applying international accountability and humanitarian law in a selective manner. Such positions gain more significance amid a heated geostrategic competition between Western and Eastern camps and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Capitals like Algiers were already struggling to balance their calls to respect the UN charter and values with their longstanding relations with Moscow as they fell under Western pressures to condemn Russia’s actions. In that sense, the European reactions to the humanitarian situation in Gaza and Israeli retaliation to Hamas’ attacks will be evaluated carefully by Arab countries including Algeria. Failure to defend similar principled positions will jeopardize Europe’s reputation and make it nearly impossible for the Middle East and North Africa to understand Western concerns and demands about the Ukraine war. Furthermore, the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel may provoke a deep gap between Western and Arab priorities and policies.
Finally, it is safe to say that the results of the ongoing conflict will determine some aspects of the future of Algeria-Europe rapprochement. Recent months have witnessed increasing coordination between Algiers and European capitals on regional challenges and security issues. It is important to underscore the centrality of the Palestinian cause for Algeria’s foreign policy agenda and vision of long-term peace and stability in the region. Even if a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still far and will be a complex task, Europe’s engagement will give clear signs about its impartiality and reliability as a solid foreign policy partner for Algeria. At the end, the Palestinian cause is here to stay as an undisputed and central concern for official and popular Algeria which will impact future policies, narratives, and strategic choices. Europe may have the possibility to consolidate its ties with Algiers in preparation for more coordination on security challenges at the UNSC, but that will require a humanitarian approach that listens to the region and its historical grievances.
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856
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Algeria profile - Timeline
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2011-07-12T07:33:31+00:00
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A chronology of key events
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BBC News
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856
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A chronology of key events:
1830 - France seizes Algiers, ending Algeria's three centuries as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire.
1939-1945 - The collapse of France and the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa during Second World War encourages hopes for independence.
1945 - Pro-independence demonstrations in Setif. Thousands are killed in suppression of ensuing unrest.
1954-1962 - Algerian War of Independence.
1962 - Algeria gains independence from France.
1963 - Ahmed Ben Bella elected as first president.
1965 - Col Houari Boumedienne overthrows Ben Bella, pledges to end corruption.
1976 - Col Boumedienne introduces a new constitution which confirms commitment to socialism and role of the National Liberation Front as the sole political party. Islam is recognised as state religion.
1976 December - Col Boumedienne is elected president and is instrumental in launching a programme of rapid industrialisation.
1978 - President Boumedienne dies and is replaced by Col Chadli Bendjedid, as the compromise candidate of the military establishment.
1986 - Rising inflation and unemployment, exacerbated by the collapse of oil and gas prices, lead to a wave of strikes and violent demonstrations.
1992 January-February - Army forces President Chadli to dissolve parliament and resign, replacing him with a Higher State Council chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf.
Government declares state of emergency and disbands the FIS and all its local and regional council administrations, triggering ten years of bloody conflict with Islamist groups.
1992 June - Head of State Boudiaf is assassinated by a member of his bodyguard with Islamist links. Violence increases and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerges as the main group behind these operations.
1994 - Liamine Zeroual, a retired army colonel, is appointed chairman of the Higher State Council.
1995 - Col Zeroual wins presidential election with a comfortable majority.
1996 - Proposed constitutional changes approved in a referendum by over 85 per cent of voters.
1997 - Parliamentary elections won by the newly-created Democratic National Rally, followed by the Movement of Society for Peace moderate Islamic party.
1999 - Former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika elected president after all opposition candidates withdraw over concerns and fairness and transparency of poll.
1999 - Referendum approves President Bouteflika's law on civil concord, the result of long and largely secret negotiations with the armed wing of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Thousands of members of the AIS and other armed groups are pardoned.
2000 - Attacks on civilians and security forces continue, and are thought to be the work of small groups still opposed to the civil concord. Violence is estimated to have claimed over 100,000 lives in Algeria since 1992.
2002 June - Prime Minister Ali Benflis's National Liberation Front (FLN) wins general elections marred by violence and a low turnout. They are boycotted as a sham by four parties - two of which represent Berbers.
2003 21 May - More than 2,000 people are killed and thousands are injured by a powerful earthquake in the north. The worst-hit areas are east of Algiers.
2003 June - Leader of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Abassi Madani and his deputy Ali Belhadj are freed after serving 12-year sentences.
2004 April - President Bouteflika is re-elected to a second term in a landslide poll victory.
2005 January - Authorities announce the arrest of rebel Armed Islamic Group (GIA) head Nourredine Boudiafi and the killing of his deputy, and declare the group to be virtually dismantled.
Government makes deal with Berber leaders, promising more investment in Kabylie region and greater recognition for Tamazight language.
2005 March - Government-commissioned report says security forces were responsible for the disappearances of more than 6,000 citizens during the 1990s civil conflict.
2005 September - Voters back government plans to amnesty many of those involved in post-1992 killings in a reconciliation referendum.
2006 May - Algeria is to pay back all of its $8bn debt to the Paris Club group of rich creditor nations, in a move seen as reflecting its economic recovery.
2006 December - Roadside bomb hits a bus carrying staff of a US oil firm, killing one man. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) claims responsibility.
2007 January - GSPC renames itself the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb and steps up attacks through over the next two years.
2007 April - Thirty-three people are killed in two bomb blasts in Algiers - one the prime minister's office. Al-Qaeda claims responsibility.
2007 May - Parliamentary elections: dozens are killed in the run-up, in a wave of fighting between the military and armed groups. Pro-government parties retain their absolute majority in parliament.
2007 September - Al-Qaeda's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri urges north Africa's Muslims to ''cleanse'' their land of Spaniards and French.
2008 November - Parliament approves constitutional changes allowing President Bouteflika to run for a third term.
2009 April - President Bouteflika wins third term at the polls.
2009 July - Nigeria, Niger and Algeria sign an agreement to build a $13bn pipeline to take Nigerian gas across the Sahara to the Mediterranean.
2010 April - Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger set up joint command to tackle threat of terrorism.
Protests
2011 January - Major protests over food prices and unemployment, with two people being killed in clashes with security forces. The government orders cuts to the price of basic foodstuffs.
2011 February - President Abdelaziz Bouteflika lifts 19-year-old state of emergency - a key demand of anti-government protesters.
2011 September - President Bouteflika ends state monopoly over radio and TV.
2014 April - Bouteflika wins another term as president in elections condemned by the opposition as flawed.
2014 September - Islamists behead French tourist Herve Gourdel after demanding that France end its support for the campaign against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
2015 June - US airstrike reported to kill Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the al-Murabitoun armed Islamist group, in eastern Libya, although his supporters deny this.
2015 September - President Bouteflika sacks Mohamed Mediene, head of the top intelligence body for 25 years; he was regarded as a major power behind the scenes.
2016 - February - Parliament passes constitutional reforms limiting presidents to two terms, expanding the legislature's power and giving the Berber language official status.
2018 January - New Year celebrated by the Berber people is marked for the first time as a national public holiday.
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