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| © **2012 International Monetary Fund** July, 2012 |
| Country Report No. 12/199 |
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| **Moldova: Taking Compliance Management Further** |
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| This paper was prepared based on the information available at the time it was completed on April |
| 2012. The views expressed in this document are those of the staff team and do not necessarily reflect |
| the views of the government of Moldova or the Executive Board of the IMF. |
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| The policy of publication of staff reports and other documents by the IMF allows for the deletion of |
| market-sensitive information. |
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| Copies of this report are available to the public from |
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| International Monetary Fund - Publication Services |
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| 700 19th Street, N.W. - Washington, D.C. 20431 |
| Telephone: (202) 623-7430 - Telefax: (202) 623-7201 |
| E-mail: publications@imf.org - Internet: http://www.imf.org |
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| ### **International Monetary Fund** **Washington, D.C.** |
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| # **INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND** |
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| ## Fiscal Affairs Department |
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| # **MOLDOVA** |
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| ## **TAKING COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT FURTHER** |
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| ### **Allan Jensen, Norman Gillanders, Enriko Aav, Frank Bosch, and John Buchanan** **April 2012** |
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| **Contents** **Page** |
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| Acronyms .................................................................................................................................... 4 |
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| Preface ......................................................................................................................................... 5 |
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| Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 6 |
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| I. Enhancing The Strategic Approach to Compliance Management ........................................... 9 |
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| A. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 9 |
| B. Developing Strategies to Reduce the Tax Gap .................................................... 10 |
| C. Assessing the Results .......................................................................................... 11 |
| D. Preliminary Lessons ............................................................................................ 11 |
| E. Other Considerations ........................................................................................... 14 |
| F. Training is Key to Future Success ....................................................................... 19 |
| G. Recommendations ............................................................................................... 19 |
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| II. Strengthening Personal Income Tax Compliance ................................................................ 20 |
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| A. Addressing Unreported Cash Wage Payments .................................................... 20 |
| B. Building a High-Wealth-Individual Compliance Program .................................. 23 |
| C. Introducing Indirect Audit Methods as a Personal Income Tax Compliance |
| Tool ...................................................................................................................... 27 |
| D. Technical Assistance ........................................................................................... 29 |
| E. Recommendations ................................................................................................ 29 |
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| III. Improving Operational Tools to Implement the Compliance Strategy ............................... 30 |
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| A. Taxpayer Services ............................................................................................... 30 |
| B. Audit .................................................................................................................... 34 |
| C. Establishing Capacity to Investigate Tax Fraud .................................................. 37 |
| D. Arrears Collection ............................................................................................... 39 |
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| IV. Other Tax Administration Issues ........................................................................................ 42 |
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| A. Value Added Tax Refunds .................................................................................. 42 |
| B. Streamlining Headquarters and Field Offices Organization Structures .............. 47 |
| C. Modernizing Information Technology Systems .................................................. 51 |
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| Tables |
| 1. Tax Revenue by Nominal Value and Percent of GDP, 2007–11 ............................................ 9 |
| 2. Results of the 2011 Sectoral Compliance Program .............................................................. 11 |
| 3. Collection of Personal Income Tax and Social Contributions .............................................. 21 |
| 4. Employee Count and Wage Reported Data .......................................................................... 21 |
| 5. Audit Results (Not including Large Taxpayers) ................................................................... 35 |
| 6.Tax Fraud Cases, 2009–11 ..................................................................................................... 38 |
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| 7. Tax Arrears by Type of Tax 2009–11 ................................................................................... 40 |
| 8. Value of Value-Added Tax Refunds by Country/Region ..................................................... 44 |
| 9. Value-Added Tax Refunds Audit Results, 2010–11 ............................................................ 46 |
| 10. Tax Revenue by Value and as a Percent of GDP, 2007–11. ............................................... 54 |
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| Figures |
| 1. Accumulated Value-Added Tax Credits to be Carried Forward; 2007–11 .......................... 43 |
| 2. Proposed Structure of Headquarters Organization ............................................................... 50 |
| 3. Stock of Value-Added Tax Credit, As Reported on Line 21 of the Value-Added |
| Tax Return ............................................................................................................................ 56 |
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| Boxes |
| 1. Key Measures of the State Tax Inspectorate 2012 Compliance Plan ................................... 14 |
| 2. International Trends in Taxpayer Services ........................................................................... 31 |
| 3. Elements of a Progressive Training Strategy for Audit Staff ............................................... 36 |
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| Appendixes |
| 1. Preliminary Review of Tax Revenue Performance .............................................................. 54 |
| 2. Nontax Administration Tasks Handled by the State Tax Inspectorate ................................. 58 |
| 3. Personal Income Tax Reporting for 2010 ............................................................................. 59 |
| 4. Illustration of a Potential High-Wealth Individuals Project Plan (Phase 1) ......................... 60 |
| 5. Illustration of a Potential Indirect Audit Training Schedule ................................................. 62 |
| 6. Roles and Responsibilities of a Business Owner for Information Technology Systems ...... 63 |
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| **ACRONYMS** |
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| CCECC Center for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption |
| CIT Corporate Income Tax |
| COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf Computerization Solution |
| FAD Fiscal Affairs Department |
| HWI High-Wealth Individuals |
| IAM Indirect Audit Methods |
| IT Information Technology |
| LTO Large Taxpayer Office |
| MDL Moldovan Lei |
| MoF Ministry of Finance |
| MOL Ministry of Labor |
| OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PIT Personal Income Tax |
| PO Prosecutor’s Office |
| STI State Tax Inspectorate |
| TA Technical Assistance |
| VAT Value Added Tax |
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| **PREFACE** |
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| This report concerns the delivery of a tax administration mission to Moldova during |
| February 8 – 21, 2012 by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the IMF as a component of |
| implementing FAD’s technical assistance strategy for Southeast Europe. |
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| The mission was led by Mr. Allan Jensen (Chief) and comprised Mr. Norman Gillanders |
| (FAD Regional Tax Administration Advisor); Mr. Enriko Aav (FAD); Mr. Frank Bosch and |
| Mr. John Buchanan (both external experts). Invaluable input to the mission and the report |
| was provided by Mr. Erik Hutton (FAD) on revenue performance analysis and Mr. Paul |
| Martens (external expert) on large taxpayer management. Both happened to be on FAD |
| assignments in Chisinau at the time of the mission. |
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| The mission met with Mr. Veaceslav Negruta, Minister of Finance; Mr. Victor Barbaneagra, |
| Deputy Minister of Finance; Mr. Nicolae Platon, Chief of the Main State Tax Inspectorate |
| (STI); Mr. Gheorghe Cojocari, Mr. Adrian Timotin, Mr. Iuri Lichii, all Deputy Chiefs of the |
| STI; Mr. Procopie Duca, Chief of the STI’s Strategic Management and Innovation |
| Directorate; Mr. Igor Ţurcanu, Chief of the STI’s Large Taxpayer Office; Ms. Maia |
| Tverdohleb, Chief of the STI’s Innovation and Administration Methods Section, as well as |
| many other managers and staff of the STI. |
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| The mission also met with Mr. Vladimir Grosu, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Justice; |
| Mr. Peter Menhard, Advisor to the Head of the State Tax Inspectorate in Moldova, from the |
| EU’s High-Level Policy Advisory Team to the Government in Moldova; and Mr. Vitalie |
| Coceban, Director General, FiscServInform, a state enterprise that provides IT services to the |
| STI. |
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| To facilitate technical assistance coordination and encourage additional donor input to tax |
| administration reform, the mission also met with Mr. Abdoulaye Seck, Country Manager, |
| and Ms. Lillian Razzlog, Public Sector and Institutional Reform Specialist, both from the |
| World Bank; Mr. Wolfgang Behrendt, Head of Political and Economic Section, and Mr. Oleg |
| Hirbu, Project Manager, both from the Delegation of the European Union to Moldova. |
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| The mission expresses its gratitude for the first-rate cooperation it received from all with |
| whom it met at the Ministry of Finance and the STI. The mission is also very thankful for the |
| support provided by Mr. Tokhir Mirzoev, IMF Resident Representative, and his staff before |
| and during the mission. Finally, the mission appreciated the invaluable help provided by |
| Ms. Lidia Dogaru, Mr. Serge Bufteac, Ms. Iulia Timotin, and Ms. Christina Umanet, the |
| mission interpreters. |
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| **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** |
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| **Main conclusions** |
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| _Supported by the Finance Minister, the STI continues to strengthen tax administration in line_ |
| _with IMF advice. Most importantly, to reduce tax evasion―and building on the Strategic_ |
| _Plan for 2011–15—the agency has come far with implementing a Compliance Risk Model_ |
| _(CRM), which is aligned with good international practices. A pilot testing of the model_ |
| _in 2011 showed encouraging results in terms of extra revenue. This has motivated the STI to_ |
| _roll out the model in full from January 1, 2012. However, effective implementation and long_ |
| _lasting compliance impact require considerable further improvements with regard to_ |
| _taxpayer services, audit, tax fraud investigations, information technology systems (IT), and_ |
| _the value-added tax (VAT) refund system. Of major concern is the current lack of_ |
| _prosecutions to deter tax fraud. In the medium term, this could seriously undermine the CRM_ |
| _efforts and the potentially large revenue gains from implementing the model. Continued_ |
| _technical assistance (TA) from the IMF and other TA providers during the next three–four_ |
| _years is essential to improve the areas mentioned._ |
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| **Current situation and issues** |
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| **The STI have come far in implementing a modern CRM.** The pilot testing in 2011 of the |
| CRM (which is based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and |
| Development(OECD)/EU compliance concept) was successful in increasing taxpayer |
| compliance within the segments targeted by the pilot (e.g., about 20 percent revenue |
| increase). The compliance plan for 2012 involves a full roll out of its use. The model uses a |
| mixture of compliance approaches applied cohesively to an identified tax risk affecting a set |
| of taxpayers. For example, in 2011, the STI contacted the riskier taxpayers in selected |
| economic sectors with the aim to persuade them to improve their tax compliance voluntarily. |
| Meetings were held with taxpayers and only later did the STI start to audit noncomplying |
| businesses. As predicted, the vast bulk of tax recovered did not come from audit but from |
| prompted voluntary compliance. The success of the 2011 pilot test suggests that the model |
| has the potential to change taxpayer behavior, if implemented well. The compliance plan |
| for 2012 further includes the compliance measures communicated in the Government’s letter |
| of intent concerning the Fund program, including to increase compliance within the segment |
| of high-wealth individuals (HWIs); pursue the use of indirect audit methods; and improve the |
| collection of payroll taxes. |
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| **Successful implementation and long-lasting impact of the CRM require that a number** |
| **of tax administration components be further strengthened.** Addressing the remaining |
| shortcomings in a range of key tax administration areas puts a significant focus on training |
| and also requires considerable TA in excess of what can be provided by the Fund; in |
| particular this is the case with the much needed IT reform. The main areas for attention are: |
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| - _**Taxpayer services must be strengthened and used to promote compliance.**_ The STI has |
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| put in place the standard approaches necessary to handle taxpayers’ queries. It has also |
| begun to use publicity and marketing techniques to make taxpayers more conscious of |
| their compliance obligations and of the dangers of being detected if they evade tax. |
| However, much more can be done and a dedicated taxpayer services unit must be |
| established at the STI headquarters to take on this agenda. |
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| - _**A simple but effective first step is for the STI to work more closely with tax**_ |
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| _**professionals and business groups to promote compliance.**_ This would foster a better |
| understanding of mutual problems and attempt to find ways of simplifying tax |
| administration. The report proposes establishing a compliance cooperation council to |
| allow constructive collaboration on critical compliance and administrative issues. |
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| - _**Improved compliance will also require enhanced audit skills.**_ Auditors must learn how |
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| to identify unreported income (including hidden wages), how to recognize evidence of |
| serious tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance, and how to combat these abuses. |
| Filling these knowledge gaps will require a higher level of technical training over a |
| sustained period. |
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| - _**The authorities must learn how to bring a small but well-selected group of tax evaders**_ |
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| _**before the courts each year.**_ This will require a radical re-evaluation of the anti-fraud |
| arrangements involving the STI and other agencies. A significant amount of time is spent |
| on processing dossiers across a number of organizational boundaries; but without any |
| single court conviction within the last three years. Clearer procedures and role definitions |
| must be brought to this area, as the system now used is broken. |
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| - _**Organizational structures can be improved.**_ The mission supports the STI management’s |
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| intention to start planning a rationalized regional structure. This would improve the |
| handling of the STI’s risk portfolio by placing staff where they are most needed. |
| Initiatives around HWIs and indirect audit methods will take effect in 2013 and require |
| dedicated staff working in new units. |
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| - _**The Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) must continue its evolution**_ . It should begin by |
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| grouping its taxpayers into administrative units based on economic sector and increase |
| the focus on the “top 40” businesses. The LTO must quickly acquire skills in core aspects |
| of big business taxation. Unless this happens, the LTO will struggle to reach the |
| benchmark level of accounting for 50 percent of the STI’s total collections. |
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| - _**The reform agenda relies on better IT.**_ Core tax processes are in need for better IT. The |
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| CRM model must be driven by good intelligence drawn from IT systems based on high |
| quality, well-integrated data. The mission endorses the STI’s plans to install new |
| software quickly and cheaply, using off-the-shelf software with minimal customization. |
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| - _**Handling of VAT needs improvement**_ **.** VAT control will benefit from improved audit |
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| training and better risk analysis. The large-scale VAT refund audit program shows little |
| wrongdoing by taxpayers. Other countries (including some of Moldova’s neighbors) |
| achieve similar levels of VAT security using risk-based methods at far lower costs in |
| terms of staff time. Finally, moves in this direction should accompany a move towards a |
| full-refund VAT system. The existing system has accumulated huge liabilities for the |
| Government to the detriment of businesses. |
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| **I. ENHANCING THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT** |
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| **A. Introduction** |
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| 1. **Tax revenue in 2011 fell short of expectations.** As is the case with many |
| economies, tax revenue in Moldova was impacted by the financial crisis with the revenue |
| downfall commencing in 2008. Table 1 shows tax revenue collection during 2007–11. |
| In 2011, tax revenue—notably VAT and payroll taxes―fell short of what was expected from |
| the now booming economy. Combined, revenue shortfalls across the various tax types are |
| estimated at 0.7 percent of GDP (social and health fund contributions |
| -0.4 percent; personal income tax (PIT) -0.1 percent; foreign trade tax -0.1 percent; and VAT |
| -0.1 percent). It has been generally assumed that the shortfall is due to legislative loopholes |
| and weak tax collection. |
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| **Table 1. Moldova: Tax Revenue by Nominal Value and Percent of GDP, 2007–11** |
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| |2007 2008 2009 2010 2011|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |
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| |MDL<br>% of|MDL<br>% of|MDL<br>% of<br>|<br> MDL<br>% of|MDL<br>% of| |
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| GDP |
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| **Tax revenue** **18.4** **34.4** **21.3** **33.8** **19.6** **32.4** **22.5** **31.4** **25.6** **30.9** |
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| 1.1.1. Taxes on Income, Profits, and Capital Gains 2.7 5.1 2.2 3.5 1.9 3.2 2.0 2.8 2.3 2.8 |
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| _Profit tax_ 1.4 2.6 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 |
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| _Personal income tax_ 1.3 2.5 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.1 1.8 2.1 |
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| 1.1.2. Taxes on Payroll and Workforce 5.2 9.7 6.6 10.5 7.0 11.5 7.5 10.4 8.2 9.9 |
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| _Social Fund contributions_ 4.4 8.2 5.4 8.6 5.6 9.2 6.0 8.3 6.6 7.9 |
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| _Health Fund contributions_ 0.8 1.6 1.2 1.8 1.4 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.6 2.0 |
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| 1.1.3 Taxes on Property 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 |
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| 1.1.4. Taxes on Goods and Services 9.0 16.8 10.7 17.0 9.1 15.1 11.2 15.6 13.1 15.8 |
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| _VAT_ 7.6 14.2 9.1 14.5 7.6 12.6 9.1 12.7 10.5 12.6 |
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| _Excises_ 1.4 2.6 1.6 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.7 3.2 |
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| 1.1.5. Taxes on International Trade and Transactions 0.9 1.7 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.4 |
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| 1.1.6. Other Taxes 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 |
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| GDP 1/ 53.4 62.9 60.4 71.8 82.9 |
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| Source: Moldova Ministry of Finance. |
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| 1/ Value for 2011 is a preliminary estimate. |
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| 2. **It appears that the decline in the VAT relative to the economy may not be due to** |
| **weakened tax administration** . While the shortfall in payroll taxes is difficult to explain, the |
| VAT shortfall is likely related to tax policy changes and booming exports and not a decline |
| in taxpayer compliance. Preliminary analysis undertaken by this mission suggests that a very |
| significant factor in the declining performance of the VAT is due to an increased proportion |
| of reduced rate and zero-rate supplies (sales). While VAT revenue to GDP declined, the |
| supplies declared by taxpayers on VAT returns increased relative to GDP―which may |
| suggest an increase in tax compliance. The analyses show that the decrease in VAT to GDP |
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| is due to a decline in the proportion of supplies that were taxed at the 20 percent standard rate |
| against supplies that were taxed at the lower 8 percent rate (e.g., agricultural products) and |
| the zero rate (e.g., export goods). Of course, it cannot be excluded that a portion of the shift |
| by taxpayer to the 8 percent rate is related to evasion. To mitigate any risks in this direction, |
| the tax agency’s compliance plan includes activities to verify and tackle such problems. The |
| mission’s preliminary analyses are attached at Appendix 1. |
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| 3. **It is expected that the State Tax Inspectorate intensifies its compliance efforts.** |
| Reflecting on the revenue shortfalls against budget expectations, the Government has |
| requested the STI to step up further its efforts to strengthen tax collection to help safeguard |
| budget deficit targets. The focus of this mission has been to assist the STI in its efforts to |
| determine the most appropriate strategy and means to strengthen its capacity to increase |
| revenue in the short to medium term. |
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| **B. Developing Strategies to Reduce the Tax Gap** |
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| 4. **The STI began implementing a modern compliance management strategy** |
| **during 2011.** In 2010, the STI management, with advice from FAD, developed a strategic |
| plan for 2011–15. A December 2010 mission recommended further improvement in |
| compliance management so that by end March 2011 there would also be in place a detailed |
| plan governing the STI’s compliance efforts for the remainder of the year. By April, the STI |
| managers with some IMF expert input had developed a compliance plan for 2011. |
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| 5. **A clear attempt was made by the STI to apply CRM techniques.** In particular, the |
| plan and its analytical underpinnings: |
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| analyzed the composition of tax revenues by taxpayer category (based on turnover |
| ranges) and economic sector; |
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| subjected the tax revenue analysis to a tax gap calculation designed to identify the |
| economic sectors contributing most to the gap—these proved to be public catering, IT |
| services and the wholesale trade; and |
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| selected from within the three sectors the taxpayers who appeared to present the |
| greatest risks of tax evasion. |
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| Execution of the plan began in April 2011 against a backdrop where the STI already had in |
| place a revised headquarters structure with a small risk analysis unit, a large taxpayer office, |
| and a functional structure that largely follows previous FAD advice. |
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| **C. Assessing the Results** |
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| 6. **By the end of 2011 the compliance plan had produced worthwhile results using** |
| **new approaches** . In the course of implementation, a range of methods was used, including |
| the issue of letters to taxpayers informing them of the STI focus on their sector. This was the |
| first time the STI used “compliance marketing” techniques to attempt to influence taxpayers’ |
| behavior. Information meetings with taxpayers were held urging them to review their own |
| tax liabilities and to make any necessary corrections. By the end of the year, the STI had |
| engaged with over 1,500 taxpayers in the three sectors. In about 500 cases, the STI accepted |
| explanations from businesses setting out why they appeared to be risky but asserting that they |
| were compliant. These businesses were spared the intrusion and cost of a tax audit. Over |
| 1,000 taxpayers were subjected to audit, some 600 of whom produced, on average, quite |
| modest tax recoveries. |
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| 7. **However, the general rise in tax payments from the taxpayers covered by the** |
| **project was much greater than the amount recovered on audit** . In all, Moldovan Lei |
| (MDL) 108.8 million was collected, of which only MDL 11.5 million arose from audit. There |
| was an increase in tax payments of 24 percent from the taxpayer population covered by the |
| sectoral compliance program against a 7.7 percent increase in total tax revenues collected by |
| the STI. The main results from the 2011 sectoral program are summarized in Table 2. |
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| **Table 2. Moldova: Results of the 2011 Sectoral Compliance Program** |
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| Public IT |
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| Activity Catering Wholesale Services Total |
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| Cases reviewed 842 500 214 |
| O _f which_ : |
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| Public |
| Catering Wholesale |
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| 842 500 214 1,556 |
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| Audited 653 302 97 1,052 |
| Paid audit settlement 378 175 52 605 |
| Cases paying extra tax including cases not audited 561 398 126 1,085 |
| Total amount recovered from audit (in MDL millions) [1] 2.8 8.3 0.4 11.5 |
| Total increase in revenues from the program |
| (in MDL millions) 16.3 87.3 5.2 108.8 |
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| Source: State Tax Inspectorate. |
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| [1] MDL 19.5 million was assessed by auditors of which MDL 11.5 million was paid by December 31 and is included in |
| the total increase in tax payments by the three sectors of MDL 108.8 million. |
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| **D. Preliminary Lessons** |
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| 8. **Taking a strategic approach to CRM can improve the STI’s effectiveness.** |
| The 2011sectoral compliance campaign can be seen as a large scale pilot project that |
| produced a substantial percentage increase in payments from the taxpayers affected. It is |
| significant that audit recoveries represent roughly only 10 percent of the total tax increase |
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| from the taxpayers contacted during the project and that the overall increase in tax payments |
| was far greater than the underlying national trend in tax revenues. |
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| 9. **Using national planning, publicity and taxpayer education seems to have** |
| **changed taxpayer behavior in those sectors covered by the STI’s action, at least** |
| **temporarily.** A key presumption behind the CRM methodology is that audit, as part of a |
| broader compliance approach (which includes the use of marketing techniques), provides |
| leverage to ratchet up compliance across a wider group. The overall results from the |
| compliance campaign are much better than when audit takes place on the basis of local |
| decisions and unsupported by other measures. The STI pilot outcome for 2011 supports the |
| CRM’s logic. |
|
|
|
|
| 10. **The challenge for the STI is to build credibility and competence so that** |
| **taxpayers are convinced to make a** _**permanent**_ **adjustment to their compliance behavior.** |
| Improved risk analysis techniques have been developed and the STI’s case selection process |
| for inclusion in the 2012 compliance plan will be improved by their use. In 2011, the |
| measured compliance uplift was limited to the taxpayers contacted directly by the tax agency, |
| whether audited or not. Statistics could not be compiled on the impact of the compliance |
| campaign on cases in the target sectors that were _not_ directly affected by the STI campaign. |
| In 2012, the challenge will be to find ways of increasing the leverage of the sectoral projects |
| within the compliance plan to change the behavior of a wider circle of businesses and to |
| measure the impact of the compliance campaign across the entire sectors affected. |
|
|
|
|
| 11. **The STI’s plan for 2012 is to influence the compliance behavior of 93,000** |
| **taxpayers by persuading them that compliance is the best option.** Using a well planned |
| campaign, the STI plans to cover the following sectors: **(** 1) wholesale and retail; |
| (2) manufacturing; and (3) transport and communications. Estimates suggest that these |
| sectors cover 56 percent of the tax gap, numbering some 93,000 businesses (the 1,500 |
| businesses contacted in 2011 are a subset of this group).Taxpayers will be contacted and |
| asked to voluntarily review their tax position with a view to self-correction. Avoiding the |
| expense of audit and its intrusiveness in terms of running a business offers a voluntary |
| compliance incentive. |
|
|
|
|
| 12. **A systematic approach will demonstrate the serious intent of the STI.** Building on |
| the experience already gained would suggest that the STI should: |
|
|
|
|
| - First make contact with the first tranche of taxpayers by letter. Craft the letter with |
| great care to maximize its impact. It should not be a ‘typical’ tax agency letter. |
|
|
|
|
| - Accompany the issue of the letter with a media campaign to alert the wider |
| membership of the industry groupings to the tax agency’s activities in their sector. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 14 --> |
|
|
| 13 |
|
|
|
|
| - Monitor the compliance behavior, electronically within the STI, of the next 2,000 |
| cases, defined by risk, to see if it changes and how. Identify any cases that begin to |
| significantly change their tax paying behavior. |
|
|
|
|
| - Publicize the results of the first six months of the campaign and then contact the next |
| 2,000 taxpayers inviting voluntary disclosures of any tax irregularities with the offer |
| of a less penal settlement to those who come forward. |
|
|
|
|
| - Track the compliance trends across _all businesses_ in the sectors treated and analyze in |
| full the data collected in the course of the year to help design the following year’s |
| campaign. |
|
|
|
|
| 13. **The STI should also leverage further the work done in 2011.** It would appear |
| sensible to keep all or some of the 1,500 taxpayers reviewed in 2011 under a simple “control |
| regime” and to try to nudge them towards continuing improved compliance. An obvious way |
| of doing this would be to: |
|
|
|
|
| - Divide these cases at random into a treatment group and a control group. |
|
|
|
|
| - Write to the treatment group, reminding each taxpayer that he was examined under |
| the 2011 program and stating that the STI will continue to observe his tax compliance |
| patterns electronically. |
|
|
|
|
| - Do not write to the control group but monitor its members anyway. |
|
|
|
|
| - In the final quarter of 2012, assess the compliance outcomes of each group. Compare |
| the outcomes using analytical statistics to determine if there was a statistically |
| significant difference in the behavior of the treatment group. |
|
|
|
|
| - If so, issue the ‘under observation’ letter to the control group. Record and analyze the |
| outcome after a period of months. |
|
|
|
|
| 14. **The new compliance approach will continue into future years and will evolve.** |
| This mission provided comprehensive input to fine tuning the 2012 compliance plan, which |
| is attached to this report as an addendum. The plan is solidly based on a CRM model that is |
| also recommended by the OECD and the EU with risk analysis guiding compliance work |
| mainly on a taxpayer segment basis against a backdrop of planned improvements in service |
| and taxpayer education. |
|
|
|
|
| 15. **The CRM model is not restricted to categorization of taxpayers by economic** |
| **sector.** Instead, a project could be devised to tackle the issue of payment of untaxed wages |
| paid in cash. The methodology is the same: publicize the issue, contact a target group of |
| taxpayers prompting them to self-correct their recent tax returns, and then begin an audit |
| process. In the context of payroll tax fraud, training in new techniques of detection would |
|
|
| <!-- page: 15 --> |
|
|
| 14 |
|
|
|
|
| also be part of the plan. Similarly, the STI could gain a better understanding of the large |
| number of VAT taxpayers registered voluntarily at turnover levels below the tax threshold by |
| conducting a targeted compliance project. Box 1 provides a broad outline of the key |
| compliance measures of the plan. |
|
|
|
|
| **Box 1. Moldova: Key Measures of the State Tax Inspectorate 2012 Compliance Plan** |
|
|
|
|
| Sectoral compliance campaign selectively covering 93,000 taxpayers in the wholesale and retail, |
| manufacturing, transport and communications. |
|
|
|
|
| Partially compliant taxpayers—educate and assist them to become fully compliant through seminars, |
| publications and the STI web site. |
|
|
|
|
| Publish a broad set of risk indicators so that business taxpayers can assess and correct their behavior |
| voluntarily. |
|
|
|
|
| Identify persistently noncompliant taxpayers and develop a graduated scale of response ranging from |
| assistance to audit and finally to “permanent” control. |
|
|
|
|
| Focus on tax evasion, international issues, corporate restructuring, and major transactions with regard to |
| large businesses. |
|
|
|
|
| Improve assistance to large business. |
|
|
|
|
| Extend the scope of the large taxpayer office to cover at least 50 percent of tax revenue. |
|
|
|
|
| Establish a unit focusing on the compliance of high-wealth-individuals. |
|
|
|
|
| Build the High-Wealth-Individual program for operation in 2013 to include the use of indirect methods of |
| assessment of income. |
|
|
|
|
| Deliver training, better information, and promotion of voluntary compliance for small- and medium-sized |
|
|
| enterprises. |
|
|
|
|
| **E. Other Considerations** |
|
|
|
|
| 16. **Work of this nature requires professional support.** The STI is fortunate to have the |
| services of a United Nations Development Program/EU-funded expert analyst who works |
| with the support of a professional economist. Such analytical skills are essential if this |
| compliance risk management model is to be pursued. The STI must begin to build similar inhouse capacity to undertake sophisticated analysis. |
|
|
|
|
| 17. **Existing law does not fully support the CRM model.** More intensive monitoring |
| and control of “badly behaved” or high risk taxpayers means that they will require more |
| frequent audits. Others will require less attention by virtue of their fiscal insignificance or |
|
|
| <!-- page: 16 --> |
|
|
| 15 |
|
|
|
|
| their good compliance habits. It is understood that the law at present forbids full audit of a |
| taxpayer more frequently than every second year. (It is unclear whether single issue audits |
| are restricted in this way). Clarification of the position is needed - demonstrable evidence of |
| the risk of significant revenue loss is normally the determining audit trigger. Law changes |
| must be made to support a modern compliance management approach. |
|
|
|
|
| 18. **It is possible to work with business groups using formal structures to improve** |
| **tax compliance.** Other actors in the Moldovan business world have a valid interest in tax |
| compliance. Over time, it will become possible to work with them in ways that support |
| CRM. Many EU and OECD countries now use so-called horizontal monitoring or |
| ‘cooperative compliance’ arrangements to reach understandings about the parameters of tax |
| compliance for industry sectors or individual large companies. These are, in effect, selfmanaged compliance arrangements. They are lightly policed by the tax authority but the |
| penalties for tax evasion, where it occurs, apply in full. These arrangements rely to a large |
| extent on the active participation of competent third parties such as fully-qualified tax |
| advisors. |
|
|
|
|
| 19. **It is too soon to move towards this formalized model in Moldova because the** |
| **necessary framework of trust is not yet in place.** However, the foundations could be put in |
| place soon by creating a tax compliance council composed of representatives of the STI at |
| senior level, industrial groups, chambers of commerce and tax professionals. Such a group |
| would have: |
|
|
|
|
| - Clear terms of reference aimed at reaching a shared understanding of how tax compliance |
|
|
| is managed in a modern society. |
|
|
|
|
| - The right to discuss in advance changes to tax procedures and administrative practices, |
|
|
| tax forms, tax filing arrangements and so on. |
|
|
|
|
| - A limited annual menu of topics where improvements can be made to tax administration |
|
|
| aimed at simplification of compliance. |
|
|
|
|
| - A manageable number of meetings per year tied to the fiscal cycle. |
|
|
|
|
| - A small secretariat within the STI to produce agreed agendas, minutes and action points. |
|
|
|
|
| - A limited number of sub-groups that contain topic experts. The sub-groups could be |
|
|
| activated when a theme emerges that needs expert input. |
|
|
|
|
| 20. **There is a willingness to participate in the work of a tax compliance cooperation** |
| **council.** The mission met a group of business people and tax advisors in Chisinau and it is |
| clear that they see the values of such arrangements. The long-term goal should be to observe |
| and measure improvements in tax compliance and in the business climate. The tax gap |
| should narrow as compliance costs fall. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 17 --> |
|
|
| 16 |
|
|
|
|
| 21. **The time is right for the creation of such a body.** Moldova has long had a LTO and |
| is developing a unit for the better management of the tax affairs of HWIs. A compliance |
| cooperation council would be the ideal forum for exploring the complex tax issues that will |
| surface as Moldova continues to develop. Important issues regarding LTO operations and |
| HWI taxation could be explored and resolved within the compliance cooperation council |
| avoiding poor administrative design and subsequent disputes and litigation. |
|
|
|
|
| 22. **A compliance cooperation council would support the CRM.** By starting to foster a |
| cooperative relationship with taxpayers and their advisors, the STI can demonstrate its |
| understanding that there are compliance-building techniques that go beyond traditional audit. |
| There is no need for this to have specific legal backing but it will need simple agreed |
| procedures. Of course, the creation of such a body would, perhaps, create a channel for |
| demands for high quality taxpayer services such as advance binding rulings for complex tax |
| transactions and nonbinding rulings on more routine issues. But these demands are already |
| being articulated and will become more urgent as the economy develops. The STI has, to |
| some extent, prepared the ground for creating this council by co-hosting, with the IMF, a |
| well-attended business round table at the end of 2011. Many of the issues raised by the |
| business people and tax practitioners could be handled by a compliance cooperation council. |
|
|
|
|
| 23. **It will be important for the compliance reforms now underway to permeate the** |
| **LTO.** Its taxpayer base is markedly different from the plurality of taxpayers managed by the |
| rest of the STI’s operational areas, but the challenges it faces are the same. Work needs to |
| start immediately on how to fully integrate the modern compliance risk management |
| approach into the LTO. It must learn to identify distinct categories of tax risk. It must start |
| treating each risk category with a tailored mix of treatments. To expend resources on |
| programs that don’t focus on particular identified compliance risks achieves less-than-best |
| outcomes. Although, the changes needed in the LTO reflect the same problems evident in the |
| wider STI, the solutions are more specialized. This stems from the nature of the entities |
| managed by the LTO. More intensive scrutiny of the 40 biggest LTO cases is a challenge |
| now emerging. Similarly, there are economies of scale in knowledge-sharing, should the |
| LTO implement an organizational structure based on the sectoral distribution of its taxpayers. |
|
|
|
|
| 24. **For the LTO to secure and maintain fifty percent of STI collections, it will have** |
| **to update its skills.** This reasonable target has been accepted by the Government. Skills |
| upgrading in the LTO is a matter of strategic importance for the STI and requiring prompt |
| attention. Areas of concern would include audit skills, the use of electronic tools for audit, |
| the tax management of de facto groups of commonly-owned companies, international |
| taxation issues including transfer pricing, and taxpayer profiling skills. It must improve its |
| audit skills in the key areas of VAT and payroll tax. Separately from the mission, an FAD |
| expert on LTO issues has visited Moldova and completed the first part of his assignment. An |
| interim expert report has been given to the LTO head and this will be finalized in April 2012 |
| when the expert returns to the STI. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 18 --> |
|
|
| 17 |
|
|
|
|
| 25. **A long-term vision for the large taxpayer operation is needed.** Such a vision |
| should encompass the LTO’s aims, methods, skills and scope. Formulating this vision is a |
| job for the Deputy Head of the STI with LTO responsibilities. It would be useful if, in |
| formulating this vision, the LTO could start a wide-ranging consultation process, perhaps |
| beginning with the compliance cooperation council mentioned above. |
|
|
|
|
| 26. **A wider concept of taxpayer service would also help to improve the compliance** |
| **environment.** While it is important to have a competent response to taxpayer needs and |
| queries, service should also be pro-active. Under the compliance risk model, service supports |
| compliance and can be used to market it. For example, with the re-introduction of corporate |
| income tax there is a need to remind companies of payment basis periods, the due dates for |
| quarterly installments and so on. The wrong alternative is to wait and face the more difficult |
| task of recovering these payments from defaulting taxpayers after the event. Default involves |
| case-by-case contact and, in some instances, costly visits to taxpayers. Prevention through |
| pro-active service is easier and can use mass _marketing techniques_ such as mail shots, poster |
| campaigns or television or radio advertising, The STI has already used some of these |
| techniques. While it may be assumed that the taxpayers concerned will know about the |
| reintroduction of corporate income tax (they have been obliged to keep records and submit |
| nil returns while the tax was in abeyance), many may choose not to comply. In that |
| circumstance, it is important to convey the impression that the STI is vigilant and ready to |
| act. |
|
|
|
|
| 27. **As a rule, marketing of compliance should include publicizing the results of** |
| **sectoral campaigns** . This ought to extend to publishing the main features of the compliance |
| plan. These activities leverage the value of audit which is just a quest for impact and not an |
| end in itself. It is acknowledged that the 2011 compliance plan incorporated some of these |
| insights. Treatments of taxpayer groups were not confined to audit and publicity was used |
| successfully. The 2012 plan must build on these achievements, integrating compliance |
| marketing and pro-active service into a continuum of graduated responses to the wide range |
| of compliance problems. It would facilitate these developments if a taxpayer services unit |
| with a wide brief were created in the STI headquarters. This could be achieved by |
| redeployment of existing staff. |
|
|
|
|
| 28. **Other proposals for improving compliance were made by STI managers during** |
| **the mission.** Some suggestions were made in a series of workshop-type discussions and |
| others in a short note given to the mission. However, the mission advised that some of the |
| measures were not adequately linked to the core compliance strategy being pursued by the |
| STI. As such, they could prove to be a distraction from what is emerging as a successful |
| approach. In other cases, the results to be obtained from implementing the proposals were not |
| fully obvious. Nevertheless, some of the issues discussed were clearly significant for the |
| STI’s future development. More detail is given in the following paragraphs. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 19 --> |
|
|
| 18 |
|
|
|
|
| 29. **The STI is planning a major restructuring including its field offices and** |
| **headquarters.** This change is an opportunity to adapt the structure to better serve the tax |
| agency’s mission and methods. If carried out carefully, restructuring can better align the |
| STI’s staff to pursue the revenues legally due, manage the compliance risks and serve the |
| population. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section IV. |
|
|
|
|
| 30. **The STI continues to plan improvements to its IT systems.** FAD advice has |
| supported this objective in the past and the World Bank is now considering offering financial |
| support for IT reform. The mission met STI personnel and local World Bank representatives |
| to discuss the design methodology for the new system, reaching a consensus that the solution |
| should focus on the acquisition of industry standard off-the-shelf software to which STI |
| processes could be retro-fitted. Better IT is essential for improved compliance management. |
| The issue is discussed in more detail in Section IV. |
|
|
|
|
| 31. **Procedures are too inflexible** . Related to the IT issue is the extent to which |
| administrative procedures can be adjusted as circumstances change. In the STI, |
| administrative procedures are set out in tax procedures codes that have statutory force. |
| Because of their statutory basis, changing internal procedures is difficult and timeconsuming. A more effective STI will need to operate under a less rigid set of processes that |
| are administratively determined. Safeguards against abuse of power can be provided through |
| a simple informal dispute resolution process that relies on external reviewers working with |
| an STI taxpayer champion, perhaps with further recourse to a tax ombudsman. An internal |
| audit unit ought to be available to check from documents, files and computer systems that the |
| standardized nonstatutory procedures are applied consistently across the organization. |
|
|
|
|
| 32. **Inflexibility imposes costs** . Many procedures are in need of review already. Unless |
| more flexible process design methodologies can be devised, there is a risk that the new IT |
| system will have outdated processes engineered into it because they are mandated by statute. |
| In that scenario, existing rigidly-designed processes would be carried forward into the new IT |
| system combining extra development costs with the unnecessary preservation of inefficient |
| working methods for many years to come. The STI management is committed to avoid this |
| risk seeking statute changes where required. |
|
|
|
|
| 33. **The STI still performs a wide range of tasks for other government agencies.** |
| These activities divert vital resources from core compliance functions. These tasks include |
| such things as collecting unpaid loans made by state agencies to businesses, collecting fines |
| levied on unlicensed or illegal business activities, auditing the payment of dividends due to |
| the state from companies it owns, carrying out audits mandated by other state bodies, and |
| policing price controls on staple foods. There is always a temptation for governments to |
| make the revenue agency the regulator of choice, and for good reasons. In most cases, the |
| revenue agency with the support of the finance ministry tries to fend off these extensions to |
| its remit. Where it does not succeed in doing so, the opportunity cost in terms of its own |
| programs is likely to be high. Some of the nontax activities performed by the STI utilize its |
|
|
| <!-- page: 20 --> |
|
|
| 19 |
|
|
|
|
| core competencies and are unlikely to be too costly. However, many others are far off the |
| mark and should be performed elsewhere. Appendix 2 lists some of these tasks. |
|
|
|
|
| 34. **The challenges ahead are difficult and meeting them will require strong political** |
| **backing.** Implementing a CRM strategy is difficult. It requires leaving behind methods that, |
| while familiar, have relatively limited effect on tax outcomes. It requires a more |
| entrepreneurial style of management that can communicate goals clearly to staff and motivate |
| them to deliver. It requires flexibility in the choice of compliance tools and the deployment |
| of staff. In short, it appears to be more risky than maintaining the status quo. However, by |
| adopting some key elements of the compliance risk management model the STI management |
| has shown that it takes the opposite view and regards the status quo as too risky. The changed |
| way of working that has been endorsed and deployed in 2011 will deliver more effective tax |
| management from a given resource. It will have more impact on the crucial goal of reducing |
| the tax gap and will be far less intrusive for the generality of business taxpayers. |
|
|
|
|
| **F. Training is Key to Future Success** |
|
|
|
|
| 35. **A major training program is urgently needed** . As the remaining parts of this report |
| show, progress in the STI will require extensive training and ongoing technical assistance in |
| areas such as audit—including payroll tax audit, VAT management, tax fraud investigation |
| and the pursuit of arrears. In the LTO, these training needs are even more complex given the |
| nature of its taxpayers. Other difficult new issues are emerging onto the agenda such as the |
| taxation of HWIs and the related technical issue of the deployment of indirect audit methods. |
| Tackling these training needs is central to the future development of the STI. New skills do |
| not have to be learned all at once but a medium term training plan is needed to permit their |
| orderly acquisition. The task of devising this plan should begin at once with assistance from |
| the IMF and other donors. |
|
|
|
|
| **G. Recommendations** |
|
|
|
|
| 36. These are the recommendations related to enhancing the strategic approach to |
| compliance management: |
|
|
|
|
| - Use a wide range of treatment methods to improve the compliance of business sectors |
|
|
| selected for compliance programs in 2012 and beyond. Treatments should include |
| “compliance marketing,” taxpayer education, taxpayer monitoring, behavioral |
| experiments, and audit. [1] |
|
|
|
|
| - Maintain a focus in 2012 on the businesses treated in the 2011 program to sustain their |
|
|
| improved compliance rates. |
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
| The aim is to achieve “whole sector impact” extending far beyond the audited taxpayers. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 21 --> |
|
|
| 20 |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensure that the STI risk unit has a small group of numerate analysts whose skills are |
|
|
| required to make the compliance risk model work in collaboration with business experts |
| from the STI. |
|
|
|
|
| - Identify and repeal any laws that prescribe or restrict the frequency of audit as the |
|
|
| compliance risk model requires close control of risky businesses and light control of |
| small or compliant businesses. |
|
|
|
|
| - Institute formal cooperation on compliance and administrative aspects of taxation |
|
|
| between the STI, industry representatives, chambers of commerce and tax professionals. |
|
|
|
|
| - Develop a vision for the future aims, methods, skills and scope of the LTO more in line |
|
|
| with the CRM model. |
|
|
|
|
| - Use compliance marketing as a tool to facilitate the reintroduction of corporate income |
|
|
| tax. |
|
|
|
|
| - Carefully restructure the STI to better align its resources to its risk portfolio and to |
|
|
| maximize the impact of its new compliance approaches. |
|
|
|
|
| - Build the planned new IT system as quickly as possible with the minimum possible level |
|
|
| of customization of “off-the-shelf” software. |
|
|
|
|
| - Move away from the statutory definition of internal STI administrative procedures. |
|
|
|
|
| - Seek Government support to release the STI from a number of tasks performed for other |
|
|
| government agencies. |
|
|
|
|
| - Develop a strategic training plan to prioritize and implement the training requirements |
|
|
| identified in this report. |
|
|
|
|
| - Obtain unambiguous political backing for these changes. |
|
|
|
|
| **II. STRENGTHENING PERSONAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE** |
|
|
|
|
| **A. Addressing Unreported Cash Wage Payments** |
|
|
|
|
| **Current situation** |
|
|
|
|
| 37. **In nominal value, the collection of personal income tax withheld on wages, social** |
| **security contributions, and health insurance contributions have continued to increase** |
| **into 2011** . Table 3 summarizes collections since 2007. In 2011, PIT on wages, social security |
| contributions, and health insurance contributions totaled MDL 9,9 billion and made up |
| 34.4 percent of the overall collection of tax in Moldova. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 22 --> |
|
|
| 21 |
|
|
|
|
| **Table 3. Moldova: Collection of Personal Income Tax and Social Contributions** |
|
|
|
|
| (MDL millions) |
|
|
|
|
| Revenue Type 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 |
|
|
|
|
| Personal income tax—wages 1,322 1,480 1,465 1,544 1,769 |
|
|
|
|
| Social security contribution 3,947 5,398 5,575 5,987 6,551 |
|
|
|
|
| Health insurance contribution 760 1,122 1,339 1,447 1,578 |
|
|
|
|
| Total 6,029 8,000 8,379 8,978 9,898 |
|
|
|
|
| Source: State Tax Inspectorate. |
|
|
| 38. **The STI and the Ministry of Labor (MOL) share responsibility for overseeing** |
| **the reporting and collecting of wage and social contribution withholdings.** The MOL |
| generally handles processing and the STI has the main responsibility for collection. Table 4 |
| compares 2009 and 2010 data provided by the MOL. In 2010, the number of employees fell |
| by 2.7 percent, but the reported wages increased by 5.4 percent and the average wage per |
| employee increased by 8 percent. |
|
|
|
|
| **Table 4. Moldova: Employee Count and Wage Reported Data** |
|
|
|
|
| Percent |
| 2009 2010 |
| ~~Change~~ |
| Total employee count [2] 1,140,473 1,110,021 -2.7 |
|
|
|
|
| Wages reported (MDL millions) 20,715 21,906 5.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Average wage per employee (MDL) |
|
|
|
|
| Source: Moldovan authorities. |
|
|
|
|
| **Issues** |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 18,164 19,735 8.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 39. **The STI has committed to initiating a compliance strategy to strengthen** |
| **compliance for the wage and social contribution collections.** This strategy results from the |
| realization that wage reporting and withholding is a primary revenue source and needs to be |
|
|
| 2 The employee count is the total of employees reported by all companies. If an employee works for more than |
| one company, then that employee will be counted more than once in the above count. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 23 --> |
|
|
| 22 |
|
|
|
|
| protected. The strategy was announced in the “ _Taxpayer Compliance Program for 2012._ ” |
| The strategy will initially focus on unreported salary payments, often referred to as the |
| “brown envelope” payments. [3] This is a new initiative that is in its initial planning stages. STI |
| officials told the mission that it is common for many employees to be reported as earning the |
| minimum wage of MDL 766 per month when real wages are much higher. The unreported |
| wages are paid in cash (brown envelopes). STI officials mentioned that this is the case in |
| particular in the construction industry and the catering and restaurant businesses. |
|
|
|
|
| 40. **A cross-agency compliance strategy to improve wage-reporting compliance is** |
| **required** . In June 2011, the authorities announced a plan to address wage envelope |
| payments, with MOL having the lead responsibility. The STI and several other agencies are |
| supposed to support MOL in this effort. The STI’s and the MOL’s joint responsibility for |
| wage reporting requires cooperation between the two agencies to allow their experience, |
| knowledge, and abilities to be focused on effective actions to address this high risk area. |
|
|
|
|
| 41. **The cross agency strategy should include the classic aspects of a compliance risk** |
| **strategy.** These include articulating the risk, establishing desired outcomes, designing a |
| strategy to achieve those outcomes, and a system to measure the outcomes. These classic |
| phases of a compliance project are detailed further in Section II.B in the context of |
| developing strategies for improving the compliance of high-wealth-individuals. |
|
|
|
|
| 42. **The strategy should seek to increase public understanding of the size and nature** |
| **of the problem** _**.**_ To raise awareness, the STI and the MOL should mount media campaigns to |
| publicize the problem and make the public recognize that it as a national priority. In the case |
| of social contributions, this would include highlighting the pension and other benefits |
| available to those registered for contributions and the consequences of not being covered. |
| The nonpayment of contributions means that employees will eventually receive reduced |
| benefits. Television and newspaper companies may be interested in focusing on this issue for |
| some time to mobilize general public pressure on employers to submit correct contribution |
| returns. This may contribute to a higher level of labor union and employee confidence with |
| regard to pursuing these matters with employers. |
|
|
|
|
| 43. **A strategy would include a program to educate employers about their** |
| **obligations.** Steps would also be taken to make it as simple as possible for employers to |
| register for the first time and pay any tax or contributions owing. This might include |
| reviewing the registration process, simplifying declarations, and producing new leaflets for |
| employers. |
|
|
|
|
| 3 The reference “brown envelope” originates in the practice of placing unreported cash wage payments into |
| brown envelopes and discreetly passing these on to employees. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 24 --> |
|
|
| 23 |
|
|
|
|
| 44. **STI auditors could benefit from focused training on how to identify and** |
| **substantiate unreported cash wage payments.** Past measures attempting to curb unreported |
| cash payments have largely been ineffective. To some degree this can be related to weak |
| audit techniques. In 2011 the STI reported completing 797 LTO audits and identifying |
| MDL 3.6 million in additional employment tax. This is a relatively small return of |
| employment tax for this effort. STI officials advised that in 2011, audits of non LTO |
| businesses also resulted in very few employment tax adjustments. [4] The low recovery of tax |
| from employment tax audits may result from poor audit planning, outdated audit techniques, |
| weak audit skills, and ineffective training. The mission recommends that the STI update |
| training programs and audit procedures to allow for more effective identification of |
| unreported cash wage payments. Employment tax training should be offered to STI auditors |
| periodically during 2012 and 2013. |
|
|
|
|
| 45. **Expert assistance could be very helpful in the employment tax area** . This should |
| be in relation to the development of the compliance risk strategy, updating of audit |
| procedures, and implementing a new training emphasis. Many countries have wrestled with |
| this same area of noncompliance and some expertise has developed from these efforts. |
| Identifying and bringing in experienced expert assistance can be very valuable for addressing |
| employment tax noncompliance and should be considered. |
|
|
|
|
| **B. Building a High-Wealth-Individual Compliance Program** |
|
|
|
|
| **Current situation** |
|
|
|
|
| 46. **The STI has commenced the development of a compliance strategy concerning** |
| **HWI.** This strategy initially was announced in “ _The Development Plan for 2011–2015_ ” and |
| again in the “ _Taxpayer Compliance Program for 2012_ .” This is a new initiative and much |
| needs to be done to make the compliance strategy a reality for use in 2012 and beyond. |
|
|
|
|
| 47. **The authorities introduced indirect audit methods as a new audit tool to** |
| **strengthen PIT compliance in legislation passed January 2012.** The new legislation |
| requires individuals to file a “Statement of Financial Assets” by December 31, 2012 where |
| an individual has in excess of MDL 1 million in assets or MDL 300,000 in personal |
| expenditures. The legislation allows for the use of indirect audit methods (IAM) commencing |
| in 2013 for PIT returns due for 2012. The introduction of IAM as a compliance tool will |
| require significant preparation work during the next 15 months to allow for the methods to be |
| put into practice in 2013. |
|
|
|
|
| 4 The STI is preparing an analysis of PIT results for 2011, but the analysis was not completed at the time of this |
| mission. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 25 --> |
|
|
| 24 |
|
|
|
|
| 48. **Both the HWI strategy and the IAM initiative have strong potential to improve** |
| **PIT collections.** Wages and dividends combined, provided 90.2 percent of PIT reported |
| for 2010, as seen in Appendix 3. Reporting and collection from other sources, particularly |
| international income (.047 percent) and capital gains (.347 percent) appear weak. Both the |
| HWI and IAM efforts provide new tactics and methods for encouraging compliance in these |
| and other PIT income streams that have not been historically emphasized within the STI and |
| that appear to have significant tax risks and tax benefits associated with them. |
|
|
|
|
| **Issues** |
|
|
|
|
| 49. **The HWI initiative would require the establishment of a dedicated** |
| **organizational unit.** At this stage, a working group has been formed for the implementation |
| of the recently passed legislation on IAM. The working group provides some energy toward |
| organizing an HWI initiative, but better and quicker progress would be achieved by |
| establishing a dedicated and permanent headquarters unit or project office to organize and |
| manage HWI efforts. The unit would require adequate knowledge, skills, authority, staffing, |
| budget, equipment, workspace, approval processes, and cooperation to carry out numerous |
| activities. Chief among these would be: |
|
|
|
|
| - Gather and analyze high income tax data. |
|
|
|
|
| - Develop risk information for high-income taxpayers. |
|
|
|
|
| - Design and recommend a process for appropriate approval of high-income projects, |
|
|
| project teams, and/or specialized units to STI management. |
|
|
|
|
| - Recruit project managers for specific projects/initiatives being considered for |
|
|
| implementation. |
|
|
|
|
| - Recommend the implementation to appropriate STI management regarding project teams, |
|
|
| audit projects, and/or special high-income tax units to address high-risk areas determined |
| under the risk analysis process. |
|
|
|
|
| - Coordinate proposed changes in operating manuals and procedures necessary to establish |
|
|
| a functional HWI initiative with appropriate units within STI and at the Ministry of |
| Finance (MoF). |
|
|
|
|
| - Implement recruitment and training of staffing to ensure that knowledge and skills are |
|
|
| adequate for all phases of a project office and among the auditors, IT staff, managers, and |
| others who will support a HWI income risk-based compliance approach. |
|
|
|
|
| - Recommend procedures for selection and audit of project cases. |
|
|
|
|
| - Coordinate joint approaches with STI units from operations, methodologies, support |
|
|
| services, IT, and others that have substantial parts to play in improving compliance and |
| services for the HWI taxpayer. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 26 --> |
|
|
| 25 |
|
|
|
|
| 50. **The HWI unit would need to be staffed appropriately.** At least five people will be |
| required at its initiation. The staff should be well versed in the use of risk-based techniques |
| and the use of compliance strategy approaches to strengthen compliance. The unit should |
| also include experienced compliance staff. Project management skills will be valuable for |
| this operation. Knowledge regarding data analysis techniques would also be helpful. A close |
| working relationship with IT is highly desirable. |
|
|
|
|
| 51. **A formal HWI compliance strategy is necessary to outline and set the** |
| **parameters for quality efforts.** The strategy drafting process should commence as soon as |
| possible. If an HWI unit is established, then this unit may be charged with drafting the |
| strategy. However, if the establishment of the unit is delayed, or is determined unnecessary, |
| appropriate officials should be charged with drafting this strategy. It is recommended that a |
| HWI Compliance Strategy be drafted within the next 60 days. |
|
|
|
|
| 52. **It is desirable that an HWI compliance strategy address the following four** |
| **phases of a project of this type:** |
|
|
|
|
| _**Phase 1:**_ Articulate the compliance risks; |
|
|
|
|
| _**Phase 2**_ : Develop a listing of intended outcomes and a strategy to deliver |
| these desired outcomes to address the compliance risks; |
|
|
|
|
| _**Phase 3:**_ Implement a business plan to support delivery of the strategy; and |
|
|
|
|
| _**Phase 4**_ _:_ Create a system of measurement to determine actual outcomes and |
| compare with projected outcomes. |
|
|
|
|
| 53. **Articulating the compliance risk that is attached to the HWI tax sector will** |
| **require a five-step process.** These steps include: (1) define what constitutes an HWI for |
| project purposes; (2) determine the population of taxpayers that meet this definition; |
| (3) gather available data on the HWI population; (4) analyze data and quantify the attributes |
| and characteristics of this population; and (5) complete a review and summarize the pertinent |
| information gathered with emphasis on HWI compliance behavior, characteristics, trends, tax |
| gap projection, and a summary of the compliance risk and risk groups. Appendix 4 provides |
| a suggested action plan outlining the steps to articulate the risks. |
|
|
|
|
| 54. **The strategy would initially focus on a small number of taxpayers.** The initial |
| HWI population should be limited to approximately 200 taxpayers. Recent legislation |
| provides a legal definition for the use of IAM. The legislation establishes MDL 300,000 in |
| personal expenditures and MDL 1 million in assets as benchmarks for indirect audits. |
| However, these benchmarks are too low in an HWI context, as they would draw in a taxpayer |
| population far exceeding the STI’s capacity at this stage. The number of taxpayers included |
| in the initial stages of the HWI project should not exceed 200. The definition of a HWI |
|
|
| <!-- page: 27 --> |
|
|
| 26 |
|
|
|
|
| taxpayer should therefore be descriptive enough to identify a group of individuals that |
| represent the wealthiest citizens while at the same time keeping the population of taxpayers |
| that would be initially targeted by the project at a manageable number. |
|
|
|
|
| 55. **A good HWI compliance strategy requires the STI to determine the desired** |
| **outcome of implementing the strategy.** As a crucial component of developing the strategy, |
| the development team should answer two key questions: |
|
|
|
|
| a) What short-term and long-term outcomes are reasonably expected by addressing |
|
|
| the compliance risk? |
|
|
|
|
| b) What treatment strategies will be required to deliver these outcomes? |
|
|
|
|
| 56. **The implementation of the HWI strategy would be facilitated through a** |
| **comprehensive business plan.** An HWI strategy and the resourcing of HWI operations |
| require a business plan to facilitate resourcing, staffing, facilities, IT needs, training, work |
| plans, etc. Many of the supporting actions necessary for an HWI effort will require their own |
| action plans to assist with their completion on a timely basis. The supporting action plans are |
| then drawn together in an overall HWI business plan. The business plan is designed to |
| provide a map on how the HWI strategy, outcomes, and measurements will be resourced and |
| completed. The business plan process commences in earnest, once the outcomes and strategy |
| have been determined. |
|
|
|
|
| 57. **A measurement system to monitor the achievement of the desired outcomes** |
| **established in the HWI strategy is an important feature for this project.** To justify and |
| administer the effectiveness of the HWI program, the tax administrators must be able to state |
| the compliance benefits being achieved through the strategy as well as determine whether |
| predicted outcomes are being accomplished. If the tax administrators do not measure the |
| effectiveness of the HWI strategy, they run the risk of taking actions that do not align with |
| their stated objectives and they lose an opportunity to make necessary adjustments to |
| improve the strategy or identify new treatments for noncompliance. |
|
|
|
|
| 58. **Data and information available on wealth is limited.** There is currently a lack of |
| information sources, especially electronic data that can be used to identify, case build, |
| research, select, and support compliance activities. Most tax data comes from several basic |
| sources, such as: |
|
|
|
|
| - Third-party information providers of wage, interest, dividends, and real estate |
|
|
| transactions. These providers forward income and withholding information. |
|
|
|
|
| - Form CET08. Data from these forms record entity information and information germane |
|
|
| to the computing of personal income tax. There is no significant data on wealth or assets |
| included in these filings. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 28 --> |
|
|
| 27 |
|
|
|
|
| - Corporate income tax (CIT) filing database by legal entities, as well as the registration |
|
|
| database for these entities. |
|
|
|
|
| - Ad hoc data is available on real estate, auto sales, high-end consumer goods, etc., which |
|
|
| can be procured and used for project purposes. |
|
|
|
|
| 59. **HWI project relevant data should be expanded.** The data currently available |
| should be “data mined” and correlated into a profile of HWI taxpayers to determine a starting |
| point. There has been some work completed in this regard, but it is insufficient to identify a |
| potential population of HWI taxpayers. Additional data sources need to be determined and |
| brought to bear to identify HWI taxpayers and to determine possible compliance issues. The |
| STI will need to gather and analyze a wider range of publicly available information. The |
| mandated statement of financial assets due at the end of 2012 will provide additional data to |
| enhance the STI’s understanding of the HWI population. |
|
|
|
|
| **C. Introducing Indirect Audit Methods as a Personal Income Tax Compliance Tool** |
|
|
|
|
| **Issues** |
|
|
|
|
| 60. **The STI is currently drafting additional fiscal procedures to clarify some aspects** |
| **of indirect audit methods.** These procedures are mandated by the January 2012 legislation |
| and it is anticipated they will be issued in April 2012. In addition, the new law requires a |
| filing of a financial statement of assets by qualified individuals by December 31, 2012. The |
| drafting process has just begun on the procedures, so there were no drafts available for |
| review. However, a draft version of the form to obtain the financial statement of assets was |
| available and was reviewed and discussed with the working group. |
|
|
|
|
| 61. **It is essential to develop a strategy to state IAM objectives and how these audit** |
| **techniques will be applied.** The issues and organizational support requirement for |
| implementation of indirect methods are numerous and often include: |
|
|
|
|
| - Organizational procedures to augment the requirements of the new legislation. |
|
|
|
|
| - Guidance on when and who within the STI will be authorized to commence an |
| indirect audit. |
|
|
|
|
| - Development of a selection process to pre-determine possible individual audits for |
| use of indirect techniques. |
|
|
|
|
| - Media and communication materials to educate taxpayers on indirect methods. |
|
|
|
|
| - Monitoring and audit feedback processes to insure proper use of indirect methods and |
| to track results of audits completed. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 29 --> |
|
|
| 28 |
|
|
|
|
| - Identification of information sources to support auditors to obtain necessary data to |
| complete an indirect method. |
|
|
|
|
| - Agreements with IT to build systems and develop support systems for indirect audits. |
|
|
|
|
| - A determination whether to have indirect audit specialists, where to locate specialists, |
| and how many specialists would be necessary. |
|
|
|
|
| - The issuance of guidance on the application of indirect methods for identified |
| compliance risk areas such as: (1) HWI; (2) rich owners of poor companies; and |
| (3) high-income-individuals with no filing history. |
|
|
|
|
| - Implement a training plan to build indirect audit skills among selected examiners. |
|
|
|
|
| - Identification of resources, support, and mentoring available for introduction of |
| indirect audits from EU partners, World Bank, IMF, and other organizations. |
|
|
|
|
| 62. **There is an approximate 15-month window of opportunity to prepare for the** |
| **application of indirect audit methods.** The first individual tax period that will be subject to |
| the use of indirect audits, will be tax year 2012 (March 2013 filing). These 2012 tax returns |
| generally will not be fully processed until mid-summer 2013. Therefore, it will be latesummer 2013 before the first indirect audits could be initiated and it would likely be 2014 |
| before any substantial results could be reasonably expected. |
|
|
|
|
| 63. **Ideally, the preparation for the implementation should start soon.** To commence |
| using indirect audit methods in 2013, there is a need to complete the strategic, procedural, |
| tactical, staffing, and training planning within the next 180 days (October 2012 completion |
| date). This would allow for a rollout of indirect audit methods in 2013. The timely |
| completion of strategic and business planning will allow for a window of opportunity in the |
| spring of 2013 to deliver these plans. This is particularly true for training, as the bulk of |
| training of auditors should be completed by May 2013. Appendix 5 provides a proposed |
| action plan discussed with the working group to ensure delivery of necessary training in time |
| to start indirect audits in late-summer 2013. |
|
|
|
|
| 64. **A dedicated project must be established.** The inclusion of indirect methods as a |
| compliance tool within the audit program is a complex endeavor and requires a full-time |
| project coordinator/manager and several project support members. At the time of this |
| mission, no official has been designated, rather it is a collateral assignment for several staff |
| personnel and managers. |
|
|
|
|
| 65. **Indirect audit techniques need not be limited to only HWI audits.** Indirect audit |
| methodologies are a powerful technique and have value in combating noncompliance by |
| individual taxpayers, individual owners of legal entities, and individuals of moderate wealth |
| who fail to report any source of income. Based on tax official comments, these additional |
|
|
| <!-- page: 30 --> |
|
|
| 29 |
|
|
|
|
| areas have a high compliance risk and would be worthy of projects designed to address |
| noncompliance. Consideration should be given on how to apply the new audit tools for |
| identified problem areas within the Indirect Methods Compliance Plan. Through a workshop, |
| the mission provided the STI working group with comprehensive advice and material on |
| IAM. [5] |
|
|
|
|
| **D. Technical Assistance** |
|
|
|
|
| 66. **Experienced guidance and support will expedite and improve the introduction of** |
| **HWI and IAM.** The Government’s interest in addressing compliance problems with the |
| HWI taxpayer segment is encouraging. However, for any tax administration, this is a |
| complex and difficult task. Most of the recommendations in this report are geared toward: |
| (1) establishing an HWI unit in 2012; and (2) having indirect methods in productive use |
| by 2013. Establishing both programs requires 2012 to be the year of identifying the desired |
| outcomes, drawing up strategies supportive of these outcomes, developing and implementing |
| business plans, and designing systems to help evaluate progress. The tasks involved are often |
| confusing and are made simpler if experienced guidance and expertise can be accessed. |
| While preparations should commence, it is recommended that the STI seek additional expert |
| assistance on these topics prior to the role out of these programs |
|
|
|
|
| **E. Recommendations** |
|
|
|
|
| 67. These are the recommendations related to: |
|
|
|
|
| **Addressing compliance issues concerning unreported cash wage payments** |
|
|
| - Coordinate a compliance strategy for unreported cash wages with the Ministry of Labor. |
|
|
|
|
| - Develop a compliance risk strategy/plan to address wage-reporting concerns. |
|
|
| - Utilize media and education tools to support the compliance strategy. |
|
|
|
|
| - Update employment tax audit techniques and renew employment tax training efforts. |
|
|
|
|
| **Establish an HWI compliance capacity** |
|
|
| - Establish an HWI compliance unit. |
|
|
|
|
| 5 Hand out material included: FAD Technical Notes “Revenue Administration: Tax Audit—Use of Indirect |
| Methods,” April 2010; the OECD’s “Strengthening Tax Audit Capabilities: Innovative Approaches to Improve |
| Efficiency and Effectiveness of Indirect Income Measurement Methods,” October 2006; and “Audit Toolkit— |
| Individual Income,” April 2011, J. Buchanan; three audit lead sheet prototypes on personal living expenses; |
| cash-T techniques; minimum income probes; and the workshop power point presentation . |
|
|
| <!-- page: 31 --> |
|
|
| 30 |
|
|
|
|
| - Develop an HWI income tax compliance strategy. |
|
|
|
|
| - Identify additional HWI income sources of information |
|
|
|
|
| **Implementing indirect audit methods** |
|
|
| - Designate a fulltime project team/manager to coordinate the strategy and actions to |
|
|
| implement IAM. |
|
|
| - Develop a strategy on how IAM will be used. |
|
|
|
|
| - Establish an implementation plan for IAM that includes a training plan. |
|
|
|
|
| **Technical assistance** |
|
|
| - Seek expert support to expedite implementation of HWI and IAM initiatives. |
|
|
|
|
| **III. IMPROVING OPERATIONAL TOOLS TO IMPLEMENT THE COMPLIANCE STRATEGY** |
|
|
|
|
| **A. Taxpayer Services** |
|
|
|
|
| **Introduction** |
|
|
|
|
| 68. **Providing taxpayer services is a core function of a tax administration operating a** |
| **tax system based on the principle of voluntary compliance.** Based on the principle of |
| voluntary compliance, the majority of taxpayers will comply with their obligations under the |
| tax laws, if they know what their obligations are and they are able to comply with them. |
| Taxpayer service therefore plays a critical role in the STI's objective to maximize voluntary |
| compliance, by delivering taxpayers the information and assistance they need to enable them |
| to meet their tax obligations. Box 2 shows the international trend in taxpayer services. |
|
|
|
|
| 69. **Taxpayer services are a key tool for addressing priority compliance risks under** |
| **a compliance management strategy.** Many compliance problems arise from unawareness |
| and ignorance of tax obligations and are much more efficiently resolved through application |
| of taxpayer service initiatives than through the application of enforcement measures. |
| Building a strong taxpayers service capability usually receives great attention in modern tax |
| administration. |
|
|
|
|
| 70. **The STI has implemented a number of good initiatives to improve services to** |
| **taxpayers.** Since the previous mission in 2010, new initiatives include: |
|
|
| <!-- page: 32 --> |
|
|
| 31 |
|
|
|
|
| **Box 2. International Trends in Taxpayer Services** |
|
|
|
|
| - Understanding that an appropriate balance of resources between enforcement and service |
| is a critical tool in achieving higher overall tax compliance as a measure to reduce the tax |
| gap. |
|
|
|
|
| - Treating taxpayers as clients with rights that are codified in the form of charters, etc., and |
| publicized. |
|
|
|
|
| - Public Agencies work together to provide coordinated services to clients. |
|
|
|
|
| - Tailored approach of service delivery to match the needs of various taxpayer segments |
| and the risk to revenue. |
|
|
|
|
| - Modern marketing techniques are extensively utilized to influence on taxpayer behavior. |
|
|
|
|
| - Services staff are highly qualified in terms of being able to match the expectations of |
| taxpayers and those of their professional tax accountants and advisors. |
|
|
|
|
| - Establishment of client call centers and a move towards larger and more centralized |
| service centers to ensure delivery of consistent, high quality service that enables |
| specialization (e.g., by taxpayer segment or tax type and procedure). |
|
|
|
|
| - Services are available independent of time and place in step with the growing |
| possibilities for electronic services (e.g., interactive telephones, e-services and web |
| pages). |
|
|
|
|
| - Provision of dedicated inquiry services for tax professionals. |
|
|
|
|
| - Taxpayer services (excluding staff involved with returns filing and coding) consume |
| about 10 percent of tax agencies’ human resources. |
|
|
|
|
| - Goal to move customers to web and e-services with compulsory e-filing and payments |
| requirements for certain taxpayer segments (e.g., large taxpayers) and annual targets for |
| take up rate. |
|
|
|
|
| - Consulting widely with taxpayers and/or their representatives prior to the implementation |
| of changes. |
|
|
|
|
| - Establishing and monitoring service delivery performance according to prescribed |
| performance standards; measuring client satisfaction; and demonstrating accountability |
| by publicizing the levels of performance achieved against service standards set. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 33 --> |
|
|
| 32 |
|
|
|
|
| - Introduction of an on-line database containing frequently asked questions and |
| answers on legal requirements under the tax laws, including a helpdesk (located |
| within Fiscservinform [6] ) to assist taxpayers access and use this facility; |
|
|
|
|
| - Expansion of the STI website to allow taxpayers access to their personal tax |
| information (e.g., accounts information, types of taxes they are registered for); and |
|
|
|
|
| - On-line self-generated assessment notices for property tax (taxpayers can choose |
| between an electronic and a paper notification). |
|
|
|
|
| **Strengthening service capabilities** |
|
|
|
|
| 71. **Despite improvements through the introduction of new technology, much** |
| **remains to be done to improve services to taxpayers** . If the STI is to capitalize on the full |
| potential of taxpayer services as a tool for improving taxpayers' compliance, a more |
| ambitious approach to improving services to taxpayers needs to be adopted. The first step |
| should be to instill the appropriate service mentality in STI Officers. Providing service to |
| taxpayers is a critical task to facilitate voluntary compliance. Respectful and fair treatment of |
| taxpayers will help build trust in the STI and will in turn lead to improved compliance. |
| Modern tax administrations monitor the level of trust taxpayers have in the tax administration |
| through surveys. [7] |
|
|
|
|
| 72. **Non optimal organizational structures at both headquarters and field offices** |
| **limit the STI's ability to deliver focused and effective taxpayer services** . As such, |
| responsibility for taxpayer services within headquarters are spread between a number of units |
| in the Methodology Department, which also have responsibility for operational delivery in |
| respect of the service center that responds to telephone calls and correspondence from |
| taxpayers. Delivery of taxpayer services in the field offices lies with the administration |
| divisions that are also responsible for a range of other tasks, including arrears collection. The |
| international trend is to deliver taxpayer services through units that are fully dedicated to this |
| task. In field offices, a separate area would be designated as a "shop front" where the public |
| can come to raise their issues, rather than allowing the public to wander through the tax |
| office to try to find a relevant official. Taxpayer services staff would be service specialists |
| who are trained to deal with taxpayers’ information needs. |
|
|
|
|
| 6Fiscservinform is the state enterprise responsible for managing and developing the State Tax Service’s IT |
| systems. |
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
| In Estonia for example, the Tax and Customs Administration consistently rates as between the third and fifth |
| most trusted Government institution, with some 80 percent of surveyed taxpayers believing the organization is |
| trustworthy. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 34 --> |
|
|
| 33 |
|
|
|
|
| 73. **Current taxpayer services activities are not designed well enough to effectively** |
| **help mitigating the key compliance risk identified in the STI’ compliance strategy.** To |
| its credit, the STI does provide some proactive taxpayer services through conducting |
| seminars to inform taxpayers about changes in the tax laws and how these may affect them [8] . |
| However, most services activities are simply in response to taxpayer initiated contacts. There |
| is little evidence that taxpayer services place any focus on addressing key compliance risks either proactively or reactively. Neither is any attempt made to measure the effectiveness of |
| taxpayer services with regard to influencing compliance behaviors. While improvements in |
| taxpayer services alone are unlikely to be a sufficient response to serious noncompliance |
| such as tax evasion and fraud, they nevertheless play a crucial role in maintaining and |
| encouraging compliance by the majority of taxpayers. This would allow the STI to designate |
| a bigger portion of its compliance resources on those who remain unwilling to comply. The |
| first step in addressing high compliance risks identified through the compliance strategy |
| should be to consider the impact that targeted taxpayer services could have on taxpayer |
| compliance behavior prior to deciding to make use of the much more expensive audit and |
| enforcement options. Taxpayer services can also influence on taxpayers’ behavior by using |
| “marketing techniques.” For example, they could inform the public about the STI’s audit and |
| enforcement successes to make taxpayers aware that it is not worthwhile to engage in tax |
| evasion and fraudulent activity. |
|
|
|
|
| 74. **Taxpayers’ compliance costs appear to get insufficient attention in the context of** |
| **business procedures and processes design.** It is generally accepted that high compliance |
| costs discourages taxpayers from meeting their obligations. Therefore, the STI ought to |
| analyze the compliance aspects when introducing new laws, procedures, and processes. A |
| current and relevant example is the introduction of the requirement that taxpayers shall |
| acquire a digital signature to enable them to e-file tax returns. While the service is free for |
| individuals, businesses have to pay a fee to obtain the digital signature with VAT taxpayers |
| even paying a higher rate. [9] That taxpayers must pay for using the e-filing option may be a |
| deterrent to compliance. The STI should reconsider this fee, in particular taking into account |
| that it is planned to make e-filing obligatory for all taxpayers. |
|
|
|
|
| 75. **Closer cooperation with the business community would facilitate taxpayer** |
| **compliance.** A taxpayer satisfaction survey was recently undertaken and the STI has |
| expressed a desire to undertake such surveys on a more regular basis. However, there appears |
| to be no plan for using the survey results to develop and implement initiatives to improve |
| taxpayer satisfaction. The STI ought to use the results of the surveys to improve tax |
| administration and thereby increase the level of taxpayer satisfaction. In addition, they should |
|
|
| 8 During a year around 450 seminars to the taxpayers were organized throughout a country to explain various |
| tax law implementation aspects. |
|
|
|
|
| 9https://servicii.fisc.md/TarifeDeclaratiaElectronica.aspx. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 35 --> |
|
|
| 34 |
|
|
|
|
| learn from other tax administrations that have established close dialog and cooperation with |
| representatives of the business community. These initiatives often means establishing a |
| "Consultative Counsel" where senior managers of the tax administration meet on a regular |
| basis (e.g., quarterly) with representative of the business community (e.g., Chamber of |
| Commerce, large taxpayers, Banker's Association, Employers' Association, large accounting |
| firms) to discuss issues that are relevant for both parties with regard to facilitating |
| compliance with the tax laws. Feedback provided through such a forum typically would |
| initiative actions that reduce taxpayers’ compliance cost and at the same time facilitates a |
| higher level of compliance. It also serves to create greater public acceptance of changes, as |
| the business community have a better understanding of the issues and see their views heard. |
|
|
|
|
| **Recommendations** |
|
|
|
|
| 76. The following is recommended for taxpayer services: |
|
|
|
|
| - Establish a dedicated unit in the STI Methodology Department to be responsible for |
| program and product design, planning and coordination of taxpayer services. |
|
|
|
|
| - Develop a comprehensive taxpayer services strategy linked to the STI’s taxpayer |
| compliance strategy taking account of taxpayer demands and needs, geography, |
| service channel options; and staffing requirements, etc. |
|
|
|
|
| - Establish taxpayer _“shop fronts,_ ” at field offices to provide quality services to |
| taxpayers, taking account of (1) the conclusions of the taxpayer service strategy (once |
| developed) and (2) the need to substantially reduce the number of field offices over |
| time, as discussed in Section IV. |
|
|
|
|
| - Utilize modern marketing techniques (“ _compliance marketing”_ ), including public |
| relations, to influence on taxpayer behavior with the aim to mitigate key compliance |
| risks identified by the STI’s compliance plan. |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensure results of taxpayer satisfaction surveys are used to develop satisfaction |
| improvement initiatives and measure the effectiveness of those measures through |
| subsequent surveys. |
|
|
|
|
| - Establish a Compliance Cooperation Council comprising senior STI officials and |
| representatives of the business community as a means of seeking the business |
| community's input into significant tax administration initiatives to improve |
| compliance. |
|
|
|
|
| **B. Audit** |
|
|
|
|
| 77. **The audit program is a core tax administration function that features** |
| **prominently in any tax agency's compliance management strategy.** Modern tax |
| administrations give strong emphasis to risk-based audit programs aimed at broad coverage |
| of taxpayer groups and compliance issues, with intense focus on high risk areas to combat |
|
|
| <!-- page: 36 --> |
|
|
| 35 |
|
|
|
|
| abuse. With similar objectives in mind, the STI has shown a gradual move away from |
| comprehensive audits in favor of more focused audit activities that are concentrated on areas |
| of highest compliance risk. As can be seen from Table 5, the number of comprehensive (full) |
| audits has been reduced and the number of single-issue audits increased over the period |
| from 2010 to 2011. |
|
|
|
|
| **Table 5. Moldova: Audit Results (Not including Large Taxpayers)** |
|
|
|
|
| (MDL millions) |
|
|
|
|
| 2010 2011 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Number of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Percent with |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Additional |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Number of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Percent |
| with Results |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Additional |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Type of audit Audits Results Tax Audits with Results Tax |
|
|
|
|
| Registration checks 294 67 4,1 308 71 4.0 |
| VAT refund 1,157 53 9.9 1,344 50 8.9 |
| Single issue 24,236 66 151.4 27,190 62 93.0 |
| Comprehensive 5,436 84 200.0 4,721 82 238.3 |
| **Total** **31,123** **365.4** **33,563** **344.2** |
|
|
| Source: State Tax Inspectorate. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Type of audit |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Audits |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Results |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Tax |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Audits |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 78. **Management of the audit program is the responsibility of the Audit Division in** |
| **the STI headquarters.** The responsible division is the Division for Organization of Tax |
| Audit, which comprises three sections: (1) Audit Methodology; (2) Planning and Analysis; |
| and (3) Cash Registers. Until June 2011, the planning and analysis section was primarily |
| engaged on identifying high risk taxpayer who would be targeted for comprehensive audits |
| by the field offices. Since the second quarter of 2011, this section has been engaged on |
| implementation of the STI's compliance strategy. This shifted the focus away from |
| undertaking audits to a "partnership" approach, which involved intensive compliance |
| monitoring by the field offices of some 1,553 taxpayer who were chosen from three high-risk |
| industry sectors (catering, telecommunications/IT, and wholesales). [10] These taxpayers were |
| encouraged and supported to comply with their tax obligations and audits initiated only in |
| cases of persistent noncompliance. |
|
|
|
|
| 79. **Significant potential remains to strengthen the audit function.** Although, the |
| greater focus on compliance risks achieved through the implementation of a more strategic |
| approach to compliance management is strongly endorsed and will undoubtedly lead to |
| improved results, much remains to be done to strengthen the STI's capabilities in the audit |
| function. In particular, concerns remain over the STI's ability to undertake in-depth tax audits |
|
|
| 10 Refer Section I. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 37 --> |
|
|
| 36 |
|
|
|
|
| and therefore its capability for detecting more complex tax abuses, such as tax avoidance |
| arrangements. Building this capacity should therefore remain a key priority for the STI and |
| requires the delivery of more in-depth training for auditors. The range of skills and |
| knowledge needed by competent auditors is vast and includes issues such as (1) audit |
| techniques; (2) tax technical and legal issues; (3) interviewing skills; (4) report writing; |
| (5) litigation; and (6) court appearance techniques. This may require a progressive training |
| strategy, whereby staff can progress through multiple levels (e.g., beginner, intermediate and |
| advanced) of training in order to achieve the highest skill levels needed for effective dealings |
| with taxpayers’ affairs. Box 3 sets out the elements of a typical progressive training strategy |
| for audit staff. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|  |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 80. **The introduction of the compliance strategy presents an opportunity to focus** |
| **training in priority areas** . The present initiative to focus on three high-risk sectors as |
| described above, presents an opportunity for the STI to identify a selected pool of auditors to |
| work on these sectors. These auditors can be targeted for specialist training, including |
| training on the industry sector in which their work will be concentrated―to enhance |
| effectiveness of the compliance enforcement effort. |
|
|
|
|
| 81. **A significant component of audit activity is focused on nontax issues** . Although, |
| the STI has been successful in broadening the audit coverage by increasing the number of |
| single-issue audits, these efforts are undermined by the extent of nontax related audits, which |
| do not identify tax discrepancies. Such audits include checking on the origin of goods, |
| checking compliance with price controls on socially important products, such as milk and |
| bread, and checking whether cash registers have been properly registered with the STI. |
| Violations detected during the course of such inspections lead to fines being charged, but |
| have no tax compliance implications and are resource consuming. Such inspections should |
| not be part of an effective tax audit program and should easily be undertaken by other |
| government agencies. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 38 --> |
|
|
| 37 |
|
|
|
|
| 82. **Extensive control over cash registers is not an adequate substitute for a proper** |
| **risk-based compliance program** . Traders are required to register cash machines with the |
| STI, who currently have some 79,000 of these logged nationally. In addition, certain |
| taxpayers (currently some 1,600 exchange bureaus [11] ) have their cash registers linked on-line |
| to the STS that receive daily reports of all cash transactions. These transactions are checked |
| against tax returns for discrepancies. The STI is presently considering the expansion of this |
| initiative to a larger group of taxpayers. Similar initiatives have been implemented in various |
| countries, including former soviet states (e.g., Armenia) who report positive results. |
| However, the sustainability of such results remains questionable, as taxpayers inevitably find |
| ways to circumvent the controls. In addition, great care must be taken to avoid the imposition |
| of excessive compliance costs on small taxpayers, who may be driven back into the shadow |
| economy as a result. The risk that the STI places undue confidence in such controls as a |
| substitute for a robust risk-based compliance enforcement program must be avoided. |
|
|
|
|
| **Recommendations** |
|
|
|
|
| 83. The following is recommended for audit: |
|
|
|
|
| - Continue, and where possible increase, efforts to improve skills of auditors to |
| undertake more in-depth tax audits. |
|
|
|
|
| - Implement a progressive training strategy to up skill auditors. |
|
|
|
|
| - Identify selected auditors to concentrate on the high-risk sectors identified in the |
| compliance strategy and provide these auditors with targeted training to ensure their |
| effectiveness. |
|
|
|
|
| - Focus the audit program on detection of noncompliance with tax obligations by |
| removing all nontax related tasks. |
|
|
|
|
| - Maintain focus on implementing a risk-based compliance program rather than |
| increasing reliance on micro-level controls such as on-line case registers. |
|
|
|
|
| **C. Establishing Capacity to Investigate Tax Fraud** |
|
|
|
|
| **Introduction** |
|
|
|
|
| 84. **The Criminal Code prescribes thresholds for cases that the STI must refer to** |
| **relevant authorities for possible fraud investigation and prosecution.** These are MDL |
|
|
|
|
| 11 Ironically, these exchange bureaus have not been liable to tax and the information gathered through this |
| process has been of little use to improve tax compliance. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 39 --> |
|
|
| 38 |
|
|
|
|
| 30,000 in unreported taxes for legal entities (companies) and MDL 20,000 for natural |
| persons (individuals). Until January 12, 2012, the threshold was MDL 50,000. |
|
|
|
|
| 85. **All potential tax fraud cases meeting these thresholds are referred either to the** |
| **local prosecutor office or to the Center for Combating Economic Crimes and** |
| **Corruption (CCECC).** Local STI offices do the processing of cases under MDL 500,000 |
| directly with the local prosecutor offices (PO), while cases of MDL 500,000 and above are |
| referred to the CCECC by the STI’s anti-fraud unit. Both the PO and the CCECC are |
| independent and have their own investigative staff and mandate to prosecute tax crimes. |
|
|
|
|
| **Issues** |
|
|
|
|
| 86. **The current system of selecting, transferring, and investigating potential tax** |
| **fraud does not seem to produce prosecutions and convictions** . According to statistics |
| provided to the mission (Table 6), a total of 437 cases were referred to the above authorities |
| in 2011 based on the described thresholds. Out of these, 134 were accepted for investigation, |
| and only 1 was placed for prosecution. The situation is similar in previous years. The mission |
| was not able to document any tax fraud convictions during the last three years. Provided, the |
| statistics reflect the factual situation, the system is broken and must be reviewed and fixed. |
| The inability to develop or prosecute tax fraud cases seriously hampers the STI’s efforts to |
| deliver on the Government’s expectation of improved taxpayer compliance to strengthen |
| Moldova’s economy. The absence of a tax fraud deterrent undermines current efforts to |
| address risks to revenue in a strategic way and build trust between the tax authority and |
| taxpayers. Compliance strategies that are currently being developed to address compliance |
| problems related to large businesses, high-wealth-individuals, and unreported payroll taxes |
| lose their impact if there is an inability to prosecute taxpayers who intentionally under-report |
| their tax liabilities. |
|
|
|
|
| **Table 6. Moldova: Tax Fraud Cases, 2009–11** |
|
|
|
|
| (In thousands of MDL) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2009 2010 2011 |
| PO CECC PO CECC PO CECC |
|
|
| - 50 >500 Total >50 - 500 Total >50 >500 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CECC |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CECC |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| - 500 Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CECC |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| - 50 >500 Total >50 - 500 Total >50 >500 Total |
|
|
|
|
| Cases referred 181 184 365 166 124 290 230 207 437 |
| Investigations ... ... ... 11 55 66 7 127 134 |
| Prosecutions 2 0 2 3 1 4 1 0 1 |
|
|
| Source: State Tax Inspectorate. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| >500 Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| PO |
| >50 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| PO |
| >50 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 87. **The authorities should consider the establishment of a joint agency-working** |
| **group to identify and fix the barriers preventing prosecution and conviction of tax** |
| **evaders.** This process would be enhanced if the stakeholders of the criminal tax fraud |
|
|
| <!-- page: 40 --> |
|
|
| 39 |
|
|
|
|
| process are all participating. This would, for example, include the MoF, the Ministry of |
| Justice, POs, the CCECC, the judiciary, as well as the STI. Until the barriers are identified |
| and fixes agreed upon and implemented, it would appear that even serious fraud cases will go |
| unprosecuted. The MoF may want to initiate such an effort. The participation of an external |
| moderator or discussion leader with experience in criminal tax fraud investigation and |
| prosecution may facilitate the process. |
|
|
|
|
| 88. **The STI does not investigate for tax fraud** . The 2006 FAD mission recommended |
| that a criminal investigation capacity be established within the STI. The STI did establish an |
| antifraud unit in 2007 to review and process audit cases that exceed MDL 500,000. However, |
| the project never materialized and this unit does not investigate tax fraud; rather it reviews |
| for accuracy and prepares the case files for referral to the CCECC. |
|
|
|
|
| 89. **Tax compliance might be better served if the investigation of tax fraud was** |
| **placed with the STI.** Currently, the STI has responsibility only for determining the tax |
| obligation. The actual investigation to determine fraud is outsourced to the PO and the |
| CECC. In many countries, tax administrations have specially trained criminal investigation |
| units that are mandated to investigate tax fraud. It is the responsibility of these units to |
| develop the case and gather evidence that proves intent to evade taxes. These bars of proof |
| are set high, but if met, then the unit refers the case to the appropriate office for prosecution. |
| A similar situation may work well in Moldova, provided that there is appropriate oversight, |
| adequate technical facilities, and training of personnel. |
|
|
|
|
| **Recommendation** |
|
|
|
|
| 90. The following is recommended concerning tax fraud investigation. |
|
|
|
|
| - MoF to initiate a joint working group of key agencies to identify barriers and find |
| solutions to enable successful investigation, prosecution, and conviction of taxpayers |
| who intentionally and materially evade tax laws. In this context consider placing the |
| mandate for tax fraud investigations with the STI. |
|
|
|
|
| **D. Arrears Collection** |
|
|
|
|
| **Introduction** |
|
|
|
|
| 91. **The stock of tax arrears continues to grow.** Although, the current level of tax |
| arrears, when expressed as a percentage of total STI collections, [12] does not present cause for |
| immediate alarm, the level continues to show an upward trend. The current level of arrears |
|
|
|
|
| 12 The total level of arrears (tax and social/health contributions) was 11 percent at the end of 2010, which was the latest full |
| year for which data was available. Total arrears were MDL 1,639.3 million against total collections of MDL 14,790 million. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 41 --> |
|
|
| 40 |
|
|
|
|
| still reflects the effects of the 2007 tax amnesty [13] rather than being the result of an effective |
| collection enforcement program on the part of the STI. Table 7 below sets out the tax arrears |
| for each tax type for 2009–11. Note that 2011 data is for part of the year (to December 1 |
| only). As can be seen, the largest component of the stock of arrears is accumulated penalties |
| and interest, followed by VAT and social contributions [14] . The imminent reinstatement of a |
| positive rate of corporate income tax has the potential to further accelerate the growth in tax |
| arrears. Strengthening the collections enforcement program in the STI may therefore become |
| an increasing priority. |
|
|
|
|
| **Table 7. Moldova: Tax Arrears by Type of Tax 2009–11** |
|
|
|
|
| (In millions of MDL) |
|
|
|
|
| 2009 2010 2011 1/ |
|
|
| Tax Type Arrears % of Total Arrears % of Total Arrears % of Total |
|
|
|
|
| Corporate income 49 3.5 42 2.6 44 3.2 |
| Personal income 37 2,5 38 2.3 48 3.5 |
| VAT 246 17.4 256 15.6 300 21.9 |
| Excises 2 0.1 6 0.3 6 0.4 |
| Social Fund 618 43.8 684 41.8 249 18.2 |
| Health Fund 10 0.7 14 0.8 15 1.1 |
| Fines and penalties 363 25,8 493 30.1 616 44.9 |
| Others 88 6.2 106 6.5 94 6.8 |
| **Total** **1,413** **100** **1,639** **100** **1,372** **100** |
|
|
| Source: State Tax Inspectorate. |
|
|
| 1/ As at December 1, 2011. |
|
|
| **Management of tax arrears** |
|
|
|
|
| 92. **Headquarters staff is responsible for the preparation of the annual arrears** |
| **collection plan.** The first of such plans was produced for 2011 and included an analysis of |
| tax arrears at the start of the year and monitored the collection results throughout the year. |
| The main aim was to obtain better information for setting realistic collection targets for the |
|
|
|
|
| 13 Tax arrears (taxes, social and health contributions, penalties, interest, etc.) totaling approximately MDL 4.4 billion by the |
| end of 2006 were eliminated at large by a tax amnesty implemented in mid-2007. The amnesty applied to all pre-2007 state |
| budget taxes that remained unpaid by the time of publication of the amnesty law (May 11, 2007), irrespective of the |
| collectability of the arrears. |
|
|
| 14 As the data for 2011 reflects 11 months activities, direct comparison between 2010 and 2011 requires caution, as the |
| payments for the final month of the year are likely to significantly alter the relative components of the total arrears. In |
| particular, the relative size of the stock of penalties and interest is likely to be less. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 42 --> |
|
|
| 41 |
|
|
|
|
| field offices. The 2012 plan is still a skeletal plan in respect of which work is continuing. The |
| STI's strategic plan contains initiatives to arrest the growth in tax arrears, but it is not clear |
| how these initiatives are being built into operational plans for the debt management function. |
|
|
|
|
| 93. **In addition, the STI has implemented a number of operational improvements.** |
| These include the computerized identification of debtors, automated addition of penalties and |
| interest, and automated prioritization of arrears cases for action by collection officers. |
| Arrears cases are prioritized on the basis of age and size, so that priority is given to collection |
| of the largest debts and new cases where the probability of successful collection remains |
| high. These initiatives are considered good international practice. |
|
|
|
|
| **Collection methods** |
|
|
|
|
| 94. **Collection procedures are generally sound.** The law provides a good range of |
| collection powers, including the ability to freeze bank accounts, arrest of assets, garnish bank |
| accounts, confiscate property, etc. Counterproductive legal restrictions on the use of payment |
| arrangements continue to apply **.** The law authorizes the use of installment payment |
| arrangements for recovery of tax arrears over periods up to two years, but does not allow the |
| use of this recovery mechanism in relation to social security contributions, which represent a |
| significant component of the total arrears (see Table 7). |
|
|
|
|
| 95. **Write off procedures are not applied** . The law provides for writing off of |
| uncollectible tax arrears, but only after the statutory period for collections has expired. This |
| period is presently six years, after which the STI is statutorily barred from collecting a debt. |
| Since the 2007 tax amnesty effectively wiped all arrears existing at that time off the books, |
| there are no arrears currently on the books that are older than six years. The write off |
| provisions are therefore effectively redundant until 2013, when collection of arrears accrued |
| for the 2008 tax year become statute barred. Since there are a multitude of reasons for tax |
| debts becoming uncollectible, the current write off authority are too restrictive. In addition, |
| many tax administrations automatically and routinely write off small arrears balances, where |
| these are considered uneconomic to collect. Given the large proportion of interest and |
| penalties that make up the stock of arrears in Moldova, it is likely that these comprise many |
| small balances that may be better removed from the debtor’s ledger to allow effective use of |
| collections resources. |
|
|
|
|
| **Resourcing** |
|
|
|
|
| 96. **Collection of tax arrears in the field offices is the responsibility of the** |
| **Administration Division** . In the larger offices, this work is performed by a separate |
| collections enforcement section within the Division, but in smaller offices the collection |
| work is part of a wider range of tasks performed by administration staff. Collection |
| enforcement is one of the core tax administration functions and requires dedicated staff that |
| are specifically trained to undertake payment recoveries work. While the difficulties in |
| maintaining dedicated specialists in small offices is acknowledged, centralizing the collection |
|
|
| <!-- page: 43 --> |
|
|
| 42 |
|
|
|
|
| effort in fewer tax offices may prove to be a more effective alternative than allocating the |
| collection tasks to nonspecialist staff. |
|
|
|
|
| **Recommendations** |
|
|
|
|
| 97. The following is recommended in respect of the recoveries of arrears: |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensure measures for arresting the growth in tax arrears contained in the strategic plan |
| are reflected in operational plans. |
|
|
|
|
| - Authorize the use of installment payment arrangements in respect of all types of |
| arrears in cases where this is considered the most appropriate method for recovery. |
|
|
|
|
| - Extend the write off provisions to cover all debts that are considered uncollectible. |
|
|
|
|
| - Implement an automated process for writing off small balances that are considered to |
| be uneconomic to pursue. |
|
|
|
|
| - Consolidate tax arrears operations into significantly fewer sites and ensure dedicated |
| and specialist trained staff are engaged on the recovery effort. |
|
|
|
|
| **IV. OTHER TAX ADMINISTRATION ISSUES** |
|
|
|
|
| **A. Value-Added Tax Refunds** |
|
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| **Introduction** |
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| 98. **VAT refunds continue to be a highly problematic issue** . This topic has been |
| discussed by successive IMF missions over the years, but despite numerous |
| recommendations for improvements, no discernable progress has been made. The law |
| continues to require that all excess input credits must be carried forward for offsetting against |
| future VAT liabilities. Refunds are available only for exporters and investors in respect of the |
| acquisition of capital goods other than vehicles and furnishings. This has led to a buildup of |
| considerable amounts of excess VAT credits which effectively represent an involuntary loan |
| by taxpayers to the Government and which must at some point be repaid. For those who are |
| eligible, the refund claims process continues to be cumbersome and claims subjected to |
| excessive and unproductive audit scrutiny, resulting in significant administrative and |
| compliance costs. |
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|
| **Accumulation of value-added tax credits** |
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| 99. **The stock of un-refunded VAT credits is increasing at an alarming rate** . By the |
| end of the third quarter of 2011, the accumulated total had reached a staggering MDL |
| 3.9 billion and continues to rise as shown in figure 1. This is a "fiscal time bomb,” as the |
| total amount grows at a rate where eventual repayment becomes ever more problematic. This |
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| 43 |
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| said, the extension of cash VAT refunds to purchases of investment goods in the two largest |
| cities should help somewhat to reverse the trend in accumulation of VAT refund credits. |
| Moreover, a big part of the problem stems from the proliferation of reduced-rate supplies (at |
| 8 percent), which benefit from input credit at the standard rate (20 percent). The Government |
| may want to consider gradually raising the reduced rate and/or limiting the scope of supplies |
| subject to the reduced rate. This could both arrest further accumulation of VAT refund |
| credits and generate the funds for their gradual repayment. |
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| Figure 1. Accumulated Value-Added Tax Credits to be Carried Forward, 2007–11 |
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| 100. **When refunds of excess input credits are denied, the nature of the VAT is** |
| **effectively altered, in part, from a tax on final consumption to a tax on production** . The |
| denial of refunds of excess input credits primarily stems from concerns about revenue |
| leakage due to fraudulent refund claims, particularly in the face of Moldova's |
| underdeveloped "tax culture" and relatively weak tax administration. However, in addressing |
| these concerns, inadequate weight is evidently given to the economic costs and reduced |
| revenue flows resulting from the detrimental impacts that denied refunds have on business |
| cash flows and therefore investment and growth. |
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| 44 |
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| 101. **Refunds are a normal feature of the invoice credit form of VAT and can be** |
| **substantial** . As shown in Table 8, the amount of VAT refunds as a percentage of gross VAT |
| is substantial in most regions. Even in the former Soviet Union countries refunds amount to |
| almost 30 percent of gross VAT collections on average. At 10.6 percent in 2011, refunds in |
| Moldova are clearly much below this average, mostly as a result of the legal restrictions that |
| prevent refunds being paid. |
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| **Table 8. Value of Value-Added Tax Refunds by Country/Region** |
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| (In percent of gross VAT collections) |
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| Average [ 1] |
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| Canada 50.3 |
| EU 38.1 |
| Eastern Europe 36.8 |
| New Zealand 35.5 |
| Former Soviet Union countries 29.6 |
| Latin America 17.4 |
| Middle East 16.2 |
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| Sources: IMF survey responses; IMF staff estimates; and _World Economic Outlook_ . |
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| [1] Average refund level over a four-year period (1998 to 2001). |
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| 102. **Although, VAT refunds are undoubtedly a high compliance risk, denial of** |
| **refunds is not necessarily the best way to manage that risk** . The denial of refunds and |
| overbearing audit scrutiny of refund claims appear to reflect a misguided view that refunding |
| a Lei (which is treated as public expenditure) is somehow more detrimental to the revenue |
| effort that foregoing a Lei through underpayment of accurate VAT liabilities through under |
| reporting or other means (i.e., lost revenue receipts). In the case of Moldova, the various |
| legal provisions that are aimed at combating abuse of the VAT refund system have resulted |
| in a cumbersome system that has created high administrative costs for the STI and high |
| compliance costs for taxpayers. [15] Verification of input credits that are carried forward to be |
| set off against future VAT liabilities on the other hand are subjected to significantly less |
| scrutiny. Advanced tax administrations adopt a different approach by giving strong emphasis |
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| 15 In particular, the present requirement that a VAT refund cannot be made until the STI has confirmed that the |
| input tax in respect of any transaction has in fact been declared and paid as output tax by the other party to the |
| transaction, poses an unreasonable verification burden on the STI, which is effectively required to audit each |
| refund claim as a consequence. Similarly, the restriction of refunds to exporters to 20 percent of the value of |
| exported goods in the tax period also complicates the refund calculation and requires significant supporting |
| documentation. (This latter restriction exists to ensure refunds to exporters are restricted to the proportion of |
| their production that is actually exported so that they do not receive a more favourable treatment than domestic |
| producers in respect of goods destined for the domestic market.) |
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| to risk-based audit programs aimed at broad coverage of taxpayer groups and compliance |
| issues to combat abuse, rather than relying on legislative restrictions than frequently have |
| unintended consequences. In this way, compliance efforts are targeted at high risk taxpayers |
| while compliant taxpayers are left to conduct their business and contribute to growth and |
| employment, without the additional costs that universal restrictions and overbearing scrutiny |
| bring. |
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| 103. **An efficient VAT system would facilitate refunds to all taxpayers as soon as** |
| **possible.** This means paying refunds as a matter of course, subject of course to appropriate |
| risk-based controls, and as soon as possible. The stock of accumulated VAT credits presents |
| a significant transition problem for adopting such a full refunding approach. Given the high |
| value of accumulated VAT credits, a structured program will be needed to transition to a full |
| refunding approach. A first priority of such a program should be to arrest the growth in |
| accumulating credits, by allowing full refunding of excess input credits arising in the current |
| and future tax periods. The accumulated stock of credits can then be isolated and an ordered |
| and phased refunding program developed that can be accommodated within existing fiscal |
| constraints. |
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| **Claiming value-added tax refunds** |
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| 104. **The process for claiming VAT refunds is unnecessarily cumbersome** . There is |
| considerable scope for simplifying the refund claims system if full refunding is implemented. |
| In particular, no separate claims should be necessary, as taxpayers could simply indicate on |
| the VAT return how they want their refund treated (paid to their bank account, set off against |
| other tax liabilities, etc.). While the ability to set a refund entitlement against future tax |
| liabilities could be retained on a voluntary basis, this will require the necessary functionality |
| to be available in the taxpayer accounting system to accurately track the offsetting across |
| multiple tax periods. |
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| 105. **Audit scrutiny of VAT refunds could also be simplified** . Selective verification of |
| VAT refunds is simply one of many components of a wide-ranging audit program. Advanced |
| tax administrations (i.e., those applying principles of self-assessment and administering |
| domestic VAT along with income tax in a function-based organizational structure) give |
| strong emphasis to risk-based audit programs aimed at broad coverage of taxpayer groups |
| and compliance issues. The effectiveness of the current VAT refund audit strategy on the |
| other hand must be doubtful, as audit results are modest. As can be seen from Table 9 below, |
| despite purportedly high strike rates, VAT refund audits conducted during 2010 and 2011 |
| only yielded MDL 12.2 million and MDL 13.5 million respectively. These results are hardly |
| consistent with the high fraud risks attributed to VAT refunds. |
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| 46 |
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| **Table 9. Moldova: Value-Added Tax Refunds Audit Results, 2010–11** |
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| 2010 2011 |
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| Additional |
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| Tax (mil) Number |
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| Percent |
| Adjusted |
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| Additional |
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| Tax (mil) |
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| Number |
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| Percent |
| Adjusted |
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| Large taxpayers 93 62 2.3 85 65 4.6 |
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| Other taxpayers 1,157 53 9.9 1,344 50 8.9 |
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| **Total** **1,250** **12.2** **1,429** **13.5** |
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| Source: State Tax Inspectorate. |
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| **Budgeting for VAT refunds** |
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| 106. **Payments of refunds are sometimes delayed due to budget constraints** . Although |
| approval of refund claims is the responsibility of the STI, actual disbursement of refund |
| entitlements is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. Existing instructions allow the |
| STI 37 days to approve or disallow a refund claim and the Ministry of Finance 8 days to |
| facilitate disbursement of the refund amount. However, the disbursement is sometimes |
| delayed due to lack of funds, as Moldova treats refunds as expenditure rather than a revenue |
| item. [16] By following the example of many other countries, including countries in Europe |
| (Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and others) and adopting the approach of |
| paying VAT refunds from gross VAT receipts, such funding problems can be avoided. |
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| **Recommendations** |
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| 107. The following is recommended in respect of the administration of VAT refunds: |
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| - Remove all restrictions on VAT refund entitlements by allowing all VAT payers to |
| receive a full refund of excess input credits arising in the current and future tax |
| periods, subject to risk-based audit controls, which may require law changes. |
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| 16 |
| There are two methods of budgeting for VAT refunds: (1) making payments from gross VAT revenue; or |
| (2) paying from budget expenditure appropriations. With the latter method, an accurate forecast of refunds has |
| to be made to ensure adequate funds are appropriated to meet refund expenditures throughout the tax year, |
| which is invariably problematic and leads to an inability to meet refund claims when appropriated funds have |
| been exhausted. |
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| 47 |
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| - Consider gradually raising the reduced rate and/or limiting the scope of supplies |
| subject to the reduced rate. |
|
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|
|
| - Develop a structured program for repayment of accumulated credits that have arisen |
| in previous tax periods that allows the current stock of accumulated credits to be |
| depleted over a number of years and in a way that can be accommodated within fiscal |
| constraints. |
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|
|
| - Once refund entitlement restrictions are removed, remove the need for taxpayers to |
| make a separate application to receive their refund entitlement by treating the tax |
| return as the application in any case where an excess of input tax over output tax |
| occurs. |
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|
| - Remove the requirement that all VAT refunds are audited (whether before or after |
| payment of the refund) in favor of a targeted risk-based audit program. |
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|
| - Remove the requirement that VAT refunds are treated as an expenditure that requires |
| a budget appropriation and pay VAT refunds from gross VAT receipts. |
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| **B. Streamlining Headquarters and Field Offices Organization Structures** |
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| **Introduction** |
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| 108. **The mission was asked to again consider the organizational structures of the** |
| **STI.** Previous FAD missions have made key recommendations on STI structures for both the |
| headquarters and field offices. In particular, it was recommended that the STI: (1) strengthen |
| headquarters by implementing a headquarters organized according to functions with key |
| supporting departments; and (2) develop options for the rationalization and merger of |
| local tax offices into a consolidated regional delivery network. The observations and |
| recommendations on organizational matters made by previous missions are still valid and |
| are largely repeated here. |
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|
| 109. **The current organization of the STI is not markedly different from the** |
| **structure reviewed by previous FAD missions.** The STI has 1,986 employees spread |
| across headquarters (232 staff), a large taxpayer office (59 staff), a call center (13 staff) |
| and a network of 35 regional tax offices (1,682 staff). In addition, a state enterprise |
| “Fiscservinform” has been established to manage IT related issues on behalf of the STI. This |
| enterprise employs 117 staff, including 65 staff that deal with returns filing, data processing |
| and payments operations. The STI’s headquarters organization remains a hybrid largely |
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| 48 |
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| reflecting a functional organization design, with some features pertaining to taxpayer |
| segmentation and some remnants of “tax type” approaches. [17] |
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| **Field Offices** |
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| 110. **The number of offices within the delivery network remains unusually high in** |
| **comparison to the number of taxpayers** The 2008 mission reported that, based on the 2007 |
| FAD mission’s recommendations, the STI had developed a number of organizational models |
| that reduced the number of field offices to approximately eight. A reorganization proposal |
| was forwarded to the Government for consideration. However, the STI had at that stage not |
| obtained approval to proceed with the implementation. Today, the network of field offices |
| remains the same and no progress has been made on this issue. A radical overhaul and |
| slimming down of the network of field offices remains necessary. The aim of such a |
| structural reform is to make tax administration delivery more efficient and effective. In this |
| context, the STI should use an appropriate mix of re-organization methods, including: |
| merging offices and centralizing tasks. |
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| 111. **The STI should seek, over time, to merge the current 35 local tax offices into a** |
| **much reduced number of modernized facilities.** Perhaps not more than six–eight such |
| offices will be required. This would effectively establish regional offices that are large |
| enough to operate effectively across a number of municipalities. It is not only costly to |
| uphold the current number of rather small tax offices, it also imposes a risk to a uniform |
| implementation of tax laws throughout Moldova, as small offices cannot develop and |
| maintain sufficient knowledge, experience, and specialization in all aspects of tax |
| administration. The current infrastructure situation in Moldova may necessitate, though, that |
| limited tax administration presence be maintained in remote areas. This could be either in the |
| form of a permanent tax administration presence (small satellite offices) or an arrangement |
| where tax administration personnel are present a few days a month (mobile offices). Each |
| satellite office would report to the regional tax office in its geographic area. Merging tax |
| offices is a sensitive issue in most countries. Nevertheless, it is inconsistent with best |
| administrative practice and increasingly costly for the authorities to maintain small and |
| unviable offices when more efficient tax administration, with economies of scale, can be |
| achieved by consolidating tasks in fewer and more effective offices. |
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| 112. **Centralization of tasks should also be considered.** The STI has already achieved |
| important efficiency gains by centralizing national processing of tax returns to exploit |
| economies of scale over large volumes of processing. [18] A centralized contact center has also |
| been established in Chisinau to facilitate taxpayers’ service needs. These are very |
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| 17 The Tax Administration Methodology Directorate still has separate sections for direct and indirect taxes. |
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| 18 This task is performed by Fiscservinform. |
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| 49 |
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| commendable initiatives; the STI should continue in that direction and explore other areas of |
| tax administration where efficiency gains can be achieved by concentrating work in either a |
| single or a few places. This may involve, for example, that one specific task be performed by |
| one of the regional offices on behalf of all regional offices. Other tasks may be performed by |
| 2- 4 regional offices on behalf of all regional offices. [19] |
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| 113. **As a transitional measure, all field activities except taxpayer services could be** |
| **centralized into regional centers.** The STI could determine the six–eight offices that will |
| become the regional centers for tax administration and centralize all activities except |
| taxpayer services that require face-to-face contact with taxpayers, into those regional centers; |
| this would leave the remaining centers as small satellite offices that report to one of the |
| regions. The longer term future of these satellite offices can be determined later on the basis |
| of their cost viability. |
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|
| **Headquarters** |
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|
|
| 114. **Previous missions also made a number of observations about the STI** |
| **headquarters.** In particular (1) the headquarters appeared overly fragmented—there are |
| multiple accountabilities for delivery functions spread across deputy heads and there is a lack |
| of clarity between organizational units concerning some of the key tax administration |
| functions; and (2) there was not a clear delineation between headquarters and the field |
| operation. Although the STI has moved some way to redress these issues, further |
| improvements remain possible. |
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|
|
| 115. **The mission therefore reiterates the advice provided by previous missions.** It |
| recommends the STI to consider amending its structure to conform better to the structure set |
| out in Figure 2 below. This organization chart also incorporates current STI intentions to |
| establish units for Planning and Reform and Risk Management Analysis (both fully |
| supported by this mission) and this and previous FAD missions’ recommendations to |
| establish a unit dedicated to taxpayer services (program and product design). |
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| 116. **The proposal has taken account of current Government regulations, which allow** |
| **the tax agency to employ three deputy directors only** . Otherwise, the organization chart |
| would have shown four deputy director positions in that LTO would also be managed by a |
| deputy director. This is due to the importance of this unit to the overall collection of budget |
|
|
| 19 For example, in Denmark regional offices all perform identical core activities. However, a number of |
| specialized tasks (e.g., the administration of excises) are not performed at all regional offices. Instead, five |
| regional offices manage these tasks on behalf of all regional offices on top of their core tasks. To increase |
| corporate expertise and become “centers for excellence” on each particular issue, they collaborate and exchange |
| experience in a horizontal network; the networking may also include joint training activities to further improve |
| staff expertise and, thus, improve the quality of tax administration delivery. Other specialized tasks are |
| concentrated within other regional offices (two–eight), similarly working in a network. |
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| 50 |
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| revenue and the complexity and sensitivity of the work of the unit, which justifies and |
| necessitates a short reporting line to the STI Head. There is an urgent need to ease the |
| mentioned and other restrictions that limit the STI in establishing its organization structure |
| on the basis of its business needs. |
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| Figure 2. Moldova: Proposed Structure of Headquarters Organization |
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|
| **Recommendations** |
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|
| 117. These are the recommendations on organization structures, which are identical to |
| these made by previous missions: |
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|
|
| - Rationalize the network of field offices into six to eight regional centers. |
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|
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| - Strengthen headquarters by implementing a headquarters structure organized |
| according to function with key supporting departments. |
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| 51 |
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| **C. Modernizing Information Technology Systems** |
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|
|
| 118. **The STI’s IT system is outdated and does not adequately support core tax** |
| **administration functions.** Previous FAD missions have expressed concerns about the |
| capabilities of the STI’s IT system, which severely constrains ongoing reform efforts. As |
| noted in these reports, various functional areas are desperately in need of improved IT |
| support, and the inflexibility of those systems currently in place is also a significant |
| impediment to the much needed organizational streamlining of the STI’s field structure. |
| Many reform initiatives simply cannot be implemented in the current IT environment. These |
| missions have recommended that the IT system be upgraded or replaced with a new system. |
| In this context, the authorities are now with the World Bank exploring the possibilities for |
| launching a major project to reform the IT system and streamline all the associated business |
| processes, etc. |
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|
|
| 119. **It has been concluded that upgrading the current IT system is not a viable** |
| **option and a new system would need to be procured.** The procurement of a new IT system |
| is a significant undertaking, which will require substantial time and funding. The intention is |
| to acquire a Commercial Off-The-Shelf System (COTS)―a proven software package |
| consisting of a suite of products which are specifically designed for tax administration, along |
| with expert implementation staff. The project would require some customization of the |
| COTS software, the acquisition of hardware, the establishment of an appropriate network, |
| comprehensive re-engineer of the STI’s business processes to match the capabilities of a |
| modern IT system, and the training of STI personnel and the taxpayer community. |
|
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|
|
| 120. **There are major differences between implementing a COTS solution and a** |
| **project which involves major in-house software development of modifications to a** |
| **COTS solution.** The cost is known prior to making a decision to proceed. This is contrary to |
| projects involving major in-house design and build/integrate efforts, which are much harder |
| to estimate. Many such large-scale projects fail because of underestimation of both cost and |
| time-to-market factors. Another significant difference can be with business processes. |
| Implementation of a COTS product can deliberately adopt those business processes inherent |
| to the product. That is, the way the tax administration works is changed to match the product |
| selected. In cases where existing business processes in tax administration are far from best |
| practice (as is the case in Moldova), this style of implementation can also have the benefit of |
| automatically introducing best practice processes as well as systems. |
|
|
|
|
| 121. **The STI is determined to move quickly with the IT modernization and major** |
| **work has been done to develop a strategy for the reform.** Based on FAD advice and with |
| significant assistance of the resident EU tax administration advisor, efforts have been made |
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| 52 |
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| to develop major components of an IT strategy [20] for the reform in that the current state has |
| been fully documented. Efforts should now commence on defining the user requirements to a |
| new system (the future state report). In this context, it must be ensured that the STI’s |
| business units (e.g., taxpayer registration, returns processing, payment and arrears |
| management, audit, investigation, appeals, legal, human resource management, statistics) are |
| fully involved in the process, as it is critical that the business units” fully endorse the final |
| software package solution chosen. By including the business units in all stages, the project |
| will be recognized within the STI as a business led project and not just an IT initiative. |
|
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|
|
| 122. **Care should be taken to minimize any customization of the new software packet.** |
| Typically, businesses or government institutions who opt for COTS for their IT needs, |
| consider all options for adapting their internal business processes before contemplating |
| customization of the new software **.** Similarly, the STI should make every effort to ensure that |
| the level of software customization is kept to an essential minimum as customization will |
| defeat the purpose of selecting an off the shelf software package solution and will greatly |
| increase the cost of the overall IT systems modernization. Since modern tax administration |
| package systems accommodate modern tax administration business processes, the STI’s |
| business processes (and likely also a number of laws) should be redesigned to ensure the |
| necessary alignment with the new system – effectively a reverse re-engineering of the |
| business processes. The need for customization of the new system to the STI’s business |
| processes would consequently be reduced. This approach will therefore significantly curtail |
| the procurement and implementation timeframes and is likely to be less expensive. |
|
|
|
|
| 123. **There is a range of specialized COTS products available on the market.** These |
| can fulfill more granular functionalities such as tax accounting, rules/processing engines, |
| document management, reporting, analysis, workflow etc., and modern architecture can |
| facilitate integration of these products with already custom built items, which the STI may |
| want to maintain. The use of COTS products in high-risk, high dependency areas such as |
| accounting is the direction adopted generally across many industries/organizations and |
| commoditized products such as document management, and risk management; print/channel |
| management solutions also are generally used rather than custom made developments. |
| Similarly, packaged suites of integration tools are almost universally used rather than |
| attempting to reproduce functionality locally. |
|
|
|
|
| 124. **The current project governance framework within the STI will need to be** |
| **significantly strengthened to support the IT modernization reform.** While the WB may |
| likely undertake the tender activity to procure the new IT system, it is essential that the STI |
|
|
| 20 |
| An IT strategy normally comprises five components: (1) the business context and IT architecture positions; |
| (2) a current state report; (3) a future state report; (4) a transition plan; and (5) a maintenance plan. The end |
| product would be a comprehensive document containing the detailed user requirements for the new system. |
| This document would be critical for developing the tender to procure the new system. |
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| 53 |
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| manages the implementation of the IT system and the subsequent modernization of the |
| business processes. Therefore it is important that an appropriate governance framework is in |
| place in order to (1) ensure the most optimal use of resources by assessing project risks and |
| their impact on the overall program; (2) assign roles and responsibilities and demand |
| accountability; (3) balance and resolve possible conflicts between competing resource needs |
| of current revenue operations and reform activities; and (4) assure program/project financiers |
| that there is a sound accountability mechanism. It is recognized best practice to have all |
| projects managed by a central project office regardless of whether or not they are business or |
| IT related projects. Experienced project managers’ work across functions and in some cases |
| manage more than one project at a time in order to avoid duplication across the organization. |
|
|
|
|
| 125. **The role of business managers as owners of their part of the IT system will need** |
| **to be maintained within the STI.** While the responsibility for care and maintenance of the |
| IT systems may be outsourced to FiscServInform, ownership of the systems should be vested |
| in the various STI business managers whose business the IT system support. For example, |
| the registration component of the system should be owned by the manager in the STI |
| headquarters who is responsible for design issues relating to the service and registration |
| processes. Similarly, the collections system should be owned by the director for collections |
| and the audit case selection system by the audit director. The acceptance and performance of |
| their role as system owners will be critical for the introduction of a new IT system. A more |
| detailed description of the role and responsibilities of business managers as IT systems |
| owners is set out in Appendix 6. For illustration purposes only, the mission provided the STI |
| with a copy of recently established user requirements for an identical IT project in a tax |
| administration in Europe. |
|
|
|
|
| **Recommendations** |
|
|
|
|
| 126. These are the recommendations related to IT reform: |
|
|
|
|
| - Develop user requirements to a new system that will require minimal customization |
| of the future selected COTS software. |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensure an adequate modernization program governance framework is in place. |
|
|
|
|
| - Maintain the “business owner” role for IT systems across all STI business units. |
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| 54 |
|
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|
| **Appendix 1. Moldova: Preliminary Review of Tax Revenue Performance** |
|
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|
| **Overview of revenue performance** |
|
|
|
|
| **Tax revenue, as a percent of GDP, has been declining.** Table 10, below, displays the |
| tax revenue collection performance for the years 2007 through 2011 in both value terms |
| and as a percent of GDP, organized into Government Finance Statistics categories. |
| From 2007 to 2011 tax revenue has shown a decline of approximately 3.5 percentage |
| points of GDP, or roughly 10 percent. |
|
|
|
|
| **Table 10. Tax Revenue by Value and as a Percent of GDP, 2007–11.** |
|
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|
|
|
| |2007 2008 2009 2010 2011|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |
| |---|---|---|---|---| |
| |MDL<br>% of|MDL<br>% of|MDL<br>% of<br>|<br> MDL<br>% of|MDL<br>% of| |
|
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| (billions) |
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| GDP |
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| (billions) |
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| GDP |
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|
| (billions) |
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|
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|
| GDP |
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|
| (billions) |
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|
| GDP |
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| (billions) |
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|
| GDP |
|
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|
|
|
| **Tax revenue** **18.4** **34.4** **21.3** **33.8** **19.6** **32.4** **22.5** **31.4** **25.6** **30.9** |
|
|
| 1.1.1. Taxes on Income, Profits, and Capital Gains 2.7 5.1 2.2 3.5 1.9 3.2 2.0 2.8 2.3 2.8 |
|
|
| _Profit tax_ 1.4 2.6 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 |
|
|
| _Personal income tax_ 1.3 2.5 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.1 1.8 2.1 |
|
|
| 1.1.2. Taxes on Payroll and Workforce 5.2 9.7 6.6 10.5 7.0 11.5 7.5 10.4 8.2 9.9 |
|
|
| _Social Fund contributions_ 4.4 8.2 5.4 8.6 5.6 9.2 6.0 8.3 6.6 7.9 |
|
|
| _Health Fund contributions_ 0.8 1.6 1.2 1.8 1.4 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.6 2.0 |
|
|
| 1.1.3 Taxes on Property 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 |
|
|
| 1.1.4. Taxes on Goods and Services 9.0 16.8 10.7 17.0 9.1 15.1 11.2 15.6 13.1 15.8 |
|
|
| _VAT_ 7.6 14.2 9.1 14.5 7.6 12.6 9.1 12.7 10.5 12.6 |
|
|
| _Excises_ 1.4 2.6 1.6 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.7 3.2 |
|
|
| 1.1.5. Taxes on International Trade and Transactions 0.9 1.7 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.4 |
|
|
| 1.1.6. Other Taxes 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 |
|
|
|
|
| GDP 1/ 53.4 62.9 60.4 71.8 82.9 |
|
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|
|
| Source: Moldova Ministry of Finance. |
|
|
| 1/ Value for 2011 is a preliminary estimate. |
|
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|
|
| **Of particular concern has been the decline in the performance of the VAT and the** |
| **social fund payroll tax.** Together these two taxes comprised 66 percent of tax revenues |
| in 2011. In order to analyze the contributing factors to their declining performance |
| relative to GDP, the authorities have been asked to provide detailed breakdowns on the |
| collections. As of the time of the submission of this report only detailed data on domestic |
| VAT collections for the years 2008–11 has been assembled. Data on customs collections |
| of VAT, social fund contributions collections data, and additional data on domestic |
| collections of VAT is pending. Obtaining data from customs has proceeded slowly due to |
| the necessity for following protocols. The social insurance data might not be available |
|
|
| <!-- page: 56 --> |
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| 55 |
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|
|
| until June, as the due date for the 2011 detailed annual return is April 25. [21] On receipt of |
| this data a report with a more complete revenue performance analysis will be produced. |
|
|
|
|
| **Preliminary Results of Analysis of Domestic VAT Collections** |
|
|
|
|
| **Over the period 2009 to 2011, while VAT collections were falling in relation to GDP,** |
| **the amount of output declared on VAT returns actually increased in relation to** |
| **GDP.** Total declared output (taxable, zero-rated, and exempt supplies) grew in relation to |
| GDP from a ratio of 2.49 output to GDP to 2.54 output to GDP. This statistic reveals that |
| the reduced revenue performance may not be due to undeclared output of taxpayers, but |
| more relates to the nature of the output being declared. The VAT return data allows for |
| decomposing the output declared by taxpayers into supplies subject to the normal VAT |
| rate, supplies taxed at the reduced rate, zero-rated supplies, and exempt supplies. By |
| analyzing the changes in the proportions each of these supplies to total output estimates |
| of the revenue impacts of the changing proportions of each of these components of output |
| can be assessed. |
|
|
|
|
| **It is estimated that from 2009 to 2011, the increased proportion of reduced rate** |
| **supplies being declared reduced potential output tax on supplies by MDL 1.3 billion.** |
| This was estimated by comparing the proportion of reduced rate supplies to total output |
| for each month in 2011 to the corresponding month in 2009, for each sector of activity. |
| On average, reduced rate supplies grew from 8.4 percent of total output to 14.5 percent. |
| The difference in the amount of 2011 output which would have been taxable at the full |
| rate using the change in proportion of reduced rate output was then multiplied by the |
| difference between the normal rate and the reduced rate to estimate the potential change |
| in output tax. [22] For 2010 the increased proportion of reduced rate supplies, as compared |
| to 2009, reduced potential output tax by MDL 1.0 billion. |
|
|
|
|
| **It is also estimated that the increased proportion of zero-rated supplies in 2011, as** |
| **compared to 2009, reduced potential output tax by MDL 1.1 billion.** Again, this |
| estimate was performed by comparing the ratio of zero-rated supplies to total output |
| in 2009 and 2011, and applying the difference in the rates to the net change in volume of |
| such supplies. On average the proportion of zero-rated supplies to total output grew from |
| an average of 12.9 percent to 15.3 percent. For 2010 the increase proportion of zero-rated |
| supplies reduced potential output tax by MDL 0.5 billion. |
|
|
|
|
| 21 Following receipt of the returns, it could take six to eight weeks to capture and verify the data in the |
| system. |
|
|
|
|
| 22 The electricity, gas, and water sector was excluded from this analysis, due to the separate, lower, reduced |
| rate supply for gas supplies. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 57 --> |
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| 56 |
|
|
|
|
| **Offsetting these two reductions in output tax it is estimated that shifts in the** |
| **composition of output resulted in a slight decrease in credits for input tax of** |
| **MDL 0.1 billion.** Input tax credits would have been affected over the period by two |
| factors: increased output of reduced rate supplies may have resulted in reduced tax on |
| inputs, while there was a decrease in the amount of exempt output, which would have |
| increased claims for input tax credits. Unfortunately the impact of these two factors on |
| input tax credits claimed cannot be easily isolated, and so only a joint estimate can be |
| performed. The impact on input tax credits was estimated by calculating the input tax |
| credit to output ratio for 2009 (by tax period and sector) and applying it to the 2011 |
| returns data to estimate the change in input tax credits. [23] For 2010 the impact on input tax |
| credits would have been greater, resulting in a net decrease in input tax credits of |
| MDL 0.4 billion. |
|
|
|
|
| **The combined resultant impact on net VAT for 2011 is estimated to be MDL** |
| **2.3 billion, or roughly 2.7 percent of GDP.** [24] For 2010 the combined impact on net |
| VAT is estimated to have been MDL 1.1 billion, or around 1.6 percent of GDP. Part of |
| the revenue decrease would have also been offset by reduced support to farmers that was |
| implemented in 2010 as part of the package which increased the schedule of supplies |
| taxable at a reduced rate. |
|
|
|
|
| Figure 3. Moldova: Stock of Value-Added Tax Credit, As Reported on Line 21 of |
|
|
| the Value-Added Tax Return |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|  |
|
|
| 23 While it would be better to use the input tax credit to inputs ratio, large anomalies were discovered in the |
| values reported for inputs, yielding highly inconsistent ratio values. A more thorough examination of this |
| and other data issues will be provided in the final report on the revenue performance analysis. |
|
|
|
|
| 24 This is the reduce output tax from the increased proportion of reduced rate supplies, plus the reduced |
| output tax from increased zero-rated supplies, minus the drop in input tax credits. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 58 --> |
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| 57 |
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|
|
| **Of the estimated MDL 2.3 billion reduction in net VAT for 2011, MDL 0.8 billion** |
| **reduced VAT payable (or 0.9 percent of GDP), while MDL 1.5 billion (1.8 percent of** |
| **GDP) resulted in increased refundable VAT or additional excess-credit carry-** |
| **forward.** The decrease in net VAT impacts both the VAT payable as well as the VAT |
| refundable, or available to taxpayers as excess credit carry-forwards. As there was no |
| notable increase in the value of VAT refunds for 2011 (MDL 1.2 billion in 2009 |
| and 2011), the bulk of the impact of these changes would have been realized in the |
| accumulation of excess credits. As can be seen in Figure 3, while the stock of excess |
| credits declined in 2009, they grew substantially through 2010 and 2011. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 59 --> |
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|
| 58 |
|
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|
|
| **Appendix 2. Moldova: Nontax Administration Tasks Handled by the State Tax** |
|
|
| **Inspectorate** |
|
|
|
|
| - Disposal of seized goods, goods retained as evidence of crime and other property |
| that has fallen into state ownership. |
|
|
|
|
| - Collecting unpaid loans made by the State or its agencies to business borrowers. |
|
|
|
|
| - Collecting fines imposed on businesses or people who have carried out unlicensed |
| or banned economic activities. |
|
|
|
|
| - Carrying out audits to ensure that dividends due from state-owned companies to |
| the State have actually been paid. |
|
|
|
|
| - Checking the accuracy of settling state tax. |
|
|
|
|
| - Collecting a levy on the incomes of those opting for an alternative form of |
| compulsory military service. |
|
|
|
|
| - Collecting a special levy on natural gas supplies from a gas company. |
|
|
|
|
| - Monitoring aspects of international trade or finance at individual company level |
| where goods or funds end up in Moldova as a result of these trades. |
|
|
|
|
| - Collecting a levy on capital investment in the construction industry. |
|
|
|
|
| - Preventing and detecting specified illegal activity involving motor cars. |
|
|
|
|
| - Working with the Agriculture Ministry to police the sealing of containers used in |
| production of alcohol. |
|
|
|
|
| - Carrying out tax audits as requested by other state bodies as well as at the request |
| filed by the citizens. |
|
|
|
|
| - Certifying and auditing court-controlled bank accounts. |
|
|
|
|
| - Policing certain price controls on staple foods. |
|
|
|
|
| - Acting as a paying agent for certain State debts. |
|
|
|
|
| - Auditing businesses to determine the mark up rates and transport costs of |
| imported goods. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 60 --> |
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| 59 |
|
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|
|
| **Appendix 3. Moldova: Personal Income Tax Reporting for 2010** |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (H) |
| Percent of |
|
|
| Total PIT |
| (E)/ Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (in MDL) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (G) |
| Percent of |
|
|
| Gross |
| Income |
| (D)/Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (D) |
| Gross |
| Income |
| Reported |
| (in MDL) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (E) |
| PIT |
| Reported |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (C) |
| Statutory |
| Tax Rates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| for 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (A) |
|
|
|
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|
|
| (B) |
| Type of Income 1/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| (D) |
|
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|
|
|
|
| (A) Type of Income 1/ for 2010 (in MDL) (in MDL) (D) (E) |
|
|
| 1 Wages 7/18 Percent 23,206 1,489.46 82.8967 74.0933 |
| 2 Dividends 15 Percent 2,109 286.62 7.5371 14.2578 |
| 3 Rental and real estate 10 Percent 532 53.01 1.9009 2.6369 |
| income |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 Percent 532 53.01 1.9009 2.6369 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 Article 71 payments to |
| nonresidents |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Various 290 39.89 1.0365 1.9845 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 Interest 15 Percent 405 35.07 1.4473 1.7446 |
| 6 Patent payments 5 Percent 838 27.56 2.9945 1.3710 |
| 7 Royalties 15 Percent 257 27.18 .9167 1.2524 |
| 8 Other income Various 141 21.15 .5037 1.0521 |
| 9 Capital gains 7/18 Percent 97 14.55 .3465 .7238 |
| 10 Gambling and prizes 18 Percent 36 6.63 .1290 .3298 |
| 11 Payments settled by 15 Percent 30 4.47 .1063 .2222 |
| nonresidents |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 Promotional campaign |
| income |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 Percent 24 2.57 .0867 .1280 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 13 International income 15 Percent 13 1.97 .0470 .0981 |
| 14 Settlements with 15 Percent 7 1.07 .0255 .0532 |
| founders |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 Enterprises – natural |
| persons |
|
|
| 16 Equity draws from |
| corporations |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 Percent 5 .68 .0161 .0336 |
|
|
|
|
| 15 percent 3 .37 .0094 .0183 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 17 Annuities 18 Percent .03 .01 .0001 .0003 |
| Total 27,994 2,010.25 |
|
|
| 1/ Income and tax figures provided by STI. |
| 2/ STI withholding information program and CET08 (PIT return) information for 2010 have been |
| combined to determine gross income and PIT totals. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 61 --> |
|
|
| **Appendix 4. Moldova: Illustration of a Potential High-Wealth Individuals Project Plan (Phase 1)** |
|
|
|
|
| The first phase is to develop a working definition of a HWI taxpayer, identify taxpayers that meet this definition, and complete the |
| compliance risk assessment for identified HWI taxpayers. This assignment should be the responsibility of HWI Project Team. |
|
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|  |
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|
|
| **PHASE 1: ARTICULATE THE RISK (Start date: April 2012)** |
|
|
|
|
| _1)_ _Define what constitutes a high-wealth individual (HWI)_ March 2012 30 days April 2012 |
|
|
|
|
| _2)_ _Determine the HWI population based on the HWI definition_ April 2012 90 days May 2012 |
|
|
|
|
| _3)_ _Gather available data on the HWI population_ March 2012 90 days May 2012 |
|
|
|
|
| a) Identify data sources |
|
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|
|
| b) Complete a compilation and description of each data source |
|
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|
|
| c) Determine IT capability to electronically access data |
|
|
|
|
| d) Will a capacity to store HWI electronic data (e‐data) be possible? |
|
|
|
|
| i) If no, conventional file and storage methods will need to be provided. |
|
|
|
|
| ii) If yes, an e‐file for each HWI taxpayer will need to be created within a master |
| database. |
|
|
|
|
| e) Data entry from identified data sources to be completed |
|
|
| <!-- page: 62 --> |
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|  |
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|
|
| _4)_ _Analyze data and quantify the attributes and characteristics of this population_ May 2012 150 days June 2012 |
|
|
|
|
| a) Develop analytical process appropriate to review and summarize data compiled |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| b) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Complete analysis/review of data and compile into a usable summary of HWI |
| taxpayers |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| _5)_ _Complete a written summary highlighting:_ June 2012 210 days August 2012 |
|
|
|
|
| a) HWI attributes and characteristics |
|
|
|
|
| b) HWI trends |
|
|
|
|
| c) HWI PIT contributions for 2008, 2009, & 2010 |
|
|
|
|
| d) HWI tax gap projections |
|
|
|
|
| e) HWI risk compliance projections |
|
|
|
|
| f) Identify likely HWI taxpayers that high‐risk for noncompliance |
|
|
| <!-- page: 63 --> |
|
|
| 62 |
|
|
|
|
| **Appendix 5. Moldova: Illustration of a Potential Indirect Audit Training Schedule** |
|
|
|
|
| Implementation of Training for the Examination of Income: |
|
|
|
|
| 1. A training development team consisting of a project lead, an experienced auditor, a |
| HQ person, and a training officer would be recommended to coordinate necessary |
| training of auditors to implement indirect audit methodologies within STI. |
|
|
|
|
| 2. As the training materials are being prepared, the team will make recommendations |
| and decisions to support training delivery, such as approvals, budget, location, |
| facilities, number of participants, instructors, testing, and certification. |
|
|
|
|
| 3. Establish planned delivery dates for the training. |
|
|
|
|
| Major projected actions and timeline to ensure delivery of indirect training in 2013 are |
| outlined below. |
|
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|
|
| |Action|Timeline<br>Estimate<br>Calendar<br>Days|Accumulated<br>Time Calendar<br>Days|Estimated<br>Completion Date| |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| |1) Obtain necessary approvals for<br>funding and development of indirect<br>methods training. Include<br>in 2012/2013 training plan.|30 days|30 days|March 2012| |
| |2) Establish training development<br>team for approved course(s)|30 days|60 days|April 2012| |
| |3) Gather training guides, technical<br>materials, and internal procedures for<br>preparing the training materials|60 days|120 days|June 2012| |
| |4) Draft training materials|60 days|180 days|August 2012| |
| |5) Review and approve training<br>materials|60 days|240 days|October 2012| |
| |6) Schedule training and technical<br>support/instructors|30 days|270 days|November 2012| |
| |7) Start indirect training|120 days|480 days|March 2013| |
| |8) Estimated Completion Date|30 days|510 days|April 2013| |
|
|
|
|
| Delivery Dates: |
|
|
|
|
| Completion of indirect training in the spring of 2013 would allow skilled examiners to be |
| available for the expected audits of 2012 PIT using indirect methods to start in |
| July/August of 2013. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 64 --> |
|
|
| 63 |
|
|
|
|
| **Appendix 6. Moldova: Roles and Responsibilities of a Business Owner for** |
|
|
| **Information Technology Systems** |
|
|
|
|
| **General** |
|
|
|
|
| - Defines the scope and strategic objectives of the business system. Establishes |
| objectives and plans for the ongoing support, maintenance and enhancement of |
| the application. |
|
|
|
|
| - Learns and understands the overall purpose and sufficient details of the IT system |
| to manage or direct the day-to-day business operations of the system for their |
| unit’s area of responsibility. |
|
|
|
|
| - Conducts periodic reviews of the system operations in conjunction with IT to |
| ensure system is working as intended. |
|
|
|
|
| - When systems issues arise, ensures appropriate root cause problem resolution has |
| occurred and that system issues are addressed and communicated accordingly. |
|
|
|
|
| - Makes final decisions in situations where stored system data is inaccurate after |
| appraising the impact to system customers versus resources and time available to |
| fix the problem. |
|
|
|
|
| - Collaborates with IT to develop and maintain a system business continuity plan |
| including business-operating procedures to support the IT disaster recovery plan. |
|
|
|
|
| **System Changes and Enhancements** |
|
|
|
|
| - Defines system requirements for new systems and system enhancements. |
|
|
|
|
| - Reviews and prioritizes requests for new systems and system enhancements and |
| considers options including business process reengineering prior to |
| recommending an IT system change. |
|
|
|
|
| - For approved system changes, coordinates with their business analysts to ensure |
| an appropriate test plan is prepared and executed, and monitors the testing and |
| review of the system during development. |
|
|
|
|
| - Provides final approval for implementing changes to the production system and |
| formally accepts the system as complete and ready for production. |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensures the implementation of effective system roll-out plans to include, (1) |
| adequate user communications, (2) quality of user training and the related training |
| documents, and (3) preparedness of help desk support. |
|
|
|
|
| - Communicates planned and completed changes, improvements, and other |
| important information about the system to users and support personnel as needed. |
|
|
| <!-- page: 65 --> |
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| 64 |
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|
|
|
| - Participates in planning for enterprise system-wide upgrades. |
|
|
|
|
| **User Access Control** |
|
|
|
|
| - Establishes criteria for controlling user access to the various features of the |
| system including the prerequisites for users who need read/write access. |
|
|
|
|
| - Controls access to personal identity information. |
|
|
|
|
| **User Training and Support** |
|
|
|
|
| - Establishes and maintains a training program for all staff updating data in the |
| system and provide other training as needed for users who will be accessing and |
| reviewing information in the system. |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensures the availability and quality of user training and related materials, |
| reliability and the preparedness of help desk and other technical support processes |
| and personnel. |
|
|
|
|
| **Data Integrity** |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensures the availability, reliability and security of the business data stored in the |
| system. |
|
|
|
|
| - Recommends improvements to the system to maintain an efficient and accurate |
| process for providing taxpayer-oriented information. |
|
|
|
|
| - Oversees the maintenance and reviews data security, reliability, and integrity. |
|
|
|
|
| - Conducts periodic reviews with IT of the data to ensure data is accurate and |
| secure. |
|
|
|
|
| - Ensures data input controls are documented, effective, and tested periodically. |
|
|
|
|
| - Reviews and, if acceptable, approves requests to use data in standard management |
| reports, or as inputs to other systems. Participates in the development and |
| maintenance of standard management reports based on system data. |
|
|