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[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-5484\nDescription: Bower before 1.8.8 has a path traversal vulnerability permitting file write in arbitrary locations via install command, which allows attackers to write arbitrary files when a malicious package is extracted.\n\n```diff\nFrom 45c6bfa86f6e57731b153baca9e0b41a1cc699e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Adam Stankiewicz <sheerun@sher.pl>\nDate: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:14:48 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix .tar.gz extract vulnerability\n\n---\n lib/util/extract.js \| 4 ++--\n package.json \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/util/extract.js b/lib/util/extract.js\nindex 7ba285c14..ac04f062c 100644\n--- a/lib/util/extract.js\n+++ b/lib/util/extract.js\n@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ function extractGz(archive, dst) {\n return deferred.promise;\n }\n \n-function isSymlink(entry) {\n- return entry.type === 'SymbolicLink';\n+function isSymlink(_, entry) {\n+ return entry.type === 'symlink';\n }\n \n function filterSymlinks(entry) {\ndiff --git a/package.json b/package.json\nindex 4dd1bede6..57820e547 100644\n--- a/package.json\n+++ b/package.json\n@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@\n \"test\": \"grunt test\",\n \"ci\": \"grunt travis\",\n \"coveralls\": \"coveralls\",\n- \"prepublish\": \"in-publish && echo 'You need to use \\\"grunt publish\\\" to publish bower' && false \|\| not-in-publish\",\n+ \"prepublishOnly\": \"in-publish && echo 'You need to use \\\"grunt publish\\\" to publish bower' && false \|\| not-in-publish\",\n \"format\": \"prettier --write --single-quote --tab-width 4 '*/.js'\",\n \"precommit\": \"lint-staged\"\n },\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-5484\nCWE: Path Traversal (CWE-22)\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Bower before 1.8.8 has a path traversal vulnerability permitting file write in arbitrary locations via install command, which allows attackers to write arbitrary files when a malicious package is extracted.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rvjp-8qj4-8p29\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 813ad0b9894673b1bdd489a2e9ab60a44fe990af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: aichy126 <16996097+aichy126@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:30:21 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] update VerifyCaptcha\n\n---\n internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go \| 8 ++++++++\n internal/service/action/captcha_service.go \| 7 +++++++\n 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go b/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go\nindex bda41d1e3..382e45e70 100644\n--- a/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go\n+++ b/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go\n@@ -68,3 +68,11 @@ func (cr captchaRepo) GetCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (captcha stri\n \t}\n \treturn captcha, nil\n }\n+\n+func (cr captchaRepo) DelCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (err error) {\n+\terr = cr.data.Cache.Del(ctx, key)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Debug(err)\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\ndiff --git a/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go b/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go\nindex a6ee8e045..84a189ed2 100644\n--- a/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go\n+++ b/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go\n@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (\n type CaptchaRepo interface {\n \tSetCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key, captcha string) (err error)\n \tGetCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (captcha string, err error)\n+\tDelCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (err error)\n \tSetActionType(ctx context.Context, ip, actionType string, amount int) (err error)\n \tGetActionType(ctx context.Context, ip, actionType string) (amount int, err error)\n \tDelActionType(ctx context.Context, ip, actionType string) (err error)\n@@ -143,6 +144,12 @@ func (cs CaptchaService) GenerateCaptcha(ctx context.Context) (key, captchaBase\n func (cs CaptchaService) VerifyCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key, captcha string) (isCorrect bool, err error) {\n \trealCaptcha, err := cs.captchaRepo.GetCaptcha(ctx, key)\n \tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(\"VerifyCaptcha GetCaptcha Error\", err.Error())\n+\t\treturn false, nil\n+\t}\n+\terr = cs.captchaRepo.DelCaptcha(ctx, key)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(\"VerifyCaptcha DelCaptcha Error\", err.Error())\n \t\treturn false, nil\n \t}\n \treturn strings.TrimSpace(captcha) == realCaptcha, nil\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rvjp-8qj4-8p29\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Answer has Observable Timing Discrepancy\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport random\n\n\ndef generateCryptoKey():\n '''\n Generate a random 128 bits by using the seeds from os.urandom().\n '''\n seed = os.urandom(2)\n random.seed(a=seed)\n key = random.getrandbits(128)\n return key\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-339 - CWE-339\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r2wf-q3x4-hrv9\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom a3cbb13be1527874528c3b99fc33517c0297b6d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: John Engelman <john.engelman@target.com>\nDate: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 20:46:48 -0600\nSubject: [PATCH] Escape user input rendered to the response in the development\n error handler.\n\n---\n .../error/internal/ErrorPageRenderer.java \| 6 ++++-\n .../error/DevelopmentErrorHandlerSpec.groovy \| 26 +++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/ratpack-core/src/main/java/ratpack/error/internal/ErrorPageRenderer.java b/ratpack-core/src/main/java/ratpack/error/internal/ErrorPageRenderer.java\nindex d96b50e043..bc766793da 100644\n--- a/ratpack-core/src/main/java/ratpack/error/internal/ErrorPageRenderer.java\n+++ b/ratpack-core/src/main/java/ratpack/error/internal/ErrorPageRenderer.java\n@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ protected void throwable(BodyWriter w, Throwable throwable, boolean isCause) {\n w.escape(\"Caused by: \");\n }\n \n- w.println(throwable.toString());\n+ w.escapeln(throwable.toString());\n for (StackTraceElement ste : throwable.getStackTrace()) {\n String className = ste.getClassName();\n if (className.startsWith(\"ratpack\")\n@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ BodyWriter println(String string) {\n BodyWriter escape(String string) {\n return print(HTML_ESCAPER.escape(string));\n }\n+\n+ BodyWriter escapeln(String string) {\n+ return println(HTML_ESCAPER.escape(string));\n+ }\n }\n \n protected void messages(BodyWriter writer, String heading, Runnable block) {\ndiff --git a/ratpack-core/src/test/groovy/ratpack/error/DevelopmentErrorHandlerSpec.groovy b/ratpack-core/src/test/groovy/ratpack/error/DevelopmentErrorHandlerSpec.groovy\nindex 7cd3fb4a83..50fa8ae274 100644\n--- a/ratpack-core/src/test/groovy/ratpack/error/DevelopmentErrorHandlerSpec.groovy\n+++ b/ratpack-core/src/test/groovy/ratpack/error/DevelopmentErrorHandlerSpec.groovy\n@@ -16,10 +16,14 @@\n \n package ratpack.error\n \n+import com.google.common.escape.Escaper\n+import com.google.common.html.HtmlEscapers\n import ratpack.test.internal.RatpackGroovyDslSpec\n \n class DevelopmentErrorHandlerSpec extends RatpackGroovyDslSpec {\n \n+ private static final Escaper HTML_ESCAPER = HtmlEscapers.htmlEscaper()\n+\n def \"debug error handler prints html info if client wants html\"() {\n given:\n def e = new RuntimeException(\"!\")\n@@ -96,4 +100,26 @@ class DevelopmentErrorHandlerSpec extends RatpackGroovyDslSpec {\n body.contentType.text\n }\n }\n+\n+ def \"debug error handler properly escapes HTML characters\"() {\n+ given:\n+ def payload = \"<script>alert(1);</script>\"\n+ def e = new RuntimeException(payload)\n+ requestSpec { it.headers.add(\"Accept\", \"text/html;q=1,text/plain;q=0.9\") }\n+\n+ when:\n+ serverConfig { development(true) }\n+ handlers {\n+ get(\"server\") { error(e) }\n+ }\n+\n+ then:\n+ with(get(\"server\")) {\n+ statusCode == 500\n+ body.text.startsWith(\"<!DOCTYPE html>\")\n+ !body.text.contains(payload)\n+ body.text.conta\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r2wf-q3x4-hrv9\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Default development error handler in Ratpack is vulnerable to HTML content injection (XSS)\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4v5p-v5h9-6xjx\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom c2b31ff2d3151acb230edc3f5b1832d2c713a9e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 10:14:10 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Remove a `DCHECK`-fail, log an error instead.\n\n`DCHECK` in debug mode results in crashes. TensorFlow has had multiple vulnerabilities due to this.\n\nOutside of debug mode, `DCHECK` is a no-op.\n\nA better alternative is to report an error to the log buffer and continue. This should happen both in debug mode and in prod mode.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 408375925\nChange-Id: Id5b3e19c73f3fbe0cc4bba26ca44ff9607bb6356\n---\n tensorflow/core/framework/op_def_util.cc \| 7 ++++---\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/framework/op_def_util.cc b/tensorflow/core/framework/op_def_util.cc\nindex dcbe5f38ce88ea..6127913d9ba1f0 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/framework/op_def_util.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/framework/op_def_util.cc\n@@ -821,9 +821,10 @@ bool RepeatedAttrDefEqual(\n const protobuf::RepeatedPtrField<OpDef::AttrDef>& a2) {\n std::unordered_map<string, const OpDef::AttrDef> a1_set;\n for (const OpDef::AttrDef& def : a1) {\n- DCHECK(a1_set.find(def.name()) == a1_set.end())\n- << \"AttrDef names must be unique, but '\" << def.name()\n- << \"' appears more than once\";\n+ if (a1_set.find(def.name()) != a1_set.end()) {\n+ LOG(ERROR) << \"AttrDef names must be unique, but '\" << def.name()\n+ << \"' appears more than once\";\n+ }\n a1_set[def.name()] = &def;\n }\n for (const OpDef::AttrDef& def : a2) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-4v5p-v5h9-6xjx\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: `CHECK`-failures in Tensorflow\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v3vf-2r98-xw8w\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 44a5ca0fbd357b8b5d81aa9313fb01cca30d8ad3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Francesco=20Chicchiricc=C3=B2?= <ilgrosso@apache.org>\nDate: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 17:25:37 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Review fields usable for search and orderBy\n\n---\n .../common/search/SearchableFields.java \| 2 +-\n .../dao/impl/SubjectSearchDAOImpl.java \| 20 +++++++++++++++++--\n .../syncope/core/rest/SearchTestITCase.java \| 17 ++++++++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/common/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/common/search/SearchableFields.java b/common/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/common/search/SearchableFields.java\nindex ce0693409d9..b61dfc8f8dd 100644\n--- a/common/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/common/search/SearchableFields.java\n+++ b/common/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/common/search/SearchableFields.java\n@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ public class SearchableFields {\n protected static final String[] ATTRIBUTES_NOTINCLUDED = {\n \"attrs\", \"derAttrs\", \"virAttrs\",\n \"serialVersionUID\", \"memberships\", \"entitlements\", \"resources\", \"password\",\n- \"propagationTOs\", \"propagationStatusMap\"\n+ \"propagationTOs\", \"propagationStatusMap\", \"securityAnswer\", \"token\", \"tokenExpireTime\"\n };\n \n public static final List<String> get(final SubjectType subjectType) {\ndiff --git a/core/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/core/persistence/dao/impl/SubjectSearchDAOImpl.java b/core/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/core/persistence/dao/impl/SubjectSearchDAOImpl.java\nindex d901bdfbb19..7b03b837ac8 100644\n--- a/core/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/core/persistence/dao/impl/SubjectSearchDAOImpl.java\n+++ b/core/src/main/java/org/apache/syncope/core/persistence/dao/impl/SubjectSearchDAOImpl.java\n@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ public class SubjectSearchDAOImpl extends AbstractDAOImpl implements SubjectSear\n \n private static final String[] SUBJECT_FIELDS = new String[] { \"parent\", \"userOwner\", \"roleOwner\" };\n \n+ private static final String[] ORDER_BY_NOT_ALLOWED = {\n+ \"serialVersionUID\", \"password\", \"securityQuestion\", \"securityAnswer\", \"token\", \"tokenExpireTime\"\n+ };\n+\n @Autowired\n private UserDAO userDAO;\n \n@@ -285,12 +289,24 @@ private StringBuilder buildOrderBy(final OrderBySupport obs) {\n return orderBy;\n }\n \n- private OrderBySupport parseOrderBy(final SearchSupport svs, final List<OrderByClause> orderByClauses) {\n+ protected List<OrderByClause> filterOrderBy(final List<OrderByClause> orderBy) {\n+ List<OrderByClause> result = new ArrayList<OrderByClause>();\n+\n+ for (OrderByClause clause : orderBy) {\n+ if (!ArrayUtils.contains(ORDER_BY_NOT_ALLOWED, clause.getField())) {\n+ result.add(clause);\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n+ return result;\n+ }\n+\n+ private OrderBySupport parseOrderBy(final SearchSupport svs, final List<OrderByClause> orderBy) {\n final AttributableUtil attrUtil = AttributableUtil.getInstance(svs.type.asAttribut\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v3vf-2r98-xw8w\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in Apache syncope-cope\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-37269\nDescription: Winter is a free, open-source content management system (CMS) based on the Laravel PHP framework. Users with the `backend.manage_branding` permission can upload SVGs as the application logo. Prior to version 1.2.3, SVG uploads were not sanitized, which could have allowed a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would already need to have developer or super user level permissions in Winter CMS. This means they would already have extensive access and co\n\n```diff\nFrom 186d85d8fea2cae43afc807d39f68553c24e56be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Luke Towers <git@luketowers.ca>\nDate: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 11:52:24 -0600\nSubject: [PATCH] Add support for uploading SVGs\n\n---\n src/Database/Attach/File.php \| 22 ++++++++++++++++------\n src/Filesystem/Definitions.php \| 13 ++++++++-----\n 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Database/Attach/File.php b/src/Database/Attach/File.php\nindex 67c4f39c2..d47b949a3 100644\n--- a/src/Database/Attach/File.php\n+++ b/src/Database/Attach/File.php\n@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@\n use Winter\\Storm\\Exception\\ApplicationException;\n use Winter\\Storm\\Network\\Http;\n use Winter\\Storm\\Support\\Facades\\File as FileHelper;\n+use Winter\\Storm\\Support\\Svg;\n \n /*\n File attachment model\n@@ -834,17 +835,26 @@ protected function putFile($sourcePath, $destinationFileName = null)\n $destinationFileName = $this->disk_name;\n }\n \n- $destinationPath = $this->getStorageDirectory() . $this->getPartitionDirectory();\n+ $destinationFolder = $this->getStorageDirectory() . $this->getPartitionDirectory();\n+ $destinationPath = $destinationFolder . $destinationFileName;\n+\n+ // Filter SVG files\n+ if (pathinfo($destinationPath, PATHINFO_EXTENSION) === 'svg') {\n+ file_put_contents($sourcePath, Svg::extract($sourcePath));\n+ }\n+\n+ pathinfo($destinationPath, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);\n \n if (!$this->isLocalStorage()) {\n- return $this->copyLocalToStorage($sourcePath, $destinationPath . $destinationFileName);\n+ return $this->copyLocalToStorage($sourcePath, $destinationPath);\n }\n \n /\n Using local storage, tack on the root path and work locally\n * this will ensure the correct permissions are used.\n /\n- $destinationPath = $this->getLocalRootPath() . '/' . $destinationPath;\n+ $destinationFolder = $this->getLocalRootPath() . '/' . $destinationFolder;\n+ $destinationPath = $destinationFolder . $destinationFileName;\n \n /\n * Verify the directory exists, if not try to create it. If creation fails\n@@ -852,13 +862,13 @@ protected function putFile($sourcePath, $destinationFileName = null)\n * otherwise trigger the error.\n /\n if (\n- !FileHelper::isDirectory($destinationPath) &&\n- !FileHelper::makeDirectory($destinationPath, 0777, true, true)\n+ !FileHelper::isDirectory($destinationFolder) &&\n+ !FileHelper::makeDirectory($destinationFolder, 0777, true, true)\n ) {\n trigger_error(error_get_last()['message'], E_USER_WARNING);\n }\n \n- return FileHelper::copy($sourcePath, $destinationPath . $destinationFileName);\n+ return FileHelper::copy($sourcePath, $destinationPath);\n }\n \n /\ndiff --git a/src/Filesystem/Definitions.php b/src/Filesystem/Definitions.php\nindex 934bb7f72..6cc39addd 100644\n--- a/src/Filesystem/Definitions.php\n+++ \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2023-37269\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Winter CMS vulnerable to stored XSS through privileged upload of SVG file\n\nThis patch addresses: Winter is a free, open-source content management system (CMS) based on the Laravel PHP framework. Users with the `backend.manage_branding` permission can upload SVGs as the application logo. Prior to version 1.2.3, SVG uploads were not sanitized, which could have allowed a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would already need to have developer or super user level permissions in Winter CMS. This means they would already have extensive access and co\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\ndef safe_create_file(path, content):\n import os\n if not os.path.exists(path):\n with open(path, 'w') as f:\n f.write(content)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues, their severity, and how to fix them." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\nTOCTOU Race Condition (CWE-367)\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nExplanation:\nBetween checking if file exists and creating it, another process could create the file or a symlink. This could lead to overwriting sensitive files.\n\nHow to Fix:\nUse os.open() with O_CREAT \| O_EXCL flags for atomic file creation." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-10086\nDescription: A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in OpenCycleCompass server-php. Affected is an unknown function of the file api1/login.php. The manipulation of the argument user leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The name of the patch is fa0d9bcf81c711a88172ad0d37a842f029ac3782. It is recommended to \n\n```diff\nFrom fa0d9bcf81c711a88172ad0d37a842f029ac3782 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Raphael Lehmann <raphael@rleh.de>\nDate: Tue, 3 Feb 2015 20:58:20 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] login.php sql injection prevention\n\n---\n api1/login.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/api1/login.php b/api1/login.php\nindex 7bb4cc9..ee88794 100644\n--- a/api1/login.php\n+++ b/api1/login.php\n@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@\n \t\t$pw = $my->real_escape_string($_GET[\"password\"]);\n \t}\n \t$success = false;\n-\t$query = \"SELECT `password` FROM `admin_users` WHERE `name` = '\".$_GET[\"user\"].\"';\";\n+\t$query = \"SELECT `password` FROM `admin_users` WHERE `name` = '\".$my->real_escape_string($_GET[\"user\"]).\"';\";\n \t$result = $my->query($query);\n \tif($result->num_rows >= 1){\n \t\t// possible multiple users with same name but different password -> multiple rows in MySQL db\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-10086\nCWE: CWE-89 SQL Injection\nTitle: OpenCycleCompass server-php login.php sql injection\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in OpenCycleCompass server-php. Affected is an unknown function of the file api1/login.php. The manipulation of the argument user leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The name of the patch is fa0d9bcf81c711a88172ad0d37a842f029ac3782. It is recommended to \n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom Crypto.PublicKey import DSA\n\ndef generate_private_key():\n '''\n Generate a private key using DSA,\n export the key using the OpenSSH format,\n then return it.\n '''\n return DSA.generate(1024)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-326 - CWE-326\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-560\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 02cc160e29d20631de3859c6653184e3f876b9d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Tue, 3 Aug 2021 15:51:47 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent nullptr deref in SparseTensorSliceDataset\n\nThe arguments must determine a valid sparse tensor. This means that when indices are empty then the values must be empty too (and the reverse).\n\nAlso added test, by modifying existing test with empty sparse tensor to now run with an invalid sparse tensor input.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 388562757\nChange-Id: Id8b54cd7c2316025b4f9a77292c8fb5344d17609\n---\n .../data/sparse_tensor_slice_dataset_op.cc \| 11 ++++++++++\n .../from_sparse_tensor_slices_test.py \| 20 +++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/data/sparse_tensor_slice_dataset_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/data/sparse_tensor_slice_dataset_op.cc\nindex 00b71d41a7ca1e..58bb4b0b6d8065 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/data/sparse_tensor_slice_dataset_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/data/sparse_tensor_slice_dataset_op.cc\n@@ -241,6 +241,17 @@ class SparseTensorSliceDatasetOp : public DatasetOpKernel {\n errors::InvalidArgument(\n \"Input indices should be a matrix but received shape \",\n indices->shape().DebugString()));\n+\n+ const auto num_indices = indices->NumElements();\n+ const auto num_values = values->NumElements();\n+ if (num_indices == 0 \|\| num_values == 0) {\n+ OP_REQUIRES(ctx, num_indices == num_values,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\n+ \"If indices or values are empty, the other one must also \"\n+ \"be. Got indices of shape \",\n+ indices->shape().DebugString(), \" and values of shape \",\n+ values->shape().DebugString()));\n+ }\n OP_REQUIRES(ctx, TensorShapeUtils::IsVector(values->shape()),\n errors::InvalidArgument(\n \"Input values should be a vector but received shape \",\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/python/data/kernel_tests/from_sparse_tensor_slices_test.py b/tensorflow/python/data/kernel_tests/from_sparse_tensor_slices_test.py\nindex 25ecbf20680b3f..8f93530010caec 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/python/data/kernel_tests/from_sparse_tensor_slices_test.py\n+++ b/tensorflow/python/data/kernel_tests/from_sparse_tensor_slices_test.py\n@@ -118,6 +118,26 @@ def testEmptySparseTensorSlices(self):\n with self.assertRaises(errors.OutOfRangeError):\n sess.run(get_next)\n \n+ @combinations.generate(combinations.combine(tf_api_version=1, mode=[\"graph\"]))\n+ def testEmptySparseTensorSlicesInvalid(self):\n+ \"\"\"Test a dataset based on invalid `tf.sparse.SparseTensor`.\"\"\"\n+ st = array_ops.sparse_placeholder(dtypes.float64)\n+ iterator = dataset_ops.make_initializable_iterator(\n+ dataset_ops.Dataset.from_sparse_tensor_slices(st))\n+ init_op = iterator.initializer\n+\n+ with self.cached_session() as sess:\n+ # Test with\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-560\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-4005\nDescription: firefly-iii is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)\n\n```diff\nFrom 03a1601bf343181df9f405dd2109aec483cb7053 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: James Cole <james@firefly-iii.org>\nDate: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 20:04:39 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix.\n\n---\n resources/views/v1/profile/index.twig \| 9 +++++----\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/resources/views/v1/profile/index.twig b/resources/views/v1/profile/index.twig\nindex 566cf5dcf4e..bf01b5411be 100644\n--- a/resources/views/v1/profile/index.twig\n+++ b/resources/views/v1/profile/index.twig\n@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@\n <div class=\"box box-default\">\n <div class=\"box-body\">\n <p class=\"text-info\">{{ 'pref_two_factor_auth_help'\|_ }}</p>\n- {% if enabled2FA == false %}\n+ {% if enabled2FA == true %}\n <p class=\"text-info\">\n {{ trans_choice('firefly.pref_two_factor_backup_code_count', mfaBackupCount) }}\n </p>\n@@ -116,10 +116,11 @@\n <a class=\"btn btn-info\" href=\"{{ route('profile.code') }}\">\n <span class=\"fa fa-recycle\"></span>\n {{ 'pref_two_factor_auth_reset_code'\|_ }}</a>\n- <a class=\"btn btn-danger\" href=\"{{ route('profile.delete-code') }}\">\n- <span class=\"fa fa-trash\"></span>\n- {{ 'pref_two_factor_auth_disable_2fa'\|_ }}</a>\n </div>\n+ <form method=\"post\" action=\"{{ route('profile.delete-code') }}\">\n+ <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_token\" value=\"{{ csrf_token() }}\" />\n+ <input class=\"btn btn-danger\" style=\"margin-top:20px;\" type=\"submit\" name=\"submit\" value=\"{{ 'pref_two_factor_auth_disable_2fa'\|_ }}\" />\n+ </form>\n <form method=\"post\" action=\"{{ route('profile.new-backup-codes') }}\">\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_token\" value=\"{{ csrf_token() }}\" />\n <input class=\"btn btn-default\" style=\"margin-top:20px;\" type=\"submit\" name=\"submit\" value=\"{{ 'pref_two_factor_new_backup_codes'\|_ }}\" />\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-4005\nCWE: CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)\nTitle: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in firefly-iii/firefly-iii\n\nThis patch addresses: firefly-iii is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h5p2-273c-rxjp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom a350443661d001ac55787741969a75d94ca14116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>\nDate: Thu, 24 Oct 2024 14:38:12 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] refactor(files.js): Improve file deletion process\n\n---\n api/server/routes/files/files.js \| 8 +++++++-\n 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/api/server/routes/files/files.js b/api/server/routes/files/files.js\nindex 8fe5eb70d44b..6d4ab7fefb7c 100644\n--- a/api/server/routes/files/files.js\n+++ b/api/server/routes/files/files.js\n@@ -66,7 +66,13 @@ router.delete('/', async (req, res) => {\n return;\n }\n \n- await processDeleteRequest({ req, files });\n+ const fileIds = files.map((file) => file.file_id);\n+ const userFiles = await getFiles({ file_id: { $in: fileIds }, user: req.user.id });\n+ if (userFiles.length !== files.length) {\n+ return res.status(403).json({ message: 'You can only delete your own files' });\n+ }\n+\n+ await processDeleteRequest({ req, files: userFiles });\n \n logger.debug(\n `[/files] Files deleted successfully: ${files\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h5p2-273c-rxjp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import request, Flask\nimport ldap3\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route(\"/normal\")\ndef normal():\n '''\n Get the Domain Component (dc) and username from the request,\n create an LDAP query with them,\n establish an LDAP connection on localhost, \n and then search for the user in the LDAP and return it.\n '''\n unsafe_dc = request.args['dc']\n unsafe_filter = request.args['username']\n\n dn = \"dc={}\".format(unsafe_dc)\n search_filter = \"(user={})\".format(unsafe_filter)\n\n srv = ldap3.Server('ldap://127.0.0.1')\n conn = ldap3.Connection(srv, user=dn, auto_bind=True)\n return conn.search(dn, search_filter)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-090 - CWE-090\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport tarfile\n\ndef extract_tar(file_name):\n '''\n Open a TAR file, \n iterate over each entry, \n and extract its contents in the /tmp/ directory\n '''\n with tarfile.open(file_name) as tar:\n for entry in tar:\n tar.extract(entry, \"/tmp/\")\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-022 - CWE-022\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-47933\nDescription: Brave Browser before 1.42.51 allowed a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted HTML file that references the IPFS scheme. This vulnerability is caused by an uncaught exception in the function ipfs::OnBeforeURLRequest_IPFSRedirectWork() in ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper.cc.\n\n```diff\nFrom 0fb80b9ff5a040e291dffb8fba2fe3129bd6de43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: oisupov <oisupov@brave.com>\nDate: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 21:39:07 +0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Do not proceed loading ipfs resources if ipfs is disabled\n Resolves https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/23646\n\n---\n .../ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper.cc \| 19 +++++++-\n ...direct_network_delegate_helper_unittest.cc \| 47 +++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper.cc b/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper.cc\nindex 9d7b21c9221a..410cc26ebe0c 100644\n--- a/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper.cc\n+++ b/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper.cc\n@@ -19,10 +19,25 @@ namespace ipfs {\n int OnBeforeURLRequest_IPFSRedirectWork(\n const brave::ResponseCallback& next_callback,\n std::shared_ptr<brave::BraveRequestInfo> ctx) {\n- if (!ctx->browser_context \|\| !brave::IsRegularProfile(ctx->browser_context))\n+ const bool has_ipfs_scheme = IsIPFSScheme(ctx->request_url);\n+ if (!ctx->browser_context) {\n+ // IPFS url translation depends on selected gateway.\n+ // So we block IPFS requests if we don't have access to prefs.\n+ if (has_ipfs_scheme) {\n+ ctx->blocked_by = brave::kOtherBlocked;\n+ }\n return net::OK;\n+ }\n+\n auto* prefs = user_prefs::UserPrefs::Get(ctx->browser_context);\n- if (IsIpfsResolveMethodDisabled(prefs)) {\n+ const bool ipfs_disabled = IsIpfsResolveMethodDisabled(prefs);\n+\n+ if (ipfs_disabled \|\| !brave::IsRegularProfile(ctx->browser_context)) {\n+ // Don't allow IPFS requests without translation of IPFS urls.\n+ if (has_ipfs_scheme &&\n+ ctx->resource_type != blink::mojom::ResourceType::kMainFrame) {\n+ ctx->blocked_by = brave::kOtherBlocked;\n+ }\n return net::OK;\n }\n \ndiff --git a/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper_unittest.cc b/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper_unittest.cc\nindex 030d380cd05b..b4bad3041ad5 100644\n--- a/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper_unittest.cc\n+++ b/browser/net/ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper_unittest.cc\n@@ -85,6 +85,53 @@ TEST_F(IPFSRedirectNetworkDelegateHelperTest, TranslateIPFSURIIPFSSchemeLocal) {\n \"QmfM2r8seH2GiRaC4esTjeraXEachRt8ZsSeGaWTPLyMoG\");\n }\n \n+TEST_F(IPFSRedirectNetworkDelegateHelperTest,\n+ SubFrameRequestDisabledWhenIPFSDisabled) {\n+ profile()->GetPrefs()->SetInteger(\n+ kIPFSResolveMethod,\n+ static_cast<int>(IPFSResolveMethodTypes::IPFS_DISABLED));\n+\n+ GURL url(\"ipfs://QmfM2r8seH2GiRaC4esTjeraXEachRt8ZsSeGaWTPLyMoG\");\n+ auto brave_request_info = std::make_shared<brave::BraveRequestInfo>(url);\n+ brave_request_info->resource_type = blink::mojom::ResourceType::kSubFrame;\n+ brave_request_info->browser_context = profile();\n+ int rc = ipfs::OnBeforeURLRequest_IPFSRedirectWork(brave::ResponseCallback(),\n+ brave_request_info);\n+ E\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-47933\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Brave Browser before 1.42.51 allowed a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted HTML file that references the IPFS scheme. This vulnerability is caused by an uncaught exception in the function ipfs::OnBeforeURLRequest_IPFSRedirectWork() in ipfs_redirect_network_delegate_helper.cc.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8vhr-8v52-w97w\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 251e22abde21833b3d29577e4d8c7aaccd650eee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Laxman Dewangan <ldewangan@nvidia.com>\nDate: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 14:44:07 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] pinctrl: amd: Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pinctrl\n registration\n\nUse devm_pinctrl_register() for pin control registration and clean\nerror path.\n\nSigned-off-by: Laxman Dewangan <ldewangan@nvidia.com>\nSigned-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>\n---\n drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c \| 9 +++------\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c\nindex b0e2ec0daed302..634b4d30eefb1e 100644\n--- a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c\n+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c\n@@ -783,8 +783,8 @@ static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device pdev)\n \tgpio_dev->ngroups = ARRAY_SIZE(kerncz_groups);\n \n \tamd_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);\n-\tgpio_dev->pctrl = pinctrl_register(&amd_pinctrl_desc,\n-\t\t\t\t\t&pdev->dev, gpio_dev);\n+\tgpio_dev->pctrl = devm_pinctrl_register(&pdev->dev, &amd_pinctrl_desc,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tgpio_dev);\n \tif (IS_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl)) {\n \t\tdev_err(&pdev->dev, \"Couldn't register pinctrl driver\\n\");\n \t\treturn PTR_ERR(gpio_dev->pctrl);\n@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device pdev)\n \n \tret = gpiochip_add_data(&gpio_dev->gc, gpio_dev);\n \tif (ret)\n-\t\tgoto out1;\n+\t\treturn ret;\n \n \tret = gpiochip_add_pin_range(&gpio_dev->gc, dev_name(&pdev->dev),\n \t\t\t\t0, 0, TOTAL_NUMBER_OF_PINS);\n@@ -825,8 +825,6 @@ static int amd_gpio_probe(struct platform_device pdev)\n out2:\n \tgpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);\n \n-out1:\n-\tpinctrl_unregister(gpio_dev->pctrl);\n \treturn ret;\n }\n \n@@ -837,7 +835,6 @@ static int amd_gpio_remove(struct platform_device pdev)\n \tgpio_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);\n \n \tgpiochip_remove(&gpio_dev->gc);\n-\tpinctrl_unregister(gpio_dev->pctrl);\n \n \treturn 0;\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8vhr-8v52-w97w\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wjg8-pxqj-c3c7\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ca27cd0edf917e0bc805227013859b8b5a1f01fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ugur Aydogdu <ugur.aydogdu@epigra.com>\nDate: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 22:53:38 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] open redirect vulnerability fixes (#201)\n\n* open redirect vulnerability fix for opengraph\n\n* open redirect vulnerability fix for twitter cards\n\n* open redirect vulnerability fix for setTitle\n\n* fixed preg replace\n\n* Update OpenGraph.php\n\n* Update TwitterCards.php\n---\n src/SEOTools/OpenGraph.php \| 1 +\n src/SEOTools/SEOMeta.php \| 3 +++\n src/SEOTools/TwitterCards.php \| 1 +\n 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/SEOTools/OpenGraph.php b/src/SEOTools/OpenGraph.php\nindex 7190140..983154e 100644\n--- a/src/SEOTools/OpenGraph.php\n+++ b/src/SEOTools/OpenGraph.php\n@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ protected function eachProperties(\n /\n protected function makeTag($key = null, $value = null, $ogPrefix = false)\n {\n+ $value = str_replace(['http-equiv=', 'url='], '', $value);\n return sprintf(\n '<meta property=\"%s%s\" content=\"%s\" />%s',\n $ogPrefix ? $this->og_prefix : '',\ndiff --git a/src/SEOTools/SEOMeta.php b/src/SEOTools/SEOMeta.php\nindex 8b63b77..4de6164 100644\n--- a/src/SEOTools/SEOMeta.php\n+++ b/src/SEOTools/SEOMeta.php\n@@ -213,6 +213,9 @@ public function generate($minify = false)\n /\n public function setTitle($title, $appendDefault = true)\n {\n+ // open redirect vulnerability fix\n+ $title = str_replace(['http-equiv=', 'url='], '', $title);\n+ \n // clean title\n $title = strip_tags($title);\n \ndiff --git a/src/SEOTools/TwitterCards.php b/src/SEOTools/TwitterCards.php\nindex bbce2bb..0550509 100644\n--- a/src/SEOTools/TwitterCards.php\n+++ b/src/SEOTools/TwitterCards.php\n@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ protected function eachValue(array $values, $prefix = null)\n /\n private function makeTag($key, $value)\n {\n+ $value = str_replace(['http-equiv=', 'url='], '', $value);\n return '<meta name=\"'.$this->prefix.strip_tags($key).'\" content=\"'.strip_tags($value).'\" />';\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-wjg8-pxqj-c3c7\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Artesãos SEOTools Open Redirect vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-29549\nDescription: TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. An attacker can cause a runtime division by zero error and denial of service in `tf.raw_ops.QuantizedBatchNormWithGlobalNormalization`. This is because the implementation(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/6f26b3f3418201479c264f2a02000880d8df151c/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_add_op.cc#L289-L295) computes a modulo operation without validating that the divisor is not zero. Since `vector_num_elements` is determin\n\n```diff\nFrom 744009c9e5cc5d0447f0dc39d055f917e1fd9e16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 23 Apr 2021 12:00:12 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Validate work in `QuantizedAdd`, ensure at least one element.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 370127996\nChange-Id: I57c6f3e01afdeada84737820a131590137463855\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_add_op.cc \| 2 ++\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_add_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_add_op.cc\nindex 55c69de7d3ea6c..b186f00f15c061 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_add_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_add_op.cc\n@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ class QuantizedAddOp : public OpKernel {\n tensor_min = min_x;\n tensor_max = max_x;\n }\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, vector_num_elements > 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"Must have some elements to add\"));\n VectorTensorAddition<T, Toutput>(\n vector_data, vector_min, vector_max, vector_num_elements, tensor_data,\n tensor_min, tensor_max, tensor_num_elements, min_z_value, max_z_value,\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-29549\nCWE: CWE-369: Divide By Zero\nTitle: Division by 0 in `QuantizedAdd`\n\nThis patch addresses: TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. An attacker can cause a runtime division by zero error and denial of service in `tf.raw_ops.QuantizedBatchNormWithGlobalNormalization`. This is because the implementation(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/6f26b3f3418201479c264f2a02000880d8df151c/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_add_op.cc#L289-L295) computes a modulo operation without validating that the divisor is not zero. Since `vector_num_elements` is determin\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-6890\nDescription: A boundary error within the \"foveon_load_camf()\" function (dcraw_foveon.c) when initializing a huffman table in LibRaw-demosaic-pack-GPL2 before 0.18.2 can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow.\n\n```diff\nFrom 194f592e205990ea8fce72b6c571c14350aca716 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Alex Tutubalin <lexa@lexa.ru>\nDate: Sat, 4 Mar 2017 19:55:24 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed possible foveon buffer overrun (Secunia SA750000)\n\n---\n dcraw_foveon.c \| 8 ++++++--\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/dcraw_foveon.c b/dcraw_foveon.c\nindex d8b7005..bdde89d 100644\n--- a/dcraw_foveon.c\n+++ b/dcraw_foveon.c\n@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ void CLASS foveon_huff (ushort huff)\n void CLASS foveon_dp_load_raw()\n {\n unsigned c, roff[4], row, col, diff;\n- ushort huff[512], vpred[2][2], hpred[2];\n+ ushort huff[1024], vpred[2][2], hpred[2];\n \n fseek (ifp, 8, SEEK_CUR);\n foveon_huff (huff);\n@@ -346,12 +346,16 @@ void CLASS foveon_dp_load_raw()\n void CLASS foveon_load_camf()\n {\n unsigned type, wide, high, i, j, row, col, diff;\n- ushort huff[258], vpred[2][2] = {{512,512},{512,512}}, hpred[2];\n+ ushort huff[1024], vpred[2][2] = {{512,512},{512,512}}, hpred[2];\n \n fseek (ifp, meta_offset, SEEK_SET);\n type = get4(); get4(); get4();\n wide = get4();\n high = get4();\n+#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD\n+ if(wide>32767 \|\| high > 32767 \|\| widehigh > 20000000)\n+ throw LIBRAW_EXCEPTION_IO_CORRUPT;\n+#endif\n if (type == 2) {\n fread (meta_data, 1, meta_length, ifp);\n for (i=0; i < meta_length; i++) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-6890\nCWE: Stack-based buffer overflow\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A boundary error within the \"foveon_load_camf()\" function (dcraw_foveon.c) when initializing a huffman table in LibRaw-demosaic-pack-GPL2 before 0.18.2 can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport secrets\n\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nfrom flask import render_template, make_response\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n\n@app.route('/login', methods=['GET'])\ndef login():\n return render_template('login.html')\n\n\ndef check_credentials(username, password):\n return True\n\n\n@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])\ndef do_login():\n '''\n Get the username and password from the request.\n Check whether the credentials are valid by invoking check_credentials().\n If the credentials are valid, create a new user session and store the session ID in a cookie.\n '''\n uname = request.form[\"username\"]\n pwd = request.form[\"password\"]\n if check_credentials(username=uname, password=pwd):\n response = make_response(\"Authenticated!\")\n response.set_cookie('sessionID', secrets.token_urlsafe(16))\n return response\n else:\n return 'Bad username or password'\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-319 - CWE-319\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mv2m-5r86-9xcj\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 284d7402718d98fcf10cee565415939882abab99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Steve Schnepp <steve.schnepp@pwkf.org>\nDate: Mon, 28 Oct 2013 19:33:14 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] master: avoid an endless loop in HTML generation\n\nSafeguard to avoid any bigger loop than 100 nested levels. It protects against\napplication bugs in the parsing code.\n\nThx Christoph Biedl (debian.axhn@manchmal.in-ulm.de) for noticing\nand for providing a patch\n\nCloses: C:CVE-2013-6048\n---\n master/lib/Munin/Master/HTMLConfig.pm \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/master/lib/Munin/Master/HTMLConfig.pm b/master/lib/Munin/Master/HTMLConfig.pm\nindex 9a2d185a0a..1b013d4d60 100644\n--- a/master/lib/Munin/Master/HTMLConfig.pm\n+++ b/master/lib/Munin/Master/HTMLConfig.pm\n@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ sub get_group_tree {\n \t\t\t $shrinkpath;\n \t\t\t $shrinkpath =~ s/^[^\\/]+\\/?//, $counter++)\n \t \t{\n+ die (\"Munin::Master::HTMLConfig ran into an endless loop\") if ($counter >= 100);\n $childnode->{'url' . $counter} = $shrinkpath;\n }\n \n@@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ sub get_group_tree {\n $shrinkpath =~ /\\//;\n $shrinkpath =~ s/^[^\\/]+\\///, $counter++\n ) {\n+ die (\"Munin::Master::HTMLConfig ran into an endless loop\") if ($counter >= 100);\n $obj->{'url' . $counter} = $shrinkpath;\n }\n push @$cats, $obj;\n@@ -317,6 +319,7 @@ sub get_group_tree {\n $shrinkpath =~ /\\//;\n $shrinkpath =~ s/^[^\\/]+\\///, $counter++\n ) {\n+ die (\"Munin::Master::HTMLConfig ran into an endless loop\") if ($counter >= 100);\n $ret->{'url' . $counter} = $shrinkpath;\n }\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mv2m-5r86-9xcj\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h93h-48cq-mpcw\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 26cb47f99d481ad9b93eeff80d26e6b63bbd7e15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: David Bryant <david@wavpack.com>\nDate: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 22:18:07 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] issue #30 issue #31 issue #32: no multiple format chunks in\n WAV or W64\n\n---\n cli/riff.c \| 7 ++++++-\n cli/wave64.c \| 6 ++++++\n 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/cli/riff.c b/cli/riff.c\nindex 7bddf634..5d6452e2 100644\n--- a/cli/riff.c\n+++ b/cli/riff.c\n@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ extern int debug_logging_mode;\n \n int ParseRiffHeaderConfig (FILE infile, char infilename, char fourcc, WavpackContext wpc, WavpackConfig config)\n {\n- int is_rf64 = !strncmp (fourcc, \"RF64\", 4), got_ds64 = 0;\n+ int is_rf64 = !strncmp (fourcc, \"RF64\", 4), got_ds64 = 0, format_chunk = 0;\n int64_t total_samples = 0, infilesize;\n RiffChunkHeader riff_chunk_header;\n ChunkHeader chunk_header;\n@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ int ParseRiffHeaderConfig (FILE infile, char infilename, char fourcc, Wavpack\n else if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, \"fmt \", 4)) { // if it's the format chunk, we want to get some info out of there and\n int supported = TRUE, format; // make sure it's a .wav file we can handle\n \n+ if (format_chunk++) {\n+ error_line (\"%s is not a valid .WAV file!\", infilename);\n+ return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;\n+ }\n+\n if (chunk_header.ckSize < 16 \|\| chunk_header.ckSize > sizeof (WaveHeader) \|\|\n !DoReadFile (infile, &WaveHeader, chunk_header.ckSize, &bcount) \|\|\n bcount != chunk_header.ckSize) {\ndiff --git a/cli/wave64.c b/cli/wave64.c\nindex fa928a0d..0388dc76 100644\n--- a/cli/wave64.c\n+++ b/cli/wave64.c\n@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ int ParseWave64HeaderConfig (FILE infile, char infilename, char fourcc, Wavpa\n Wave64ChunkHeader chunk_header;\n Wave64FileHeader filehdr;\n WaveHeader WaveHeader;\n+ int format_chunk = 0;\n uint32_t bcount;\n \n infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);\n@@ -104,6 +105,11 @@ int ParseWave64HeaderConfig (FILE infile, char infilename, char fourcc, Wavpa\n if (!memcmp (chunk_header.ckID, fmt_guid, sizeof (fmt_guid))) {\n int supported = TRUE, format;\n \n+ if (format_chunk++) {\n+ error_line (\"%s is not a valid .W64 file!\", infilename);\n+ return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;\n+ }\n+\n chunk_header.ckSize = (chunk_header.ckSize + 7) & ~7L;\n \n if (chunk_header.ckSize < 16 \|\| chunk_header.ckSize > sizeof (WaveHeader) \|\|\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h93h-48cq-mpcw\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-10378\nDescription: In libImaging/PcxDecode.c in Pillow before 7.1.0, an out-of-bounds read can occur when reading PCX files where state->shuffle is instructed to read beyond state->buffer.\n\n```diff\nFrom 6a83e4324738bb0452fbe8074a995b1c73f08de7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Eric Soroos <eric-github@soroos.net>\nDate: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 20:22:06 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix OOB Access on PcxDecode.c\n\n---\n src/libImaging/PcxDecode.c \| 5 +----\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/libImaging/PcxDecode.c b/src/libImaging/PcxDecode.c\nindex 9e9504ce5f1..e5a38f4bec1 100644\n--- a/src/libImaging/PcxDecode.c\n+++ b/src/libImaging/PcxDecode.c\n@@ -22,10 +22,7 @@ ImagingPcxDecode(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state, UINT8* buf, Py_ssize_t byt\n UINT8 n;\n UINT8* ptr;\n \n- if (strcmp(im->mode, \"1\") == 0 && state->xsize > state->bytes * 8) {\n- state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_OVERRUN;\n- return -1;\n- } else if (strcmp(im->mode, \"P\") == 0 && state->xsize > state->bytes) {\n+ if ((state->xsize * state->bits + 7) / 8 > state->bytes) {\n state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_OVERRUN;\n return -1;\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-10378\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: In libImaging/PcxDecode.c in Pillow before 7.1.0, an out-of-bounds read can occur when reading PCX files where state->shuffle is instructed to read beyond state->buffer.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v8r4-hc5w-5ww3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 4e677b9c40ccbc5f090971b31dc2fe07bf05541d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org>\nDate: Thu, 28 Jul 2022 18:44:27 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] patch 9.0.0101: invalid memory access in diff mode with \"dp\"\n and undo\n\nProblem: Invalid memory access in diff mode with \"dp\" and undo.\nSolution: Make sure the line number does not go below one.\n---\n src/diff.c \| 9 ++++++---\n src/testdir/test_diffmode.vim \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n src/version.c \| 2 ++\n 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/diff.c b/src/diff.c\nindex e4bafe2c934e2..fb43eee844cd8 100644\n--- a/src/diff.c\n+++ b/src/diff.c\n@@ -464,7 +464,10 @@ diff_mark_adjust_tp(\n \t\t for (i = 0; i < DB_COUNT; ++i)\n \t\t\tif (tp->tp_diffbuf[i] != NULL && i != idx)\n \t\t\t{\n-\t\t\t dp->df_lnum[i] -= off;\n+\t\t\t if (dp->df_lnum[i] > off)\n+\t\t\t\tdp->df_lnum[i] -= off;\n+\t\t\t else\n+\t\t\t\tdp->df_lnum[i] = 1;\n \t\t\t dp->df_count[i] += n;\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n@@ -2863,8 +2866,8 @@ ex_diffgetput(exarg_T eap)\n \t {\n \t\t// remember deleting the last line of the buffer\n \t\tbuf_empty = curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count == 1;\n-\t\tml_delete(lnum);\n-\t\t--added;\n+\t\tif (ml_delete(lnum) == OK)\n+\t\t --added;\n \t }\n \t for (i = 0; i < dp->df_count[idx_from] - start_skip - end_skip; ++i)\n \t {\ndiff --git a/src/testdir/test_diffmode.vim b/src/testdir/test_diffmode.vim\nindex dcacd5516bb7d..41f7fe3493ca5 100644\n--- a/src/testdir/test_diffmode.vim\n+++ b/src/testdir/test_diffmode.vim\n@@ -1628,5 +1628,19 @@ func Test_diff_manipulations()\n %bwipe!\n endfunc\n \n+\" This was causing the line number in the diff block to go below one.\n+\" FIXME: somehow this causes a valgrind error when run directly but not when\n+\" run as a test.\n+func Test_diff_put_and_undo()\n+ set diff\n+ next 0\n+ split 00\n+ sil! norm o0\u001bgguudpo0\u001bggJuudp\n+\n+ bwipe!\n+ bwipe!\n+ set nodiff\n+endfunc\n+\n \n \" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab\ndiff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c\nindex 9e682a5fd6357..1241e98b08b0f 100644\n--- a/src/version.c\n+++ b/src/version.c\n@@ -735,6 +735,8 @@ static char (features[]) =\n \n static int included_patches[] =\n { /* Add new patch number below this line /\n+//\n+ 101,\n //\n 100,\n //\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-v8r4-hc5w-5ww3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Null Byte Injection (CWE-626):\n\n```python\ndef check_extension(filename):\n if not filename.endswith('.txt'):\n raise ValueError(\"Only .txt files allowed\")\n return open(filename).read()\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Strip null bytes: filename = filename.replace('\\x00', '')\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Null Byte Injection (CWE-626)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\nIn some contexts, 'malicious.php\\x00.txt' passes the check but opens malicious.php due to null byte termination.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Null Byte Injection) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-40013\nDescription: SVG Loader is a javascript library that fetches SVGs using XMLHttpRequests and injects the SVG code in the tag's place. According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in Cross-site Scripting (XSS). When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as `onmouseover`, `oncl\n\n```diff\nFrom 8213ac3127755e97dc47356fcfc90e682d72e3e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Shubham Jain <shubham.jain.1@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 11 Aug 2023 10:38:48 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH 1/3] Fix XSS vulnerability\n\n---\n svg-loader.js \| 7 +++++--\n test/icons/svg-xss-2.svg \| 3 +++\n test/icons/svg-xss.svg \| 3 +++\n test/index.html \| 10 +++++++++-\n 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n create mode 100644 test/icons/svg-xss-2.svg\n create mode 100644 test/icons/svg-xss.svg\n\ndiff --git a/svg-loader.js b/svg-loader.js\nindex 73c3c48..130c69e 100644\n--- a/svg-loader.js\n+++ b/svg-loader.js\n@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ const getAllEventNames = () => {\n }\n }\n \n+ // SVG <animate> events\n+ DOM_EVENTS.push('onbegin', 'onend', 'onrepeat');\n+\n return DOM_EVENTS;\n };\n \n@@ -128,7 +131,7 @@ const renderBody = (elem, options, body) => {\n }\n \n // Remove \"javascript:...\" unless specifically enabled\n- if ([\"href\", \"xlink:href\"].includes(name) && value.startsWith(\"javascript\") && !enableJs) {\n+ if ([\"href\", \"xlink:href\", \"values\"].includes(name) && value.startsWith(\"javascript\") && !enableJs) {\n attributesToRemove.push(name);\n }\n }\n@@ -391,4 +394,4 @@ globalThis.SVGLoader.destroyCache = async () => {\n localStorage.removeItem(key);\n }\n });\n-}\n+}\n\\ No newline at end of file\ndiff --git a/test/icons/svg-xss-2.svg b/test/icons/svg-xss-2.svg\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000..9bf0cf1\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/test/icons/svg-xss-2.svg\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+<svg version=\"1.1\" baseProfile=\"full\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\">\n+ <animate onbegin=alert(1) attributeName=x dur=1s>\n+</svg>\n\\ No newline at end of file\ndiff --git a/test/icons/svg-xss.svg b/test/icons/svg-xss.svg\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000..a8397cd\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/test/icons/svg-xss.svg\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+ <svg version=\"1.1\" baseProfile=\"full\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\">\n+ <animate xlink:href=#xss attributeName=href values=javascript:alert(1) /><a id=xss><text x=20 y=20>XSS</text></a></svg>\n+ </svg>\n\\ No newline at end of file\ndiff --git a/test/index.html b/test/index.html\nindex 69b7264..c18b9c3 100644\n--- a/test/index.html\n+++ b/test/index.html\n@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@\n <html>\n <head>\n- <link rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"/main.css\">\n <style>\n body {\n padding-bottom: 80px;\n@@ -61,6 +60,15 @@ <h1>\n <div>This is a more complicated SVG with JS, only map with overlay message should be shown</div>\n <svg data-src=\"./USStates.svg\"></svg>\n \n+ <div class=\"heading\">Icon with XSS</div>\n+ <div>Tricky XSS that needs to be filtered out. On clicking \"X\" nothing should happen </div>\n+ <svg data-src=\"/icons/svg-xss.svg\"></svg>\n+\n+ <div class=\"heading\">Icon with XSS 2</div>\n+ <div>Alert should not come</div>\n+ <svg data-src=\"/icons/svg-xss-2.svg\"></svg>\n+\n+\n <div class=\"heading\">Icon with JS (enabled)</div>\n <div\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-40013\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') in external-svg-loader\n\nThis patch addresses: SVG Loader is a javascript library that fetches SVGs using XMLHttpRequests and injects the SVG code in the tag's place. According to the docs, svg-loader will strip all JS code before injecting the SVG file for security reasons but the input sanitization logic is not sufficient and can be trivially bypassed. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious SVG which can result in Cross-site Scripting (XSS). When trying to sanitize the svg the lib removes event attributes such as `onmouseover`, `oncl\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5wmg-j84w-4jj4\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom e4ef56d48eb029648b0e895bb0b6a393ef0829c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: aviadatsnyk <aviad@snyk.io>\nDate: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 01:02:35 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: prevent extraction of archived files outside target path\n (#65)\n\n* fix: prevent extraction of archived files outside target path\n\n* CR: consolidate the path sanitaiton logic\n---\n archiver.go \| 12 ++++++++++++\n cmd/archiver/main.go \| 5 ++++-\n rar.go \| 13 ++++++++++---\n tar.go \| 15 +++++++++++----\n zip.go \| 5 +++++\n 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/archiver.go b/archiver.go\nindex 68f8ea38..32baf3e0 100644\n--- a/archiver.go\n+++ b/archiver.go\n@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (\n \t\"os\"\n \t\"path/filepath\"\n \t\"runtime\"\n+\t\"strings\"\n )\n \n // Archiver represent a archive format\n@@ -105,3 +106,14 @@ func mkdir(dirPath string) error {\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n }\n+\n+func sanitizeExtractPath(filePath string, destination string) error {\n+\t// to avoid zip slip (writing outside of the destination), we resolve\n+\t// the target path, and make sure it's nested in the intended\n+\t// destination, or bail otherwise.\n+\tdestpath := filepath.Join(destination, filePath)\n+\tif !strings.HasPrefix(destpath, destination) {\n+\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"%s: illegal file path\", filePath)\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\ndiff --git a/cmd/archiver/main.go b/cmd/archiver/main.go\nindex d274e167..2e181fa4 100644\n--- a/cmd/archiver/main.go\n+++ b/cmd/archiver/main.go\n@@ -27,7 +27,10 @@ func main() {\n \t\t}\n \t\terr = ff.Make(filename, os.Args[3:])\n \tcase \"open\":\n-\t\tdest := \"\"\n+\t\tdest, osErr := os.Getwd()\n+\t\tif osErr != nil {\n+\t\t\tfatal(err)\n+\t\t}\n \t\tif len(os.Args) == 4 {\n \t\t\tdest = os.Args[3]\n \t\t} else if len(os.Args) > 4 {\ndiff --git a/rar.go b/rar.go\nindex 7744c24a..86f8a63d 100644\n--- a/rar.go\n+++ b/rar.go\n@@ -72,8 +72,15 @@ func (rarFormat) Read(input io.Reader, destination string) error {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \n+\t\terr = sanitizeExtractPath(header.Name, destination)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn err\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tdestpath := filepath.Join(destination, header.Name)\n+\n \t\tif header.IsDir {\n-\t\t\terr = mkdir(filepath.Join(destination, header.Name))\n+\t\t\terr = mkdir(destpath)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\t\treturn err\n \t\t\t}\n@@ -82,12 +89,12 @@ func (rarFormat) Read(input io.Reader, destination string) error {\n \n \t\t// if files come before their containing folders, then we must\n \t\t// create their folders before writing the file\n-\t\terr = mkdir(filepath.Dir(filepath.Join(destination, header.Name)))\n+\t\terr = mkdir(filepath.Dir(destpath))\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\terr = writeNewFile(filepath.Join(destination, header.Name), rr, header.Mode())\n+\t\terr = writeNewFile(destpath, rr, header.Mode())\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\ndiff --git a/tar.go b/tar.go\nindex 2fbfbb27..caa9de22 100644\n--- a/tar.go\n+++ b/tar.go\n@@ -219,15 +219,22 @@ func untar(tr tar.Reader, destination string) error {\n \n // untarFile untars a single file from tr with header header into destination.\n func untarFile(tr tar\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5wmg-j84w-4jj4\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction in mholt/archiver\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-554\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom a2b743f6017d7b97af1fe49087ae15f0ac634373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Mon, 2 Aug 2021 19:05:27 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix heap OOB in `tf.raw_ops.RaggedGather`\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 388355464\nChange-Id: If14d96231d1cd7aad7c4d1c22c1bab1576b75717\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/ragged_gather_op.cc \| 8 +++++++-\n 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/ragged_gather_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/ragged_gather_op.cc\nindex 3bf82cba050e3b..d6d51c770bbb7a 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/ragged_gather_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/ragged_gather_op.cc\n@@ -58,15 +58,21 @@ class RaggedGatherOpBase : public OpKernel {\n \n void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {\n // Get the input Tensors.\n+\n OpInputList params_nested_splits_in;\n OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->input_list(\"params_nested_splits\",\n &params_nested_splits_in));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(\n+ context, params_nested_splits_in.size() > 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"params_nested_splits must be non empty\"));\n+\n const Tensor& params_dense_values_in =\n context->input(params_nested_splits_in.size());\n const Tensor& indices_in =\n context->input(params_nested_splits_in.size() + 1);\n \n- DCHECK_GT(params_nested_splits_in.size(), 0); // Enforced by REGISTER_OP.\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, params_nested_splits_in[0].dims() > 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"Split tensors must not be scalars\"));\n SPLITS_TYPE num_params = params_nested_splits_in[0].dim_size(0) - 1;\n OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, ValidateIndices(indices_in, num_params));\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-554\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport re\ndef parse_email(email):\n pattern = r'^([a-zA-Z0-9._-]+)@([a-zA-Z0-9._-]+)\\.([a-zA-Z]{2,})$'\n return re.match(pattern, email)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues, their severity, and how to fix them." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\nReDoS - Regular Expression Denial of Service (CWE-1333)\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nExplanation:\nQuantifiers with overlapping character classes cause exponential backtracking on malformed input.\n\nHow to Fix:\nRemove unnecessary * after groups, or use a dedicated email validation library." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-x4xp-29gp-7qw9\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9933e113c2e87a9f46a40fde8dafbf801dca1ab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>\nDate: Wed, 10 May 2017 03:48:23 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks\n\nThe API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the\nskcipher conversion. This patch restores them.\n\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nFixes: 4e6c3df4d729 (\"crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...\")\nReported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>\nSigned-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>\n---\n crypto/skcipher.c \| 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c\nindex 014af741fc6a3d..4faa0fd53b0c12 100644\n--- a/crypto/skcipher.c\n+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c\n@@ -764,6 +764,44 @@ static int crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablkcipher(struct crypto_tfm tfm)\n \treturn 0;\n }\n \n+static int skcipher_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_skcipher tfm,\n+\t\t\t\t const u8 key, unsigned int keylen)\n+{\n+\tunsigned long alignmask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(tfm);\n+\tstruct skcipher_alg cipher = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm);\n+\tu8 buffer, alignbuffer;\n+\tunsigned long absize;\n+\tint ret;\n+\n+\tabsize = keylen + alignmask;\n+\tbuffer = kmalloc(absize, GFP_ATOMIC);\n+\tif (!buffer)\n+\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n+\n+\talignbuffer = (u8 )ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);\n+\tmemcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);\n+\tret = cipher->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);\n+\tkzfree(buffer);\n+\treturn ret;\n+}\n+\n+static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher tfm, const u8 key,\n+\t\t\t unsigned int keylen)\n+{\n+\tstruct skcipher_alg cipher = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm);\n+\tunsigned long alignmask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(tfm);\n+\n+\tif (keylen < cipher->min_keysize \|\| keylen > cipher->max_keysize) {\n+\t\tcrypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);\n+\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)\n+\t\treturn skcipher_setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);\n+\n+\treturn cipher->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);\n+}\n+\n static void crypto_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm tfm)\n {\n \tstruct crypto_skcipher skcipher = __crypto_skcipher_cast(tfm);\n@@ -784,7 +822,7 @@ static int crypto_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm tfm)\n \t tfm->__crt_alg->cra_type == &crypto_givcipher_type)\n \t\treturn crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablkcipher(tfm);\n \n-\tskcipher->setkey = alg->setkey;\n+\tskcipher->setkey = skcipher_setkey;\n \tskcipher->encrypt = alg->encrypt;\n \tskcipher->decrypt = alg->decrypt;\n \tskcipher->ivsize = alg->ivsize;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-x4xp-29gp-7qw9\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-gf72-h4cp-wcm4\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 52c531e156fb8653e47ab99df432c4fb9651f36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Robert Ragas <robertragas@getopensocial.com>\nDate: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 16:44:21 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] When language service is not being called make sure to use\n the route object\n\n---\n modules/custom/social_language/src/Access.php \| 19 +++++++++++++++----\n 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/modules/custom/social_language/src/Access.php b/modules/custom/social_language/src/Access.php\nindex 8a6c20646d8..cf44c6edc59 100644\n--- a/modules/custom/social_language/src/Access.php\n+++ b/modules/custom/social_language/src/Access.php\n@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@\n use Drupal\\Core\\Routing\\Access\\AccessInterface;\n use Drupal\\Core\\Routing\\RouteMatchInterface;\n use Drupal\\Core\\Session\\AccountInterface;\n+use Symfony\\Component\\Routing\\Route;\n \n /*\n Class Access.\n@@ -49,12 +50,22 @@ public function __construct(LanguageManagerInterface $language_manager) {\n /\n public function access(RouteMatchInterface $route_match, AccountInterface $account, $permission = NULL) {\n if (count($this->languageManager->getLanguages()) > 1) {\n- if (!empty($permission)) {\n- return AccessResult::allowedIfHasPermission($account, $permission);\n+ // If the permission is null the service was not called,\n+ // and we should get it from the route object.\n+ if (is_null($permission)) {\n+ // Get route object.\n+ $route = $route_match->getRouteObject();\n+ assert($route instanceof Route);\n+\n+ // Get defined permission on _social_language_access.\n+ $permission = $route->getRequirements()['_social_language_access'];\n }\n- else {\n- return AccessResult::allowed();\n+\n+ if (is_string($permission)) {\n+ return AccessResult::allowedIfHasPermission($account, $permission);\n }\n+\n+ return AccessResult::neutral();\n }\n \n return AccessResult::forbidden();\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-gf72-h4cp-wcm4\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Drupal Open Social Missing Authorization vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jgrh-5m3h-9c5f\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ab408354690e6b9cf3c4724befb3b3fa4bb90aac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tomas Della Vedova <delvedor@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 18:30:04 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Enable versioning on demand (#172)\n\n---\n README.md \| 4 +++-\n index.js \| 5 ++++-\n lib/accept-version.js \| 19 +++++++++++++++----\n test/version.default-versioning.test.js \| 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/README.md b/README.md\nindex 209771be..d9c79646 100644\n--- a/README.md\n+++ b/README.md\n@@ -144,7 +144,9 @@ router.on('GET', '/example', (req, res, params, store) => {\n \n ##### Versioned routes\n \n-If needed you can provide a `version` option, which will allow you to declare multiple versions of the same route.\n+If needed you can provide a `version` option, which will allow you to declare multiple versions of the same route. If you never configure a versioned route, the `'Accept-Version'` header will be ignored.\n+\n+Remember to set a [Vary](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Vary) header in your responses with the value you are using for deifning the versioning (e.g.: 'Accept-Version'), to prevent cache poisoning attacks. You can also configure this as part your Proxy/CDN.\n \n ###### default\n <a name=\"semver\"></a>\ndiff --git a/index.js b/index.js\nindex 6941dc9c..9d3f99fa 100644\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ function Router (opts) {\n this.ignoreTrailingSlash = opts.ignoreTrailingSlash \|\| false\n this.maxParamLength = opts.maxParamLength \|\| 100\n this.allowUnsafeRegex = opts.allowUnsafeRegex \|\| false\n- this.versioning = opts.versioning \|\| acceptVersionStrategy\n+ this.versioning = opts.versioning \|\| acceptVersionStrategy(false)\n this.trees = {}\n this.routes = []\n }\n@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ Router.prototype._on = function _on (method, path, opts, handler, store) {\n })\n \n const version = opts.version\n+ if (version != null && this.versioning.disabled) {\n+ this.versioning = acceptVersionStrategy(true)\n+ }\n \n for (var i = 0, len = path.length; i < len; i++) {\n // search for parametric or wildcard routes\ndiff --git a/lib/accept-version.js b/lib/accept-version.js\nindex 3d698c69..a5a7708c 100644\n--- a/lib/accept-version.js\n+++ b/lib/accept-version.js\n@@ -2,9 +2,20 @@\n \n const SemVerStore = require('semver-store')\n \n-module.exports = {\n- storage: SemVerStore,\n- deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {\n- return req.headers['accept-version']\n+function build (enabled) {\n+ if (enabled) {\n+ return {\n+ storage: SemVerStore,\n+ deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {\n+ return req.headers['accept-version']\n+ }\n+ }\n+ }\n+ return {\n+ storage: SemVerStore,\n+ deriveVersion: function (req, ctx) {},\n+ disabled: true\n }\n }\n+\n+module.exports = build\ndiff --git a/test/version.default-versioning.test.js b/test/version.default-versioning.test.js\nindex 497f641e..b\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jgrh-5m3h-9c5f\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Web Cache Poisoning in find-my-way\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-839c-8x38-qf59\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>\nDate: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 16:32:04 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] adapter: Fix storing discoverable setting\n\ndiscoverable setting shall only be store when changed via Discoverable\nproperty and not when discovery client set it as that be considered\ntemporary just for the lifetime of the discovery.\n---\n src/adapter.c \| 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------\n 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/adapter.c b/src/adapter.c\nindex 12e4ff5c0c..663b778e4a 100644\n--- a/src/adapter.c\n+++ b/src/adapter.c\n@@ -560,7 +560,11 @@ static void settings_changed(struct btd_adapter adapter, uint32_t settings)\n \tif (changed_mask & MGMT_SETTING_DISCOVERABLE) {\n \t\tg_dbus_emit_property_changed(dbus_conn, adapter->path,\n \t\t\t\t\tADAPTER_INTERFACE, \"Discoverable\");\n-\t\tstore_adapter_info(adapter);\n+\t\t/ Only persist discoverable setting if it was not set\n+\t\t * temporarily by discovery.\n+\t\t /\n+\t\tif (!adapter->discovery_discoverable)\n+\t\t\tstore_adapter_info(adapter);\n \t\tbtd_adv_manager_refresh(adapter->adv_manager);\n \t}\n \n@@ -2162,8 +2166,6 @@ static bool filters_equal(struct mgmt_cp_start_service_discovery a,\n static int update_discovery_filter(struct btd_adapter adapter)\n {\n \tstruct mgmt_cp_start_service_discovery sd_cp;\n-\tGSList l;\n-\n \n \tDBG(\"\");\n \n@@ -2173,17 +2175,24 @@ static int update_discovery_filter(struct btd_adapter adapter)\n \t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n \t}\n \n-\tfor (l = adapter->discovery_list; l; l = g_slist_next(l)) {\n-\t\tstruct discovery_client client = l->data;\n+\t/ Only attempt to overwrite current discoverable setting when not\n+\t * discoverable.\n+\t /\n+\tif (!(adapter->current_settings & MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE)) {\n+\t\tGSList l;\n \n-\t\tif (!client->discovery_filter)\n-\t\t\tcontinue;\n+\t\tfor (l = adapter->discovery_list; l; l = g_slist_next(l)) {\n+\t\t\tstruct discovery_client client = l->data;\n \n-\t\tif (client->discovery_filter->discoverable)\n-\t\t\tbreak;\n-\t}\n+\t\t\tif (!client->discovery_filter)\n+\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n \n-\tset_discovery_discoverable(adapter, l ? true : false);\n+\t\t\tif (client->discovery_filter->discoverable) {\n+\t\t\t\tset_discovery_discoverable(adapter, true);\n+\t\t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n \n \t/\n \t * If filters are equal, then don't update scan, except for when\n@@ -2216,8 +2225,7 @@ static int discovery_stop(struct discovery_client client)\n \t\treturn 0;\n \t}\n \n-\tif (adapter->discovery_discoverable)\n-\t\tset_discovery_discoverable(adapter, false);\n+\tset_discovery_discoverable(adapter, false);\n \n \t/\n \t * In the idle phase of a discovery, there is no need to stop it\n@@ -6913,6 +6921,7 @@ static void adapter_stop(struct btd_adapter adapter)\n \tg_free(adapter->current_discovery_filter);\n \tadapter->current_discovery_filter = NULL;\n \n+\tset_discovery_discoverable(adapter, false);\n \tadapter->discovering = false;\n \n \twhile (adapter->connections) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-839c-8x38-qf59\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-69h6-vqxf-rc54\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 5d82cce0d615a76b738798577a28a15803e59aeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jim-p <jimp@netgate.com>\nDate: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 08:38:21 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Clean up pkg filter text before use. Fixes #12725\n\nAlso remove unnecessary echos of the value.\n---\n src/usr/local/www/pkg.php \| 9 +++------\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/usr/local/www/pkg.php b/src/usr/local/www/pkg.php\nindex 4d0bed82ee6..6a48b974380 100644\n--- a/src/usr/local/www/pkg.php\n+++ b/src/usr/local/www/pkg.php\n@@ -434,10 +434,11 @@ function save_changes_to_xml(xml) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif ($sf['name'] == $_REQUEST['pkg_filter_type']) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$filter_fieldname = $sf['fieldname'];\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t#Use a default regex on sortable fields when none is declared\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$pkg_filter = cleanup_regex_pattern(htmlspecialchars(strip_tags($_REQUEST['pkg_filter'])));\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif ($sf['regex']) {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$filter_regex = str_replace(\"%FILTERTEXT%\", $_REQUEST['pkg_filter'], trim($sf['regex']));\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$filter_regex = str_replace(\"%FILTERTEXT%\", $pkg_filter, trim($sf['regex']));\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$filter_regex = \"/{$_REQUEST['pkg_filter']}/i\";\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$filter_regex = \"/{$pkg_filter}/i\";\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n@@ -452,7 +453,6 @@ function save_changes_to_xml(xml) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t$fieldname = $ip[xml_safe_fieldname($column['fieldname'])];\n \t\t\t\t\t\tif ($column['fieldname'] == $filter_fieldname) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\tif ($filter_regex) {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t//echo \"$filter_regex - $fieldname<p/>\";\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpreg_match($filter_regex, $fieldname, $filter_matches);\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n@@ -603,7 +603,4 @@ function save_changes_to_xml(xml) {\n \n </form>\n <?php\n-echo \"<!-- filter_fieldname: {$filter_fieldname} -->\";\n-echo \"<!-- filter_regex: {$filter_regex} -->\";\n-\n include(\"foot.inc\"); ?>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-69h6-vqxf-rc54\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-0880\nDescription: Misinterpretation of Input in GitHub repository thorsten/phpmyfaq prior to 3.1.11.\n\n\n\n```diff\nFrom a67dca41576834a1ddfee61b9e799b686b75d4fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thorsten Rinne <thorsten@phpmyfaq.de>\nDate: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 18:02:47 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: added trim to avoid questions with a single space\n\n---\n phpmyfaq/ajaxservice.php \| 18 +++++++++---------\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/phpmyfaq/ajaxservice.php b/phpmyfaq/ajaxservice.php\nindex 5d1b54a63c..d175fe3764 100644\n--- a/phpmyfaq/ajaxservice.php\n+++ b/phpmyfaq/ajaxservice.php\n@@ -317,21 +317,21 @@\n $category = new Category($faqConfig);\n $questionObject = new Question($faqConfig);\n \n- $author = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'name', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n- $email = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'email', FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL);\n+ $author = trim(Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'name', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW));\n+ $email = trim(Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'email', FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL));\n $faqId = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'faqid', FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n $faqLanguage = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'lang', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n $question = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'question', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n- $question = strip_tags($question);\n+ $question = trim(strip_tags($question));\n if ($faqConfig->get('main.enableWysiwygEditorFrontend')) {\n $answer = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'answer', FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n- $answer = html_entity_decode($answer);\n+ $answer = trim(html_entity_decode($answer));\n } else {\n $answer = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'answer', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n $answer = strip_tags($answer);\n- $answer = nl2br($answer);\n+ $answer = trim(nl2br($answer));\n }\n- $translatedAnswer = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'translated_answer', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n+ $translatedAnswer = trim(Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'translated_answer', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW));\n $contentLink = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'contentlink', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n $contentLink = Filter::filterVar($contentLink, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);\n $keywords = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'keywords', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n@@ -478,11 +478,11 @@\n $faq = new Faq($faqConfig);\n $cat = new Category($faqConfig);\n $categories = $cat->getAllCategories();\n- $author = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'name', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n- $email = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'email', FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL);\n+ $author = trim(Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'name', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW));\n+ $email = trim(Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'email', FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL));\n $ucategory = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'category', FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n $question = Filter::filterInput(INPUT_POST, 'question', FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW);\n- $question = strip_tags($question);\n+ $question \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-0880\nCWE: CWE-115 Misinterpretation of Input\nTitle: Misinterpretation of Input in thorsten/phpmyfaq\n\nThis patch addresses: Misinterpretation of Input in GitHub repository thorsten/phpmyfaq prior to 3.1.11.\n\n\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w26q-7wf7-m5ph\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom f3069c6d33f6ae63a1668737bc78aaaa51bff7ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?H=C3=A5kon=20Bugge?= <Haakon.Bugge@oracle.com>\nDate: Wed, 6 Dec 2017 17:18:28 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nThis is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was\nattempted without any underlying transport being loaded.\n\nAnalysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR\n(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.\n\nHere is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:\n\nBUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0\nIP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]\nPGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0\nOops: 0000 [#1] SMP\nModules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4\ndns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp\ncoretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul\nghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd\niTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd\nshpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core\nauth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2\nmgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect\nsysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm\ncrc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror\ndm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod\nCPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2\nHardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017\ntask: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000\nRIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580\nRBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002\nR10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580\nR13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc\nFS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0\nCall Trace:\n rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]\n rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]\n ? __fget_light+0x25/0x60\n ? __fdget+0x13/0x20\n SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0\n do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0\n entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25\nRIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9\nRSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9\nRDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b\nRBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860\nR10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021\n\nCode: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w26q-7wf7-m5ph\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-7856\nDescription: LibreOffice before 2017-03-11 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow in the SVMConverter::ImplConvertFromSVM1 function in vcl/source/gdi/svmconverter.cxx.\n\n```diff\nFrom 28e61b634353110445e334ccaa415d7fb6629d62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Caol=C3=A1n=20McNamara?= <caolanm@redhat.com>\nDate: Sat, 11 Mar 2017 17:29:05 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] ofz#817 nStrLen-1 changed to nStrLen-3\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nregression from...\n\ncommit ff8f6629287d0d1bdbcf4f8ed16cb8d077d08c7a\nAuthor: Caolán McNamara <caolanm@redhat.com>\nDate: Thu Jan 19 16:56:34 2017 +0000\n\n Resolves: ofz#424 guard against broken dxary length\n\nbut this weird typo doesn't appears in the 5-2 and 5-3 backports,\nodd how I managed that\n\nChange-Id: I5fb1db2284d48ee78e717d41274a3d37ab0255cf\n---\n vcl/source/gdi/svmconverter.cxx \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/vcl/source/gdi/svmconverter.cxx b/vcl/source/gdi/svmconverter.cxx\nindex 6149f00b36c4f..2e08f1aaeb2bb 100644\n--- a/vcl/source/gdi/svmconverter.cxx\n+++ b/vcl/source/gdi/svmconverter.cxx\n@@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ void SVMConverter::ImplConvertFromSVM1( SvStream& rIStm, GDIMetaFile& rMtf )\n // difference to last elem and store\n // in very last.\n if( nStrLen > 1 )\n- pDXAry[ nStrLen-3 ] = pDXAry[ nStrLen-2 ] + pTmpAry[ nStrLen-1 ] - pTmpAry[ nStrLen-2 ];\n+ pDXAry[ nStrLen-1 ] = pDXAry[ nStrLen-2 ] + pTmpAry[ nStrLen-1 ] - pTmpAry[ nStrLen-2 ];\n else\n pDXAry[ nStrLen-1 ] = pTmpAry[ nStrLen-1 ]; // len=1: 0th position taken to be 0\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-7856\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: LibreOffice before 2017-03-11 has an out-of-bounds write caused by a heap-based buffer overflow in the SVMConverter::ImplConvertFromSVM1 function in vcl/source/gdi/svmconverter.cxx.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-482\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom da5ff2daf618591f64b2b62d9d9803951b945e9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Amit Patankar <amitpatankar@google.com>\nDate: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 11:24:45 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix FPE issue with `tf.raw_ops.DenseCountSparseOutput`.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 370946862\nChange-Id: I3752584ad04aaecb327ff6793a9640ac56acfe7a\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/count_ops.cc \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/count_ops.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/count_ops.cc\nindex eeb0b853c7aad2..40aa1fe458c1ee 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/count_ops.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/count_ops.cc\n@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ class DenseCount : public OpKernel {\n \n int num_batch_elements = 1;\n for (int i = 0; i < num_batch_dimensions; ++i) {\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, data.shape().dim_size(i) != 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\n+ \"Invalid input: Shapes dimension cannot be 0.\"));\n num_batch_elements = data.shape().dim_size(i);\n }\n int num_value_elements = data.shape().num_elements() / num_batch_elements;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* PYSEC-2021-482\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32664\nDescription: Combodo iTop is an open source web based IT Service Management tool. In affected versions there is a XSS vulnerability on \"run query\" page when logged as administrator. This has been resolved in versions 2.6.5 and 2.7.5.\n\n```diff\nFrom 4f5c987d8b1bd12814dc606ea69b6cfb88490704 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Eric <eric.espie@combodo.com>\nDate: Thu, 27 May 2021 15:57:04 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?N=C2=B04002=20-=20code=20hardening?=\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\n---\n pages/run_query.php \| 1 -\n 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/pages/run_query.php b/pages/run_query.php\nindex 2d9288c348..c6bc61648f 100644\n--- a/pages/run_query.php\n+++ b/pages/run_query.php\n@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ function ShowExamples($oP, $sExpression)\n \t{\n \t\t// Translate $sExpression into a oql expression\n \t\t$sClearText = base64_decode($sExpression);\n-\t\techo \"<strong>FYI: '$sClearText'</strong><br/>\\n\";\n \t\t$oFilter = DBObjectSearch::unserialize($sExpression);\n \t\t$sExpression = $oFilter->ToOQL();\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32664\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Reflected XSS in Combodo/iTop\n\nThis patch addresses: Combodo iTop is an open source web based IT Service Management tool. In affected versions there is a XSS vulnerability on \"run query\" page when logged as administrator. This has been resolved in versions 2.6.5 and 2.7.5.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-16618\nDescription: An exploitable vulnerability exists in the YAML loading functionality of util.py in OwlMixin before 2.0.0a12. A \"Load YAML\" string or file (aka load_yaml or load_yamlf) can execute arbitrary Python commands resulting in command execution because load is used where safe_load should have been used. An attacker can insert Python into loaded YAML to trigger this vulnerability.\n\n```diff\nFrom 5d0575303f6df869a515ced4285f24ba721e0d4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: tadashi-aikawa <syou.maman@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 22:49:31 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH] :scream: Fix vulnerability of `load_yaml` and `load_yamlf`\n (#12)\n\n---\n owlmixin/util.py \| 7 +++----\n tests/test_util.py \| 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n tests/yaml/vulnerability.yaml \| 1 +\n 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n create mode 100644 tests/yaml/vulnerability.yaml\n\ndiff --git a/owlmixin/util.py b/owlmixin/util.py\nindex 207b77f..15d8974 100644\n--- a/owlmixin/util.py\n+++ b/owlmixin/util.py\n@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@\n import json\n import yaml\n from urllib.request import urlopen\n-from yaml import Loader, SafeLoader\n+from yaml import SafeLoader\n \n import csv\n from csv import register_dialect, Dialect, QUOTE_MINIMAL\n@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ def increase_indent(self, flow=False, indentless=False):\n def construct_yaml_str(self, node):\n return self.construct_scalar(node)\n \n-Loader.add_constructor(u'tag:yaml.org,2002:str', construct_yaml_str)\n SafeLoader.add_constructor(u'tag:yaml.org,2002:str', construct_yaml_str)\n \n \n@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ def load_yaml(yaml_str):\n :param unicode yaml_str:\n :rtype: dict \| list\n \"\"\"\n- return yaml.load(yaml_str)\n+ return yaml.safe_load(yaml_str)\n \n \n def load_yamlf(fpath, encoding):\n@@ -103,7 +102,7 @@ def load_yamlf(fpath, encoding):\n :rtype: dict \| list\n \"\"\"\n with codecs.open(fpath, encoding=encoding) as f:\n- return yaml.load(f)\n+ return yaml.safe_load(f)\n \n \n def load_csvf(fpath, fieldnames, encoding):\ndiff --git a/tests/test_util.py b/tests/test_util.py\nindex 60fe899..e1dbb46 100644\n--- a/tests/test_util.py\n+++ b/tests/test_util.py\n@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@\n \n from __future__ import division, absolute_import, unicode_literals\n \n+from yaml.constructor import ConstructorError\n from owlmixin import util\n \n+import pytest\n+\n \n class TestReplaceKeys:\n def test_need_not_snake(self):\n@@ -82,3 +85,38 @@ def test_docopt(self):\n assert util.to_snake(\"<file_list>\") == \"file_list\"\n assert util.to_snake(\"-o\") == \"o\"\n assert util.to_snake(\"--detail-option\") == \"detail_option\"\n+\n+\n+class TestLoadYaml:\n+ def test(self):\n+ actual = util.load_yaml('''\n+id: 1\n+names:\n+ - tadashi\n+ - aikawa\n+ ''')\n+ assert actual == {\n+ \"id\": 1,\n+ \"names\": ['tadashi', 'aikawa']\n+ }\n+\n+ def test_yaml_load_vulnerability(self):\n+ with pytest.raises(ConstructorError):\n+ util.load_yaml('!!python/object/apply:os.system [\"calc.exe\"]')\n+\n+\n+class TestLoadYamlf:\n+ def test(self):\n+ assert util.load_yamlf('tests/yaml/spots_utf8.yaml', 'utf-8') == [\n+ {\n+ \"address\": {\"name\": \"address1\"},\n+ \"names\": [\"spot1\"]\n+ },\n+ {\n+ \"names\": [\"スポット21\", \"スポット22\"]\n+ }\n+ ]\n+\n+ def test_yaml_load_vulnerability(self):\n+ with pyt\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-16618\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: An exploitable vulnerability exists in the YAML loading functionality of util.py in OwlMixin before 2.0.0a12. A \"Load YAML\" string or file (aka load_yaml or load_yamlf) can execute arbitrary Python commands resulting in command execution because load is used where safe_load should have been used. An attacker can insert Python into loaded YAML to trigger this vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3xr8-q83f-2wqp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9d18b6246755472c8324bf3e20e234e08ac45618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sergei Golubchik <serg@mariadb.org>\nDate: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 18:08:02 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] rpm/deb and auth_pam_tool_dir/auth_pam_tool\n\ndon't let mysql_install_db set SUID bit for auth_pam_tool in rpm/deb\npackages - instead package files with correct permissions and\nonly fix the ownership of auth_pam_tool_dir (which can only be done\nafter mysql user is created, so in post-install).\n\nkeep old mysql_install_db behavior for bintars\n---\n debian/mariadb-server-10.4.postinst \| 3 +++\n debian/rules \| 4 ++++\n scripts/mysql_install_db.sh \| 18 +++++++++---------\n support-files/rpm/server-postin.sh \| 7 ++-----\n 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/debian/mariadb-server-10.4.postinst b/debian/mariadb-server-10.4.postinst\nindex fbb2584f2df36..3db4d50ea08de 100644\n--- a/debian/mariadb-server-10.4.postinst\n+++ b/debian/mariadb-server-10.4.postinst\n@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ EOF\n chmod 2750 $mysql_logdir\n set -e\n \n+ # Set the correct filesystem ownership for the PAM v2 plugin\n+ chown mysql /usr/lib/mysql/plugin/auth_pam_tool_dir\n+\n # This is important to avoid dataloss when there is a removed\n # mysql-server version from Woody lying around which used the same\n # data directory and then somewhen gets purged by the admin.\ndiff --git a/debian/rules b/debian/rules\nindex 9914bae721b2a..ac85ef7dc2669 100755\n--- a/debian/rules\n+++ b/debian/rules\n@@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ endif\n \tln -s libmariadb.so.3 $(TMP)/usr/lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH)/libmysqlclient.so.19\n \tln -s libmariadb.so.3 $(TMP)/usr/lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH)/libmysqlclient.so.20\n \n+override_dh_fixperms:\n+\tdh_fixperms\n+\tchmod 04755 debian/mariadb-server-10.4/usr/lib/mysql/plugin/auth_pam_tool_dir/auth_pam_tool\n+\tchmod 0700 debian/mariadb-server-10.4/usr/lib/mysql/plugin/auth_pam_tool_dir\n \n override_dh_installlogrotate-arch:\n \tdh_installlogrotate --name mysql-server\ndiff --git a/scripts/mysql_install_db.sh b/scripts/mysql_install_db.sh\nindex caa575dc091e9..e9744333af5b5 100644\n--- a/scripts/mysql_install_db.sh\n+++ b/scripts/mysql_install_db.sh\n@@ -478,16 +478,8 @@ do\n fi\n done\n \n-if test -n \"$user\"\n+if test -n \"$user\" -a \"$in_rpm\" -eq 0\n then\n- chown $user \"$pamtooldir/auth_pam_tool_dir\" && \\\n- chmod 0700 \"$pamtooldir/auth_pam_tool_dir\"\n- if test $? -ne 0\n- then\n- echo \"Cannot change ownership of the '$pamtooldir/auth_pam_tool_dir' directory\"\n- echo \" to the '$user' user. Check that you have the necessary permissions and try again.\"\n- exit 1\n- fi\n if test -z \"$srcdir\"\n then\n chown 0 \"$pamtooldir/auth_pam_tool_dir/auth_pam_tool\" && \\\n@@ -499,6 +491,14 @@ then\n echo\n fi\n fi\n+ chown $user \"$pamtooldir/auth_pam_tool_dir\" && \\\n+ chmod 0700 \"$pamtooldir/auth_pam_tool_dir\"\n+ if test $? -ne 0\n+ then\n+ echo \"Cannot change ownership of the '$pamtooldir/auth_pam_tool_dir' directory\"\n+ echo \" to the '$user' user. Che\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3xr8-q83f-2wqp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-238g-gw8w-m679\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom bef1e4f637d8f665bc133a9c6d30df08d983bc3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Cristy <urban-warrior@imagemagick.org>\nDate: Fri, 5 Feb 2016 21:20:42 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/120\n\n---\n coders/wpg.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/coders/wpg.c b/coders/wpg.c\nindex 964530533ea..b01dcf9cc63 100644\n--- a/coders/wpg.c\n+++ b/coders/wpg.c\n@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ static Image ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo image_info,\n {\n ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bppimage->columns+7)/8);\n BImgBuff=(unsigned char ) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)\n- ldblk,sizeof(BImgBuff));\n+ ldblk+1,sizeof(BImgBuff));\n if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char ) NULL)\n goto NoMemory;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-238g-gw8w-m679\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-812\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 7731e8dfbe4a56773be5dc94d631611211156659 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"A. Unique TensorFlower\" <gardener@tensorflow.org>\nDate: Thu, 19 Aug 2021 11:25:32 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Don't constant-fold DT_RESOURCE constants.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 391803952\nChange-Id: I0ea3ec31d3e7dfda0f03b4027a237f08d00a3091\n---\n tensorflow/core/common_runtime/constant_folding.cc \| 4 +++-\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/common_runtime/constant_folding.cc b/tensorflow/core/common_runtime/constant_folding.cc\nindex 8367e5ff6aff34..ca75dc9f19160a 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/common_runtime/constant_folding.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/common_runtime/constant_folding.cc\n@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ limitations under the License.\n #include \"tensorflow/core/framework/log_memory.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/framework/op_kernel.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/framework/types.h\"\n+#include \"tensorflow/core/framework/types.pb.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/graph/algorithm.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/graph/node_builder.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/graph/subgraph.h\"\n@@ -223,7 +224,8 @@ bool IsConstantFoldable(\n std::unordered_map<const Node, std::vector<Tensor>>\n shape_replacement_map) {\n if (n->IsConstant()) {\n- return true;\n+ // Skip constant folding resources as they cannot be deep copied.\n+ return n->output_type(0) != DT_RESOURCE;\n }\n if (MaybeReplaceShapeOp(n, shape_map, shape_replacement_map)) {\n return true;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-812\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-3122\nDescription: The try_to_unmap_cluster function in mm/rmap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.14.3 does not properly consider which pages must be locked, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by triggering a memory-usage pattern that requires removal of page-table mappings.\n\n```diff\nFrom 57e68e9cd65b4b8eb4045a1e0d0746458502554c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>\nDate: Mon, 7 Apr 2014 15:37:50 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking\n\nA BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin\nfuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock\nthe pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).\n\nThe BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is\nsomewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,\nwhich could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would\nnot be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but\nNR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds\na comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that\neffect.\n\nThe call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=\ncheck_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we\nalready have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only\nupon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left\nwithout PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable\nmemory design.\n\nSigned-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>\nSigned-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>\nReported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>\nCc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>\nCc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>\nCc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>\nAcked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>\nCc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>\nCc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>\nCc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>\nCc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\n---\n mm/mlock.c \| 2 ++\n mm/rmap.c \| 14 ++++++++++++--\n 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/mm/mlock.c b/mm/mlock.c\nindex 4e1a6816228568..b1eb5363400560 100644\n--- a/mm/mlock.c\n+++ b/mm/mlock.c\n@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ void clear_page_mlock(struct page page)\n /\n void mlock_vma_page(struct page page)\n {\n+\t/ Serialize with page migration /\n \tBUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));\n \n \tif (!TestSetPageMlocked(page)) {\n@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page page)\n \tunsigned int nr_pages;\n \tstruct zone zone = page_zone(page);\n \n+\t/ For try_to_munlock() and to serialize with page migration /\n \tBUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));\n \n \t/\ndiff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c\nindex 11cf322f8133d7..9c3e77396d1a11 100644\n--- a/mm/rmap.c\n+++ b/mm/rmap.c\n@@ -1332,9 +1332,19 @@ static int try_to_unmap_cluster(unsigned long cursor, unsigned int mapcount,\n \t\tBUG_ON(!page \|\| PageAnon(page));\n \n \t\tif (locked_vma) {\n-\t\t\tmlock_vma_page(page); / no-op if already mlocked /\n-\t\t\tif (page == check_page)\n+\t\t\tif (page == check_page) {\n+\t\t\t\t/ we know we have check_page locked /\n+\t\t\t\tmlock_vma_page(p\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2014-3122\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The try_to_unmap_cluster function in mm/rmap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.14.3 does not properly consider which pages must be locked, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by triggering a memory-usage pattern that requires removal of page-table mappings.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-p43c-fp87-rj5p\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 5e1ff4e5f4fdb3f32aab465f7b429e0b91299d1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Enis Aksu <108895816+EnisAksu@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Wed, 30 Apr 2025 22:49:13 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Delete CVEs/CVE-2025-33028 (WinZip) directory\n\n---\n .../CVE-2025-33028 (WinZip)/CVE-2025-33028.md \| 48 -------------------\n 1 file changed, 48 deletions(-)\n delete mode 100644 CVEs/CVE-2025-33028 (WinZip)/CVE-2025-33028.md\n\ndiff --git a/CVEs/CVE-2025-33028 (WinZip)/CVE-2025-33028.md b/CVEs/CVE-2025-33028 (WinZip)/CVE-2025-33028.md\ndeleted file mode 100644\nindex 95e3f6cd7..000000000\n--- a/CVEs/CVE-2025-33028 (WinZip)/CVE-2025-33028.md\t\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@\n-# CVE-2025-33028 - WinZip Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Vulnerability\n-\n-## Vulnerability Overview\n-A Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) Bypass Vulnerability has been discovered in WinZip (up to version 76.9), which allows attackers to bypass the Mark-of-the-Web protection mechanism. This flaw allows extracted files from a malicious archive to lose the MotW tag, making the system treat them as local files and bypass any security warnings that would normally prevent execution of potentially harmful files.\n-\n-## Vulnerability Description\n-WinZip does not propagate the Mark-of-the-Web protection to the extracted files when opening an archive that has been downloaded from the internet. As a result, files such as macro-enabled Office documents or executable scripts are treated as trusted files and can be executed without triggering security alerts.\n-\n-## Exploitation Chain\n-1. The attacker crafts a malicious archive (e.g., `.zip` or `.7z`) containing a file (e.g., `.bat` or `.cmd`).\n-2. The archive is downloaded from the internet and tagged with the Mark-of-the-Web (MotW).\n-3. The archive is opened with WinZip, and the contents are extracted.\n-4. The MotW is stripped from the extracted files, allowing them to be trusted and executed.\n-5. Malicious macros or scripts inside the extracted file can then be executed.\n-\n-## CVSS Score\n-CVSS v3.0 Score: 7.8 - High\n-- Attack Vector: Local\n-- Complexity: Low\n-- Privileges Required: None\n-- User Interaction: Required (the target must open the malicious archive)\n-\n-## Affected Products\n-- WinZip versions 76.9 (Windows 64-bit)\n-- No fix available as of now.\n-\n-## Impact\n-- Code execution: Malicious scripts or executables can be executed on the user's system.\n-- Escalation of Privileges: Attackers can gain control in the context of the current user.\n-- Information Disclosure: Sensitive information may be exposed.\n-\n-## Exploitation Example\n-1. Download or create a macro-enabled `.bat` file.\n-2. Compress it into a `.zip` archive.\n-3. Extract the `.zip` archive using WinZip.\n-4. The extracted `.bat` file will not have the MotW, which means macros can execute without warning.\n-\n-## Discoverer\n-Enis Aksu \n-[GitHub](https://github.com/EnisAksu) \n-[LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/EnisAksu/)\n-\n-## References\n-- [Wi\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-p43c-fp87-rj5p\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/')\ndef index():\n '''\n Get the module version from the request object\n importing the urllib module with the version by using exec()\n '''\n module = request.args.get(\"module\")\n exec(\"import urllib%s as urllib\" % module)\n return \"Module imported\"\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-094 - CWE-094\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-18985\nDescription: Pimcore before 6.2.2 lacks brute force protection for the 2FA token.\n\n```diff\nFrom 9f2d075243a8392c114d9a8028858b9faf041e2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bernhard Rusch <bernhard.rusch@elements.at>\nDate: Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:26:06 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Brute-force attack protection for 2fa codes\n\n---\n .../AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/LoginController.php \| 11 +++++++----\n .../AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/UserController.php \| 2 --\n 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/LoginController.php b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/LoginController.php\nindex fc211623e32..69a9e6e8320 100644\n--- a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/LoginController.php\n+++ b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/LoginController.php\n@@ -225,22 +225,25 @@ protected function buildLoginPageViewModel()\n \n /*\n @Route(\"/login/2fa\", name=\"pimcore_admin_2fa\")\n- \n- @param Request $request\n- \n @TemplatePhp()\n /\n- public function twoFactorAuthenticationAction(Request $request)\n+ public function twoFactorAuthenticationAction(Request $request, BruteforceProtectionHandler $bruteforceProtectionHandler)\n {\n $view = $this->buildLoginPageViewModel();\n \n if ($request->hasSession()) {\n+\n+ // we have to call the check here manually, because BruteforceProtectionListener uses the 'username' from the request\n+ $bruteforceProtectionHandler->checkProtection($this->getAdminUser()->getName(), $request);\n+\n $session = $request->getSession();\n $authException = $session->get(Security::AUTHENTICATION_ERROR);\n if ($authException instanceof AuthenticationException) {\n $session->remove(Security::AUTHENTICATION_ERROR);\n \n $view->error = $authException->getMessage();\n+\n+ $bruteforceProtectionHandler->addEntry($this->getAdminUser()->getName(), $request);\n }\n } else {\n $view->error = 'No session available, it either timed out or cookies are not enabled.';\ndiff --git a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/UserController.php b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/UserController.php\nindex 830af8a48fa..e8a4c5f8031 100644\n--- a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/UserController.php\n+++ b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/UserController.php\n@@ -799,8 +799,6 @@ public function uploadImageAction(Request $request)\n /\n public function renew2FaSecretAction(Request $request)\n {\n- $this->checkCsrfToken($request);\n-\n $user = $this->getAdminUser();\n $proxyUser = $this->getAdminUser(true);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-18985\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Pimcore before 6.2.2 lacks brute force protection for the 2FA token.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rgvj-c7cw-xr3r\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom e36b4a1b0bafa53df47514c419d5be3e8916ebc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Dirk Farin <dirk.farin@gmail.com>\nDate: Sat, 4 Nov 2023 15:20:50 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] null-pointer check in debug output (fixes #426)\n\n---\n libde265/slice.cc \| 11 ++++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libde265/slice.cc b/libde265/slice.cc\nindex 280b7417..435123dc 100644\n--- a/libde265/slice.cc\n+++ b/libde265/slice.cc\n@@ -1277,14 +1277,23 @@ void slice_segment_header::dump_slice_segment_header(const decoder_context* ctx,\n #define LOG3(t,d1,d2,d3) log2fh(fh, t,d1,d2,d3)\n #define LOG4(t,d1,d2,d3,d4) log2fh(fh, t,d1,d2,d3,d4)\n \n+ LOG0(\"----------------- SLICE -----------------\\n\");\n+\n const pic_parameter_set* pps = ctx->get_pps(slice_pic_parameter_set_id);\n+ if (!pps) {\n+ LOG0(\"invalid PPS referenced\\n\");\n+ return;\n+ }\n assert(pps->pps_read); // TODO: error handling\n \n const seq_parameter_set* sps = ctx->get_sps((int)pps->seq_parameter_set_id);\n+ if (!sps) {\n+ LOG0(\"invalid SPS referenced\\n\");\n+ return;\n+ }\n assert(sps->sps_read); // TODO: error handling\n \n \n- LOG0(\"----------------- SLICE -----------------\\n\");\n LOG1(\"first_slice_segment_in_pic_flag : %d\\n\", first_slice_segment_in_pic_flag);\n if (ctx->get_nal_unit_type() >= NAL_UNIT_BLA_W_LP &&\n ctx->get_nal_unit_type() <= NAL_UNIT_RESERVED_IRAP_VCL23) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rgvj-c7cw-xr3r\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-566m-3pvx-3xvx\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 00194f5fe462123f70b0bae7987317b52898b868 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jeanlf <jeanlf@gpac.io>\nDate: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 10:50:38 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] fixed #1769 (fuzz)\n\n---\n src/media_tools/media_export.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/media_tools/media_export.c b/src/media_tools/media_export.c\nindex b89936f83c..968818da31 100644\n--- a/src/media_tools/media_export.c\n+++ b/src/media_tools/media_export.c\n@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ static GF_Err gf_media_export_filters(GF_MediaExporter dumper)\n \t\t}\n \t\tesd = gf_media_map_esd(dumper->file, track_num, 0);\n \t\tsample_count = gf_isom_get_sample_count(dumper->file, dumper->trackID);\n-\t\tif (esd) {\n+\t\tif (esd && esd->decoderConfig) {\n \t\t\tif (esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication<GF_CODECID_LAST_MPEG4_MAPPING) {\n \t\t\t\tcodec_id = gf_codecid_from_oti(esd->decoderConfig->streamType, esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication);\n #ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-566m-3pvx-3xvx\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-pj36-9rxw-2h2x\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d072ed6aff835c174e856ce3a428163c0da9e8f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Glenn Randers-Pehrson <glennrp@gmail.com>\nDate: Sun, 9 Jul 2017 22:42:32 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] Skip MNG CLIP chunk with out-of-range object IDs\n\n---\n coders/png.c \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/coders/png.c b/coders/png.c\nindex d6d33ee3603..ea6dce6ab5f 100644\n--- a/coders/png.c\n+++ b/coders/png.c\n@@ -5899,6 +5899,9 @@ static Image ReadOneMNGImage(MngInfo mng_info, const ImageInfo image_info,\n \n for (i=(int) first_object; i <= (int) last_object; i++)\n {\n+ if ((i < 0) \|\| (i >= MNG_MAX_OBJECTS))\n+ continue;\n+\n if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i])\n {\n MngBox\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-pj36-9rxw-2h2x\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0766\nDescription: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository janeczku/calibre-web prior to 0.6.17.\n\n```diff\nFrom 965352c8d96c9eae7a6867ff76b0db137d04b0b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ozzie Isaacs <ozzie.fernandez.isaacs@googlemail.com>\nDate: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 08:05:35 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Don't allow redirects on cover uploads, catch more addresses\n which resolve to localhost\n\n---\n cps/helper.py \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/cps/helper.py b/cps/helper.py\nindex b5495930bd..c162f7eefc 100644\n--- a/cps/helper.py\n+++ b/cps/helper.py\n@@ -734,10 +734,10 @@ def save_cover_from_url(url, book_path):\n if not cli.allow_localhost:\n # 127.0.x.x, localhost, [::1], [::ffff:7f00:1]\n ip = socket.getaddrinfo(urlparse(url).hostname, 0)[0][4][0]\n- if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\":\n+ if ip.startswith(\"127.\") or ip.startswith('::ffff:7f') or ip == \"::1\" or ip == \"0.0.0.0\" or ip == \"::\":\n log.error(\"Localhost was accessed for cover upload\")\n return False, _(\"You are not allowed to access localhost for cover uploads\")\n- img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200)) # ToDo: Error Handling\n+ img = requests.get(url, timeout=(10, 200), allow_redirects=False) # ToDo: Error Handling\n img.raise_for_status()\n return save_cover(img, book_path)\n except (socket.gaierror,\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0766\nCWE: CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\nTitle: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in janeczku/calibre-web\n\nThis patch addresses: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository janeczku/calibre-web prior to 0.6.17.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-665w-mwrr-77q3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9336020c5e603323f5cf4a2ac3bb9a7735cf61f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jason Raimondi <jason@raimondi.us>\nDate: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 21:59:20 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] fix(security): require screenshot protocol to be http/https\n\nprevent file:// URI scheme in Playwright screenshots\n\nA critical vulnerability was discovered in a web application feature that utilizes\nPlaywright's screenshot capability. Attackers could exploit this vulnerability by\nusing the file:// URI scheme to read arbitrary files on the server's filesystem,\npotentially exposing sensitive information, such as AWS credentials.\n\nThis commit addresses the vulnerability by implementing proper input validation\nand sanitization to prevent the use of the file:// URI scheme in Playwright\nscreenshot requests, mitigating the risk of unauthorized file access.\n\nresolves #47\n---\n src/lib/schema.ts \| 19 +++++++++++++++++--\n src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts \| 10 +++++++++-\n tests/app.spec.ts \| 12 ++++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/lib/schema.ts b/src/lib/schema.ts\nindex 95dc938..c8aae6e 100644\n--- a/src/lib/schema.ts\n+++ b/src/lib/schema.ts\n@@ -7,10 +7,25 @@ const zodStringBool = z\n .transform(x => x === \"true\")\n .pipe(z.boolean());\n \n-const zodStringUrl = z.string().url();\n+const urlSchema = z\n+ .string()\n+ .url()\n+ .refine(\n+ val => {\n+ try {\n+ const url = new URL(val);\n+ return url.protocol === \"http:\" \|\| url.protocol === \"https:\";\n+ } catch (err) {\n+ return false;\n+ }\n+ },\n+ {\n+ message: \"must start with http or https\",\n+ },\n+ );\n \n export const PlainConfigSchema = z.object({\n- url: zodStringUrl,\n+ url: urlSchema,\n width: z.coerce.number().nullish(),\n height: z.coerce.number().nullish(),\n viewPortWidth: z.coerce.number().nullish(),\ndiff --git a/src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts b/src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts\nindex a216c9e..e710d7a 100644\n--- a/src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts\n+++ b/src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts\n@@ -33,7 +33,15 @@ export function handleExtractQueryParamsMiddleware(encryptionService?: StringEnc\n const { validData, errors } = parseForm({ data: input, schema: PlainConfigSchema });\n \n if (errors) {\n- throw new HTTPException(400, { message: \"Invalid query parameters\", cause: errors });\n+ let message: string = \"Invalid query parameters: \";\n+\n+ const specificErrors = Object.entries(errors).map(([key, value]) => `(${key} - ${value})`).join(\" \")\n+\n+ message = `${message} ${specificErrors}`;\n+\n+ console.log(message);\n+\n+ throw new HTTPException(400, { message, cause: errors });\n }\n \n if (validData.width && validData.width > 1920) {\ndiff --git a/tests/app.spec.ts b/tests/app.spec.ts\nindex 98c57d7..c0ff1f0 100644\n--- a/tests/app.spec.ts\n+++ b/tests/app.spec.ts\n@@ -71,6 +71,18 @@ suite(\"app\", () => {\n expect(res.status).toBe(400);\n expec\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-665w-mwrr-77q3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Arbitrary file read via Playwright's screenshot feature exploiting file wrapper\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-5669\nDescription: The do_shmat function in ipc/shm.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9.12 does not restrict the address calculated by a certain rounding operation, which allows local users to map page zero, and consequently bypass a protection mechanism that exists for the mmap system call, by making crafted shmget and shmat system calls in a privileged context.\n\n```diff\nFrom 95e91b831f87ac8e1f8ed50c14d709089b4e01b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>\nDate: Mon, 27 Feb 2017 14:28:24 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection\n\nThe issue is described here, with a nice testcase:\n\n https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931\n\nThe problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and\nthe address rounded down to 0. For the regular mmap case, the\nprotection mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the\naddress -- arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and\nreturn that address. So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things\nget funky for shmat().\n\nThe testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will\nnot have a problem attaching a nil-page. There are two possible fixes\nto this. The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root\nto crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking\nup the testcase and adding mmap(... \|MAP_FIXED). While this approach\nis the safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the\nrounded address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags. This makes the\nbehavior of shmat() identical to the mmap() case. The downside of this\nis obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains\nsemantics after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.\n\nPasses shm related ltp tests.\n\nLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net\nSigned-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>\nReported-by: Gareth Evans <gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk>\nCc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>\nCc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\n---\n ipc/shm.c \| 13 +++++++++----\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c\nindex d7805acb44fd49..06ea9ef7f54a77 100644\n--- a/ipc/shm.c\n+++ b/ipc/shm.c\n@@ -1091,8 +1091,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmctl, int, shmid, int, cmd, struct shmid_ds __user , buf)\n \"raddr\" thing points to kernel space, and there has to be a wrapper around\n * this.\n /\n-long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong raddr,\n-\t unsigned long shmlba)\n+long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user shmaddr, int shmflg,\n+\t ulong raddr, unsigned long shmlba)\n {\n \tstruct shmid_kernel shp;\n \tunsigned long addr;\n@@ -1113,8 +1113,13 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong raddr,\n \t\tgoto out;\n \telse if ((addr = (ulong)shmaddr)) {\n \t\tif (addr & (shmlba - 1)) {\n-\t\t\tif (shmflg & SHM_RND)\n-\t\t\t\taddr &= ~(shmlba - 1);\t /* round down /\n+\t\t\t/\n+\t\t\t * Round down to the nearest multiple of shmlba.\n+\t\t\t * For sane do_mmap_pgoff() parameters, avoid\n+\t\t\t * round downs that trigger nil-page and MAP_FIXED.\n+\t\t\t /\n+\t\t\tif ((shmflg & SHM_RND) && addr >= shmlba)\n+\t\t\t\taddr &= ~(shmlba - 1);\n \t\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2017-5669\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The do_shmat function in ipc/shm.c in the Linux kernel through 4.9.12 does not restrict the address calculated by a certain rounding operation, which allows local users to map page zero, and consequently bypass a protection mechanism that exists for the mmap system call, by making crafted shmget and shmat system calls in a privileged context.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-26m7-wv2f-g2rw\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 8d1e72250c847fa96498ec029891de4dc638a5ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>\nDate: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 23:01:11 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Staging: bcm: info leak in ioctl\n\nThe DevInfo.u32Reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks kernel\ninformation to user space.\n\nReported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>\nReported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>\nSigned-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>\nCc: stable@kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\n---\n drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c b/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c\nindex f91bc1fdd895ed..639ba96adb36b5 100644\n--- a/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c\n+++ b/drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c\n@@ -1960,6 +1960,7 @@ static long bcm_char_ioctl(struct file filp, UINT cmd, ULONG arg)\n \n \t\tBCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, \"Called IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO\\n\");\n \n+\t\tmemset(&DevInfo, 0, sizeof(DevInfo));\n \t\tDevInfo.MaxRDMBufferSize = BUFFER_4K;\n \t\tDevInfo.u32DSDStartOffset = EEPROM_CALPARAM_START;\n \t\tDevInfo.u32RxAlignmentCorrection = 0;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-26m7-wv2f-g2rw\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6cpj-3r2r-v2m4\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 0849a2885f81cfd82134992c06df3ccd59052ac7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Yukihiro \\\"Matz\\\" Matsumoto\" <matz@ruby.or.jp>\nDate: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 12:46:36 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH] codegen.c: stack position may be wrong on assignments.\n\nWhen `[]=` access includes keyword arguments.\n---\n mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/codegen.c \| 10 ++++++++--\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/codegen.c b/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/codegen.c\nindex 4a9fb9aeb0..86f88b6e64 100644\n--- a/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/codegen.c\n+++ b/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/codegen.c\n@@ -1865,15 +1865,21 @@ gen_assignment(codegen_scope s, node tree, node rhs, int sp, int val)\n }\n }\n if (tree->cdr->car) { / keyword arguments /\n+ if (n == 14) {\n+ pop_n(n);\n+ genop_2(s, OP_ARRAY, cursp(), n);\n+ push();\n+ n = 15;\n+ }\n gen_hash(s, tree->cdr->car->cdr, VAL, 0);\n if (n < 14) {\n n++;\n- push();\n }\n else {\n- pop();\n+ pop_n(2);\n genop_2(s, OP_ARYPUSH, cursp(), 1);\n }\n+ push();\n }\n }\n if (rhs) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-6cpj-3r2r-v2m4\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xq9w-j69v-6chc\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2046bbde72ed76af0cfdcae082de629bcc4b44c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: febinrev <52229330+febinrev@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 08:31:02 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] Patched the RCE (#636)\n\nI have patched the file upload directory traversal to Authenticated Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.\n---\n tinyfilemanager.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tinyfilemanager.php b/tinyfilemanager.php\nindex 714524c0..3d7052a4 100644\n--- a/tinyfilemanager.php\n+++ b/tinyfilemanager.php\n@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ function get_file_path () {\n \n $targetPath = $path . $ds;\n if ( is_writable($targetPath) ) {\n- $fullPath = $path . '/' . $_REQUEST['fullpath'];\n+ $fullPath = $path . '/' . str_replace(\"./\",\"_\",$_REQUEST['fullpath']);\n $folder = substr($fullPath, 0, strrpos($fullPath, \"/\"));\n \n if(file_exists ($fullPath) && !$override_file_name) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xq9w-j69v-6chc\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2q2r-xgj5-h3hm\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 5192f489a13ff9417d7b57c63420187789beea5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ingo Renner <ingo@typo3.org>\nDate: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 22:17:01 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed an XSS issue, thanks to Marcus Krause\n\ngit-svn-id: https://svn.typo3.org/TYPO3v4/Extensions/solr/trunk@24526 735d13b6-9817-0410-8766-e36946ffe9aa\n---\n ChangeLog \| 4 ++++\n pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_formcommand.php \| 2 +-\n pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_noresultscommand.php \| 2 +-\n 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog\nindex b41092bc2..4a4811d7f 100644\n--- a/ChangeLog\n+++ b/ChangeLog\n@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@\n+2009-09-16 Ingo Renner <ingo.renner@dkd.de>\n+\n+\t* Fixed an XSS issue\n+\n 2009-09-15 Ingo Renner <ingo.renner@dkd.de>\n \n \t* Initial Public Release of the community version\n\\ No newline at end of file\ndiff --git a/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_formcommand.php b/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_formcommand.php\nindex 5325c77b7..cf11ffc1d 100644\n--- a/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_formcommand.php\n+++ b/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_formcommand.php\n@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ public function execute() {\n \n \t\t$testSearchWord = t3lib_div::GParrayMerged('tx_solr');\n \t\tif (trim($testSearchWord['q'])) {\n-\t\t\t$searchWord = trim($testSearchWord['q']);\n+\t\t\t$searchWord = t3lib_div::removeXSS(trim($testSearchWord['q']));\n \t\t}\n \n \t\t$marker = array(\ndiff --git a/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_noresultscommand.php b/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_noresultscommand.php\nindex e368d3bbc..6696c7c94 100644\n--- a/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_noresultscommand.php\n+++ b/pi_results/class.tx_solr_pi_results_noresultscommand.php\n@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ public function __construct(tslib_pibase $parentPlugin) {\n \t}\n \n \tpublic function execute() {\n-\t\t$searchWord = trim($this->parentPlugin->piVars['q']);\n+\t\t$searchWord = t3lib_div::removeXSS(trim($this->parentPlugin->piVars['q']));\n \n \t\t$nothingFound = strtr(\n \t\t\t$this->parentPlugin->pi_getLL('no_results_nothing_found'),\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2q2r-xgj5-h3hm\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Apache Solr Search for TYPO3 vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-6514\nDescription: mcp-remote is exposed to OS command injection when connecting to untrusted MCP servers due to crafted input from the authorization_endpoint response URL\n\n```diff\nFrom 607b226a356cb61a239ffaba2fb3db1c9dea4bac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Glen Maddern <glen@glenmaddern.com>\nDate: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 15:04:25 +1000\nSubject: [PATCH] Forcibly escape username/pass for basic auth URLs too\n\n---\n src/lib/utils.test.ts \| 5 +++++\n src/lib/utils.ts \| 2 ++\n 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/lib/utils.test.ts b/src/lib/utils.test.ts\nindex e15bc33..5cb2c5f 100644\n--- a/src/lib/utils.test.ts\n+++ b/src/lib/utils.test.ts\n@@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ describe('sanitizeUrl', () => {\n const result = sanitizeUrl('https://example.com?empty&hasvalue=test')\n expect(result).toBe('https://example.com/?empty&hasvalue=test')\n })\n+\n+ it('should encode basic auth', () => {\n+ const result = sanitizeUrl('http://user$(calc)r:pass$(calc)word@domain.com')\n+ expect(result).toBe('http://user%24(calc)r:pass%24(calc)word@domain.com/')\n+ })\n })\n \n describe('should handle complex URLs', () => {\ndiff --git a/src/lib/utils.ts b/src/lib/utils.ts\nindex 274e181..f752ab9 100644\n--- a/src/lib/utils.ts\n+++ b/src/lib/utils.ts\n@@ -722,6 +722,8 @@ export function sanitizeUrl(raw: string) {\n if (url.hostname !== encodeURIComponent(url.hostname)) abort()\n \n // Forcibly sanitise all the pieces of the URL\n+ if (url.username) url.username = encodeURIComponent(url.username)\n+ if (url.password) url.password = encodeURIComponent(url.password)\n url.pathname = url.pathname.slice(0, 1) + encodeURIComponent(url.pathname.slice(1)).replace(/%2f/ig,'/')\n url.search = url.search.slice(0, 1) + Array.from(url.searchParams.entries()).map(sanitizeParam).join('&')\n url.hash = url.hash.slice(0, 1) + encodeURIComponent(url.hash.slice(1))\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-6514\nCWE: CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')\nTitle: OS command injection in mcp-remote when connecting to untrusted MCP servers\n\nThis patch addresses: mcp-remote is exposed to OS command injection when connecting to untrusted MCP servers due to crafted input from the authorization_endpoint response URL\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h55h-wq7v-r6qm\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 3e88c98ca513880e2b43ed7f27ade17fef5d9170 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ingo Schommer <ingo@silverstripe.com>\nDate: Wed, 8 May 2013 10:22:52 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] API Restrict MemberLoginForm to POST requests for increased\n security\n\nCVE-2013-2653 - Thanks to Fara Rustein of Deloitte Argentina for reporting.\n---\n security/MemberLoginForm.php \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/security/MemberLoginForm.php b/security/MemberLoginForm.php\nindex 1e5e2bceb98..cb584539cc2 100644\n--- a/security/MemberLoginForm.php\n+++ b/security/MemberLoginForm.php\n@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ public function __construct($controller, $name, $fields = null, $actions = null,\n \t\t\t$fields->push(new HiddenField('BackURL', 'BackURL', $backURL));\n \t\t}\n \n+\t\t// Reduce attack surface by enforcing POST requests\n+\t\t$this->setFormMethod('POST', true);\n+\n \t\tparent::__construct($controller, $name, $fields, $actions);\n \n \t\t// Focus on the email input when the page is loaded\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h55h-wq7v-r6qm\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-25052\nDescription: A vulnerability has been found in Catalyst-Plugin-Session up to 0.40 and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects the function _load_sessionid of the file lib/Catalyst/Plugin/Session.pm of the component Session ID Handler. The manipulation of the argument sid leads to cross site scripting. The attack can be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 0.41 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 88d1b599e1163761c9bd53bec53ba078f13e09d4. It is recommended to upgrade the a\n\n```diff\nFrom 88d1b599e1163761c9bd53bec53ba078f13e09d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Michael McClimon <michael@mcclimon.org>\nDate: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 11:41:38 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Session: encode HTML entities in error\n\nWithout this, it's possible to self-XSS by trying to set a session id to\nsomething like `</script><svg/onload='alert(\"xss\")'>`.\n---\n lib/Catalyst/Plugin/Session.pm \| 2 ++\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/Catalyst/Plugin/Session.pm b/lib/Catalyst/Plugin/Session.pm\nindex d6a6b9a..0a2e5ef 100644\n--- a/lib/Catalyst/Plugin/Session.pm\n+++ b/lib/Catalyst/Plugin/Session.pm\n@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use Catalyst::Exception ();\n use Digest ();\n use overload ();\n use Object::Signature ();\n+use HTML::Entities ();\n use Carp;\n use List::Util qw/ max /;\n \n@@ -480,6 +481,7 @@ sub _load_sessionid {\n $c->_sessionid($sid);\n return $sid;\n } else {\n+ $sid = HTML::Entities::encode_entities($sid);\n my $err = \"Tried to set invalid session ID '$sid'\";\n $c->log->error($err);\n Catalyst::Exception->throw($err);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-25052\nCWE: CWE-79 Cross Site Scripting\nTitle: Catalyst-Plugin-Session Session ID Session.pm _load_sessionid cross site scripting\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability has been found in Catalyst-Plugin-Session up to 0.40 and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects the function _load_sessionid of the file lib/Catalyst/Plugin/Session.pm of the component Session ID Handler. The manipulation of the argument sid leads to cross site scripting. The attack can be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 0.41 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 88d1b599e1163761c9bd53bec53ba078f13e09d4. It is recommended to upgrade the a\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-25050\nDescription: netCDF in GDAL 2.4.2 through 3.0.4 has a stack-based buffer overflow in nc4_get_att (called from nc4_get_att_tc and nc_get_att_text) and in uffd_cleanup (called from netCDFDataset::~netCDFDataset and netCDFDataset::~netCDFDataset).\n\n```diff\nFrom 767e3a56144f676ca738ef8f700e0e56035bd05a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>\nDate: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 21:56:17 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] netCDF: avoid buffer overflow. master only. Fixes\n https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=15143. Credit to OSS\n Fuzz\n\n---\n gdal/frmts/netcdf/netcdfsg.cpp \| 15 +++++----------\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/gdal/frmts/netcdf/netcdfsg.cpp b/gdal/frmts/netcdf/netcdfsg.cpp\nindex 2da0e39dcdc9..b5920b6cbf34 100644\n--- a/gdal/frmts/netcdf/netcdfsg.cpp\n+++ b/gdal/frmts/netcdf/netcdfsg.cpp\n@@ -54,26 +54,21 @@ namespace nccfdriver\n /\n std::string& attrf(int ncid, int varId, const char attrName, std::string& alloc)\n {\n- alloc = \"\";\n-\n size_t len = 0;\n nc_inq_attlen(ncid, varId, attrName, &len);\n- \n+\n if(len < 1)\n {\n+ alloc.clear();\n return alloc;\n }\n \n- char attr_vals[NC_MAX_NAME + 1];\n- memset(attr_vals, 0, NC_MAX_NAME + 1);\n+ alloc.resize(len);\n+ memset(&alloc[0], 0, len);\n \n // Now look through this variable for the attribute\n- if(nc_get_att_text(ncid, varId, attrName, attr_vals) != NC_NOERR)\n- {\n- return alloc;\n- }\n+ nc_get_att_text(ncid, varId, attrName, &alloc[0]);\n \n- alloc = std::string(attr_vals);\n return alloc;\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-25050\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: netCDF in GDAL 2.4.2 through 3.0.4 has a stack-based buffer overflow in nc4_get_att (called from nc4_get_att_tc and nc_get_att_text) and in uffd_cleanup (called from netCDFDataset::~netCDFDataset and netCDFDataset::~netCDFDataset).\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-46731\nDescription: XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform offering runtime services for applications built on top of it. XWiki doesn't properly escape the section URL parameter that is used in the code for displaying administration sections. This allows any user with read access to the document `XWiki.AdminSheet` (by default, everyone including unauthenticated users) to execute code including Groovy code. This impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki instance. This vulnerabilit\n\n```diff\nFrom fec8e0e53f9fa2c3f1e568cc15b0e972727c803a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Michael Hamann <michael.hamann@xwiki.com>\nDate: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 16:47:08 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] XWIKI-21110: Improve section name display in administration\n\n---\n .../src/main/resources/XWiki/AdminSheet.xml \| 2 +-\n .../administration/AdminSheetPageTest.java \| 60 +++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n create mode 100644 xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/test/java/org/xwiki/administration/AdminSheetPageTest.java\n\ndiff --git a/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/main/resources/XWiki/AdminSheet.xml b/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/main/resources/XWiki/AdminSheet.xml\nindex 18ad45179dad..cce429f63612 100644\n--- a/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/main/resources/XWiki/AdminSheet.xml\n+++ b/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/main/resources/XWiki/AdminSheet.xml\n@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@\n #end\n #end\n (% id=\"document-title\" %)(((\n- = $services.localization.render(\"administration.sectionTitle$level\", [$sectionName]) =\n+ = $services.localization.render(\"administration.sectionTitle$level\", 'xwiki/2.1', [$sectionName]) =\n ## Display the category/section description below the title.\n #set ($categoryOrSectionId = $crtCategory.id)\n #if (\"$!crtSection.id\" != '')\ndiff --git a/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/test/java/org/xwiki/administration/AdminSheetPageTest.java b/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/test/java/org/xwiki/administration/AdminSheetPageTest.java\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000000..1a3f933f5874\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-ui/src/test/java/org/xwiki/administration/AdminSheetPageTest.java\n@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@\n+/\n+ See the NOTICE file distributed with this work for additional\n+ * information regarding copyright ownership.\n+ \n+ This is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it\n+ * under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as\n+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of\n+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n+ \n+ This software is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU\n+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.\n+ \n+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public\n+ * License along with this software; if not, write to the Free\n+ * Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA\n+ * 02110-1301 USA, or see the FSF site: http://www.fsf.org.\n+ \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2023-46731\nCWE: CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')\nTitle: Remote code execution through the section parameter in Administration as guest in XWiki Platform\n\nThis patch addresses: XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform offering runtime services for applications built on top of it. XWiki doesn't properly escape the section URL parameter that is used in the code for displaying administration sections. This allows any user with read access to the document `XWiki.AdminSheet` (by default, everyone including unauthenticated users) to execute code including Groovy code. This impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki instance. This vulnerabilit\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-grcg-hjg8-mrhw\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 45c1380358b12bf2d1db20a5874e9544f56b34ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>\nDate: Sun, 27 Oct 2019 16:53:24 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] ASoC: SOF: ipc: Fix memory leak in\n sof_set_get_large_ctrl_data\n\nIn the implementation of sof_set_get_large_ctrl_data() there is a memory\nleak in case an error. Release partdata if sof_get_ctrl_copy_params()\nfails.\n\nFixes: 54d198d5019d (\"ASoC: SOF: Propagate sof_get_ctrl_copy_params() error properly\")\nSigned-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>\nLink: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191027215330.12729-1-navid.emamdoost@gmail.com\nSigned-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>\n---\n sound/soc/sof/ipc.c \| 4 +++-\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/sound/soc/sof/ipc.c b/sound/soc/sof/ipc.c\nindex b2f359d2f7e530..086eeeab867955 100644\n--- a/sound/soc/sof/ipc.c\n+++ b/sound/soc/sof/ipc.c\n@@ -572,8 +572,10 @@ static int sof_set_get_large_ctrl_data(struct snd_sof_dev sdev,\n \telse\n \t\terr = sof_get_ctrl_copy_params(cdata->type, partdata, cdata,\n \t\t\t\t\t sparams);\n-\tif (err < 0)\n+\tif (err < 0) {\n+\t\tkfree(partdata);\n \t\treturn err;\n+\t}\n \n \tmsg_bytes = sparams->msg_bytes;\n \tpl_size = sparams->pl_size;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-grcg-hjg8-mrhw\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xw2r-f8xv-c8xp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom aff4bc61e0e0d99418241a9105b1988e806b3ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: matthieu-rolland <matthieu.rolland@prestashop.com>\nDate: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 11:12:59 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] add missing html attributes\n\n---\n classes/Validate.php \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/classes/Validate.php b/classes/Validate.php\nindex d7679ea4df58f..8feb706aaabee 100644\n--- a/classes/Validate.php\n+++ b/classes/Validate.php\n@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ public static function isCleanHtml($html, $allow_iframe = false)\n $events .= '\|ondragleave\|ondragover\|ondragstart\|ondrop\|onerrorupdate\|onfilterchange\|onfinish\|onfocusin\|onfocusout\|onhashchange\|onhelp\|oninput\|onlosecapture\|onmessage\|onmouseup\|onmovestart';\n $events .= '\|onoffline\|ononline\|onpaste\|onpropertychange\|onreadystatechange\|onresizeend\|onresizestart\|onrowenter\|onrowexit\|onrowsdelete\|onrowsinserted\|onscroll\|onsearch\|onselectionchange';\n $events .= '\|onselectstart\|onstart\|onstop\|onanimationcancel\|onanimationend\|onanimationiteration\|onanimationstart';\n+ $events .= '\|onpointerover\|onpointerenter\|onpointerdown\|onpointermove\|onpointerup\|onpointerout\|onpointerleave\|onpointercancel\|ongotpointercapture\|onlostpointercapture';\n \n if (preg_match('/<[\\s]script/ims', $html) \|\| preg_match('/(' . $events . ')[\\s]=/ims', $html) \|\| preg_match('/.script\\:/ims', $html)) {\n return false;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-xw2r-f8xv-c8xp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: PrestaShop XSS injection through Validate::isCleanHTML method\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125073\nDescription: A vulnerability was found in mapoor voteapp. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is the function create_poll/do_poll/show_poll/show_refresh of the file app.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The patch is identified as b290c21a0d8bcdbd55db860afd3cadec97388e72. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-217790 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.\n\n```diff\nFrom b290c21a0d8bcdbd55db860afd3cadec97388e72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: mapoor <imac@imactekiMac-mini.local>\nDate: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 18:54:14 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] prevent sql injection\n\n---\n app.py \| 26 ++++++++++++--------------\n templates/show.html \| 11 ++++++-----\n 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app.py b/app.py\nindex ffd115c..f73cc43 100755\n--- a/app.py\n+++ b/app.py\n@@ -36,17 +36,15 @@ def create_poll():\n \ttry:\n \t\tcursor = conn.cursor() \n \t\tuid = request.remote_addr\n-\t\timport pdb\n-\t\tpdb.set_trace()\n \t\tvid = str(int(time.time()100))\n \t\ttitle, optn, l_dsc = parse_req()\n \t\toptdsc = '\|'.join(l_dsc)\n \t\toptnum = '\|'.join(['0']optn)\n \t\tsql = \"insert into t_vote_info(FUid, FVoteId, FTitle, FOptionNum, \\\n \t\t\t\tFOptionDesc, FOptionVoteNum, FState, FCreateTime, FEndTime) \\\n-\t\t\t\tvalues(\\\"%s\\\",\\\"%s\\\",\\\"%s\\\",%d,\\\"%s\\\",\\\"%s\\\",0,now(),now()+interval 1 day);\" \n+\t\t\t\tvalues(%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,0,now(),now()+interval 1 day);\" \n \t\tparam = (uid, vid, title, optn, optdsc, optnum) \n-\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql%param)\n+\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql, param)\n \t\tconn.commit()\n \t\tcursor.close()\n \texcept Exception,e:\n@@ -58,8 +56,8 @@ def do_poll():\n \tif \"p_id\" in request.args:\n \t\tp_id = request.args['p_id']\n \t\tcursor = conn.cursor()\n-\t\tsql_s = \"select FTitle, FOptionDesc from t_vote_info where FVoteId=%s;\"%p_id\n-\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_s)\n+\t\tsql_s = \"select FTitle, FOptionDesc from t_vote_info where FVoteId=%s;\"\n+\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_s, (p_id,))\n \t\tr = cursor.fetchone()\n \t\tcursor.close()\n \t\ttitle = r[0]\n@@ -75,13 +73,13 @@ def do_poll():\n \tp_id = request.form['p_id']\n \ttry:\n \t\tcursor = conn.cursor()\n-\t\tsql_s = \"select FOptionVoteNum from t_vote_info where FVoteId=%s;\"%p_id\n-\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_s)\n+\t\tsql_s = \"select FOptionVoteNum from t_vote_info where FVoteId=%s;\"\n+\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_s, (p_id,))\n \t\topt_pre = cursor.fetchone()[0].split('\|')\n \t\topt_pre[o_id] = str(int(opt_pre[o_id])+1)\n \t\topt_new = '\|'.join(opt_pre)\n-\t\tsql_u = \"update t_vote_info set FOptionVoteNum=\\\"%s\\\" where FVoteId=\\\"%s\\\";\"%(opt_new,p_id)\n-\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_u)\n+\t\tsql_u = \"update t_vote_info set FOptionVoteNum=%s where FVoteId=%s;\"\n+\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_u, (opt_new,p_id))\n \t\tconn.commit()\n \t\tcursor.close()\n \texcept Exception,e:\n@@ -98,8 +96,8 @@ def show_poll():\n \trows = []\n \ttry:\n \t\tcursor = conn.cursor()\n-\t\tsql_s = \"select FTitle,FOptionDesc,FOptionVoteNum,FState,FEndTime from t_vote_info where FVoteId=%s;\"%p_id\n-\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_s)\n+\t\tsql_s = \"select FTitle,FOptionDesc,FOptionVoteNum,FState,FEndTime from t_vote_info where FVoteId=%s;\"\n+\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_s, (p_id,))\n \t\tr = cursor.fetchone()\n \t\tcursor.close()\n \t\ttitle = r[0]\n@@ -121,8 +119,8 @@ def show_refresh():\n \trows = []\n \ttry:\n \t\tcursor = conn.cursor()\n-\t\tsql_s = \"select FTitle,FOptionDesc,FOptionVoteNum,FState,FEndTime from t_vote_info where FVoteId=%s;\"%p_id\n-\t\tres = cursor.execute(sql_s)\n+\t\tsql_s = \"select FTitle,FOptionDesc,FOptionVoteNu\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125073\nCWE: CWE-89 SQL Injection\nTitle: mapoor voteapp app.py show_refresh sql injection\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability was found in mapoor voteapp. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is the function create_poll/do_poll/show_poll/show_refresh of the file app.py. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The patch is identified as b290c21a0d8bcdbd55db860afd3cadec97388e72. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-217790 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4vgm-5r69-wvp8\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 8ee70ec63931d1e38567905387ab9b1d45734d81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tom Yu <tlyu@mit.edu>\nDate: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 19:27:33 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] KDC TGS-REQ null deref [CVE-2013-1416]\n\nBy sending an unusual but valid TGS-REQ, an authenticated remote\nattacker can cause the KDC process to crash by dereferencing a null\npointer.\n\nprep_reprocess_req() can cause a null pointer dereference when\nprocessing a service principal name. Code in this function can\ninappropriately pass a null pointer to strlcpy(). Unmodified client\nsoftware can trivially trigger this vulnerability, but the attacker\nmust have already authenticated and received a valid Kerberos ticket.\n\nThe vulnerable code was introduced by the implementation of new\nservice principal realm referral functionality in krb5-1.7, but was\ncorrected as a side effect of the KDC refactoring in krb5-1.11.\n\nCVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:O/RC:C\n\nticket: 7600 (new)\nversion_fixed: 1.10.5\nstatus: resolved\n---\n src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c \| 6 ++++--\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c\nindex 9ff80cfd0ec..86496e94911 100644\n--- a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c\n+++ b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c\n@@ -1141,7 +1141,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req request, krb5_principal krbtgt_princ)\n retval = ENOMEM;\n goto cleanup;\n }\n- strlcpy(comp1_str,comp1->data,comp1->length+1);\n+ if (comp1->data != NULL)\n+ memcpy(comp1_str, comp1->data, comp1->length);\n \n if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST \|\|\n krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST \|\|\n@@ -1164,7 +1165,8 @@ prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req request, krb5_principal krbtgt_princ)\n retval = ENOMEM;\n goto cleanup;\n }\n- strlcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data,comp2->length+1);\n+ if (comp2->data != NULL)\n+ memcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data, comp2->length);\n retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);\n free(temp_buf);\n if (retval) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4vgm-5r69-wvp8\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wmj9-xh24-j4gx\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 14a1bb971bcb8b5456c2bf0020c3018907a2704d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bozhidar Slaveykov <bobi@microweber.com>\nDate: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 11:36:59 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] xss fix on tagging module\n\n---\n src/MicroweberPackages/Helper/HTMLClean.php \| 12 ++++++++++++\n userfiles/modules/tags/TaggingTagsManager.php \| 4 +++-\n 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/MicroweberPackages/Helper/HTMLClean.php b/src/MicroweberPackages/Helper/HTMLClean.php\nindex 2a20e428ca8..d9cac9b20fd 100644\n--- a/src/MicroweberPackages/Helper/HTMLClean.php\n+++ b/src/MicroweberPackages/Helper/HTMLClean.php\n@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@\n \n class HTMLClean\n {\n+ public function cleanArray($array) {\n+ if (is_array($array)) {\n+\n+ $cleanedArray = [];\n+ foreach ($array as $key=>$value) {\n+ $cleanedArray[$key] = $this->clean($value);\n+ }\n+\n+ return $cleanedArray;\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n public function clean($html) {\n \n $antiXss = new \\voku\\helper\\AntiXSS();\ndiff --git a/userfiles/modules/tags/TaggingTagsManager.php b/userfiles/modules/tags/TaggingTagsManager.php\nindex df86b670225..dd1e191b8fd 100644\n--- a/userfiles/modules/tags/TaggingTagsManager.php\n+++ b/userfiles/modules/tags/TaggingTagsManager.php\n@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ function tagging_tag_edit($params) {\n $newData['id'] = $params['id'];\n }\n \n+ $cleanInput = new \\MicroweberPackages\\Helper\\HTMLClean();\n+ $newData = $cleanInput->cleanArray($newData);\n+\n if (isset($params['tagging_tag_id']) && !empty($params['tagging_tag_id'])) {\n $tagging_tag_id = $params['tagging_tag_id'];\n $tag = db_get('tagging_tags', [\n@@ -105,7 +108,6 @@ function tagging_tag_edit($params) {\n }\n }\n \n-\n $tagSaved = db_save('tagging_tags',$newData);\n if ($tagSaved) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wmj9-xh24-j4gx\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting in microweber\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qch4-jmf8-xvp7\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 8e85698aa3aa4884c2f3d6c987542477eb64f07c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tony Murray <murraytony@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 13:24:22 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix possible RSS XSS (#14457)\n\nEscape titles when shown. Body was already cleaned.\n---\n includes/html/pages/notifications.inc.php \| 6 +++---\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/includes/html/pages/notifications.inc.php b/includes/html/pages/notifications.inc.php\nindex 0a172be326ec..13ea55b52ca0 100644\n--- a/includes/html/pages/notifications.inc.php\n+++ b/includes/html/pages/notifications.inc.php\n@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@\n \n $class = $notif['severity'] == 2 ? 'text-danger' : 'text-warning';\n echo \"<h4 class='$class' id='${notif['notifications_id']}'>\";\n- echo \"<strong><i class='fa fa-bell-o'></i> ${notif['title']}</strong>\";\n+ echo \"<strong><i class='fa fa-bell-o'></i> \" . htmlentities($notif['title']) . '</strong>';\n echo \"<span class='pull-right'>\";\n \n if ($notif['user_id'] != Auth::id()) {\n@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@\n } elseif ($notif['severity'] == 2) {\n $class = 'text-danger';\n }\n- echo \"<h4 class='$class' id='${notif['notifications_id']}'>${notif['title']}<span class='pull-right'>\";\n+ echo \"<h4 class='$class' id='${notif['notifications_id']}'>\" . htmlentities($notif['title']) . \"<span class='pull-right'>\";\n \n if (Auth::user()->hasGlobalAdmin()) {\n echo '<button class=\"btn btn-primary fa fa-bell-o stick-notif\" data-toggle=\"tooltip\" data-placement=\"bottom\" title=\"Mark as Sticky\" style=\"margin-top:-10px;\"></button>';\n@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@\n } elseif ($notif['severity'] == 2) {\n echo ' class=\"text-danger\"';\n }\n- echo \" id='${notif['notifications_id']}'>${notif['title']}\";\n+ echo \" id='${notif['notifications_id']}'>\" . htmlentities($notif['title']);\n \n if (Auth::user()->isAdmin()) {\n echo '<span class=\"pull-right\"><button class=\"btn btn-primary fa fa-bell-o stick-notif\" data-toggle=\"tooltip\" data-placement=\"bottom\" title=\"Mark as Sticky\" style=\"margin-top:-10px;\"></button></span>';\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qch4-jmf8-xvp7\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting in librenms/librenms\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-prc3-7f44-w48j\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d59fd4398c8ae6361e0b13c491f66b51e49a7441 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mark Thomas <markt@apache.org>\nDate: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 09:56:26 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Small optimisation. The resolver and the factory are only\n used when running under a security manager so only load them in this case.\n Also avoid a possible memory leak when creating these objects. This is part 1\n of 7 of the fix for CVE-2014-0119\n\ngit-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/tomcat/trunk@1588193 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68\n---\n .../catalina/security/SecurityClassLoad.java \| 13 +++++++++++++\n .../apache/catalina/servlets/DefaultServlet.java \| 15 ++++++++++-----\n 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/security/SecurityClassLoad.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/security/SecurityClassLoad.java\nindex 58a243596..5e85690d3 100644\n--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/security/SecurityClassLoad.java\n+++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/security/SecurityClassLoad.java\n@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static void securityClassLoad(ClassLoader loader, boolean requireSecurityManager\n loadCoyotePackage(loader);\n loadLoaderPackage(loader);\n loadRealmPackage(loader);\n+ loadServletsPackage(loader);\n loadSessionPackage(loader);\n loadUtilPackage(loader);\n loadValvesPackage(loader);\n@@ -126,6 +127,18 @@ private static final void loadRealmPackage(ClassLoader loader)\n }\n \n \n+ private static final void loadServletsPackage(ClassLoader loader)\n+ throws Exception {\n+ final String basePackage = \"org.apache.catalina.servlets.\";\n+ // Avoid a possible memory leak in the DefaultServlet when running with\n+ // a security manager. The DefaultServlet needs to load an XML parser\n+ // when running under a security manager. We want this to be loaded by\n+ // the container rather than a web application to prevent a memory leak\n+ // via web application class loader.\n+ loader.loadClass(basePackage + \"DefaultServlet\");\n+ }\n+\n+\n private static final void loadSessionPackage(ClassLoader loader)\n throws Exception {\n final String basePackage = \"org.apache.catalina.session.\";\ndiff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/servlets/DefaultServlet.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/servlets/DefaultServlet.java\nindex a8b47ee2e..0c678ebc0 100644\n--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/servlets/DefaultServlet.java\n+++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/servlets/DefaultServlet.java\n@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ public class DefaultServlet extends HttpServlet {\n \n private static final DocumentBuilderFactory factory;\n \n- private static final SecureEntityResolver secureEntityResolver =\n- new SecureEntityResolver();\n+ private static final SecureEntityResolver secureEntityResolver;\n \n /*\n Full range marker.\n@@ -166,9 +165,15 @@ public class DefaultServlet extends HttpServlet {\n urlEncoder.addSafeCharacter('');\n urlEncoder.addSafeChara\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-prc3-7f44-w48j\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Missing XML Validation in Apache Tomcat\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport random\n\n\ndef getSessionID():\n '''\n Return a random and unique session ID.\n '''\n return random.randint(0, 0xFFFFFFFF)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-330 - CWE-330\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8x9g-h36m-4rg2\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9b46d38dd3c4de6048a488b655c7319f845af185 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: radare <pancake@nopcode.org>\nDate: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 01:46:58 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)\n\n0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-\nmov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--\nleA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-\nleA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-\nmov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--\n---\n libr/asm/p/asm_x86_nz.c \| 11 +++++++----\n 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libr/asm/p/asm_x86_nz.c b/libr/asm/p/asm_x86_nz.c\nindex 623892b6d7cf5..79abc9d60d308 100644\n--- a/libr/asm/p/asm_x86_nz.c\n+++ b/libr/asm/p/asm_x86_nz.c\n@@ -4575,14 +4575,17 @@ static int parseOperand(RAsm a, const char str, Operand op, bool isrepop) {\n \t\t\tif (last_type == TT_SPECIAL) {\n \t\t\t\tif (str[pos] == '+' \|\| str[pos] == '-' \|\| str[pos] == ']') {\n \t\t\t\t\tif (reg != X86R_UNDEFINED) {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\top->regs[reg_index] = reg;\n-\t\t\t\t\t\top->scale[reg_index] = temp;\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tif (reg_index < 2) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\top->regs[reg_index] = reg;\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\top->scale[reg_index] = temp;\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t\t++reg_index;\n \t\t\t\t\t} else {\n \t\t\t\t\t\top->offset += temp;\n-\t\t\t\t\t\top->regs[reg_index] = X86R_UNDEFINED;\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tif (reg_index < 2) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\top->regs[reg_index] = X86R_UNDEFINED;\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t}\n-\n \t\t\t\t\ttemp = 1;\n \t\t\t\t\treg = X86R_UNDEFINED;\n \t\t\t\t} else if (str[pos] == '') {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8x9g-h36m-4rg2\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2q8v-3gqq-4f8p\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 55e18f6d128b2da8986adbbcccf1cd59a4b9ad6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Charles Cooper <cooper.charles.m@gmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 10:08:03 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: concat buffer bug (#3738)\n\nthe `concat()` builtin did not respect the `copy_bytes()` API, it\nallocated a buffer in some cases which did not have enough padding.\n\npatches GHSA-2q8v-3gqq-4f8p\n\n---------\n\nCo-authored-by: cyberthirst <cyberthirst.eth@gmail.com>\n---\n .../builtins/codegen/test_concat.py \| 64 +++++++++++++++++++\n vyper/builtins/functions.py \| 11 ++--\n 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tests/functional/builtins/codegen/test_concat.py b/tests/functional/builtins/codegen/test_concat.py\nindex 5558138551..7354515989 100644\n--- a/tests/functional/builtins/codegen/test_concat.py\n+++ b/tests/functional/builtins/codegen/test_concat.py\n@@ -55,6 +55,70 @@ def krazykonkat(z: Bytes[10]) -> Bytes[25]:\n print(\"Passed third concat test\")\n \n \n+def test_concat_buffer(get_contract):\n+ # GHSA-2q8v-3gqq-4f8p\n+ code = \"\"\"\n+@internal\n+def bar() -> uint256:\n+ sss: String[2] = concat(\"a\", \"b\")\n+ return 1\n+\n+\n+@external\n+def foo() -> int256:\n+ a: int256 = -1\n+ b: uint256 = self.bar()\n+ return a\n+ \"\"\"\n+ c = get_contract(code)\n+ assert c.foo() == -1\n+\n+\n+def test_concat_buffer2(get_contract):\n+ # GHSA-2q8v-3gqq-4f8p\n+ code = \"\"\"\n+i: immutable(int256)\n+\n+@external\n+def __init__():\n+ i = -1\n+ s: String[2] = concat(\"a\", \"b\")\n+\n+@external\n+def foo() -> int256:\n+ return i\n+ \"\"\"\n+ c = get_contract(code)\n+ assert c.foo() == -1\n+\n+\n+def test_concat_buffer3(get_contract):\n+ # GHSA-2q8v-3gqq-4f8p\n+ code = \"\"\"\n+s: String[1]\n+s2: String[33]\n+s3: String[34]\n+\n+@external\n+def __init__():\n+ self.s = \"a\"\n+ self.s2 = \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\" # 33'a'\n+\n+@internal\n+def bar() -> uint256:\n+ self.s3 = concat(self.s, self.s2)\n+ return 1\n+\n+@external\n+def foo() -> int256:\n+ i: int256 = -1\n+ b: uint256 = self.bar()\n+ return i\n+ \"\"\"\n+ c = get_contract(code)\n+ assert c.foo() == -1\n+\n+\n def test_concat_bytes32(get_contract_with_gas_estimation):\n test_concat_bytes32 = \"\"\"\n @external\ndiff --git a/vyper/builtins/functions.py b/vyper/builtins/functions.py\nindex 4f8101dfbe..8ee6f5fd76 100644\n--- a/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n+++ b/vyper/builtins/functions.py\n@@ -543,13 +543,12 @@ def build_IR(self, expr, context):\n else:\n ret_typ = BytesT(dst_maxlen)\n \n+ # respect API of copy_bytes\n+ bufsize = dst_maxlen + 32\n+ buf = context.new_internal_variable(BytesT(bufsize))\n+\n # Node representing the position of the output in memory\n- dst = IRnode.from_list(\n- context.new_internal_variable(ret_typ),\n- typ=ret_typ,\n- location=MEMORY,\n- annotation=\"concat destination\",\n- )\n+ dst = IRnode.from_list(buf, typ=ret_typ, location=MEMORY, annotation=\"concat dest\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-2q8v-3gqq-4f8p\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: concat built-in can corrupt memory in vyper\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-55658\nDescription: SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.1.16, SiYuan's /api/export/exportResources endpoint is vulnerable to arbitary file read via path traversal. It is possible to manipulate the paths parameter to access and download arbitrary files from the host system by traversing the workspace directory structure. Version 3.1.16 contains a patch for the issue.\n\n```diff\nFrom e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Daniel <845765@qq.com>\nDate: Wed, 11 Dec 2024 17:15:54 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] :lock: Some security vulnerabilities\n https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/13426\n\n---\n kernel/api/template.go \| 6 ++++++\n kernel/model/export.go \| 8 +++++++-\n kernel/model/upload.go \| 5 +++++\n kernel/treenode/template.go \| 6 ++++++\n kernel/util/path.go \| 4 ++++\n 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/kernel/api/template.go b/kernel/api/template.go\nindex 69f2db4722d..82e7d504a56 100644\n--- a/kernel/api/template.go\n+++ b/kernel/api/template.go\n@@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ func renderTemplate(c gin.Context) {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n+\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(p) {\n+\t\tret.Code = -1\n+\t\tret.Msg = \"Path [\" + p + \"] is not in workspace\"\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n+\n \tpreview := false\n \tif previewArg := arg[\"preview\"]; nil != previewArg {\n \t\tpreview = previewArg.(bool)\ndiff --git a/kernel/model/export.go b/kernel/model/export.go\nindex 88a62de433a..b844b08bfc0 100644\n--- a/kernel/model/export.go\n+++ b/kernel/model/export.go\n@@ -532,7 +532,13 @@ func ExportResources(resourcePaths []string, mainName string) (exportFilePath st\n \n \t// 将需要导出的文件/文件夹复制到临时文件夹\n \tfor _, resourcePath := range resourcePaths {\n-\t\tresourceFullPath := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, resourcePath) // 资源完整路径\n+\t\tresourceFullPath := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, resourcePath) // 资源完整路径\n+\t\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(resourceFullPath) {\n+\t\t\tlogging.LogErrorf(\"resource path [%s] is not in workspace\", resourceFullPath)\n+\t\t\terr = errors.New(\"resource path [\" + resourcePath + \"] is not in workspace\")\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tresourceBaseName := filepath.Base(resourceFullPath) // 资源名称\n \t\tresourceCopyPath := filepath.Join(exportFolderPath, resourceBaseName) // 资源副本完整路径\n \t\tif err = filelock.Copy(resourceFullPath, resourceCopyPath); err != nil {\ndiff --git a/kernel/model/upload.go b/kernel/model/upload.go\nindex c21a4aa8dfe..04fcd83c2f2 100644\n--- a/kernel/model/upload.go\n+++ b/kernel/model/upload.go\n@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ func Upload(c gin.Context) {\n \tif nil != form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"] {\n \t\trelAssetsDirPath = form.Value[\"assetsDirPath\"][0]\n \t\tassetsDirPath = filepath.Join(util.DataDir, relAssetsDirPath)\n+\t\tif !util.IsAbsPathInWorkspace(assetsDirPath) {\n+\t\t\tret.Code = -1\n+\t\t\tret.Msg = \"Path [\" + assetsDirPath + \"] is not in workspace\"\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \tif !gulu.File.IsExist(assetsDirPath) {\n \t\tif err = os.MkdirAll(assetsDirPath, 0755); err != nil {\ndiff --git a/kernel/treenode/template.go b/kernel/treenode/template.go\nindex 84561fc6106..0472a42f659 100644\n--- a/kernel/treenode/template.go\n+++ b/kernel/treenode/template.go\n@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ import (\n \n func BuiltInTemplateFuncs() (ret template.FuncMap) {\n \tret = sprig.TxtFuncMap()\n+\n+\t// 因为安全原因移除一些函数 https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/13426\n+\tdelete(ret, \"env\")\n+\tdelete(ret, \"expandenv\")\n+\tdelete(ret, \"getHostByName\")\n+\n \tret[\"Wee\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-55658\nCWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')\nTitle: SiYuan has an arbitrary file read and path traversal via /api/export/exportResources\n\nThis patch addresses: SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.1.16, SiYuan's /api/export/exportResources endpoint is vulnerable to arbitary file read via path traversal. It is possible to manipulate the paths parameter to access and download arbitrary files from the host system by traversing the workspace directory structure. Version 3.1.16 contains a patch for the issue.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2hw3-h8qx-hqqp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 7b5ed20c608c7b9b36d1950a386678e0a89f8175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Hantong Chen <cxwdyx620@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 01:06:46 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: XSS issue reported\n\n---\n src/pages/home/previews/markdown_with_word_wrap.tsx \| 9 ++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/pages/home/previews/markdown_with_word_wrap.tsx b/src/pages/home/previews/markdown_with_word_wrap.tsx\nindex ad325a511..ab430c0af 100644\n--- a/src/pages/home/previews/markdown_with_word_wrap.tsx\n+++ b/src/pages/home/previews/markdown_with_word_wrap.tsx\n@@ -1,11 +1,18 @@\n import { Markdown, MaybeLoading } from \"~/components\"\n import { useFetchText } from \"~/hooks\"\n+import { objStore } from \"~/store\"\n+import { ext } from \"~/utils\"\n \n const MdPreview = () => {\n const [content] = useFetchText()\n return (\n <MaybeLoading loading={content.loading}>\n- <Markdown class=\"word-wrap\" children={content()?.content} toc />\n+ <Markdown\n+ class=\"word-wrap\"\n+ children={content()?.content}\n+ ext={ext(objStore.obj.name)}\n+ toc\n+ />\n </MaybeLoading>\n )\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2hw3-h8qx-hqqp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: OpenList (frontend) allows XSS Attacks in the built-in Markdown Viewer\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8hgj-6pgq-37q3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 4f68e9661518463fca523c9726bb5d940a2aa6d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Cristy <urban-warrior@imagemagick.org>\nDate: Mon, 31 Aug 2015 16:19:40 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] \n https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/imagemagick/+bug/1490362\n\n---\n coders/tga.c \| 2 ++\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/coders/tga.c b/coders/tga.c\nindex c2d760425dc..781933dfbd0 100644\n--- a/coders/tga.c\n+++ b/coders/tga.c\n@@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ static Image ReadTGAImage(const ImageInfo image_info,\n /\n Read TGA raster colormap.\n /\n+ if (image->colors < tga_info.colormap_index)\n+ image->colors=tga_info.colormap_index;\n if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)\n ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,\"MemoryAllocationFailed\");\n for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) tga_info.colormap_index; i++)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8hgj-6pgq-37q3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2m39-62fm-q8r3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 46065d38a5e6d1bccf86d3efb2fb83c14e3f9957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Alex Wilson <alex.wilson@joyent.com>\nDate: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 15:54:08 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] joyent/node-sshpk#44 Performance issues parsing long SSH\n public keys Reviewed by: Cody Peter Mello <cody.mello@joyent.com>\n\n---\n lib/formats/ssh.js \| 6 +++---\n package.json \| 2 +-\n test/horrors.js \| 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/formats/ssh.js b/lib/formats/ssh.js\nindex 655c9ea..7f88ceb 100644\n--- a/lib/formats/ssh.js\n+++ b/lib/formats/ssh.js\n@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ var PrivateKey = require('../private-key');\n var sshpriv = require('./ssh-private');\n \n /JSSTYLED/\n-var SSHKEY_RE = /^([a-z0-9-]+)[ \\t]+([a-zA-Z0-9+\\/]+[=])([\\n \\t]+([^\\n]+))?$/;\n+var SSHKEY_RE = /^([a-z0-9-]+)[ \\t]+([a-zA-Z0-9+\\/]+[=])([ \\t]+([^ \\t][^\\n][\\n])?)?$/;\n /JSSTYLED/\n-var SSHKEY_RE2 = /^([a-z0-9-]+)[ \\t]+([a-zA-Z0-9+\\/ \\t\\n]+[=])(.)$/;\n+var SSHKEY_RE2 = /^([a-z0-9-]+)[ \\t\\n]+([a-zA-Z0-9+\\/][a-zA-Z0-9+\\/ \\t\\n=])([^a-zA-Z0-9+\\/ \\t\\n=].)?$/;\n \n function read(buf, options) {\n \tif (typeof (buf) !== 'string') {\n@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ function read(buf, options) {\n \t\t * chars from the beginning up to this point in the the string.\n \t\t * Then offset in this and try to make up for missing = chars.\n \t\t /\n-\t\tvar data = m[2] + m[3];\n+\t\tvar data = m[2] + (m[3] ? m[3] : '');\n \t\tvar realOffset = Math.ceil(ret.consumed / 3) 4;\n \t\tdata = data.slice(0, realOffset - 2). /JSSTYLED/\n \t\t replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9+\\/=]/g, '') +\ndiff --git a/package.json b/package.json\nindex a553c66..8ff671d 100644\n--- a/package.json\n+++ b/package.json\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\n {\n \"name\": \"sshpk\",\n- \"version\": \"1.13.1\",\n+ \"version\": \"1.13.2\",\n \"description\": \"A library for finding and using SSH public keys\",\n \"main\": \"lib/index.js\",\n \"scripts\": {\ndiff --git a/test/horrors.js b/test/horrors.js\nindex f1eaaef..e983d6c 100644\n--- a/test/horrors.js\n+++ b/test/horrors.js\n@@ -86,6 +86,30 @@ test('line continuations, key from hell', function (t) {\n \tt.end();\n });\n \n+var KEY_NO_COMMENT = 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAA' +\n+ 'IbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK9+hFGVZ9RT61pg8t7EGgkvduhPr/CBYfx+5rQFEROj8EjkoGIH2xy' +\n+ 'pHOHBz0WikK5hYcwTM5YMvnNxuU0h4+c=';\n+test('normal key, no comment', function (t) {\n+\tvar k = sshpk.parseKey(KEY_NO_COMMENT, 'ssh');\n+\tt.strictEqual(k.type, 'ecdsa');\n+\tt.strictEqual(k.fingerprint('sha256').toString(),\n+\t 'SHA256:Kyu0EMqH8fzfp9RXKJ6kmsk9qKGBqVRtlOuk6bXfCEU');\n+\tt.strictEqual(k.comment, '(unnamed)');\n+\tt.end();\n+});\n+\n+var KEY_COMMENT_EQ = 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAA' +\n+ 'IbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK9+hFGVZ9RT61pg8t7EGgkvduhPr/CBYfx+5rQFEROj8EjkoGIH2xy' +\n+ 'pHOHBz0WikK5hYcwTM5YMvnNxuU0h4+c= abc=def=a\\n';\n+test('comment contains =, trailing newline', function (t) {\n+\tvar k = sshpk.parseKey(KEY_COMMENT_EQ, 'ssh');\n+\tt.strictEqual(k.type, 'ecdsa');\n+\tt.strictEqual(k.fingerprint('sha256').toString(),\n+\t \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2m39-62fm-q8r3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Regular Expression Denial of Service in sshpk\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3mw4-6rj6-74g5\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 53b0dd6dc5957652f35964af16b892ec9af4a559 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Isha Arkatkar <ishark@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 10:02:20 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix nullptr exception in QuantizedMaxPool op when empty list\n is sent to min_input or max_input parameters.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 413960973\nChange-Id: I9e3ded593f3c4eabf0d6d5dc356e6a19a3ad2682\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_pooling_ops.cc \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_pooling_ops.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_pooling_ops.cc\nindex 17df3c223676aa..b512369b3c4dd9 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_pooling_ops.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantized_pooling_ops.cc\n@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ limitations under the License.\n \n // See docs in ../ops/nn_ops.cc.\n \n+#include \"tensorflow/core/framework/op_requires.h\"\n+#include \"tensorflow/core/platform/errors.h\"\n #define EIGEN_USE_THREADS\n \n #include \"third_party/eigen3/unsupported/Eigen/CXX11/Tensor\"\n@@ -117,6 +119,18 @@ class QuantizedMaxPoolingOp : public MaxPoolingOp<Device, T> {\n : MaxPoolingOp<Device, T>(context) {}\n \n void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {\n+ auto min_input_tensor = context->input(1);\n+ auto max_input_tensor = context->input(2);\n+ OP_REQUIRES(\n+ context, min_input_tensor.NumElements() == 1,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\n+ \"min_input must be a scalar float value, got tensor with shape \",\n+ min_input_tensor.shape()));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(\n+ context, max_input_tensor.NumElements() == 1,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\n+ \"max_input must be a scalar float value, got tensor with shape \",\n+ max_input_tensor.shape()));\n const float min_input = context->input(1).flat<float>()(0);\n const float max_input = context->input(2).flat<float>()(0);\n MaxPoolingOp<Device, T>::Compute(context);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3mw4-6rj6-74g5\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Null pointer dereference in TensorFlow\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-21502\nDescription: Versions of the package fastecdsa before 2.3.2 are vulnerable to Use of Uninitialized Variable on the stack, via the curvemath_mul function in src/curveMath.c, due to being used and interpreted as user-defined type. Depending on the variable's actual value it could be arbitrary free(), arbitrary realloc(), null pointer dereference and other. Since the stack can be controlled by the attacker, the vulnerability could be used to corrupt allocator structure, leading to possible heap exploitation. Th\n\n```diff\nFrom 57fc5689c95d649dab7ef60cc99ac64589f01e36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Anton Kueltz <antonku@zillowgroup.com>\nDate: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 11:26:28 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] fix memory corruption issue\n\nsee https://gist.github.com/keltecc/49da037072276f21b005a8337c15db26\nfor details on the issue\n\nverified by running proof of concept against fix -\n> python poc.py\n3.11.0 (main, Nov 24 2022, 13:13:19) [Clang 13.1.6 (clang-1316.0.21.2.5)]\nX: 0x0\nY: 0x0\n(On curve <MyCurve>)\n<POINT AT INFINITY>\n---\n pyproject.toml \| 1 +\n src/curveMath.c \| 1 +\n 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml\nindex f664bff..2a6a391 100644\n--- a/pyproject.toml\n+++ b/pyproject.toml\n@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ classifiers = [\n \"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.9\",\n \"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10\",\n \"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11\",\n+ \"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12\",\n \"Operating System :: MacOS :: MacOS X\",\n \"Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux\"\n ]\ndiff --git a/src/curveMath.c b/src/curveMath.c\nindex 33608a6..65f4ff2 100644\n--- a/src/curveMath.c\n+++ b/src/curveMath.c\n@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ static PyObject * curvemath_mul(PyObject self, PyObject args) {\n }\n \n PointZZ_p result;\n+ mpz_inits(result.x, result.y, NULL);\n mpz_t scalar;\n mpz_init_set_str(scalar, d, 10);\n CurveZZ_p * curve = buildCurveZZ_p(p, a, b, q, gx, gy, 10);;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-21502\nCWE: Use of Uninitialized Variable\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Versions of the package fastecdsa before 2.3.2 are vulnerable to Use of Uninitialized Variable on the stack, via the curvemath_mul function in src/curveMath.c, due to being used and interpreted as user-defined type. Depending on the variable's actual value it could be arbitrary free(), arbitrary realloc(), null pointer dereference and other. Since the stack can be controlled by the attacker, the vulnerability could be used to corrupt allocator structure, leading to possible heap exploitation. Th\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4x2f-54wr-4hjg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d8ab0a81a7bce35cc95ff7dff851a7e87a084336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: gondoh <gondoh@gufii.net>\nDate: Thu, 25 Nov 2021 15:19:42 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge pull request from GHSA-4x2f-54wr-4hjg\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\n* 固定ページプレビュー実行時に入力内容検証を追加\n\n* SimpleZipの利用を停止しZipArchiveの利用に切り替え\n\n* 不要コード除去\n\n* BcZip利用時、ZipArchiveをopenしていない場合エラーログが出力される問題を改善\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4x2f-54wr-4hjg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Potential Zip Slip Vulnerability in baserCMS\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xr97-25v7-hc2q\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 49d5f6ac4d5d9ef7d9cdfe01853234d531c55f75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"devansh.pal507\" <devansh.pal507@webkul.in>\nDate: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 18:50:13 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: add validation for file extension and mime\n\n- add missing 'file' key from request in ImportController\n- update user controller for test case\n---\n .../Settings/DataTransfer/ImportController.php \| 1 +\n .../src/Http/Controllers/Settings/UserController.php \| 2 ++\n .../JobInstances/Import/CategoryJobValidator.php \| 11 ++++++++---\n .../JobInstances/Import/ProductJobValidator.php \| 12 ++++++++----\n 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/DataTransfer/ImportController.php b/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/DataTransfer/ImportController.php\nindex 0caecaf9d..68336833f 100755\n--- a/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/DataTransfer/ImportController.php\n+++ b/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/DataTransfer/ImportController.php\n@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ public function update(int $id)\n 'allowed_errors',\n 'field_separator',\n 'images_directory_path',\n+ 'file',\n 'filters',\n ]),\n [\ndiff --git a/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/UserController.php b/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/UserController.php\nindex 6bd9f6e6c..80b7e2005 100755\n--- a/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/UserController.php\n+++ b/packages/Webkul/Admin/src/Http/Controllers/Settings/UserController.php\n@@ -283,6 +283,8 @@ private function prepareUserData(UserForm $request, $id)\n return $this->cannotChangeRedirectResponse('role');\n }\n \n+ unset($data['image']);\n+\n return $data;\n }\n \ndiff --git a/packages/Webkul/DataTransfer/src/Validators/JobInstances/Import/CategoryJobValidator.php b/packages/Webkul/DataTransfer/src/Validators/JobInstances/Import/CategoryJobValidator.php\nindex e3ef582e7..4fde7dd24 100644\n--- a/packages/Webkul/DataTransfer/src/Validators/JobInstances/Import/CategoryJobValidator.php\n+++ b/packages/Webkul/DataTransfer/src/Validators/JobInstances/Import/CategoryJobValidator.php\n@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@\n \n namespace Webkul\\DataTransfer\\Validators\\JobInstances\\Import;\n \n+use Webkul\\Core\\Rules\\FileMimeExtensionMatch;\n use Webkul\\DataTransfer\\Rules\\SeparatorTypes;\n use Webkul\\DataTransfer\\Validators\\JobInstances\\Default\\JobValidator;\n \n@@ -12,9 +13,13 @@ class CategoryJobValidator extends JobValidator\n /\n public function getRules(array $options): array\n {\n- if (isset($options['id'])) {\n- $this->rules['file'] = 'mimes:csv,xls,xlsx,txt';\n- }\n+ $this->rules['file'] = [\n+ empty($options['id']) ? 'required' : 'nullable',\n+ 'mimes:csv,txt,xlsx,xls',\n+ 'extensions:csv,xlsx,xls',\n+ new FileMimeExtensionMatch,\n+ \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-xr97-25v7-hc2q\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: UnoPim has Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in user creation functionality\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-25978\nDescription: All versions of the package github.com/usememos/memos/server are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) due to insufficient checks on external resources, which allows malicious actors to introduce links starting with a javascript: scheme. \r\r\n\n```diff\nFrom b11d2130a084385eb65c3761a3c841ebe9f81ae8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: boojack <stevenlgtm@gmail.com>\nDate: Sat, 11 Feb 2023 17:34:29 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] chore: validate external link (#1069)\n\n---\n server/resource.go \| 23 +++++++++------------\n web/src/components/CreateResourceDialog.tsx \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/server/resource.go b/server/resource.go\nindex f951de3cda521..3d79b0a54ee4e 100644\n--- a/server/resource.go\n+++ b/server/resource.go\n@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ func (s Server) registerResourceRoutes(g echo.Group) {\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tresourceCreate.CreatorID = userID\n+\t\t// Only allow those external links with http prefix.\n+\t\tif resourceCreate.ExternalLink != \"\" && !strings.HasPrefix(resourceCreate.ExternalLink, \"http\") {\n+\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"Invalid external link\")\n+\t\t}\n \t\tresource, err := s.Store.CreateResource(ctx, resourceCreate)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, \"Failed to create resource\").SetInternal(err)\n@@ -188,13 +192,7 @@ func (s Server) registerResourceRoutes(g echo.Group) {\n \t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, \"Failed to fetch resource\").SetInternal(err)\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tc.Response().Writer.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n-\t\tc.Response().Writer.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", resource.Type)\n-\t\tc.Response().Writer.Header().Set(echo.HeaderContentSecurityPolicy, \"default-src 'self'\")\n-\t\tif _, err := c.Response().Writer.Write(resource.Blob); err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, \"Failed to write resource blob\").SetInternal(err)\n-\t\t}\n-\t\treturn nil\n+\t\treturn c.Stream(http.StatusOK, resource.Type, bytes.NewReader(resource.Blob))\n \t})\n \n \tg.PATCH(\"/resource/:resourceId\", func(c echo.Context) error {\n@@ -296,16 +294,15 @@ func (s Server) registerResourcePublicRoutes(g echo.Group) {\n \t\t}\n \t\tresource, err := s.Store.FindResource(ctx, resourceFind)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to fetch resource ID: %v\", resourceID)).SetInternal(err)\n+\t\t\treturn echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf(\"Failed to find resource by ID: %v\", resourceID)).SetInternal(err)\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tresourceType := strings.ToLower(resource.Type)\n-\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(resourceType, \"text\") \|\| (strings.HasPrefix(resourceType, \"application\") && resourceType != \"application/pdf\") {\n-\t\t\tresourceType = echo.MIMETextPlain\n-\t\t}\n \t\tc.Response().Writer.Header().Set(echo.HeaderCacheControl, \"max-age=31536000, immutable\")\n \t\tc.Response().Writer.Header().Set(echo.HeaderContentSecurityPolicy, \"default-src 'self'\")\n-\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(resourceType, \"video\") \|\| strings.HasPrefix(resourceType, \"audio\") {\n+\t\tresourceType := strings.ToLower(resource.Type)\n+\t\tif strings.HasPrefix(resourceType, \"text\") {\n+\t\t\tresourceType = echo.MIMETextPlainCharsetUTF8\n+\t\t} else if strings.HasPrefix(resourceType, \"video\") \|\| stri\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-25978\nCWE: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: All versions of the package github.com/usememos/memos/server are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) due to insufficient checks on external resources, which allows malicious actors to introduce links starting with a javascript: scheme. \r\r\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-62369\nDescription: Xibo is an open source digital signage platform with a web content management system (CMS). Versions 4.3.0 and below contain a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the CMS Developer menu's Module Templating functionality, allowing authenticated users with \"System -> Add/Edit custom modules and templates\" permissions to manipulate Twig filters and execute arbitrary server-side functions as the web server user. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.1. To workaround this issue, use the 4.1 and 4.2 p\n\n```diff\nFrom 0f4e88396111ea027785a48dd8f5eeb14536bd71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Dan Garner <dan@xibosignage.com>\nDate: Mon, 6 Oct 2025 08:39:25 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Widget: add missing filter and allowed tags.\n\n---\n lib/Widget/Render/WidgetHtmlRenderer.php \| 6 +++++-\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/Widget/Render/WidgetHtmlRenderer.php b/lib/Widget/Render/WidgetHtmlRenderer.php\nindex a5e74f8d18..cba647e552 100644\n--- a/lib/Widget/Render/WidgetHtmlRenderer.php\n+++ b/lib/Widget/Render/WidgetHtmlRenderer.php\n@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@\n use Slim\\Views\\Twig;\n use Twig\\Extension\\SandboxExtension;\n use Twig\\Sandbox\\SecurityPolicy;\n+use Twig\\TwigFilter;\n use Xibo\\Entity\\Module;\n use Xibo\\Entity\\ModuleTemplate;\n use Xibo\\Entity\\Region;\n@@ -886,10 +887,13 @@ private function getTwigSandbox(): Twig\n 'cache' => false,\n ]);\n \n+ // Add missing filter\n+ $sandbox->getEnvironment()->addFilter(new TwigFilter('url_decode', 'urldecode'));\n+\n // Configure a security policy\n // Create a new security policy\n $policy = new SecurityPolicy();\n- $policy->setAllowedTags(['if', 'for', 'set']);\n+ $policy->setAllowedTags(['if', 'for', 'set', 'import', 'macro']);\n $policy->setAllowedFilters(['escape', 'raw', 'url_decode']);\n \n // Create a Sandbox\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-62369\nCWE: CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')\nTitle: Xibo CMS: Remote Code Execution through module templates\n\nThis patch addresses: Xibo is an open source digital signage platform with a web content management system (CMS). Versions 4.3.0 and below contain a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the CMS Developer menu's Module Templating functionality, allowing authenticated users with \"System -> Add/Edit custom modules and templates\" permissions to manipulate Twig filters and execute arbitrary server-side functions as the web server user. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.1. To workaround this issue, use the 4.1 and 4.2 p\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-45w7-7g63-2m5w\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2a4d53809e3000f40085f2b229b6b1a33759881d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: John Hodge <tpg@mutabah.net>\nDate: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 21:30:38 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Avoid double-drops when `clone` panics in slice push. Fixes\n #5\n\n---\n src/stack.rs \| 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------\n tests/stack.rs \| 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/stack.rs b/src/stack.rs\nindex 7e5e218..daf5c59 100644\n--- a/src/stack.rs\n+++ b/src/stack.rs\n@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ impl<T: ?Sized, D: ::DataBuf> StackA<T, D> {\n mem::size_of::<&T>() / mem::size_of::<usize>() - 1\n }\n \n- fn push_inner(&mut self, fat_ptr: &T) -> Result<&mut [usize], ()> {\n+\t/// Returns the metadata and data slots\n+ fn push_inner(&mut self, fat_ptr: &T) -> Result<(&mut [usize],&mut [usize]), ()> {\n let bytes = mem::size_of_val(fat_ptr);\n let words = super::round_to_words(bytes) + Self::meta_words();\n // Check if there is sufficient space for the new item\n@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ impl<T: ?Sized, D: ::DataBuf> StackA<T, D> {\n meta.clone_from_slice(&ptr_words[1..]);\n \n // Increment offset and return\n- Ok(rv)\n+ Ok( (meta, rv) )\n } else {\n Err(())\n }\n@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ impl<T: ?Sized, D: ::DataBuf> StackA<T, D> {\n );\n \n match self.push_inner(f(&v)) {\n- Ok(d) => {\n+ Ok((_,d)) => {\n // SAFE: Destination address is valid\n unsafe {\n ptr::write(d.as_mut_ptr() as mut U, v);\n@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ impl<T: ?Sized, D: ::DataBuf> StackA<T, D> {\n impl<D: ::DataBuf> StackA<str, D> {\n /// Push the contents of a string slice as an item onto the stack\n pub fn push_str(&mut self, v: &str) -> Result<(), ()> {\n- self.push_inner(v).map(\|d\| unsafe {\n+ self.push_inner(v).map(\|(_,d)\| unsafe {\n ptr::copy(v.as_bytes().as_ptr(), d.as_mut_ptr() as mut u8, v.len());\n })\n }\n@@ -151,12 +152,24 @@ impl<D: ::DataBuf> StackA<str, D> {\n impl<D: ::DataBuf, T: Clone> StackA<[T], D> {\n /// Pushes a set of items (cloning out of the input slice)\n pub fn push_cloned(&mut self, v: &[T]) -> Result<(), ()> {\n- self.push_inner(&v).map(\|d\| unsafe {\n- let mut ptr = d.as_mut_ptr() as mut T;\n- for val in v {\n- ptr::write(ptr, val.clone());\n- ptr = ptr.offset(1);\n- }\n- })\n+ let (meta,d) = self.push_inner(&v)?;\n+\t\t// Prepare the slot with zeros (as if it's an empty slice)\n+\t\t// The length is updated as each item is written\n+\t\t// - This ensures that there's no drop issues during write\n+\t\tmeta[0] = 0;\n+\t\tfor v in d.iter_mut() {\n+\t\t\tv = 0;\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tunsafe {\n+\t\t\tlet mut ptr = d.as_mut_ptr() as mut T;\n+\t\t\tfor val in v {\n+\t\t\t\tptr::write(ptr, val.clone());\n+\t\t\t\tmeta[0] += 1;\n+\t\t\t\tptr = ptr.offset(1);\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tOk( () )\n }\n }\ndiff --git a/tests/stack.rs b\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-45w7-7g63-2m5w\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Drop of uninitialized memory in stack_dst\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-10507\nDescription: Integer overflow vulnerability in the bmp24toimage function in convertbmp.c in OpenJPEG before 2.2.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted bmp file.\n\n```diff\nFrom 893143c8e13e491d0e884eb757580ec9575bbc8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: trylab <trylab@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 17:43:30 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix issue 833.\n\nAdd some overflow check operations.\n---\n src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c \| 18 ++++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c\nindex d264823f0..ae83077ca 100644\n--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c\n+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c\n@@ -675,10 +675,28 @@ opj_image_t* bmptoimage(const char filename, opj_cparameters_t parameters)\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \t\n+\tif (Info_h.biWidth == 0 \|\| Info_h.biHeight == 0) {\n+\t\tfclose(IN);\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\t}\n+\t\n+\tif (Info_h.biBitCount > (((OPJ_UINT32)-1) - 31) / Info_h.biWidth) {\n+\t\tfclose(IN);\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\t}\n \tstride = ((Info_h.biWidth * Info_h.biBitCount + 31U) / 32U) * 4U; /* rows are aligned on 32bits /\n \tif (Info_h.biBitCount == 4 && Info_h.biCompression == 2) { / RLE 4 gets decoded as 8 bits data for now... /\n+\t\tif (8 > (((OPJ_UINT32)-1) - 31) / Info_h.biWidth) {\n+\t\t\tfclose(IN);\n+\t\t\treturn NULL;\n+\t\t}\n \t\tstride = ((Info_h.biWidth 8U + 31U) / 32U) * 4U;\n \t}\n+\t\n+\tif (stride > ((OPJ_UINT32)-1) / sizeof(OPJ_UINT8) / Info_h.biHeight) {\n+\t\tfclose(IN);\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\t}\n \tpData = (OPJ_UINT8 ) calloc(1, stride Info_h.biHeight * sizeof(OPJ_UINT8));\n \tif (pData == NULL) {\n \t\tfclose(IN);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-10507\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Integer overflow vulnerability in the bmp24toimage function in convertbmp.c in OpenJPEG before 2.2.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted bmp file.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fvm8-v4j9-jgp3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: David Benjamin <davidben@mit.edu>\nDate: Fri, 25 Mar 2011 18:52:42 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] Support all the new variables added\n\n---\n src/npw-rpc.c \| 7 +++++++\n src/npw-viewer.c \| 2 ++\n src/utils.c \| 7 +++++++\n 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/npw-rpc.c b/src/npw-rpc.c\nindex 569aa0c..ecb99a4 100644\n--- a/src/npw-rpc.c\n+++ b/src/npw-rpc.c\n@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ int rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(int variable)\n case NPNVisOfflineBool:\n case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:\n case NPNVSupportsWindowless:\n+ case NPNVprivateModeBool:\n+ case NPNVsupportsAdvancedKeyHandling:\n \ttype = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;\n \tbreak;\n case NPNVToolkit:\n@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ int rpc_type_of_NPPVariable(int variable)\n case NPPVpluginNameString:\n case NPPVpluginDescriptionString:\n case NPPVformValue: // byte values of 0 does not appear in the UTF-8 encoding but for U+0000\n+ case NPPVpluginNativeAccessibleAtkPlugId:\n \ttype = RPC_TYPE_STRING;\n \tbreak;\n case NPPVpluginWindowSize:\n@@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ int rpc_type_of_NPPVariable(int variable)\n case NPPVpluginTransparentBool:\n case NPPVjavascriptPushCallerBool:\n case NPPVpluginKeepLibraryInMemory:\n+ case NPPVpluginUrlRequestsDisplayedBool:\n+ case NPPVpluginWantsAllNetworkStreams:\n+ case NPPVpluginCancelSrcStream:\n+ case NPPVSupportsAdvancedKeyHandling:\n \ttype = RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN;\n \tbreak;\n case NPPVpluginScriptableNPObject:\ndiff --git a/src/npw-viewer.c b/src/npw-viewer.c\nindex 384b9a7..c37813c 100644\n--- a/src/npw-viewer.c\n+++ b/src/npw-viewer.c\n@@ -1302,6 +1302,8 @@ g_NPN_GetValue(NPP instance, NPNVariable variable, void value)\n case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:\n case NPNVWindowNPObject:\n case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:\n+ case NPNVprivateModeBool:\n+ case NPNVsupportsAdvancedKeyHandling:\n \treturn g_NPN_GetValue_real(instance, variable, value);\n default:\n \tswitch (variable & 0xff) {\ndiff --git a/src/utils.c b/src/utils.c\nindex 842b1e9..f87a29d 100644\n--- a/src/utils.c\n+++ b/src/utils.c\n@@ -247,6 +247,11 @@ const char string_of_NPPVariable(int variable)\n \t_(NPPVpluginNeedsXEmbed);\n \t_(NPPVpluginScriptableNPObject);\n \t_(NPPVformValue);\n+\t_(NPPVpluginUrlRequestsDisplayedBool);\n+\t_(NPPVpluginWantsAllNetworkStreams);\n+\t_(NPPVpluginNativeAccessibleAtkPlugId);\n+\t_(NPPVpluginCancelSrcStream);\n+\t_(NPPVSupportsAdvancedKeyHandling);\n #undef _\n default:\n \tswitch (variable & 0xff) {\n@@ -283,6 +288,8 @@ const char string_of_NPNVariable(int variable)\n \t_(NPNVWindowNPObject);\n \t_(NPNVPluginElementNPObject);\n \t_(NPNVSupportsWindowless);\n+\t_(NPNVprivateModeBool);\n+\t_(NPNVsupportsAdvancedKeyHandling);\n #undef _\n default:\n \tswitch (variable & 0xff) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-fvm8-v4j9-jgp3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4cxv-c4qq-q263\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom a9c97eea6c268fb83d93a817d58bac75e0d2599e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jamie Cameron <jcameron@webmin.com>\nDate: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 08:50:15 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] HTML escape command description\n\n---\n custom/run.cgi \| 5 +++--\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/custom/run.cgi b/custom/run.cgi\nindex 327de410d1..375b041b93 100755\n--- a/custom/run.cgi\n+++ b/custom/run.cgi\n@@ -40,8 +40,9 @@ if ($cmd->{'format'} ne 'redirect' && $cmd->{'format'} ne 'form') {\n \t\tprint \"\\n\";\n \t\t}\n \telse {\n-\t\t&ui_print_unbuffered_header($cmd->{'desc'}, $text{'run_title'},\n-\t\t\t\t\t \"\", -d \"help\" ? \"run\" : undef);\n+\t\t&ui_print_unbuffered_header(\n+\t\t\t&html_escape($cmd->{'desc'}), $text{'run_title'},\n+\t\t\t\"\", -d \"help\" ? \"run\" : undef);\n \t\t}\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4cxv-c4qq-q263\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-8339\nDescription: A buffer overflow in Redis 3.2.x prior to 3.2.4 causes arbitrary code execution when a crafted command is sent. An out of bounds write vulnerability exists in the handling of the client-output-buffer-limit option during the CONFIG SET command for the Redis data structure store. A crafted CONFIG SET command can lead to an out of bounds write potentially resulting in code execution.\n\n```diff\nFrom 6d9f8e2462fc2c426d48c941edeb78e5df7d2977 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: antirez <antirez@gmail.com>\nDate: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 22:48:41 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Security: CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit overflow\n fixed.\n\nThis commit fixes a vunlerability reported by Cory Duplantis\nof Cisco Talos, see TALOS-2016-0206 for reference.\n\nCONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit accepts as client class \"master\"\nwhich is actually only used to implement CLIENT KILL. The \"master\" class\nhas ID 3. What happens is that the global structure:\n\n server.client_obuf_limits[class]\n\nIs accessed with class = 3. However it is a 3 elements array, so writing\nthe 4th element means to write up to 24 bytes of memory after the end\nof the array, since the structure is defined as:\n\n typedef struct clientBufferLimitsConfig {\n unsigned long long hard_limit_bytes;\n unsigned long long soft_limit_bytes;\n time_t soft_limit_seconds;\n } clientBufferLimitsConfig;\n\nEVALUATION OF IMPACT:\n\nChecking what's past the boundaries of the array in the global\n'server' structure, we find AOF state fields:\n\n clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT];\n /* AOF persistence /\n int aof_state; / AOF_(ON\|OFF\|WAIT_REWRITE) /\n int aof_fsync; / Kind of fsync() policy /\n char aof_filename; /* Name of the AOF file /\n int aof_no_fsync_on_rewrite; / Don't fsync if a rewrite is in prog. /\n int aof_rewrite_perc; / Rewrite AOF if % growth is > M and... /\n off_t aof_rewrite_min_size; / the AOF file is at least N bytes. /\n off_t aof_rewrite_base_size; / AOF size on latest startup or rewrite. /\n off_t aof_current_size; / AOF current size. /\n\nWriting to most of these fields should be harmless and only cause problems in\nRedis persistence that should not escalate to security problems.\nHowever unfortunately writing to \"aof_filename\" could be potentially a\nsecurity issue depending on the access pattern.\n\nSearching for \"aof.filename\" accesses in the source code returns many different\nusages of the field, including using it as input for open(), logging to the\nRedis log file or syslog, and calling the rename() syscall.\n\nIt looks possible that attacks could lead at least to informations\ndisclosure of the state and data inside Redis. However note that the\nattacker must already have access to the server. But, worse than that,\nit looks possible that being able to change the AOF filename can be used\nto mount more powerful attacks: like overwriting random files with AOF\ndata (easily a potential security issue as demostrated here:\nhttp://antirez.com/news/96), or even more subtle attacks where the\nAOF filename is changed to a path were a malicious AOF file is loaded\nin order to exploit other potential issues when the AOF parser is fed\nwith untrusted input (no known issue known currently).\n\nThe fix checks the places where the 'master' class is specifiedf i\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2016-8339\nCWE: Arbitrary Code Execution\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A buffer overflow in Redis 3.2.x prior to 3.2.4 causes arbitrary code execution when a crafted command is sent. An out of bounds write vulnerability exists in the handling of the client-output-buffer-limit option during the CONFIG SET command for the Redis data structure store. A crafted CONFIG SET command can lead to an out of bounds write potentially resulting in code execution.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w5rh-j4g3-jr29\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2e85e45c0e4e7a9231b0317392928e2d19e77368 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Adrien Lecharpentier <adrien.lecharpentier@gmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 6 May 2021 14:41:49 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [SECURITY-2201]\n\n---\n .../java/hudson/plugins/s3/S3BucketPublisher.java \| 13 +++++++++++--\n 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/s3/S3BucketPublisher.java b/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/s3/S3BucketPublisher.java\nindex 55e05f81..e96b592f 100644\n--- a/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/s3/S3BucketPublisher.java\n+++ b/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/s3/S3BucketPublisher.java\n@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@\n import hudson.model.AbstractProject;\n import hudson.model.Action;\n import hudson.model.Fingerprint;\n+import hudson.model.Item;\n import hudson.model.Result;\n import hudson.model.Run;\n import hudson.model.TaskListener;\n@@ -34,10 +35,10 @@\n import net.sf.json.JSONObject;\n import org.apache.commons.lang.StringUtils;\n import org.jenkinsci.Symbol;\n+import org.kohsuke.stapler.AncestorInPath;\n import org.kohsuke.stapler.DataBoundConstructor;\n import org.kohsuke.stapler.QueryParameter;\n import org.kohsuke.stapler.StaplerRequest;\n-import org.kohsuke.stapler.StaplerResponse;\n import org.kohsuke.stapler.interceptor.RequirePOST;\n \n import javax.annotation.Nonnull;\n@@ -466,8 +467,16 @@ public boolean configure(StaplerRequest req, JSONObject json) {\n }\n \n @SuppressWarnings(\"unused\")\n- public ListBoxModel doFillProfileNameItems() {\n+ public ListBoxModel doFillProfileNameItems(@AncestorInPath Item item) {\n final ListBoxModel model = new ListBoxModel();\n+ if (item != null && !item.hasPermission(Item.CONFIGURE)) {\n+ return model;\n+ }\n+ if (item == null && !Jenkins.get().hasPermission(Item.CREATE)) {\n+ // accessing from $JENKINS_URL/pipeline-syntax\n+ return model;\n+ }\n+\n for (S3Profile profile : profiles) {\n model.add(profile.getName(), profile.getName());\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w5rh-j4g3-jr29\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Missing Authorization in Jenkins S3 publisher Plugin\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-37704\nDescription: PhpFastCache is a high-performance backend cache system (packagist package phpfastcache/phpfastcache). In versions before 6.1.5, 7.1.2, and 8.0.7 the `phpinfo()` can be exposed if the `/vendor` is not protected from public access. This is a rare situation today since the vendor directory is often located outside the web directory or protected via server rule (.htaccess, etc). Only the v6, v7 and v8 will be patched respectively in 8.0.7, 7.1.2, 6.1.5. Older versions such as v5, v4 are not longer \n\n```diff\nFrom 820398be6af28fb109defbbaa0172fe6069b2117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Geolim4 <contact@geolim4.com>\nDate: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 13:35:42 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed vulnerability issue that cause exposed phpinfo() in\n some situations.\n\n---\n .gitattributes \| 3 ++-\n docs/examples/phpinfo.php \| 3 ---\n 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n delete mode 100644 docs/examples/phpinfo.php\n\ndiff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes\nindex d995ab8db..e6ef3db5b 100644\n--- a/.gitattributes\n+++ b/.gitattributes\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n /tests export-ignore\n+/docs/examples export-ignore\n /bin/ci export-ignore\n /bin/stubs export-ignore\n /.github export-ignore\n@@ -14,4 +15,4 @@ CODING_GUIDELINE.md export-ignore\n phpunit.xml.dist export-ignore\n phpcs.xml.dist export-ignore\n composer.lock export-ignore\n-CNAME export-ignore\n\\ No newline at end of file\n+CNAME export-ignore\ndiff --git a/docs/examples/phpinfo.php b/docs/examples/phpinfo.php\ndeleted file mode 100644\nindex cf6086080..000000000\n--- a/docs/examples/phpinfo.php\n+++ /dev/null\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\n-<?php\n-phpinfo();\n-?>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-37704\nCWE: CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor\nTitle: Exposed phpinfo() in PhpFastCache\n\nThis patch addresses: PhpFastCache is a high-performance backend cache system (packagist package phpfastcache/phpfastcache). In versions before 6.1.5, 7.1.2, and 8.0.7 the `phpinfo()` can be exposed if the `/vendor` is not protected from public access. This is a rare situation today since the vendor directory is often located outside the web directory or protected via server rule (.htaccess, etc). Only the v6, v7 and v8 will be patched respectively in 8.0.7, 7.1.2, 6.1.5. Older versions such as v5, v4 are not longer \n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-733f-44f3-3frw\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom addc7461c3a90a040e79aa75bfd245107a210245 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Humaid AlQassimi <git@humaidq.ae>\nDate: Sun, 3 May 2020 18:02:27 +0400\nSubject: [PATCH] static: clean the path URL before redirecting (#199)\n\n---\n static.go \| 5 +++--\n static_test.go \| 12 ++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/static.go b/static.go\nindex 9f9bca1..593e474 100644\n--- a/static.go\n+++ b/static.go\n@@ -149,8 +149,9 @@ func staticHandler(ctx Context, log log.Logger, opt StaticOptions) bool {\n \t// Try to serve index file\n \tif fi.IsDir() {\n \t\t// Redirect if missing trailing slash.\n-\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(ctx.Req.URL.Path, \"/\") {\n-\t\t\thttp.Redirect(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, ctx.Req.URL.Path+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n+\t\tredirPath := path.Clean(ctx.Req.URL.Path)\n+\t\tif !strings.HasSuffix(redirPath, \"/\") {\n+\t\t\thttp.Redirect(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req.Request, redirPath+\"/\", http.StatusFound)\n \t\t\treturn true\n \t\t}\n \ndiff --git a/static_test.go b/static_test.go\nindex 5f283ad..27a7dd1 100644\n--- a/static_test.go\n+++ b/static_test.go\n@@ -218,6 +218,18 @@ func Test_Static_Redirect(t testing.T) {\n \t\tSo(resp.Code, ShouldEqual, http.StatusFound)\n \t\tSo(resp.Header().Get(\"Location\"), ShouldEqual, \"/public/\")\n \t})\n+\n+\tConvey(\"Serve static files with improper request\", t, func() {\n+\t\tm := New()\n+\t\tm.Use(Static(currentRoot))\n+\n+\t\tresp := httptest.NewRecorder()\n+\t\treq, err := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", `http://localhost:4000//example.com%2f..`, nil)\n+\t\tSo(err, ShouldBeNil)\n+\t\tm.ServeHTTP(resp, req)\n+\n+\t\tSo(resp.Code, ShouldEqual, http.StatusNotFound)\n+\t})\n }\n \n func Test_Statics(t testing.T) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-733f-44f3-3frw\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: gopkg.in/macaron.v1 Open Redirect vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-66xq-fc4p-m6xv\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ffcc82219cef0928bed2d558b19ef6ea35634130 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>\nDate: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 14:37:26 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to\n bytestream2\n\nFixes: out of array accesses\n\nFound-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab\nSigned-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>\n---\n libavformat/rtmppkt.c \| 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------\n 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libavformat/rtmppkt.c b/libavformat/rtmppkt.c\nindex 572e165498aab..3ae605d28049b 100644\n--- a/libavformat/rtmppkt.c\n+++ b/libavformat/rtmppkt.c\n@@ -505,53 +505,70 @@ int ff_amf_tag_size(const uint8_t data, const uint8_t data_end)\n return bytestream2_tell(&gb);\n }\n \n-int ff_amf_get_field_value(const uint8_t data, const uint8_t data_end,\n+static int amf_get_field_value2(GetByteContext gb,\n const uint8_t name, uint8_t dst, int dst_size)\n {\n int namelen = strlen(name);\n int len;\n \n- while (data != AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT && data < data_end) {\n- len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);\n- if (len < 0)\n- len = data_end - data;\n- data += len;\n+ while (bytestream2_peek_byte(gb) != AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT && bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) > 0) {\n+ int ret = amf_tag_skip(gb);\n+ if (ret < 0)\n+ return -1;\n }\n- if (data_end - data < 3)\n+ if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < 3)\n return -1;\n- data++;\n+ bytestream2_get_byte(gb);\n+\n for (;;) {\n- int size = bytestream_get_be16(&data);\n+ int size = bytestream2_get_be16(gb);\n if (!size)\n break;\n- if (size < 0 \|\| size >= data_end - data)\n+ if (size < 0 \|\| size >= bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb))\n return -1;\n- data += size;\n- if (size == namelen && !memcmp(data-size, name, namelen)) {\n- switch (data++) {\n+ bytestream2_skip(gb, size);\n+ if (size == namelen && !memcmp(gb->buffer-size, name, namelen)) {\n+ switch (bytestream2_get_byte(gb)) {\n case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER:\n- snprintf(dst, dst_size, \"%g\", av_int2double(AV_RB64(data)));\n+ snprintf(dst, dst_size, \"%g\", av_int2double(bytestream2_get_be64(gb)));\n break;\n case AMF_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:\n- snprintf(dst, dst_size, \"%s\", data ? \"true\" : \"false\");\n+ snprintf(dst, dst_size, \"%s\", bytestream2_get_byte(gb) ? \"true\" : \"false\");\n break;\n case AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING:\n- len = bytestream_get_be16(&data);\n- av_strlcpy(dst, data, FFMIN(len+1, dst_size));\n+ len = bytestream2_get_be16(gb);\n+ if (dst_size < 1)\n+ return -1;\n+ if (dst_size < len + 1)\n+ len = dst_size - 1;\n+ byt\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-66xq-fc4p-m6xv\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-18667\nDescription: /usr/local/www/freeradius_view_config.php in the freeradius3 package before 0.15.7_3 for pfSense on FreeBSD allows a user with an XSS payload as password or username to execute arbitrary javascript code on a victim browser.\n\n```diff\nFrom 30b22b6b0db7b73732a5da346afca66dc244e02a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jim-p <jimp@netgate.com>\nDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 08:28:28 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] Encode FreeRADIUS config file display output. Fixes #9866\n\n---\n net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/Makefile \| 2 +-\n .../files/usr/local/www/freeradius_view_config.php \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/Makefile b/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/Makefile\nindex 7d5c3a9de36e..66777a8902e6 100644\n--- a/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/Makefile\n+++ b/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/Makefile\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n \n PORTNAME=\tpfSense-pkg-freeradius3\n PORTVERSION=\t0.15.7\n-PORTREVISION=\t2\n+PORTREVISION=\t3\n CATEGORIES=\tnet\n MASTER_SITES=\t# empty\n DISTFILES=\t# empty\ndiff --git a/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/files/usr/local/www/freeradius_view_config.php b/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/files/usr/local/www/freeradius_view_config.php\nindex 625415d7884c..a88f3be7cd50 100644\n--- a/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/files/usr/local/www/freeradius_view_config.php\n+++ b/net/pfSense-pkg-freeradius3/files/usr/local/www/freeradius_view_config.php\n@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ function get_file($file) {\n \n \tif ($files[$file] != \"\" && file_exists($files[$file])) {\n \t\tprint '<pre>';\n-\t\tprint $files[$file] . \"\\n\" . file_get_contents($files[$file]);\n+\t\tprint $files[$file] . \"\\n\" . htmlspecialchars(file_get_contents($files[$file]));\n \t\tprint '</pre>';\n \t}\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-18667\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: /usr/local/www/freeradius_view_config.php in the freeradius3 package before 0.15.7_3 for pfSense on FreeBSD allows a user with an XSS payload as password or username to execute arbitrary javascript code on a victim browser.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2024-248\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2c11575b1a3dd8b0df26a879ba856c0aa350c049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: David Baker Effendi <dave@whirlylabs.com>\nDate: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 09:10:55 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent Local Privilege Escalation via Config & Untrusted\n Aliases\n\n* Mitigated local config exploitability\n* Re-ordered precedence to sys locations\n* Added warning if local location is used\n* Mitigated untrusted alias execution\n---\n opencanary/__init__.py \| 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n opencanary/config.py \| 15 +++++++++------\n opencanary/modules/portscan.py \| 4 ++--\n 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/opencanary/__init__.py b/opencanary/__init__.py\nindex c5981731..bdab3e8b 100644\n--- a/opencanary/__init__.py\n+++ b/opencanary/__init__.py\n@@ -1 +1,34 @@\n+import os\n+import subprocess\n+\n __version__ = \"0.9.3\"\n+\n+from os import PathLike\n+from typing import Union\n+\n+BIN_LOCATIONS = [\"/usr/bin\", \"/bin\", \"/usr/sbin\", \"/sbin\"]\n+\n+\n+def _check_file_exists_and_executable(path: Union[PathLike, str]) -> bool:\n+ if not os.path.isfile(path):\n+ return False\n+ else:\n+ return os.access(path, os.X_OK)\n+\n+\n+def safe_exec(binary_name: str, args: list) -> bytes:\n+ \"\"\"\n+ Executes the given binary with the given arguments as a subprocess. What makes this safe is that the binary name\n+ is not executed as an alias, and only binaries that live in trusted system locations are executed. This means that\n+ only system-wide binaries are executable.\n+ \"\"\"\n+ exec_path = None\n+ for prefix in BIN_LOCATIONS:\n+ bin_path = os.path.join(prefix, binary_name)\n+ if _check_file_exists_and_executable(os.path.join(prefix, binary_name)):\n+ exec_path = bin_path\n+ break\n+ if exec_path is None:\n+ raise Exception(f\"Could not find executable ${binary_name}\")\n+ else:\n+ return subprocess.check_output(args, shell=True, executable=exec_path)\ndiff --git a/opencanary/config.py b/opencanary/config.py\nindex 4886783c..5a621f2a 100644\n--- a/opencanary/config.py\n+++ b/opencanary/config.py\n@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@\n import json\n import itertools\n import string\n-import subprocess\n import shutil\n import re\n from os.path import expanduser\n from pkg_resources import resource_filename\n from pathlib import Path\n+from . import safe_exec\n \n SAMPLE_SETTINGS = resource_filename(__name__, \"data/settings.json\")\n SETTINGS = \"opencanary.conf\"\n@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ def __init__(self, configfile=SETTINGS):\n self.__configfile = configfile\n \n files = [\n- configfile,\n- \"%s/.%s\" % (expanduser(\"~\"), configfile),\n \"/etc/opencanaryd/%s\" % configfile,\n+ \"%s/.%s\" % (expanduser(\"~\"), configfile),\n+ configfile,\n ]\n print(\n \" We hope you enjoy using OpenCanary. For more open source Canary goodness, head over to canarytokens.org. \"\n@@ -67,14 +67,17 @@ def __init__(self, configfile=SETTINGS):\n print(\"[-] \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2024-248\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5f5v-5c3v-gw5v\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 604c32871202064a4aa12c3b3fd58140231685e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Christopher Pitt <cgpitt@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 18:17:51 +1300\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed XSS vulnerability relating to rewrite_hash\n\n---\n tests/view/SSViewerTest.php \| 19 ++++++++++++++++---\n view/SSTemplateParser.php \| 2 +-\n view/SSTemplateParser.php.inc \| 2 +-\n view/SSViewer.php \| 4 ++--\n 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tests/view/SSViewerTest.php b/tests/view/SSViewerTest.php\nindex d8349c50d9a..550eaa046b3 100644\n--- a/tests/view/SSViewerTest.php\n+++ b/tests/view/SSViewerTest.php\n@@ -1131,8 +1131,10 @@ public function testThemeRetrieval() {\n \n \tpublic function testRewriteHashlinks() {\n \t\t$orig = Config::inst()->get('SSViewer', 'rewrite_hash_links'); \n-\t\tConfig::inst()->update('SSViewer', 'rewrite_hash_links', true); \n-\t\t\n+\t\tConfig::inst()->update('SSViewer', 'rewrite_hash_links', true);\n+\n+\t\t$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] = 'http://path/to/file?foo\"onclick=\"alert(\\'xss\\')\"\"';\n+\n \t\t// Emulate SSViewer::process()\n \t\t$base = Convert::raw2att($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']);\n \t\t\n@@ -1143,6 +1145,8 @@ public function testRewriteHashlinks() {\n \t\t\t<html>\n \t\t\t\t<head><% base_tag %></head>\n \t\t\t\t<body>\n+\t\t\t\t<a class=\"external-inline\" href=\"http://google.com#anchor\">ExternalInlineLink</a>\n+\t\t\t\t$ExternalInsertedLink\n \t\t\t\t<a class=\"inline\" href=\"#anchor\">InlineLink</a>\n \t\t\t\t$InsertedLink\n \t\t\t\t<svg><use xlink:href=\"#sprite\"></use></svg>\n@@ -1151,15 +1155,24 @@ public function testRewriteHashlinks() {\n \t\t$tmpl = new SSViewer($tmplFile);\n \t\t$obj = new ViewableData();\n \t\t$obj->InsertedLink = '<a class=\"inserted\" href=\"#anchor\">InsertedLink</a>';\n+\t\t$obj->ExternalInsertedLink = '<a class=\"external-inserted\" href=\"http://google.com#anchor\">ExternalInsertedLink</a>';\n \t\t$result = $tmpl->process($obj);\n \t\t$this->assertContains(\n \t\t\t'<a class=\"inserted\" href=\"' . $base . '#anchor\">InsertedLink</a>',\n \t\t\t$result\n \t\t);\n+\t\t$this->assertContains(\n+\t\t\t'<a class=\"external-inserted\" href=\"http://google.com#anchor\">ExternalInsertedLink</a>',\n+\t\t\t$result\n+\t\t);\n \t\t$this->assertContains(\n \t\t\t'<a class=\"inline\" href=\"' . $base . '#anchor\">InlineLink</a>',\n \t\t\t$result\n \t\t);\n+\t\t$this->assertContains(\n+\t\t\t'<a class=\"external-inline\" href=\"http://google.com#anchor\">ExternalInlineLink</a>',\n+\t\t\t$result\n+\t\t);\n \t\t$this->assertContains(\n \t\t\t'<svg><use xlink:href=\"#sprite\"></use></svg>',\n \t\t\t$result,\n@@ -1192,7 +1205,7 @@ public function testRewriteHashlinksInPhpMode() {\n \t\t$obj->InsertedLink = '<a class=\"inserted\" href=\"#anchor\">InsertedLink</a>';\n \t\t$result = $tmpl->process($obj);\n \t\t$this->assertContains(\n-\t\t\t'<a class=\"inserted\" href=\"<?php echo strip_tags(',\n+\t\t\t'<a class=\"inserted\" href=\"<?php echo Convert::raw2att(',\n \t\t\t$result\n \t\t);\n \t\t// TODO Fix inline links in PHP mode\ndiff --git a/view/SSTemplateParser.php b/view/SSTemplateParser.php\nindex 3c11980dc69..bd87a31afa6 100644\n--- a/view/SSTemplateParser.php\n+++ b/view/SSTemplateParser.php\n@@ -4684,7 +4684,7\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5f5v-5c3v-gw5v\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Silverstripe IE requests not properly behaving with rewritehashlinks\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vm74-j4wq-82xj\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 51fe2e6521c9c02b421b383943dc9e4bbbe65d4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Gon=C3=A7alo=20Cabrita?= <_@gmcabrita.com>\nDate: Fri, 25 Nov 2022 19:14:26 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent Regex Denial of Service in Sisimai::String.to_plain\n\n---\n lib/sisimai/string.rb \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/sisimai/string.rb b/lib/sisimai/string.rb\nindex 107db0ff..d3d993ac 100644\n--- a/lib/sisimai/string.rb\n+++ b/lib/sisimai/string.rb\n@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ def to_plain(argv1 = '', loose = false)\n # 3. <a href = 'http://...'>...</a> to \" http://... \"\n # 4. <a href = 'mailto:...'>...</a> to \" Value <mailto:...> \"\n plain.scrub!('?')\n- plain.gsub!(%r\|<head>.+</head>\|im, '')\n- plain.gsub!(%r\|<style.+?>.+</style>\|im, '')\n+ plain.gsub!(%r\|<head>.?</head>\|im, '')\n+ plain.gsub!(%r\|<style.?>.?</style>\|im, '')\n plain.gsub!(%r\|<a\\s+href\\s=\\s['\"](https?://.+?)['\"].?>(.?)</a>\|i, '[\\2](\\1)')\n plain.gsub!(%r\|<a\\s+href\\s=\\s[\"']mailto:([^\\s]+?)[\"']>(.?)</a>\|i, '[\\2](mailto:\\1)')\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vm74-j4wq-82xj\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Sisimai Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-12465\nDescription: An array overflow was discovered in mt76_add_fragment in drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c in the Linux kernel before 5.5.10, aka CID-b102f0c522cf. An oversized packet with too many rx fragments can corrupt memory of adjacent pages.\n\n```diff\nFrom b102f0c522cf668c8382c56a4f771b37d011cda2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>\nDate: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 12:41:39 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] mt76: fix array overflow on receiving too many fragments for\n a packet\n\nIf the hardware receives an oversized packet with too many rx fragments,\nskb_shinfo(skb)->frags can overflow and corrupt memory of adjacent pages.\nThis becomes especially visible if it corrupts the freelist pointer of\na slab page.\n\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>\nSigned-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>\n---\n drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c \| 9 ++++++---\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c\nindex 6173c80189ba3e..1847f55e199b09 100644\n--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c\n+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c\n@@ -447,10 +447,13 @@ mt76_add_fragment(struct mt76_dev dev, struct mt76_queue q, void data,\n \tstruct page page = virt_to_head_page(data);\n \tint offset = data - page_address(page);\n \tstruct sk_buff skb = q->rx_head;\n+\tstruct skb_shared_info shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);\n \n-\toffset += q->buf_offset;\n-\tskb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, page, offset, len,\n-\t\t\tq->buf_size);\n+\tif (shinfo->nr_frags < ARRAY_SIZE(shinfo->frags)) {\n+\t\toffset += q->buf_offset;\n+\t\tskb_add_rx_frag(skb, shinfo->nr_frags, page, offset, len,\n+\t\t\t\tq->buf_size);\n+\t}\n \n \tif (more)\n \t\treturn;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-12465\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: An array overflow was discovered in mt76_add_fragment in drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/dma.c in the Linux kernel before 5.5.10, aka CID-b102f0c522cf. An oversized packet with too many rx fragments can corrupt memory of adjacent pages.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4q53-fqhc-cr46\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 45ee8df2a0efc0afe233d6b9b17045782a2e6b2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Robert Jackson <robert.w.jackson@me.com>\nDate: Wed, 5 Feb 2014 13:37:47 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] [SECURITY CVE-2014-0046] Ensure link-to non-block escapes\n title.\n\n---\n packages/ember-routing/lib/helpers/link_to.js \| 11 +++++++++-\n packages/ember/tests/helpers/link_to_test.js \| 22 +++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/packages/ember-routing/lib/helpers/link_to.js b/packages/ember-routing/lib/helpers/link_to.js\nindex 1f3aea22a81..a8017a3f339 100644\n--- a/packages/ember-routing/lib/helpers/link_to.js\n+++ b/packages/ember-routing/lib/helpers/link_to.js\n@@ -787,7 +787,16 @@ Ember.onLoad('Ember.Handlebars', function(Handlebars) {\n if (linkType === 'ID') {\n options.linkTextPath = linkTitle;\n options.fn = function() {\n- return Ember.Handlebars.get(context, linkTitle, options);\n+ var result = Ember.Handlebars.get(context, linkTitle, options);\n+ if (result === null \|\| result === undefined) {\n+ result = \"\";\n+ } else if (!(result instanceof Handlebars.SafeString)) {\n+ result = String(result);\n+ }\n+ if (!options.hash.unescaped){\n+ result = Handlebars.Utils.escapeExpression(result);\n+ }\n+ return result;\n };\n } else {\n options.fn = function() {\ndiff --git a/packages/ember/tests/helpers/link_to_test.js b/packages/ember/tests/helpers/link_to_test.js\nindex ef8bba47ca6..86eab0c37df 100644\n--- a/packages/ember/tests/helpers/link_to_test.js\n+++ b/packages/ember/tests/helpers/link_to_test.js\n@@ -922,6 +922,28 @@ test(\"The non-block form {{link-to}} performs property lookup\", function() {\n assertEquality('/about');\n });\n \n+test(\"The non-block form {{link-to}} protects against XSS\", function() {\n+ Ember.TEMPLATES.application = Ember.Handlebars.compile(\"{{link-to display 'index' id='link'}}\");\n+\n+ App.ApplicationController = Ember.Controller.extend({\n+ display: 'blahzorz'\n+ });\n+\n+ bootApplication();\n+\n+ Ember.run(router, 'handleURL', '/');\n+\n+ var controller = container.lookup('controller:application');\n+\n+ equal(Ember.$('#link', '#qunit-fixture').text(), 'blahzorz');\n+ Ember.run(function() {\n+ controller.set('display', '<b>BLAMMO</b>');\n+ });\n+\n+ equal(Ember.$('#link', '#qunit-fixture').text(), '<b>BLAMMO</b>');\n+ equal(Ember.$('b', '#qunit-fixture').length, 0);\n+});\n+\n test(\"the {{link-to}} helper calls preventDefault\", function(){\n Router.map(function() {\n this.route(\"about\");\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4q53-fqhc-cr46\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: ember-source Cross-site Scripting vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7prf-vw4p-qr59\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 94dcc6fc45e0fed96187cb52aaffadf76dbbc0a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: vasyl <vasyl@flash-fx.com.au>\nDate: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 13:40:01 +1000\nSubject: [PATCH] Avoiding prototype pollution\n\n---\n src/mixer.js \| 3 +++\n test/merge.js \| 10 ++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/mixer.js b/src/mixer.js\nindex 896d74d..2e18e01 100644\n--- a/src/mixer.js\n+++ b/src/mixer.js\n@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ export default function mixer(opts = {}) {\n }\n \n function iteratee(sourceValue, key) {\n+ if (key === 'constructor' && typeof sourceValue === 'function') return;\n+ if (key == '__proto__') return;\n+\n const targetValue = target[key];\n if (opts.filter && !opts.filter(sourceValue, targetValue, key)) {\n return;\ndiff --git a/test/merge.js b/test/merge.js\nindex 30a0b48..dc581a8 100644\n--- a/test/merge.js\n+++ b/test/merge.js\n@@ -61,3 +61,13 @@ test('merge', (t) => {\n t.ok(result.func2, 'Should mix functions.');\n t.end();\n });\n+\n+test('merging should avoid prototype pollutions', (t) => {\n+ let result = merge({}, JSON.parse('{\"__proto__\":{\"poc\":\"evil\"}}'));\n+ t.notEqual(result.poc, 'evil', 'Should not merge __proto__.');\n+\n+ result = merge({}, { constructor: noop });\n+ t.notEqual(result.constructor, noop, 'Should not merge constructor functions')\n+\n+ t.end();\n+});\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7prf-vw4p-qr59\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Prototype pollution in supermixer\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\ndef getFibonacci(n):\n '''\n Compute the n-th fibonacci number using loops only.\n '''\n a, b = 1, 1\n i = 2\n while i < n:\n a, b = b, a + b\n return b\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-835 - CWE-835\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]

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