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[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-1866\nDescription: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer vulnerability in warmcat libwebsockets allows Pointer Manipulation, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory access. This issue affects libwebsockets before 4.3.4 and is present in code built specifically for the Win32 platform.\n\nBy default, the affected code is not executed unless one of the following conditions is met:\n\nLWS_WITHOUT_EXTENSIONS (default ON) is manually set to OFF in CMake.\nLWS_WITH_HTTP_STREAM_COMPRESSION\n\n```diff\nFrom 3f7c79fd57338aca1bf4a1b1f24e324b80d36265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>\nDate: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:35:50 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] win32port: zlib: upstream bugfix patch on inftrees.c\n\nFrom 6a043145ca6e9c55184013841a67b2fef87e44c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nSubject: [PATCH] Remove offset pointer optimization in inftrees.c.\n\ninftrees.c was subtracting an offset from a pointer to an array,\nin order to provide a pointer that allowed indexing starting at\nthe offset. This is not compliant with the C standard, for which\nthe behavior of a pointer decremented before its allocated memory\nis undefined. Per the recommendation of a security audit of the\nzlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the\nMozilla Foundation, this tiny optimization was removed, in order\nto avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.\n---\n win32port/zlib/inftrees.c \| 18 ++++++++----------\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/win32port/zlib/inftrees.c b/win32port/zlib/inftrees.c\nindex 11e9c52acc..71eff202be 100644\n--- a/win32port/zlib/inftrees.c\n+++ b/win32port/zlib/inftrees.c\n@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned short FAR work;\n code FAR next; /* next available space in table /\n const unsigned short FAR base; /* base value table to use /\n const unsigned short FAR extra; /* extra bits table to use /\n- int end; / use base and extra for symbol > end /\n+ unsigned match; / use base and extra for symbol >= match /\n unsigned short count[MAXBITS+1]; / number of codes of each length /\n unsigned short offs[MAXBITS+1]; / offsets in table for each length /\n static const unsigned short lbase[31] = { / Length codes 257..285 base /\n@@ -181,19 +181,17 @@ unsigned short FAR work;\n switch (type) {\n case CODES:\n base = extra = work; /* dummy value--not used /\n- end = 19;\n+ match = 20;\n break;\n case LENS:\n base = lbase;\n- base -= 257;\n extra = lext;\n- extra -= 257;\n- end = 256;\n+ match = 257;\n break;\n default: / DISTS /\n base = dbase;\n extra = dext;\n- end = -1;\n+ match = 0;\n }\n \n / initialize state for loop /\n@@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ unsigned short FAR work;\n for (;;) {\n /* create table entry /\n here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);\n- if ((int)(work[sym]) < end) {\n+ if (work[sym] + 1 < match) {\n here.op = (unsigned char)0;\n here.val = work[sym];\n }\n- else if ((int)(work[sym]) > end) {\n- here.op = (unsigned char)(extra[work[sym]]);\n- here.val = base[work[sym]];\n+ else if (work[sym] >= match) {\n+ here.op = (unsigned char)(extra[work[sym] - match]);\n+ here.val = base[work[sym] - match];\n }\n else {\n here.op = (unsigned char)(32 + 6\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2025-1866\nCWE: CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer\nTitle: Undefined Behavior Due to Out-of-Bounds Pointer Arithmetic in libwebsockets\n\nThis patch addresses: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer vulnerability in warmcat libwebsockets allows Pointer Manipulation, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory access. This issue affects libwebsockets before 4.3.4 and is present in code built specifically for the Win32 platform.\n\nBy default, the affected code is not executed unless one of the following conditions is met:\n\nLWS_WITHOUT_EXTENSIONS (default ON) is manually set to OFF in CMake.\nLWS_WITH_HTTP_STREAM_COMPRESSION\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-43846\nDescription: `solidus_frontend` is the cart and storefront for the Solidus e-commerce project. Versions of `solidus_frontend` prior to 3.1.5, 3.0.5, and 2.11.14 contain a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability that allows a malicious site to add an item to the user's cart without their knowledge. Versions 3.1.5, 3.0.5, and 2.11.14 contain a patch for this issue. The patch adds CSRF token verification to the \"Add to cart\" action. Adding forgery protection to a form that missed it can have some side e\n\n```diff\nFrom 4d17cacf066d9492fc04eb3a0b16084b47376d81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Marc=20Busqu=C3=A9?= <marc@lamarciana.com>\nDate: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 10:36:44 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Protect `Spree::OrdersController#populate` against CSRF\n attacks\n\nSee\nhttps://github.com/solidusio/solidus/security/advisories/GHSA-h3fg-h5v3-vf8m\nfor all the details.\n\nSome time ago, all order actions were left out of CSRF protection (see\n95ea57058ab1c5e722b327b10747cd41e68a4deb). The reason given was that the\nauthentication token got stale after the second rendering because the\nproduct page is cached. That was limited to `#populate` in\ncb797542c6948ef33d2cc9e6076c88f4cc927fb2 (see also\nhttps://github.com/spree/spree/pull/5601).\n\nHowever, those assumptions are not correct. Although the authenticity\ntoken changes at every request, that doesn't mean that the old ones are\nno longer valid. The variation comes from a one-time pad added to a\nsession-dependant token (and meant to avoid timing attacks). However,\nbefore validation, that one-time pad is removed. That means the token\nremains valid as long as the session has not been reset. Think about\nsubmitting a form from one browser tab after opening another with the\nsame URL. Even if both tokens differ, the submission from the first tab\nwill still be valid. You can read\nhttps://medium.com/rubyinside/a-deep-dive-into-csrf-protection-in-rails-19fa0a42c0ef\nfor an in-deep understanding.\n\nThe initial confusion could come because of\nhttps://github.com/rails/rails/issues/21948. Due to browser-side cache,\na form can be re-rendered and sent without any attached request cookie.\nThat will cause an authentication error, as the sent token won't match\nwith the one in the session (none in this case). There's no perfect\nsolution for that, and all partial fixes should be seen at the\napplication level. From our side, we must provide a safe default. For an\nexcellent survey of all the available options, take a look at\nhttps://github.com/betagouv/demarches-simplifiees.fr/blob/5b4f7f9ae9eaf0ac94008b62f7047e4714626cf9/doc/adr-csrf-forgery.md.\nThe information given in that link is third-party but it's very\nrelevant here. For that reason we've copied it in the security advisory\n(see link above), but all the credit goes to @kemenaran.\n---\n frontend/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb \| 1 -\n 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/frontend/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb b/frontend/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb\nindex bc23c3b46a6..f21e4db6534 100644\n--- a/frontend/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb\n+++ b/frontend/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb\n@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ class OrdersController < Spree::StoreController\n before_action :assign_order, only: :update\n # note: do not lock the #edit action because that's where we redirect when we fail to acquire a lock\n around_action :lock_order, only: :update\n- skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, only: [:populate]\n \n def show\n \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-43846\nCWE: CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)\nTitle: CSRF forgery protection bypass for Spree::OrdersController#populate\n\nThis patch addresses: `solidus_frontend` is the cart and storefront for the Solidus e-commerce project. Versions of `solidus_frontend` prior to 3.1.5, 3.0.5, and 2.11.14 contain a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability that allows a malicious site to add an item to the user's cart without their knowledge. Versions 3.1.5, 3.0.5, and 2.11.14 contain a patch for this issue. The patch adds CSRF token verification to the \"Add to cart\" action. Adding forgery protection to a form that missed it can have some side e\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r773-pmw3-f4mr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom e7ce4000e9fe4d957332df1056640a22ebea28ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Patrik=20=C3=85kerstrand?= <patrik.akerstrand@schibsted.com>\nDate: Wed, 12 May 2021 11:02:00 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: only redirect for current origin\n\n---\n index.js \| 8 ++++++--\n test/index.js \| 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/index.js b/index.js\nindex 0102e84..dc1d7c5 100644\n--- a/index.js\n+++ b/index.js\n@@ -41,8 +41,12 @@ function removeTrailingSlashes(opts) {\n path = path.slice(0, -1);\n const query = querystring.length ? '?' + querystring : '';\n \n- ctx.status = 301;\n- ctx.redirect(path + query);\n+ const newURL = new URL(path + query, ctx.request.URL);\n+\n+ if (ctx.origin === newURL.origin) {\n+ ctx.status = 301;\n+ ctx.redirect(path + query);\n+ }\n }\n \n if (!opts.defer) {\ndiff --git a/test/index.js b/test/index.js\nindex 28f1a53..6efa5a5 100644\n--- a/test/index.js\n+++ b/test/index.js\n@@ -16,6 +16,15 @@ describe('koa-remove-trailing-slashes', () => {\n .expect('Location', '/foo')\n .expect(301, done);\n });\n+\n+ it('does not redirect to malicious domains', (done) => {\n+ const app = new Koa();\n+ app.use(removeTrailingSlashes());\n+\n+ request(app.listen())\n+ .get('//ev1l.example/')\n+ .expect(404, done);\n+ });\n });\n \n describe('defer = false', () => {\n@@ -104,6 +113,24 @@ describe('koa-remove-trailing-slashes', () => {\n expect(mock.ctx.status).toBe(301);\n });\n \n+ it('Should not modify protocol-relative redirects', async () => {\n+ const mock = createMock('/fOo/?baz=1', 'baz=1');\n+\n+ // Mock that something has made a redirect before us\n+ mock.ctx.status = 301;\n+ mock.ctx.body = 'Redirecting to …';\n+ mock.ctx.response = {\n+ get() {\n+ return '//another-domain.com/external/';\n+ }\n+ };\n+\n+ await removeTrailingSlashes()(mock.ctx, mock.next);\n+\n+ expect(mock.redirectMock).toNotHaveBeenCalled();\n+ expect(mock.ctx.status).toBe(301);\n+ });\n+\n it('should redirect on url and path has trailing slash', async () => {\n const mock = createMock('/foo/');\n await removeTrailingSlashes()(mock.ctx, mock.next);\n@@ -157,6 +184,10 @@ function createMock(originalUrl, querystring) {\n ctx: {\n querystring: querystring,\n originalUrl: originalUrl,\n+ origin: 'https://example.com',\n+ request: {\n+ URL: new URL(originalUrl + '?' + querystring, 'https://example.com')\n+ },\n status: undefined,\n redirec\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r773-pmw3-f4mr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Open Redirect in koa-remove-trailing-slashes\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32803\nDescription: The npm package \"tar\" (aka node-tar) before versions 6.1.2, 5.0.7, 4.4.15, and 3.2.3 has an arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite vulnerability via insufficient symlink protection. `node-tar` aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary `stat` calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached \n\n```diff\nFrom 9dbdeb6df8e9dbd96fa9e84341b9d74734be6c20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: isaacs <i@izs.me>\nDate: Mon, 26 Jul 2021 16:10:30 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Remove paths from dirCache when no longer dirs\n\n---\n lib/unpack.js \| 22 +++++++++++++++++++++\n test/unpack.js \| 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/unpack.js b/lib/unpack.js\nindex 216fa71b..edaf7833 100644\n--- a/lib/unpack.js\n+++ b/lib/unpack.js\n@@ -465,6 +465,19 @@ class Unpack extends Parser {\n }\n \n [CHECKFS2] (entry, done) {\n+ // if we are not creating a directory, and the path is in the dirCache,\n+ // then that means we are about to delete the directory we created\n+ // previously, and it is no longer going to be a directory, and neither\n+ // is any of its children.\n+ if (entry.type !== 'Directory') {\n+ for (const path of this.dirCache.keys()) {\n+ if (path === entry.absolute \|\|\n+ path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '/') === 0 \|\|\n+ path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '\\\\') === 0)\n+ this.dirCache.delete(path)\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode, er => {\n if (er) {\n done()\n@@ -529,6 +542,15 @@ class Unpack extends Parser {\n \n class UnpackSync extends Unpack {\n [CHECKFS] (entry) {\n+ if (entry.type !== 'Directory') {\n+ for (const path of this.dirCache.keys()) {\n+ if (path === entry.absolute \|\|\n+ path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '/') === 0 \|\|\n+ path.indexOf(entry.absolute + '\\\\') === 0)\n+ this.dirCache.delete(path)\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n const er = this[MKDIR](path.dirname(entry.absolute), this.dmode, neverCalled)\n if (er)\n return this[ONERROR](er, entry)\ndiff --git a/test/unpack.js b/test/unpack.js\nindex 1b2a0334..db7c8f54 100644\n--- a/test/unpack.js\n+++ b/test/unpack.js\n@@ -2605,3 +2605,56 @@ t.test('handle errors on fs.close', t => {\n cwd: dir + '/sync', strict: true,\n }).end(data), poop, 'sync')\n })\n+\n+t.test('drop entry from dirCache if no longer a directory', t => {\n+ const dir = path.resolve(unpackdir, 'dir-cache-error')\n+ mkdirp.sync(dir + '/sync/y')\n+ mkdirp.sync(dir + '/async/y')\n+ const data = makeTar([\n+ {\n+ path: 'x',\n+ type: 'Directory',\n+ },\n+ {\n+ path: 'x',\n+ type: 'SymbolicLink',\n+ linkpath: './y',\n+ },\n+ {\n+ path: 'x/ginkoid',\n+ type: 'File',\n+ size: 'ginkoid'.length,\n+ },\n+ 'ginkoid',\n+ '',\n+ '',\n+ ])\n+ t.plan(2)\n+ const WARNINGS = {}\n+ const check = (t, path) => {\n+ t.equal(fs.statSync(path + '/x').isDirectory(), true)\n+ t.equal(fs.lstatSync(path + '/x').isSymbolicLink(), true)\n+ t.equal(fs.statSync(path + '/y').isDirectory(), true)\n+ t.strictSame(fs.readdirSync(path + '/y'), [])\n+ t.throws(() => fs.readFileSync(path + '/x/ginkoid'), { code: 'ENOENT' })\n+ t.strictSame(WARNINGS[path], [\n+ 'TAR_ENTRY_ERROR',\n+ 'Cannot extract through symbolic link',\n+\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32803\nCWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')\nTitle: Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite via insufficient symlink protection due to directory cache poisoning\n\nThis patch addresses: The npm package \"tar\" (aka node-tar) before versions 6.1.2, 5.0.7, 4.4.15, and 3.2.3 has an arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite vulnerability via insufficient symlink protection. `node-tar` aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary `stat` calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached \n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-m6c6-6vhq-xhvp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 74cd0a9b62f11bc07c5a1d3ba0098b54883eb0ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Aleksander Machniak <alec@alec.pl>\nDate: Tue, 4 Dec 2012 09:17:08 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] - Fix XSS vulnerability in vbscript: and data:text links\n handling (#1488850)\n\n---\n CHANGELOG \| 1 +\n program/lib/washtml.php \| 2 +-\n tests/MailFunc.php \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG\nindex a47c95dcf3..af7d29c044 100644\n--- a/CHANGELOG\n+++ b/CHANGELOG\n@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@\n CHANGELOG Roundcube Webmail\n ===========================\n \n+- Fix XSS vulnerability in vbscript: and data:text links handling (#1488850)\n - Fix broken message/part bodies when FETCH response contains more untagged lines (#1488836)\n - Fix empty email on identities list after identity update (#1488834)\n - Add new identities_level: (4) one identity with possibility to edit only signature\ndiff --git a/program/lib/washtml.php b/program/lib/washtml.php\nindex 0d4ffdb4bb..d13d664043 100644\n--- a/program/lib/washtml.php\n+++ b/program/lib/washtml.php\n@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ private function wash_attribs($node)\n $key = strtolower($key);\n $value = $node->getAttribute($key);\n if (isset($this->_html_attribs[$key]) \|\|\n- ($key == 'href' && !preg_match('!^javascript!i', $value)\n+ ($key == 'href' && !preg_match('!^(javascript\|vbscript\|data:text)!i', $value)\n && preg_match('!^([a-z][a-z0-9.+-]+:\|//\|#).+!i', $value))\n ) {\n $t .= ' ' . $key . '=\"' . htmlspecialchars($value, ENT_QUOTES) . '\"';\ndiff --git a/tests/MailFunc.php b/tests/MailFunc.php\nindex 967277c2a4..4d4250c22a 100644\n--- a/tests/MailFunc.php\n+++ b/tests/MailFunc.php\n@@ -96,6 +96,20 @@ function test_html_xss2()\n $this->assertNotRegExp('/font-style:italic/', $washed, \"Allow valid styles\");\n }\n \n+ /*\n+ Test the elimination of some XSS vulnerabilities\n+ /\n+ function test_html_xss3()\n+ {\n+ // #1488850\n+ $html = '<p><a href=\"data:text/html,<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\">Firefox</a>'\n+ .'<a href=\"vbscript:alert(document.cookie)\">Internet Explorer</a></p>';\n+ $washed = rcmail_wash_html($html, array('safe' => true), array());\n+\n+ $this->assertNotRegExp('/data:text/', $washed, \"Remove data:text/html links\");\n+ $this->assertNotRegExp('/vbscript:/', $washed, \"Remove vbscript: links\");\n+ }\n+\n /\n Test washtml class on non-unicode characters (#1487813)\n /\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-m6c6-6vhq-xhvp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-25051\nDescription: objstack in GNU Aspell 0.60.8 has a heap-based buffer overflow in acommon::ObjStack::dup_top (called from acommon::StringMap::add and acommon::Config::lookup_list).\n\n```diff\nFrom 0718b375425aad8e54e1150313b862e4c6fd324a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Kevin Atkinson <kevina@gnu.org>\nDate: Sat, 21 Dec 2019 20:32:47 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] objstack: assert that the alloc size will fit within a chunk\n to prevent a buffer overflow\n\nBug found using OSS-Fuze.\n---\n common/objstack.hpp \| 18 ++++++++++++++----\n 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/common/objstack.hpp b/common/objstack.hpp\nindex 3997bf7e..bd97ccd6 100644\n--- a/common/objstack.hpp\n+++ b/common/objstack.hpp\n@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@\n #include \"parm_string.hpp\"\n #include <stdlib.h>\n #include <assert.h>\n+#include <stddef.h>\n \n namespace acommon {\n \n@@ -26,6 +27,12 @@ class ObjStack\n byte * temp_end;\n void setup_chunk();\n void new_chunk();\n+ bool will_overflow(size_t sz) const {\n+ return offsetof(Node,data) + sz > chunk_size;\n+ }\n+ void check_size(size_t sz) {\n+ assert(!will_overflow(sz));\n+ }\n \n ObjStack(const ObjStack &);\n void operator=(const ObjStack &);\n@@ -56,7 +63,7 @@ class ObjStack\n void * alloc_bottom(size_t size) {\n byte * tmp = bottom;\n bottom += size;\n- if (bottom > top) {new_chunk(); tmp = bottom; bottom += size;}\n+ if (bottom > top) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); tmp = bottom; bottom += size;}\n return tmp;\n }\n // This alloc_bottom will insure that the object is aligned based on the\n@@ -66,7 +73,7 @@ class ObjStack\n align_bottom(align);\n byte * tmp = bottom;\n bottom += size;\n- if (bottom > top) {new_chunk(); goto loop;}\n+ if (bottom > top) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); goto loop;}\n return tmp;\n }\n char * dup_bottom(ParmString str) {\n@@ -79,7 +86,7 @@ class ObjStack\n // always be aligned as such.\n void * alloc_top(size_t size) {\n top -= size;\n- if (top < bottom) {new_chunk(); top -= size;}\n+ if (top < bottom) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); top -= size;}\n return top;\n }\n // This alloc_top will insure that the object is aligned based on\n@@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ class ObjStack\n {loop:\n top -= size;\n align_top(align);\n- if (top < bottom) {new_chunk(); goto loop;}\n+ if (top < bottom) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); goto loop;}\n return top;\n }\n char * dup_top(ParmString str) {\n@@ -117,6 +124,7 @@ class ObjStack\n void * alloc_temp(size_t size) {\n temp_end = bottom + size;\n if (temp_end > top) {\n+ check_size(size);\n new_chunk();\n temp_end = bottom + size;\n }\n@@ -131,6 +139,7 @@ class ObjStack\n } else {\n size_t s = temp_end - bottom;\n byte * p = bottom;\n+ check_size(size);\n new_chunk();\n memcpy(bottom, p, s);\n temp_end = bottom + size;\n@@ -150,6 +159,7 @@ class ObjStack\n } else {\n size_t s = temp_end - bottom;\n byte * p = bottom;\n+ check_size(size);\n new_chunk();\n memcpy(bottom, p, s);\n temp_end = bottom + size;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-25051\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: objstack in GNU Aspell 0.60.8 has a heap-based buffer overflow in acommon::ObjStack::dup_top (called from acommon::StringMap::add and acommon::Config::lookup_list).\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-7103\nDescription: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in jQuery UI before 1.12.0 might allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the closeText parameter of the dialog function.\n\n```diff\nFrom 9644e7bae9116edaf8d37c5b38cb32b892f10ff6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Jo=CC=88rn=20Zaefferer?= <joern.zaefferer@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 28 Oct 2015 19:11:07 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Dialog: Escape closeText option before passing it to button\n\nRef gh-1632\nFixes jquery/api.jqueryui.com#281\n---\n tests/unit/dialog/options.js \| 7 ++++++-\n ui/widgets/dialog.js \| 4 ++--\n 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tests/unit/dialog/options.js b/tests/unit/dialog/options.js\nindex 6d3a619bd65..ab9ace259d5 100644\n--- a/tests/unit/dialog/options.js\n+++ b/tests/unit/dialog/options.js\n@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ test( \"closeOnEscape\", function() {\n } );\n \n test( \"closeText\", function() {\n-\texpect( 3 );\n+\texpect( 4 );\n \n \tvar element = $( \"<div></div>\" ).dialog();\n \t\tequal( $.trim( element.dialog( \"widget\" ).find( \".ui-dialog-titlebar-close\" ).text() ), \"Close\",\n@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ test( \"closeText\", function() {\n \t\tequal( $.trim( element.dialog( \"widget\" ).find( \".ui-dialog-titlebar-close\" ).text() ), \"bar\",\n \t\t\t\"closeText via option method\" );\n \telement.remove();\n+\n+\telement = $( \"<div></div>\" ).dialog( { closeText: \"<span>foo</span>\" } );\n+\t\tequal( $.trim( element.dialog( \"widget\" ).find( \".ui-dialog-titlebar-close\" ).text() ), \"<span>foo</span>\",\n+\t\t\t\"closeText is escaped\" );\n+\telement.remove();\n } );\n \n test( \"draggable\", function() {\ndiff --git a/ui/widgets/dialog.js b/ui/widgets/dialog.js\nindex f0a2f6751ae..c3ca95ed390 100644\n--- a/ui/widgets/dialog.js\n+++ b/ui/widgets/dialog.js\n@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ $.widget( \"ui.dialog\", {\n \t\t// dialog in IE (#9312)\n \t\tthis.uiDialogTitlebarClose = $( \"<button type='button'></button>\" )\n \t\t\t.button( {\n-\t\t\t\tlabel: this.options.closeText,\n+\t\t\t\tlabel: $( \"<a>\" ).text( this.options.closeText ).html(),\n \t\t\t\ticon: \"ui-icon-closethick\",\n \t\t\t\tshowLabel: false\n \t\t\t} )\n@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ $.widget( \"ui.dialog\", {\n \t\t\tthis.uiDialogTitlebarClose.button( {\n \n \t\t\t\t// Ensure that we always pass a string\n-\t\t\t\tlabel: \"\" + value\n+\t\t\t\tlabel: $( \"<a>\" ).text( \"\" + this.options.closeText ).html()\n \t\t\t} );\n \t\t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-7103\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in jQuery UI before 1.12.0 might allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the closeText parameter of the dialog function.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-30861\nDescription: Flask is a lightweight WSGI web application framework. When all of the following conditions are met, a response containing data intended for one client may be cached and subsequently sent by the proxy to other clients. If the proxy also caches `Set-Cookie` headers, it may send one client's `session` cookie to other clients. The severity depends on the application's use of the session and the proxy's behavior regarding cookies. The risk depends on all these conditions being met.\n\n1. The applicati\n\n```diff\nFrom 8705dd39c4fa563ea0fe0bf84c85da8fcc98b88d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>\nDate: Mon, 1 May 2023 08:01:32 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] set `Vary: Cookie` header consistently for session\n\n---\n src/flask/sessions.py \| 10 ++++++----\n tests/test_basic.py \| 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/flask/sessions.py b/src/flask/sessions.py\nindex 1334184eb0..e5650d6862 100644\n--- a/src/flask/sessions.py\n+++ b/src/flask/sessions.py\n@@ -329,6 +329,10 @@ def save_session(\n samesite = self.get_cookie_samesite(app)\n httponly = self.get_cookie_httponly(app)\n \n+ # Add a \"Vary: Cookie\" header if the session was accessed at all.\n+ if session.accessed:\n+ response.vary.add(\"Cookie\")\n+\n # If the session is modified to be empty, remove the cookie.\n # If the session is empty, return without setting the cookie.\n if not session:\n@@ -341,13 +345,10 @@ def save_session(\n samesite=samesite,\n httponly=httponly,\n )\n+ response.vary.add(\"Cookie\")\n \n return\n \n- # Add a \"Vary: Cookie\" header if the session was accessed at all.\n- if session.accessed:\n- response.vary.add(\"Cookie\")\n-\n if not self.should_set_cookie(app, session):\n return\n \n@@ -363,3 +364,4 @@ def save_session(\n secure=secure,\n samesite=samesite,\n )\n+ response.vary.add(\"Cookie\")\ndiff --git a/tests/test_basic.py b/tests/test_basic.py\nindex 32b41b6378..ca373dcae3 100644\n--- a/tests/test_basic.py\n+++ b/tests/test_basic.py\n@@ -501,6 +501,11 @@ def getitem():\n def setdefault():\n return flask.session.setdefault(\"test\", \"default\")\n \n+ @app.route(\"/clear\")\n+ def clear():\n+ flask.session.clear()\n+ return \"\"\n+\n @app.route(\"/vary-cookie-header-set\")\n def vary_cookie_header_set():\n response = flask.Response()\n@@ -533,11 +538,29 @@ def expect(path, header_value=\"Cookie\"):\n expect(\"/get\")\n expect(\"/getitem\")\n expect(\"/setdefault\")\n+ expect(\"/clear\")\n expect(\"/vary-cookie-header-set\")\n expect(\"/vary-header-set\", \"Accept-Encoding, Accept-Language, Cookie\")\n expect(\"/no-vary-header\", None)\n \n \n+def test_session_refresh_vary(app, client):\n+ @app.get(\"/login\")\n+ def login():\n+ flask.session[\"user_id\"] = 1\n+ flask.session.permanent = True\n+ return \"\"\n+\n+ @app.get(\"/ignored\")\n+ def ignored():\n+ return \"\"\n+\n+ rv = client.get(\"/login\")\n+ assert rv.headers[\"Vary\"] == \"Cookie\"\n+ rv = client.get(\"/ignored\")\n+ assert rv.headers[\"Vary\"] == \"Cookie\"\n+\n+\n def test_flashes(app, req_ctx):\n assert not flask.session.modified\n flask.flash(\"Zap\")\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-30861\nCWE: CWE-539: Use of Persistent Cookies Containing Sensitive Information\nTitle: Flask vulnerable to possible disclosure of permanent session cookie due to missing Vary: Cookie header\n\nThis patch addresses: Flask is a lightweight WSGI web application framework. When all of the following conditions are met, a response containing data intended for one client may be cached and subsequently sent by the proxy to other clients. If the proxy also caches `Set-Cookie` headers, it may send one client's `session` cookie to other clients. The severity depends on the application's use of the session and the proxy's behavior regarding cookies. The risk depends on all these conditions being met.\n\n1. The applicati\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6cf9-gr3m-fgc8\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 13dad7d5ef74ca2e6fe4010f5b03eb12e9bbe0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jeanlf <jeanlf@gpac.io>\nDate: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 09:21:51 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] fixed #1719\n\n---\n src/filters/reframe_av1.c \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/filters/reframe_av1.c b/src/filters/reframe_av1.c\nindex 591a826a92..c8b402c8a9 100644\n--- a/src/filters/reframe_av1.c\n+++ b/src/filters/reframe_av1.c\n@@ -739,6 +739,9 @@ static GF_Err av1dmx_parse_flush_sample(GF_Filter filter, GF_AV1DmxCtx ctx)\n \tGF_FilterPacket pck;\n \tu8 output;\n \n+\tif (!ctx->opid)\n+\t\treturn GF_NON_COMPLIANT_BITSTREAM;\n+\t\t\n \tgf_bs_get_content_no_truncate(ctx->state.bs, &ctx->state.frame_obus, &pck_size, &ctx->state.frame_obus_alloc);\n \n \tif (!pck_size) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6cf9-gr3m-fgc8\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xh66-6mj6-94rg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 3cf291f72224715942beaf8553e42ba8891ab3c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Yukihiro \\\"Matz\\\" Matsumoto\" <matz@ruby.or.jp>\nDate: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 12:26:52 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH] vm.c: create break object before clearing GC arena.\n\nOtherwise it possibly cause use-after-free.\n---\n src/vm.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/vm.c b/src/vm.c\nindex 3796f41738..6d61386b31 100644\n--- a/src/vm.c\n+++ b/src/vm.c\n@@ -2268,9 +2268,9 @@ mrb_vm_exec(mrb_state mrb, const struct RProc proc, const mrb_code pc)\n }\n if (ci->cci > CINFO_NONE) {\n ci = cipop(mrb);\n+ mrb->exc = (struct RObject)break_new(mrb, RBREAK_TAG_BREAK, proc, v);\n mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);\n mrb->c->vmexec = FALSE;\n- mrb->exc = (struct RObject)break_new(mrb, RBREAK_TAG_BREAK, proc, v);\n mrb->jmp = prev_jmp;\n MRB_THROW(prev_jmp);\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-xh66-6mj6-94rg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0213\nDescription: vim is vulnerable to Heap-based Buffer Overflow\n\n```diff\nFrom de05bb25733c3319e18dca44e9b59c6ee389eb26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org>\nDate: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 13:08:14 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.4074: going over the end of NameBuff\n\nProblem: Going over the end of NameBuff.\nSolution: Check length when appending a space.\n---\n src/drawscreen.c \| 9 +++++----\n src/testdir/test_edit.vim \| 15 +++++++++++++++\n src/version.c \| 2 ++\n 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/drawscreen.c b/src/drawscreen.c\nindex 28a2072959fed1..453ca91c33adb8 100644\n--- a/src/drawscreen.c\n+++ b/src/drawscreen.c\n@@ -462,12 +462,13 @@ win_redr_status(win_T wp, int ignore_pum UNUSED)\n \tp = NameBuff;\n \tlen = (int)STRLEN(p);\n \n-\tif (bt_help(wp->w_buffer)\n+\tif ((bt_help(wp->w_buffer)\n #ifdef FEAT_QUICKFIX\n-\t\t\|\| wp->w_p_pvw\n+\t\t \|\| wp->w_p_pvw\n #endif\n-\t\t\|\| bufIsChanged(wp->w_buffer)\n-\t\t\|\| wp->w_buffer->b_p_ro)\n+\t\t \|\| bufIsChanged(wp->w_buffer)\n+\t\t \|\| wp->w_buffer->b_p_ro)\n+\t\t&& len < MAXPATHL - 1)\n \t (p + len++) = ' ';\n \tif (bt_help(wp->w_buffer))\n \t{\ndiff --git a/src/testdir/test_edit.vim b/src/testdir/test_edit.vim\nindex e83d67250c26bf..63226466ee9bc7 100644\n--- a/src/testdir/test_edit.vim\n+++ b/src/testdir/test_edit.vim\n@@ -2103,5 +2103,20 @@ func Test_edit_CTRL_hat()\n bwipe!\n endfunc\n \n+\" Weird long file name was going over the end of NameBuff\n+func Test_edit_overlong_file_name()\n+ CheckUnix\n+\n+ file 0000000000000000000000000000\n+ file %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%\n+ file %%%%%%\n+ set readonly\n+ set ls=2 \n+\n+ redraw!\n+ set noreadonly ls&\n+ bwipe!\n+endfunc\n+\n \n \" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab\ndiff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c\nindex 1b37a5d50abd5f..1f4a031622401c 100644\n--- a/src/version.c\n+++ b/src/version.c\n@@ -750,6 +750,8 @@ static char (features[]) =\n \n static int included_patches[] =\n { / Add new patch number below this line /\n+//\n+ 4074,\n //\n 4073,\n //\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2022-0213\nCWE: CWE-122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow\nTitle: Heap-based Buffer Overflow in vim/vim\n\nThis patch addresses: vim is vulnerable to Heap-based Buffer Overflow\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-9364\nDescription: Unrestricted File Upload exists in BigTree CMS through 4.2.18: if an attacker uploads an 'xxx.pht' or 'xxx.phtml' file, they could bypass a safety check and execute any code.\n\n```diff\nFrom b72293946951cc650eaf51f5d2f62ceac6335e12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tim Buckingham <mr@timbuckingham.com>\nDate: Thu, 25 May 2017 16:28:42 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] Disabling phtml/pht files from being uploaded.\n https://github.com/bigtreecms/BigTree-CMS/issues/280\n\n---\n core/inc/bigtree/apis/storage.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/core/inc/bigtree/apis/storage.php b/core/inc/bigtree/apis/storage.php\nindex 0c867f8c1..7dda69252 100755\n--- a/core/inc/bigtree/apis/storage.php\n+++ b/core/inc/bigtree/apis/storage.php\n@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ class BigTreeStorage {\n \n \t\tvar $AutoJPEG = false;\n \t\tvar $DisabledFileError = false;\n-\t\tvar $DisabledExtensionRegEx = '/\\\\.(exe\|com\|bat\|php\|rb\|py\|cgi\|pl\|sh\|asp\|aspx)/i';\n+\t\tvar $DisabledExtensionRegEx = '/\\\\.(exe\|com\|bat\|php\|rb\|py\|cgi\|pl\|sh\|asp\|aspx\|phtml\|pht)/i';\n \t\tvar $Service = \"\";\n \t\tvar $Cloud = false;\n \t\tvar $Settings;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-9364\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Unrestricted File Upload exists in BigTree CMS through 4.2.18: if an attacker uploads an 'xxx.pht' or 'xxx.phtml' file, they could bypass a safety check and execute any code.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nimport lxml.etree\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n\ndef checkPassword(userid, password):\n pass\n\n\n@app.post(\"/upload\")\ndef upload():\n '''\n Get the xml file from the request and check if the userid and password are correct by invoking checkPassword().\n '''\n xml = request.files['xml']\n root = lxml.etree.fromstring(xml.read())\n userid = root.find('userid').text\n password = root.find('password').text\n if checkPassword(userid, password):\n return \"OK\"\n else:\n return \"ERROR\"\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-611 - CWE-611\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4f8m-x9c7-gvcq\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 70b21279098fc973eae803693c0705a548128e48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Aaron Campbell <aaron@xavisys.com>\nDate: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 14:48:47 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Database: Hardening for `wpdb::prepare()`\n\nPreviously if you passed an array of values for placeholders, additional values could be passed as well. Now additional values will be ignored.\n\n\nBuilt from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@41470\n\n\ngit-svn-id: http://core.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@41303 1a063a9b-81f0-0310-95a4-ce76da25c4cd\n---\n wp-includes/version.php \| 2 +-\n wp-includes/wp-db.php \| 11 ++++++++++-\n 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/wp-includes/version.php b/wp-includes/version.php\nindex 6967ffd8b19f..3e8480acf96c 100644\n--- a/wp-includes/version.php\n+++ b/wp-includes/version.php\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n \n @global string $wp_version\n /\n-$wp_version = '4.9-alpha-41457';\n+$wp_version = '4.9-alpha-41470';\n \n /\n Holds the WordPress DB revision, increments when changes are made to the WordPress DB schema.\ndiff --git a/wp-includes/wp-db.php b/wp-includes/wp-db.php\nindex 57ed865a35ae..5cc2be114fc7 100644\n--- a/wp-includes/wp-db.php\n+++ b/wp-includes/wp-db.php\n@@ -1236,9 +1236,18 @@ public function prepare( $query, $args ) {\n \n \t\t$args = func_get_args();\n \t\tarray_shift( $args );\n+\n \t\t// If args were passed as an array (as in vsprintf), move them up\n-\t\tif ( isset( $args[0] ) && is_array($args[0]) )\n+\t\tif ( is_array( $args[0] ) && count( $args ) == 1 ) {\n \t\t\t$args = $args[0];\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tforeach ( $args as $arg ) {\n+\t\t\tif ( ! is_scalar( $arg ) ) {\n+\t\t\t\t_doing_it_wrong( 'wpdb::prepare', sprintf( __( 'Unsupported value type (%s).' ), gettype( $arg ) ), '4.8.2' );\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\t$query = str_replace( \"'%s'\", '%s', $query ); // in case someone mistakenly already singlequoted it\n \t\t$query = str_replace( '\"%s\"', '%s', $query ); // doublequote unquoting\n \t\t$query = preg_replace( '\|(?<!%)%f\|' , '%F', $query ); // Force floats to be locale unaware\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-4f8m-x9c7-gvcq\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0552\nDescription: A flaw was found in the original fix for the netty-codec-http CVE-2021-21409, where the OpenShift Logging openshift-logging/elasticsearch6-rhel8 container was incomplete. The vulnerable netty-codec-http maven package was not removed from the image content. This flaw affects origin-aggregated-logging versions 3.11.\n\n```diff\nFrom d6b72d6c32e7c06b65324294d10406546734004d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sergey Yedrikov <syedriko@redhat.com>\nDate: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 16:35:51 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Update netty to 4.1.63\n\n---\n elasticsearch/Dockerfile \| 4 ++--\n elasticsearch/Dockerfile.in \| 4 ++--\n elasticsearch/fetch-artifacts-koji.yaml \| 4 ++--\n 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/elasticsearch/Dockerfile b/elasticsearch/Dockerfile\nindex 27e53a12b..f44637a4a 100644\n--- a/elasticsearch/Dockerfile\n+++ b/elasticsearch/Dockerfile\n@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ARG OPENSHIFT_CI\n \n ENV ES_PATH_CONF=/etc/elasticsearch/ \\\n ES_HOME=/usr/share/elasticsearch \\\n- ES_VER=6.8.1.redhat-00018 \\\n+ ES_VER=6.8.1.redhat-00019 \\\n HOME=/opt/app-root/src \\\n INSTANCE_RAM=512G \\\n JAVA_VER=11 \\\n@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ ENV ES_PATH_CONF=/etc/elasticsearch/ \\\n NODE_QUORUM=1 \\\n PROMETHEUS_EXPORTER_VER=6.8.1.2-redhat-00001 \\\n INGEST_PLUGIN_VER=6.8.1.0-redhat-00003 \\\n- OPENDISTRO_VER=0.10.1.2-redhat-00006 \\\n+ OPENDISTRO_VER=0.10.1.2-redhat-00009 \\\n PLUGIN_LOGLEVEL=INFO \\\n RECOVER_AFTER_NODES=1 \\\n RECOVER_EXPECTED_NODES=1 \\\ndiff --git a/elasticsearch/Dockerfile.in b/elasticsearch/Dockerfile.in\nindex ade4a345b..8905c4e23 100644\n--- a/elasticsearch/Dockerfile.in\n+++ b/elasticsearch/Dockerfile.in\n@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ ARG OPENSHIFT_CI\n \n ENV ES_PATH_CONF=/etc/elasticsearch/ \\\n ES_HOME=/usr/share/elasticsearch \\\n- ES_VER=6.8.1.redhat-00018 \\\n+ ES_VER=6.8.1.redhat-00019 \\\n HOME=/opt/app-root/src \\\n INSTANCE_RAM=512G \\\n JAVA_VER=11 \\\n@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ ENV ES_PATH_CONF=/etc/elasticsearch/ \\\n NODE_QUORUM=1 \\\n PROMETHEUS_EXPORTER_VER=6.8.1.2-redhat-00001 \\\n INGEST_PLUGIN_VER=6.8.1.0-redhat-00003 \\\n- OPENDISTRO_VER=0.10.1.2-redhat-00006 \\\n+ OPENDISTRO_VER=0.10.1.2-redhat-00009 \\\n PLUGIN_LOGLEVEL=INFO \\\n RECOVER_AFTER_NODES=1 \\\n RECOVER_EXPECTED_NODES=1 \\\ndiff --git a/elasticsearch/fetch-artifacts-koji.yaml b/elasticsearch/fetch-artifacts-koji.yaml\nindex 8d1684980..9a33bcde3 100644\n--- a/elasticsearch/fetch-artifacts-koji.yaml\n+++ b/elasticsearch/fetch-artifacts-koji.yaml\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-- nvr: org.elasticsearch-elasticsearch-6.8.1.redhat_00018-1\n-- nvr: com.amazon.opendistroforelasticsearch-opendistro_security-0.10.1.2_redhat_00006-1\n+- nvr: org.elasticsearch-elasticsearch-6.8.1.redhat_00019-1\n+- nvr: com.amazon.opendistroforelasticsearch-opendistro_security-0.10.1.2_redhat_00009-1\n - nvr: org.elasticsearch.plugin.prometheus-prometheus-exporter-6.8.1.2_redhat_00001-1\n - nvr: org.elasticsearch.plugin.ingest-openshift-ingest-plugin-6.8.1.0_redhat_00003-1\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0552\nCWE: CWE-444\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A flaw was found in the original fix for the netty-codec-http CVE-2021-21409, where the OpenShift Logging openshift-logging/elasticsearch6-rhel8 container was incomplete. The vulnerable netty-codec-http maven package was not removed from the image content. This flaw affects origin-aggregated-logging versions 3.11.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-41317\nDescription: XSS Hunter Express before 2021-09-17 does not properly enforce authentication requirements for paths.\n\n```diff\nFrom 56bb44ed9024849f64173f71583ecb7d873baba0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Matthew Bryant (mandatory)\" <matt@refinery.io>\nDate: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 22:43:16 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Better path checking\n\n---\n api.js \| 10 +++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/api.js b/api.js\nindex cb48bf5..c2544ee 100644\n--- a/api.js\n+++ b/api.js\n@@ -94,9 +94,17 @@ async function set_up_api_server(app) {\n constants.API_BASE_PATH + 'settings',\n ];\n \n+ // Check if the path being accessed required authentication\n+ var requires_authentication = false;\n+ AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES.map(authenticated_route => {\n+ if(req.path.toLowerCase().startsWith(authenticated_route)) {\n+ requires_authentication = true;\n+ }\n+ });\n+\n // If the route is not one of the authentication required routes\n // then we can allow it through.\n- if(!AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED_ROUTES.includes(req.path)) {\n+ if(!requires_authentication) {\n next();\n return;\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-41317\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: XSS Hunter Express before 2021-09-17 does not properly enforce authentication requirements for paths.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-92hm-c572-wrpc\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9a77f508a2bf8cf661d588f37a4cc29ecaea4fc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: owen <owen@joget.org>\nDate: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 09:04:01 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed: wflow-core - User Profile Menu - Prevent XSS. T1604\n @7.0-SNAPSHOT\n\n---\n .../java/org/joget/plugin/enterprise/UserProfileMenu.java \| 7 ++++---\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/wflow-core/src/main/java/org/joget/plugin/enterprise/UserProfileMenu.java b/wflow-core/src/main/java/org/joget/plugin/enterprise/UserProfileMenu.java\nindex 5d63d95182..a298b58149 100644\n--- a/wflow-core/src/main/java/org/joget/plugin/enterprise/UserProfileMenu.java\n+++ b/wflow-core/src/main/java/org/joget/plugin/enterprise/UserProfileMenu.java\n@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@\n import org.joget.apps.userview.model.UserviewBuilderPalette;\n import org.joget.apps.userview.model.UserviewMenu;\n import org.joget.commons.util.ResourceBundleUtil;\n+import org.joget.commons.util.SecurityUtil;\n import org.joget.commons.util.SetupManager;\n import org.joget.commons.util.StringUtil;\n import org.joget.commons.util.TimeZoneUtil;\n@@ -205,12 +206,12 @@ private void submitForm() {\n }\n UserSecurity us = DirectoryUtil.getUserSecurity();\n \n- if (\"\".equals(getPropertyString(\"f_firstName\"))) {\n- currentUser.setFirstName(getRequestParameterString(\"firstName\"));\n+ if (\"\".equals(getPropertyString(\"f_firstName\")) && !StringUtil.stripAllHtmlTag(getRequestParameterString(\"firstName\")).isEmpty()) {\n+ currentUser.setFirstName(StringUtil.stripAllHtmlTag(getRequestParameterString(\"firstName\")));\n }\n \n if (\"\".equals(getPropertyString(\"f_lastName\"))) {\n- currentUser.setLastName(getRequestParameterString(\"lastName\"));\n+ currentUser.setLastName(StringUtil.stripAllHtmlTag(getRequestParameterString(\"lastName\")));\n }\n \n if (\"\".equals(getPropertyString(\"f_email\"))) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-92hm-c572-wrpc\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fqpx-xfjr-2qr9\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom eff9472b64f68749e5272aa59b68e561fb4ab4cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Christoph Schulz <christoph.2.schulz@atos.net>\nDate: Wed, 25 May 2022 10:38:33 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-27204\n\nImplement suggestion from https://www.jenkins.io/doc/developer/security/form-validation/\n---\n .../ExtendedChoiceParameterDefinition.java \| 5 +++++\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/main/java/com/cwctravel/hudson/plugins/extended_choice_parameter/ExtendedChoiceParameterDefinition.java b/src/main/java/com/cwctravel/hudson/plugins/extended_choice_parameter/ExtendedChoiceParameterDefinition.java\nindex d3734974..55701a98 100644\n--- a/src/main/java/com/cwctravel/hudson/plugins/extended_choice_parameter/ExtendedChoiceParameterDefinition.java\n+++ b/src/main/java/com/cwctravel/hudson/plugins/extended_choice_parameter/ExtendedChoiceParameterDefinition.java\n@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@\n import org.kohsuke.stapler.QueryParameter;\r\n import org.kohsuke.stapler.Stapler;\r\n import org.kohsuke.stapler.StaplerRequest;\r\n+import org.kohsuke.stapler.verb.POST;\r\n \r\n import com.opencsv.CSVReader;\r\n import groovy.lang.Binding;\r\n@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ public String getDisplayName() {\n \t\t\treturn Messages.ExtendedChoiceParameterDefinition_DisplayName();\r\n \t\t}\r\n \r\n+\t\t@POST\r\n \t\tpublic FormValidation doCheckPropertyFile(@QueryParameter final String propertyFile, @QueryParameter final String propertyKey,\r\n \t\t\t\t@QueryParameter final String type) throws IOException, ServletException {\r\n \t\t\tif(StringUtils.isBlank(propertyFile)) {\r\n@@ -158,16 +160,19 @@ else if(StringUtils.isNotBlank(propertyKey)) {\n \t\t\t}\r\n \t\t}\r\n \r\n+\t\t@POST\r\n \t\tpublic FormValidation doCheckPropertyKey(@QueryParameter final String propertyFile, @QueryParameter final String propertyKey,\r\n \t\t\t\t@QueryParameter final String type) throws IOException, ServletException {\r\n \t\t\treturn doCheckPropertyFile(propertyFile, propertyKey, type);\r\n \t\t}\r\n \r\n+\t\t@POST\r\n \t\tpublic FormValidation doCheckDefaultPropertyFile(@QueryParameter final String defaultPropertyFile,\r\n \t\t\t\t@QueryParameter final String defaultPropertyKey, @QueryParameter final String type) throws IOException, ServletException {\r\n \t\t\treturn doCheckPropertyFile(defaultPropertyFile, defaultPropertyKey, type);\r\n \t\t}\r\n \r\n+\t\t@POST\r\n \t\tpublic FormValidation doCheckDefaultPropertyKey(@QueryParameter final String defaultPropertyFile,\r\n \t\t\t\t@QueryParameter final String defaultPropertyKey, @QueryParameter final String type) throws IOException, ServletException {\r\n \t\t\treturn doCheckPropertyFile(defaultPropertyFile, defaultPropertyKey, type);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fqpx-xfjr-2qr9\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: CSRF vulnerability and missing permission checks in Jenkins Extended Choice Parameter Plugin allow SSRF\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-24805\nDescription: net-snmp provides various tools relating to the Simple Network Management Protocol. Prior to version 5.9.2, a buffer overflow in the handling of the `INDEX` of `NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB` can cause an out-of-bounds memory access. A user with read-only credentials can exploit the issue. Version 5.9.2 contains a patch. Users should use strong SNMPv3 credentials and avoid sharing the credentials. Those who must use SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c should use a complex community string and enhance the protecti\n\n```diff\nFrom ce66eb97c17aa9a48bc079be7b65895266fa6775 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Wes Hardaker <opensource@hardakers.net>\nDate: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 15:00:17 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] updates to CHANGES/NEWS\n\n---\n CHANGES \| 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----\n NEWS \| 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-\n 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES\nindex 6addcd2246..f7eef0e288 100644\n--- a/CHANGES\n+++ b/CHANGES\n@@ -4,10 +4,28 @@ a summary of the major changes, and the ChangeLog file for a comprehensive\n listing of all changes made to the code.\n \n 5.9.2:\n- misc:\n- - snmp-create-v3-user: Fix the snmpd.conf path @datadir@ is\n-\texpanded in ${datarootdir} so datarootdir must be set before\n-\t@datadir@ is used.\n+ security:\n+ - These two CVEs can be exploited by a user with read-only credentials:\n+ - CVE-2022-24805 A buffer overflow in the handling of the INDEX of\n+ NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB can cause an out-of-bounds memory access.\n+ - CVE-2022-24809 A malformed OID in a GET-NEXT to the nsVacmAccessTable\n+ can cause a NULL pointer dereference.\n+ - These CVEs can be exploited by a user with read-write credentials:\n+ - CVE-2022-24806 Improper Input Validation when SETing malformed\n+ OIDs in master agent and subagent simultaneously\n+ - CVE-2022-24807 A malformed OID in a SET request to\n+ SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB::vacmAccessTable can cause an\n+ out-of-bounds memory access.\n+ - CVE-2022-24808 A malformed OID in a SET request to\n+ NET-SNMP-AGENT-MIB::nsLogTable can cause a NULL pointer dereference\n+ - CVE-2022-24810 A malformed OID in a SET to the nsVacmAccessTable\n+ can cause a NULL pointer dereference.\n+ - To avoid these flaws, use strong SNMPv3 credentials and do not share them.\n+ If you must use SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, use a complex community string\n+ and enhance the protection by restricting access to a given IP address range.\n+ - Thanks are due to Yu Zhang of VARAS@IIE and Nanyu Zhong of VARAS@IIE for\n+ reporting the following CVEs that have been fixed in this release, and\n+ to Arista Networks for providing fixes.\n \n Windows:\n - WinExtDLL: Fix multiple compiler warnings\n@@ -27,6 +45,10 @@ listing of all changes made to the code.\n - Moved transport code into a separate subdirectory in snmplib\n - Snmplib: remove inline versions of container funcs\".\n \n+ misc:\n+ - snmp-create-v3-user: Fix the snmpd.conf path @datadir@ is\n+\texpanded in ${datarootdir} so datarootdir must be set before\n+\t@datadir@ is used.\n \n 5.9.1:\n General: Many bug fixes\ndiff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS\nindex 661903d084..7c331c0f8a 100644\n--- a/NEWS\n+++ b/NEWS\n@@ -4,13 +4,36 @@ that have been fixed/applied, and the ChangeLog file for a comprehensive\n listing of all changes made to the code.\n \n 5.9.2:\n- general: Many bug fixes\n+ security:\n+ - These two CV\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-24805\nCWE: CWE-120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')\nTitle: net-snmp: A buffer overflow in the handling of the INDEX of NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB can cause an out-of-bounds memory access.\n\nThis patch addresses: net-snmp provides various tools relating to the Simple Network Management Protocol. Prior to version 5.9.2, a buffer overflow in the handling of the `INDEX` of `NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB` can cause an out-of-bounds memory access. A user with read-only credentials can exploit the issue. Version 5.9.2 contains a patch. Users should use strong SNMPv3 credentials and avoid sharing the credentials. Those who must use SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c should use a complex community string and enhance the protecti\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qrmm-w75w-3wpx\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 401c7cb81e5efe835ceb8aae23e82057d57c7d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"dependabot[bot]\" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 12:35:57 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Bump swagger-ui-dist in /src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI\n\nBumps [swagger-ui-dist](https://github.com/swagger-api/swagger-ui) from 3.52.1 to 4.1.3.\n- [Release notes](https://github.com/swagger-api/swagger-ui/releases)\n- [Commits](https://github.com/swagger-api/swagger-ui/compare/v3.52.1...v4.1.3)\n\n---\nupdated-dependencies:\n- dependency-name: swagger-ui-dist\n dependency-type: direct:production\n...\n\nSigned-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>\n---\n .../package-lock.json \| 14 +++++++-------\n src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package.json \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package-lock.json b/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package-lock.json\nindex 2b4fc8054c..8db97568cc 100644\n--- a/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package-lock.json\n+++ b/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package-lock.json\n@@ -9,20 +9,20 @@\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"hasInstallScript\": true,\n \"dependencies\": {\n- \"swagger-ui-dist\": \"3.52.1\"\n+ \"swagger-ui-dist\": \"4.1.3\"\n }\n },\n \"node_modules/swagger-ui-dist\": {\n- \"version\": \"3.52.1\",\n- \"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/swagger-ui-dist/-/swagger-ui-dist-3.52.1.tgz\",\n- \"integrity\": \"sha512-S/UFHg1Zr5v5QUn7hCuoPqltuGrmobny66pZYdl/nb5p4OvFgEfYy9bY2ZaIZlgkX5kYkOdoEui8Hia0mtj74g==\"\n+ \"version\": \"4.1.3\",\n+ \"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/swagger-ui-dist/-/swagger-ui-dist-4.1.3.tgz\",\n+ \"integrity\": \"sha512-WvfPSfAAMlE/sKS6YkW47nX/hA7StmhYnAHc6wWCXNL0oclwLj6UXv0hQCkLnDgvebi0MEV40SJJpVjKUgH1IQ==\"\n }\n },\n \"dependencies\": {\n \"swagger-ui-dist\": {\n- \"version\": \"3.52.1\",\n- \"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/swagger-ui-dist/-/swagger-ui-dist-3.52.1.tgz\",\n- \"integrity\": \"sha512-S/UFHg1Zr5v5QUn7hCuoPqltuGrmobny66pZYdl/nb5p4OvFgEfYy9bY2ZaIZlgkX5kYkOdoEui8Hia0mtj74g==\"\n+ \"version\": \"4.1.3\",\n+ \"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/swagger-ui-dist/-/swagger-ui-dist-4.1.3.tgz\",\n+ \"integrity\": \"sha512-WvfPSfAAMlE/sKS6YkW47nX/hA7StmhYnAHc6wWCXNL0oclwLj6UXv0hQCkLnDgvebi0MEV40SJJpVjKUgH1IQ==\"\n }\n }\n }\ndiff --git a/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package.json b/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package.json\nindex 5bcccd9323..2083e7318e 100644\n--- a/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package.json\n+++ b/src/Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI/package.json\n@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"private\": true,\n \"dependencies\": {\n- \"swagger-ui-dist\": \"3.52.1\"\n+ \"swagger-ui-dist\": \"4.1.3\"\n },\n \"scripts\": {\n \"postinstall\": \"node scripts/remove-source-map-links.js\"\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qrmm-w75w-3wpx\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Server side request forgery in SwaggerUI\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qwvf-9vg7-643x\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 3ea2a5a026e73d81cd9a3e9bbd4300c433004bfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>\nDate: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:21:06 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd: fix side-channel leak where 1 in 2018 handshakes\n fail\n\nPreviously the Hunting and Pecking algorithm of EAP-pwd aborted when\nmore than 10 iterations are needed. Every iteration has a 50% chance\nof finding the password element. This means one in every 2048 handshakes\nwill fail, in which case an error frame is sent to the client. This\nevent leaks information that can be abused in an offline password\nbrute-force attack. More precisely, the adversary learns that all 10\niterations failed for the given random EAP-pwd token. Using the same\ntechniques as in the Dragonblood attack, this can be used to brute-force\nthe password.\n\nThis patch fixes the above issue by executing enough iterations such that\nthe password element is always found eventually.\n\nNote that timing and cache leaks remain a risk against the current\nimplementation of EAP-pwd.\n---\n src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c b/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c\nindex c54f08c03081b..d94851c3aa0fc 100644\n--- a/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c\n+++ b/src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_pwd/eap_pwd.c\n@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int compute_password_element (pwd_session_t session, uint16_t grp_num,\n \t}\n \tctr = 0;\n \twhile (1) {\n-\t\tif (ctr > 10) {\n+\t\tif (ctr > 100) {\n \t\t\tDEBUG(\"unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy\", grp_num);\n \t\t\tgoto fail;\n \t\t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-qwvf-9vg7-643x\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-62426\nDescription: vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From version 0.5.5 to before 0.11.1, the /v1/chat/completions and /tokenize endpoints allow a chat_template_kwargs request parameter that is used in the code before it is properly validated against the chat template. With the right chat_template_kwargs parameters, it is possible to block processing of the API server for long periods of time, delaying all other requests. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.1.\n\n```diff\nFrom 3ada34f9cb4d1af763fdfa3b481862a93eb6bd2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Russell Bryant <rbryant@redhat.com>\nDate: Mon, 20 Oct 2025 22:57:34 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] [Frontend] Enforce tokenize=False when applying chat template\n (#27205)\n\nSigned-off-by: Isotr0py <mozf@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>\nCo-authored-by: Isotr0py <mozf@mail2.sysu.edu.cn>\n---\n tests/entrypoints/test_chat_utils.py \| 12 +++++++++++\n vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py \| 31 +++++++++++++++++-----------\n 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tests/entrypoints/test_chat_utils.py b/tests/entrypoints/test_chat_utils.py\nindex 224b68412e60..8c7e626830ce 100644\n--- a/tests/entrypoints/test_chat_utils.py\n+++ b/tests/entrypoints/test_chat_utils.py\n@@ -1810,6 +1810,7 @@ def test_resolve_hf_chat_template_kwargs(sample_json_schema, model, expected_kwa\n \"unsed_kwargs_2\": \"abc\",\n # should not appear\n \"chat_template\": \"{% Hello world! %}\",\n+ \"tokenize\": True,\n # used by tokenizer\n \"continue_final_message\": True,\n \"tools\": tools,\n@@ -1846,10 +1847,21 @@ def test_resolve_hf_chat_template_kwargs(sample_json_schema, model, expected_kwa\n tools=tools,\n model_config=model_config,\n )\n+ with pytest.raises(\n+ ValueError, match=\"Found unexpected chat template kwargs from request\"\n+ ):\n+ # should raise error if `chat_template_kwargs` contains\n+ # `chat_template` or `tokenize`\n+ resolve_chat_template_kwargs(\n+ tokenizer,\n+ chat_template=chat_template,\n+ chat_template_kwargs=chat_template_kwargs,\n+ )\n resolved_chat_template_kwargs = resolve_chat_template_kwargs(\n tokenizer,\n chat_template=chat_template,\n chat_template_kwargs=chat_template_kwargs,\n+ raise_on_unexpected=False,\n )\n assert set(resolved_chat_template_kwargs.keys()) == expected_kwargs\n \ndiff --git a/vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py b/vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py\nindex 881447cb205e..9bed327723b9 100644\n--- a/vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py\n+++ b/vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py\n@@ -1499,18 +1499,25 @@ def resolve_chat_template_kwargs(\n tokenizer: PreTrainedTokenizer \| PreTrainedTokenizerFast,\n chat_template: str,\n chat_template_kwargs: dict[str, Any],\n+ raise_on_unexpected: bool = True,\n ) -> dict[str, Any]:\n+ # We exclude chat_template from kwargs here, because\n+ # chat template has been already resolved at this stage\n+ unexpected_vars = {\"chat_template\", \"tokenize\"}\n+ if raise_on_unexpected and (\n+ unexpected_in_kwargs := unexpected_vars & chat_template_kwargs.keys()\n+ ):\n+ raise ValueError(\n+ \"Found unexpected chat template kwargs from request: \"\n+ f\"{unexpected_in_kwargs}\"\n+ )\n+\n fn_kw = {\n k\n for k in chat_template_kwargs\n if supports_kw(tokenizer.apply_chat_template, k, allow_var_kwargs=False)\n }\n-\n template_vars = _cached_res\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-62426\nCWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\nTitle: vLLM vulnerable to DoS via large Chat Completion or Tokenization requests with specially crafted `chat_template_kwargs`\n\nThis patch addresses: vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From version 0.5.5 to before 0.11.1, the /v1/chat/completions and /tokenize endpoints allow a chat_template_kwargs request parameter that is used in the code before it is properly validated against the chat template. With the right chat_template_kwargs parameters, it is possible to block processing of the API server for long periods of time, delaying all other requests. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.1.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6mv9-x42q-f8qh\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 30d5506c20d26efbb9942fbdc6f981a0bd333b97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jan Schneider <jan@horde.org>\nDate: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 14:46:21 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix XSS with data:html links and form actions.\n\nThe academically correct way to filter out xlink hrefs should have been to use hasAttributeNS/getAttributeNS with the XLink namespace. But from my testing browsers don't care about that namespace at all, and only use the xlink: prefix. This means that even if you correctly specify a different prefix for the XLink NS, the links won't be detected by the browser. xlink: prefixes OTOH even work without specifying the XLink namespace in the XML document.\n\nReported By: Liuzhu <fantasy7082@hotmail.com>\n---\n .../Text_Filter/lib/Horde/Text/Filter/Xss.php \| 16 ++++++++++++----\n .../test/Horde/Text/Filter/XssTest.php \| 5 ++++-\n 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/framework/Text_Filter/lib/Horde/Text/Filter/Xss.php b/framework/Text_Filter/lib/Horde/Text/Filter/Xss.php\nindex e8556783d85..419283e06fc 100644\n--- a/framework/Text_Filter/lib/Horde/Text/Filter/Xss.php\n+++ b/framework/Text_Filter/lib/Horde/Text/Filter/Xss.php\n@@ -109,11 +109,19 @@ protected function _node($node)\n \n switch (Horde_String::lower($node->tagName)) {\n case 'a':\n- /* Strip out data URLs living in an A HREF element\n+ case 'form':\n+ /* Strip out data URLs living in link-like elements\n * (Bug #8715). /\n- if ($node->hasAttribute('href') &&\n- preg_match(\"/\\sdata:/i\", $node->getAttribute('href'))) {\n- $remove[] = 'href';\n+ if (Horde_String::lower($node->tagName) == 'form') {\n+ $attributes = array('action');\n+ } else {\n+ $attributes = array('href', 'xlink:href');\n+ }\n+ foreach ($attributes as $attribute) {\n+ if ($node->hasAttribute($attribute) &&\n+ preg_match(\"/\\sdata:/i\", $node->getAttribute($attribute))) {\n+ $remove[] = $attribute;\n+ }\n }\n break;\n \ndiff --git a/framework/Text_Filter/test/Horde/Text/Filter/XssTest.php b/framework/Text_Filter/test/Horde/Text/Filter/XssTest.php\nindex 088ead9ea05..5093952c2d1 100644\n--- a/framework/Text_Filter/test/Horde/Text/Filter/XssTest.php\n+++ b/framework/Text_Filter/test/Horde/Text/Filter/XssTest.php\n@@ -139,7 +139,10 @@ public function xssProvider()\n array('<body/onload=alert(/xss/)>', ''),\n array('<img src=\"\"> <BODY ONLOAD=\"a();\"><SCRIPT>function a(){alert(\\'XSS\\');}</SCRIPT><\"\" />', '<img src=\"\"/>'),\n array('<img src=\\'blank.jpg\\'style=\\'width:expression(alert(\"xssed\"))\\'>', '<img src=\"blank.jpg\"/>'),\n- array($framedata, '')\n+ array($framedata, ''),\n+ array('<svg><a xlink:href=\"data:text/html,<s\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-6mv9-x42q-f8qh\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport re\n\nfrom flask import request, Flask\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n\n@app.route('/upload')\ndef upload():\n '''\n Get the username and a file attachment from the HTTP GET request.\n Then, search the username in the filename of the attachment.\n '''\n\n username = request.args.get('username')\n filename = request.files.get('attachment').filename\n\n re.search(username, filename)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-400 - CWE-400\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5vp3-v4hc-gx76\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 024cc50df478d2e8f78539819749e94d6df60592 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Hadrien Croubois <hadrien.croubois@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 16:50:27 -0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Restrict upgrade to proxy context in UUPSUpgradeable\n\nCo-authored-by: Francisco Giordano <frangio.1@gmail.com>\n(cherry picked from commit 6241995ad323952e38f8d405103ed994a2dcde8e)\n---\n CHANGELOG.md \| 4 ++++\n contracts/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol \| 22 +++++++++++++++++++---\n 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md\nindex a6976a94dc7..7fa6e4ad51d 100644\n--- a/CHANGELOG.md\n+++ b/CHANGELOG.md\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n # Changelog\n \n+## 4.3.2\n+\n+ * `UUPSUpgradeable`: Add modifiers to prevent `upgradeTo` and `upgradeToAndCall` being executed on any contract that is not the active ERC1967 proxy. This prevents these functions being called on implementation contracts or minimal ERC1167 clones, in particular.\n+\n ## 4.3.1 (2021-08-26)\n \n * `TimelockController`: Add additional isOperationReady check.\ndiff --git a/contracts/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol b/contracts/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol\nindex eeb528967ad..a88b2c23b47 100644\n--- a/contracts/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol\n+++ b/contracts/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol\n@@ -17,6 +17,22 @@ import \"../ERC1967/ERC1967Upgrade.sol\";\n * _Available since v4.1._\n /\n abstract contract UUPSUpgradeable is ERC1967Upgrade {\n+ /// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow state-variable-immutable state-variable-assignment\n+ address private immutable __self = address(this);\n+\n+ /\n+ @dev Check that the execution is being performed through a delegatecall call and that the execution context is\n+ * a proxy contract with an implementation (as defined in ERC1967) pointing to self. This should only be the case\n+ * for UUPS and transparent proxies that are using the current contract as their implementation. Execution of a\n+ * function through ERC1167 minimal proxies (clones) would not normally pass this test, but is not guaranteed to\n+ * fail.\n+ /\n+ modifier onlyProxy() {\n+ require(address(this) != __self, \"Function must be called through delegatecall\");\n+ require(_getImplementation() == __self, \"Function must be called through active proxy\");\n+ _;\n+ }\n+\n /\n @dev Upgrade the implementation of the proxy to `newImplementation`.\n \n@@ -24,9 +40,9 @@ abstract contract UUPSUpgradeable is ERC1967Upgrade {\n \n * Emits an {Upgraded} event.\n /\n- function upgradeTo(address newImplementation) external virtual {\n+ function upgradeTo(address newImplementation) external virtual onlyProxy {\n _authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation);\n- _upgradeToAndCallSecure(newImplementation, bytes(\"\"), false);\n+ _upgradeToAndCallSecure(newImplementation, new bytes(0), false);\n }\n \n /\n@@ -37,7 +53,7 @@ abstract contract UUPSUpgradeable is ERC1967Upgrade {\n \n * Emits \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5vp3-v4hc-gx76\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: UUPSUpgradeable vulnerability in @openzeppelin/contracts\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r6hf-gj32-7rc9\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 176f8a075a963ffbfa56f1c460c15f6a1a6af5a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Martin Blix Grydeland <martin@varnish-software.com>\nDate: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 16:04:53 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Avoid buffer read overflow on vcl_error and -sfile\n\nThe file stevedore may return a buffer larger than asked for when\nrequesting storage. Due to lack of check for this condition, the code\nto copy the synthetic error memory buffer from vcl_error would overrun\nthe buffer.\n\nPatch by @shamger\n\nFixes: #2429\n---\n bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c \| 2 ++\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c b/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c\nindex 20b35960178..883964239c1 100644\n--- a/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c\n+++ b/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c\n@@ -899,6 +899,8 @@ vbf_stp_error(struct worker wrk, struct busyobj bo)\n \t\tl = ll;\n \t\tif (VFP_GetStorage(bo->vfc, &l, &ptr) != VFP_OK)\n \t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\tif (l > ll)\n+\t\t\tl = ll;\n \t\tmemcpy(ptr, VSB_data(synth_body) + o, l);\n \t\tVFP_Extend(bo->vfc, l);\n \t\tll -= l;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r6hf-gj32-7rc9\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xv75-c298-2v8f\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 7afb2d41c6d373cf965285840b85c45011357115 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: tobhe <tobhe@openbsd.org>\nDate: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 14:22:53 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix return value check for openssl API used during pubkey\n validation.\n\nFound thanks to bug report by Michael Scheibel <m.Scheibel (at) tuvit (dot) de>\nok patrick@, markus@, tb@\n---\n sbin/iked/ca.c \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/sbin/iked/ca.c b/sbin/iked/ca.c\nindex 15a0e4bcbfff..afb45a24d922 100644\n--- a/sbin/iked/ca.c\n+++ b/sbin/iked/ca.c\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-/\t$OpenBSD: ca.c,v 1.64 2020/07/15 14:45:15 tobhe Exp $\t/\n+/\t$OpenBSD: ca.c,v 1.65 2020/07/27 14:22:53 tobhe Exp $\t/\n \n /\n Copyright (c) 2010-2013 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>\n@@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@ ca_validate_pubkey(struct iked env, struct iked_static_id id,\n \tif (localkey == NULL)\n \t\tgoto sslerr;\n \n-\tif (peerkey && !EVP_PKEY_cmp(peerkey, localkey)) {\n+\tif (peerkey && EVP_PKEY_cmp(peerkey, localkey) != 1) {\n \t\tlog_debug(\"%s: public key does not match %s\", __func__, file);\n \t\tgoto done;\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xv75-c298-2v8f\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-54384\nDescription: CKAN is an open-source DMS (data management system) for powering data hubs and data portals. Prior to 2.10.9 and 2.11.4, the helpers.markdown_extract() function did not perform sufficient sanitization of input data before wrapping in an HTML literal element. This helper is used to render user-provided data on dataset, resource, organization or group pages (plus any page provided by an extension that used that helper function), leading to a potential XSS vector. This vulnerability has been fixed \n\n```diff\nFrom 112affffa74b14fc97c54abcf18315df97114917 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ian Ward <ian@excess.org>\nDate: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 08:56:09 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH 1/2] helpers: strip tags with bleach only\n\n---\n ckan/lib/helpers.py \| 7 +------\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/ckan/lib/helpers.py b/ckan/lib/helpers.py\nindex 1954c75c4f0..515f4739ba6 100644\n--- a/ckan/lib/helpers.py\n+++ b/ckan/lib/helpers.py\n@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ def markdown_extract(text: str,\n will not be truncated.'''\n if not text:\n return ''\n- plain = RE_MD_HTML_TAGS.sub('', markdown(text))\n+ plain = bleach_clean(markdown(text), strip=True)\n if not extract_length or len(plain) < extract_length:\n return literal(plain)\n return literal(\n@@ -2133,10 +2133,6 @@ def get_request_param(parameter_name: str,\n flags=re.UNICODE\n )\n \n-# find all tags but ignore < in the strings so that we can use it correctly\n-# in markdown\n-RE_MD_HTML_TAGS = re.compile('<[^><]>')\n-\n \n @core_helper\n def html_auto_link(data: str) -> str:\n@@ -2196,7 +2192,6 @@ def render_markdown(data: str,\n if allow_html:\n data = markdown(data.strip())\n else:\n- data = RE_MD_HTML_TAGS.sub('', data.strip())\n data = bleach_clean(\n markdown(data), strip=True,\n tags=MARKDOWN_TAGS,\n\nFrom 9beb8110f114ecc9463b55bd85874e941c6e1108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ian Ward <ian@excess.org>\nDate: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 11:50:01 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH 2/2] render_markdown: update tests\n\n---\n ckan/tests/lib/test_helpers.py \| 10 +++++-----\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/ckan/tests/lib/test_helpers.py b/ckan/tests/lib/test_helpers.py\nindex a97d019c681..af66ab59b6a 100644\n--- a/ckan/tests/lib/test_helpers.py\n+++ b/ckan/tests/lib/test_helpers.py\n@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ class TestHelpersRenderMarkdown(object):\n @pytest.mark.parametrize(\n \"data,output,allow_html\",\n [\n- (\"<h1>moo</h1>\", \"<h1>moo</h1>\", True),\n- (\"<h1>moo</h1>\", \"<p>moo</p>\", False),\n+ (\"<script>moo</script>\", \"<script>moo</script>\", True),\n+ (\"<script>moo</script>\", \"moo\", False),\n (\n \"http://example.com\",\n '<p><a href=\"http://example.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\">http://example.com</a></p>',\n@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ class TestHelpersRenderMarkdown(object):\n (u\"[text](javascript: alert(1))\", u\"<p><a>text</a></p>\", False),\n (\n u'<p onclick=\"some.script\"><img onmouseover=\"some.script\" src=\"image.png\" /> and text</p>',\n- u\"<p>and text</p>\",\n+ '<p><img src=\"image.png\"> and text</p>',\n False,\n ),\n (u\"#heading\", u\"<h1>heading</h1>\", False),\n@@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ class TestHelpersRenderMarkdown(object):\n False,\n ),\n (\n- u\"<a href=\\u201dsomelink\\u201d>somelink</a>\",\n- \"\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2025-54384\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: CKAN stored XSS vulnerability in Markdown description fields\n\nThis patch addresses: CKAN is an open-source DMS (data management system) for powering data hubs and data portals. Prior to 2.10.9 and 2.11.4, the helpers.markdown_extract() function did not perform sufficient sanitization of input data before wrapping in an HTML literal element. This helper is used to render user-provided data on dataset, resource, organization or group pages (plus any page provided by an extension that used that helper function), leading to a potential XSS vector. This vulnerability has been fixed \n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-hfx2-wgxq-fp88\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 515f453556c99d27c4dddb5424898dc1a5537708 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: George Wang <gwang@litespeedtech.com>\nDate: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 17:42:07 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Release 4.0.4\n\n---\n src/liblsquic/lsquic_full_conn_ietf.c \| 7 +++++--\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/liblsquic/lsquic_full_conn_ietf.c b/src/liblsquic/lsquic_full_conn_ietf.c\nindex ca159889..718a6885 100644\n--- a/src/liblsquic/lsquic_full_conn_ietf.c\n+++ b/src/liblsquic/lsquic_full_conn_ietf.c\n@@ -7283,7 +7283,8 @@ on_dcid_change (struct ietf_full_conn conn, const lsquic_cid_t dcid_in)\n struct lsquic_conn const lconn = &conn->ifc_conn; / Shorthand /\n struct conn_cid_elem cce;\n \n- LSQ_DEBUG(\"peer switched its DCID, attempt to switch own SCID\");\n+ LSQ_DEBUGC(\"peer switched its DCID to %\"CID_FMT\n+ \", attempt to switch own SCID\", CID_BITS(dcid_in));\n \n for (cce = lconn->cn_cces; cce < END_OF_CCES(lconn); ++cce)\n if (cce - lconn->cn_cces != lconn->cn_cur_cce_idx\n@@ -7545,7 +7546,9 @@ process_regular_packet (struct ietf_full_conn conn,\n << packet_in->pi_path_id);\n }\n }\n- else if (is_dcid_changed)\n+ else if (is_dcid_changed\n+ && !LSQUIC_CIDS_EQ(CN_SCID(&conn->ifc_conn),\n+ &packet_in->pi_dcid))\n {\n if (0 != on_dcid_change(conn, &packet_in->pi_dcid))\n return -1;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-hfx2-wgxq-fp88\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7rqh-6ccp-gvhv\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom b31ff3cdf540110da4572e3e29bd172087af65cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Richard Wareing <rwareing@fb.com>\nDate: Wed, 13 Sep 2017 09:09:35 +1000\nSubject: [PATCH] xfs: XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE() should be false if no rt device\n present\n\nIf using a kernel with CONFIG_XFS_RT=y and we set the RHINHERIT flag on\na directory in a filesystem that does not have a realtime device and\ncreate a new file in that directory, it gets marked as a real time file.\nWhen data is written and a fsync is issued, the filesystem attempts to\nflush a non-existent rt device during the fsync process.\n\nThis results in a crash dereferencing a null buftarg pointer in\nxfs_blkdev_issue_flush():\n\n BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008\n IP: xfs_blkdev_issue_flush+0xd/0x20\n .....\n Call Trace:\n xfs_file_fsync+0x188/0x1c0\n vfs_fsync_range+0x3b/0xa0\n do_fsync+0x3d/0x70\n SyS_fsync+0x10/0x20\n do_syscall_64+0x4d/0xb0\n entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25\n\nSetting RT inode flags does not require special privileges so any\nunprivileged user can cause this oops to occur. To reproduce, confirm\nkernel is compiled with CONFIG_XFS_RT=y and run:\n\n # mkfs.xfs -f /dev/pmem0\n # mount /dev/pmem0 /mnt/test\n # mkdir /mnt/test/foo\n # xfs_io -c 'chattr +t' /mnt/test/foo\n # xfs_io -f -c 'pwrite 0 5m' -c fsync /mnt/test/foo/bar\n\nOr just run xfstests with MKFS_OPTIONS=\"-d rtinherit=1\" and wait.\n\nKernels built with CONFIG_XFS_RT=n are not exposed to this bug.\n\nFixes: f538d4da8d52 (\"[XFS] write barrier support\")\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nSigned-off-by: Richard Wareing <rwareing@fb.com>\nSigned-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\n---\n fs/xfs/xfs_linux.h \| 9 ++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_linux.h b/fs/xfs/xfs_linux.h\nindex 9301c5a6060b68..dcd1292664b340 100644\n--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_linux.h\n+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_linux.h\n@@ -270,7 +270,14 @@ static inline uint64_t howmany_64(uint64_t x, uint32_t y)\n #endif /* DEBUG /\n \n #ifdef CONFIG_XFS_RT\n-#define XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip) ((ip)->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME)\n+\n+/\n+ * make sure we ignore the inode flag if the filesystem doesn't have a\n+ * configured realtime device.\n+ /\n+#define XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip)\t\t\t\\\n+\t(((ip)->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME) &&\t\\\n+\t (ip)->i_mount->m_rtdev_targp)\n #else\n #define XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip) (0)\n #endif\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-7rqh-6ccp-gvhv\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Log Injection (CWE-117):\n\n```python\ndef audit_action(logger, user_input, action):\n logger.info(f\"{action}: {user_input}\")\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Escape or encode user input before logging: user_input.replace('\\n', '\\\\n')\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Log Injection (CWE-117)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\nuser_input with newlines can create fake log entries. With certain formats, could inject format string attacks.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Log Injection) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Path Traversal (CWE-22):\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\ndef read_user_file(user_id, filename):\n user_dir = Path(f\"/data/users/{user_id}\")\n filepath = user_dir / filename\n return filepath.read_text()\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Resolve path and check: filepath.resolve().is_relative_to(user_dir.resolve())\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Path Traversal (CWE-22)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\nfilename can contain '..' to escape user_dir. Even with pathlib, no automatic protection.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Path Traversal) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-8852\nDescription: Varnish 3.x before 3.0.7, when used in certain stacked installations, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via a header line terminated by a \\r (carriage return) character in conjunction with multiple Content-Length headers in an HTTP request.\n\n```diff\nFrom 29870c8fe95e4e8a672f6f28c5fbe692bea09e9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Martin Blix Grydeland <martin@varnish-software.com>\nDate: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 12:57:39 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests\n\nIf a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a\n400 (Bad Request)\n\nFix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would\nnot fail because of that.\n---\n bin/varnishd/cache_http.c \| 19 +++++++++++++------\n bin/varnishtest/tests/b00041.vtc \| 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++\n bin/varnishtest/tests/r00102.vtc \| 2 --\n 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n create mode 100644 bin/varnishtest/tests/b00041.vtc\n\ndiff --git a/bin/varnishd/cache_http.c b/bin/varnishd/cache_http.c\nindex 5ab7bc0928..3680422abc 100644\n--- a/bin/varnishd/cache_http.c\n+++ b/bin/varnishd/cache_http.c\n@@ -639,10 +639,12 @@ http_splitline(struct worker w, int fd, struct http hp,\n /--------------------------------------------------------------------/\n \n static int\n-htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http hp)\n+htc_request_check_hdrs(struct sess sp, struct http hp)\n {\n \tint u;\n \tint seen_host = 0;\n+\tint seen_cl = 0;\n+\n \tfor (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {\n \t\tif (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)\n \t\t\tcontinue;\n@@ -650,10 +652,19 @@ htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http hp)\n \t\tAN(hp->hd[u].e);\n \t\tif (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {\n \t\t\tif (seen_host) {\n+\t\t\t\tWSP(sp, SLT_Error, \"Duplicated Host header\");\n \t\t\t\treturn (400);\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tseen_host = 1;\n \t\t}\n+\t\tif (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Content_Length)) {\n+\t\t\tif (seen_cl) {\n+\t\t\t\tWSP(sp, SLT_Error,\n+\t\t\t\t \"Duplicated Content-Length header\");\n+\t\t\t\treturn (400);\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tseen_cl = 1;\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn (0);\n }\n@@ -698,11 +709,7 @@ http_DissectRequest(struct sess sp)\n \t}\n \thttp_ProtoVer(hp);\n \n-\tretval = htc_request_check_host_hdr(hp);\n-\tif (retval != 0) {\n-\t\tWSP(sp, SLT_Error, \"Duplicated Host header\");\n-\t\treturn (retval);\n-\t}\n+\tretval = htc_request_check_hdrs(sp, hp);\n \treturn (retval);\n }\n \ndiff --git a/bin/varnishtest/tests/b00041.vtc b/bin/varnishtest/tests/b00041.vtc\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000..292cea9493\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/bin/varnishtest/tests/b00041.vtc\n@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@\n+varnishtest \"Fail request on duplicate Content-Length headers in requests\"\n+\n+server s1 {\n+\trxreq\n+\ttxresp\n+} -start\n+\n+varnish v1 -vcl+backend {\n+\tsub vcl_deliver {\n+\t\tif (req.http.foo) {\n+\t\t\tset resp.http.Foo = req.http.foo;\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif (req.http.bar) {\n+\t\t\tset resp.http.Bar = req.http.bar;\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+} -start\n+\n+client c1 {\n+\ttxreq -req POST -hdr \"Content-Length: 5\" -body \"12345\"\n+\trxresp\n+\texpect resp.status == 400\n+} -run\ndiff --git a/bin/varnishtest/tests/r00102.vtc b/bin/varnishtest/tests/r00102.vtc\nindex 6d2d8aac7e..7309762d80 100644\n--- a/bin/varnishtest/tests/r00102.vtc\n+++ b/bin/varnishtest/tests/r00102.vtc\n@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ varnish v1 -vcl+backend {\n \n client c1 {\n \ttxreq -req POST -url \"/\" \\\n-\t\t-hdr \"Content-Length: 10\" \\\n \t\t-body \"123456789\\n\"\n \trxres\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2015-8852\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Varnish 3.x before 3.0.7, when used in certain stacked installations, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via a header line terminated by a \\r (carriage return) character in conjunction with multiple Content-Length headers in an HTTP request.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vh7m-p724-62c2\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 856fe4d99fe7b6200556e6400b3bf585b1721bec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Fedor Indutny <fedor@indutny.com>\nDate: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 08:29:21 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] signature: prevent malleability and overflows\n\n---\n lib/elliptic/ec/signature.js \| 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----\n 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/elliptic/ec/signature.js b/lib/elliptic/ec/signature.js\nindex 2cb6b490..539df6a2 100644\n--- a/lib/elliptic/ec/signature.js\n+++ b/lib/elliptic/ec/signature.js\n@@ -32,11 +32,24 @@ function getLength(buf, p) {\n return initial;\n }\n var octetLen = initial & 0xf;\n+\n+ // Indefinite length or overflow\n+ if (octetLen === 0 \|\| octetLen > 4) {\n+ return false;\n+ }\n+\n var val = 0;\n for (var i = 0, off = p.place; i < octetLen; i++, off++) {\n val <<= 8;\n val \|= buf[off];\n+ val >>>= 0;\n }\n+\n+ // Leading zeroes\n+ if (val <= 0x7f) {\n+ return false;\n+ }\n+\n p.place = off;\n return val;\n }\n@@ -60,6 +73,9 @@ Signature.prototype._importDER = function _importDER(data, enc) {\n return false;\n }\n var len = getLength(data, p);\n+ if (len === false) {\n+ return false;\n+ }\n if ((len + p.place) !== data.length) {\n return false;\n }\n@@ -67,21 +83,37 @@ Signature.prototype._importDER = function _importDER(data, enc) {\n return false;\n }\n var rlen = getLength(data, p);\n+ if (rlen === false) {\n+ return false;\n+ }\n var r = data.slice(p.place, rlen + p.place);\n p.place += rlen;\n if (data[p.place++] !== 0x02) {\n return false;\n }\n var slen = getLength(data, p);\n+ if (slen === false) {\n+ return false;\n+ }\n if (data.length !== slen + p.place) {\n return false;\n }\n var s = data.slice(p.place, slen + p.place);\n- if (r[0] === 0 && (r[1] & 0x80)) {\n- r = r.slice(1);\n+ if (r[0] === 0) {\n+ if (r[1] & 0x80) {\n+ r = r.slice(1);\n+ } else {\n+ // Leading zeroes\n+ return false;\n+ }\n }\n- if (s[0] === 0 && (s[1] & 0x80)) {\n- s = s.slice(1);\n+ if (s[0] === 0) {\n+ if (s[1] & 0x80) {\n+ s = s.slice(1);\n+ } else {\n+ // Leading zeroes\n+ return false;\n+ }\n }\n \n this.r = new BN(r);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vh7m-p724-62c2\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Signature Malleabillity in elliptic\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wjvx-jhpj-r54r\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 72e0c9712aec6fbb82fb40fda091dfc2a42c70a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: ASHWIN KRISHNA <38850354+akrishna1995@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 11:34:39 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] feature: set default allow_pickle param to False (#4557)\n\n* breaking: set default allow_pickle param to False\n\n* breaking: fix unit tests and linting\n\nNumpyDeserializer will not allow deserialization\nunless allow_pickle flag is set to True explicitly\n\n* fix: black-check\n\n---------\n\nCo-authored-by: Ashwin Krishna <ashwikri@amazon.com>\n---\n src/sagemaker/base_deserializers.py \| 17 ++++++++++++++---\n .../deserializers/test_deserializers.py \| 3 ++-\n 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/sagemaker/base_deserializers.py b/src/sagemaker/base_deserializers.py\nindex 7162e5274d..a152f0144d 100644\n--- a/src/sagemaker/base_deserializers.py\n+++ b/src/sagemaker/base_deserializers.py\n@@ -196,14 +196,14 @@ class NumpyDeserializer(SimpleBaseDeserializer):\n single array.\n \"\"\"\n \n- def __init__(self, dtype=None, accept=\"application/x-npy\", allow_pickle=True):\n+ def __init__(self, dtype=None, accept=\"application/x-npy\", allow_pickle=False):\n \"\"\"Initialize a ``NumpyDeserializer`` instance.\n \n Args:\n dtype (str): The dtype of the data (default: None).\n accept (union[str, tuple[str]]): The MIME type (or tuple of allowable MIME types) that\n is expected from the inference endpoint (default: \"application/x-npy\").\n- allow_pickle (bool): Allow loading pickled object arrays (default: True).\n+ allow_pickle (bool): Allow loading pickled object arrays (default: False).\n \"\"\"\n super(NumpyDeserializer, self).__init__(accept=accept)\n self.dtype = dtype\n@@ -227,10 +227,21 @@ def deserialize(self, stream, content_type):\n if content_type == \"application/json\":\n return np.array(json.load(codecs.getreader(\"utf-8\")(stream)), dtype=self.dtype)\n if content_type == \"application/x-npy\":\n- return np.load(io.BytesIO(stream.read()), allow_pickle=self.allow_pickle)\n+ try:\n+ return np.load(io.BytesIO(stream.read()), allow_pickle=self.allow_pickle)\n+ except ValueError as ve:\n+ raise ValueError(\n+ \"Please set the param allow_pickle=True \\\n+ to deserialize pickle objects in NumpyDeserializer\"\n+ ).with_traceback(ve.__traceback__)\n if content_type == \"application/x-npz\":\n try:\n return np.load(io.BytesIO(stream.read()), allow_pickle=self.allow_pickle)\n+ except ValueError as ve:\n+ raise ValueError(\n+ \"Please set the param allow_pickle=True \\\n+ to deserialize pickle objectsin NumpyDeserializer\"\n+ ).with_traceback(ve.__tr\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wjvx-jhpj-r54r\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: sagemaker-python-sdk vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-46852\nDescription: In Memcached before 1.6.22, a buffer overflow exists when processing multiget requests in proxy mode, if there are many spaces after the \"get\" substring.\n\n```diff\nFrom 76a6c363c18cfe7b6a1524ae64202ac9db330767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: dormando <dormando@rydia.net>\nDate: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 10:32:16 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] proxy: fix buffer overflow with multiget syntax\n\n\"get[200 spaces]key1 key2\\r\\n\" would overflow a temporary buffer used to\nprocess multiget syntax.\n\nTo exploit this you must first pass the check in try_read_command_proxy:\n- The request before the first newline must be less than 1024 bytes.\n- If it is more than 1024 bytes there is a limit of 100 spaces.\n- The key length is still checked at 250 bytes\n- Meaning you have up to 772 spaces and then the key to create stack\n corruption.\n\nSo the amount of data you can shove in here isn't unlimited.\n\nThe fix caps the amount of data pre-key to be reasonable. Something like\nGAT needs space for a 32bit TTL which is at most going to be 15 bytes +\nspaces, so we limit it to 20 bytes.\n\nI hate hate hate hate hate the multiget syntax. hate it.\n---\n proto_proxy.c \| 16 ++++++++++++++--\n t/proxyunits.t \| 6 ++++++\n 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/proto_proxy.c b/proto_proxy.c\nindex 890ed2d329..62f5433cb0 100644\n--- a/proto_proxy.c\n+++ b/proto_proxy.c\n@@ -721,6 +721,12 @@ int proxy_run_coroutine(lua_State Lc, mc_resp resp, io_pending_proxy_t p, con\n return 0;\n }\n \n+// basically any data before the first key.\n+// max is like 15ish plus spaces. we can be more strict about how many spaces\n+// to expect because any client spamming space is being deliberately stupid\n+// anyway.\n+#define MAX_CMD_PREFIX 20\n+\n static void proxy_process_command(conn c, char command, size_t cmdlen, bool multiget) {\n assert(c != NULL);\n LIBEVENT_THREAD thr = c->thread;\n@@ -793,12 +799,18 @@ static void proxy_process_command(conn c, char command, size_t cmdlen, bool mu\n if (!multiget && pr.cmd_type == CMD_TYPE_GET && pr.has_space) {\n uint32_t keyoff = pr.tokens[pr.keytoken];\n while (pr.klen != 0) {\n- char temp[KEY_MAX_LENGTH + 30];\n+ char temp[KEY_MAX_LENGTH + MAX_CMD_PREFIX + 30];\n char cur = temp;\n // Core daemon can abort the entire command if one key is bad, but\n // we cannot from the proxy. Instead we have to inject errors into\n // the stream. This should, thankfully, be rare at least.\n- if (pr.klen > KEY_MAX_LENGTH) {\n+ if (pr.tokens[pr.keytoken] > MAX_CMD_PREFIX) {\n+ if (!resp_start(c)) {\n+ conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);\n+ return;\n+ }\n+ proxy_out_errstring(c->resp, PROXY_CLIENT_ERROR, \"malformed request\");\n+ } else if (pr.klen > KEY_MAX_LENGTH) {\n if (!resp_start(c)) {\n conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);\n return;\ndiff --git a/t/proxyunits.t b/t/proxyunits.t\nindex bebe26a514..3ebf3ed434 100644\n--- a/t/proxyunits.t\n+++ b/t/proxyunits.t\n@@ -151,6 +151,12 @@ sub proxy_test {\n\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2023-46852\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: In Memcached before 1.6.22, a buffer overflow exists when processing multiget requests in proxy mode, if there are many spaces after the \"get\" substring.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3638-4f56-qcf5\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 3e52dabe3e64dc50f4422effe364a1457a8a8592 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sam Hocevar <sam@hocevar.net>\nDate: Sat, 29 Dec 2018 22:35:07 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] img2txt: fix an integer overflow in the BMP loader.\n\nFixes: #37 (CVE-2018-20545)\nFixes: #40 (CVE-2018-20548)\nFixes: #41 (CVE-2018-20549)\n---\n src/common-image.h \| 10 +++++-----\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/common-image.h b/src/common-image.h\nindex b78b05c6..438b2bce 100644\n--- a/src/common-image.h\n+++ b/src/common-image.h\n@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@\n /\n Imaging tools for cacaview and img2irc\n- * Copyright (c) 2003-2012 Sam Hocevar <sam@hocevar.net>\n- * All Rights Reserved\n+ * Copyright © 2003—2018 Sam Hocevar <sam@hocevar.net>\n+ * All Rights Reserved\n \n This program is free software. It comes without any warranty, to\n * the extent permitted by applicable law. You can redistribute it\n * and/or modify it under the terms of the Do What the Fuck You Want\n- * to Public License, Version 2, as published by Sam Hocevar. See\n- * http://www.wtfpl.net/ for more details.\n+ * to Public License, Version 2, as published by the WTFPL Task Force.\n+ * See http://www.wtfpl.net/ for more details.\n /\n \n struct image\n {\n char pixels;\n- unsigned int w, h;\n+ size_t w, h;\n struct caca_dither dither;\n void priv;\n };\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3638-4f56-qcf5\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\ndef inputInt():\n '''\n Take an int input and return it after checking type\n '''\n userInput = int(input(\"Enter a number: \"))\n assert type(userInput) == int\n return userInput\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-703 - CWE-703\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-0786\nDescription: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic in GitHub repository thorsten/phpmyfaq prior to 3.1.11.\n\n\n\n```diff\nFrom ce676eb9e9d8cb7864f36ee124e838b1ad15415f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thorsten Rinne <thorsten@phpmyfaq.de>\nDate: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 07:29:22 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: added missing conversion to HTML entities\n\n---\n phpmyfaq/admin/report.view.php \| 11 ++++++-----\n phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Report.php \| 4 +---\n 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/phpmyfaq/admin/report.view.php b/phpmyfaq/admin/report.view.php\nindex 23c3d025c9..f0f0b9be4d 100644\n--- a/phpmyfaq/admin/report.view.php\n+++ b/phpmyfaq/admin/report.view.php\n@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@\n \n use phpMyFAQ\\Filter;\n use phpMyFAQ\\Report;\n+use phpMyFAQ\\Strings;\n \n if (!defined('IS_VALID_PHPMYFAQ')) {\n http_response_code(400);\n@@ -80,12 +81,12 @@\n if (0 != $data['category_parent']) {\n printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['category_parent']);\n } else {\n- printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['category_name']);\n+ printf('<td>%s</td>', Strings::htmlentities($data['category_name'] ?? ''));\n }\n }\n if ($useSubcategory) {\n if (0 != $data['category_parent']) {\n- printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['category_name']);\n+ printf('<td>%s</td>', Strings::htmlentities($data['category_name']));\n } else {\n echo '<td>n/a</td>';\n }\n@@ -103,16 +104,16 @@\n printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['faq_sticky']);\n }\n if ($useTitle) {\n- printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['faq_question']);\n+ printf('<td>%s</td>', Strings::htmlentities($data['faq_question']));\n }\n if ($useCreationDate) {\n printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['faq_updated']);\n }\n if ($useOwner) {\n- printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['faq_org_author']);\n+ printf('<td>%s</td>', Strings::htmlentities($data['faq_org_author']));\n }\n if ($useLastModified) {\n- printf('<td>%s</td>', $data['faq_last_author']);\n+ printf('<td>%s</td>', Strings::htmlentities($data['faq_last_author'] ?? ''));\n }\n if ($useUrl) {\n $url = sprintf(\ndiff --git a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Report.php b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Report.php\nindex 555a123810..7b2df0823a 100644\n--- a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Report.php\n+++ b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Report.php\n@@ -145,8 +145,6 @@ public function convertEncoding(string $outputString = ''): string\n }\n \n $toBeRemoved = ['=', '+', '-', 'HYPERLINK'];\n- $outputString = str_replace($toBeRemoved, '', $outputString);\n-\n- return $outputString;\n+ return str_replace($toBeRemoved, '', $outputString);\n }\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-0786\nCWE: CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic in thorsten/phpmyfaq\n\nThis patch addresses: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic in GitHub repository thorsten/phpmyfaq prior to 3.1.11.\n\n\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xr7r-88qv-q7hm\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 1aec4f9d71855dbfb223fa61ca60260400cc5d5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Pyfisch <pyfisch@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 22:15:26 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent stack overflow from nested tags\n\nIn the deserializer decrement the remaining depth\neach time a tagged value is encountered to prevent\nstack overflows caused by this recursion.\nSmall malicious input can cause this overflow,\ntherefore it is considered to be a security issue.\n\nI'd like to thank Eric Rafaloff at Trail of Bits,\nwho discovered this issue during a code review,\nfor reporting it.\n\nAdd a test case.\n---\n src/de.rs \| 10 +++++-----\n tests/de.rs \| 11 +++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/de.rs b/src/de.rs\nindex 69cb4564..9e259b52 100644\n--- a/src/de.rs\n+++ b/src/de.rs\n@@ -704,22 +704,22 @@ where\n 0xbf => self.parse_indefinite_map(visitor),\n \n // Major type 6: optional semantic tagging of other major types\n- 0xc0..=0xd7 => self.parse_value(visitor),\n+ 0xc0..=0xd7 => self.recursion_checked(\|de\| de.parse_value(visitor)),\n 0xd8 => {\n self.parse_u8()?;\n- self.parse_value(visitor)\n+ self.recursion_checked(\|de\| de.parse_value(visitor))\n }\n 0xd9 => {\n self.parse_u16()?;\n- self.parse_value(visitor)\n+ self.recursion_checked(\|de\| de.parse_value(visitor))\n }\n 0xda => {\n self.parse_u32()?;\n- self.parse_value(visitor)\n+ self.recursion_checked(\|de\| de.parse_value(visitor))\n }\n 0xdb => {\n self.parse_u64()?;\n- self.parse_value(visitor)\n+ self.recursion_checked(\|de\| de.parse_value(visitor))\n }\n 0xdc..=0xdf => Err(self.error(ErrorCode::UnassignedCode)),\n \ndiff --git a/tests/de.rs b/tests/de.rs\nindex 7e3fd9cf..49f6e8b5 100644\n--- a/tests/de.rs\n+++ b/tests/de.rs\n@@ -725,4 +725,15 @@ mod std_tests {\n let deserialized_ip = from_slice::<IpAddr>(&buf).unwrap();\n assert_eq!(ip, deserialized_ip);\n }\n+\n+ #[test]\n+ fn attempt_stack_overflow() {\n+ // Create a tag 17, followed by 999 more tag 17:\n+ // 17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(17(...\n+ // This causes deep recursion in the decoder and may\n+ // exhaust the stack and therfore result in a stack overflow.\n+ let input = vec![0xd1; 1000];\n+ let err = serde_cbor::from_slice::<serde_cbor::Value>(&input).expect_err(\"recursion limit\");\n+ assert!(err.is_syntax());\n+ }\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xr7r-88qv-q7hm\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Out of bounds write in serde_cbor\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jj5v-2f8v-5cg8\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 01521d614cb578de75a406394b4f0426f6036ba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Luciano Righetti <luciano.righetti@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 11:46:27 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] security: fix stored xss in sharing groups view as reported\n by Nicolas Vidal from TEHTRIS.\n\n---\n app/View/SharingGroups/view.ctp \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app/View/SharingGroups/view.ctp b/app/View/SharingGroups/view.ctp\nindex 6500f7b210b..67014a47cf3 100644\n--- a/app/View/SharingGroups/view.ctp\n+++ b/app/View/SharingGroups/view.ctp\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n <div class=\"roles view\">\n-<h2><?= __('Sharing Group %s', $sg['SharingGroup']['name']);?></h2>\n+<h2><?= __('Sharing Group %s', h($sg['SharingGroup']['name']));?></h2>\n <div class=\"row-fluid\"><div class=\"span8\" style=\"margin:0\">\n <?php\n $tableData = [\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jj5v-2f8v-5cg8\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-f3gh-529w-v32x\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d9d8339813f1c43d3eb7d8d80f11fdabb2fd2ee4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Livio Spring <livio.a@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 08:49:02 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork\n\n---\n proto/zitadel/admin.proto \| 24 ++++++++++++------------\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/proto/zitadel/admin.proto b/proto/zitadel/admin.proto\nindex 4050e9cee0b..5e5da269ac7 100644\n--- a/proto/zitadel/admin.proto\n+++ b/proto/zitadel/admin.proto\n@@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"org.idp.read\"\n+ permission: \"iam.idp.read\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"org.idp.read\"\n+ permission: \"iam.idp.read\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -2092,7 +2092,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"org.idp.write\"\n+ permission: \"iam.idp.write\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -2110,7 +2110,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"org.idp.write\"\n+ permission: \"iam.idp.write\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -2561,7 +2561,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"policy.write\"\n+ permission: \"iam.policy.write\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -2578,7 +2578,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"policy.write\"\n+ permission: \"iam.policy.write\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -2595,7 +2595,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"policy.write\"\n+ permission: \"iam.policy.write\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -2612,7 +2612,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"policy.write\"\n+ permission: \"iam.policy.write\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.options.openapiv2_operation) = {\n@@ -2629,7 +2629,7 @@ service AdminService {\n };\n \n option (zitadel.v1.auth_option) = {\n- permission: \"policy.write\"\n+ permission: \"iam.policy.write\"\n };\n \n option (grpc.gateway.protoc_gen_openapiv2.o\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-f3gh-529w-v32x\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: IDOR Vulnerabilities in ZITADEL's Admin API that Primarily Impact LDAP Configurations\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport os\n\ndef raisePrivileges():\n pass\n\n\ndef lowerPrivileges():\n pass\n\n\ndef makeNewUserDir(username):\n '''\n Create a directory at the /home/ directory for the given username.\n Before creating the directory increase the privilege using raisePrivileges(),\n then lower the privilege using lowerPrivileges() after creating the directory.\n Handle the exception if the directory already exists.\n '''\n try:\n raisePrivileges()\n os.mkdir('/home/' + username)\n lowerPrivileges()\n except OSError:\n print('Unable to create new user directory for user:' + username)\n return False\n return True\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-250 - CWE-250\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0273\nDescription: Improper Access Control in Pypi calibreweb prior to 0.6.16.\n\n```diff\nFrom 0c0313f375bed7b035c8c0482bbb09599e16bfcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ozzie Isaacs <ozzie.fernandez.isaacs@googlemail.com>\nDate: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 17:55:10 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent creating a public shelf without permission\n\n---\n cps/shelf.py \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/cps/shelf.py b/cps/shelf.py\nindex 29a4fe99d3..ad6a2665a2 100644\n--- a/cps/shelf.py\n+++ b/cps/shelf.py\n@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ def create_edit_shelf(shelf, page_title, page, shelf_id=False):\n if not current_user.role_edit_shelfs() and to_save.get(\"is_public\") == \"on\":\n flash(_(u\"Sorry you are not allowed to create a public shelf\"), category=\"error\")\n return redirect(url_for('web.index'))\n- is_public = 1 if to_save.get(\"is_public\") else 0\n+ is_public = 1 if to_save.get(\"is_public\") == \"on\" else 0\n if config.config_kobo_sync:\n shelf.kobo_sync = True if to_save.get(\"kobo_sync\") else False\n if shelf.kobo_sync:\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0273\nCWE: CWE-284 Improper Access Control\nTitle: Improper Access Control in janeczku/calibre-web\n\nThis patch addresses: Improper Access Control in Pypi calibreweb prior to 0.6.16.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fhf3-77x2-3mpp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9a64e62f0f20c9cf9b2e1609f037060eb2d8eb22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Etienne Samson <samson.etienne@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 21:24:33 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error\n variable\n\n---\n src/transports/http.c \| 3 +--\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/transports/http.c b/src/transports/http.c\nindex ad28c5889c7..155fd7b30b5 100644\n--- a/src/transports/http.c\n+++ b/src/transports/http.c\n@@ -624,13 +624,12 @@ static int http_connect(http_subtransport t)\n \tif ((!error \|\| error == GIT_ECERTIFICATE) && t->owner->certificate_check_cb != NULL &&\n \t git_stream_is_encrypted(t->io)) {\n \t\tgit_cert cert;\n-\t\tint is_valid;\n+\t\tint is_valid = (error == GIT_OK);\n \n \t\tif ((error = git_stream_certificate(&cert, t->io)) < 0)\n \t\t\treturn error;\n \n \t\tgiterr_clear();\n-\t\tis_valid = error != GIT_ECERTIFICATE;\n \t\terror = t->owner->certificate_check_cb(cert, is_valid, t->connection_data.host, t->owner->message_cb_payload);\n \n \t\tif (error < 0) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fhf3-77x2-3mpp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-gr7h-xw4f-wh86\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom bde070104b1de01f4a6458dca6d9e0880a0e3c04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sam Ottenhoff <ottenhoff@longsight.com>\nDate: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 10:40:13 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] SAK-49866 use commons-text for generation\n\nuse SecureRandom\n\n(cherry picked from commit baea15177800d796346e94cea5db1276ad0b58ba)\n---\n .../app/scheduler/jobs/cm/processor/sis/UserProcessor.java \| 4 +++-\n .../sakaiproject/util/impl/EncryptionUtilityServiceImpl.java \| 5 ++++-\n .../sakaiproject/webapi/controllers/ProfileController.java \| 1 -\n 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/jobscheduler/scheduler-component-shared/src/java/org/sakaiproject/component/app/scheduler/jobs/cm/processor/sis/UserProcessor.java b/jobscheduler/scheduler-component-shared/src/java/org/sakaiproject/component/app/scheduler/jobs/cm/processor/sis/UserProcessor.java\nindex 823ce8d7cac3..80b0491a9860 100644\n--- a/jobscheduler/scheduler-component-shared/src/java/org/sakaiproject/component/app/scheduler/jobs/cm/processor/sis/UserProcessor.java\n+++ b/jobscheduler/scheduler-component-shared/src/java/org/sakaiproject/component/app/scheduler/jobs/cm/processor/sis/UserProcessor.java\n@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@\n /\n package org.sakaiproject.component.app.scheduler.jobs.cm.processor.sis;\n \n+import java.security.SecureRandom;\n import java.util.Arrays;\n import java.util.HashMap;\n import java.util.List;\n@@ -146,7 +147,8 @@ private void processSisUser(SisUser user, ProcessorState state) throws Exception\n }\n \n protected String generatePassword() {\n- return RandomStringUtils.randomAlphanumeric(9);\n+ final SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();\n+ return RandomStringUtils.random(12, 0, 0, true, true, null, random);\n }\n \n protected void updateExtraPropertiesWithEdit(SisUser sisUser, UserEdit ue) throws UserNotDefinedException, UserPermissionException, UserLockedException, UserAlreadyDefinedException {\ndiff --git a/kernel/kernel-impl/src/main/java/org/sakaiproject/util/impl/EncryptionUtilityServiceImpl.java b/kernel/kernel-impl/src/main/java/org/sakaiproject/util/impl/EncryptionUtilityServiceImpl.java\nindex c4112814aab6..0cb840fca662 100644\n--- a/kernel/kernel-impl/src/main/java/org/sakaiproject/util/impl/EncryptionUtilityServiceImpl.java\n+++ b/kernel/kernel-impl/src/main/java/org/sakaiproject/util/impl/EncryptionUtilityServiceImpl.java\n@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@\n \n import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;\n \n+import java.security.SecureRandom;\n+\n import org.apache.commons.lang3.RandomStringUtils;\n import org.jasypt.util.text.AES256TextEncryptor;\n import org.sakaiproject.util.api.EncryptionUtilityService;\n@@ -30,7 +32,8 @@ public void init() {\n int keyLength = 30;\n boolean useLetters = true;\n boolean useNumbers = true;\n- String serverSecretKey = RandomStringUtils.random(keyLength, useLetters, useNumbers);\n+ final SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();\n+ final String serverSecretKey = RandomStringUtils.random(keyLength, 0, 0, useLetters, us\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-gr7h-xw4f-wh86\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Sakai kernel-impl: predictable PRNG used to generate server‑side encryption key in EncryptionUtilityServiceImpl\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2012-5368\nDescription: phpMyAdmin 3.5.x before 3.5.3 uses JavaScript code that is obtained through an HTTP session to phpmyadmin.net without SSL, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by modifying this code.\n\n```diff\nFrom a547f3d3e2cf36c6a904fa3e053fd8bddd3fbbb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20=C4=8Ciha=C5=99?= <mcihar@suse.cz>\nDate: Mon, 3 Sep 2012 14:57:59 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Escape json reply received from server\n\n---\n js/functions.js \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/js/functions.js b/js/functions.js\nindex ad2e39c8cd7d..b9fad9e9ee1d 100644\n--- a/js/functions.js\n+++ b/js/functions.js\n@@ -132,9 +132,9 @@ function PMA_current_version(data)\n {\n var current = parseVersionString(pmaversion);\n var latest = parseVersionString(data['version']);\n- var version_information_message = PMA_messages['strLatestAvailable'] + ' ' + data['version'];\n+ var version_information_message = PMA_messages['strLatestAvailable'] + ' ' + escapeHtml(data['version']);\n if (latest > current) {\n- var message = $.sprintf(PMA_messages['strNewerVersion'], data['version'], data['date']);\n+ var message = $.sprintf(PMA_messages['strNewerVersion'], escapeHtml(data['version']), escapeHtml(data['date']));\n if (Math.floor(latest / 10000) == Math.floor(current / 10000)) {\n /* Security update /\n klass = 'error';\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2012-5368\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: phpMyAdmin 3.5.x before 3.5.3 uses JavaScript code that is obtained through an HTTP session to phpmyadmin.net without SSL, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by modifying this code.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g64c-rxmq-vwm7\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom bfba26bd34af31648a11af35a0bb66f1948752a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tristan Meleshko <tmeleshk@ualberta.ca>\nDate: Fri, 3 Apr 2015 18:10:40 -0600\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed some bugs and SQL injection.\n\n---\n _login.php \| 5 +++--\n setup.sql \| 1 +\n users.php \| 2 +-\n 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/_login.php b/_login.php\nindex a91e251..108fedd 100644\n--- a/_login.php\n+++ b/_login.php\n@@ -24,11 +24,12 @@ function redirect() {\n \t\trequire ('_database.php');\n \t\t$user = $_POST['user'];\n \t\t$pass = $_POST['pass'];\n-\t\t// <-- Bad.\n \n-\t\t$query = \"SELECT user_name, class, person_id FROM users WHERE user_name = '$user' AND password = '$pass'\";\n+\t\t$query = \"SELECT user_name, class, person_id FROM users WHERE user_name = :username AND password = :password\";\n \t\t\n \t\t$statement = oci_parse($connection, $query);\n+\t\toci_bind_by_name($statement, ':username', $user);\n+\t\toci_bind_by_name($statement, ':password', $pass);\n \t\t$results = oci_execute($statement);\n \n \t\t// Did we get a valid result?\ndiff --git a/setup.sql b/setup.sql\nindex 3f7f09a..c5c22ef 100644\n--- a/setup.sql\n+++ b/setup.sql\n@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DROP TABLE users;\n DROP TABLE persons;\n DROP SEQUENCE record_id_seq;\n DROP SEQUENCE image_id_seq;\n+DROP SEQUENCE person_id_seq;\n \n /\n To store the personal information\ndiff --git a/users.php b/users.php\nindex 2247285..39a7cce 100644\n--- a/users.php\n+++ b/users.php\n@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@\n \t\t</p>\n \t\t<div>\n \t\t\t<form id=\"searchform\" required=\"1\" name=\"search_users\" method=\"get\" action=\"<?php $PHP_SELF ?>\" >\n-\t\t\t\t<input type=\"text\" name=\"q\" />\n+\t\t\t\t<input type=\"text\" name=\"q\" value=\"<?php echo $_GET['q']; ?>\" />\n \t\t\t\t<input type=\"submit\" value=\"Search\" />\n \t\t\t</form>\n \t\t</div>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g64c-rxmq-vwm7\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rcx6-7jp6-pqf2\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 12fa46ba1c6efb9ddac7bfdef7f4f6909781c801 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Robert Jackson <robert.w.jackson@me.com>\nDate: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 14:31:42 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] [SECURITY CVE-2014-0014] Ensure {{group}} helper escapes\n properly.\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2014-0014.\n\nIn general, Ember.js escapes or strips any user-supplied content before\ninserting it in strings that will be sent to innerHTML. However, we\nhave identified a vulnerability that could lead to unescaped content being\ninserted into the innerHTML string without being sanitized.\n\nWhen using the `{{group}}` helper, user supplied content in the template\nwas not being sanitized. Though the vulnerability exists in Ember.js proper,\nit is only exposed via the use of an experimental plugin.\n\nIn applications that use the `{{group}}` helper, a specially-crafted\npayload could execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the current\ndomain (\"XSS\").\n\nThis vulnerability was reported to us by Edward Faulkner of CleriCare.\nMany thanks for working with us on the patches and advisory.\n---\n .../ember-handlebars/lib/helpers/binding.js \| 10 +++++++++-\n .../tests/helpers/group_test.js \| 17 +++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/packages/ember-handlebars/lib/helpers/binding.js b/packages/ember-handlebars/lib/helpers/binding.js\nindex 88b1d36351f..1ca19d4907c 100644\n--- a/packages/ember-handlebars/lib/helpers/binding.js\n+++ b/packages/ember-handlebars/lib/helpers/binding.js\n@@ -120,7 +120,15 @@ function simpleBind(currentContext, property, options) {\n };\n \n var result = handlebarsGet(currentContext, property, options);\n- if (result === null \|\| result === undefined) { result = \"\"; }\n+ if (result === null \|\| result === undefined) {\n+ result = \"\";\n+ } else if (!(result instanceof Handlebars.SafeString)) {\n+ result = String(result);\n+ }\n+ if (!options.hash.unescaped){\n+ result = Handlebars.Utils.escapeExpression(result);\n+ }\n+\n data.buffer.push(result);\n } else {\n var bindView = new Ember._SimpleHandlebarsView(\ndiff --git a/packages/ember-handlebars/tests/helpers/group_test.js b/packages/ember-handlebars/tests/helpers/group_test.js\nindex bd7d93167fc..cdfa0120a2b 100644\n--- a/packages/ember-handlebars/tests/helpers/group_test.js\n+++ b/packages/ember-handlebars/tests/helpers/group_test.js\n@@ -214,3 +214,20 @@ test(\"#each with itemViewClass behaves like a normal bound #each\", function() {\n // IE likes to add newlines\n equal(trim(view.$().text()), 'ErikPeterTom');\n });\n+\n+test(\"should escape HTML in normal mustaches\", function() {\n+ createGroupedView(\n+ '{{msg}}', {msg: 'you need to be more <b>bold</b>'}\n+ );\n+ appendView();\n+ equal(view.$('b').length, 0, \"does not create an element\");\n+ equal(view.$().text(), 'you need to be more <b>bold</b>', \"inserts entities, not elements\");\n+});\n+\n+test(\"should not escape HTML in tr\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rcx6-7jp6-pqf2\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: ember-source Cross-site Scripting vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-hxp5-8pgq-mgv9\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 43eeafcbac29d02c72bd520c003cdfc571de2d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Stamatis Zampetakis <zabetak@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 23:42:06 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [CALCITE-4298] Avoid disabling hostname verification on HTTPS\n connections\n\n---\n .../org/apache/calcite/runtime/HttpUtils.java \| 17 +----------------\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 16 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/core/src/main/java/org/apache/calcite/runtime/HttpUtils.java b/core/src/main/java/org/apache/calcite/runtime/HttpUtils.java\nindex a3b140beeed5..d23b93805df1 100644\n--- a/core/src/main/java/org/apache/calcite/runtime/HttpUtils.java\n+++ b/core/src/main/java/org/apache/calcite/runtime/HttpUtils.java\n@@ -23,11 +23,9 @@\n import java.io.Writer;\n import java.net.HttpURLConnection;\n import java.net.URL;\n-import java.net.URLConnection;\n import java.net.URLEncoder;\n import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n import java.util.Map;\n-import javax.net.ssl.HttpsURLConnection;\n \n /*\n Utilities for connecting to REST services such as Splunk via HTTP.\n@@ -37,20 +35,7 @@ private HttpUtils() {}\n \n public static HttpURLConnection getURLConnection(String url)\n throws IOException {\n- URLConnection conn = new URL(url).openConnection();\n- final HttpURLConnection httpConn = (HttpURLConnection) conn;\n-\n- // take care of https stuff - most of the time it's only needed to\n- // secure client/server comm\n- // not to establish the identity of the server\n- if (httpConn instanceof HttpsURLConnection) {\n- HttpsURLConnection httpsConn = (HttpsURLConnection) httpConn;\n- httpsConn.setSSLSocketFactory(\n- TrustAllSslSocketFactory.createSSLSocketFactory());\n- httpsConn.setHostnameVerifier((arg0, arg1) -> true);\n- }\n-\n- return httpConn;\n+ return (HttpURLConnection) new URL(url).openConnection();\n }\n \n public static void appendURLEncodedArgs(\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-hxp5-8pgq-mgv9\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Apache Calcite\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-10366\nDescription: An issue was discovered in the Users (aka Front-end user management) plugin 1.4.5 for October CMS. XSS exists in the name field.\n\n```diff\nFrom 098c2bc907443d67e9e18645f850e3de42941d20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Samuel Georges <sam@daftspunk.com>\nDate: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 13:56:08 +1000\nSubject: [PATCH] KISS and form_value() doesn't use escaping\n\n---\n components/account/update.htm \| 8 ++++----\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/components/account/update.htm b/components/account/update.htm\nindex a294dd0d..7d980daa 100644\n--- a/components/account/update.htm\n+++ b/components/account/update.htm\n@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@\n-{{ form_ajax('onUpdate', { model: user }) }}\n+{{ form_ajax('onUpdate') }}\n \n <div class=\"form-group\">\n <label for=\"accountName\">Full Name</label>\n- <input name=\"name\" type=\"text\" class=\"form-control\" id=\"accountName\" value=\"{{ form_value('name') }}\">\n+ <input name=\"name\" type=\"text\" class=\"form-control\" id=\"accountName\" value=\"{{ user.name }}\">\n </div>\n \n <div class=\"form-group\">\n <label for=\"accountEmail\">Email</label>\n- <input name=\"email\" type=\"email\" class=\"form-control\" id=\"accountEmail\" value=\"{{ form_value('email') }}\">\n+ <input name=\"email\" type=\"email\" class=\"form-control\" id=\"accountEmail\" value=\"{{ user.email }}\">\n </div>\n \n <div class=\"form-group\">\n@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@\n \n <button type=\"submit\" class=\"btn btn-default\">Save</button>\n \n-{{ form_close() }}\n\\ No newline at end of file\n+{{ form_close() }}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-10366\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: An issue was discovered in the Users (aka Front-end user management) plugin 1.4.5 for October CMS. XSS exists in the name field.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2012-4506\nDescription: Directory traversal vulnerability in gitolite 3.x before 3.1, when wild card repositories and a pattern matching \"../\" are enabled, allows remote authenticated users to create arbitrary repositories and possibly perform other actions via a .. (dot dot) in a repository name.\n\n```diff\nFrom f636ce3ba3e340569b26d1e47b9d9b62dd8a3bf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sitaram Chamarty <sitaram@atc.tcs.com>\nDate: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 07:19:59 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] (security) fix bug in pattern to detect path traversal\n\nwhile we're about it, add the same check to some of the internal\nroutines, so that commands can also be protected.\n\nfinally, just to make sure we don't lose it again in some other fashion,\nadd a few tests for path traversal...\n---\n src/gitolite-shell \| 2 +-\n src/lib/Gitolite/Conf/Load.pm \| 15 ++++++++++++++-\n t/0-me-first.t \| 19 ++++++++++++++++++-\n 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/gitolite-shell b/src/gitolite-shell\nindex 5d48cc98b..4bbae489d 100755\n--- a/src/gitolite-shell\n+++ b/src/gitolite-shell\n@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ sub sanity {\n my $repo = shift;\n _die \"'$repo' contains bad characters\" if $repo !~ $REPONAME_PATT;\n _die \"'$repo' ends with a '/'\" if $repo =~ m(/$);\n- _die \"'$repo' contains '..'\" if $repo =~ m(\\.\\.$);\n+ _die \"'$repo' contains '..'\" if $repo =~ m(\\.\\.);\n }\n \n # ----------------------------------------------------------------------\ndiff --git a/src/lib/Gitolite/Conf/Load.pm b/src/lib/Gitolite/Conf/Load.pm\nindex 4abfa9003..0f7690877 100644\n--- a/src/lib/Gitolite/Conf/Load.pm\n+++ b/src/lib/Gitolite/Conf/Load.pm\n@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ my $last_repo = '';\n \n sub access {\n my ( $repo, $user, $aa, $ref ) = @_;\n- _die \"invalid repo '$repo'\" if not( $repo and $repo =~ $REPOPATT_PATT );\n _die \"invalid user '$user'\" if not( $user and $user =~ $USERNAME_PATT );\n+ sanity($repo);\n+\n my $deny_rules = option( $repo, 'deny-rules' );\n load($repo);\n \n@@ -175,8 +176,18 @@ sub option {\n return $ret->{$option};\n }\n \n+sub sanity {\n+ my $repo = shift;\n+\n+ _die \"invalid repo '$repo'\" if not( $repo and $repo =~ $REPOPATT_PATT );\n+ _die \"'$repo' ends with a '/'\" if $repo =~ m(/$);\n+ _die \"'$repo' contains '..'\" if $repo =~ $REPONAME_PATT and $repo =~ m(\\.\\.);\n+}\n+\n sub repo_missing {\n my $repo = shift;\n+ sanity($repo);\n+\n return not -d \"$rc{GL_REPO_BASE}/$repo.git\";\n }\n \n@@ -400,6 +411,8 @@ sub generic_name {\n \n sub creator {\n my $repo = shift;\n+ sanity($repo);\n+\n return ( $ENV{GL_USER} \|\| '' ) if repo_missing($repo);\n my $f = \"$rc{GL_REPO_BASE}/$repo.git/gl-creator\";\n my $creator = '';\ndiff --git a/t/0-me-first.t b/t/0-me-first.t\nindex dc8916bb4..22102ef88 100755\n--- a/t/0-me-first.t\n+++ b/t/0-me-first.t\n@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ use warnings;\n use lib \"src/lib\";\n use Gitolite::Test;\n \n+my $rb = `gitolite query-rc -n GL_REPO_BASE`;\n+\n # initial smoke tests\n # ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n \n-try \"plan 65\";\n+try \"plan 73\";\n \n # basic push admin repo\n confreset;confadd '\n@@ -75,4 +77,19 @@ try \"\n glt ls-remote u5 file:///cc/1; ok; perl s/TRACE.//g; !/\\\\S/\n glt ls-remote u5 file:///cc/2; !ok; /DENIED by fallthru/\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2012-4506\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Directory traversal vulnerability in gitolite 3.x before 3.1, when wild card repositories and a pattern matching \"../\" are enabled, allows remote authenticated users to create arbitrary repositories and possibly perform other actions via a .. (dot dot) in a repository name.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r367-m5qq-xxfg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2d6fbfe733f35c6b355c216644e08e149c61b271 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>\nDate: Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:51:52 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()\n\nThe current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.\nIt also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes\nnet/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable\nto userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.\n\nFix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared\nabout caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was\nset.\n\nCc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>\nSigned-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n---\n net/caif/caif_socket.c \| 2 ++\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/net/caif/caif_socket.c b/net/caif/caif_socket.c\nindex 095259f839023a..ff2ff3ce6965a7 100644\n--- a/net/caif/caif_socket.c\n+++ b/net/caif/caif_socket.c\n@@ -286,6 +286,8 @@ static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb iocb, struct socket sock,\n \tif (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)\n \t\tgoto read_error;\n \n+\tm->msg_namelen = 0;\n+\n \tskb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret);\n \tif (!skb)\n \t\tgoto read_error;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r367-m5qq-xxfg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mjpp-wxm2-vx37\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 656cb0450aeb73b25d7d26980af342b37ac4c568 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>\nDate: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 17:58:08 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] avcodec/vp3: Add missing check for av_malloc\n\nSince the av_malloc() may fail and return NULL pointer,\nit is needed that the 's->edge_emu_buffer' should be checked\nwhether the new allocation is success.\n\nFixes: d14723861b (\"VP3: fix decoding of videos with stride > 2048\")\nReviewed-by: Peter Ross <pross@xvid.org>\nSigned-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>\n---\n libavcodec/vp3.c \| 7 ++++++-\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libavcodec/vp3.c b/libavcodec/vp3.c\nindex e9ab54d736773..e2418eb6fa041 100644\n--- a/libavcodec/vp3.c\n+++ b/libavcodec/vp3.c\n@@ -2679,8 +2679,13 @@ static int vp3_decode_frame(AVCodecContext avctx,\n AV_GET_BUFFER_FLAG_REF)) < 0)\n goto error;\n \n- if (!s->edge_emu_buffer)\n+ if (!s->edge_emu_buffer) {\n s->edge_emu_buffer = av_malloc(9 FFABS(s->current_frame.f->linesize[0]));\n+ if (!s->edge_emu_buffer) {\n+ ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);\n+ goto error;\n+ }\n+ }\n \n if (s->keyframe) {\n if (!s->theora) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mjpp-wxm2-vx37\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-5216\nDescription: In Secure Headers (RubyGem secure_headers), a directive injection vulnerability is present in versions before 3.9.0, 5.2.0, and 6.3.0. If user-supplied input was passed into append/override_content_security_policy_directives, a newline could be injected leading to limited header injection. Upon seeing a newline in the header, rails will silently create a new Content-Security-Policy header with the remaining value of the original string. It will continue to create new headers for each newline. Th\n\n```diff\nFrom 3a2b548223de854ab9768ae07acedfcd2ac211e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Neil Matatall <oreoshake@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 12:32:41 -1000\nSubject: [PATCH] Filter and warn on newlines\n\n---\n lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb \| 6 +++---\n .../secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy_spec.rb \| 7 ++++++-\n 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb b/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb\nindex 9f50623b..cb75050c 100644\n--- a/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb\n+++ b/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb\n@@ -106,11 +106,11 @@ def build_source_list_directive(directive)\n if source_list != OPT_OUT && source_list && source_list.any?\n minified_source_list = minify_source_list(directive, source_list).join(\" \")\n \n- if minified_source_list.include?(\";\")\n- Kernel.warn(\"#{directive} contains a ; in '#{minified_source_list}' which will raise an error in future versions. It has been replaced with a blank space.\")\n+ if minified_source_list =~ /(\\n\|;)/\n+ Kernel.warn(\"#{directive} contains a #{$1} in #{minified_source_list.inspect} which will raise an error in future versions. It has been replaced with a blank space.\")\n end\n \n- escaped_source_list = minified_source_list.gsub(\";\", \" \")\n+ escaped_source_list = minified_source_list.gsub(/[\\n;]/, \" \")\n [symbol_to_hyphen_case(directive), escaped_source_list].join(\" \").strip\n end\n end\ndiff --git a/spec/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy_spec.rb b/spec/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy_spec.rb\nindex 32b9b44d..c1f24e6c 100644\n--- a/spec/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy_spec.rb\n+++ b/spec/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy_spec.rb\n@@ -29,10 +29,15 @@ module SecureHeaders\n end\n \n it \"deprecates and escapes semicolons in directive source lists\" do\n- expect(Kernel).to receive(:warn).with(\"frame_ancestors contains a ; in 'google.com;script-src ;.;' which will raise an error in future versions. It has been replaced with a blank space.\")\n+ expect(Kernel).to receive(:warn).with(%(frame_ancestors contains a ; in \"google.com;script-src ;.;\" which will raise an error in future versions. It has been replaced with a blank space.))\n expect(ContentSecurityPolicy.new(frame_ancestors: %w(https://google.com;script-src https://;.;)).value).to eq(\"frame-ancestors google.com script-src .\")\n end\n \n+ it \"deprecates and escapes semicolons in directive source lists\" do\n+ expect(Kernel).to receive(:warn).with(%(frame_ancestors contains a \\n in \"\\\\nfoo.com\\\\nhacked\" which will raise an error in future versions. It has been replaced with a blank space.))\n+ expect(ContentSecurityPolicy.new(frame_ancestors: [\"\\nfoo.com\\nhacked\"]).value).to eq(\"frame-ancestors foo\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-5216\nCWE: CWE-113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting')\nTitle: Limited header injection when using dynamic overrides with user input in RubyGems secure_headers\n\nThis patch addresses: In Secure Headers (RubyGem secure_headers), a directive injection vulnerability is present in versions before 3.9.0, 5.2.0, and 6.3.0. If user-supplied input was passed into append/override_content_security_policy_directives, a newline could be injected leading to limited header injection. Upon seeing a newline in the header, rails will silently create a new Content-Security-Policy header with the remaining value of the original string. It will continue to create new headers for each newline. Th\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2010-5328\nDescription: include/linux/init_task.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.35 does not prevent signals with a process group ID of zero from reaching the swapper process, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging access to this process group.\n\n```diff\nFrom fa2755e20ab0c7215d99c2dc7c262e98a09b01df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>\nDate: Wed, 26 May 2010 14:44:08 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] INIT_TASK() should initialize ->thread_group list\n\nThe trivial /sbin/init doing\n\n\tint main(void)\n\t{\n\t\tkill(0, SIGKILL)\n\t}\n\ncrashes the kernel.\n\nThis happens because __kill_pgrp_info(init_struct_pid) also sends SIGKILL\nto the swapper process which runs with the uninitialized ->thread_group.\n\nChange INIT_TASK() to initialize ->thread_group properly.\n\nNote: the real problem is that the swapper process must not be visible to\nsignals, see the next patch. But this change is right anyway and fixes\nthe crash.\n\nReported-and-tested-by: Mathias Krause <mathias.krause@secunet.com>\nSigned-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>\nCc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>\nCc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>\nCc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>\nCc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>\nCc: Mathias Krause <Mathias.Krause@secunet.com>\nAcked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>\nAcked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>\nAcked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\n---\n include/linux/init_task.h \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h\nindex 0551e0dcb71b70..6deb1ba52fdb69 100644\n--- a/include/linux/init_task.h\n+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h\n@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;\n \t\t[PIDTYPE_PGID] = INIT_PID_LINK(PIDTYPE_PGID),\t\t\\\n \t\t[PIDTYPE_SID] = INIT_PID_LINK(PIDTYPE_SID),\t\t\\\n \t},\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n+\t.thread_group\t= LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.thread_group),\t\t\\\n \t.dirties = INIT_PROP_LOCAL_SINGLE(dirties),\t\t\t\\\n \tINIT_IDS\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n \tINIT_PERF_EVENTS(tsk)\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2010-5328\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: include/linux/init_task.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.35 does not prevent signals with a process group ID of zero from reaching the swapper process, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging access to this process group.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-29514\nDescription: XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform offering runtime services for applications built on top of it. Any user with edit rights on any document (e.g., their own user profile) can execute code with programming rights, leading to remote code execution. This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.8, 14.10.1 and 15.0 RC1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\n\n```diff\nFrom 7bf7094f8ffac095f5d66809af7554c9cc44de09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Michael Hamann <michael.hamann@xwiki.com>\nDate: Fri, 25 Nov 2022 17:13:37 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] XWIKI-20268: Improve escaping in AdminTemplatesSheet\n\n---\n .../test/ui/PageTemplatesIT.java \| 24 +++++++++++++++++++\n .../resources/XWiki/AdminTemplatesSheet.xml \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-test/xwiki-platform-administration-test-docker/src/test/it/org/xwiki/administration/test/ui/PageTemplatesIT.java b/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-test/xwiki-platform-administration-test-docker/src/test/it/org/xwiki/administration/test/ui/PageTemplatesIT.java\nindex e82a785676fd..9f135ebac23e 100644\n--- a/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-test/xwiki-platform-administration-test-docker/src/test/it/org/xwiki/administration/test/ui/PageTemplatesIT.java\n+++ b/xwiki-platform-core/xwiki-platform-administration/xwiki-platform-administration-test/xwiki-platform-administration-test-docker/src/test/it/org/xwiki/administration/test/ui/PageTemplatesIT.java\n@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@\n import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;\n import org.junit.jupiter.api.Order;\n import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\n+import org.openqa.selenium.WebElement;\n import org.xwiki.administration.test.po.TemplateProviderInlinePage;\n import org.xwiki.administration.test.po.TemplatesAdministrationSectionPage;\n import org.xwiki.model.reference.DocumentReference;\n@@ -358,6 +359,29 @@ void createPageFromForbiddenTemplate(TestUtils setup, TestReference testReferenc\n assertEquals(\"Some content in that page\", viewPage.getContent());\n }\n \n+ /*\n+ The goal of this test is to check that the template provider's title is correctly escaped.\n+ /\n+ @Test\n+ @Order(5)\n+ void templateProviderTitleEscaping(TestUtils setup, TestReference testReference) throws Exception\n+ {\n+ cleanUp(setup, testReference);\n+\n+ // Create a template\n+ String templateContent = \"Templates are fun\";\n+ String providerName = \"{{html}}<span>HTML</span>{{/html}}\";\n+ LocalDocumentReference templateProviderReference = new LocalDocumentReference(providerName,\n+ testReference.getLocalDocumentReference().getParent());\n+ createTemplateAndTemplateProvider(setup, templateProviderReference, templateContent,\n+ \"Funny templates\", true);\n+\n+ TemplatesAdministrationSectionPage adminPage = TemplatesAdministrationSectionPage.gotoPage();\n+ List<WebElement> links = adminPage.getExistingTemplatesLinks();\n+ assertFalse(links.stream().anyMatch(element -> element.getText().equals(\"HTML\")));\n+ assertTrue(links.stream().anyMatch(element -> providerName.equals(element.getText())));\n+ }\n+\n /\n Helper function to Create both a Template and a \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-29514\nCWE: CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')\nTitle: Code injection in template provider administration in xwiki-platform\n\nThis patch addresses: XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform offering runtime services for applications built on top of it. Any user with edit rights on any document (e.g., their own user profile) can execute code with programming rights, leading to remote code execution. This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.8, 14.10.1 and 15.0 RC1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2018-7\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom db586ede1fbb41dce21310ea28ae15a1cf1286c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: medmunds <medmunds@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 11:41:14 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Security: prevent timing attack on WEBHOOK_AUTHORIZATION\n secret\n\nAnymail's webhook validation was vulnerable to a timing attack.\nAn attacker could have used this to recover your WEBHOOK_AUTHORIZATION\nshared secret, potentially allowing them to post fabricated or malicious\nemail tracking events to your app.\n\nThere have not been any reports of attempted exploit in the wild. (The\nvulnerability was discovered through code review.) Attempts would be\nvisible in http logs as a very large number of 400 responses on\nAnymail's webhook urls, or in Python error monitoring as a very large\nnumber of AnymailWebhookValidationFailure exceptions.\n\nIf you are using Anymail's webhooks, you should upgrade to this release.\nIn addition, you may want to rotate to a new WEBHOOK_AUTHORIZATION\nsecret ([docs](http://anymail.readthedocs.io/en/stable/tips/securing_webhooks/#use-a-shared-authorization-secret)),\nparticularly if your logs indicate attempted exploit.\n---\n anymail/webhooks/base.py \| 15 ++++++++++++---\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/anymail/webhooks/base.py b/anymail/webhooks/base.py\nindex 28380311..2bfd36e0 100644\n--- a/anymail/webhooks/base.py\n+++ b/anymail/webhooks/base.py\n@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@\n \n import six\n from django.http import HttpResponse\n+from django.utils.crypto import constant_time_compare\n from django.utils.decorators import method_decorator\n from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt\n from django.views.generic import View\n@@ -40,8 +41,13 @@ def __init__(self, *kwargs):\n def validate_request(self, request):\n \"\"\"If configured for webhook basic auth, validate request has correct auth.\"\"\"\n if self.basic_auth:\n- basic_auth = get_request_basic_auth(request)\n- if basic_auth is None or basic_auth not in self.basic_auth:\n+ request_auth = get_request_basic_auth(request)\n+ # Use constant_time_compare to avoid timing attack on basic auth. (It's OK that any()\n+ # can terminate early: we're not trying to protect how many auth strings are allowed,\n+ # just the contents of each individual auth string.)\n+ auth_ok = any(constant_time_compare(request_auth, allowed_auth)\n+ for allowed_auth in self.basic_auth)\n+ if not auth_ok:\n # noinspection PyUnresolvedReferences\n raise AnymailWebhookValidationFailure(\n \"Missing or invalid basic auth in Anymail %s webhook\" % self.esp_name)\n@@ -77,8 +83,11 @@ def validate_request(self, request):\n All* definitions of this method in the class chain (including mixins)\n will be called. There is no need to chain to the superclass.\n (See self.run_validators and collect_all_methods.)\n+\n+ Security note: use django.utils.crypto.constan\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2018-7\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-gcff-f9p7-hmfg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ef299cc3fa1a9e1288665a9fdc8bff55629fd359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 13 Mar 2020 22:29:54 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] net_sched: cls_route: remove the right filter from hashtable\n\nroute4_change() allocates a new filter and copies values from\nthe old one. After the new filter is inserted into the hash\ntable, the old filter should be removed and freed, as the final\nstep of the update.\n\nHowever, the current code mistakenly removes the new one. This\nlooks apparently wrong to me, and it causes double \"free\" and\nuse-after-free too, as reported by syzbot.\n\nReported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f9b32aaacd60305d9687@syzkaller.appspotmail.com\nReported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2f8c233f131943d6056d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com\nReported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9c2df9fd5e9445b74e01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com\nFixes: 1109c00547fc (\"net: sched: RCU cls_route\")\nCc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>\nCc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>\nCc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>\nSigned-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n---\n net/sched/cls_route.c \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/net/sched/cls_route.c b/net/sched/cls_route.c\nindex 6f8786b06bde17..5efa3e7ace1524 100644\n--- a/net/sched/cls_route.c\n+++ b/net/sched/cls_route.c\n@@ -534,8 +534,8 @@ static int route4_change(struct net net, struct sk_buff in_skb,\n \t\t\tfp = &b->ht[h];\n \t\t\tfor (pfp = rtnl_dereference(fp); pfp;\n \t\t\t fp = &pfp->next, pfp = rtnl_dereference(fp)) {\n-\t\t\t\tif (pfp == f) {\n-\t\t\t\t\tfp = f->next;\n+\t\t\t\tif (pfp == fold) {\n+\t\t\t\t\trcu_assign_pointer(fp, fold->next);\n \t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-gcff-f9p7-hmfg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Open Redirect (CWE-601):\n\n```python\ndef get_redirect(request):\n return_to = request.GET.get('return_to', '/home')\n return HttpResponseRedirect(return_to)\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Use url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme() or validate against allowlist.\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Open Redirect (CWE-601)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\nreturn_to can be any URL including external malicious sites.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Open Redirect) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3q9r-pq9x-wfp4\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 889f6af37164775192e33b233a90e86fd3df0f57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>\nDate: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 19:43:33 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] patch 9.0.1847: [security] potential oob write in do_addsub()\n\nProblem: potential oob write in do_addsub()\nSolution: don't overflow buf2, check size in for loop()\n\nSigned-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>\n---\n src/ops.c \| 2 +-\n src/version.c \| 2 ++\n 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/ops.c b/src/ops.c\nindex d46a049fe4e790..f4524d3d7b1288 100644\n--- a/src/ops.c\n+++ b/src/ops.c\n@@ -2919,7 +2919,7 @@ do_addsub(\n \t for (bit = bits; bit > 0; bit--)\n \t\tif ((n >> (bit - 1)) & 0x1) break;\n \n-\t for (i = 0; bit > 0; bit--)\n+\t for (i = 0; bit > 0 && i < (NUMBUFLEN - 1); bit--)\n \t\tbuf2[i++] = ((n >> (bit - 1)) & 0x1) ? '1' : '0';\n \n \t buf2[i] = '\\0';\ndiff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c\nindex 5cde7c18552595..c638a107e30f1b 100644\n--- a/src/version.c\n+++ b/src/version.c\n@@ -699,6 +699,8 @@ static char (features[]) =\n \n static int included_patches[] =\n { / Add new patch number below this line /\n+//\n+ 1847,\n //\n 1846,\n //\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-3q9r-pq9x-wfp4\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-32rx-xvvr-4xv9\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 68407ca5be644d1c53fb894453df951230afc6dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?P=C3=A9C=C3=A9?= <pc.bertineau@alterphp.com>\nDate: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 00:01:54 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] security breach on action case insensitivity\n\n---\n src/Security/AdminAuthorizationChecker.php \| 3 ++\n tests/Controller/UserRolesTest.php \| 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Security/AdminAuthorizationChecker.php b/src/Security/AdminAuthorizationChecker.php\nindex 953f3437..e2a55d4f 100644\n--- a/src/Security/AdminAuthorizationChecker.php\n+++ b/src/Security/AdminAuthorizationChecker.php\n@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ public function isEasyAdminGranted(array $entityConfig, string $actionName, $sub\n \n protected function getRequiredRole(array $entityConfig, string $actionName)\n {\n+ // Prevent from security breach: role for 'list' action was not required for 'List' nor 'LIST'...\n+ $actionName = strtolower($actionName);\n+\n if (isset($entityConfig[$actionName]) && isset($entityConfig[$actionName]['role'])) {\n return $entityConfig[$actionName]['role'];\n } elseif (isset($entityConfig['role_prefix'])) {\ndiff --git a/tests/Controller/UserRolesTest.php b/tests/Controller/UserRolesTest.php\nindex 92e596e8..b5784d85 100644\n--- a/tests/Controller/UserRolesTest.php\n+++ b/tests/Controller/UserRolesTest.php\n@@ -191,4 +191,51 @@ public function testAdminGroupRolesFormMayDisplay()\n $crawler->filter('form#edit-admingroup-form .field-easyadmin_admin_roles input[type=\"checkbox\"]')->count()\n );\n }\n+\n+ public function testEntityActionsAreForbiddenOnCaseInsensitiveSpecificRoles()\n+ {\n+ $this->logIn(['ROLE_ADMIN']);\n+\n+ $this->client->followRedirects();\n+\n+ // Edit\n+ $crawler = $this->getBackendPage(['entity' => 'Product', 'action' => 'edit', 'id' => 1]);\n+ $this->assertSame(403, $this->client->getResponse()->getStatusCode());\n+ $this->assertSame(\n+ 'You must be granted ROLE_TEST_EDIT_PRODUCT role to perform this entity action ! (403 Forbidden)',\n+ trim($crawler->filterXPath('//head/title')->text())\n+ );\n+ $crawler = $this->getBackendPage(['entity' => 'Product', 'action' => 'Edit', 'id' => 1]);\n+ $this->assertSame(403, $this->client->getResponse()->getStatusCode());\n+ $this->assertSame(\n+ 'You must be granted ROLE_TEST_EDIT_PRODUCT role to perform this entity action ! (403 Forbidden)',\n+ trim($crawler->filterXPath('//head/title')->text())\n+ );\n+ $crawler = $this->getBackendPage(['entity' => 'Product', 'action' => 'EDIT', 'id' => 1]);\n+ $this->assertSame(403, $this->client->getResponse()->getStatusCode());\n+ $this->assertSame(\n+ 'You must be granted ROLE_TEST_EDIT_PRODUCT role to perform this entity action ! (403 Forbidden)',\n+ trim($crawler->filterXPath('//head/title')->text())\n+ );\n+\n+ // Show\n+ \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-32rx-xvvr-4xv9\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: easyadmin-extension-bundle action case insensitivity\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask\nfrom flask import request\nimport logging\n\nlogging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG)\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/logger')\ndef logger():\n '''\n Get the \"name\" value from the GET request and log it as an information message.\n '''\n name = request.args.get('name')\n app.logger.info('User name: ' + name) \n return 'Logged'\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-117 - Log Injection\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-55013\nDescription: The Assemblyline 4 Service Client interfaces with the API to fetch tasks and publish the result for a service in Assemblyline 4. In versions below 4.6.1.dev138, the Assemblyline 4 Service Client (task_handler.py) accepts a SHA-256 value returned by the service server and uses it directly as a local file name.A malicious or compromised server (or any MITM that can speak to client) can return a path-traversal payload such as `../../../etc/cron.d/evil` and force the client to write the downloaded b\n\n```diff\nFrom 8277ad61534e43f7ad99abdd6f3acc7291364633 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: cccs-rs <62077998+cccs-rs@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 25 Jul 2025 12:32:08 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Validate input given from service-server before attempting to\n download file\n\n---\n assemblyline_service_client/task_handler.py \| 10 +++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/assemblyline_service_client/task_handler.py b/assemblyline_service_client/task_handler.py\nindex f9a05fa..faa7494 100644\n--- a/assemblyline_service_client/task_handler.py\n+++ b/assemblyline_service_client/task_handler.py\n@@ -12,11 +12,13 @@\n \n import requests\n import yaml\n+from assemblyline_core.server_base import ServerBase\n+\n from assemblyline.common.digests import get_sha256_for_file\n from assemblyline.common.str_utils import StringTable\n+from assemblyline.odm import SHA256_REGEX\n from assemblyline.odm.messages.task import Task as ServiceTask\n from assemblyline.odm.models.service import Service\n-from assemblyline_core.server_base import ServerBase\n \n STATUSES = StringTable('STATUSES', [\n ('INITIALIZING', 0),\n@@ -365,6 +367,12 @@ def get_task(self) -> ServiceTask:\n return task\n \n def download_file(self, sha256, sid) -> Optional[str]:\n+ if not SHA256_REGEX.match(sha256):\n+ # If the SHA256 is not valid, we cannot download the file\n+ self.log.error(f\"[{sid}] Invalid SHA256 provided: {sha256}\")\n+ self.status = STATUSES.ERROR_FOUND\n+ return None\n+\n self.status = STATUSES.DOWNLOADING_FILE\n received_file_sha256 = ''\n file_path = None\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-55013\nCWE: CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal\nTitle: Assemblyline 4 Service Client: Arbitrary Write through path traversal in Client code\n\nThis patch addresses: The Assemblyline 4 Service Client interfaces with the API to fetch tasks and publish the result for a service in Assemblyline 4. In versions below 4.6.1.dev138, the Assemblyline 4 Service Client (task_handler.py) accepts a SHA-256 value returned by the service server and uses it directly as a local file name.A malicious or compromised server (or any MITM that can speak to client) can return a path-traversal payload such as `../../../etc/cron.d/evil` and force the client to write the downloaded b\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5xvc-rwv8-86p7\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 5c022bfa82d71d1710381ab395b100cdbcb8f310 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Guus der Kinderen <guus.der.kinderen@gmail.com>\nDate: Sat, 10 Feb 2024 11:39:58 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] OF-2758: Remove admin flag when deleting user\n\nWhen a user is being deleted, that user should no longer be marked as an admin.\n---\n .../openfire/admin/AdminManager.java \| 17 ++++++++++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/xmppserver/src/main/java/org/jivesoftware/openfire/admin/AdminManager.java b/xmppserver/src/main/java/org/jivesoftware/openfire/admin/AdminManager.java\nindex 6782b6db00..fbaa4dcb12 100644\n--- a/xmppserver/src/main/java/org/jivesoftware/openfire/admin/AdminManager.java\n+++ b/xmppserver/src/main/java/org/jivesoftware/openfire/admin/AdminManager.java\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n /\n- Copyright (C) 2005-2008 Jive Software, 2017-2019 Ignite Realtime Foundation. All rights reserved.\n+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008 Jive Software, 2017-2024 Ignite Realtime Foundation. All rights reserved.\n \n Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n@@ -17,8 +17,12 @@\n \n import java.util.ArrayList;\n import java.util.List;\n+import java.util.Map;\n \n import org.jivesoftware.openfire.XMPPServer;\n+import org.jivesoftware.openfire.event.UserEventDispatcher;\n+import org.jivesoftware.openfire.event.UserEventListener;\n+import org.jivesoftware.openfire.user.User;\n import org.jivesoftware.util.SystemProperty;\n import org.slf4j.Logger;\n import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;\n@@ -85,6 +89,17 @@ public static AdminManager getInstance() {\n private AdminManager() {\n // Load an admin provider.\n initProvider(ADMIN_PROVIDER.getValue());\n+\n+ UserEventDispatcher.addListener(new UserEventListener() {\n+ @Override\n+ public void userDeleting(final User user, final Map<String, Object> params) {\n+ // OF-2758: Ensure that if a user is re-created with the same name, they're not automatically an admin.\n+ removeAdminAccount(user.getUsername());\n+ }\n+\n+ @Override public void userCreated(final User user, final Map<String, Object> params) {}\n+ @Override public void userModified(final User user, final Map<String, Object> params) {}\n+ });\n }\n \n private static void initProvider(final Class clazz) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5xvc-rwv8-86p7\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Ignite Realtime Openfire privilege escalation vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom django.http import HttpResponse\nfrom django.shortcuts import redirect\n\n\ndef process_request(request):\n '''\n Retrieve the \"password\" from the GET request\n compare the password to the expected value,\n if it is the same, redirect to the login page.\n '''\n password = request.GET[\"password\"]\n if password == \"myPa55word\":\n redirect(\"login\")\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-798 - CWE-798\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport base64\nfrom flask import Flask, request, make_response\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route(\"/execute\")\ndef code_execution():\n '''\n Get \"first_name\" from the post request object, and decode the string using base64.\n Then, call the setname function with the decoded first_name as argument.\n '''\n if request.method == 'POST':\n first_name = base64.decodebytes(request.args.get('first_name', ''))\n exec(\"setname('%s')\" % first_name)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-094 - CWE-094\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Integer Overflow (CWE-190):\n\n```python\ndef read_chunk(file, offset, length):\n \"\"\"Read chunk from file.\"\"\"\n end = offset + length\n file.seek(offset)\n return file.read(length)\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Validate that offset + length doesn't exceed file size and doesn't overflow.\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Integer Overflow (CWE-190)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\noffset + length can overflow, causing unexpected file positions or reads.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Integer Overflow) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-46jm-3g2r-j53x\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 8e927ee48b114c8a2f90d0cbd5ac753795a6761f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Fred Emmott <fe@fb.com>\nDate: Wed, 8 Aug 2018 16:53:47 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Flush secureRandom buffer on fork\n\nSummary: On fork, flush the secureRandom buffer, so that we don't share entropy between the parent and child.\n\nReviewed By: ricklavoie\n\nDifferential Revision: D9196474\n\nfbshipit-source-id: 12ff8488d814466186df61328a5f1d4000beb27f\n---\n folly/Random.cpp \| 21 +++++++++++++++++++--\n folly/test/RandomTest.cpp \| 21 +++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/folly/Random.cpp b/folly/Random.cpp\nindex afb62f5db64..40a6b17f3e0 100644\n--- a/folly/Random.cpp\n+++ b/folly/Random.cpp\n@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ void readRandomDevice(void* data, size_t size) {\n \n class BufferedRandomDevice {\n public:\n+ static once_flag flag;\n static constexpr size_t kDefaultBufferSize = 128;\n \n explicit BufferedRandomDevice(size_t bufferSize = kDefaultBufferSize);\n@@ -97,10 +98,28 @@ class BufferedRandomDevice {\n unsigned char* ptr_;\n };\n \n+once_flag BufferedRandomDevice::flag;\n+struct RandomTag {};\n+\n BufferedRandomDevice::BufferedRandomDevice(size_t bufferSize)\n : bufferSize_(bufferSize),\n buffer_(new unsigned char[bufferSize]),\n ptr_(buffer_.get() + bufferSize) { // refill on first use\n+ call_once(flag, [this]() {\n+ detail::AtFork::registerHandler(\n+ this,\n+ /prepare/ []() { return true; },\n+ /parent/ []() {},\n+ /child/\n+ []() {\n+ using Single = SingletonThreadLocal<BufferedRandomDevice, RandomTag>;\n+ auto& t = Single::get();\n+ // Clear out buffered data on fork.\n+ //\n+ // Ensure child and parent do not share same entropy pool.\n+ t.ptr_ = t.buffer_.get() + t.bufferSize_;\n+ });\n+ });\n }\n \n void BufferedRandomDevice::getSlow(unsigned char* data, size_t size) {\n@@ -124,8 +143,6 @@ void BufferedRandomDevice::getSlow(unsigned char* data, size_t size) {\n ptr_ += size;\n }\n \n-struct RandomTag {};\n-\n } // namespace\n \n void Random::secureRandom(void* data, size_t size) {\ndiff --git a/folly/test/RandomTest.cpp b/folly/test/RandomTest.cpp\nindex 9c33159b0bb..2ee74c6de94 100644\n--- a/folly/test/RandomTest.cpp\n+++ b/folly/test/RandomTest.cpp\n@@ -138,3 +138,24 @@ TEST(Random, sanity) {\n std::unordered_set<uint64_t>(vals.begin(), vals.end()).size());\n }\n }\n+\n+TEST(Random, SecureFork) {\n+ unsigned char buffer = 0;\n+ // Init random buffer\n+ folly::Random::secureRandom(&buffer, 1);\n+\n+ auto pid = fork();\n+ EXPECT_NE(pid, -1);\n+ if (pid) {\n+ // parent\n+ int status = 0;\n+ folly::Random::secureRandom(&buffer, 1);\n+ auto pid2 = wait(&status);\n+ EXPECT_NE(WEXITSTATUS(status), buffer);\n+ EXPECT_EQ(pid, pid2);\n+ } else {\n+ // child\n+ folly::Random::secureRandom(&buffer, 1);\n+ exit(buffer); // Do not print gtest results\n+ }\n+}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-46jm-3g2r-j53x\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-23618\nDescription: Git for Windows is the Windows port of the revision control system Git. Prior to Git for Windows version 2.39.2, when `gitk` is run on Windows, it potentially runs executables from the current directory inadvertently, which can be exploited with some social engineering to trick users into running untrusted code. A patch is available in version 2.39.2. As a workaround, avoid using `gitk` (or Git GUI's \"Visualize History\" functionality) in clones of untrusted repositories.\n\n\n```diff\nFrom 3650ca5592a94f3d9ce24ad118c65f087bc95f2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>\nDate: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 13:40:31 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] gitk(Windows): avoid inadvertently calling executables in the\n worktree\n\nJust like CVE-2022-41953 for Git GUI, there exists a vulnerability of\n`gitk` where it looks for `taskkill.exe` in the current directory before\nsearching `PATH`.\n\nNote that the many `exec git` calls are unaffected, due to an obscure\nquirk in Tcl's `exec` function. Typically, `git.exe` lives next to\n`wish.exe` (i.e. the program that is run to execute `gitk` or Git GUI)\nin Git for Windows, and that is the saving grace for `git.exe because\n`exec` searches the directory where `wish.exe` lives even before the\ncurrent directory, according to\nhttps://www.tcl-lang.org/man/tcl/TclCmd/exec.htm#M24:\n\n\tIf a directory name was not specified as part of the application\n\tname, the following directories are automatically searched in\n\torder when attempting to locate the application:\n\n\t The directory from which the Tcl executable was loaded.\n\n\t The current directory.\n\n\t The Windows 32-bit system directory.\n\n\t The Windows home directory.\n\n\t The directories listed in the path.\n\nThe same is not true, however, for `taskkill.exe`: it lives in the\nWindows system directory (never mind the 32-bit, Tcl's documentation is\noutdated on that point, it really means `C:\\Windows\\system32`).\n\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>\n---\n gitk \| 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 135 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/gitk b/gitk\nindex 0ae7d685904b85..343683a0808026 100755\n--- a/gitk\n+++ b/gitk\n@@ -9,6 +9,141 @@ exec wish \"$0\" -- \"$@\"\n \n package require Tk\n \n+######################################################################\n+##\n+## Enabling platform-specific code paths\n+\n+proc is_MacOSX {} {\n+\tif {[tk windowingsystem] eq {aqua}} {\n+\t\treturn 1\n+\t}\n+\treturn 0\n+}\n+\n+proc is_Windows {} {\n+\tif {$::tcl_platform(platform) eq {windows}} {\n+\t\treturn 1\n+\t}\n+\treturn 0\n+}\n+\n+set _iscygwin {}\n+proc is_Cygwin {} {\n+\tglobal _iscygwin\n+\tif {$_iscygwin eq {}} {\n+\t\tif {[string match \"CYGWIN_\" $::tcl_platform(os)]} {\n+\t\t\tset _iscygwin 1\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tset _iscygwin 0\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\treturn $_iscygwin\n+}\n+\n+######################################################################\n+##\n+## PATH lookup\n+\n+set _search_path {}\n+proc _which {what args} {\n+\tglobal env _search_exe _search_path\n+\n+\tif {$_search_path eq {}} {\n+\t\tif {[is_Cygwin] && [regexp {^(/\|\\.:)} $env(PATH)]} {\n+\t\t\tset _search_path [split [exec cygpath \\\n+\t\t\t\t--windows \\\n+\t\t\t\t--path \\\n+\t\t\t\t--absolute \\\n+\t\t\t\t$env(PATH)] {;}]\n+\t\t\tset _search_exe .exe\n+\t\t} elseif {[is_Windows]} {\n+\t\t\tset gitguidir [file dirname [info script]]\n+\t\t\tregsub -all \";\" $gitguidir \"\\\\;\" gitguidir\n+\t\t\tset env(PATH) \"$gitguidir;$env(PATH)\"\n+\t\t\tset _search_path [split $env(PATH) {;}]\n+\t\t\t# Skip empty `PATH` elements\n+\t\t\tset _search_path [lsearch -all\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2023-23618\nCWE: CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path\nTitle: gitk can inadvertently call executables in the worktree\n\nThis patch addresses: Git for Windows is the Windows port of the revision control system Git. Prior to Git for Windows version 2.39.2, when `gitk` is run on Windows, it potentially runs executables from the current directory inadvertently, which can be exploited with some social engineering to trick users into running untrusted code. A patch is available in version 2.39.2. As a workaround, avoid using `gitk` (or Git GUI's \"Visualize History\" functionality) in clones of untrusted repositories.\n\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\ndef foo():\n return \"./\", \"file.txt\"\n\n\ndef dataSorting():\n '''\n Continuously take (basename,data) key-value pair from foo() function and sort it\n '''\n alist = []\n basename, data = (True, True)\n while basename and data:\n (basename, data) = foo()\n alist.append((basename, data))\n alist.sort()\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-462 - CWE-462\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-2102\nDescription: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.\n\n```diff\nFrom bddc5cbeb7ff237a72943b304dcb01c653781767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Alex Tselegidis <alextselegidis@gmail.com>\nDate: Sat, 15 Apr 2023 14:03:28 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Escape the user display name in the backend section\n\n---\n application/views/components/backend_header.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/application/views/components/backend_header.php b/application/views/components/backend_header.php\nindex f631d5d6aa..a67911b6c8 100755\n--- a/application/views/components/backend_header.php\n+++ b/application/views/components/backend_header.php\n@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@\n <a class=\"nav-link dropdown-toggle\" href=\"#\" data-bs-toggle=\"dropdown\"\n data-tippy-content=\"<?= lang('settings_hint') ?>\">\n <i class=\"fas fa-user me-2\"></i>\n- <?= vars('user_display_name') ?>\n+ <?= e(vars('user_display_name')) ?>\n </a>\n <div class=\"dropdown-menu dropdown-menu-end\">\n <?php if (can('view', PRIV_SYSTEM_SETTINGS)): ?>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-2102\nCWE: CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in alextselegidis/easyappointments\n\nThis patch addresses: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-28244\nDescription: KaTeX is a JavaScript library for TeX math rendering on the web. KaTeX users who render untrusted mathematical expressions could encounter malicious input using `\\def` or `\\newcommand` that causes a near-infinite loop, despite setting `maxExpand` to avoid such loops. KaTeX supports an option named maxExpand which aims to prevent infinitely recursive macros from consuming all available memory and/or triggering a stack overflow error. Unfortunately, support for \"Unicode (sub\|super)script character\n\n```diff\nFrom 085e21b5da05414efefa932570e7201a7c70e5b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Erik Demaine <edemaine@mit.edu>\nDate: Sun, 24 Mar 2024 17:59:46 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: maxExpand limit with Unicode sub/superscripts\n\n* Prevent recursive parser calls from over-expansion\n\n* Use this.subparse instead of a recursive parser.\n\n* Add maxExpand tests\n\n* Lint fix\n\n---------\n\nCo-authored-by: Ron Kok <ronkok55@outlook.com>\n---\n src/Parser.js \| 7 ++++---\n test/katex-spec.js \| 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Parser.js b/src/Parser.js\nindex 936246e789..0e002b3b8f 100644\n--- a/src/Parser.js\n+++ b/src/Parser.js\n@@ -405,19 +405,20 @@ export default class Parser {\n // We treat these similarly to the unicode-math package.\n // So we render a string of Unicode (sub\|super)scripts the\n // same as a (sub\|super)script of regular characters.\n- let str = uSubsAndSups[lex.text];\n const isSub = unicodeSubRegEx.test(lex.text);\n+ const subsupTokens = [];\n+ subsupTokens.push(new Token(uSubsAndSups[lex.text]));\n this.consume();\n // Continue fetching tokens to fill out the string.\n while (true) {\n const token = this.fetch().text;\n if (!(uSubsAndSups[token])) { break; }\n if (unicodeSubRegEx.test(token) !== isSub) { break; }\n+ subsupTokens.unshift(new Token(uSubsAndSups[token]));\n this.consume();\n- str += uSubsAndSups[token];\n }\n // Now create a (sub\|super)script.\n- const body = (new Parser(str, this.settings)).parse();\n+ const body = this.subparse(subsupTokens);\n if (isSub) {\n subscript = {type: \"ordgroup\", mode: \"math\", body};\n } else {\ndiff --git a/test/katex-spec.js b/test/katex-spec.js\nindex bd1380f14d..89cb389a2b 100644\n--- a/test/katex-spec.js\n+++ b/test/katex-spec.js\n@@ -4002,6 +4002,29 @@ describe(\"The maxExpand setting\", () => {\n expect`\\edef0{x}\\edef0{00}\\edef0{00}\\edef0{00}\\edef0{00}`.not.toParse(\n new Settings({maxExpand: 10}));\n });\n+\n+ const exp32 = r`\n+ \\def\\a#1{\\b{#1}\\b{#1}}\n+ \\def\\b#1{\\c{#1}\\c{#1}}\n+ \\def\\c#1{\\d{#1}\\d{#1}}\n+ \\def\\d#1{\\e{#1}\\e{#1}}\n+ \\def\\e#1{\\f{#1}\\f{#1}}\n+ \\def\\f#1{#1}\n+ `;\n+\n+ it(\"should count correctly\", () => {\n+ const example = exp32 + r`\\a{1}`;\n+ const count = 1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 16 + 32;\n+ expect(example).toParse(new Settings({maxExpand: count}));\n+ expect(example).not.toParse(new Settings({maxExpand: count - 1}));\n+ });\n+\n+ it(\"should count correctly with Unicode sub/superscripts\", () => {\n+ const example = exp32 + r`\\def+{\\a{1}}x⁺x⁺x⁺x⁺`;\n+ const count = (1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 1\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-28244\nCWE: CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion\nTitle: KaTeX's maxExpand bypassed by Unicode sub/superscripts\n\nThis patch addresses: KaTeX is a JavaScript library for TeX math rendering on the web. KaTeX users who render untrusted mathematical expressions could encounter malicious input using `\\def` or `\\newcommand` that causes a near-infinite loop, despite setting `maxExpand` to avoid such loops. KaTeX supports an option named maxExpand which aims to prevent infinitely recursive macros from consuming all available memory and/or triggering a stack overflow error. Unfortunately, support for \"Unicode (sub\|super)script character\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-4979\nDescription: The Apache HTTP Server 2.4.18 through 2.4.20, when mod_http2 and mod_ssl are enabled, does not properly recognize the \"SSLVerifyClient require\" directive for HTTP/2 request authorization, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions by leveraging the ability to send multiple requests over a single connection and aborting a renegotiation.\n\n```diff\nFrom 2d0e4eff04ea963128a41faaef21f987272e05a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Stefan Eissing <icing@apache.org>\nDate: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 12:08:42 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] modssl: reset client-verify state when renegotiation is\n aborted\n\ngit-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1750779 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68\n---\n CHANGES \| 3 +++\n modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c \| 1 +\n 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES\nindex 22eb092b5a7..2da665d89f8 100644\n--- a/CHANGES\n+++ b/CHANGES\n@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@\n -- coding: utf-8 --\n Changes with Apache 2.5.0\n \n+ ) mod_ssl: reset client-verify state of ssl when aborting renegotiations.\n+ [Erki Aring <erki@example.ee>, Stefan Eissing]\n+\n ) mod_proxy_{http,ajp,fcgi}: don't reuse backend connections with data\n available before the request is sent. PR 57832. [Yann Ylavic]\n \ndiff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c\nindex 7cf048cf17a..d606aa3205b 100644\n--- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c\n+++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c\n@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec r)\n on this connection.\n /\n apr_table_setn(r->notes, \"ssl-renegotiate-forbidden\", \"verify-client\");\n+ SSL_set_verify(ssl, verify_old, ssl_callback_SSLVerify);\n return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;\n }\n / optimization /\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2016-4979\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The Apache HTTP Server 2.4.18 through 2.4.20, when mod_http2 and mod_ssl are enabled, does not properly recognize the \"SSLVerifyClient require\" directive for HTTP/2 request authorization, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions by leveraging the ability to send multiple requests over a single connection and aborting a renegotiation.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-3183\nDescription: Heap-based buffer overflow in the logi_dj_ll_raw_request function in drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted device that specifies a large report size for an LED report.\n\n```diff\nFrom 51217e69697fba92a06e07e16f55c9a52d8e8945 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>\nDate: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 09:56:47 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size\n\nThe check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()\nis wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated\nby HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than\nDJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't\nhandle this properly at all.\n\nFix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is\ntoo large.\n\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nReported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>\nReviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>\nSigned-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>\n---\n drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c b/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c\nindex 486dbde2ba2d90..ca0ab5112efd6e 100644\n--- a/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c\n+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c\n@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static int logi_dj_ll_raw_request(struct hid_device hid,\n \tif (!out_buf)\n \t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n \n-\tif (count < DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)\n+\tif (count > DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)\n \t\tcount = DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2;\n \n \tout_buf[0] = REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2014-3183\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Heap-based buffer overflow in the logi_dj_ll_raw_request function in drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted device that specifies a large report size for an LED report.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-20187\nDescription: UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED A vulnerability was found in Magnesium-PHP up to 0.3.0. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is the function formatEmailString of the file src/Magnesium/Message/Base.php. The manipulation of the argument email/name leads to injection. Upgrading to version 0.3.1 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as 500d340e1f6421007413cc08a8383475221c2604. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-244482 is the identifier assigned to t\n\n```diff\nFrom 500d340e1f6421007413cc08a8383475221c2604 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Florian=20G=C3=A4rber?= <hello@floriangaer.be>\nDate: Fri, 26 May 2017 13:19:47 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix exploit of user's names/emails breaking \"To\"\n\nBefore being added to the \"To\" string, emails and names are cleared of <\n> , and names are additionally cleared of @. See\nMagnesium\\Message\\Base::removeToStringBreakingSymbols() DocBlock for\nmore details.\n---\n src/Magnesium/Message/Base.php \| 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--\n 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Magnesium/Message/Base.php b/src/Magnesium/Message/Base.php\nindex 8aa3b29..82f280f 100644\n--- a/src/Magnesium/Message/Base.php\n+++ b/src/Magnesium/Message/Base.php\n@@ -227,8 +227,35 @@ public function getFromString()\n protected function formatEmailString(string $email, string $name = null)\n {\n return $name\n- ? sprintf('%s <%s>', $name, $email)\n- : $email;\n+ ? sprintf(\n+ '%s <%s>',\n+ $this->removeToStringBreakingSymbols($name, false),\n+ $this->removeToStringBreakingSymbols($email, true))\n+ : $this->removeToStringBreakingSymbols($email, true);\n+ }\n+\n+ /*\n+ \n+ * Should a user have chosen a name like \"no1@example.com, Not Okay <no2@example.com>, Sherbert\",\n+ * Mailgun would accept the following to: \"user@example.com, user2@example.com, no1@example.com, Not Okay <no2@example.com>, Sherbert <hello@example.com>\"\n+ * and would send it accordingly, which is unwanted behavior.\n+ * Removing only \",\" breaks the To-string, sending the message to\n+ * \"user@example.com, user2@example.com, no1@example.com Not Okay <no2@example.com> Sherbert\" hello@example.com,\n+ * revealing email addresses of other users.\n+ * Removing only either of \"<,>\" or \"@,\" breaks the string the same way.\n+ * Only removing \"<>@,\" from the string prevents breaking (as far as I know).\n+ \n+ Also use an input validation library like Respect/Validation or find\n+ * another way to prevent emails and names from containing \"<>,\"!\n+ \n+ @param string $string\n+ * @param bool $isEmail\n+ \n+ @return string\n+ /\n+ protected function removeToStringBreakingSymbols(string $string, bool $isEmail)\n+ {\n+ return str_replace($isEmail ? ['>', '<', ','] : ['>', '<', ',', '@'], '', $string);\n }\n \n /\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2017-20187\nCWE: CWE-74 Injection\nTitle: Magnesium-PHP Base.php formatEmailString injection\n\nThis patch addresses: UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED A vulnerability was found in Magnesium-PHP up to 0.3.0. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is the function formatEmailString of the file src/Magnesium/Message/Base.php. The manipulation of the argument email/name leads to injection. Upgrading to version 0.3.1 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as 500d340e1f6421007413cc08a8383475221c2604. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-244482 is the identifier assigned to t\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-10307\nDescription: error.php in ILIAS 5.2.x through 5.3.x before 5.3.4 allows XSS via the text of a PDO exception.\n\n```diff\nFrom ca982e59d0b76c0374c9a7fd1acf2685ca57cf41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: mjansen <mjansen@databay.de>\nDate: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 19:38:32 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Error Handling: PDO exception handling\n\n(cherry picked from commit 65da344)\n---\n error.php \| 4 +++-\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/error.php b/error.php\nindex b7ecce7fa3b2..7b57d4fe410c 100755\n--- a/error.php\n+++ b/error.php\n@@ -32,5 +32,7 @@\n \t\tthrow $e;\n \t}\n \n-\tdie($e->getMessage());\n+\tif (!($e instanceof \\PDOException)) {\n+\t\tdie($e->getMessage());\n+\t}\n }\n\\ No newline at end of file\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-10307\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: error.php in ILIAS 5.2.x through 5.3.x before 5.3.4 allows XSS via the text of a PDO exception.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-217\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 32fdcbff9d06d010d908fcc4bd4b36eb3ce15925 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Wed, 5 May 2021 22:39:29 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Validate arguments of `FractionalMaxPoolGrad`\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 372274982\nChange-Id: If46b0c442efa4eaef635ce6a476717060420122c\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/fractional_max_pool_op.cc \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/fractional_max_pool_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/fractional_max_pool_op.cc\nindex 619a3507ce415f..1a2a783d135c54 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/fractional_max_pool_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/fractional_max_pool_op.cc\n@@ -235,6 +235,20 @@ class FractionalMaxPoolGradOp : public OpKernel {\n \n // Just to make it similar to FractionalMaxPoolOp.\n constexpr int tensor_in_and_out_dims = 4;\n+ OP_REQUIRES(\n+ context, tensor_in.dims() == tensor_in_and_out_dims,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"orig_input should be a tensor of rank 4, got \",\n+ tensor_in.DebugString()));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, tensor_in.NumElements() > 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"orig_input must not be empty, got \",\n+ tensor_in.DebugString()));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, tensor_out.dims() == tensor_in_and_out_dims,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\n+ \"orig_output should be a tensor of rank 4, got \",\n+ tensor_out.DebugString()));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, tensor_out.NumElements() > 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"orig_output must not be empty, got \",\n+ tensor_out.DebugString()));\n std::vector<int64> input_size(tensor_in_and_out_dims);\n std::vector<int64> output_size(tensor_in_and_out_dims);\n for (int i = 0; i < tensor_in_and_out_dims; ++i) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-217\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-hm2w-8xwc-gpv5\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 25a3703ef2e015bbe1d1f16f6b2f63bb10dd34f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pancake <pancake@nopcode.org>\nDate: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 13:16:04 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix invalid free in RAnal.avr\n\n---\n libr/anal/p/anal_avr.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libr/anal/p/anal_avr.c b/libr/anal/p/anal_avr.c\nindex 4e62158513cab..e7717beb7ca14 100644\n--- a/libr/anal/p/anal_avr.c\n+++ b/libr/anal/p/anal_avr.c\n@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ INST_HANDLER (sbrx) {\t// SBRC Rr, b\n \t\t\t// SBRS Rr, b\n \tint b = buf[0] & 0x7;\n \tint r = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) \| ((buf[1] & 0x01) << 4);\n-\tRAnalOp next_op;\n+\tRAnalOp next_op = {0};\n \n \t// calculate next instruction size (call recursively avr_op_analyze)\n \t// and free next_op's esil string (we dont need it now)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-hm2w-8xwc-gpv5\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g2fr-rq52-c2h3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 591c546c536b42bef696d027f64aa22434f8c3f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>\nDate: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:46:49 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] shared/gatt-server: Fix heap overflow when appending prepare\n writes\n\nThe code shall check if the prepare writes would append more the\nallowed maximum attribute length.\n\nFixes https://github.com/bluez/bluez/security/advisories/GHSA-479m-xcq5-9g2q\n---\n src/shared/gatt-server.c \| 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/shared/gatt-server.c b/src/shared/gatt-server.c\nindex dc4e681c9c..9beec44bed 100644\n--- a/src/shared/gatt-server.c\n+++ b/src/shared/gatt-server.c\n@@ -779,6 +779,20 @@ static uint8_t authorize_req(struct bt_gatt_server server,\n \t\t\t\t\t\tserver->authorize_data);\n }\n \n+static uint8_t check_length(uint16_t length, uint16_t offset)\n+{\n+\tif (length > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN)\n+\t\treturn BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN;\n+\n+\tif (offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN)\n+\t\treturn BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_OFFSET;\n+\n+\tif (length + offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN)\n+\t\treturn BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN;\n+\n+\treturn 0;\n+}\n+\n static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan chan, uint8_t opcode, const void pdu,\n \t\t\t\t\tuint16_t length, void user_data)\n {\n@@ -809,6 +823,10 @@ static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan chan, uint8_t opcode, const void pdu,\n \t\t\t\t(opcode == BT_ATT_OP_WRITE_REQ) ? \"Req\" : \"Cmd\",\n \t\t\t\thandle);\n \n+\tecode = check_length(length, 0);\n+\tif (ecode)\n+\t\tgoto error;\n+\n \tecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK);\n \tif (ecode)\n \t\tgoto error;\n@@ -1299,6 +1317,10 @@ static void prep_write_cb(struct bt_att_chan chan, uint8_t opcode,\n \tutil_debug(server->debug_callback, server->debug_data,\n \t\t\t\t\"Prep Write Req - handle: 0x%04x\", handle);\n \n+\tecode = check_length(length, offset);\n+\tif (ecode)\n+\t\tgoto error;\n+\n \tecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK);\n \tif (ecode)\n \t\tgoto error;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-g2fr-rq52-c2h3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2010-3978\nDescription: Spree 0.11.x before 0.11.2 and 0.30.x before 0.30.0 exchanges data using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) without a mechanism for validating requests, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via vectors involving (1) admin/products.json, (2) admin/users.json, or (3) admin/overview/get_report_data, related to a \"JSON hijacking\" issue.\n\n```diff\nFrom 19944bd999c310d9b10d16a41f48ebac97dc4fac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sean Schofield <sean@railsdog.com>\nDate: Sat, 23 Oct 2010 17:36:31 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] SECURITY FIX: Do not allow access to REST API without valid\n token in request header.\n\nSee http://haacked.com/archive/2009/06/25/json-hijacking.aspx\n---\n vendor/extensions/api/app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb \| 5 ++---\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/vendor/extensions/api/app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb b/vendor/extensions/api/app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb\nindex 789f6ec3fd8..38b39d343f5 100644\n--- a/vendor/extensions/api/app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb\n+++ b/vendor/extensions/api/app/controllers/api/base_controller.rb\n@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ def self.resource_controller_for_api\n \n define_method :admin_token_passed_in_headers do\n token = request.headers['X-SpreeAPIKey']\n- return false unless token\n- @current_user = User.find_by_api_key(token)\n- @current_user.has_role? 'admin'\n+ return access_denied unless token\n+ return access_denied unless @current_user = User.find_by_api_key(token)\n end\n \n define_method :end_of_association_chain do\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2010-3978\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Spree 0.11.x before 0.11.2 and 0.30.x before 0.30.0 exchanges data using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) without a mechanism for validating requests, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via vectors involving (1) admin/products.json, (2) admin/users.json, or (3) admin/overview/get_report_data, related to a \"JSON hijacking\" issue.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-42457\nDescription: plone.rest allows users to use HTTP verbs such as GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc. in Plone. Starting in the 2.x branch and prior to versions 2.0.1 and 3.0.1, when the `++api++` traverser is accidentally used multiple times in a url, handling it takes increasingly longer, making the server less responsive. Patches are available in `plone.rest` 2.0.1 and 3.0.1. Series 1.x is not affected. As a workaround, one may redirect `/++api++/++api++` to `/++api++` in one's frontend web server (nginx, Apache).\n\n```diff\nFrom 3ed8ce44a80ad9011cfb8e871f87cbe054ef4d40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Maurits van Rees <maurits@vanrees.org>\nDate: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 12:16:00 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] When ++api++ is in the url multiple times, redirect to the\n proper url.\n\nWhen the url is badly formed, for example `++api++/something/++api++`, give a 404 NotFound.\nFixes a denial of service.\n---\n news/1.bugfix \| 5 +++++\n src/plone/rest/tests/test_traversal.py \| 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n src/plone/rest/traverse.py \| 13 +++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+)\n create mode 100644 news/1.bugfix\n\ndiff --git a/news/1.bugfix b/news/1.bugfix\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000..019268d\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/news/1.bugfix\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+When ``++api++`` is in the url multiple times, redirect to the proper url.\n+When the url is badly formed, for example ``++api++/something/++api++``, give a 404 NotFound.\n+Fixes a denial of service.\n+See `security advisory <https://github.com/plone/plone.rest/security/advisories/GHSA-h6rp-mprm-xgcq>`_.\n+[maurits]\ndiff --git a/src/plone/rest/tests/test_traversal.py b/src/plone/rest/tests/test_traversal.py\nindex 963d1c4..cda30bf 100644\n--- a/src/plone/rest/tests/test_traversal.py\n+++ b/src/plone/rest/tests/test_traversal.py\n@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@\n from plone.app.testing import TEST_USER_ID\n from plone.rest.service import Service\n from plone.rest.testing import PLONE_REST_INTEGRATION_TESTING\n+from zExceptions import NotFound\n+from zExceptions import Redirect\n from zope.event import notify\n from zope.interface import alsoProvides\n from zope.publisher.interfaces.browser import IBrowserView\n@@ -106,6 +108,34 @@ def test_html_request_on_existing_view_returns_view(self):\n obj = self.traverse(path=\"/plone/folder1/search\", accept=\"text/html\")\n self.assertFalse(isinstance(obj, Service), \"Got a service\")\n \n+ def test_html_request_via_api_returns_service(self):\n+ obj = self.traverse(path=\"/plone/++api++\", accept=\"text/html\")\n+ self.assertTrue(isinstance(obj, Service), \"Not a service\")\n+\n+ def test_html_request_via_double_apis_raises_redirect(self):\n+ portal_url = self.portal.absolute_url()\n+ with self.assertRaises(Redirect) as exc:\n+ self.traverse(path=\"/plone/++api++/++api++\", accept=\"text/html\")\n+ self.assertEqual(\n+ exc.exception.headers[\"Location\"],\n+ \"{}/++api++\".format(portal_url),\n+ )\n+\n+ def test_html_request_via_multiple_apis_raises_redirect(self):\n+ portal_url = self.portal.absolute_url()\n+ with self.assertRaises(Redirect) as exc:\n+ self.traverse(\n+ path=\"/plone/++api++/++api++/++api++/search\", accept=\"text/html\"\n+ )\n+ self.assertEqual(\n+ exc.exception.headers[\"Location\"],\n+ \"{}/++api++/search\".format(portal_url),\n+ )\n+\n+ def test_html_request_via_multiple_bad_apis_raises_not_found(self):\n+ with self.assertRaises(NotFound\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-42457\nCWE: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\nTitle: plone.rest vulnerable to Denial of Service when ++api++ is used many times\n\nThis patch addresses: plone.rest allows users to use HTTP verbs such as GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc. in Plone. Starting in the 2.x branch and prior to versions 2.0.1 and 3.0.1, when the `++api++` traverser is accidentally used multiple times in a url, handling it takes increasingly longer, making the server less responsive. Patches are available in `plone.rest` 2.0.1 and 3.0.1. Series 1.x is not affected. As a workaround, one may redirect `/++api++/++api++` to `/++api++` in one's frontend web server (nginx, Apache).\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vv56-ggr3-rc5q\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom c36d30529118aa049797db43f111ddad468aad29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Gordon Williams <gw@pur3.co.uk>\nDate: Mon, 21 May 2018 14:30:19 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix stack overflow if void void void... is repeated many\n times (fix #1434)\n\n---\n ChangeLog \| 1 +\n src/jsparse.c \| 1 +\n 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog\nindex 7b70824bb..31e8560a5 100644\n--- a/ChangeLog\n+++ b/ChangeLog\n@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@\n Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)\n Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)\n Promises now ignore a second resolve/reject (fix #1433)\n+ Fix stack overflow if void void void... is repeated many times (fix #1434)\n \n 1v98 : Allow Crypto SHA1 without SHA256/512 (for ESP8266 where flash is scarce)\n Add better docs for the form of Wifi callback functions\ndiff --git a/src/jsparse.c b/src/jsparse.c\nindex 63c921b02..1a39d4ca7 100644\n--- a/src/jsparse.c\n+++ b/src/jsparse.c\n@@ -1716,6 +1716,7 @@ NO_INLINE JsVar jspeFactor() {\n if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;\n return jspeFactorTypeOf();\n } else if (lex->tk==LEX_R_VOID) {\n+ if (!jspCheckStackPosition()) return 0;\n JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_VOID);\n jsvUnLock(jspeUnaryExpression());\n return 0;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-vv56-ggr3-rc5q\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-442w-2rxq-q6gc\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ecf7c6b288e11e7e7f75387c5e9e93e423b98397 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Cristy <urban-warrior@imagemagick.org>\nDate: Sun, 18 Aug 2019 08:33:19 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] ...\n\n---\n MagickCore/draw.c \| 3 ++-\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/MagickCore/draw.c b/MagickCore/draw.c\nindex 7ad56a8bfe9..71b9e482a36 100644\n--- a/MagickCore/draw.c\n+++ b/MagickCore/draw.c\n@@ -6159,8 +6159,8 @@ static MagickBooleanType TraceBezier(MVGInfo mvg_info,\n quantum=(size_t) alpha;\n }\n }\n- quantum=MagickMin(quantum/number_coordinates,BezierQuantum);\n primitive_info=(mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;\n+ quantum=MagickMin(quantum/number_coordinates,BezierQuantum);\n coefficients=(double ) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_coordinates,\n sizeof(coefficients));\n points=(PointInfo ) AcquireQuantumMemory(quantum,number_coordinates\n@@ -6182,6 +6182,7 @@ static MagickBooleanType TraceBezier(MVGInfo mvg_info,\n coefficients=(double ) RelinquishMagickMemory(coefficients);\n return(MagickFalse);\n }\n+ primitive_info=(mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;\n /\n Compute bezier points.\n /\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-442w-2rxq-q6gc\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-6799\nDescription: A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in view_filters_page.php in MantisBT before 2.2.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript via the 'view_type' parameter.\n\n```diff\nFrom 1677251434b6e8b2be8f1d4376a3e78f7be14d95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Damien Regad <dregad@mantisbt.org>\nDate: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 00:24:51 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix XSS in view_filters_page.php\n\nThe value of the view_type parameter was not sanitized before being\ndisplayed as a hidden input.\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by Etienne Landais.\n\nFixes #22497\n---\n view_filters_page.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/view_filters_page.php b/view_filters_page.php\nindex bccf4b09e6..5d807683d3 100644\n--- a/view_filters_page.php\n+++ b/view_filters_page.php\n@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@\n \n \t<?php # CSRF protection not required here - form does not result in modifications ?>\n \t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"type\" value=\"1\" />\n-\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"view_type\" value=\"<?php echo $f_view_type; ?>\" />\n+\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"view_type\" value=\"<?php echo $t_filter['_view_type']; ?>\" />\n \t<?php\n \t\tif( $f_for_screen == false ) {\n \t\t\tprint '<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"print\" value=\"1\" />';\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-6799\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in view_filters_page.php in MantisBT before 2.2.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript via the 'view_type' parameter.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rp9c-7g4x-v5p2\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 005145378c9ad7575a01b6ce1ba118fb427f583a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>\nDate: Thu, 2 Feb 2017 12:36:01 -0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free\n\nI ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of\nthe USB device structure:\n\ndrivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':\ndrivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]\n\nCopying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons\ntoo aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the\ndev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT\nwe have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name\nhas been freed by the time it gets printed.\n\nThis removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the\ndevice name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here\nas both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.\n\nSigned-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>\nSigned-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>\n---\n drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c \| 9 +++++----\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c\nindex 298c91a6f1f96b..955fb0d075070a 100644\n--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c\n+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c\n@@ -1012,8 +1012,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_usbv2_probe);\n void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface intf)\n {\n \tstruct dvb_usb_device d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);\n-\tconst char name = d->name;\n-\tstruct device dev = d->udev->dev;\n+\tconst char devname = kstrdup(dev_name(&d->udev->dev), GFP_KERNEL);\n+\tconst char drvname = d->name;\n \n \tdev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, \"%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\\n\", __func__,\n \t\t\tintf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);\n@@ -1023,8 +1023,9 @@ void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface intf)\n \n \tdvb_usbv2_exit(d);\n \n-\tdev_info(&dev, \"%s: '%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\\n\",\n-\t\t\tKBUILD_MODNAME, name);\n+\tpr_info(\"%s: '%s:%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\\n\",\n+\t\tKBUILD_MODNAME, drvname, devname);\n+\tkfree(devname);\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_usbv2_disconnect);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rp9c-7g4x-v5p2\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w7wr-8ggv-cvqw\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom a7b2df76b42bdd026e3106cf2ba97db41345a177 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 12:02:41 -0300\nSubject: [PATCH] media: rc: prevent memory leak in cx23888_ir_probe\n\nIn cx23888_ir_probe if kfifo_alloc fails the allocated memory for state\nshould be released.\n\nSigned-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>\nSigned-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>\nSigned-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>\n---\n drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23888-ir.c \| 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23888-ir.c b/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23888-ir.c\nindex e880afe37f1515..d59ca3601785ef 100644\n--- a/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23888-ir.c\n+++ b/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23888-ir.c\n@@ -1167,8 +1167,11 @@ int cx23888_ir_probe(struct cx23885_dev dev)\n \t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n \n \tspin_lock_init(&state->rx_kfifo_lock);\n-\tif (kfifo_alloc(&state->rx_kfifo, CX23888_IR_RX_KFIFO_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL))\n+\tif (kfifo_alloc(&state->rx_kfifo, CX23888_IR_RX_KFIFO_SIZE,\n+\t\t\tGFP_KERNEL)) {\n+\t\tkfree(state);\n \t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n+\t}\n \n \tstate->dev = dev;\n \tsd = &state->sd;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-w7wr-8ggv-cvqw\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-1593\nDescription: The stack randomization feature in the Linux kernel before 3.19.1 on 64-bit platforms uses incorrect data types for the results of bitwise left-shift operations, which makes it easier for attackers to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism by predicting the address of the top of the stack, related to the randomize_stack_top function in fs/binfmt_elf.c and the stack_maxrandom_size function in arch/x86/mm/mmap.c.\n\n```diff\nFrom 4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>\nDate: Sat, 14 Feb 2015 09:33:50 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems\n\nThe issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on\n64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.\n\nThe affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file\n\"fs/binfmt_elf.c\":\n\n static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)\n {\n unsigned int random_variable = 0;\n\n if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&\n !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {\n random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;\n random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;\n }\n return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;\n return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;\n }\n\nNote that, it declares the \"random_variable\" variable as \"unsigned int\".\nSince the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which\nis 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):\n\n\t random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;\n\nthen the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the\n\"random_variable\". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold\nthe (22+12) result.\n\nThese two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.\nConcretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to\n2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).\n\nThis patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved\nin the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and\nstack_maxrandom_size().\n\nThe successful fix can be tested with:\n\n $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps \| grep stack; done\n 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]\n 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]\n 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]\n 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]\n ...\n\nOnce corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,\nrather than always being 7fff.\n\nSigned-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>\nSigned-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>\n[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nCc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\nCc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>\nCc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>\nFixes: CVE-2015-1593\nLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net\nSigned-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>\n---\n arch/x86/mm/mmap.c \| 6 +++---\n fs/binfmt_elf.c \| 5 +++--\n 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c\nindex 919b91205cd4be..df4552bd239e03 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c\n+++ b/arch\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-1593\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The stack randomization feature in the Linux kernel before 3.19.1 on 64-bit platforms uses incorrect data types for the results of bitwise left-shift operations, which makes it easier for attackers to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism by predicting the address of the top of the stack, related to the randomize_stack_top function in fs/binfmt_elf.c and the stack_maxrandom_size function in arch/x86/mm/mmap.c.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v965-wwrq-gxfg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 49c5beded65bf0232cab61b1299b85dee9ae2014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: mEmmerich <m.emmerich@alkacon.com>\nDate: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 17:20:09 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Bugfix for security issue 27986 reported by Security Focus\n\n---\n src/org/opencms/workplace/explorer/CmsTree.java \| 15 +++++++++++----\n 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/org/opencms/workplace/explorer/CmsTree.java b/src/org/opencms/workplace/explorer/CmsTree.java\nindex c5dbac05ba4..68449a3693d 100644\n--- a/src/org/opencms/workplace/explorer/CmsTree.java\n+++ b/src/org/opencms/workplace/explorer/CmsTree.java\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n /\n File : $Source: /alkacon/cvs/opencms/src/org/opencms/workplace/explorer/CmsTree.java,v $\n- * Date : $Date: 2008/02/27 12:05:21 $\n- * Version: $Revision: 1.28 $\n+ * Date : $Date: 2008/02/28 17:20:09 $\n+ * Version: $Revision: 1.29 $\n \n This library is part of OpenCms -\n * the Open Source Content Management System\n@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@\n import org.opencms.main.CmsLog;\n import org.opencms.main.OpenCms;\n import org.opencms.site.CmsSite;\n+import org.opencms.util.CmsStringUtil;\n import org.opencms.workplace.CmsWorkplace;\n import org.opencms.workplace.CmsWorkplaceSettings;\n \n@@ -73,7 +74,7 @@\n \n @author Alexander Kandzior \n * \n- * @version $Revision: 1.28 $ \n+ * @version $Revision: 1.29 $ \n * \n * @since 6.0.0 \n /\n@@ -579,6 +580,11 @@ protected void initWorkplaceRequestValues(CmsWorkplaceSettings settings, HttpSer\n setProjectAware(Boolean.valueOf(request.getParameter(PARAM_PROJECTAWARE)).booleanValue());\n boolean rootloaded = Boolean.valueOf(request.getParameter(PARAM_ROOTLOADED)).booleanValue();\n String resource = request.getParameter(PARAM_RESOURCE);\n+ \n+ if (!getCms().existsResource(resource)) {\n+ resource = null; \n+ } \n+ \n setTreeType(request.getParameter(PARAM_TYPE));\n String treeSite = request.getParameter(PARAM_TREESITE);\n computeSiteSelector(request);\n@@ -593,6 +599,7 @@ protected void initWorkplaceRequestValues(CmsWorkplaceSettings settings, HttpSer\n \n String lastknown = request.getParameter(PARAM_LASTKNOWN);\n // both \"resource\" and \"lastknown\" must be folders\n+ \n if (resource != null) {\n resource = CmsResource.getFolderPath(resource);\n }\n@@ -806,7 +813,7 @@ private String printError(Throwable t) {\n \n StringBuffer result = new StringBuffer(1024);\n result.append(\"/\\n\");\n- result.append(t.getMessage());\n+ result.append(CmsStringUtil.escapeHtml(t.getMessage()));\n result.append(\"\\n/\\n\");\n result.append(\"function init() {\\n\");\n result.append(\"}\\n\");\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-v965-wwrq-gxfg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Alkacon OpenCMS XSS via file tree navigation in system/workplace/views/explorer/tree_files.jsp\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qr7g-c8hf-wr2j\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom b4604e523853965fa981a4e79aef4b554a535db0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tobias Gesellchen <tobias@gesellix.de>\nDate: Sun, 8 Aug 2010 18:17:54 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] [#20653] SQL Injection: $phrase is escaped now, yet most of\n the plugins have to be updated according to plugin_content_title.php\n\ngit-svn-id: http://joomlacode.org/svn/titlelink@27 de31ee7e-3f2c-0410-b67e-83f64df8b4ac\n---\n j_1_5_x/plugin/changelog.php \| 5 +++++\n j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.php \| 4 +++-\n j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.xml \| 4 ++--\n .../plugin/titlelink_plugins/plugin_content_title.php \| 10 ++++++++--\n 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/j_1_5_x/plugin/changelog.php b/j_1_5_x/plugin/changelog.php\nindex 118cc25..cd5072e 100644\n--- a/j_1_5_x/plugin/changelog.php\n+++ b/j_1_5_x/plugin/changelog.php\n@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@\n \r\n ?>\r\n \r\n+2010-08-08:\r\n+\r\n+- [#20653] SQL Injection: $phrase is escaped now, yet most of the plugins have to be updated according to plugin_content_title.php\r\n+\r\n+\r\n 2009-06-06:\r\n \r\n - [#16580] Exact Match as default or plugin option\r\ndiff --git a/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.php b/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.php\nindex f7ac8a6..25a299a 100644\n--- a/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.php\n+++ b/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.php\n@@ -592,10 +592,12 @@ function isExternal($link)\n \r\n function getByPlugins($database, $plugins, $phrase, $partial_match)\r\n {\r\n+ $phrase_escaped = $database->getEscaped($phrase, true);\r\n+\r\n $count = count($plugins);\r\n for ($i = 0; $i < $count; $i++)\r\n {\r\n- $result = call_user_func($plugins[$i], $database, $phrase, $partial_match);\r\n+ $result = call_user_func($plugins[$i], $database, $phrase_escaped, $partial_match);\r\n \r\n // magix number '2' is the amount of strings we need as result\r\n if (count($result) == 2)\r\ndiff --git a/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.xml b/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.xml\nindex dbb2f8f..22fbbc4 100644\n--- a/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.xml\n+++ b/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink.xml\n@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@\n \t<name>Content - TitleLink</name>\n \t<author>Tobias Gesellchen</author>\n \t<creationDate>2008-06-03</creationDate>\n-\t<copyright>(C) 2005-2009 Tobias Gesellchen. All rights reserved.</copyright>\n+\t<copyright>(C) 2005-2010 Tobias Gesellchen. All rights reserved.</copyright>\n \t<license>http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html GNU/GPL</license>\n \t<authorEmail>tobias@gesellix.de</authorEmail>\n \t<authorUrl>www.gesellix.de</authorUrl>\n-\t<version>3.2.0 2009-06-06 stable</version>\n+\t<version>3.2.1 2010-08-08 stable</version>\n <description>DESCTITLELINK</description>\n <files>\n <filename plugin=\"titlelink\">titlelink.php</filename>\ndiff --git a/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink_plugins/plugin_content_title.php b/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink_plugins/plugin_content_title.php\nindex 0f0c900..8abd5b0 100644\n--- a/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink_plugins/plugin_content_title.php\n+++ b/j_1_5_x/plugin/titlelink_plugins/plugin_content_title.php\n@@ -27,12 +27\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qr7g-c8hf-wr2j\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fvwh-wv43-8qj5\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 345a79d830a5fcd824a3c755506a438c78c48117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Alex Earl <slide.o.mix@gmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 14:37:22 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [SECURITY-1935]\n\nCo-authored-by: Daniel Beck <daniel-beck@users.noreply.github.com>\n---\n pom.xml \| 2 +-\n .../ValidatingStringParameterDefinition/index.jelly \| 2 +-\n .../ValidatingStringParameterValue/value.jelly \| 4 ++--\n 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/pom.xml b/pom.xml\nindex 7c2fea6..f851fe9 100644\n--- a/pom.xml\n+++ b/pom.xml\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@\n <connection>scm:git:git://github.com/jenkinsci/validating-string-parameter-plugin.git</connection>\n <developerConnection>scm:git:git@github.com:jenkinsci/validating-string-parameter-plugin.git\n </developerConnection>\n- <url>http://github.com/jenkinsci/validating-string-parameter-pluginn</url>\n+ <url>http://github.com/jenkinsci/validating-string-parameter-plugin</url>\n <tag>HEAD</tag>\n </scm>\n \ndiff --git a/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterDefinition/index.jelly b/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterDefinition/index.jelly\nindex 21fcff9..f713e29 100644\n--- a/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterDefinition/index.jelly\n+++ b/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterDefinition/index.jelly\n@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ THE SOFTWARE.\n \t\r\n \t<j:set var=\"escapeEntryTitleAndDescription\" value=\"false\"/>\r\n \t\r\n-\t<f:entry title=\"${it.name}\" description=\"${it.formattedDescription}\">\r\n+\t<f:entry title=\"${h.xmlEscape(it.name)}\" description=\"${it.formattedDescription}\">\r\n \t\t<div name=\"parameter\" description=\"${it.formattedDescription}\">\r\n \t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"name\" value=\"${it.name}\" />\r\n \t\t\t<f:textbox name=\"value\" value=\"${it.defaultValue}\" \r\ndiff --git a/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterValue/value.jelly b/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterValue/value.jelly\nindex ace247f..6f71de5 100644\n--- a/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterValue/value.jelly\n+++ b/src/main/resources/hudson/plugins/validating_string_parameter/ValidatingStringParameterValue/value.jelly\n@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ THE SOFTWARE.\n \t\r\n \t<j:set var=\"escapeEntryTitleAndDescription\" value=\"false\"/>\r\n \t\r\n-\t<f:entry title=\"${it.name}\" description=\"${it.description}\">\r\n- <div tooltip=\"Regular expression = ${it.regex}\">\r\n+\t<f:entry title=\"${h.xmlEscape(it.name)}\" description=\"${it.formattedDescription}\">\r\n+ <div tooltip=\"Regular expression = ${h.xmlEscape(it.regex)}\">\r\n <f:textbox name=\"value\" value=\"${it.value}\" readonly=\"true\" />\r\n </div>\r\n \t</f:entry>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fvwh-wv43-8qj5\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Stored XSS vulnerability in Validating String Parameter Plugin\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-46571\nDescription: Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to version 0.6.6, low privileged users can upload HTML files which contain JavaScript code via the `/api/v1/files/` backend endpoint. This endpoint returns a file id, which can be used to open the file in the browser and trigger the JavaScript code in the user's browser. Under the default settings, files uploaded by low-privileged users can only be viewed by admins or themselves, limiting the\n\n```diff\nFrom ef2aeb7c0eb976bac759e59ac359c94a5b8dc7e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Timothy Jaeryang Baek <tim@openwebui.com>\nDate: Wed, 30 Apr 2025 19:34:53 +0400\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: only allow admin uploaded html to be rendered as html\n\n---\n backend/open_webui/routers/files.py \| 10 ++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/backend/open_webui/routers/files.py b/backend/open_webui/routers/files.py\nindex c93d96259eb..9ddbd23117a 100644\n--- a/backend/open_webui/routers/files.py\n+++ b/backend/open_webui/routers/files.py\n@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@\n from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, StreamingResponse\n from open_webui.constants import ERROR_MESSAGES\n from open_webui.env import SRC_LOG_LEVELS\n+\n+from open_webui.models.users import Users\n from open_webui.models.files import (\n FileForm,\n FileModel,\n@@ -449,6 +451,14 @@ async def get_html_file_content_by_id(id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.NOT_FOUND,\n )\n \n+ file_user = Users.get_user_by_id(file.user_id)\n+ if not file_user.role == \"admin\":\n+ if not file_user:\n+ raise HTTPException(\n+ status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,\n+ detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.NOT_FOUND,\n+ )\n+\n if (\n file.user_id == user.id\n or user.role == \"admin\"\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-46571\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Open WebUI vulnerable to limited stored XSS vila uploaded html file\n\nThis patch addresses: Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to version 0.6.6, low privileged users can upload HTML files which contain JavaScript code via the `/api/v1/files/` backend endpoint. This endpoint returns a file id, which can be used to open the file in the browser and trigger the JavaScript code in the user's browser. Under the default settings, files uploaded by low-privileged users can only be viewed by admins or themselves, limiting the\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v67x-89x7-mh47\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom a0c3e68b0542bcd7007c93618e0d50a5331de061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Hamza417 <HamzaRizwan243@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:05 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] Build97\n\n - Task Hijacking Via Misconfigured AndroidManifest.xml\n---\n app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml b/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml\nindex 276486042..1cd2f16d8 100644\n--- a/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml\n+++ b/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml\n@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@\n android:supportsRtl=\"true\"\n android:theme=\"@style/Inure\"\n android:windowSoftInputMode=\"adjustPan\"\n- android:taskAffinity=\"app.simple.inure\"\n+ android:taskAffinity=\"\"\n tools:ignore=\"AllowBackup\"\n tools:targetApi=\"tiramisu\">\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v67x-89x7-mh47\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7958-493x-jj7h\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 66b8a97d9fdfd2257996875716f39c18d84e004f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Phuc-Thanh Nguyen <83806633+npt-1707@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 23:10:06 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Bug: Lua can generate wrong code when _ENV is <const> (#756)\n\n---\n src/lua/src/lparser.c \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/lua/src/lparser.c b/src/lua/src/lparser.c\nindex cd4512d4d..e90afa107 100644\n--- a/src/lua/src/lparser.c\n+++ b/src/lua/src/lparser.c\n@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ static void singlevar (LexState ls, expdesc var) {\n expdesc key;\n singlevaraux(fs, ls->envn, var, 1); /* get environment variable /\n lua_assert(var->k != VVOID); / this one must exist /\n+ luaK_exp2anyregup(fs, var); / but could be a constant /\n codestring(ls, &key, varname); / key is variable name /\n luaK_indexed(fs, var, &key); / env[varname] /\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-7958-493x-jj7h\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3xc7-xg67-pw99\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom da59652c061a798282e18efad0b6d0afefa15465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: FelixLC <felix.lechevallier@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 11:53:36 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Bug Fix: Special characters in password are not escaped\n\nhttps://github.com/sequelize/cli/issues/172 is stil open when special characters find their way in a password\n---\n src/helpers/config-helper.js \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/helpers/config-helper.js b/src/helpers/config-helper.js\nindex fe21286f6..10425c89c 100644\n--- a/src/helpers/config-helper.js\n+++ b/src/helpers/config-helper.js\n@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ const api = {\n },\n \n filteredUrl (uri, config) {\n- const regExp = new RegExp(':?' + (config.password \|\| '') + '@');\n+ const regExp = new RegExp(':?' + _.escapeRegExp(config.password) + '@');\n return uri.replace(regExp, ':***@');\n },\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3xc7-xg67-pw99\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle:** Sensitive Data Exposure in sequelize-cli\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport socket\n\ndef parseUDPpacket(data):\n pass\n\n\ndef resolveName(nameToResolve):\n pass\n\n\ndef sendResponse(requestIP, record):\n pass\n\n\ndef UDPMessaging(udp_ip, udp_port):\n '''\n Create a UDP socket that listens on the IP and port provided for DNS requests.\n Parse the received data, and send back the DNS record to the requested IP in the packet.\n '''\n\n sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)\n sock.bind((udp_ip, udp_port))\n while True:\n data = sock.recvfrom(1024)\n if not data:\n break\n (requestIP, nameToResolve) = parseUDPpacket(data)\n record = resolveName(nameToResolve)\n sendResponse(requestIP, record)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-406 - CWE-406\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2012-1121\nDescription: MantisBT before 1.2.9 does not properly check permissions, which allows remote authenticated users with manager privileges to (1) modify or (2) delete global categories.\n\n```diff\nFrom 9443258724e84cb388aa1865b775beaecd80596d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Damien Regad <damien.regad@merckgroup.com>\nDate: Mon, 2 Jan 2012 01:14:31 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] User must have global access to update global categories\n\nThe user's global access level must be >= $g_manage_site_threshold to\nbe allowed to add, edit or delete global categories.\n\nPrior to this, once a user had been defined as Manager on at least one\nproject, they could freely update global categories.\n\nAlso prevents such updates through URL manipulation.\n\nFixes #13561\n---\n manage_proj_cat_delete.php \| 4 ++--\n manage_proj_cat_edit_page.php \| 4 ++--\n manage_proj_page.php \| 10 +++++++++-\n 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/manage_proj_cat_delete.php b/manage_proj_cat_delete.php\nindex 59ea3374b8..d3f6f7f279 100644\n--- a/manage_proj_cat_delete.php\n+++ b/manage_proj_cat_delete.php\n@@ -60,12 +60,12 @@\n $f_category_id = gpc_get_int( 'id' );\n $f_project_id = gpc_get_int( 'project_id' );\n \n-access_ensure_project_level( config_get( 'manage_project_threshold' ), $f_project_id );\n-\n $t_row = category_get_row( $f_category_id );\n $t_name = category_full_name( $f_category_id );\n $t_project_id = $t_row['project_id'];\n \n+access_ensure_project_level( config_get( 'manage_project_threshold' ), $t_project_id );\n+\n # Get a bug count\n $t_bug_table = db_get_table( 'bug' );\n $t_query = \"SELECT COUNT(id) FROM $t_bug_table WHERE category_id=\" . db_param();\ndiff --git a/manage_proj_cat_edit_page.php b/manage_proj_cat_edit_page.php\nindex 89f69327f1..a6e2d4c6df 100644\n--- a/manage_proj_cat_edit_page.php\n+++ b/manage_proj_cat_edit_page.php\n@@ -55,13 +55,13 @@\n $f_category_id\t\t= gpc_get_int( 'id' );\n $f_project_id\t\t= gpc_get_int( 'project_id' );\n \n-access_ensure_project_level( config_get( 'manage_project_threshold' ), $f_project_id );\n-\n $t_row = category_get_row( $f_category_id );\n $t_assigned_to = $t_row['user_id'];\n $t_project_id = $t_row['project_id'];\n $t_name = $t_row['name'];\n \n+access_ensure_project_level( config_get( 'manage_project_threshold' ), $t_project_id );\n+\n html_page_top();\n \n print_manage_menu( 'manage_proj_cat_edit_page.php' ); ?>\ndiff --git a/manage_proj_page.php b/manage_proj_page.php\nindex 681e490245..4cbbca4141 100644\n--- a/manage_proj_page.php\n+++ b/manage_proj_page.php\n@@ -164,20 +164,25 @@\n \t<h2><?php echo lang_get( 'global_categories' ) ?></h2>\n \t<table cellspacing=\"1\" cellpadding=\"5\" border=\"1\"><?php\n \t\t$t_categories = category_get_all_rows( ALL_PROJECTS );\n+\t\t$t_can_update_global_cat = access_has_global_level( config_get( 'manage_site_threshold' ) );\n+\n \t\tif ( count( $t_categories ) > 0 ) { ?>\n \t\t<tr class=\"row-category\">\n \t\t\t<td><?php echo lang_get( 'category' ) ?></td>\n \t\t\t<td><?php echo lang_get( 'assign_to' ) ?></td>\n+\t\t\t<?php if( $t_can_update_global_cat ) { ?>\n \t\t\t<td class=\"center\"><?php echo lang_get( 'actions' ) ?></td>\n+\t\t\t<?php } ?>\n \t\t</tr><?php\n \t\t}\n \n-\tforeach ( $t_categories as $t_category ) {\n+\tforeach( $t_categories \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2012-1121\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: MantisBT before 1.2.9 does not properly check permissions, which allows remote authenticated users with manager privileges to (1) modify or (2) delete global categories.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125057\nDescription: A vulnerability was found in mrobit robitailletheknot. It has been classified as problematic. This affects an unknown part of the file app/filters.php of the component CSRF Token Handler. The manipulation of the argument _token leads to incorrect comparison. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The patch is named 6b2813696ccb88d0576dfb305122ee880eb36197. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix th\n\n```diff\nFrom 6b2813696ccb88d0576dfb305122ee880eb36197 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Matthew Robitaille <matthew@robitaille.io>\nDate: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 10:31:00 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Patch security vulnerability.\n\n---\n app/filters.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app/filters.php b/app/filters.php\nindex fd0b4bc..97a9468 100644\n--- a/app/filters.php\n+++ b/app/filters.php\n@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@\n \n Route::filter('csrf', function()\n {\n-\tif (Session::token() != Input::get('_token'))\n+\tif (Session::token() !== Input::get('_token'))\n \t{\n \t\tthrow new Illuminate\\Session\\TokenMismatchException;\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125057\nCWE: CWE-697 Incorrect Comparison\nTitle: mrobit robitailletheknot CSRF Token filters.php comparison\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability was found in mrobit robitailletheknot. It has been classified as problematic. This affects an unknown part of the file app/filters.php of the component CSRF Token Handler. The manipulation of the argument _token leads to incorrect comparison. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The patch is named 6b2813696ccb88d0576dfb305122ee880eb36197. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix th\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-24766\nDescription: CasaOS-UserService provides user management functionalities to CasaOS. Starting in version 0.4.4.3 and prior to version 0.4.7, the Casa OS Login page disclosed the username enumeration vulnerability in the login page. An attacker can enumerate the CasaOS username using the application response. If the username is incorrect application gives the error `User does not exist`. If the password is incorrect application gives the error `Invalid password`. Version 0.4.7 fixes this issue.\n\n```diff\nFrom c75063d7ca5800948e9c09c0a6efe9809b5d39f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: CorrectRoadH <a778917369@gmail.com>\nDate: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 14:13:58 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge pull request from GHSA-c967-2652-gfjm\n\n* fix: fix username enumeration\n\n* fix typo msg type\n\n* fix: recovery error patch\n\n* fix: recovery error patch\n\n---------\n\nSigned-off-by: CorrectRoadH <a778917369@gmail.com>\n---\n route/v1/user.go \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/route/v1/user.go b/route/v1/user.go\nindex 87e0077..90a7c01 100644\n--- a/route/v1/user.go\n+++ b/route/v1/user.go\n@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ func PostUserLogin(c gin.Context) {\n \t}\n \tif user.Password != encryption.GetMD5ByStr(password) {\n \t\tc.JSON(common_err.CLIENT_ERROR,\n-\t\t\tmodel.Result{Success: common_err.PWD_INVALID, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.PWD_INVALID)})\n+\t\t\tmodel.Result{Success: common_err.USER_NOT_EXIST_OR_PWD_INVALID, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.USER_NOT_EXIST_OR_PWD_INVALID)})\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ func PutUserInfo(c gin.Context) {\n \tuser := service.MyService.User().GetUserInfoById(id)\n \tif user.Id == 0 {\n \t\tc.JSON(common_err.SERVICE_ERROR,\n-\t\t\tmodel.Result{Success: common_err.USER_NOT_EXIST, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.USER_NOT_EXIST)})\n+\t\t\tmodel.Result{Success: common_err.USER_NOT_EXIST_OR_PWD_INVALID, Message: common_err.GetMsg(common_err.USER_NOT_EXIST_OR_PWD_INVALID)})\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \tif len(json.Username) > 0 {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-24766\nCWE: CWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy\nTitle: CasaOS Username Enumeration\n\nThis patch addresses: CasaOS-UserService provides user management functionalities to CasaOS. Starting in version 0.4.4.3 and prior to version 0.4.7, the Casa OS Login page disclosed the username enumeration vulnerability in the login page. An attacker can enumerate the CasaOS username using the application response. If the username is incorrect application gives the error `User does not exist`. If the password is incorrect application gives the error `Invalid password`. Version 0.4.7 fixes this issue.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-14230\nDescription: In the mboxlist_do_find function in imap/mboxlist.c in Cyrus IMAP before 3.0.4, an off-by-one error in prefix calculation for the LIST command caused use of uninitialized memory, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a 'LIST \"\" \"Other Users\"' command.\n\n```diff\nFrom 6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bron Gondwana <brong@fastmail.fm>\nDate: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 12:43:09 +1000\nSubject: [PATCH] mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is\n \"Other Users\"\n\n---\n imap/mboxlist.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/imap/mboxlist.c b/imap/mboxlist.c\nindex 413cdcebe5..dbee06c0f5 100644\n--- a/imap/mboxlist.c\n+++ b/imap/mboxlist.c\n@@ -2851,7 +2851,7 @@ static int mboxlist_do_find(struct find_rock rock, const strarray_t patterns)\n if (len) len--; // trailing separator\n \n if (!strncmp(rock->namespace->prefix[NAMESPACE_USER], commonpat, MIN(len, prefixlen))) {\n- if (prefixlen < len) {\n+ if (prefixlen <= len) {\n /* we match all users /\n strlcpy(domainpat+domainlen, \"user.\", sizeof(domainpat)-domainlen);\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2017-14230\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: In the mboxlist_do_find function in imap/mboxlist.c in Cyrus IMAP before 3.0.4, an off-by-one error in prefix calculation for the LIST command caused use of uninitialized memory, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a 'LIST \"\" \"Other Users\"' command.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]

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