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Nelson did not invent the strategy; his innovation was to take a strategy whose primary purpose had always been simply stopping the clock, and use it instead primarily to minimize the opposition's scoring.
Nelson first used the strategy against Dennis Rodman of the Chicago Bulls in 1997, who was making 38% of his free throws on the season. He could not use the strategy on every Bulls possession, as a player committing his sixth foul is disqualified from the game. He used the strategy selectively, and chose a little-used player, whose absence the team could tolerate, to commit the fouls. He believed that Rodman's horrific foul shooting would result in the Mavericks actually giving up fewer total points during those Bulls possessions than they would give up by playing a standard defense against the Bulls' efficient offense, led by Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen.
In that game, Rodman shot 9-for-12 from the free throw line, defeating the strategy, and the Bulls won the game. The strategy was thus largely forgotten, except that Maverick player Bubba Wells, who had been assigned to foul Rodman, set the all-time NBA record for fewest minutes played (3) before fouling out of a game.
Nelson used the strategy again in 1999, this time against Shaquille O'Neal, a career 52% free throw shooter. Other NBA coaches also did so to defend against O'Neal. So, even though it had been first used two years earlier against Rodman, the strategy became known for its use against O'Neal.
As with Chamberlain decades earlier, intentional off-the-ball fouls against O'Neal became controversial. During the 2000 NBA Playoffs, both the Portland Trail Blazers and Indiana Pacers relentlessly used the Hack-a-Shaq defense against the Lakers. The NBA discussed expanding the off-the-ball foul rule to cover more than just the final two minutes of the game, or another rule change that would discourage the use of Hack-a-Shaq. Ultimately, though, the NBA did not change any rules to discourage the Hack-a-Shaq strategy. An effective rebuttal was that the Lakers won both of the games where Hack-a-Shaq was notorious, suggesting that the strategy was too ineffective to require remediation.
In subsequent seasons, fans and media remained displeased with the continued use of the strategy, particularly in high-profile playoff games. In 2008, the NBA Competition Committee again considered rule changes but did not achieve consensus. According to an ESPN study in 2016, offensive efficiency was higher than the Golden State Warriors when the Hack-a-Shaq strategy was used against a team. NBA commissioner Adam Silver announced that the competition committee would look into changing the rule before the start of the 2016–2017 season due to extended length of games. It takes only three or more Hack-a-Shaq fouls to add 11 minutes to the length of a game, and at the time such fouls were being committed at a rate of four times more often than the prior season.
The Hack-a-Shaq strategy is most effective against a player who shoots free throws poorly, but who is so effective in other areas that the coach is reluctant to simply remove them from the game. Few players other than O'Neal meet those criteria.
Ben Wallace shot only 42% free throws over his career, the worst percentage in the history of the NBA among players with 1000 attempts. Bruce Bowen was also among the game's best defenders but among its worst free throw shooters. Because of their struggles at the free throw line, each man has at times become a target of the Hack-a-Shaq strategy.
On May 29, 2012, the Oklahoma City Thunder used a so-called hack-a-Splitter strategy on Tiago Splitter during Game 2 of Western Conference Final of 2012 NBA Playoffs, who made 5 of 10 free throw attempts from these fouls.
On April 10, 2015, the San Antonio Spurs was reported to use this strategy on Josh Smith to keep the basketball away from the super-hot James Harden and San Antonio Spurs won this season game by 104–103.
During the 2015 NBA Playoffs, Howard, then with the Houston Rockets, was again targeted often by opponents, particularly during round 2 against the Los Angeles Clippers. During Game 2, Howard shot 21 (converting 8) out of the 64 free throws for the Rockets. In turn, the Rockets targeted DeAndre Jordan, who had been victim of "Hack-a-Jordan" or "Hack-a-DJ" since 2014, and in particular was fouled five times in two minutes during the previous playoff round against the San Antonio Spurs. In Game 4, Jordan broke O'Neal's record for most free throw attempts in a half game with 28.
On January 20, 2016, the Houston Rockets used Hack-a-Drummond against Detroit Pistons center Andre Drummond, and Drummond went 13 for 36 from the free throw line. Those 23 misses are an NBA record for most free throws missed by a player in a game. However, the Pistons would still win the game 123-114.
In the 2016–17 playoffs, Oklahoma City Thunder forward André Roberson was a victim of this strategy against the Houston Rockets in the first round of the playoffs. Roberson shot 3/21 in the series.
On November 29, 2017, the Washington Wizards used what a newspaper called a "hack-a-Ben Simmons strategy" when trailing the Philadelphia 76ers by 24 points in the third quarter. The Wizards repeatedly fouled 76ers point guard Ben Simmons, giving him 29 free throws, 24 of them in the fourth quarter. Simmons was a notoriously bad shooter and had entered the game with a 56% free throw rate. He shot free throws even worse in this game, making 15/29 (52%). However, the 76ers held on to win the game, 118-113. Simmons' 31 points were a career high for him at the time.
Detractors argue that deliberate fouling makes the game unpleasant to watch, violates the spirit or disrupts the rhythm of the game, puts the fouling team too quickly into the penalty situation, and disparages the team's defensive abilities.
"All that did was allow us to set our defense. I think that's disrespectful to their players. Basically, they were telling their players that they couldn't guard us."
Many coaches have heeded these criticisms and doubted the effectiveness of the strategy in minimizing scoring. One imponderable is the effect on the psychology of the player fouled deliberately on the belief that he will not make his free throws. Some believe that frequently sending O'Neal to the foul line risked putting him "into a rhythm" and temporarily making him a better shooter.
These factors, and the fact that there are only handful of players who satisfy the criteria for Hack-a-Shaq, mean that the strategy is uncommon in the NBA. A rule change starting in the 2016–17 NBA season put an additional constraint on deliberate fouling: Away-from-the-ball fouls now award the fouled team a free throw and possession of the ball in the final 2 minutes of "each" quarter, extended from the prior rule affecting only the final 2 minutes of the 4th quarter. The rule change sought to eliminate cases where teams would intentionally foul off-the-ball in order to gain the final possession of a quarter.
In basketball, run and gun is a fast, freewheeling style of play that features a high number of field goal attempts, resulting in high-scoring games. The offense typically relies on fast breaks while placing less emphasis on set plays. A run-and-gun team typically allows many points on defense as well.
In the National Basketball Association (NBA), the run and gun was at its peak in the 1960s when teams scored an average of 115 points a game. Around 2003, the average had dropped to 95. The Boston Celtics were a run-and-gun team in the 1950s and 1960s while winning 11 NBA championships, as were the five-time champion Los Angeles Lakers during their Showtime era in the 1980s.
Although the run and gun is believed by many to de-emphasize defense, the Celtics of the 60s' had Bill Russell, and the Lakers of the 80s' had Kareem Abdul-Jabbar as defensive stoppers. Coach Doug Moe, who ran the run and gun with the Denver Nuggets in the 1980s, believed the high scores surrendered were more indicative of the fast pace of the game than a low level of defense. Still, his teams sometimes appeared to give up baskets in order to score one. Though his offensive strategy led to high scores, Moe's Denver teams were never adept at running fast breaks.
Paul Westhead coached the Loyola Marymount men's basketball team in the late 1980s using a version of the run and gun.
While run and gun basketball is often thought of as a system of offense, Westhead's system uses a combined offensive and defensive philosophy. Offensively, the team moves the ball forward as quickly as possible and takes the first available shot, often a three-pointer. Westhead's teams try to shoot the ball in less than seven seconds. The aim is to shoot before the defense is able to get set. Defensively, the team applies constant full-court pressure. Generally, the team is willing to gamble on giving away easy baskets for the sake of maintaining a high tempo.
Loyola Marymount successfully used the system in 1990 when they advanced to the Elite 8 of the NCAA Basketball Tournament, beating the defending champion Michigan 149–115 along the way. The style has been used at some other teams. Coach Westhead tried, rather unsuccessfully, to implement the system in the NBA with the Denver Nuggets in the early 1990s. They averaged a league-best 119.9 points per game in 1990-91, but also surrendered an NBA record 130.8 points per game. They also allowed 107 points to be scored in a single half to the Phoenix Suns, which also remains an NBA record.
Westhead's system has been imitated by other college teams, including Grinnell College. David Arseneault, the architect of the Grinnell System, added to Westhead's system by substituting players in three waves of five players, similar to an ice hockey shift. The highest scoring game in NCAA history was played by two teams (Troy & DeVry-Atlanta) who both employed Westhead's system the entire game, resulting in 399 combined points in 1992.
The Grinnell System, sometimes referred to as The System, is a fast-tempo style of basketball developed by coach David Arseneault at Grinnell College. It is a variation of the run-and-gun system popularized by coach Paul Westhead at Loyola Marymount University in the early 1980s. The Grinnell System relies on shooting three-point field goals, applying constant pressure with a full-court press, and substituting players frequently.
Under the system, Grinnell guard Jack Taylor scored an NCAA-record 138 points in a 2012 game, and 109 in a 2013 game. Previously, Grinnell players Jeff Clement (77) and Griffin Lentsch (89) held the Division III scoring record.
The main tenets of the system are:
To keep his players fresh and get more individuals involved, Arseneault added to Westhead's system by substituting players in three waves of five players, similar to an ice hockey shift. A 15-man roster is divided three groups of five and new shifts are substituted every 45 to 90 seconds. Each shift plays at full speed and then rests while the next group does the same. Players rarely play more than 20 minutes a game.
Arseneault and the Grinnell program have been criticized for using the system to run up the score and set records, especially against overmatched opponents.
Other college and high school programs have also adopted the Grinnell System. David Arseneault Jr., the coach's son, ran a modified version of The System after being named the head coach of the Reno Bighorns of the NBA Development League in 2014–15. Limited to a 10-man roster and subject to the D-League's high roster turnover, Arseneault adjusted the system, abandoning its hockey-style substitutions and full-court press.
The M-drop is a play in the sport of water polo which is mainly used when there is a strong, offensive set of players. The defense sets up in an M-shape, hence the name "M-Drop".
A basic offense would look like an umbrella shape, with 5 offensive players in a half-circle around the goal, with one defensive player on each of them. There is one player in the middle, called set. There is one defensive player guarding each of the offensive players. From left to right, and moving around the circle, the offensive players are named 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and the set is 6. The defensive players are named D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, and D6, who guard sets.
If the opposing team has a very strong set player, the D3 player will drop back and help the D6 player. This play leaves the offensive player 3 open, so defensive members D2 and D4 will “split” while swimming in between their player and offensive player 3. They also split in between the set and their player, hence the name M-drop, from the ‘M’ shape created.
In water polo, the goalkeeper occupies a position as the last line of defense between the opponent's offence and their own team's goal, which is .
The goalkeeper is different from other people on their team; they possess certain privileges and are subject to different restrictions from those of field players. As well as this, they must possess different skills from those of the fielders.
Goalkeepers often have longer playing careers than field players because they swim far less.
In water polo, the goalkeeper is commonly known as the "goalie" or "keeper" and may also be known as "the man/woman in the cage".
The position of the goalkeeper has existed since the game of water polo originated. At that time, the object of the game was to touch the ball on the opponent's end of the pool. The goalkeeper would wait at the end of the pool until an opposing player approached the goal, when the goalkeeper would try to stop that player, for example, by dunking their head.
A change occurred in the game and the role of the goalkeeper in the 1880s, when the Scottish reduced the size of the scoring area by placing rugby posts, spaced about 10 feet apart, at each end of the pool. At the same time, the rules were changed to allow goalkeepers to stand on the pool deck and leap onto the head of an opposing player who approached the goal. This change in the rules was brief. To prevent the serious injuries that resulted from this method of goalkeeping, the rules were revised again to require the goalie to remain in the water.
The basic functions of the goalie position have changed little over the last century, but there have been changes affecting the style of play. In the 1940s, Hungary introduced a new technique called the eggbeater kick that enables goalkeepers to maintain a stable balance in the water.
Inside the area, the goalkeeper is the only person on the team permitted to touch the ball with two hands, touch the bottom of the pool and punch the ball with a clenched fist. Although the goalkeeper may not advance beyond the half-way line, they may attempt shots at the other goal.
Any goalkeeper who aggressively fouls an attacker in position to score can be charged with a penalty shot for the other team. The goalkeeper can also be temporarily ejected from the game for twenty seconds if they prevent a likely goal (for example, by splashing). If the goalkeeper pushes the ball under the water in the area, instead of being a free throw to the other team, it is a penalty. A penalty is also awarded to the other team if the goalkeeper pulls down from the crossbar of the goal to prevent a goal.
Unless reserve, all goalkeepers caps are numbered 1 and contrast with their team's colour to distinguish their position. Reserve goalkeepers have differently numbered caps depending on the governing body; they are shown in the table below.
Below is a table showing the major differences of rules and regulations for water polo goalkeepers between the three largest governing bodies: FINA, NCAA and NFHS.
In water polo, field players possess entirely different skills and responsibilities to the goalkeeper.
The primary role of the goalkeeper is to block shots at the goal. After saving the ball, the goalkeeper has the responsibility to keep possession of the ball in order to stop opposing players regaining possession. They must make sure that whenever the opposition appears to be ready to make a shot on goal, their hands are near or above the surface of the water. They also possess the job to pass down the pool accurately in order to retain possession of the ball, often starting the team's counterattack.
The goalkeeper is the only player who may block a penalty and because 63.7% of penalties are goals, the goalkeeper has a massive role in this area but failure to be in the correct position at a penalty is an exclusion foul. At a penalty shootout, the goalkeeper's job is critical and will largely determine the outcome of the match. If the goalkeeper is excluded during the course of the penalty shootout, then one of the other five players in the pool may take their place. The goalkeeper's hips should be high at a penalty shot to give them extra height. The goalkeeper should do one of two things at a penalty shot:
Moreover, goalkeepers should have leadership. They should inform field players of information, such as unmarked players and the time of the game clock and give instructions to the field players. Because of this, they may sometimes be known as "the coach in the water".
When a man down, goalkeepers have extra responsibility. It is easier for the other team to continue to shoot, making the goalkeeper very worn out. Platanou said that with a man down the goalkeeper had "The highest possible intensity".
Most of the time, goalkeepers do low-intensity work (treading water without too much effort) but when they do work (for example, when they have a man down or are in the ready position) it is very intense.
Goalkeepers must be able to perform the eggbeater kick to a high standard. Before the eggbeater kick, goalkeepers would use breaststroke which meant that they could not stay up for very long and players found it easier to score. By using the eggbeater kick, goalkeepers can raise their bodies high enough in the water to be able to block shots at the goal for longer periods of time. This can be used conjunctively with sculling, in which the goalkeeper keeps their hands closed (with the fingers together) and moves them forwards and backwards.
The easiest way for the goalkeeper to block shots is for them to block the ball with either their hands or arms. Longer arms can help the goalkeeper to reach the ball, thus being an advantage. Sports involving quick reactions may be helpful, as these help the goalkeeper's reflexes which is a crucial skill.
In order to improve, there are a variety of drills designed to improve the goalkeeper's skill.
To start with, there are drills to help improve the goalkeeper in the water. These range from simple exercise (such as jumping as high out of the water as possible with two hands) to drills not specifically used in water polo; rather they are used to improve the goalkeeper's core muscles (such as catching a ball dropped from the side into the water).
As the goalkeeper must be able to swim quickly for short distances, to improve they can practice exercises such as swimming quickly and then immediately stopping without touching the sides. It is important for the goalkeeper to swim both breastroke and freestyle - the breastroke helping with the eggbeater kick and the freestyle helping with the swimming in the match.
Moreover, at the start of the game it is vital for the goalkeeper to stretch for 15 minutes.
As blocking the ball is the primary role of the goalkeeper, they must have good knowledge of blocking techniques.
As the goalkeeper has the choice of how many hands they want to use, the decision should be made of what they want to do. A shot should be stopped with two hands either if it is weak or close to the goalkeeper's body, and normally stopped with one in other circumstances. This is because one-handed saves can go to the ball faster.
Most shots are saved with the arms or the hands, but goalkeepers are known to save shots with their faces and even feet.
Hole set is an offensive position in the game of water polo. It can be referred to as either just the "hole" position or the "set." Because this player is typically positioned on the two meter (2M) marker and in center of the opposing team's goal, the position can also be called the two-meter or simply 2M. Other names for this position include center forward, due to the similarity between the corresponding basketball position, as well as the pit-man. The defensive player guarding the hole set can be called the hole-D, where D stands for defense, two-meter defender, or 2M-D.
Track and field racers have a variety of options in the ways they can choose to pace their races.
Even-splitting is a strategy in which the racer attempts to hit the same split in every lap of the race. The racer tries to run an "even" pace during the entire race. In long-distance events, this can often be an optimal strategy.
Positive-splitting is a racing strategy that involves completing the first half of a race faster than the second half. Typically, the runner goes out at a pace faster than he or she can maintain for the entire race, leading to a slower end of the race. Positive-splitting can be employed as a tactic, or can simply be a byproduct of an overambitious early pace.
Negative-splitting is a racing strategy that involves completing the second half of a race faster than the first half. The racer runs slow in the beginning, and gradually runs faster as the race progresses. This is typically seen as a conservative racing strategy, but in distance events, many world records have been run with a slight negative split.
Sit-and-kick, a related strategy to negative-splitting, is one in which the racer typically sits in the pack of the race, not taking the lead or going very fast, and then attempts to "kick" or sprint by the other racers during the last laps of the race. The sit-and-kick can be employed by individual runners or, in the case of many championship races, the entire field may attempt to sit-and-kick, thus leading to drastically slow times for the first few laps and faster than normal times for the last laps.
While all of the above strategies can be employed, certain pacing strategies, for physiological reasons, will yield the fastest times.
For the 100m and 200m events, pacing is not a factor. Because the race is so short, racers simply run at their top speed for the duration of the race. However, for the 400m at the elite level, the event is almost uniformly run with a positive-split strategy. Runners run the first 200m faster than the final 200m.
In the 800 meters, the fastest times have almost always been achieved with a positive-split strategy. A study of 26 world-record 800m races from 1912 to 1997 showed that in 92% of the fastest 800m races, the first half of the race has been run faster than the second half. This implies that the optimal strategy for the 800m is to positive-split.
In the 400 meters, the strategy proven to be the most effective is starting off at a 70-75% pace and working up to 100%, or known as the threshold pace strategy. Examples of this race plan are Michael Johnson’s former World Record of 43.18 in 1999 and Cathy Freeman’s Olympic Gold Medal in 2000, both 400 meters runners who benefited from this type of pacing strategy.
In the 5000 meters and 10000 meters, the optimal strategy shifts to even-splitting. An analysis of world-record performances in these events shows a clear pattern: relatively even pacing throughout most of the race, and a slight increase in speed in the last 1000m of both the 5000m and 10000m. While one could interpret this concluding increase in speed as evidence of a sit-and-kick strategy, the increase in speed observed in these performances is not nearly as dramatic and pronounced as what is typically observed in a sit-and-kick type race.
Although "swindling" in general usage is synonymous with cheating or fraud, in chess the term does not imply that the swindler has done anything unethical or unsportsmanlike. There is nonetheless a faint stigma attached to swindles, since players feel that one who has outplayed one's opponent for almost the entire game "is 'morally' entitled to victory" and a swindle is thus regarded as "rob[bing] the opponent of a well-earned victory". However, the best swindles can be quite artistic, and some are widely known.
There are ways that a player can maximize their chances of pulling off a swindle, including playing actively and exploiting . Although swindles can be effected in many different ways, themes such as stalemate, perpetual check, and surprise mating attacks are often seen.
The ability to swindle one's way out of a lost position is a useful skill for any chess player and according to Graham Burgess is "a major facet of practical chess". Frank Marshall may be the only top player who has become well known as a frequent swindler. Marshall was proud of his reputation for swindles, and in 1914 wrote a book entitled "Marshall's Chess "Swindles"".
Frank Marshall, a gifted who was one of the world's strongest players in the early 20th century, has been called "the most renowned of swindlers". To Marshall, the term 'swindle' "meant a particularly imaginative method of rescuing a difficult, if not lost, position." The phrase "Marshall swindle" was coined because Marshall "was famed for extricating himself from hopeless positions by such means".
Perhaps the most celebrated of his many "Marshall swindles" occurred in Marshall–Marco, Monte Carlo 1904. Marshall wrote of the position in the leftmost diagram, "White's position has become desperate, as the hostile b-pawn must queen." White could play 45.Rxc7+, but Black would simply respond 45...Kb8, winning. Many players would resign here, but Marshall saw an opportunity for "a last 'swindle. He continued 45.c6 Now Black could have played 45...bxc6!, but disdained it because White could then play 46.Rxc7+ Kb8 47.Rb7+! Kxb7 48.Nc5+, winning Black's rook and temporarily stopping Black's pawn from advancing.
Black should have played this line, however, because he still wins after 48...Ka7 49.Nxa4: while there are many ways to win from the resulting position, the quickest would be to play Bd4, trapping the knight, and after 50.Kf3 Ka6 51.Ke4 Ka5 52.Kxd4 Kxa4 53.Kc3 Ka3, Black's pawn queens after all. Instead, Marco played 45...Be5, mistakenly thinking that this would put an end to Marshall's tricks. The game continued 46.cxb7+ Kb8 (46...Kxb7? 47.Nc5+ wins the rook) 47.Nc5! Ra2+ 48.Kh3 b2 49.Re7! Ka7 (not 49...b1=Q 50.Re8+ Ka7 51.Ra8+ Kb6 52.b8=Q+, winning Black's newly created queen) 50.Re8 c6 51.Ra8+ Kb6 52.Rxa2! b1=Q (rightmost diagram).
White's resources finally seem to be at an end, but now Marshall reveals his deeply hidden point: 53.b8=Q+ Bxb8 54.Rb2+! Qxb2 55.Na4+ Kb5 56.Nxb2. Marshall has caught Black's pawn after all, and is now a pawn up in a position where it is Black who is fighting for a draw. Fred Reinfeld and Irving Chernev commented, "Marshall's manner of extricating himself from his difficulties is reminiscent of an end-game by Rinck or Troitsky!" Marshall eventually won the game after a further mistake by Black.
International Master (IM) Simon Webb in his book "Chess for Tigers" identified five "secrets of swindling":
Grandmaster (GM) John Nunn adds a caveat: when in a bad position, one must decide between two strategies, which he calls "grim " and "create confusion." "Grim defence" involves finding some way to hang on, often by liquidating to an ending. "Create confusion" entails trying to "gain the initiative, even at material cost, hoping to stir up complications and cause the opponent to go wrong." Nunn cautions that, "If you decide to go for 'create confusion' then you should press the panic button sufficiently early to give yourself a reasonable chance of success. However, you should be sure that your position is really bad enough to warrant such drastic measures. In my experience, it is far more common to panic too early than too late."
Negi also notes that the prospective swindler should "keep enough options on the board so your opponent has a chance to see ghosts and lose his bearings. The closer he gets to winning, the less he wants to work – exploit that state of mind!"
Such play-acting can be carried to extremes. GM Nikolai Krogius writes that Najdorf, in his game against Gligorić at the 1952 Helsinki Olympiad, "left a pawn "" in time trouble, and then desperately clutched his head and reached out as if wanting to take the pawn back. ... Gligorić took the pawn, and soon thereafter lost the game. It transpired that Najdorf had staged the whole pantomime to blunt his opponent's watchfulness. This can hardly be called ethical."
Swindles can occur in myriad different ways, but as illustrated below certain themes are often seen.
One classic way of saving a draw in a losing position is by stalemate. Almost every master has at some point spoiled a won game by falling into a stalemate trap. The defender often achieves the stalemate by sacrificing all of his or her remaining mobile pieces, with check, in such a way that they must be captured, leaving the defender with only a king (and sometimes also pawns and/or pieces) with no legal moves.
Another well-known Marshall swindle is Marshall–MacClure, New York 1923 (diagram at above left). Marshall, a rook down, played 1.Rh6! Rxh6 2.h8=Q+! Rxh8 3.b5! A very unusual position has arisen: now Black is up "two" rooks and on move, but the only way to avoid stalemate is 3...Rd7 4.cxd7 (threatening 5.d8=Q+, forcing stalemate) c5?? 5.bxc6 Kb8 6.Kxb6, when White even wins. Decades later, someone pointed out an alternative draw with 1.Rg6! fxg6 2.h8=Q+ Rxh8 3.b5 or 1...Re8 2.Rg8 Rb8 3.b5.
In Chigorin–Schlechter, Ostend 1905, (diagram at above right), a game between two of the leading players of the day, an unusual combination of stalemate and "zugzwang" enabled the great Schlechter to rescue a desperate position. Schlechter, in extreme , played 44...Qc7+! Chigorin, thinking Schlechter had blundered, responded 45.Qb6+??, seemingly forcing the trade of queens. Schlechter's 45...Ka8! forced an immediate draw: 46.Qxc7 is stalemate, and 46.Ka6 Qc8+! 47.Ka5 allows a draw with either 47...Qc7! ("zugzwang"), when White cannot make progress, or 47...Qc3+! 48.Ka6 Qc8+! with a perpetual check.
In Kasparov–McDonald, simultaneous exhibition, Great Britain 1986, (left-most diagram), the world champion had a winning advantage, which he could have converted with 54.Qd6+ Kg7 55.c6! Instead, he played 54.Bxe4??, allowing 54...Rxg3+! 55.Kxg3 Qe5+! , since the forced 56.Qxe5 gives stalemate (right-most diagram). Note that 55.Kh4 (instead of 55.Kxg3), with the strong threat of 56.Qh7#, would have been met by 55...Rg4+! 56.Kxg4 (forced) Qd7+! 57.Qxd7 with a different stalemate.
For further examples of swindles based on stalemate, see Stalemate; Desperado (chess); Congdon–Delmar, New York 1880; Post–Nimzowitsch, Barmen Masters 1905; Schlechter–Wolf, Nuremberg 1906; Znosko-Borovsky–Salwe, Ostend B 1907; Walter–Nagy, Győr 1924; Janowski–Grünfeld, Marienbad 1925; Heinicke–Rellstab, German Championship 1939; Bernstein–Smyslov, Groningen 1946; Horowitz–Pavey, U.S. Championship 1951; Fichtl–F. Blatny, Czechoslovakia 1956; Portisch–Lengyel, Málaga 1964; Matulović–Suttles, Palma de Mallorca Interzonal 1970; Fuller–Basin, Michigan Open 1992; Boyd–Glimbrant, Alicante 1992; and Pein–de Firmian, Bermuda 1995.
This stunning reversal had a major impact on the match. Staunton had won seven and drawn one of the first eight games, and believed that St. Amant would have resigned the match if he had lost. Instead, St. Amant was able to continue the match for three more weeks, winning another five games, before finally succumbing.
Draw by perpetual check is another often-seen way of swindling a draw from a lost position.
The position at left is from Ivanchuk–Moiseenko, Russian Team Championship, Sochi 2005. Black is down two pawns against the world's sixth highest-rated player. Worse, Ivanchuk's pieces dominate the board. IM Malcolm Pein notes that after almost any sensible move, for example 30.Qc2, Black would be completely lost. White would then threaten 31.Rd6 pinning the knight to the queen, and neither 30...Nf6 31.Bxf6 gxf6 32.Qxh7# nor 30...Nc5 31.Ree7 is an adequate response. 30.Qc2 would also guard against a possible ...Qd1+, the significance of which becomes apparent after seeing the game continuation.
Moiseenko met Ivanchuk's 30.Rb7?? with 30...Nf8!! This not only threatens 31...Nxe6, but also enables Black to meet 31.Rxb8 with 31...Qd1+ 32.Kh2 Qh5+ 33.Kg1 Qd1+, drawing by perpetual check. The perpetual check is based on White's weak back rank combined with his slightly compromised king position (no h-pawn). Note how pieces that are well placed for attacking purposes may be misplaced for defensive purposes. White's rook on e6 was well placed when White had the initiative, but is of no use in stopping the threatened perpetual check. (Similarly, in Rhine–Nagle, Black's rook on g5 was an excellent attacking piece, but was poorly placed to defend Black's back rank or stop White's passed c-pawn.)
White tried 31.Rh6, but could not avoid the perpetual: 31...Rxb7 32.Qxb7 Qd1+ 33.Kh2 Rh5+ 34.Rxh5 34.Kg3!? (hoping for 34...Rxh6?? 35.Qxg7#) is met by 34...Rg5+! and White must repeat moves with 35.Kh2! Rh5+, since 35.Kh3?? Qh1#; 35.Kh4?? Qg4#; and 35.Kf4?? Qg4# all get mated. 34...Qxh5+ 35.Kg3 Qg5+ 36.Kf3 Qf5+ ½–½ since White cannot escape the perpetual check.
David Bronstein, in his immortal losing game, valiantly but unsuccessfully tried to swindle Bogdan Śliwa with a surprise mating attack.
Sometimes a player who is behind in material may achieve a draw by exchanging off, or sacrificing for, all of the opponent's pawns, leaving a position (for example, two knights versus lone king) where the superior side still has a material advantage but cannot force checkmate. (Properly speaking, this may or may not be a "swindle", depending on whether the superior side missed a clear win earlier.) The inferior side is also sometimes able to achieve an ending that is theoretically still lost, but where the win is difficult and may be beyond the opponent's abilities—for example, bishop and knight versus lone king; queen versus rook; two knights versus pawn, which is sometimes a win for the knights; or two bishops versus knight.
White drew similarly in Parr–Farrand, England 1971. From the diagram at above right, play continued 1.Rd5 Bf6 2.Rxf5! On 2...gxf5 3.Kf4, White's king will capture Black's f-pawn, then retreat to h1, reaching a bishop and opposite-colored draw. Instead, Black tried 2...Ke7 3.Rb5 Ke6, "but he soon had to admit that the draw was inevitable."
Schmidt–Schaefer, Rheinhessen 1997 (diagram at above left), is another straightforward example. Black has connected passed pawns, but if White can sacrifice his knights for them he can reach the drawn two knights versus lone king ending. Thus, 50.Nfe4! threatened to capture both pawns with the knights. 50...dxe4 51.Nxe4 Kd5 52.Nxc5! would also achieve that goal. Black tried 50...d4, but agreed to a draw after 51.Nxc5+ Kd6 52.Nb5+! Kxc5 53.Nxd4!
The five examples above arguably are not true swindles, but rather the inferior side's exploitation of a defensive resource available in the position. However, Chandler–Susan Polgar, Biel 1987, (diagram at above right), is a "bona fide" swindle. Polgar has just played 53...Nh6!? (from g8), transparently playing for a rook pawn and wrong-colored bishop draw. GM Chandler obligingly played 54.gxh6+??, expecting 54...Kxh6 55.Kf6! when he will win because Black cannot get her king to h8. Polgar, however, responded 54...Kh8! with the standard draw. White's possession of a second h-pawn is immaterial, and the game concluded 55.Bd5 Kh7 56.Kf7 Kh8! ½–½
The position above left, the conclusion of an endgame study by the American master Frederick Rhine, provides a more complicated example of forcing a draw by material insufficiency. White draws with 5.Nxc4+! Nxc4 If 5...Kc6 6.Nxb6 Kxb6 7.Rxb2+, White's rook draws easily against Black's knight and bishop. 6.Rxb6+ Now Black's best try is 6...Kd5! or 6...Ke7!, when the endgame of rook against two knights and a bishop is a well-established theoretical draw. The more natural 6...Nxb6+ leads to a surprising draw after 7.Kd8! (diagram above), when any bishop move stalemates White, and any other move allows 8.Kxe8, when the two knights cannot force checkmate.
Building a fortress is another method of saving an otherwise lost position. It is often seen in the endgame, for example in endings with bishops of opposite colors (see above).

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