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Sevastopol maintains a large port facility in the Bay of Sevastopol and in smaller bays around the Heracles peninsula. The port handles traffic from passengers (local transportation and cruise), cargo, and commercial fishing. The port infrastructure is fully integrated with the city of Sevastopol and naval bases of the Black Sea Fleet. |
Due to its military history, most streets in the city are named after Russian and Soviet military heroes. There are hundreds of monuments and plaques in various parts of Sevastopol commemorating its military past. |
The population of Sevastopol proper is 443,211 (01.01.19), making it the largest in the Crimean Peninsula. The city's agglomeration has about 600,000 people (2015). According to the Ukrainian National Census, 2001, the ethnic groups of Sevastopol include Russians (71.6%), Ukrainians (22.4%), Belarusians (1.6%), Tatars (0.7%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Armenians (0.3%), Jews (0.3%), Moldovans (0.2%), and Azerbaijanis (0.2%). |
There are many historical buildings in the central and eastern parts of the city and Balaklava, some of which are architectural monuments. The Western districts have modern architecture. More recently, numerous skyscrapers have been built. Balaklava Bayfront Plaza (on hold), currently under construction, will be one of the tallest buildings in Ukraine, at with 43 floors. |
After the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea the city's monument to Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny was removed and handed over to Kharkiv. |
The naval Battle of Kerch Strait (also known as Battle of Yenikale, by the old Turkish name of the strait near Kerch) took place on 19 July 1790 near Kerch, Crimea, was a victory for Imperial Russia over the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Turkish War, 1787-1792. |
"Rozhdestvo Christovo" 84 (flag of Vice-Admiral Fyodor Ushakov) |
"Mukaddeme-i Nusret" 74 (flag of Kapudane Said Bey) |
"Bahr-i Zafer" 72 (flag of Kapudan Pasha Giritli Hüseyin) |
"Melik-i Bahri" 72 (flag of Patrona Bey) |
"Feyz-i Hüda" 66 (flag of Riyale Bey) |
23 small craft (kırlangıç, pergende (brigantine) and şehtiye (xebec) type ships) |
These battles took place during the Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774, on 20 June and 9 July (Old Style) 1774 south of Kerch, Ukraine. |
On 20 June an Ottoman force of 5 ships of the line, 9 frigates and 26 galleys and xebecs surprised a Russian force, under Vice-Admiral Senyavin, of 3 frigates, 4 16-gun vessels, 2 bombs and 3 small craft and tried to cut it off. The Russians anchored just outside the Kerch Strait and sailed toward Kerch the next day. |
On 9 July, the Ottomans, needing to destroy the Russian ships so their land army could cross the Kerch Strait, attacked, but abandoned the effort after it was found that the Russian bombs had a greater range. The Ottoman force that day consisted of 6 battleships, 7 frigates, 1 bomb and 17 galleys and xebecs. |
The de-Tatarization of Crimea (, ) refers to the Soviet and Russian efforts to remove traces of the indigenous Crimean Tatar presence from the peninsula. De-Tatarization has manifested in various ways throughout history, from smaller measures such as the burning of Crimean Tatar books in the 1920s to the full-scale deportation and exile of Crimean Tatars in 1944. |
The vast majority of districts, raions, villages, and geographic features in Crimea bearing Crimean Tatar names were given Slavic names shortly after the deportation of the Tatars per a decree of the Crimean Regional Committee mandating such renaming. Most places in Crimea still bear the post-deportation names, many redundant, that were imposed in the 1940s to remove traces of Qirim Tatarlik. Very few localities Bakhchysarai, Dzhankoy, , Alushta, Alupka, and Saky were spared renaming. |
Soviet party officials in Crimea indoctrinated the Slavic population of Crimea with Tatarophobia, depicting Crimean Tatars as "traitors", "bourgeoisie", or "counter-revolutionaries", and falsely implying that they were "Mongols" with no historical connection to the Crimean peninsula (despite their Greek, Italian, Armenian, and Gothic roots.) A 1948 conference in Crimea was dedicated to promoting and sharing anti-Crimean-Tatar sentiments. |
The attempts to paint Amet-khan Sultan as a Dagestani contrary to his Crimean origins has faced backlash from the Crimean Tatar community. Despite the flying ace being born in Crimea to a Tatar mother and always identifying himself as Tatar, the Russian Federation named a Dagestani Airport after him while naming Crimea's main airport after Ivan Aivazovsky instead, ignoring numerous petitions from the Crimean Tatar community requesting that the airport bearing Amet-khan's name be in his homeland. |
De Ghisolfi (also known as de Guizolfi, de Gisolfi, Guigursis, Guilgursis and Giexulfis) was the name of a Genoese-Jewish family prominent in the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance. |
In 1419, the Genoese Jew Simeone de Ghisolfi married a reigning princess of the municipality of Tmutarakan on the Taman Peninsula named Bikhakhanim, and took possession of this area, most likely centered on the town of Matrega. The de Ghisolfi clan ruled this principality as a protectorate of the Genoese consulate of Gazaria for much of the 15th century. |
In 1453, the Republic of Genoa ceded its Crimean possessions to the Bank of St. George, a private enterprise to which it was heavily in debt. The Ghisolfi family continued to rule Matrega and the surrounding region on behalf of the Bank. Through such intermediaries as Khozi Kokos, they maintained relations with the rulers of Muscovy and other Russian principalities. |
Notwithstanding the fact that the Turks had captured Tana (Azov) and most of the settlements in Gazaria, Ghisolfi continued the war from Matrice, but with only a small measure of success. Learning that he had expressed a desire to come to Russia, and glad of an opportunity to ally with the Circassians and other peoples resisting Ottoman incursions, Ivan III of Muscovy directed Prince Nozdrevaty, his ambassador to the Crimean Tatar khan Meñli I Giray, to forward a message "sealed with the gold seal" to Zacharias the Jew, at Caffa. This message, dated March 14, 1484, and forwarded by Luka and Prince Vasili, both court dignitaries, reads as follows: |
From subsequent events, it is evident that Ghisolfi entered the service of the khan, for further negotiations were carried on, and in April 1500, Ivan, instructing his ambassador, refers to Ghisolfi as "Zacharias the Fryazin," who had lived in Circassia and is now in the service of Meñli I Giray, but who never reached Russia." |
Ivan's repeated invitations to Ghisolfi seem to indicate that he hoped the latter's services would be valuable to him in extending Russian influence on the Black Sea. Yet it is strange that during a period of more than eighteen years Ghisolfi did not succeed in reaching Russia. Whether the fact that Ghisolfi was a Jew had anything to do with the impediments put in his way, it is difficult to ascertain, for no mention of him is to be found in Jewish writings. The different spellings of Zachariah's name in Italian and Russian documents—"Guizolfi," "Guigursis," and "Guilgursis"—may be attributed to errors of the Russian scribes. |
The Black Sea bumping incident of 12 February 1988 occurred when American cruiser tried to exercise the right of innocent passage through Soviet territorial waters in the Black Sea during the Cold War. The cruiser was bumped by the Soviet frigate "Bezzavetny" with the intention of pushing "Yorktown" into international waters. This incident also involved the destroyer , sailing in company with USS "Yorktown" and claiming the right of innocent passage, which was intentionally shouldered by a Soviet "SKR-6". "Yorktown" reported minor damage to its hull, with no holing or risk of flooding. "Caron" was undamaged. |
At the time, the Soviet Union recognized the right of innocent passage for warships in its territorial waters solely in designated sea lanes. The United States believed that there was no legal basis for a coastal nation to limit warship transits to sea lanes only. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of State found that the Russian-language text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 22, paragraph 1 allowed the coastal state to regulate the right of innocent passage whenever necessary, while the English-language text did not. Following the incident, the Soviet Union expressed a commitment to resolve the issue of innocent passage in Soviet territorial waters. |
In 1979, the United States launched an informal program to promote the "rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight guaranteed to all nations under international law". The US government said that it initiated the program because some countries were beginning to assert jurisdictional boundaries beyond traditional claims. The United States wished to stop this and, it said, diplomatic protests had seemed to be ineffective. A new customary international law could emerge if nations avoided operating their ships and aircraft in the disputed areas, and the US saw this as undesirable. |
In the 1980s, US warships were passing through the straits from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea two or three times a year to "show the flag" and to claim the right of innocent passage in the coastal states. Aside from the right of free passage, US naval activity in the Black Sea served the purpose of upholding US rights under the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. According to a US government official, "the Dardanelles and the Bosporus form an international waterway" under that convention and "if you don't periodically reaffirm your rights you find that they're hard to revive". |
Meanwhile, "The Rules of Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Waters and Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR", enacted by the Soviet Council of Ministers in 1983, acknowledged the right of innocent passage of foreign warships only in restricted areas of Soviet territorial waters in the Baltic, Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan; no sea lanes for innocent passage in the Black Sea were designated. Soviet vessels and aircraft were routinely dispatched to observe US warships there. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union viewed the US presence in the Black Sea as an attempt to undermine improving Soviet–American relations. |
After the 1986 incident in the Black Sea, also involving USS "Yorktown" and USS "Caron", a meeting of the Soviet Defence Council was held later in the same year. At the meeting, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy Vladimir Chernavin suggested to Mikhail Gorbachev, Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and other senior officials that intruding foreign warships could be driven from Soviet waters by several means, including bumping. |
First, "Caron" was approached by the frigate "SKR-6", and three minutes later, "Yorktown" was approached by the frigate "Bezzavetnyy", while Tupolev Tu-16 bombers monitored the vessels' movements. As the US warships clipped a corner of the Soviet territorial waters, they were bumped. At 10:02 a.m, local time, at , from the coast, "SKR-6" bumped the port side aft of "Caron" at frame about from the bow. "Caron" received superficial scraping of paint, with no personnel injuries. "Bezzavetnyy", having bumped "Yorktown", was ordered to move away and not to contact her again. |
Both US warships stayed on even course after the incident. "Caron" left Soviet territorial waters at 11:50 a.m. local time without further incident. |
Both US warships reported the incident to the commander-in-chief of United States Naval Forces Europe. "Caron" reported that, at 13:20 local time, it was informed on channel 16 VHF by "Bezzavetnyy": "Soviet ships have orders to prevent violation of territorial waters, extreme measure is to strike your ship with one of ours." The reply of "Caron" was "I am engaged in innocent passage consistent with international law." "Yorktown", in its report stated that on 9:56, local time, it was contacted by "Bezzavetnyy" via channel 16 and told to leave Soviet territorial waters or "our ship is going to strike on yours." Then, according to the report, "Bezzavetnyy" came alongside port side of "Yorktown" at 10:03 and bumped it by turning into the ship. |
The starboard anchor of "Bezzavetnyy" was torn away. Two Harpoon missile canisters on "Yorktown" sustained damage when "Bezzavetnyy"s bullnose passed down port quarter. "Bezzavetnyy" then cleared to port and took station off the port beam of "Yorktown". "Bezzavetnyy" required a minor repair. |
The Soviet Ministry of Defense issued a statement blaming the U.S. warships for ignoring the "warning signals of Soviet border guard ships" and for "dangerously maneuvering in Soviet waters". The incident also drew a diplomatic protest from the U.S. government. |
These incidents were covered in the annual review of compliance with the US/Soviet Agreement On the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas signed on 25 May 1972. |
On 18 March 2014, a Ukrainian soldier and the member of quasi "Crimean self-defense forces" were killed in the first case of bloodshed during the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. |
After the attack, the Crimean interior ministry stated that a militant from Right Sector had been detained, according to Russian media Gazeta.ru. Right Sector had previously stated (on February 27, 2014) that it did not have any intention to go to Crimea. On March 20, Crimean prosecution denied that the detention had happened. |
None of the accounts of this event could be verified independently. The Ukrainian and the Crimean authorities provided conflicting reports of the event. The two casualties had a joint funeral attended by both Crimean and Ukrainian authorities. The event continues to be under investigation by both the Crimean authorities and the Ukrainian military. |
On March 18, 2014, at 3 p.m, 15 masked gunmen attired in Russian uniforms without insignia, stormed the 13th Photogrammetric Center of the Central Military-Topographic and Navigation Administration in Simferopol, Crimea. The base was administered by Ukrainian soldiers and had been completely surrounded by pro-Russian and Crimean Self-Defense troops since 13 March. Pro-Russian forces demanded that the garrison surrender the base or otherwise they will take the center with force. |
Although it is unclear how the incident initially began, reports emerged of a pro-Russian self-defense member attempting to scale a wall into the base compound, and being told to get back by Ukrainian guards. The argument escalated into live gunfire being exchanged by both sides and the storming of the base itself. However, civilian testimonies indicated seeing self-defense troops and militiamen preparing for a possible storming of the base prior any confrontation. |
Soldier Serhiy Kokurin, a Ukrainian junior officer manning a watchtower overseeing a vehicle pool at the base, was fatally injured in the neck during the shoot-out. A second Ukrainian serviceman was shot in the neck and evacuated by several ambulances. The ambulances were granted entrance to the scene by self-defense troops, who sealed off the base to journalists. This death marked the first military fatality in the Russian takeover of Crimea. In addition to the officer, an ethnic Russian volunteer was reported killed per Crimean authorities, though it was unclear if he was killed by resisting Ukrainian troops or by accidental friendly fire (both were reported). |
The storming followed with the takeover of the park located within the base's compound and the Ukrainian command center. According to civilians and journalists at the scene, a total of 15 unmarked soldiers, armed with shotguns and AK-47s, participated in the assault, supported by two military vehicles bearing the Russian flag. A Ukrainian soldier on patrol at the park was beaten by self-defense soldiers with a pair of iron rods during the capture. The soldier's condition was reported as serious, according to military accounts. |
Shooting continued until the Ukrainian commander, Colonel Andriy Andryushyn, was captured. He was taken hostage, along with several other soldiers, in order to gain entry into the base's nautical building, where the remaining Ukrainian personnel had barricaded themselves on the second floor, refusing to surrender. The Ukrainian commander was interrogated by Russian troops, and allegedly declared his defection to the "People of Crimea" afterwards. |
Negotiations over the surrender of the nautical building, and the Ukrainian troops inside, continued until late Tuesday evening, when talks were met over their surrender. A total of 18 remaining Ukrainian soldiers were detained and placed under arrest by gunmen. The soldiers were placed in rows and had all identification marks, weapons, and money confiscated at the behest of Crimean police. By March 24, the remaining Ukrainian troops who had been captured during the altercation were freed, unharmed. |
Ukrainian interim prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk accused Russia of a war crime over the incident. "Today, Russian soldiers began shooting at Ukrainian servicemen and this is a war crime without any expiry under a statute of limitations." Acting Ukrainian president Oleksandr Turchynov suggested that the Russian annexation of Crimea was moving from a political phase to a military phase, following the announcement of the death of a servicemen. He issued orders on the night of 18 March, allowing Ukrainian soldiers to use their weapons to defend themselves. The Ukrainian government released a statement declaring that the steps Russia was reminiscent to those taken by Nazi Germany and its annexations of territories before the start of World War 2. |
The Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed on the same day by Vladimir Putin and the self-declared Crimean republic, formally joining the independent Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation as two federal subjects - the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. |
British prime minister David Cameron said: "The steps taken by President Putin today to attempt to annexe Crimea to Russia are in flagrant breach of international law and send a chilling message across the continent of Europe. Russia will face more serious consequences and I will push European leaders to agree further EU measures." |
On March 19, 2014 Russian media, citing Crimean police, reported that authorities had detained a 17-year-old nationalist Right Sector marksman from Western Ukraine in connection to the killings. Sergey Aksyonov, de facto Head of Crimea, confirmed it in Twitter. Later, however, Crimean prosecutors denied detaining any gunmen, according to Interfax. "The information on the shooter's detention has not been confirmed. It is untrue. Unfortunately, no one has been detained yet," Natalia Boyarkina, press officer for the Crimean prosecutors, told Interfax-Ukraine on March 20. |
Igor Strelkov, the commander of pro-Russian forces in the War in Donbass in 2014, admitted in his interview he gave on November 20, 2014, he was in charge of the Center's assault. |
The Crimean Prosecutor General Natalia Poklonskaya investigated the incident. |
The day after the incident, Poklonskaya reported that pre-trial investigation services had determined the following: |
Several unarmed officials of the Russian Defense Ministry came to the Ukrainian military base to discuss cartography issues. This meeting had been agreed upon by both the base's Commander and Kyiv. While they were inside the base, Crimean self-defense forces were shot outside the base. |
A series of shots were fired both at Ukrainian soldiers and members of Crimean self-defence forces. There were victims on both sides: a Cossack self-defense soldier was killed, and another was injured. One Ukrainian soldier from the military base was killed and another was injured. |
At the time of Poklonskaya's initial statement, the exact position and number of shooters were unknown. |
The scene was examined by six investigation groups, including criminologists, detectives from the Crimean Republic attorney office, detectives from the main department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [of Ukraine or Russia?], and members of related departments. Poklonskaya stated that according to these experts, the incident was very similar to the snipers' attacks on Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Kyiv's central square, from February 18 to 21, 2014. Their goal was allegedly to provoke conflict between soldiers of Ukraine and the Crimean Republic. |
Several expert examinations were completed, including forensic medical examinations. Ballistic examinations were continuing, along with witness interviews. |
Meir Ashkenazi was a sixteenth-century Crimean Jew. |
Anti-NATO protests (including one riot) took place in the Ukrainian port city of Feodosia from late May to early June 2006, partially disrupting a joint Ukrainian-U.S. military exercise, which was canceled 20 July 2006. |
The military Ukraine-NATO Partnership for Peace military exercise "Sea Breeze 2006" exercise (in Crimea) was scheduled to take place in Ukraine starting 17 July 2006. Its aim was to "simulate the defence of a peninsula caught between a totalitarian state and a democratic one." "Sea Breeze" manoeuvres had been held annually since 1997. Another British-Ukrainian war-game called "Tight Knot" was scheduled to start on 14 June 2006 (near Mykolaiv). |
On 4 June 2006, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree on preparations of the two war-games. The approval for the exercises by the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament) was still pending early June 2006 because after the parliamentary election of March 2006 it resumed its work on 7 June 2006. In February 2006 the Verkhovna Rada elected before the 2006 election rejected a presidential bill on allowing foreign troops to take part in the maneuvers planned for 2006. The Verkhovna Rada was due to vote on the same bill on 7 June 2006, but decided to adjourn until 14 June. |
On 6 June 2006 the Crimean legislature declared Crimea a "NATO-free territory". |
On 27 May 2006 the United States (U.S.) cargo ship "Advantage" anchored in Feodosia, bringing what Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko described as U.S. "technical aid." Unarmed seamen offloaded construction materials to build barracks for Ukrainian sailors at a training range near the town of Stary Krym, not far from Feodosia. Two days later, Feodosia residents, mobilized by local chapters of the Party of Regions, the Nataliya Vitrenko Bloc, and the Russian Community of Crimea, began to picket the port, displaying anti-NATO slogans written in Russian and blocking U.S. cargo from getting to its destination. |
Reportedly the group of protesters rarely consisted of more than a few hundred demonstrators. They accused NATO and the United States of seeking a foothold in Ukraine. The Ukrainian defense ministry stated 2 June 2006 that the planned exercises were not connected with NATO. |
On 5 June 2006, Serhiy Yevtushenko, an advisor to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, was stopped at the Moscow airport and sent back to Ukraine. The following day, Russian Duma vice-speaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky and member Konstantin Zatulin were banned from entering Ukraine (were declared "persona non grata") based on the Ukrainian law concerning foreigners’ status, "foreigners are prohibited to enter the country if they violated Ukrainian legislation during their previous stay." In the case of Zatulin, Ukrainian government accused him of trying to invoke ethnic violence and work against territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. For example, Zhirinovskiy stated: “Ukraine does not exist. Russian governors must sit in Kyiv and Minsk. True Russian borders are the borders of September 1917.” The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the ban as unfriendly. |
NATO-involved military events in Ukraine since 2006. |
The 2006 Crimean anti-NATO protests did not impact foreign military units to participate in multinational military exercises in Ukraine. Various military exercises (including ones with NATO troops) were held in Crimea since 2006. |
According to a poll by Razumkov Center in March 2011 some 51% of the Crimean residents considered NATO a threat, while across Ukraine this rate was 20.6% on average. |
The 1927 Crimean earthquakes occurred in the month of June and again in September in the waters of the Black Sea near the Crimean Peninsula. Each of the submarine earthquakes in the sequence triggered tsunami. The June event was moderate relative to the large September 11 event, which had at least one aftershock that also generated a tsunami. Following the large September event, natural gas that was released from the sea floor created flames that were visible along the coastline, and was accompanied by bright flashes and explosions. |
The June shock was a strong event with a magnitude of 6.0 that caused a nondestructive tsunami along the coast. The shock occurred at a depth of on the submarine slope near Yalta. The shock's intensity was gauged to be VII–VIII ("Very strong–Damaging") on the Medvedev–Sponheuer–Karnik scale. Tide gauge stations recorded waves with a maximum amplitude of at Yalta, at Yevpatoria, and at Feodosia. |
The September event struck the Crimean Peninsula with a moment magnitude of 6.7 at a depth of . This destructive earthquake occurred at 22:15 UTC and was recorded by several early seismographs. The shock was centered about southeast of Yalta and had a maximum perceived intensity of VIII ("Damaging") on the Medvedev–Sponheuer–Karnik scale. Near the epicentral region, fishermen reported disturbance of the sea, with tidal gauges recording waves at Yevpatoria and waves in Yalta. |
Numerous, very large flames were seen offshore Sevastopol, Cape Lucullus, and Yalta in the early morning following the September event. Several types of fire and flame were described by witnesses. Pale flames were up to wide and up to in height, and were visible for several minutes at a time. Other flames began with a whitish glow and became bright red; this style of flame sometimes burned for more than an hour. Bright flashes and explosions were also reported. The flames and explosions were attributed to methane or other hydrocarbon gasses that had been released from the seabed and spontaneously combusted in Phosphine (a self-igniting gas). |
An aftershock that was estimated to have a magnitude of 4.9 occurred on September 16 at 08:21 UTC. The shock was described as weak, but the sea receded at Balaklava Bay. |
The COVID-19 pandemic was confirmed to have reached Sevastopol in March 2020. The Russian government includes the cases in Sevastopol in the count of cases in Russia (the city is "de facto" administered by Russia, but recognised as a part of Ukraine by most of the international community). |
As of 30 March 2020, there were five confirmed cases in Sevastopol. |
On March 13, 1986, the American cruiser and the destroyer , claiming the right of innocent passage, entered Soviet territorial waters in the Black Sea near the southern Crimean Peninsula. The warships passed within six miles of the Soviet coast, where they were soon confronted by the Soviet frigate . The commander of "Ladny" notified the U.S. warships that they had violated Soviet territorial waters and requested that they depart immediately. The U.S. warships confirmed receipt of the warning but did not change course. The Soviet command placed its Black Sea air and naval forces on combat readiness and dispatched border guard vessels and naval aircraft to intercept the U.S. warships. |
"Yorktown" and "Caron" stayed in Soviet territorial waters for roughly two hours. The situation de-escalated when the U.S. ships left; diplomatic repercussions continued for several weeks. |
On March 10, 1986, the USS "Yorktown", accompanied by the USS "Caron", entered the Black Sea via the Turkish Straits. Their entrance was observed by a , "Ladny", which was ordered to continue observation. On March 13 with their main armament pointed in the direction of the Soviet coastline, "Yorktown" and "Caron" entered the Soviet territorial waters and sailed west along the southern Crimean Peninsula, approaching within six miles of the coast. Having entered from the direction of Feodosia, the US warships sailed for two hours and 21 minutes. Both American warships also confronted the Soviet border guard vessels "Dozorny" and "Izmail". The commander of "Ladny", Captain Zhuravlev, reported the incident to his superiors. |
According to "Izvestiya" editor Vyacheslav Lukashin, at the time of the incident the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy Vladimir Chernavin knew that the order for the U.S. warships to proceed into Soviet waters was given by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger with the consent of President Ronald Reagan. |
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs held two press conferences concerning the incident. The U.S. charge d'affaires, Richard Combs, was summoned to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive the Soviet protest. The Soviet Union stated that the U.S. violation of its territorial waters "was of a demonstrative, defiant nature and pursued clearly provocative aims". Vladimir Chernavin affirmed that "the innocent passage of foreign warships through the territorial waters of the USSR is permitted only in specially authorized coastal areas which have been announced by the Soviet government [and] there are no such areas in the Black Sea off the coast of the Soviet Union". |
In the subsequent incident of 1988, the same USS "Yorktown" and USS "Caron", while claiming innocent passage again in the Black Sea, were bumped by the Soviet vessels. |
The Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic () was an unsuccessful attempt to establish a Soviet republic situated in the Crimean Peninsula part of Soviet Russia. The republic was established by Bolsheviks Jan Miller and Anton Slutsky who previously participated in the Petrograd Bolshevik Revolution. |
It existed from 19 March to 30 April 1918 and was recognised by the Russian SFSR. |
Following the 1917 October Revolution, the ethnic Tatar government proclaimed the Crimean People's Republic on 13 December 1917. In January 1918, however, it was overrun by Bolshevik forces. In Simferopol a guberniya revkom was established which, however, did possess sufficient authority as the military center continued to be located in Sevastopol. |
To liquidate this dual authority on February 10–12, 1918 there took place a conference of revkoms at which participated 44 delegates (including 27 Bolsheviks). The conference was later recognized as an extraordinary congress of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. At the meeting, it was decided to create 14 commissariats. The Congress also confirmed the disbandment of the Council of People's Representatives and Qurultay. The local administration was transformed into a system of soviets replacing the old system of duma and land administration (zemstvo). The 14-member Central Executive Committee was established as the central administration of guberniya which consisted of 10 Bolsheviks; the rest were Left SRs. Jan Miller (Bolshevik) was appointed as chairman of the committee. |
The Congress, with 23 votes "for" and 20 "against", decided that the administrative center would be in Simferopol rather than Sevastopol, while the military center, which was subordinated to the central executive committee, was left in Sevastopol. The major administrative and political issues were to be decided by laws adopted at the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The Taurida congress also approved the adoption of drastic measures for grain procurement allowing requisition and the use of armed force sending bread to industrial areas and the army. |
A few weeks later, on 19 and 21 March, decrees of the Taurida Central Executive Committee (CEC) issued in Simferopol established the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic on the same territory. Areas of Taurida that lay north of Crimea were also claimed by the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic. |
With the assistance of the German Empire, the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic was quickly overrun by forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic during the Crimean Offensive. By the end of April 1918, the majority of the CEC and the Council of People's Commissars, including council leader Anton Slutsky and local Bolshevik chief Jan Tarwacki, were arrested and shot in Alushta by insurgent Crimean Tatars. On 30 April, the Republic was abolished. |
Following the invasion, a German-protected Crimean Regional Government was established under Maciej Sulkiewicz and, later, Solomon Krym. After the defeat of the White Movement's Volunteer Army and the reassertion of Soviet control in late 1920, the lands of the former Republic were passed to the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic under the Russian SFSR. |
The South Russian Government () was a Russian White movement government established by Armed Forces of South Russia commander Anton Denikin in Novorossiysk, Kuban, in March 1920 during the Russian Civil War. |
On 27 March 1920, Denikin was forced to evacuate Novorossiysk for Crimea, which the Whites had controlled since June 1919. However, the slipshod retreat discredited Denikin and he stepped down, succeeded by General Pyotr Wrangel, who was elected new Commander-in-Chief of the White Army by military council. The South Russian Government was dissolved on 30 March in Feodosiya. Wrangel set up a new Government of South Russia in Sevastopol in April. |
This attempted establishment of civil government by the White authorities was a recognition that previous neglect of civil administration by the General Command of the Armed Forces of South Russia had cost the Whites civilian support. |
Seraya Shapshal or "His Excellency Hajji Seraya Khan Shapshal " (Karaim: Серая Бен Мордехай Шапшал; ; ; ) (1873–1961) was a hakham and leader of the Crimean and then the Polish and Lithuanian Crimean Karaites (Karaim) community. |
Shapshal was born in Bahçesaray, Crimea and studied at St. Petersburg University, where he was graduated in philology and oriental languages. During his studies he became a strong adopter of Russian orientalist V.Grigorjev's theory about the Khazarian origin of the Crimean Karaites. Immediately after his graduation at 1901 he was invited to serve as the personal tutor of the Iranian crown prince, Mohammad Ali Shah, and became a minister in the Persian government in 1907 (actually he was a Russian spy). In 1911 he returned to Crimea and became Chief Hakham of the Crimean Karaites communities in Crimea. |
From 1920 to 1927 he lived in Istanbul. Here he was active in the pan-Turkic movement. In 1927 while living in Turkey he was elected the head of the Karaims in Poland and in 1928 moved to Wilno. |
He denied any connection between Crimean Karaites and Rabbinic Jews. Shapshal is the founder of the Crimean Karaite religion and historical doctrine of Dejudaization. |
Under this doctrine, he changed the traditional title of "Hacham" to "Gahan" ("Ḥakhan"), which in his opinion goes back to the Khazarian word "Khagan". In the mid 1930s, he began to create a theory of the Altai-Turkic origin of the Karaims and the pagan roots of the Karaite religious teaching (worship of sacred oaks, polytheism, led by the god Tengri, the Sacrifice). Shapshal's doctrine is still a topic of critical research and public debate. |
He made a number of reforms aimed at the Turkification of the Karaims and the eradication of Jewish elements from their culture and language. He issued an order abolishing the teaching of Hebrew in Karaite schools, replaced names of Jewish holidays and months with the Turkic ones, renamed "Gahan" the position of "Hacham" in consonance with the word "khan". According to Shapshal, the doctrine of Anan ben David was close to early Christianity, and Karaites had believed for centuries in Jesus and Mohammed as prophets. Crimean Karaites adopted the law of Moses, but continued to adhere to the ancient Turkic pagan beliefs. |
Between the efforts to impose a Khazarian origin for the Crimean Karaites was the "militarization" process of their history originated in the 20th century's inter-war Poland: the trend of representing the Karaite population of Eastern Europe as a nation of warriors. |
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