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As technology continues to advance, many people are beginning to worry about potential security risks as they relate to cyber crime and online activity. Since the Internet was created, many have used it for their personal gain, resulting in numerous security breaches that have caused extensive financial damage to both individuals and corporations. Even now, despite the best efforts of security companies, many dangerous security breaches can still take their toll on corporate activities. Fortunately, there are many steps that professionals and individuals can take to learn more about the dangers and determine how they can prevent and overcome them. To learn more, check out this infographic.
All proper safety procedures begin at the awareness stage. Individuals must know about the threat and what they can do to combat it. On average, 3,000 United States companies are victims of cyber crimes every year. In 2014, there were 783 data breaches, which was a serious rise from the year before at 27.5%. This means that there were roughly 15 breeches on a weekly average. Over 78% of all CEOs are worried about data breeches, especially after learning of these numbers and how significant the concerns are. Roughly one in every five Americans has been impacted in some way by these breeches as well. All of these statistics add up to the fact that cyber security is an important facet of business that should be handled appropriately. Otherwise, such problems will always be prevalent.
All types of industries may be at risk of cyber threats. Breaking down the businesses by their sector, there have already been some troubling statistics made. 84% of all government organizations, 80% of banking and financial institutions, 72% of telecommunications and information organizations, 70% of healthcare groups, and 62% of insurance organizations have all been targeted by cybercriminal activities. The top crimes in these industries include things such as identity theft and confidential records being compromised or stolen. Sometimes files and systems may be altered as well, and other times criminals will connect to a system or network outside of their permission.
Top Causes of Data Breaches
There are many causes for such breaches that all professionals should be aware of. The vast majority of the concerns come from malware infections, which stand at a frightening 44% of all incidents. 30% of all incidents come from accidents that occur on the inside, usually because of an employee or company system. 27% of incidents are a result of hacking attempts. 26% occur because of SQL injections, while 24% occur because of a compromised password. In 19% of all incidents, the attack was intentional or targeted at the corporation to achieve a certain end.
As far as human errors are concerned, this is one of the easiest to control aspects of cyber security breaches. All business owners should instruct their employees to be careful in their approach with the Internet and the company. The vast majority of the problems are divided into two categories: password problems and malware and phishing issues. Over 30,000 websites are infected with malware problems daily, and it is up to the employees of the company to know how to uphold the proper security procedures to the best effect.
Consequences of Security Breaches
All types of breaches can have terrible consequences. There have been many cyber crimes committed already, many of which have affected major corporations such as eBay, Target, and Home Depot. In fact, 7% of United States corporations have lost a million dollars or more because of cyber crimes. 19% of other United States corporations have lost between fifty thousand and one million dollars. In addition to the direct financial consequences, businesses may be subjected to other issues. Corporations may take a major hit in their reputation and brand name, in addition to lost time and productivity that could have helped the company move forward instead.
Almost 46% of all breaches are accidentally found. One the other hand, 42% of active monitoring systems were able to identify breaches before they had the chance to become a serious issue. 23% of all detections occurred because of a third party or affiliated company notifying the one being breached. In 19% of situations, an audit or general assessment was able to locate the breach and deal with it appropriately. In order for all businesses to stay on top of their company’s cyber security systems, it is vital for them to practice careful browsing and to be prudent in planning their safety measures.
As the nation’s oldest private military college, Norwich University has been a leader in innovative education since 1819. Through its online programs, Norwich delivers relevant and applicable curricula that allow its students to make a positive impact on their places of work and their communities.
At Norwich University, we extend a tradition of values-based education, where structured, disciplined, and rigorous studies create a challenging and rewarding experience. Online programs, such as the Master of Science in Cybersecurity, have made our comprehensive curriculum available to more students than ever before.
Norwich University has been designated as a Center for Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense Education by the National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security. Through your program, you can choose from five concentrations that are uniquely designed to provide an in-depth examination of policies, procedures, and overall structure of a cybersecurity program. | <urn:uuid:c82aa47c-823e-4715-9d47-8c38bca5208b> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://pro.norwich.edu/academic-programs/resources/importance-implementing-security-protocol-practices-and-awareness | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.967341 | 1,062 | 2.75 | 3 |
by Dr John Thirlwell, Belrose Veterinary Hospital, NSW
This X-ray imaging system consists of a Canon wireless DR radiography panel and a Dell console PC with touchscreen capabilities.
What’s good about it
Our old CR system produced images of fairly average quality. When it suddenly stopped working, I wanted a system that could be used with our existing mobile generator. Radincon came out to the practice so we could trial this system and the results were amazing. It produced some of the best X-ray images I’ve seen. The high quality is largely due to the software I was sold. Now we’re taking more X-rays than ever.
A big advantage of a DR system over a CR system is that the processing time is much faster. A CR system requires the plate to be placed in a processor so it can be read and the image transferred to a computer screen. This can take a good couple of minutes. With a DR system the images appear on the screen in a couple of seconds.
The plate is wireless and battery powered. It comes with two rechargeable batteries that last for ages. The wireless connection is faultless and the images show very fine detail. We use it for pretty much everything except dental X-rays. It works beautifully with wildlife.
Over the years, I’ve purchased a lot of veterinary equipment that adequately does the job. This DR system has greatly exceeded my expectations—every time I use it, I’m happy with it.
What’s not so good
It’s not cheap to purchase but it’s a fairly robust piece of equipment. It would probably survive being dropped but I would prefer not to experience that. If someone was to break it, that would be soul destroying. | <urn:uuid:53306e00-a7bd-4488-b2b5-6e1519aaddde> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.vetpracticemag.com.au/tools-of-the-trade-rad-x-dr-cx1a-701g-wireless-flat-panel-system/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.963198 | 367 | 1.671875 | 2 |
GM Potato Trials to Continue in EuropeApril 13, 2012
BASF revealed that it will continue its GM potato trials this year on less than one hectare on sites in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. The announcement was published despite a decision made in January to transfer BASF's GM research from Germany to the United States. BASF said that it would carry on trials of crops undergoing the European Union approvals process.
Peter Eckes, president of BASF Plant Science, said that they will continue the approval processes which are already underway and the production of seed material for such purposes. "BASF is convinced that plant biotechnology is a technology of the future," he added.
This year's trials will include the starch potato Modena and blight-resistant Fortuna. The trials will be conducted in Saxony-Anhalt in Germany, in the provinces of Skane and Halland in Sweden, and the provinces of Gelderland, Drenthe and Noord-Brabant in the Netherlands.
Read the press release at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-germany-gmo-basf-idUSBRE8340Y120120405.
The Crop Biotech Update is a weekly newsletter of ISAAA, a not-for-profit organization. The CBU is distributed for free to over 23,000 subscribers worldwide to inform them about the key developments in biosciences, especially in agricultural biotechnology. Your support will help us in our mission to feed the world with knowledge. You can help by donating as little as $10.
See more articles:
News from Around the World
- Paarlberg: GM Crops Produce Higher Yields
- NARO Scientist: Uganda to Commercialize Biotech Cotton in 2014
- African Farmers Share the Story of Biofortified Crops on Radio
- Investing in S & T will Spur Kenya's Development Says President Kibaki
- UCLA Study to Predict Plant Survival vs. Drought
- Plant Genetics Facility Opens in Iowa, USA
- Chinese Scientists Breed Long-fiber Cotton
- A Potato for the Day's Vitamin C Fix
- Hokkaido Government to Keep GM Planting Ban
- Mini-symposium on GM Crops in Asia by Hokkaido Bio-Industry Association, Japan
- More GM Corn Field Trials Before Commercialization in Vietnam
- University of Southern Mindanao Welcomes Development in Bt Eggplant Field Trial
- Chinese Researchers Estimate Uncertainty in GMO Quantification
- China Develops Second Generation GM Cotton
- GM Crop Seminar Enlightens University Executive
- Algae.Tec to Open Production Facility in Australia and Sri Lanka
- GM Potato Trials to Continue in Europe
- EFSA: GM Maize Safe
- UK Donates £16M to FAO to Improve Agricultural Statistics
- Maternally Produced siRNAs Regulate Seed Size
- Touch Activates Plant's Insect Defenses
- Auxin's Role in Symptom Dev't upon Rhodococcus fascians infection
Beyond Crop Biotech
- Scientists Identify Childhood Obesity Genes
- Genome Sequencing Isn't Predictive of Most Diseases
- 2012 BIO International Convention
- Commercialization of Biotech Crops: Learning from Asia
- OECD Environment Working Paper No. 40 Now Available
Read the latest:
- Crop Biotech Update (August 10, 2022)
- Genome Editing Supplement (August 10, 2022)
- Gene Drive Supplement (July 27, 2022)
Subscribe to CBU: | <urn:uuid:fd3c31db-ae73-4014-9512-510cc2d68a65> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.isaaa.org/kc/cropbiotechupdate/article/default.asp?ID=9409 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.881908 | 783 | 1.859375 | 2 |
Understand grocery labels for animal products
Use our guide to help you understand labels on animal products and how that relates to animal welfare.
Get your humane shopping guide
Humane farms are better for animals, people and the environment:
- Raising animals humanely often leads to less feed, fuel and water use by farmers as they move away from intensive farming practices that not only harms animals, causes pollution
- Humane farms can create jobs, boost profits and keep local food supplies healthy
- By farming crops and livestock, humane farms can reduce environmental damage – recycling nutrients and improving the soil
- Greenhouse gas emissions are often reduced when animals are healthy and have good welfare. | <urn:uuid:4d75b0e4-181c-4c86-b815-1ebd3cf89da0> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.worldanimalprotection.ca/our-work/animals-farming/humane-shopping-guide | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.929379 | 137 | 3.0625 | 3 |
As largely expected, the Roberts Court has obliterated the EPA's authority over power plant emissions, saying that even the Trump Regime's industry-friendly measures went too far, let alone the old Obama power plant regs that were nuked in 2016.
The Supreme Court on Thursday sharply cut back the Environmental Protection Agency’s ability to reduce the carbon output of existing power plants, a blow to the nation’s chances of averting catastrophic climate change.
The vote was 6 to 3, with Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. writing for the court’s conservatives.
“Capping carbon dioxide emissions at a level that will force a nationwide transition away from the use of coal to generate electricity may be a sensible ‘solution to the crisis of the day,’ ” Roberts wrote, referring to a court precedent. “But it is not plausible that Congress gave EPA the authority to adopt on its own such a regulatory scheme.”
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the dissenters, countered: “The Court appoints itself — instead of Congress or the expert agency — the decisionmaker on climate policy. I cannot think of many things more frightening.”
The decision risks putting the United States even further off track from President Biden’s goal of running the U.S. power grid on clean energy by 2035 — and making the entire economy carbon-neutral by 2050.
With higher seas, fiercer wildfires and other consequences of climate change apparent, the world is already in unprecedented territory. Biden hoped to lead by example to convince other countries to cut emissions and help the world keep warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit).
Now such diplomacy has become more difficult for Biden, especially as countries scramble for new sources of oil and gas after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In a statement, White House spokesman Abdullah Hasan called Thursday’s ruling “another devastating decision from the court that aims to take our country backwards.” Biden, he added, “will not relent in using the authorities that he has under law to protect public health and tackle the climate change crisis.”
“Our lawyers will study the ruling carefully and we will find ways to move forward under federal law,” Hasan said. “At the same time, Congress must also act to accelerate America’s path to a clean, healthy, secure energy future.”
The court was considering the powers granted by the Clean Air Act, which was written decades ago, before climate change was widely recognized as a worldwide crisis.
Environmentalists were alarmed by the court’s decision.
Richard Lazarus, a Harvard environmental law professor, said that by insisting that an agency “can promulgate an important and significant climate rule only by showing ‘clear congressional authorization’ at a time when the Court knows that Congress is effectively dysfunctional, the Court threatens to upend the national government’s ability to safeguard the public health and welfare at the very moment when the United States, and all nations, are facing our greatest environmental challenge of all: climate change.”
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) praised the ruling.
“The Court has undone illegal regulations issued by the EPA without any clear congressional authorization and confirmed that only the people’s representatives in Congress — not unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats — may write our nation’s laws,” McConnell said in a statement.
The United States is the world’s second-biggest annual emitter of greenhouse gases, and is responsible for a greater portion of historical emissions than any other nation. | <urn:uuid:11239760-002f-4677-8957-d063454137af> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://zandarvts.blogspot.com/2022/06/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.942586 | 753 | 2.09375 | 2 |
Medically reviewed by Drugs.com. Last updated on Jan 24, 2022.
On This Page
To reduce the development of drug-resistant bacteria and maintain the effectiveness of PCE tablets and other antibacterial drugs, PCE tablets should be used only to treat or prevent infections that are proven or strongly suspected to be caused by bacteria.
PCE tablets (erythromycin particles in tablets) are an antibacterial product containing specially coated erythromycin base particles for oral administration. The coating protects the antibiotic from the inactivating effects of gastric acidity and permits efficient absorption of the antibiotic in the small intestine. PCE tablets are available in two strengths containing either 333 mg or 500 mg of erythromycin base. PCE tablets 500 mg tablets contain no synthetic dyes or artificial colors.
Erythromycin is produced by a strain of Saccharopolyspora erythraea (formerly Streptomyces erythraeus) and belongs to the macrolide group of antibiotics. It is basic and readily forms salts with acids. Erythromycin is a white to off-white powder, slightly soluble in water, and soluble in alcohol, chloroform, and ether. Erythromycin is known chemically as (3R*, 4S*, 5S*, 6R*, 7R*, 9R*, 11R*, 12R*, 13S*, 14R*)-4-[(2,6-dideoxy-3-C-methyl-3-O-methyl-α-L-ribo-hexopyranosyl)oxy]-14-ethyl-7,12,13-trihydroxy-3,5,7,9,11,13-hexamethyl-6-[[3,4,6-trideoxy-3-(dimethylamino)-β-D-xylo-hexopyranosyl]oxy]oxacyclotetradecane-2,10-dione. The molecular formula is C37H67NO13, and the molecular weight is 733.94. The structural formula is:
Inactive IngredientsPCE 333 mg Tablets
Cellulosic polymers, citrate ester, colloidal silicon dioxide, D&C Red No. 30, hydrogenated vegetable oil wax, lactose, magnesium stearate, microcrystalline cellulose, povidone, propylene glycol, sodium starch glycolate, stearic acid and vanillin.PCE 500 mg Tablets
Cellulosic polymers, citrate ester, colloidal silicon dioxide, crospovidone, hydrogenated vegetable oil wax, microcrystalline cellulose, polyethylene glycol, povidone, propylene glycol, stearic acid, talc, titanium dioxide and vanillin. PCE 500 mg tablets contain no synthetic dyes or artificial colors.
PCE - Clinical Pharmacology
Orally administered erythromycin base and its salts are readily absorbed in the microbiologically active form. Interindividual variations in the absorption of erythromycin are, however, observed, and some patients do not achieve optimal serum levels. Erythromycin is largely bound to plasma proteins. After absorption, erythromycin diffuses readily into most body fluids. In the absence of meningeal inflammation, low concentrations are normally achieved in the spinal fluid but the passage of the drug across the blood-brain barrier increases in meningitis. Erythromycin crosses the placental barrier, but fetal plasma levels are low. The drug is excreted in human milk. Erythromycin is not removed by peritoneal dialysis or hemodialysis.
In the presence of normal hepatic function, erythromycin is concentrated in the liver and is excreted in the bile; the effect of hepatic dysfunction on biliary excretion of erythromycin is not known. After oral administration, less than 5% of the administered dose can be recovered in the active form in the urine.
The erythromycin particles in PCE tablets are coated with a polymer whose dissolution is pH dependent. This coating allows for minimal release of erythromycin in acidic environments, e.g., stomach. This delivery system is designed for optimal drug release and absorption in the small intestine. In multiple-dose, steady-state studies, PCE tablets have demonstrated rapid and generally adequate drug delivery in both fasting and nonfasting conditions. However, the presence of food results in lower blood levels, and optimal blood levels are obtained when PCE tablets are given in the fasting state (at least 1/2 hour and preferably 2 hours before meals). Bioavailability data are available from Arbor Pharmaceuticals.
Erythromycin acts by inhibition of protein synthesis by binding 50 S ribosomal subunits of susceptible organisms. It does not affect nucleic acid synthesis. Antagonism has been demonstrated in vitro between erythromycin and clindamycin, lincomycin, and chloramphenicol.
Many strains of Haemophilus influenzae are resistant to erythromycin alone but are susceptible to erythromycin and sulfonamides used concomitantly.
Staphylococci resistant to erythromycin may emerge during a course of erythromycin therapy.
Erythromycin has been shown to be active against most strains of the following microorganisms, both in vitro and in clinical infections as described in the INDICATIONS AND USAGE section.Gram-positive organisms
- Corynebacterium diphtheriae
Staphylococcus aureus (resistant organisms may emerge during treatment)
- Bordetella pertussis
- Chlamydia trachomatis
The following in vitro data are available, but their clinical significance is unknown.
Erythromycin exhibits in vitro minimal inhibitory concentrations (MIC's) of 0.5 µg/mL or less against most (≥ 90%) strains of the following microorganisms; however, the safety and effectiveness of erythromycin in treating clinical infections due to these microorganisms have not been established in adequate and well-controlled clinical trials.Gram-positive organisms
- Viridans group streptococci
- Moraxella catarrhalis
Quantitative methods are used to determine antimicrobial minimum inhibitory concentrations (MIC's). These MIC's provide estimates of the susceptibility of bacteria to antimicrobial compounds. The MIC's should be determined using a standardized procedure. Standardized procedures are based on a dilution method1,2 (broth or agar) or equivalent with standardized inoculum concentrations and standardized concentrations of erythromycin powder. The MIC values should be interpreted according to the following criteria:
For Staphylococcus spp:
|≤ 0.5||Susceptible (S)|
|≥ 8||Resistant (R)|
For Streptococcus spp. and Streptococcus pneumoniae:
|≤ 0.25||Susceptible (S)|
|≥ 1||Resistant (R)|
A report of "Susceptible" indicates that the pathogen is likely to be inhibited if the antimicrobial compound in the blood reaches the concentrations usually achievable. A report of "Intermediate" indicates that the result should be considered equivocal, and, if the microorganism is not fully susceptible to alternative, clinically feasible drugs, the test should be repeated. This category implies possible clinical applicability in body sites where the drug is physiologically concentrated or in situations where high dosage of drug can be used. This category also provides a buffer zone which prevents small uncontrolled technical factors from causing major discrepancies in interpretation. A report of "Resistant" indicates that the pathogen is not likely to be inhibited if the antimicrobial compound in the blood reaches the concentrations usually achievable; other therapy should be selected.
Standardized susceptibility test procedures require the use of laboratory control microorganisms to control the technical aspects of the laboratory procedures. Standard erythromycin powder should provide the following MIC values:
|S. aureus ATCC* 29213||0.25-1|
|E. faecalis ATCC 29212||1-4|
|S. pneumoniae ATCC 49619||0.03-0.12|
Quantitative methods that require measurement of zone diameters also provide reproducible estimates of the susceptibility of bacteria to antimicrobial compounds. One such standardized procedure2,3 requires the use of standardized inoculum concentrations. This procedure uses paper disks impregnated with 15-µg erythromycin to test the susceptibility of microorganisms to erythromycin.
Reports from the laboratory providing results of the standard single-disk susceptibility test with a 15-µg erythromycin disk should be interpreted according to the following criteria:
For Staphylococcus spp:
|Zone Diameter (mm)||Interpretation|
|≥ 23||Susceptible (S)|
|≤ 13||Resistant (R)|
For Streptococcus spp. and Streptococcus pneumoniae:
|Zone Diameter (mm)||Interpretation|
|≥ 21||Susceptible (S)|
|≤ 15||Resistant (R)|
Interpretation should be as stated above for results using dilution techniques. Interpretation involves correlation of the diameter obtained in the disk test with the MIC for erythromycin.
As with standardized dilution techniques, diffusion methods require the use of laboratory control microorganisms that are used to control the technical aspects of the laboratory procedures. For the diffusion technique, the 15-µg erythromycin disk should provide the following zone diameters in these laboratory test quality control strains:
|Microorganism||Zone Diameter (mm)|
|S. aureus ATCC 25923||22-30|
|S. pneumoniae ATCC 49619||25-30|
Indications and Usage for PCE
To reduce the development of drug-resistant bacteria and maintain the effectiveness of PCE tablets and other antibacterial drugs, PCE tablets should be used only to treat or prevent infections that are proven or strongly suspected to be caused by susceptible bacteria. When culture and susceptibility information are available, they should be considered in selecting or modifying antibacterial therapy. In the absence of such data, local epidemiology and susceptibility patterns may contribute to the empiric selection of therapy.
PCE tablets are indicated in the treatment of infections caused by susceptible strains of the designated microorganisms in the diseases listed below:
Upper respiratory tract infections of mild to moderate degree caused by Streptococcus pyogenes; Streptococcus pneumoniae; Haemophilus influenzae (when used concomitantly with adequate doses of sulfonamides, since many strains of H. influenzae are not susceptible to the erythromycin concentrations ordinarily achieved). (See appropriate sulfonamide labeling for prescribing information.)
Lower respiratory tract infections of mild to moderate severity caused by Streptococcus pyogenes or Streptococcus pneumoniae.
Listeriosis caused by Listeria monocytogenes.
Respiratory tract infections due to Mycoplasma pneumoniae.
Skin and skin structure infections of mild to moderate severity caused by Streptococcus pyogenes or Staphylococcus aureus (resistant staphylococci may emerge during treatment).
Pertussis (whooping cough) caused by Bordetella pertussis. Erythromycin is effective in eliminating the organism from the nasopharynx of infected individuals, rendering them noninfectious. Some clinical studies suggest that erythromycin may be helpful in the prophylaxis of pertussis in exposed susceptible individuals.
Diphtheria: Infections due to Corynebacterium diphtheriae, as an adjunct to antitoxin, to prevent establishment of carriers and to eradicate the organism in carriers.
Erythrasma: In the treatment of infections due to Corynebacterium minutissimum.
Intestinal amebiasis caused by Entamoeba histolytica (oral erythromycins only). Extraenteric amebiasis requires treatment with other agents.
Acute pelvic inflammatory disease caused by Neisseria gonorrhoeae: Erythrocin® Lactobionate-I.V. (erythromycin lactobionate for injection, USP) followed by erythromycin base orally, as an alternative drug in treatment of acute pelvic inflammatory disease caused by N. gonorrhoeae in female patients with a history of sensitivity to penicillin. Patients should have a serologic test for syphilis before receiving erythromycin as treatment of gonorrhea and a follow-up serologic test for syphilis after 3 months.
Erythromycins are indicated for treatment of the following infections caused by Chlamydia trachomatis: conjunctivitis of the newborn, pneumonia of infancy, and urogenital infections during pregnancy. When tetracyclines are contraindicated or not tolerated, erythromycin is indicated for the treatment of uncomplicated urethral, endocervical, or rectal infections in adults due to Chlamydia trachomatis.
When tetracyclines are contraindicated or not tolerated, erythromycin is indicated for the treatment of nongonococcal urethritis caused by Ureaplasma urealyticum.
Primary syphilis caused by Treponema pallidum. Erythromycin (oral forms only) is an alternative choice of treatment for primary syphilis in patients allergic to the penicillins. In treatment of primary syphilis, spinal fluid should be examined before treatment and as part of the follow-up after therapy.
Legionnaires' Disease caused by Legionella pneumophila. Although no controlled clinical efficacy studies have been conducted, in vitro and limited preliminary clinical data suggest that erythromycin may be effective in treating Legionnaires' Disease.
ProphylaxisPrevention of Initial Attacks of Rheumatic Fever
Penicillin is considered by the American Heart Association to be the drug of choice in the prevention of initial attacks of rheumatic fever (treatment of Streptococcus pyogenes infections of the upper respiratory tract e.g., tonsillitis, or pharyngitis).4 Erythromycin is indicated for the treatment of penicillin-allergic patients. The therapeutic dose should be administered for ten days.Prevention of Recurrent Attacks of Rheumatic Fever
Penicillin or sulfonamides are considered by the American Heart Association to be the drugs of choice in the prevention of recurrent attacks of rheumatic fever. In patients who are allergic to penicillin and sulfonamides, oral erythromycin is recommended by the American Heart Association in the long-term prophylaxis of streptococcal pharyngitis (for the prevention of recurrent attacks of rheumatic fever).4
Erythromycin is contraindicated in patients with known hypersensitivity to this antibiotic.
Erythromycin is contraindicated in patients taking terfenadine, astemizole, cisapride, pimozide, ergotamine or dihydroergotamine. (See PRECAUTIONS – Drug Interactions.)
Do not use erythromycin concomitantly with HMG CoA reductase inhibitors (statins) that are extensively metabolized by CYP 3A4 (lovastatin or simvastatin), due to the increased risk of myopathy, including rhabdomyolysis.
There have been reports of hepatic dysfunction, including increased liver enzymes, and hepatocellular and/or cholestatic hepatitis, with or without jaundice, occurring in patients receiving oral erythromycin products.
Erythromycin has been associated with prolongation of the QT interval and infrequent cases of arrhythmia. Cases of torsades de pointes have been spontaneously reported during postmarketing surveillance in patients receiving erythromycin. Fatalities have been reported. Erythromycin should be avoided in patients with known prolongation of the QT interval, patients with ongoing proarrhythmic conditions such as uncorrected hypokalemia or hypomagnesemia, clinically significant bradycardia, and in patients receiving Class IA (quinidine, procainamide) or Class III (dofetilide, amiodarone, sotalol) antiarrhythmic agents. Elderly patients may be more susceptible to drug-associated effects on the QT interval.
Syphilis in Pregnancy
There have been reports suggesting that erythromycin does not reach the fetus in adequate concentration to prevent congenital syphilis. Infants born to women treated during pregnancy with oral erythromycin for early syphilis should be treated with an appropriate penicillin regimen.
Clostridium difficile Associated Diarrhea
Clostridium difficile associated diarrhea (CDAD) has been reported with use of nearly all antibacterial agents, including PCE tablets, and may range in severity from mild diarrhea to fatal colitis. Treatment with antibacterial agents alters the normal flora of the colon leading to overgrowth of C. difficile.
C. difficile produces toxins A and B which contribute to the development of CDAD. Hypertoxin producing strains of C. difficile cause increased morbidity and mortality, as these infections can be refractory to antimicrobial therapy and may require colectomy. CDAD must be considered in all patients who present with diarrhea following antibiotic use. Careful medical history is necessary since CDAD has been reported to occur over two months after the administration of antibacterial agents.
If CDAD is suspected or confirmed, ongoing antibiotic use not directed against C. difficile may need to be discontinued. Appropriate fluid and electrolyte management, protein supplementation, antibiotic treatment of C. difficile, and surgical evaluation should be instituted as clinically indicated.
Serious adverse reactions have been reported in patients taking erythromycin concomitantly with CYP3A4 substrates. These include colchicine toxicity with colchicine; rhabdomyolysis with simvastatin, lovastatin, and atorvastatin; and hypotension with calcium channel blockers metabolized by CYP3A4 (e.g., verapamil, amlodipine, diltiazem) (see PRECAUTIONS – Drug Interactions).
There have been post-marketing reports of colchicine toxicity with concomitant use of erythromycin and colchicine. This interaction is potentially life-threatening, and may occur while using both drugs at their recommended doses (see PRECAUTIONS – Drug Interactions).
Rhabdomyolysis with or without renal impairment has been reported in seriously ill patients receiving erythromycin concomitantly with lovastatin. Therefore, patients receiving concomitant lovastatin and erythromycin should be carefully monitored for creatine kinase (CK) and serum transaminase levels. (See package insert for lovastatin.)
Prescribing PCE tablets in the absence of a proven or strongly suspected bacterial infection or a prophylactic indication is unlikely to provide benefit to the patient and increases the risk of the development of drug-resistant bacteria.
Since erythromycin is principally excreted by the liver, caution should be exercised when erythromycin is administered to patients with impaired hepatic function. (See CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY and WARNINGS.)
Exacerbation of symptoms of myasthenia gravis and new onset of symptoms of myasthenic syndrome has been reported in patients receiving erythromycin therapy.
There have been reports of infantile hypertrophic pyloric stenosis (IHPS) occurring in infants following erythromycin therapy. In one cohort of 157 newborns who were given erythromycin for pertussis prophylaxis, seven neonates (5%) developed symptoms of non-bilious vomiting or irritability with feeding and were subsequently diagnosed as having IHPS requiring surgical pyloromyotomy. A possible doseresponse effect was described with an absolute risk of IHPS of 5.1% for infants who took erythromycin for 8-14 days and 10% for infants who took erythromycin for 15-21 days.5 Since erythromycin may be used in the treatment of conditions in infants which are associated with significant mortality or morbidity (such as pertussis or neonatal Chlamydia trachomatis infections), the benefit of erythromycin therapy needs to be weighed against the potential risk of developing IHPS. Parents should be informed to contact their physician if vomiting or irritability with feeding occurs.
Prolonged or repeated use of erythromycin may result in an overgrowth of nonsusceptible bacteria or fungi. If superinfection occurs, erythromycin should be discontinued and appropriate therapy instituted.
When indicated, incision and drainage or other surgical procedures should be performed in conjunction with antibiotic therapy.
Observational studies in humans have reported cardiovascular malformations after exposure to drug products containing erythromycin during early pregnancy.
Information for Patients
Patients should be counseled that antibacterial drugs including PCE tablets should only be used to treat bacterial infections. They do not treat viral infections (e.g., the common cold). When PCE tablets are prescribed to treat a bacterial infection, patients should be told that although it is common to feel better early in the course of therapy, the medication should be taken exactly as directed. Skipping doses or not completing the full course of therapy may (1) decrease the effectiveness of the immediate treatment and (2) increase the likelihood that bacteria will develop resistance and will not be treatable by PCE tablets or other antibacterial drugs in the future.
Diarrhea is a common problem caused by antibiotics which usually ends when the antibiotic is discontinued. Sometimes after starting treatment with antibiotics, patients can develop watery and bloody stools (with or without stomach cramps and fever) even as late as two or more months after having taken the last dose of the antibiotic. If this occurs, patients should contact their physician as soon as possible.
Erythromycin use in patients who are receiving high doses of theophylline may be associated with an increase in serum theophylline levels and potential theophylline toxicity. In case of theophylline toxicity and/or elevated serum theophylline levels, the dose of theophylline should be reduced while the patient is receiving concomitant erythromycin therapy.
There have been published reports suggesting that when oral erythromycin is given concurrently with theophylline there is a decrease in erythromycin serum concentrations of approximately 35%. The mechanism by which this interaction occurs is unknown. The decrease in erythromycin concentrations due to co-administration of theophylline could result in subtherapeutic concentrations of erythromycin.
Hypotension, bradyarrhythmias, and lactic acidosis have been observed in patients receiving concurrent verapamil, belonging to the calcium channel blockers drug class.
Concomitant administration of erythromycin and digoxin has been reported to result in elevated digoxin serum levels.
There have been reports of increased anticoagulant effects when erythromycin and oral anticoagulants were used concomitantly. Increased anticoagulation effects due to interactions of erythromycin with oral anticoagulants may be more pronounced in the elderly.
Erythromycin is a substrate and inhibitor of the 3A isoform subfamily of the cytochrome p450 enzyme system (CYP3A). Coadministration of erythromycin and a drug primarily metabolized by CYP3A may be associated with elevations in drug concentrations that could increase or prolong both the therapeutic and adverse effects of the concomitant drug. Dosage adjustments may be considered, and when possible, serum concentrations of drugs primarily metabolized by CYP3A should be monitored closely in patients concurrently receiving erythromycin.
The following are examples of some clinically significant CYP3A based drug interactions. Interactions with other drugs metabolized by the CYP3A isoform are also possible. The following CYP3A based drug interactions have been observed with erythromycin products in post-marketing experience:
Post-marketing reports indicate that co-administration of erythromycin with ergotamine or dihydroergotamine has been associated with acute ergot toxicity characterized by vasospasm and ischemia of the extremities and other tissues including the central nervous system. Concomitant administration of erythromycin with ergotamine or dihydroergotamine is contraindicated (see CONTRAINDICATIONS).
Triazolobenzodiazepines (such as triazolam and alprazolam) and related benzodiazepines
Erythromycin has been reported to decrease the clearance of triazolam and midazolam, and thus, may increase the pharmacologic effect of these benzodiazepines.
HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitors
Erythromycin has been reported to increase concentrations of HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (e.g., lovastatin and simvastatin). Rare reports of rhabdomyolysis have been reported in patients taking these drugs concomitantly.
Erythromycin has been reported to increase the systemic exposure (AUC) of sildenafil. Reduction of sildenafil dosage should be considered. (See Viagra package insert.)
There have been spontaneous or published reports of CYP3A based interactions of erythromycin with cyclosporine, carbamazepine, tacrolimus, alfentanil, disopyramide, rifabutin, quinidine, methyl-prednisolone, cilostazol, vinblastine, and bromocriptine.
Concomitant administration of erythromycin with cisapride, pimozide, astemizole, or terfenadine is contraindicated. (See CONTRAINDICATIONS.)
In addition, there have been reports of interactions of erythromycin with drugs not thought to be metabolized by CYP3A, including hexobarbital, phenytoin, and valproate.
Erythromycin has been reported to significantly alter the metabolism of the nonsedating antihistamines terfenadine and astemizole when taken concomitantly. Rare cases of serious cardiovascular adverse events, including electrocardiographic QT/QTc interval prolongation, cardiac arrest, torsades de pointes, and other ventricular arrhythmias, have been observed. (See CONTRAINDICATIONS.) In addition, deaths have been reported rarely with concomitant administration of terfenadine and erythromycin.
There have been post-marketing reports of drug interactions when erythromycin was co-administered with cisapride, resulting in QT prolongation, cardiac arrhythmias, ventricular tachycardia, ventricular fibrillation, and torsades de pointes, most likely due to the inhibition of hepatic metabolism of cisapride by erythromycin. Fatalities have been reported. (See CONTRAINDICATIONS).Colchicine
Colchicine is a substrate for both CYP3A4 and the efflux transporter P-glycoprotein (P-gp). Erythromycin is considered a moderate inhibitor of CYP3A4. A significant increase in colchicine plasma concentration is anticipated when co-administered with moderate CYP3A4 inhibitors such as erythromycin. If co-administration of colchicine and erythromycin is necessary, the starting dose of colchicine may need to be reduced, and the maximum colchicine dose should be lowered. Patients should be monitored for clinical symptoms of colchicine toxicity (see WARNINGS).
Drug/Laboratory Test Interactions
Erythromycin interferes with the fluorometric determination of urinary catecholamines.
Carcinogenesis, Mutagenesis, Impairment of Fertility
Long-term oral dietary studies conducted with erythromycin stearate in rats up to 400 mg/kg/day and in mice up to about 500 mg/kg/day (approximately 1-2 fold of the maximum human dose on a body surface area basis) did not provide evidence of tumorigenicity. Erythromycin stearate did not show genotoxic potential in the Ames, and mouse lymphoma assays or induce chromosomal aberrations in CHO cells. There was no apparent effect on male or female fertility in rats treated with erythromycin base by oral gavage at 700 mg/kg/day (approximately 3 times the maximum human dose on a body surface area basis).
Pregnancy Category B
There is no evidence of teratogenicity or any other adverse effect on reproduction in female rats fed erythromycin base by oral gavage at 350 mg/kg/day (approximately twice the maximum recommended human dose on a body surface area) prior to and during mating, during gestation, and through weaning. No evidence of teratogenicity or embryotoxicity was observed when erythromycin base was given by oral gavage to pregnant rats and mice at 700 mg/kg/day and to pregnant rabbits at 125 mg/kg/day (approximately 1-3 times the maximum recommended human dose).
Labor and Delivery
The effect of erythromycin on labor and delivery is unknown.
Erythromycin is excreted in human milk. Caution should be exercised when erythromycin is administered to a nursing woman.
Elderly patients, particularly those with reduced renal or hepatic function, may be at increased risk for developing erythromycin-induced hearing loss. (See ADVERSE REACTIONS and DOSAGE AND ADMINISTRATION).
Elderly patients may be more susceptible to development of torsades de pointes arrhythmias than younger patients. (See WARNINGS).
Elderly patients may experience increased effects of oral anticoagulant therapy while undergoing treatment with erythromycin. (See PRECAUTIONS - Drug Interactions).
PCE 333 MG Tablets contain 0.5 mg (0.02 mEq) of sodium per individual dose.
PCE 500 MG Tablets do not contain sodium.
The most frequent side effects of oral erythromycin preparations are gastrointestinal and are dose-related. They include nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea and anorexia. Symptoms of hepatitis, hepatic dysfunction and/or abnormal liver function test results may occur. (See WARNINGS.)
Onset of pseudomembranous colitis symptoms may occur during or after antibacterial treatment. (See WARNINGS.)
Erythromycin has been associated with QT prolongation and ventricular arrhythmias, including ventricular tachycardia and torsades de pointes. (See WARNINGS.)
Allergic reactions ranging from urticaria to anaphylaxis have occurred. Skin reactions ranging from mild eruptions to erythema multiforme, Stevens-Johnson syndrome, and toxic epidermal necrolysis have been reported rarely.
There have been reports of interstitial nephritis coincident with erythromycin use.
There have been rare reports of pancreatitis and convulsions.
There have been isolated reports of reversible hearing loss occurring chiefly in patients with renal insufficiency and in patients receiving high doses of erythromycin.
In case of overdosage, erythromycin should be discontinued. Overdosage should be handled with the prompt elimination of unabsorbed drug and all other appropriate measures should be instituted.
Erythromycin is not removed by peritoneal dialysis or hemodialysis.
PCE Dosage and Administration
In most patients, PCE tablets are well absorbed and may be dosed orally without regard to meals. However, optimal blood levels are obtained when either PCE 333 mg or PCE 500 mg tablets are given in the fasting state (at least 1/2 hour and preferably 2 hours before meals).
The usual dosage of PCE tablets are one 333 mg tablet every 8 hours or one 500 mg tablet every 12 hours. Dosage may be increased up to 4 g per day according to the severity of the infection. However, twice-a-day dosing is not recommended when doses larger than 1 g daily are administered.
Age, weight, and severity of the infection are important factors in determining the proper dosage. The usual dosage is 30 to 50 mg/kg/day, in equally divided doses. For more severe infections this dosage may be doubled but should not exceed 4 g per day.
In the treatment of streptococcal infections of the upper respiratory tract (e.g., tonsillitis or pharyngitis), the therapeutic dosage of erythromycin should be administered for at least ten days.
The American Heart Association suggests a dosage of 250 mg of erythromycin orally, twice a day in long-term prophylaxis of streptococcal upper respiratory tract infections for the prevention of recurring attacks of rheumatic fever in patients allergic to penicillin and sulfonamides.4
Conjunctivitis of the Newborn Caused by Chlamydia trachomatis
Oral erythromycin suspension 50 mg/kg/day in 4 divided doses for at least 2 weeks.4
Pneumonia of Infancy Caused by Chlamydia trachomatis
Although the optimal duration of therapy has not been established, the recommended therapy is oral erythromycin suspension 50 mg/kg/day in 4 divided doses for at least 3 weeks.
Urogenital Infections During Pregnancy Due to Chlamydia trachomatis
Although the optimal dose and duration of therapy have not been established, the suggested treatment is 500 mg of erythromycin by mouth four times a day or two erythromycin 333 mg tablets orally every 8 hours on an empty stomach for at least 7 days. For women who cannot tolerate this regimen, a decreased dose of one erythromycin 500 mg tablet orally every 12 hours, one 333 mg tablet orally every 8 hours or 250 mg by mouth four times a day should be used for at least 14 days.6
For adults with uncomplicated urethral, endocervical, or rectal infections caused by Chlamydia trachomatis, when tetracycline is contraindicated or not tolerated
500 mg of erythromycin by mouth four times a day or two 333 mg tablets orally every 8 hours for at least 7 days.6
For patients with nongonococcal urethritis caused by Ureaplasma urealyticum when tetracycline is contraindicated or not tolerated
500 mg of erythromycin by mouth four times a day or two 333 mg tablets orally every 8 hours for at least seven days.6
30 to 40 g given in divided doses over a period of 10 to 15 days.
Acute Pelvic Inflammatory Disease Caused by N. gonorrhoeae
500 mg Erythrocin Lactobionate-I.V. (erythromycin lactobionate for injection, USP) every 6 hours for 3 days, followed by 500 mg of erythromycin base orally every 12 hours, or 333 mg of erythromycin base orally every 8 hours for 7 days.
500 mg every 12 hours, 333 mg every 8 hours or 250 mg every 6 hours for 10 to 14 days.Children
30 to 50 mg/kg/day in divided doses for 10 to 14 days.
Although optimal dosage and duration have not been established, doses of erythromycin utilized in reported clinical studies were 40 to 50 mg/kg/day, given in divided doses for 5 to 14 days.
Although optimal dosage has not been established, doses utilized in reported clinical data were 1 to 4 g daily in divided doses.
How is PCE Supplied
PCE tablets (erythromycin particles in tablets) are supplied as unscored, ovaloid tablets in the following strengths and packages.
333 mg, pink-speckled white (imprinted with PCE):
|Bottles of 60||(NDC 24338-112-60).|
500 mg, white (imprinted with EK):
|Bottles of 100||(NDC 24338-114-13).|
Store below 86°F (30°C).
- Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute. Methods for Dilution Antimicrobial Susceptibility Tests for Bacteria that Grow Aerobically, 7th ed. Approved Standard, CLSI Document M07-A7, Vol. 26(2). CLSI, Wayne, PA, Jan. 2006.
- Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute. Performance Standards for Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing, 18th Informational Supplement, CLSI Document M100-S18, Vol 28(1). CLSI, Wayne, PA, Jan. 2008.
- Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute. Performance Standards for Antimicrobial Disk Susceptibility Tests, 9th ed. Approved Standard CLSI Document M02-A9, Vol. 26(1). CLSI, Wayne, PA, Jan. 2006.
- Committee on Rheumatic Fever, Endocarditis, and Kawasaki Disease of the Council on Cardiovascular Disease in the Young, the American Heart Association: Prevention of Rheumatic Fever. Circulation. 78(4):1082-1086, October 1988.
- Honein, M.A., et. al.: Infantile hypertrophic pyloric stenosis after pertussis prophylaxis with erythromycin: a case review and cohort study. The Lancet 1999; 354 (9196):2101-5.
- Data on file, Arbor Pharmaceuticals.
Atlanta, GA 30328
Rev. January 2018
(Nos. 3389, 6290)
PRINCIPAL DISPLAY PANEL - 333 mg Tablet Bottle Label
PRINCIPAL DISPLAY PANEL - 500 mg Tablet Bottle Label
particles in tablets
erythromycin ethylsuccinate tablet
erythromycin ethylsuccinate tablet
|Labeler - Arbor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (781796417)|
Frequently asked questions
More about PCE Dispertab (erythromycin)
- Side effects
- Drug interactions
- Dosage information
- During pregnancy or Breastfeeding
- Drug images
- Drug class: macrolides | <urn:uuid:72fb0ab7-6e35-4273-b890-62537f66c468> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.drugs.com/pro/pce.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.863182 | 8,854 | 2.296875 | 2 |
Presidential candidate Beto O’Rourke told The Root in an on-camera interview that all Americans need to understand the story of slavery before the government considers cash reparations for descendants of slaves.
“I would support those steps that would allow us to repair the damage done and to stop visiting this kind of injustice on future generations,” O’Rourke said. “But I am convinced in a democracy, unless everybody understands the story of this country—and most people do not—you’ll never get to that action or that end result.”
I pushed back on O’Rourke’s response.
“There would be a lot of people...who would say that a lot of Americans did not understand why Jim Crow was wrong or they didn’t understand why other practices of discrimination or slavery was wrong,” I said. “So, if you wait on people to get a conscience, then it will never happen. So, I think that would be the concern that people would have about your desire to tell a story that is pretty much known, but people may not want to hear.”
O’Rourke held firm on his position.
“I think part of the problem is that not everyone knows that story,” he said. “In a democracy, unless you have the political will to take a very tough step, you’re not going to be able to do it.”
The reparations conversation (which starts at 16:23 in the full video below) was one of many The Root had with O’Rourke. We asked him about his low polling numbers in Iowa and how he expects black people to support his candidacy if voters in Iowa aren’t excited about him (4:10). We also discussed the Exonerated Five and whether or not President Donald Trump should apologize to them (5:36). At 13:11, he explained how, as president, he would seek accountability for Sandra Bland and why he supports Julián Castro’s plan to limit qualified immunity for police officers in cases of deadly force (14:28).
O’Rourke has gone on record calling himself a capitalist, so we asked him if there can be capitalism without racism and classism (22:21). He shared how he would address the gender wage gap for black women (23:56) and explained his views of whether incarcerated people should have the right to vote (24:57). We also discussed maternal mortality rates among black women (28:14); Roe v. Wade (30:03); HBCU funding (31:07); Debt-free college (32:14); what he has learned from talking to black voters in South Carolina (33:55); and if he is hoping to get another Beyoncé endorsement (35:52).
Watch the full interview below: | <urn:uuid:5ce2126a-638a-48e9-ad9c-c52986ebe9f0> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.theroot.com/beto-orourke-says-all-americans-must-understand-history-1835801087?utm_source=theroot_twitter&utm_medium=socialflow&/setsession | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.967761 | 600 | 1.820313 | 2 |
For almost 20 years, the Pennsylvania Breast Cancer Coalition (PBCC) has supported top Wistar researchers embarking on their scientific careers. For them, it has meant the opportunity to pursue scientific theories — no matter how off-the-beaten-track — and to investigate and make discoveries that could be transformative.
Wistar’s Dr. Zach Schug became the latest PBCC research grant winner. Funding has allowed him to study the complex role of acetate in cancer. He hopes to connect the dots between a high fat/high sugar diet, acetate metabolism, the gut microbiome, and gene expression to better understand how tumors eat, grow and progress in breast cancer.
PBCC founder Pat Halpin-Murphy and team came to Wistar for a heartfelt and socially distanced celebration and check presentation with Wistar’s president & CEO Dr. Dario Altieri and Dr. Schug.
“We are thrilled to focus our 2021 research grants funding on the treatments of tomorrow for patients with metastatic breast cancer,” said PBCC president and founder Pat Halpin-Murphy. “It is our hope that, with this research, scientists like Dr. Schug will find cures for patients whose disease has spread to advanced stages. Seeing these brilliant minds in action, and supporting their selfless work, is the motivation behind our mission of finding a cure for breast cancer now… so our daughters don’t have to.”
“We couldn’t do cutting-edge science without key funding from the PBCC, a local organization that has done so much for breast cancer research and care in our region,” said Dario Altieri, M.D., Wistar president and CEO, Cancer Center director and the Robert & Penny Fox Distinguished Professor. “We are fortunate to continue a long-standing partnership with the PBCC to advance the most innovative science and improve the lives of countless women with breast cancer.”
Out front of Wistar, the sun shone down on this special day, as the three discussed the shared opportunities and impact their organizations have made together. | <urn:uuid:0584a3ec-7f08-4aa7-817b-44d3cc69b6fa> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://wistar.org/featured-news/support-runs-deep-pennsylvania-breast-cancer-coalition-funding-wistar-has-been-bridge | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.947352 | 441 | 1.6875 | 2 |
A distal phalanx is a bone at the end of both the fingers and toes. Distal phalanges shape the nails of a human hand or foot and hence are also called ungula phalanges. It is not uncommon for them to be called terminal phalanges either in reference to the bones location at the end of the digits. The bones are shaped to support the finger. In humans, a distal phalanx is usually a flatter and wider bone compared to other mammals.
A phalanx that occurs at the end of human fingers is distinguishable by a mixture of flat and convex surfaces. The surface of a distal phalanx on a finger is horseshoe shaped so that it can support the flesh and vulnerable parts. Human fingers also contain apical tufts, which are wide openings that support the nail and finger.
A distal phalanx of the toe is usually very similar to that of the finger aside from a few small differences. Firstly, a toe distal phalanx is smaller than a finger phalanx. Also, the toe phalanges are flattened on the top and come with a larger end in order for them to fit and support the nail. They also have a large base that allows the bone to connect correctly to the second set.
Many mammals have similar distal phalanges although there are a large number of variations. For example, the apical tufts in other mammals can vary in size. This is thought to be an evolutionary response to the need for tool making. A human distal phalanx, however, is always larger than the phalanx of any other mammal.
Due to the distal phalanges close proximity to the end of the finger, injuries are likely. Distal phalanx fractures, for example, are very common and are often caused by the finger being crushed. In general a fracture to a distal phalanx won’t require surgical intervention although this depends on the severity of the injury. Immobilizing the phalanx for several weeks usually helps to ease the pain and allow for faster healing although isn’t always required.
Other potential injuries to a terminal phalanx include mallet finger, nail bed injuries and Jersey finger. The treatment for these injuries depends on the exact type as well as the severity of the problem. Immobilization is often used for a number of different types of injury though as this allows the joint a greater time to heal. | <urn:uuid:ad4ba384-96c9-4e66-8e81-a49db9f5c6eb> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.thehealthboard.com/what-is-the-distal-phalanx.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882573104.24/warc/CC-MAIN-20220817183340-20220817213340-00465.warc.gz | en | 0.951455 | 510 | 3.5 | 4 |
A vital element of aiding your human body do what it previously understands how to do to stay healthy is by giving it with loads of whole foods nourishment. Complete meals nourishment refers to all of the nutrition that are present in the foodstuff that we get from crops – fruits, greens, grains, nuts, berries, beans, and so on. We are all informed as kids that fruits and veggies are good for us – the problem is that there are not really a lot of folks who realize just how quite harmful it is NOT to take in these foods.
We all probably feel, “Sure, I need to take in far more fruits and greens and I may well be a small better off if I try to eat some, but I am Ok proper now” – that possibly isn’t correct if you might be not eating these foods. It really is hazardous to not eat these. Why? It is now recognized that there is a procedure in the human entire body that establishes rate of growing older and illness chance. Oxidative stress occurs when that method is permitted to go alongside at a faster price. You then age far more swiftly and your danger of establishing disease is a great deal higher because your entire body has considerably much more problems therapeutic difficulties that take place.
When your entire body burns oxygen to generate energy, by-merchandise referred to as free of charge-radicals remain. Totally free radicals hurt cells. That damage is what decides your charge of growing older and risk of disease and how a lot difficulties your entire body is having remaining wholesome.
People do things or knowledge factors on a day-to-day basis that boosts their threat – factors these kinds of as cigarette smoking, anxiety, even physical pressure these kinds of as working out. Nutricionista em Porto Alegre can creates more cost-free radicals. Without having the suitable protecting nourishment the harmful approach can be sped up.
Complete food nourishment is vital because these foodstuff incorporate hundreds of phytonutrients, also named micronutrients because they are in such tiny quantities. The crucial is that there is an interdependence amid these vitamins and minerals and the physique knows how how to use them. You will find a synergistic impact to obtaining them all jointly, so it is genuinely important to consider them into your physique in that way with it currently being virtually tens of hundreds of substances, there really is no other way to get it other than as it happens in the meals.
Now a major portion of total meals is that they include antioxidants. Anti-oxidants function to neutralize the dangerous totally free radicals ahead of they can cause the damage that increases your price of growing older and threat of illness. As a result, it is essential to have these vitamins and antioxidants all with each other.
The indicators of a degenerate or continual disease, like most cancers, coronary heart condition, arthritis and kidney disease appear about after numerous a long time of the damaging method of free radicals likely on at a increased price. All of our degenerative ailments are at least worsened by, if not brought on by, the approach of oxidative pressure, so including adequate whole food nourishment in the diet regime is an critical factor of staying effectively or avoiding ailment.
I myself have been battling most cancers for the earlier yr and wish that I experienced identified this data faster. Maybe it would have produced a big difference in my wellness. I in no way actually did have a excellent diet program, but I thought I was super healthful! I realized about why proper nourishment is essential to a wholesome life late, but I uncovered and I am undertaking something about it now. I am a survivor and I prepare getting all around for a prolonged time. | <urn:uuid:1ba26799-96b0-455d-96cf-d9b0a0ecd311> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.customworksdaytona.com/healthier-diet-programs-protecting-against-disease-with-total-food-nutrition/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.96684 | 760 | 2.375 | 2 |
LIVING IN LILLE
As the capital of a region (Hauts-de-France region) with a population of six million, Lille benefits from the advantages of its unique environment. The city is the center of a rich cultural life, which is derived from the long history of Europe. The University of Lille attracts many students thanks to a vibrant academic environment, and world-class international universities also provide a rich learning environment. Students enjoy good learning conditions on a large campus with many connections, culture and facilities. They can use modern international standard university dormitories, the latest library (learning center) equipped with digital technology and new learning facilities, and a highly developed rich and diverse cultural calendar (cinema, exhibition hall, theater).
Lille is the principal city of the Lille Métropole, the fourth-largest metropolitan area in France after those of Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Lille is situated in French Flanders, on the Deûle River, near France's border with Belgium. It is the capital of the Nord-Pas de Calais region and the prefecture of the Nord department.
The University of Lille continually develops and promotes student exchanges with high-quality institutions of higher education in the European Union and beyond, thanks to a variety of programmes (Erasmus +, etc.). It also promotes cosupervised doctoral theses, for which doctoral students do research alternately at the University of Lille and in an international institution
HELPING STUDENTS GET STARTED
The University of Lille has established a variety of events to welcome students and to help them get off on the right foot. Every year, the University of Lille organizes a student orientation session (JIVE), a time for exchanging impressions and sharing experiences that allows students to discover the different campuses and facilities of the university. Numerous athletic and cultural events are organized during this period. It is also an opportunity for newcomers to discover the campuses and services of the university. A specialized service accompanies students with disabilities throughout their time at the university, for example by providing specially adapted facilities.
WELCOME ACTIVITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS
Every year the University of Lille hosts a week-long celebration of international students: the International Student Week. This is an opportunity for French and international students to participate in many festivities and events on the theme of international exchange. The University of Lille also works in close partnership with the Lille branch of the ESN (Erasmus Student Network) to provide a warm welcome to international students and to provide support during their stay. A welcome meeting is organized by the ESN at the beginning of each semester. Exchange students can also take advantage of the chance to stay at the newly built Reeflex international residence hall.
The university offers a selection of courses that are bilingual or taught entirely in English. In order to prepare for their exchange, thematic summer schools that include language training in French are available. International students can also take advantage of French language courses that will allow them to reach the level necessary for their studies (offered by the Department of French as a Foreign Language – DEFI) as well as French courses for particular scientific fields (offered by La Maison des Langues). | <urn:uuid:c250e458-ff2e-43d6-9163-727a0822d8d9> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.master-strains.eu/living-in-lille | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.943812 | 669 | 1.742188 | 2 |
The Meaning of Colors in Cultures Around the World. Color quite literally colors the way we view our world.
Here’s an in-depth look at what various colors symbolize in cultures around the world. If you’ve ever had the blues or been so angry you saw red, then you’re familiar with the powerful ways in which color can describe intangible ideas and emotions. Colors. 3 Creative Ways to Embrace Autumn in Your Designs - The Shutterstock Blog. 2021 Color Trends: The Year's Top Colors – Shutterstock. Some purples stand up and shout, desperate for attention—on the contrary, Velvet Violet whispers and draws the eye with its come-hither magnetism.
And yet, it represents the boldest of our trending colors for 2022, still able to turn heads without over-the-top flamboyance. The hue carries a decidedly regal tone, confident in its dignified grace and allure. Gallery: Humans come in all shapes, sizes — and colors. “It has been 128 years since the last country in the world abolished slavery and 53 years since Martin Luther King pronounced his ‘I Have A Dream’ speech,” says Brazilian artist Angélica Dass (TED Talk: The beauty of human skin in every color).
“But we still live in a world where the color of our skin not only gives a first impression, but a lasting one that remains.” She shows off Humanae, the photo project she started to highlight the truly multi-colored hues of humankind. Material Design Colors - Material Palette. Great Big Story - At the Harvard University Harvard Art... The Most Popular Color On The Internet Is… It’s blue.
The web is very blue. Not metaphorically, either. The Internet’s most heavily trafficked websites are literally colored with nearly twice as many shades of blue as shades of yellow and red, and three times as much green. This Man's Implanted Antenna Allows Him To "Hear” Color. Neil Harbisson was born with achromatopsia – a rare visual condition that results in total color blindness.
To him, the world is a constantly dreary plane of grays, black and whites. But since 2003, the eccentric artist has had an antenna poking out of his distinctive bowl-cut hairdo, which allows him to “hear” colors. His head-mounted antenna is able to detect the wavelengths of light reflected off whatever is in front of the sensor and then convert them into sound, with different wavelengths corresponding to different sound frequencies. The Belfast-born, Catalan-raised artist's antenna is permanently attached to his skull and delivers the sound waves to his inner ear through bone conduction. Purples and indigos are perceived as a high-pitched bleep, with the colors becoming lower pitched as the spectrum shifts from blues to greens, then yellows to oranges, and so on. Only 4% Of People Can Pass This Color IQ Test. Can You? 10 Color Inspiration Secrets Only Designers Know About. “Color: what a deep and mysterious language!”
Specific hues can provoke different emotions, associations, and responses that affect how your brand is perceived. Put simply, color choices can make or break a design. In fact, research has shown that color can increase brand recognition (by up to 80%), memory, engagement with a design piece, text comprehension, among many others. Fortunately, we are far from the times when our color choices were limited to a small batch of natural pigments. Our options are no longer whatever colors minerals, animals, and plants had to offer. Overwhelmed yet? Flickr Flow. Flickr Flow is an experiment whose materials are color and time.
Color. Design Principle: Chromostereopsis (Or Why Blue on Red Doesn’t Work) Don’t ever design blue text on a red background.
Ever. And don’t put green on red, either. If the image below doesn’t give you reason enough not to, I don’t know what will. A visual phenomenon, called chromostereopsis, makes our eyes want to turn a 2D image into something 3D.
Colour Theory. Tools for Colour Schemes. Color Test - Online Color Challenge. 9 Interesting Infographics About Color. Color, one of the most overlooked and yet important elements to our every day lives.
Because of the makeup of our brains, and the correlations between sight and perception, we are affected on a very deep level by color. Perhaps even more than we are affected by shape, or any other sense in the mind and body. But color can relate to a great many things, even changing the way we think and feel. Artist Wants To Map Every Single Human Skin Tone On Earth. Perhaps, in the near future, besides wearing mobile devices on our faces and sporting unisex high-waisted pants, we’ll cease to refer to people as black or white, or some variant in between.
Instead, we’ll use their corresponding Pantone color to describe the tone of their skin. If this happens, we’ll have to thank artist Angelica Dass for building the first database of skin hues. Dass started her project, Humanae, in April 2012, by photographing some of her Brazilian family members. Dass sampled a small pixel from the subject’s skin--usually from the well-lit cheek area--and then matched it to a Pantone hue, which is used as the backdrop. She does this with all her photographs for Humanae, which now number around 2,000. “Humanae is a pursuit for highlighting our true color, rather than the untrue red, yellow, black, and white,” says Dass, who is the “granddaughter of a ‘black’ and ‘native’ Brazilian and the daughter of a ‘black’ father adopted by a ‘white’ family.” List of colors. The following is a list of colors.
A number of the color swatches below are taken from domain-specific naming schemes such as X11 or HTML4. RGB values are given for each swatch because such standards are defined in terms of the sRGB color space. It is not possible to accurately convert many of these swatches to CMYK values because of the differing gamuts of the two spaces, but the color management systems built into operating systems and image editing software attempt such conversions as accurately as possible. Pallette & Colors. Color Meaning. Psychology of Color [Infographic] Perhaps no choice is as vital to marketing as color. His And Hers Colors – Common Color Names By Gender Preference. Colors of the Social World (Wide Web) [Infographic + Video] by COLOURlovers. When a social network like Twitter allows a user to select a theme to represent themselves in the digital world, that user is choosing to identify their digital persona with colors...
Color Theory. 30+ Very Useful Color Tools For Designers. Choosing the right colors and color combination for your web or print design is crucial when trying to invoke a certain feel, reaction or emotion from your viewers. In this post I have assembled an amazing collection of color selectors / color combination tools to make the selection process a little easier when trying to figure out what colors to use in your next design. All these tools are unique in their own way, so find the one that is right for your design needs and good luck with that next big project. Enjoy! Kuler.adobe.com Adobe.com | Kuler colorschemedesigner.com colorschemedesigner.com | Color Scheme Designer 3 dasplankton.de. The 5 best colour search tools for designers. Name that Color - Chirag Mehta : chir.ag. The Creation of Color in Eighteenth-Century Europe.
Practical Rules for Using Color in Charts. List of Crayola crayon colors. HTML Color Names. Copic Colour Chart / System. | <urn:uuid:f836988d-f1aa-4786-884c-61c1b047cfd3> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://www.pearltrees.com/iwona.h./colour/id7958178 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.924623 | 1,681 | 2.875 | 3 |
Businesses commonly develop some form of intangible property (IP). IP could be legally registered – like patents, copyrights or trademarks – or not registered and somewhat amorphous in nature, such as manufacturing know-how, marketing intangibles, workforce-in-place, goodwill and going concern value. The location of IP for a company operating in multiple countries can materially impact its tax costs and overall risk.
Lesen Sie den ganzen Artikel hier: Financier Worldwide Magazine.
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The following book review of “Thirteen Reasons Why,” by Jay Asher, is taken from Focus on the Family’s Plugged In site, which reviews movies and books.
The following book review of “The Adventures of Captain Underpants,” by Dav Pilkey, is taken from Focus on the Family’s Plugged In site, which reviews movies and books.
Sin is taken lightly by Muslims because they believe that man was born good. Committing a few mistakes were not really a big deal because Allah will forgive them by the good works they have done in their life.This idea of heaven and hell is very narrow because they believe that every person has two angels recording their good and bad deeds. Going to heaven or hell is the ultimate decision of Allah after they die, by weighing their good deeds and bad deeds. If the good deeds outweigh the bad deeds then the person will go to heaven; but if the bad deeds outweigh the good, that person will go to hell. | <urn:uuid:772afeeb-4a19-4924-93b5-5ce03bb4b721> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.alfonsejaved.com/category/blog/book-reviews/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.980995 | 207 | 1.84375 | 2 |
Due to the various beneficiaries of Electronic Health Records (EHR), the information requirements of each group should be taken into account while designing the EHR. In line with the priority of implementing electronic health records in the province of Sistan and Baluchestanin Iran, this study aims to assess the dental information requirements of EHR at Zahedan Dental School. This cross-sectional study was performed in 2014. The study population comprised 6565 faculty members, residents of dental school and staff in Health Information Management of Zahedan Hospitals. The data collection instrument was a questionnaire which comprised six sets of data and 67 informative elements that were prioritized based on the average of scores. Data were analyzed by using descriptive statistics, SPSS. All the elements, except two ones including marital and employment status which were considered as the second priority with average scores below 7, other proposed elements such as clinical findings, final diagnosis, oral health status, drug sensitivity, main complaint, patient's full name, required X-rays, medical record number, and the discharge recommendations of an average above 7 were regarded as the first priority of the respondents. In conclusion, it is recommended that these findings should be considered in the design of electronic health records system at Zahedan Dental School.
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Rare Book Library & Research Collections
The History of the Book
The Center’s collection of books from the hand-press period contains a diverse range of bindings, type, illustrations, and marginalia. The Center also possesses many materials on bibliography and book collections. Our Stansbury printing press is available for lessons and demonstrations, allowing visitors to learn how to set type by hand.
Botany and Gardening
The Center's collection of early books on the subject of botany and gardening is ever-expanding, supporting the research necessary to maintain critical scholarly research and the Center's sixteenth-century Kitchen Garden. One of our finer books on botany is a 1633 copy of Gerarde’s Herball. The Herball was an immensely informative and popular work, each page containing detailed descriptions and illustrations of plants. In a similar vein is Adam Lonicer’s Kreuterbuch (1564). In addition to the pages on plants, it also covers animals, minerals, and distilling. Each of the numerous illustrations is hand-colored.
Early Modern English Theater
Our collection of early modern English theater includes editions and criticism of Shakespeare as well as his contemporaries, including Christopher Marlowe, Thomas Dekker, Ben Jonson, and Philip Massinger. Our rare holdings include a 1690 folio of The Works of Ben Jonson, Fifty Tragedies and Comedies by Beaumont and Fletcher from 1690, and a 1656 quarto edition of The Old Law, or A New Way to Please You, a tragicomedy attributed to Thomas Middleton, William Rowley, and Philip Massinger on the book's title page.
The Center holds eight different editions of Sir Philip Sidney’s the Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia. Other major works of literature include Edmund Spenser’s epic poem The Faerie Queene (copies from 1609 and 1611), and Sir John Harrington’s translation of Orlando Furioso (1634).
The Renaissance produced many humanist thinkers and scholars who studied the teachings and philosophies of classical scholars. The most famous of these was Erasmus of Rotterdam whose extensive knowledge was influential for centuries. He was widely published and the Center has collected many copies of his works, including his Adages, The Encomium for Thomas More, and his instructions on letter writing. The Center also holds a 1573 copy of Thomas More’s Dialogue of Comfort Against Tribulation.
Notable amongst the Center’s collection of classics is a 1503 copy of the works of Euripides in Greek, and a 1515 copy of Ovid in Latin. Each of these volumes was published by the Aldine Press in Venice, best known for popularizing the italic font and the more portable octavo format. The Center has several other copies of Ovid, most notably a 1632 copy of George Sandys’s famous translation of the Metamorphosis.
The Center maintains an extensive collection of books pertaining to European armor, weapons, and their use. In addition, it is home to the Raymond J. Lord Collection of Historical Combat Treatises: a digital archive of historical combat treatises and fencing manuals dating primarily from the Renaissance. The collection contains over thirty digitized combat manuals, dating from the early-sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century and spanning most of western Europe.
For scholars of the Bible and church history, the Center’s rare holdings include several useful works. These include a 1496 Bible with commentary by Nicholas of Lyra, two Geneva Bibles from 1586 and 1598; a 1699 King James Bible bound in velvet, a Bishop’s Bible from 1611, and a 1545 Vulgate Bible. We also have the works of many influential early Church philosophers, often appearing as multi-volume sets. These include the works of St. Augustine (1729), St. Gregory I (1705), St. Jerome (1684), Hugh of St. Cher (1645), Cornelius Lapide (1625), and Matthew Poole (1684).
Spanish Literature and Theater
Many works of the Spanish Golden Age are housed at the Center. These include the writings of Cervantes, Lope de Vega, Tirso de Molina, Francisco Quevedo, and Pedro Calderón de la Barca. Our most prized item is a 1633 copy of Todas las obras de don Lvis de Gongora en varios poemas, the complete works of Luis de Gongóra. Gongóra was one of the most famous Spanish poets of all time.
Our collection of works on art history contains over two hundred and fifty volumes, with a particular focus on Italian art. Some of the collection deals with the complete works of famous artists of the period, while other texts are devoted to artistic practices such as architecture, engraving, altarpieces, and illumination.
The Arthur F. Kinney Collection
Rare books, monographs, manuscripts
The collection of Professor Arthur F. Kinney, the Center's founder and director, is the cornerstone of our library. His collection includes over 12,000 manuscripts, rare books, maps, facsimiles, monographs, and editions, mostly related to English Renaissance political and social history, literature, religion, music, and art.
The Samuel Schoenbaum Collection
Samuel Schoenbaum (1927-1996) was one of the foremost Shakespearean scholars of the 20th century. His numerous seminal publications include Internal Evidence and Elizabethan Dramatic Authorship (1966), Shakespeare's Lives (1970), and Shakespeare: A Documentary Life (1974). The collection consists of many of Schoenbaum's books, in addition to several handsome 19th editions of English Renaissance dramatists.
The Harold Garrett-Goodyear Collection
Harold Garrett-Goodyear, author of The Later Middle Ages and Professor Emeritus of History at Mount Holyoke College has donated over 2,000 monographs dealing with the subjects of medieval and early modern history, women, spirituality, and power; medieval conflicts and boundaries; law and justice.
The O.B. Hardison, Jr. Collection
Rare Books and Monographs
Professor O.B. Hardison, Jr. (1929-1990), who taught at Georgetown University and directed the Folger Shakespeare Library from 1969-1983, was an eminent scholar of Renaissance studies. The collection focuses upon Renaissance poetry and poetics, including Renaissance editions of Italian works.
The William A. Ringler, Jr. Collection
Rare Books and Monographs
William A. Ringler, Jr. (1912-1987), editor of the Clarendon Press Poems of Sir Philip Sidney (1962), was also known for his important bibliographic work, including the Bibliography and Index of English Verse, 1476-1558 (published posthumously by Stephen May). The collection contains rare books and first editions, and 1500 secondary volumes, with a special emphasis on Tudor history and the life and work of Sir Philip Sidney.
The Robert “Bob” Hoopes Collection
Robert Hoopes (1920-2008), who served an instrumental role as the first Dean of Faculty at Oakland University (Michigan), completed his career as an English professor at UMass Amherst (1970-90). He published much work on English Renaissance literature and culture. The collection focuses on English intellectual history of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Centuries, with an especial concentration on Milton and Seventeenth-Century poetry.
The Carol and Robert Kaske Collection
Rare Books and Monographs
Robert Kaske (1921-1989), and Carol Kaske both taught at Cornell. Robert wrote the book Medieval Christian Literacy Imagery: A Guide to Interpretation and served on the editorial and advisory boards of several prominent journals and as editor-in-chief of Traditio. Carol, a noted Spenserain, has published Marsilio Ficino, Three Books on Life, a Criminal Edition and Translation with Introduction and Notes (1989), Spenser and Biblical Poetics (1999); and Edmund Spenser: "The Faerie Queene" Book I, (2006). Their donation consists of over 150 rare books and 6500 monographs, covering the subject areas of Spencer, Neo-Platonism, Italian literature, philosophy, theology, and medieval literature and history.
The Dan S. Collins Collection
Dan S. Collins was a co-founder of the journal English Literary Renaissance (with Arthur F. Kinney). An annual lecture is given at the Center every spring in his name. The collection contains works on the prose and poetry of the Seventeenth-Century.
The G. Blakemore Evans Collection
Gwynne Blakemore Evans (1913-2006) was a Shakespearean who taught at Harvard University and was editor of the Riverside Shakespeare (first pub. 1974). He also wrote books on William Cartwright and Robert Parry. The collection consists entirely of rare books from Evans's personal library.
The Clare M. Murphy Collection
Clare Murphy (1933-2013) was a specialist of Thomas More and early Tudor humanism, Erasmus, John Fisher, and John Colet. She was the editor for the journal Moreana, an adjunct scholar at the Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance studies, and co-organized conferences on Thomas More in Ireland, France, Argentina, and Amherst, Massachusetts. Her collection includes her library of works dealing with religious studies and the Reformation.
The Virginia Scott Collection
Monographs and Archival Papers
Virginia Scott assisted in founding the theater department at UMass-Amherst. She was a scholar of Molière, publishing in 2000 the first English language biography of the playwright to appear in over seventy years, and other French theater. The collection includes her library of scholarly books and her academic papers on Molière and the theater of France and Spain.
The Gerald Snare Collection
Gerald Snare taught at Tulane University wrote The Mystification of George Chapman (Duke, 1989). The collection consists of books of prose and poetry from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Centuries, with an especial focus on Spenser.
The David Allen Brown Collection
Curator of Italian Paintings at the National Gallery of Art, Washington, David Allen Brown is a world-renowned scholar of Renaissance Italian art. His donations have given the Renaissance Center an extensive collection of books on Italian art.
Yale Thomas More Collection
Monographs and Archival Papers
This collection consists of books, photostats, microfilms, and editorial correspondence concerning the edition of the Works of St. Thomas More published by Yale (15 volumes, published from 1963-1997). Richard S. Sylvester—one of the chief editors in the project—owned most of the books in the collection, many of which contain his handwritten marginalia.
The Dame Helen Gardner Papers
Dame Helen Gardner (1908-1986) was one of the twentieth century's preeminent Donne scholars, producing editions of the poet's Divine Poems (1952) and Elegies and Songs and Sonnets(1965). She also published work on T.S. Eliot, Milton, and Shakespeare. She was widely admired all over the world as an excellent lecturer. The Center's Gardner Collection includes all of the working notes for her editions of Donne and Eliot, professional correspondence, and lectures on Shakespeare and Renaissance English drama.
The Harriet Hawkins Papers
Harriet Hawkins (1934-1995), longtime professor of English literature at Vassar College, was an influential critic of English Renaissance poetry and drama. Some of her research interests included Shakespeare, poetics, literary taboo, and chaos theory. The Center's collection includes all of Hawkins's correspondence, lectures, essays, reviews, and some personal papers.
The J.H. Hexter Library
Professor J.H. “Jack” Hexter (1910-1996), a historian who taught at Washington University and Yale, published important work on St. Thomas More, Machiavelli, and English Renaissance historiography. Hexter is well known for his categorical distinction between the “lumpers” and the “splitters.” At the time of his death, he was working on an ambitious “History of Modern Freedom.” This collection consists of Hexter's working library, which contains many annotated volumes.
The Raymond J. Lord Collection of Historical Combat Treatises and Fencing Manuals
The Raymond J. Lord Collection is a digital archive of historical combat treatises and fencing manuals dating primarily from the Renaissance. The collection contains over 30 digitized combat manuals, dating from the early Sixteenth-Century to the mid-Seventeenth-Century and spanning most of Western Europe.
The Alan and Rosalie Soons Library of Hispanic Studies
Rare books and Monographs
Professor Emeritus Alan Soons (1925-2011), formerly of the Department of Romance Languages at UMass Amherst, published numerous articles and editions related to Golden Age Spain throughout his long career. The collection contains over 2,000 items on Golden Age Spain, French and Italian literature, and culture.
The Irving P. Rothberg Collection
In addition to the Alan Soons Collection, books donated by Professor Emeritus Irving P. Rothberg (UMass-Romance Languages) create a large and rich collection of materials related to early modern Spanish history, literature, and culture. The collection contains over 1,000 secondary sources in the Spanish literature of the Golden Age.
The Roy Flannagan Collection
Professor Roy Flannagan, of the English Department at the University of Ohio, has published numerous books and articles on John Milton, in addition to editing the Riverside Milton. The collection contains more than 1,500 resources (mainly scholarly monographs) in the literature and culture of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Centuries, with a special focus on John Milton.
The Roland Mushat Frye Papers
Professor Roland Mushat Frye (1922-2005), an eminent scholar in Miltonic and theological studies, taught at Emory University and the University of Pennsylvania. He published hundreds of scholarly articles and books, including Milton's Imagery and the Visual Arts and Shakespeare and Christian Doctrine. The collection contains all of Frye's working papers and notes.
The Robert Kinsman Papers
Professor Robert S. Kinsman (1919-2006) taught English literature at UCLA for over 40 years. He published important work on the poems of John Skelton, including John Skelton: Canon and Census (1967). Kinsman's research interests also included the works of James Joyce. The collection contains Kinsman's working papers, including those related to his unfinished Complete Works of Skelton.
The Marvin Rosenberg Papers
Marvin Rosenberg (1912-2003) taught at U.C. Berkley and his work focused on the documentation of Shakespeare stage production. His collection includes working papers from his scholarship, notes, programs, and Rosenberg's novel and prize-winning play manuscripts. | <urn:uuid:276ac917-6ac0-428b-8830-17a3a0906adf> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://content.hfa.umass.edu/renaissance/rare-book-library-research-collections | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.913481 | 3,195 | 3.046875 | 3 |
The chaparral-covered hill-slope to the south of the camp, besides furnishing nesting-places for countless merry birds, is the home and hiding-place of the curious wood rat (Neotoma), a handsome, interesting animal, always attracting attention wherever seen. It is more like a squirrel than a rat, is much larger, has delicate, thick, soft fur of a bluish slate color, white on the belly; ears large, thin, and translucent; eyes soft, full, and liquid; claws slender, sharp as needles; and as his limbs are strong, he can climb about as well as a squirrel. No rat or squirrel has so innocent a look, is so easily approached, or expresses such confidence in one’s good intentions. He seems too fine for the thorny thickets he inhabits, and his hut also is as unlike himself as may be, though softly furnished inside. No other animal inhabitant of these mountains builds houses so large and striking in appearance. The traveler coming suddenly upon a group of them for the first time will not be likely to forget them. They are built of all kinds of sticks, old rotten pieces picked up anywhere, and green prickly twigs bitten from the nearest bushes, the whole mixed with miscellaneous odds and ends of everything movable, such as bits of cloddy earth, stones, bones, deerhorn, etc., piled up in a conical mass as if it were got ready for burning. Some of[Pg 72] these curious cabins are six feet high and as wide at the base, and a dozen or more of them are occasionally grouped together, less perhaps for the sake of society than for advantages of food and shelter. Coming through the dense shaggy thickets of some lonely hillside, the solitary explorer happening into one of these strange villages is startled at the sight, and may fancy himself in an Indian settlement, and begin to wonder what kind of reception he is likely to get. But no savage face will he see, perhaps not a single inhabitant, or at most two or three seated on top of their wigwams, looking at the stranger with the mildest of wild eyes, and allowing a near approach. In the centre of the rough spiky hut a soft nest is made of the inner fibres of bark chewed to tow, and lined with feathers and the down of various seeds, such as willow and milkweed. The delicate creature in its prickly, thick-walled home suggests a tender flower in a thorny involucre. Some of the nests are built in trees thirty or forty feet from the ground, and even in garrets, as if seeking the company and protection of man, like swallows and linnets, though accustomed to the wildest solitude. Among housekeepers Neotoma has the reputation of a thief, because he carries away everything transportable to his queer hut,—knives, forks, combs,[Pg 73] nails, tin cups, spectacles, etc.,—merely, however, to strengthen his fortifications, I guess. His food at home, as far as I have learned, is nearly the same as that of the squirrels,—nuts, berries, seeds, and sometimes the bark and tender shoots of the various species of ceanothus.One of these ancient flood boulders stands firm in the middle of the stream channel, just below the lower edge of the pool dam at the foot of the fall nearest our camp. It is a nearly cubical mass of granite about eight feet high, plushed with mosses over the top and down the sides to ordinary high-water mark. When I climbed on top of it to-day and lay down to rest, it seemed the most romantic spot I had yet found—the one big stone with its mossy level top and smooth sides standing square and firm and solitary, like an altar, the fall in front of it bathing it lightly with the finest of the spray, just enough to keep its moss cover fresh;[Pg 49] the clear green pool beneath, with its foam-bells and its half circle of lilies leaning forward like a band of admirers, and flowering dogwood and alder trees leaning over all in sun-sifted arches. How soothingly, restfully cool it is beneath that leafy, translucent ceiling, and how delightful the water music—the deep bass tones of the fall, the clashing, ringing spray, and infinite variety of small low tones of the current gliding past the side of the boulder-island, and glinting against a thousand smaller stones down the ferny channel! All this shut in; every one of these influences acting at short range as if in a quiet room. The place seemed holy, where one might hope to see God.August 8. Camp at the west end of Lake Tenaya. Arriving early, I took a walk on the glacier-polished pavements along the north[Pg 196] shore, and climbed the magnificent mountain rock at the east end of the lake, now shining in the late afternoon light. Almost every yard of its surface shows the scoring and polishing action of a great glacier that enveloped it and swept heavily over its summit, though it is about two thousand feet high above the lake and ten thousand above sea-level. This majestic, ancient ice-flood came from the eastward, as the scoring and crushing of the surface shows. Even below the waters of the lake the rock in some places is still grooved and polished; the lapping of the waves and their disintegrating action have not as yet obliterated even the superficial marks of glaciation. In climbing the steepest polished places I had to take off shoes and stockings. A fine region this for study of glacial action in mountain-making. I found many charming plants: arctic daisies, phlox, white spiræa, bryanthus, and rock-ferns,—pellæa, cheilanthes, allosorus,—fringing weathered seams all the way up to the summit; and sturdy junipers, grand old gray and brown monuments, stood bravely erect on fissured spots here and there, telling storm and avalanche stories of hundreds of winters. The view of the lake from the top is, I think, the best of all. There is another rock, more striking in form than this, standing isolated at the[Pg 197] head of the lake, but it is not more than half as high. It is a knob or knot of burnished granite, perhaps about a thousand feet high, apparently as flawless and strong in structure as a wave-worn pebble, and probably owes its existence to the superior resistance it offered to the action of the overflowing ice-flood.
We were pelted about noon by a short, heavy rainstorm, sublime thunder reverberating among the mountains and cañons,—some strokes near, crashing, ringing in the tense crisp air with startling keenness, while the distant peaks loomed gloriously through the cloud fringes and sheets of rain. Now the[Pg 123] storm is past, and the fresh washed air is full of the essences of the flower gardens and groves. Winter storms in Yosemite must be glorious. May I see them!
CHAPTER XI BACK TO THE LOWLANDSCoffee, too, has its marvels in the camp kitchen, but not so many, and not so inscrutable as those that beset the bean-pot. A low, complacent grunt follows a mouthful drawn in with a gurgle, and the remark cast forth aimlessly, “That’s good coffee.” Then another gurgling sip and repetition of the judgment, “Yes, sir, that is good coffee.” As to tea, there are but two kinds, weak and strong, the stronger the better. The only remark heard is, “That tea’s weak,” otherwise it is good enough and not worth mentioning. If it has been boiled an hour or two or smoked on a pitchy fire, no matter,—who cares for a little tannin or creosote? they make the black beverage all the stronger and more attractive to tobacco-tanned palates.
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We passed a number of charming garden-like meadows lying on top of the divide or hanging like ribbons down its sides, imbedded in the glorious forest. Some are taken up chiefly with the tall white-flowered Veratrum Californicum, [Pg 94]with boat-shaped leaves about a foot long, eight or ten inches wide, and veined like those of cypripedium,—a robust, hearty, liliaceous plant, fond of water and determined to be seen. Columbine and larkspur grow on the dryer edges of the meadows, with a tall handsome lupine standing waist-deep in long grasses and sedges. Castilleias, too, of several species make a bright show with beds of violets at their feet. But the glory of these forest meadows is a lily (L. parvum). The tallest are from seven to eight feet high with magnificent racemes of ten to twenty or more small orange-colored flowers; they stand out free in open ground, with just enough grass and other companion plants about them to fringe their feet, and show them off to best advantage. This is a grand addition to my lily acquaintances,—a true mountaineer, reaching prime vigor and beauty at a height of seven thousand feet or thereabouts. It varies, I find, very much in size even in the same meadow, not only with the soil, but with age. I saw a specimen that had only one flower, and another within a stone’s throw had twenty-five. And to think that the sheep should be allowed in these lily meadows! after how many centuries of Nature’s care planting and watering them, tucking the bulbs in snugly below winter frost,[Pg 95] shading the tender shoots with clouds drawn above them like curtains, pouring refreshing rain, making them perfect in beauty, and keeping them safe by a thousand miracles; yet, strange to say, allowing the trampling of devastating sheep. One might reasonably look for a wall of fire to fence such gardens. So extravagant is Nature with her choicest treasures, spending plant beauty as she spends sunshine, pouring it forth into land and sea, garden and desert. And so the beauty of lilies falls on angels and men, bears and squirrels, wolves and sheep, birds and bees, but as far as I have seen, man alone, and the animals he tames, destroy these gardens. Awkward, lumbering bears, the Don tells me, love to wallow in them in hot weather, and deer with their sharp feet cross them again and again, sauntering and feeding, yet never a lily have I seen spoiled by them. Rather, like gardeners, they seem to cultivate them, pressing and dibbling as required. Anyhow not a leaf or petal seems misplaced.About sundown saw a flock of dun grayish sparrows going to roost in crevices of a crag above the big snow-field. Charming little mountaineers! Found a species of sedge in flower within eight or ten feet of a snow-bank. Judging by the looks of the ground, it can hardly have been out in the sunshine much longer than a week, and it is likely to be buried again in fresh snow in a month or so, thus[Pg 252] making a winter about ten months long, while spring, summer, and autumn are crowded and hurried into two months. How delightful it is to be alone here! How wild everything is—wild as the sky and as pure! Never shall I forget this big, divine day—the Cathedral and its thousands of cassiope bells, and the landscapes around them, and this camp in the gray crags above the woods, with its stars and streams and snow.
After a long ramble through the dense encumbered woods I emerged upon a smooth meadow full of sunshine like a lake of light, about a mile and a half long, a quarter to half a mile wide, and bounded by tall arrowy pines. The sod, like that of all the glacier meadows hereabouts, is made of silky agrostis and calamagrostis chiefly; their panicles of purple flowers and purple stems, exceedingly light and airy, seem to float above the green plush of leaves like a thin misty cloud, while the sod is brightened by several species of gentian, potentilla, ivesia, orthocarpus, and their corresponding bees and butterflies. All the glacier meadows are beautiful, but few are so[Pg 204] perfect as this one. Compared with it the most carefully leveled, licked, snipped artificial lawns of pleasure-grounds are coarse things. I should like to live here always. It is so calm and withdrawn while open to the universe in full communion with everything good. To the north of this glorious meadow I discovered the camp of some Indian hunters. Their fire was still burning, but they had not yet returned from the chase.
The shepherd in Scotland seldom thinks of being anything but a shepherd. He has probably descended from a race of shepherds and inherited a love and aptitude for the business almost as marked as that of his collie. He has but a small flock to look after, sees his family and neighbors, has time for reading in fine weather, and often carries books to the fields with which he may converse with kings. The oriental shepherd, we read, called his sheep by name; they knew his voice and followed him. The flocks must have been small and easily managed, allowing piping on the hills and ample leisure for reading and thinking. But whatever the blessings of sheep-culture in other times and countries, the California shepherd, as far as I’ve seen or heard, is never quite sane for any considerable time. Of all Nature’s voices baa is about all he hears. Even the howls and ki-yis of coyotes might be blessings if well heard, but he hears them only through a blur of mutton and wool, and they do him no good.[Pg 25]
Fortunately the sheep need little attention, as they are driven slowly and allowed to nip and nibble as they like. Since leaving Hazel Green we have been following the Yosemite trail; visitors to the famous valley coming by way of Coulterville and Chinese Camp pass this way—the two trails uniting at Crane Flat—and enter the valley on the north side. Another trail enters on the south side by way of Mariposa. The tourists we saw were in parties of from three or four to fifteen or twenty, mounted on mules or small mustang ponies. A strange show they made, winding[Pg 99] single file through the solemn woods in gaudy attire, scaring the wild creatures, and one might fancy that even the great pines would be disturbed and groan aghast. But what may we say of ourselves and the flock? | <urn:uuid:643df02f-c221-4447-b695-155d1c981277> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://mnots.com/play/566851059615.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.962501 | 3,144 | 2.75 | 3 |
Power Electronics for Mobility
In the mobility sector with high GHG emissions, electrification and efficiency improvement are being promoted. We will continuously promote the development of power electronics technology to meet the needs of railway traffic and automotive traffic, and provide core products such as motors and inverters.
In the development of motors and inverters, the loss generated when converting electrical energy into kinetic energy or another electrical energy is reduced using various techniques. For example, in the induction motor for railway vehicles, the harmonic loss was reduced by about 80% by analyzing the flux distribution of the inside of the motor using electromagnetic field analysis. In addition, the output density of the fully SiC(Silicon carbide) power module (3.3 kV, 1000 A), which is developed by applying sintered copper bonding technology, is 25% better than the previous technology and is the world's highest class 47kVA/cm2. On the other hand, we have developed a double-sided cooling power module that directly cools both sides of the built-in power semiconductors with cooling water instead of using grease, and the inverter for automobiles with this is enhanced to 54 kVA/L with output power density of 1.6 times the conventional ratio.
Other Innovation Challenges
Energy Systems Supporting Society 5.0
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Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
AI control reduces base station power consumption by up to 50% | <urn:uuid:1855dc03-a991-40c1-9a18-1333598dea08> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://challenge-zero.jp/en/casestudy/569 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.876053 | 431 | 2.046875 | 2 |
The UK Government has implemented an EU directive requiring mandatory disclosure of cross-border tax arrangements, known as the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6 (DAC6). The International Tax Enforcement (Disclosable Arrangements) Regulations 2020 involves promoters, intermediaries and, in some instances, taxpayers themselves.
It is designed to enable EU tax authorities to share information about cross-border tax schemes, and comes into force on 1 July 2020.
The regulations require UK intermediaries to report to HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) any cross border tax arrangements which contain a prescribed ‘hallmark’. The information received from these reports will be shared with tax authorities in EU member states so that they can identify any potential tax risks in their jurisdictions. EU tax authorities will in turn share the information they receive about arrangements involving the UK with HMRC.
The primary reporting obligation will fall on ‘intermediaries’. This is very widely defined and includes those who design and market cross-border arrangements as well as those who provide aid, assistance or advice in respect of such arrangements. In some circumstances the taxpayer will be obliged to make the report.
There are several criteria outlining whether a cross-border arrangement is subject to mandatory reporting – known as the main benefit test.
The central point is establishing if the individual may “reasonably expect” to gain a tax advantage.
Transactions must be reported even if:
- There is a condition of confidentiality linked to the arrangement;
- The intermediary is set to receive a fee either based on the tax advantage or not. In the latter case, if the advantage was not partially or fully achieved, the intermediary would need to refund fees, accordingly;
- It is an arrangement that doesn’t need customisation to be implemented;
- It is an arrangement involving the purchase of a loss-making company for it to be discontinued and used to reduce the participant’s tax liability;
- The aim of the transaction is to convert income into capital, gifts or other types of revenue taxed at a lower level or are completely exempt from tax;
- Circular transactions are made resulting in the round-tripping of funds or transactions that offset or cancel each other;
- The arrangement involves deductible cross-border payments made between two or more entities;
- Deductions for the same depreciations are claimed in more than one jurisdiction;
- Relief from double taxation on the same income is claimed in more than one jurisdiction;
- Assets transferred have a material difference in the payable amount compared to the assets in the jurisdictions involved;
- The arrangement undermines reporting obligations under EU law;
- A transaction involves a non-transparent legal or beneficial ownership chain;
- It uses unilateral safe harbour rules – the provisions that relieves taxpayers from obligations otherwise imposed by a country’s general transfer pricing rules;
- The transaction involves ‘hard-to-value intangibles’; and,
- The projected annual earnings before interest and taxes (Ebit) for three years after the transfer of functions and/or risks and/or assets by an intragroup, are less than 50% of the projected annual Ebit if the transfer had not been made.
- HMRC said it will provide guidance and case studies to clarify any confusion regarding the applicability and compliance with the regulation before the 1 July 2020 deadline.
To ensure Brexit does not impact the legislation, the UK Government has made clear what will happen post-January 31st.
“The UK is legally obliged to transpose this directive before the UK leaves the European Union,” HMRC said.
“That obligation will continue during the implementation period, under the terms of the withdrawal agreement. The UK’s commitment to tax transparency will not be weakened as a result of leaving the EU.
“The government will continue to work with international partners to tackle offshore tax avoidance and evasion.
“As part of this collaboration, we will consider amending the rules further, if necessary, to ensure they work as planned,” the Revenue added. | <urn:uuid:4e2e5b71-9b83-4c66-a671-45f868033f22> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://tradingandinvestment.co.uk/the-international-tax-enforcement-regulations-2020/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.946409 | 840 | 1.507813 | 2 |
Playing in the mud-building our house!
Dear friends and family,
We hope you are all staying and healthy and that the situation in your country begins to improve.
As many of you know, towards the end of January, Myanmar was beginning to contain the 2nd wave of Covid which has spread through the country. Unfortunately, Myanmar now faces new challenges. On February 1st the military gained country of the country resulting in a very unstable country and civil unrest. If you are unaware of the situation please check your international news in order to see the current political condition of the country. We pray for those brave youth have lost their lives of over the past month working to restore democracy to the country and keep them and their families in our hearts.
Due to the current political situation and unstability in the country we have chosen to focus our energy and time in the village at Whispering Earth Training Centre. Regular phone, internet and power outages contribute to the many challenges we face once again here in Myanmar.
Treated Bamboo Viewpoint Meeting Hall
We are so pleased to share that we were able to build our first treated bamboo house on the new land over the last 2 months! The building was the first experiment with treated bamboo, a technique using borax treatment to prolong the life of the bamboo. We also worked with local village carpenters to teach them new techniques of building, joining and working with this treated bamboo.
It took some persuasion to convince the villagers that the bamboo would be strong enough with the new design, but they have been quite pleased with the new learning and the result of the building. We still have some finishing touches to put on the building over the next two months before the rains come.
First mud building at Whispering Earth
We are also so excited to share with you that we have started our first mud building on the training centre. Due to the political situation and uncertainty of security, we have chosen to start with a smaller building in order to ensure the completion before the rains in case we cannot easily travel out to the farm.
Together with the villagers we have been making bricks over the past year and have over 5,000 bricks. We have completed the foundation and are almost complete the first floor of the building.
It has been so fun to see their faces as we tell them that no cement, concrete, steel or wood support beams are needed….only mud, straw, rice husk and sand!!
We have been inserting recycled glass bottle windows and teaching them a variety of techniques in working with natural building including; adobe, cob and much more.
We are so pleased with the result so far! We will continue to work for the completion of the building for the next two months prior to the coming of the rainy season. We cannot wait to share with you the final result in our next report.
Dry Season Fire Break and Struggles with Water
As some of you may remember, we have at forest fires over the last two years at the farm. This year we have been working hard to plant a green or living fence around the property and to create a small fire break to combat the fires during the few months of hot dry season here in Kalaw.
Because we have been unable to stay easily in town and run Sprouting Seeds, we have spent more time out at Whispering Earth. With more people staying here and building this year, along with an exceptionally dry hot season, our water source which we borrow from the neighboring farm has almost completely dried up.
For the last month we have been researching and visiting various sites around the farm to see what options we have to get more water.
We are pleased to share that we will start digging a bore hole in the next weeks! This is process becoming more popular in the local villages.
This will guarantee us a sustainable and endless source of water on our farm. This will completely change life on the farm! We are so excited as we will not only have more water for building and simple living on the farm, but we will be able to care for our trees much better and also will be able to grow more vegetables, fruits and herbs on the farm throughout the entire year!
Although we face extremely challenging times here in Myanmar once again, we are focusing our energy as best we can on the development of our training centre. Our aim is to be able to continue to support the people of Myanmar as best we can and make our small contribution to the development of the country.
With warmest regards,
Whispering Earth Family
Fun for all ages
The building is going up!
Building the walls with glass bottles
So many things we can make with mud
Making cob is lots of fun! | <urn:uuid:c559c257-a6df-4d33-9823-aabedcf75a20> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.globalgiving.org/projects/whispering-earth-natural-building-training/reports/?subid=166302 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.970666 | 960 | 1.75 | 2 |
Deputy Secretary General discusses NATO 2030 initiative at NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană outlined the opportunities of the NATO 2030 initiative in his address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on Monday (17 May 2021). Looking ahead to the NATO Summit, the Deputy Secretary General called it a pivotal moment for NATO, underscoring the need to reinforce unity and solidarity, accelerate adaptation, and prepare the Alliance for the future.
The NATO 2030 initiative sets out an ambitious agenda which will be at the heart of the NATO Summit on June 14, Mr Geoană explained. He outlined the initiative’s priorities, including the need to strengthen collective defence and focus on resilience. NATO will also need to broaden its approach to security, he explained, including by addressing the security implications of climate change and maintaining NATO’s technological edge. He added that NATO 2030 is also about reaffirming NATO’s values and safeguarding the rules-based international order. The Deputy Secretary General stressed the importance of a strong transatlantic bond to meet the challenges of tomorrow together, demonstrating solidarity in words and in deeds. | <urn:uuid:d5151c41-0c34-45e1-b440-5d152c9bc7ad> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_183703.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.931171 | 225 | 1.554688 | 2 |
Cognitive Health as We Age: 3 Ways Older Adults Can Promote Strong Cognitive Health
As we age, our bodies are constantly changing. This is a basic fact of life. We may grow hair in places where it wasn’t before, or begin losing hair in places where we’ve had plenty of it since we were children. It becomes more difficult to maintain muscle mass, while for many it becomes much easier to regain that mass in the form of fat.
But it isn’t only our physical health and fitness that changes as we grow older. Our mental fitness and cognitive health are also affected by the passing of time. For many adults, these changes can mean it is more difficult to remember things than it was before. For others, they may find it more of a challenge to organize the information they need for certain tasks throughout the day.
These changes in how our minds work are due to several interrelated factors which can be categorized into two basic areas: Brian Health and Cognitive Health.
Brain health, in this sense, refers to the physical changes that happen to our body and brain as we age which we have less ability to control. These may be due to brain trauma from injuries or stroke, for example. They may also be the result of diseases such as Alzheimer’s, or the result of substance abuse and addiction. These damaging events, large and small, accumulate and their effects become more apparent as we age.
Cognitive health, on the other hand, would refer to those aspects which as less physical and that we have more control over. This would include lifestyle and environmental factors, as well as social aspects of our lives.
Understanding Cognitive Health
Since we have some measure of control over the factors which affect cognitive health, it is important to understand these factors if we want to be able to keep our minds healthy as we age.
How Lifestyle Affects Cognitive Health
This may be the most obvious are of cognitive health, and it is possibly the one we have the most controlover.
How we live, what we do each day, will have a huge impact on our cognitive health in the long run and, luckily, there are several ways we can make changes today to get on the road to better cognitive health.
Lifestyle changes can include adjusting physical activities as well as mental activities.
One physical aspect of our lifestyle that plays a huge role in our cognitive health is our diet. Just like our bodies need protein, iron, calcium, and other nutrients to make our muscles and bones stronger, the brain also needs healthy nutrients to work at it’s best.
Diets with healthy fats, lean meats, and plenty of fresh fruits and vegetables, such as the Mediterranean diet, have shown promising results for cognitive health, while diets high in refined sugars, saturated fats, and processed foods may contribute to lower overall cognitive health.
Another physical lifestyle choice that has a huge effect on our cognitive health is the level of physical activity we get each day. Studies have shown that people who stay physically active may have positive outcomes related to cognitive health.
But it isn’t just physical activity that has positive benefits for our brains. Staying mentally active has also been shown to improve cognitive health as well. When the brain is active, it strengthens the neural pathways related to the various cognitive abilities we use every day. And just like any muscle, the more we use it, the stronger it becomes.
How Environment Affects Cognitive Health
Environment is another area where we can make changes to improve our cognitive health outcomes.
Living in an environment where we are constantly feeling stressed or anxious may cause changes in the brain which negatively affect our cognitive health.
In addition to this, living in an area with high pollution, unclean air or water, or other unhealthy environmental factors can result in adverse effects on both our cognitive and physical health.
How Social Aspects Affect Cognitive Health
The third area which may have a strong influence on cognitive health is something which has quite a bit of overlap with both lifestyle and environmental aspects of our lives.
Having a strong social element can be incredibly beneficial to our overall cognitive and mental health. Conversely, social isolation may result in negative cognitive outcomes.
After receiving his undergraduate degree in psychology, Scott went on to work as a teacher and educational counselor while working towards his master’s degree. He has spent several years working with children and adults and has personal experience with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder, Dyslexia, and Depression. | <urn:uuid:692711ab-e9e8-4647-8efd-d9a470c91053> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://yourbrain.health/cognitive-health-aging/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.968975 | 916 | 3 | 3 |
« VorigeDoorgaan »
instanced as examples of the world-wide disturbance of commerce caused by the outbreak of war.
One very important obstruction to commerce at first was the restriction placed by the military authorities on cabling. Until early in August, when the use of codes was entirely forbidden, many people could not have realised fully the extent to which codes are used in business. It is no uncommon thing for a single word to express a sentence of eight or ten words; and special codes are employed in the different industries, adapted to the peculiar requirements. In the end the concession was made that each set of ten letters should be reckoned as one word, and then permission was granted to firms to use four specified codes. This limited permission did not please everybody, and finally three more codes were placed on the approved list.
A scheme for the relief of traders who were unable to recover debts from abroad was one of the Government's important emergency measures.
A Joint Committee, on which the Treasury, the Bank of England, the Joint-Stock Banks and the Chambers of Commerce were represented, was formed, with the object of authorising advances where need was urgent to an amount not exceeding 50 per cent. of the foreign book debts. These advances were to be in the form of bills; and it was agreed that 75 per cent. of any ultimate loss should be borne by the Government and the remaining 25 per cent. by the accepting banks.
We may next consider briefly prices as affected by the war.
Food prices moved very little. At first wheat advanced rapidly, then declined, and for some weeks was hardly on more than a normal basis. Then prices of wheat and flour began to rise, and the half-quartern loaf advanced from 2 d. to 31d. That was one of the few direct ways in which housewives in the South and West of England felt the effect of the war. The rise in wheat was due, to some extent, to the stopping of the Russian supplies from the Black Sea district and also to a short harvest following drought in Australia. Happily, the United States and Canada had good harvests, and were able to ship liberal supplies, which went some way to make up for the deficiency. Prices of meat moved only
slightly. At first shipments of chilled beef from Argentina were curtailed through fears of interference by the German cruisers; but confidence was quickly restored, and a steady supply, both for the population at home and the Army in France, has been regularly maintained week by week ever since.
Cotton fell heavily, which was bad for those who held large stocks and for some speculators, but it meant cheap raw material for manufacturers. The fall was due to the production of an abnormally heavy American crop, coinciding with the shrinkage in demand caused by the war. Even if there had been no war, cotton would have been very cheap.
Wool is one of the commodities which have been most affected by the war. The great source of supply is Australasia ; and normally more than half the Australian clip is bought by Germany, France, and Belgium. No exports have been made to Germany; and, as the French and Belgian mills have been in the hands of the Germans, the whole clip must be dealt with by this country and the United States. The immense requirements of the Allies for army clothing have resulted in an unprecedented advance in the price of coarse wools, while the finer wools of merino growth have been correspondingly depressed. The activity in the English mills producing khaki has been very great indeed. Some authorities in the woollen trade go so far as to say that Germany could not face a second winter campaign, since she could not acquire the wool with which to clothe her men.
Finally, the enormous orders of the Allies for boots has caused a great advance in the price of boot leather. Leather, being contraband, cannot reach the enemy from overseas in any great quantities. Already it has been reported that the Austrians have been using canvas boots with leather toe-caps and thin soles. As Great Britain holds the command of the sea, it would seem likely that before the end of the year the enemy forces will be on their uppers.
Art. 15.-THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON INDUSTRY
Board of Trade Labour Gazette,
ment in October 1914 [Cd. 7703]. WHEN Great Britain first declared war on Germany, the nation held its breath and braced itself to meet the industrial upheaval which it was assumed must accompany a great European war. But Christmas has come and gone, and instead of our streets being filled with processions of the unemployed, most employers are complaining that workpeople are more difficult to find than at the height of a trade boom. The man in the street, forgetting his fears of August, has swung completely round and is disposed to think that war spells prosperity for the country fortunate enough to hold command of
The logic of events in this as in the Napoleonic wars proves that to a considerable extent this revised opinion is the correct one; but it is important that this outward calm should not lead us to overlook the very considerable changes that are taking place below the surface. The public generally, among whom we must include economists as well as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has learned a great deal in the past few months about the economic life of the nation, for there has been taking place before our eyes a remarkable disturbance of the ordinary channels of trade, and sweeping readjustments have been made, some with and some without the aid of active intervention by the State. For a detailed picture of recent industrial changes we shall have to wait until full information is available after the war; but we can perceive the chief outlines.
The general course of employment since August, as shown by unemployment statistics of Trade Unions, exhibits the same tendencies, though in a very different degree, in both England and Germany. According to the December Labour Gazette, the proportion of trade unionists in receipt of out-of-work benefit has shown the following changes, the figures in both cases being exclusive of those who have joined the Army or Navy:
The Board of Trade is continually warning us against making any absolute comparison between the unemployment returns of German and English Trade Unions; but the story told by these figures is too apparent to be affected by detailed differences in the basis of compilation. At the end of November employment in the United Kingdom was distinctly better than a year ago in all trades affected by war contracts, but in other trades there was a decline. The improvement in the German percentage is stated in the 'Reichsarbeitsblatt’to be due to the same cause, though other non-war trades, with the exception of building, are said to be better than in the first months of the war.
The Trade Unions figures, however, only give us a part of the story, for they throw no light on the extent to which the labour market has been relieved by the withdrawal of men for naval or military service. In view of the mobilisation of eight million men for the armies of the Kaiser, the above figures indicate an extraordinary shrinkage of industrial activity in Germany, The mobilisation, which in this country has acted throughout as a mitigation of unemployment, has probably been itself a cause of unemployment in Germany, through the crippling of certain industries which form an indispensable link in the long chain of production. Moreover, it will probably be found, when we know the facts, that lack of inland transport has ranked with the withdrawal of men and the cutting-off of oversea trade as a chief cause of industrial dislocation in Germany.
But while these points are at present a matter of conjecture, we have in the Board of Trade Report on the State of Employment in October a means of estimating the contraction of production in this country. The Report shows for the United Kingdom and for particular districts the extent to which those who were at work before the war in various trades are now working shorttime or overtime, have been discharged, or have joined
the forces. It is also shown how far employers have filled the places of recruits, or have been compelled to enlarge their staff. The figures for October, which may be applied to the whole industrial population, viz. 7,000,000 men and 2,250,000 women, are these :
CONDITION IN THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER OF THOSE EMPLOYED IN
5.2 17.3 10:7
5.9 26.0 6.2
Known by employers to have joined the forces
In order to estimate the shrinkage of production from these figures, the proportion working overtime * may be
* set against a similar proportion on short time, leaving a net 12.1 per cent. of males and 20.1 per cent. of females on short time. These may be assumed (from information given on pages 11 and 12 of the Report) to be losing on the average one quarter of their normal weekly hours. That is to say, we must add to the actual contraction figure a quarter of the netshort time, in order to get the total reduction in work done. This gives us 13-7 per cent. reduction for males and 11:2 per cent. for females. Now the number of females occupied in industry is one-third of the number of males, while their work, as shown by wage statistics, is valued at something less than half that of males. Allowing importance to the work of males and females respectively on this basis, we get a combined percentage of 13:3 per cent. as the probable reduction in the industrial output of the nation. The corresponding figure for September was 16 per cent.showing that the nation was more busily employed in October than in September.t
* Some overtime may have escaped the notice of the Board of Trade ; and, in cases where no overtime is being worked, the output may be above the normal owing to an increased display of energy by the workpeople under the stimulus of a national emergency. But this tendency, if indeed it exists, is almost certain to be counterbalanced by the astonishingly small amount of work which a factory on short time contrives to do.
+ Since this article was in type, the Board of Trade Report on Employ. ment in December has been issued, showing that a fortnight before | <urn:uuid:b47dfa3a-2724-4ca9-be37-ecce8174b45f> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://books.google.nl/books?id=1w02Tz_rhyMC&pg=PA266&dq=editions:STANFORD36105008497005&lr=&hl=nl&output=html_text | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.974734 | 2,166 | 2.546875 | 3 |
Sunday (June 28) is the birthday of John Wesley — the founder of Methodism! In honor of the occasion we offer a few of the best John Wesley sermons …
All of these John Wesley bestsermons
are included in
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The Cure of
“If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: If he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he will not hear them, tell it to the Church. But if he does not hear the church, let him be to thee as an heathen man and a publican.” Matt. 18:15-17
1. “Speak evil of no man,” says the great Apostle: — As plain a command as, “Thou shalt do no murder.” But who, even among Christians, regards this command Yea, how few are there that so much as understand it What is evil-speaking It is not, as some suppose, the same with lying or slandering. All a man says may be as true as the Bible; and yet the saying of it is evil-speaking. For evil-speaking is neither more nor less than speaking evil of an absent person; relating something evil, which was really done or said by one that is not present when it is related. Suppose, having seen a man drunk, or heard him curse or swear, I tell this when he is absent; it is evil-speaking. In our language this is also, by an extremely proper name, termed backbiting. Nor is there any material difference between this and what we usually style tale-bearing. If the tale be delivered in a soft and quiet manner (perhaps with expressions of good-will to the person, and of hope that things may not be quite so bad,) then we call it whispering. But in whatever manner it be done, the thing is the same; — the same in substance, if not in circumstance. Still it is evil-speaking; still this command, “Speak evil of no man,” is trampled under foot; if we relate to another the fault of a third person, when he is not present to answer for himself.
2. And how extremely common is this sin, among all orders and degrees of men! How do high and low, rich and poor, wise and foolish, learned and unlearned, run into it continually! Persons who differ from each other in all things else, nevertheless agree in this. How few are there that can testify before God, “I am clear in this matter; I have always set a watch before my mouth, and kept the door of my lips!” What conversation do you hear, of any considerable length, whereof evil-speaking is not one ingredient and that even among persons who, in the general, have the fear of God before their eyes, and do really desire to have a conscience void of offence toward God and toward man.
3. And the very commonness of this sin makes it difficult to be avoided. As we are encompassed with it on every side, so, if we are not deeply sensible of the danger, and continually guarding against it, we are liable to be carried away by the torrent. In this instance, almost the whole of mankind is, as it were, in a conspiracy against us. And their example steals upon us, we know not how; so that we insensibly slide into the imitation of it. Besides, it is recommended from within as well as from without. There is scarce any wrong temper in the mind of man, which may not be occasionally gratified by it, and consequently incline us to it. It gratifies our pride, to relate those faults of others whereof we think ourselves not to be guilty. Anger, resentment, and all unkind tempers, are indulged by speaking against those with whom we are displeased; and, in many cases, by reciting the sins of their neighbors, men indulge their own foolish and hurtful desires.
4. Evil-speaking is the more difficult to be avoided, because it frequently attacks us in disguise. We speak thus out of a noble, generous (it is well if we do not say,) holy indignation, against these vile creatures! We commit sin from mere hatred of sin! We serve the devil out of pure zeal for God! It is merely in order to punish the wicked that we run into this wickedness. “So do the passions” (as one speaks) “all justify themselves,” and palm sin upon us under the veil of holiness!
5. But is there no way to avoid the snare Unquestionably there is. Our blessed Lord has marked out a plain way for His followers, in the words above recited. None, who warily and steadily walk in this path, will ever fall into evil-speaking. This rule is either an infallible preventive, or a certain cure of it. In the preceding verses, our Lord had said, “Woe to the world, because of offences,” — unspeakable misery will arise in the world from this baleful fountain: (Offences are all things whereby anyone is turned out of, or hindered in, the ways of God.): “For it must be that offenses come,” — Such is the nature of things; such the wickedness, folly, and weakness of mankind: “But woe to that man,” — miserable is that man, “by whom the offense cometh.” “Wherefore if thy hand, thy foot, thine eye, cause thee to offend,” — if the most dear enjoyment, the most beloved and useful person, turn thee out of or hinder thee in the way, “pluck it out,” — cut them off, and cast them from thee. But how can we avoid giving offense to some, and being offended at others Especially, suppose they are quite in the wrong, and we see it with our own eyes Our Lord here teaches us how: He lays down a sure method of avoiding offenses and evil-speaking together. “If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and tell him of his fault, between thee and him alone: If he will hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that by the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he will not hear them, tell it to the church: But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as an heathen man and a publican.”
I. 1. First, “If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and tell him of his fault, between thee and him alone.” The most literal way of following this first rule, where it is practicable, is the best: Therefore, if thou seest with thine own eyes a brother, a fellow Christian, commit undeniable sin, or hearest it with thine own ears, so that it is impossible for thee to doubt the fact, then thy part is plain: Take the very first opportunity of going to him; and, if thou canst have access, “tell him of his fault between thee and him alone.” Indeed, great care is to be taken that this is done in a right spirit, and in a right manner. The success of a reproof greatly depends on the spirit wherein it is given. Be not, therefore, wanting in earnest prayer to God, that it may be given in a lowly spirit; with a deep, piercing conviction, that it is God alone who maketh thee to differ; and that if any good be done by what is now spoken, God doeth it himself. Pray that he would guard thy heart, enlighten thy mind, and direct thy tongue to such words as he may please to bless. See that thou speak in a meek as well as a lowly spirit; for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.” If he be “overtaken in a fault,” he can no otherwise be restored, than “in the spirit of meekness.” If he opposes the truth, yet he cannot be brought to the knowledge thereof, but by gentleness. Still speak in a spirit of tender love, “which many waters cannot quench.” If love is not conquered, it conquers all things. Who can tell the force of love
Love can bow down the stubborn neck, The stone to flesh convert; Soften, and melt, and pierce and break An adamantine heart.
Confirm, then, your love toward him, and you will thereby “heap coals of fire upon his head.”
2. But see that the manner also wherein you speak be according to the Gospel of Christ. Avoid everything in look, gesture, word, and tone of voice, that savors of pride or self-sufficiency. Studiously avoid everything magisterial or dogmatical, everything that looks like arrogance or assuming. Beware of the most distant approach to disdain, overbearing, or contempt. With equal care avoid all appearance of anger; and though you use great plainness of speech, yet let there be no reproach, no railing accusation, no token of any warmth but that of love. Above all, let there be no shadow of hate or ill-will, no bitterness or sourness of expression; but use the air and language of sweetness, as well as gentleness, that all may appear to flow from love in the heart. And yet this sweetness need not hinder your speaking in the most serious and solemn manner; as far as may be, in the very words of the oracles of God (for there are none like them,) and as under the eye of Him who is coming to judge the quick and dead.
3. If you have not an opportunity of speaking to him in person, or cannot have access, you may do it by a messenger; by a common friend, in whose prudence, as well as uprightness, you can thoroughly confide. Such a person, speaking in your name, and in the spirit and manner above described, may answer the same end, and, in a good degree, supply your lack of service. Only beware you do not feign the want of opportunity, in order to shun the cross; neither take it for granted that you cannot have access, without ever making the trial. Whenever you can speak in your own person, it is far better. But you should rather do it by another, than not at all: This way is better than none.
4. But what, if you can neither speak yourself, nor find such a messenger as you can confide in If this is really the case, it then only remains to write. And there may be some circumstances which make this the most advisable way of speaking. One of these circumstances is, when the person with whom we have to do is of so warm and impetuous a temper as does not easily bear reproof, especially from an equal or inferior. But it may be so introduced and softened in writing as to make it far more tolerable. Besides, many will read the very same words, which they could not bear to hear. It does not give so violent a shock to their pride, nor so sensibly touch their honor. And suppose it makes little impression at first, they will, perhaps, give it a second reading, and, upon farther consideration, lay to heart what before they disregarded. If you add your name, this is nearly the same thing as going to him, and speaking in person. And this should always be done, unless it be rendered improper by some very particular reason.
5. It should be well observed, not only that this is a step which our Lord absolutely commands us to take, but that he commands us to take this step first, before we attempt any other. No alternative is allowed, no choice of anything else: This is the way; walk thou in it. It is true, he enjoins us, if need require, to take two other steps; but they are to be taken successively after this step, and neither of them before it: Much less are we to take any other step, either before or beside this. To do anything else, or not to do this, is, therefore, equally inexcusable.
6. Do not think to excuse yourself for taking an entirely different step, by saying, “Why, I did not speak to anyone, till I was so burdened that I could not refrain.” You was burdened! It was no wonder you should, unless your conscience was seared; for you was under the guilt of sin, of disobeying a plain commandment of God! You ought immediately to have gone, and told “your brother of his fault between you and him alone.” If you did not, how should you be other than burdened (unless your heart was utterly hardened,) while you was trampling the command of God under foot, and “hating your brother in your heart” And what a way have you found to unburden yourself God reproves you for a sin of omission, for not telling your brother of his fault; and you comfort yourself under His reproof by a sin of commission, by telling your brother’s fault to another person! Ease bought by sin is a dear purchase! I trust in God, you will have no ease, but will be burdened so much the more, till you “go to your brother and tell him,” and no one else.
7. I know but of one exception to this rule: There may be a peculiar case, wherein it is necessary to accuse the guilty, though absent, in order to preserve the innocent. For instance: You are acquainted with the design which a man has against the property or life of his neighbor. Now, the case may be so circumstanced, that there is no other way of hindering that design from taking effect, but the making it known, without delay, to him against whom it is laid. In this case, therefore, this rule is set aside, as is that of the Apostle, “Speak evil of no man:” and it is lawful, yea, it is our bounden duty, to speak evil of an absent person, in order to prevent his doing evil to others and himself at the same time. But remember, meanwhile that all evil-speaking is, in its own nature, deadly poison. Therefore if you are sometimes constrained to use it as a medicine, yet use it with fear and trembling; seeing it is so dangerous a medicine, that nothing but absolute necessity can excuse your using it at all. Accordingly, use it as seldom as possible; never but when there is such a necessity: And even then use as little of it as is possible; only so much as is necessary for the end proposed. At all other times, “go and tell him of his fault between thee and him alone.”
II. 1. But what, “if he will not hear” If he repay evil for good If he be enraged rather than convinced What, if he hear to no purpose, and go on still in the evil of his way We must expect this will frequently be the case; the mildest and tenderest reproof will have no effect; but the blessing we wished for another will return into our own bosom. And what are we to do then Our Lord has given us a clear and full direction. Then “take with thee one or two more:” This is the second step. Take one or two whom you know to be of a loving spirit, lovers of God and of their neighbor. See, likewise, that they be of a lowly spirit, and “clothed with humility.” Let them also be such as are meek and gentle, patient and longsuffering; not apt to “return evil for evil, or railing for railing, but contrariwise blessing.” Let them be men of understanding, such as are endued with wisdom from above; and men unbiased, free from partiality, free from prejudice of any kind. Care should likewise be taken, that both the persons and their characters be well known to him: And let those that are acceptable to him be chosen preferable to any others.
2. Love will dictate the manner wherein they should proceed, according to the nature of the case. Nor can any one particular manner be prescribed for all cases. But perhaps, in general, one might advise, before they enter upon the thing itself, let them mildly and affectionately declare that they have no anger or prejudice toward him, and that it is merely from a principle of goodwill that they now come, or at all concern themselves with his affairs. To make this the more apparent, they might then calmly attend to your repetition of your former conversation with him, and to what he said in his own defense, before they attempted to determine anything. After this they would be better able to judge in what manner to proceed, “that by the mouth of two or three witnesses, every word might be established;” that whatever you have said may have its full force by the additional weight of their authority.
3. In order to this, may they not, (1.) Briefly repeat what you spoke, and what he answered (2.) Enlarge upon, open, and confirm the reasons which you had given (3.) Give weight to your reproof, showing how just, how kind, and how seasonable it was And, lastly, enforce the advices and persuasions which you had annexed to it And these may likewise hereafter, if need should require, bear witness of what was spoken.
4. With regard to this, as well as the preceding rule, we may observe that our Lord gives us no choice, leaves us no alternative, but expressly commands us to do this, and nothing else in the place of it. He likewise directs us when to do this; neither sooner nor later; namely, after we have taken the first, and before we have taken the third step. It is then only that we are authorized to relate the evil another has done, to those whom we desire to bear a part with us in this great instance of brotherly love. But let us have a care how we relate it to any other person, till both these steps have been taken. If we neglect to take these, or if we take any others, what wonder if we are burdened still For we are sinners against God, and against our neighbor; and how fairly soever we may color it, yet, if we have any conscience, our sin will find us out, and bring a burden upon our soul.
III. 1. That we may be thoroughly instructed in this weighty affair, our Lord has given us a still farther direction: “If he will not hear them,” then, and not till then, “tell it to the church.” This is the third step. All the question is, how this word, “the church,” is here to be understood. But the very nature of the thing will determine this beyond all reasonable doubt. You cannot tell it to the national Church, the whole body of men termed “the Church of England.” Neither would it answer any Christian end if you could; this, therefore, is not the meaning of the word. Neither can you tell it to that whole body of people in England with whom you have a more immediate connection. Nor, indeed, would this answer any good end: The word, therefore, is not to be understood thus. It would not answer any valuable end to tell the faults of every particular member to the church (if you would so term it,) the congregation or society, united together in London. It remains that you tell it to the elder or elders of the church, to those who are overseers of that flock of Christ to which you both belong, who watch over yours and his soul, “as they that must give account.” And this should be done, if it conveniently can, in the presence of the person concerned, and, though plainly, yet with all the tenderness and love which the nature of the thing will admit. It properly belongs to their office, to determine concerning the behavior of those under their care, and to rebuke, according to the demerit of the offense, “with all authority.” When, therefore, you have done this, you have done all which the Word of God, or the law of love, requireth of you: You are not now partaker of his sin; but if he perish, his blood is on his own head.
2. Here, also, let it be observed, that this, and no other, is the third step which we are to take; and that we are to take it in its order after the other two; not before the second, much less the first, unless in some very particular circumstance. Indeed, in one case, the second step may coincide with this: They may be, in a manner, one and the same. The elder or elders of the church may be so connected with the offending brother, that they may set aside the necessity, and supply the place, of the one or two witnesses; so that it may suffice to tell it to them, after you have told it to your brother, “between you and him alone.”
3. When you have done this, you have delivered your own soul. “If he will not hear the church,” if he persist in his sin, “let him be to thee as an heathen man and a publican.” You are under no obligation to think of him any more; only when you commend him to God in prayer. You need not speak of him any more, but leave him to his own Master. Indeed, you still owe to him, as to all other heathens, earnest, tender goodwill. You owe him courtesy, and, as occasion offers, all the offices of humanity. But have no friendship, no familiarity with him; no other intercourse than with an open Heathen.
4. But if this be the rule by which Christians walk, which is the land where Christians live A few you may possibly find scattered up and down, who make a conscience of observing it. But how very few! How thinly scattered upon the face of the earth! And where is there any body of men that universally walk thereby Can we find them in Europe Or, to go no farther, in Great Britain or Ireland I fear not: I fear we may search these kingdoms throughout, and yet search in vain. Alas for the Christian world! Alas for Protestants, for Reformed Christians! O, “who will rise up with me against the wicked” “Who will take God’s part” against the evil-speakers Art thou the man By the grace of God, wilt thou be one who art not carried away by the torrent Art thou fully determined, God being thy helper, from this very hour to set a watch, a continual “watch, before thy mouth, and keep the door of thy lips” From this hour wilt thou walk by this rule, “Speaking evil of no man” If thou seest thy brother do evil, wilt thou “tell him of his fault between thee and him alone” Afterwards, “take one or two witnesses,” and then only “tell it to the church” If this be the full purpose of thy heart, then learn one lesson well, “Hear evil of no man.” If there were no hearers, there would be no speakers, of evil. And is not (according to the vulgar proverb) the receiver as bad as the thief If, then, any begin to speak evil in thy hearing, check him immediately. Refuse to hear the voice of the charmer, charm he never so sweetly; let him use ever so soft a manner, so mild an accent, ever so many professions of goodwill for him whom he is stabbing in the dark, whom he smiteth under the fifth rib! Resolutely refuse to hear, though the whisperer complain of being “burdened till he speak.” Burdened! thou fool! dost thou travail with thy cursed secret, as a woman travaileth with child Go, then, and be delivered of thy burden in the way the Lord hath ordained! First, “go and tell thy brother of his fault between thee and him alone.:” next, “take with thee one or two” common friends, and tell him in their presence: If neither of these steps take effect, then “tell it to the church.” But, at the peril of thy soul, tell it to no one else, either before or after, unless in that one exempt case, when it is absolutely needful to preserve the innocent! Why shouldst thou burden another as well as thyself, by making him partaker of thy sin
5. O that all you who bear the reproach of Christ, who are in derision called Methodists, would set an example to the Christian world, so called, at least in this one instance! Put ye away evil-speaking, talebearing, whispering: Let none of them proceed out of your mouth! See that you “speak evil of no man;” of the absent, nothing but good. If ye must be distinguished, whether ye will or no, let this be the distinguishing mark of a Methodist: “He censures no man behind his back: By this fruit ye may know him.” What a blessed effect of this self-denial should we quickly feel in our hearts! How would our “peace flow as a river,” when we thus “followed peace with all men!” How would the love of God abound in our own souls, while we thus confirmed our love to our brethren! And what an effect would it have on all that were united together in the name of the Lord Jesus! How would brotherly love continually increase, when this grand hindrance of it was removed! All the members of Christ’s mystical body would then naturally care for each other. “If one member suffered, all would suffer with it; if one was honored, all would rejoice with it;” and everyone would love his brother “with a pure heart fervently.” Nor is this all: But what an effect might this have, even on the wild unthinking world! How soon would they descry in us, what they could not find among all the thousands of their brethren, and cry (as Julian the Apostate to his heathen courtiers,) “See how these Christians love one another!” By this chiefly would God convince the world, and prepare them also for His kingdom; as we may easily learn from those remarkable words in our Lord’s last, solemn prayer: “I pray for them who will believe in me, that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me!” [John 17:21] The Lord hasten the time! The Lord enable us thus to love one another, not only “in word and in tongue, but in deed and in truth,” even as Christ hath loved us. | <urn:uuid:a730e346-007c-4300-9dc8-f9c8a8bb45e5> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://englewoodreview.org/john-wesley-seven-of-the-best-sermons-from-the-founder-of-methodism/6/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.970033 | 5,759 | 2.078125 | 2 |
David Nasaw's magnificent, definitive biography of William Randolph Hearst is based on newly released private and business papers and interviews. For the first time, documentation of Hearst's interactions with Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, and every American president from Grover Cleveland to Franklin Roosevelt, as well as with movie giants Louis B. Mayer, Jack Warner, and Irving Thalberg, completes the picture of this colossal American. Hearst, known to his staff as the Chief, was a man of prodigious appetites. By the 1930s, he controlled the largest publishing empire in the country, including twenty-eight newspapers, the Cosmopolitan Picture Studio, radio stations, and thirteen magazines. As the first practitioner of what is now known as synergy, Hearst used his media stronghold to achieve political power unprecedented in the industry. Americans followed his metamorphosis from populist to fierce opponent of Roosevelt and the New Deal, from citizen to congressman, and we are still fascinated today by the man characterized in the film classic CITIZEN KANE. In Nasaw's portrait, questions about Hearst's relationships are addressed, including those about his mistress in his Harvard days, who lived with him for ten years; his legal wife, Millicent, a former showgirl and the mother of his five sons; and Marion Davies, his companion until death. Recently discovered correspondence with the architect of Hearst's world-famous estate, San Simeon, is augmented by taped interviews with the people who worked there and witnessed Hearst's extravagant entertaining, shedding light on the private life of a very public man. | <urn:uuid:2162f786-d0e2-4f7a-88a4-17b33c060133> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://shop.landmarkbooksellers.com/products/the-chief-the-life-of-william-randolph-hearst | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.973195 | 321 | 2.109375 | 2 |
Objectives: To report the consistency in movement strategy selection in athletic groin pain patients and to assess whether there are differences in consistency between athletic groin pain patients and healthy athletes. Design: Cross sectional exploratory study. Methods: Twenty athletic groin pain patients and 21 healthy athletes performed 15 repetitions of 110° change of direction task. Lower limb and trunk kinematics alongside ground reaction forces were collected. A correlation-to-mean algorithm was used to allocate each trial to a movement strategy using kinematic and kinetic features. Mann–Whitney U tests were used to compare the frequency of the most selected strategy (i.e. consistency) and fuzziness between athletic groin pain patients and healthy athletes. Chi-squared tests were used to compare the strategy selection between athletic groin pain patients and healthy athletes. Results: There were no differences between groups in consistency in movement strategy selection (>80%). Athletic groin pain patients tended to select a knee dominant movement strategy whereas healthy athletes preferred an ankle dominant movement strategy. Conclusions: The consistency observed in athletic groin pain patients supports the implementation of movement strategy assessments to inform AGP rehabilitation programmes tailored to athletes’ deficiencies. Such assessments could help enhance the success of athletic groin pain rehabilitation. Differences in movement strategy selection might not be associated with injury state since there were no differences between athletic groin pain patients and healthy athletes.
- Movement classification
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Orthopedics and Sports Medicine
- Physical Therapy, Sports Therapy and Rehabilitation | <urn:uuid:3b7fe567-8987-4b40-9ba0-ce15575cce41> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/athletic-groin-pain-patients-and-healthy-athletes-demonstrate-con-2 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.923191 | 321 | 2.09375 | 2 |
Actions for Orcas
Start: Saturday, September 15, 2018•10:30 AM
Our Salish Sea is under assault. Fossil fuel projects and accelerating human activity and development are contributing to pollution, climate change and ocean acidification. On September 15th, please join us for a powerful Salish Sea Day of Action event.
Please join some of Orca Network's amazing volunteers on September 15th for the Salish Sea Day of Action and International Coastal Clean-up Day.
You can choose between Bayview State Park: https://www.facebook.com/events/477183962759932/ (Bayview Edison Rd 10901, Mount Vernon, WA) and
Fay Bainbridge Park: https://www.facebook.com/events/269613833657315/ (15446 Sunrise Dr NE, Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110),
Join your friends and neighbors in a day of Action for Orcas on Sept 15! Take part in the International Coastal Clean-up and learn about our Salish Sea orcas, and how YOU can take Action to make a difference in the health of the Salish Sea and its creatures.
Activities include: * Learning about the Salish Sea, its amazing creatures and what you can do to help. * Hands-on activities for kids. * A shoreline vigil recognizing and celebrating the Salish Sea’s endangered Southern Resident Orcas. * Participate in a beach cleanup (tools and trash bags provided) and help improve the health of the aquatic environment and nearshore habitat. * Come ready to learn and lend a hand.
Or if you are on Whidbey Island, stop by our Langley Whale Center (105 Anthes, Langley, WA) to learn about orcas and other cetaceans of the Salish Sea.
Our local communities are joining other communities around the bioregion to build broader awareness and advocacy around protection for our Sacred Sea and all living creatures. While the sea itself may separate us physically, we are uniting to face these growing threats together. #WeAretheWater | <urn:uuid:fecb5266-3b57-458a-98f5-f27f3b049787> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://actionnetwork.org/events/actions-for-orcas | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.892988 | 433 | 2.390625 | 2 |
Parable Dance, a Brighton-based Community Interest Company (CIC) which aims to provide a space for creativity, individuality, and opportunity for people with disabilities through dance, has secured Arts Council England funding to create a film bringing together 42 of the UK’s most experienced inclusive (disability) dance artists and companies.
Parable Dance’s Artistic Directors Natasha Britton and Erica Moshman have created the film, titled Inclusive Practice Is Good Practice, which is a one and a quarter hour resource offering advice when
teaching dance to people with disabilities.
The film brings together the voices of 42 disabled and non-disabled dance practitioners, including representation from 23 inclusive dance companies and features eight disabled and non-disabled dancers.
Companies featured include those who champion inclusion such as Candoco Dance Company, Stopgap Dance Company and Para Dance UK.
The film, which will be premiered on Parable Dance’s YouTube channel from 7pm on Wednesday, March 10, is aimed at anyone wanting to develop their inclusive dance skills, and particularly at university students, new graduates and early career dance artists both with and without disabilities, who have been missing out on work experience opportunities due to the pandemic.
The speakers offer advice to people starting out, talk about their approaches, how to ensure access in dance
classes, and offer top tips for teaching. It will be available for free for years to come to help steer new
inclusive dance artists in their career.
Natasha Britton, Parable Dance artistic director, said: “A positive outcome of this past year is that artists and companies have been connecting to share their collective voices more and to advocate for the arts to not only survive but to thrive. We were keen to harness this wish to collaborate by bringing together some of the most experienced inclusive dance artists and companies from around the UK to make this film.”
Millie Kingsnorth, a dance student, added: “Finding a pathway into inclusive dance is difficult at the best of times, let alone in the current climate. Having diversity and inclusion at the heart of teaching is invaluable because it makes these aspects a priority, not a second thought.” | <urn:uuid:50d77290-3160-46d9-a26f-9475026a4803> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.gscene.com/news/parable-dance-premieres-new-inclusive-disability-dance-film/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.962337 | 448 | 1.9375 | 2 |
SARANAC, Mich. (WOOD) — Two West Michigan schools are dropping Native American-related mascots.
Saranac Community Schools said this week that its board voted unanimously to “respectfully retire” the mascot. The district said it will remain the Redskins until a new name is chosen.
It is the last school in West Michigan to use the Redskins mascot.
The superintendent will be charge of the new mascot selection process, which will be selected by a committee.
Hartford Public Schools also announced in a letter to parents Friday they are retiring their Indians mascot.
The letter from Superintendent Kelly Millin and the president of Hartford’s Board of Education, Mike Banic, highlighted the importance of diversity and inclusion and the partnership with their Pokagon Band of Potawatomi.
“We value our long shared partnership with the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi; and, as we learn more about social emotional needs, both parties agree that it is necessary to reexamine our current mascot and school logo,” the letter read.
The school will work with the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi to find a new mascot that symbolizes their community.
The school’s mascot will be officially be retired at the end of the 2021-2022 school year.
Early last year, after years of controversy in the community, Paw Paw Public Schools said it would get rid of the Redskins mascot. It adopted a new mascot in July, becoming the Red Wolves. The district said that was part of a culture reform initiative that it said left students feeling more respected.
Only two other schools in Michigan continue use the Redskins mascot: Camden-Frontier near the Ohio line and Sandusky in the Thumb. Clinton in southeastern Michigan changed its mascot, also to the Redwolves, last year. | <urn:uuid:ce3467e9-2e04-4134-972d-9a2470827468> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.woodtv.com/news/ionia-county/saranac-school-board-votes-to-change-redskins-mascot/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882572304.13/warc/CC-MAIN-20220816120802-20220816150802-00465.warc.gz | en | 0.953111 | 376 | 1.835938 | 2 |
Miss Andrew and Ms Field
Gulliver's World Residential Trip
Please see the meeting presentation below. If you have any questions about the trip please don't hesitate to ask.
Please download a Kit list here
This half term our topic is creatures and beasts. Our text will be The Dragon Machine and The Bear and The Piano. We will be writing dairy entries, descriptions and retelling stories. We will be learning about animals and their offspring in science. In Geography the children will be learning about maps.
For maths, we will continue to follow White Rose. Details of this can be found online including resources. We will start the term continuing our shape work before we move onto fractions. We will be also be learning measuring with Miss Andrew too.
Welcome to year 2!
We have had a great start to the year being back with our friends again and enjoying school life. We are all settled in and ready for the Autumn term.
On this page you will find:
- What topic we are studying this half-term
- Some useful information about year 2
- Latest school news bulletins
This half term we will be exploring the book 'Meerkat Mail'. We will be using this text for inspiration in English to help us write postcards, letters, luggage labels and more. We will also be looking at different climates around the globe like in the Kalahari desert (where meerkats live), creating artwork inspired by African artists and studying music based on Hands Feet Heart; a song which celebrates South African music.
In maths this half term we will focus on place value along with addition and subtraction. | <urn:uuid:4bcb0d04-1172-4bd5-84b3-1e6eda3f11c4> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.marton.cheshire.sch.uk/classes/year-2 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.922732 | 344 | 2.796875 | 3 |
There’s no doubt that one needs to have an understanding of the bias inherent in a given media platform as part of interpreting the news from that platform. It’s very clear that the polarization of politics south of the border are clearly evident in the various news outlets there. I wondered if there was a comparable diagram for Canada, and so I googled “media bias Canada Canadian chart” and discovered a number of interesting things by rooting through the search results.
The Media Bias Chart 6, Ad Fontes Media
There is an updated version 6.0 (June 2020) of the Ad Fontes Media chart you have shared. It appears to incorporate even more media, but is navigable in the version 5.0 interactive form.
The Canadian Encyclopedia has a very nice article about the kinds of bias that can appear in the media, with examples from Canadian contexts.
I did come across a “bias chart” of Canadian news media, posted on Twitter, however based on the attached tweet and other information surrounding the tweet, I question whether it is based on objective data or whether it actually represents a bias inherent in the poster/artist who created it?
Is there bias inherent in the following representation of the bias in Canadian media? There is no attached data or cited source to support this image.
unattributed source: “Canadian Media Bias Chart,” shared on Twitter
What do you think? How would you go about assessing the validity of this representation?
It would be interesting to know if Ad Fontes Media has data to support the verification (or creation) of a Canadian Media Bias Map.
Two Raspberry Pi 4Bs running Rossetta@Home to fight COVID-19 (GIF by @aforgrave)
We are now eight weeks since the arrival of the pandemic and the shelter-at-home orders hit Ontario. Over the past 56 odd days, my daily efforts have been devoted to three “pandemic response” areas:
my “day job,” supporting the delivery of webinars teaching kids the principles of coding, AI, and computational thinking — 102 webinars and counting;
my “volunteer job” as president of the Educational Computing Organization of Ontario (ECOO);
a little side project, contributing to the “folding@home” and “rosetta@home” wide-scale distributed computing endeavours as they seek to understand various diseases like cancers, and the current scourge — COVID-19.
In what might have been a fairly boring time to be recently retired and housebound, all three of these endeavours have allowed me to contribute, and, most importantly, have given me the daily opportunity to collaborate and work together with other folks. In the case of the day job, everyone got the “work from home” order on Friday March 13th, and since then, the days have been mediated by Zoom, Meet, and Slack calls, along with emails, slack chats, and lots of shared Google docs, spreadsheets, and presentations. In my case, I was already working from home, so that aspect of things didn’t change dramatically for me, but the nature of our communications now during work is mediated by an overarching sense of “all in this together,” and reflects a significant pivot from a face-to-face model to a completely online delivery model. Whether folks are in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, (or Belleville 🙂 ) this has worked because everyone is collaborating and working together to support the common cause. The daily fifteen minute online “breathe-breaks” during the noon hour are a great opportunity to take a brief pause together and reflect on the importance of wellness. Thanks to colleagues Maddy, Rita, Mavis, Matt, Gabrielle, Martin, German, Peter, Maia, La Donna, Maria, Maddie, Simon, and all the rest.
The ECOO Board of Directors during the May 4th Board Meeting (capture by @aforgrave)
Similarly, the ECOO Board of Directors responded to the arrival of the pandemic with an acknowledgement that our annual conference, Bring IT, Together (#BIT20) was likely in jeopardy, along with the regional #ECOOcamp events that were in the planning stages for the summer months. The Board collaborated in short order to develop a pandemic response plan, resulting in a number of us working long hours to revise the content on the ECOO.org website to support the current reality facing Ontario educators — teaching students at home, from home. Again, the importance of personal wellness and balance has been key, reflected on the landing page of the website and as part of our online meetings. Kudos to the members of the ECOO Board for the very positive and supportive get-togethers that have occured in recent months. BIG thanks to Mary, Lynn, Jen, Adele, Mel, David, Elias, Jason, and Ramona!
Recent updates to ECOO.org include learn-from-home Resources, Podcasts, and webinar Events.
The last project — clustered under the #OntarioEducatorsUnited hashtag — started with a simple tweet exchange and has grown now to include a good number of Ontario Educators. Just as the combined work of our group has resulted in the completion of over 2000 work units of computational support in the modelling of protein folding, that contribution works together with all of the other teams that feed into the project headquarters where the research teams analyse the data models in the effort to understand the coronavirus. Congrats to our team for reaching another milestone — shout out to Jim, Tim, Alanna, Max, Brock, Frank, Jen and Jen, Cal, and Erin. (If you’re interested in joining the team, we’d love to have you! Details are in the post Your Computer can fight COVID-19.)
The #OntarioEducatorsUnited Team reached the milestone of 2000 work units on May 18th, 2020.
In recent days I’ve also got a couple of Raspberry Pi4s contributing to a separate Fold for Covid project. You might also want to join in on that, too.)
Join the fight against COVID-19. Get your pin on the map!
Rosetta@Home running on Raspberry Pi 4B (capture by @aforgrave)
So much of the fall this year was a struggle in working positively despite the challenges of contrary forces (the Ontario government against the teachers’ federations as one example) and it is so much more productive to be working with positive, supportive groups during the duress imposed by this pandemic. If you are one of the folks that continue to act in a mentor/collaborator capacity for me — thank you for your ongoing support, counsel, and care. It truly makes a difference! Working together is the key.
When I wake Sunday mornings I look forward to reading Doug Peterson’s, “Whatever happened to…” This morning, Doug pose the question about ….pens.
This is a good topic. On one hand, you might say that everyone has pens and uses them all the time. On the other hand, we can acknowledge that some people probably don’t use pens very much at all anymore. Pondering on that this morning, it surprised me. Personally, I wouldn’t have put pens into the category of things that aren’t used anymore until Doug raised the question this morning and I did a little self assessment.
Note: Sometimes when I respond to Doug’s Sunday morning post, I like to take his list of questions and just work my way through them, one by one that’s what I did this morning. Today, as I got towards the end of the list, I realized there was some good reflection arising as a result. That part comes at the end of this piece
So in responding to Doug’s first question, related to pens in easy reach, without thinking too much or going and digging throughout my place, I realize and can report that my writing implements are in one of two spots:
I have a single pen attached to a small clipboard in the closet at the door that I can use whenever someone does a delivery and needs a signature. I added the clipboard when I got tired of having the ink drain from the tip about halfway through my signature when I used the wall as a writing surface. (Note that since contactless delivery started a month or so ago, no one needs a signature anymore.)
I have writing implements within reach of my desk. In one cubby I have a couple of pen cups: one with pencils, and one with pens. In a drawer, I have multiple pencil cases, each one containing a family of similar markers (sharpies, highlighters, fine points) or pencils (colored pencils) for various art projects. Also included are the metallic ink sharpies (silver, gold, and bronze) that do such a good job of marking up all the various power adaptors so that you can tell after the fact which adaptor matches up with which device.
I have a couple of pen sets that I have received as gifts. They come in nice presentation boxes which do a great job of storing them and keeping them dust free. The boxes also serve to allow them to remain unused.
Over my years as a learner and educator, I tended to standardize on a particular brand/style for a few years at a time as pen technologies evolved and my preferences changed.
In middle school, I went through a phase where I used green and black Bic ballpoint pens.
In high school and university, the Pilot fineliner felt tip was my pen of choice, along with yellow highlighters for highlighting, and in combination with the fineliners, doodling. I never really liked the thin, scratchy profile that ball point pens provided, and so I moved to felt tips as they provided something a little bit closer to a calligraphy effect. However, pressing down too hard on the tip of the Fineliner would ruin it, and so I went through a lot of those in the days before I first had a computer and started doing a lot more by hand.
During my high school and university days, I also used mechanical pencils, with those really really thin long leads and replaceable eraser tips that hid underneath the clicker tip. For fun, I called them electric pencils, rather than mechanical pencils.
At some point in the past 20 years my preferences evolved away from felt tips back to ballpoints, specifically when gel pens and larger diameter tips came into play. I think the large diameter ball points now have something like a 1.4 mm sphere which gives you a much smoother ink coverage and much less of a ballpoint effect. Maybe those pens are up to 1.7 mm? Anyway, that’s what I have multiples of in the pen cup at my desk. I would have purchased them a year or two ago now.
I will also mention that pencil technologies have also improved over the years. I have standardized my pencil purchases to the Staedtler brand of Wopex pencils. Rather than being made out of raw wood, they are made out of a wood dust and glue compound. They last much much longer and really don’t break. If you carefully avoid losing them, a single Wopex pencil can last for more than a year. Over the last couple of years in the classroom, I know I had a couple pencils used in rotation that were in service for more than 18 months each. The secret is to put your name on them and not lose them.
I have stopped collecting hotel and conference pens. I don’t need them. When travelling with my brother this summer, he was offered a replacement hotel pen when we were stopped for a visit in Spruce Grove, Alberta, just outside Edmonton. He had been using the same plastic hotel pen for the longest time, stored in the pen slot in his travel diary, and the clerk at the front desk noticed that it was an older version of their brand, and graciously offered a replacement, which my brother happily accepted. I’m sure he had travelled and made notes with that pen for years.
I do have one conference pen that I have continued to keep, and that is an ECOO pen that was provided as conference swag. I’m fairly certain it was the year that David Thornburg keynoted, or perhaps Derrick de Kerchhove. I know I should find the pen and dig into the ECOO records to confirm that, but I will leave that as a fact check for another day. The pen is unique in that you reveal the ballpoint tip by turning the cylinder, and rather use the clicker at the top of the pen to turn on the light that is built-in. The pen is purpose-designed and built for use to take notes in a darkened conference hall.
I also have a very nice hand turned and finished wooden pen from Diane Bedard. I know you have one from her as well, Doug. They are beautiful keepsakes, each one unique.
Now, as for the keyboard having taken over, indeed it has. Although pencils and pens were a significant part of my daily life as a classroom teacher for providing feedback and marking, since I retired last June I find that my use of the pencil and pen has all but abated. Virtually everything I do now is via keyboard, fingertip, or voice. I wrote this entire piece using my voice on my iPad, using the magic of my finger tip for editing.
I’m conscious and reflect on it periodically that we grew up thinking with pencils and pens in our hands, and for many years have ruminated on the fact that various types of thinking are encouraged/supported when a pencil is in hand. Mathematics, for example, has never flowed easily out of the computer keyboard for me, and so I always revert back to the pencil for that. Similarly, drawing is so much easier with a pencil or stylus than anything that can be accomplished with a keyboard and mouse. For that reason, I was so happy to see the iPad Pro arrive, supported by the Apple Pencil a few years back. There is a flow to using a pen or pencil that contrasts greatly with the granular nature of using finger clicks on a keyboard. The act of typing requires you to break your thought up into specific little bits, and that seems to impede the flow.
There’s no doubt that moving to a keyboard and word processor augments the writing process, allowing you to make revisions and edits to the original, cutting and pasting and backspacing without the need to completely rewrite from scratch each time. However, that can come with a price. Sometimes the flow of the pencil, without the constant stopping to deal with a red underline or a typo can make for a much more productive experience of drafting. However, knowing that you can take your draft with you on whatever device you happen to have handy makes for a much more portable writing experience. Where did I leave those paper notes again?
This past week was a very hectic one for me. It was one in which I found myself juggling multiple jobs with multiple tasks/projects within each job. Using multiple google accounts, conferencing platforms, competing calendars, and a huge number of windows and tabs on my multiple monitors, I reached a point where I needed to focus everything down to a shortlist on a piece of paper, written by hand, using a pencil. Sure, I typically use Things to organize and track of my tasks, and sometimes Monday for a particular context. But on Thursday, my brain needed something that reduced to a primal (primary?) simplicity. I was easily able to grab a pencil from the cubby near my desk, but I then realized that I had no paper readily at hand. There were a couple of receipts sitting on my desk that I could have scribbled on, but I needed something bigger with the clarity that comes from a blank page. I do have lots of paper in my office, stored in the cabinet beneath the printers. I didn’t need any of the specialty papers that are there in multiple colours and multiple weights. I just needed a simple piece of paper for the task at hand. A simple piece of 8 1/2 x 11 white paper, folded in half, allowed me to capture a short list with four points. Unlike the electronic lists that go with me on my phone or iPad if I’m not at my computer, I just needed a paper list that would still be sitting there at my desk the next time I returned.
It was the first time in I don’t know how long that I needed a piece of paper and wrote something with a pencil. We’re talking weeks, if not months. As I made that list, I also acknowledged that I was going to take some time off on Friday to relax and regroup. Slowing down to write with a pencil reminded me that I needed to slow down in general. It was a good call.
This post started out as a comment for Doug Peterson’s (@dougpete, on Twitter) Sunday morning Whatever happened to… webcams? but it expanded (as such reminiscences are wont to do) and so I have posted it here. In light of the current emergency remote teaching protocols in place in Ontario, the rest of Canada, and the rest of the world, the topic is both current and nostalgia-inducing, and offers some insight into the pace of change in education over the past 25 years.
So, the Connectix Quickcam! The eyeball-shaped, greyscale camera, originally Mac-only and marketed before the web (and thus, the term webcam) was really a thing. Yet another great blast-from-the-past as a result of Doug’s “Whatever Happened to … ?” Sunday morning series!
(In chasing back looking for an image of the original, I discovered that Logitech — who still markets with the QuickCam name today — had purchased the product line from Connectix in 1998, and in doing so, I was reminded of a number of other Connectix products of the time, specifically Speed Doubler and RAM Doubler, software products that augmented the hardware back then make it work a little better before Moore’s Law really started to kick in. I also remember coming up with a idea for a great piece of wetware at the time — DayDoubler, which once installed into your body allowed you to double the amount of work you could complete in a day. Sadly, like other great vapourware of the time, it never materialized.)
Hurdles to Overcome
I have a sad, yet prescient, memory that took place in our curriculum office one day back then, shortly after a colleague and I set up two QuickCams and tested connecting to one another across our then-recently Ethernet-empowered room. The Manager of IT appeared in the doorway, and quickly expressed his frustration and concern that we might start encouraging the use of the cameras with the schools throughout the district during our visits! What? Wasn’t that part of what we were supposed to be doing? As it turned out, it was only one of many instances through the years when the system wasn’t ready for so rapid a change. In this particular case, I did understand his concern over the available bandwidth. Most of the world still lived on dial-up. However, the incident also emphasized that change, in education, can come quite slowly.
However, the incident also emphasized that change, in education, can come quite slowly.
Moving forward in time, I remember when Apple marketed the iSight camera, a cylinder that fastened to the top of your laptop or monitor and provided its connection via FireWire, at the time a much faster protocol than the typical USB connection.
The colour camera included microphones, and existed until Apple had introduced built-in cameras across their computer and monitor product lines. With the introduction of Apple FaceTime — and the subsequent introduction of forward-facing cameras on iPhones, they renamed the conferencing camera the FaceTime camera, and relegated the iSight name to the camera on the back of iOS devices.
But the QuickCam was almost 25 years ago, certainly things have progressed a lot since then?
These days, I use the built-in webcam on my laptop when travelling, and external Logitech C920 camera at home at my desk. I have also used my Sony a6000 over HDMI, when I want to capture a really good image.
Of course, phones and iPads have forward facing cameras, which come in handy these days for communicating with family members during this virus-induced physical distancing.
As for meeting room software, over the past three weeks I’ve been in Google Meet/Hangouts on a daily basis, hosted around 30 Zoom sessions, used Slack videoconferencing a few times (not as easy, because it uses the system default microphone and speakers, rather than letting you configure them in the app), and then a one-off Skype call to the UK on Friday. Zoom certainly has the most features and back-end customizations, but with all the recent hype about Zoom security, a replacement may be coming down the pipe. Any recommendations, anyone? (I have fond memories of Elluminate from back before it was gobbled up by Blackboard, I tried it out again on Friday. Screenshare capabilities are too limited. However, kudos to Alec Couros (@courosa), Dean Shareski (@shareski), Sue Waters (@suewaters), Steve Hargadon (@stevehargadon), and Alan Levine (@cogdog) for the great memories from a decade ago!)
I was looking recently at upgrading my WebCam, and see that they are essentially out of stock. It’s not due to the lack of demand, but rather due to an increased demand. Everybody and his brother has been buying up WebCams since the shelter at home started to come into effect.
However, how prepared are we, as a system, 25 years later?
Which brings us to the present. Educators the world over are wrestling with what some are calling “Emergency Remote Teaching.” It’s not the same as eLearning, or Distance Learning, but webcams and conferencing platforms could be playing a role in helping teachers and students connect. However, how prepared are we, as a system, 25 years later? Lots of folks may have high-speed connections now , and webcams in their laptops now, but how prepared are we as a profession and as a society to make use of the technology to connect in the support of learning? What can we do to ensure there is equity of opportunity for all learners, and that the learning takes place in an environment as safe as our face-to-face classrooms?
If things had been planned out, as part of a longer term initiative, supported by all stakeholders, Emergency Remote Teaching might be better able to make use of webcams and conferencing tools. However, in this current state of duress, we’re likely to encounter a much more scattershot approach. It seems as if the change in education, as it did 25 years back, will still progress slowly.
Put your unused computing power to work in helping to fight the battle against the COVID-19 Coronavirus!
Perhaps you remember the SETI-at-home project from years back that allowed members of the public to dedicate unused processing power from their computers to help UC Berkeley churn through massive amounts of data from outer space in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence?
The same kind of opportunity now exists for your computer to help simulate protein folding for researchers who are working to find treatments for cancers and other critical afflictions. For the past 16 days, a small group of Ontario educators have turned their computers toward supporting the process to understand and combat the terrible COVID-19 virus. Kudos to Jim Pedrech (@jpedrech) and Tim King (@tk1ng) for getting us started.
We invite you to join us!
You can easily download the necessary software (Windows, Mac, or Linux) and get your computer up and “folding” in minutes! Enter team ID 239360 to have your Work Units (WU) recognized as part of team the OntarioEducatorsUnited contribution. So far we have completed over 200 Work Units.
Folding refers to the way human protein folds in the cells that make up your body. We rely on the proteins to keep us healthy and they assemble themselves by folding. But when they misfold, there can be serious consequences to a person’s health.
While your computer “folds” the protein pairs, you can see a visualizations of the kinds of things your computer is working on.
Work Units are allocated by the software to your CPU, and in some cases they may be appropriate so as to be sent to a GPU. If you or your child has a gaming computerwith a dedicated graphics card, maybe it can be put to use during its daily downtime? (Gamers have to sleep sometime, SHOULDN’T THEY?).
I want to do this! Exactly what do I do?
1. Download and install the software for your computer. Once installed, it runs on its own in the background. You can get the nice web interface (shown in the GIF at the top of this post) by connecting to foldingathome.org/client once the software is running on your computer.
2. You can configure your client from either the Web Control or from within the actual FAHControl. Please contribute to Team 239360. If you include your name in the donor field, you will be listed on our team page as something other than Anonymous (Note: Don’t use your twitter handle with the @ symbol — it will be rejected and your contributions will show as unattributed on the team list — personal experience!)
3. You can stop the process at any time with the pause or finish button in the FAHcontrol or with the Stop Folding button in the Web Control. You can also determine how much of your computer’s unused thinking cycles will be devoted to folding by adjusting the Folding Power, again in either the FAHcontrol or the Web Control. Both interfaces provide an easy slider to let you give the application as little or as much thinking power as you wish.
While we can all hope that researchers and scientists will get a handle on the COVID-19 virus sooner rather than later — if you can put some computer thinking time towards the project (especially while you yourself are sleeping) — please do. Your computer — and you — can fight COVID-19!
It has been over two weeks since our new Minister of Education, Lisa Thompson (@LisaThompsonMPP, on Twitter) stated (six times) regarding Health and Physical Education, “in September, teachers will be using the 2014 curriculum.” As yet, there has been no official directive issued from the Ministry of Education to school boards in this regard, and the current 2015 HPE curriculum remains posted on the Ministry of Education web site. We are now just 3 weeks out from Labour Day, and the pending return to school.
In fact, just today I noted the following posted to Twitter:
Thirty public school boards have now made public statements in response to the proposed roll-back, along with statements of support for the current 2015 curriculum from an additional32 religious, legal, health and education organizations. Check out the Statements on the Rollback of the HPE Curriculum as collated by Andrew Campbell (@acampbell99, on Twitter).
As uncovered in my previous post, Clarifying the Ontario Health and Physical Education Curriculum, the curriculum in place in 2014 (March 25th, to be exact, as uncovered via The Wayback Machine) was The Ontario Curriculum, Health and Physical Education, Interim Edition, 2010 (revised). Were the Ministry of Education to follow through on their rollback to “the curriculum teachers were using in 2014,” one would assume that this would be the document they would reference.
I decided it might be instructive to do a bit more digging and see if I could find the document that was released PRIOR to the Interim Edition, 2010 (Revised), given that the Interim Edition was the re-release of the 2010 (Revised) document that caused considerable consternation.
Back to The Wayback Machine
A bit of poking around by paging backward on The Wayback Machine from edu.gov.on.ca/eng/curriculum/elementary/health showed that the first appearance of the previously controvertial 2010 (Revised) document occurred between December 2009 and January 2010.
Following the initial January 2010 release, the 2010 (Revised) document lived on the Ministry of Education website for a period of several months of calm, before a sudden condemnation caused a media fury in late April, and resulted in an abrupt about-face by then-Premier Dalton McGuinty. The 2010 (revised) document was withdrawn, and a couple months later the Interim Edition, 2010 (revised) appeared on the Ministry site. It is this curriculum version — essentially the 2010 Health and Physical Education document with the 2010 Human Development and Sexual Health section removed and the 1998 Growth and Development section inserted — that would be “the curriculum teachers were using in 2014.”
As part of this research, I came across a very interesting paper by David Rayside (University College, UT), presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Concordia University, Montreal, June 2010: Sex Ed In Ontario: Religious Mobilization and Socio-Cultural Anxiety. The paper documents in very significant detail the various pressures in play at the time and the significant work done during the period 2007-2009 in preparing the 2010 (Revised) version.
Here are only a couple of excerpts:
From the beginning these discussions included Catholic educators, who seemed no different from public system educators in the numbers of them calling for change in the sex education component to HPE. The Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association had become an advocate for greater attention to LGBT issues, and did not shy away from advocating change in elementary schools. They recognized how much information students were getting about sex from outside the school, and most of them agreed that bullying and harassment based on sexual difference required concerted attention. There are no indications that Catholic educators consulted over the new curriculum were out of alignment with those public school educators who were calling for significant updating of the approach to sex education.
After the January 18th posting and distribution, silence followed. Many many people knew about the curriculum; thousands had been involved in consultations; hundreds of school board officials in both Catholic and public systems knew about it and then received copies of it in January. Some would already have sent the new curriculum through the system to ensure adequate preparation for September.
If you are interested in understanding (as I was) more of the background and behind-the-scenes political forces, I recommend the paper to your attention. Suffice to say, this one paragraph says a lot:
On the morning of April 20th, 2010, veteran anti-gay evangelical crusader Charles McVety issued a press release denouncing a new Ontario sex education curriculum, and calling for protest against it. Fifty-four hours later, Premier Dalton McGuinty withdrew what were seen the most controversial sections of the Health and Physicial Education document (HPE) for a “re-think.” This was an unusual and embarrassing reversal for a Liberal leader widely viewed as strategically canny.
Now, it was interesting to note that I was unable to obtain an active link to the initial release from 2010 (Revised) document. Unlike the 1998, 2010 Interim Edition (revised), and 2015 (Revised) documents, the short-lived 2010 (Revised) document is not archived on The Wayback Machine.
However, the file name in the URL gave sufficient direction to lead me via a simple Google search (look for health18curr2010.pdf) to a copy of the actual document still available on a third-party website.
In trying to understand what was controversial enough to be withdrawn in 2010, and what might now be controversial in 2018 again three years after the implementation of the 2015 document, I have done a document-by-document comparison of the contested sections of the documents: 1998, 2010 (Revised), Interim Edition 2010 (Revised), and 2015 (Revised).
You can click on the image above to get a full-screen view of the comparative PDF, but essentially there is clearly a forwards and backwards battle underway with the safety of Ontario’s children at stake. If the current government has its way and officially rescinds the 2015 curriculum, then the old Growth and Development section will once again be in force, throwing that component of Ontario Health education back to 1998.
That 62 stakeholder organizations, including The United Church of Canada Ministers, the Metropolitan Community Church, the Ontario Principals’ Council, The Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada, Registered Nurses Association Ontario, Anishinaabe Nation, Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ Association, Ontario Public School Boards Association, Catholic Principals’ Council, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Ontario Federation of Home and School Associations, Association of Ontario Midwives, Ontario Physical and Health Educators’ Association, and 30 Ontario public school boards, have come out in support of keeping the 2015 curriculum should give this government serious pause before they send us back 20 years.
Sadly, should Minister Lisa Thompson rise to the challenge and respond to the very real need to provide educators with greater clarity around the “2014” curriculum, she need only copy the text from either the first or third columns of the comparison table, and paste it into the fifth column, which I have relabeled in advance as “Ford/Thompson 2018.”
With that simple act, coupled with a quick cover memo to the Directors of Education throughout Ontario, she would make her throwback 20 years to the 1998 curriculum complete. | <urn:uuid:9b913bf8-2d51-41e5-aa1d-988fb42f8bdd> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://edvisioned.ca/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.963809 | 7,132 | 2.359375 | 2 |
Future efforts to produce domain-specific monoclonal antibodies are much more likely to be successful if only the I-domain, T-domain, or amino acid sequences contained within these domains, are used as antigens. of CCN5, LDN-192960 hydrochloride we are developing domain-specific mouse monoclonal antibodies. Monoclonal antibodies have the advantages of great specificity, reproducibility, and ease of long-term storage and production. In this communication, we injected mixtures of GST-fused rat CCN5 domains into mice to generate monoclonal antibodies. To identify the domains recognized by the antibodies, we constructed serial expression plasmids that express dual-tagged rat CCN5 domains. All of the monoclonal antibodies generated to date recognize the VWC LDN-192960 hydrochloride domain, indicating it is the most highly immunogenic of the CCN5 domains. We characterized one particular clone, 22H10, and found that it recognizes mouse and rat CCN5, but not human recombinant CCN5. Purified 22H10 was successfully applied in Western Blot analysis, immunofluorescence of Smad3 cultured cells and tissues, and immunoprecipitation, indicating that it will be a useful tool for domain analysis and studies of mouse-human tumor models. and in animal modelsunderscoring the promise of this protein in future therapeutic uses (Lake et al. 2003; Mason et al. 2004b) Jones et al. 2007). The availability of antibodies that recognize specific epitopes within individual domains of CCN5 would be a valuable tool for studying the structure-function relationship of the three peptide domains of CCN5. Currently, the antibodies used to detect CCNs are either affinity purified rabbit polyclonal antibodies raised against peptide fragments of CCN proteins, or rabbit polyclonal antibodies raised against recombinant CCN proteins (Brigstock et al. 1997; Chevalier et al. 1998; Kutz et al. 2005; Lake et al. 2003; Steffen et al. 1998; Yang and Lau 1991; Zoubine et al. 2001). These antibodies have proven highly useful in monitoring full length CCN protein, but they are limited in their ability to define the presence of individual domains (in the case of polyclonal antibodies raised against LDN-192960 hydrochloride peptide fragments), or lack domain specificity (in the case of those raised against recombinant protein). A clever alternative approach was used by Perbal group, in which polyclonal antibodies were raised against each domain of CCN3. These antibodies were then LDN-192960 hydrochloride used to define CCN3 isoform expression in a number of different cancer samples (Lazar et al. 2007). We are aware of only one report using monoclonal antibodies: Tamatani et al used partially purified recombinant CCN2 LDN-192960 hydrochloride to generate monoclonal antibodies against CCN2 (Tamatani et al. 1998). In this paper, we report our efforts to develop monoclonal antibodies to the three domains of CCN5. To date, all of the positive hybridoma clones isolated recognize the VWC domain. Characterization of one of these antibodies, 22H10, indicates that it is a useful antibody for immunoblotting, immunofluorescence microscopy, and immunoprecipitation. The high degree of specificity, reproducibility, and ease of producing large quantities of monoclonal antibodies should make this approach a useful one for domain analysis and other mechanistic studies. Materials and methods Cell culture All cell were cultured at 37C in a humidified, 5% CO2 /95% air atmosphere. Sprague-Dawley aorta smooth muscle cells were cultured using high glucose RPMI 1640 medium (GIBCO) containing 10% bovine growth serum (BGS, Hyclone), 2?mM L-glutamine (GIBCO), and 100ug/ml penicillin/ streptomycin (GIBCO). BHK and 3T3 cells were cultured in high glucose DMEM (GIBCO) containing 10% BGS, L-glutamine, and penicillin/streptomycin. Hybridoma clones were cultured in HAT hybridoma selection media containing DMEM, 25% heat inactivated serum (Sigma CPSR3), L-glutamine, penicillin/ streptomycin, HAT supplement solution (hypoxanthine, aminopterin, thymidine; Invitrogen), 7.8% NCTC-109 media (GIBCO), nonessential amino acids (Hyclone). HT media is complete DMEM containing HT supplement solution (hypoxanthine, thymidine; Invitrogen). HI-DMEM media is same as complete DMEM except that it contains heat-inactivated fetal bovine serum (FBS, Hyclone). B-27 media is basal DMEM with L-glutamine, penicillin/streptomycin, and B-27 supplement (GIBCO). Sprague-Dawley rat aorta smooth muscle (SDSM) cells were isolated as previously described (Lake et al. 2003). SDSM were used at passage 8 or lower. Growth-arrest of SDSM cells was accomplished by culturing cells for 72C96?h in RPMI containing only 0.4% serum plus L-glutamine, and penicillin/streptomycin. Selected hybridomas were first grown in HT media for subcloning through limited dilution, then grown in HI-DMEM media. Stock cultures were frozen in HI-DMEM with 10% dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO, SIGMA). Construction. | <urn:uuid:6a25ee17-e065-452d-bc7d-b2c72e7a5f59> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://virology2016.com/future-efforts-to-produce-domain-specific-monoclonal-antibodies-are-much-more-likely-to-be-successful-if-only-the-i-domain-t-domain-or-amino-acid-sequences-contained-within-these-domains-a/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.891961 | 1,215 | 2.015625 | 2 |
Cranach and Bach, Liszt and Strauss, Nietzsche and Feininger are among the many who have strolled down Weimar’s attractive streets and across its fine squares and spacious parks. Weimar’s classical attractions and Bauhaus Sites are mentioned in the UNESCO World heritage list. More than 3.5 million visitors come to Weimar every year to spend time in this charming town with its many cafés, welcoming bars and chic restaurants. And many of them enjoy the slower pace of life they find here.
Holidays to Weimar
Weimar is not as cosmopolitan as Paris or New York; it is a small, restful town on the river Ilm. But it does have the aura of an international cultural centre, an appeal that attracted Goethe and Schiller and a great many other beaux esprits and intellectual giants
WEIMAR TRAVEL FACTS
Arrival Airport: Leipzig | Transfer Time from airport: 1 hour 45 mins (rail) / 1 hour 10 mins (driving) | 800 km from Calais
(Information is approximate and subject to change / rail transfers are not always direct and may involve changing trains).
Travel without Borders offers a wide variety of travel (air-rail/fly-drive/self-drive/rail) and accommodation (hotel/guesthouse) options.
Contact us for a detailed quotation based on your specific requirements. | <urn:uuid:03aa3e72-1630-41cc-982c-d3b0488e4421> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://travelwithoutborders.co.uk/destinations/holidays-to-eastern-germany/weimar/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.912926 | 292 | 1.8125 | 2 |
Striatal fast-spiking (FS) interneurons are interconnected by gap junctions into sparsely connected networks. As demonstrated for cortical FS interneurons, these gap junctions in the striatum may cause synchronized spiking, which would increase the influence that FS neurons have on spiking by the striatal medium spiny (MS) neurons. Dysfunction of the basal ganglia is characterized by changes in synchrony or periodicity, thus gap junctions between FS interneurons may modulate synchrony and thereby influence behavior such as reward learning and motor control. To explore the roles of gap junctions on activity and spike synchronization in a striatal FS population, we built a network model of FS interneurons. Each FS connects to 30-40% of its neighbors, as found experimentally, and each FS interneuron in the network is activated by simulated corticostriatal synaptic inputs. Our simulations show that the proportion of synchronous spikes in FS networks with gap junctions increases with increased conductance of the electrical synapse; however, the synchronization effects are moderate for experimentally estimated conductances. Instead, the main tendency is that the presence of gap junctions reduces the total number of spikes generated in response to synaptic inputs in the network. The reduction in spike firing is due to shunting through the gap junctions; which is minimized or absent when the neurons receive coincident inputs. Together these findings suggest that a population of electrically coupled FS interneurons may function collectively as input detectors that are especially sensitive to synchronized synaptic inputs received from the cortex. | <urn:uuid:bb7af580-f7ae-4753-969b-92e4f36ebfbf> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19386924/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.928194 | 324 | 1.859375 | 2 |
8. Elevated Blood Pressure
Our circulatory function and kidneys rely on each other to work properly, if we examine our kidneys they contain nephrons. When blood cells become damaged, the neurons are most likely to get damaged as well. This equals less oxygen and nutrients delivered to nephrons, leading to elevated blood pressure. You may boost the formation of red blood cells by consuming foods that are high in folic acid. These foods will boost the formation of red blood cells and help improve anemia symptoms.
OPEN THE NEXT PAGE TO CONTINUE READING….. | <urn:uuid:b4b657bb-81a4-403e-b238-f690382975b7> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://yourchain.info/what-are-the-symptoms-of-bad-kidneys/6/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.90562 | 116 | 3.25 | 3 |
The prize, which is awarded every two years, highlights the most inspired and significant new buildings constructed around the globe.
The SNFCC’s recognition by RIBA follows a series of awards and distinctions that include the Platinum level LEED Certification, which is the highest possible rating for environmentally conscious and sustainable buildings. Most recently, the SNFCC was awarded the European Solar Prize for 2017, in the Solar Architecture and Urban Design category.
The SNFCC is the largest single grant of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) which covered exclusively the cost for its design, construction and full equipment. In February 2017, following the completion of the SNFCC’s construction, the SNF delivered the SNFCC as a gift to the Greek State and the Greek society, the legal owner of the project. At the same time, the SNF announced its commitment to continue supporting the SNFCC for the following five years, through grants totaling up to €50 million for the implementation of public programming and for covering SNFCC’s operational costs.
For more information about the RIBA International Prize, click here. | <urn:uuid:00326cf4-5252-4f37-ba6a-85eed6ac91e4> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.snf.org/en/newsroom/news/2017/12/the-snfcc-is-nominated-for-the-riba-international-prize-2018/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.952378 | 234 | 1.960938 | 2 |
Population Problems and Efforts to Combat Infertility
In France, as in other comparable countries, infertility was the object of popular practices and cultural traditions dating back to ancient times. In the nineteenth century, various physicians and quacks offered a wide range of methods, rooted in pre-scientific conceptions and beliefs, claiming not only to ‘cure’ infecundity, but also to determine the sex of the child.3 The emergence of gynaecology as a specialism within medicine in the early nineteenth century reflected heightened concerns about the female reproductive body, including female infertility.4 The rising medical interest in involuntary childlessness may also be due to the involvement of French ‘middle-class medicine’ in bourgeois marital fertility, as physicians attempted to address male anxiety and ward off social decline.5 However, until the late nineteenth century, medical treatments for infertility were still only available on a private basis, and therefore probably limited to well-off female patients. This means that the story of responses to the problem of involuntary childlessness is complicated: we need to explain the coexistence of increased interest in infertility and lack of attention to collective methods of tackling the problem.
On the one hand, there was undoubtedly an increase in published medical literature on the topic. These works mostly related to gynaecology and obstetrics, but also to physiology, forensic science, female hygiene, and water cures. Some of the most famous and scientifically and politically influential gynaecologists and obstetricians in France, such as Jacques Doleris (1852-1938), Adolphe Pinard (1844-1934), and Charles Pajot (1816-96), conducted important investigations into infertility, based on both their own clinical practice and international medical research on the topic.6 A search of the digital catalogue of the Bibliotheque interuniversitaire de Sante/Medicine in Paris, one of the most important medical reference libraries in the world, reveals that between 1800 and 1914, approximately 60 books or theses with the term ‘sterilite’ (infertility) in the title were published.7 As the Google Ngram computations below show (Figs. 1 and 2), from the 1880s onwards there was a rise in discussion of ‘sterilite involontaire’ (involuntary sterility), and after 1930 the number of publications with the terms ‘sterilite involontaire’, ‘sterilite conju- gale or ‘ sterilite pathologique’ rose sharply once again. 8 These figures suggest a dramatic increase in medical attention devoted to the problem of involuntary childlessness, with sharp explosions of interest in the decades around the turn of the century, and then again from 1930 to around the mid-century.
On the other hand, for many reasons, the social conditions necessary for recognition of involuntary childlessness as a collective issue were not yet in place. From the 1870s, there was intense concern about the slow rate of population growth in France, fuelled partly by anxieties about the after-effects of defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. It was widely believed that a large and healthy population would be needed both to defeat Germany in any future war, and for imperial expansion. In this context, the rise offeminism and neo-Malthusianism both induced moral panics, while campaigns to promote
Fig. 1 Ngram of incidence of terms sterilite conjugate, sterilite involontaire, and sterilite pathologique, 1800-1980. (Source: Ngram Culturomics Search: http://books. google.com/ngrams [accessed 6 December 2016]. For the purposes of reproduction in this volume, the results of these Ngram searches have been adapted into black-and- white line illustrations by Kirsty Harding.)
Fig. 2 Ngram of combined incidence of terms sterilite conjugale, sterilite involuntaire, and sterilite pathologique, 1800-1980. (Source: Ngram Culturomics Search: http:// books.google.com/ngrams [accessed 6 December 2016]. For the purposes of reproduction in this volume, the results of these Ngram searches have been adapted into black-and-white line illustrations by Kirsty Harding.)
population growth became more common. At the centre of these efforts was the Alliance nationale contre la depopulation, a lobbying group founded in 1896 by the statistician Jacques Bertillon (1851-1922).9 There was, then, widespread agreement that management of the population was an urgent issue, but far less consensus on what means should be chosen to ‘repopulate’ the nation. There were always great difficulties in simultaneously convincing government decisionmakers, pronatalist pressure groups, pro-family associations, social hygienists and physicians of the worth of particular interpretations of the cause of relative population decline, or of proposed measures to tackle it.10 Internal dissension among these collective stakeholders, as well as between them, about the aim of political programmes, their most urgent priorities, and the means by which these aims would be best achieved, made it even more difficult to address the problem of involuntary childlessness.
Of course, one of the main reasons that medical and other pressure groups paid comparatively little attention to involuntary childlessness was that few believed this was an important contributory factor in the decline in the birth rate. Physicians and statisticians had wondered for several decades to what extent the fall of the French birth rate was due to a physiological decrease in reproductive capacity, whether because of venereal diseases, tuberculosis, excessive alcohol consumption, or other ‘diseases of civilization’. Using the number of childless households listed in the 1896 census as the proxy for infertility, in the belief that very few couples want no children, Jacques Bertillon calculated that the rate of involuntary childlessness could not exceed 15% of the adult population.11 Like other pronatalist experts and lobbyists, Bertillon believed that ‘physiological causes’ played only a marginal role in the population decline: according to the most respected observers, the main culprits were ‘Malthusian behaviours’ (use of birth control) and, especially from the physicians’ standpoint, ‘criminal abor- tion’.12 This interpretation of the reasons for the declining birth rate resulted in the passing of legislation in 1920 which banned the dissemination of contraceptives, propaganda around birth control, and incitement to abortion. In 1923, even harsher measures against abortion were introduced, including making it illegal to recommend an abortionist; an important aspect of this legislation was reclassifying abortion as a minor offence, which in effect made it possible to secure more prosecutions for procuring or performing the operation.13 In the same year, the adoption of abandoned or orphaned children was legalized, in recognition of the increased numbers of such children following the 1914-18 war. Although this was not its main purpose, by providing a potential social solution to the difficulties of infertile couples, this law also provided a means of bypassing the medical aspect of the problem.
The belief that birth control and abortion were the main factors behind the population decline led to the belief that the best way to prevent reproductive disorders, including involuntary childlessness, was to reduce gynaecological infections induced by abortion by eliminating abortion itself. Doctors frequently highlighted the association between abortion and secondary infertility. In 1927, a small number of participants in the Kiev Congress of Gynaecology had decried the effects of the 1920 legalization of abortion in the Soviet Union on women’s health. In the early 1930s, the Alliance nationale contre la depopulation disseminated discussions from the Congress on the dire demographic consequences of legal abortion without any critical commentary.14 Lobbying groups interpreted medical evidence presented at the Congress as demonstrating that even when practised by physicians, induced abortion often led to metritis (inflammation of the uterus), salpingitis (infection and inflammation of the fallopian tubes), and post-abortion curettage which damaged reproductive capacity.
Because there was so much anxiety around voluntary childlessness, whether by means of birth control or abortion, as the cause of the declining birth rate, venereal disease was not awarded the central place among explanations of the causes of involuntary childlessness that it held in Britain (for further discussion of approaches to this issue in Britain, see Anne Hanley’s chapter in this volume). French physicians did worry about men transmitting venereal disease (which they had supposedly contracted from sex workers) to their wives, and thereby causing an increase in miscarriages and acquired infertility, but most tended to emphasize the likelihood that venereal disease would result in the production of ‘inferior’ offspring.15 These fears increased during the First World War, when social hygienist discourse on the sexual health of French soldiers generated fevered debates on the future of regulated prostitution, stimulated the introduction of a totally new health policy to tackle venereal disease (based on the creation of VD dispensaries), and even led to the army taking direct control of brothels across the country.16 In subsequent decades, physicians incorporated awareness of the effects of venereal disease to differing extents in their accounts of male and of female infertility. By the end of the Second World War it was widely accepted that gonorrhoeal epididymitis (inflammation of the epididymis) was the main cause of male physiological infertility.17 However, although physicians were progressively aware of the links between syphilis and spontaneous abortion, and especially between gonorrhoea and tubal infertility, they continued to emphasize the effects of post-abortion complications on female infertility.
All this shows that involuntary childlessness was not framed as an autonomous public health problem (in fact, if we use government involvement as an index, infertility did not achieve this status until the late 1930s). This helps to explain why, in the 1920s, the first significant initiatives in medical treatments for infertility were isolated undertakings, on the margins of the public health system. After the First World War, a number of Parisian gynaecologists and obstetricians combined their desire to relieve patients’ suffering with their interests in medical experimentation and the qualitative and quantitative ‘betterment’ of the French population. Around this time, a handful of doctors who believed that providing assistance to childless couples was more fruitful than hunting down the women who aborted attempted to set up specialized hospital treatments for infertility. The physicians Louis Devraigne (1876-1946) and Jean Dalsace (1893-1970) were influential figures in the attempt to construct medical and social models to address infertility, and to provide practical help for all those who suffered from this problem.
Louis Devraigne was a leader of the puericulture movement, which Pinard described in 1896 as concerned with ‘research and application of knowledge useful to the reproduction, preservation and improvement of the species’.18
This movement, often perceived as a French version of eugenics, mixed social hygiene and pronatalism in campaigns for the modernization of hospital maternity wards. Devraigne believed it was essential to rationalize procreation in order to strengthen the social body, and he presented puericulture, denatalite (the decline in the birth rate), and sterilite as inseparable issues. Jean Dalsace was a different kind of character. He belonged to the more liberal end of the biopolitical spectrum: a member of the French Communist Party, he was also an early advocate of sexology (a discipline which might be viewed as operating at the crossroads of gynaecology, eugenics and psychoanalysis), sex reform, and birth control, which he viewed as both a reproductive right and a necessary measure to protect women from post-abortion diseases. For Dalsace, medical treatments for infertility were, as in the puericulture model, a matter of social importance, but he believed the problem of involuntary childlessness could only be resolved if physicians were able to foster individual well-being, in particular in sexual and reproductive life. As this 1937 poster (Fig. 3), used to attract patients to his dispensary in Suresnes, shows, Dalsace saw infertility (sterilite) as connected to eugenics (eugenique). Dalsace believed, as did many other doctors and later demographers, that only motivated couples would ask for reproductive assistance, and that this self-selection for infertility treatment had potential eugenic benefits. By definition, couples who sought
Fig- 3 A poster announcing Dalsace’s clinic in Suresnes (1937). By permission of the Archives municipales de Suresnes (Q 66) treatment must really want to have children, and it was thought that if children were greatly desired, they would be better raised.19 Like Devraigne’s project, Dalsace’s work greatly influenced the creation of sites and practices for infertility medicine in interwar France. | <urn:uuid:62a15d84-580b-4abd-8b3b-0d1d4fd1aa2f> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://ebrary.net/63743/history/population_problems_efforts_combat_infertility | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.958124 | 2,674 | 2.625 | 3 |
Your credit score is a number between 300-850 that lenders use to determine your creditworthiness, or the likelihood that you will repay a loan. The higher the score, the better you are in the eyes of the lenders.
July 5, 2022
What is a Credit Score?
Your credit score is a number between 300-850 that lenders use to determine your creditworthiness, or the likelihood that you will repay a loan. The higher the score, the better you are in the eyes of lenders. This score is based on a variety of factors including payment history, credit utilization, length of credit history, etc. A good credit score can help you qualify for loans and get better rates on such loans, qualify you for lower insurance premiums, and sometimes even impact your job prospects.
Going from 0 to 60 (figuratively of course, a credit score of 60 won’t cut it)
You don’t start out with credit. Once you are a legal adult (age 18 in the US), you can start applying for loans. But without credit it’s hard to get started (the “chicken before the egg” problem). There are steps you can take to build credit initially:
Secured Loans: Banks often offer secured loans or credit cards. These are “pseudo” loans in a sense that you can borrow money but it is secured against your bank account or another asset. If you don’t repay the loan, the borrower has the right to go after your assets to collect on the debt therefore greatly reducing the chances of non-repayment.
Get a co-signer: If this is your first time borrowing, you can have a friend or relative cosign your loan. In this case the lender can collect on the debt from either of the co-signers (borrowers) therefore increasing their chances of being repaid. Often your first apartment or auto loan may require a co-signer if you haven’t built any credit.
Authorized User: You can start building credit before age 18 with help. A parent or family member can open a credit card and add you as an authorized user as early as age 13. As long as the primary account owner makes the payments on time and maintains a responsible balance, your credit score (as an authorized user) will be positively impacted. However as an authorized user, you have the ability to spend on the credit line and the primary account owner is required to repay the debt. Be responsible, you don’t want to burn a bridge!
Pay Student Loan Payments: This may be your first borrowing experience, and provides an opportunity to start building credit by consistently making your payments on time.
What’s a Good Score?
Similar to standardized test scores where the number seems arbitrary (why can’t it just be out of 100!), credit scores are based on a scale of 300-850. A score above 700 is generally considered good. Below is a breakdown of scores and the percentage of people in each category:
As mentioned above, your credit score greatly impacts your financial life. In the table below, you can see the benefits (and penalties) of credit score ranges and how they can affect various aspects of your finances:
How do you maintain your good credit score?
We’re glad you asked! A good credit score will help qualify you for better interest rates on your loans (i.e. home loans, auto loans etc). To maintain your good credit score, we recommend the following:
Pay off credit cards monthly.
Pay installment loans on time (auto loans, student loans, etc).
Don’t max out your credit lines
Don’t apply for a line of credit unless you need to (your credit score is negatively impacted every time you apply for a new loan).
Regularly review your credit report for fraud or inaccurate information. If you see inaccurate information there is a dispute process.
Don’t let your debt run away with you
Sometimes borrowing large sums of money can be scary. Here are some tips to make sure you don’t let your debt get out of control:
Freeze your credit cards (literally). I heard about this from my sister and it made me smile. She freezes her cards in a cup of water. You can use your credit card to automatically pay recurring bills (i.e. utility bill, cell phone bill, etc). Set up automatic payments from your checking account to pay off this credit card each month. This way you’re using your credit, but not accumulating a balance. Once it’s all automated you can freeze your cards. A few inches of ice is a simple barrier to put in place so you don’t use this card for frivolous spending that you’ll later regret.
Prioritize high interest debt first. If you’re balancing multiple debt payments, likely you should pay off the debts with highest interest rates first (usually credit cards) to reduce the overall amount of interest you pay over time. Then work on debts with mid-level interest rates like student loans and auto loans.
Create a sustainable budget. Spending within your means will allow you to avoid accumulating debt, and set you up for financial success.
Decisions you make now to build credit and spend responsibly will impact your future financial success. A good credit score can make it easier to achieve your financial goals through cheaper borrowing costs so make sure you’re starting your credit journey on the right foot.
Paying Off Debt
Debt. Your financial four-letter word. Whether you’re carrying student loans, credit card debt or car loans, you’re not alone. You may be feeling overwhelmed (or face it, in denial – I’ve been there) about your debt, but addressing it now will lead you to freedom sooner. | <urn:uuid:18fa1ae9-3ce1-4208-bd5f-9c58e1c0bb37> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.useorigin.com/articles/building-your-credit/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.947342 | 1,216 | 2.078125 | 2 |
After some time, you could start to notice that your older iPhone is operating slowly, but these tricks might help even a sluggish iPhone 7 or iPhone 6 work quicker. Anytime your iPhone lags, you should save this article and refer to it. Here are seven little-known techniques you may use the next time you need to speed up your iPhone.
- Get alerted and improved your memory
I have software that swiftly frees up memory and speeds up my Mac. It turned out to be the forty dollars I’ve ever spent. But! On your iPhone, the App Store has comparable software that is free to download. Announcing Battery Saver. You can see how much memory you’ve used and how much free memory is still available in the app. It might save your life if your phone is sluggish. Throughout the testing of each method, I’ll also be keeping an eye on how much RAM I’m using to see whether it makes a discernible difference.
- A big green button that reads “Boost Memory” is there. The software will put your iPhone in “ideal form” when you press that.
- Before running the software, You possessed roughly 100 MB of memory available; now, You have nearly 1076 MB of free capacity, all in the space of two minutes.
- The app is a fantastic method to keep track of how well the other phone performance tips are working for you.
- Use This Clear RAM with iPhone Restart Trick to Speed Up a Slow Phone
This differs from merely restarting or shutting down your iPhone. This is the precise technique to clean the RAM on your iPhone, for any reason. Follow the instructions in the article mentioned above for your specific iPhone model up until your screen goes black and then comes back on to complete this. As said in the tip above, shut any unneeded applications before attempting this advice because if you leave a lot of apps open, your iPhone will restart them when it reboots, using up a lot of memory. After that, I used this approach to free up roughly 120 MB more RAM, according to the Battery Saver app.
Also Read: Apple iPhone 14 | <urn:uuid:b9eb8e39-d9e0-48ce-acd1-04107c762e7f> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.mymobileindia.com/how-to-speed-up-iphone/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.921749 | 448 | 1.609375 | 2 |
The increased presence and activities of terrorist groups and their affiliates under different names in various parts of Syria were condemned by Turkish, Russian and Iranian leaders on Tuesday.
In order to discuss the recent developments in Syria, the fight against the terrorist groups, particularly YPG/PKK and Daesh/ISIS, which pose a threat to the regional security, the humanitarian situation, and the voluntarily return of the Syrians to their homes, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, and Iran’s Ebrahim Raisi gathered in Iran’s capital Tehran for the 7th summit in the Astana format.
According to a joint statement released after the meeting, the leaders “rejected all attempts to create new realities on the ground” under the pretext of fighting terrorism, including “illegitimate self-rule initiatives.”
In addition to cross-border attacks and infiltrations, they also expressed their determination to stand against “separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and threatening the national security of neighboring countries.”
Security and stability in the region can only be achieved on the basis of the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, Erdogan, Putin, and Raisi said.
Agreeing to make further efforts to ensure sustainable normalization of the situation in and around the Idlib de-escalation area, including the humanitarian situation, the leaders reviewed in detail the situation in the Idlib de-escalation area and stressed that it is necessary to maintain calm on the ground with all agreements on Idlib fully implemented, the statement also said.
There could be “no military solution to the Syrian conflict” and “it could only be resolved through the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, UN-facilitated political process in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254,” the leaders expressed.
The next trilateral summit was also agreed to be held in Russia at the invitation of Putin. | <urn:uuid:ed77b150-34c3-4c48-883d-c3d0c2589aa9> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://menaaffairs.com/increasing-presence-of-terror-groups-in-syria-condemned-by-turkiye-russia-iran/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.948881 | 402 | 1.570313 | 2 |
Housing has been one of the most eminent factors in the process of evolution, derived from the history of human civilisation. Housing is an essential aspect of human well-being that depends on territoriality, security, and a balance between privacy and communal activity.
The growth of housing has been unable to keep pace with the demand, and as per an estimate by the Government of India, the shortfall of housing in India was close to 1.9 crore units in 2012. This shortage ignited policies at the centre level like Housing for All and missions like Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana that intend to fill the gap in the demand-supply market and shape the future of the housing sector. Under the Constitution of India, housing is a state subject, and the state governments must estimate the shortfall, prepare required policies and ensure successful implementation in the state.
The housing policies laid down by the government of India have come a long way since independence, where initially the government’s role was essentially the ‘provider’, which gradually modified to ‘facilitator’. Earlier, the housing policies focused on the delivery of housing stock. In contrast, initiatives like Eco-Niwas Samhita, GRIHA, and LEED focus on aspects beyond the delivery, covering parts of thermal comfort, energy efficiency, and sustainability.
These efficient buildings not only reduce or try to eliminate the negative impacts the built stock has on the environment by using fewer resources, but in a few cases, they have a positive impact by generating their energy and enhancing biodiversity. At the building level, the occupant gets improved liveable conditions and savings on resource consumption bills. At the global level, these buildings can support limiting the global temperature rise to 2°C above the pre-industrial level. These buildings could be estimated to save billions of dollars on energy spending. Hence, implementing these policies impacts the building’s scale and helps achieve national and global targets.
Cognisance of the importance of implementing such policy interventions in the housing segment, we attempted to map down the institutions involved in implementing these policies and programs. This blog thoroughly overviews all state government initiatives and organisations involved in the housing sector. The intent is to give a comprehensive picture for knowledge sharing. The map below highlights the following aspect for every state of India:
- Urban Development Entity: The organisations involved in the housing sector’s planning and development are listed under this head. These organisations at the state level are one of the most important entities for implementing and enforcing the designed policy.
- Housing Policies and Schemes: As housing is a state subject, this section in the map highlights the housing policies, programs, and schemes launched, run, and managed by the state governments.
- State Designated Agency: State Designated Agencies are the nodal agencies coordinating, regulating, and enforcing the Energy Conservation Act within the state.
- Land Assembly Method, Building Bye-Laws and Rules, and RERA rules: This section highlights the method of land assembly, the name of building byelaw, and the real estate rules as the housing sector is heavily influenced by the applicable.
- Status of Energy Conservation Building Code- Commercial and Eco-Niwas Samhita: Energy Conservation Building Code for commercial buildings is the first-ever code in the country that defines the minimum standards for energy conservation at the building level. This initiative paved the path for the Eco-Niwas Samhita, with similar intent for the residential building sector. These initiatives focus on aspects beyond mere housing delivery like thermal comfort, proper ventilation, and energy efficiency.
- The number of LEED-certifiedbuildings and number of GRIHA registered buildings: This component indicates the number of green and efficient buildings that have come up in the state. These buildings contribute to achieving the energy-saving targets of the state.
- Energy-saving targets: The Bureau of Energy Efficiency has defined each state’s energy-saving target that mustbe achieved by 2031. On average, the buildings sector has a 14-17% share in the total energy saving targets, making the sector one of the essential components in reaching the envisaged goal.
Hover and click over the states for details
Download the table
States and cities with a comprehensive, affordable housing strategy can review other states’ plans, policies, and energy conservation goals to determine whether there are some new contemporary or additional options they may consider as part of a revision of their existing strategy.
Furthermore, the list can help identify the stakeholders who have the power to take actions to help expand the scope of the housing market, availability of affordable homes, introduce the concept of energy efficiency and conservation to building users, supporting local planning efforts and help localities develop strategies to address the existing and anticipated needs.
This blog is written by Shatakshi Suman and Arzoo Kumari
Disclaimer: The information provided in the blog is based on the knowledge and research conducted by the authors. Any update or revision required may please be communicated to firstname.lastname@example.org
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- An insight into India’s administrative structure and jurisdiction boundaries from the housing sector’s perspective posted on March 23, 2022
- Retrofit and Modernize: A way forward for revamping legacy cold storages in India posted on October 21, 2021 | <urn:uuid:8edd866e-69db-4b5f-9d21-730afe74cd5c> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://aeee.in/a-state-wise-insight-of-indias-building-sector-policy-and-strategy-mapping/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.92444 | 1,152 | 2.875 | 3 |
Scientists have detected water vapor in the atmosphere of the planet tau Boötis b, which orbits a star named tau Boötis, and their new technique could help us find more planets with water outside of our solar system.
This planet belongs to a class of relatively common extrasolar planets known as "hot Jupiters,” called such because they are massive exoplanets that orbit very close to its parent star. Unlike our Jupiter, which is pretty cold and takes 12 years to orbit around the Sun, tau Boötis b orbits its star every 3.3 days, and its proximity to the star heats it up to extreme temps. In those conditions, water exists as high temperature steam.
Before this, scientists have only detected water on a handful of planets outside of our solar system, and that’s because the main ways of doing so require very specific circumstances. "When a planet transits -- or passes in orbit in front of -- its host star, we can use information from this event to detect water vapor and other atmospheric compounds," study researcher Alexandra Lockwood from Caltech says in a press release. "Alternatively, if the planet is sufficiently far away from its host star, we can also learn about a planet's atmosphere by imaging it." Most extrasolar planets don’t fit these criteria.
So, Lockwood and collaborators from around the country developed a new technique to study the atmosphere of non-transiting exoplanets -- specifically hot Jupiters, which are too close to their star to separate the planet's light from that of the star. With tau Boötis, the infrared radiation from the star is more than 10,000 times greater than that of the planet.
They adapted a method called radial velocity technique, which uses the Doppler Effect to detect exoplanets. It’s traditionally used in the visible region of the spectrum, but the team expanded the technique into the infrared. Then they added further analysis of the light's spectrum; since every compound emits a different wavelength of light, researchers can use the unique “light signatures” to analyze molecules making up the planet's atmosphere.
Using data of tau Boötis b from the Near Infrared Echelle Spectrograph at the W. M. Keck Observatory in Hawaii, the researchers compared the molecular signature of water to the light spectrum emitted by the exoplanet, confirming that the exotic planet's atmosphere includes water vapor.
"The information we get from the spectrograph is like listening to an orchestra performance; you hear all of the music together, but if you listen carefully, you can pick out a trumpet or a violin or a cello, and you know that those instruments are present," Lockwood explains. "With the telescope, you see all of the light together, but the spectrograph allows you to pick out different pieces; like this wavelength of light means that there is sodium, or this one means that there's water."
In addition to studying atmospheric composition, the method allows researchers to analyze the mass of planets. That’s how they discovered that tau Boötis b is six times more massive than Jupiter. Hot damn.
The work was published in the Astrophysical Journal Letters earlier last week.
Image: David Aguilar, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics via NRL | <urn:uuid:e6c92a1e-1948-4037-ae5a-e00a3e8fe22e> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.iflscience.com/water-found-extrasolar-%E2%80%98hot-jupiter%E2%80%99-24041 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.927835 | 690 | 4.25 | 4 |
The origins of the town's name are uncertain: for some historians, it derives from Herculaneum, while for others it seems to be taken from the Latin person's name "Arcon", to which adding the suffix "-anus" indicates the ownership. Municipality in the province of Vicenza, between the Berici hills, the territory of Arcugnago covers an area of hills, valleys and Lake of Fimon.
The discovery of several prehistoric artifacts, including a settlement, attest the presence of man, in the area of Arcugnago, since Neolithic times. In 157 B.C. the Vicenza area was annexed to the possessions of Rome and in the Middle Ages it was incorporated into the Marca of Aquileia and Verona. In the XII century, the city of Vicenza was proclaimed municipality and created together with other cities of the area, the Veronese League. From 1100 to 1300 the capital of Vicenza was subjected to various lords, including the Scala and the Visconti. The first documents that attest the presence of a major settlement dates back to 1185, while in the earliest years of the XV century the province of Vicenza subdued to the Serenissima. The Venetian rule came to an end with the conquest of Napoleon: while with the Treaty of Campoformio, the territories were ceded to Austria. In 1848 the Radetzky's army invaded the area with the aim to end the anti-Austrian riots and attacked and destroyed Arcugnago.
- the Parish Church of Santa Giustina, of ancient foundation, it was enlarged in the first half of the XIX century. It features a Classic style with a single nave plan and the façade is adorned with pilasters, engraved stone decorations and a large tympanum. Within three Baroque altars, a XV century stone bas-relief depicting Christ Patiens and a Madonna and Child from the XVI century, that after a restoration, was transferred to Vicenza in the Diocesan Museum. The Bell Tower base features a truncated pyramid shaped base and rectangular body decorated with pilasters, topped by an octagonal drum;
- the XIV century Church of Santa Margherita of the Berici, inside which is preserved a precious cycle of frescoes by Battista from Vicenza;
- the early XVIII century Oratory of St. Peter, which houses a contemporary Nativity scene realized by the artist Cassetti;
- the XVI century Church of Santa Maria della Neve and San Rocco;
- the XVIII century Oratory of Our Lady of Peace;
- the Oratory of Santa Teresa, whose construction dates back to 1771;
- the Oratory of the Holy Family, built in 1752;
- the Oratory of San Gaetano, built in 1790;
- the XV century Villa Anti, in late Gothic style;
- the XVII century Villa Bornigni;
- Villa Colonna;
- Villa Calvi;
- the pentagonal shaped watchtower. | <urn:uuid:b5c136b5-0003-4d51-adc2-7bd0b883b0d8> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.localidautore.com/paesi/arcugnano-1973 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.927924 | 639 | 3.03125 | 3 |
Machine vision systems are playing an increasingly important role in many industrial applications, whether it is counting parts on an assembly line or examining surfaces for defects. Improvements in computing power, optics, connectivity, and software are allowing vision systems to be deployed in a wider range of applications.
Although machine vision systems have been around for several decades, their potential is not fully realized, according to Amir Novini, president and founder of Applied Vision Corp. (Akron, OH). “Machine vision remains one of the best-kept secrets - a lot of people still don’t know about them. “We’re going to see machine vision in everyday products and systems. They will become adaptable, more sophisticated. We’re working on coupling artificial intelligence to machine vision to be more forgiving and adaptive.”
Counting parts on an assembly line is a common machine vision application. But as lighting systems improve, machine vision systems are now used to search for cracks and scratches in materials in low intensity structures, according to Ben Dawson, director of strategic development at DALSA Industrial Products (Billerica, MA).
High-speed food and beverage processing operations are also increasing their use of machine vision, noted Novini. In such applications, the vision system is often required to keep up with count rates of 600 to several thousand objects per minute.
Implementing a vision system remains a somewhat daunting task, often requiring the expertise of a systems integrator. A fair amount of set-up and programming is required to train the systems to perform specific tasks. “It is hard to put together a flexible system to do more than one thing that it is assigned to, said Karl Gunnarsson, vision manager of SICK Inc. (Minneapolis, MN). “There still has to be known parts — the same parts should appear again and again. A lot of times the goal part needs certain features such as holes or other surface features.”
Nevertheless, machine vision is making impressive strides in areas such as software. “Previously, vision algorithms could only analyze two-dimensional planar surfaces. They are now looking at 3-D surfaces,” said DALSA’s Dawson.
Vision software is also becoming more flexible, with the ability to be deployed for different systems, according to John Agapakis, Machine Vision Business Manager Siemens Energy and Automation (Alpharetta, GA). “We offer the Simatic Visionscape image processing software, which allows programming for either PC-based or Smart Camera-based vision environments. You can use the same software to program different vision systems.”
Visionscape allows simultaneous viewing of several camera pictures. It can also be used for linescan applications such as checking labels on cylindrical objects like bottles.
Software advances have been accompanied by more powerful hardware. “The most noticeable difference is the speed of the computing hardware, which is several orders of magnitude faster than years ago,” said Novini.
“The progress made to provide high-performance, low-cost components has allowed broadening the scope of machine vision in more applications,” added Stephane Francois, executive vice president of Leutron Vision Inc. a Swiss-based supplier of machine vision cameras and hardware.
Some processing power now resides not on a separate vision processing board but inside the vision camera itself. No longer mere image capture devices, vision cameras are scaling up the technology curve by adding intelligence and processing capability. The enhanced cameras are sometimes referred to as “smart cameras”.
“Algorithms that used to require lots of processing power now can be done on the smart camera itself,” said Agapakis. One of Siemens’ smart cameras, the SIMATIC HawkEye 1600T, combines image capture, image processing and analysis, and communications into a compact housing. These cameras are suited for applications where several inspection tasks must be performed in a single test cycle.
The smart cameras can ease cabling. “With a smart camera, the cable connection becomes lighter and simpler,” said Agapakis. “Previously, you needed a heavy cable with lots of small conductors to get the signal off the robot arm to the processor.”
Joe Christenson, president and CEO of PPT Vision Inc. (Eden Prairie, MN), added, “The interconnectivity and networking features in most of today’s smart cameras make it easier to implement a multi-camera solution in motion control applications. In addition to the traditional RS232/485 and discrete I/O data transfer, most smart camera technology today is designed to support a wide range of communication protocols, such as TCP/IP, Modbus, Device Net, and OPC. This makes sharing information among different cameras and between the cameras and the host computer fast and effective — a must-have for lots of motion control applications such as robot guidance and multi-axis pick-and-place arm control.”
Better vision sensors are partially responsible for vision camera improvements. “The tools have gotten a lot better. Sensors costing less than $1,500 can do what high-end sensors did a few years ago,” said SICK’s Gunnarsson. “You can (now) do pattern match in any field of view with cameras costing as low as $1,000.”
CCD sensors have been the predominant technology in machine vision cameras because of their resolution. But companies are taking a closer look at lower-cost CMOS sensors, according to Applied Vision’s Novini, thanks to improvements in power consumption and dynamic range.
Machine vision lighting systems are also benefitting from improvements in light-emitting diode (LED) technology that are enabling the vision system to detect objects or patterns in remote or hidden areas. LEDs are now stable over time, have a long life, can be turned on and off rapidly, and controlled accurately.
“LEDs have become the standard for lighting,” said Siemens’ Agapakis. “Brighter LEDS can illuminate a larger area from a long distance.”
Further integration of vision system components and subsystems will likely be dictated by the laws of physics, Agapakis added. “There’s a push to make vision hardware smaller, developing cameras with lenses and the processor built in. The processor makers have been able to drive down power consumption. The main issue is dissipating the heat generated.”
Getting the signals from the machine vision system to a robot or other controller often means connecting bulky cables. “One of the most critical aspects of success of integrating machine vision with motion control lies in cables,” said Leutron’s Francois. “A lot of information has to go through these wires and must do so without being stressed mechanically in an environment full of electromagnetic interference.”
A plethora of standards exist, including Firewire, Camera Link, and Gigabit Ethernet. Firewire, originally designed for desktop video applications, cannot keep up with the rigors of machine vision apps where linking of multiple cameras is required, according to DALSA’s Dawson. Although Camera Link remains a viable standard, many machine vision companies are adapting the GigE Vision Standard, based on the Gigabit Ethernet protocol. It uses standard Gigabit Ethernet hardware and low-cost CAT5e or CAT6 cables.
“FLIR supports the GigE Vision standard and networked infrared vision systems,” added Jason Styron, business development manager of automation for vision camera supplier FLIR Systems (North Billerica, MA). “These features ensure investment protection for organizations committed to advancing manufacturing productivity.”
Hardware and software improvements have improved the price-performance ratio of machine vision, making it more affordable to motion control and other systems integrators.
“The price of machine vision systems have come down significantly where as it is no longer a large cost burden to add vision to an industrial automated solution,” said PPT’s Joe Christenson. Considering the cost of robots and other motion control equipment, vision components sometimes only comprise 10 percent of the total solution cost.” | <urn:uuid:586e86bd-91ac-4a3e-b45a-706a042bdbd8> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.techbriefs.com/component/content/article/tb/supplements/mct/features/articles/9808?r=11804 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.934215 | 1,688 | 2.21875 | 2 |
Rabia Cattie, MD is a Hematologist/Oncologist at St. Charles Parish Hospital.
Should you get cancer screenings? The answer is YES! As an oncologist, I can assure you that early detection of cancer greatly increases the chances for successful therapies, including curative treatments. It is so important that as we age, we get regular screenings for cancer. Although we don’t know the causes and risk factors for every kind of cancer, certain types have increased risk, making these tests very important.
FOUR CANCER SCREENINGS THAT COULD SAVE YOUR LIFE:
Breast cancer accounts for about 30 percent of all cancer diagnoses in women (approx. 270,000 cases annually). It is recommended that all women should have an annual mammogram starting at age 40 to check for breast cancer. Some women may want to be screened earlier depending on family or medical history. Women should also familiarize themselves with how their breasts look and feel. Always let your doctor know if you ever notice any changes in your breasts.
The cervix is the lower part of the uterus. Women should begin screening for cervical cancer at age 21. You should also have a Pap test every three to five years, along with an HPV test. This can help find cervical cell changes before they become cancer. If you have had the HPV vaccine, you should still have routine tests. Women with a higher risk of cervical cancer may need to be screened more often. Most women will not have any symptoms, so it is important to have routine screenings.
Colon cancer accounts for about 8-10 percent of all cancer diagnoses (approx. 145,000 cases annually). People at average risk of colon cancer should start regular screenings at age 45. If you have a family history of colon cancer, screening should be initiated earlier. The primary screening for colon cancer is a colonoscopy, which should be done every 10 years, unless more frequent tests are suggested by your doctor. Another screening option is known as a FIT screen, an annual at-home screening test that checks for hidden blood in the stool.
Skin cancer is the most common form of cancer in the United States, so it is recommended that adults see a dermatologist annually for routine skin checks. You should always be familiar with all moles and spots on your skin. If you notice any changes, you should talk to your doctor right away. Things to look for include changes in size, color and symmetry in current moles or marks on your skin.
In 2020, about 26,500 new cases of cancer will be diagnosed in Louisiana, which translates to about 72 new diagnoses every day. This year alone, there is estimated to be about 9,300 deaths statewide from the disease. Cancer screenings are still essential healthcare, and during the COVID-19 pandemic, keeping up with routine health screenings is more important than ever.
If you’ve missed an annual exam or routine screening, or if you’re having symptoms you are concerned about, you should contact your health care provider to get your appointments and screenings back on track. Prevention is key and early detection is vital.
Dr. Rabia Cattie received her undergraduate degree from Kinnaird College, Lahore and her medical degree from Allama Iqbal Medical College in Lahore, Pakistan. Following this, she completed an internship, residency and fellowship at SUNY Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York. She is board certified in Hematology and Oncology and has been on staff at Ochsner since January 2020 and practicing medicine since 2007. Dr. Cattie’s expertise is in solid tumors, especially breast cancer. In her spare time, she enjoys spending time with her family, traveling and reading. | <urn:uuid:ca54eb24-c92d-4f23-85b7-3d469ace3a41> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.myneworleans.com/cancer-screenings-can-save-lives/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.95999 | 799 | 2.828125 | 3 |
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China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation
China’s fifty-five officially recognised ethnic minorities form over 8 per cent of the Chinese population, with over 100 million people, and occupy some 60 per cent of China’s territory. They are very diverse, and the degree of modernisation among them varies greatly. This book examines the current state of China’s ethnic minorities at a time when ethnic affairs and globalisation are key forces affecting the contemporary world. It considers the fields of policy, economy, society and international relations, including the impact of globalisation and outside influences. Colin Mackerras is Foundation Professor in the School of International Business and Asian Studies, Griffith University, Australia. A leading China specialist, his research work focuses on two main areas: China’s ethnic minorities, and its regional theatre, especially Peking Opera.
China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation
First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2003 Colin Mackerras All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Mackerras, Colin China’s ethnic minorities and globalisation / Colin Mackerras. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Minorities – China. 2. China – Ethnic relations – Political aspects. I. Title. DS730 .M33335 2003 305.8⬘00951–dc21 ISBN 0-203-18046-1 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-34420-0 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0– 415–30901–8 (Print Edition)
Preface Abbreviations 1 Introduction
vii viii 1
2 Historical background, 1949–1989
3 Minorities politics, 1989–2002
4 The economies of the minorities
5 The realm of the mind, religion and education
6 Population, women and family
7 International relations
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities Notes References Index
182 196 199 209
It is a truism to say that changes in the world at large, and in China in particular, have been enormous since the early 1990s. These changes have affected China’s ethnic minorities and necessitated a reconsideration of many matters relating to them. Some of the particular aspects of China’s minorities are covered in two earlier works that I completed in the early 1990s. These aspects are also treated in the present book, such as policy, international relations, economy and population. The material and interpretations come from a time period reflecting these recent changes. The term ‘globalisation’ was already in widespread use, yet it had not yet assumed the status of ‘grand narrative’ for interpreting the state of the world that it has come to occupy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Although I take full responsibility for any weaknesses or errors this book may contain, I should like to offer thanks to the many people who have helped me write it. The first to mention are the members of the minorities themselves, who have offered me friendship and cooperation in giving me the material that forms the basis of the book. Several Chinese organisations have made it possible for me to visit the ethnic areas of China, some of which are situated in places that are difficult to access, by making travel arrangements and offering necessary assistance. The Australian Research Council has given me several research grants that have enabled me to spend time in China and its ethnic areas, to buy books and other materials about China’s minorities, and to undertake other research activities necessary for writing this book. My own university has been generous in granting me necessary leave and providing excellent research conditions, and my colleagues have always been supportive of my research and shared their ideas generously. In the last few years I have taught a course at Griffith University entitled ‘Minorities Questions in Asia’, which has included quite a lot of material on China. I would like to thank the students who have taken this course; quite a few of them over the years. They have helped me frame my ideas on minorities’ issues, commented on lectures, taken part in discussions and given me insights of value to formulating and thinking through ideas and interpreting information. Finally, I should like to thank my family, who have offered criticisms and comments, given unstinting assistance and shared many ideas with me. Colin Mackerras Brisbane June 2002
ADB BJP CCP CND GDI HDI IMAR MPR NATO NBS NCNA NPC PLA PRC SDPC SSB TAR UNDP WTO XUAR
Asian Development Bank Bharatiya Janata Party Chinese Communist Party China News Digest gender-related development index human development index Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Mongolian People’s Republic North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Bureau of Statistics New China News Agency National People’s Congress People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China State Development Planning Commission State Statistical Bureau Tibetan Autonomous Region United Nations Development Programme World Trade Organisation Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
Among issues with the greatest impact on the world as a whole at the turn of the twenty-first century two of particular importance are ethnic relations and globalisation. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 produced a spectacular flow-on effect all over the world. Among many other factors, it saw a dramatic increase in ethnic wars and conflicts in many parts of the globe, while ethnic tensions intensified in a range of other countries. Globalisation, or at least the less total form we might call internationalisation, has been important for a very long time. However, it gathered momentum greatly towards the end of the twentieth century. Its increasingly controversial nature became crystal clear at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Seattle in November 1999, when demonstrators protesting against unchecked globalisation forced a postponement of a new trade round. The reasons for the protests will be taken up later in this chapter. At the time China was in the late stages of active negotiations to join the WTO, having signed an agreement on entry with the United States earlier the same month. Negotiations had been lengthy and at times acrimonious. For China this success seemed a crowning achievement, since the United States was by far the most important and powerful of those countries with a say in whether China could join. There was considerable irony in the fact that China, which on many issues had once stood alongside ordinary people and against the power of governments, should now find itself aligned with powerful states against protestors. Quite a few hurdles stood in China’s way to WTO membership, but its efforts were eventually crowned with success in December 2001. China is a country with fifty-five state-recognised minority nationalities, plus a majority nationality called the Han, the ethnic group whom we associate most closely with China and ‘the Chinese’. Although the 2000 census put the proportion of the minority population in China’s total at 8.41 per cent, the areas where they reside take up about 60 per cent of the territory of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and many live near sensitive borders. For this and other reasons, China’s minorities are actually considerably more important for China than their population would suggest. This book aims to describe developments among China’s minorities between the end of the 1980s and 2002. Several significant events took place in 1989,
marking it out as very significant. A large-scale crisis rocked China, followed by the appointment of Jiang Zemin as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in June 1989. Later the same year crises erupted in Eastern Europe, leading to the overthrow of the great majority of ruling Marxist–Leninist parties there, and 2 years later the Soviet Union itself collapsed. The second date is when the typescript of this book was completed. It also saw the retirement of Jiang Zemin as CCP General Secretary, and his replacement by Hu Jintao. The book aims to take up the minorities’ economies, their politics, their education, and their societies, including gender and population issues and in some cases religion. It also aims at preliminary explorations on how globalisation and its concomitant modernisation have affected China’s ethnic minorities during that time. In addition, the book considers the ramifications of secessionist activities at the turn of the century, and their implications for China as an integrated state. No account of globalisation can avoid international relations, and the book aims to cast further light on the way in which China’s minorities affect the international relations of the country as a whole. Finally, I am aiming through this book to contribute to theoretical discussions about the nature of globalisation in the contemporary world and its effects on ethnic groups, especially minorities.
Some background What is a minority nationality? Just who are we discussing when we talk of China’s ethnic minorities or minority nationalities? The answer is those fifty-five ethnic groups the Chinese state recognises as its ‘minority nationalities’. The Chinese state follows a definition of nationality laid down by Stalin in 1913 (1953: 307). It runs that a nationality (Chinese minzu) is ‘a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’. There are problems in applying any definition involved in anything so controversial as ethnic matters, including this one. The Chinese Muslims who are termed Hui do not have their own language nowadays and their territory is so dispersed throughout the country that it is very difficult to claim that they have a common territory. Hardly any Manchus still speak Manchu. And there are other anomolies. However, the reality is that the Chinese state and its scholars have given a great deal of attention to ethnic identification based on this definition, especially in the 1950s. There was a substantial break owing to the Cultural Revolution of 1966– 1976, but the work of identification then began again. By 1979, the number of fifty-five had been reached. For various reasons, all other claims to being classified as a ‘nationality’ since then have been rejected. By far the largest group who could be, but is not in fact, considered a ‘nationality’ is the Hakkas. These are a south Chinese people who, although culturally, linguistically and socially quite distinct in the late imperial period of Chinese history, nevertheless played a significant role in twentieth-century Chinese nationalism,
especially in the early period. Among smaller groups, one people that stands out is the Mosuo, a matrilinear people still living near the Lugu Lake which straddles the Yunnan-Sichuan border in the southwest of China. For various reasons, mainly political, the state does not recognise either of these peoples as a ‘nationality’. It still considers the Hakkas as part of the majority Han, and the Mosuo as a branch of the Naxi, and is unlikely to change its mind. This is despite the fact that there is still some ethnic pride in both peoples, including those who are quite convinced that they are indeed separate peoples. The Chinese state has published numerous official statistics based on its classifications. They cover a great many of the fields of relevance to this book. Moreover, Chinese scholars and officials have put out enormous amounts of information and insight, virtually all of it using the state-recognised classifications of the minority nationalities. Although the official figures can be subjected to criticism, they are on the whole the best available, and international bodies use them. Moreover, although some of the classifications are open to question, most are reasonably valid. Ethnic boundaries are rubbery at the best of times, and the fact remains that every Chinese has a ‘nationality’, which is included in a registration card using the official classifications. It is my overwhelming impression that the great majority of members of the minorities agree with, or at any rate accept, the classification in which they are placed. For these reasons, it is sensible and appropriate to adopt the Chinese state classifications for the purposes of this book. This does not mean that they should never be questioned. In the West many scholars have challenged the Chinese state categories and terminology. One eminent scholar of the Hui, or Chinese Muslims, argues that ‘Marxist–Stalinist nationality theory’ has placed limitations on official Chinese portrayals of the Hui (Gladney 1991: ix–x), and he is not alone in offering criticisms of this kind (e.g. Tapp 1995: especially 195–9). In the West there has been an enormous amount of thought and literature on questions relating to ethnic minorities terminology. The term ‘race’, which was once the most fashionable, has gone out of date because of its popularity with people now regarded as racists, such as nineteenth-century imperialists. A much more recent term than race is ‘ethnicity’, the first dictionary appearance of which was in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1972 (Eriksen 1993: 3). This term is preferable, since it lacks the judgemental overtones of ‘race’ and implies more cultural than biological concerns. Despite the relative novelty of the term, the corresponding adjective ‘ethnic’ has a much longer pedigree. One authority has written that ‘the term ethnic group is now widely used both within and without academic discourse’ (Fenton 1999: 58). A definition of an ‘ethnic group’ would appeal to ancestry, a shared history, and a common language and culture, possibly including religion. Schermerhorn (1970: 12) claims that ‘A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group’. This need places this definition on a much more subjective level than that of Stalin, who took no account at all of consciousness. The definition offered avoids the issue of whether ethnicity is primordial or socially derived, a debate over which much controversy has raged. On the other hand, Stalin’s definition, by
calling a nationality ‘historically constituted’, suggests that it is socially based, an impression confirmed by the trend of Marxist thinking generally. One of the advantages of the term ‘ethnic group’ over ‘ethnic minority’ is that in some countries, such as Indonesia, there are no ethnic groups with populations making up the majority of the people, meaning that all groups belong to minorities. However, that is certainly not the case in China. The aim of this section is to clarify precisely who is the subject of this book. The theory of ethnicity is an enormous topic and well outside my scope. But given these background comments, it seems to me legitimate to refer to the peoples of concern to this book as ‘ethnic groups’, ‘ethnic minorities’, ‘minority nationalities’ or simply ‘minorities’. I intend to use those terms more or less interchangeably, making it clear if there is a reason for avoiding one or the other. The sources There has been a considerable amount of work carried out over the last 20 years or so on China’s minorities in contemporary times, both in Chinese and European languages. Chinese works are too numerous to mention here, but many are cited in the notes and bibliography. Works in English are much more limited in number, although not necessarily in distinction. Some particularly deserving mention are Dru Gladney’s work on the Hui (1991), Stevan Harrell’s on the Yi,1 Louisa Schein’s on the Miao (2000), Ralph Litzinger’s on the Yao (2000), Katherine Kaup’s on the Zhuang (2000) and Tsering Shakya’s history of modern Tibet (1999). Obviously it is appropriate that this book should base itself at least in part on what others have written. I note that one issue separating the present book from the great bulk of other work, either in Chinese or a European language, is that it attempts consideration of the minorities as a whole, rather than approaching one only. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for global coverage and draws attention to differences, comparisons and contrasts between and among ethnic groups. It allows for consideration of how the Chinese state and the minorities who live within its territory impact upon each other. In addition to written sources, I have made use of numerous visits to minority areas, especially in the 1990s, and these have formed my main material for this book. Minority areas visited include Tibet in 1985, 1990, 1997 and 2002, Xinjiang in 1982, 1994 and 1999, Guizhou in 1990, western Sichuan in December 1996 and January 1997, the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in 1986 and 1990, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia in 1990, Qinghai in 1995, and minority areas of Yunnan in 1996, 2000 and on other occasions. With but few exceptions, visits to these minority areas have involved going to see schools and other educational institutions, families, factories, farms, performances and art troupes, and monasteries, temples, mosques and/or other religious sites, among other places of interest. In all places I have tried to interview relevant people, finding out not only details of their lives and work but also their views about what matters to them, their role as members of an ethnic minority and their attitude
towards life in contemporary China. The great majority of these interviews have been conducted in Chinese, but with a few in English or through interpreters familiar with minority languages such as Uygur and Tibetan. History Some background history of the period of focus in this book is necessary to make sense of developments among China’s ethnic minorities, and the mutual impact of globalisation on China and its minority nationalities. Since there is a considerable amount in other chapters about the history and conditions of individual minorities, it is Chinese background history that is of concern here. After a period of radical revolution known as the Cultural Revolution (1966 –1976) and led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976), China entered a period of reform, in which the principal goal was economic development under the continued leadership of the CCP. The main architect of this policy was Deng Xiaoping (1904 –1997), a towering figure in modern Chinese history who, though never the formal leader either of the Chinese government or CCP, in fact wielded gigantic power during the last quarter of the twentieth century, far more than any other single individual. The influence of Mao Zedong was so strongly eclipsed and the evaluation of his role so severely negated at that time that one eminent authority on Chinese politics has entitled his book on the age of Deng Xiaoping ‘burying Mao’ (Baum 1994). The period of reform was introduced by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, which lasted from 18 to 22 December 1978. What this full session of China’s top Party body did was to set the parameters of a new revolution based not on radical ideology but on a quest for modernisation, economic development, national strengthening and a drastic rise in the standard of living. More than any other it was at this meeting that Deng Xiaoping asserted himself and laid the groundwork for his future power. Openness to the outside world was a primary aim of the reform policies. Overseas trade boomed and foreign expertise poured into the country. Chinese students went overseas in large numbers and, although many never returned, enough did so that their training and expertise made a difference to the economy and society. China changed from an isolated country to one that was highly susceptible and open to world influences. China’s joining the WTO in 2001 was a major spur to globalisation, but in fact the country had been subject to those good and bad trends we associate with globalisation somewhat before then. This incipient globalisation had profound implications for China. Finding out about what was happening outside the country, people began to demand far more in the way of freedoms and outside knowledge and techniques. Western, especially American, influence became incomparably more widespread than had been the case under Mao Zedong. One result was a rapid decline in the impact of Marxism–Leninism among ordinary people, and a concomitant growth in that of Western liberalism.
During the 1980s there were several major student movements, the main ones being at the end of 1986 and in the middle of 1989. The first of these brought about the downfall of the CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang, appointed to that position in the middle of 1981 and, after a break, the appointment of Zhao Ziyang to the position. The second developed a momentum so powerful on behalf of democracy that Deng Xiaoping came to believe that the CCP was about to be overthrown. He reacted by suppressing the student movement brutally through a military action on the night of 3– 4 June, with substantial casualties among the students and others. Later the same month a CCP Central Committee Plenum dismissed CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, replacing him with Jiang Zemin, who also became state president in March 1993. The period following the suppression of the student demonstrations of 1989 was much more stable politically than most Western observers had expected. Jiang Zemin remained the CCP General Secretary until the Sixteenth CCP Congress towards the end of 2002. On the other hand, the plague of corruption, which had worsened significantly in the 1980s by comparison with the earlier period, continued to intensify its attack on China’s body politic. To be fair to him, Jiang Zemin appears to have done his best to counter this corruption, and authorities tracked down some extremely high-ranking corrupt officials. These even included former Guangxi Governor Cheng Kejie, executed on 14 September 2000. For a former provincial governor to be executed for corruption was completely unprecedented in the history of the PRC. Despite the efforts of authorities to stamp out corruption, they are most unlikely to solve the problem and are unlikely to do better than contain it. The opening up, indeed globalisation, of China has brought tremendous changes to its society and culture. There is very much more freedom than there used to be. There has been a religious revival, which has affected virtually all parts of the country, especially the minority areas. On the other hand, the authorities did not hesitate to suppress religious activities they thought were a threat to the state, the most important example being the Falungong, a quasi-religious sect drawing on martial arts, meditation and healing. On 25 April 1999 this body suddenly and unexpectedly announced its presence in society with a large-scale demonstration outside the residences of the top leadership. The authorities took fright and banned the Falungong in July 1999. This did not prevent further demonstrations by the Falungong, with authorities arresting practitioners. In 2001 the Falungong leader Li Hongzhi, who had lived in the United States since 1992, was actually nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize but made no headway. Mao Zedong’s regime laid considerably more weight on gender equality than Deng Xiaoping’s, with the slogan that ‘women hold up half the sky’. This was never reality under Mao, but observers generally saw a decline in the status of women in the period of reform. Certainly, the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women held in Beijing in September 1995 brought forward some very negative Western images of the fate of women under Deng, with emphasis laid on the abduction and sale of girls and the poor treatment of female orphans (see Mackerras 1999: 160–3). On the other hand, there was a brighter side to the story.
The United Nations 1998 Human Development Report (cited ‘Monitor’ 1999: 12) ranked 174 countries according to such criteria as the number of women in parliament and the percentage of female administrators and professional and technical workers in the workforce. In general Asian countries fared very badly, but China came in the first in Asia and number 33 in the world. Women’s share of earned income was 38 per cent. This compared with 45 per cent in Sweden (the highest ranked country in the world for all criteria combined), 37 per cent in Thailand and 34 per cent in Japan. Economically, China went ahead spectacularly in the last quarter of the twentieth century. It was, for a start, not affected nearly as severely by the financial and economic crisis that afflicted much of East and Southeast Asia in 1997 and following years; so that the balance between China and its neighbours shifted in its favour. China’s economic growth over the entire period from 1979 to 2000 was officially given as 9.6 per cent per year, the highest of any major economy over those years; while between 1990 and 1996 the average real growth rate per person in the gross national product was 11 per cent, the highest in the world after Equatorial Guinea (Turner 2000: 434). The result was that China changed from an extremely backward country to one in the early stages of modernity in an astonishingly short time for so huge a country. In the eastern seaboard and in some other urban centres there were places that could definitely be called ‘modern’, even by world standards. It is true that poverty remained, being very serious in many places, but the number of people regarded as ‘impoverished’ was drastically reduced. An official Chinese white paper claimed that, in the rural areas, the number of people under the poverty line had fallen from about 250 million in the late 1970s to 34 million at the end of 1999, with even those impoverished people having ‘basically achieved adequate feeding and clothing’ (Information Office 2000a: para. 7).2 Western observers tend to be sceptical of the Chinese figures, arguing that the boundary of precisely what constitutes absolute poverty is set too low, but accept that poverty has been greatly reduced. On the other hand, some parts of the country developed much more quickly than others, while some people did much better than others in all regions. The result was that inequalities were far more serious at the beginning of the twenty-first century than they had been in 1978. The economic growth of China was accompanied by a spectacular political rise. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the rise of China internationally was one of the most important developments in the history of the world of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Moreover, by the end of the century it was actually getting on better both with its neighbours and the world as a whole than had been the case for a long time. The very poisonous Sino-Soviet relations of the 1960s to mid-1980s gave place to quite a warm friendship valued by both sides. Relations with Vietnam, which had been very bad during the 1980s, were more or less repaired in the 1990s. Although China’s relationships with Japan and the United States were rather unstable by the end of the century, they could hardly be described as bad, both countries maintaining cordiality with China strong enough for cooperation in a great many international endeavours.
Globalisation We now turn to a much more detailed discussion of the concept that is one of the cores of this book: globalisation. What is globalisation? Since the 1980s a substantial literature has developed on this concept and scholars are not in full agreement over just what globalisation means and entails. Afshar and Barrientos (1999: 1) write that the term has come into use ‘to define various aspects of global expansion in the past decade’. It is certainly true that the term gained considerable currency in the last decade of the twentieth century by comparison with the preceding period. Yet, it was as early as 1960 that the eminent theorist Marshall McLuhan coined the phrase the ‘global village’.3 Moreover, there is nothing new about global expansion or internationalisation. One thinks of the dramatic expansion of religions in the distant past, for example, the rapid and spectacular spread of Islam over much of the Eurasian continent and North Africa in the decade or so before the death of Muhammad in 632 and the century or so following it. Nineteenth-century colonialism spread modernising influences, ideas and Western economic patterns through much of the world and led on to expanded global penetration from the main Western powers to countries elsewhere. Yet despite these earlier movements, globalisation has gathered momentum since the end of the Second World War, and especially since the ongoing computer revolution of the 1980s and 1990s. It has become more and more difficult for any of the world’s regions to escape influence from elsewhere, so that internationalisation has become more genuinely global. The ability of people to move around the world in very large numbers and extremely quickly through air travel, and above all the instantaneous transfer of news, information and ideas through radio, television and the Internet have transformed world society and culture in a way, at a speed, and to an extent which previous generations could hardly have imagined. Anthony McGrew has put forward a definition that to me seems very appropriate to the contemporary era. He writes (1992: 65–6):4 Globalization refers to the mutiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation-states (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. Nowadays, goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, communications, crime, culture, pollutants, drugs, fashions, and beliefs all readily flow across territorial boundaries. Transnational networks, social movements and relationships are extensive in virtually all areas of human activity from the academic to the sexual.
There is clearly a tight connection between modernisation and globalisation. In his now famous essay on ‘the consequences of modernity’, British New Labour ideologue Anthony Giddens (1990: 63, 177) rightly stresses that modernity ‘is inherently globalising’. It was the Industrial Revolution that led to colonialism, a factor which spread modernising economies, cultures and ideas throughout the globe. The advance of technologies of various kinds has been of crucial importance in the development both of modernisation and globalisation. One thinks of the advances from the sailing ship to the steamship, from propellor-driven aeroplanes to jet aircraft, from telegraph to the digital telephone, from radio to satellite television, and above all the development of the computer. On the other hand, there are aspects in which the modernisation and globalisation point in opposite directions. Probably the main one is the role of the nationstate. Giddens (1990: 1) associates modernity with ‘modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeeth century onwards’, obviously including the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which saw the beginnings of the rise of the nation-state. But by ignoring borders globalisation is in some ways inherently hostile to the nation-state and challenges the way it operates at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As it happens, many of China’s minorities live near borders which globalisation appears to undermine. Globalisation seems to reduce the control most governments exert over the economies of their own countries, and it allows influences from outside which may damage the independence of societies. One specialist (Beck 2000: 21) believes that globalisation implies ‘the breakdown of the basic assumptions whereby societies and states have been conceived, organised and experienced as territorial units separated from one another’ (italics in original). The term ‘modernisation’ appears to emphasise time, while ‘globalisation’ puts the stress on space. But it may be features that define both. Arif Dirlik’s summary of the process from the discourse of modernisation to that of globalisation appears to me apt and worth quoting. He writes (2000: 248): What we may describe as the replacement of the paradigm of modernization by a paradigm of globalization has many dimensions that range from the recognition of new groups, the empowerment of others, and questions about the nation-state as an appropriate political, economic, and cultural unit, to the disappearance of socialist alternatives to capitalism accompanied by, ironically, an erosion of a Eurocentric teleology of modernity. In McGrew’s list of items which can so easily cross borders in the contemporary world some are clearly good, notably knowledge, and some can be either good, bad or indifferent, such as goods, culture or people, though an optimist would expect that all three are predominantly good. But some are quite clearly bad, such as crime, pollutants and drugs. Certainly, criminals take major advantage of globalisation, among them drug-traffickers being prominent. And drugs are among factors that imply the spread of disease. Although there is absolutely nothing new about global epidemics – indeed, what is remarkable is the extent to
which globalisation has spread the prevention and curing of disease – the spread of the HIV virus and AIDS since the 1980s has been among the most disastrous developments of our time. Environmentalists have often pointed out that ecosystems, wild animals and pollutants attach absolutely no importance whatever to national borders. Globalisation, democracy and human rights The example of Islam mentioned above emphasises the importance of beliefs and ideas in globalisation. To this writer two related ideas appear to have been pre-eminent in the globalisation processes accelerating in the late years of the twentieth century. These are democracy and human rights. Both are relevant to the topic of this book, especially since one of the most important forms of human rights is ethnic rights. As one globalisation theorist has put it (Scholte 1997: 26 –7), ‘there is a broad and fairly solid consensus in today’s world that good governance means democratic governance’, and many people see globalisation and democratisation ‘as two sides of the same coin’. Liberal theorists, among others, have drawn attention to the large-scale spread of democracy across the globe in recent times, from the fall of the Soviet bloc like a row of dominoes late in 1989 to that of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the apartheid regime in South Africa during the 1990s. And meanwhile in East Asia, South Korea and Taiwan saw the expansion of democratic values, with Taiwan holding its first elections for president in March 1996. There are of course many remaining undemocratic factors in the world. Few people are consulted when world bodies make decisions that affect populations all over the world in the most direct ways. The protestors in Seattle in November 1999 and in Prague in August 2000 were very vocal in demanding greater popular participation in bodies such as the WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. And one does not have to look far to find places where democracy actually retreated, a prominent example being the military takeover in Pakistan in October 1999. China was the most important among the world’s countries that failed to overthrow its communist party, nor did it introduce popular elections for its top leaders. However, this did not mean that there was no progress towards democratic governance. In November 1987 the government introduced a law allowing for village elections. By the end of the twentieth century more than a million village elections had taken place throughout the country, only about 60 per cent of them resulting in village heads who were members of the CCP. At the end of 1998 an open election took place to elect the head of a township, a level higher than the village. Although it is most unlikely that the election of non-CCP members will lead quickly to a multi-party system, the long-term trend appears to be in the direction of greater democratic participation. The democracy movement of 1989 had not revived by the middle of 2002, but there does not appear to be any fundamental reason why China should not eventually adopt a more democratic system of government.5
The fact that Taiwan holds regular democratic elections suggests most strongly that democracy is not inherently contrary to Chinese culture. Issues of human rights have become a focus for considering globalisation because, whereas law concerning individual rights once belonged to the national arena, it became definitely international after the Second World War. The main starting point was the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. But since then a whole series of international laws and conventions has developed, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965. One of the central debates over human rights has revolved around the issue of whether they are universal or communitarian. The former position holds that human beings have rights simply by being human; and that they are given by nature or God and cannot be taken away. The communitarian view emphasises ‘the formative role of the community in constituting individuality’ (Brown 1997: 480); rights did not exist before societies and it is particular societies that bestow rights on individual people. Since the 1990s, the international community has focused far more on human rights than it ever did before, which means that they are much more a global issue than in earlier times. On the other hand, some scholars claim that the end of the Cold War meant a challenge to the universalist view of human rights ‘by critics who stress the western, masculine, intolerant nature of this universalism’ (Brown 1997: 471). In this view, human rights theory is based largely on Western notions of rights, ignoring other civilisations’ contributions to humanitarian values; and the articles both in the Universal Declaration and the various covenants assume traditional gender roles. As far as China is concerned, however, the year promoting human rights in world consciousness was most certainly 1989, and the debate over universalist and communitarian values has raged ever since. Following the crackdown of mid1989, China came under severe criticism, especially from the United States and other Western countries, for its abuse of human rights in suppressing protestors peacefully demonstrating on behalf of democracy and democratic values. The Chinese state, on the other hand, saw things quite differently. In its view, it was merely suppressing a rebellion which, had it succeeded, would have brought down the CCP and thrown the country into chaos, as has happened in the Soviet Union. This would have meant far more suffering for far more people than in fact happened. Based on the communitarian view of human rights, to suppress this movement with so much potential for instability was a far better course of action than simply standing by and waiting to be overthrown, which is what the West seemed to be asking for. Or so argued the Chinese authorities.6 For Western countries, the issue of human rights in developing policy towards China has remained a crucial one since 1989. They have consistently criticised China for human rights abuses, even while taking steps to deal with China both in commercial and strategic matters. The Chinese state has been more than willing to deal with the West, but has been clear that relations in the area of human
rights must be between equals, not the West as teacher lecturing the naughty boy. On 1 November 1991, the Chinese government issued a document on human rights in China (Information Office 1991: 8–45), which was the first of a series in what marked a major push in human rights diplomacy. Focusing on the right to subsistence as the primary right, the paper argued that China had done very well in this realm, and also covered such diverse topics as the rights of ethnic minorities and the disabled, religious freedom, and cultural and social rights. Later papers followed similar themes, with some focusing on such individual items as women and minority nationalities. By the end of the century, Western governments seemed less enthusiastic about acting as international police on human rights in the case of China, and many had developed a human rights dialogue with the Chinese government. They had decided that this was a far better, more productive and less dangerous and provocative way of tackling the human rights issue with China than direct confrontation. Authorities are generally quite happy to leave the main running in the field of human rights to self-appointed, non-governmental activists. Why is globalisation so controversial? The proponents of globalisation include most of the world’s main power-holders. The reason for this is that the globalised world has allowed a faster and more widespread expansion of wealth than ever experienced before in history. More food and other life necessities are produced, housing is better, more people are able to travel, lifestyles have become more varied, news travels faster, more people have the opportunity to watch television, more are hooked up to the Internet, and freedoms have spread to include more people than has ever been the case before. Why then should anybody complain about globalisation? Some observers charge globalisation with being too set on a single course of action and ideas, despite its show of freedom and liberalism. In an avowedly radical critique Ulrich Beck (2000: 129) denounces globalisation for ‘its economic one-dimensionalism, its one-way-street linear thinking, its world-market authoritarianism’. Critics of globalisation accuse it of promoting inequalities and even of increasing poverty, at the same time as it expands wealth. The ‘world-market authoritarianism’ of which Beck speaks is central here. The critics believe that the emphasis of the WTO on free trade and reduction of tariffs is a factor spreading inequalities in economic and social terms, because it allows the products of the richer countries to flood the markets of the poorer. Certainly the late years of the twentieth century saw a rise in economic inequalities throughout most of East and Southeast Asia, being worst in Thailand and China (Islam 2000: 322). The latter country had come out of a period in which economic equality was touted as one of the major benefits of a radical revolution. And although the realities belied the ideology, most people saw the slide towards inequality as one of the prices that had to be paid for the greater wealth of the reform period, especially since the overwhelming majority of people benefited from the new policies introduced from 1978 (see also Wang 2000: 378–9).
One point about globalisation is that influences can move in any direction. They can move either from the developed countries to the developing, or the other way around. In the West, Tibetan Buddhism has become very fashionable in the ‘new spirituality’ popular among young Westerns since the late years of the twentieth century. However, influences do not move equally in all directions. Western, and especially American, influence all over the world is incomparably greater and more deep-seated than is Asian influence in the Western countries. The domination of the world economy by that of the United States and other major Western powers, and the concomitant impact on ideas and culture make the United States look still very hegemonic among the world’s countries. Indeed, some observers have even regarded globalisation as equivalent to Americanisation, with the advance of global capitalism destroying communities everywhere. The November 1999 protests at the WTO meetings in Seattle and later demonstrations against globalisation in other parts of the world addressed a range of issues, including labour standards, environmental norms, women’s and ethnic rights, and the tendency, as they saw it, for globalisation to undermine local and ethnic cultures. On the subject of labour and the environment, Asian governments have on the whole been keen to prevent the WTO from interfering, arguing that it is precisely the low cost of labour in their own countries which makes them competetive. Then United States President Bill Clinton supported the view of protestors that the WTO had an obligation to consider the connection between trade and labour standards, and take a stand against child labour and bad labour conditions found in some Asian countries. And on the environment, Asian governments have wanted the WTO to keep out, because too great an emphasis on the environment risks holding back their economic growth, while protesters and many Western authorities see a direct relationship between trade and the environment. In all these matters, China has come over as one of the targets of protestors, because it stands on the side opposite to them on so many globalising issues. Exiled labour activists have painted an extremely grim picture of labour conditions in China, trying to argue that trade with China should depend on attempts to improve such conditions radically. And China’s environment is recognised by virtually all people as shockingly bad. It is true that progressive and stringent laws have been introduced to improve the situation, and the Chinese authorities should, in my opinion, be given credit for them. Yet the improvements are not nearly enough to counter the impression that in any competition between economic growth and environmental protection it is the former that will prevail. One of the most controversial features of globalisation lies in the perception that it eliminates cultural difference and cultural identities. One hears a great deal in the contemporary world about big developers who destroy the habitat not only of wild animals but even of small ethnic communities, eradicating their culture in the process. There is of course some truth in this charge. Globalisation does tend to spread a global culture everywhere, and indigenous cultures frequently suffer, or even go under, as a result. Yet it is important not to exaggerate the destructive effects of globalisation on cultural identities. Indeed, in some ways it can even strengthen cultural
consciousness. Two specialists have expressed this tension between globalisation and identity as follows (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 2): There is much empirical evidence that people’s awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows seems to trigger a search for fixed orientation points and action frames, as well as determined efforts to affirm old and construct new boundaries. For students of globalization it is therefore important to develop an understanding of globalization that not only takes into account the rapid increase in mobility of people, goods and images, but also the fact that, in many places, flow goes hand in hand with a closure of identities which often used to be much more fuzzy and permeable. Nick Knight (2000: 242) is, in my opinion, quite right to point out that ‘the technologies that make a global culture possible also facilitate the dissemination and hence revival of distinctive local cultures’. His emphasis on technology in the context both of creating the global culture and maintaining or reviving the local ones is well placed. In his thoughtful essay on cultural identity in the contemporary world, Stuart Hall (1992: 304) draws attention to the fact that ‘globalization is very unevenly distributed around the globe’. And in a country like China, it is ‘very unevenly distributed’ even within a single nation-state, being already highly influential in the large cities of the eastern seaboard but very much less so in the unmodern villages of the west, including in the minority areas. Hall (1992: 304) also comments on ‘a fascination with difference and the marketing of ethnicity and “otherness” ’, which coexist with globalisation. He continues: There is a new interest in ‘the local’ together with the impact of ‘the global’. Globalization (in the form of flexible specialization and ‘niche marketing’) actually exploits local differentiation. Thus, instead of thinking of the global replacing the local, it would be more accurate to think of a new articulation between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’. … [I]t seems unlikely that globalization will simply destroy national identities. It is more likely to produce, simultaneously, new ‘global’ and new ‘local’ identifications. Hall is quite right to suggest that globalisation can actually assist cultural identities through its emphasis on the local. The dichotomy between the global and the local has even led to the adoption of a new term: glocalisation. In the 1980s the word had been used in Japanese business jargon for ‘global localisation’ but in the 1990s entered the sociological lexicon in a very different sense (for instance Robertson 1995: 28–32). China has clearly been a site of this ‘glocalisation’. One writer argues that, especially since the early to mid-1990s, Chinese preference for local consumer products has involved resistance to foreign or global counterparts. She claims (Hooper 2000: 441) that ‘an alliance of Chinese commercial interests, the government and media’ has appropriated both nationalism and culture, ‘alleging
the greater “suitability” of their products for Chinese consumers’ in a largely successful bid to secure a good share of the market against foreign competition. One excellent example of this lust for otherness is in tourism. Although not new to the second half of the twentieth century, it certainly accelerated and grew exponentially at that time, to become one of the largest and most important spinners of wealth in the world economy. Millions of people came to enjoy both prosperity through higher standards of living and the opportunity through better and faster means of transport and more holidays to travel all over the world. Backpacking became extremely fashionable among younger people, while older ones joined organised tourist groups to visit places ordinary people in previous generations could hardly have dreamed about. At the height of the tourist season many cities of Europe have as many visitors as residents, and a few even more. And of course tourism is a vital component of the economy well beyond Europe. The number of international tourists visiting China, including those from Hong Kong and Macao, rose from 5.7 million in 1980 to 17.83 million in 1985, and then from 43.68 million in 1994 to 63.48 million in 1998. Earnings from international tourism grew enormously over the same period. In American dollars the rise was from $617 million in 1980, to $1.25 billion in 1985, and from $7.2 billion in 1994 to $12.6 billion in 1998.7 Although North America and Europe provide the greatest numbers of tourists, the people of Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan have entered the tourist market in a very big way, travelling not only in their own and other Asian countries but in Europe, America and elsewhere. Domestic Chinese tourism also grew during the 1990s, with 5.24 million in 1994 and 6.94 in 1998 (NBS 1999: 609). And for the first time, significant numbers of Chinese began to go abroad for the purposes of tourism in the 1990s. Globalisation, sovereignty and the state It was earlier pointed out that one of the respects in which modernisation and globalisation differ in their effects is in the power of the nation-state and in the concept of sovereignty, both of them central to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. And the rise of the nation-state and the demands of sovereignty have made for clearer and more sharply demarcated borders throughout the world. But the acceleration of globalisation has reversed this trend, with borders becoming challenged and in some cases more porous. Migrations of people in significant numbers to distant countries have become common, with authorities finding great difficulty in controlling them. One writer (Scholte 1997: 21) goes so far as to say that ‘the core Westphalian norm of sovereignty is no longer operative; nor can it be retrieved in the present globalizing world’. This is a very strong statement with which some would not agree, especially governments striving to control their own territories. Crucial among such governments is that of China, which has made very clear its insistence that it has the right to exercise sovereignty over all those territories it claims as within the PRC, including the minority areas of Tibet and Xinjiang. Indeed, numerous accusations
of human rights abuses from Western organisations have been ritually and uniformly greeted by requests to keep out of China’s internal affairs, implying that China intends to maintain its rights of sovereignty in those areas. The controversy over sovereignty came to a head in March 1999, when the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) began a major bombing campaign against Serbia, mainly on the grounds that it had been carrying out ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. For China this bombing campaign was outrageous, because the NATO powers had, without reference to the United Nations, taken the matter into their own hands and intervened in the sovereign affairs of an independent nation-state against the wishes of its government. For the Chinese leadership, the whole episode suggested that the Western powers or some other regional grouping might bomb China’s own capital if they decided that the human rights situation in Tibet or Xinjiang had descended into a situation of ethnic cleansing. If, against the wishes of such states as China and Russia, sovereignty is in decline, then what of the nation-state itself. According to McGrew (1992: 92), ‘A powerful argument can be made that globalization is compromising the authority, the autonomy, the nature and the competence of the modern nation-state’. When one considers the growing influences of transnational bodies and the declining authority which many governments command within their own countries one can see the point of this contention. However, there are differing points of view. One of them, challenging the theory of the decline of the state, argues that ‘the generic “state” persists as a crucial actor in the world economy’ (Smith et al. 1999: 1), but in changing contexts and with new functions. The point is made in the political realm through the terrorist attack that brought about the total collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001. While the terrorists who hijacked and flew the planes into the towers had no obvious state allegiance, it was a coalition of American-led states that retaliated with war, and against a state, Afghanistan. It is also striking that by the growth and improvement of computer and other technology, states are able to intervene in the affairs of their citizens more effectively than ever. Moreover, states are able to cooperate with each other to serve common interests. Examples include the NATO intervention over Kosovo. In my opinion, the nation-state may have declined in some ways, but in others it is stronger than ever, albeit with different functions. I do not expect its demise in the foreseeable future. China as one of the world’s more statist countries will be struggling to maintain this institution for a long time. Of all the countries around the globe it is among the oldest to have a recognisable state power exercising effective control over a significant territory. Specialists argue over when China first saw the emergence of ‘the state’, but it was certainly no later that the first unification of China in the third century BCE under the Qin dynasty led by the powerful tyrant Qin Shihuang. The Qin state certainly had a powerful army, and a powerful bureaucratic apparatus exercising control over the people. It controlled a significant territory and, perhaps most important of all, it laid down the idea of the unity of the Chinese nation which proved so effective that it has lasted ever since. Of course China’s territory has not always been the same as it is at present, but the ideal of
a single China governing all Chinese territory has, on the whole, held sway more or less since that time. In recent years the power of the CCP and the Chinese government has become more dispersed. They are much less able to exercise full control over the activities of the citizens of China than they were during the reign of Mao Zedong. Outside influences, especially those from the United States and other Western countries, were able to create a greater impact on what people knew, on their fashions and lifestyle, and on the arts they enjoyed than had once been the case. Since joining the WTO in 2001, China has had to take much more notice of international laws governing trade, investment and the environment, and even such social matters as human rights. This process is likely to accelerate in the coming years, further increasing international influence on China and inevitably reducing the control the Chinese state can exert in its own territory. Yet it is important not to exaggerate this claim. The state, as one specialist has pointed out, was closely involved in the rise of the Chinese economy that was one of the most important processes characterising the last decades of the twentieth century (Friedman 1999: especially 252–62). The CCP, or whichever group dominates the government of China, will hardly give up all its authority. And it is most unlikely that external governments or international bodies will require the authorities in China to give up more than a modicum of its power. Bodies such as the International Monetary Fund have on occasion made extreme demands on governments in return for loans. But the Chinese economy will have to decline enormously before it gets remotely near such a position. The relevance of globalisation for China and her ethnic minorities So what has globalisation to do with China and her minorities? In essence, globalisation is relevant because of its implications for the state and because minorities are a kind of case study of ‘the local culture’ threatened by globalisation. Clifford Geertz (1963: 108) puts the contradiction very well in his discussion of new states. He writes of ‘two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives – the desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions “matter”, and the desire to build an efficient, dynamic modern state’. For China to function as an efficient, dynamic and modern state, it is of crucial importance that the country should be integrated well enough to act as a single and coherent whole, and at least to avoid national disintegration. This fate which did so much damage to the economy, politics and society of the once powerful Soviet Union is one the Chinese leaders wish at all costs to avoid following. Globalisation has the potential to weaken or even undermine the Chinese state. It certainly has the potential to effect the overthrow of the CCP. The way in which the Chinese state relates to its ethnic minorities carries implications of the most enormous importance for China, because at least two of China’s most populous minorities, the Uygurs of Xinjiang and the Tibetans of Tibet, have already undertaken secessionist movements. As will be shown in later
chapters, at least the first of these two grew more confident in the last decade of the twentieth century, as the Chinese state strove harder to check and suppress them, being sharply criticised for human rights abuses in the process. On the other hand, concepts like that of nation-state, globalisation and modernisation look very different to ethnic minorities within large states. Some of China’s minorities value their identities very deeply and are willing to struggle, or even fight against heavy odds, to keep them thriving. The issue of how the cultures of China’s ethnic minorities have fared under the impact of the thrust towards modernisation and the trend towards globalisation since the late 1970s is of great significance, globalisation having affected virtually all the minorities to a greater or lesser extent. Many of the minorities have diasporas able and prepared to wield influence outside China on behalf of their co-nationals at home. The most outstanding example is of course the Tibetans, who have a leader in the form of the Dalai Lama with a status and reputation high enough to win the Nobel Peace Prize (1989). There are, however, others with diasporas which, if they are not particularly influential as the twenty-first century dawns, are certainly doing their best to become so. Although the diasporas are not the subject of this book, they have a relevance for their impact, or potential impact, on foreign images of China and on China’s foreign relations. In Western countries it has become fashionable to support ethnonationalist movements, even including independence and the founding of new nation-states. The Basques of Spain are among the few counter-examples, but among others with strong popular sympathy in the West one thinks of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Chechens, the Kurds and several peoples in Indonesia. And of course before its foundation as an independent state in May 2002, the aspirations of East Timor enjoyed enormous popular support in Australia and elsewhere. A range of factors has created this sympathy for ethnonationalists, including the oppression states have forced on them. But ironically, globalisation has assisted greatly, because it has quickened awareness in all countries of what is happening elsewhere. The relevance of globalisation is wide-ranging in the contemporary world. It certainly matters greatly both for China and for its ethnic minorities. And it matters for people outside China as well. With this ‘big picture’ in mind, some details should become clear in the following chapters.
Historical background, 1949–1989
The government of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), which lasted from 1927 to 1949, cared a great deal about China’s national unity, and was aware how important minorities could be in border affairs. However, he was not particularly concerned about minority affairs from any other point of view. The Japanese had attempted to woo over the Mongolians to their side and part of the Mongolian population, as well as other ethnic groups of northeast China or Manchuria, had belonged to the Japanese puppet state of Manchukoku in the 1930s and down to their defeat in 1945. The succeeding civil war had done nothing to improve the situation in the country as a whole either economically or socially, either for the majority Han people or the minorities.
The minorities, 1949–1976 Given China’s recent history it was not surprising that ethnic issues imposed themselves on the CCP right from the moment it established itself in power at the head of the PRC on 1 October 1949. Mao Zedong and his CCP had already had occasion to develop ideas about the minorities during their time as revolutionary opponents of the government, and they had gained some support from the ethnic areas through which they passed during their famous Long March of 1934–1935. But actually being the government of the whole country raised different problems the CCP had never really had to face. Early policy on minorities The PRC laid down its policy on minorities in Articles 50 –3 of its interim constitution called the ‘Common Programme’, adopted on 29 September 1949. Article 50 ran: All nationalities within the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China are equal. They shall establish unity and mutual aid among themselves and shall oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People’s Republic of China will become a big fraternal and cooperative family composed of all its nationalities. Greater nationalism and chauvinism shall
Historical background be opposed. Acts involving discrimination, oppression, and splitting of the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited.1
The CCP summed up its policy on minorities as ‘unity and equality’. The Common Program also included a degree of regional autonomy for minorities in areas where they were concentrated. In addition, it stipulated the ‘freedom to develop their dialects and languages, and to preserve or reform their traditions, customs, and religious beliefs’ (Article 53). For the CCP, the first priority was to carry out a social revolution among the minorities, as indeed it was doing among the Han. At the time, the social systems prevailing among the minorities were extremely diverse. However, the majority of them involved fairly extreme social and economic inequalities. Most had landowning aristocracies, and many featured clergies with very great power among the people. These clergies themselves were unequal: among some ethnic groups monks resident in monasteries were themselves ranked according to a strict hierarchy, while monastic estates concentrated wealth in very few hands. One of the most uneven societies of the minorities was that of the Nuosu, a people living in Liangshan (literally ‘cool mountains’) in the southwest of China straddling the border between Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces. The Nuosu were – and still are – regarded as a branch of the Yi nationality, formerly called Lolos. Nuosu society featured a rigid hierarchy of slaves, in which slaves could themselves own slaves of an even more wretched order. One reporter, Alan Winnington, actually visited Liangshan in the late 1950s, the first European to do so under the PRC, at a time when the suppression of slavery was nearing its conclusion. He interviewed numerous former slaves and had the following to say about what he found: House-slaves are the most abject of all humans in the Cool Mountains and maybe anywhere in the world. They possess nothing at all, not even the tatters they wear. Unable to ‘cheat’ to any greater extent than growing a little opium secretly, they live at bedrock subsistence level, eating only what they are given by the master and that is very little indeed. Their normal diet is the coarse siftings of the grains they have ground for the master’s family, mixed with swill from his table and wild vegetables collected by themselves, served in a wooden trough on the floor. While they remain in their master’s home, generally until they are able to produce children, they are treated like animals – actually rather worse than animals – work all available hours, tend the fire at night and are beaten for the least hint of fault or at the whim of their ill-tempered and opium-sodden master or mistress. They are unimaginably ignorant. (Winnington 1959: 35–6) Winnington gained a very good impression of the ways in which the CCP had wiped out slavery among the Nuosu. He knew that social change was frequently violent, including in China in the 1950s, but marvelled at the fact that in the case of the Nuosu it had been peaceful. The Nuosu slave-owners had actually agreed
to the abolition of slavery, even though it meant the loss of their wealth and privileges (Winnington 1959: 210). During the 1950s, the government began the process of identifying ethnic groups. The central government sent out social scientists to determine which groups were nationalities according to the Stalin’s definition, mentioned in Chapter 1. The 1964 census recognised fifty-three minorities, with two more being added later, the last being the Juno of Yunnan in 1979. The establishment of autonomous places was an early priority of the CCP’s government. They had already set up the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) in May 1947, and during the 1950s many others followed. By the year 1990 there were 157, with several levels (listed Mackerras 2001a: 254–6). The largest was the autonomous region, equivalent in status to a province. There were five of these: the IMAR, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR, set up in 1955), the Guangxi Zhuang and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions (1958), and the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR 1965). In addition, there were 30 autonomous prefectures, the earliest set up being the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province in 1952, and a series of autonomous counties and banners. The principal aim of autonomy at this stage was nationalisation, ‘defined as “national in form of autonomous organs, languages, and cadres” ’ (Dreyer 1976: 105). What this meant was that members of the minority groups should take over their own administration as far as possible, using their own languages. Another implication was that the state should train as many cadres as possible belonging to the minorities themselves. The term ‘cadres’ in the PRC means administrators, CCP members and professionals. In the specific case of Xinjiang the leadership was more cautious, no doubt because of the history of violent secessionism from the 1920s to the 1940s. One author states that ‘Han predominance and authority’ were sought throughout the 1949–1956 period, but with Han cadres instructed to cooperate with minority counterparts (McMillen 1979: 89). In addition, they were asked to respect minority customs and beliefs, ‘implement Party policies according to local conditions’, and promote a mood of tolerance. This training of national cadres was initially a very slow process, because most of the minorities were not interested in the CCP or its ideology. There were exceptions, of course. Minorities relatively responsive to the CCP were mainly those that had been directly affected by Japanese aggression before 1949, especially the Koreans, Mongolians and Manchus. To effect more central control of the training of minority cadres, the government approved the establishment of a Central Nationalities Institute in November 1950. By 1957 there were about 700,000 CCP members among the minorities, that being about 5.5 per cent of the total of 12.72 million (Mackerras 1994: 157). Relations between government and minorities deteriorated in 1958, largely due to the more radical policies of the Great Leap Forward, including the establishment of people’s communes. ‘Local nationalism’, that is the wish to promote the nationalism of the local ethnic groups not that of China as a whole, came to the fore as a serious crime, replacing the policy of denouncing great Han chauvinism.
In Xinjiang several high-ranking minority cadres were publicly denounced as ‘local nationalists’ (McMillen 1979: 94), and there were similar developments in other minority regions. Territorial unity and Tibet Right from the start of its rule, the issue of China’s territorial integrity and unity loomed extremely large, just as it had done for the Nationalist Party government of Chiang Kai-shek. Although the CCP had allowed for the possibility that certain minorities would secede from China in the early 1930s, the need to deal with the Japanese invasion forced Mao Zedong and the other CCP leaders to renege on this concession. From the beginning, the CCP was clear that almost all those territories which had formed part of China under the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) were also part of the PRC, and that included the ethnic areas of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. There was one exception, namely the territory known to the Chinese as Outer Mongolia, which had declared independence with a Constitution calling itself the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) in 1924. The Soviet Union had been heavily involved in MPR affairs, and as a result the CCP had recognised its independence. The new PRC Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) cabled agreement to establish diplomatic relations with the MPR on 16 December 1949, in other words hardly more than two weeks after the CCP came to power. Although relations between the PRC and Mongolia have been unstable, the CCP has never gone back on its recognition of the MPR as an independent territory. The policy of autonomy was definitely a significant advance on what the minorities had experienced under the previous Republican government of Chiang Kai-shek. However, at no stage did autonomy make any pretence to being remotely equivalent to independence. An editorial in the main official newspaper on 2 October 1951 (cited Dreyer 1976: 94) dubbed any minority movement wishing to secede from the PRC as ‘reactionary since, objectively considered, it would undermine the interests of the various nationalities, and hence would work to the advantage of imperialism’. The 1954 Constitution declared that ‘National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People’s Republic of China’.2 Inner Mongolia was controlled by the CCP even before the PRC was established. Although separatist movements had wracked Xinjiang during much of the first half of the twentieth century, it fell quite easily to the CCP, with the provincial head Burhan cabling his surrender on 26 September 1949 and being appointed as Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government on 17 December. There was resistance to CCP rule in some ethnic areas in the 1950s, but on the whole the process of communist takeover of relatively peaceful. The major exception to this pattern was Tibet. The Nationalist Party government of Chiang Kai-shek considered Tibet to be a ‘special territory’ within China, but the local Tibetan authorities did not accept Chinese rule. In fact, the extent of Chinese influence in Tibet during the period 1912–1950 was minimal. The CCP was clear right from the start that Tibet was part of China. Troops of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), led by General Zhang Guohua, advanced towards Tibet in 1950, the first skirmishes taking place in May. After a fierce battle, they captured the eastern Tibetan city of Chamdo, then in Xikang Province, on 19 October 1950. The Chinese government demanded that the Tibetan local authorities negotiate, the bottom line being that they should recognise Tibet as an integral part of China. After an unsuccessful appeal for help to the United Nations, a Tibetan delegation signed an agreement in Beijing on 23 May 1951. Among the seventeen points of the agreement, two stand out as most important. ●
In Clause 1, it is stated that ‘the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the motherland – the People’s Republic of China’. Clause 4 declares that ‘The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet’.3
Intensive debate ensued within the Tibetan government itself and there were discussions with the Americans. Then, on 24 October 1951, the young Dalai Lama cabled his acceptance of the seventeen-point agreement. It was only after the central government received the cable that General Zhang Guohua arrived in Lhasa on 26 October, with PLA troops following shortly afterwards. Yet the period from the Dalai Lama’s acceptance of the 1951 agreement to the late 1950s was a relatively good one for the minorities in China, with the standard of living rising significantly. In 1955, the central government established a committee to prepare to set up the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and placed the Dalai Lama at its head, with the Panchen Lama, the second most influential of the Tibetan lamas, and Zhang Guohua as deputies. On the whole, the Chinese allowed the old system of government and society to remain in Tibet, even though it was extremely unequal and featured a kind of serf system with extreme clerical influence and large monastic estates. In March 1959 full-scale rebellion against Chinese rule broke out in the Tibetan capital Lhasa. The Tibetans blamed Chinese oppression and cultural suppression, but the Chinese saw things differently, castigating American intervention and the old ruling clerical and serf-owning classes for provoking the uprising. Chinese troops suppressed the rebellion very quickly but with considerable bloodshed. The Dalai Lama fled to India, taking up residence in Dharamsala, where he has remained ever since as the head of a government-in-exile. Meanwhile in Tibet itself, the Chinese carried out a ‘democratic reform’, which in effect uprooted the old political system and replaced it with the socialist one prevailing in the rest of China. Both sides appeared to recognise that the two main planks of the seventeenpoint agreement were no longer relevant. The Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976 Although the early 1960s saw a relaxation of policy towards the minorities, this was but a prelude to a period most commentators and minorities have seen as the most repressive and destructive in the PRC, namely the Cultural Revolution,
lasting from 1966 to 1976. In the latter year Mao Zedong, the architect of the Cultural Revolution, died on 9 September and within a month his main supporters had been overthrown and his political legacy was on the way out. The most important feature of the Cultural Revolution was an ideological narrowness of almost unbelievable dimensions. Only Mao Zedong’s thought was allowed currency, and his works were the almost exclusive reading diet of the Chinese people from August 1966 until the end of the 1960s. On 25 December 1967, China’s official New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that the number of published copies of Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, which contained the gems of Mao’s sayings, had reached no less than 350 million. For ethnic affairs, a particularly vicious part of the ideology of the Cultural Revolution was the obsession with class struggle, which was dubbed ‘the key link’ on which all else depended. The implication was that ethnic struggle simply did not matter and was only a reflection of class struggle anyway. It was during the Cultural Revolution that Jiang Qing (1914–1991), Mao’s wife and leader of the radical faction known as the ‘gang of four’, reportedly asked her infamous question, ‘Why do we need national minorities anyway?’, answering by stating flatly: ‘National identity should be done away with!’ (See Gladney 1991: 138) Although the Constitution of January 1975 retained the concept of autonomy for minorities, a far lower status was accorded it, and in practice it meant nothing.4 The Cultural Revolution saw severe instability in many parts of China and periods of localised civil war, such as in Hubei province in August and September 1967. A case of full-scale, though brief, rebellion in the ethnic areas was the Shadian Incident. Following years of repression during the Cultural Revolution, the Hui (Chinese Muslims) of Shadian, a village in Mengzi County of southern Yunnan Province near the border with Vietnam, had wished to reopen a mosque closed due to Cultural Revolution persecution, but had been refused permission. As a result the local Hui established a militia group, leading authorities to accuse them of trying to found an independent Islamic republic. Late in July 1975, PLA troops moved into the village, razing it to the ground. Fierce fighting over the next week in Shadian and surrounding areas left over 1,600 Chinese Muslims dead, as well as several hundred PLA troops. In terms of casualties, this was certainly among the worst single incidents involving minorities in the history of the PRC. Not until February 1979, by which time the Cultural Revolution was over, were reparations and apologies made to the relatives of the dead, with the government building seven new mosques in the Shadian area.5 The Shadian Incident is a good illustration showing two related features of the Cultural Revolution: religious persecution and cultural destruction. In most minority areas religion was banned, with clerics being forced to return to lay life, harmed or even killed, and religious buildings closed, damaged or destroyed. With many minorities religion and culture are tightly linked. For instance, Tibetan Buddhist monasteries are also major repositories of Tibetan traditional arts, paintings, masks for dancing, and religious statues. Many were damaged and some destroyed. The great Ganden Monastery outside Lhasa sustained damage that has to be seen to be believed. My visit to the great Muli Monastery in western Sichuan Province at the beginning of 1997 revealed ruined buildings alongside
the restored ones. In addition, the traditional dramas of the Tibetans, Miao, Koreans, Dong and others were banned, as were their classical literature and poetry, with many books damaged or destroyed. It is not surprising that minorities look back on the Cultural Revolution as a nightmare. Moreover, it is hardly a consolation to know that the Han also suffered similar cultural destruction and religious persecution.
The period of reform No sooner had Mao died than his main followers, termed the ‘gang of four’ and including his widow Jiang Qing, were overthrown on 6 October 1976 and China began the long process of dismantling the system of government and society that Mao had installed. At the end of 1978, the CCP determined to lead China towards modernisation and economic prosperity in place of the revolutionary society to which Mao had aspired. The years since 1978 are generally known as ‘the period of reform’. The brief interregnum from 1976 to the end of 1978 was led by a nonentity called Hua Guofeng, but the man regarded as the chief architect of the reform policies was Deng Xiaoping, a towering figure who had been disgraced several times under Mao, but whose role in China’s twentieth-century history is probably equal to Mao’s. The revival of minority concerns, 1976–1990 It was not long after the fall of the ‘gang of four’ that moves began away from the extremist policies that quartet had instigated. In his speech to the Fifth National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 1978 Hua Guofeng laid some stress on equality and autonomy for minorities, and even called for Han cadres who worked in ethnic areas to learn the local language. Although few followed this prescription, the fact that he saw fit to make it showed a positive attitude towards minorities’ rights in their own areas. In 1980, progress towards a new policy gathered momentum. There were several signs of this, one of them specifically concerning Tibet and discussed below in the relevant section. What they all had in common was a thrust towards a much better deal for minorities. In March the highest-ranking member of a minority published an article in the CCP’s principal ideological journal. The author was Ulanhu (1906–1988), a Mongolian revolutionary of long standing who had joined the CCP as early as 1925 and become a member of that extremely powerful CCP body the Politburo in 1977, in other words somebody who could hardly be ignored. He denounced Cultural Revolutionary policies as reactionary coercive assimilation and likened them to the benighted practices followed under the feudal rulers. He called for immediate change in minority policy, including the strengthening of autonomy, far more expenditure of public money on the ethnic areas and increased training of minority scientific and technical cadres and skilled workers (Ulanhu 1980: 12–16). On 15 July 1980, China’s main newspaper People’s Daily published a long article on issues concerned with nationalities. It accused the ‘gang of four’ and
others of having inflicted a ‘feudal fascist dictatorship’ in the ethnic areas (People’s Daily Special Commentator 1980: 17). However, its main point was to denounce the notion, which Mao and his followers had espoused during the Cultural Revolution, that ethnic issues boiled down fundamentally not to ethnicity but to class. ‘The existence of classes is of much shorter duration than that of nationalities’, it argued. ‘After the withering away of the former, the latter will remain in existence for a long time’ (People’s Daily Special Commentator 1980: 18). The special commentator argued instead (1980: 21) that ethnic problems in China should be solved by strengthening regional autonomy and by ‘gradually eliminating the political, economic and cultural inequalities among the nationalities’. One of the features of the 1980s was its revival of a legal system. Whereas the 1950s saw the introduction of a few formal laws, and the Cultural Revolution downgraded law almost entirely in favour of Maoist administration based on mass participation, the 1980s strove to encode numerous rules and regulations into law. One of the aspects covered was that of the minorities. The Constitution of December 1982 was quite a bit more expansive on the minorities than its 1975 counterpart had been. Article 4 outlawed discrimination against the minorities, and also any acts which might undermine ethnic unity or incite secession. It re-emphasised autonomy for the minorities, but also declared all minority area ‘inalienable parts’ of the PRC (National People’s Congress 1982: 12). The whole of Section VI (Articles 112–22) is devoted to the organs of selfgovernment in the autonomous areas. Among other provisions it declares that the administrative head of an autonomous place must belong to the ethnic group that exercises autonomy in the area concerned (Article 114). Another provision (Article 116) is that congresses in autonomous areas have the right to pass laws applying to the places under their jurisdiction. In such cases the Standing Committee of the NPC has the right to reject the law. But my explorations among minority officials and leaders suggest that it is actually very unusual for that to happen. Much more likely is that the autonomous places negotiate beforehand with the central authorities and make sure that the law is acceptable to the higher level before it is passed at the lower. Just as important as including ethnic affairs in the State Constitution was the fact that it was followed up by the Law of Regional Autonomy, which went into effect in October 1984. This is actually very similar in style and content to the relevant passages of the Constitution, in some places word for word. However, the 1984 Law expands considerably on the various specific aspects of autonomy, in such areas as administration, law, the economy, finance and budgeting, culture and education.6 Despite the very clear advantages of autonomy, it is very important to note major restrictions applying to the policy. The most important is that these autonomy provisions apply only to the government, not to the CCP. In other words, there is no provision that the Party secretary must belong to a relevant minority ethnic group nor that the CCP branch of the autonomous places may adopt rules different from the PRC’s law. The fact that the CCP is actually a much more powerful body in China than is the Chinese government diminishes the extent of autonomy enjoyed by the minority areas.
Yet at both CCP and state level, policy was to increase minority representation in those bodies exercising influence. Success in implementing this policy during the 1980s was mixed. In 1990, minority membership of the CCP was 2.8 million, that is 5.7 per cent of the total of just over 49 million. Although the number was considerably higher than the 700,000 members in 1957, the proportion had gone up only marginally from 5.5 per cent (Mackerras 1994: 157). In terms of total numbers of cadres, however, the figures show a distinct rise. In 1980, less than 3 per cent of cadres belonged to a minority, but by 1990 the proportion had more than doubled to over 6 per cent, with absolute figures doubling from 1.03 million in 1982 to 2.06 million in 1990 (Sautman 1998: 116). It is to be expected that the ethnic groups vary from one another in the representation of cadres. In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, the proportion of Korean cadres (51.2 per cent) outstripped the percentage of Koreans in the total population in the late 1980s (41 per cent). In 1990, more than half the police and judges and most unit leaders throughout the prefecture were Korean (Mackerras 1994: 158–9). In Xinjiang in the 1980s the proportion of cadres belonging to the minorities fluctuated slightly around 45 per cent (Sautman 1998: 117), although the minority ethnic groups constituted well over half the total population throughout the decade. The policy of training cadres belonging to the minorities is one of a series of ‘preferential policies’ (youhui zhengce) introduced in the 1980s. They included quotas for higher education, preference for certain kinds of employment, economic investments in ethnic areas and special measures taken to alleviate poverty there. One of the best known, and most important, ‘preferential policies’ is exemption from the requirement introduced at the end of the 1970s that each couple have no more than one child. In almost all areas restrictions developed in the 1980s affecting minority areas. But, with but few exceptions, they were considerably more lenient than among the Han. The policies of affirmative action do appear to have made quite a bit of difference. In many schools and universities I visited in the 1980s or in 1990 in ethnic areas, I heard that minorities found access easier than Han. The rise in the proportion of China’s minority population was less than 1 per cent between the 1964 and 1982 censuses (5.76 –6.7 per cent). However, it was considerably more than 1 per cent over the much shorter period between the 1982 and 1990 censuses (6.7–8.04 per cent) (Mackerras 1994: 237). The impact of the policies was notable also in the particularly difficult region of Xinjiang which, as noted above, was among those areas where the minority cadres failed to reflect population as a whole. The veteran observer A. Doak Barnett (1993: 377), who had explored China’s far western regions in the late 1940s and revisited the area 40 years later, was impressed by the ‘much larger role than in the past’ that Xinjiang’s minorities were playing both in the leadership and bureaucracies, and even in the intellectual scientific elite. He also quoted a particularly knowledgeable Han Chinese friend as saying to him that the Uygurs in high positions ‘are by no means mere figureheads now; they do have real influence’.
The greater autonomy for minorities and the generally better deal for them in the 1980s brought about massive revivals in traditional culture. Books started to be published in the local languages. Famous traditional buildings were restored and properly maintained. The old performing arts, theatre, dances and music, came back like a flood, not only in their modernised and professionalised forms, but even as part of the old rituals which had sustained them in the old days. And most important of all for many of the minorities, the old religious beliefs, practices and clergies revived very strongly, so that by the end of the 1980s Islam and Tibetan Buddhism had regained a great deal of the social influence they had lost due to the CCP’s revolution. Tibet revisited This last comment brings us to the controversial issue of Tibet. No minority area had suffered more severely due to Chinese rule than this one. The 1959 rebellion had already shown the difficulties China would face in integrating Tibet into China. The Cultural Revolution had been particularly devastating for Tibetan culture. The commitment of its people to religion had made Tibet among the principal targets of the fanatical zealots of the Cultural Revolution, both Han and Tibetan. One of the principal events marking a change in policy towards China’s minorities as a whole was a visit a group led by Hu Yaobang (1915–1989) made to Tibet in the last week of May 1980. At the time Hu was General Secretary of the CCP and second in command after Hua Guofeng, whom he was to replace as CCP chief in the middle of the following year. Hu was shocked by what he found in Tibet and determined to bring about radical change. His ideas were outlined in a major speech he made to 5,000 cadres in Lhasa on 29 May 1980. There were two main thrusts in the content. One was a strategy for improving the situation. He outlined six main tasks, including: ●
implementing autonomy in Tibet fully and letting the Tibetans be the real masters of their own lives; a commitment to relieving the people of taxation, by exempting them from agricultural and animal husbandry taxes over the following three to five years; the adoption of a special policy to revive the Tibetan economy; and an undertaking to increase the number of Tibetan cadres, sending many of the Chinese cadres back east, and to try to improve relations between the Tibetan and Han cadres.
The other main content of Hu’s speech was tantamount to an apology for past actions and policies. ‘We feel that our party has let the Tibetan people down’, he said, adding ‘We feel very bad!’ ‘We have worked nearly thirty years, but the life of the Tibetan people has not been notably improved. Are we not to blame?’ (quoted Wang 1994: 287–8). Many of the Han cadres were privately furious that they were being asked to take some responsibility for policies they had supported, though not devised. But the fact of the matter was that the CCP as a body was admitting that its policies had failed and that it must shoulder the main part of the blame.
The situation certainly did improve in Tibet after Hu’s visit, though probably not as much as he had hoped. The economy was bullish, especially in the countryside that had been the focus of Hu Yaobang’s policy. In the autumn of 1984 the government approved over forty major construction projects in the TAR, designed further to raise economic production and to broaden the scope of development. One problem with this new policy was that it required the introduction of more Han technicians and economic experts, who did not necessarily get on well with the Tibetans or like life in Tibet. Population issues in Tibet and among the Tibetans have been clouded with controversy, with accusations including forced birth control being levelled against the Chinese authorities. These have been discredited in a highly scholarly study (Yan 2000: 11–36), and there seems little reason to doubt that during the 1980s the Tibetans and other minorities of the TAR were generally exempt from the onechild-per-couple policy, which prevailed among the Han almost everywhere in China from the beginning of the 1980s. Two scholars concluded from on-the-spot surveys in the TAR from 1986 to 1988 that the region was ‘actually experiencing high population growth rates rather than suffering a policy of coercive and restrictive birth control’ that was ‘causing population decline and threatening the continued existence of Tibetans’ (Goldstein and Beall 1991: 300). The population of Tibet and of Tibetans in the TAR rose sharply during the 1980s. The 1982 census, taken in the middle of the year, showed the total population of Tibet at 1,892,224, of whom Tibetans numbered 1,786,544, or 94.4 per cent. Another national census, in 1990 and also taken in the middle of the year, showed that the total TAR population had risen to 2,196,010, an average of 1.45 per cent growth per year, much higher than the average annual 0.84 per cent rise between the 1964 and 1982 censuses. In 1990 Tibetans were 2,096,346, or 95.5 per cent of the total, their population rising at an average annual 1.47 per cent since the 1982 census. The Han population sank over the 1982–1990 period from 91,551 to 81,217 with quite a few returning east and only a portion being replaced. In addition, both censuses counted small numbers of other minorities, such as the Moinba and Hui.7 Following Hu Yaobang’s speech, social life became much more relaxed in Tibet. Religion revived very quickly and to a remarkable extent, with the TAR government investing money in the rehabilitation of monasteries. Former monks who had left the monasteries for the laity during the Cultural Revolution resumed their clerical life and even took on disciples to train a younger generation of monks. Another area affected by the more liberal policies of the 1980s was the nationalisation of the Tibetan bureaucracy. Figures suggest a quite dramatic rise in the number of Tibetan cadres, from 29,406 or 54.4 per cent of the total in the TAR in 1981, to 33,000 or 61.35 per cent of the total in 1989.8 However, Shakya (1999: 390) is quite right to point out that the Tibetanisation of the bureaucracy was focused more on the lower than the upper levels. The Chinese government had no intention of relaxing its grip on CCP power in Tibet, nor of letting Tibetans be masters of their own lives to the extent of trying to secede from China. In contrast to the 1950s, they were not prepared to countenance a separate and non-CCP government in Tibet. Still the fact that it was Tibetans who were exercising power at the lower levels definitely made a difference to the way people felt and
gave the impression that the improvements in living standards were due to their own efforts. In 1985 a man who was a member of China’s minorities and not a PLA leader took up the position of CCP Party Secretary in Tibet. This was Wu Jinghua, an Yi, who went out of his way to adopt Tibetan habits and took a liberal line on encouraging Tibetan language and culture to flourish. Moreover, shortly after arriving in Lhasa, he appointed many Tibetans to senior CCP posts. There seemed a good possibility that a Tibetan might become Party Secretary at some stage. A small number of tourists began to visit Tibet in the 1980s, with numbers of overseas tourists controlled within the range of 1,500 to 2,000. After much discussion, authorities decided that more tourism would benefit the region, and in December 1984 the TAR government established a tourist company. Numbers expanded dramatically, with 15,402 in 1985, 30,000 in 1986 and 43,500 in 1987, the highest in history to that point (Duojie and Jiangcun 1995: 534–5). One point of great importance is that the new tourists were very different in kind from those who had gone before. Many were young backpackers from Europe, North America, Japan, Hong Kong and Australia who wanted to taste the Tibetan spirituality that had for long been famous in the West. These young tourists wandered around completely freely, especially in Lhasa and its surroundings, and found no difficulty in hiring bicycles. There were a limited number of hotels, and they were not particularly clean or comfortable. But they were perfectly adequate for the backpackers. Most of the backpackers were solid supporters of Tibetan independence, and a few I met while in Tibet in September and October 1985 told me proudly of their view that it was quite proper to make things difficult for the Chinese. One told me that stirring up trouble was the reason he had come to Tibet. By 1986 the situation was much better in TAR than it had ever been before. ‘This was still China’, writes one authority, ‘but great strides had been made in permitting Tibetan culture and religion to flourish in a region that was still overwhelmingly Tibetan in demographic composition’ (Goldstein 1997: 74). Moreover, policy did not change when Hu Yaobang himself was disgraced and demoted at the beginning of 1987. This was despite the fact that there was a strong faction within the Chinese government that remained suspicious of Hu Yaobang’s and Wu Jinghua’s liberal policies and was very nervous indeed of giving too much freedom to the Tibetans. In the autumn of 1987 events in Lhasa gave reinforcement to the hardline view. On 27 September monks demonstrated in favour of independence for Tibet, leading to some arrests. On 1 October, further demonstrations occurred on behalf of independence but also for the release of the monks arrested 4 days earlier. This time the demonstrations led to a full-scale riot. Police, including Tibetans, fired at the crowd, and casualties resulted. Further unrest followed in Tibet. On 5 March, the last day of a large-scale ceremony for the Great Prayer Festival, a violent riot erupted, which the police forcibly suppressed. However, the riot had two results of long-lasting significance. One was that the clampdown ‘further drew the mass of people to the side of the radical nationalists’ (Goldstein 1997: 83). The other was that film footage
was secretly taken of police beating monks in Lhasa; this was smuggled out of China and has been frequently shown on Western televisions since. From 5 to 7 March 1989 anti-Chinese demonstrations again took place in Lhasa in preparation for a celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the 1959 uprising. Serious violence erupted between police and demonstrators, with looting of Han Chinese houses and shops and quite a few casualties, making the trouble the worst since 1959. The Chinese authorities in Beijing declared martial law on 7 March, to take effect from midnight the same day. Martial Law Decree 1 (reproduced in Harris and Jones 2000: 55) commanded that ‘assemblies, demonstrations, strikes by workers, students and other people, petitions, and other get-togethers are strictly forbidden’ during the time martial law remained in force. This was the first time in the PRC’s history that the government had declared martial law anywhere in China.9 Observing these events from 1987 to 1989 the hardliners on Tibet within the Chinese government were feeling themselves more and more vindicated. Already in December 1988 the Han leader Hu Jintao, destined for leadership of the whole country in 2002, replaced Wu Jinghua as CCP secretary, and his line had proved more decisive in suppressing disorder. Meanwhile, Beijing was itself wracked by demonstrations from April to June 1989. Martial law was again declared, this time in the capital of China itself, and the demonstrations were forcibly suppressed in the terrible Beijing Massacre of the night of 3–4 June 1989. The result was that the central government rethought its attitudes, including on Tibet. Late in 1989 the Politburo formalised the new policy, which was based on an attempt to step up modernisation under the clear political assumption that separatism would be totally banned. Strands of policy included sending better educated Han to Tibet, educating young Tibetan cadres better with focus on loyalty to the PRC, strengthening the CCP structure at all levels in Tibet, and stepping up the security apparatus significantly with enhanced surveillance equipment (see Goldstein 1997: 92–3). There was no hint of a return to the Cultural Revolution days, and Tibetans could continue to practise their religion and culture and speak their own language. But the proviso was clear that anybody who used religion to destabilise the political situation or urge independence for Tibet would be trodden on immediately and firmly. Martial law was lifted in Lhasa on 1 May 1990.
The minorities in China’s foreign relations, 1949–1990 In the 40 years or so from the establishment of the PRC, minorities contributed to improving or worsening relations between China and foreign countries, especially with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, except in the case of Tibet and the Tibetans, minorities were not actually causal factors in China’s foreign relations. The Koreans were a factor in China’s participation in the Korean War (1950–1953), but not the reason why China sent troops to Korea. China’s relations with the MPR in the PRC’s first four decades were largely a function of relations with the Soviet Union, and the Mongolians in China were hardly a primary factor. The fact that relations deteriorated rapidly in 1963–1964, not long after China
and the MPR signed their Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance in May 1960, was due mainly to the state of Sino-Soviet relations at the time, and although the Mongolians of Inner Mongolia were involved in the dispute they were a peripheral factor in a relationship which would have deteriorated anyway. The recovery of relations with the MPR in the 1980s was also linked with the mainly simultaneous improvement in those with the Soviet Union. Xinjiang’s border with the Soviet Union made the region important for SinoSoviet relations. The fact that minorities on the Chinese side of the border were co-nationals with those on the Soviet side affected the relationship, but not usually centrally. The most important incident involving minorities and contributing towards a worsening Sino-Soviet relationship took place in 1962. From April to late summer a crisis erupted in Yining (which the Uygurs call Gulja), very close to the border with the Soviet Union. About 50,000 people, mostly Kazaks and Uygurs, fled across the borders to the Soviet Union. Chinese attempts to prevent them resulted in serious riots which troops were finally despatched to suppress, with casualties and arrests following. These events certainly worsened SinoSoviet relations, especially since each side was moved to make hostile statements about the other’s motives and actions. But the crisis took place at a time when other factors had, since the late 1950s, made the relationship take a decisive turn for the worse anyway. They were as much a result as a cause of bad relations. Sino-Soviet relations remained very bad indeed until the mid-1980s. But the factors making them so hostile had more to do with the Cultural Revolution, the role of Mao Zedong, and the general world geopolitical balance of power than with Xinjiang’s minorities. It is true that Xinjiang’s border with the Soviet Union was an extremely sensitive one, and even on occasion the site of armed clashes (notably on 10 June and 13 August 1969). However, these had nothing to do with the minorities. The minorities of Xinjiang were relatively quiescent during the 1970s and 1980s, even though there was quite a bit of instability there due to factors such as Han youths sent from the east during the Cultural Revolution. The point to emphasise is that by 1989 both China and the Soviet Union wanted better bilateral relations. In sharp contrast to the situation in the early 1960s, neither wished to take advantage of the other’s woes for its own benefit. If anything ethnic issues added to an already improving relationship, but they were not focal in determining the direction it would take. Tibet and the Tibetans, 1949–1989 Alone among the ethnic areas of China, Tibet was a primary cause for disintegration of relations in two instances: with India in the late 1950s and early 1960s; and with the United States in the late 1980s. The Indians were never happy with the Chinese takeover of Tibet in the early 1950s. Indeed, as Dawa Norbu (2001: 291–2) notes, India remained emotionally and culturally involved in Tibet throughout this period. However, India was the first non-communist country to recognise the PRC, at the end of 1949, and from then until the end of the 1950s the two countries enjoyed very good relations indeed. They shared important interests in terms of a shared resistance to imperialism
and colonialism, among other matters. Both were keen exponents of the ‘five principles of coexistence’ and were proud to take part in the Conference of Afro-Asian states held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. Indian Prime Minister Nehru visited China in October 1954, while China’s Premier Zhou Enlai had been to India earlier the same year and made further trips there in 1956 and 1957. On the debit side was a border dispute left over from the days of the British Raj in India. While relations were so good, this dispute did not matter, though it tended to worsen from 1956 on. It was the flight of the Dalai Lama to India following the rebellion of March 1959 which gave the border dispute ‘a new dimension and therefore qualitatively a new character’ (Ojha 1969: 160) at a time when both sides were still trying to maintain friendly relations. Following the rebellion, the Dalai Lama fled Lhasa on 17 March 1959, entering India 2 weeks later. His representatives immediately began interceding with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on his behalf. On 16 April the Dalai Lama issued a statement very condemnatory of China and met Nehru himself later the same month. Nehru was caught in a no-win situation. He was under serious pressure from most political forces in India to turn against China. He issued a statement in which he tried to show sympathy both for the Tibetans and the Chinese. China was in no doubt about its position. It denounced various forces for the rebellion, including Nehru’s India, and condemned Nehru himself as counter-revolutionary. Later developments are well known and need no recapitulation here. The Dalai Lama was granted asylum in India and set up a government-in-exile there. SinoIndian relations deteriorated to the point where the two countries fought a bitter border war in October and November 1962. Their relations showed but very little improvement until the 1980s, the Dalai Lama’s residence in India being one of the causes of the deep freeze. Great improvements in bilateral relations were signalled when, in December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian prime minister to visit China for 34 years, even meeting with Deng Xiaoping. However, the Tibetan issue and the Dalai Lama’s continuing residence in India remained a thorn in the side of the two countries’ mutual relations. Tibet has also played a role in China’s relations with the United States. One book, devoting a full chapter to Tibet in Sino-American relations over the period 1948 to 1998, adds the subtitle ‘from secret service to public pressure’ (Norbu 2001: 263–82). In the 1950s and 1960s, when Sino-American relations were at their worst point in history, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) actively supplied training, money and weaponry in support of a guerilla war against the Chinese, with many thousands of casualties (Sarin and Sonam 1998). A report in the Los Angeles Times of 16 July 1998 claimed that the CIA provided the Tibetan independence movement with US$ 1.7 annually from the early 1960s, reducing to $1.2 million in 1968, the Dalai Lama receiving $180,000 per year. China held the United States partly responsible for the uprising of 1959 in Lhasa. Hardly anybody other than the United States President and the CIA Director knew what was going on at the time, certainly not the public (Norbu 2001: 271). The end of the 1960s and early 1970s saw a spectacular improvement in SinoAmerican relations, leading to the formal establishment of diplomatic relations at the beginning of 1979. In response, the CIA reduced its support for Tibetan
resistance, stopping it completely in 1974. The period from then until 1987 represented the acme of bilateral relations under the PRC. However, it was the issue of Tibet that marked the first major point of deterioration. Before dealing with this subject in detail, it is necessary to note that the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile took the cue from the beginnings of reform in China to launch its own diplomacy aimed at reconsidering the status of Tibet and effecting the Dalai Lama’s return home. From August 1979 onwards several delegations visited Tibet from Dharamsala and, to the surprise and dismay of the Chinese authorities, received a rapturous welcome from the people there. There were also two delegations sent to China in 1982 and 1984 representing the Dalai Lama, which held formal negotiations with the Chinese over Tibet. The main demand of the Tibetan side, at least at the second meeting, was the ‘creation of a demilitarized Greater Tibet with complete internal political autonomy’ (Goldstein 1997: 73), with Greater Tibet meaning not just the TAR, but also all Tibetan areas in China.10 The Chinese negotiators were not interested in such demands, and the negotiations got nowhere. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama began travelling more actively throughout the world. In 1973 he had made his first visit to the West and in 1979 went to the Soviet Union and the MPR for the first time. In the second half of the 1980s, the Dalai Lama strove quite consciously to step up the pressure in what one author (Shakya 1999: 412) has termed the ‘internationalisation of the Tibet issue’. Western countries, including governments, were quite receptive to this campaign because moral issues like human rights, the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples were starting to take priority over the ideological divide between Marxism–Leninism and liberal capitalism. In June 1987 the American Congress passed a bill declaring Tibet an occupied country and endorsing many of the claims about Tibet’s history and the situation there made by the Dalai Lama’s followers. Even more provocative, the Dalai Lama himself made his first political speech in the United States on 21 September 1987. Speaking before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, he called for Tibet, including not just the TAR but all Tibetan areas, to be transformed into a ‘zone of peace’, from which all Chinese troops and military installations should be withdrawn. He also asked for earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples (Goldstein 1997: 77). It is not surprising that when the pro-independence demonstrations began in Lhasa just 6 days later, the Chinese blamed them directly on the Dalai Lama and American interference in their affairs. One Tibetan account alleges that it was ‘the Chinese denigration’ of the speech, rather than the speech itself, which sparked off the demonstrations (Wangyal 1994: 202). In my opinion, this formulation shifts blame but does not change the fact that the speech was the primary immediate cause of the demonstrations. When the Dalai Lama was stirring up trouble for them in Washington, it was simply not an option for the Chinese to do nothing, or to do other than forcefully disagree with him. Sino-American relations declined further after the riots, with the American Administration under President Ronald Reagan taking the side of the Tibetans
against the Chinese on human rights grounds, but nevertheless stopping short of withdrawing recognition of Tibet as part of China. At the end of the year Reagan endorsed the view from Congress that the treatment of the Tibetans should be an important factor in American relations with the PRC; and that the United States should urge the PRC to establish constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama on the future of Tibet. American attitudes towards developments in Tibet continued to remain condemnatory as the disturbances of 1988 and 1989 unfolded. The crisis and crackdown in Beijing itself in 1989 brought human rights even more decisively to centre stage in China’s relations with the West, especially the United States, and greatly hardened feeling in the West against China. But Tibet had preceded it and, in any case, retained an indefinite and high priority as a determinant in relations. The Dalai Lama continued his attempts to internationalise the Tibet issue in the late 1980s and may have thought that continued pressure at this stage would yield concrete results in terms of his wish for a change in the status of Tibet. His next major move was a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 June 1988. He proposed that the whole of the TAR and all other Tibetan areas should become a self-governing democratic political entity in association with the PRC, with the Chinese government retaining responsibility for Tibet’s foreign policy. This was not exactly independence, but much closer than the Chinese were prepared to accept. After some deliberation, they rejected the proposal as an indirect form of independence. The Dalai Lama’s Strasbourg proposals also came up against strong resistance from among his own supporters and in 1991 he withdrew them. In January 1989, the Panchen Lama died of a heart attack in Tibet. This was a considerable blow to the Chinese, since he had been generally supportive of Chinese policy and, as the most authoritative of Tibetan lamas after the Dalai Lama, he had played a role extremely useful for Chinese policy. The Chinese Buddhist Association invited the Dalai Lama to Beijing for the funeral, ‘letting it be known that this would be a good time for him to discuss the political situation informally with top Chinese officials’ (Goldstein 1997: 90). However, on the advice of the exiled Tibetan leadership, he declined the invitation. Events over the rest of 1989 spelled the end of dialogue with the Chinese authorities, at least for the time being. The riots in Lhasa and imposition of martial law hardly pointed to an atmosphere in which constructive dialogue would be possible. Finally, it may have been a triumph for Tibetans in exile that the Dalai Lama won the Nobel Peace Prize at the end of the year. But for China it was a humiliation and major setback of the kind that foreclosed dialogue.
Conclusion The Cultural Revolution was politically the worst period the minorities suffered in the twentieth century. Yet economically it was certainly no worse than the years 1958–1962. Other years of the PRC down to 1989 were definite improvements on the first half of the century politically, socially and economically, and, even in
Tibet, the first years of the reform period witnessed unprecedented prosperity and social and political promise. It seems to me fair to argue that domestically the PRC was overall an advance on the period that preceded it. In terms of the difficulties the minorities occasioned for China in its foreign relations, the first 40 years of the PRC were far from easy ones. Many of the border areas were quite unstable. The most serious problems were along the borders with the Soviet Union and in Tibet. The obsession with the Soviet threat from the 1960s to the early 1980s made Xinjiang a very sensitive area for China. And of course the problems in Tibet and the perception of American and Indian involvement could not but be very damaging to China’s relations with Western countries. Yet if we compare the PRC with the first half of the twentieth century in the way minorities impacted on China’s foreign relations we again see improvement. In Xinjiang Soviet intervention was more serious during the 1930s and 1940s than at any time in the second half of the twentieth century. And at least none of China was occupied by a foreign power under the PRC. This was in contrast with the preceding period when Japanese troops occupied many of the Mongolian regions and the Korean areas, not to mention those of the Manchus and other minorities of the northeastern regions of China. Globalisation is certainly not a word we can associate with the minorities in China during the period 1949 –1990. It is true we see strong Soviet influence in the 1950s. On the other hand, what is most striking is local isolation, the precise opposite of globalisation. Moreover, the Cultural Revolution decade probably saw the minority areas more tightly cut off from the rest of the world, and in some cases even the rest of China, than any other period in the twentieth century. In other words, if globalisation is the measure there was scope for immense expansion from 1989 on. Yet the last few years of this period definitely see some signs that a process of globalisation was beginning. There was reference in this chapter to the ‘internationalisation’ of the Tibet issue in the second half of the 1980s. In addition, I have suggested above that the Dalai Lama’s speech before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington in September 1987 was a major spark for the independence demonstrations occurring shortly afterwards. The influx of tourism into Tibet in the mid-1980s certainly exercised some influence on developments in Tibet itself. And at the same time the beginnings of tourism into minority areas elsewhere, not to mention scholarly visits there, both features of the 1980s, can be seen as representing an early stage of internationalisation after the isolation of the Cultural Revolution. So when does ‘internationalisation’ become globalisation. The latter can be understood as a more extreme and widespread, a later and more highly developed form of internationalisation. Already in the late 1980s the West and India were both involved in Tibet, as well as several other countries. However, on the whole, international involvement was still at a fairly low level and very patchy in its impact. Certainly it was to gather momentum enormously over the following years. It was ‘internationalisation’, but it was not yet globalisation.
Minorities politics, 1989–2002
China has become noticeably more nationalist since the early 1990s. This trend is both reactive and proactive. The reactive process has developed in response to outside pressures, especially from the United States. From the point of view of ethnic minorities, the most important source of this nationalism is the constant criticism over China’s human rights record, notably that over Tibet and other minority areas. However, the growth in nationalism results also from internal factors like the continuing growth in the Chinese economy, its resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in mid-1997 and Macau at the end of 1999, and its strategic power in the world. It seems evident that Chinese nationalism is in tension with any rise in minority identities. This is because the state will give even less space than formerly to any form of ethnonationalism, such as is quite likely to flow from ethnic consciousness. One scholar has even coined the phrase ‘essentializing the Han’ (Gladney 1994: 98), highlighting how the majority Han have represented China’s minorities as exotic as a means of marking out their own identity and promoting their own nationalism. The tension between ethnic identities and Chinese nationalism may mirror that between globalisation and localisation. Chinese markets will open further because the country has joined the WTO, and China will be even more subject to ideas and social trends from outside than it was beforehand. But Chinese nationalism is likely to remain strong, and could even strengthen. The increased globalising influences that have followed China’s entry into the WTO could inspire a strengthening of a wish among the ethnic minorities to maintain their own differences in political, economic, social and cultural terms.
Overall policies and realities China underwent a major crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The main event for the country as a whole was the suppression of the student movement early in June 1989; but for the minorities the independence movements in Tibet from 1987 to 1989 and the Muslim uprising in Akto County, Xinjiang, in April 1990. These disturbances inevitably produced some effect on policy, and there is some discussion of these changes for Tibet and Xinjiang in later sections of this chapter.
However, what is most striking for the country as a whole is not how great the policy changes but how little. For a tense period of over 18 months from June 1989, many people wondered if the reform policies might be reversed, despite disclaimers to the contrary. Then in February 1992 Deng Xiaoping came out of retirement to make his ‘southern journey’ to Shanghai and various places in Guangdong, including the successful first ‘special economic zone’ Shenzhen, just over the border from Hong Kong. During his visits he emphasised his support for the open economy and pushed reform as hard as he could. The message was crystal clear. There could be no further doubt that, despite the crisis of 1989, reform in the direction of free enterprise was not only to continue but accelerate. Just before Deng made his pronouncements affecting the country as a whole, CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin gave a major speech on ethnic affairs. His forum was the opening session, on 14 January 1992, of the First National Conference on Ethnic Affairs, co-sponsored by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, in other words an occasion with a great deal of political clout. Jiang made it quite clear that the CCP and government were determined to maintain national unity and had no intention of yielding to any demands for independence from any minority area. On the other hand, he intended to keep to the policies of ethnic autonomy and helping all minorities to develop themselves. He also emphasised the importance of economic development in the ethnic areas, so that they could keep pace with the rest of the country, and social welfare for minority peoples (‘Party Chief’ 1992: 5). In essence, Jiang Zemin was telling the minorities that they would get preferential policies and treatment if they opted to stay within China, with plenty of economic and other incentives and an improving standard of living. However, the government would not tolerate separatism and would immediately suppress any attempt at secession on the part of any ethnic group. This set of policies has remained essentially unchanged into the twenty-first century. In his last report to the Ninth National People’s Congress, delivered on 5 March 1998 just before stepping down as premier in favour of Zhu Jongji, Li Peng claimed that ethnic unity and social stability had been consolidated throughout the country. Despite the troubles that had occurred only about a year before in Xinjiang, which he did not mention, Li went on to assert (1998:12) that ‘socialist ethnic relations’ had improved due to the guaranteeing of equal rights for ethnic groups and autonomy for ethnic minority areas. Notwithstanding his relatively optimistic assessment, it seems that in 1999, the Chinese government decided to upgrade ethnic issues, by focusing more strongly on improvements both in the economy and in the social life of the people of a kind that would make them more content with life in the PRC and hence less prone to rebellious movements. One major sign of this upgrading of ethnic affairs was the reconvening of the irregular Central Ethnic Work Conference late in September and early in October 1999. Both CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji attended, and both called for better handling of ethnic issues. The media highlighted Jiang Zemin’s mention of other countries as warnings that poor treatment of ethnic issues can lead to war and foreign intervention. He was referring
Minorities politics 39 of course to Kosovo and East Timor, both of which had exploded on the world earlier in the year, East Timor only a matter of weeks before the meeting (Sautman 2002: 98–9). In both cases, brutal oppression by the current sovereign power had led to foreign intervention. Serbian ‘ethnic cleansing’ provoked NATO intervention in Kosovo, while an Australian-led United Nations force moved to restore order in East Timor following rampages by pro-Indonesian militia. Within a few months of this Conference, the government decided to shift the focus of economic construction from the eastern coastal provinces to the western regions. This will be considered in Chapter 4. Because most of the ethnic areas, including especially Tibet and Xinjiang, lie in the western areas, and because it is so important to policy, it requires at least a mention here. Another result of the Central Ethnic Work Conference of autumn 1999 was the Chinese government’s February 2001 adoption of an amended version of the Law on Regional National Autonomy, originally passed in 1984 (see Chapter 2) (Sautman 2002: 99). The amended version is slightly longer than the original, with 74 articles in the new as against 67 in the old and clauses added to several of the existing articles. There are no differences in substance, and in particular Article 2 of both versions is equally insistent that ‘all national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People’s Republic of China’. Still, it is worth noting that the additions in the new version are all in the direction of strengthened autonomy. Some examples are noted elsewhere in this book. One illustration relevant here is in Article 20, which concerns the ability of autonomous governments to deviate from those state instructions that do not suit the conditions of a particular autonomous area. The 1984 version (given Kaup 2000: 188) stipulates that the autonomous government may simply cease implementing such instructions after receiving approval from the higher state organ. The 2001 version (pp. 8–9, 41) imposes a time limit of 60 days on the higher state organ to give such approval. The reason for this addition is that experience showed some state organs simply did nothing, leaving the autonomous government in a bind on how to proceed. Chinese bureaucracy is – and has always been – expert at the technique of delaying and refusing to give answers. The implication of the addition is that delay of more than 60 days is equivalent to approval. Since 1990, the government appears to have strengthened its insistence both that China’s borders shall remain unchanged, and that autonomy for ethnic minorities should become more meaningful. Obviously there is some tension between these two demands, because some ethnic groups prefer outright independence to autonomy, however great its extent. But the two demands in some ways balance each other, because some people do in fact see advantages in remaining part of a comparatively successful state where their lives have indeed greatly improved. Some realities of autonomy The practice of autonomy has led to a strong sense of ethnic identity among many, perhaps most, of the minorities. In later sections of this chapter several prominent examples of the most intense forms of ethnic identity or nationalism will come
under discussion. However, the expressions of this ethnic identity vary significantly from place to place and from group to group. In very few does it lead to major problems for the state. The privileges extended to minorities under the autonomy policy have resulted in a push for recognition of additional groups by the state, though so far all such attempts have failed, and the number of acknowledged minorities has remained at fifty-five since 1979. A prominent example of a potential extra ethnic group is the Mosuo, who straddle the Yunnan-Sichuan border, most of them on the Yunnan side, and are currently categorised as a branch of the Naxi. During a visit to the Mosuo area in January 1996 I found quite a strong feeling that they were separate from the Naxi. When I interviewed a village head during a visit to their territory in January 1996, he told me that he would be better able to bargain with authorities if he represented a ‘minority nationality’, rather than simply a branch of one. Harrell (2001: 219) reports being asked by a prominent Mosuo member of the Ninglang County CCP Committee, and hence hardly a dissident member of society, to apply foreign pressure on the Chinese government to have the Mosuo recognised as a separate nationality. His argument was that the Mosuo were completely separate from the Naxi, and had ‘mistakenly got lumped in with them’ due to errors in the identification process in the 1950s (Harrell 2001: 218). One example of prominent ethnic identity comes from the Hui, who live scattered over most of China and are recognised mainly through their adherence to Islam. One major work on the Hui has it that ‘the Hui people, once members primarily of religious communities, through interacting with changing social contexts and state policy now very much see themselves as a bona fide ethnic group’ with a pronounced ethnic identity (Gladney 1991: 323). The Hui have all along insisted on their right to practise Islam, including abstaining from pork. Since 1975, the year of the Shadian Incident mentioned in Chapter 2, the Hui have been quite loyal to the Chinese state and serious disturbances involving them have been quite rare. The worst one occurred on 12 December 2000. Somebody placed a pig’s head outside a mosque in Yangxin County, Shandong, intended as and certainly seen as an absolute insult to the Islamic faith, and, when Muslims protested, a clash ensued with police resulting in the deaths of six people. What is important in this context is that the authorities came down on the side of the Hui over this incident. According to People’s Daily (22 August 2001), six local officials were held responsible and investigated for criminal proceedings, having made ‘inappropriate decisions’ in dealing with the protest. Obviously, the state does not see its interests as best served by inciting discontent among the Hui when there is no question of separatism. Some ethnic groups do not care very much about their ethnicity. I have myself interviewed heads of ethnic villages in western Hunan and elsewhere who are quite open about their interest in being counted as ethnic only because of the privileges it brings in terms of such matters as family planning. Another factor is loyalty not so much either to one’s own ethnic group or to China, as to one’s own locality. Based on research among China’s most populous minority in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, one specialist argues that localism still overrides nationalism among the Zhuang. By that she means that ‘villagers tend
Minorities politics 41 to have a stronger sense of loyalty to their locality than to their ethnic group’ (Palmer 1997: 284). She regards this triumph of localism over nationalism as one important factor restricting further Zhuang mobilisation and preventing it from ever leading to a viable secessionist movement, despite the recent growth of Zhuang ethnic consciousness (Kaup 2000: 174). I believe these comments would apply with equal validity to a wide range of ethnic minorities in China. Yunnan’s ethnic groups appear on the whole to be quite happy to remain part of the PRC, even while they are active in maintaining and developing their own ethnic cultures and may have complaints against the Han-dominated society. Based on research among the Dai, Bai and the Muslim Hui of Yunnan Province, Susan McCarthy (2000: 108) has argued that ethnic minority cultural activism, including linguistic promotion and religious education, is quite capable of expressing a belonging to the Chinese nation, not just to minority consciousness. In her words, it can represent ‘claims derived from a Chinese political identity, a conception of minority membership in the Chinese national community’. She argues that such activism can become subversive depending in part on the reception it gets from ordinary people, and on the stance of the state, but it does not necessarily do so (McCarthy 2000: 116). She found extensive cultural activism among the three ethnic minorities, most of it leading more to feelings of being part of China than to any separatist feelings. Ethnic CCP members and cadres One of the issues that bears on a sense of ethnic importance is participation in such bodies as government, Party and the professions. Certainly, the wish to give ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples more power to control their own destiny has become a global trend at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It is true that not many countries have realised anything approaching what the ethnic groups themselves regard as ideal. But the effort is recognisably part of globalisation. One of the clauses the February 2001 amended Law on Regional Autonomy added to the original version was to improve recruitment opportunities in the government for members of local ethnic minorities. Although the earlier version had stipulated training cadres at various levels and enjoined preferential treatment for specialised ethnic personnel and professionals in various kinds of construction in the autonomous areas, the requirement of affirmative action for government positions is new.1 The difference may not be great, but the new provision cannot harm the sense of self-empowerment of ethnic minorities. The NPC is the highest level of government in China, though not of the CCP. A new NPC is chosen every fifth year, the Seventh holding its first session in 1988, the Eighth in 1993 and the Ninth in 1998. The percentage of ethnic participation reached its height in 1988, with 15 per cent of membership. In 1993 and 1998 the proportion declined slightly to 14.75 and 14.37 per cent, respectively. The CCP is China’s main power-holding group, and the inclusion of ethnic minorities is therefore important. The record shows that since 1990 ethnic representation has increased, both in absolute numbers and proportionately. In that year there were 2.8 million CCP members among the minorities, accounting
for 5.7 per cent of the total membership of about 49 million. By 1995 the comparable figures were 3.19 million ethnic members, 5.8 per cent of the total of 55 million CCP members. The figures for mid-2001 were that the CCP had grown to 64.5 million members altogether, among whom 4 million belonged to ethnic minorities, in other words 6.2 per cent of the total.2 Still, given that the census of November 2000 showed the minorities at 8.41 per cent of China’s total population, their membership in the CCP still does not reflect their proportion among the people in the country as a whole. Xinjiang is an ethnic region with particular sensitivities and is worth special mention. Figures from Xinjiang show that in 1997 there were altogether some 958,000 CCP members, among whom about 358,000 were from the minorities, that is 37.37 per cent (XUAR 1998: 49). On the other hand, the percentage of the minorities in the total population of Xinjiang at the same time was about 61.6 per cent (XUAR 1998: 9), meaning that the proportion belonging to the CCP was very much lower than that in the population as a whole. The great majority of the ethnic population is Muslim, and many of them are disaffected with the CCP and its rule in Xinjiang anyway. Under these circumstances, what is surprising is not that the CCP membership is so low, but that it is as high as it is. Turning to all categories of cadres in China, not just the CCP members, we find that the numbers are actually somewhat lower. This is because to become a cadre usually requires more professional qualifications than political reliability, though the latter is always important in China. The number of ethnic cadres in 1990 was 1.02 million, or about 6.6 per cent of the total (see figures in Mackerras 1994: 157). A work conference of June 2000 specifically dedicated to the issue of minority cadres gave further relevant national figures. It claimed that at the end of 1999 there were 2.824 million minority cadres, representing 6.9 per cent of the total national figure of just less than 41 million. The increase in the number of minority cadres since 1993 had been altogether 452,000, that is an average 3 per cent a year (Zhai and Zhang 2000: 1). The proportion of ethnic cadres to the total has thus not risen much over the 1990s, though the absolute number increased significantly. Moreover, it remains lower than their percentage in the total population. In Xinjiang, the reflection of ethnic cadres among the Region’s total rose from 240,000 or 46 per cent in 1990 (Sautman 1998: 117) to 312,000 or 48.83 per cent in 1997 (XUAR 1998: 49). The proportion may have risen but remains well below the 61.6 per cent the ethnic minorities take up of Xinjiang’s total population. The Tibet Autonomous Region shows a more rapidly rising pattern but still with Tibetans not even nearly reflecting their proportion in the total population. The number of Tibetan cadres rose from about two-thirds of the total in the early 1990s (Mackerras 1994: 158) to 74.9 per cent in 1998 (Information Office 1999: 23). In Inner Mongolia in 1996, there were 137,000 Mongolian officials, representing nearly 19 per cent of all officials (Cui 1997: 13), whereas Mongolians were only 3.65 million of the total population of Inner Mongolia of 23 million, or 15.9 per cent (Wuliji 1997: 10). In the late 1990s, the proportion of ethnic cadres in the whole country who were members of the CCP was 37.7 per cent. More than 40 per cent of ethnic cadres were aged below 40, while three-quarters had graduated from senior
Minorities politics 43 middle school or above. About two-thirds were engaged in professional and/or technical work (Chen 1999: 13). What do all these statistics mean? One factor on which these figures are comparatively silent is the locus of political power. Are the cadres and CCP members mainly at the bottom of the heap, simply doing what they are told? Perhaps most of them are, but one could ask precisely the same question about the Han majority. The figures suggest, I believe, that the ethnic minorities have gone some way towards gaining influence within their own communities. There appears to be some kind of self-empowerment process going on, and central authorities seem keen to promote it, as long as they do not have to sacrifice their own power. It is important that the number and proportion of CCP members has grown since 1990. However, there are still serious shortcomings in the extent to which ethnic people truly run the affairs of their own regions, which means that autonomy has a way to go before it can be said to be truly genuine.
The human rights issue Human rights are among the most important of those discourses that we can associate with globalisation. They are also an area of international concern that has already necessitated concessions from China and especially since its accession to the WTO. Though far from new in the early 1990s, human rights concerns have accelerated since then to assume a dominant position in global discussions of the state of the planet. Certainly they remain controversial, but at the beginning of the twenty-first century, few power-holders can ignore issues such as how minorities, women or workers are treated in areas or enterprises under their control. Human rights activists and organisations have grown enormously in the influence they are able to wield, including on governments. As explained in the Introduction, the year 1989 was a very important one for human rights discourse in China, because of worldwide horror over the Beijing massacre of June that year. The document that began China’s human rights diplomacy in 1991 included a section on minorities, presenting a very bright picture of conditions in ethnic minority areas against the background of the misery the CCP found when it came to power (Information Office 1991: 32–6). It was glowing about the success of regional autonomy and the equal rights minorities enjoyed with the Han, adding (p. 33) that ‘the minority nationalities enjoy some special rights accorded to them by law’, a reference to the preferential policies dictated by the government. Some of these preferential policies are covered both in this and other chapters. As in many other countries, minorities have been increasingly prepared to show anger at behaviour showing insensitivity towards their cultures, customs and other aspects of their ethnicity. Chinese society is not short of racists and my own and others’ impressional evidence shows many signs of conduct that minorities find insulting and degrading. On the private level, it is as difficult to cope with such behaviour as in other countries. On the public level, however, the law is in theory prepared to step in to protect the equal rights of minorities. This is a trend that appears well in accord with globalisation processes.
One area of concern is the media and publications. On 7 June 1994, various senior government bodies, including the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Culture, issued a notice expressing alarm at the offence given to the minorities through the lack of sensitivity shown in some publications, media outlets and literature and art works. The notice mentioned several specific items, including the book Sexual Customs, which had caused a furore and widespread Muslim protests in 1989 by several comparisons insulting to Muslims, such as likening the structure of a mosque to male genitalia.3 Some of the content in the above books and articles has seriously hurt the feelings of the minority nationalities and aroused righteous indignation and strong protest from the relevant ethnic minorities. It has given rise to serious consequences, and become an untoward factor impacting on current ethnic relations and social stability in our country. Some have had an unfortunate influence outside China, damaging our country’s international reputation. If we do not give such matters our most earnest attention and take necessary preventative measures, similarly serious, or even more serious, phenomena are bound to recur. This could even go to the extent of affecting our country’s reform and opening up to the outside world and the smooth conduct of economic and social construction, and of influencing our country’s social stability. (Economic Department 1995: 45) The notice contains a number of provisions for correcting these harmful trends. It calls for outlets to publish material more likely to improve ethnic relations and forbids the publication of material insensitive or insulting to any ethnic minority. The case of the media and publications raises the very thorny issue of censorship. In Western countries people argue strongly over where it is legitimate to defend minority rights in entertainment, the media and publications by forbidding certain types of material, and where such bans cross the border into unjustifiable censorship; and different countries and territories within them have different laws governing such matters. Comparing the early twenty-first century with the 1960s and 1970s, however, there has been a swing back towards more acceptance of censorship in many parts of the world, and it is partly associated with demands from ethnic minorities for sensitivity for their cultures. In China, this debate is much less pressing than in the West. Censorship is far more pervasive, even to the extent that many people in the West regard it as a human rights abuse. The Chinese state is not reluctant to take measures to suppress publications it believes will harm ethnic unity. If an argument or legal case ensues regarding minority rights, it will normally side with the ethnic party. The case of the Yangxin riots of December 2000 is a good illustrative example. In April 1996 authorities decided against screening the Australian film Babe in China, in which the star is a talking pig, because of fear of upsetting Muslims. The major exception is when there is a question of secession or perceived threats to the state, a matter on which the Chinese authorities have been very concerned, even obsessed, since the late 1980s.
Minorities politics 45 Among the succession of ‘white papers’ the PRC State Council’s Information Office put out on human rights issues was one published in September 1999 dealing exclusively with the treatment of ethnic minorities (Information Office 1999). Covering political, economic, social demographic and cultural issues and full of facts and figures, the document presented a picture of enormous progress and improvements in the livelihood of the ethnic minorities. One of the claims put forward in the document was respect for the ‘folkways and customs’ of the ethnic minorities, and preservation of their cultural heritage (Information Office 1999: 30–3). This account could hardly be more different from the claims put forward by human rights activists, especially those in the West. One of the most striking things about these activist groups is that they take their information and perceptions largely from diasporas, groups of people who have themselves taken refuge from China and are keen to increase their influence in their new homes. Given that worldwide refugee movements and diasporas are among the notable features of globalisation, it is obvious that this process has ordained a selection in favour of particular ethnic groups. Human rights: Tibet and Xinjiang Among the diasporas, by far the most important is the Tibetans’, that ‘steady flow of refugees into Nepal and into a Tibetan diaspora that has rooted exiles in foreign lands around the world’ (Schell 2000: 273). There are other groups, which include the Uygurs, the Mongolians and the Miao, but their influence in human rights terms is minimal by comparison with the Tibetans. The reason is largely to do with the figure of the Dalai Lama, there being no comparable figure among the other ethnic groups, either inside China or outside. I return to this question in Chapter 7, and it requires no further coverage here. Bodies such as Amnesty International, Asia Watch (renamed Human Rights Watch/Asia) and the United States State Department have issued regular reports on human rights in Asia. Accusations of human rights abuses against China’s ethnic minorities since before the early 1990s have focused almost entirely on the Tibetans and, since the late 1990s, the Uygurs as well.4 Human rights activists and bodies such as Amnesty International have issued many criticisms that arbitrary arrests have taken place among both peoples, with condemnations but no fair trials. Other frequent bases for accusations of human rights abuses are excessive Han immigration into Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as religious persecution on the pretext of suppressing separatism. As regards the case of Tibet, human rights activists regarded issues like the Chinese determination on the identity of the Eleventh Panchen Lama in 1995 and the ban on pictures of the Dalai Lama in 1996 (see Chapter 5) as infringements of human rights. The boy the Dalai Lama nominated as the Eleventh Panchen Lama became regarded as the world’s youngest political prisoner. Human Rights Watch (1998: 180) claimed that he ‘was under house arrest or some other form of custody’. It added that Chinese authorities had refused all requests for access to him, even to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary
Robinson. Basically, human rights activists regarded Chinese actions on these matters as abuses, because they involved infringements on religious freedom. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities saw the same matters as suppression of separatism and hence lying within their legitimate state jurisdiction. Any government would do the same, they argued. Activists regard Chinese claims of separatism merely as a smokescreen masking human rights infringements. One representative of the Tibet Information Network has stated that, at the end of 1998, the average sentence for political prisoners, said to number about 500 –600, was just over 7 years, with many detainees suffering torture, beating and degrading treatment during interrogation (Marshall 2000: 144). Drapchi Prison in Lhasa is the most famous in Tibet. Sometimes shown to foreigners to delude them into a positive image of prison life in Tibet, it has also been the site of many protests against harsh conditions. Despite the claims of cultural preservation in Chinese government publications, the Dalai Lama has been prepared to make a charge of ‘cultural genocide’ (see Chapter 7) and his supporters around the world have shared his view, many demanding guerrilla warfare against the Chinese. My own view on this matter, based on four visits to Tibet since 1985 and several to other Tibetan areas, is somewhat different. It is true that the Cultural Revolution saw massive cultural destruction. However, what strikes me most forcefully about the period since 1980 or so is not how much the Chinese have harmed Tibetan culture, but how much they have allowed, even encouraged it to revive; not how weak it is, but how strong. What is true is that there is a modernisation process going on in Tibet, carried on in the context of Tibet as part of China, which may dilute tradition. But everywhere there are still many signs of Tibetan lifestyle, culture, religion and traditions. Chinese authorities have also found themselves under very strong criticism for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and against its Uygur population. For instance, Amnesty International (2001: 72) claimed that in 2000 Xinjiang had been ‘the only region of China where political prisoners were known to have been executed in recent years’. Even more serious was the allegation that executions of Uygurs for separatism or terrorism followed ‘secret or summary trials where convictions were based on confessions extracted under torture’. In March 2000, Rebiya Kadeer, whom many had pointed to as an example of a Uygur woman who had got to the very pinnacle of business in Xinjiang, was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for threatening national security, Amnesty International (2001: 72) being among many bodies to issue condemnations.
Inner Mongolia In July 1990 reports appeared in Hong Kong (cited in Kaup 2000: 2) of Mongolian organisations in Inner Mongolia bent on securing Inner Mongolia’s secession from China to form a single Mongolian republic with the then MPR. The reports claimed that clashes between Mongolian activities and the government in May 1990 had led to the deaths of some 200 people. I happened to meet a Mongolian professor in Hohhot within a few months of these alleged clashes. He claimed to be very interested in the history of such Mongolian separatist activities in Inner Mongolia, but
Minorities politics 47 denied absolutely that the reported clashes had taken place, let alone any resulting in deaths. Certainly, however, people in Inner Mongolia were following closely what was happening on the other side of the border, where the MPR collapsed at the end of the next year. There were no doubt some who wished to link up with co-nationals over the border, but how strong their organisations were is very unclear. It is likely that any such activism weakened in the course of the twentieth century’s last decade and into the new century. A study by Uradyn E. Bulag, a partly Western-educated Mongol living in the West, argues that any resistance among the Mongols of China presupposes acceptance of the Chinese state; ‘it has not questioned the state’s legitimacy in ruling the Mongols, only its methods of rule’ (Bulag 2000: 178). Bulag suggests that preferential or affirmative action policies have indeed won over major portions of the Mongol people to accept that they are part of China, while at the same time the firm suppression of any secessionist movements instils fear into them. Many Mongols have taken quite readily to doing business and making money as part of China. The new ideology of ‘opening up and development’ targets the ever-shrinking pastureland in Inner Mongolia. By the end of the twentieth century, this ideology had ‘apparently charmed people into ethnic cooperation’. It is not just Han who conduct agricultural expansion, ‘for Mongols have also become active developers’ (Bulag 2000: 195). The creation of the Handominated multi-ethnic China, according to Bulag, ‘is not just a state project; it is also, in this and many other instances, one that is enthusiastically embraced in diverse ways by the minzu [ethnic] subjects or fractions thereof’ (Bulag 2000: 195). The reasons for this trend are an interesting question. Bulag’s comments imply that the ideology of development is a major cause. I agree with this interpretation. Another factor is that the Inner Mongolian economy has been doing much better since at least the early 1990s than in the Republic of Mongolia over the border, leaving little incentive to join up into a single state with people there, even though they may be co-nationals. I would also add my impression from visits to Inner Mongolia that Mongolian ethnic consciousness there is not particularly strong. It has been, with some variations at particular times, in long-term decline since the early years of the twentieth century.
Tibet This situation contrasts very strongly with that among the Tibetans and certain ethnic groups in Xinjiang. These two cases are by far the most difficult for the Chinese state, illustrating policy since 1990, and require separate treatment. In Tibet the pro-independence riots of 1987–1989 caused a shift towards a harder policy, as explained in Chapter 2, and the new policy remained in place into the twenty-first century. As Shakya (1999: 432) puts it, the new policies ‘meant that the region would no longer be treated as a special case and that the concessions that had been made to the Tibetans would be reined in’. They can be summed up as much greater emphasis on economic development, combined with absolute prohibition on separatism in all forms and under any guise. Though this is actually the overall policy carried out in all the ethnic areas of the PRC, the situation in Tibet is special because of the intensity of Tibetan ethnic and cultural consciousness.
In political terms one of the main prongs of the policy was a tightening up in attitude towards Tibetan members of the CCP. ‘There were repeated calls for Party members and cadres to demonstrate their loyalty and to eschew nationalistic sentiments’ (Shakya 1999: 433). CCP members were still allowed to attend religious ceremonies, but authorities took much more active steps to ensure that they were not believers in religion. A much firmer attitude was adopted towards displaying pictures of the Dalai Lama at home, as many CCP members had done in the laxer spirit of the 1980s. Demonstrations continued after 1989, but much more infrequently and on a smaller scale. The largest was in Lhasa on 24 May 1993 when up to 3,000 Tibetans took part in attacks on government and public security organs, followed by smaller demonstrations on following days. Authorities had improved their methods of crowd control since 1989. Police were reported to have ‘kept their distance’ until ‘slogans changed into calls for Tibetan independence’ and even then used tear gas, not lethal weapons, to disperse the crowds (‘Clashes in Lhasa’ 1993: 23202). When the riots of the late 1980s were suppressed, not even the Chinese authorities were denying that some people were killed. But in May 1993 authorities acknowledged no deaths, though a later Kyodo report (cited ‘Quarterly Chronicle’ 1993: 638) quoted two Japanese tourists as saying that casualties may have seen up to nine people killed. There have been further disturbances in Tibet since these 1993 demonstrations, and pro-independence feeling is not dead. This is evident from the material on human rights above and suggested strongly by the controversy over the Panchen Lama in 1995 and the banning of pictures of the Dalai Lama in 1996 (see Chapter 5). In April 1996, the authorities again began a ‘strike hard’ campaign to eliminate separatism, which took the form of arrests of dissident political activists and ‘political re-education campaigns’ in the monasteries the authorities most suspected of separatism (see Amnesty International 1997). However, it appears that the Chinese government has indeed succeeded in integrating Tibet more closely into China than was the case in the 1980s. Many of the signs of this are apparent in the economy, and will be considered in Chapter 4. Goldstein notes (1997: 93) that the Chinese authorities accomplished this strengthened control ‘without restricting the day-to-day life’ of the inhabitants of the Tibetan capital Lhasa. Provided Lhasans were not engaging in anti-government political activities, he continues ‘they were free to go where they wished, meet with friends, invite monks for religious services, have parties, and so forth’. These comments accorded with the impressions I have gained in travelling in Tibetan areas of China. Two important anniversaries occurred at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. The first was in March 1999, marking both the fortieth anniversary of the 1959 uprising against Chinese rule and the tenth year since the independence demonstrations that led to the imposition of martial law in 1989. The other was the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the 1951 agreements, falling in May 2001. Nobody thought the Chinese would mark March 1999, but the Tibetan diaspora and its supporters predicted there could be anti-Chinese incidents within Tibet itself. The fact that nothing untoward occurred signalled that the Chinese had
Minorities politics 49 succeeded in establishing control better than most people expected. On the other hand, the Chinese certainly did hold large-scale celebrations in May 2001 as a mark of half a century since the Dalai Lama’s regime had signed its agreement that Tibet was part of China. Again, the lack of overt opposition to the celebrations showed how tight Chinese control had become. No doubt many Tibetans were unhappy about this, but none was prepared to demonstrate open disapproval.
Xinjiang There are some commonalities between the situations in Tibet and Xinjiang since 1990. Both have been the focus of disturbance against the Chinese government. Both are ethnic areas in which the tradition is profoundly religious. In both cases, the Chinese government has adopted policies of suppression of separatism, combined with economic development and affirmative action towards minorities. In both cases, Chinese harshness towards separatism has made the leadership the target of severe international criticism on human rights grounds. Both are associated with the global trend towards minority rights and in that sense are influenced by the globalisation trend so important in the world today. There are also very important differences. The Islam of Xinjiang is very different from Tibetan Buddhism in doctrine and influence, and in international relations. Islam has its own internationalisation or globalisation process, which is in many ways hostile to the dominant liberal form of globalisation, especially since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center of 11 September 2001. Xinjiang is much more multi-ethnic than Tibet. There is no international leader in Xinjiang corresponding to the Dalai Lama, either inside or outside China. What is striking is that, since 1990, Xinjiang has actually presented far more difficulties to the Chinese central government than Tibet. This is in sharp contrast to the 1980s, when Xinjiang was rather free of disturbance, especially when compared with Tibet. Ethnic clashes and terrorism The first of the troubles occurred in April 1990, the month before martial law was lifted in Tibet. According to Xinjiang Television on 21 April, public security personnel were attacked in a government building in Baren Township, Akto County, Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture, not far from Kashgar in the southwest of Xinjiang. The following day the authorities sent in troops of the People’s Armed Police and the People’s Liberation Army and successfully inflicted a devastating defeat on the rebels. The number of casualties overall is open to question. The official version acknowledged twenty-one dead, but one account (Dillon 1997: 137) has it that the foreign press quoted over sixty. Precisely who had organised and led this uprising? According to Michael Winchester (1997: 31), who interviewed a participant in the underground group that led the uprising, the leader was Zahideen Yusuf, a strong Muslim from a poor Uygur village south of Kashgar with a long-standing history of anti-Chinese unrest. The Islamic side will be considered in Chapter 5. Winchester claims ( p. 31) to have been told that Zahideen had smuggled and stockpiled weapons and
it was a police sweep on the village in search of such arms that sparked off the initial attack, which turned out to be premature. Official Chinese sources described it as an ‘armed counter-revolutionary rebellion’, and attributed it to the Islamic Party of East Turkestan. According to the 21 April broadcast, the disturbances were directly separatist in intent, and flowed from the activities of ‘extremely reactionary political forces whose aim was to undermine the motherland’s unification and unity among nationalities and practise splittism of nationalities’ (quoted from ‘Quarterly Chronicle’ 1990: 583). Subsequent official reports also put some of the blame on efforts to revitalise Islam, ‘paralysis’ among local CCP organisations and the indifference of ‘grassroots leading bodies’ towards the interests of the people (‘Quarterly Chronicle’ 1990: 583). In other words, authorities could not heap all the responsibility on their enemy for the disastrous trend that had produced this uprising, but had to take some of the blame themselves. There is actually a good deal in common in these reports. There is general agreement that the aim was separatism, with one side supporting it, but the other strongly in opposition. This was, moreover, the first time since 1949 that anybody had taken serious action on behalf of political independence for Xinjiang as an East Turkestan Republic. The Chinese were quite easily able to produce many leaders and ordinary people who simply hated this renewal of what could be viewed as terrorism. But this may not have been the impact on everybody. A Uygur friend told me in 1994 that he knew of many different reactions from people who had seen the television footage of the defeated Uygur uprising. Some people were full of admiration that anybody should dare to defy the mighty Chinese state, others were terrified or horrified over what might happen to anybody who got involved in such activity. It is also clear that the uprising produced serious flow-on effects. Uygur opposition surfaced outside China itself, as discussed in Chapter 7. Even though Zahideen Yusuf himself was killed, followers fled to the mountains to organise further unrest, and many of them continued their activities, including some whom the Chinese had arrested but then released. The smuggling of weapons continued, despite added official vigilance. A series of bomb blasts began. The first of them took place on 5 February 1992, timed to coincide with the Chinese New Year. It exploded on a parked bus in Ürümqi, killed six people and injured twenty others (Winchester 1997: 34). There were also reports of bomb attacks in widely scattered parts of Xinjiang in March 1992. There appears to have been serious unrest involving up to 150,000 people in rallies and strikes in April 1995 in six towns in the area around Gulja (Yining in Chinese), capital of the Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture in the northwest of Xinjiang. Demonstrations included petitions to local officials and demands for an end to Chinese rule. Although the accounts of these disturbances are unconfirmed, and a Chinese official at the Xinjiang Foreign Affairs Bureau in Ürümqi, Liu Yusheng, is reported to have denied that any unrest occurred, most Western scholars accept that there is some basis in the reports (e.g. Dillon 1997: 138–9, 147). The same year a vice-chairman of Xinjiang’s Political Consultative Conference was assassinated.
Minorities politics 51 Further serious disturbances erupted in Gulja on 5 February 1997. Exactly what sparked them off is unclear, but some sources claim that police had entered a mosque to arrest two religious students but met with resistance. However, the incident certainly developed into riots involving demonstrations on behalf of independence, mostly by Uygurs, assaults on Han people and vandalisation of vehicles, and continued into the next day. Although soon quelled, the riots resulted in the deaths of about sixteen people, with nearly 150 wounded. Summary arrests and execution of Muslim separatists, almost all Uygurs, followed over the next days (see Mackerras 1998: 290). Moreover, arrests, trials and executions following from those times have continued into the twenty-first century. On 25 February 1997, terrorists planted four bombs in buses in Ürümqi. Three of them exploded in the evening, an official source (cited by Reuter in Mackerras 1998: 292) giving casualty figures of nine dead and seventy-four wounded, mostly school children on their way home. What added further poison to an already horrific incident was that 25 February 1997 happened to be the day of patriarch Deng Xiaoping’s funeral service. He had died 6 days before and the country was in mourning. Virtually everybody recognised the enormous achievements he had made to China, but what the bomb blasts seemed to be saying was that the separatists cared nothing at all for him and were happy to add insult to injury through a terrorist attack targeting civilians, even children. Yet another bomb exploded on a commuter bus on 7 March 1997, this time in Beijing. Mayor of Beijing Jia Qinglin put the blame on criminal elements, not on Uygur separatists, and called for calm. However, the Organisation for Turkestan Freedom, based in Turkey, claimed responsibility for the incident, arguing through Taiwan’s Central News Agency that such an explosion was the only way the Uygur people could take revenge against China-inflicted oppression. It appeared that, for the first time, Uygur separatist activity was making itself felt outside Xinjiang and in China’s own capital. Terrorist incidents such as the ones discussed continued into the following years. In January 2002, the Chinese government released a long report quoting ‘incomplete statistics’ as showing that terrorist forces fighting for an independent Uygur state had been responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang. These had resulted in the deaths of 162 people and injuries to over 440 (Information Office 2002: 15). The report divided the incidents into six categories. These were (Information Office 2002: 15–18): ● ● ● ● ●
explosions; assassinations; attacks on police and government institutions; crimes of poison and arson; establishing secret training bases and raising money to buy and manufacture arms and ammunitions; and plotting and organising disturbances and riots, and creating an atmosphere of terror.
The authorities are subject to two counter-pressures, especially since 11 September 2001. On the one hand, they are very keen to be regarded as part of the international war against terrorism. The list of categories, as well as the 1997 bus explosions mentioned earlier, suggests strongly that some terrorists have targeted civilians. At the same time, the reference to secret training bases and purchase and manufacture of arms and ammunitions points towards preparations for open warfare or rebellion. On the other hand, the governments of China and Xinjiang are both very keen to attract investors to Xinjiang. To achieve that purpose, they need to play down the extent of terrorism and disturbance in Xinjiang. On 8 March 2002, in a new conference focusing on attracting investors, Xinjiang Governor Abulahat Abdurixit declared that the preceding year had been free of major violent terrorist activity (Bodeen 2002). It is true that the January 2002 report has only one death from the preceding year, together with an incident in which police uncovered and confiscated explosives and equipment for making arms, so the two accounts are not necessarily in contradiction with each other. But there is certainly a different emphasis. Government reaction The revival of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang, just when it had come under better control in Tibet, obviously caused concern in Beijing. The Marxist–Leninist parties in Eastern Europe had been falling from power like ninepins, adding to the CCP’s worries, and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 strengthened their belief that the Americans and others would like China to follow the Soviet Union into disintegration. In a speech in September 1995 to honour the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, a senior Xinjiang CCP leader Wang Zhaoguo blamed hostile forces for the revival of separatism in the 1990s and for trying to split China. By suggesting that these forces were hoping that their actions would ‘lead to China “breaking up” and becoming Westernised’ (quoted China Daily, 25 September 1995), Wang seems to have been highlighting the Americans as the main ‘hostile force’. However, it was 1996 that marked the main policy turning point. That year saw two major events on the domestic front, and one on the international, which is considered in more detail in Chapter 7. First was a confidential message from the CCP Central Committee to the authorities in Xinjiang, dated 19 March. This message, which has become known generally simply as ‘Document No. 7’, required the local authorities to take firmer action to stop the burgeoning threat of ethnic separatism and conflict. It charged that ‘Groups are fomenting trouble, assaulting Party and government structures, bombing and committing terrorist attacks. Some organizations have already turned from underground to semi-public, to the point of openly confronting the government’ (quoted from Becquelin 2000: 87). Document No. 7 went on to claim that the chaos and turmoil would, if not checked, affect stability in Xinjiang and eventually in the whole country.
Minorities politics 53 The second event was a major work conference the Xinjiang CCP held in the capital Ürümqi from 3 to 6 May 1996 to discuss the stability of the region. Delegates repeated the arguments that separatists were organising riots, terrorist activities and bombings, and that many were being fomented from outside China (Macartney 1996). The meeting called for several measures to move towards solving the problem, the main ones being to improve the economy and to strengthen CCP control by reorganising ‘weak and lax’ branches, especially those dominated by Muslims, and training cadres better.5 The attempt to oppose separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang has developed into an ongoing campaign. Moreover, the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 gave the Chinese authorities an additional reason for cracking down even more severely. After all, Islamic fundamentalism, which they claimed as one of the roots of Xinjiang’s problems, was now shown to be a source of terrorism. The obvious question is how successful the various initiatives of the Chinese authorities have been. On the situation in 2002, my view is that the policies have been successful in some ways, but not in others. The separatist movement is no nearer its goal of full independence than it was in 1990. Gladney’s view (1997: 288) was as valid in 2002 as when he wrote it: Though many portray the Uyghur [Uygurs] as united around separatist or Islamist causes, they continue to be divided by religious conflicts (Sufi and non-Sufi factors),6 territorial loyalties, linguistic discrepancies, commonerelite alienation, and competing political loyalties. On the other hand, the separatist movement shows no signs at all of giving up. An improved economy does not necessarily weaken opposition to Chinese rule. The fact that the authorities found it necessary to imprison the rich businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer in 2000 even suggests that one could find the rise of a class of ‘rich people who agitate for change’ (Gilley 2001: 27). One study of Xinjiang in the 1990s found widespread Uygur resistance to Chinese rule on the level of complaints about the conditions of their lives, including criticism of the system of autonomy and the Uygurs who implement it and open wishes for independence. While recognising that ‘drastic political gains’ are unlikely under present circumstances, he contends that ‘this record of grumbling, joking, and wishing indicates the depth of feeling and the potential for change’ if the Chinese state were to falter or a new leader were to usher in a period of political openness (Bovingdon 2002: 68). Moreover, relations between Uygurs and Han appear to have worsened noticeably since the early 1990s. A recent study suggests that one of the reasons for this reality lies in the fact that boundaries between the lives of the two nationalities have weakened over this period, making contact commoner between them. For instance, Han have gone to work more in the Xinjiang rural areas than used to be the case. At the same time, the Uygurs ‘have themselves begun to move into Handominated sectors, lured by new opportunities in education, employment, and
trade’ (Smith 2002: 157). Han immigration has increased and the Han dominate in the cities to the extent that Uygurs often find themselves marginalised. Knowledge of the Chinese language is more necessary than ever. Yet despite actual and perceived discrimination against Uygurs in employment, there are quite a few Uygurs who have done very well from the increased economic prosperity since the early 1980s. Ben-Adam (1999: 205) considers that this ‘has resulted in positive sentiments of the Uighur peasantry towards the Chinese government and Han Chinese in general’. The overall conclusion to flow from this material is that policy may have tightened Chinese rule over Xinjiang against a fragmented opposition. Most people might even accept the current order for the time being, devoting energies more to individual and family matters than to politics. But hatred of the Han and their rule is still very widespread and government policy has not succeeded in deflecting ethno-nationalists from their struggle. The reaction of the authorities since 11 September 2001 may even have exacerbated the tensions. Gladney’s late twentiethcentury view (1997: 290) remains apt at the dawn of the twenty-first: ‘As they have in the past, the Uyghur will support a policy that benefits them even as it contributes to the rest of the country. Few believe, however, that the current two-pronged policy of economic development and political repression will satisfy these demands’.
Conclusion There appears to have been a general process of Chinese national integration going on in the past decades in China. If anything it has accelerated since 1990. There are exceptions to this pattern, of which by far the most important is the situation in Xinjiang. Is this general integration of China since 1990 a product of globalisation? And has it accelerated since China joined the World Trade Organisation in December 2001? I suspect that in fact globalisation promotes a more fragmented society rather than a more integrated one. Its impact is to tie ethnic societies in China more to worldwide trends than to those specific to China. The Chinese government wishes to take advantage of the many benefits that go with further dealings with and influence from world capitalism. But that does not mean it will abstain from doing everything it can to strengthen national integration in China and keep the country together. Diasporas are an important part of globalisation. In world terms, diasporas tend to move towards the Western countries, such as those of North America and Western Europe. There is an increasing number of people belonging to ethnic diasporas who have left China for what they expect to be better conditions in these Western countries. They also bring with them perceptions of ethnic identity. And it is part of the globalisation process that these should find enormous sympathy in the West. The effect they have exercised both in their new and old homes tends to be strongly hostile to the Chinese and their rule. By far the best example is the Tibetan diaspora, but it is not the only one. The impact of such globalisation tendencies in Tibet and several other ethnic areas has promoted that kind of Tibetan ethnic consciousness that wants full independence for Tibet, and has thus been
Minorities politics 55 very hostile to the form of Chinese national integration that insists on the maintenance of the present borders. I expect the dichotomy between a strengthened ethnic identity and an enhanced Chinese national integration to persist, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. There are two kinds of globalisation at work in China, and especially in Xinjiang. One is the liberal mainstream globalisation that is associated mainly with culture, values and fashions emanating from Western countries, especially the United States, and spreading outward towards China. The other is that contrary, but also important, sub-stream associated with Islam, and above all the radical version that requires the victory of Muslims over the infidel. The Chinese authorities are fiercely hostile to any separatism that appears to them associated with this sub-stream, and the resultant oppression has further exacerbated ethnic feelings, especially among the Uygur Muslim communities of Xinjiang. What some Uygurs, including the majority among the Uygur diasporas, regard as religious persecution and oppression looks very different to authorities. They have even coined the term ‘the three evil forces’ to denote the terrorism, separatism and extremism (that is extreme and fundamentalist Islam) they believe is behind the troubles in Xinjiang (Gao 2001: 8–9). One may ask if there is any room at all for the concept of localisation amid an overall globalisation in the context of the politics of China’s ethnic minorities. In some ways, one could answer positively. The globalisation that is taking phenomena associated with world capitalism – tall buildings, foreign commodities and investments, freeways, consumer tastes – is beginning to spread to the ethnic areas. And in reaction local culture is strengthening in some places, notably in some parts of southern Xinjiang. But it may be that it is not only globalisation that is spawning this reaction but also Chinese attempts to form an integrated multinational state by suppressing separatism and those forms of ethnic consciousness that threaten the state. The ethnic identity growing both in Tibet and Xinjiang may be, at least in part, responses to globalisation, but they are hardly reactions against it. China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation could easily end up promoting the kind of reactions against globalisation that some scholars have termed ‘glocalisation’ (see Chapter 1), but that process had not gone far by 2002. The Introduction flagged the likelihood that globalisation would lead to a diminution of control of Chinese authorities over their own territory. Has this in fact happened since the 1990s? I believe that it most certainly has in parts of China, and that is one of the reasons why the CCP believes it more necessary to fight against separatist movements. It is less able to control the revival of inimical traditional forces and the upsurge of new ideas that could ultimately threaten even its very survival. The fact that it still cracks down on threats to the current Chinese authorities merely shows that it is not prepared to sacrifice power either to alternative internal or external forces and is struggling to retain sovereignty and the control that goes with it.
The economies of the minorities
The economy has been among the most successful aspects of China’s development since 1990. Industry, agriculture, pasture and infrastructure have all improved dramatically, and the standard of living of most people has risen very rapidly and significantly, with poverty being greatly reduced. China has been welded far more closely into the world economy than ever before and its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001 has not only been a culmination of this process, but a means to accelerate it even faster. These successes have not been without problems, especially in terms of environmental degradation and widening inequalities, but they have radically improved the livelihood of the great majority of China’s people. The minorities have participated in this economic improvement. However, they have tended strongly to be at the poor end of the widening disparities. In the uneven and imbalanced economic growth, the eastern seaboard has advanced far faster than the rest of the country. And almost all the minorities live in the western part of the country, which includes the poorest provinces and autonomous regions. Moreover, the minority areas have not been exempt from the environmental damage the economic growth has inflicted, with Xinjiang hit with special severity.
The background The economic trends since the early 1990s have definitely been in the direction of linking the Chinese economy with world capitalism. Although the suppression of the student movement in 1989 cast doubt on whether the reform policies would remain in operation and introduced a period of political and economic tension, Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern journey’ of early 1992 removed this uncertainty and set the country on the path of greatly accelerated reform (see Chapter 3). Four further steps pointed towards free enterprise and capitalism. The first was the emphasis on the ‘socialist market economy’. The idea was central to General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s speech opening the Fourteenth CCP Congress on 12 October 1992. In March 1993, the NPC actually changed the Constitution of the PRC to declare that ‘The State has put into practice a socialist market economy’. Though the Constitution still had ‘socialist public
The economies of the minorities 57 ownership’ and economic planning as the basis, it strengthened the role of ‘regulation by the market’ (Constitution of PRC 2000: 22). The importance of the market became very clear with the corporatisation of the state-owned enterprises. Again it was Jiang Zemin who suggested this move, using his report to the Fifteenth CCP Congress on 12 September 1997 for the purpose, the move being confirmed by the NPC early the next year. There were profound implications in this move, since the state-owned enterprises are the bedrock of the planned economy. The state-owned share of gross industrial output value had already fallen from 77.6 per cent in 1978 to 28.2 per cent in 1998 (Mackerras 2001a: 191), and the corporatisation of the state-owned enterprises merely accelerated the power of the market and the trend towards collective and privately owned enterprises. The government took some measures to cushion the effects on the unemployment that resulted from the process, but could not prevent resentment and protests from retrenched workers. One particularly severe case of prolonged protests was in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province in China’s northeast, in March 2002, when workers protested over a range of matters, including the closure of their factories and their retrenchment without compensation. The third step towards capitalism was to allow private business people and entrepreneurs to become members of the CCP. In a speech of 1 July 2001, Jiang Zemin urged this move, praising the honesty and social contribution of the majority of people working in the private sector. The next CCP Plenum, held late in September, duly adopted his suggestion. The importance of the decision, which overturned years of looking down on the entrepreneurs as exploiters, was great enough to make one journalist remark: ‘When the world looks back to the moment when the Chinese Communist Party finally embraced capitalism, this may be it’ (Lawrence 2001: 36). The fourth step is one that was brewing during nearly the whole period under discussion in this book: China’s accession to the WTO. However, the fact is that it actually came to fruition at the end of 2001, which is why it is located after the decision to allow entrepreneurs into the CCP. The total impact of the flow-on effects is not clear as this book goes to print, but is likely to be highly significant and point in the direction of China’s incorporation into global capitalism. Two specialists have aptly observed: ‘Perhaps more than any other industry, tourism is closely associated with globalisation, of which it is both a cause and effect’ (Harrison and Price 1996: 6). However, in the isolationist time under Mao Zedong, the Chinese leadership considered tourism unproductive and was not committed to its growth, even stifling domestic travel to a large extent (Wen and Tisdell 2001: 5). Tourism also struck a major obstacle with the suppression of the student movement in mid-1989. Yet despite this setback, it has still seen unprecedented growth since 1990. I believe a focus on tourism is appropriate here. There is no doubt that tourism is among the top money-spinners in the world today. Just how much money depends precisely on what items one includes in tourism. If the term were taken to encompass all the aviation industry, all international travel and all hotels, then it would be far larger than if only a portion of such enterprises were included. But whatever way one looks at it, tourism
The economies of the minorities
is extremely significant in the world economy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Global tourism suffered a serious blow due to the terror attacks on New York’s World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. The Fourteenth General Assembly of the World Tourism Organisation, which concluded in Osaka, Japan, on 1 October 2001, issued a press release on the impact of the disaster (carried by various agencies), ‘reporting that tourists are postponing holidays and switching to destinations that are closer to home’. Many people no longer considered air travel as safe as they used to do, and an atmosphere of fear grew in some parts of the world. The Organisation also reduced its short-term forecast for tourist arrivals in 2001 from 3 per cent growth to 1.5 per cent growth. What is perhaps striking is that it could still predict growth at all, given the enormity of the calamity that had happened and the effect the incidents were all but certain to create on the enormous American market. Tourism is going to remain a major factor in the world economy, despite the war on terrorism. Only recently has China become a major force in international tourism, but its rise in the 1990s has changed all that. The World Tourism Organisation estimated that the number of international tourist arrivals in China in 1999, not including Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, was 27.047 million, up from 25.073 million the preceding year. The 1999 figure put China fifth in the world behind France, Spain, the United States and Italy, but ahead of the United Kingdom, which it had overtaken between 1998 and 1999 (Wen and Tisdell 2001: 3). The World Tourism Organisation also predicted at the end of the twentieth century that China would overtake France to become the top destination for tourists by 2020 (Turner 2000: 440), a prediction the deputy chief David de Villiers repeated at a one-day Cyprus International Tourism Conference in Nicosia on 19 October 2001, in other words after the 11 September 2001 calamity. Chinese earnings from international tourism rose from US$ 2,218 million in 1990 (SSB 1996: 603) to US$ 14,099 million in 1999 (NBS 2000: 625), thus multiplying more than six times in 9 years. It is also worth noting that Chinese domestic tourism also increased greatly at the end of the twentieth century, the total number of tourists rising from 629 million in 1995 to 719 million in 1999 (NBS 2000: 625).
Basic economic indicators Government policy has been to get the minorities to share in the economic growth that China has experienced since the early 1990s. It is clearly in the interests of political stability that all people should feel some stake in the current order of things. However, there have been two additional prongs to the policy. One is to ensure that economic growth should assist in the political integration of China. The other is to pursue a preferential policy based on the general poverty of minority economies and attempt to give them an economic boost. There have been clear overall successes in both policies, but also some significant failures. Table 4.1 indicates some of the basic economic indicators of China’s ethnic autonomous areas. These figures generally indicate economic growth in the
The economies of the minorities 59 Table 4.1 Major economic indicators 1985
Cultivated area (million hectares) 17.47 17.67 15.08 20.69 21.28 Grain (millions of tons) 40.06 53.73 53.60 72.95 68.62 Cotton (thousands of tons) 190 470 946 1,481 1,361 Large livestock (millions) 47.49 52.86 56.18 56.69 56.89 Sheep and goats (millions) 97.57 113.62 119.06 128.74 130.36 Pigs (millions) 45.33 56.65 72.40 76.15 72.92 Steel (millions of tons) 2.33 3.68 7.00 6.33 6.43 Pig-iron (millions of tons) 2.58 4.17 5.55 7.02 6.96 Raw coal (millions of tons) 85.97 120.77 166.39 175.70 153.61 Crude oil (millions of tons) 18.05 12.65 16.10 20.47 20.58 Electricity (millions of kwh) 38,900 73,880 118,650 132,310 142,890 Timber (million cu. m.) 18.26 17.61 32.57 16.37 12.30 Railways (thousands of km) 12.5 13.1 17.0 17.1 17.5 Roads (thousands of km) 254.1 293.7 332.1 374.1 402.6 Source: NBS 2000: 39.
ethnic autonomous areas, and suggest better integration with the national economy. The increases in grain production and in the numbers of livestock point to a generally better and more varied diet in the ethnic areas. Sheep are animals of particular cultural importance to minorities such as the Mongolians and Kazaks, among whom they play many roles that include providing both food and clothing, the larger numbers suggesting more prosperous life among pastoralists. The great expansion in the production of electricity can only help towards modernisation and a more abundant lifestyle for the mass of people. Industry has never been particularly important among the ethnic minorities of China. Despite efforts to expand industry in the minority areas, only a few of them have given it much attention. One of them is Inner Mongolia, where Baotou is home to a major iron-and-steel works. However, this particular example illustrates a highly significant point about industry in China’s ethnic areas, namely that the state perceives it very definitely as China-wide, not ethnic. Baotou is a new Han city, even though in an ethnic area. There is a certain homogenising effect of industry and industrialisation, wherever they occur, and China is no different from other countries in this respect. The figures given in Table 4.1 on railways and roads are examples showing a great improvement in infrastructure in the ethnic autonomous areas since the early 1990s. In Yunnan, many ethnic areas previously very difficult indeed of access now have airports. The years since 1990 have witnessed the opening of several railways with considerable importance for communications in the ethnic areas. September 1990 saw the opening of the newly constructed railway linking the Xinjiang capital Ürümqi with the Alataw Pass on the border with Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union, opening a complete Eurasian ‘rail bridge’ from Lianyungang on China’s eastern coast to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. In December 1997 communications for the southwestern minorities took a step forward with the
The economies of the minorities
opening of an electrified single-track line linking the Guangxi capital Nanning with Yunnan’s capital Kunming. And in May 1999 the 1,451-km South Xinjiang railway linking Turpan to Kashgar began taking traffic. Tibet remained the only province-level unit without railways, its topography being considered too difficult to build tracks the benefits of which would in any way make the enormous costs worthwhile. However, in 2001, the government announced its intention to complete a railway in Tibet, despite the cost. Even before this move, communications in Tibet had begun to make impressive progress. During the 1990s, highway mileage greatly increased, as did the length of postal routes and the number of post offices and satellite stations. Telephone services improved enormously, and Tibet started such modern phenomena as mobile phones, the Internet and email. To make previously isolated places more easily accessible is part of globalisation. It allows for domestic and foreign commodities and services to reach these places, meaning that consumption patterns from outside can exert influence. As we shall see below, tourists enter and with them new ideas and lifestyle patterns. A better infrastructure opens the possibility of improved links not only with other parts of China, but also with the world more generally. The expansion of cotton and crude oil production are very important, especially in Xinjiang. Oil has a much longer pedigree there, but the large-scale introduction of cotton dates only from the late years of the twentieth century. There are great political implications in the dual strategy of promoting oil and cotton production in Xinjiang, which is in essence part of a long-term strategy to enrich Xinjiang in order to weld its economy into that of China as a whole, and hence integrate the region more tightly into China. Both the Eighth and Ninth Five-Year Plans, which ran from 1991 to 1995 and 1996 to 2000 respectively, placed weight on cotton production in Xinjiang, declaring that the autonomous region should become a national cotton-producing base. Indeed, cotton produced in the ethnic autonomous areas rose from about 10 per cent of the national total in 1990 to about 35 per cent in 1999 (see national totals in NBS 2000: 24–5). Almost all the expansion of cotton production in the ethnic autonomous areas noted in the figures in Table 4.1 was in Xinjiang. The state opened up new land through reclamation, but took over some land previously devoted to grain for cotton production. However, according to one scholar, grain is more profitable in Xinjiang than cotton for ordinary people. He claims that it is the state that reaps the financial benefits of the cotton industry, while the income of many local farmers actually fell. His research in the dominantly Uygur areas of southern Xinjiang led him to the conclusion that ‘quotas for cotton production are imposed on households in terms of acreage that must be sown’. The reason for this is ‘to ensure that farmers grow cotton even though profits are doubtful’ (Becquelin 2000: 82). It is hardly surprising that this causes resentment among the Uygurs. The Chinese policy of economic enrichment of Xinjiang does benefit many Uygurs and other minorities, though far less so than the Han. Journalist Bruce Gilley (2001: 27) claims that ‘a central aim of the development drive in Xinjiang
The economies of the minorities 61 is to bolster ethnic incomes in order to dilute allegiance to Islam’. But it is far from clear how successful this will be. In my impression, many Uygurs resent the Han Chinese whatever they do and there are some who say they would rather stay poor than accept a prosperity bestowed on them by the Chinese. Gilley (2001: 26) goes as far as to argue that ‘the handful of newly enriched Uighur [Uygur] businessmen could even be a source of new funding for nationalists’. My own view is that the Chinese government deserves some credit for trying to improve Xinjiang’s economy and the alternative of leaving it poor would be much worse than the present policy. However, that does not mean that the Uygurs will respond with gratitude. Policies in many respects similar to those in Xinjiang have also prevailed in Tibet, but it appears to me that they have been somewhat more successful there since the early 1990s. In July 1994, Premier Li Peng convened a Tibet Work Forum in Beijing, which determined to push economic development with far greater vigour than ever before. It also decided to undertake sixty-two major infrastructure and other development projects of various kinds, with considerable government investment and support from the eastern provinces, all of them completed by the beginning of the twenty-first century. There seems little doubt that this emphasis on development in Tibet ‘propelled Tibet further towards the mainstream trends prevailing in the rest of China’ (Shakya 1999: 438). Many activists in the West and elsewhere charged that this process would undermine Tibetan culture, and benefit Han more than Tibetans. In an immensely detailed study of Tibet’s economy at the end of the twentieth century, two scholars conclude that Tibetan culture is indeed weakening. However, this is not because the territory is part of China, but because it is undergoing a modernisation and commercialisation process in the context of globalisation (see Sautman and Eng 2001: 74). What is very clear is the Tibetan economy has grown greatly since the early 1990s, Tibetan standards of living rose and Tibet was increasingly dragged into the modern world. Interethnic resentments persisted, but the relative lack of protest incidents by comparison either with Tibet in the 1980s or Xinjiang in the 1990s suggested that the threat they posed to Chinese rule was on the wane.
Urbanisation The point about the urban bias in Tibet leads us on to one of the most dramatic processes going on in China, namely urbanisation. Official figures show that only 10.6 per cent of the total population lived in towns or cities in 1949. The 1990 census put 26.23 per cent of China’s people in the urban districts, while that of 2000 indicated an increase to 36.09 per cent (see figures in Mackerras 2001a: 209, 211–12). While the notion of precisely what constitutes a city changed significantly with the period of reform, it was roughly constant between 1990 and 2000. It is evident that the nearly 10 per cent jump in just 10 years indicates an accelerating process towards urbanisation in China. While the ethnic areas of the western regions of China are still generally much less urbanised than the eastern seaboard, the process affects the whole country. It is certainly globalising and can only have accelerated still more since China’s
The economies of the minorities
accession to the WTO. Lifestyle has changed, with very large numbers of people, whether Han or minority, moving into apartment blocks which are the same all over China stylistically, and have strong similarities with similar places in other parts of the world. Ürümqi, capital of Xinjiang, is mainly Han in its architecture, and the 1990s saw the construction of globalised tall buildings and modern roads and freeways. In the 1990s, Lhasa, capital of Tibet, became very much more modern than it had ever been before. Modern hotels expanded in number. Just below the Potala Palace an enormous modern square was built, in a style similar to those found elsewhere in China or other countries. In Jinghong, the capital of the Sipsong panna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, the roads became incomparably more modern, and the number of hotels, shops and commercial and other enterprises housed in buildings with globalised architecture expanded greatly in number. Yet despite this trend, it would be a mistake to claim that the ethnic style has vanished altogether. In Lhasa and Ürümqi there are still areas not much affected by modernisation. In both cities there are still very large numbers of buildings in traditional ethnic architectural style. Traditional buildings have been renovated, including the Potala Palace in Lhasa, rightly regarded as one of the wonders of the world and listed among UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites. Smaller cities, such as Shigaze in Tibet or Kashgar in southern Xinjiang, retain far more ethnic flavour than the biggest ones, even though they also are undergoing modernisation. Han people tend to congregate far more heavily in the cities than in the countryside and Han migration to minority areas focuses on the cities. Consequently, Han migration is part of the urbanisation of society. Its economic effects are profound. The businesses Han people establish provide jobs for local people and expand the range of consumer products available in the ethnic areas. Some have criticised this process on the grounds that it spreads Han culture to minority areas, diluting or even destroying local culture, but it is also arguable that the Han themselves are usually taking part in a globalisation and modernisation that they do not fully control. There seems no doubt at all that this expansion of commerce helps raise the standard of living of the great majority of people in the cities of the ethnic areas, though it is true that the Han are generally better off than the minorities.
Standard of living, poverty, inequalities The standard of living of the great majority of minority members has risen greatly since the early 1990s. Although inequalities have widened, as will be discussed in more detail below, the livelihood of most people has improved enormously. In virtually every minority area I have visited since 1990, I have seen and heard evidence of an improvement in the standard of living and, in the cities, of a modernisation process with the potential to enhance the quality of life. Figures bear out this suggestion. For instance, in the ethnic autonomous areas, the average annual wage of employees rose from 2,040 yuan in 1990 to 6,822 yuan
The economies of the minorities 63 in 1999 (there are about 8 yuan to US$ 1). In the rural areas, the average annual per capital net income of households rose from 402 yuan in 1990 to 1,653 yuan in 1999 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 538, 541). In the two very poor but ethnically important provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou, the average per capita net income of rural households rose, respectively, from 472 yuan and 495 yuan in 1994 (Economic Department 1995: 321) to 1,227.69 yuan and 1,287.96 yuan in 1999 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 542), in both cases well over doubling in 5 years. Although all these figures are extremely low by comparison with industrialised countries, the direction is right and the increases substantial. However, it needs to be pointed out that the figures apply to the ethnic autonomous areas, not specifically to members of ethnic groups. In most ethnic autonomous areas, there are substantial Han populations and they are frequently in the majority. It is in this context that the figures for rural Yunnan and rural Guizhou are most relevant. In the ethnic areas of these two provinces, as opposed to the whole of the two provinces, the concentration of ethnic groups is very substantial and in the countryside they are in the great or even overwhelming majority, because of the way Han people living in ethnic areas tend to concentrate in the cities. The extent to which the figures may show much better conditions among the Han than the minorities is discussed below. Another caution is that the figures may not take account of inflation, which averaged 7.1 per cent per year between 1990 and 1998, but was generally lower in the second half of the 1990s and actually negative in 1998–1999 (Mackerras 2001a: 201–3). The figures are not as impressive as they seem, but they are still significant. One aspect of living standards is ownership of durable consumer goods, and they are interesting in that interpreting the data avoids the problem of inflation. The figures in Table 4.2 show the number of durable consumer goods owned by 100 rural households in Xinjiang. The countryside is more important in measuring ethnic standards of living, because of Han concentration in the cities. They show a very impressive improvement in the livelihood of rural people. Table 4.2 Durable consumer goods per 100 rural households in Xinjiang Commodity
Bicycles Sewing machines Clocks, watches Radio sets Black-and-white televisions Colour televisions Washing machines Cameras Electric refrigerators Motor bikes
100.97 54.27 160.72 26.37 25.0 3.79 10.81 0.73 0.4 1.61
143.03 64.19 179.74 45.29 51.74 12.13 16.17 1.97 1.16 3.42
147.4 66.33 196.13 61.07 62.2 28.27 20.87 2.53 8.53 17.73
Source: Liu et al. 2000: 253.
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The general situation in terms of public health has improved enormously since the CCP came to power. However, if the measure is since 1990, then it has improved in some ways, but in others, such as the numbers of hospitals and doctors, has seen relatively little change. And there are some alarming signs of deterioration. The process of the privatisation of health delivery has accelerated, which has meant that health outlays have grown for ordinary people. This has allowed the return of some diseases once thought eradicated. Only in Tibet do basic medical services remain free as the twenty-first century dawns, and what is available is actually so minimal that it often makes very little difference towards solving health problems. One of the diseases to stage a comeback is tuberculosis. ‘From the polluted, bleak streets of its urban ghettoes to the soft, lush hills that are home to its minorities, 250,000 people a year are dying of TB’ (Jiang 2000: 84). A group from the French-based group Médicins sans Frontières and the World Health Organisation worked in some of the worst affected areas, including some ethnic Miao villages in Gongdong County, Guangxi. They found that many of those afflicted with the disease simply could not afford the necessary medical treatment or sometimes not even the bus fare to get to the nearest hospital. A World Health Organisation adviser on tuberculosis in China reached the conclusion that ‘the key is to get the Chinese government to consider healthcare. … A programme can’t depend on external funds and be viable’ (Jiang 2000: 87). However, there are some signs of improvement in the countryside. In the rural ethnic autonomous areas, the number of rural doctors and other medical personnel rose from 135,424 in 1990 to 169,759 in 1999. Over the same period, the number of village health stations in the ethnic autonomous areas rose from 68,843 to 82,023, while the proportion of villages with such stations increased from 75.6 to 83.3 per cent (Economic and Development Department 2000: 625, 623). The number of rural doctors and other medical personnel in Tibet rose from 3,304 in 1994 to 4,533 in 1999, while the comparable figures in the ethnic autonomous areas of Yunnan were 15,739 and 20,473 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 626 and Economic Department 1995: 405). One area of interest in terms of ethnic health is the extent of the use of traditional ethnic medicines. Figures show that the number of ethnic full-time health care personnel rose from 170,738 in 1990 to 185,458 in 1999 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 621), but only a minority practised their own traditional medicine. In fact, several of the ethnic groups have a distinguished traditional medicine, notably the Tibetans, the Mongolians, the Uygurs and the Dai, and all these are very active in the villages, though less so in the cities. During an interview with specialists on Dai medicine in Jinghong, Sipsong panna, on 25 September 2000, I learned that there are traditional Dai doctors in virtually all Dai villages, and two in some. Some of these doctors are hereditary, but it is also possible for doctors to train people other than their sons. Most Dai doctors are male, and only a small minority female. They are folk practitioners and so practise medicine only part-time, carrying out duties as peasants or monks as well as being doctors. Their services are not free, but payment can be either in
The economies of the minorities 65 the form of money or a gift, such as a chicken. In contrast to the past, when payment was usually through a gift, the trend nowadays is towards monetary fees, reflecting the growing strength of the cash economy in Dai villages. Dai medicine is preventative, rather than curative, and most medicines are actually natural herbs and other such foods. It is based on the idea that good health is best preserved through good foods, especially green vegetables and fruits. However, traditional medicine does not conflict with modern, and my informants told me that the government is taking proactive measures to try and prevent the spread of infectious diseases through improving hygienic facilities and practices. The revival of the old ethnic medicines is not only part of the renewed emphasis placed on Chinese traditional medicines, but also in line with a global appreciation for indigenous medicines. In some places they may prevent the adoption of more modern forms of medicine that came originally from the West, but the example from the Dai suggests that this is not the case in China. Indeed, both forms appear to coexist quite well among China’s ethnic minorities. Both have a contribution to make to good health. Both are part of globalisation, as defined in this book, because they exemplify the spread of global practices alongside the retention of local customs. Concrete medical improvements since 1949 include the control of major diseases such as plague and smallpox in the minority areas in the early years of the PRC. Life expectancy at birth in Ningxia rose from 30 before 1949 to 69 in 1998, the latter figure being just below the national average of about 70. In Tibet, life expectancy rose from 36 in 1959 to about 65 in 1998. Infant mortality in Tibet fell from about 43 per cent in 1959 to 3.7 per cent in 1998 (Information Office 1999: 24). One writer (Kwan 2001: 8) claims that by 2001 life expectancy in Tibet had risen to about 67. In the remote ethnic areas of Guizhou and Yunnan, among other provinces, life expectancy is almost certainly somewhat lower, probably no more than the low sixties. However, there are parts of Yunnan with better health, and I was told in an interview in Luxi, capital of the Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, at the end of September 2000 that life expectancy in the prefecture was 68, with just over half the population members of ethnic minorities. The general reduction in poverty and rise in living standards since 1990 has probably meant that health standards have improved. China as a whole has gradually moved up the scale in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) measure of overall human development index (HDI), a figure measuring longevity, educational attainment and real gross domestic product per capita. Although the measure gives no specific place to health standards, the inclusion of longevity would suggest that a rise would point towards improved health standards. On the other hand, there seems little doubt that the ethnic minorities’ rate of improvement has been well below that of the country as a whole. Moreover, this section has taken no account of one catastrophic disease that is already spreading in China, including some of the minority areas, as part of a global pandemic, namely HIV/AIDS. There is some discussion of this frightful disease in the ethnic areas of Yunnan in Chapter 7.
The economies of the minorities
Poverty and poverty alleviation The very broad outline of poverty and its alleviation in China shows the following trends: ●
Poverty was greatly reduced between the beginning of the reform period in the late 1970s and the mid-1980s. From the mid-1980s, the adoption of what two scholars term a ‘coastal development strategy’ (Khan and Riskin 2001: 144) led to a fall in the rate at which rural poverty declined and an increase in the rate of urban poverty (Khan and Riskin 2001: 147). From the early 1990s the government was increasingly concerned by the incidence of poverty and in 1994 formalised a plan to eliminate absolute poverty by the year 2000 (UNDP 1997: 50). The result was that by 1998 the number of rural poor had halved by comparison with 1990. Although the official Chinese figures show much lower absolute figures than the World Bank estimates, both agree that the reduction was very substantial.1 Although absolute poverty persists as of 2002, its incidence is very much less than it was in the late 1970s, let alone in 1949.
Because poverty is very much more serious among the minorities than among the Han, the 1994 project to alleviate poverty gave a high priority to members of ethnic groups. This policy was translated into law in the 2001 amendments to the Law of the PRC on Regional National Autonomy. Article 69 stipulates that the state shall provide greater support to poverty-stricken ethnic areas ‘in the financial, monetary, material, technological and trained personnel fields’ with the aim of helping poor people there ‘shake off poverty as soon as possible’ (Zhonghua 2001: 65). There is no corresponding article in the 1984 Law. What this suggests is that, at least in policy terms, there was considerable advance in the 1990s in poverty alleviation among the minorities. Official figures reported to a conference of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission on 21 October 2001 and carried in a front-page article in People’s Daily (23 October 2001) claimed that large government investments and World Bank aid since 1994 had reduced the impoverished population in areas of ethnic poverty from 45 million in 1994 to 14 million in 1999. These figures are based on the Chinese government’s official boundary for what constitutes poverty and would certainly be much larger if the World Bank’s higher borderline were adopted. However, the sharp downward trend of poverty is perfectly credible. On a less positive note Director of the State Council’s Poverty Alleviation Office Lü Feijie revealed in a speech to the conference that among China’s total population suffering from absolute poverty, 36.5 per cent belonged to minority nationalities, who were only 8.41 per cent of China’s total population in 2000 (see Chapter 6).
The economies of the minorities 67 Lü explained the context of poverty among the minorities, including some reasons why it was so much worse than in the general population. He said: Natural disasters are frequent, and the ability to fight natural disasters and the hazards of the market is not very good. The annual rate of reversion to poverty is always above 15 per cent. Because local production and livelihood conditions are poor, outlays for consumption are quite high. Basic facilities are weak and there are still quite a few places without electricity or roads. Culture and education lag behind, and the level of social development is quite low. In some villages, proportions of illiteracy and semi-literacy among laborers go higher than 30 per cent. (People’s Daily, 23 October 2001) Another reason for the high incidence of poverty among the minorities is that many ethnic group members live on very poor land. In some areas they have been more or less hunted over many generations to poor, remote and infertile places deep in the mountains. According to the UNDP (1997: 50), most of the minorities ‘live in areas where the soil is too poor for even subsistence crop production, so they are net buyers of food and have been hit hard by higher prices’. The UNDP’s comment actually elaborates on the issue of what Lü Feijie calls ‘the hazards of the market’. Of course both the government and the World Bank are to be commended for their efforts in reducing poverty in the minority areas, and China’s record stands up well in international terms. However, the impact of globalisation may well leave behind those minority villages without the economic strength to compete. It is hardly surprising that even Lü acknowledges that such villages are net consumers. Poverty is very uneven throughout China, including among the minorities. There are minorities that are actually quite well off, the primary example being the Koreans, most of whom live in Jilin Province. There are also class divisions within the ethnic groups, just as there are among the great majority of peoples. However, the worst poverty in China is in the western regions and there is considerable overlap between the areas with the lowest standards of living and those that are home to minorities. Three province-level units show poverty in different ways. One is Yunnan, which of all China’s provinces had the highest number of rural poor people in 1996 (7.7 million), as well as the largest number of ethnic groups, accounting for over one-third of the total provincial population, according to the 1990 census (Economic and Development Department 2000: 434). Moreover, as many as 22.9 per cent of the total population was living in poverty (ADB and SPDC 2001: 5-4). Topography certainly does not help the elimination of poverty in Yunnan. It is extremely mountainous and many of the villages are very difficult of access, even in days when the infrastructure has greatly improved. Globalisation trends are likely to leave them behind. The province-level unit where the highest proportion of the population was poor in 1996 was Xinjiang (27.4 per cent, ADB and SPDC 2001: 5-4).
The economies of the minorities
There is, however, great variation in Xinjiang in poverty terms, with conditions being much better in the north than the south, where it is the great Taklamakan Desert that dominates the landscape and many people live in quite small oases. In my explorations in Xinjiang generally in the 1990s, I found housing to be quite good, even among the poor, or at least better than in provinces like Yunnan. On the other hand, the climate is very diverse, with very much wider variations between the cold and hot seasons than one finds in Yunnan. In addition, there is a very real political imperative in overcoming poverty in Xinjiang, because disparities in living standards and income between Han and members of minorities bear very directly and negatively on relations among different ethnic groups. Another area where poverty is potentially explosive politically is Tibet. Here again, poverty has been drastically reduced, but remains a serious problem. Daniel Kwan (2001: 8) cites Bureau of Tibetan Poverty-Relief Leading Group Director Zhao Xianzhong as claiming that there were 480,000 poor people in the TAR in 1994 but only 70,000 in 2001. However, his definition of the poverty line was special to Tibetan circumstances. A farmer who earns less than 600 yuan (about US$ 75) a year, or a herdsman less than 700 yuan a year, is considered poverty stricken. However, Zhao acknowledged that if the boundary were set at 1,300 yuan a year, then there were would be 1.2 million people below the poverty line in Tibet. It is worth pointing out in this context that 1,300 yuan per year works out at about US$ 0.45 per day, as against the US$ 1 per day that the World Bank takes as its boundary mark for poverty. Thus, although the government deserves credit for poverty alleviation since 1994, the fact is that those who have succeeded in escaping what the official line regards as poverty are still very poor. It is hardly surprising that many of those who have ‘shaken off ’ poverty revert to it when the markets shrink or the weather turns bad. Still, the figures do represent improvements. Moreover, other indicators suggest significant rises in the standard of living. As we saw earlier, life expectancy has risen greatly. The government continued to allocate significant funds to poverty alleviation in the early years of the century. Despite controversy over Han immigration, Daniel Kwan (2001: 8) remarks that they do at least show one advantage for Tibetans, because Han migrants ‘have opened businesses and provide job opportunities for locals’ in the towns, especially Lhasa. Income and standard of living inequalities An intensively researched study, based on surveys taken in 1988 and 1995, found that inequalities in China grew significantly over those years. Using the Gini ratio for measuring inequalities, which typically finds industrial economies at 0.30 – 0.40 and developing economies at greater than 0.40, the study found that the ratio rose from 0.34 to 0.42 for rural incomes and from 0.23 to 0.33 for urban incomes over those years (Khan and Riskin 2001: 144 –5). The authors associate both increases with the era of globalisation, adding that by 1995 they had made China ‘one of the more unequal of the Asian developing countries’, with inequality in
The economies of the minorities 69 income distribution greater than in countries like India, Pakistan or Indonesia (Khan and Riskin 2001: 49). In 1997 measurements of China’s HDI by province-level unit showed great inequalities by unit. The top six were Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Guangdong, Liaoning and Zhejiang in that order, the worst six being (from bottom to top) Tibet, Guizhou, Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan and Ningxia (UNDP 1999: 96). What is striking in these figures is that the top six includes not a single province with a high minority population (despite a small number in Guangdong), whereas the bottom six are, without exception, all places with high or very high numbers of ethnic group members. The inevitable conclusion appears to be that in general the Han are much better off than the minorities. An interesting illustrative example is Xinjiang, which ranks about middle among all China’s province-level units. Unfortunately, the HDI measurements by province do not record differentiations within provinces. However, official figures for household consumption in 1999 show very significant differences between regions, with the centre and north of Xinjiang generally far better off than the south. The two highest districts, in terms of consumption levels in yuan, were Karamai (8,846 yuan) and Ürümqi (6,837 yuan), in the north and centre respectively, while the two lowest were both in the south and far west, Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture (1,214 yuan) and Kashgar (1,225 yuan) (Liu et al. 2000: 236). What is striking here is that Karamai, a famous petroleum city in central north Xinjiang, and Ürümqi are dominantly Han in population, while Kizilsu’s people are over 90 per cent Uygur or Kirgiz and those of Kashgar are over 90 per cent Uygur.2 What this suggests is extensive disparities between Han and minorities. In other words, the case of Xinjiang bears out, rather than contradicts, the general pattern that economically the Han are doing better than the minorities. In the case of Tibet there are also significant disparities between Han and Tibetan. However, a recent study has shown that this is not primarily an ethnic issue. Rather it is due to a strong ‘urban bias’ operating in Tibet, and elsewhere. This favours Han over Tibetans, simply because in Tibet the Han live overwhelmingly in the cities, whereas Tibetans are predominantly rural. For instance, in 1990, 83.5 per cent of Tibetans in the TAR were peasants or nomads, but the comparable figure for permanently settled Han was only 3.4 per cent (Sautman and Eng 2001: 21–2, 47). There are also inequalities among the various minorities and within each of them. The Manchus, whose homes are mostly in Liaoning, Hebei, Heilongjiang and Jilin, the Mongolians, concentrated mainly in Inner Mongolia, and the Koreans are among the most prosperous of China’s ethnic groups. Figures for the rural parts of the ethnic autonomous areas for 1999 show Jilin with the highest per capita annual net income (2,226.85 yuan) among those provinces with significant minority populations. The main ethnic populations in Jilin are Koreans and Manchus. At the other end are Gansu (1,040.33 yuan) and Yunnan (1,227.69 yuan) (Economic and Development Department 2000: 542). The main minorities in Gansu’s ethnic autonomous places are Hui, Tibetans and Dongxiang, while Yunnan is the most multi-ethnic of all China’s province-level units.
The economies of the minorities
The main disparities within ethnic groups are still urban versus rural. The findings of Sautman and Eng with regard to the TAR almost certainly apply generally throughout the country, even if not necessarily to the same extent. It is much easier to get a prosperous life in the cities than in the countryside. Many minorities have done quite well in business and in the professions. There are preferential policies favouring the hiring and promotion of minorities that have allowed many members of the ethnic groups to rise in society (for instance, see Sautman 1998: 94–7). The great western development strategy The Chinese government has for a long time been very concerned about the inequalities within society, including those relating to ethnic minorities. Conferences have given thought to how to reduce the disparities, or at least to prevent them widening still further. There are political reasons for this, because the CCP knows full well that social instability could result if inequalities become too wide. These disparities were one of the reasons for a change in economic policy, designed to shift the emphasis of economic growth away from the eastern seaboard, which had been the focus of economic development since the mid1980s, and towards the West, counted as including all five autonomous regions, plus the provinces of Shaanxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai and Gansu. In February 2000, the central government took a decision to launch a long-term strategy to overcome the relatively poor economic development of the western regions. The government set up a leading group chaired by Premier Zhu Rongji and consisting of numerous ministries. Called the Great Western Development Strategy, this programme is broad-ranging and ambitious, and aims to reduce the economic disparities by accelerating the rise of the vast areas that were previously backward. The strategy faces many problems. Among the most serious are the shortage of water in the western regions and the need to develop without inflicting further devastation on an already damaged environment. There are labour issues, and the fact that educational levels are lower in the western regions, which may necessitate migration of skilled technical personnel. In the minority areas that are of concern to this book, such immigration could well exacerbate ethnic tensions unless very careful preventative measures are taken. In my opinion, Chinese authorities have given a great deal of thought to how to implement the strategy. However, as this book goes to print, it is far too early to say what its eventual impact will be.
Tourism Since the 1990s, ethnic tourism has expanded enormously in China. For a start the China Folk Culture Villages (Zhongguo minsu wenhua cun) in Shenzhen was opened in October 1991. Although this is actually in a Han area, it illustrates minority customs through showing off real minority people in a large park, together with their villages, clothes and performances. It is a ‘theme park’ based on the minority nationalities, rather like the many theme parks that have sprung up in many parts of China and other countries.
The economies of the minorities 71 What is even more important is the fact that many ethnic areas have opened up to tourism, both foreign and domestic. A large number of cities in ethnic areas that were formerly regarded as completely inaccessible to foreigners no longer require special permits and even those that do are much easier to get to than they used to be. Many members of the minorities have begun to cater for the tourists, both domestic and international. Some ethnic villages have made themselves into ‘theme parks’, hoping to attract tourists and make more money than they had ever been able to accumulate before. Tourism mushroomed in Yunnan and Guizhou. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Tibet was very tense politically as the 1990s dawned, but it still put a great deal of effort into tourism, and the Tibetans responded enthusiastically. Xinjiang has also seen a rapid expanse of tourism, although the political situation has inhibited even faster growth. The growth in tourism is corroborated by various figures. In Tibet the number of foreign tourists reached a peak of about 43,500 in 1987, but then experienced a very significant decline in the following years, owing to the political troubles in Lhasa and elsewhere and the restrictions imposed by authorities on travel to Tibet. However, there was a recovery in the early 1990s (Duojie et al. 1995: 535–6) and by the year 1999 the number of foreign tourists in Tibet had gone up to 100,800 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 528). The total number of tourists in 2000, including domestic travellers, was estimated at about 500,000 (‘Tibet’ 2000: 29). In Xinjiang the number of international and domestic tourists rose, respectively, from 79,833 and 1,672,200 in 1990 to 223,829 and 6,946,000 in 1999, while the cash inflow from international tourists rose from US$ 12,120,000 in 1990 to US$ 85,820,000 in 1999, with every year showing increases despite the political tensions (Liu et al. 2000: 594–5). The main ethnic provinces of China, especially Yunnan, show similar patterns of increase since the early 1990s in the numbers of both foreign and domestic tourists (for instance, see Wen and Tisdell 2001: 213, 231–3). Ethnic areas may have more to offer tourists than ethnic culture. There is spectacularly beautiful scenery in many ethnic areas. Ecotourism has become very fashionable worldwide since the late years of the twentieth century, and in some ethnic areas there are natural phenomena that are worth seeing and preserving. One scholar (Wen in Wen and Tisdell 2001: 229) surveyed over 100 tourists at Jinghong airport in 1995 to find out their rankings of the attractions of Sipsong panna Dai Autonomous Prefecture. She found that ethnic culture was most highly ranked, and that is significant, given that Sipsong panna boasts magnificent nature reserves and tropical forests and gorgeous scenery as well as being home to the Dai ethnic group. The acceleration of tourism since about 1990 has played a variety of roles among China’s ethnic minorities, some of them positive, some negative. It has gone hand in hand with a major development of the infrastructure of the ethnic areas. To take but one example, there may still be bottlenecks in the tourist routes of Yunnan (Wen and Tisdell 2001: 235) but tourism has led to the establishment of airports and air routes throughout Yunnan, so that it is now possible to reach in an hour or two ethnic areas that formerly required days or even weeks of arduous
The economies of the minorities
travel. Tourism requires reasonably comfortable buses that make it pleasant to visit the ethnic areas. This has been a major factor encouraging the Yunnan authorities to invest money and effort into improving the roads. Hotels have sprung up all over China, far more in the provinces along the eastern seaboard than elsewhere. Yet, the ethnic areas have also seen a mushrooming of tourist hotels. Table 4.3 shows the number of tourist hotels in 3 years in the province-level units where minorities are most important. Based on very extensive experience of staying in hotels of this sort over the years, I add that they have not only increased in number but also improved in quality and standards of service and comfort. What is important about infrastructure and service points like hotels is that they are available not only to tourists but to other people as well. Like counterparts in other countries, the great majority of the hotels provide meeting rooms, shops and restaurants as well as accommodation. People travel not only for leisure and tourist purposes, but also for business and work. More and more, Chinese travellers are demanding comfortable hotels, just like foreigners. It is true that there are still very bad hotels in China, but gone are the days when one assumed that while foreigners needed reasonably comfortable accommodation, Chinese were prepared to slum it. Overall, tourism has undoubtedly contributed to the modernisation and globalisation of the minorities. However, modernisation and globalisation both have their complexities. In his study of selected ethnic areas of Guizhou Province, Tim Oakes (1998: 229) has dubbed what has developed a ‘false modernity’. His basic reason is the serious contradiction between, on the one hand, trying to preserve ethnic cultures and, on the other, undermining them through cultural and economic development (Oakes 1998: 186–7). Oakes hints at a series of important and interesting questions. Is modernity necessarily desirable? What does it do to cultures, especially ethnic cultures? Does it matter if ethnic cultures disappear, as long as the minorities themselves are happy for this to happen? Table 4.3 Tourist hotels in selected provinces Province-level unit
Guangxi Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang
57 13 40 12 7 13 49
95 38 138 23 10 17 79
190 48a 234a 65 15 37 176
Sources: SSB 1992: 649; SSB 1996: 606; NBS 1999: 612; NBS 2000: 628. Note a 1998 Figure.
The economies of the minorities 73 The establishment of ethnic villages as ‘theme parks’ commercialises ethnic culture. I visited an ethnic village of Li and Miao people in the centre of Hainan Province in January 2000. Set up specifically for tourists, one paid to enter and was shown the customs of the Li and Miao, such as their wedding practices, their courtship rituals, their religious ceremonies. Amateurs from the village put on a performance of local ethnic songs and dances. Of course all the people wore their ‘native’ costumes and everything was made to seem ‘authentic’. The people sold their ethnic clothes and commodities in a special shop and on the streets of the village. The ethnic culture demonstrated in such theme parks is false in the sense that it is a deliberate construction for tourists. Probably it has some relation with the authentic cultural practices that once obtained in the village, but it has been torn from its social roots and in that sense is more like a museum than an authentic ethnic village. On the other hand, it may be that the ethnic cultures are going to succumb to modernisation anyway, because they are not in accord with the global processes of development that are sweeping the planet, and especially China. In that case, the display of culture does indeed help it to survive, because it gives it a new reason for existence, namely to make money. And does the fact that it is like a museum make it bad? And one could reasonably ask, is this commercialisation such a bad thing if it helps raise the living standards of the people? There can be no doubt that tourism brings in a great deal of money. But for whom? In my observation, the minority people themselves get some of this money. But there is very little doubt that minority elites get more than ordinary people, that representatives of the Han-dominated state get more than minority elites, that private entrepreneurs in such cities as London, New York, Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Sydney get much more than the Chinese tourist agents who arrange travel to the ethnic areas. I suspect that almost everybody benefits, but some benefit far more than others. It also has to be remembered that tourism can very readily spread social ills, and is certainly already doing so. Tourism gives opportunities for profit-making through prostitution and drugs, and can contribute to the spread of AIDS and other diseases. The effects such ills create on ethnic societies are obviously harmful and may turn out to be very extensive over the coming decades. On the other hand, the rising prosperity that tourism helps bring may also raise standards of medicine and health and the education that can help prevent AIDS. My own view is that, despite the seriousness of such evils, the positive impact of tourism outweighs the negative. My explorations leave me in no doubt that the minorities want tourism, because they believe – correctly – that it will raise their standard of living. I suspect that it is impossible to reverse the tide of tourism, just as one cannot reverse the globalisation of which tourism is an important part. However, it may be possible to take remedial measures that can reduce the damaging effects of tourism on the ethnic societies of China. I believe, for instance, that the minorities themselves should be given more control over the tourism of their area than is currently the case. And that implies training far more members of minorities in the hospitality industries, itself requiring a significant investment
The economies of the minorities
in education. Such measures have been tried in other countries. They may not solve all the problems. But they do give the minorities themselves more ‘ownership’ and control over the tourism that affects them most directly.
Foreign trade and Central Asia We turn now to another aspect of the economy with ramifications in foreign relations, namely foreign trade. In terms of value the minority autonomous areas account only for a minute proportion of China’s total foreign trade. However, combined exports and imports from the ethnic autonomous areas have risen very substantially since the early 1990s, reaching US$ 6,219 million in 1999 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 528). Tibet’s foreign trade rose from about US$ 100 million in 1994 (Shakya 1999: 436) to US$ 166.45 million in 1999 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 528). Much of the foreign trade is undertaken across international borders. Examples of this include Guangxi’s trade with northern Vietnam and that of Inner Mongolia with Mongolia. In 1999 Guangxi and Inner Mongolia were among the largest of the ethnic autonomous areas in terms of their trade with foreign countries. The single best-represented province-level unit in the foreign trade of China’s ethnic autonomous areas is Xinjiang, with the value growing from about US$ 1,400 million in 1996 to US$ 1,765 million (or 28.4 per cent of the total) in 1999 (Economic and Development Department 2000: 528). In both years neighbouring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were the best represented foreign countries, the former taking up 17.5 per cent of the total and the latter 10.7 per cent (XUAR 1998: 238). By 1999, however, the proportions of the trade had shifted very sharply, with Kazakhstan accounting for 52.4 per cent of Xinjiang’s foreign trade, but Kyrgyzstan only 7.5 per cent. In 1999, the largest single export commodity, in terms of value, was cotton products, while the largest import was steel products (Liu et al. 2000: 58–7). Early in 2002 sources in Kazakhstan reported the beginning of the development of a copper deposit in Xinjiang, signalling competition with Kazakhstan’s copper industry and an increase in China’s already powerful position in the Central Asian economies. One Kazakh observer wrote in April 2002 of expectations that other Xinjiang activities aimed at strengthening China’s economic impact in Central Asia would include ‘laying transport roads and railway routes from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to China and introducing its financial organizations in the region’ (Serov 2002). Possibly the most important commodities in Xinjiang’s imports from Central Asia in strategic and economic terms are those related to energy, such as gas, petroleum and coal. In the 1990s China began for the first time to play a major role in world energy diplomacy. At the same time the Central Asian region has grown greatly in importance as a world supplier of energy, especially in the oil and gas sectors. China’s economy has long been heavily dependent on coal, and produces most of what it needs itself. On the other hand, its oil and gas reserves ‘are modest by comparison to the potential future domestic demand for these sources of energy’ (Andrews-Speed and Vinogradov 2000: 385).
The economies of the minorities 75 As discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, China has already moved to strengthen its relationships with the countries of Central Asia, notably with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Economic and strategic factors are strongly interwoven in these multifaceted relationships, which for various reasons have grown in complexity since the 11 September 2001 terror attacks. For some time China has been keen to build gas and oil pipelines that would involve it more closely in the energy trade network of the Central Asian region. It has undertaken active negotiations for a pipeline that would facilitate the movement of oil from the Caspian Sea through Kazakhstan to Xinjiang and for several gas pipelines as well. There are conflicting interests, and the United States is also actively involved and keen to expand its economic power in the region. The world’s only remaining superpower has also used the 11 September 2001 incidents as a mechanism for increasing its military and strategic power in Central Asia. However, there seems little doubt that at the beginning of the twenty-first century China ‘is set to become one of the world’s major importers of both oil and natural gas’ (Andrews-Speed and Vinogradov 2000: 388). The impact in terms of globalisation is potentially very significant not only for China but for the world. Already its influence in Central Asia is greater than at any time in recent history. With the onset of war in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 incidents, the energy and strategic diplomacy is likely to undergo change, with the growth of the American presence in Central Asia. China is likely to wish to reduce its oil dependence on the Middle East and on the United States as a way of enhancing its long-term oil security. This means that the extent of China’s economic dealings in the region is sure to grow and the process of globalisation to intensify, especially with China a member of the WTO.
Conclusion China’s economic performance in the ethnic areas has been reasonably successful, but has by no means been free of problems. It has seen prosperity of a kind probably never seen before in history in some areas, and general rises in the standard of living. The infrastructure has improved, economic growth has been impressive and tourism has generally added to lifestyle variety as well as contributing to prosperity. Absolute poverty is much less widespread than it used to be. On the other hand, the problems have not gone away, in some cases the very successes producing new ills. Inequalities have worsened. Tourism has contributed towards non-trivial social problems. Poverty has demonstrated a remarkable tenacity, remaining very serious in some places and generally more serious in the ethnic areas than in the country as a whole. Tuberculosis, once thought eradicated, has raised its head again. This chapter has focused mainly on Xinjiang and Tibet, with far fewer references to the many other minority areas in China. The reason for this is because it is these two regions that remain most controversial and difficult for the Chinese authorities. The other ethnic areas may have their problems, but in general seem quite happy to become integrated into China. One specialist (Palmer 1997: 284)
The economies of the minorities
claims that the ethnic areas are demanding more central government involvement in their affairs, especially economic affairs, because they believe that opens the way towards better sharing in the growing prosperity of China as a whole. The Chinese government’s policy is that economic development is the best way to solve political problems of separatism. On the whole it is probably right. But in the case of Xinjiang the evidence is very mixed, and at the end of the twentieth century seemed to be pointing more towards social disharmony and resentment than integration. The aftermath of the 11 September terror attacks in New York and Washington may change that situation, but there is no guarantee at all of that. There are elements of globalisation in the economic experience of the ethnic areas of China since the early 1990s. Paramount among these is the rise of oil and gas diplomacy that is linking China to countries further west in an area of crucial importance to all of the world’s main economies. But one can also identify several other major aspects of the world economy, such as tourism and the transfer of goods in international markets. And it is remarkable that for the first time a railway traverses China’s ethnic regions to link its eastern seaboard with Europe. And there are also important negative globalisation influences visible in the experience of China’s ethnic minorities since the early 1990s, such as drugs and certain diseases. Economic modernisation and globalisation have probably weakened cultural differences among the minorities. But they have certainly not destroyed them. The survival, even strengthening, of traditional medicines, which coexist with more modern counterparts, bears witness to this suggestion. Economic growth might even reinforce patterns of traditional lifestyle in the usage of crops and certain types of animals, which can become very closely linked with particular ethnic cultures. The economy might be more intolerant of difference than those other factors considered in this book, but its homogenising impact in China’s ethnic areas is very far from complete.
Plate 1 A statue of Mao Zedong in the central square of Kashgar, a Uygur city in the far southwest of Xinjiang. During the Cultural Revolution there were many statues of Mao like this one throughout China. Most have now been taken down, but this one remains. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 2 A Miao courtship dance at the Folk Customs Cultural Villages, which is a major tourist attraction in Shenzhen, a modern city very near Hong Kong. Traditionally, young Miao men play reedpipes to court ‘counterparts’, that is young women. Although the custom is still alive in some Miao areas today, the picture shows a performance put on for tourists. A modern building can be seen in the background. Taken in January 1993.
Plate 3 A Uygur performance by a professional song-and-dance company put on for tourists in Turpan, Xinjiang. The site is a space covered with traditional Uygur grape vines in the grounds of one of the main tourist hotels in Turpan. Many song-and-dance companies in China nowadays make most of their money through performing specially for tourists.
Plate 4 Mongolian dance in a restaurant in Beijing. The girls are in traditional Mongolian dress and probably most of them are Mongolians, but there is no guarantee of that. Taken in June 2001.
Plate 5 Open-air vegetable market in Menglun, Sipsong panna, Yunnan Province, not very far from the border with Myanmar. The vendors are Dai. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 6 This back street scene in Kashgar, southwestern Xinjiang, shows the old-fashioned method of donkey-drawn cart is still very much alive. Taken in October 1994.
Plate 7 A Uygur carpet-selling family in the main market of Ürümqi, capital of Xinjiang. The Uygurs are famous for their beautiful carpets, which belong more to the wall than to the floor. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 8 Uygur food stall in Kashgar. Taken in October 1994.
Plate 9 Uygur sellers of eggs in a market in Kashgar. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 10 Hardware stall in Kashgar, June 1999.
Plate 11 Uygur sellers of Uygur hats in a free market in Kashgar, June 1999.
Plate 12 Free animal market in Kashgar, June 1999. Mutton is eaten widely among the Uygurs, but as Muslims they do not eat pork under any circumstances. Sheep are useful for various other purposes as well.
Plate 13 A view of the Kumbum Monastery, which the Chinese call Taer Temple, near Xining, Qinghai Province. This is one of the most important of all Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. Although it has become a tourist attraction, it still has an active religious life, with over 700 monks. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 14 A scene at the entrance of the Kumbum Monastery. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 15 A view of the Labrang Monastery, Gansu Province, one of the most important of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 16 Young monks at the Labrang Monastery. It is still very common for Tibetan boys to enter monasteries, and several I met at the Labrang Monastery told me they had been only 13 when they entered, and some had come in when considerably younger. Nowadays they are supposed to make a free choice when they reach adulthood to decide whether to return to lay life or stay in the monastery for the rest of their lives. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 17 A Tibetan Buddhist monk trains his disciple in the traditional arts at the Labrang monastery. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 18 The head monk of the Red Sect of Tibetan Buddhism with his daughter at the Labrang Monastery. Taken in July 1995. The main sect of Tibetan Buddhism is often known as the Yellow Sect and monks remain celibate all their lives. On the other hand, the monks of the Red Sect, who are far less numerous than those of the Yellow Sect, are allowed to marry.
Plate 19 Four Tibetan boys at the Red Sect Monastery attached to the great Labrang Monastery. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 20 A temple in a village of the Tu nationality in Huzhu Tu Autonomous County not far from Xining, Qinghai Province. The Tu are quite distinct linguistically and ethnically from the Tibetans, but practise Tibetan Buddhism. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 21 Two Tu women bowing down in reverence to the Buddha at the temple in the village in Huzhu, Qinghai Province. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 22 Young Tibetan women prepare to perform a ritual dance at a religious festival gathering in Maba Village, Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province. The festival saw thousands of people, almost all Tibetans, come from all around the region to take part, some walking quite long distances. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 23 A young male participant in the Tibetan religious festival. One of the leaders of the festival has stuck a long pin through the young man’s cheek, a kind of sacrifice to the gods through the pain it inflicted.
Plate 24 Vultures come to eat a corpse at a ‘sky burial’, the most normal form of disposal for the common people in Tibet. The undertaker dissects the corpse from the back, cutting the flesh into small pieces. He also crushes the bones, feeding the entire corpse to the vultures. Taken by Tama Furuno at the Langmu Monastery outside a Tibetan village in central western Sichuan Province in May 2001.
Plate 25 A Tibetan monk chants sutras as the vultures consume the corpse in the background. Taken by Tama Furuno at the Langmu Monastery in central western Sichuan in May 2001.
Plate 26 A general view of the Tibetan village outside which the Langmu Monastery is situated. Taken by Tama Furuno in May 2001.
Plate 27 The Bodhi Temple in Mangshi, capital of the Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, in far southwestern Yunnan just on the border with Myanmar. This is the oldest temple in the city, dating from the first half of the nineteenth century. Although it is the headquarters of the local Buddhist Association, there are only four monks living there. Taken in October 2000.
Plate 28 A Theravada Buddhist temple attached to a small Dai village in Sipsong panna called Jingmengyuan, set in mountains in the extreme south of Yunnan Province. Approximately every second village in Sipsong panna has its own temple and all are still used for celebrations, festivals and worship. However, some of them, such as the one in the picture, have no resident monks to look after them. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 29 Another view of the Theravada Buddhist temple above Jingmengyuan village. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 30 The long flight of stairs leading from the village up to the village temple, long dragons sculpted on either side of the staircase. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 31 Three old men look after the Wuyun Temple in Mangshi, Dehong, Yunnan Province. There are no monks resident here, but the temple functions quite actively and is well maintained. The statue of the Buddha is visible in the background between two of the men. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 32 Boy monks playing cards in a temple outside Ruili, Yunnan Province, a few minutes drive from the border with Myanmar. It is quite common for young Dai boys to become monks and live in the temple for a period. In this particular temple, built in 1983, there were eighteen monks, including twelve young boys. Taken in October 2000.
Plate 33 The main entrance of the great Idkah Mosque in Kashgar, southwest Xinjiang, which is the largest mosque in China. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 34 Scholars and worshippers inside the grounds of the Idkah Mosque, Kashgar. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 35 The courtyard in front of the old mosque in Yarkand, southwestern Xinjiang, with the complex of old buildings that include the tomb of the famous Uygur female musician Amanisahan (1526–1560). The mosque itself dates from 1533. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 36 Uygur worshippers in the old Yarkand mosque. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 37 The main mosque in Guanghe County town, Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 38 A class in the Koran and Arabic language in the mosque in Guanghe County. The children stay there all day during their vacation from their secular education, their parents thinking it necessary for them to have grounding in their Islamic religion and in the language in which the Koran was originally written. Taken in July 1995.
Plate 39 Children at a secondary school for nationalities in Jinghong, capital of Sipsong panna, Yunnan Province. There are nearly 1,000 students here, about four-fifths of them belonging to the Dai and other minority nationalities. One of the students in the front row is a boy monk, wearing the traditional saffron robe. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 40 A Buddhist pagoda in Mangshi, Dehong, Yunnan Province. The special feature of the pagoda, which is covered with Buddhist images, is that there is a large bodhi tree growing out of it in such a way that the two seem inextricably linked. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 41 The picture shows the same bodhi tree, which is in the grounds of a primary school. Just beside it is a map of China. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 42 Teachers at the Aimudla Primary School in Turpan, Xinjiang. The School was established with money from local people. Aimudla, the old man in the centre of the picture, donated 80,000 yuan, by far the highest of any contributor, which is why the school is named after him. The school is for Uygur children and all the ten teachers are Uygurs. The main signs are first in Uygur and then in Chinese. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 43 A class prepares to give a performance at a school in the back streets of Kashgar, their teacher giving them last-minute instructions. Taken in October 1994.
Family and women
Plate 44 A Dai woman with a small child on her back. This street is a few minutes drive from the border with Myanmar. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 45 Girl with a baby on her back, taken in a Zhuang village in Guangxi in January 1992.
Plate 46 Girl with a baby on her back, taken in a Zhuang village in Guangxi in January 1992.
Plate 47 Two young Yao women in national clothes, taken in a Yao village near Jinxiu, Guangxi, in January 1992. The women put on their national clothes especially for the photograph. However, in general minority women wear their national clothes more than do men.
Plate 48 Older Yao woman in a Yao village near Jinxiu, Guangxi, taken in January 1992.
Plate 49 A group of Tu women and children, in a Tu village in Huzhu Tu Autonomous County, Qinghai. Two of the women are in their national dress, because this was a festival day. Taken in June 1995.
Plate 50 The back view of a Tibetan woman in a remote Tibetan village. Older Tibetans are far more insistent on wearing their national clothes than are most of China’s minorities nowadays. Although this applies to people of both genders, it is even more the case with women than with men. Taken by Miss Tama Furuno in Jiangda County, eastern Tibet in May 2001.
Plate 51 Two young Tibetans who have come as onlookers to a religious dance festival. Taken in Maba, Qinghai Province, in July 1995. They have dressed up well, and the one on the right has traditional Tibetan beads. But many young Tibetans are less enthusiastic about wearing the traditional clothing than their elders.
Plate 52 A young Hui (Muslim) couple having tea at a restaurant. The young man was 22 years old, and his wife was 17 at the time the picture was taken in July 1995, and they had already been married a few months. It is against the law for a girl to marry so young, but there are special exemptions for minorities. She wears the black veil of a married woman, even though she looks rather like a child.
Plate 53 People resting and chatting near the Idkah Mosque. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 54 A group of women near the Idkah Mosque. Some women wear veils that cover the entire head, including the eyes, especially when there are men about. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 55 A group of women and children in the back streets of Kashgar. The women wear head scarves but when they are near home they see no need to wear the veil. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 56 Kazaks in their yurt in the Baiyangou region of Xinjiang, near the capital Ürümqi. They are a man and wife, the woman on the right being the wife’s friend. Yurts are like large tents. They are mobile and enable the family to move to a different place depending on the needs of the season. On the other hand, they can be quite comfortable, as this one appears to be. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 57 Women and children in a Uygur village near Gulja (Yining in Chinese), which is in the far northwest of Xinjiang, near the border with Kazakhstan. The children all belong to the family of the woman with the small boy on her lap. In all she had nine children. Families of that size are fairly common among rural Uygurs. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 58 Six Uygur girls of a nine-child family in a village outside Khotan, southwest Xinjiang. One of the oldest brothers was training for the Muslim clergy. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 59 Abdulla Tursun, an ancient Uygur man living outside Khotan who claimed to be 115 years old when this picture was taken in June 1999. There is no way to check the accuracy of his claim, but the Pamir region is known for longevity. When I met him, Abdulla Tursun was quite able to walk without a walking stick and carried on a conversation quite readily.
Plate 60 A mulberry-paper producing Uygur family in Khotan. Production of mulberry paper is an ancient craft among the Uygurs, but is dying out now with the onset of modernisation. The manager of the factory is the man on the right. The young woman at the back and on the left is 18 and the daughter of the manager. Despite her youth and beauty, she had already endured much suffering. Her father had introduced her to a young man whom she married but who beat her, as a result of which she soon divorced him. Divorce is very common and easily obtained in southern Xinjiang. Traditionally, it is the man who asks for divorce, but this case shows that the woman readily does so in the present age. She had already had a child, who died of sickness. Taken in June 1999.
Plate 61 A young Dai boy playing table tennis at a school in a village on the road between Jinghong and Menglun, in Sipsong panna, Yunnan Province. Note that he has a T-shirt with the word Thailand written across it. The Dai are closely related culturally and ethnically with the Thais of Thailand and there is a great deal of good will towards Thailand among the Dai, especially Xishuang banna. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 62 Zhuang village scene in Guangxi. Taken in January 1992.
Plate 63 Newly built meeting hall, also usable as a stage for performances, in a Dong village in Sanjiang Dong Autonomous County in northern Guangxi. Taken in January 1992.
Plate 64 Entrance to a Dong village in Sanjiang, Guangxi. Taken in January 1992.
Plate 65 The wind-and-rain bridge is a traditional feature of Dong architecture. These wind-and-rain bridges are covered and, apart from their beauty, very useful for a variety of social purposes. People hold meetings there, court, or chat. And they can also be used for performances. Taken in January 1992 in a Dong village of Sanjiang, Guangxi.
Plate 66 A wind-and-rain bridge in a Dong village in Sanjiang, Guangxi. Taken in January 1992.
Plate 67 People, mainly Dai, crowd for an outing near Mangshi in Dehong, Yunnan. The outing is the Dragon Boat Race of the Mangshi District. Although this is not a specifically Dai festival, they take it very seriously and dress up in their best clothes for it. Taken in October 2000.
Plate 68 Dai participants at the Dragon Boat Race of the Mangshi District. The older women have more traditional headgear and clothing than the younger couple or the children. Taken in October 2000.
Plate 69 General view of a Dai village in Sipsong panna. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 70 General view of a Dai village in Sipsong panna. Taken in September 2000.
Plate 71 A general view of the town of Fenghuang in far west Hunan Province, a Miao and Tujia region. This town is known for its traditional remnants and charm. Taken in February 1992.
Plate 72 A performance of a traditional nuo drama on a very old stage built in very traditional style in Fenghuang, western Hunan. Nuo drama is still popular among some of the minorities, including the Tujia and Miao. Taken in February 1992.
The realm of the mind, religion and education
Early in 1992 Deng Xiaoping made a much publicised ‘journey to the south’. It was intended to revitalise policies of economic reform throughout China, and it succeeded brilliantly. It also led on to a period of unprecedented get-rich-quick mentality, which has survived into the twenty-first century. Few people outside the CCP were any longer concerned about socialist ideology. Within the CCP corruption continued to worsen, even at the highest levels, despite serious official attempts to prevent the trend. Of course CCP leaders worried desperately about these trends, fearing that they could lead to the Party’s overthrow in an age where ruling Marxist parties had lost power and gone out of fashion almost everywhere in the world. In October 1996, a full meeting of the CCP’s Central Committee discussed the issues, determining to find ways of reviving ‘socialist ethics’ through education and law. The Plenum still placed great emphasis on economic advance and on patriotism, and of course on Marxism. It also made moral demands, such as: to foster among all the people the spirit of serving the people and of collectivism, advocate respect and care of the people, loving the collective, caring for public benefits, assistance for those in need, or in trouble, performing more good deeds for the people and society, and oppose and resist the worship of money, hedonism and individualism. (‘Resolution’ 1996: 25–6) The actual impact on society of declarations of this kind has not been enormous. What is striking, however, is recognition at the highest level of just how serious the problem of moral decay is in the reformed China.
Religion To a large extent religion and comparable movements have filled the spiritual vacuum that has come along with the sharp decline in popular faith in socialist ideology since the mid- to late 1970s. Traditional religions of all kinds have revived. The CCP has permitted this, although as an atheist organisation it does not like it. It has, however, continued to rail against superstition and to demand some control over approved religious bodies. In particular, it has been as keen as ever to suppress any religious or quasi-religious activities it sees as threatening its own grip on power.
The mind, religion and education
The best illustrative example has been its suppression of the Falungong, mentioned in Chapter 1. The fact that the Falungong leader, Li Hongzhi, was a Chinese living in New York and hence outside PRC authority was a determining factor in the CCP’s anxiety over the Falungong, because it raised visions of a movement controlled from overseas bent on stirring up social instability in China itself. Chinese authorities have always been particularly resentful of Chinese who shelter under foreign citizenship or protection to harm what they see as Chinese interests, and it is my strong impression that ordinary Chinese do not care much for such people either. Since the banning order, the CCP has waged an unremitting struggle against the Falungong, condemning it as ‘an evil cult’ (xiejiao), which has even induced death and suicide among its practitioners. At the same time, the campaign against the Falungong has brought the CCP and Chinese government themselves under severe international criticism for persecution of religion, with accusations that the anti-Falungong campaign has itself led to torture, beatings and deaths. Some background Among those people to whom religion matters most in China many belong to minority nationalities. It seems to me a valid generalisation to claim that, by and large, the minorities are very much more religious both in belief and practice than are the Han, and this is especially so following the secularising influences of the twentieth century. The following observations written by a scholar at the Institute for Research on Religion of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences conform to my own views based on various explorations in minority areas of China since the early 1980s. He begins by emphasising that since the proportion of believers among the ethnic minorities ranges from fairly high to almost 100 per cent, one must regard religion as having a ‘mass nature’. Religious beliefs, minority group feelings, and customs are integrated into an organic whole among these national minorities. Religion sets the norms for their core culture and morality. … Today, while the situation of all religious believers has undergone certain changes, the fact is that religion and the national minorities are still intimately related. We must respect and take seriously their religious beliefs, or else it will affect the unity of the national minorities. (Luo 1991: 11) Religion affects all kinds of matters of lifestyle, including diet, festivals and marriage. The most famous aspect of the way in which religion impacts on diet is the Muslim prohibition of pork, the Koran specifically forbidding Muslims to eat ‘carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine’ (Koran 1995: 106). Shrines are found in the houses of most minorities I have visited, even those which are not especially committed religiously. When the CCP came to power in 1949 it first adopted the policy of toleration of religion, and freedom of religion was formally incorporated into the 1954
The mind, religion and education
Constitution. The CCP also set up various bodies to control religion, an early example being the China Islamic Association (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao xiehui), established in July 1952. However, during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, Mao Zedong had minorities’ religions banned as harmful feudal remnants, with absolutely disastrous results, temples, mosques and churches being destroyed and clergy forced to return to lay life. The negation of the Cultural Revolution followed quickly on the heels of Mao’s death in 1976, with religions of all kinds soon reviving, including those of the minorities.1 The 1982 Constitution, still in force at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, includes freedom of religion. It also prohibits any religious body from being subject to foreign domination and declares that no person may ‘make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State’ (Article 36 in ‘Constitution of PRC’ 2000: 7). The 1980s were a generally very positive period for religion in China. The aftermath of the Cultural Revolution witnessed great expansion and revival, like a wilting flower after watering. However, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw several events in Tibet and Xinjiang the effect of which was to make the CCP much more cautious about any kind of religion with foreign connections, and more condemnatory of any activities which threatened the state and CCP rule. These included independence demonstrations in Tibet in 1987, 1988 and 1989 and the Akto rebellion of April 1990 in Xinjiang, all discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The more cautious view finds expression in an official account of religion written mainly by Gong Xuezeng with the express purpose of guiding CCP and government cadres in the treatment of religion (Gong 1999: 1). Originally published in December 1997 it was written very specifically in the shadow of the CCP Central Committee’s Plenum on reviving socialist ethics of October 1996 mentioned above. It proved important enough to go to a second edition as early as July 1999. In the section on religion among the minorities, Gong insists on the enormous importance of handling religion among minorities carefully and humanely, and allowing them the freedom of religious belief and practice so crucial to their lifestyle. This policy gains in importance from the fact that the majority of those most strongly committed to religious belief and practice live near borders. As a result they have the potential either to disturb or consolidate Chinese unity (Gong 1999: 304–5). Gong Xuezeng has a section on what he calls ‘new circumstances and new problems’ in religion in the minority areas (Gong 1999: 306–8). There are altogether seven of these, of which the first two are the most important and worth quoting directly for what they show about the globalising trends in minorities’ religion since the last decade or so of the twentieth century. Firstly, the infiltration activities of hostile external powers using religion in the minority areas are getting more intense day by day. They are using broadcasts to carry on missionary work over the airwaves. They are secretly bringing illegal religion propaganda items into the Chinese mainland. They
The mind, religion and education are taking the opportunity provided by tourists or people visiting relations and friends to indulge in missionary preaching, to find converts and win over our religious groups to their side with money. They are making use of economic, technical, cultural, educational, and other exchanges and cooperation for missionary activities. They are recruiting religious overseas students, and roping into their cause Chinese who go abroad to see relatives, for a pilgrimage or for trade. Secondly, national splittists are using religion to destroy the unity of the motherland and of its nationalities. They focus on the Dalai Lama’s clique to unfurl the banner of religion in an attempt to bring about the independence of Tibet. Splittists both inside Xinjiang and outside are using religion as a cover for trying to destroy the unity of the nationalities and of the motherland. (Gong 1999: 307)
The mention of tourists and educational or commercial exchange is particularly interesting. In Lhasa and other Tibetan areas, I have met quite a few tourists very enthusiastic to transmit information about the independence struggle from abroad to Tibet and vice versa. They are also keen to buy pictures of the Dalai Lama for local Tibetans; until this practice was banned in 1996 there were special shops where these pictures could be bought or reproduced very easily. In the Korean areas of China, it is no secret that Koreans from South Korea coming to see relations or for business bring in money to subsidise Christian activities. I have personally met several American teachers in minority areas of China who were quite open that their real purpose in coming to teach in China was to spread Christianity. There is a bit more discussion below on the charge against people who use religion as a cover to bring about the secession of Tibet or Xinjiang. What is most striking is that the people whom Gong attacks with his rather provocative language have a totally different attitude from the Chinese authorities. Christian teachers or businesspeople believe they are doing very valuable and virtuous work in trying to spread Christianity. Supporters of Tibetan independence take pride in doing what they can to help their cause. But for the Chinese authorities, with their very different interests and values, it is nothing short of criminal to attempt to overturn the rule of the CCP and throw the country into turmoil. This may be a question of religious freedom for foreigners who observe or visit China; for the Chinese authorities it has nothing to do with religious freedom but everything to do with politics. There is a linkage here with Chinese political tradition, which has always been secular in the sense that it does not allow clerics to hold state power. Probably none of the great world traditions has placed such weight on this kind of secular government as the Confucian, on which Han Chinese political culture is based. This contrasts strikingly with pre-modern Christian civilisation, as well as with several religious and ethnic traditions in China itself, which exemplify religious governance. Perhaps the best illustration is Tibet, where the Dalai Lama was both the spiritual and political leader and ruler. On the other hand, one of the main trends in the modernisation process beginning late in the eighteenth century was
The mind, religion and education
to reduce the power of clergies and of religion in politics. In the United States and elsewhere, a major legal issue was to keep the state and religion apart, with many jurists believing that the state should never favour one religion over another, let alone fund religious activities. An interesting issue in China in the relationship between politics and religion since the 1980s has been in membership of the CCP. Can a religious believer belong to the CCP and, if not, won’t that prevent minorities from joining the CCP, with implications for their loyalty to the Chinese state? Authorities have been very keen to win over influential members of the minorities to become members of the CCP precisely in order to strengthen their commitment to the PRC. In 1982 the CCP Central Committee put out an official communiqué on religion. It declared that members of the CCP could neither believe in, nor practise, religion, since it was based on an atheist philosophy, namely Marxism–Leninism. However, it allowed for flexibility for the minorities. It argued that since religion was often an essential part of social life and popular customs, it would isolate CCP members from their social group if they were forbidden to take part in such religious ceremonies as weddings, funeral rituals and traditional festivals (cited Pas 1989: 10). This policy forbids religious belief, but allows for religious practice of certain kinds. My observation is that minority CCP members abide by these rules, with some of them stretching the flexibility to belief. Two examples can illustrate this point. In the middle of 1999, I met a Uygur on the plane from Beijing to Xinjiang who told me that he believed in Islam despite being a member of the CCP. He said that he would not go to pray at the mosque until he was 60, because of his membership of the CCP. He also added that he knew of some Uygurs who were both members of the CCP and believing Muslims, and in Xinjiang I met several people who told me that they were quite able to combine CCP membership with belief in Islam. In an interview I held with a Dai professional woman in Jinghong, capital of Sipsong panna (Xishuang banna in Chinese), in September 2000, who was also a member of the CCP, it emerged that she still had a certain belief in Buddhism, the religion of the Dai, even though she denied being strongly committed. For her there was no absolute demarcation between CCP membership and religious belief, but declaring atheism would isolate her from her community and came close to denying her Dai identity, and she saw absolutely no need to do that. Despite official attitudes what I have found most striking in all my visits to minority areas since the early 1990s has been how strong religion appears to be, not how weak. This applies especially to the Tibetans, and the Islamic nationalities, above all the Uygurs. Moreover, I suspect that in some ways religion among the minorities has actually been growing since the early 1990s, at least in terms of adherents and probably clergy as well. Islam Islam is by far the most prevalent of all formal religions in China. Among its adherents, the three most populous nationalities are the Hui, the Uygurs and the
The mind, religion and education
Kazaks, but there are seven others with much smaller populations. The Hui have their own autonomous region, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, but in fact they are scattered throughout virtually all China, even including Tibet. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Prefecture is not only the province-level unit dedicated to the Uygurs, but is also the one with the most Muslims and the principal home of six of China’s Islamic nationalities: the Uygurs, Kazaks, Kirgiz, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Tatars. There is also a significant concentration of Hui in Xinjiang. The Hui are descended from Muslims who became integrated into Chinese society from about the fourteenth century, and are now hardly distinguishable from the Han Chinese, other than in their adherence to Islam. Most of the other Islamic nationalities are Turkic culturally and linguistically. The only people in China to speak an Iranian language are the Tajiks. The great majority of Muslims in China are Sunni, the prevalent form of Islam worldwide, other than among Iranians, who are Shiite. There are still adherents to the mystic Sufi sect of Islam, with its emphasis on direct personal experience of God. Since the 1990s, Sufis have been reclaiming land lost during the collectivization programme of the 1950s, a process sometimes leading to conflict (Dillon 1999: 182). Official figures claim that at the end of the twentieth century there were over 18 million believers in Islam in China;2 in Xinjiang 8.1 million people, that is 56.3 per cent of the total population, were religious believers, almost all of them being Muslim. There were about 30,000 mosques in China, about two-thirds of them in Xinjiang, and some 40,000 Islamic clergy, with about 29,000 religious personnel in Xinjiang, the overwhelming majority of them Muslim (Information Office 2000b: 48–9). In Xinjiang, Islam is considerably stronger in some places than others. According to Justin Rudelson (1997: 48), the strongest resistance to Chinese restrictions on religion is to be found in Kashgar and Khotan, both in the south of Xinjiang. At the same time, in Turpan in central Xinjiang and Hami to its east Islam has reacted less forcefully, ‘sometimes with seeming indifference’. In my opinion, the Chinese are more suspicious of Islam in southern Xinjiang, believing it will be used against the state there, but are more relaxed about the religion in Turpan and Hami. A survey carried out by the Centre for Religious Research, Xinjiang Social Sciences Institute, in 1983 and 1984, appears to bear out the greater strength of Islam in the south than the north. The team surveyed two Kazak villages in Yili, northern Xinjiang, and two rural communities and one urban in and near Kashgar. It found that among the people of Kashgar, who are Uygurs, over 90 per cent of villagers take part in Islamic religious practice, while among the Kazaks of Yili the relevant proportion was only about one in five. Not surprisingly, a far higher proportion of villagers practised fasting and recited the scriptures than among workers (He 1991: 225–6). These general conclusions were still valid in the 1990s. Indeed, impressional evidence from visits in 1994 and 1999 suggested to me that, if anything, Islam had grown in influence since the 1980s, especially among the Uygurs.
The mind, religion and education
The strength of Islamic culture among Muslims in China varies enormously. In Quanzhou, Fujian Province, there are Hui who do not believe in Islam or even follow Islamic dietary proscriptions, but consider themselves Hui because they can trace their foreign Islamic ancestry back to the seventh century through tombstones (Gladney 1991: 262–5). At the other extreme, many Uygurs adhere fiercely to their traditional Islamic culture. One researcher, noting that veneration of the dead has long been at the heart of religious practices among the Uygurs, claims that fieldwork data from the 1990s ‘point to the remarkable persistence of these practices throughout the socialist period’ (Bellér-Hann 2001: 9). Despite enormous variation, what has impressed me since the 1990s is how strong Islam and Islamic cultural influence remains among the Muslim minorities of China, not how weak. In many Islamic areas of China, clergy are trained in schools, which are attached to mosques, or even part of them. In some villages, Islamic clergy are said to exercise even more power than the local CCP branch. There have been since the 1990s a number of social disturbances due to clashes between Hui and Han, and even riots caused by Muslim anger at Han cooking pork. However, the Hui have traditionally been essentially loyal to the Chinese state, and there is no suggestion that they will wish to secede from China. On the whole, separatist moves among Islamic nationalities have been limited to the Uygurs, some of whom wish to set up an independent Uygur state. As noted in Chapter 3, Uygur separatist activities have posed quite a serious problem to the Chinese state since 1990. An interesting and important question to arise in the context of religion is whether these secessionist movements are inspired by Islam, or by another factor, for instance by strong cultural identity feelings, by repression from the Chinese state, or by forces outside China itself. This question has aroused very strong feelings on all sides. Chinese sources blame radical Muslims for the troubles, whereas Uygurs place responsibility firmly with Chinese repression. My own view is that there is a wide range of causes for Xinjiang separatism, with Islam being only one of them, though an important one. According to Michael Winchester (1997: 31), the Uygur leader of the 1990 Baren uprising took his inspiration from the idea of the ‘holy war’ practised in Afghanistan against the Soviet ‘infidel invader’. The reason why separatism intensified so dramatically from 1990 was the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet Union. Though it reached its climax at the end of 1991, this process had already spawned followon effects which have intensified since then, are still with us at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and unlikely to go away soon.3 The implication is that globalisation is affecting the development of Islam in China in a variety of ways. China is becoming part of the Islamic revival, which has become a global phenomenon over the last few decades. According to one specialist, ‘the floodgates of the Islamic revival’ in Central Asia opened in 1989 (Rashid 1994: 244), in other words the very year before the Akto disturbances. A certain kind of international Islam has become involved in strengthening Uygur identity, just as it has become enmeshed with ethnonationalist movements in various parts of the world. I noted in Chapter 1 that globalising tendencies do not
The mind, religion and education
exclude important local ethnic and other identities, which may actually gain strength in reaction against the pressures of globalisation. Trends in Xinjiang are a good example of this process, which some have termed ‘glocalisation’. Buddhism Buddhism is traditionally very widespread in China, both among the Han and the minorities. The great majority of Buddhist believers in China subscribe to the Mahayana tradition which, developing between the second century BCE and the second century CE, claimed to represent the Buddha’s most complete teachings. Following for the older Theravada tradition comes mainly from the Dai people of southwest Yunnan. But, for China’s minorities, by far the most important tradition of Buddhism is the esoteric Tantric form which became prominent in India in the seventh century, spreading quickly to Tibet. Although many Chinese know this religion as ‘lamaism’ (lama jiao), it is more accurately termed Tibetan Buddhism. These three traditions share such basic doctrines of Buddhism as reincarnation, but they differ in theologies and their styles are heavily influenced by the local cultures that embraced them. Buddhism among the minorities benefited from the religious revival affecting all of China from the 1980s, especially in its Tibetan and Theravada forms. Those minorities that traditionally espoused Mahayana Buddhism were less enthusiastic for revival. One example is the Koreans of northeast China, among whom Buddhism appears to be very weak, and verging on extinction, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The present brief account will focus on Tibetan Buddhism and the Buddhism of the Dai people. It is very clear from Chapters 2 and 3 that Tibetan Buddhism has become an important part of the ‘new spirituality’ of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Exerting greatest influence in the United States and other Western countries, this has become part of globalisation, the Dalai Lama himself being one of the world’s main trendsetters (Mackerras 1999: 167). Tourists in Tibet bring both news about developments overseas and messages of support, as well as transmitting information about what is happening in Tibet itself and requests for support and assistance in their struggle. Independence for Tibet has also become a globalised cause, especially in Western countries and in India. Moreover, this cause is tightly bound up with the fashion for Tibetan Buddhism. The effect of the association has had its negative effects in the sense that it has attracted Chinese ire towards those religious centres they believe support independence. The best example is Tibet’s most important monastery, the Drepung. According to Melvyn Goldstein (1998: 42), every Drepung monk wants the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet and ‘virtually all support his efforts to secure Tibetan independence’. He also adds (ibid.) that ‘some monks believe these efforts are not only unrealistic but also harmful to the monastery and the revival of religion’. Their reason is simply that they attract the very powerful and suspicious eagle eye of Chinese authorities, who are prepared to allow religious revival but certainly not attempts to use religion for Tibetan independence.
The mind, religion and education
Many of the main political controversies in Tibet have both revolved around religion and had some global content. One was around the selection of the Eleventh Panchen Lama, following the death of the Tenth in January 1989. Early in 1995, the Chinese authorities took advice from the head of a search team they had set up to find the Tenth Panchen Lama’s successor. This was Chatral Rinpoche, a highly respected religious and political figure from Shigatse’s Tashilhunpo Monastery, the seat of the Panchen Lama’s power. Chatral Rinpoche was keen for the Dalai Lama to be given a voice in the selection but, in May 1995, the latter announced it ahead of time, arguing that it was he and not the Chinese who should make such a choice. The Dalai Lama’s action embarrassed and annoyed the Chinese, who immediately set about looking for another boy through the traditional method of taking the name by lottery from a golden urn. The Chinese choice was enthroned in a large-scale traditional ceremony at the Tashilhunpo Monastery in December 1995. At the same time, that of the Dalai Lama disappeared from the scene, immediately becoming regarded by the Tibetan exile community and their supporters as the world’s youngest prisoner of conscience (for instance see Harris and Jones 2000: 160–3). In May 1997 Chatral Rinpoche was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment for colluding with the Dalai Lama to find the Eleventh Panchen Lama and thus conspiring to split the nation and betraying state secrets.4 In 1996 another religious controversy arose, when the Chinese banned photographs of the Dalai Lama on the grounds of his separatist activities. Tibetan Buddhist clergy and many ordinary Tibetans reacted furiously. In one incident in May two monks threw stones at and injured two Chinese government officials as they tried to enforce the ban. Police intervened and shot at least three monks, seriously wounding one of them. During visits to Tibet in 1997 and 2002, I saw no pictures of the Dalai Lama, this being in marked contrast to visits in 1985 and 1990, when not even the most casual observer could avoid being struck by their prevalence. These moves against the influence of the Dalai Lama were accompanied by a series of ‘patriotic education campaigns’, which aimed to win over support to the Chinese among ordinary Tibetans. Authorities kept a very careful eye on what was happening at the main monasteries, including setting up ‘democratic management committees’. In theory these were designed to make monasteries more democratic, but they also had the effect of strengthening government control over the monks. Human Rights Watch (1998: 180) cites a government figure claiming that 76 per cent of Tibetan monasteries and nunneries had been ‘rectified’ by 1997. Yet it appears that the authorities did not consider either this proportion or the extent of control by the democratic management committees adequate. An official document dated 20 September 1997 (and reproduced in Harris and Jones 2000: 88–9) describes these committees in some monasteries as ‘powerless and inattentive’ and unable to exert the necessary energy. Issued in connection with a patriotic education campaign in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, the purpose of the document was a further tightening of control. Despite these attempts, the Chinese government’s Tibet policy suffered a major reverse at century’s end. The 14-year-old Karmapa Lama, who happened to be the
The mind, religion and education
most influential of Tibet’s incarnate lamas after the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, left China late in December 1999 to join the Dalai Lama and supporters in India. Early in 2001, to China’s anger and distress, the Indian government granted him formal refugee status. The Karmapa Lama had been enthroned in 1992 with China’s specific approval and was also regarded with genuine favour by the Dalai Lama. The escape of so significant a figure, with the respect he enjoyed both in Tibet itself and in the exile Tibetan community, was a serious propaganda blow to China. In terms of the global implications of Tibet, China has not done well since the late 1980s. And it has reacted by imposing tighter control over religious life in Tibet itself. It has also continued to allow the open practice of Buddhism in Tibet, provided it saw no threat to the security of the state. It was my impression from both my visits to Tibet in the 1990s and that in 2002 that the people remained generally very religious, and that Tibetan culture was very much alive. In 1997 I attended a ceremony at the Sera Monastery in Lhasa to mark the exposure of the Buddha picture on the large rock beside the monastery. Many thousands of Tibetans visited the monastery to view the picture, dressed in their best clothes, the majority in very traditional Tibetan style. Most Tibetan houses have prayer flags flying above them, and almost all those I have entered have a shrine or even a whole room set aside for religious purposes. Pilgrims still go in large numbers to the main monasteries. There is a general impression that more or less all Tibetans believe in Tibetan Buddhism. That is certainly what virtually all informants claim. Almost all Tibetans whom I have asked if they were Buddhists have answered in the affirmative. The only exception I have found was a Tibetan family I interviewed in Kangding, western Sichuan, in December 1996, the members of which scoffed at religion. However, a more accurate account may have come from a team led by Professor Herbert Yee of the Baptist University of Hong Kong, which surveyed 586 Tibetan households in specific parts of the TAR, Gansu and Sichuan from June to September 1996. They enquired about belief in religion and among 2,758 individual respondents, 86 per cent replied Tibetan Buddhism, 10.5 per cent no religious belief, and the remaining 3.5 per cent the ancient traditional Tibetan Bon, Islam and other religions. In Lhasa, belief in Tibetan Buddhism was just over 76 per cent, with those answering ‘no religious belief’ being about 22.5 per cent. The team found, not surprisingly, that the non-believers were mostly members of the CCP and cadres (Yu and Guo 1999: 46–7). Traditionally, the proportion of Tibetans in the clerical estate was enormous, and each family was expected to give at least one son to the monasteries. This number declined to vanishing point during the Cultural Revolution, but revived very slowly in the 1980s. For the TAR, as distinct from all Tibetan regions, there are official figures covering the period since the 1990s. For 1992, there were 34,000 monks and nuns, about 1.5 per cent of the TAR’s population at the time. A 2000 count gave 46,000 monks and lamas, which is about 1.8 per cent of the TAR’s population or about 3.6 per cent of its males, and some 1,700 places for
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religion, temples and monasteries (Information Office 2000b: 49). These figures, which do not include nuns, are very similar indeed to what I was told during an interview with government officials in Lhasa in August 1997. They suggest that both the number and the proportion are rising, being very much higher than in the early 1980s, but very much lower than in the old days before the CCP revolution.5 The official figures may underestimate the actuality of the situation. When I visited the Tibetan areas of western Sichuan in December 1996 and January 1997, several people told me independently that about one in five young Tibetan men now go into the clerical life there. Many go to very small monasteries or temples and some actually stay at home. In one family house I visited in a remote Tibetan village in western Sichuan a room had been set aside for the young man of the family to live the monastic life. It is extremely doubtful if such a person is counted in official figures. While western Sichuan is not necessarily the same as the TAR, it would surprise if religious life were any less vigorous there. Other than the Tibetans, there are several minorities claiming adherence to Tibetan Buddhism. The most important group is the Mongolians, who converted to Tibetan Buddhism progressively beginning in the thirteenth century and gathering momentum from the sixteenth. However, Tibetan Buddhism among the Mongolians fared very badly through the revolutionary processes of the twentieth century and the Cultural Revolution dealt it a severe blow. Tibetan Buddhism is not nearly as strong among the Mongolians as among the Tibetans. Yet the fact is that there was a substantial revival in the period of reform, especially in the rural areas. Buddhism is once again part of the ethnic identity of Mongolian farmers and herders. Many Tibetan Buddhist monasteries have been reopened in Inner Mongolia. In 1995, the number of monasteries the State Council regarded as examples of ‘cultural heritage’, and hence as protected sites, was seventy-four (Charleux 1999). There are some very large and active Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Inner Mongolia, the most important being the Wudang zhao not far from the Autonomous Region’s largest city Baotou. During a visit to Inner Mongolia in November 1992 I was able to meet and interview several incarnate lamas, two of whom ran a school in the Inner Mongolian capital Hohhot to train novices. One of the incarnate lamas told me that there were 5,000 monks and lamas in Inner Mongolia at the time of my visit. Both were very positive about the role of the state in religion. Not only did they greatly admire Chinese patriarch Deng Xiaoping, but they claimed that his reform policies had been immensely beneficial to religion. They cited two specific benefits. One was the far greater freedom they enjoyed, but the other was that the ability to get rich had enabled monasteries to go into business, making money for the Buddhist religion and its clergy. These particular incarnate lamas received a salary from the government, but that did not prevent them earning additional money. I found an instance of this money-making activity at the Wudang zhao, where monks charge money to enter a parlour with vivid displays of the tortures those who do wrong will suffer after they die. Other minorities practising Tibetan Buddhism include the Tu of Qinghai and the Mosuo people of the border area of Yunnan and Sichuan, a branch of the Naxi.
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I visited a Tu village not far from Xining, the Qinghai capital, in the middle of 1995. Though quite small, the Buddhist temple there was the largest building in the village and very active with many lay pilgrims taking part in a large-scale fast preceding a festival. The Mosuo village I visited early in 1996 lay beside the Lugu Lake, a beautiful expanse of water separating Yunnan from Sichuan. The temple there was located on an island in the lake. There were only two monks in residence, the younger one, whom I interviewed, speaking very enthusiastically of his life in the clerical order and of the future of Buddhism among his people. Another devoutly Buddhist people is the Dai of southwestern Yunnan. In contrast to Tibetan Buddhism, however, they adhere to the Theravada Buddhism characteristic of Thailand and Burma. There are two main branches of the Dai people. The first is the Shui or Water Dai concentrated in Sipsong panna. These are very close culturally, linguistically and in religion to the Thais of Thailand. The second is the Han Dai, who live mainly in Dehong to the northwest of Sipsong panna and are identical both culturally and linguistically to the Shan people of Burma. I visited both Sipsong panna and Dehong in September and October 2000, interviewing Buddhist monks and laity, and visiting monasteries, temples and villages. Most Dai, both Shui and Han, still believe in Buddhism, and in the countryside most families have shrines in their houses. The Water Splashing Festival, with its religious significance of washing the Buddha statues and washing away personal disaster, is still very prevalent, although it has become much more secular than it once was. Overall, however, it was my general impression that Buddhism was much stronger in Sipsong panna and among the Shui Dai than in Dehong among the Han Dai. About half the villages in Sipsong panna still have temples, and the great majority of boys go into the temples as ‘little monks’ for a week or two. Some go for considerably longer periods, 2 or 3 years, but only a very small number remain as monks for life. The stage of life they enter the monastery is just after completing primary school, for apart from learning about Buddhism the aim is to master their own written language to a higher level than they can do in the schools, where the dominant written language is Chinese. At the same time, several schools I visited in Sipsong panna included some young monks among their pupils. They wear the saffron robes of the Buddhist monks and attend to their religious duties freely, but also go to class along with all the other students. The Han Dai are actually much closer to the Han majority than their Shui conationals. Government officials told me at the end of September 2000 that only about three in five of the over 520,000 Dai in Dehong were still Buddhist (1998 figures). The number of temples throughout Dehong was 642; monks were active only in 37, although religious activities still took place in all of them. The officials also told me that only about 0.7 per cent of boys become little monks, and the number appears to be in constant decline. I did not see or hear of any young monks among the students of the schools I visited, although I did hear indirectly that a few do take them in. Men often seek the monastic life as they grow older, but religion is losing its appeal among young Han Dai. Although Dai Buddhism is not particularly global in its effects, I learned from many of the monks I interviewed of their close relations with co-nationals across
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borders. The Water Dai monks were enthusiastic about Thailand, many had visited it or wanted to do so, and received visits from Thai monks. The Han Dai also have fairly close relations with co-nationals in Burma. At the time of my visit in 2000, all those with whom I discussed the relationship regarded the situation in Burma as both poorer and less stable than in China, even though Buddhism was recognised as much stronger. Many told me of relations who come to China during periods of instability in Burma, even though most return home when the situation improves. Other religions There are numerous other religions among the minorities and it is impossible to cover them properly here. One closely associated with the global expansion of the past is Christianity. There are quite a few surviving Christian communities among the minorities, such as that among the Miao in Shimenkan, Weining County, in the far central west of Guizhou. Ironically, such communities do not on the whole exemplify contemporary globalisation, because they are remnants from past missionary successes. There is a vast range of indigenous popular religions among the minorities, especially those that do not subscribe to the more universalistic religions like Islam and Buddhism. These are generally tightly associated with the popular ritual of the people and have revived in the period of reform since the late 1970s. At the turn of the century these popular rituals are still performed in many places during festivals and special occasions and may take the form of dramatic, quasidramatic or dance performances. In some respects popular religions can be similar to an insurance policy, in that one of their functions is to assist with the healing of the sick. In a Yao village I visited in Longsheng, Guangxi, in February 1992, several old and young people told me that the most effective treatment for minor illnesses was to worship the Gods. One 70-year-old woman expressed passionate support for the CCP because of the benefits it had brought the village, but she still wanted to worship the gods for the cure of minor illnesses. In many minority villages I have visited, male or female peasant shamans still exist who contribute to society mainly by curing everyday complaints. What does the CCP think of these revivals, given that its main emphasis is modernisation? On the one hand, it does not like them, because it perceives them as obstructive to socialist modernisation, which it sees as the wave of the future. But on the other hand, many CCP members, especially those belonging to minority nationalities, can see that it is ‘futile to try to control every aspect of religious belief and popular ritual’ (Litzinger 2000: 197). While this specific reference is to the Yao people, it would be equally applicable to many other situations in China at the turn of the century. It is better to avoid irritating people by abstaining from interference in such personal matters, as long as any impact on production is minimal. After all, in contrast to the situation in Tibet or Xinjiang, there is absolutely no question of secession among the overwhelming majority of minorities practising popular folk religions.
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In many ways the revival of popular religion and ritual is a return to isolationism. But there is another side to the story. In some minority areas ritual performances have become involved in the tourist industry and in my opinion this is likely to expand over the coming years. Tourism brings people from overseas or other parts of China to minority areas, and hence money, ideas and knowledge of the outside world. The rituals performed may lose some of their authenticity, but they also gain an economic rationale, helping them to survive longer. They are an example of how tourism encourages cultural survival, as mentioned in Chapter 4. For better or worse, tourism supports both modernisation and its corollary globalisation.
Education Although religion has its globalising aspects, it has generally operated as a conservative force among China’s minorities. Like religion, education bears closely on what people think. But in sharp contrast, it exerts influences crucial for modernisation. Education has aimed to bring minorities within the aegis of a united and modernising socialist China. In an age in which China has itself just joined the WTO, education has the strong potential to contribute to the globalisation of all of China, including the minorities. A secular state education system moving in the direction of being comprehensive was developed in China in the 1950s and 1960s, including for the minorities. The Cultural Revolution suspended many schools for a period, and those that continued to operate imposed an extremely narrow ideological line with virtually no space given to minority differences. But, to be fair, the Cultural Revolution also attached great importance to expanding education at secondary level. By the time the movement was over there were far more minority students than there had been before it began, with the rise in the number at secondary level being very dramatic (see Table 5.1). The Law of the PRC on Compulsory Education of 1986 laid down a timetable for achieving universal 9-year education, beginning with the cities and spreading to the remote areas. Although such places would include most of the minority areas, the law stated that there should be compulsory education almost everywhere by the end of the twentieth century. Policy since the late 1970s has emphasised that the education system must keep to the framework of modernisation and national integration, within which it should promote ethnic autonomy.6 Article 37 of the Law of Regional Autonomy of 1984 (as revised in 2001) lays down ( Zhonghua 2001: 12–13, 37–8) that the organs of self-government shall independently develop education for the nationalities by eliminating illiteracy, setting up various kinds of schools, spreading nine-year compulsory education, developing regular secondary education and secondary vocational and technical education in various forms, and developing higher education, where possible and necessary, so as to train specialized people from among all the minority nationalities.
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Table 5.1 Numbers of minority students enrolled (thousands)
Higher education Secondary schools Primary schools
2.9 73.0 1,474.0
21.9 36.03 94.1 177.9 217.0 247.7 371.8 2,468.0 2,245.0 3,242.0 4,039.0 4,632.9 5,219.0 7,686.0 9,548.0 11,492.0 12,482.0 12,142.0
Source: Economic and Development Department 2000: 564.
At the same time, educational fees were introduced. During the 1990s these became quite significant at senior secondary level and, depending on such issues as the place and status of the institution, very high at tertiary level. At primary school and junior secondary levels, there were no or much lower tuition fees, but various administrative and other moneys required were frequently enough to prevent very poor students from going to school. In January 2000 I was able to interview in Tongzha, in the middle of Hainan Province, two teachers from a remote village of the Li ethnic group. They told me that there were still quite a few children whose families could not afford to send them to school. But the teachers had taken the initiative to institute a project whereby Li children could get education first and pay later. And they have benefited greatly from Project Hope, mentioned below. Looking at the situation from the early twenty-first century, it is thus clear that nothing like 9-year universal education had been achieved by the end of the twentieth among the ethnic minorities. Yet this does not negate very substantial achievements. These are obvious from Table 5.1, which shows figures for minority students attending school from 1952 to the end of the twentieth century, including some from the 1990s. The last decade or so of the twentieth century saw the launching of three specific programmes aimed at boosting education in China, especially that of the ethnic minorities. ●
Project Hope was launched in 1989 and designed to encourage ordinary Chinese to contribute to helping poverty-stricken children, including those from minorities, to attend school. Project Spring Bud was launched at about the same time as Project Hope, assuming its current name in 1992. Similar to Project Hope, it is aimed specifically at girls. In 1993 the government launched a programme to encourage economically and educationally advanced provinces and municipalities to twin with povertystricken partners in ethnic areas, with the aim of assisting them in promoting compulsory education.
The preferential policies for minorities include certain areas of privileged access to education, such as special schools for ethnic minorities, preferential admissions,
The mind, religion and education Table 5.2 Numbers of minority teachers Year
% of total
% of total
1965 1978 1985 1990 1997 1999
133,200 310,200 397,800 458,700 527,900 545,100
3.5 5.9 7.4 8.2 9.1 9.3
14,635 112,261 125,560 182,991 246,900 271,400
3.2 3.5 4.7 6.0 6.9 7.1
Sources: Economic Department 1995: 340; Economic and Development Department 2000: 560–1; SSB 1998: 44.
reduced school fees or scholarships and remedial programmes (Sautman 1999: 173–4). Students from ethnic minorities are often given subsidies denied to Han students, even if their circumstances are not markedly inferior. Do these privileges make a real difference? My answer is that they do. Barry Sautman (1999: 196) has argued that preferential admission to higher education has ‘proven to be a success in creating minority education elites’. Research he has undertaken specifically for Xinjiang concludes that, by 1990, the preferential policies in education had reduced inequalities in employment by giving more students from ethnic minorities better access to upper middle school and university. He argues that ‘for minorities who manage to gain access to higher education, affirmative action plays its intended role of enlarging and diversifying the minority middle class’ (Sautman 1998: 94). In Inner Mongolia, the result of priority given to Mongolians in education has meant that, in the mid-1990s, 48 per cent of Mongolian students who completed high school went on to receive a tertiary education, a proportion higher than for any other ethnic group (Iredale et al. 2001: 118). A dean of education at a teachers’ training school I interviewed in Xining, capital of Qinghai Province, in mid1995 was shocked at my question whether the preferential policies for ethnic minorities really made a difference. Himself Han, he answered vehemently that they certainly had made a very big difference in his area of competence. He had seen the numbers of teachers from the Tibetans and other ethnic groups rise greatly over the years both in numbers and in professional skills. The official figures contained in Table 5.2 seem to bear out his view, confirming that the pace remained quick in the 1990s. Another question to arise from the preferential policies is whether they cause any acrimony to those who fail to benefit from them, especially Han students. Sautman (1999: 194) argues that, despite some anecdotal evidence of resentment, it has never been strong enough to be ‘publicly manifested by any social group’ and can therefore be claimed as relatively absent, given that grievances of various kinds have frequently been aired very publicly in China. In the case of Xinjiang, he argues that resentments do not translate into tensions, ‘in the sense of manifest discontent’, which would likely be higher than at present but for the preferential policies (Sautman 1998: 102–5).
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Literacy Naturally enough, literacy is one guide to extent of education. A major study by Jacques Lamontagne (1999: 145–6) predicted that disparities in literacy between Han and minorities would decline during the 1990s, but at very different paces and from very different levels depending on the ethnic group and the region. Provinces such as Jilin, home to the Koreans, would do very well indeed, with Tibet lagging very far behind. The 1990 census showed illiteracy and semiliteracy of people aged 15 and over at 15.88 per cent nationally, but falling to only 6.72 per cent in the 2000 census (see Mackerras 2001a: 272). The comparable illiteracy and semi-literacy rate in 1990 was 30.8 per cent among the minorities as a whole, but 21.5 per cent among the Han (Lamontagne 1999: 145). Figures for 1999 by province show very great differentials, and it is obvious that there are extreme disparities in literacy levels among all nationalities, including the Han. However, it is striking that the province-level units with the highest rates of semiliteracy and illiteracy all have comparatively high proportions of minority populations.7 On the other hand, Xinjiang does quite well in terms of literacy. Comparisons with the 1990 census show increases in literacy in all provinces with high minority populations, the rises being larger or much larger than the national average in most cases. They suggest that Lamontagne’s prediction has turned out correct. In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture 96.8 per cent of children graduated from junior middle school in 1998, meaning that the aim of compulsory 9-year education had been virtually achieved. There was hardly any illiteracy among Koreans aged 15 and over, other than among very old people. In the TAR, on the other hand, the proportion of school-age children attending school was only 81.3 per cent, while those who graduated from 9 years’ school was considerably less than that. The literacy rate in 1998 for people aged 15 and over was only 52 per cent, and while this figure was much higher than the 5 per cent in old Tibet, it was still the lowest in the country (Information Office 1999: 23–4).8
Language and education Language is of extreme importance for the survival of the culture of any ethnic group, because it embodies not only the lifestyle and literature, but the legends and values of a people. On the other hand, there is no doubt at all that knowing the majority language is essential in any country to get a good job and play a respected role in society. As the Mongolian scholar Naran Bilik (1998: 51) has pointed out, proficiency in Chinese ‘is essential for upward social mobility and a privileged position in society’ with modern standard Chinese representing ‘the political-economic centre’. While it is perfectly possible for a spoken language to maintain strength in the home indefinitely without being used in the schools, schools can provide a major mechanism for the transmission of written languages from generation to generation.
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Article 37 of the Law of Regional Autonomy (Zhonghua 2001: 13, 49–50) also has something to say about language in education among the minorities. Schools (classes and grades) and other institutions of education where most of the students come from minority nationalities shall, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use their languages as the media of instruction. Classes for the teaching of Chinese (the Han language) shall, where possible, be opened for junior or senior grades of primary schools to popularize putonghua (the common speech based on Beijing pronunciation) and standard Chinese characters. China has a unified national curriculum, which means that children all over the country, whichever ethnic group they belong to, learn more or less the same at school. There is not much variation, especially at primary level. A few of the ethnic minorities have ensured that textbooks are published in their own languages, and in some areas these have become fairly widespread in use at the turn of the twenty-first century. These include especially those that are politically sensitive or influential, or those with their own scripts or significant literatures. Examples include the Tibetans, the Uygurs, the Koreans, the Mongolians, the Yi and the Dai. During a visit to Tibet in the autumn of 1997, I observed that bookshops stocked a range of textbooks in the Tibetan language. Schoolboys I met showed me textbooks for such subjects as history and science, all in Tibetan; even the textbooks for Chinese language are in Tibetan, although of course they include Chinese characters, just as an English-language textbook for Japanese includes much writing in Japanese. Most such textbooks are simply translations from Chinese-language counterparts. However, in some places special textbooks have been written for use in schools with a focus on the history and culture of the region. Such textbooks are on topics in addition to the standard national curricula, not instead. One such work is a history of Xinjiang in two versions, Uygur and Chinese, designed specifically for senior secondary and higher level. Written by a team of specialist historians from various ethnic groups, it is entitled History of the Xinjiang Region and both the Uygur and Chinese versions came out in 1992 (XUAR 1992), classes to instruct teachers on the use of the books beginning the same year. There is plenty about Uygur literature, religion and history in the book, but two points may be made about it. One is that it follows the Chinese official line closely. The second is that religion is presented as part of culture; there is certainly nothing that actually promotes Islam, even though the treatment aspires to be fair and to give a positive account of Uygur culture. Among the Tibetans and Dai the monasteries are still repositories of language and culture. In quite a few Tibetan monasteries I have visited both in Tibet itself and other Tibetan areas, I have found that one of the motivations for boys or young men to enter the religious life is to master their written script better. Dai boys enter monasteries in much smaller numbers, and generally for far shorter periods than Tibetan, but they share in common a wish to improve their knowledge of their own nationality’s script.
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Another important issue is the language of instruction. Under the law, bilingual education is desirable for ethnic minorities, the two languages being their own and Chinese. My own explorations over many years and in many minority areas of China suggest that efforts to maintain the use of ethnic languages in the classroom are very spotty and inconsistent. Although they may be improving in some regions at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has been my impression that they may be getting worse in others. As in so many other ways, certain ethnic groups feel much more strongly about the retention of their own language and culture than others. In the case of classes that contain children from a variety of minorities, the language of instruction will almost always be Chinese, because there is no other common language and the teacher is often Han anyway. Minorities lacking their own script or textbooks in their own language are not in a strong position to maintain their language through the classroom. What happens in such cases is that mono-national classes at the first years of primary level are in the local language, because the children do not understand Chinese, but increasingly transfer to Chinese from then on. One scholar has observed cynically but aptly that both in China and the United States, bilingual education really means ‘transitional schooling in the native language(s) while students master the dominant language’ (Dwyer 1998: 78). It is my impression that the two ethnic minorities with the strongest insistence on the regular use of their own language as the medium of instruction in schools are the Uygurs and the Koreans, followed closely by the Tibetans, and more distantly by the Dai and the Yi. In Korean, Uygur, Tibetan, Dai and Yi primary schools, the use of the local minority language is very widespread, provided the children all belong to the same ethnic group. As one goes up the system, the language of instruction changes to Chinese, except in the classes teaching the relevant language. In Yanbian in 1990 and in Xinjiang in 1994 and 1999, I visited several secondary schools where there was hardly any evidence of Chinese. Harrell (2001: 76) reports that in the Yi areas of Sichuan, where the people are called Nuosu, the secondary schools often include ‘special classes composed only of minority students (minzu ban) or classes taught primarily in the Nuosu language (Yiwen ban)’. In 1988 a language commission was set up in the TAR with the task of protecting and promoting the use of Tibetan as the dominant language in Tibet (Stites 1999: 116), but secondary-school education is not well developed there. The year 1988 saw the establishment of a fully Tibetan-language secondary school in Songpan County, northern central Sichuan Province, which, in Janet Upton’s claim, receives a great deal of social support (Upton 1999: 299) and is thus worth close scholarly attention (pp. 299–306). According to Hansen (1999: 128), the only school in Sipsong panna that teaches Dai beyond the primary level is the Normal School. This has a bilingual Dai class each year, which aims to train teachers to give instruct in the Dai language and teach Dai scipt in primary schools. One nationality of particular importance because of the weight of its culture and history is the Mongolians. There has been a push among Mongolian intellectual elites to promote Mongolian-language education, but it has not got far. Naran Bilik (1998: 48), himself a Mongolian intellectual, writes that ‘Mongolian-language
The mind, religion and education
education seems to be losing out, despite efforts from ethnic elites and symbolic gestures from local governments’. Many Mongolian parents have lost interest in this elite-driven movement. They ‘see little benefit in sending their children to Mongolian schools and opt for a Chinese education for their children, hoping that this will lead to a brighter economic future’ (Iredale et al. 2001: 116). By the mid1990s, there was only one Mongolian-language school in the Inner Mongolian capital Hohhot. At tertiary level the city’s Inner Mongolia Normal University pushed Mongolian culture, including compiling curriculum materials in Mongolian and about Mongolian history and culture, but being virtually alone in such emphases was regarded as a ‘Mongolian language island’ (Iredale et al. 2001: 117). An aspect of language closely related with the issue of globalisation is the spread of English. The fact is that English is a language useful for virtually all peoples in the contemporary world. Never in the past has any language achieved the dominant place in the world that characterises English today. A minority group in China which wishes to maintain its own language will need to be trilingual if it wants to adopt English, because any ethnic group which is part of China must know Chinese to get on in the world. A Mongolian incarnate lama who felt strongly enough about Mongolian language to teach it in the schools told me: ‘there isn’t much use in knowing Mongolian in the modern world’, and it is an attitude I have found to be fairly typical, other than among Uygurs, Koreans and Tibetans. On the other handw, many people want to know English and if given the choice of two out of three among Chinese, English and their own language, there are many minority people who would leave aside the third. Globalisation will more and more encourage such an attitude, because it promotes the influence of Western countries, most of which are either mainly English-speaking or with a citizenry that largely or even mostly knows English to a very high level. Ethnic identity versus integration in education Being a highly significant marker of identity, the topic of language leads on to that of ethnic consciousness. Since the 1990s there have been two contrary trends in ethnic education. On the one hand, governments appear to have done quite significant work to increase aspects of ethnic identity in the education of the minority areas. But on the other hand, education has clearly striven to integrate China as a unified nation everywhere. One writer aptly sums up the situation as follows. Despite the authoritarian character of state schooling in China, a great deal of diversity continues to exit. This diversity derives from the vast variety of cultural traditions and practices, especially in religion and language, that continue to flourish. Yet, the diversity that exists among China’s ethnic minority population does not appear to be fully reflected in the content of schooling, even though minority languages are emphasized in many regions. (Postiglione 1999: 17)
The mind, religion and education
In other words there are limits to the degree of autonomy allowed or of identity encouraged. The fact is that the primary aim of education for the CCP is to integrate and modernise the country on the basis of a socialist ideology. This unity includes ethnic difference and the modernisation encompasses what one writer (Hansen 1999: 156) describes as ‘an atmosphere of ethnic brotherhood’. However, these phenomena cannot be more than secondary to Chinese national unity and the modernisation that will make China a strong and prosperous country. The question of teachers illustrates the point. In my opinion there are advantages for children to be taught by teachers from their own nationality. Such teachers can speak and write their background language and understand and sympathise with their culture. They can help strengthen and perpetuate ethnic identities. So it is a real achievement to train large numbers of teachers from the ethnic minorities, as shown in Table 5.2. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the teachers will in fact be in charge of children from their own ethnic group. My travels and interviews in ethnic regions suggest that many minority teachers take care of non-Han children, but from an ethnic group other than their own. Moreover, by the very nature of their training the teachers have become more adapted to the Chinese state system, rather than to their own ethnic culture. The training schools certainly teach minority languages and culture, but their emphasis is on Chinese language and culture; and they certainly do not encourage the practice of traditional religions so important to many of the minorities, let alone give any quarter to secessionist feeling. This is hardly surprising: the Chinese state is not about to pay to have itself undermined. But the implication is that minority teachers have become more like Han counterparts; they operate more to integrate the nation that is China than to perpetuate the distinctive features of the minorities.
Conclusion What is most striking to me at the turn of the twenty-first century among the minorities is the retention of traditions as far as religion is concerned and, for education, the impact of the Chinese state. Of course there are areas which are beginning to become globalised, such as the mutual influences of Tibetan Buddhism and the ‘new spirituality’ so popular in the West. Tourism in China’s ethnic areas is beginning to create a globalising effect. That most globalised of languages, English, is beginning to spread, even in the minority areas, and in Tibet ordinary people very frequently address tourists in broken English. China’s accession to the WTO will increase both the impact of globalisation and probably also the manifestations of local identities. But the situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century is that the impact of globalisation is in its early stages in the religion and education of China’s ethnic minorities.
Population, women and family
The period since 1990 has been one of continuing rapid change both in the world at large and in China in particular. Although awareness of the need to control population growth was nothing new, it certainly remained centre stage as the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first. The United Nations chose 12 October 1999 as the day symbolising the arrival of the planet at a population of 6 billion, and designated a particular infant as the world’s 6 billionth inhabitant. There has also been increasing awareness of the need to stop the population growing too fast in order to be able to protect the environment better and at the same time enhance the prosperity of the world’s people. China has been in the forefront of action in this regard, even though some have attacked its policy as contravening human rights. Since 1980 it has had a policy restricting couples of the majority Han to one child only. China is still the world’s most populous country, but may not be so forever. In May 2000 India became the second of the world’s population billionaires after China and, since its population control programmes have been somewhat less draconian and less successful than China’s it will probably overtake China during the first half of this century. If trends of the last years of the twentieth century continue, this could happen as early as 2012 (Westlake 2000: 66). Globalisation has had two contrary effects on gender discourse throughout the world. On the one hand, it has helped the spread of consciouness concerning gender equality, and it is not too much to say that attempts to move in that direction have been one of the most significant features of the period. On the other hand, globalisation has exacerbated many inequalities, and these have included gender. Many observers talk of a feminisation of poverty that has spread through many parts of the world. China’s NPC adopted the PRC Law Protecting Women’s Rights and Interests in April 1992. The 1990s saw China as one centre of debate over the status of women, when Beijing hosted the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995. The Conference adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which noted the gains that women had made over the previous decades and called for acceleration of the advancement of women towards full gender equality. The Chinese organisers did derive some credit for their handling of the Conference, but the country also came under criticism in some quarters for
Population, women and family
aspects of its treatment of women. Probably the most enduring statement of the Conference was that of the American President Bill Clinton’s wife Hillary Rodham Clinton declaring that ‘human rights are women’s rights and women’s rights are human rights, once and for all’. There was nothing new in the idea that women’s rights were part of human rights, itself one of the main sites of discourse in world affairs, but Hillary Clinton’s statement was particularly forceful and brought unusual impact.
Population By the beginning of the twenty-first century, China’s one-child-per-couple policy had been in force long enough to affect China’s demographic structure. Premier Li Peng told an international population conference in Beijing in October 1997 that the population policy had resulted in 300 million fewer births from the mid1970s to the present than would have occurred without it (Mackerras 2001a: 213). In January 2000, the government announced that people who were themselves only children born under the policy would be allowed two children, with about 2005 being the time when large numbers of the first cohort would reach marriageable age. However, the government also stuck to its policy of population restriction. On 7 May 2000, NCNA (quoted Mackerras 2001a: 213) stated that ‘the country will continue to encourage marriage and childbearing at later ages and call for one child per couple while some couples will be allowed to have a second child in accordance with the law’. Population and ethnic minorities The population of China’s ethnic minorities has been growing since the mid1960s, as has their proportion within the total population. Table 6.1 shows the total number of the ethnic minorities as shown in the five censuses taken in the PRC so far, together with the percentages in the total population. The five censuses applied to 1 July in 1953, 1964, 1982 and 1990, and to 1 November 2000. The reasons for the rise in the proportion of the total population since the 1964 census are discussed elsewhere (for instance, Mackerras 1994: 242–5), and Table 6.1 Ethnic minority populations in the PRC’s five censuses Census
Proportion of total (%)
1953 1964 1982 1990 2000
34,013,782 39,883,909 66,434,341 90,567,245 106,456,300
5.89 5.77 6.62 8.01 8.41
Source: Economic and Development Department 2000: 431, People’s Daily, 29 March 2001, p. 1.
Population, women and family
include factors like reregistration. That is the practice whereby communities with ethnicity similar to Han and registered as such change their registration to belong to a minority. An extremely important reason for the growth in minorities’ population is because of government policy, which since 1949 has always been more flexible in population matters for the ethnic minorities than the Han. When the authorities imposed the one-child-per-couple policy in 1980, they specifically exempted the ethnic minorities. This did not mean there were no restrictions, and the various autonomous governments have taken on policies specific to their own minorities in the period since then.1 One official statement summed up the policy laid down for ethnic minorities at the end of the twentieth century as follows: To improve the quality of the ethnic minority population and accelerate the economic and social development of the ethnic minority autonomous areas, the people’s congresses of these areas have formulated their own family planning policies toward the ethnic minorities in light of the spirit of the state’s regulations concerning the need also for minority peoples to practice family planning. These policies are more lenient than those with the Han people. Under these policies, an ethnic minority family generally may have two or three children; in frontier areas and areas with adverse natural conditions, families of ethnic groups with very small populations may have more than three children each; and Tibetan farmers and herdsmen in the Tibet Autonomous Region may have as many children as they like. (Information Office 1999: 29) My very strong impression travelling in ethnic areas since the early 1990s is that two trends are operating, and both point towards smaller families. One is that authorities are encouraging fewer children, even while actually allowing more. Large slogan posters advocating the desirability of reducing the population, but improving the educational, health and moral level are visible everywhere. The statement above that TAR farmers and herdsmen may have as many children as they like does not mean that there is no birth control policy in Tibet. On the contrary, there have been official pressures to restrict the number of children born since 1983, and the Lhasa government ordered greater emphasis on rural family planning in the early 1990s (Goldstein et al. 2002: 27–9). The TAR Birth Control Commission Chair Purbo Zholma was quoted in 2000 as saying: ‘With regard to the Tibetan farmers and herders, we encourage them to have small numbers of healthy children. We also encourage those who already have three children not to have more’ (Namgyai 2000: 24). However, contrary to claims by the Tibetan government-in-exile, a detailed survey carried out in several parts of rural Tibet from November 1997 to August 2000 found that targets and fines for birth control were imposed only sporadically and lightly (Goldstein et al. 2002: 31–2). The second trend is that increasingly ethnic parents want fewer children than their parents did, and many will stop at numbers less than the state allows them.
Population, women and family
In an interview at the People’s Hospital of Jinghong, Sipsong panna, in September 2000, I was told that many Dai couples in the cities prefer to have only one child, even though they are allowed two. I have found similar comments made in many ethnic areas since the early 1990s and although the new trend is more pronounced in the cities than the countryside, it applies to some rural areas as well. A survey on family matters was undertaken in Tibet in 1996 covering 100 urban and 100 rural families, the urban ones in Lhasa, the rural ones in a village in Nedong County some distance to the south of Lhasa. One of the questions asked concerned how many children couples wanted. Their finding was that most couples, both urban and rural, consider the most desirable family to be one son and one daughter. So why have most couples had three or more? The leader of the survey (Wang 2001: 93) suggests two reasons. One is the great disparity among regions. Pastoralists in northern Tibet tend to favour larger families. The other reason is worth quoting directly: ‘The author learned from several clinics and drugstores in Lhasa that the Tibetan people were not accustomed to the use of contraceptive tools and medicines, and once the Tibetan women get pregnant they would not have an induced abortion on religious grounds’. The slightly later survey on rural Tibet mentioned above came to a similar conclusion on the number of children, namely that since the 1990s younger women want fewer children than had been normal in the past, and ‘a shift to lower fertility may already be in progress’ (Goldstein et al. 2002: 37). However, the reasons found were largely economic: too many children bring hardship to the household and form a barrier to greater prosperity. The survey authors also suggest that another reason for wanting smaller families may be that the drop in child mortality is bringing a voluntary decline in the birth rate (Goldstein et al. 2002: 37). A study of childbearing strategies among educated Uygurs in Ürümqi found that modernisation was beginning to exert a powerful influence over family preferences. The study found that Uygur couples have had fewer children over the past few decades. The reasons for this they share in common ‘with other modernising societies such as the late age of marriage, the increased power of women to regulate their births, the expense of raising children, and the difficulties of finding childcare’ (Clark 2001: 225). Education is a major factor that has helped foster receptivity to modern ideas, including a desire to have fewer children. It is by choice, not compulsion, that the couples have fewer children. Indeed, there is considerable pressure from grandparents for more (Clark 2001: 228). Quite a few couples stop at one child, but most consider one son and one daughter to be the ideal for contemporary young families. There is still a strong feeling that children are ‘a blessing from God’ and bring joy to the home. There is also a political motivation for a second child with some Uygurs, namely concern ‘that their numbers are declining in relation to the Han’ (Clark 2001: 236). There is another side to the story that merits some attention, namely the views and reports that come from sources hostile to the present Chinese government. A Uygur I interviewed in a mosque in Yining in 1994 told me that he believed the Han Chinese authorities were trying to wipe out the Uygur people with their population policy. This was because they were putting restrictions on population size,
Population, women and family
even if they were less stringent than those imposed on the Han. Given the quite significant rises in the Uygur population, as shown in the 2000 census, I find this charge somewhat hysterical. There are also many stories of abortions and sterilisations, forced especially on Tibetan women. Bodies such as the Tibetan government-in-exile and Tibet Support Group have made frequent charges along these lines. For instance, Tibet Support Group UK (1996–2001) claims first-hand reports by refugees of abortions. It gives the example of Tashi Drolma, whose second child was forcibly aborted. She was one of four Tibetan doctors at a hospital in Amdo (which the Chinese call Qinghai) who lost their jobs in obstetrics because they protested against the inhumanity of the birth control policies. How can one square such reports with the 1996 survey suggesting that many Tibetans were having more children than they wanted because their religion prevented them from having an abortion, even though this practice is not illegal in China? I have no reason to doubt the statement of Tashi Drolma. But the detailed survey carried out in rural Tibet from November 1997 to August 2000 found no evidence of widespread forced abortions or sterilisations and suggests most strongly that ‘there is no general program of forced birth control in rural Tibet’ (Goldstein et al. 2002: 24–5). The study even concluded with a warning against the dangers of using refugee reports and anecdotal evidence to interpret highly politicised situations (Goldstein et al. 2002: 39). To me the evidence of a highly scholarly and thoroughly worked out survey, one that is actually carried out on the spot, is far more compelling than the accounts of refugees that are used by action groups with specific political purposes. Migration Migration is an important phenomenon in contemporary China. Most of this migration is by the Han, but there are also members of minorities who move to other parts of China. Han people have been migrating to ethnic areas for many centuries, as a result of which almost all provinces now have dominantly Han populations. For instance, Yunnan province is noted for its large number of ethnic minorities, over twenty-five in all. Yet the minorities are actually only a third of total population.2 On the other hand, the Han tend to concentrate in the cities, as a result of which there are still many villages with very few or no Han. There are two province-level units where migration has been extremely controversial, and where the Han are still in the minority. These are Tibet and Xinjiang. When the Dalai Lama addressed the British Parliament in July 1996 (see Chapter 7), he claimed that ‘the destruction of cultural artefacts and traditions coupled with the mass influx of Chinese into Tibet amounts to cultural genocide’. He added that ‘the very survival of the Tibetans as a distinct people is under constant threat’. There certainly has been Han immigration, and it has increased since 1990. However, I argue that the Dalai Lama’s account is an exaggeration and a distortion of the actual situation.
Population, women and family
Table 6.2 Population of the TAR, ethnic breakdown 1990 Census
Tibetans Han Total
2,096,346 81,217 2,196,010
2,411,100 155,300 2,616,300
Sources: SSB Population Office 1991: 78, Yan 2000: 30, People’s Daily, 3 April 2001, p. 1.
In the 1960s and 1970s there was some immigration of Han Chinese into Tibet to fill government positions in Lhasa. However, from 1980, many returned to the East because, following Hu Yaobang’s visit to Tibet that year, government policy determined that Tibetans should take the lead in administering Tibet. In 1981, 30,567 people, mostly Han, left Tibet in accordance with that policy. From then until 1992 the number of people who left Tibet outnumbered immigrants by 61,953 (see figures in Iredale et al. 2001: 150–1). Only in 1984, 1987 and 1988 did the number of those moving to Tibet exceed the number who left. However, since 1992, the trend has reversed. Table 6.2 shows the totals and proportions in Tibet’s population for the Han and Tibetans according to both the 1990 and 2000 censuses. It will be seen that the Tibetan proportion has fallen, while the Han percentage has grown by nearly 38 per cent. Yet the Han are still less than 6 per cent of the total population of the TAR. When we remember that most of the Han are in the main cities, their significance in the overall population dwindles further. There are several major caveats that we need to make about these data. One is that the figures do not include the ‘floating population’, that is people who go temporarily to the TAR for a particular purpose and then return home. According to one journalist (Kwan 2001: 8), some critics have put the figures of this floating population as high as hundreds of thousands. Because it is difficult to find work elsewhere, these Han floaters stay mainly in the big cities, and it is true that Lhasa, especially, has become very Sinicised since the early 1990s. But even if the figure of hundreds of thousands were accepted, it would hardly amount to cultural genocide, because the Han would still be well below 50 per cent of the population and the floaters never stay longer than a few years, and mostly for much shorter periods. Since few of them go to the countryside, the overwhelming proportion of the population there remains Tibetan (Sautman 2001: 109). Actually, I doubt the figures are nearly as high as ‘some critics’ claim, because the census includes people who have lived in the area for 1 year. When the Dalai Lama spoke of ‘the mass influx of Chinese into Tibet’ in his July 1996 speech, he was probably referring not to the TAR, but to the Tibetan ethnographic areas. In addition to the TAR, he might have included the whole of Qinghai Province, and parts of Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. However, one recent
Population, women and family
study (Yan 2000: 29–31) has shown that, if one excludes the northeast corner of Qinghai from the figures, then in fact there were still far more Tibetans than Han in those areas according to 1990 census figures. The northeast corner of Qinghai includes the capital Xining and has been a Han and Muslim area for centuries. It seems to me a gross distortion to include this area in any discussion of Han immigration under the PRC. My overall conclusion on the TAR is that there has indeed been greater Han immigration since the 1990s than earlier. This is regrettable and the Chinese government should be very careful about allowing it to grow. However, I do not accept the Dalai Lama’s suggestion that Han migration into Tibet is a factor leading to cultural genocide, nor that the Tibetan people are under threat as a nationality. What the census data suggest to me, on the contrary, is that the Tibetans are more numerous than ever. We turn now to the case of Xinjiang. The Han population there in 1949 was very small, only 6.71 per cent of a total population of 4.33 million (Mackerras 1994: 253). However, there was intensive Han immigration to Xinjiang from the 1950s to the 1970s, partly to take part in construction work with the Production and Construction Corps. The proportion of Han reached its peak in 1978, when they accounted for 41.6 per cent of a total population of 12.33 million (Sun et al. 1994: 17, 25). In the 1980s, they began to withdraw. However, according to one specialist (Ben-Adam 1999: 206), from 1987 some 250,000 Hans have migrated to Xinjiang each year without official permission to look for work. The figures in Table 6.3 do indeed show that there has been substantial immigration into Xinjiang during the 1990s, but especially in the last years of the decade. The proportion of Uygurs in the population is falling, while that of the Han is rising, despite the fact that Han are far more constrained by the population control policy than the Uygurs. The reason for the rise is obviously immigration. One reason the Han are going is to take part in the burgeoning cotton industry (see Chapter 4). Bruce Gilley (2001: 27) claims that the 2000 census gave a figure of 7.5 million Han in Xinjiang, adding that the same census put the total population of the
Table 6.3 Population of Xinjiang, ethnic breakdown 1990 (census)
Uygurs Han Others Totals
7,194,675 5,695,626 2,265,477 15,155,778
47.5 37.6 14.9
7,800,000 6,318,100 2,495,400 16,613,500
46.9 38.0 15.0
8,250,300 6,871,500 2,628,200 17,750,000
46.5 38.7 14.8
Sources: SSB Population Office 1991: 78–86; Liu et al. 2000: 87, 89; People’s Daily, 3 April 2001, p. 1.
Population, women and family
Autonomous Region at 18.5 million. However, an official figure for Xinjiang from the 2000 census claimed the total population was 19,250,000 million (People’s Daily, 3 April 2001, p. 1). Given that a rise from 17,750,000 to 19,250,00 seems incredible, I am inclined to put more weight on Gilley’s figure, pending publication of more detailed figures from the 2000 census. If the 2000 census did indeed show 7.5 million Han in the XUAR, then the average annual number of Han immigrants over the decade 1990 to 2000 was about 175,000. This is a very substantial number, and will make a big demographic difference if continued over a long period. However, it is somewhat less than the 250,000 claimed by BenAdam. The possibility that his figures are inflated or that the official ones are undercounts cannot be overlooked. But I think it is more likely that there is a good deal of rotation, as in Tibet. In other words, many of the Han immigrants do not stay for more than a couple of years, and then return to the East. If those that have been in Xinjiang less than a year are not counted, then the actual number of Han may be even larger than the census shows. The impact on ethnic identity appears to vary significantly in different parts of China. According to one study, it has not watered down minority cultures such as the Uygur. On the contrary, the authors argue that Uygur migration may even be contributing to a strengthening of ethnic identity among the Uygurs (Iredale et al. 2001: 195). It is true that this view is directly at odds with a Human Rights Watch report of October 2001, which argues that the Uygurs ‘have struggled for cultural survival in the face of a government-supported influx by Chinese migrants’ (Human Rights Watch 2001: 1). My own observations in Xinjiang in 1982, 1994 and 1999 suggest that Chinese influence is increasing, but so are Uygur religion and culture strengthening, perhaps in reaction. What is striking is not the weakness of Uygur culture and religion, but its tenacity and strength.
Women and gender The link between this section and the preceding one is a general acknowledgement that the empowerment of women helps to control population growth. China has exemplified this quite well since the early 1990s. In the international arena it has done reasonably well in gender terms since the early 1990s. The UNDP has developed a gender-related development index (GDI). It is similar to the human development index (HDI) but differs in adjusting ‘the average achievement in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement between women and men’ (UNDP 1997: 123). The higher the ranking and the nearer the absolute value approaches towards 1, the better. In 1994, China ranked no. 108 out of 175 countries in its HDI, but its GDI was no. 90, with a value of 0.617 (UNDP 1997: 150). In 1999, its HDI ranked no. 87 out of 162 countries, but its GDI was no. 76, with a value of 0.715, representing quite impressive improvements over 5 years (UNDP 2001). For the sake of comparison we may note that India’s GDI ranking rose from no. 118, with a value of 0.419 in 1994 to no. 105 with a value of 0.553 in 1999, meaning that though India tended to catch up, China was still well ahead. In specific terms,
Population, women and family
what the figures for China mean is that women improved relative to men in life expectancy, literacy and income. I discussed China’s achievements in moving towards the eradication of poverty in Chapter 4. The UNDP has been very insistent that, on the whole, more gender equality means less poverty. ‘A creative commitment to gender equality will strengthen every area of action to reduce poverty’ (UNDP 1997: 7). So the improvements in gender equality can take some of the credit for the reduction in poverty. This positive spin does not mean that the problems are solved, or anywhere near it. Indeed, government sources are quite ready to admit ‘difficulties and resistance’ that have hindered women’s participation in such areas as ‘political and government affairs, employment’ and access to education (Information Office 1994: 9). There is a tendency in many places to value men’s work more than women’s and resistance to employing women in the first place, because of the likely costs of providing maternity leave and childcare. The privatisation of the state-owned enterprises since 1997 has differentially impacted on female employment (ADB and SPDC 2001: 12-15). This comment encompasses not only China in general, but more specifically the western provinces of China, where the minorities are mostly concentrated. The only province-level unit where the percentage of female employees exceeded the proportion of laid-off workers in 1999 was Ningxia (ADB and SPDC 2001: 12-15). We do not have breakdowns by ethnic group, but we do know that Ningxia has China’s largest concentration of Hui people, and it is possible that the figures reflect well on the ability of Hui women to move into and hold employment in various spheres. The proportion of female ethnic cadres did not move during the decade of the 1990s. Women cadres were 26.6 per cent of all ethnic cadres in 1992, and still 26.6 per cent at the end of the decade. However, the absolute numbers rose significantly, from 607,600 female ethnic cadres in 1992 to about 718,000 by the late 1990s (Information Office 1994: 16 and Chen 1999: 13). In Tibet, the proportion of female officials tended to rise, being 31 per cent of the total in 1998 (Jiang 1998: 20). In the educational attainment area that the UNDP rightly considers so important, gender differences remain among the ethnic minorities, with girls often staying at school for shorter periods than boys. However, these differentials have progressively narrowed in recent years. One study found that between 1982 and 1990, the difference between male and female illiteracy among the ethnic minorities narrowed in all province-level territories except Tibet (Lamontagne 1999: 151). It also predicted that in the 1990s the gender illiteracy gap would further narrow, but peaking in Tibet before narrowing. Although the gender gap would not disappear altogether, it would become very small in the northeastern provinces, which include the Koreans, Xinjiang, home to the Uygurs, Kazaks and other minorities, and a few other places (Lamontagne 1999: 155–6). By 1998, the Spring Bud Project, mentioned in Chapter 5, had begun to make some meaningful difference in Tibet, opening classes for girls who had dropped out of school, and paying all their tuition and living necessities (Jiang 1998: 21). My explorations in widely scattered minority areas since the early 1990s suggest that the gender differentials have indeed come down since then.
Population, women and family
The Spring Bud Project has made a substantial contribution to the education of girls in many minority areas. In a Hui village visited completely at random in an impoverished area of Qinghai in mid-1995, the local teacher told me that only a few years before there had been no girls at all in the class, whereas now the numbers were equal. It was Project Spring Bud that had enabled the girls of the village to go to school. Figures given to me in the Dai areas of western Yunnan in 2000, both at individual schools and by local government officials, pointed to a pattern in which both boys and girls received schooling equally. In visits to secondary schools for Uygurs in Ürümqi and Yining in 1994, and in 1999 to a teacher training school in Hotan, all in Xinjiang, I learned that girls actually outnumbered boys. In a remote Tibetan village I visited in Sichuan in January 1997, one family was allocating a very significant proportion of their income to give the elder daughter a secondary education. On the other hand, in one primary school I visited at random in a Tibetan and Yi village in Sichuan in January 1997, there were no girls at all in the small class. The number and proportion of female teachers has risen since 1990, both in the country as a whole and in the ethnic areas. The overall national figure put women teachers at 38.4 per cent in 1990, rising to 45.5 in 1999, a very significant increase (NBS 2000: 657). In Xinjiang the rise was from 52.6 per cent in 1990 to 58.5 per cent in 1999, also a large rise from a figure already representing a majority (Liu et al. 2000: 607). During my visit to the Dai areas in 2000, several school principals, most of them male, told me independently that they thought women made better teachers than men, because they were more patient. The 1990s saw more women from ethnic minorities achieve distinction in commerce and in professions other than teaching than was formerly the case. An example in the professions is Yangjin, a Tibetan herself and the first female lawyer in Tibet. In 1993 she launched the first cooperative lawyer’s office in Tibet. In 1999 she was named among the top ten lawyers in China (Sun and Liu 1999: 36). In business, the best-known single example is the Uygur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, who became not only the richest woman in Xinjiang, but the richest person. Unfortunately, she was accused of threatening national security and sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment early in March 2000. However, in the meantime she had shown that it was possible for a woman to overcome the still strong social prejudices of society and the ‘glass ceiling’, rising to the top of her chosen calling. On a much more general and widespread basis than the single case of Rebiya Kadeer, I have been very struck all over China, including in most ethnic areas, with how actively women promote business, especially small business. This has been a trend that has followed the opening up of the economy to the market and has gathered momentum since the early 1990s, in part because of Deng Xiaoping’s and the CCP’s overt and strong encouragement of the ‘socialist market economy’ in 1992. In many ethnic villages I have visited, I have found that it is a woman who runs the local village shop, and frequently women who sell things on the open market. Although this does not necessarily make them equal to men, it certainly does add to their sense of independence and status within society.3 Among the Buddhist Dai people, it seemed to me that women do quite well in terms of education and employment. Certainly, they are very active and generally
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successful in commerce. In villages I visited both men and women were insistent on gender equality in theory and, largely, in practice, certainly much more so than I found in most ethnic areas I have visited. Despite these advances, there is a very negative side to the gender issues among China’s ethnic minorities. Some of the worst poverty in China is to be found among ethnic minority women who, for various reasons, are probably poorer than their menfolk. The effects of globalisation may have made a few poorer just as it has made many better off. It is accurate to call some of these women ‘the poorest of the poor’ (for instance, ADB and SDPC 2001: 12–14). The advances also should not blind us to the tenacity of traditional opinions and attitudes towards women, and probably they are most pronounced among the Islamic and most strongly Confucianised ethnic groups. The attitude the Chinese call zhongnan qingnü (literally ‘regarding the male as important, the female as light’) is still very prevalent among most members of ethnic groups in China, including both Han and minorities. It is an attitude I have found almost everywhere, including among women themselves, even very confident ones, and seems to be even more dominant in the countryside than in the cities. It is probably due largely to tenacity of traditional thinking, but may have been in some ways even strengthened by the economic reforms, which gave better opportunities for advancement to men than to women. Despite advances in Xinjiang, I found attitudes in the countryside there during my 1999 visit to be still very conservative. I interviewed many people in areas as widely dispersed as Kashgar, Khotan, Ürümqi, Turpan and Yining and their surroundings. I found a clear difference between the strongly Islamic south and the somewhat more open north and centre. On the whole, men disclaim gender equality, especially in the south. In Kashgar many women wear full veils when in public, covering themselves so fully that one cannot see their eyes, though there is netting so that they can see out. I did not see this in Yining, Turpan or Ürümqi nearly as much as in the south, although Muslim women usually wear headscarves in public places. In Xinjiang, Uygur women are not allowed to enter mosques and there are no female Islamic clergy. There are special mosques for the Hui in Xinjiang and women are allowed to enter these, but must stay at the side or back. Conditions are a bit different in other parts of China. There are a few mosques especially for women in Henan, Gansu and elsewhere, with female clergy. As for the regular mosques, there are no female clergy there. Women may enter them, but only if they stay at the back or the side. Even among the Dai, who are Theravada Buddhists, religion seems more conservative than society at large. Several Buddhist monks I interviewed were quite clear in their view that, though women were equal with men in society, they were inferior to men in the Buddhist religion. One senior Buddhist monk I interviewed in October 2000 in Mangshi, capital of Dehong in far southwestern Yunnan, told me he did not think women were equal to men from a religious point of view, because they cannot become Buddhas. If they lead good lives, they can eventually be reborn as men, and only then can they become Buddhas.
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One ethnic group to gain quite a bit of publicity in the West since the 1990s is that group of the Mosuo who straddle the Lugu Lake along the border area of Yunnan and Sichuan. I discussed them in Chapter 3 as an example of a potential extra nationality. The reason for the publicity is because their descent was traditionally matrilineal, in other words through the female, and remains so to this day. Matriliny has given the Mosuo the reputation as a society where women are equal or dominate. This is not a straightforward issue, and I abstain from the term ‘matriarchy’ to describe the Mosuo social system, with its implications of women’s power.4 I note that the elected village head of the Mosuo community I visited early in 1996 was a man. However, certainly the fact of female inheritance does suggest that women have a higher status than in most societies in China, including those of the non-Confucian and non-Muslim ethnic minorities. The Mosuo are among the many ethnic groups in China to have opened to tourism in the 1990s. First the sexually strait-laced Han came to wonder at this unusual society of relatively free women. Then came the Westerners with the added fascination of the potential feminist dream. In any case, the Mosuo lead us on to the gender aspects of tourism, a phenomenon that is already creating a profound effect on many ethnic women in China. Along with the added prosperity and modernising effects discussed in Chapter 4, tourism is bringing about some unwanted consequences. One of the most prominent is prostitution, even including overt sex tourism. In many countries authorities have become very concerned indeed over the rise of the abuse of women and children due to sex tourism. We cannot put all the blame on tourists by any means. And of course prostitution is not new in China, or anywhere else. Prostitution has increased enormously everywhere in China in the wake of the economic reforms and may get worse now that China has joined the World Trade Organisation. The better business opportunities of the economic reform period and globalisation, together with the female unemployment caused, are among factors leading to increase in the sex industry. Yet the fact is that both domestic and international tourism have promoted prostitution in China. Of course it affects primarily the Han areas, but is spreading to some of the ethnic areas with remarkable speed. One example to illustrate the tendencies comes from Jinghong, capital of Sipsong panna (which the Chinese call Xishuangbanna), an area that has opened up to tourism in a big way since 1990. As it happens, Dai women are often objects of sexual fantasy to Han men, and have the reputation for being sexually liberal, an image not generally confirmed in reality. Because of this, Han women sometimes go to Jinghong and take jobs in the sex industry, pretending to be Dai. One scholar wrote in the late 1990s: One aspect of tourism to Xishuangbanna is the development of a variety of sex tourism such as is seen in other parts of Asia, the growth of prostitution there, and the attendant problems of sexually transmitted diseases. It is estimated that Jinghong has around 500 prostitutes, most of them Han immigrants, some of whom pretend to be Dai, and a small number of Dai and other minority women. (Evans 2001: 170)
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Most of the tourists are domestic Han Chinese, but there are also some foreigners, mostly from Southeast Asia. It is also interesting that Dai and other minority girls from Yunnan are found in the booming sex industry in Thailand, which feeds on tourism probably even more than in China. These Dai girls tend to occupy the lowest rungs of sex workers there, along with minority girls from Myanmar and Thailand itself. Many are infected with HIV and are a conduit for the spread of the disease throughout the region (Feingold 2000: 187–9). Some family matters In family matters, there appears to me to have been a gradual rise in the position of women, but it is uneven and differs among the ethnic groups and by place. The PRC banned arranged marriages in 1950 and, while reality has been slow to reflect law, the change had become very significant indeed by the beginning of the twenty-first century. I asked if arranged marriages still survived in a great many of the villages I visited in various ethnic regions of China. Most said there were no longer arranged marriages, but in southern Xinjiang I found several village heads acknowledging that arranged marriages were still the norm in their area and elsewhere in the ethnic areas a few interviewees conceded some survivals. The survey taken in urban and rural Tibet in 1996 found a trend towards openness. Among Tibetan women 68.5 per cent reported that they had chosen their spouse by free choice and love, 5 per cent through introduction by other people, 13.5 per cent through parental arrangement, 0.5 per cent through the arrangement of their unit, and 1 per cent by other means. What is very striking, and probably contrary to trends elsewhere, is that mate selection through love was actually greater among rural respondents (75 per cent) than urban (62 per cent), while parentally arranged marriages were commoner among the urban respondents (16 per cent) than the rural (11 per cent) (Wang 2001: 90–1). It appears to me that both among Han and minorities there is a strong feeling that no marriage should go ahead without the consent of the parents of both bride and groom. One Yi professor I interviewed in Kunming early in October 2000 told me there were still some arranged marriages in Yi villages, but they were no longer the norm. He continued that ‘on the whole parents must agree to a marriage, even if the young people themselves love each other and agree to marry’. He also added that the custom of bride price was still quite prevalent and that polygyny was by no means extinct, even though in sharp decline. One of the many aspects of society in China to have seen change over recent years is the sensitive matter of interethnic marriages. In most places, the trend is towards greater openness and follows the overall modernising influences that have come with the policies of economic reform. In Inner Mongolia, Han–Mongolian marriages have become quite accepted, especially in Hohhot (Cui 1997: 15). One of the questions the 1996 survey among Tibetans posed was whether people of different ethnic groups might get married if they genuinely loved each other. Among 199 respondents, 9.5 per cent agreed strongly that they
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might, and 69.5 per cent agreed, with 8 per cent indifferent and only 1.5 per cent definitely opposed. Even more striking was that the country people were more open than the city, with no less than 98 per cent of rural respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with the proposition (Wang 2001: 90). Stevan Harrell has carried out a major study of the ethnic groups of southwestern China, especially Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, southwestern Sichuan. This place is home to the people called Nuosu, whom the state regards as a branch of the Yi nationality. He sums up the intermarriage situation he found as follows: In general, Nuosu do not marry with other groups (even other groups classified as part of the Yi minzu) in the village context; they do not even intermarry among different castes of Nuosu. All other groups intermarry to a certain extent: Han will intermarry with anyone, anywhere, while other groups tend to be selective. In the cities and among educated people, all kinds of intermarriage are possible and frequent, with the possible exception of intercaste marriage among Nuosu. Any kind of intermarriage, of course, produces the problem of the minzu affiliation (and sometimes also the ethnic identity) of the offspring. In general, offspring of mixed marriages are classified as belonging to the non-Han minzu, because of the affirmative action benefits available. They may, however, acculturate to Han ways while retaining a minority identity. (Harrell 2001: 75) In my opinion, Harrell’s formulation could in some ways apply to most of ethnic China. I refer specifically to the differentiation of urban and rural areas, the way the children of interethnic marriages prefer to belong to an ethnic minority because of the preferential policies, and their tendency to acculturate to Han practices. There are still major social factors inhibiting intermarriage in the countryside. It is still the case that most villages in China are still dominantly or entirely monoethnic, which means that opportunities to meet and court members of different ethnic groups are limited. There is still a strong feeling among Islamic ethnic groups that it is unwise to marry non-Muslims. The reason is that nonMuslims are required to adapt to Muslim doctrines and customs and often find this impossible, with the result that marriage breakdown is frequent. Despite a general trend towards more openness, there are even cases where the trend in the last years of the twentieth century was against marriage between Han and minorities. One such example concerns a Muslim minority in Xinjiang. At one time it was reasonably common for Han and Uygurs to marry, but by the mid1990s, such intermarriage was definitely not favoured by Uygurs themselves, even though government policy continued to favour it. The chief reason for this is ‘differences in religio-cultural practices’ (Smith 2002: 162). But one senses that one reason may be the decline in relations between the two ethnic groups as well. I was informed by several people independently in Xinjiang that intermarriage between Uygurs and Han was much commoner in the 1970s and 1980s than during the 1990s.
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There is change in other family matters as well, mostly reflecting the rising status of women. One study of childbearing strategies among the Uygur educated elite of Ürümqi, capital of Xinjiang, found that Uygur families are increasingly making decisions with their private interests in mind, not those of the state. Most important for this chapter is that the more egalitarian environment in the home ‘has given women more power in the decision-making process in all the family strategies’, including childbearing decisions (Clark 2001: 237). Data showing female influence in childbearing strategies emerge from two surveys carried out in Tibet, respectively in 1993 and 1996. The former found that 72.91 per cent of urban families and 82.87 per cent of rural families decided on childbearing through mutual consultation, but that of those where one party decided, it was more often the wife than the husband, especially in the cities. The 1996 survey showed only 52 per cent of births were the result of mutual consultation, 31 per cent were decided by the wife and only 17 per cent by the husband. In other words, the surveys agree, though to differing extents, that mutual consultation is the most popular road to decision on childbearing, but the wife is more likely to be dominant in decision-making than the husband (Wang 2001: 93). Among Tibetans, the influence of women may be surprisingly dominant in childbearing matters, but in matters like who controls the family income, and whose words carry more weight on matters like buying a television set or the school of children, it is the husband who matters more. The 1996 survey found that among 185 respondents in urban and rural areas, 53.76 per cent said such household affairs were decided by the husband, only 21.51 per cent by the wife, 5.91 by the elders and 18.28 per cent jointly. Interesting but not surprising was the fact that husbands were even more dominant in the countryside than in the cities and the wife correspondingly weaker (Wang 2001: 94). On the other hand, the surveying team found that the number of families where decisions were made jointly by the husband and wife was ‘on the increase’ and regarded this as ‘an indication of the more democratic atmosphere in family life’ (p. 95). In Xinjiang, my own interviewing in 1999 suggested that men make the main family decisions in the south, but in the centre and north there is more of a trend towards joint decision-making. Just as in other gender matters, there is also a much more conservative trend in attitudes related to family matters. One such area is in the preference for sons over daughters. The idea that boys can perform more productive labour because they are muscularly stronger makes them more desirable to families not only among the Han but most of the minorities. Also, it is still the case among most ethnic groups, not only the Han, that it is the male who carries on the family line and property, not the female. There may be exceptions to this pattern, but there are not very many of them. One such exception is the Mosuo around the Lugu Lake, who have no formal system of permanent marriage arrangements. Instead they follow a practice of ‘walking marriages’, in which the man visits a lover at night and returns to his own family at dawn. It follows logically from the Mosuo matriliny, because it is theoretically possible that a child knows who his or her mother is, but not the
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father. The walking marriages, together with the system of matriliny, mean that the Mosuo are definitely among those ethnic groups who give no preference to sons over daughters. Indeed, it could be the other way around. Mosuo houses still have the woman’s room nearest the entrance, so that she can more easily welcome her lover. Though ‘walking marriages’ are still very much alive, nowadays it is always clear who a child’s father is. I got a strong impression during my 1996 visit that at least some men do take some responsibility for their children in financial and other ways. One man told me both he and his lover were very keen for their daughters to get a good education in a nearby town, so that they could leave the village and move up in the world. He said that both would share the considerable expenses involved in their education. Another interesting traditional survival is the Tibetan custom of polyandry, by which one or more brothers, or occasionally friends or even father and son, shared a wife. Polygyny usually took the form of sisters sharing a husband. The aim was basically to avoid splitting inheritance so, because property descended mostly through the male, polyandry was commoner than polygyny and more prevalent among the richer classes than the poorer. The Tibetan Marriage Law of 1981 banned both polyandry and polygyny. The practice had declined greatly since the rebellion of 1959 and even more due to the Cultural Revolution. However, it retained a great deal of currency as an idea, even among the educated elite (see Mackerras 1995: 175). It appears to have actually revived in the period of economic reform. In a random 1995 survey in a village with 113 families, 94 were monogamous, 5 polygynous and 11 polyandrous, mainly with sisters sharing a husband or brothers a wife, although one case of polyandry was found with friends sharing a wife (Wang 2001: 92). It is also found in Tibetan communities outside Tibet itself. For instance, in Yunnan, one account referring to 1990 said of polyandry and polygyny that ‘though they are not seen much, they still exist’ (Zhang et al. 1994: 124). The reason why these practices have come back is not at all clear. Wang (2001: 92) believes that the revival both of polygynous and polyandrous marriages in the rural areas of Tibet is ‘perhaps due to the increased need for more workers in the household after the initiation of economic reform’, or the need for more men or women around the house. It could be that the need to avoid splitting the inheritance still carries some weight, but almost certainly far less than was once the case. We finish this section with a brief discussion of divorce among the ethnic minorities. Though divorce in China is still very uncommon by comparison with such countries as the United States, it is a rising trend. The overall national figures for 1991 showed 9,509,849 couples married and 829,449 divorced, which means that the ratio of divorces to marriages in that year was 8.7 per cent (SSB 1992: 801). The corresponding figures in 1999 were 8,799,079 and 1,201,541, the ratio of divorces to marriages being 13.66 per cent, quite a substantial rise over 8 years (NBS 2000: 768). Although the statistics do not indicate ethnicity, it is striking that most province-level units with significant ethnic populations, such as Yunnan, Tibet and Ningxia, show increases, but the ratio of divorces to marriages actually fell in Guizhou.
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One place with a particularly interesting situation is Xinjiang. The figures for 1991 showed 59,755 divorces and 170,999 marriages, the percentage of divorces to marriages being 34.9 per cent, by far the highest in the country (SSB 1991: 802). By 1999 marriages were 174,267, while divorces were 58,341, or 33.5 per cent, the proportions actually being higher in Shanghai and Heilongjiang (NBS 2000: 768). Indeed, the figures suggest that while divorce has got considerably worse in China as a whole, it has slightly reduced in Xinjiang. Though no longer the highest in number in the country and with a slightly falling proportion to marriages, divorces in Xinjiang appear consistently so numerous as to demand explanation. The reason is a very unstable family life among the Uygurs in southern Xinjiang. Men very easily abandon their wives for others. Several informants both in 1994 and 1999 told me of this trend, adding that it was far from new (Mackerras 1995: 176). Figures from the 1990 census showed that the number of the divorced ethnic minority population in Xinjiang at that time was 3.28 times the figure for divorced Han (Sun et al. 1994: 90). A Chinese source (Sun et al. 1994: 89) claims that many men ignore the civil law, using instead the Islamic rules, under which it is comparatively easy for men to divorce their wives. However, this does not necessarily affect divorce rates among other Muslims in China as much as those in Xinjiang, and the explanation for the high rate may also include cultural factors. One Uygur living in Kaxgar with whom I talked about the subject in June 1999 told me that he himself was in the process of divorcing his wife at the time and finding it a very complicated and difficult process, certainly not the picture one imagines from the masses of husbands abandoning their wives for new lovers. It may be that civil law is coming more into force with the passage of time.
Conclusion There is a clear relationship between population control and the social status of women. Bodies like the United Nations Population Fund and World Bank insist that higher female status means lower population growth. Specifically, giving females ‘equal access to education, jobs, property and credit’ and getting more women into the public sphere ‘reduces child mortality, improves public health, slows population growth and strengthens overall economic growth’ (quoted from Westlake 2001a: 67–8). It seems to me to follow from the material in this chapter that China’s record in both fields since the early 1990s has been mixed but generally positive. If the aim is to reduce population growth, then that has occurred. It is certainly possible to challenge the methods, and human rights activists have indeed done that. But in the population area, the worst excesses belong to the 1980s, not the 1990s, let alone later. The material suggesting growing willingness to restrict the size of one’s own family as modernisation takes hold is especially compelling and credible. On the other hand, the pace of migration shows no sign of let-up and seems to be accelerating into the most sensitive areas, Tibet and Xinjiang. In neither case is the migration as extensive as exile communities’ and human rights activists’
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accounts allege, but it is quite serious all the same. My own view is that the Chinese government should not, and cannot, force the Han who already live in Xinjiang and Tibet to leave, since many have already made their home there. However, they certainly can, and should, try to restrict the scope of immigration from now on. What is obvious is that this immigration causes deep resentment among local ethnic minorities. It gives them the feeling that their home is being taken over. Migration of peoples from one part of a country or of the world to another is undoubtedly part of globalisation. However, it is striking that the West should now be opposing Han migration into China’s ethnic areas so vigorously. After all, the peoples of Europe have spread to many parts of the world, even taking over some of them and displacing the original inhabitants. What seems to have happened is that, as well as becoming part and parcel of globalisation, migration is also coming to be one of the targets of those forces that oppose globalisation. Issues of gender have resonances with various other aspects of society. They pit modernity against tradition with the globalising forces of the West squarely placed alongside on the side of modernity and the minorities themselves on the side of the tradition. One scholar has put forward a dichotomy in which being modern is ‘to consume or reproduce rather than to produce, to watch rather than to do, to be urban rather than rural, masculine rather than feminine’ (Schein 2000: 253). Schein is absolutely right to pose the dichotomy as being partly between urban and rural. In virtually all ethnic areas I have visited, the more modernised towns are rejecting traditional attitudes towards women more strongly than the countryside. I must add that I see significant change in the rural areas as well, and the stronger rejection of arranged marriages in rural than urban Tibet is very striking. But in general modernisation is probably far less thorough than in the towns and cities. Despite the appeal of Schein’s formulation, I prefer to see the dichotomy between modernity and tradition a bit differently. It seems to me that the last decade and more of the twentieth century ushered in a process in which ethnic youth were more and more attracted to modernisation and the global forces that came from the West, but at the same time there was a process that pulled back to traditions. It is true, as Schein implies, that the pressures on young women to return to traditions were somewhat greater than on the young men. However, I believe that the thrust towards that goal of modernisation affected both women and men. The material I have presented in this chapter shows some convergence between the experience of China’s ethnic minorities and global forces. That is evident in the halting progress towards empowerment and the incipient participation of ethnic women in commerce. At the same time, the material on Tibetan marriage practices shows the pull of tradition very clearly. Probably as time goes by, globalisation will increasingly favour the processes of modernity and oppose those of tradition. The effect is likely to be to increase the educational and empowerment levels of women in China, including among the minorities. There are likely to be exceptions. The fact is that there remains great diversity among the minorities. Already tradition had women with more social power in some ethnic groups than others. But I suspect the overall direction will be clear and promote modernity.
The minorities of China have increasingly become involved in China’s international relations since 1990. In the far northwest, the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 has imposed a very different texture of relations with the countries to China’s west, which has involved the minorities in a way much tighter and more direct than was the case during the Soviet period. On the whole, the minorities have exercised a beneficial effect on China’s relations with Russia and other bordering countries to its west. The Tibetan issue has become more internationalised and globalised since 1990. It has affected China’s relations with the Western countries, especially the United States, but also with India, Mongolia and other countries. It has increased in intensity, with ‘Tibet lobbies’ exercising significant public influence in Western countries and elsewhere. While the issue has never taken a priority at the top either of China’s or other countries’ foreign relations, and China is reasonably friendly with most of the countries concerned, the impact of Tibet on bilateral relations has been damaging.
The background The development of humankind since 1990 has been subject to several major events and trends. Possibly the most important of them has been the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and its replacement by a commonwealth of independent states, of which four share borders with China. The Federation of Russia is by far the largest and most important of these states, but as a world power its status is very much lower than the Soviet Union’s had been. The period also saw a further spectacular rise both in the economy and power of China, which remained as the only country with the rank anything remotely approaching that of a world power still governed by a party espousing Marxism–Leninism. The fact that few people still believed in it did not alter the fact that Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought–Deng Xiaoping Theory was still the official ideology of the CCP. Russia’s woes left only one superpower: the United States, which continued to grow economically and exert mighty technological, military, economic, political, social and cultural influence throughout the globe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which was originally founded primarily as a defence grouping of North American and West European countries against the Soviet
Union and its allies, not only continued in existence despite the elimination of its primary enemy, but even expanded in size and power. In March 1999, NATO actually added three countries of the former Soviet bloc to its membership: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and at its meeting of December 2002 formally added another large group of countries, some of them actually republics of former Soviet Union. The break-up of Yugoslavia brought several major conflicts in its wake, radically expanding the extent of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. The most serious of them was the war between Serbians, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina (1992–1995), which spawned ethnic hatreds and caused casualties and destruction on a horrific scale. From March to June 1999, NATO forces carried out a bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo, respectively a republic and province of Yugoslavia. Kosovo, where over 80 per cent of the population in the early 1990s was Albanian, wished to secede from Yugoslavia but was fiercely resisted by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, whose practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ against the Albanians NATO’s bombing campaign was trying to prevent. Milosevic was forced to give in to NATO, and fell from power in October 2000. In June 2001 he was handed over to the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity. These events were accompanied by a major thrust towards globalisation throughout the world, a trend discussed in detail in Chapter 1. Other than the spread of computer and other technologies, markets and economic investments, this trend included some important social trends of great importance for this book. The main one, especially affecting the West, was an international rise in the concern for human rights. A subcategory of this concern was worry over ethnic conflict, which seemed to spread and intensify in many parts of the world when the Soviet Union collapsed. Yugoslavia was the most obvious example, but possibly the worst was Rwanda, where in 1994 ethnic carnage and civil war reportedly took over 1 million lives (Turner 2000: 1300). There were political implications, with international bodies reaching the conclusion that they had not only the right but even the duty to intervene in cases of totally outrageous abuses of human rights. The intervention in Kosovo was a primary example of such intervention. Another social element associated with globalisation in the 1990s is the renewed triumph of certain kinds of religion. Two specific religions are of particular relevance to this chapter, namely Tibetan Buddhism and Islam. The youth movements of the 1960s and the revolutionary culture that accompanied the protests against American intervention in Vietnam led many people to the belief that religions in general were in decline and would eventually disappear. This has not happened. On the contrary, if anything, religion has strengthened. In some Western countries, especially Western Europe, traditional Christianity may exert less influence than it once did. Yet it is still a force to be reckoned with. It is also very important that other, non-Christian, forms of spirituality have increased dramatically in influence, among which Tibetan Buddhism and Islam have both ranked high. In the West, Tibetan Buddhism has become part of the ‘new spirituality’ that has become very fashionable with Western youth, filling a void the rampant materialism of daily life cannot satisfy.
The destruction of the World Trade Center towers in New York and the attack on the Pentagon in Washington on 11 September 2001 produced a significant effect on global international relations. All the major governments of the world expressed themselves shocked by the incidents and enthusiastic to defeat the terrorism that had caused them. United States President George W. Bush accused the extremist Islamic Taliban government of Afghanistan of harbouring Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network that he held responsible for the 11 September incidents. As it happened the Americans and their allies launched a war to overthrow the Taliban about a month after the destruction of the World Trade Center. By the end of 2001, the American-led coalition had overthrown the Taliban and installed a new pro-American government. China’s foreign relations For China, with its rising economy and world status, there were two countries with which bilateral relations mattered above all others.1 These were, in order of importance, the United States and Russia. As the only remaining superpower and a country with which China had had a very unstable relationship since 1949, the United States was the country of greatest concern for China’s foreign policy formulators. Russia, though enjoying but a shadow of its former power, still has plenty of military hardware and technology, and an extremely long border with China. It shared with the United States a highly unstable and sensitive relationship with China in the preceding decades. In principle, both China and the United States want good relations with each other, with presidential visits having taken place both ways. Yet Sino-American relations were bifurcated in the sense that each country has had a very different priority in formulating policy towards the other. For China, the top priority is its own territorial integrity and the requirement that the United States should support its one-China policy, especially acknowledging Taiwan as part of China. For the United States, the main concern is that a rising China should cooperate with the United States, rather than challenge its global supremacy, the implication being that it must become democratic. The China policy of President Bill Clinton of the Democratic Party (January 1993–January 2001) was engagement. This meant that he wanted to cooperate with China in various kinds of economic, cultural, social and political exchange, which in his view would ultimately lead to a democratisation of China. However, Republican George W. Bush, who became American president on 20 January 2001, adopted a much more defiant line towards China. Not long after taking over he specified that China was a ‘strategic competitor’ and made it clear that any hint of ‘kowtowing to China’ was a thing of the past. The bottom line of China’s foreign relations is an acceptance of Taiwan as part of China. Every country which establishes diplomatic relations with China recognises the PRC as the sole legal government of China and, explicitly or implicitly, that there is but one China to which Taiwan belongs. Since the early 1990s a series of incidents has cast serious doubt on the long-term sustainability of these propositions
as far as the United States is concerned. In particular, the question of whether the United States would intervene militarily in order to defend a democratic Taiwan against an attack from the mainland has, for the Chinese, cast serious doubt on whether the Americans share their concern for territorial integrity. The 1990s saw a definite rise in Chinese nationalism, especially in its relations with the United States. More reactive than assertive, what spawned this nationalism was essentially a fear that the United States was trying to stop the Chinese rise by bringing down the CCP and throwing the country into chaos and disintegration, just as had happened with the Soviet Union. Other factors behind the nationalism were resentment over criticism by the Americans of its human rights record, their response to the Taiwan situation, and their excessive demands in return for giving support for China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation. In addition, there were several specific events that intensified anti-American nationalist feelings in China. Foremost among these was the bombing of China’s Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 during the NATO intervention over Kosovo. American and other NATO spokespeople claimed this as a ‘tragic accident’, while Chinese on the whole found the greatest difficulty in believing that so sophisticated a military power could use wrong maps or mistarget in so crass a fashion as to strike the Embassy of a supposedly friendly country. During this period of tension in Sino-American relations, China got on extremely well with Russia, both under its earlier President Boris Yeltsin, who retired from the position on the last day of 1999, and his successor Vladimir Putin. When Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in April 1997, he and Yeltsin agreed that the two countries wanted a strategic partnership, representing, in the words of one Western specialist (Dittmer 2001: 412), ‘a stable and meaningful commitment to bilateral aid and support’. For most of the period since the early 1990s, Russia has had great difficulties with its republic of Chechnya, which declared independence in November 1991 against voluble protests from the Russian leadership. Russian attempts to suppress this secessionist movement have resulted in more or less continuous warfare since that time, and China has offered strong support for the Russian cause. The Chinese leaders’ reaction to the 11 September 2001 incidents was to express shock and support for the war against terrorism. There was a strong public sentiment that the Americans had brought the incidents on themselves through their high-handed policies around the world, and especially in the Middle East. Internet sites seemed even quite pleased at American humiliation (Niquet 2001: 4–5). But what mattered was what the government did. At a major international forum in Shanghai in October 2001, Jiang Zemin and Bush presented a strong united front over the evils of terrorism and the need to attack it in all its forms. One of the effects of the incidents was to bring the three major powers, the United States, Russia and China, together with common interests. It was the first time this had happened since the Second World War. One had the impression that only war could bring the three powers together, because only a shared war could create common interests for them. However, in some ways the war against terrorism was harmful to China’s interests. It saw the United States draw Pakistan
more strongly into its orbit, with Chinese influence mattering less than before (Niquet 2001: 7). The years since 1990 have been very good ones in China’s relations with its neighbours. In 1991, it ‘normalised’ its relations with Vietnam after a period of extreme bitterness and in December 1999 the two countries signed two agreements settling their mutual borders. Although some issues of division remained, Chinese influence in Vietnam as well as trade and investment increased dramatically. Chinese visited Vietnam to an unprecedented extent, and China became Vietnam’s principal source of international tourism. China has also enjoyed very good relations with its neighbour Myanmar, rather too good for Western human rights activists, who regarded Myanmar with disgust and horror, especially before the release of democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2002. Several events of the early 1990s caused China to shift its ‘Western Asian focus … from the Middle East to Central Asia’ (Harris 1993: 126). These included the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War of 1991, which pitted the United Nations against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. China’s relations with the countries of Central Asia have been generally both good and improving since that time. China’s relationship with the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) improved greatly during the 1980s, along with that with the Soviet Union. However, the MPR fell at about the same time as the Soviet Union, and the Constitution of 12 February 1992 changed the name of the state from MPR simply to Mongolia. It has tried to maintain good relations both with Russia and China, while at the same time reducing dependence on them. In October 1994, Russia, China and Mongolia signed a protocol defining their mutual borders. To the dismay of both Russia and China, Mongolia has accepted military relations with various countries, including the United States. To the east of Mongolia is Korea, which was divided in 1945 into the northern Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or North Korea, and the southern Republic of Korea, or South Korea. During the Korean War (1950–1953), China fought in defence of North Korea, which was then, and is still, ruled by a Marxist – Leninist party called the Korean Workers’ Party. Ever since the Korean War, China has enjoyed good relations, on a reasonably stable basis, with North Korea. During the 1980s, Chinese relations with South Korea began to thaw, and a PRC team took part in the Olympic Games held in Seoul in the autumn of 1988. In August 1992, South Korea established diplomatic relations with China. North Korea was definitely displeased by the Chinese action, but chose not to highlight it by making its opposition too clear. Since that time relations between China and South Korea have developed quite well, especially in the trade area. After a very long period of hostility, relations with India continued a tendency to improve even though, as one writer has it, ‘India principally represents to China a budding regional rival’ (Roy 1998: 170). Visits at prime ministerial level resumed after a very long break. In September 1993 Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to China included the signing of documents concerning the maintenance of border peace, the reduction of troops along the border and expanded border trade. In May 1998, Defence Minister George Fernandes of the
newly formed right-wing nationalist government of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) declared China, not Pakistan, as the greatest potential threat to India. Later the same month Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee cited the Chinese threat as a primary reason for five nuclear tests. Relations appeared set for decline. However, since that time, both countries appear to have decided that ‘at least a modicum of warmth’ is essential for their own security and that of their regions.2
Tibet and the Tibetans In Chapter 2, I noted that Tibet was already an issue leading to a decline in SinoAmerican relations by the late 1980s. Since the early 1990s this trend has intensified, Tibet becoming one of those issues of concern to popular opinion in Western countries, especially the United States. Hand in hand with the religious influence of Tibetan Buddhism, noted above, has come the political influence of the ‘Tibet lobby’, which tends to support independence for Tibet and is solidly critical of more or less everything China does in Tibet. American sympathy for the Dalai Lama and his supporters is virtually synonymous with opposition to China. It is hardly surprising that this has brought about a sharp response in Beijing and contributed to a downturn in Sino-American relations. At the same time, neither the United States nor other countries have allowed the Tibet issue seriously to threaten their overall relationships. The general pattern in China’s foreign relations concerning Tibet has been that, in response to public opinion and lobbies pushing the Tibet cause, the United States and other countries have condemned China for its policy and human rights abuses in Tibet. Some members of the American Congress and the parliaments of other countries have demanded further diplomatic action against China. However, executive governments have stopped short of taking diplomatic measures with the potential to inflict serious damage on commercial dealings with China. And as for a major country actually recognising the Tibetan government-in-exile, that has never come into serious question. The Tibet issue may matter, but in the overall scheme of things, it does not rank at or near the top of the priorities affecting bilateral relations with China. For example, the United States has numerous other issues overshadowing Tibet in relating to China. These include a range of strategic issues, such as Taiwan and Korea, and economic relations. Unless the bilateral relationship were to deteriorate drastically due to other factors, it is quite out of the question that the United States would again provide military support on behalf of Tibetan independence, as it did from the mid-1950s to 1974, let alone send in troops. Right at the beginning of a major 1994 report on Tibet, the American State Department declared unequivocally that it recognised Tibet as part of China. It stated that it did not conduct diplomatic relations with the ‘self-styled “Tibetan government-in-exile” ’ (State Department 1995: 1), the terminology implying a suspicious, even mildly hostile, attitude. On 20 October 1999, Reuters reported a spokesman for British Prime Minister Tony Blair as saying that Britain recognises Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and that the PRC leaders were well aware of this (quoted Sautman 2000: 37). As far as concerns diplomatic relations, the
governments of other countries have adopted similar positions. Moreover, one scholar suggests that several countries friendly to the Dalai Lama, including the United States, Denmark and Britain, actually moved closer to China’s position in 1999 and 2000 (Sautman 2002: 92–3). Yet, as we shall see in more detail below, government leaders have frequently met with the Dalai Lama and offered him sympathy. Moreover, on 31 October 1997 President Bill Clinton announced the appointment of a special coordinator on Tibet, with functions that included encouraging the Chinese government to hold dialogue with the Dalai Lama. The announcement was a calculated insult to China. Jiang Zemin was actually in the United States at the time, and the Chinese government had declared since 1979 that any dialogue with the Dalai Lama depended on his accepting that Tibet was an inalienable part of China. Certainly the International Campaign for Tibet was delighted at the news of Clinton’s appointment of the special coordinator, regarding it as a victory for their cause, even though the United States government was at pains to deny that the appointment implied an American recognition of an independent Tibet. On 27 June 1998, during Clinton’s return visit to China, the two presidents held a joint news conference in Beijing. Clinton again urged closer dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Jiang Zemin’s response was that he would do so as soon as the Dalai Lama acknowledged that both Tibet and Taiwan were part of China. This was nothing new, but Jiang abstained from attacking the Dalai Lama and his tone was unusually conciliatory. However, hopes that this might portend a movement towards a slackening of tension over Tibet came to nothing, with both sides deciding against dialogue late in 1998 (Sautman 2002: 79). China exuded confidence in celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the 23 May 1951 Agreement which had sealed Tibet’s return to China (see Chapter 2), while overseas commentary was remarkably muted. The American Congress has generally been much more forthright on the subject of Tibet than have Administrations. Congress has on occasion gone far beyond condemning China for human rights abuses in Tibet. It has referred to Tibet, specifically including the Tibetan areas of Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai, as ‘an occupied country’. It has described the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile as ‘recognized by Congress as the true representatives of the Tibetan people’. There is no doubt that many in Congress would like to recognise an independent Tibet (see Goldstein 1997: 118–19). There are many supporters of the same cause in other Western parliaments, including that of Australia. When Jiang Zemin visited Australia in September 1999, a Tibetan attended a lunch in his honour at the invitation of one of Parliament’s supporters of Tibetan independence and handed him a letter demanding that he allow the Tibetans to determine their own future. The international role of the Dalai Lama The international relations bearing on the issue of Tibet are strongly dominated by the individual person of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Leading his government-in-exile
in Dharamsala, India, his influence mushroomed throughout the world after he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. Although, among non-Tibetans, he enjoys greatest following in the West, especially the United States, his popularity is global. One specialist on Tibetan affairs claims that the Dalai Lama has ‘in some senses become a pop-culture icon’ (Goldstein 1997: 119) in the United States. Early in 1998 the magazine Asiaweek included the Dalai Lama among the top twenty-five ‘trend-makers’ in Asia, calling him ‘the Patron Saint of the “Tibet Chic” phenomenon that is sweeping the planet’ (Seno and Morgan 1998: 42). The same magazine’s 2001 list of Asia’s fifty most powerful people ranked him twenty-first. Appropriate to the age, the ability to communicate was the main criterion. Justifying the Dalai Lama’s inclusion, Asiaweek called him ‘Tibet’s global operator’ and declared that ‘in the public-relations battle for the world’s sympathy, Beijing is losing the fight with the Dalai Lama. The question is whether the messenger is becoming bigger than his message’ (Hornik 2001: 56). This seems to me a very perceptive comment, especially the last sentence. It is by no means obvious that the international acclaim accorded the Dalai Lama means that the causes of the Tibet lobby are moving towards triumph. In the second half of the 1990s, Hollywood took up the Dalai Lama and his cause in a big way, contributing greatly to what one scholar has described as ‘virtual Tibet’ (Schell 2000). What Hollywood presented was an unreal Tibet, one that had never existed and does not now. Film stars such as Richard Gere and Brad Pitt were active in promoting the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence and denouncing China for its role in Tibet, which they saw as simple occupation of a foreign country. The year 1997 saw the screening of Jean-Jacques Annaud’s Seven Years in Tibet. Based on the experiences of the Austrian Heinrich Harrer in Tibet in the days before the 1950s, it focuses on his friendship with the young Dalai Lama, whom it shows in an extremely positive, saintly, light, with Brad Pitt in the role of Harrer. Another film on Tibet, Kundun, came out the following year. The Dalai Lama as a child is the central character and again comes across with a saintly image. Although the Chinese do not loom large in either film, especially the second, any appearances show them as demons akin to the Nazis, whom Heinrich Harrer had supported during the War (see also Schell 2000: 31–41). Ironically, the Nazi link was a major factor the Chinese used in an attempt to discredit Hollywood’s attempts to deify the Dalai Lama. A former Nazi was using Hollywood to advertise himself, they charged, and Hollywood was happy to help him, because it was bent on prejudicing the world against China on the Tibet issue (Schell 2000: 296). In the 1990s, the Dalai Lama continued and intensified his international mission from his base in Dharamsala. He made numerous visits to cities in various parts of the world. He became, just as Asiaweek rightly called him, a global operator. Of course the Chinese government protested against the visits, accusing him of being a ‘splittist’ determined to split the motherland, a political leader rather than a religious one. Their protests were especially loud when the Dalai Lama’s itinerary involved meetings with political leaders, which it very frequently did. They became more voluble and severe with the passage of time, corresponding to
the expanding reputation and influence of the Dalai Lama and of China’s increasing nationalism. For relations with the United States two of the Dalai Lama’s meetings deserve particular mention. Both President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush met with the Dalai Lama very early in their terms of office. Clinton received him at the White House in April 1993, Bush following suit on 22 May 2001. The latter visit gained added political sharpness in terms of relations with China in that it corresponded exactly with celebrations in China itself to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the agreement of 23 May 1951. Among the most important trips the Dalai Lama has made outside his new home country of India from the point of view of politics was to Great Britain. There, in mid-July 1996, he addressed the British Parliament in the Palace of Westminster on the subject of Tibet and its relations with China. He made several points. One was to attack Chinese rule in the most forthright terms, as we saw in the section on population in Chapter 6. On the other hand, he also said very clearly that what he wanted for Tibet was not full independence of China, but instead ‘genuine’ self-rule. He did not spell out the exact nature of this autonomy, but it was certainly a retreat from an earlier insistence on total independence. In contrast to the similar proposal put forward at Strasbourg in 1988, the Dalai Lama has never withdrawn from his 1996 British statement. On the contrary he repeated his demand for ‘genuine’ self-rule in many forums and in many places, emphasising his wish for ‘a high degree of autonomy’ along the lines found in Hong Kong since 1997. One place of considerable importance where he repeated his ‘genuine self-rule’ formula was Taiwan. He visited the island for the first time in March 1997, even meeting with President Lee Teng-hui. Considering that the PRC regards Taiwan as part of China, this visit was like a red rag to a bull from the mainland’s point of view. To assuage the Chinese government, the Dalai Lama insisted that he was seeking to pave the way for a closer understanding between Taiwan and the mainland, and stressed that what he wanted for Tibet was autonomy not independence. In an interview with the Taipei-based China Times in Ladakh in mid-1998 the Dalai Lama stated that it was ‘my consistent position that I don’t support nor encourage the movement of Taiwan’s independence’. He also conceded that he had postponed a planned visit to Taiwan because of opposition from Beijing (CND, Global News, no. GL98-102 (20 July 1998), item 55). For the PRC, Taiwanese independence is even more sensitive than Tibetan. What the Dalai Lama was doing was to emphasise that visiting Taiwan was not designed to irritate the PRC government. Mainland reaction to these initiatives of the Dalai Lama was very negative. Asked his response to the Dalai Lama’s statement in Taiwan of his willingness to abandon independence for Tibet, a Beijing Foreign Ministry spokesman, Cui Tiankai, retorted in a regular news briefing (1997: 12): China will never tolerate any attempt to split the nation. China attaches great importance to national unity. The Dalai Lama always claims not to seek an
independent Tibet, but this is actually what he does wherever he goes. The fact is that he has never given up his separatist scheme. PRC authorities believe that the Dalai Lama’s is a two-step approach. This means that he will first secure a ‘high degree of autonomy’, then proceed towards demanding full independence later. As Barry Sautman points out (2000: 59–66), this is by no means a ridiculous concern. The Dalai Lama’s own brother Tenzin Chogyal (quoted Sautman 2000: 59) has said ‘Let us first of all achieve autonomy. Then we can throw out the Chinese!’ In a ‘genuinely autonomous’ Tibet, there could be no restrictions on secessionist activity aiming towards full independence, and it would be almost certain not only to succeed but also to gain international recognition. As the Dalai Lama’s new home, India was inevitably wound up in the Tibet issue. Defence Minister George Fernandes of the BJP-led government was known for his strong feelings on Tibet, having run a campaign against China for its role there. The Dalai Lama visited BJP Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee only a few months after the latter came to power in March 1998. The Chinese predictably reacted quickly and caustically. Their foreign affairs spokesman Tang Guoqiang (1998b: 8) denounced the Dalai Lama as a politician in exile, not a religious figure, and charged that the Indian Prime Minister’s meeting with him was a violation of ‘India’s promise not to allow the Dalai Lama to engage in anti-Chinese activities’. Human rights, cultural survival If governments are reluctant to recognise the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile for fear of repercussions from the Chinese, they are less reticent about attacking human rights abuses in Tibet, including religious persecution and the destruction of culture. Among governments putting forward such severe condemnations, the most important are those of the West, especially the American. On the whole, Asian governments are less inclined to condemn China. In the hierarchy of Western images of Chinese human rights abuses, Tibet is certainly less important than the Beijing Massacre of 1989. Yet images of Chinese behaviour in Tibet are negative in the extreme. There are five main such images: ●
China is destroying Tibetan culture in a process leading towards cultural genocide. The Chinese are persecuting and suppressing Tibetan Buddhism, practising ghastly human rights abuses in the process. Over a million Tibetans have died as a result of Chinese occupation. The Tibetan areas of China are becoming ‘swamped’ by Han Chinese to such an extent that they have become a minority in their own country. China has despoiled the Tibetan landscape, especially through deforestation.3
It may be clear from other chapters of this book that I do not entirely share these images, regarding them generally as simplistic or exaggerated or even false.
However, some of the reports certainly contain some accuracy. Moreover, there is no doubt at all of their currency in Western countries or of the passion with which many people hold them, including some in government or parliamentary positions. It is also important that the images of cultural despoliation and, in the context of Tibet, its subset religious persecution, have tended to dominate discussions over Tibet between Western leaders and those of China or the Dalai Lama. Although these images were certainly not new to the 1990s, they have gathered momentum since that time, because of the increasing globalisation of the Tibet issue and the acceleration of economic modernisation and development there. Agencies such as the Tibet Information Network have more offices in Western countries, with increased efforts to keep people informed of their views. In December 1997, the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists issued a lengthy report on the situation in Tibet. It was possibly the most important of those by international bodies. However, it is also worth emphasising because both its content and the Chinese reaction typified international discourse with China over Tibet, and indeed other matters involving human rights. The report condemned China for its role in Tibet, notably for its treatment of religious and political prisoners, which it denounced as repressive and harsh. It was extremely critical of the ‘patriotic education’ campaigns which authorities had been carrying out in the 1990s to win over the population to Chinese rule, charging that they were nothing more than intensified repression. The report called on China to hold a referendum in Tibet to test if the local people really wished to remain part of China. Reaction to the report from China was furious and entirely predictable. Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang retorted that ‘the report’s creators are extremely ignorant of Tibet’s history and present and of the rules concerning international relations’. He denied the human rights violations that the Commission had alleged. He rejected the suggestion of an act of self-determination, arguing that Tibet had always been an integral part of China since ancient times. ‘Tibetan affairs are China’s internal affairs and no foreign countries, forces or organizations have the right to interfere’, he concluded (Tang Guoqiang 1998a: 9). In August 1997, American Republican Congressman Frank Wolf secretly visited Tibet for 4 days in the guise of a tourist. He returned home claiming that China was swallowing up the country through mass arrests and brutal repression, and that the Tibetan language and culture were being destroyed. He called on the West to act urgently to save Tibetan culture. The fact that such a man was prepared to visit Tibet without permission from China, not to mention his claims on return, further added poison to Sino-American relations as regards Tibet, even though it is true that as a Republican, he was explicitly in opposition to the Democrat President Clinton. Chinese leaders travelling overseas either to Western countries or India are more or less always confronted with demonstrators with placards reading ‘save Tibet’ or ‘free Tibet’. During Premier Li Peng’s West European trip early in 1992, it was the Beijing Massacre that dominated public reaction. However, Swiss Justice Minister Arnold Koller refused to meet him in protest over the Chinese
refusal to discuss either Tibet or human rights in general. Jiang Zemin paid state visits to Italy, Switzerland and Austria in March 1999. One source claims that ‘Protestors calling for improved human rights and a free Tibet dogged his visit, prompting the president to lose his temper and reprimand his hosts in Switzerland’ (Westlake 2000: 111). Perhaps the public role of Tibet in Chinese leaders’ overseas visits is best exemplified in Jiang Zemin’s to the United States from 26 October to 3 November 1997. Though it is true that the Beijing Massacre still loomed larger than Tibet on the human rights front and Taiwan on the issue of independence, there were plenty of passionate and vociferous demonstrators against Jiang over Tibet at more or less every stop he made. Film star Richard Gere went on television repeatedly to claim that ‘6 million Tibetans live in slavery’ under Chinese rule (Forney 1997: 20). In a speech in Washington to a friendly audience, Jiang chose to elaborate on the Chinese version of Tibetan history, likening the reforms that followed the suppression of the 1959 uprising against China to the emancipation of black slaves in the United States. One journalist claimed that the ‘Washington establishment was aghast’ at his insensitivity, quoting one China specialist as saying: ‘It shows the level to which the Chinese just don’t get it’ (Forney 1997: 16). When George W. Bush met with the Dalai Lama in May 2001, he chose to emphasise ‘the strong commitment of the United States to support the preservation of Tibet’s unique religious, cultural and linguistic identity and the protection of the human rights of all Tibetans’.4 In Tibet itself, the celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of the 1951 Agreement were placing stress on change, development, progress, economic growth and the rise in the living standards of ordinary Tibetans, especially since the 1980s, though also with praise for the repair and maintenance of ancient buildings and monasteries. So while Bush was chatting about human rights in Tibet with the Dalai Lama, with the assumption of a ghastly situation in Tibet itself, Chinese media reports were painting a picture of transition there from hell to relative paradise. Several specific incidents relating to Tibet have caused diplomatic embarrassment for China since the early 1990s. I select two of them for treatment as interesting examples of how Tibetan affairs have affected China’s foreign relations. The first concerns Tibetan religion: the way the Chinese forced their own choice of child as the Eleventh Panchen Lama in 1995, taken against a different nomination from the Dalai Lama (see Chapter 5). Chinese authorities came under very serious foreign criticism for their treatment of the boy. Journalists and others charged that they had placed him under house arrest, making him the world’s youngest religiously motivated political prisoner. Chinese spokespeople, on the other hand, argued that the Dalai Lama’s choice was living the life of a normal Tibetan boy and refused foreign media access to him. When the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited China, including Tibet, in September 1998, she raised this issue with Chinese officials, among a range of other human rights concerns, but all they did was to assure her of his safety without telling her his whereabouts. At a news conference at the end of the visit, she called on Jiang Zemin to meet with the Dalai Lama before the end of
the century. Although this did not happen, the fact that Robinson actually visited Tibet and that its affairs occupied so important a place in her visit shows its priority in international human rights discourse with respect to China. The second issue concerns the environment and the economy. The Chinese requested money from the World Bank for its Chinese Western Poverty Reduction Project, covering Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Qinghai. In June 1999 the World Bank Board of Executive Directors approved US$ 160 million towards the project, just over half the total cost. However, both the United States and Germany voted against the funding, the representatives of several other countries abstaining, and the Board specified the condition that it be entitled to review an inspection study of the Qinghai component of the project. The reason for the condition and for American and German hostility to the project was because the Qinghai component involved a resettlement programme anti-China Tibet activists in the West considered would harm the interests of local Tibetans in the host area and damage the environment. In May 2000 an Independent Inspection Panel of the World Bank reported to the World Bank management, sharply criticising a proposed loan of US$ 40 million designed to relocate some 58,000 rural Han families to a region in Qinghai inhabited by about 4,000 Tibetan and Mongolian herders. The Panel argued that the bank staff should have tried harder to find an alternative location. World Bank President James Wolfensohn sent an approval letter to twenty-four executive directors of the Bank, ‘stating that the relocation project follows new safeguards and meets the bank’s standards’ (CND, no. GL00-079 (26 June 2000), item 3 (37)). In London he expressed his confidence that the problems could be solved. However, as it turned out, a majority of the 181 countries represented on the Board of Executive Directors demanded further Board review based on conditions concerned with human rights and the environment. On 7 July 2000, the Chinese Executive Director, Zhu Xian, announced in Washington that his government rejected the conditions. He said (World Bank Group 2000): China will therefore turn to its own resources to implement the Qinghai Component of the project, and in its own way. Our efforts in fighting poverty will not be interrupted because of this development. We regret that because of political opposition from some shareholders the World Bank has lost a good opportunity to assist some of the poorest people in China, probably in the world, after so much effort by World Bank management and staff. It seems to me that the World Bank decision to impose further conditions was highly counter-productive. It was most certainly due to lobbying by activists whose main intention was to embarrass China. Some of them no doubt had the interests of the affected Tibetan and Mongolian community at heart. But the overall result is that World Bank experts had no input into the reduction of poverty among Tibetans in Qinghai. China was further embittered in its relations with the United States and its nationalism further heightened. The Chinese did exactly as they wished in implementing the project. Their success in reducing poverty
among the affected population is undoubted, but the environmental and cultural effects will be worse than they need have been had the World Bank decided to contribute funds. Both the case of the Eleventh Panchen Lama and that of the Western Poverty Reduction Project show the effects of globalisation. They show how interconnected the world has become both in terms of its economy and its concern for religious freedom, the environment and human rights. They show both the importance and the limitations of the work of international bodies. They also show the power of lobbies in the globalisation process. There may be instances in which global capitalism operates worldwide like an uncontrollable monster. But this is by no means universal, or even the norm. On the contrary, it is often the vocal minorities who cause the damage, by preventing beneficial projects that help to reduce human misery and poverty.
The Muslim peoples since 1990 Whereas it is southwestern China that is home to the Tibetans, the main Muslim concentrations are in the northwest, especially Xinjiang. The Muslim people that produces the greatest impact on China’s foreign relations is the Uygurs of Xinjiang, and they will take up the bulk of coverage here. One of the major differences between the Uygurs and Tibetans is that the Uygurs lack any figure appealling to Western countries. There is no leader in any sense comparable to the Dalai Lama, who can take the Uygur message to Western peoples and governments and arouse support for their cause. In sharp contrast to Tibetan Buddhism, an icon of the ‘new spirituality’, Islam has a generally negative image in the West, where people tend to see it in terms of terrorism and intolerance. Quite different from the peacefulness of the Tibetan Buddhists, the image of Islam tends towards violence. This image is old but gained added currency during the 1990s because of the rise of the fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan. These student Muslim radicals made no secret both of their adherence to the doctrine of the jihad or holy war and of their wish to use this notion to spread their version of Islam outside Afghanistan. Other than Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the international community rejected the Taliban regime. Pakistan was home to a rising system of Islamic schools that helped train Muslim guerrillas, even including Uygurs wishing to stir up trouble for China. The rise of the military government in October 1999, led by General Pervez Musharraf, merely exacerbated foreign anxiety about these schools and Muslim fundamentalism in general. The Pakistan government did not wish directly to sponsor such schools, for fear of alienating outside countries. But neither did it wish to be regarded as anti-Islamic, a factor inhibiting crackdowns on the schools. The inclusion of Uygurs among the students of the schools shows that there is a Uygur exile community some of the members of which have been trying for many years to stir up anti-Chinese feeling among Uygurs, both in Xinjiang itself and outside. Among the most prominent of its leaders are Erkin Alptekin and
Arslan Alptekin, the two sons of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, a strong Turki nationalist of the pre-1949 era.5 Both escaped from China in 1949 together with Isa. There is also Uygur exile activity in Kazakhstan, which in 2000 had a Uygur population of some 250,000 among its total of 16.93 million people (Hoh 2000: 25 and Turner 2000: 936). In April 1991 a body called the Uygur Liberation Organisation even registered as a legal political party in Kazakhstan (Dillon 1997: 140). However, the Uygur exiles get no support from the government of Kazakhstan, which has suppressed their activities since the mid-1990s and keeps surveillance over them. According to Erkin Alptekin (cited Hoh 2000: 25), Uygurs ‘can hardly breathe in Kazakhstan’. Late in 1999, the Uygur exile groups held the first East Turkestan National Congress in Munich, Germany, in order to organize themselves against China more effectively and place greater pressure on Western governments on behalf of their cause. Despite meetings of this kind, a serious problem for the Uygur exiles is that they are very splintered, lacking both organization and funds. According to Erkin Alptekin (cited in Hoh 2000: 25), ‘Disunity is a historical problem among the peoples of East Turkestan. If we were a united people we would not have been under Chinese rule today’. Efforts by such congresses as that of 1999 are unlikely to solve this problem, and it is improbable that the Uygur exiles can create any alliance with the potential to be more than a pinprick to Chinese rule. The Chinese government is very clear in its belief that outside forces are crucial in any attempt to separate Xinjiang from China. Since the Baren Township uprising of April 1990, the Chinese have become increasingly worried about the potential of Uygur Muslim radicals in Xinjiang to stir up separatist feeling. The Ürümqi meeting of May 1996 (see Chapter 3) accused ‘some hostile forces in the West’ of stirring up infiltration and subversion in the region (Macartney 1996). The reference to the West in such contexts usually means mainly the United States, but probably also includes the range of Islam-based groups in Western countries. Most of Beijing’s worries are actually nearer at hand. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the three states of the former Soviet Union bordering China to the west, have become sites of growing radical Islamic fundamentalism. In the early 1990s, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan vied for influence in the Central Asian region (Rashid 1994: 212–14). However, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan altered the picture there, because of their insistence on radical Islamism. Yet this does not mean that extremist Islamic influence is negligible and it has been a major factor of anxiety to its neighbours, extending even into Xinjiang. One journalist has written (Lawrence 2000: 23–4): The newly independent Central Asian states bordering Xinjiang inspire Uighur [Uygur] separatists. They have also become sources of weapons, money, training and places of refuge. Foreign Islamic missionaries now target Xinjiang’s Muslims, and Uighurs are starting to take part in armed Islamic movements abroad, from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and even Chechnya.
The context of this development is the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia since the mid-1990s. Two movements are of particular importance and worth mentioning here. These are the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party for Islamic Freedom) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The first of these movements is pan-Islamic and has a vision of uniting Central Asia and Xinjiang, and eventually all Muslims, in an Islamic religious state under a latter-day caliphate. According to Ahmed Rashid (2002a: 115) it had, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, become ‘the most popular, widespread underground movement’ in the three Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the last two of which border China. Dosybiev (2002) claims that it had spread to Kazakhstan and become active enough to cause great concern to authorities there by April 2002; the reasons he cites being ‘plunging living standards, the lack of a social safety net, corruption and state heavy-handedness’. Already in 1990 a group of Islamic fundamentalists had, against the wishes of the authorities, set up a mosque and Islamic school in a town in Uzbekistan with the sign ‘Long Live the Islamic State’ displayed outside the mosque (Rashid 2002a: 138). Due to various factors that included strong support and assistance from Osama bin Laden’s network in Afghanistan and repression from the Uzbek government led by President Islam Karimov, this group grew strongly over the following years into a fierce fighting force posing a very direct threat to the status quo in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. In 1998 its leaders formally set up the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The next year, the Movement’s religious leadership issued its call for a holy war or jihad against Karimov’s government, and announced its intention to establish an Islamic state.6 The regimes involved in Central Asia have taken action to counter the threat they see to their own power in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The governments of five neighbouring states have taken the initiative to strengthen their friendship, the countries being China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Later Uzbekistan joined their ranks. Certainly these countries have other reasons for getting on with each other, for example mutual security concerns, economic cooperation and preventing the movement of narcotics across the borders. Yet this does not diminish the importance of their shared interest in countering the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. So in April 1996 the Presidents of the five neighbouring states met in Shanghai to discuss common problems, becoming known as the ‘Shanghai Five’. The forums became an annual event, with subsequent meetings in Moscow in 1997, Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 1998, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 1999 and Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in 2000. In mid-June 2001, the meeting of the group was back in Shanghai. Uzbekistan had observer status in the 2000 meeting and was formally added as a regular participant at the meeting in Shanghai in 2001, the six countries signing a formal pact and establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. They also signed a document pledging to cooperate to combat terrorism and extremism, a clear reference to Islamic fundamentalism. Jiang Zemin (quoted Kazer 2001: 7) stated that ‘The signing of the Shanghai Pact has laid the legal
foundation for jointly cracking down on terrorism, separatism and extremism and reflects the firm determination of the six states on safeguarding regional security’. As one writer correctly observed, ‘China is hoping to contain the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly from Afghanistan, and sees itself as vulnerable in Xinjiang’ (Kazer 2001: 7). In my opinion, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese see Xinjiang as under threat. In Chapter 3, I noted that the Chinese had put out a report in January 2002 alleging numerous terrorist incidents in Xinjiang over the previous decade. Rashid (2002a: 204) claims that a senior fundamentalist Islamic leader he interviewed in Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe on 16 March 2001 told him that the Uygurs ‘are waging their own jihad against Beijing and China sees that there is a trans-national threat that cannot be stopped just from Xinjiang’. The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is of considerable significance for China and for the region. The countries involved obviously think of their mutual relations as very important, since otherwise they would not go to the trouble of holding annual meetings at so high a level. Moreover, the meetings appear to be based on a common view that radical pan-Islamic sentiment is not in their interests. Clearly it is not accidental that Kazakhstan is doing what it can to curb anti-Chinese activities among its Uygur population. The Shanghai Five and successor Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have discussed a range of issues. They include attempts to control drug trafficking, which has become quite a serious issue in Xinjiang, including for the Uygurs and other minorities. The countries hold a similar view on the crucial issue of human rights. In reaction to NATO intervention in Kosovo earlier in 1999, the August 1999 Bishkek communiqué stated that ‘The protection of human rights should not be used as an excuse to interfere in others’ internal affairs’ (‘Bishkek Statement’ 1999: 11). The 2001 Shanghai meeting expressed strong opposition to a plan to build an expensive missile defence system put forward by George W. Bush, who had recently taken over as American President. They argued that Bush’s strategy would spawn a new arms race, which would ‘have serious negative consequences for international and regional stability and security’ (quoted Kazer 2001: 7). In the 1970s and much of the 1980s, the central plank of China’s foreign policy had been to oppose Soviet hegemonism. During the 1980s, this policy drove China to throw in its lot with an American-supported war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union (see Cooley 1999: 65–79). The fall of the Soviet Union and rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia created a completely new situation for China along its western borders. China could befriend the Soviet successor states, but there was still a threat from Muslim radicals. In a sense China had, through its policy in the 1970s and 1980s, itself helped create the bed in which it had to lie. Although the Uygurs are the Islamic minority with much the greatest relevance to China’s foreign relations, they are not the only one. There are several Muslim ethnic groups in Xinjiang, the co-nationals of which run their own state on the other side of the border. There is a substantial Kazak population in northern Xinjiang abutting Kazakhstan, and small Kirgiz and Tajik communities across the border from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, respectively. Although these peoples are interested in what happens in the countries where their co-nationals dominate the
state, they do not appear to be anxious to split off from China and join up with the state where they would be in the majority. Generally speaking, they are doing quite well enough in China to warrant staying there and the Central Asian governments are currently not trying to change the borders to bring such co-national communities under their wing. The Hui, who are spread throughout China, have generally been loyal to the Chinese state, at least since the Republican period beginning in 1912. In Xinjiang, the Hui do not generally share the Uygurs’ distaste for the Chinese state and thus offer no support for separatism. Indeed, in the 1930s they turned out to be crucial to the survival of Chinese rule in Xinjiang, and that could easily happen again. Hui communities in other parts of China are not particularly near borders and their effect on China’s foreign relations has been relatively insignificant. However, one area where they have played an economic and religious role is in relations with the Muslim world of Southwest Asia. The World Islamic Development Bank has been active in China, especially since establishment of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in July 1990. The World Islamic Development Bank has contributed to building major Islamic theological colleges in Yinchuan, capital of Ningxia, and Ürümqi, both including large mosques. It has helped with Muslim activities in Xinjiang, Ningxia and elsewhere. China’s wish to maintain good relations with the Islamic states has also had the effect of more tolerance towards Muslims in general, provided they do not encourage separatism. This is a condition with which the Saudi authorities have found it in their interests to comply. The impact of the 11 September 2001 incidents and the war against terrorism The large-scale impact of the 11 September 2001 incidents on global international relations was relevant above all to Islam. For China some of the main flowon effects were connected with the Muslim peoples of Xinjiang, and above all the Uygurs. The Chinese government was very quick to try and assure the world that separatism of all kinds was equivalent to terrorism. In the case of the Uygurs, they also produced evidence of links with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and claimed that many hundreds of those radical Muslim Uygurs fighting for independence had been trained in the camps run by the al-Qaeda. Actually, there was nothing new about such suggestions. The Chinese government had been cooperating with Central Asian governments and Russia to combat terrorism and their fears that Uygurs were undergoing training in radical Islamic camps in Pakistan had long been known to Western journalists. It was not in the least surprising that they should take advantage of the war against terrorism the United States-led coalition was waging in Afghanistan to step up attacks on Uygur separatism. Oddly enough, Western reports began surfacing that the Chinese were secretly trying to assist the Taliban economically and in other ways. Of course, China immediately denied such reports. As emphasised above, such cooperation was
flatly contradictory to China’s interests. The country had held no diplomatic relations with Afghanistan since 1993. The suggestion of economic support seems to me highly unlikely. The United States initially responded in two ways to China’s policy on the war against terrorism. On the one hand, George W. Bush was very effusive in his praise for Jiang Zemin’s support, adding that nobody should use the war to oppress minorities. The implication that this was what China was doing was not lost on the Chinese leadership, but they were insistent that they never oppressed minorities, and certainly never used a war against terrorism as an excuse to do so. The second response is closely related to the first. Despite Bush’s praise for Jiang Zemin, the United States refused, in the first instance, to make a direct link between the Chinese fight against its own form of Uygur separatist terrorism and the war it was itself waging. The Americans did acknowledge that there were Chinese among the foreign fighters they had been confronting in Afghanistan, but when the Chinese authorities asked for them to be repatriated, the Americans refused to comply, their grounds being fear that the same fighters would be the targets of human rights abuses by the Chinese authorities. On 5 March 2002, Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner said that Uygur activists were advocating greater civil liberties, which was not the same as terrorism (Torode 2002: 7). He does not seem to have taken at all seriously the evidence the Chinese presented in their January report, in which China detailed the incidents linking Uygur separatist terrorism with the al-Qaeda network (see Chapter 3). However, the United States Department of State later changed its position. When in May 2002 it released its report on terrorism the preceding year, the Department of State’s Counterterrorism Office gave quite high marks to China for its efforts against terrorism. In particular, it acknowledged that Uygurs had been found fighting with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and named two groups as ‘cause for concern’, including the East Turkestan Islamic Party, which ‘was founded in the early 1980s with the goal of establishing an independent state of Eastern Turkestan and advocates armed struggle’ (US Department of State 2002: 17). Late in August 2002, Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage announced in Beijing that the United States had recognised this body as a terrorist organisation. The Chinese leaders were of course delighted by this change in attitude. Uygur spokesmen were correspondingly extremely upset, feeling that people who should be their friends had turned against them. Human rights activists in the West and elsewhere were dismayed at the American change of heart. They had felt vindicated in their view that the Chinese were simply using the war against terrorism to push their own repressive agendas against Muslims and other dissidents. American official spokesmen continued to decry the use of counterterrorism ‘as a substitute for addressing legitimate social and economic aspirations’ (US Department of State 2002: 17), but it was obvious that the highest item on the agenda was not defence of human rights but the war against terrorism. In some ways the war against terrorism has improved Sino-American relations. Both have a common interest in fighting against terrorism, especially that conducted by radical Muslims. But it is obvious from the previous paragraph that
there are still tensions, and they could easily flare again in the aftermath of the American-led war against terrorism. The United States was very quick to move militarily into Central Asia, and this is very important, because ‘it is the first arrival of Western armies since Alexander the Great conquered the region in 334 B.C.’ (Rashid 2002b: 16). This totally unprecedented historical development has made China feel encircled by the Americans to an extent even greater than was the case before the war. There is still serious ideological difference between the United States and China. The American government would still like to see the CCP overthrown and replaced by a democratic government more in line with its own ideological persuasion. China may have given place to Islamic fundamentalism as the main threat to the United States. But each power remains wary of the other and China probably feels even more under threat than before the war against terrorism. The United States also got Pakistan involved in its war against terrorism. This was a highly significant victory, because many Muslims in Pakistan shared views of Islam and the United States with the Taliban. Probably the Taliban had only got to power through support from Pakistan. However, China got much more direct support for its struggle against Uygur terrorist separatism from Pakistan than it did from the United States. The Associated Press reported that on 21 December 2001, while in Beijing, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had promised the Chinese leadership support for a crackdown on Uygur separatism. So the traditional links between Pakistan and China have become even tighter through the war against terrorism. As for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, it is still highly relevant, and possibly more so than ever, because one of its main aims is to defeat terrorism. They still share values concerning distaste for the American view of human rights, and they still share interests in common on security matters, such as the wish to retain the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The United States Bush Administration has declared its intention to negate the Treaty, and if any of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation powers agree to this, it will be very reluctantly. Nevertheless, there are also signs that do not favour the Organisation. With the Americans moving into the Central Asian region, the countries of the former Soviet Union may see their interests best served in cooperating with the Americans. Some members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation may be moved to downgrade its importance in the wake of the changes in the overall balance of forces effected by the war against terrorism. Yet despite the support Russian President Putin has offered Bush, Russia and China both know that the American presence in a region traditionally their own sphere of influence makes mutual cooperation essential. Early in 2002 Beijing placed an order with a Russian defence plant for two brand-new destroyers. A view from Kazakhstan has it that ‘the obvious result of the US presence in Central Asia in the Russian–Chinese relations will be the building up of their military and technical potential’ (Serov 2002). The developments in the war against terrorism that have followed the incidents of 11 September 2001 have intensified globalisation in Xinjiang and among its Uygurs in several ways. First, these developments have brought the region into
the mainstream of global international relations more directly than has been the case for a very long time. Second, they have strengthened the impact of both the most powerful forces of globalisation that we associate with the United States and one of the secondary forces, in the form of Islam. Finally, the United States can hardly avoid linking its military and economic penetration, which means that the near and medium future is likely to see more intense rivalry among China, Russia, the United States and others over control of oil and gas pipelines, drawing Xinjiang more closely into the competitive structure that makes up global capitalism.
The northeast and its minorities Much further to the east, another area impacted by the collapse of the Soviet Union, though much less so by the 11 September incidents, is Mongolia. The MPR followed in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, going out of existence at almost exactly the same time, namely the end of 1991. Yet there has been continuity, along with great change. In the regular elections held in the new post-MPR both for president and national assembly, the Great Khural, the formerly communist Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) has dominated both the presidency and the national assembly for all but 4 years each of the period since the early 1990s. The population of Mongolia in 2000 was estimated at 2.74 million, the great majority belonging to a Mongol nationality.7 The main exception is the small Kazak community of about 160,000 people. There are about 5 million Mongols in China, the great majority of them in Inner Mongolia, in other words about double the number in Mongolia itself. Although Mongolians in China exerted considerable influence on bilateral relations from time to time during the period of the MPR, the impact since the early 1990s has not been great. There are organisations in Inner Mongolia demanding secession from China and union with Mongolia, but their influence is limited and China has done its utmost to hide their existence. More serious has been the effect of Tibetan affairs. The Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in 1991, to the anger of the Chinese. Mongolians are traditionally adherents of Tibetan Buddhism and the religion has revived strongly under the new order, a 2000 opinion poll showing that 67 per cent of the people are still Buddhists. Chinese pressure prevented a visit by the Dalai Lama to Mongolia planned for September 2000. However, reformist Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar, himself both a Buddhist and a member of the MPRP, permitted him entry in August 2001, arguing that ‘His visit is at the request of our ordinary Buddhists. We cannot resist our big neighbour so we just explain that it was not the government but ordinary Buddhists who invited him’ (Murphy 2001: 32). This argument quoted directly from an interview and published in an international journal could hardly assuage the Chinese, who continued to protest vigorously against the visit. As it happened, this particular visit did not go ahead: it was Moscow that prevented it by denying him a Russian visa and hence transit through Russia to Mongolia (Westlake 2001b: 162). Yet the cancellation turned out to be a postponement only when, to China’s dismay and anger, the Dalai Lama revisited Mongolia early in November 2002.
Other than Mongolia, there is one other country where a nationality represented by an ethnic minority in China dominates the population: Korea. On the whole, the Koreans in China are not a major factor in China’s overall relationship with either North or South Korea. Yet there are a few points worth making. Koreans in China have been active in promoting economic dealings with South Korea. Many Koreans in China still have relatives in North Korea, and some go to visit them across the border, bringing them financial and other assistance. This was particularly important during the last years of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twentyfirst, when a very serious famine afflicted North Korea. The Korean population has thus contributed positively to China’s relations both with North and South Korea since the 1990s. Negative factors are very few. Although Chinese authorities certainly do not like it, they take but very little action against South Korean Christian missionaries who visit the Korean areas of China under other guises.
The southwest Moving to the opposite end of China, we find that the range of minorities is broader and the issues very different, but the impact on foreign relations also rather slight. Since the early 1990s, China’s relations with the countries to its southwest, such as Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar (Burma) have not been much affected by the minorities of Yunnan and Guangxi. This is despite the fact that there have been sensitive dealings across borders where minorities live. One issue worth mentioning is the number of Vietnamese women who have moved to China and married Zhuang men. The Zhuang are close ethnically to the Kinh, the majority people of Vietnam. In Vietnam the sex ratio is low,8 in part a result of the long and bitter war that raged in the country in the 1960s and 1970s, killing more males than females. But sex ratios tend to be higher in China, including among the Zhuang. Authorities both in China and Vietnam look upon this female migration with disfavour, and it is usually illegal. However, since the early 1990s authorities have cooperated in dealing with it, and it has not been a major issue in relations. At the beginning of 2002, I was told by one government official in Meng Cai in the far northeast of Vietnam, just over the border from China, that authorities repatriated about 1,000 Vietnamese women each year from China, and that the governments of each country cooperated actively in preventing any such illegal migration of women. Several issues are of very considerable importance in China’s relations with Myanmar and, though they affect some people in China in serious ways, including among the minorities, these are not primary and they do not exemplify how minorities impact on China’s international relations. Three of these issues are the transport of narcotics over the border from Myanmar into China, the spread of AIDS, and gambling. These are all ills that have gathered some momentum in China since the turn of the century. Official statistics certainly underestimate the scale of such problems, but even these have made no attempt to hide how grave they are becoming.9 In Dai villages I visited in 2000 on the Sino-Myanmar border, I learned that border controls are quite lax for local people, meaning that Dai people can cross
the border quite readily either way. Nobody made any secret about the fact that drug-pushers, not usually Dai, make use of this laxity to smuggle narcotics across the border. The Chinese authorities have taken drastic punitive action, for example by executing drug-smugglers they catch. But this does not really solve the problem. One Dai CCP village official very near the border was quite open about the seriousness of the growth in narcotic smuggling, arguing there was very little he could do about it apart from trying to enforce state regulations. Probably corruption makes it more difficult to enforce the rules, despite the severity of punishments meted out to offenders whom police are able to apprehend. AIDS is an even more secretive and sensitive matter, and many Dai share with Han Chinese the reluctance to talk about or have anybody try to ‘educate’ them regarding their sex lives. However, doctors I interviewed in Yunnan in 2000 told me that AIDS does spread over the borders with such countries as Myanmar through such men as truck-drivers engaged in commercial and other activities. One doctor, himself of the Wa ethnic group, was insistent that Thailand was the most serious source of this problem, not Myanmar, even though there is no border between China and Thailand. This disease does not distinguish between ethnic groups. Among the drivers most are Han, but some are no doubt either Dai from China or Shan from Myanmar, two ethnonyms which actually represent identical groups. Gambling may be harmful but certainly not on the scale either of AIDS or narcotics. There are quite a few gambling dens along the borders between China and Myanmar. Because gambling is formally banned in China, many Chinese entrepreneurs, mostly Han, have set up gambling dens in Myanmar, just on the border so that they are easily accessible to Chinese people. In one place in a Dai area of Yunnan, I saw a gambling den on an island in the middle of a river separating China from Myanmar. The island is in neither Chinese nor Myanmar territory, and so outside the law of both countries. Both governments turn a blind eye to the gambling, presumably because they make money out of it. Regular boats, which take only a few minutes to reach their destination, go to the island and back from both countries. Nobody made any secret of what was happening, even though public boards were on display on the Chinese side reminding everybody that the Criminal Code expressly forbids gambling.
Conclusion In two major general respects, China’s international relations with respect to its minorities have become very much more globalised since the early 1990s. In the first place, the rights of ethnic minorities have become much more part of international relations discourse than was the case at that time. It is part of the repertoire of the global citizen to be concerned about the rights of ethnic minorities. Of course, this is especially the case in Western countries, which are the front-runners in determining the factors of importance in international relations. But the citizens of other countries are also concerned. And China has been forced to react to this by creating its own criteria and ideas for coping with international theory in this matter.
Second, human rights have grown as a factor in international relations globally to an enormous extent since the early 1990s. Citizens feel not only a right but also a duty to concern themselves with how human rights are managed all over the world. Human rights guardians such as Amnesty International have become global bodies to an extent of which their founders could only have dreamed. The rights of ethnic groups are actually a subset of human rights in general. The specific cases of Tibet and the Muslim peoples of Xinjiang show differing but important aspects of the way globalisation operates and the kinds of reactions it provokes. The fact is that the Tibetan issue has become woven into global feelings about ethnic rights and the ‘new spirituality’, and largely due to the person of the Dalai Lama, in ways that have proved very helpful to the Tibetan cause. But Islam is also becoming both global itself as well as being to some extent in opposition to the liberal version which tends to dominate debate about globalisation. Put another way, Islamic fundamentalism is one aspect of the phenomenon I referred to ‘glocalisation’ in the Introduction. Globalisation has thus exercised a profound impact of China’s international relations, including as these affect the minorities. It is most unlikely that this situation is reversible. Indeed, it is much more likely to gather momentum with China a member of the WTO. China can probably manage the new situation and trends that derive from this globalising process. But it should certainly not ignore them. It is very striking that China has taken up a strongly statist attitude in dealing with its foreign relations, especially in areas involving its minorities. In other words, China shows no sign at all of any willingness for itself to weaken as a nation-state. The idea that globalisation might result in any diminution of state power, as the Introduction suggested might follow, is precisely what the Chinese leaders wish to prevent. They have seen what happened to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia through ethnic strife in the context of globalisation and intend to avoid the model of disintegration and party overthrow for as long as they can. One of the effects of the war against terrorism was to restrengthen the power of states everywhere, not only in China. The fashion for criticising states and state power certainly did not disappear. However, it did weaken while states all over the world prepared themselves for a united American-led war against terrorism. Bush himself used the incidents for a drastic improvement of his own public image and gained enormous support from Americans of most political colourings for the leadership he gave to the war. Certainly one of the effects of this war was to strengthen the United States strategically in many parts of the world, and especially in Central Asia.
The processes of globalisation have already made a significant impact on China, and with increasing acceleration since the country joined the WTO in December 2001. In general, the impact of globalisation on the minorities and the minority areas has been much slighter than on the richer areas of the eastern seaboard. This is because the minority areas are in general less highly developed, less urbanised and less accessible to the forces of globalisation than the Han areas. They attract much less foreign capital and fewer foreign commodities and services than do the main Han regions. On the whole the case of China’s minorities bears out the theory that localisation counters some of the homogenisation processes engendered by globalisation. Though many of the identities of the ethnic minorities have declined greatly since the early 1990s and others appear to be on the wane, still others have actually strengthened. Some aspects of traditional minority cultures are losing their vitality under the pressures of modernisation and globalisation, but others show no sign at all of dying out. If there is one overwhelming conclusion to this study, it is diversity: in other words globalisation has affected the various nationalities and areas in different ways and to differing extents. Moreover, the globalisation processes are themselves very diverse. They include not only those factors we normally associate with ‘liberal’ globalisation, such as markets, investments and social and cultural trends deriving from the advanced industrial nations of the West, but also contrary widely spread and even global forces like Islam. The interlinkages and interconnections transcending the nation-state that have affected China and its minorities since 1990 have also been very diverse in their character. The economic factors have been of immense importance and probably primary, including markets and the victory of capitalism that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, globalisation processes affecting China and its minorities have also included political, social, cultural and intellectual factors, not to mention some that sit only uncomfortably in such categories, like the despoliation of the environment and the spread of the AIDS epidemic. Trade is clearly important for global processes. Commodities and services that flow from one country to another affect lifestyles and eventually ideas. Since the late 1980s Western goods have tended to exert a more profound influence on China than the other way around. Although the impact has been greater on the
Han areas than the minorities, it has affected all parts of the country. Since China’s accession to the WTO at the end of 2001 commodities have flowed both into and out of China more extensively than they did up to that time. This can only intensify globalisation processes. One of the aspects of trade of importance for the global economy, and specifically of global capitalism, is energy. One ethnic area of China where such trade is highly relevant is Xinjiang. The flow of oil and gas through pipelines linking Central Asia and Xinjiang could have a long-term powerful impact on the Chinese economy as a whole. It certainly links in with the sensitive strategic issues throughout Central Asia, where the United States, Russia and China, among other countries are trying to involve themselves strategically and economically in a way that illustrates globalisation processes. One of the forces that should be given special emphasis is tourism. This is because it is multifaceted in the sense of being economic, social and cultural. It brings in money from various parts of the world, especially the advanced capitalist countries that are so important for globalisation, but also affects ethnic cultures and societies, because it brings in ideas and fashions from outside. Though the effects of tourist globalisation are probably mainly positive, there are definitely negative aspects, including such serious matters as prostitution and the AIDS epidemic. It is especially important to note that tourism increasingly affects not only the Han areas, but also the ethnic areas of China, bringing them more rapidly into the global influences that are so important in the world. Another reason to give tourism emphasis is because it is becoming so important a force in globalisation and China as a whole is adopting a crucially important place in world tourism. As China joins the WTO, it already ranks among the top four or five destinations of international tourism, and it is likely to soar even higher in the coming years, especially with Beijing hosting the Olympic Games in 2008. Some have predicted that China will be the top destination for international tourism by the year 2020. Religion is one of those factors exemplifying both globalisation and localisation. Religions like Islam have become more influential in China and have had the effect of bringing Muslims into closer relations with Islamic brethren in other parts of the world than was the case earlier in the period of PRC rule. The same can be said of Theravada Buddhism among the Dai, who follow with considerable interest what their co-religionists in Thailand and Burma are thinking and doing. At the same time, many of China’s ethnic religions are highly localised and look like remaining so. Actually, these local religions are tending to dwindle in significance and may become more of a remnant as modernisation dilutes their social base. Their long-term future does not seem to me assured. Gender issues have assumed increasing importance since the last couple of decades of the twentieth century, and they continue to gather momentum. China, including its minorities, has been affected by this trend. Although the CCP leaders put a reasonably high priority on women’s issues from early days, the fact is that they did rather little about the women of the ethnic minorities until well after Deng’s reforms were taking effect. It seems as though leaders did not care very much about them. However, there seems little doubt that globalisation is creating
an impact with them too. In many ethnic areas, families are decreasing in size not because of government compulsion but because ordinary people are wanting fewer children. And there are cases where models are being found in China’s ethnic regions themselves to enthrall Western tourists and others, the most notable example being the matrilinear Mosuo. And if China’s ethnic regions are hardly world leaders in the field of family and gender, then the same is not true of population policy. China’s one-child-per-couple policy may be highly controversial. But it certainly shows a daring to confront an exceedingly serious problem that few governments can match. And of course the fact that the minorities have been able to adopt their own practices and attitudes on population is an added factor in the overall autonomy policy. The determination to control population growth is hardly new to China, but it can claim to be one of the sources of globalisation in this respect, rather than simply a receiver. Another example that shows China as a point of origin of globalisation processes is the way in which Western and other countries have taken to Tibetan Buddhism. Traditionally followed by the Tibetans and Mongols, it is spreading to other parts of the world in the era of globalisation in a way that has not occurred to the same extent for many centuries. The Dalai Lama won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 and went on to become one of the most powerful icons of the contemporary world. Globalisation may be mainly a one-way street for China, but it is not entirely so. The issue of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhism leads us on to the way diasporas function in the processes of globalisation. Diasporas are not new, but they have increased enormously in number in recent decades. People from poorer countries, often with oppressive governments, have tended to leave for climes they regard as richer and freer. Diasporas carry their own cultures to their new homes, and frequently try to use the freer climate there to influence trends and events in the countries where they were born. They are thus a powerful factor in globalisation. China’s ethnic minorities have become a force in globalisation processes. As implied in the reference to the Dalai Lama, the most obvious case in point is the Tibetans. There are already significant Tibetan communities in India, the United States and elsewhere in the West. They have become a significant influence outside their own home, one that seeks to spread their own culture but, more importantly, tries to influence major powers to affect what is happening in their original home. Having seen the success of the Tibetans in influencing the West, especially the United States, several others have tried to follow suit, especially the Uygurs and Miao but also others. Up to now they have failed utterly to establish themselves as a ‘cause’ in the way the Tibetans have done, in part due to a notable leading figure comparable to the Dalai Lama. But it will not surprise if their presence in the international scene increases over the coming years, a factor showing China as the origin of globalising tendencies, not merely the recipient.
National integration To what extent has globalisation affected the integration of China as a nation? In my opinion, the very significant improvement in the infrastructure has tied the economies and cultures of the minority areas into that of China as a whole.
The fact that television, radio, telephones and even the Internet are reaching these minority areas makes it much easier for central Chinese authorities to put over their message to the minorities. At the same time globalisation processes are bringing these economies much more thoroughly into the world system. Since China’s accession to the WTO such processes have intensified, and they link these economies not so much with the national markets of China as with those from outside the country. It is reasonably easy to control television and radio, but the Internet is an entirely different matter. According to a front-page article in People’s Daily (23 April 2002), quoting Nielsen/NetRatings, China had overtaken Japan to assume the second place in the world (after the United States) for home Internet users, with no fewer than 56.6 million people able to access the Internet in their own homes. Chinese authorities have tried to prevent certain types of messages from reaching both the Han and minority areas of the country, but this is an increasingly difficult exercise. Globalisation means that products, ideas, cultures and lifestyles from outside China compete with the local ones, regarding ‘local’ as meaning either derived from China or from the individual ethnic group or minority area concerned. In the contemporary world, it is likely that what is local will succumb to what comes from outside. There seems to be a very widespread, even almost universal, appeal in the kinds of consumerism that has become normal in Western countries and elsewhere. As the country has become more integrated economically and living standards have risen for the majority of people, even if not for all, separatism has generally tended to decline. The kinds of separatist incidents that were common in the late 1980s and into the early 1990s in Tibet have decreased in number and scale. Although relations between Han and Tibetans cannot be described as good, they are not as intensely hostile as they were in the late 1980s. In other areas of the country, such as Inner Mongolia, those few separatist incidents that occurred in the early 1990s have not been repeated. On the other hand, Uygur separatist feeling seems to have increased quite significantly since the Baren Township incident of April 1990. This is despite the economic progress and great strengthening of the infrastructure that has occurred since then. Some even argue that it is because of this stronger infrastructure and economy, because separatist forces are quite capable of using technologies that the state sets up for their own purposes. Of all ethnic areas of China, Xinjiang is the one most directly affected by the 11 September 2001 incidents in New York and Washington. This is because of suggestions by the Chinese state of numerous Uygurs undertaking training in schools run by the al-Qaeda network that the United States-led war against terrorism has fought so strongly. It is true that Washington continues to attack China for its human rights abuses in Xinjiang and other ethnic areas. But the fact is that the Chinese state has used the opportunity of the war against terrorism to step up attacks on Uygur separatism, and Washington has been relatively quiet in its overt criticisms. The reason is because it greatly values China’s support for its war against terrorism. As a matter of fact, China has announced that it sees three main sources of terrorism in its own territory. Apart from the case of the Uygurs and their secessionist activities, the Chinese government has specified Tibetan and Taiwan
separatism. However, if one applied a definition of terrorism that emphasised using violence targeted against civilians for political purposes, then it seems to me very unlikely that the United States would ever accept that those forces that wish to detach Tibet or Taiwan from China were terrorists. And I doubt that they would include such forces in any war against terrorism. They enjoy too much support among public opinion in Western countries.
Prospects for the future The trends mentioned in the first part of this chapter are likely to intensify in the coming years, but they may do so to different extents in different ethnic areas of China. The standard of living will probably go on rising for most members of ethnic minorities, but at very different rates in different places and for different groups of people within the same region. The Korean areas are likely to continue their rise towards prosperity more effectively than most of the minorities of Yunnan, while within the minorities class differences could become more apparent. Disparities are thus likely to widen still further as globalisation strengthens. The policy to develop the Western regions will no doubt bring a measure of success, but could also bring some unwanted by-products, such as further ethnic tensions and damage to the environment. Tourism is likely to increase in the ethnic areas, as more and more of them become alive to the potential profits Han or foreign visitors bring. At least some ethnic societies will become more modern, undergoing the wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory social, cultural and economic implications of modernisation. Some ethnic cultures will weaken or even die under this impact. However, the stronger ones will survive or even get stronger as people turn to their own traditions as a way of demonstrating difference. I do not foresee any general homogenisation of Chinese society, let alone in the ethnic areas. Globalisation does not necessarily bring individual countries more closely together. In fact, it can do precisely the opposite. Some countries have experienced fragmentation at least in part due to globalising forces. The worldwide sweep of liberal democracy appears to have been one of the forces that tore the once might Soviet Union apart. Could China follow suit? Most observers acknowledge that China’s accession to the WTO at the end of 2001 has exacerbated many trends that could turn out to be socially divisive and conduce to fragmentation. In addition to increasing economic disparities, it will create unemployment by allowing in foreign competition that many enterprises may prove unable to meet. This has already sparked social and labour protests, which are likely to increase in frequency and intensity in the coming years. China’s WTO accession may increase global influences from such countries as the United States in parts of China such as Tibet and other sensitive ethnic areas, thus increasing the chance of successful secession. It will also enhance those of China’s industries and enterprises that are competitive worldwide. That will increase China’s economic prosperity and overseas sales. It is likely to accelerate urbanisation, a force that will likely increase state control in the ethnic areas. There is the possibility that these influences could actually improve China’s overall national integration.
It seems to me that one of the effects of the 11 September 2001 incidents in New York and Washington is to increase the power of states and governments. The willingness of states to cooperate against an essentially non-state force such as terrorism was extremely striking. This could act as a deterrent to separatist movements in various places, including in China. And if it is not a deterrent to them, it could certainly enhance the power of the Chinese state to resist them. Another of the effects of 11 September is to bring relations among China, the United States and Russia to a better point than at any time since the end of the Second World War. It seems as if war reveals consonant interests in a way that few other trends can do. The three big countries share interests in opposing terrorism of all kinds, and especially that form inspired by Muslim fundamentalism. How long this consonance of interests will last it is of course very difficult to say. The United States is increasing its influence in Central Asia, a part of the world that has traditionally been Russian and Chinese spheres of influence. Neither China nor Russia will welcome the growth of American influence in that part of the world that used to be Soviet Central Asia. And there is a series of other matters in which interests are not necessarily the same. Still, Russia does not seem to have any interest in China’s disintegration. The United States would probably still like to see the CCP overthrown, and that could happen as globalisation gathers momentum in China. But CCP overthrow is somewhat different from Chinese disintegration. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has a long history as a united state with a strong central government. That does not prove it cannot disintegrate, but I suspect that it is much less likely to do so than most comparable continental states. I also think that Chinese disintegration along ethnic lines looks somewhat less likely at the beginning of the twenty-first century than it did in the 1980s or early 1990s. Most of the ethnic areas are better integrated through economic prosperity than they were late in the twentieth century. A separatist movement among the Mongols seems to have been defeated so thoroughly that very few Mongols now living in China would prefer to be part of the Republic of Mongolia rather than the PRC. It has even dealt the Tibetan separatists a series of defeats thorough enough that few Tibetans in China now believe their own independent state a likely prospect. While it is true that Xinjiang and the Uygurs remain a major problem for China, the 11 September incidents appear to have reduced it in scope, rather than the opposite. China has many problems ahead of it as a result of globalisation. But I suspect that it will succeed in staying together as a more or less united country. Its strategic influence is on the rise. Although its economy faces many problems, some of them a direct result of globalisation, it still seems to be expanding more quickly than those of most of its neighbours. Of course nobody knows how long this growth will last, and if it were to grind to a halt within the next few years, then all bets over China’s future would be off. But the likelihood is that China will continue to grow strategically and economically for quite a few years to come. In that case, China’s historical tradition of unity will help it stay together as a more or less united country. This may not include Taiwan for many years to come, but it will almost certainly encompass those ethnic regions that currently come under its rule.
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities
The following is an alphabetical listing of China’s fifty-five state-recognised ethnic minorities, with some very brief notes concerning each. The population figures are from the November 2000 census, given in NBS 2002: 97. The list is adapted from Mackerras 2001a: 262–6.
Achang Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 33,936, male: 17,189, female: 16,747 The Achang are mountain farmers. Some groups believe in primitive spirits and practise ancestor worship, while others follow Theravada Buddhism. They speak a Tibeto-Burman language, but most can also speak Chinese.
Bai Provinces of main concentration: Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan Population: 1,858,063, male: 947,019, female: 911,044 A Tibeto-Burman people, the Bai were a major ethnic grouping and cultural elite in the Nanzhao kingdom that dominated the region to China’s southwest from the seventh century until 902. They are rice-growers, whose religions include worship of ‘local tutelary spirits’, shamanism, Buddhism and Daoism. The Bai have close cultural ties with the Han.
Bonan Province of main concentration: Gansu Population: 16,505, male: 8,416, female: 8,089 The Bonan are culturally close to the Hui and, like them, are Muslims. They speak a Mongolian language.
Blang Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 91,882, male: 47,534, female: 44,348
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities 183 The Blang speak a Mon-Khmer language, and their culture is closely related to those of nearby Burma (Myanmar) and Laos. They are farmers, with an economy based on shifting cultivation. The main traditional religions are Theravada Buddhism, polytheism and ancestor worship.
Bouyei Province of main concentration: Guizhou Population: 2,971,460, male: 1,530,887, female: 1,440,573 The Bouyei way of life is similar to the Miao and their language is closely related to those of the Zhuang and Dai. They practise polytheism and ancestor worship.
Dai Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 1,158,989, male: 578,938, female: 580,051 There are two main branches of Dai, the Water Dai, who have a close affinity with the Thais, and the Han Dai, who are more or less identical with the Shan of Burma (Myanmar). The Dai were one of the main ethnic groups dominating the Nanzhao kingdom (seventh century to 902). They are the most populous of China’s Theravada Buddhist ethnic groups.
Daur Province-level units of main concentration: Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang Population: 132,394, male: 65,699, female: 66,695 The traditional occupations of the Daur are grain and vegetable farming and animal husbandry; they also rely on logging, hunting and fishing. In spoken language and culture, this ethnic group has a strong affinity with the Mongolians. The main religion is shamanism.
De’ang Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 17,935, male: 9,032, female: 8,903 The De’ang speak an Austro-Asiatic language close to that of the Va. They are subsistence farmers and are culturally similar to the Burmese. Some De’ang follow a form of Theravada Buddhism.
Dong Provinces of main concentration: Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi Population: 2,960,293, male: 1,566,575, female: 1,393,718 The Dong trace their origins back to about the third century BC. They speak a Thai language and are primarily agricultural. Dong architecture features covered bridges and multistorey drum towers.
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities
Dongxiang Province-level units of main concentration: Gansu, Xinjiang Population: 513,805, male: 264,453, female: 249,352 The Dongxiang are closely related to the Mongolians and speak a Mongolian language. However, they are Islamic and mainly agricultural, growing potatoes, wheat and maize, as well as industrial crops.
Drung Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 7,426, male: 3,649, female: 3,777 These farmers speak a Tibeto-Burman language closely related to Jingpo. Their traditional religion is nature worship, with belief in spirits, but there are also some Christians.
Ewenki Province-level unit of main concentration: Inner Mongolia Population: 30,505, male: 14,740, female: 15,765 The Ewenki are a Tungus people who speak a Tungus language. Their religions include animal and ancestor worship, shamanism and Tibetan Buddhism. Once migrant hunters, the Ewenki have led a more settled life over the past few decades, but they still hunt, breed deer, tend flocks and farm.
Gaoshan Provinces of main concentration: Taiwan, Fujian Population: just over 400,000, all but 4,461 in Taiwan The aboriginal mountain people of Taiwan, the Gaoshan are millet farmers and hunters. They speak a Malay-Polynesian language and believe in polytheism and ancestor worship, and a few are Christians.
Gelo Province of main concentration: Guizhou Population: 579,357, male: 310,775, female: 268,582 The Gelo are mountain subsistence farmers and hunters. The Gelo have a spoken language belonging to the Sino-Tibetan family but by the late 1980s only about 25 per cent still used it, instead communicating in Chinese, Miao, Yi and Bouyei. The Gelo have largely lost their original culture, despite some lingering distinctive features.
Gin Province-level unit of main concentration: Guangxi Population: 22,517, male: 11,328, female: 11,189
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities 185 The Gin cultivate rice and are good fishermen. They have their own language, but many now speak Cantonese. The Gin are descendants of Vietnamese migrants who arrived in China from the fifteenth century on, the word gin being an equivalent of the Vietnamese Kinh, the name given to the majority people of Vietnam. Some are Daoists and a few Catholics.
Hani Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 1,439,673, male: 751,899, female: 687,774 The Hani are subsistence farmers who speak a Tibeto-Burman language. They practise polytheism and nature and ancestor worship. They claim to have been the first in the world to have developed rice cultivation through terraced fields, which are still prominent in their agriculture.
Hezhen Province of main concentration: Heilongjiang Population: 4,640, male: 2,289, female: 2,351 Among China’s least populous ethnic group, the Hezhen speak a Manchu-Tungus language. They are farmers who concentrate on rice-growing. Their religion is based on nature worship and shamanism. Their main art form is sung folk narrative.
Hui Province-level units of main concentration: Ningxia, Gansu, Henan, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan. The Hui are China’s most widely scattered minority ethnic group. Population: 9,816,805, male: 5,002,072, female: 4,814,733 The Hui are Muslims, a part tracing their origins to the seventh century, when Arab and Persian merchants settled in China. They are involved in many occupations, with the Hui working as shop and restaurant keepers, artisans and peasants. Other than their belief in Islam, and all that implies, the Hui culture is basically the same as that of the Han, with Chinese the standard written and spoken language.
Jingpo Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 132,143, male: 65,291, female: 66,852 The Jingpo live in the mountainous areas along the Burma border and speak a Tibeto-Burman language closely related to Drung. The main traditional religion is polytheism, but some practise Christianity. The main staple food is rice, but in some places maize.
Juno Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 20,899, male: 10,596, female: 10,303
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities
Subsistence farmers, renowned for their fine, colourful fabrics, the Juno speak a Tibeto-Burman language. Of all the minorities, the state recognized the Juno as a nationality most recently (in 1979). Their traditional religion is nature and ancestor worship.
Kazak Province-level unit of main concentration: Xinjiang Population: 1,250,458, male: 633,875, female: 616,583 The Kazaks are a Turkic people, speaking a Turkic language. The Kazak language has two scripts, one based on Arabic, the other on Latin. Renowned for their horsemanship, some Kazaks are wandering herders of goats and sheep. Kazak people are mainly Muslims, but shamanism still survives.
Kirgiz Province-level unit of main concentration: Xinjiang Population: 160,823, male: 81,695, female: 79,128 The Kirghiz are pastoral wanderers and herders of goats and sheep. They are a Turkic people who speak a Turkic language. Most are Islamic, but a few follow Tibetan Buddhism.
Korean Provinces of main concentration: Jilin, Heilongjiang, Liaoning Population: 1,923,842, male: 956,946, female: 966,896 Korean migration into Manchuria dates from the seventeenth century, but did not occur in sizeable numbers until the nineteenth century. The Koreans are mainly rice-growers, but have also joined China’s industrialisation. This ethnic group’s culture and language are the same as in Korea.
Lahu Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 453,705, male: 234,144, female: 219,561 The Lahu have their own language, which belongs to the Yi branch of the Tibeto-Burman languages, but most Lahu speak Chinese or Thai due to a close association with the Han and Dai peoples. They lacked a written script until 1957. Some Lahu practise nature and ancestor worship, but Mahayana Buddhism and Christianity are also found.
Lhoba Province-level unit of main concentration: Tibet Population: 2,965, male: 1,484, female: 1,481 The Lhoba speak a Tibetan language and they are ethnically very similar to the Tibetans, but their traditional religion is nature worship, not Tibetan Buddhism.
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities 187
Li Province of main concentration: Hainan Population: 1,247,814, male: 647,547, female: 600,267 Natives of Hainan Island, the Li live mainly in the mountainous areas and are agricultural. Their area is tropical and rich in tropical crops, such as coconuts, cocoa, pineapples, mangoes and bananas. They speak a Sino-Tibetan language, but many now speak Chinese. They believe in polytheism and nature worship.
Lisu Provinces of main concentration: Yunnan, Sichuan Population: 634,912, male: 326,274, female: 308,638 Subsistence farmers, the Lisu have monogamous marriages, with free love a normal pattern beforehand. Their language belongs to the Yi branch of the TibetoBurman family.
Manchu Province-level units of main concentration: Liaoning, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Beijing Population: 10,682,262, male: 5,547,750, female: 5,134,512 Once herders and hunters, the Manchus trace their origins back some 3,000 years. They conquered China in the seventeenth century and adopted Chinese manners, language and culture to such an extent that little survives of their own distinctive culture. Very few now speak the Manchu language. The Manchus formerly practised shamanism and ancestor worship. Territorially they are, next to the Hui, the least concentrated of all minorities in China.
Maonan Province-level unit of main concentration: Guangxi Population: 107,166, male: 56,443, female: 50,723 The Maonan culture is similar in many ways to the Zhuang, and they speak a related language. An agricultural ethnic group, their staple crops are rice and maize, but they also grow millet and sweet potatoes.
Miao Province-level units of main concentration: Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Chongqinig, Hubei, Sichuan Population: 8,940,116, male: 4,656,974, female: 4,283,142 The Miao are one of the most ancient of China’s nationalities, tracing their origins back more than 4,000 years. In China some people whom the state classifies as Miao, regard themselves as Hmong. Groups of this designation are found in many of the countries of mainland Southeast Asia. Before the modernisation of farming methods the Miao grew millet and buckwheat using the slash-and-burn method.
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities
The Miao language has three main dialects, but there was no unified written script until 1956. Religions include nature and ancestor worship and Christianity.
Moinba Province-level unit of main concentration: Tibet Population: 8,923, male: 4,428, female: 4,495 The Moinba are mountain herders. They have a way of life, culture and language similar to the Tibetans and follow Tibetan Buddhism.
Mongolian Province-level units of main concentration: Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang Population: 5,813,947, male: 2,875,453, female: 2,938,494 The Mongolians once ran a gigantic empire, founded in 1206 by Chinggis Khan, which covered most of the Eurasian continent. The Mongolian language belongs to the Altaic family, but there are many dialects. The Mongolian script, still in use in the PRC, dates at least from the early thirteenth century. The main religion is Tibetan Buddhism. Mongolians were traditionally nomadic (some still are), living in hide and felt tents called yurts. However, they are increasingly becoming settled with many urban dwellers, and industry is well developed. The Mongolians run their own independent republic, called Mongolia, to the north of Inner Mongolia. In 2000, there were about 2.5 million people there of Mongolian ethnicity (about 94 per cent of the total population of Mongolia), meaning that there were more than twice as many Mongolians in China as in Mongolia.
Mulam Province-level unit of main concentration: Guangxi Population: 207,352, male: 107,154, female: 100,198 The Mulam are an agricultural people with a self-sufficient village economy. Religions include Buddhism and Daoism. The Mulam language is related to that of the Dong and Chinese characters are used.
Naxi Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 308,839, male: 154,971, female: 153,868 The Naxi speak a language belonging to the Yi branch of the Tibeto-Burman family. Traditional religions include the national worship of Dongba (a form of shamanism, which is nearly extinct), Tibetan Buddhism and Daoism. Most Naxi follow a patriarchal family system, but one section, called the Mosuo, who straddle the Yunnan–Sichuan border area around the Lugu Lake, is still matrilineal.
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities 189
Nu Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 28,759, male: 14,857, female: 13,902 Farmers who are closely related to the Tibetans, the Nu speak a Tibeto-Burman language. Some follow Tibetan Buddhism, while others are nature worshippers or Christians.
Oroqen Province-level units of main concentration: Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia Population: 8,196, male: 3,872, female: 4,324 A Tungus people who speak a Tungus language, the Oroqen were once seminomadic, living in birch and hide tents. They are now more settled and work as hunters, herders of deer and farmers.
Primi Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 33,600, male: 17,043, female: 16,557 The Primi speak a language related to Tibetan and have a similar lifestyle to Tibetans, but only part of the ethnic group accepts Tibetan Buddhism; the others have a polytheistic religion and sacrifice to their ancestors.
Qiang Province of main concentration: Sichuan Population: 306,072, male: 155,981, female: 150,091 Closely related to Tibetans and speaking a similar language, the Qiang are herders and farmers. They are, however, polytheists, nature worshippers and shamanists, not Tibetan Buddhists.
Russian Province-level units of main concentration: Xinjiang, Heilongjiang Population: 15,609, male: 7,365, female: 8,244 Almost all of China’s Russian population arrived in the northeast and Xinjiang after the Russian civil war of 1918–1922. Culturally and linguistically they are the same as in Russia.
Salar Province of main concentration: Qinghai Population: 104,503, male: 53,715, female: 50,788 Islamic Turkic speakers living in a semi-desert area, the Salars are herders of sheep and some cattle. Their diet consists largely of steamed buns and a variety of noodles made of highland barley, wheat and buckwheat.
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities
She Provinces of main concentration: Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong Population: 709,592, male: 381,038, female: 328,554 The only minority to live in the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangxi, the She are in many ways quite similar culturally to the Han. Although most She nowadays speak Chinese, some use a language belonging to the Miao branch of the Miao–Yao family. The origins of the She are unclear, but probably date back to the seventh century. Some are Buddhists, while others are polytheists or ancestor worshippers.
Shui Province-level units of main concentration: Guizhou, Guangxi Population: 406,902, male: 213,488, female: 193,414 The Shui have a language close to that of the Dong. Their main diet is rice and fish, supplemented with corn, barley, wheat and sweet potatoes. Most are nature worshippers and polytheists, but a few are Catholics.
Sibe Province-level units of main concentration: Liaoning, Xinjiang Population: 188,824, male: 98,737, female: 90,087 The Sibes speak a Manchu-Tungus language. Manchu script, dead among the Manchus, is still occasionally found among the Sibes. They traditionally lived in the northeast of Liaoning with the Manchus, but in 1764 many were moved to the west as border guards on the Russian frontier, where a portion of the Sibe population still lives. They are traditionally polytheistic but a few follow Tibetan Buddhism.
Tajik Province-level unit of main concentration: Xinjiang Population: 41,028, male: 20,954, female: 20,074 Of Iranian stock, the Tajiks speak an Iranian language and follow Islam. By means of extensive irrigation, they grow rice, wheat, fruit and cotton; some are herders. Houses are built of wood and stone, with square flat roofs.
Tatar Province-level unit of main concentration: Xinjiang Population: 4,890, male: 2,550, female: 2,340 The Tatars are Islamic Turkic speakers and farmers. Their diet includes round cakes, with the outside crisp and inside soft. They also eat cheese, dried apricots and rice.
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities 191
Tibetan Province-level units of main concentration: Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan Population: 5,416,021, male: 2,697,807, female: 2,718,214 Before the implementation of reforms in 1959, following a major rebellion against Chinese rule, Tibet was a theocratic state. The Tibetans have a highly distinctive culture, mainly based on their own form of Buddhism, and a rich written and oral literature. They are farmers of barley, peas and tubers, and herders of yaks, sheep and goats. They are also the only one of China’s minority nationalities to have created a major tradition of drama completely independently of the Han people.
Tu Provinces of main concentration: Qinghai, Gansu Population: 241,198, male: 123,571, female: 117,627 The Tu trace their origins to the thirteenth century. They speak a Mongolian language and are related to the Mongolians. They have two dialects and a rich oral literature. Originally pastoralists, they have practised agriculture for several centuries. Most follow Tibetan Buddhism, but some still adhere to polytheistic beliefs.
Tujia Province-level units of main concentration: Hunan, Hubei, Chongqing, Guizhou Population: 8,028,133, male: 4,196,469, female: 3,831,664 The Tujia farm rice and corn, collect fruit and fell trees for lumber. In most ways they are very similar to the Han people.
Uygur Province-level unit of main concentration: Xinjiang Population: 8,399,393, male: 4,272,863, female: 4,126,530 A Turkic people who ran a major empire centred on what is now Mongolia from 744 to 840, the Uygurs converted to Islam over several centuries. They grow fruit, wheat, cotton and rice through irrigation. Uygur customs, culture and art are similar to those of other Turkic people and they excel in music, song and dance. The Uygur language belongs to the Turkic group of the Altaic family of languages.
Uzbek Province-level unit of main concentration: Xinjiang Population: 12,370, male: 6,498, female: 5,872
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities
The origins of the Uzbeks go back to the fourteenth century. They are Islamic Turkic speakers and farmers with dress and food similar to those of the Uygurs.
Va Province of main concentration: Yunnan Population: 396,610, male: 202,626, female: 193,984 The Va speak a Mon-Khmer Austro-Asiatic language, but had no script until recently. They grow rice, maize, cotton and fruits such as bananas, pineapples, mangoes and oranges. Most are nature worshippers, but some are Theravada Buddhists or Christians.
Yao Province-level units of main concentration: Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan and Guangdong Population: 2,637,421, male: 1,391,332, female: 1,246,089 The Yao farm sweet potatoes, maize and rice. They have recently developed hydroelectric power and increased irrigation. There are several different mutually incomprehensible Yao languages, and Chinese or Zhuang are often used for communication. Traditional religions include nature worship, ancestor worship and Daoism.
Yi Provinces of main concentration: Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou Population: 7,762,272, male: 3,989,391, female: 3,772,881 The Yi speak a Tibeto-Burman language and have their own script. They once had a reputation as fierce warriors and those in Liangshan, Sichuan, formerly had a heavily stratified slave system. They are polytheists, and also have a long tradition of Buddhism, with Daoism and Christianity introduced later.
Yugur Province of main concentration: Gansu Population: 13,719, male: 6,935, female: 6,784 Descended from the Uygurs of the ninth century, the Yugurs are Turkic speakers. They are herders and farmers, with some hunting as a sideline. Most practise Tibetan Buddhism.
Zhuang Province-level units of main concentration: Guangxi, Yunnan and Guangdong Population: 16,178,811, male: 8,376,754, female: 7,802,057
Appendix: China’s ethnic minorities 193 The Zhuang are the most populous of China’s minority nationalities, and one of the best integrated with the Han. Zhuang origins go back well before the time of Christ. They speak a language related to Thai, but many speak Chinese. The Chinese written language was formerly used, but in 1955 a Zhuang written language based on Latin letters was devised. Religions include Buddhism, Daoism, ancestor worship and Christianity.
Source: Reprinted, with permission, from the end covers of Mackerras 1994.
1 Introduction 1 For instance, Harrell 1990: 515–48; Harrell et al. (2000); and Harrell 2001. The second work was written especially to accompany a major exhibition on the Yi of Liangshan in Sichuan province (who are called Nuosu), held at the Burke Museum in Seattle, Washington, over much of 2000. The third book is a culmination of Harrell’s research. It has most focus on the Nuosu, but deals with other ethnic groups of Liangshan and some nearby areas. 2 In a speech given on 24 May 2001 at a work conference on poverty relief, Jiang Zemin claimed that the incidence of rural poverty had fallen from 30.7 per cent in 1978 to 3 per cent in 2000. He claimed this as a miracle ‘unprecedented in the history of the world’ (‘Poverty Relief Success’ 2001: 6). 3 See ‘some key events in the history of globalization’ in Scholte 1997: 17. 4 See also a collection of alternative definitions in Scholte 1997: 15. 5 See Nathan 1998. There has been a significant literature on democracy in China, of which this book is a prominent example. 6 For a full-scale discussion of the complex issues relating to human rights in China see Kent 1993. 7 See these figures in SSB 1986: 586 and NBS 1999: 609. 2 Historical background, 1949–1989 1 See Wu 1973: 797. ‘The Common Program, 1949’ is included pp. 789–98. 2 Wu 1973: 800. Much of ‘The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1954’ is included in Wu 1973: 799–810. 3 The text of the agreement can be found in English translation, among other places, in Shakya 1999: 449–52. The clauses cited above are on p. 450. 4 Article 24 of the 1975 Constitution enjoins the higher organs of state to safeguard the exercise of autonomy ‘and actively support the minority nationalities in carrying out the socialist revolution and socialist construction’ (NPC 1975: 17). In other words, autonomy really meant engaging in precisely the same activities and believing exactly the same as the Han. 5 For accounts of this horrific incident see Gladney 1991: 137– 40 and Dillon 1999: 165–6. 6 The text of this law is included in Kaup 2000: 183–97. 7 The figures in this paragraph are based on State Statistical Bureau Population Office 1991: 32, 78 and Mackerras and Yorke 1991: 175, 207. 8 See the figures presented in Shakya 1999: 390 and Mackerras 1994: 158. The 1981 figures are themselves a very big rise, both in absolute and relative terms, on the 7,508 Tibetan cadres (32.9 per cent of the TAR’s total) in 1965 and the 20,023 (44.5 per cent) in 1978. 9 For a mainly pictorial account of the 1987 and 1989 disturbances, see Harris and Jones 2000: 38–73.
10 The map in Barnett 1994: xvi–xvii shows quite a bit of territory claimed by the Tibetan government in exile which is outside the main Tibetan areas, including the capital of Qinghai Province, Xining. The map shows Tibet as including, in addition to all the TAR, the whole of Qinghai Province, much of Gansu and Sichuan Provinces and some of Yunnan Province. 3 Minorities politics, 1989–2002 1 Compare Article 22 of the 1984 and 2001 versions in Kaup 2000: 189 and Zhonghua 2001: 9, 42. 2 For the total figures and the proportions belonging to the ethnic minorities down to 1999, see Mackerras 2001a: 90. The 2001 figures are based on China’s official Xinhua News Agency, as recorded in China News Digest (CND), Global News, No. GL01-45 (8 June 2001), item 8. 3 See treatments of this topic in Gladney 1991: 1–5 and Mackerras 1994: 125–6; and, specifically for Xinjiang, Dillon 1995: 19–20. 4 For example, the section on China in Amnesty International (1995: 97–101) has quite a bit about Tibet, but does not even mention Xinjiang. On the other hand, the section on Xinjiang in Amnesty International (2001: 72) is actually longer than the comparable one on Tibet. 5 For more detail on this work conference see Mackerras 2001a: 260–1. 6 Sufi are mystic Islamic beliefs and practices that result in the development of orders of practitioners. For a detailed history of the Sufi orders in China see Dillon 1999: 113–29. 4 The economies of the minorities 1 The World Bank estimates show 280 million rural poor in 1990, and 106 million in 1998, while Chinese official figures claim 85 million in 1990 and 42 million in 1998 (ADB and SDPC 2001: 5–1). The Chinese official figures put the boundary for absolute rural poverty at US$ 0.66 per day, while the World Bank puts it at US$ 1 per day. 2 Figures from the 1990 census for the districts of Xinjiang are contained in Liu et al. 1995: 891–2. They show as follows: Ürümqi, total 1,374,195 (of whom Uygurs, 172,516 and Han, 1,015,474); Karamai, total 210,064 (of whom Uygurs, 30,855 and Han, 161,242); Kizilu 375,771 (of whom Uygurs, 241,406 and Kirgiz, 110,160); and Kashgar, total 2,853,634 (of whom Uygurs, 2,606,382 and Han, 203,934). 5 The realm of the mind, religion and education 1 For much greater detail on traditional religions among China’s minorities see Mackerras 1995: 19–38 and for the specific period 1949–1995 Mackerras 1995: 109–32. 2 This compares with 14 million in 1985 (Wan 1988: 461). 3 For much more detail and discussion on the causes of separatism in Xinjiang since 1990 see Mackerras 2001b: 294–302. 4 See detailed accounts of this affair in Goldstein 1997: 105–11 and Shakya 1999: 440–7. 5 See more information in Mackerras 1995: 25–6, 114 and Goldstein 1998: 15–6. Goldstein notes that in Thailand, ‘another prominent Buddhist society’, about 1– 2 per cent of the total number of males were monks in the early 1950s. 6 For a general rundown on minorities’ education in the first four decades or so of the PRC, see Postiglione 1992: 307–36 or Mackerras 1995: 133–57. 7 Figures for semi-literacy and illiteracy by province-level unit contained in NBS 2000: 103 show the following rates for those aged 15 and over, including all those provincelevel units with high minority populations and all those above 23 per cent. Beijing (the lowest in the country), 6.45; Xinjiang, 9.77; Inner Mongolia, 16.44; Sichuan, 16.77; Ningxia, 23.32; Yunnan, 24.34; Guizhou, 24.46; Gansu, 25.64; Qinghai, 30.52; Tibet, 66.18.
8 The census of November 2000 claimed that the illiterate population of Tibet was 850,700, which is 47.3 per cent of the 1,798,900 people in the TAR aged 15 and over. This would make the literacy rate 52.7 per cent. See ‘National Census’ 2001: 7. The sharp discrepancy with the figure given in the previous note is probably explained by the fact that the reported census figure makes no mention of semi-literacy, only of illiteracy. 6 Population, women and family 1 For a detailed account of population issues among China’s ethnic minorities down to the early 1990s see Mackerras 1994: 233–59, with policy considered 233–7. 2 In Yunnan the ethnic population in the 1990 census was 12,333,146, or 33.4 per cent of the total provincial population of 36,972,612, fractionally more than one in three. See He et al. 1993: 728–34 or SSB Population Office 1991: 78–86. 3 For an extensive study of this very interesting phenomenon in a village on the Vietnam–Guangxi border, see Xie 2000. Although the village is located in a Han area, its basic findings are almost certainly applicable to ethnic border areas of southwest China. 4 On this question see the excellent discussion of Stevan Harrell (2001: 248–51). 7 International relations 1 For an analytical selection of books on China’s foreign relations see Mackerras 2001a: 150–3. 2 This refers specifically to mutual visits by Indian President K. R. Narayanan and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to each other’s capitals in the year 2000, but can describe relations as a whole. See Westlake 2001a: 121. 3 For brief rundowns see Mackerras 1999: 166–70 or Roy 1998: 45–51. For what amounts to a full-length treatment of Western, and especially American, images of Tibet see Schell 2000. 4 This passage is cited from an editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 2001, which also attacks the Australian government for its decision to be represented at a reception at the Chinese Embassy in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 23 May 1951 Agreement on Tibet. 5 On Isa’s political career before 1949 see Benson 1990: 53, 154, 157 and 163. He died in December 1995 in Istanbul at the age of 94 (Emmet 1997). 6 See the full text of ‘The Call to Jihad by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’, dated 25 August 1999, in Rashid 2002a: 247–9. 7 According to Turner 2000: 1095, the United Nations gave a projected population for 2000 in Mongolia of 2.74 million, of whom 78.8 per cent were Halh Mongolian, 5.9 per cent were Turkic Kazaks, with 20 other Mongol minorities. 8 The 1999 census showed a total Vietnamese population of 76,323,173, among whom males numbered 37,469,117 and females 38,854,056. See General Statistics Office 2001: 3. 9 From 1985, when the first HIV case was discovered, to the end of 2000 HIV had spread to all of China’s 31 provinces, autonomous regions and independent municipalities, Chinese experts estimating that the number who had contracted the virus by then was over 600,000. According to Vice Minister of Health Yin Dakui, by June 2001 there were 26,058 HIV-positive cases, including 1,111 AIDS patients, with 584 AIDScaused deaths. The number of new HIV-positive patients in the first half of 2000 was 2,115, rising to 3,541 over the same period in 2001. Of the patients with the virus, 69.8 per cent contracted it through intravenous drug use, and 6.9 per cent through sexual contact. Among the latter group, 94 per cent were aged between 15 and 49 and five-sixths were male (Mu 2001: 21–2). The UNAIDS Beijing estimate of HIV/AIDS victims for early 2002 was 1.25 million. Dr Gao Yaojie, winner of the Global Health Council’s Jonathan Mann Award for Global Health and Human Rights, paints a grim picture, including that the official statistics are serious undercounts. Among others of her works, see her acceptance of the award, given in absentia, in Gao 2001.
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Mu Xin (2001), ‘Battle against AIDS’, Beijing Review, vol. 44, no. 37 (13 Sept.), 21–2. National People’s Congress (1975), ‘The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted on January 17, 1975, by the Fourth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China at its First Session’, Peking Review, vol. 18, no. 4 (24 Jan.), 12–17. —— (1982), ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted on December 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China at its Fifth Session’, Beijing Review, vol. 25, no. 52 (27 Dec.), 10–29. ‘Party Chief Stresses National Unity’ (1992), Beijing Review, vol. 35, no. 3 (27 Jan.– 2 Feb.), 5. People’s Daily, Beijing. People’s Daily Special Commentator (1980), ‘Is the National Question Essentially a Class Question?’, Beijing Review, vol. 23, no. 34 (25 Aug.), 17–22. ‘Poverty Relief Success’ (2001), Beijing Review, vol. 44, no. 23 (7 June), 6. ‘Resolution of the CPC Central Committee Regarding Important Questions on Promoting Socialist Ethical and Cultural Progress (Adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 14th CPC Central Committee on October 10, 1996)’ (1996), Beijing Review, vol. 39, no. 45 (4–10 Nov.), 20–31. Seno, Alexandra A. and Morgan, Peter (1998), ‘The Trend Makers’, Asiaweek, vol. 24, no. 8 (6 Mar.), 33–61. Serov, Viktor (2002), ‘The Great Wall of China Gets Ever Higher’, Ekspress K (Kazakhstan), 11 Apr. This article was translated into English in The Times of Central Asia by BBC Monitoring, dated 16 Apr. 2002. Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney. Tang Guoqiang (1998a), ‘Foreign Ministry News Briefings’, Beijing Review, vol. 41, no. 2 (12–18 Jan.), 9. —— (1998b), ‘Foreign Ministry News Briefings’, Beijing Review, vol. 41, no. 45 (9–15 Nov.), 8. ‘Tibet: One of the Hottest Tourist Destinations’ (2000), Beijing Review, vol. 43, no. 50 (11 Dec.), 29. Tibet Support Group UK (1996–2001), ‘Birth Control Policies in Tibet’, issued at http://www.tibet.org/Activism/Rights/birthcontrol.html. Torode, Greg (2002), ‘Uygur Activists Not Terrorists, Says US’, South China Morning Post, 6 Mar., 7. Winchester, Michael (1997), ‘Beijing Vs. Islam’, Asiaweek, vol. 23, no. 42 (24 Oct.), 30– 42. World Bank Group, The (2000), News Release No: 2001/004/EAP (7 July), Washington. Wuliji (1997), ‘Inner Mongolia: 50 Years of Development’, Beijing Review, vol. 40, no. 27 (7–13 July), 10–12. Zhai Wei and Zhang Yan (2000), ‘Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu duiwu buduan fazhan zhuangda’ (‘Our Country’s Ranks of Minority Nationality Cadres Develop and Strengthen Continuously’), Renmin ribao, Haiwai ban (People’s Daily, Overseas Edition), no. 4830 (28 June), 1.
Film and television Annaud, Jean-Jacques (director) (1997), Seven Years in Tibet, produced by Applecross, Mandalay Entertainment, Reperage & Vanguard Films and TriStar Pictures. Sarin, Ritu and Sonam, Tenzing (directors) (1998), Shadow Circus – The CIA in Tibet, television documentary, BBC, London. Scorsese, Martin (director) (1998), Kundun, produced by Disney/Touchdown Pictures.
11 September 2001 154, 171–2; incidents in New York and Washington, effect of 169–72, 179, 181; see also terror attacks 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 171 Abdurixit, A. 52 Achang 182 Afghanistan 165, 168, 170 Afshar, H. 8 AIDS 10, 73, 174, 177; spread of 173, 176 Akto County see Baren Alataw Pass 59 Almaty 167 Alptekin, A. 166 Alptekin, E. 165–6 al-Qaeda network 154, 169–70, 179 America: Congress 34, 158; intervention in Vietnam 153; market 58; presence in Central Asia 75; relations with the PRC 35; State Department 157; sympathy for the Dalai Lama 157; teachers in minority areas of China 116; see also United States American-led war against terrorism 171 Amnesty International 45–6, 175 ancestor worship 186–7, 190, 192–3 Annaud, J.J. 159 anti-American nationalist feelings in China 155 anti-China Tibet activists 164 Armitage, R. 170 Asia Watch (renamed Human Rights Watch/Asia) 45 Asiaweek 159 Associated Press 171 Aung San Suu Kyi 156 Australia 18, 30, 158 Austria 163 autonomy: for ethnic minorities 24, 26, 39; policy 22, 40 backpackers 15, 30 Bai 182 Baotou 59, 123 Baptist University of Hong Kong 122 Baren 49, 166; 1990 uprising 119, 179 Barrientos, S. 8 basic economic indicators 59–61 Basques of Spain 18 Beck, U. 12
Beijing 69, 177, 187; bomb blasts 50–1; Declaration and Platform for Action 134; Massacre of 1989 31, 43, 161–3; see also UN Conference Belgrade 155 Ben-Adam, J. 54, 141 Bilik, N. 129, 131 birth control 136, 138 Bishkek 167; communiqué 168 Blang 182–3 Bonan 182 Bouyei 183–4 bride price, custom of 146 Britain 157–8; Tony Blair 157 Buddha 120 Buddhism 117, 120–5, 188, 190–3; basic doctrines of 120; believers in China 120; Dai people 120, 124, 143; esoteric Tantric form 120; monks 124, 144; in Tibet 122 Bulag, U.E. 47 Bureau of Tibetan Poverty-Relief 68 Burma (Myanmar) 124, 177, 183 Bush, President George W. 154–5, 160, 163, 168, 170; Administration 171 capitalism 57; victory of 176 Caspian Sea 75 censorship, issue of 44 census: 1964 21; 1990 129; 2000 1, 182 Central Ethnic Work Conference 38–9 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 33 Central Nationalities Institutes 21 Centre for Religious Research, Xinjiang Social Sciences Institute 118 Chatral Rinpoche 121 Chechens 18 Cheng Kejie 6 Chiang Kai-shek, government of 19 childbearing strategies: female influence in 148; study of 137, 148 childcare 142 child labour 13 China 12, 167, 171; accession to the World Trade Organisation 1, 37, 43, 55, 57, 62, 75, 133, 155, 177, 179–80; borders 39; Buddhist Association 35; demographic structure 135; domestic tourism 58; economic impact in Central Asia 74;
210 Index China (Continued) economy, growth in 37; education 132; ethnic groups 69, 182; Folk Culture Villages (Zhongguo minus wenhua cun) 70; foreign policy formulators 154; foreign relations 154–7; foreign trade of ethnic autonomous areas 74; and human rights 37, 43; influence in Vietnam 156; Islamic Association 115; language 5, 54, 124, 129, 133, 184; Muslims 2; national integration 54–5; nationalism 2, 155; national unity 19, 133; participation in the Korean War 31; role in world energy diplomacy 74; society 43; sovereignty over Tibet 32, 157; Tibet policy 121; Western Poverty Reduction Project 164 China international relations 152; with its minorities 174; with Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) 156; with Russia 152; with the Western countries 152 China Times 160 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 2, 6, 10, 19, 56, 113–15, 152, 155, 181; Central Committee 5, 52, 117; corruption 113; power 17; revolution 123 Chinggis Khan 188 Chongqing 187, 191 Christianity 116, 125, 186, 192–3 Christians 184, 189, 192 clergies 20; power in politics 117 Clinton, Hillary Rodham 135 Clinton, President W. 13, 158, 160; China policy of 154 coal 74 collectivisation programme 118 colonialism 8–9, 32 Common Programme 19 commonwealth of independent states 152 Conference of Afro-Asian states 33 Constitution: of 1954 22, 114; of 1975 24; of 1982 26, 115; of the PRC 56 cotton: industry 140; production 60; products as export commodity 74 counterterrorism, use of 170 crime 9 Criminal Code 174 crude oil, production 60 cultural despoliation, images of 162 cultural destruction 24, 161 cultural genocide 138–40, 161 Cultural Revolution 2, 5, 23, 46, 115, 122–3, 126, 149; policies 25 Cyprus International Tourism Conference 58 Czech Republic 153 Dai 117, 120, 130–1, 137, 139, 143–4, 165, 174, 183; Buddhism 124; ethnic group 71; medicine 64–5; monasteries 130; villages, cash economy in 65; Water (or Shui) Dai 124–5, 183, 190 Dalai Lama 18, 23, 35, 45, 48, 116, 121–2, 138, 140, 158–60, 162–3, 172, 175, 178; charge of ‘cultural genocide’ 46; flight to India 33; government-inexile 34; influence of 121; international role 158–61; speech before Congressional Human Rights Caucus 36; statement in Taiwan 160; Strasbourg proposals 35
Daoism 188, 192–3 Daur 183 De’ang 183 Dehong 124 democracy 10–12 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) 156 Deng Xiaoping 5–6, 25, 33, 38, 51, 123, 143; ‘journey to the south’ 56, 113; reforms 177 Denmark 158 Department of State Counterterrorism Office 170 Dharamsala 23, 34, 159 diasporas 45, 54; in globalisation 178 Dirlik, A. 9 diseases 76 divorces 149–50 Doak Barnett, A. 27 doctors 64 Document No. 7 52 Dong 25, 183, 190 Dongba, national worship of 188 Dongxiang 69, 184 Dosybiev, D. 167 Drepung monastery 120 drug-pushers 174 drugs 9, 73, 76 Drung 184–5 Dushanbe 167–8 Eastern Europe 2 East and Southeast Asia 10, 12; crisis 7 East Timor 18, 39 East Turkestan Islamic Party 170 East Turkestan National Congress 166 Economic Department 128 economic development 49; under CCP 5 Economic and Development Department 127–8, 135 economic inequalities, rise in 12 economic modernization 76, 162 economies of minorities 56 ecotourism 71 education 70, 74, 113, 116, 126–33, 137, 142–3; of girls in minority areas 143 Eighth and Ninth Five-Year Plans 60 employment 143 energy trade network of Central Asia 75 Eng, I. 70 English, globalisation 132 Enkhbayar, President N. 172 environmental norms 13 environment: degradation 56, 70, 176 Equatorial Guinea 7 Ethnic Affairs, First National Conference 38 ethnic autonomous areas 59, 61, 63; average annual wage 62 ethnic CCP members and cadres 41–3 ethnic conflict in the Balkans 153 ethnic culture 71, 180 ethnic group 4; definition of 2–3; southwestern China, major study 147 ethnic health 64 ethnic identity 37, 39, 54, 132–3, 141; ethnic medicines 64; revival 65
Index 211 ethnicity 3; theory of 4 ethnic minorities 4; policy laid down for 136; rate of improvement 65; treatment of 45; women poverty 144 ethnic separatism: and conflict, threat of 52; revival in Xinjiang 52 ethnic tourism 70 ethnic villages as ‘theme park’ 73 ethnonationalism 37; movements 18 Eurasian ‘rail bridge’ 59 Europe 15, 30 Evans, G. 145 Ewenki 184 extremism 154, 168 Falungong 6; suppression of 114 family 134, 146; income 148; planning 40 famine afflicted North Korea 173 Federation of Russia 152 female ethnic cadres 142 female teachers 143 female unemployment 145 feminisation of poverty 134 five principles of coexistence 32 floating population 139 folk practitioners 64 ‘folkways and customs’ of the ethnic minorities 45 foreign relations 74 foreign trade and Central Asia 74–5 France 58 Fujian 184, 190 Ganden Monastery 24 Gandhi, Rajiv 33 gang of four 24; fall of 25 Gansu 69–70, 122, 139, 144, 164, 182, 184–5, 191–2 Gaoshan 184 gas 74; and oil pipelines 75 Geertz, C. 17 Gelo 184 gender: aspects of tourism 145; discourse effects of globalisation 134; equality 6, 134, 142, 144; illiteracy gap 142; issues among China’s ethnic minorities negative side 144; roles, traditional 11 gender-related development index (GDI) 141 Gere, R. 159, 163 Germany 164, 166 Giddens, A. 9 Gilley, B. 60, 140–1 Gin 184–5 Gini ratio for measuring inequalities 68 girls, abduction and sale 6 Gladney, D.C. 53–4; work on the Hui 4 global capitalism 177; advance of 13 global epidemics 9, 65 globalisation 1, 6, 8, 10–12, 37, 54, 151; controversial nature of 12–15; and the Dalai Lama 120; destructive effects on cultural identities 13; and identity, tension between 14; ignoring borders 9; relevance for China and ethnic minorities 17–18; sovereignty and the state 15–17; sub-stream associated with Islam 55; two kinds of 55; in Xinjiang 171
glocalisation 14, 120 Goldstein, M.C. 48, 120 Gongdong 64 Gong Xuezeng 115–16 grain 60; production 59 Great Britain 160 Great Khural 172 Great Leap Forward 21 Great Prayer Festival 30 Great Western Development Strategy 70 gross industrial output value 57 Guangdong 38, 69, 190, 192 Guangxi 183–4, 187–8, 190, 192; Governor Cheng Kejie 6; trade with northern Vietnam 74 Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 21, 40 Guizhou 4, 63, 65, 69–71, 125, 149, 182–4, 187, 190–2 Gulf War of 1991 156 Gulja (Yining in Chinese) 50–1 Hague, the 153 Hainan Province 73, 127, 187 Hakkas 2–3 Hall, S. 14 Hami 118 Han 1, 3, 27, 37, 69, 148; areas 176; chauvinism 21; Chinese 161, 174; Chinese authorities 137; Chinese political culture 116; Dai 124, 183; immigration 54, 138, 141; migration into minority areas 62, 140, 151; people 51; population 138, 140; students 128; and Tibetan, disparities 69; under the PRC 140; to Xinjiang 140 Hani 185 Hansen, M.H. 131 Harrell, S. 40, 131, 147; on the Yi 4 Harrer, Heinrich 159 head-scarves 144 health delivery privatisation of 64 Hebei 187–8 Heilongjiang 185–9 Henan 144, 185 Hezhen 185 High Commissioner for Human Rights 163 Hinayana Buddhism 183 HIV virus 10, 146 Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party for Islamic Freedom) 167 Hmong 187 Hohhot 123, 132, 146 Hollywood 159 holy war or jihad 119, 165, 167 Hong Kong 15, 30, 37–8, 46, 58, 160 hospitality industries 73 hospitals 64 hotels 57, 77 household consumption 69 Hua Guofeng 25 Hubei province 24, 187, 191 Hui (Chinese Muslims) 2–3, 24, 29, 40, 69, 117–19, 142, 144, 169, 182, 185; and Han, clashes 119 Hu Jintao 2, 31 human development index (HDI) see United Nations Development Programme
212 Index human rights 10–12: abuses of 11, 16, 153; activists 43, 150; activities 170; in Asia 45; against China’s ethnic minorities 45; communitarian view of 11; cultural survival 161; diplomacy 12; as a factor in international relations 175; guardians 175; international rise in the concern for 153; issues 11, 43–6, 168; in Tibet 45–6, 158, 161; in Xinjiang 45–6 Human Rights Watch 121, 141 Hunan 182–3, 187, 191–2 Hungary 153 Hu Yaobang 6, 28; liberal policies 29–30; visit to Tibet 139 illiteracy 129 imperialism 32 India 23, 32–3, 36, 69, 120, 134, 152, 156, 159, 162; GDI ranking 141; government 122; Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 157, 161 indigenous medicines 65 Indonesia 4, 18, 33, 69 Industrial Revolution 9 industries 59, 180 inequalities 56, 68–70, 75, 134; China 68 infectious diseases, spread of 65 Inner Mongolia 4, 42, 46–7, 59, 74, 123, 128, 132, 164, 179, 184, 187–9; economy 47; ethnic areas of 22; Han-Mongolian marriages 146; Heilonjiang 183; Normal University 132; secession from China 46 Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) 21 Institute for Research on Religion of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 114 interethnic marriages 146–7 International Campaign for Tibet 158 International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 11 internationalisation 8, 36, 49; of Tibet issue 34 international markets 76 International Monetary Fund 10, 17 international population conference 135 international relations 2 international tourism 177; arrivals in China 15, 58; cash inflow 71 Internet 8, 179; home users 179 Iran 166; language 190 Iraq 156 Islam 10, 28, 117–20, 122, 125, 130, 153, 176–7, 190–1; adherence to 40; believers in China 118; clergy 118–19, 144; culture 119; development in China 119; ethnic groups 144, 147; fundamentalism 53, 166–8, 171, 175; militant, in Central Asia 167; minority 168; revival 119; spread 8; theological colleges 169; in Western countries 166; Xinjiang 49 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 167 Islamic Party of East Turkestan 50 Islamic Turkic speakers 189–90 Italy 58, 163 Japan 7, 14–15, 30, 36; aggression before 1949 21; invasion 22; Manchukoku 19 Jiang Qing 24–5 Jiangxi 190
Jiang Zemin 2, 6, 38, 56–7, 155, 158, 167, 170; visit to the United States 163 Jilin Province 21, 67, 186–8 Jinghong 62, 145 Jingpo 184–5 Juno of Yunnan 21, 185–6 Karamai 69 Karimov, President I. 167 Karmapa Lama 121–2 Kashgar 49, 60, 62, 69, 118, 144 Kaup, K., on the Zhuang 4 Kazak community 172, 186 Kazakhstan 59, 74–5, 166–8, 171; copper industry 74 Kazaks 32, 59, 118, 142; of Yili 118 Khotan 118, 144 Kilin 129 Kinh 173 Kirgiz 69, 118, 186; community 168 Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture 49, 69 Knight, N. 14 Koller, A, 162 Koran, the 114 Korea 15, 156–7, 173, 186 Koreans 21, 25, 31, 36, 67, 69, 116, 129, 130–2, 142, 180; in China 120, 173 Korean War (1950–1953) 156 Korean Workers’ Party 156 Kosovo 16, 39; bombing campaign in 153; Kundun 159 Kunming 60 Kurds 18 Kwan, D. 68 Kyrgyzstan 74–5, 166–8 labour: activists, exiled 13; conditions in China 13; issues 70 Ladakh 160 Lahu 186 lamaism (lama jiao) 120 lamas 122 Lamontagne, J.: literacy study by 129 language: and education 129; of instruction 131 Laos 173, 183 law concerning individual rights 11 Law of the PRC on Compulsory Education of 1986 126 Law of the PRC on Regional Autonomy of 1984 26, 41, 126; 2001 amendments 39, 66; Article 37 of the 13 Lawrence, S.V. 166 Lee Teng-hui, President 160 legal system, revival of 26 Lhasa 23, 30, 48, 62, 116, 123, 139; 1987 events in 30; government 136; riots in 35; uprising of 1959 33 Lhoba 186 Li 187; ethnic group 127; ethnic village of 73 Liangshan 20, 57, 69, 186–8, 190 Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture 147 liberal capitalism 34 liberal globalisation 176 liberal mainstream globalisation 55 liberal theorists 10
Index 213 life expectancy 68; at birth 65; in Tibet 65 Li Hongzhi 6, 114 Li Peng, Premier 38, 61, 135; West European trip 162 Lisu 187 literacy 129 Litzinger, R., on the Yao 4 Liu, G. 63, 140 living standards 179; rise in 65 localisation 37, 176 localism 40 Long March of 1934–1935 19 Lü Feijie 67 Lugu Lake 3, 124, 145, 188 Macau 15, 37, 58 McCarthy, S. 41 McGrew, A. 8–9, 16 McLuhan, M. 8 Mahayana Buddhism 120, 186 Malay-Polynesian language 184 male and female illiteracy 142 Manchu 187 Manchuria 19, 186 Manchus 2, 21, 36, 69 Manchu-Tungus language 185 Maonan 187 Mao Zedong 5–6, 17, 19, 22, 24–5, 32, 115; death 115; isolationism 57 marriages: arranged 146; arrangements, permanent 148 Martial Law Decree 1 31 martial law, imposition of 35 Marxism 113 Marxism–Leninism 5, 34, 117, 152; in Eastern Europe 52 Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought–Deng Xiaoping theory 152 Marxist–Stalinist nationality theory 3 maternity leave 142 media 44 medical personnel in Tibet 64 medical services, free basic 64 medicines: Chinese traditional 65; traditional 64–5, 76 Médicins sans Frontières 64 Miao 25, 45, 125, 178, 184, 187; ethnic village of 73 migration 15, 70, 138–41, 150 Milosevic, S. 10, 153 minorities 19–25; areas 4; in China foreign relations, 1949–1990 31–5; cultures 141; customs 70; diasporas of 18; early policy on 19–22; of Guangxi 173; languages 5; membership of the CCP 27; nationalities 1–2, 114; policy 25; politics, 1989–2002 37; population growth in 136; representation 27; students enrolled 127; teachers 128, 133; of Yunnan 173, 180 minzu [ethnic] subjects 47 modernisation and globalisation 9, 72 modernisation process 61, 116; Tibet 46 Moinba 29, 188 monasteries 20; rehabilitation of 29 Mongolia 152, 172, 188; culture 132; ethnic consciousness 47; language 191; population 19, 172; schools 132; separatist activities 46
Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) 22, 31–2, 34, 47, 172 Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) 172 Mongolians 21, 45, 59, 69, 123, 130–1; in China 31; traditional medicine of 64 Mongols 181 monks 122; government control over 121 moral decay, problem of 113 Mosuo 3, 40, 123, 145, 148–9; matrilineal 145, 188; matriliny 148–9; social system 145 Mulam 188 Muli Monastery 24 Munich 166 Musharraf, P. 165, 171 Muslims 42, 44, 114, 165–72, 182, 186; activities in Xinjiang 169; in China 150; fundamentalism 165, 181; guerrillas 165; in Pakistan 171; radicals 119, 168; separatists 51; of Southwest Asia 169; uprising in Akto Country 37; women 144 Myanmar (Burma) 146, 156, 173–4 Nanning 60 narcotics, smuggling 173–4 national integration 178–80 nationalism 40; growth in 37 Nationalist Party government of Chiang Kai-shek 22 nationality (Chinese minzu) 2 National People’s Congress (NPC) 41, 56–7 nation-state 175; rise of 9, 15 nature worship 186–7, 189, 190, 192 Naxi 3, 40, 123, 188 Nehru, Jawaharlal 33 Nepal 45 Netherlands, the 59 New China News Agency (NCNA) 24 news conference in Beijing 158 new spirituality 13, 133, 153, 165 New York 114 Nicosia 58 Nielsen/NetRatings 179 Ningxia 4, 65, 69, 142, 149, 169, 185 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 21, 118 Nobel Peace Prize 6, 18, 35, 159, 178; see also Dalai Lama Norbu, D. 32 North America 15, 30, 54 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 16, 39, 152–3; bombing campaign 153; intervention in Kosovo 155, 168 Nu 189 nuns 122 Nuosu 20, 147; language 131; slave-owners 20 Oakes, T. 72 oil and gas: flow of 177; pipelines control of 172 oil movement to Xinjiang 75 Olympic Games 177; in Seoul 156 one-child-per-couple policy 29, 135–6, 178 one-China policy 154 Organisation for Turkestan Freedom 51 Oroqen 189 Osaka, Japan 58
214 Index Osama bin Laden 154, 169; network in Afghanistan 167 Outer Mongolia 22 Pakistan 10, 69, 155, 157, 165–6, 171; radical Islamic camps in 169 Panchen Lama 23, 35, 122; controversy over 48; Eleventh 45, 121, 163, 165 patriarchal family system 188 patriotic education campaigns 121, 162 patriotism 113 People Armed Police 49 people communes, establishment of 21 People Liberation Army (PLA) 22, 49 People’s Daily 25, 66, 139–40, 179 People’s Hospital of Jinghong, Sipsong panna 137 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 19, 154; authorities 161; five censuses, ethnic minority populations in 135; Law Protecting Women’s Rights and Interests 134; State Council Information Office 45 Pitt, Brad 159 plague 65 planned economy 57 Poland 153 Politburo 25 political re-education campaigns 48 pollutants 9 polygyny 146, 149 polytheism 187, 189, 190, 192 popular folk religions 125 population 134–41; control policy 140; control and social status of women relationship 150; and ethnic minorities 135–8; growth 134, 141; issues in Tibet 29; policy 135, 178 Postiglione, G.A. 132 post offices 60 Potala Palace in Lhasa 62 poverty 75; absolute 66, 75; eradication of 142; general reduction in 65; high incidence among the minorities 67; line 7; and poverty alleviation 66–8 Prague 10; meeting of November 2002 153 preferential policies: favouring minorities 58, 70, 127; (youhui zhengce) series of 27 Primi 189 Production and Construction Corps. 140 Project Hope 127 prostitution 73, 145, 177 public health 64 Putin, President Vladimir 155, 171 Qiang 189 Qin dynasty 16 Qing dynasty 22 Qinghai 4, 69–70, 124, 128, 139–40, 164, 185, 189, 191 Qin Shihuang 16 Quanzhou, Fujian Province 119 racists 43 radio 179 railways: link of eastern seaboard with Europe 76; and roads 59 Rashid, A. 167 Reagan, President R. 34–5
Rebellion of 1959 149 Rebiya Kadeer 46, 53, 143 reform, period of 25–31 religion 29, 113–26; and education of China’s ethnic minorities 133; exemplifying both globalisation and localisation 177; freedom of 114; as having a ‘mass nature’ 114; official communiqué on 117 religious persecution 24, 161–2 Republic of Chechnya 155 Republic of Korea (South Korea) 156 Republic of Mongolia 47, 181 Reuters 157 Robinson, Mary 45, 163–4 Rotterdam 59 Rudelson, J. 118 rural family planning 136 rural incomes 68 Russia 16, 154, 167, 171–2, 177, 189 Rwanda, 1994 ethnic carnage 153 Saddam Hussein 156 Salar 189 satellite stations 60 Saudi Arabia 165, 169 Sautman, B. 70, 128, 161 Schein, L. 151; on the Miao 4 Schermerhorn, R.A. 3 Seattle 10 secessionist activities 2, 17 Second World War 8, 155 self-government, organs of 126 separatism 31, 38, 168, 179; policies of suppression of 49; in Xinjiang 53 Sera Monastery in Lhasa 122 Serbia 10; bombing campaign against 16, 153; ‘ethnic cleansing’ 39 serf system 23 Seven Years in Tibet 159 sex industry 145; in Thailand 146 sex tourism, overt 145 Sexual Customs 44 Shaanxi 70 Shadian Incident 24, 40 Shakya, T. 4, 29, 47 shamanism 183, 186–7, 189 Shanghai 38, 69; Cooperation Organisation 167–8, 171; Five 167–8 Shan people of Burma (Myanmar) 124, 183 She 190 Shenzhen 38, 70 Shigaze in Tibet 62, 121 Shimenkan 125 Sibe 190 Sichuan 70, 122–4, 131, 139, 145, 147, 187, 189, 191–2 Sino-American relations 33–4, 154–5, 157, 170 Sino-Indian relations 33 Sino-Soviet relations 7, 32 Sipsong panna Dai Autonomous Prefecture 124; attractions of 71 slavery, abolition of 21 smallpox 65 socialist ideology 113, 133 socialist market economy 56, 143
Index 215 South Africa, apartheid regime in 10 South Korea 10, 116; Christian missionaries 173 Soviet Union 17, 22, 31, 34, 36, 59, 155, 175; bloc, fall of 10; collapse of 1, 10, 52, 119, 152, 156, 166, 168, 172, 176; hegemonism 168 Spain 58 special economic zone 38 Spring Bud Project 127, 142–3 SSB Population Office 139–40 Stalin 2; definition of nationality 2–3, 21 standard of living 56, 68, 73, 180; poverty, inequalities 62–70 State Council 123; Poverty Alleviation Office 66 State Ethnic Affairs Commission 44, 66 state-owned enterprises, corporatisation 57 steel products, import of 74 Strasbourg 160 student movement, suppression 37, 56–7 Sufi sect of Islam 118 superstition 113 Sweden 7 Switzerland 163 Taiwan 10–11, 15, 58, 154, 157–8, 160, 163, 180–1, 184; Central News Agency 51; separatism 179 Tajikistan 74–5, 166–8 Tajiks 118, 190 Taklamakan Desert 68 Taliban 165, 169, 171; in Afghanistan 154, 166 Tamils in Sri Lanka 18 Tang Guoqiang, Foreign Ministry spokesman 161–2 Tashilhunpo Monastery 121 Tatars 118, 190 teachers: from ethnic minorities 133; training school in Hotan 143 technologies, advance of 9 telephones 60, 179 television 179 Tenzin Chogyal 161 terror attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington 16, 49, 53, 58, 75–6; Chinese leaders’ reaction 155 terrorism 51–2, 168; three main sources of 179 textbooks 130 Thailand 7, 12, 124–5, 173–4, 177 Thais 124, 186; language 183; monks 125 ‘theme parks’ 70–1 Theravada Buddhism 124, 144, 177, 192; ethnic groups 183 Theravada tradition 120 Tianjin 69 Tibet 4, 15, 28–31, 37, 47–9, 61, 64, 69, 115, 125, 129, 138, 142, 148–50, 162–3, 175, 180, 186, 188, 191; appointment of special coordinator 158; bureaucracy nationalisation of 29; cadres 31; CCP power in 29; culture 61, 122; diaspora 48, 54; economy 61; ethnic areas of 22, 123, 139, 158; exile community 121; female officials 142; foreign tourists in 71; foreign trade 74; global implications of 122; government-in-exile 136, 138, 157; Han Chinese immigration into 139; human rights abuses in 157; impact on bilateral relations 152; incarnate lamas 122; independence for 120; independence movements in 30, 33, 37, 48, 115; Information
Network 46, 162; issue, globalisation of 162–3; language 30, 130–1; lifestyle 46; lobby 152, 157, 159; Marriage Law of 1981 149; marriage practices 151; members of the CCP 48; monasteries 130; polyandry 149; poverty 68; railway in 60; referendum in 162; religion 122, 163; separatism 179, 181; in Sino-American relations 33; spirituality 30; standards of living 61; Support Group 138; survey on family matters in 137; tourists in 120; traditional arts 24; traditional medicine of 64; women 146; Work Forum in Beijing 61 Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) 21, 23, 42, 70, 122, 140; Birth Control Commission 136; ethnic breakdown of population 139; language commission 131 Tibetan Bon, ancient traditional 122 Tibetan Buddhism 13, 28, 49, 120, 123, 133, 153, 161, 165, 172, 178, 188–92; clergy 121; monasteries 24, 121, 123 Tibetans 17, 25, 32–5, 45, 69, 130–2, 157–65; in clerical estate 122 Tibeto-Burman language 184–6, 192 Tongzha 127 tourism 15, 57, 70, 75–6, 145, 177, 180; acceleration 71; China’s ethnic areas 133; industry 126; influx into Tibet 36; positive impact 73; tourists 30, 116, 146 trade 176 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance 32 Tu 123, 191 tuberculosis 64, 75 Tujia 191 Turkey 51, 166 Turpan 60, 118, 144 Uighur [Uygur] businessmen 61 Ulanhu 25 UNESCO World Heritage Sites 62 United Arab Emirates 165 United Kingdom 58 United Nations 11, 16, 23, 134, 163; 1998 Human Development Report 7; Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing 6, 134; High Commissioner for Human Rights 45; Population Fund 150; War Crimes Tribunal 153 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 67, 141–2; measure of overall human development index (HDI) 65, 69, 141 United States 1, 7, 11, 32–3, 55, 58, 75, 117, 120, 149, 152, 154–5, 157–8, 160, 164, 171–2, 175, 177; Department of State 45, 170; domination of world economy 13; influence in Central Asia 181 United States-led war against terrorism 179 universal 9-year education 126; aim of 129 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 11 universalist view of human rights 11 Upton, J. 131 urbanisation 61–2, 180 Ürümqi 62, 69, 137, 144, 148, 169 Uygurs 17, 32, 45, 51, 54, 60, 61, 69, 117–19, 130–2, 140–2, 150, 165, 169, 178, 181, 191; educated 137, 148; exile community 165; and Han, relations between 53; language 191;
216 Index Uygurs (Continued) Liberation Organisation 166; migration 141; Muslim communities of Xinjiang 55; Muslim radicals 166; population 46, 138; separatist activities 51, 119, 179; separatist terrorism 170–1; traditional medicine of 64; women 144 Uzbekistan 74–5, 167 Uzbeks 118, 191–2 Va 192 Vietnam 156, 173, 185; relations with 7 village: elections 10; health stations 64 ‘walking marriages’ 148–9 Wang, J. 149 Wang Zhaoguo 52 war: against Afghanistan 16; in Bosnia-Hercegovina 153; against terrorism 169–72, 175 water, shortage of 70 Water Splashing Festival 124 Weining County 125 Western Europe 54, 153 Western Poverty Reduction Project 165 Western tourists 178 Westphalia, Treaty of 9, 15 Winchester, M. 49, 119 Winnington, A. 20 Wolf, F. 162 Wolfensohn, J. 164 women 6, 134; educational levels 151; empowerment of 141, 151; from ethnic minorities 143, 177; and gender 141–50; rights 13; rising status of 146, 148; see also United Nations Conference World Bank 10, 66–7, 150, 164–5; boundary mark for poverty 68; Independent Inspection Panel 164 World Health Organisation 64 World Islamic Development Bank 169 World Tourism Organisation 58 World Trade Center 49, 58; Towers, destruction 154 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 1, 5, 10, 12, 17, 54, 126, 145, 175–7; meeting in Seattle 1, 13; see also China
Wu Jinghua 30–1 Wudang zhao 123 Xining 124, 128 Xinjiang 4, 15, 22, 37, 42, 49–54, 56, 60–1, 67–8, 71, 76, 115, 117–18, 125, 128, 131, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 165, 168, 179, 181, 184–6, 188–91; 2000 census 141; ethnic breakdown of population 140; ethnic clashes and terrorism 49–52; foreign trade 74; history of 130; minorities 27; Political Consultative Conference 50; separatism 119; Television 49; tourists 71 Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 21, 52, 118 Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture 4, 21, 27, 129, 131 Yangjin 143 Yangxin riots of December 2000 44 Yan, H. 139 Yao 125, 192 Yee, Professor H. 122 Yeltsin, President Boris 155 Yi 20, 30, 130–1, 184, 187–8, 192 Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture 50 Yinchuan 169 Yining 32, 143–4 Yugoslavia 175; break-up of 153 Yugur 192 Yunnan 4, 41, 63, 65, 67, 69–72, 123–4, 138–9, 145, 149, 182–9, 191–2 Zahideen Yusuf 49–50 Zhang Guohua General 23 Zhao Ziyang 6 Zhejiang 69, 190 zhongnan qingnü 144 Zhou Enlai 22, 33 Zhuang 187, 192–3; ethnic consciousness 41; men 173; mobilisation 41 Zhu Rongji 38, 70 | <urn:uuid:dca674dd-6d34-4a3b-9612-f7345882bf7b> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://silo.pub/chinas-ethnic-minorities-and-globalisation.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.956541 | 124,882 | 1.757813 | 2 |
Autoclave and oven racks take up space and can limit the size and quantity of tools that can be processed together.
Torr can configure tools with legs and receptacles that allow them to stack, taking the place of a conventional table
This group of autoclave tools has a cart that serves as the base. Each tool has forklift pockets and large receptacles
and legs. These tools also work good with manual stackers, both hand/foot powered and electric. These particular tools
have vacuum ports and thermocouple connections installed in the plate and routed to panel connections on the ends.
This set of 5 double-diaphragm tools has a bottom cart structure. Each tool has an upper and lower diaphragm/frame
assembly. Vacuum ports are installed in the lower diaphragm and routed to a panel connection.
Even small ovens or autoclaves can be accommodated. This tool has an aluminum baseplate with a vacuum and thermocouple
port in the diaphragm. The diaphragm vacuum port is routed to a horizontally mounted bulkhead fitting on the frame to
accommodate the hose and quick-disconnect. Whenever possible, vacuum connections are installed on the frame to protect | <urn:uuid:49849f50-f679-45cd-aad8-da614008e9dc> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://torrtech.com/Pages/Tools06-Stacking1.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.924362 | 272 | 1.726563 | 2 |
Yet another way to apply the TeX formatting command to a Texinfo file
is to put that command in a local variables list at the end of the
Texinfo file. You can then specify the
commands as a
compile-command and have Emacs run it by typing
M-x compile. This creates a special shell called the
*compilation* buffer in which Emacs runs the compile command.
For example, at the end of the gdb.texi file, after the
@bye, you could put the following:
Local Variables: compile-command: "texi2dvi gdb.texi" End:
This technique is most often used by programmers who also compile programs this way; see Compilation in The GNU Emacs Manual. | <urn:uuid:9fe2eaf7-a4fa-44a7-88b1-330a1b1b662d> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://www.gnu.org/software/texinfo/manual/texinfo/html_node/Compile_002dCommand.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.851152 | 170 | 1.914063 | 2 |
Articles | Volume 16, issue 9
17 May 2019
Research article | 17 May 2019
Investigating the effect of El Niño on nitrous oxide distribution in the eastern tropical South Pacific
Qixing Ji et al.
Qixing Ji, Claudia Frey, Xin Sun, Melanie Jackson, Yea-Shine Lee, Amal Jayakumar, Jeffrey C. Cornwell, and Bess B. Ward
Biogeosciences, 15, 6127–6138,Short summary
Nitrous oxide (N2O) is a strong greenhouse gas and ozone-depletion agent. Intense N2O effluxes had been observed from nutrient-rich estuaries with human impacts, such as the Chesapeake Bay. We report that increased nitrogen availability and low-oxygen conditions stimulate N2O production. Thus, controlling the nutrient input to the bay will decrease nitrogen availability and alleviate eutrophication, leading to water column reoxygenation, and subsequently will mitigate N2O emission.
Damian Leonardo Arévalo-Martínez, Amir Haroon, Hermann Werner Bange, Ercan Erkul, Marion Jegen, Nils Moosdorf, Jens Schneider von Deimling, Christian Berndt, Michael Ernst Böttcher, Jasper Hoffmann, Volker Liebetrau, Ulf Mallast, Gudrun Massmann, Aaron Micallef, Holly A. Michael, Hendrik Paasche, Wolfgang Rabbel, Isaac Santos, Jan Scholten, Katrin Schwalenberg, Beata Szymczycha, Ariel T. Thomas, Joonas J. Virtasalo, Hannelore Waska, and Bradley Weymer
Preprint under review for BGShort summary
Groundwater flows at the land-ocean transition and the extent of freshened groundwater below the seafloor are increasingly relevant in marine sciences both because they are a highly uncertain term of biogeochemical budgets, and also due to the emerging interest in the latter as a resource. Here we discuss our perspectives on future research directions to better understand land-ocean connectivity through groundwater and its potential responses to natural and human-induced environmental changes.
Sonja Gindorf, Hermann W. Bange, Dennis Booge, and Annette Kock
Methane is a climate-relevant greenhouse gas which is emitted to the atmosphere from coastal areas such as the Baltic Sea. We measured the methane concentration in the water column of the western Kiel Bight. Methane concentrations were higher in September than in June. We found no relationship between the 2018 European Heatwave and methane concentrations. Our results show that the methane distribution in the water column is strongly affected by temporal and spatial variabilities.
Yanan Zhao, Dennis Booge, Christa A. Marandino, Cathleen Schlundt, Astrid Bracher, Elliot L. Atlas, Jonathan Williams, and Hermann W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 19, 701–714,Short summary
We present here, for the first time, simultaneously measured dimethylsulfide (DMS) seawater concentrations and DMS atmospheric mole fractions from the Peruvian upwelling region during two cruises in December 2012 and October 2015. Our results indicate low oceanic DMS concentrations and atmospheric DMS molar fractions in surface waters and the atmosphere, respectively. In addition, the Peruvian upwelling region was identified as an insignificant source of DMS emissions during both periods.
Wangwang Ye, Hermann W. Bange, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Hailun He, Yuhong Li, Jianwen Wen, Jiexia Zhang, Jian Liu, Man Wu, and Liyang Zhan
Manuscript not accepted for further reviewShort summary
CH4 is the second important greenhouse gas after CO2. We show that CH4 consumption and sea-ice melting influence the CH4 distribution in the Ross Sea (Southern Ocean), causing undersaturation and net uptake of CH4 during summertime. This study confirms the capability of surface water in the high-latitude Southern Ocean regions to take up atmospheric CH4 which, in turn, will help to improve predictions of how CH4 release/uptake from the ocean will develop when sea-ice retreats in the future.
Gerd Krahmann, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Andrew W. Dale, Marcus Dengler, Anja Engel, Nicolaas Glock, Patricia Grasse, Johannes Hahn, Helena Hauss, Mark Hopwood, Rainer Kiko, Alexandra Loginova, Carolin R. Löscher, Marie Maßmig, Alexandra-Sophie Roy, Renato Salvatteci, Stefan Sommer, Toste Tanhua, and Hela Mehrtens
Earth Syst. Sci. Data Discuss.,
Preprint withdrawnShort summary
The project "Climate-Biogeochemistry Interactions in the Tropical Ocean" (SFB 754) was a multidisciplinary research project active from 2008 to 2019 aimed at a better understanding of the coupling between the tropical climate and ocean circulation and the ocean's oxygen and nutrient balance. On 34 research cruises, mainly in the Southeast Tropical Pacific and the Northeast Tropical Atlantic, 1071 physical, chemical and biological data sets were collected.
Yanan Zhao, Cathleen Schlundt, Dennis Booge, and Hermann W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 18, 2161–2179,Short summary
We present a unique and comprehensive time-series study of biogenic sulfur compounds in the southwestern Baltic Sea, from 2009 to 2018. Dimethyl sulfide is one of the key players regulating global climate change, as well as dimethylsulfoniopropionate and dimethyl sulfoxide. Their decadal trends did not follow increasing temperature but followed some algae group abundances at the Boknis Eck Time Series Station.
Samuel T. Wilson, Alia N. Al-Haj, Annie Bourbonnais, Claudia Frey, Robinson W. Fulweiler, John D. Kessler, Hannah K. Marchant, Jana Milucka, Nicholas E. Ray, Parvadha Suntharalingam, Brett F. Thornton, Robert C. Upstill-Goddard, Thomas S. Weber, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Hermann W. Bange, Heather M. Benway, Daniele Bianchi, Alberto V. Borges, Bonnie X. Chang, Patrick M. Crill, Daniela A. del Valle, Laura Farías, Samantha B. Joye, Annette Kock, Jabrane Labidi, Cara C. Manning, John W. Pohlman, Gregor Rehder, Katy J. Sparrow, Philippe D. Tortell, Tina Treude, David L. Valentine, Bess B. Ward, Simon Yang, and Leonid N. Yurganov
Biogeosciences, 17, 5809–5828,Short summary
The oceans are a net source of the major greenhouse gases; however there has been little coordination of oceanic methane and nitrous oxide measurements. The scientific community has recently embarked on a series of capacity-building exercises to improve the interoperability of dissolved methane and nitrous oxide measurements. This paper derives from a workshop which discussed the challenges and opportunities for oceanic methane and nitrous oxide research in the near future.
Lennart Thomas Bach, Allanah Joy Paul, Tim Boxhammer, Elisabeth von der Esch, Michelle Graco, Kai Georg Schulz, Eric Achterberg, Paulina Aguayo, Javier Arístegui, Patrizia Ayón, Isabel Baños, Avy Bernales, Anne Sophie Boegeholz, Francisco Chavez, Gabriela Chavez, Shao-Min Chen, Kristin Doering, Alba Filella, Martin Fischer, Patricia Grasse, Mathias Haunost, Jan Hennke, Nauzet Hernández-Hernández, Mark Hopwood, Maricarmen Igarza, Verena Kalter, Leila Kittu, Peter Kohnert, Jesus Ledesma, Christian Lieberum, Silke Lischka, Carolin Löscher, Andrea Ludwig, Ursula Mendoza, Jana Meyer, Judith Meyer, Fabrizio Minutolo, Joaquin Ortiz Cortes, Jonna Piiparinen, Claudia Sforna, Kristian Spilling, Sonia Sanchez, Carsten Spisla, Michael Sswat, Mabel Zavala Moreira, and Ulf Riebesell
Biogeosciences, 17, 4831–4852,Short summary
The eastern boundary upwelling system off Peru is among Earth's most productive ocean ecosystems, but the factors that control its functioning are poorly constrained. Here we used mesocosms, moored ~ 6 km offshore Peru, to investigate how processes in plankton communities drive key biogeochemical processes. We show that nutrient and light co-limitation keep productivity and export at a remarkably constant level while stoichiometry changes strongly with shifts in plankton community structure.
Xiao Ma, Mingshuang Sun, Sinikka T. Lennartz, and Hermann W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 17, 3427–3438,Short summary
Monthly measurements of dissolved methane (CH4), a potent greenhouse gas, were conducted at Boknis Eck (BE), a time-series station in the southwestern Baltic Sea, from June 2006. In general CH4 concentrations increased with depth. High concentrations in the upper layer were linked to saline water inflow. Eckernförde Bay emitted CH4 to the atmosphere throughout the monitoring period. No significant trend was detected in CH4 concentrations or emissions during 2006–2017.
Claudia Frey, Hermann W. Bange, Eric P. Achterberg, Amal Jayakumar, Carolin R. Löscher, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Elizabeth León-Palmero, Mingshuang Sun, Xin Sun, Ruifang C. Xie, Sergey Oleynik, and Bess B. Ward
Biogeosciences, 17, 2263–2287,Short summary
The production of N2O via nitrification and denitrification associated with low-O2 waters is a major source of oceanic N2O. We investigated the regulation and dynamics of these processes with respect to O2 and organic matter inputs. The transcription of the key nitrification gene amoA rapidly responded to changes in O2 and strongly correlated with N2O production rates. N2O production by denitrification was clearly stimulated by organic carbon, implying that its supply controls N2O production.
Carolin R. Löscher, Wiebke Mohr, Hermann W. Bange, and Donald E. Canfield
Biogeosciences, 17, 851–864,Short summary
Oxygen minimum zones (OMZs) are ocean areas severely depleted in oxygen as a result of physical, chemical, and biological processes. Biologically, organic material is produced in the sea surface and exported to deeper waters, where it respires. In the Bay of Bengal (BoB), an OMZ is present, but there are traces of oxygen left. Our study now suggests that this is because one key process, nitrogen fixation, is absent in the BoB, thus preventing primary production and consecutive respiration.
Ye Tian, Gui-Peng Yang, Chun-Ying Liu, Pei-Feng Li, Hong-Tao Chen, and Hermann W. Bange
Ocean Sci., 16, 135–148,Short summary
Nitric oxide (NO) could be produced by nitrite photolysis; the rates from dissolved nitrite in artificial seawater showed increasing trends with decreasing pH, increasing temperatures, and increasing salinity. However, NO photoproduction from the natural seawater samples did not show correlations with pH, water temperature, salinity, or dissolved nitrite concentrations in the western tropical North Pacific Ocean (WNTP). And there were other NO loss processes in the surface layer of WNTP.
Thomas Holding, Ian G. Ashton, Jamie D. Shutler, Peter E. Land, Philip D. Nightingale, Andrew P. Rees, Ian Brown, Jean-Francois Piolle, Annette Kock, Hermann W. Bange, David K. Woolf, Lonneke Goddijn-Murphy, Ryan Pereira, Frederic Paul, Fanny Girard-Ardhuin, Bertrand Chapron, Gregor Rehder, Fabrice Ardhuin, and Craig J. Donlon
Ocean Sci., 15, 1707–1728,Short summary
FluxEngine is an open-source software toolbox designed to allow for the easy and accurate calculation of air–sea gas fluxes. This article describes new functionality and capabilities, which include the ability to calculate fluxes for nitrous oxide and methane, optimisation for running FluxEngine on a stand-alone desktop computer, and extensive new features to support the in situ measurement community. Four research case studies are used to demonstrate these new features.
Ye Tian, Chao Xue, Chun-Ying Liu, Gui-Peng Yang, Pei-Feng Li, Wei-Hua Feng, and Hermann W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 16, 4485–4496,Short summary
Nitric oxide (NO) seems to be widespread, with different functions in the marine ecosystem, but we know little about it. Concentrations of NO were in a range from below the limit of detection to 616 pmol L−1 at the surface and 482 pmol L−1 at the bottom of the Bohai and Yellow seas. The study region was a source of atmospheric NO. Net NO sea-to-air fluxes were much lower than NO photoproduction rates, implying that the NO produced in the mixed layer was rapidly consumed before entering the air.
Hermann W. Bange, Chun Hock Sim, Daniel Bastian, Jennifer Kallert, Annette Kock, Aazani Mujahid, and Moritz Müller
Biogeosciences, 16, 4321–4335,Short summary
Nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) are atmospheric trace gases which play important roles in the climate and atmospheric chemistry of the Earth. However, little is known about their emissions from rivers and estuaries. To this end, concentrations of N2O and CH4 were measured during a seasonal study in six rivers and estuaries in northwestern Borneo. The concentrations of both gases were mainly driven by rainfall. The rivers and estuaries were an overall net source of atmospheric N2O and CH4.
Xiao Ma, Sinikka T. Lennartz, and Hermann W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 16, 4097–4111,Short summary
Monthly measurements of nitrous oxide (N2O), a potent greenhouse gas and ozone depletion agent, were conducted at Boknis Eck (BE), a time series station in the southwestern Baltic Sea, since July 2005. Low N2O concentrations were observed in autumn and high in winter and early spring. Dissolved nutrients and oxygen played important roles in N2O distribution. Although we did not observe a significant N2O trend during 2005–2017, a decrease in N2O concentration and emission seems likely in future.
Eric J. Morgan, Jost V. Lavric, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Hermann W. Bange, Tobias Steinhoff, Thomas Seifert, and Martin Heimann
Biogeosciences, 16, 4065–4084,Short summary
Taking a 2-year atmospheric record of atmospheric oxygen and the greenhouse gases N2O, CO2, and CH4, made at a coastal site in the Namib Desert, we estimated the fluxes of these gases from upwelling events in the northern Benguela Current region. We compared these results with flux measurements made on a research vessel in the study area at the same time and found that the two approaches agreed well. The study region was a source of N2O, CO2, and CH4 to the atmosphere during upwelling events.
Tim Fischer, Annette Kock, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Marcus Dengler, Peter Brandt, and Hermann W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 16, 2307–2328,Short summary
We investigated air–sea gas exchange in oceanic upwelling regions for the case of nitrous oxide off Peru. In this region, routine concentration measurements from ships at 5 m or 10 m depth prove to overestimate surface (bulk) concentration. Thus, standard estimates of gas exchange will show systematic error. This is due to very shallow stratified layers that inhibit exchange between surface water and waters below and can exist for several days. Maximum bias occurs in moderate wind conditions.
Catherine A. Pfister and Mark A. Altabet
Biogeosciences, 16, 193–206,Short summary
Microbial assemblages on host plants and animals are an increasingly recognized biological phenomenon. We present evidence that microbes in association with mussels and seaweeds are contributing greatly to nitrogen cycling in coastal marine areas, often many times that of the microbes that are simply free-living in seawater. The addition of dissolved organic carbon increased nutrient uptake by microbes, suggesting that coastal species enhance microbial metabolism through resource provisioning.
Qixing Ji, Claudia Frey, Xin Sun, Melanie Jackson, Yea-Shine Lee, Amal Jayakumar, Jeffrey C. Cornwell, and Bess B. Ward
Biogeosciences, 15, 6127–6138,Short summary
Nitrous oxide (N2O) is a strong greenhouse gas and ozone-depletion agent. Intense N2O effluxes had been observed from nutrient-rich estuaries with human impacts, such as the Chesapeake Bay. We report that increased nitrogen availability and low-oxygen conditions stimulate N2O production. Thus, controlling the nutrient input to the bay will decrease nitrogen availability and alleviate eutrophication, leading to water column reoxygenation, and subsequently will mitigate N2O emission.
Samuel T. Wilson, Hermann W. Bange, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Jonathan Barnes, Alberto V. Borges, Ian Brown, John L. Bullister, Macarena Burgos, David W. Capelle, Michael Casso, Mercedes de la Paz, Laura Farías, Lindsay Fenwick, Sara Ferrón, Gerardo Garcia, Michael Glockzin, David M. Karl, Annette Kock, Sarah Laperriere, Cliff S. Law, Cara C. Manning, Andrew Marriner, Jukka-Pekka Myllykangas, John W. Pohlman, Andrew P. Rees, Alyson E. Santoro, Philippe D. Tortell, Robert C. Upstill-Goddard, David P. Wisegarver, Gui-Ling Zhang, and Gregor Rehder
Biogeosciences, 15, 5891–5907,Short summary
To determine the variability between independent measurements of dissolved methane and nitrous oxide, seawater samples were analyzed by multiple laboratories. The results revealed the influences of the different parts of the analytical process, from the initial sample collection to the calculation of the final concentrations. Recommendations are made to improve dissolved methane and nitrous oxide measurements to help preclude future analytical discrepancies between laboratories.
Johanna Maltby, Lea Steinle, Carolin R. Löscher, Hermann W. Bange, Martin A. Fischer, Mark Schmidt, and Tina Treude
Biogeosciences, 15, 137–157,Short summary
The activity and environmental controls of methanogenesis (MG) within the sulfate-reducing zone (0–30 cm below the seafloor) were investigated in organic-rich sediments of the seasonally hypoxic Eckernförde Bay, SW Baltic Sea. MG activity was mostly linked to non-competitive substrates. The major controls identified were organic matter availability, C / N, temperature, and O2 in the water column, revealing higher rates in warm, stratified, hypoxic seasons compared to colder, oxygenated seasons.
Eike E. Köhn, Sören Thomsen, Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, and Torsten Kanzow
Ocean Sci., 13, 1017–1033,
Michelle I. Graco, Sara Purca, Boris Dewitte, Carmen G. Castro, Octavio Morón, Jesús Ledesma, Georgina Flores, and Dimitri Gutiérrez
Biogeosciences, 14, 4601–4617,Short summary
The Peruvian coastal upwelling ecosystem is a natural laboratory to study climatic variability and climate change. We examined the variability in the OMZ in the last decades in connection with the equatorial Pacific strong 1997–1998 El Niño event and the influence of central Pacific El Niño events and enhanced equatorial Kelvin wave activity since 2000. The data reveal two contrasting regimes and a long-term trend corresponding to a deepening of the oxygen-deficient waters and warming.
Chun-Ying Liu, Wei-Hua Feng, Ye Tian, Gui-Peng Yang, Pei-Feng Li, and Hermann W. Bange
Ocean Sci., 13, 623–632,Short summary
We developed a new method for the determination of dissolved nitric oxide (NO) in discrete seawater samples based on the combination of a purge-and-trap setup and a fluorometric detection of NO. With this method we have a reliable and comparably easy to use method to measure oceanic NO surface concentrations, which can be used to decipher both its temporal and spatial distributions as well as its biogeochemical pathways in the oceans.
Lea Steinle, Johanna Maltby, Tina Treude, Annette Kock, Hermann W. Bange, Nadine Engbersen, Jakob Zopfi, Moritz F. Lehmann, and Helge Niemann
Biogeosciences, 14, 1631–1645,Short summary
Large amounts of methane are produced in anoxic, coastal sediments, from which it can seep into the overlying water column. Aerobic oxidation of methane (MOx) mediated by methanotrophic bacteria is an important sink for methane before its evasion to the atmosphere. In a 2-year seasonal study, we investigated the spatio-temporal variability of MOx in a seasonally hypoxic coastal inlet using radiotracer-based methods. In experiments, we assessed the effect of variable oxygen concentrations on MOx.
Sinikka T. Lennartz, Christa A. Marandino, Marc von Hobe, Pau Cortes, Birgit Quack, Rafel Simo, Dennis Booge, Andrea Pozzer, Tobias Steinhoff, Damian L. Arevalo-Martinez, Corinna Kloss, Astrid Bracher, Rüdiger Röttgers, Elliot Atlas, and Kirstin Krüger
Atmos. Chem. Phys., 17, 385–402,Short summary
We present new sea surface and marine boundary layer measurements of carbonyl sulfide, the most abundant sulfur gas in the atmosphere, and calculate an oceanic emission estimate. Our results imply that oceanic emissions are very unlikely to account for the missing source in the atmospheric budget that is currently discussed for OCS.
Lothar Stramma, Tim Fischer, Damian S. Grundle, Gerd Krahmann, Hermann W. Bange, and Christa A. Marandino
Ocean Sci., 12, 861–873,Short summary
Results from a research cruise on R/V Sonne to the eastern tropical Pacific in October 2015 during the 2015–2016 El Niño show the transition of current, hydrographic, and nutrient conditions to El Niño conditions in the eastern tropical Pacific in October 2015. Although in early 2015 the El Niño was strong and in October 2015 showed a clear El Niño influence on the EUC, in the eastern tropical Pacific the measurements only showed developing El Niño water mass distributions.
Carolin R. Löscher, Hermann W. Bange, Ruth A. Schmitz, Cameron M. Callbeck, Anja Engel, Helena Hauss, Torsten Kanzow, Rainer Kiko, Gaute Lavik, Alexandra Loginova, Frank Melzner, Judith Meyer, Sven C. Neulinger, Markus Pahlow, Ulf Riebesell, Harald Schunck, Sören Thomsen, and Hannes Wagner
Biogeosciences, 13, 3585–3606,Short summary
The ocean loses oxygen due to climate change. Addressing this issue in tropical ocean regions (off Peru and Mauritania), we aimed to understand the effects of oxygen depletion on various aspects of marine biogeochemistry, including primary production and export production, the nitrogen cycle, greenhouse gas production, organic matter fluxes and remineralization, and the role of zooplankton and viruses.
Catherine A. Pfister, Mark A. Altabet, Santhiska Pather, and Greg Dwyer
Biogeosciences, 13, 3519–3531,Short summary
It is increasingly recognized that marine animals host microbes relevant to nitrogen cycling. Rocky shore tidepools host a phylogenetically diverse biota that inspired us to experimentally isolate their effects on microbial nitrogen processing. We found that mussels promote high rates and diverse types of microbial nitrogen metabolisms. We further developed a novel mathematical model that quantified these diverse processes and showed their significance to nitrogen processing.
Carolin R. Löscher, Annie Bourbonnais, Julien Dekaezemacker, Chawalit N. Charoenpong, Mark A. Altabet, Hermann W. Bange, Rena Czeschel, Chris Hoffmann, and Ruth Schmitz
Biogeosciences, 13, 2889–2899,Short summary
The ocean is full of eddies and they play a key role for ocean biogeochemistry. In order to understand dinitrogen (N2) fixation, one major control of oceanic primary production, we investigated three eddies in the eastern tropical South Pacific off Peru. We conducted the first detailed survey and found increased N2 fixation in the oxygen-depleted cores of anticyclonic mode water eddies. Taken together, we could – for the first time – show that eddies play an important role in N2 fixation off Peru.
Denise Müller, Hermann W. Bange, Thorsten Warneke, Tim Rixen, Moritz Müller, Aazani Mujahid, and Justus Notholt
Biogeosciences, 13, 2415–2428,Short summary
Estuaries act as sources of the greenhouse gases nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) to the atmosphere. We provide first measurements of N2O and CH4 in two estuaries in north-western Borneo, a region which is dominated by peatlands. We show that N2O and CH4 concentrations in these estuaries are moderate despite high organic carbon loads, that nutrient enhancement does not lead to enhanced N2O emissions, and that the wet season dominates the variability of the emissions in these systems.
Happy Hu, Annie Bourbonnais, Jennifer Larkum, Hermann W. Bange, and Mark A. Altabet
Biogeosciences, 13, 1453–1468,
Damian L. Arévalo-Martínez, Annette Kock, Carolin R. Löscher, Ruth A. Schmitz, Lothar Stramma, and Hermann W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 13, 1105–1118,Short summary
We present the first measurements of N2O across three mesoscale eddies in the eastern tropical South Pacific. Eddie's vertical structure, offshore transport, properties during its formation and near-surface primary production determined the N2O distribution. Substantial depletion of N2O within the core of anticyclonic eddies suggests that although these are transient features, N-loss processes within their centres can lead to an enhanced N2O sink which is not accounted for in marine N2O budgets.
A. Kock, D. L. Arévalo-Martínez, C. R. Löscher, and H. W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 13, 827–840,Short summary
We measured the nitrous oxide (N2O) distribution in the water column in the oxygen minimum zone off Peru, an area with extremely high N2O emissions. Our data show very variable and often very high N2O concentrations in the water column at the coast, which lead to high N2O emissions when these waters are brought to the surface. The very high N2O production off Peru may be caused by high nutrient turnover rates together with rapid changes in the oxygen concentrations.
A. R. Baker, M. Thomas, H. W. Bange, and E. Plasencia Sánchez
Biogeosciences, 13, 817–825,Short summary
Concentrations of major ions and trace metals were measured in aerosols off the coast of Peru in December 2012. A few trace metals (iron, copper, nickel, and cobalt) had anomalously high concentrations, which may be associated with industrial metal smelting activities in the region. The atmosphere appears to supply an excess of iron (relative to atmospheric nitrogen supply) to the phytoplankton community of the Peruvian upwelling system.
D. Müller, T. Warneke, T. Rixen, M. Müller, A. Mujahid, H. W. Bange, and J. Notholt
Biogeosciences, 13, 691–705,Short summary
We studied organic carbon and the dissolved greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO2) and carbon monoxide (CO) in two estuaries in Sarawak, Malaysia, whose coast is covered by carbon-rich peatlands. The estuaries received terrestrial organic carbon from peat-draining tributaries. A large fraction was converted to CO2 and a minor fraction to CO. Both gases were released to the atmosphere. This shows how these estuaries function as efficient filters between land and ocean in this important region.
H. E. Lutterbeck and H. W. Bange
Ocean Sci., 11, 937–946,
P. Brandt, H. W. Bange, D. Banyte, M. Dengler, S.-H. Didwischus, T. Fischer, R. J. Greatbatch, J. Hahn, T. Kanzow, J. Karstensen, A. Körtzinger, G. Krahmann, S. Schmidtko, L. Stramma, T. Tanhua, and M. Visbeck
Biogeosciences, 12, 489–512,Short summary
Our observational study looks at the structure of the eastern tropical North Atlantic (ETNA) oxygen minimum zone (OMZ) in comparison with the less-ventilated, eastern tropical South Pacific OMZ. We quantify the OMZ’s oxygen budget composed of consumption, advection, lateral and vertical mixing. Substantial oxygen variability is observed on interannual to multidecadal timescales. The deoxygenation of the ETNA OMZ during the last decades represents a substantial imbalance of the oxygen budget.
S. T. Lennartz, A. Lehmann, J. Herrford, F. Malien, H.-P. Hansen, H. Biester, and H. W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 11, 6323–6339,Short summary
A time series of nine oceanic parameters from the coastal time series station Boknis Eck (BE, southwestern Baltic Sea) in the period of 1957-2013 is analysed with respect to seasonal cycles and long-term trends. Most striking was a paradoxical decreasing trend in oxygen with a simultaneous decline in eutrophication. Possible reasons for this paradox, e.g. processes related to warming temperatures such as increased decomposition of organic matter or altered ventilation, are discussed.
P. K. Swart, S. Evans, T. Capo, and M. A. Altabet
Biogeosciences, 11, 6147–6157,Short summary
The ratio of nitrogen-15 to nitrogen-14 of macroalgae has been termed the DNA of sewage. Higher amounts of N-15 have been suggested to indicate the influence of sewage-derived N. But what exactly does the ratio of 15N/14N record? We found that the nitrogen isotopic ratio was dependent upon not only the value in the water but also its concentration of nitrate. At low concentration there was little fractionation, but at higher values the uptake by algae left more of the N-15 in the water.
J. Friedrich, F. Janssen, D. Aleynik, H. W. Bange, N. Boltacheva, M. N. Çagatay, A. W. Dale, G. Etiope, Z. Erdem, M. Geraga, A. Gilli, M. T. Gomoiu, P. O. J. Hall, D. Hansson, Y. He, M. Holtappels, M. K. Kirf, M. Kononets, S. Konovalov, A. Lichtschlag, D. M. Livingstone, G. Marinaro, S. Mazlumyan, S. Naeher, R. P. North, G. Papatheodorou, O. Pfannkuche, R. Prien, G. Rehder, C. J. Schubert, T. Soltwedel, S. Sommer, H. Stahl, E. V. Stanev, A. Teaca, A. Tengberg, C. Waldmann, B. Wehrli, and F. Wenzhöfer
Biogeosciences, 11, 1215–1259,
D. L. Arévalo-Martínez, M. Beyer, M. Krumbholz, I. Piller, A. Kock, T. Steinhoff, A. Körtzinger, and H. W. Bange
Ocean Sci., 9, 1071–1087,
L. Stramma, H. W. Bange, R. Czeschel, A. Lorenzo, and M. Frank
Biogeosciences, 10, 7293–7306,
I.-N. Kim, K. Lee, H. W. Bange, and A. M. Macdonald
Biogeosciences, 10, 6783–6792,
C. A. Marandino, S. Tegtmeier, K. Krüger, C. Zindler, E. L. Atlas, F. Moore, and H. W. Bange
Atmos. Chem. Phys., 13, 8427–8437,
K. Laß, H. W. Bange, and G. Friedrichs
Biogeosciences, 10, 5325–5334,
C. Zindler, A. Bracher, C. A. Marandino, B. Taylor, E. Torrecilla, A. Kock, and H. W. Bange
Biogeosciences, 10, 3297–3311,
E. Montes, M. A. Altabet, F. E. Muller-Karger, M. I. Scranton, R. C. Thunell, C. Benitez-Nelson, L. Lorenzoni, and Y. M. Astor
Biogeosciences, 10, 267–279,
L. M. Zamora, A. Oschlies, H. W. Bange, K. B. Huebert, J. D. Craig, A. Kock, and C. R. Löscher
Biogeosciences, 9, 5007–5022,
Related subject area
Biogeochemistry: Open OceanEarly winter barium excess in the southern Indian Ocean as an annual remineralisation proxy (GEOTRACES GIPr07 cruise)Controlling factors on the global distribution of a representative marine non-cyanobacterial diazotroph phylotype (Gamma A)Summer trends and drivers of sea surface fCO2 and pH changes observed in the southern Indian Ocean over the last two decades (1998–2019)Global nutrient cycling by commercially targeted marine fishMajor processes of the dissolved cobalt cycle in the North and equatorial Pacific OceanThe impact of the South-East Madagascar Bloom on the oceanic CO2 sinkNitrite regeneration in the oligotrophic Atlantic OceanBridging the gaps between particulate backscattering measurements and modeled particulate organic carbon in the oceanBiological production in two contrasted regions of the Mediterranean Sea during the oligotrophic period: an estimate based on the diel cycle of optical properties measured by BioGeoChemical-Argo profiling floatsAcidification of the Nordic SeasReconstruction of global surface ocean pCO2 using region-specific predictors based on a stepwise FFNN regression algorithmBiogeochemical controls on ammonium accumulation in the surface layer of the Southern OceanOxygen export to the deep ocean following Labrador Sea Water formationN2 fixation in the Mediterranean Sea related to the composition of the diazotrophic community and impact of dust under present and future environmental conditionsDissolution of a submarine carbonate platform by a submerged lake of acidic seawaterSeasonal flux patterns and carbon transport from low-oxygen eddies at the Cape Verde Ocean Observatory: lessons learned from a time series sediment trap study (2009–2016)Subsurface iron accumulation and rapid aluminum removal in the Mediterranean following African dust depositionLong-distance particle transport to the central Ionian SeaDeep chlorophyll maximum and nutricline in the Mediterranean Sea: emerging properties from a multi-platform assimilated biogeochemical model experimentPhosphorus cycling in the upper waters of the Mediterranean Sea (PEACETIME cruise): relative contribution of external and internal sourcesFast local warming is the main driver of recent deoxygenation in the northern Arabian SeaInfluence of atmospheric deposition on biogeochemical cycles in an oligotrophic ocean systemImpact of dust addition on the metabolism of Mediterranean plankton communities and carbon export under present and future conditions of pH and temperatureComparing CLE-AdCSV applications using SA and TAC to determine the Fe-binding characteristics of model ligands in seawaterImpact of dust addition on Mediterranean plankton communities under present and future conditions of pH and temperature: an experimental overviewReviews and syntheses: Trends in primary production in the Bay of Bengal – is it at a tipping point?Incorporating the stable carbon isotope 13C in the ocean biogeochemical component of the Max Planck Institute Earth System ModelSeasonal cycling of zinc and cobalt in the south-eastern Atlantic along the GEOTRACES GA10 sectionCarbon export and fate beneath a dynamic upwelled filament off the California coastContrasted release of insoluble elements (Fe, Al, rare earth elements, Th, Pa) after dust deposition in seawater: a tank experiment approachOn the barium–oxygen consumption relationship in the Mediterranean Sea: implications for mesopelagic marine snow remineralizationCompound high-temperature and low-chlorophyll extremes in the ocean over the satellite periodCan machine learning extract the mechanisms controlling phytoplankton growth from large-scale observations? – A proof-of-concept studyReviews and syntheses: The biogeochemical cycle of silicon in the modern oceanOxygen budget of the north-western Mediterranean deep- convection regionCross-basin differences in the nutrient assimilation characteristics of induced phytoplankton blooms in the subtropical Pacific watersDynamics of the deep chlorophyll maximum in the Black Sea as depicted by BGC-Argo floatsNitrate assimilation and regeneration in the Barents Sea: insights from nitrate isotopesAssimilating synthetic Biogeochemical-Argo and ocean colour observations into a global ocean model to inform observing system designSouthern Ocean Biogeochemical Argo detect under-ice phytoplankton growth before sea ice retreatA new intermittent regime of convective ventilation threatens the Black Sea oxygenation statusReviews and syntheses: Present, past, and future of the oxygen minimum zone in the northern Indian OceanParticulate rare earth element behavior in the North Atlantic (GEOVIDE cruise)Elevated sources of cobalt in the Arctic OceanIncrease in ocean acidity variability and extremes under increasing atmospheric CO2Can ocean community production and respiration be determined by measuring high-frequency oxygen profiles from autonomous floats?Assessing the value of biogeochemical Argo profiles versus ocean color observations for biogeochemical model optimization in the Gulf of MexicoThe Southern Annular Mode (SAM) influences phytoplankton communities in the seasonal ice zone of the Southern OceanProfiling float observation of thermohaline staircases in the western Mediterranean Sea and impact on nutrient fluxesOcean carbonate system variability in the North Atlantic Subpolar surface water (1993–2017)
Natasha René van Horsten, Hélène Planquette, Géraldine Sarthou, Thomas James Ryan-Keogh, Nolwenn Lemaitre, Thato Nicholas Mtshali, Alakendra Roychoudhury, and Eva Bucciarelli
Biogeosciences, 19, 3209–3224,Short summary
The remineralisation proxy, barite, was measured along 30°E in the southern Indian Ocean during early austral winter. To our knowledge this is the first reported Southern Ocean winter study. Concentrations throughout the water column were comparable to observations during spring to autumn. By linking satellite primary production to this proxy a possible annual timescale is proposed. These findings also suggest possible carbon remineralisation from satellite data on a basin scale.
Zhibo Shao and Ya-Wei Luo
Biogeosciences, 19, 2939–2952,Short summary
Non-cyanobacterial diazotrophs (NCDs) may be an important player in fixing N2 in the ocean. By conducting meta-analyses, we found that a representative marine NCD phylotype, Gamma A, tends to inhabit ocean environments with high productivity, low iron concentration and high light intensity. It also appears to be more abundant inside cyclonic eddies. Our study suggests a niche differentiation of NCDs from cyanobacterial diazotrophs as the latter prefers low-productivity and high-iron oceans.
Coraline Leseurre, Claire Lo Monaco, Gilles Reverdin, Nicolas Metzl, Jonathan Fin, Claude Mignon, and Léa Benito
Biogeosciences, 19, 2599–2625,Short summary
Decadal trends of fugacity of CO2 (fCO2), total alkalinity (AT), total carbon (CT) and pH in surface waters are investigated in different domains of the southern Indian Ocean (45°S–57°S) from ongoing and station observations regularly conducted in summer over the period 1998–2019. The fCO2 increase and pH decrease are mainly driven by anthropogenic CO2 estimated just below the summer mixed layer, as well as by a warming south of the polar front or in the fertilized waters near Kerguelen Island.
Priscilla Le Mézo, Jérôme Guiet, Kim Scherrer, Daniele Bianchi, and Eric Galbraith
Biogeosciences, 19, 2537–2555,Short summary
This study quantifies the role of commercially targeted fish biomass in the cycling of three important nutrients (N, P, and Fe), relative to nutrients otherwise available in water and to nutrients required by primary producers, and the impact of fishing. We use a model of commercially targeted fish biomass constrained by fish catch and stock assessment data to assess the contributions of fish at the global scale, at the time of the global peak catch and prior to industrial fishing.
Rebecca Chmiel, Nathan Lanning, Allison Laubach, Jong-Mi Lee, Jessica Fitzsimmons, Mariko Hatta, William Jenkins, Phoebe Lam, Matthew McIlvin, Alessandro Tagliabue, and Mak Saito
Biogeosciences, 19, 2365–2395,Short summary
Dissolved cobalt is present in trace amounts in seawater and is a necessary nutrient for marine microbes. On a transect from the Alaskan coast to Tahiti, we measured seawater concentrations of dissolved cobalt. Here, we describe several interesting features of the Pacific cobalt cycle including cobalt sources along the Alaskan coast and Hawaiian vents, deep-ocean particle formation, cobalt activity in low-oxygen regions, and how our samples compare to a global biogeochemical model’s predictions.
Nicolas Metzl, Claire Lo Monaco, Coraline Leseurre, Céline Ridame, Jonathan Fin, Claude Mignon, Marion Gehlen, and Thi Tuyet Trang Chau
Biogeosciences, 19, 1451–1468,Short summary
During an oceanographic cruise conducted in January 2020 in the south-western Indian Ocean, we observed very low CO2 concentrations associated with a strong phytoplankton bloom that occurred south-east of Madagascar. This biological event led to a strong regional CO2 ocean sink not previously observed.
Darren R. Clark, Andrew P. Rees, Charissa M. Ferrera, Lisa Al-Moosawi, Paul J. Somerfield, Carolyn Harris, Graham D. Quartly, Stephen Goult, Glen Tarran, and Gennadi Lessin
Biogeosciences, 19, 1355–1376,Short summary
Measurements of microbial processes were made in the sunlit open ocean during a research cruise (AMT19) between the UK and Chile. These help us to understand how microbial communities maintain the function of remote ecosystems. We find that the nitrogen cycling microbes which produce nitrite respond to changes in the environment. Our insights will aid the development of models that aim to replicate and ultimately project how marine environments may respond to ongoing climate change.
Martí Galí, Marcus Falls, Hervé Claustre, Olivier Aumont, and Raffaele Bernardello
Biogeosciences, 19, 1245–1275,Short summary
Part of the organic matter produced by plankton in the upper ocean is exported to the deep ocean. This process, known as the biological carbon pump, is key for the regulation of atmospheric carbon dioxide and global climate. However, the dynamics of organic particles below the upper ocean layer are not well understood. Here we compared the measurements acquired by autonomous robots in the top 1000 m of the ocean to a numerical model, which can help improve future climate projections.
Marie Barbieux, Julia Uitz, Alexandre Mignot, Collin Roesler, Hervé Claustre, Bernard Gentili, Vincent Taillandier, Fabrizio D'Ortenzio, Hubert Loisel, Antoine Poteau, Edouard Leymarie, Christophe Penkerc'h, Catherine Schmechtig, and Annick Bricaud
Biogeosciences, 19, 1165–1194,Short summary
This study assesses marine biological production in two Mediterranean systems representative of vast desert-like (oligotrophic) areas encountered in the global ocean. We use a novel approach based on non-intrusive high-frequency in situ measurements by two profiling robots, the BioGeoChemical-Argo (BGC-Argo) floats. Our results indicate substantial yet variable production rates and contribution to the whole water column of the subsurface layer, typically considered steady and non-productive.
Filippa Fransner, Friederike Fröb, Jerry Tjiputra, Nadine Goris, Siv K. Lauvset, Ingunn Skjelvan, Emil Jeansson, Abdirahman Omar, Melissa Chierici, Elizabeth Jones, Agneta Fransson, Sólveig R. Ólafsdóttir, Truls Johannessen, and Are Olsen
Biogeosciences, 19, 979–1012,Short summary
Ocean acidification, a direct consequence of the CO2 release by human activities, is a serious threat to marine ecosystems. In this study, we conduct a detailed investigation of the acidification of the Nordic Seas, from 1850 to 2100, by using a large set of samples taken during research cruises together with numerical model simulations. We estimate the effects of changes in different environmental factors on the rate of acidification and its potential effects on cold-water corals.
Guorong Zhong, Xuegang Li, Jinming Song, Baoxiao Qu, Fan Wang, Yanjun Wang, Bin Zhang, Xiaoxia Sun, Wuchang Zhang, Zhenyan Wang, Jun Ma, Huamao Yuan, and Liqin Duan
Biogeosciences, 19, 845–859,Short summary
A predictor selection algorithm was constructed to decrease the predicting error in the surface ocean partial pressure of CO2 (pCO2) mapping by finding better combinations of pCO2 predictors in different regions. Compared with previous research using the same combination of predictors in all regions, using different predictors selected by the algorithm in different regions can effectively decrease pCO2 predicting errors.
Shantelle Smith, Katye E. Altieri, Mhlangabezi Mdutyana, David R. Walker, Ruan G. Parrott, Sedick Gallie, Kurt A. M. Spence, Jessica M. Burger, and Sarah E. Fawcett
Biogeosciences, 19, 715–741,Short summary
Ammonium is a crucial yet poorly understood component of the Southern Ocean nitrogen cycle. We attribute our finding of consistently high ammonium concentrations in the winter mixed layer to limited ammonium consumption and sustained ammonium production, conditions under which the Southern Ocean becomes a source of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. From similar data collected over an annual cycle, we propose a seasonal cycle for ammonium in shallow polar waters – a first for the Southern Ocean.
Jannes Koelling, Dariia Atamanchuk, Johannes Karstensen, Patricia Handmann, and Douglas W. R. Wallace
Biogeosciences, 19, 437–454,Short summary
In this study, we investigate oxygen variability in the deep western boundary current in the Labrador Sea from multiyear moored records. We estimate that about half of the oxygen taken up in the interior Labrador Sea by air–sea gas exchange during deep water formation is exported southward the same year. Our results underline the complexity of the oxygen uptake and export in the Labrador Sea and highlight the important role this region plays in supplying oxygen to the deep ocean.
Céline Ridame, Julie Dinasquet, Søren Hallstrøm, Estelle Bigeard, Lasse Riemann, France Van Wambeke, Matthieu Bressac, Elvira Pulido-Villena, Vincent Taillandier, Fréderic Gazeau, Antonio Tovar-Sanchez, Anne-Claire Baudoux, and Cécile Guieu
Biogeosciences, 19, 415–435,Short summary
We show that in the Mediterranean Sea spatial variability in N2 fixation is related to the diazotrophic community composition reflecting different nutrient requirements among species. Nutrient supply by Saharan dust is of great importance to diazotrophs, as shown by the strong stimulation of N2 fixation after a simulated dust event under present and future climate conditions; the magnitude of stimulation depends on the degree of limitation related to the diazotrophic community composition.
Matthew P. Humphreys, Erik H. Meesters, Henk de Haas, Szabina Karancz, Louise Delaigue, Karel Bakker, Gerard Duineveld, Siham de Goeyse, Andreas F. Haas, Furu Mienis, Sharyn Ossebaar, and Fleur C. van Duyl
Biogeosciences, 19, 347–358,Short summary
A series of submarine sinkholes were recently discovered on Luymes Bank, part of Saba Bank, a carbonate platform in the Caribbean Netherlands. Here, we investigate the waters inside these sinkholes for the first time. One of the sinkholes contained a body of dense, low-oxygen and low-pH water, which we call the
acid lake. We use measurements of seawater chemistry to work out what processes were responsible for forming the acid lake and discuss the consequences for the carbonate platform.
Gerhard Fischer, Oscar E. Romero, Johannes Karstensen, Karl-Heinz Baumann, Nasrollah Moradi, Morten Iversen, Götz Ruhland, Marco Klann, and Arne Körtzinger
Biogeosciences, 18, 6479–6500,Short summary
Low-oxygen eddies in the eastern subtropical North Atlantic can form an oasis for phytoplankton growth. Here we report on particle flux dynamics at the oligotrophic Cape Verde Ocean Observatory. We observed consistent flux patterns during the passages of low-oxygen eddies. We found distinct flux peaks in late winter, clearly exceeding background fluxes. Our findings suggest that the low-oxygen eddies sequester higher organic carbon than expected for oligotrophic settings.
Matthieu Bressac, Thibaut Wagener, Nathalie Leblond, Antonio Tovar-Sánchez, Céline Ridame, Vincent Taillandier, Samuel Albani, Sophie Guasco, Aurélie Dufour, Stéphanie H. M. Jacquet, François Dulac, Karine Desboeufs, and Cécile Guieu
Biogeosciences, 18, 6435–6453,Short summary
Phytoplankton growth is limited by the availability of iron in about 50 % of the ocean. Atmospheric deposition of desert dust represents a key source of iron. Here, we present direct observations of dust deposition in the Mediterranean Sea. A key finding is that the input of iron from dust primarily occurred in the deep ocean, while previous studies mainly focused on the ocean surface. This new insight will enable us to better represent controls on global marine productivity in models.
Léo Berline, Andrea Michelangelo Doglioli, Anne Petrenko, Stéphanie Barrillon, Boris Espinasse, Frederic A. C. Le Moigne, François Simon-Bot, Melilotus Thyssen, and François Carlotti
Biogeosciences, 18, 6377–6392,Short summary
While the Ionian Sea is considered a nutrient-depleted and low-phytoplankton biomass area, it is a crossroad for water mass circulation. In the central Ionian Sea, we observed a strong contrast in particle distribution across a ~100 km long transect. Using remote sensing and Lagrangian simulations, we suggest that this contrast finds its origin in the long-distance transport of particles from the north, west and east of the Ionian Sea, where phytoplankton production was more intense.
Anna Teruzzi, Giorgio Bolzon, Laura Feudale, and Gianpiero Cossarini
Biogeosciences, 18, 6147–6166,Short summary
During summer, maxima of phytoplankton chlorophyll concentration (DCM) occur in the subsurface of the Mediterranean Sea and can play a relevant role in carbon sequestration into the ocean interior. A numerical model based on in situ and satellite observations provides insights into the range of DCM conditions across the relatively small Mediterranean Sea and shows a western DCM that is 25 % shallower and with a higher phytoplankton chlorophyll concentration than in the eastern Mediterranean.
Elvira Pulido-Villena, Karine Desboeufs, Kahina Djaoudi, France Van Wambeke, Stéphanie Barrillon, Andrea Doglioli, Anne Petrenko, Vincent Taillandier, Franck Fu, Tiphanie Gaillard, Sophie Guasco, Sandra Nunige, Sylvain Triquet, and Cécile Guieu
Biogeosciences, 18, 5871–5889,Short summary
We report on phosphorus dynamics in the surface layer of the Mediterranean Sea. Highly sensitive phosphate measurements revealed vertical gradients above the phosphacline. The relative contribution of diapycnal fluxes to total external supply of phosphate to the mixed layer decreased towards the east, where atmospheric deposition dominated. Taken together, external sources of phosphate contributed little to total supply, which was mainly sustained by enzymatic hydrolysis of organic phosphorus.
Zouhair Lachkar, Michael Mehari, Muchamad Al Azhar, Marina Lévy, and Shafer Smith
Biogeosciences, 18, 5831–5849,Short summary
This study documents and quantifies a significant recent oxygen decline in the upper layers of the Arabian Sea and explores its drivers. Using a modeling approach we show that the fast local warming of sea surface is the main factor causing this oxygen drop. Concomitant summer monsoon intensification contributes to this trend, although to a lesser extent. These changes exacerbate oxygen depletion in the subsurface, threatening marine habitats and altering the local biogeochemistry.
France Van Wambeke, Vincent Taillandier, Karine Desboeufs, Elvira Pulido-Villena, Julie Dinasquet, Anja Engel, Emilio Marañón, Céline Ridame, and Cécile Guieu
Biogeosciences, 18, 5699–5717,Short summary
Simultaneous in situ measurements of (dry and wet) atmospheric deposition and biogeochemical stocks and fluxes in the sunlit waters of the open Mediterranean Sea revealed complex physical and biological processes occurring within the mixed layer. Nitrogen (N) budgets were computed to compare the sources and sinks of N in the mixed layer. The transitory effect observed after a wet dust deposition impacted the microbial food web down to the deep chlorophyll maximum.
Frédéric Gazeau, France Van Wambeke, Emilio Marañón, Maria Pérez-Lorenzo, Samir Alliouane, Christian Stolpe, Thierry Blasco, Nathalie Leblond, Birthe Zäncker, Anja Engel, Barbara Marie, Julie Dinasquet, and Cécile Guieu
Biogeosciences, 18, 5423–5446,Short summary
Our study shows that the impact of dust deposition on primary production depends on the initial composition and metabolic state of the tested community and is constrained by the amount of nutrients added, to sustain both the fast response of heterotrophic prokaryotes and the delayed one of phytoplankton. Under future environmental conditions, heterotrophic metabolism will be more impacted than primary production, therefore reducing the capacity of surface waters to sequester anthropogenic CO2.
Loes J. A. Gerringa, Martha Gledhill, Indah Ardiningsih, Niels Muntjewerf, and Luis M. Laglera
Biogeosciences, 18, 5265–5289,Short summary
For 3 decades, competitive ligand exchange–adsorptive cathodic stripping voltammetry was used to estimate the Fe-binding capacity of organic matter in seawater. In this paper the performance of the competing ligands is compared through the analysis of a series of model ligands. The main finding of this paper is that the determined speciation parameters are not independent of the application, making interpretation of Fe speciation data more complex than it was thought before.
Frédéric Gazeau, Céline Ridame, France Van Wambeke, Samir Alliouane, Christian Stolpe, Jean-Olivier Irisson, Sophie Marro, Jean-Michel Grisoni, Guillaume De Liège, Sandra Nunige, Kahina Djaoudi, Elvira Pulido-Villena, Julie Dinasquet, Ingrid Obernosterer, Philippe Catala, and Cécile Guieu
Biogeosciences, 18, 5011–5034,Short summary
This paper shows that the impacts of Saharan dust deposition in different Mediterranean basins are as strong as those observed in coastal waters but differed substantially between the three tested stations, differences attributed to variable initial metabolic states. A stronger impact of warming and acidification on mineralization suggests a decreased capacity of Mediterranean surface communities to sequester CO2 following the deposition of atmospheric particles in the coming decades.
Carolin R. Löscher
Biogeosciences, 18, 4953–4963,Short summary
The Bay of Bengal (BoB) is classically seen as an ocean region with low primary production, which has been predicted to decrease even further. Here, the importance of such a trend is used to explore what could happen to the BoB's low-oxygen core waters if primary production decreases. Lower biological production leads to less oxygen loss in deeper waters by respiration; thus it could be that oxygen will not further decrease and the BoB will not become anoxic, different to other low-oxygen areas.
Bo Liu, Katharina D. Six, and Tatiana Ilyina
Biogeosciences, 18, 4389–4429,Short summary
We incorporate a new representation of the stable carbon isotope 13C in a global ocean biogeochemistry model. The model well reproduces the present-day 13C observations. We find a recent observation-based estimate of the oceanic 13C Suess effect (the decrease in 13C/12C ratio due to uptake of anthropogenic CO2; 13CSE) possibly underestimates 13CSE by 0.1–0.26 per mil. The new model will aid in better understanding the past ocean state via comparison to 13C/12C measurements from sediment cores.
Neil J. Wyatt, Angela Milne, Eric P. Achterberg, Thomas J. Browning, Heather A. Bouman, E. Malcolm S. Woodward, and Maeve C. Lohan
Biogeosciences, 18, 4265–4280,Short summary
Using data collected during two expeditions to the South Atlantic Ocean, we investigated how the interaction between external sources and biological activity influenced the availability of the trace metals zinc and cobalt. This is important as both metals play essential roles in the metabolism and growth of phytoplankton and thus influence primary productivity of the oceans. We found seasonal changes in both processes that helped explain upper-ocean trace metal cycling.
Hannah L. Bourne, James K. B. Bishop, Elizabeth J. Connors, and Todd J. Wood
Biogeosciences, 18, 3053–3086,Short summary
To learn how the biological carbon pump works in productive coastal upwelling systems, four autonomous carbon flux explorers measured carbon flux through the twilight zone beneath an offshore-flowing filament of biologically productive water. Strikingly different particle classes dominated the carbon fluxes during successive stages of the filament evolution over 30 d. Both flux and transfer efficiency were far greater than expected, suggesting an outsized filament impact in California waters.
Matthieu Roy-Barman, Lorna Foliot, Eric Douville, Nathalie Leblond, Fréderic Gazeau, Matthieu Bressac, Thibaut Wagener, Céline Ridame, Karine Desboeufs, and Cécile Guieu
Biogeosciences, 18, 2663–2678,Short summary
The release of insoluble elements such as aluminum (Al), iron (Fe), rare earth elements (REEs), thorium (Th) and protactinium (Pa) when Saharan dust falls over the Mediterranean Sea was studied during tank experiments under present and future climate conditions. Each element exhibited different dissolution kinetics and dissolution fractions (always lower than a few percent). Changes in temperature and/or pH under greenhouse conditions lead to a lower Th release and a higher light REE release.
Stéphanie H. M. Jacquet, Dominique Lefèvre, Christian Tamburini, Marc Garel, Frédéric A. C. Le Moigne, Nagib Bhairy, and Sophie Guasco
Biogeosciences, 18, 2205–2212,Short summary
We present new data concerning the relation between biogenic barium (Baxs, a tracer of carbon remineralization at mesopelagic depths), O2 consumption and prokaryotic heterotrophic production (PHP) in the Mediterranean Sea. The purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of the relation between Baxs, PHP and O2 and to test the validity of the Dehairs transfer function in the Mediterranean Sea. This relation has never been tested in the Mediterranean Sea.
Natacha Le Grix, Jakob Zscheischler, Charlotte Laufkötter, Cecile S. Rousseaux, and Thomas L. Frölicher
Biogeosciences, 18, 2119–2137,Short summary
Marine ecosystems could suffer severe damage from the co-occurrence of a marine heat wave with extremely low chlorophyll concentration. Here, we provide a first assessment of compound marine heat wave and low-chlorophyll events in the global ocean from 1998 to 2018. We reveal hotspots of these compound events in the equatorial Pacific and in the Arabian Sea and show that they mostly occur in summer at high latitudes and their frequency is modulated by large-scale modes of climate variability.
Christopher Holder and Anand Gnanadesikan
Biogeosciences, 18, 1941–1970,Short summary
A challenge for marine ecologists in studying phytoplankton is linking small-scale relationships found in a lab to broader relationships observed on large scales in the environment. We investigated whether machine learning (ML) could help connect these small- and large-scale relationships. ML was able to provide qualitative information about the small-scale processes from large-scale information. This method could help identify important relationships from observations in future research.
Paul J. Tréguer, Jill N. Sutton, Mark Brzezinski, Matthew A. Charette, Timothy Devries, Stephanie Dutkiewicz, Claudia Ehlert, Jon Hawkings, Aude Leynaert, Su Mei Liu, Natalia Llopis Monferrer, María López-Acosta, Manuel Maldonado, Shaily Rahman, Lihua Ran, and Olivier Rouxel
Biogeosciences, 18, 1269–1289,Short summary
Silicon is the second most abundant element of the Earth's crust. In this review, we show that silicon inputs and outputs, to and from the world ocean, are 57 % and 37 % higher, respectively, than previous estimates. These changes are significant, modifying factors such as the geochemical residence time of silicon, which is now about 8000 years and 2 times faster than previously assumed. We also update the total biogenic silica pelagic production and provide an estimate for sponge production.
Caroline Ulses, Claude Estournel, Marine Fourrier, Laurent Coppola, Fayçal Kessouri, Dominique Lefèvre, and Patrick Marsaleix
Biogeosciences, 18, 937–960,Short summary
We analyse the seasonal cycle of O2 and estimate an annual O2 budget in the north-western Mediterranean deep-convection region, using a numerical model. We show that this region acts as a large sink of atmospheric O2 and as a major source of O2 for the western Mediterranean Sea. The decrease in the deep convection intensity predicted in recent projections may have important consequences on the overall uptake of O2 in the Mediterranean Sea and on the O2 exchanges with the Atlantic Ocean.
Fuminori Hashihama, Hiroaki Saito, Taketoshi Kodama, Saori Yasui-Tamura, Jota Kanda, Iwao Tanita, Hiroshi Ogawa, E. Malcolm S. Woodward, Philip W. Boyd, and Ken Furuya
Biogeosciences, 18, 897–915,Short summary
We investigated the nutrient assimilation characteristics of deep-water-induced phytoplankton blooms across the subtropical North and South Pacific Ocean. Nutrient drawdown ratios of dissolved inorganic nitrogen to phosphate were anomalously low in the western North Pacific, likely due to the high phosphate uptake capability of low-phosphate-adapted phytoplankton. The anomalous phosphate uptake might influence the maintenance of chronic phosphate depletion in the western North Pacific.
Florian Ricour, Arthur Capet, Fabrizio D'Ortenzio, Bruno Delille, and Marilaure Grégoire
Biogeosciences, 18, 755–774,Short summary
This paper addresses the phenology of the deep chlorophyll maximum (DCM) in the Black Sea (BS). We show that the DCM forms in March at a density level set by the winter mixed layer. It maintains this location until June, suggesting an influence of the DCM on light and nutrient profiles rather than mere adaptation to external factors. In summer, the DCM concentrates ~55 % of the chlorophyll in a 10 m layer at ~35 m depth and should be considered a major feature of the BS phytoplankton dynamics.
Robyn E. Tuerena, Joanne Hopkins, Raja S. Ganeshram, Louisa Norman, Camille de la Vega, Rachel Jeffreys, and Claire Mahaffey
Biogeosciences, 18, 637–653,Short summary
The Barents Sea is a rapidly changing shallow sea within the Arctic. Here, nitrate, an essential nutrient, is fully consumed by algae in surface waters during summer months. Nitrate is efficiently regenerated in the Barents Sea, and there is no evidence for nitrogen loss from the sediments by denitrification, which is prevalent on other Arctic shelves. This suggests that nitrogen availability in the Barents Sea is largely determined by the supply of nutrients in water masses from the Atlantic.
Biogeosciences, 18, 509–534,Short summary
Biogeochemical-Argo floats are starting to routinely measure ocean chlorophyll, nutrients, oxygen, and pH. This study generated synthetic observations representing two potential Biogeochemical-Argo observing system designs and created a data assimilation scheme to combine them with an ocean model. The proposed system of 1000 floats brought clear benefits to model results, with additional floats giving further benefit. Existing satellite ocean colour observations gave complementary information.
Mark Hague and Marcello Vichi
Biogeosciences, 18, 25–38,Short summary
This paper examines the question of what causes the rapid spring growth of microscopic marine algae (phytoplankton) in the ice-covered ocean surrounding Antarctica. One prominent hypothesis proposes that the melting of sea ice is the primary cause, while our results suggest that this is only part of the explanation. In particular, we show that phytoplankton are able to start growing before the sea ice melts appreciably, much earlier than previously thought.
Arthur Capet, Luc Vandenbulcke, and Marilaure Grégoire
Biogeosciences, 17, 6507–6525,Short summary
The Black Sea is 2000 m deep, but, due to limited ventilation, only about the upper 100 m contains enough oxygen to support marine life such as fish. This oxygenation depth has been shown to be decreasing (1955–2019). Here, we evidence that atmospheric warming induced a clear shift in an important ventilation mechanism. We highlight the impact of this shift on oxygenation. There are important implications for marine life and carbon and nutrient cycling if this new ventilation regime persists.
Tim Rixen, Greg Cowie, Birgit Gaye, Joaquim Goes, Helga do Rosário Gomes, Raleigh R. Hood, Zouhair Lachkar, Henrike Schmidt, Joachim Segschneider, and Arvind Singh
Biogeosciences, 17, 6051–6080,Short summary
The northern Indian Ocean hosts an extensive oxygen minimum zone (OMZ), which intensified due to human-induced global changes. This includes the occurrence of anoxic events on the Indian shelf and affects benthic ecosystems and the pelagic ecosystem structure in the Arabian Sea. Consequences for biogeochemical cycles are unknown, which, in addition to the poor representation of mesoscale features, reduces the reliability of predictions of the future OMZ development in the northern Indian Ocean.
Marion Lagarde, Nolwenn Lemaitre, Hélène Planquette, Mélanie Grenier, Moustafa Belhadj, Pascale Lherminier, and Catherine Jeandel
Biogeosciences, 17, 5539–5561,
Randelle M. Bundy, Alessandro Tagliabue, Nicholas J. Hawco, Peter L. Morton, Benjamin S. Twining, Mariko Hatta, Abigail E. Noble, Mattias R. Cape, Seth G. John, Jay T. Cullen, and Mak A. Saito
Biogeosciences, 17, 4745–4767,Short summary
Cobalt (Co) is an essential nutrient for ocean microbes and is scarce in most areas of the ocean. This study measured Co concentrations in the Arctic Ocean for the first time and found that Co levels are extremely high in the surface waters of the Canadian Arctic. Although the Co primarily originates from the shelf, the high concentrations persist throughout the central Arctic. Co in the Arctic appears to be increasing over time and might be a source of Co to the North Atlantic.
Friedrich A. Burger, Jasmin G. John, and Thomas L. Frölicher
Biogeosciences, 17, 4633–4662,Short summary
Ensemble simulations of an Earth system model reveal that ocean acidity extremes have increased in the past few decades and are projected to increase further in terms of frequency, intensity, duration, and volume extent. The increase is not only caused by the long-term ocean acidification due to the uptake of anthropogenic CO2, but also due to changes in short-term variability. The increase in ocean acidity extremes may enhance the risk of detrimental impacts on marine organisms.
Christopher Gordon, Katja Fennel, Clark Richards, Lynn K. Shay, and Jodi K. Brewster
Biogeosciences, 17, 4119–4134,Short summary
We describe a method for correcting errors in oxygen optode measurements on autonomous platforms in the ocean. The errors result from the relatively slow response time of the sensor. The correction method includes an in situ determination of the effective response time and requires the time stamps of the individual measurements. It is highly relevant for the BGC-Argo program and also applicable to gliders. We also explore if diurnal changes in oxygen can be obtained from profiling floats.
Bin Wang, Katja Fennel, Liuqian Yu, and Christopher Gordon
Biogeosciences, 17, 4059–4074,Short summary
We assess trade-offs between different types of biological observations, specifically satellite ocean color and BGC-Argo profiles and the benefits of combining both for optimizing a biogeochemical model of the Gulf of Mexico. Using all available observations leads to significant improvements in observed and unobserved variables (including primary production and C export). Our results highlight the significant benefits of BGC-Argo measurements for biogeochemical model optimization and validation.
Bruce L. Greaves, Andrew T. Davidson, Alexander D. Fraser, John P. McKinlay, Andrew Martin, Andrew McMinn, and Simon W. Wright
Biogeosciences, 17, 3815–3835,Short summary
We observed that variation in the Southern Annular Mode (SAM) over 11 years showed a relationship with the species composition of hard-shelled phytoplankton in the seasonal ice zone (SIZ) of the Southern Ocean. Phytoplankton in the SIZ are productive during the southern spring and summer when the area is ice-free, with production feeding most Antarctic life. The SAM is known to be increasing with climate change, and changes in phytoplankton in the SIZ may have implications for higher life forms.
Vincent Taillandier, Louis Prieur, Fabrizio D'Ortenzio, Maurizio Ribera d'Alcalà, and Elvira Pulido-Villena
Biogeosciences, 17, 3343–3366,Short summary
This study addresses the role played by vertical diffusion in the nutrient enrichment of the Levantine intermediate waters, a process particularly relevant inside thermohaline staircases. Thanks to a high profiling frequency over a 4-year period, BGC-Argo float observations reveal the temporal continuity of the layering patterns encountered during the cruise PEACETIME and their impact on vertical and lateral transfers of nitrate between the deep reservoir and the surface productive zone.
Coraline Leseurre, Claire Lo Monaco, Gilles Reverdin, Nicolas Metzl, Jonathan Fin, Solveig Olafsdottir, and Virginie Racapé
Biogeosciences, 17, 2553–2577,Short summary
In this study, we investigate the evolution of CO2 uptake and ocean acidification in the North Atlantic Subpolar surface water. Our results show an important reduction in the capacity of the ocean to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere (1993–2007), due to a rapid increase in the fCO2 and associated with a rapid decrease in pH. Conversely, data obtained during the last decade (2008–2017) show a stagnation of fCO2 (increasing the ocean sink for CO2) and pH.
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Toyoda, S., Yano, M., Nishimura, S.-i., Akiyama, H., Hayakawa, A., Koba, K., Sudo, S., Yagi, K., Makabe, A., Tobari, Y., Ogawa, N. O., Ohkouchi, N., Yamada, K., and Yoshida, N.: Characterization and production and consumption processes of N2O emitted from temperate agricultural soils determined via isotopomer ratio analysis, Global Biogeochem. Cy., 25, GB2008, https://doi.org/10.1029/2009GB003769, 2011.
Toyoda, S., Yoshida, N., and Koba, K.: Isotopocule analysis of biologically produced nitrous oxide in various environments, Mass Spectrom. Rev., 36, 135–160, https://doi.org/10.1002/mas.21459, 2017.
Trimmer, M., Chronopoulou, P.-M., Maanoja, S. T., Upstill-Goddard, R. C., Kitidis, V., and Purdy, K. J.: Nitrous oxide as a function of oxygen and archaeal gene abundance in the North Pacific, Nat. Commun., 7, 13451, https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms13451, 2016.
Walter, S., Breitenbach, U., Bange, H. W., Nausch, G., and Wallace, D. W. R.: Distribution of N2O in the Baltic Sea during transition from anoxic to oxic conditions, Biogeosciences, 3, 557–570, https://doi.org/10.5194/bg-3-557-2006, 2006.
Wanninkhof, R.: Relationship between wind speed and gas exchange over the ocean revisited, Limnol. Oceanogr.-Meth., 12, 351–362, https://doi.org/10.4319/lom.2014.12.351, 2014.
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Well, R., Flessa, H., Jaradat, F., Toyoda, S., and Yoshida, N.: Measurement of isotopomer signatures of N2O in groundwater, J. Geophys. Res.-Biogeo., 110, G02006, https://doi.org/10.1029/2005JG000044, 2005.
Winther, M., Balslev-Harder, D., Christensen, S., Priemé, A., Elberling, B., Crosson, E., and Blunier, T.: Continuous measurements of nitrous oxide isotopomers during incubation experiments, Biogeosciences, 15, 767–780, https://doi.org/10.5194/bg-15-767-2018, 2018.
Yamagishi, H., Westley, M. B., Popp, B. N., Toyoda, S., Yoshida, N., Watanabe, S., Koba, K., and Yamanaka, Y.: Role of nitrification and denitrification on the nitrous oxide cycle in the eastern tropical North Pacific and Gulf of California, J Geophys. Res.-Biogeo., 112, G02015, https://doi.org/10.1029/2006JG000227, 2007.
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A strong El Niño event occurred in the Peruvian coastal region in 2015–2016, during which higher sea surface temperatures co-occurred with significantly lower sea-to-air fluxes of nitrous oxide, an important greenhouse gas and ozone depletion agent. Stratified water column during El Niño retained a larger amount of nitrous oxide that was produced via multiple microbial pathways; and intense nitrous oxide effluxes could occur when normal upwelling is resumed after El Niño.
A strong El Niño event occurred in the Peruvian coastal region in 2015–2016, during which... | <urn:uuid:41b65b54-2bbb-4d10-af4b-1d017520b9f2> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://bg.copernicus.org/articles/16/2079/2019/bg-16-2079-2019-relations.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.777638 | 26,110 | 2.28125 | 2 |
This octopus looks to be about to raise one of its tentacles the marine creature painted with acrylic paints in epoxy resin will not leave anyone indifferent, especially children who are keen on marine life. They will definitely try to touch it to see if it is wet and slick. This handmade sculpture is great for any interior; it can be placed, for example, on an office desk near a computer, on a bathroom shelf or in a children's nook for animals. Put this beauty in your workplace and get ready to receive compliments from your colleagues.Or surprise your friends with this real-looking acrylic painting on their birthday, they will love it at first sight. The images hardly display what this art looks like in real life. In fact it is certainly better than you can imagine. This unique pattern is created using several layers of resin and acrylic paint to convey the illusion of depth. In order to get the 3d illusion i first apply a thin layer of resin for the background, and then i use acrylic paint to draw an octopus and other objects on that background. The octopus' head is made of polymer clay, painted with acrylics and then secured with another thin layer of resin. Material are epoxy resin ab glue and acrylic paint. First pour a layer of resin into the container, then dry in 8 hours, then paint a layer with acrylic paint, repeat 7-20 times, the multi-layer painting forms a three-dimensional effect. Usually it takes 7-14 days to make one. The finished product is stable and can be preserved forever.
Be careful to avoid high temperature and low temperature, and scratches on hard and sharp objects. | <urn:uuid:0e48dfcf-5ee1-4df4-9e75-b4b1eae68085> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://epoxyresinsolutions.com/pulpo_1.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.944227 | 334 | 2.515625 | 3 |
Forrester report: VR is not yet ready for marketers
The research firm says it’s at least five years from being a mass consumer medium, although augmented reality, 360-degree video and mixed reality are acting as stepping stones.
If you’re a marketer rubbing your hands together in anticipation of the virtual campaigns you’ll run in virtual reality, you may want to take a breath.
The title of a recent Forrester Research report will likely slow you down: “Virtual Reality Isn’t Ready for Marketing Yet.” (Fee required for non-clients.)
The study finds that “critical-mass consumer adoption of high-end VR headsets is five years away,” although 360-degree video “will flourish on low-to-mid-end VR devices in the meantime.”
Generally, VR is defined as immersive and generated environments that change as you move through them. Although 360-degree video can be seen on a headset as an immersive environment, it is a kind of “light VR” because it is a recorded spherical video that is always the same space and events.
The report does acknowledge augmented reality and mixed reality, but it makes no predictions about when they will reach critical mass. It also makes clear that augmented and mixed reality are not immersive, and so are not really VR.
Augmented reality, where generated objects are laid on top of real scenes inside a smartphone’s viewer, has already had a breakout mass hit, Pokémon Go last July.
Mixed reality is a kind of augmented reality, where the objects superimposed on real scenes are in 3-D.
As the report notes, mixed reality can sometimes interact with the world because the platform might recognize edges, actions and objects in the scene, such as a person’s actual hand moving a generated 3-D ball.
But the report describes these generated 3-D images as “holograms,” a term that is often used incorrectly to describe generated 3-D objects in a smartphone viewer. A hologram is actually created as the interference pattern from at least two lasers, and the viewed hologram is a projection of that interference.
Eventually, the report acknowledges, immersive VR will create new kinds of storytelling that offer a whole new dimension for marketing. But it has a ways to go. According to Forrester, 42 percent of US online adults last year said they had never heard of VR headsets and 46 percent didn’t see a use for it in their lives.
The challenges to growing a mass audience, co-author and Forrester VP Thomas Husson told me, include not only the cost and use of the VR headset, but also the “chicken-and-egg dilemma.”
The headsets need to reach a lot more consumers before they establish a large enough installed base, especially if marketers want to reach beyond VR’s core market of gamers. And the kinds of content and the ways they are distributed need to increase dramatically to support all those headset-wearing consumers — who are waiting for enough good content before they buy the headsets.
But Husson also pointed out two other factors affecting marketers. First, the production cost of immersive VR is still very high, and the process is complicated. And VR is not yet fully connected with marketers’ tools. From the report:
“‘There is no single partner able to produce, program, and tag your VR content, and no clear process to integrate it in your tracking, reporting, and marketing cloud systems,'” explains Boris Petrovitch Njegosh, founder at Rocket Labs Unlimited and former head of digital content innovation at Renault. ‘Every step of the way is a silo, in which you have to work with different partners and systems.'”
For instance, suppose a marketer wanted to provide more information about a product related to a given immersive experience. There are virtually no tools that make that as easy, as automated or as trackable as, say, providing that kind of “more info” on a web site, in an app or via email.
In the current environment, the report recommends, brands can benefit from investing in VR only if they want to be known as a pioneering brand, if they want to extend certain kinds of experiences (like roller coasters if the brand is Six Flags) or if they want to use VR to help navigate a complex path to purchase, like a new car or a new home.
Eventually, VR can transform the nature of advertising, social networks, the way intelligent agents work, travel and many other arenas. But that marketing future is not here yet. | <urn:uuid:500b3a36-cdf4-48aa-a699-7efc9ce1d045> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://martech.org/forrester-report-vr-not-yet-ready-marketers-2/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.949409 | 967 | 1.671875 | 2 |
by Umar Farooq
The recent events taking place foreshadow a U.S. dollar collapse. Deteriorating relations with China could suggest worsening trade dynamics going forward, but in reality, this risk is substitutable with all big U.S. trading partners. It doesn’t matter if this happens through border taxes or import tariffs, withdrawing from the WTO or involving itself in war as all these events lead to the same place for the U.S. dollar.
The dollar seems to enjoy a lot of momentum after the election. Renewed growth prospects originating from new administration policies and higher interest rate expectations have provided a constant bid, lifting the U.S. Dollar Index to 14-year highs in early January. So why is the liberal international exchange of goods so paramount to the health of the U.S. dollar? One reason has to do with foreign demand of U.S. dollars. When the U.S. exports goods, this creates demand for the dollar since foreign buyers must pay in U.S. dollars to obtain these goods. Foreign entities then convert their own currencies to U.S. dollars to complete this, increasing demand for the greenback. It’s the basic concept of supply and demand written about by Adam Smith in his 1776 book, The Wealth of Nations.
“While it’s hard to give a definitive timeline, the best strategy to protect against the economic consequences of a dollar collapse lies with diversifying your portfolio in negative correlating assets. Gold is one such asset, historically buffering currencies against falling values in local dollar terms. There are literally thousands of examples one could choose from, but we’ll highlight the recent performance of gold prices in British pounds as one such example. As of this writing, one ounce of gold cost £980.10 to purchase, up from £956.00 or 2.48% post-Brexit. Meanwhile, the GDP/USD pair has fallen roughly eight percent during that time. Put another way, had a Brit sold all their pounds for gold the day after the Brexit vote, they would be roughly 10.5% richer than by doing nothing at all. Protecting wealth is what gold does, and will forever do. Fortunately, the question of how to protect yourself from a dollar collapse is a straightforward one. If the proper risk management principles are used, it’s possible to preserve wealth and thrive in these unprecedented times ahead.” Benjamin A. Smith
In short, a U.S. dollar collapse 2017 could be imminent, depending on the agenda to be set for free trade policy by Donald J. Trump.
- Bill Gates Developing Vaccine That Spreads ‘Like a Virus’ To Vaccinate People Without Consent
- The World Is Collapsing Around Us And The Crowd Is No Longer Hedged
- Social Security payments: Millions of SSI recipients to get two checks worth up to $1,652 next month
- Democrats just screwed the whole country…
- Pennsylvania’s Unemployment Is Insolvent & Now Sending Notices To Claimants Who’ve Received Full Benefits To PAY IT ALL BACK.
- Now They Are Literally Bowing Down And Worshipping Baal Right In Front Of Our Eyes
- Insurance CEO, Todd Callender says the real pandemic is NOW.
- One Of The Most Tragic Things That I Have Read In A Long Time
- AOC..after only a few years on the squad..Net Worth 29 MILLION
- Recession is here and major liquidity squeeze on-going. US Treasuries expect a Fed pivot and either deep US recession or shortage of collateral. Neither look great for stock markets | <urn:uuid:c99e0f0e-631d-4ba4-b473-eef4c458be1b> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/the-factors-that-hint-towards-the-u-s-dollar-collapse-in-2017-how-to-avoid-the-risk-if-it-does-happen/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.922364 | 758 | 1.84375 | 2 |
explaining the figures
A rush of blood to the head- Coldplay (2002)
The song image indicates the general theme of the album. It is about sadness, about the time running out, ignoring the visible signs, and pain. This pain can be similar to the head rush one experiences when they stand upright from sitting position fast. The half-cut head, the spikes, the black and white imagery, all add to this general feeling.
Mumford and Sons 9- Babel (2012)
The image of the song counteracts how seriously the band takes itself and its music, depicting the band sitting on a bench while behind them, in front of a pub, there is much celebration, dancing, a guy in a crazy costume, and even a horse. The band wanted the Babel cover to capture the spirit of their “Gentlemen of the Road” tour, particularly its “party vibes.
A year without rain-Selena Gomez (2010)
“Can you feel me when I think about you with every breath I take” The image is about a girl to whom nothing matters. But she falls in love with someone and loves him so much that she thinks she has just been roaming, but when he comes in her life everything changes.
Kendrick Lamar – To Pimp a Butterfly (2015)
No pimps, no butterflies, just two dozen or so mostly African-American men and boys of all ages celebrating in front of the White House. Lamar’s idea was taking those close to him “around the world and letting them see things that I’ve experienced,” such as the White House, where he met with Barack Obama, the first American president to embrace hip-hop.
Radiohead – Kid A (2000)
The result was an image that Donwood says was intended to suggest “landscapes of power,” specifically “some cataclysmic power existing in the landscape.” Donwood was successful because “some sort of cataclysmic power” is a succinct and perfect explanation of Kid A. | <urn:uuid:7d7b3572-2fe8-40c2-969e-f605c520df43> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.usadissertationeditors.com/explaining-the-figures/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.951857 | 434 | 1.617188 | 2 |
New American Standard Bible
Instruction about Prayer
11 It happened that while [a]Jesus was praying in a certain place, when He had finished, one of His disciples said to Him, “Lord, teach us to pray, just as John also taught his disciples.” 2 And He said to them, “(A)When you pray, say:
‘[b]Father, [c]hallowed be Your name.
[d]Your kingdom come.
3 Give us (B)each day our [e]daily bread.
4 And forgive us our sins,
For we ourselves also forgive everyone who (C)is indebted to us.
And do not lead us into temptation.’”
5 And He said to them, “[f]Suppose one of you has a friend, and goes to him at midnight and says to him, ‘Friend, lend me three loaves, 6 because a friend of mine has come to me from a journey and I have nothing to serve him’; 7 and from inside he answers and says, ‘Do not bother me; the door has already been shut and my children [g]and I are in bed; I cannot get up and give you anything.’ 8 I tell you, even if he will not get up and give him anything just because he is his friend, yet (D)because of his [h]shamelessness he will get up and give him as much as he needs.
9 “So I say to you, [i](E)ask, and it will be given to you; [j]seek, and you will find; [k]knock, and it will be opened to you. 10 For everyone who asks receives, and the one who seeks finds, and to the one who knocks, it will be opened. 11 Now [l]which one of you fathers will his son ask for a [m]fish, and instead of a fish, he will give him a snake? 12 Or he will even ask for an egg, and his father will give him a scorpion? 13 So (F)if you, despite being [n]evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will [o]your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask Him?”Read full chapter
- Luke 11:1 Lit He
- Luke 11:2 Later mss add phrases from Matt 6:9-13 to make the two passages closely similar
- Luke 11:2 I.e., treated as sacred or holy
- Luke 11:2 Or May Your...come
- Luke 11:3 Or bread for the coming day; or needful bread
- Luke 11:5 Lit Which one of you will have...and will go
- Luke 11:7 Lit are with me
- Luke 11:8 Prob. by continued knocking
- Luke 11:9 Or keep asking
- Luke 11:9 Or keep seeking
- Luke 11:9 Or keep knocking
- Luke 11:11 Lit which of you, the father, will the son ask
- Luke 11:11 One early ms inserts loaf, he will not give him a stone, will he, or for a
- Luke 11:13 I.e., as sinful mankind
- Luke 11:13 Lit the Father from heaven | <urn:uuid:f6db3b67-9e5d-4fbb-8869-bf95a28ce157> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke%2011:1-13&version=NASB | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.972784 | 712 | 2.234375 | 2 |
The 11 Most Beautiful Places in New Jersey
Yes, you read that right. Here are just some of the most beautiful places to visit in New Jersey to take in unique & natural beauty of the garden state.
DELAWARE WATER GAP
This recreation has 70,000 acres of stunning natural landscapes containing forest, vistas, streams and, of course, the winding Delaware River itself.
JACOB BRYANT/GETTY IMAGES
This beach at the southern tip of New Jersey never disappoints, especially in the summer months when fiery, western facing Jersey sunsets.
VICKI KENYON/GETTY IMAGES
PATERSON GREAT FALLS
The magnificent, 77-foot high waterfall on the Passaic River is clearly the main attraction here, but people also come to look at the historic buildings.
SEVEN MILE BEACH,
Clean and oh-so-serene, Seven Mile Beach is
destination for anyone looking for a quiet ocean getaway in New Jersey.
ROBERT D. BARNES/GETTY IMAGES
THE RED MILL,
This charming country town is just over an hour west of the Lincoln Tunnel, but it feels like it's worlds away.
This historic lighthouse sits high above a bluff on Sandy Hook Bay and has panoramic views of New York Harbor & the Atlantic Ocean.
An adorable arched bridge, spraying water fountains and charming pergolas mix with a variety of thriving plants and flowers at these gardens in Central NJ.
BAPS SHRI SWAMINARAYAN MANDIR HINDU TEMPLE
This awe-inspiring temple is filled with intricate carvings, spires, arches, sacred figures, & a wealth of beauty.
BAPS BAPS SHRI SWAMINARAYAN MANDIR
You'll have unparalleled views of the glittering Manhattan skyline, because, after all, the best view of New York City is from New Jersey.
BARNEGAT LIGHTHOUSE STATE PARK
This state park on the tip of Long Beach Island includes a maritime forest, picnic area & lighthouse with panoramic views of Barnegat Bay.
SAURAV PANDEY PHOTOGRAPHY
With gorgeous views of the Delaware River, surrounding trees, riverfront homes and historical buildings, this beautiful bridge straddles New Jersey and its neighbor, Pennsylvania.
RICHARD T. NOWITZ/GETTY IMAGES
for more travel ideas visit | <urn:uuid:72aace54-4454-4940-9bff-84148e52ff3d> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.purewow.com/stories/the-most-beautiful-places-in-new-jersey/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.824821 | 642 | 1.515625 | 2 |
The other big drug problem
Older people taking too many pills
Consider it America's other prescription drug epidemic.
For decades, experts have warned that older Americans are taking too many unnecessary drugs, often prescribed by multiple doctors, for dubious or unknown reasons. Researchers estimate that 25 percent of people ages 65 to 69 take at least five prescription drugs to treat chronic conditions, a figure that jumps to nearly 46 percent for those between 70 and 79. Doctors say it is not uncommon to encounter patients taking more than 20 drugs to treat acid reflux, heart disease, depression or insomnia or other disorders.
Unlike the overuse of opioid painkillers, the polypharmacy problem has attracted little attention, even though its hazards are well documented. But some doctors are working to reverse the trend.
At least 15 percent of seniors seeking care annually from doctors or hospitals have suffered a medication problem; in half of these cases, the problem is believed to be potentially preventable. Studies have linked polypharmacy to unnecessary death. Older patients, who have greater difficulty metabolizing medicines, are more likely to suffer dizziness, confusion and falls. And the side effects of drugs are frequently misinterpreted as a new problem, triggering more prescriptions, a process known as a prescribing cascade.
The glide path to overuse can be gradual: A patient taking a drug to lower blood pressure develops swollen ankles, so a doctor prescribes a diuretic. The diuretic causes a potassium deficiency, resulting in a medicine to treat low potassium. But that triggers nausea, which is treated with another drug, which causes confusion, which in turn is treated with more medication.
For many patients, problems arise when they are discharged from the hospital on a host of new medications, layered on top of old ones.
Alice Cave, who divides her time between Alexandria, Virginia, and Tucson, discovered this when she traveled to Cheyenne, Wyoming, after her 87-year-old aunt was sent home following treatment for a stroke in 2015.
Before her hospitalization, Cave said, her aunt, a retired telephone company employee whose vision is impaired by glaucoma, had been taking seven drugs per day. Five new ones were added in the hospital, Cave said.
"She came home and had a huge bag of pills, half of which she was already taking, plus pages and pages of instructions," she said. Some were supposed to be taken with food, some on an empty stomach. Cave said she spent several hours sorting the medications into a giant blue pill box. "It was crazy — and scary."
Cave said she felt helpless to do much; her aunt's doctors didn't question the need for more drugs.
When Shannon Brownlee's mother was taken to an emergency room recently to determine whether her arm pain might signal a heart attack (it didn't) a cardiologist prescribed five new drugs — including an opioid — to the small dose of a diuretic she had been taking to control her blood pressure.
Brownlee, senior vice president of the Lown Institute, a Boston-based group that seeks to improve health-care quality by reducing unnecessary treatment, said that when her brother questioned the necessity of so many new drugs for a woman in her late 80s, the specialist replied frostily, "I don't see anything wrong with prescribing lots of medication to older people."
"This problem has gotten worse because the average American is on a lot more medications than 15 years ago," said cardiologist Rita Redberg, a professor of medicine at the University of California at San Francisco.
Studies bolster Redberg's contention: A 2015 report found that the share of Americans of all ages who regularly took at least five prescription drugs nearly doubled between 2000 and 2012, from 8 percent to 15 percent. University of Michigan researchers recently reported that the percentage of people older than 65 taking at least three psychiatric drugs more than doubled in the nine years beginning in 2004. Nearly half of those taking the potent medications, which include antipsychotic drugs used to treat schizophrenia, had no mental-health diagnosis.
Redberg and other doctors are trying to counter the blizzard of prescriptions through a grassroots movement called "deprescribing" — systematically discontinuing medicines that are inappropriate, duplicative or unnecessary.
Interest in deprescribing, which was pioneered in Canada and Australia, is growing in the United States, bolstered by physician-led efforts, such as the 5-year-old Choosing Wisely campaign. The Beers Criteria, a list of overused and potentially unsafe drugs for seniors first published in 1991, has been followed by other tools aimed at curbing unnecessary drug use.
"Lots of different medications get started for reasons that are never supported by evidence," said Redberg, editor in chief of JAMA Internal Medicine. "In general, we like the idea of taking a pill" a lot better than non-drug measures, such as improved eating habits or exercise.
"That's what we were taught as physicians: to prescribe drugs," said Ranit Mishori, a professor of family medicine at Georgetown University and a proponent of deprescribing. "We are definitely not taught how to take people off meds."
Kathryn McGrath, a Philadelphia geriatrician, said she tries to begin every appointment with a review of medications, which she asks patients to bring with them. "I think having the pill bottles" is much more powerful than a list, said McGrath, who has written about how to deprescribe safely.
Although support is growing, deprescribing faces formidable obstacles.
Among them, experts say, is a paucity of research about how best to do it, relentless advertising that encourages consumers to ask their doctors for new drugs, and a strong disinclination — baked into the culture of medicine — to countermand what another physician has ordered. Time constraints play a significant role. So do performance measures that are viewed as a mandate to prescribe drugs even when they make virtually no sense, such as giving statins to terminally ill patients.
Reluctance to change
"There's a reluctance to tinker or change things too much," said University of Michigan geriatric psychiatrist Donovan Maust, who labels the phenomenon "clinical inertia." When inheriting a new patient, Maust said, doctors tend to assume that if a colleague prescribed a drug, there must be a good reason for it — even if they don't know what it is. Maust said he tries to combat inertia by writing time-limited orders for medication.
He recently began treating a man in his 80s with dementia who was taking eight psychiatric drugs — each of which can cause significant side effects and most of which had been prescribed for undetermined reasons.
"It's very typical to see a patient who has a few episodes of reflux and is then put on a [proton pump inhibitor, or PPI] and a few years later are still taking it," said Georgetown's Mishori. Many experts say the heartburn drugs are overprescribed, and studies have linked their long-term use to fractures, dementia and premature death.
"This is a cultural problem and an awareness problem exacerbated by the fragmentation of care," said Brownlee, the author of "Overtreated: Why Too Much Medicine is Making Us Sicker and Poorer." Many doctors, she added, have never heard of deprescribing.
Before his death several years ago, doctors advised Brownlee's father, a hospice patient, to continue taking a statin, along with several other medications. None would improve or extend his life, and all had potentially harmful side effects.
Older people taking lots of medication was what Canadian pharmacist Barbara Farrell encountered when she began working at a geriatric hospital in Ottawa nearly two decades ago. Her experience, she said, was a catalyst for the Canadian Deprescribing Network, a consortium of researchers, physicians, pharmacists and health advocates she co-founded. The group seeks to drastically reduce inappropriate medication use among Canadian seniors by 2020.
Farrell, a clinical scientist at the Bruyere Research Institute, has also helped write guidelines, used by doctors in the United States and other countries, to safely deprescribe certain classes of widely used drugs, including PPIs and sedatives.
"I've found a lot of receptivity" to the guidelines among physicians, Farrell said. "We know there are pockets around Canada and the world where they're being implemented."
One of Farrell's most memorable successes involved a woman in her late 70s who used a wheelchair and was nearly comatose.
"She would literally slide out of her chair," Farrell recalled. The woman was taking 27 drugs four times per day and had been diagnosed with dementia and a host of other ailments.
After reviewing her medications, Farrell and her colleagues were able to weed out duplicative and potentially harmful drugs and reduce the doses of others. A year later, the woman was "like a different person": She was able to walk with a cane and live mostly independently, and she reported that her doctor said she did not have dementia after all.
When Farrell asked another patient why she was taking thyroid medication, the woman replied that her doctor had prescribed it for weight loss after her last pregnancy — in 1955.
"The patients I see are the tip of the iceberg," Farrell said.
One way to facilitate deprescribing, Farrell said, is to require doctors to record why a drug is being prescribed, a proposal the deprescribing network has made to Canadian health officials. A recent study by a team from the Boston VA Healthcare System found strong support among doctors for this concept.
While some doctors are reluctant to discontinue medications, patients can be wary, too.
"They may say, 'I tried stopping my sleeping pill and I couldn't sleep the next night, so I figured I needed it,' " Farrell said. "Nobody explained to them that rebound insomnia, which can occur after stopping sleeping pills, lasts three to five days."
Mishori said that she deprescribes only one medication at a time so she can detect any problem that arises from that change. And, she adds, "I never take people off of a medication without doing something else." In the case of heartburn drugs, she might first recommend taking the drug only when needed, not continuously. Or she might suggest a safer alternative, such as an over-the-counter antacid tablet.
Maust, the geriatric psychiatrist, recommends that doctors actively focus on "the big picture" and carefully weigh whether the benefits of a drug outweigh its risks.
"In geriatrics," he said, "less is more."
Boodman is a regular contributor to Kaiser Health News, a nonprofit health news service that is an editorially independent part of the Kaiser Family Foundation. | <urn:uuid:9a43e60a-810c-4cf3-8b4c-be392f1efb48> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.poconorecord.com/story/lifestyle/health-fitness/2017/12/13/the-other-big-drug-problem/16841239007/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.971249 | 2,225 | 2.546875 | 3 |
Expensive payments can cause exactly the same forms of problems that exist inside conventional lump-sum financing industry: repeated re-borrowing, overdrafts, therefore the significance of a profit infusion to retire financial obligation.
Payday installment mortgage money usually are significantly more compared to the 5 % of income that individuals can afford. Also because lenders have access to consumers’ checking reports, either electronically or with postdated checks, they can collect the installments whatever the individuals’ capacity to spend the money for costs. Equally, in the auto title loan marketplace, loan providers’ power to repossess borrowers’ motors can stress visitors to produce financing costs they cannot afford, which often can allow buyers without sufficient revenue to generally meet her fundamental requirements.
Dining table 2 demonstrates just how payday installment loan repayments in a large amount shows take in between 7 percent and 12 percentage in the normal debtor’s gross month-to-month earnings (of just below $2,600) and compares that with mortgage repayments in Colorado, in which stronger laws require both small payments and lower rates. 21
To solve the difficulty of expensive payments, policymakers should require financing to-be repayable in tiny installments that are affordable for almost all borrowers. Research shows that to be able to suit the spending plans of common payday loan borrowers, money mustn’t surpass 5 percentage of month-to-month earnings.
Another solution which has been suggested will be need lenders to conduct underwriting to assess the borrowers’ capability to payback. However, without clear goods safety specifications, including limiting mortgage money to 5 percentage of a borrower’s salary, this approach holds danger. It may create considerably toward price of debts by imposing newer costs on loan providers. And because loan providers get access to individuals’ verifying account or automobile brands and can collect even in the event individuals lack the capability to repay, it gives lenders with little motivation to ensure costs is really affordable.
Really customary in consumer credit marketplaces for loan providers to evaluate an upfront fee to function a software or originate a loan. But in subprime consumer finance installment loan markets, large upfront origination fees often harm consumers by significantly increasing the cost of the loan at the time it is issued, effectively penalizing borrowers who repay early. These fees greatly enhance sales and supply a considerable bonus for loan providers to encourage refinancing so that you can obtain another origination cost. Small-loan individuals are particularly vunerable to proposes online payday loans instant approval Garfield to re-finance due to the fact, like many lower- and moderate-income families, her money is commonly volatile and they have little if any discount. 22
This misalignment of incentives keeps generated prevalent continued refinancing, or a€?loan flipping,a€? for the standard subprime little installment financing markets, with refinances accounting for about three-quarters of mortgage quantity for example regarding the largest lenders. 23 One business’s Chief Executive Officer demonstrated on an earnings name with traders that the customer service associates see an advantage depending on how many of their customers re-finance a€?because encouraging renewals is actually a critical section of all of our business.a€? 24
To fix this issue, financing expenses, such as for example charge and interest, should really be dispersed uniformly across the life of the loan, in place of front-loaded. This protects consumers against taking on huge charge at the outset in the mortgage and aligns loan providers’ and individuals’ appeal by making sure success and cost without frustrating very early payment or promoting a reason to lenders to steer their clients toward refinancing.
When Colorado reformed its pay day loan law this year, it enabled an origination cost but necessary loan providers to grant pro-rata refunds whenever individuals prepay. This is important to the prosperity of the state’s change because lenders didn’t have a motivation to steer borrowers to re-finance financial loans. 25 | <urn:uuid:4cb715fe-b02d-40e3-b56c-89efdfd0a335> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.pvbevents.com/many-installment-pay-day-loans-need-money-that-go/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882573104.24/warc/CC-MAIN-20220817183340-20220817213340-00465.warc.gz | en | 0.940307 | 819 | 1.710938 | 2 |
Hey, everyone! This is part 7 of the Amazing Nature Party series. In this part of the series, you’ll find the answers to the questions asked in Part 6. I hope you enjoy!
The party leader and the party guests added more expressions to help the special guests feel welcome, impressed, and have fun.
The people who were willing to give the Nature Party a try were a nymph, a sprite named Daisy, a countess named Lavender, a king named Miles, a queen named Lila, and a superhero named Abby the Magnificent.
The party guests were very gratified and honored to have a king, nymph, countess, and superhero to be at the party. Here’s what Daisy said, “What a blooming party, this should happen every day!”. The nymph said, “What a beautiful party about nature!”
Miles said, “This is such an extravaganza! As King and wife to Lila, I would like to politely request that this nature party happens every day.” The party guests cheered happily at the demand.
Lila said, “I very much agree with Miles and everyone else at this party. As Queen and wife of Miles, I would also like to cordially ask that this nature party goes on every day.”
Everyone again applauded and cheered at the request and agreement. Abby said, “This is the most adventurous party I’ve ever seen in ages. I’ve also brought someone back with me you might like to see again.”
As soon as Abby said those words, the nature Fairy; her unicorn, and the Fairy Queen came out from beneath the tree. The Nature party guests as well as the Nature Party leader applauded cheerfully.
The Nature Fairy said, “Is there a wish I can grant all of you?” and the party guests, as well as the special guests, said, “Yes, the wish is that the nature party lasts more than a day and night.”
At those words, the Nature fairy summoned her mother who is the Fairy Queen to help her grant the wish. And so, that’s how nature gets along so well to this day.
That’s the end of the Amazing Nature Party series. I hope you enjoyed the series! | <urn:uuid:aead83bb-900e-4be3-9cfd-038ada5e9191> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://lilliandarnell.com/tag/applauded/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.977123 | 492 | 1.71875 | 2 |
About USU Concurrent Enrollment
The Utah System of Higher Education first adopted a rule regarding Concurrent Enrollment (CE) in 1988. In 1991 the Utah Legislature passed SB 196, the Minimum School Program Act Amendment that provided state funding, and Concurrent Enrollment became funded in fiscal year 1992. The state-wide concurrent enrollment program has been supported by legislative appropriation since 1995-96.
Concurrent Enrollment (CE) is now a state subsidized program wherein a student registers for a course both at the high school and through USU's website and upon completing the course successfully, receives both high school and college credit. The high school credit appears on the high school transcript and the college credit appears on the USU transcript. Public high school students who are counted in the average daily membership of their school and who have not graduated from high school may participate in Concurrent Enrollment (CE). Because CE courses are more rigorous than regular high school courses and because taking a CE course results in a permanent grade on a college transcript with future Financial Aid implications for the student, USU recommends high school juniors and seniors with a 3.0 GPA or higher take CE courses but does not recommend 9th and 10th grade students take CE courses.
How does it work?
Students are admitted at both the high school and at USU. The application fee for USU is $50; this application fee is only paid once.
Students register each semester or trimester at both the high school and at USU. Each course costs $5/credit and this amount is paid directly to USU; textbooks and course materials are extra.
Face to Face courses are taught at the high school by high school paid instructors who are qualified to teach the course for both high school and Utah State University credit.
Broadcast courses are taught by USU paid instructors teaching from a USU location and broadcast to high schools across the state. Because of this these broadcast courses do not follow any particular high school's bell schedule. High school administrators who have students taking broadcast courses must understand that students may need to leave their other courses early or arrive late in order to participate in USU's broadcast courses. Only high schools who can help accommodate their students in doing this should participate in broadcast courses. With the exception of STAT 1040, USU's statewide broadcast courses are taught 4 days a week for 12 weeks (a trimester schedule).
After the course is completed, the broadcast instructor enters the final grade in the university database (Banner). This grade is then reflected on the Utah State University transcript. The high school registrar must enter the same grade on the high school transcript.
All Utah public universities and colleges accept the concurrent enrollment credit.
Who can teach a CE course?
Either a high school or USU paid instructor who meets USU's qualifications - generally a Master's degree in the subject matter.
When are CE courses offered?
CE courses are offered during the regular high school day.
Where are CE courses offered?
CE courses are most often offered either face to face at the high school or via Interactive Video Conferencing (IVC) received at the high school.
What is the difference between Concurrent Enrollment and Advanced Placement?
|Concurrent Enrollment||Advanced Placement|
|Length||1 Semester||Year Long|
|Credit||Based on grade earned (95% of students pass)||Based on passing the exam (67% of students pass)|
|Transfer||Accepted at all Utah public schools and most public out-of-state schools||Accepted at most out-of-state public and private schools|
What are General Education Credits?
General Education (or Gen Ed for short) is required curriculum that makes up the foundation of an undergraduate degree. The courses teach students how to communicate effectively, utilize quantitative methods, make appropriate use of technology, function effectively in groups, and introduce students to the nature, history, and methods of different disciplines. The designations used for General Education courses are indicated in the course title and description. Concurrent Enrollment students are encouraged to take as many Gen Ed courses as possible while in high school, so they can focus on courses in their major when they begin college.
General Education requirements consist of 30-34 credits from the following course categories:
- Communications Literacy, CL1 and CL2
- Quantitative Literacy, QL
- American Institutions, BAI
- Creative Arts, BCA
- Humanities, BHU
- Life Sciences, BLS
- Physical Sciences, BPS
- Social Sciences, BSS
The complete list of General Education Requirements are available in the Catalog. | <urn:uuid:0eff7a36-8b1f-4500-b840-86cf04d79783> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://concurrent.usu.edu/about/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.947453 | 992 | 1.804688 | 2 |
When it comes to your shirts they can get a bit boring, especially if they are simple shirts for work or school. With things like cheap embroidery designs, an embroidery design shop, or embroidery designs for embroidery machines you can spice up your shirts and make them something truly special. Personalized embroidery patterns are great for adding your initials to a shirt, adding your logos for work or a business, or even adding fun little designs that are just meant to add detail.
A custom t shirt is a great way to feel great about what you are wearing and also to add that extra bit of flair and personality to the shirt. If you own a business or you just want to make your shirts stand out, embroidery is a wonderful option that does not cost a ton of money and that won’t affect the overall structure and integrity of the shirt. The right embroidery can make any shirt more fun. Finding the right company to embroider and screen print your shirts is essential and can make a huge difference on the finished product.
From monogram shirts to sports team custom shirts, screen printing has become a huge part of the business world here in the United States. We don’t think about it much, but almost everybody has at least one screen printed article of clothing, most typically and most likely to be a t shirt of some sort. Screen printing has a wide variety of different applications and can be used by many different people, from t shirt companies to those who are looking fund raise for a charitable organization of some sort and are interested in creating t shirts to back up their cause and advertise it. From monogram shirts to family reunion shirts, the applications of screen printing are truly endless.
And screen printing has a longer history here in the United States than many people realize, dating back more than fifty years ago. In fact, history backs this up, showing that screen printing and screen printing techniques were used to create promotional items for the movie of The Wizard of Oz back in the year of 1939. This is considered to be one of the first promotional uses of a screen printing machine ever, not just in the United States. Of course, in the years that have intervened since, now more than fifty of them, screen printing technologies have advanced considerably and are now commonplace and easy to reproduce. Screen printing services are particularly common for group events and teams, as it is easy to screen print the same shirt with the same thing, allowing for a greater sense of unity – and even some advertisement, if it is so desired. Screen printing has now reached a tremendous level of success here in the United States, now valued to be more than nine billion dollars.
Aside from screen printing, embroidery is another way in which sports and other articles of clothing can be embellished upon. Like screen printing, embroidery (which is often considered to be a form of art) has a long history here in the United States and in many other corners of this earth as well. Embroidery even has a much longer history than that of screen printing and has been traced back to the year of around thirty thousand BC. It has remained a cherished art form ever since, but has many practical purposes as well. Embroidered t shirts and the like, such as monogram shirts, are very popular nowadays, and getting an embroidered monogram shirt is not hard to do, at least not here in the United States but most likely not in other parts of the world as well. But while some monogram shirts and other embroidery projects are likely to still be hand embroidered (particularly when embroidery is done primarily as a hobby and not as a profession or even necessarily with the intent to sell anything), industry and production methods have advanced quite a bit since that year of thirty thousand BC, when the practice of and the art of embroidery first came into being.
Back in the year of 1870, still more than one hundred years ago and very nearly one hundred and fifty years ago, the first hand powered embroidery looms came into being. In the years that have passed since, more efficient methods of embroidery have been developed and it can now be mass produced on any number of products. From monogram shirts to decorative blouses, embroidery plays an important role in the production of clothing all around the world, not just here in the United States.
From monogram shirts to screen printed t shirts, screen printing and embroidery have both been what you could call revolutionary in the production of clothes all throughout the world. They provide an easy way to add a little flair to clothing, or even to include important information such as charity donation information or advertising information. In fact, screen printed shirts as marketing tools have become very common throughout sports leagues, even children’s ones. On top of this all, screen printed and embroidered clothing is likely to be cheap, making them affordable to all. | <urn:uuid:5300215f-43ef-462a-8116-0b05d82ff1e5> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://clevelandinternships.net/2018/09/how-to-spice-up-your-t-shirts-with-screen-printing-and-embroidery/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.962555 | 1,006 | 1.507813 | 2 |
Mutations in myelin genes cause inherited peripheral neuropathies that range in severity from adult-onset Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease type 1 to childhood-onset Dejerine-Sottas neuropathy and congenital hypomyelinating neuropathy. Many myelin gene mutants that cause severe disease, such as those in the myelin protein zero gene (MPZ) and the peripheral myelin protein 22 gene (PMP22), appear to make aberrant proteins that accumulate primarily within the endoplasmic reticulum (ER), resulting in Schwann cell death by apoptosis and, subsequently, peripheral neuropathy. We previously showed that curcumin supplementation could abrogate ER retention and aggregation-induced apoptosis associated with neuropathy-causing MPZ mutants. We now show reduced apoptosis after curcumin treatment of cells in tissue culture that express PMP22 mutants. Furthermore, we demonstrate that oral administration of curcumin partially mitigates the severe neuropathy phenotype of the Trembler-J mouse model in a dose-dependent manner. Administration of curcumin significantly decreases the percentage of apoptotic Schwann cells and results in increased number and size of myelinated axons in sciatic nerves, leading to improved motor performance. Our findings indicate that curcumin treatment is sufficient to relieve the toxic effect of mutant aggregation-induced apoptosis and improves the neuropathologic phenotype in an animal model of human neuropathy, suggesting a potential therapeutic role in selected forms of inherited peripheral neuropathies.
ASJC Scopus subject areas | <urn:uuid:2c6edec6-a691-42a4-8f8a-fc80c25e3245> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://ohsu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/oral-curcumin-mitigates-the-clinical-and-neuropathologic-phenotyp | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.896904 | 330 | 2.125 | 2 |
The UK government finally launched its long-awaited hydrogen strategy on Tuesday, setting out proposals to build the fledgling energy sector using a contracts for difference (CfD) support mechanism similar to the one used to kick-start the nation’s successful offshore wind sector.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s administration wants to build 5GW of hydrogen capacity by 2030 to be used in industry, transport and heating, helping the UK to become a carbon neutral economy by 2050.
The new strategy — published slightly later than expected — outlines a “twin-track” approach to support both zero-carbon green hydrogen produced by splitting water molecules using renewable energy, and blue hydrogen production from natural gas with carbon capture and storage in a process that is not totally carbon free.
As part of the strategy launch, the government has also kicked off a public consultation on the business model that will underpin the sector for the clean-burning gas.
The government is proposing using a replica of the CfD scheme that has helped build-out capacity of offshore wind in the UK to more than 10GW while also lowering its cost over the past decade by offering guaranteed 'strike prices' for power produced.
The government said the publication of the document, three months ahead of the UN’s COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, sent out a “strong signal globally” that the UK is to committed to building a thriving hydrogen economy that could deliver hundreds of thousands of green jobs.
Business & energy secretary Kwasi Kwarteng said: “This home-grown clean energy source has the potential to transform the way we power our lives and will be essential to tackling climate change and reaching net zero.
“With the potential to provide a third of the UK’s energy in the future, our strategy positions the UK as first in the global race to ramp up hydrogen technology and seize the thousands of jobs and private investment that come with it.”
In the document, the government also committed to collaborating with industry to develop standards to give certainty to producers and users that the hydrogen the UK produces is consistent with net zero.
It will also undertake a review to support the development transport and storage infrastructure and will assess the safety, technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of mixing hydrogen into the existing gas supply.
A hydrogen sector development action plan will be launched in early 2022 setting out how the government will support companies to secure supply chain opportunities and jobs in hydrogen.
The government is also consulting on the design of the £240m ($332m) Net Zero Hydrogen Fund, which aims to support the commercial deployment of new low carbon hydrogen production plants across the UK.
Director of policy at the Association for Renewable Energy & Clean Technology (REA) Frank Gordon said: “This strategy provides welcome clarity. The REA urged the government to provide certainty for investors, deliver a technology neutral approach and highlight the range of low carbon pathways.
“The Hydrogen Strategy starts to answer those calls and offers a positive vision for the role of hydrogen in meeting the UK’s net zero ambitions.
“Backed up by the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund, a revenue support scheme for hydrogen production and a standard methodology to define when hydrogen is low-carbon, we believe this Strategy can provide a stimulus for British-based hydrogen production over the coming years.”
Some of the world’s biggest oil and gas companies, including BP, Shell, Eni and Equinor, are formulating plans for blue hydrogen schemes in the UK.
Backers of that technology coupled with carbon capture and storage technology say it is a cost-effective stepping-stone towards cuttings emissions from hard-to-decarbonise clusters of heavy industry.
However, critics say it will extend dependency on coal and natural gas, while a study last week slated its environmental credentials as in some cases worse than natural gas or even coal.
- This article first appeared on Upstream | <urn:uuid:90b6945e-7d20-4310-b8aa-837b83c91884> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.rechargenews.com/energy-transition/uk-backs-hydrogen-cfds-to-repeat-offshore-wind-success-story/2-1-1052884 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882573540.20/warc/CC-MAIN-20220819005802-20220819035802-00465.warc.gz | en | 0.93314 | 808 | 2.4375 | 2 |
Non-Surgical Pain Expert Dr. William Moyal, DC, CCSP was just featured on Newswatch TV for the work he has been doing for the last 14 years in Non-Surgical Spinal Decompression.
Dr. Moyal is one of the leading crusaders for Non-Surgical Spinal Decompression helping his patient base avoid surgery, drugs and shots if qualify for this type of treatment.
This High-Tech approach has proven extremely successful in more than 95% of the case that qualify for this type of treatment without any side effects as is all too often seen with surgery.
It is the most effective treatment of its kind for chronic sciatica, spinal joint problems, stenosis, bulging discs, herniated discs, degenerative discs and even failed-back surgeries because it focuses on helping your discs heal and regain the hydration process that has broken down when your discs suffer any type of injuries, instead of just trying to pacify the pain you may be in.
Treatments attempting to just take away pain, muscle spasms or inflammation DO NOT get to the real core of your issue.
Getting epidural shots can also be dangerous… As they are not FDA approved –> see here FDA WARNING
Non-Surgical Spinal Decompression is most efficient for chronic neck and back problems because it addresses the main underlying root of your disc or joint problem, and its ability to move, create and restore a pump mechanism that does not just hydrates the disc, but also increases the influx of oxygen and nutrients back into the disc providing it the tools it needs to self-repair and heal.
This technology helps the disc heal, regain and maintain its integrity allowing disc sufferers to get back their lives and enjoy their favorite activities and hobbies.
For more information or to schedule a One-on-One Consultation with Non-Surgical Pain Expert Dr. William Moyal, call our office today at (305) 531-2933… | <urn:uuid:1c7b8872-e56d-40d1-a9e5-1379656787ef> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://coralwaydisccenter.com/non-surgical-pain-expert-dr-william-moyal-featured-on-newswatch-tv-miami-beach-fl-33139/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.942956 | 409 | 1.507813 | 2 |
10 Biggest Animals In The World
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I’m pretty confident to say that all of us here love animals! Whether it’s your pet at home or an animal you spot at the zoo or during a safari trip, I’m sure you have a favorite animal! Today I’ll be showing you 10 of the biggest animals in the world! Get ready for some big insects, big reptiles and big mammals - the animal kingdom is taking over today.
Do you know what’s the biggest animal on Earth? If you are good at biology, you might know who’s the number one on this list! And if you don’t know the answer, then today is the day to find out! Whether you’re an expert in animals or not, I’m sure you’ll have fun watching this video. Stay with me all the way to the end to find out some crazy facts about them.
The Goliath Frog
The name of this frog speaks for itself. If you think frogs are scary, wait until you meet the Goliath Frog. This amphibian is so big that sometimes it can reach the same size of a domestic cat! And with a frog this big you can only expect a lot of crazy high jumps as well - the goliath frogs can reach heights of up to 3 meters as they leap around! They can easily jump over your head if they wanted to. But don’t expect any noise from them. These frogs are mute.
Other names for this frog are “Goliath Bullfrog” and “Giant Slippery Frog.” You can find them around Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea in a very limited space. Their habitat is slowly being destroyed due to pet trading and other industries that threaten their space. I understand they’re exotic and interesting animals, but I’m sure you’ll agree that they should be left alone in the little habitat they have.
If we took into account all the birds that have existed, the one on this list wouldn’t be here. An extinct version of the albatross was the largest bird on Earth at some point. But today on this list I’m giving you: The Ostrich, the largest living bird. They can be as high as 2.7 meters and weight as much as 344 pounds. Not only their bodies are large, but their eyes are also the largest bird eyes ever - they are 5 centimeters long! Ostriches don’t fly, but they are known to be good runners, which comes in handy when predators or humans come around to mess with them - but they could easily kill you with one kick if they wanted to. If we want to keep them as the largest birds on Earth, we gotta take better care of them. Their population has significantly decreased over the last 200 years and most of the remaining ostriches in the world are in farms and parks.
This list wouldn’t be complete without the tallest animal dwelling on land: The Giraffe. With a neck as high as 1.8 meters tall, these animals live off vegetation in high trees where other animals can’t easily reach. These animals are tall even from the moment they are born! Baby Giraffes can be 2 meters high, which is taller than most of us humans. The tallest giraffe ever, whose name was George, was already taller than 5 meters at age nine! But there was another Giraffe named Zulu at a British zoo and Zulu was close to 6 meters high! Unfortunately, Zulu passed away before documenting his height in the book of Guinness World Records.
A cool fact about these animals is that each Giraffe has a distinct spotted coat, which is similar to our fingerprints - no two giraffes have the same pattern! This feature allows them to be easily individually identified. Although they’re a very common sight at any zoo, Giraffes can also be found in the wild throughout the Eastern and Southern parts of the African continent.
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#viralstory #amazingpeople #top5best | <urn:uuid:198ced13-1761-4b16-9ae6-b49067f0619f> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://coolisen.github.io/10-biggest-animals-in-the-world.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.945663 | 988 | 2.328125 | 2 |
The most important finding of the study was that only BPF showed a significant decrease after TKR and preoperative baseline levels were only reached 6 weeks after surgery. In addition, subjective outcome parameters did not show satisfying results until 6 weeks after surgery. These results suggest that a timeframe of 6 weeks after TKR should be kept before patients can safely start driving again confirming our hypothesis.
A majority of patients view rapid restoration of the postoperative driving ability as a key issue due to its necessity for mobility and independence. The ability to perform a quick and effective emergency stop is essential for the safe operation of a motor vehicle. The heterogeneity of the published data illustrates the difficulties encountered when trying to define an appropriate recommendation with due consideration of individual circumstances. This study, therefore, aimed to assess driving ability as defined by NRT, BRT, and BPF as well as subjective outcome parameters. Measurements were taken at different time points over the perioperative period to evaluate different stages in the restoration of a patients driving ability following TKR.
NRT, BRT, and BPF exhibited a large inter-individual range in the control group. BRT in younger (32 years) control subjects (706 ms) was similar to values previously reported (700–750 ms) . In contrast, the older patient group (66 years) exhibited significantly slower (985 ms) preoperative reaction times.
Of note, we found braking response times to be faster for the male control population. As NRT measurements were similar, the cause seemed to be a shorter transfer time from the accelerator to the brake pedal. Similarly, Green and Li et al. found women to have a slower brake reaction time (BRT) in critical situations [6, 10]. In contrast to our results, Li and colleagues found that women responding to an emergency signal while operating a mobile phone responded slower than men, but ended up with a shorter braking distance due to more efficient braking . Other studies, however, failed to show any significant gender differences regarding BRT [1, 5]. In summary, the available evidence does not provide clear evidence for gender-specific recommendations regarding driving safety.
We also found a correlation between age and reaction time, although the comparison is limited as the majority of older patients complained of severe knee pain. Besides pain, restriction of movement due to advanced gonarthrosis may be a decisive factor for the found age-dependent differences. Other authors have confirmed this observation [2, 4]. In contrast, Dalury et al. described a significantly shorter preoperative BRT of 530 ms in patients with gonarthrosis; while, Hernandez et al. observed a value of 692 ms [1, 7]. On a critical note, comparison of reaction times is complicated by great variances (430 ms–1330 ms) due to the heterogeneity of patient groups and the simulators employed [1, 7, 8, 11, 12]. Thus, driving ability recommendations based on NRT or BRT only might be prone to error and insufficient in many cases. As discussed by McLeod et al., evaluating BPF is critical to make reliable recommendations . In contrast to the reaction time results, this study did not determine any significant differences in BPF between genders or between the healthy control group and the preoperative patient cohort. Hence, preoperative chronic knee pain (NRS 5.1) does not seem to be associated with any significant reduction in BPF. No study so far has described influential factors or a correlation between BPF and age. In conclusion, BPF measurements offer decisive advantage for the evaluation of driving ability, especially after surgical intervention.
Both reaction time measurements and BPF reported in literature show pronounced inter-individual fluctuations, complicating establishment of universally applicable quantitative thresholds. With regard to assessing driving abilities, priority should be given to considering the individual preoperative baseline parameters and not to obtain arbitrarily defined thresholds.
Overall, NRT increased by 55 ms and BRT by 105 ms immediately after surgery. Despite the absence of statistical significance, the latter is equivalent to an extension of the braking distance by approximately 1.5 m at a speed of 50 km/h and to an increase of approximately 3 m at a speed of 100 km/h. Jordan at al. observed a similar non-significant prolongation of the BRT by 150 ms at 8 days after lower limb surgery . Other authors also found no significant prolongation of BRT during the postoperative period . On the other hand, a recent meta-analysis by Van der Velden et al. identified nine prospective studies providing partly inhomogeneous recommendations based solely on changes in reaction time . Pooling all data after right-sided TKR, reaction time reached preoperative baseline levels 4 weeks after TKR. However, none of these studies evaluated braking force as an additional outcome parameter. Another systematic review by Di Silvestro et al. concluded that operation of a motor vehicle is possible 4 weeks after TKR based on changes in reaction time . However, only 4 of the 25 investigated reports considered braking force for their recommendations (10 days to 12 weeks), and none of them focused on TKR patients . To our best knowledge, only Spalding et al. evaluated BPF as an additional safety parameter after TKR . However, this study is 26-years old and is therefore not taking current technical developments such as fast track concepts and modern rehabilitation protocols into account.
BPF was found to be significantly decreased immediately after surgery. Although no statistically significant difference was detected in the 3rd–4th postoperative weeks compared to the preoperative levels, baseline values were only fully restored after the 6th postoperative week. Furthermore, no significant difference between control and patient group was observed in week 3/4 after surgery. At present, there is paucity of literature concerning braking force after total joint replacement . Jordan et al. investigated BPF over time (preoperatively, 8 days, 6, 12, and 52 weeks postoperatively) after hip replacement : for these patients, BPF was significantly reduced and did not return to preoperative levels until week 12. In contrast, the BRT had already been restored in the 6th postoperative week. The prolonged convalescence in the Jordon et al. study when compared to the results presented in our study may be due to postoperative rehabilitation differences between knee and hip replacements, as well as mobility restrictions relating specifically to the hip.
In addition to the objective evaluation of driving ability by measuring NRT, BRT and BPF, subjective parameters like pain levels or subjective fitness to drive are key parameters in the decision-making process. Regardless of the statistical significance of the physical parameters assessed in this study, patients did not rate their own driving ability to be “good” until the 6th postoperative week. Moreover, crutches were used postoperatively for approximately 5–6 weeks. Current german case-law interprets the use of walking aids as negligent behaviour and could therefore attribute to (partial) liability in the event of a traffic accident, regardless of an individual’s subjective physical fitness (§ 315c of the German Criminal Code, StGB). Taking into account all subjective and objective parameters, patients’ driving ability was restored to preoperative levels 6 weeks after surgery. These results suggest that active participation in road traffic should generally not take place before the 6th postoperative week.
Some limitations apply to this study. The control group was not matched for age or gender. It was, therefore, not possible to reliably evaluate the impact of age and pain on NRT, BRT, and BPF. Nonetheless, comparison with preoperative baseline values appears sufficient due to the described inter-individual fluctuations. Furthermore, comparing patients to a healthy younger control group results in an even stricter evaluation. The authors are also aware that a time range of approximately 14 days for the 3rd and 4th measurements might impact the braking behaviour. Due to patient-initiated changes of scheduled appointments and organisational reasons, it was not possible to assess all patients at the exact same day after surgery. However, as rehabilitation and function improve only slowly over the postoperative course, the authors are confident that this does not result in a substantial bias of the data. Furthermore, correlation analysis failed to show any influence of time ranges within the separate measurement timepoint. A third limitation is that the effects of brake boosters on emergency braking were not considered. This study was not able to evaluate the extent to which a modern brake booster might achieve adequate braking, even with reduced BPF. By definition, however, emergency braking requires a rapid and powerful braking manoeuvre. | <urn:uuid:27110b4f-060f-470b-b829-8497aa752f4d> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00167-020-06105-2 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.949007 | 1,763 | 1.632813 | 2 |
Mutual fund managers evaluate many characteristics of potential investment opportunities. The investment team at Aquila Group of Funds evaluates a wide range of characteristics, and puts a particularly high value on three distinct criteria: material positive changes, strong business models, and attractive valuations. In addition, the team seeks to identify “moats” that may protect certain companies from competition. In this article, we explore the role of moats in contributing to business model strength and sustained profitability.
The Role of Moats from a Business Perspective
Oxford Advanced American Dictionary defines a moat as “a deep, wide channel dug around a castle, etc. and filled with water to make it more difficult for enemies to attack.” For investors analyzing the medium and long-term potential profitability of companies’ business models, moats are the business characteristics that help shield companies from attack by competitors.
In our view, there are five broad categories of moats that help companies protect their long-term profitability from competition:
- Strong brand
- Protected intellectual property
- Protected license
- Market position
- Resource advantage
Companies may have more than one kind of moat, but one is typically the primary source of its business model strength.
Types of Moats
1. Strong Brand
The first moat we consider is a strong brand. Brands encompass intangible reputation, as well as printed images and other symbols that convey the reputation of a product or service. In many cases, companies seek trademarks to provide legal protection for their brands. The goal of a brand is to create brand loyalty and raise the lifetime value of the customer relationship. As a result, a highly regarded brand can help drive sustained unit sales growth and pricing power, both of which contribute to earnings growth over time.
One example of a strong brand that provides a moat is the Ford Motor Company (F) F-Series. It has been America’s best-selling vehicle for 40 consecutive years. The F-Series is now in its fourteenth generation, and Ford sold over 700,000 F-Series trucks in 2021, almost 30% higher than the second most popular vehicle sold in the U.S. The F-Series traces its history to workhorse vehicles purchased by construction workers and farmers who needed them to do their jobs. Today, the F-Series is a versatile and reliable vehicle that fills suburban driveways where owners shuttle families, and haul home improvement projects. The vehicle has a reputation for reliability with each new generation, undergoing 10 million miles of testing before it is offered for sale.
In 2022, Ford will be rolling out its much anticipated fully-electric F-150 Lightning pickup truck, and 200,000 reservations were made within seven months of it being unveiled. The Ford F-Series’ brand reputation drives demand, which in turn, supports sales and profit forecasts that contribute to longer term cash flow prospects of the company versus its automaker peers.
Another compelling brand example is Caesars Entertainment, Inc. (CZR). For Americans of a certain generation, Caesars, which opened in 1966, is one of the most iconic brands—one they may think of first when it comes to gambling and casinos. According to YouGovAmerica brand research, it is one of the top three most recognized casino brands. Caesars is leveraging its brand to take share in online sports and casino betting, and in the U.S., is the only company succeeding in both the physical and digital markets.
Recently, Caesars grew its market share in the online/mobile sports betting market to 21% from nearly zero just a few years ago. Goldman Sachs anticipates online sports betting and iGaming to experience significant growth over the next decade (see Exhibit 1). Caesars’ strong brand should help maintain its market position. Furthermore, Caesars’ online business should contribute to the company’s profitability over the same period.
Exhibit 1 – Online Sports Betting and iGaming Forecasts
Source: Goldman Sachs, Bureau of Economic Analysis & State Gaming Commissions
Both Ford and Caesars’ strong brands provide moats that help protect their businesses from competition.
2. Protected Intellectual Property
Intellectual Property (“IP”) is an intangible asset that is owned and legally protected by a company from outside use without consent. Intellectual property protection provides assurances that certain creations of human intellect should be given the same protective rights that apply to physical property. Patents, copyrights and trademarks are all examples of protected intellectual property. If a company owns valuable IP, it can require competitors to compensate it for access to its intellectual property, generating earnings and cashflow. Alternatively, companies with protected IP can refuse to share their knowledge and protected property, enabling them to offer customers superior products that can gain market share and receive a premium price in the market.
One example of a company with valuable intellectual property is Arista Networks (ANET). Arista Networks has become the de facto leader for commercial networking solutions for the most demanding hyperscale networking environments. Their infinitely scalable and extensible software and hardware solutions leave behind the legacy, outdated, and brittle codebases that their competitors are required to support for their large installed customer bases.
Arista has many patents and other forms of IP that have allowed them to move ahead of their larger competitors in the fastest growth segments of the market and gain significant market share in revenues and units (see Exhibit 2). In our opinion, Arista’s protected IP will contribute to revenue and profit growth, providing a moat of protection from its competitors.
Exhibit 2 – Arista Networks’ Market Share
Source: Crehan Research Datacenter Switch Market Share Report Q4’2020
Note: 10GbE and Higher – Excludes blade switches
Other examples of companies with valuable IP moats include Synopsys, Inc. (SNPS) and Cadence Design Systems (CDNS), both of which benefit from their extensive suite of semiconductor design, IP license, and testing solutions. If an engineer wants to design a performant chip, electronic solution, and/or an embedded hardware and software design, they have little choice but to turn to either Synopsys or Cadence for digital and analog (respectively) design, simulation, test, and IP solutions. Growth has accelerated at both companies from the low single-digit to low double-digit range over the past decade, as their customer base has broadened from traditional semiconductor companies to hyperscalers, automotive, industrial, and system providers.
With the slowing of Moore’s Law, the only way companies can evolve their solutions is through a custom stack of silicon all the way to the application software suite. Moore’s Law states that chip performance generally doubles every two years at approximately half the price. As a result, we believe the protected IP and know-how of both companies support above-industry-average long-term growth.
3. Protected License
Licenses are often very difficult and costly to acquire and can be valuable assets because they control who is allowed to operate in or supply to a market. To this end, licenses can provide a moat that is a formidable barrier of entry for competitors to overcome.
One type of license is approval for standard treatment by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to treat a disease. Seagen Inc., formerly Seattle Genetics, Inc. (SGEN) is a leader in the discovery and development of antibody-drug therapies that facilitate the targeted delivery of cytotoxic payloads to destroy cancer cells. Their FDA-approved drugs include: 1) Adcetris, the standard frontline therapy treatment for Hodgkin lymphoma; 2) Padcev, which is used to treat metastatic urothelial cancer; and 3) Tukysa, a best-in-class metastatic breast cancer treatment. All three drugs are approved by the FDA, with multiple patents and licenses, allowing Seagen to be the exclusive manufacturer until 2031. These licenses enable Seagen to market and sell therapies to patients who suffer from these illnesses, providing the company with highly visible earnings and cash flow streams.
Another type of license granted by the U.S. government is one to export weapon systems to foreign countries. AeroVironment, Inc. (AVAV) designs, develops, and produces small unmanned aircraft and fast charge systems for electric industrial vehicle batteries. It produces Switchblade loitering missile systems that enable combatants to easily launch, fly, track, and target armored vehicles with lethal effects while minimizing collateral damage. The missiles are rapidly deployable and highly maneuverable, with high-performance optics and scalable munition payloads.
AeroVironment has acquired the requisite U.S. government license to sell Switchblade loitering missile systems to foreign countries under the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulation. AeroVironment also holds the patent for the “wave-off” technology. This feature allows an operator to cancel an attack within seconds of impact to avoid collateral damage and minimize civilian casualties during wartime efforts. The U.S. government license and patent protection allows AeroVironment to be the exclusive manufacturer and exporter of the Switchblade loitering missile systems to countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”). These export licenses are difficult to acquire and help provide a moat that supports the sustainability of AeroVironment’s business model.
4. Market Position
Market position refers to market share and leadership. It can be a highly valuable intangible asset, especially in industries where first-mover advantage, or dominant market share, leads to adoption up and down a supply chain. Aside from their years-ahead design, test, and verify tool suites, both Synopsys and Cadence’s products have attained such a large percentage of market share at key customers in each segment that the entire supply chain has essentially standardized their designs and products around both companies’ intellectual property.
In select markets, such as digital synthesis or analog design, it is considered to be very difficult for Synopsys to dislodge Cadence and vice-versa (see Exhibit 3; data outlined in red). Given the industry’s adoption of both companies’ models as a standard and their work to support that, a competitor introduction would have to be multiple times better just to be considered, which makes for unattractive research and development return on investment for any potential challengers.
Exhibit 3 – Electronic Design Automation (“EDA”) – Market Position
Source: Rosenblatt Securities Research
5. Resource Advantage
A resource advantage can be a commodity or natural resource that is in the ground (e.g., lithium mine or oil field), but can also be a resource such as a unique distribution channel, or a sales force that is difficult to replicate. Resource advantages may be nearly insurmountable by potential competition, or they may just help to secure dominant market share or margins.
One example of a resource advantage can be found at Pioneer Natural Resources (PXD), an independent oil and gas exploration company. Pioneer is the largest acreage holder in the Spraberry/Wolfcamp field in the Permian Basin, with the majority of their acreage footprint in the core of the Midland Basin in West Texas. According to Pioneer, these resources are in one of the most productive basins in North America, which gives Pioneer a massive drilling inventory, with production costs currently under $20 per barrel, and cash production costs of under $10 per barrel. This acreage is a significant resource advantage because it provides the company with a broad and deep moat that protects it against competitors whose production costs are significantly higher. As a result, Pioneer can drill and profit in a wider variety of energy market environments and achieve higher margins than peers with less productive acreage assets.
Exhibit 4 – Cash Costs of Production for Pioneer Versus North American Peers ($/Barrel of Oil Equivalent)
Source: Pioneer (Cash costs, based on Q3 2021 Company Filings. Peers include: APA, CLR, EOG, DVN, FANG, HES, MRO, OVV and OXY).
Another example is Hess Corporation (HES), a New York-based independent energy company focused on the exploration, development, production, and sale of oil, natural gas, and liquids. Hess has a resource advantage over many of its competitors in the form of a low-cost offshore development project in Guyana led by Exxon Mobil, and in which Hess has a 30% interest. This consortium in Guyana affords Hess long-term cash flow growth potential that we expect will materially increase over time as the project is further developed.
In summary, a key aspect of a strong business model is a moat that protects a company from its competition. The five moats discussed help businesses fend off competitors, and potentially generate higher earnings and cash flows than those that do not have the same protective characteristics.
From an investment perspective, identifying companies that have moats is an important part of the stock selection process because they can contribute to medium or long-term stability or growth in profitability. The investment team at Aquila Group of Funds look at moats in the context of overall business model strength that consider factors such as profitability and balance sheet strength. Other characteristics we weigh heavily in our investment decisions include attractive valuations and material positive changes. Of course, investors should consider their individual financial goals, their time frame for achieving them, and their tolerance for risk. Working with a financial professional who understands your investment objectives and long-term financial goals, can help you invest appropriately.
This material is not intended to be a recommendation or investment advice, and does not constitute a solicitation to buy, sell or hold a security or an investment strategy. The views and opinions expressed are for informational and educational purposes only as of the date of writing and may change without notice at any time based on numerous factors, such as market or other conditions, legal and regulatory developments, and additional risks and uncertainties.
A complete list of portfolio holdings, including percentage allocations, for any of the funds offered by Aquila Group of Funds is available at www.aquilafunds.com, or by calling 800-437-1020.
Past performance does not guarantee future results.
Mutual fund investing involves risk, which includes but is not limited to: potential loss of principal, market risk, financial risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, and investments in highly-leveraged companies, lower-quality debt securities, and foreign markets and currencies.
Before investing in any mutual fund offered by Aquila Group of Funds, carefully read about and consider the investment objectives, risks, charges, expenses, and other information found in the Fund’s prospectus. The prospectus is available from your financial advisor, when you visit www.aquilafunds.com, or call 800-437-1020. | <urn:uuid:3481eb12-48ed-4e9d-8d91-3478c6c89c9c> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://aquilafunds.com/identifying-strong-business-models-how-moats-protect-companies-from-competition/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.936598 | 3,084 | 2.140625 | 2 |
On the anniversary of the Stonewall riots, the Lafayette County Democratic Executive Committee released a resolution calling on all elected officials to reflect on the past and present hardships suffered by LGBTQ members of the community.
On June 28, 1969, police raided a popular gay bar called the Stonewall Inn in New York City’s Greenwich Village which ignited six days of protests. The riots that followed sparked the beginning of the modern gay civil rights movement.
“That movement continues today through the work of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer/or Questioning community,” states the resolution.
The timeline of significant events in the American fight for gay civil rights (attached) shows a long history of milestones both before and since the Stonewall uprising. Included are many setbacks and abuses but also incremental achievements and favorable rulings.
The Christopher Street Gay Liberation Day March in 1970 is regarded as the first Pride parade in history; however, communities across the nation have come to celebrate the full month of June to commemorate the Stonewall riots and the progress that has been achieved by the LGBTQ community.
The resolution was crafted by local resident Don Mason and released on the Lafayette County Dems social media sites.
“Much work remains to be done. For example, Mississippi is among the handful of states with the most restrictive and regressive laws regarding what, if anything, may be taught in public school curricula regarding LGBTQ, establishment of gay-straight alliances, or participation of transgender athletes in school sports. Also, virtually no Mississippi municipalities provide basic legal protections for their LGBTQ residents in matters of employment, housing, or public accommodations,” the resolution states.
In Oxford, Pride Month was celebrated on June 12 with the Out in the Grove event that featured a drag show, music, and the crowning of Miss Oxford Pride 2020. It was the first event of its kind held in the Grove on the University of Mississippi campus.
Milestones in the American Gay Rights Movement
December 10, 1924
The Society for Human Rights is founded by Henry Gerber in Chicago. The society is the first gay rights organization as well as the oldest documented in America. After receiving a charter from the state of Illinois, the society publishes the first American publication for homosexuals, Friendship and Freedom. Soon after its founding, the society disbands due to political pressure.
Biologist and sex researcher Alfred Kinsey publishes Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. From his research Kinsey concludes that homosexual behavior is not restricted to people who identify themselves as homosexual and that 37% of men have enjoyed homosexual activities at least once. While psychologists and psychiatrists in the 1940s consider homosexuality a form of illness, the findings surprise many conservative notions about sexuality.
November 11, 1950
In Los Angeles, gay rights activist Harry Hay founds America’s first sustained national gay rights organization. In an attempt to change public perception of homosexuality, the Mattachine Society aims to “eliminate discrimination, derision, prejudice and bigotry,” to assimilate homosexuals into mainstream society, and to cultivate the notion of an “ethical homosexual culture.”
December 15, 1950
A Senate report titled “Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government” is distributed to members of Congress after the federal government had covertly investigated employees’ sexual orientation at the beginning of the Cold War. The report states that since homosexuality is a mental illness, homosexuals “constitute security risks” to the nation because “those who engage in overt acts of perversion lack the emotional stability of normal persons.”
Over the previous few years, more than 4,380 gay men and women had been discharged from the military and around 500 fired from their jobs with the government. The purging will become known as the “lavender scare.”
The American Psychiatric Association lists homosexuality as a sociopathic personality disturbance in its first publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Immediately following the manual’s release, many professionals in medicine, mental health and social sciences criticize the categorization due to lack of empirical and scientific data.
April 27, 1953
President Dwight Eisenhower signs Executive Order 10450, banning homosexuals from working for the federal government or any of its private contractors. The order lists homosexuals as security risks, along with alcoholics and neurotics.
September 21, 1955
In San Francisco, the Daughters of Bilitis becomes the first lesbian rights organization in the United States. The organization hosts social functions, providing alternatives to lesbian bars and clubs, which are frequently raided by police.
August 30, 1956
American psychologist Evelyn Hooker shares her paper “The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual” at the American Psychological Association Convention in Chicago. After administering psychological tests, such as the Rorschach, to groups of homosexual and heterosexual males, Hooker’s research concludes homosexuality is not a clinical entity and that heterosexuals and homosexuals do not differ significantly. Hooker’s experiment becomes very influential, changing clinical perceptions of homosexuality.
January 13, 1958
In the landmark case One, Inc. v. Olesen, the U.S. Supreme Court rules in favor of the First Amendment rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) magazine One: The Homosexual Magazine. The suit was filed after the U.S. Postal Service and FBI declared the magazine obscene material, and it marks the first time the Supreme Court rules in favor of homosexuals.
January 1, 1962
Illinois repeals its sodomy laws, becoming the first U.S. state to decriminalize homosexuality.
July 4, 1965
At Independence Hall in Philadelphia, picketers begin staging the first Reminder Day to call public attention to the lack of civil rights for LGBTQ people. The gatherings will continue annually for five years.
April 21, 1966
Members of the Mattachine Society stage a “sip-in” at the Julius Bar in New York City’s Greenwich Village, where the N.Y. Liquor Authority prohibits serving gay patrons in bars on the basis that homosexuals are “disorderly.” Society president Dick Leitsch and other members announce their homosexuality and are immediately refused service.
Following the sip-in, the Mattachine Society will sue the N.Y. Liquor Authority. Although no laws are overturned, the New York City Commission on Human Rights declares that homosexuals have the right to be served.
After transgender customers become raucous in a 24-hour San Francisco cafeteria, management calls police. When a police officer manhandles one of the patrons, she throws coffee in his face and a riot ensues, eventually spilling out onto the street, destroying police and public property.
Following the riot, activists established the National Transsexual Counseling Unit, the first peer-run support and advocacy organization in the world.
June 28, 1969
Patrons of the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village riot when police officers attempt to raid the popular gay bar around 1am. Since its establishment in 1967, the bar had been frequently raided by police officers trying to rid the neighborhood of “sexual deviants.”
Angry gay youth clash with aggressive police officers in the streets, leading to a three-day riot during which thousands of protestors receive only minimal local news coverage. Nonetheless, the event will be credited with reigniting the fire behind America’s modern LGBTQ rights movement.
June 28, 1970
Christopher Street Liberation Day commemorates the one-year anniversary of the Stonewall riots. Following the event, thousands of members of the LGBTQ community march through the street of New York City into Central Park, in what will be considered America’s first gay pride parade. In the coming decades, the annual gay pride parade will spread to dozens of countries around the world.
December 15, 1973
The board of the American Psychiatric Association votes to remove homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses.
Kathy Kozachenko becomes the first openly gay American elected to public office when she wins a seat on the Ann Arbor, Michigan, City Council.
June 7, 1977
Singer and conservative Southern Baptist Anita Bryant leads a successful campaign with the “Save Our Children” Crusade to repeal a gay rights ordinance in Dade County, Florida. Bryant faces severe backlash from gay rights supporters across the U.S. The gay rights ordinance will not be reinstated in Dade County until December 1, 1998, more than 20 years later.
November 8, 1977
Harvey Milk wins a seat on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and is responsible for introducing a gay rights ordinance protecting gays and lesbians from being fired from their jobs. Milk also leads a successful campaign against Proposition 6, an initiative forbidding homosexual teachers.
A year later, on November 27, 1978, former city supervisor Dan White assassinates Milk. White’s actions are motivated by jealousy and depression, rather than homophobia.
Gilbert Baker designed the now-ubiquitous rainbow flag for San Francisco’s Gay Freedom Celebration. (Hot pink stood for sexuality, red for life, orange for healing, yellow for the sun, green for nature, turquoise for art, indigo for harmony, and violet for the soul.)
May 21, 1979
Dan White is convicted of voluntary manslaughter and is sentenced to seven years in prison. Outraged by what they believed to be a lenient sentence, more than 5,000 protesters ransack San Francisco’s City Hall, causing hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property damage in the surrounding area.
The following night, approximately 10,000 people gather on San Francisco’s Castro and Market streets for a peaceful demonstration to commemorate what would have been Milk’s 49th birthday.
October 14, 1979
An estimated 75,000 people participate in the National March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights. LGBTQ people and straight allies demand equal civil rights and urge passage of protective civil rights legislation.
July 8, 1980
The Democratic Rules Committee states that it will not discriminate against homosexuals. At their National Convention on August 11-14, the Democrats become the first major political party to endorse a homosexual rights platform.
July 3, 1981
The New York Times prints the first story of a rare pneumonia and skin cancer found in 41 gay men in New York and California. The CDC initially refers to the disease as GRID, Gay Related Immune Deficiency Disorder. When the symptoms are found outside the gay community, Bruce Voeller, biologist and founder of the National Gay Task Force, successfully lobbies to change the name of the disease to AIDS.
March 2, 1982
Wisconsin becomes the first U.S. state to outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
March 10, 1987
AIDS advocacy group ACT UP (The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) is formed in response to the devastating effects the disease has had on the gay and lesbian community in New York. The group holds demonstrations against pharmaceutical companies profiteering from AIDS-related drugs as well as the lack of AIDS policies protecting patients from outrageous prescription prices.
October 11, 1987
Hundreds of thousands of activists take part in the National March on Washington to demand that President Ronald Reagan address the AIDS crisis. Although AIDS had been reported first in 1981, it is not until the end of his presidency that Reagan speaks publicly about the epidemic.
May – June 1988
The CDC mails a brochure, Understanding AIDS, to every household in the U.S. Approximately 107 million brochures are mailed.
December 1, 1988
The World Health Organization organizes the first World AIDS Day to raise awareness of the spreading pandemic.
August 18, 1990
President George Bush signs the Ryan White Care Act, a federally funded program for people living with AIDS. Ryan White, an Indiana teenager, contracted AIDS in 1984 through a tainted hemophilia treatment. After being barred from attending school because of his HIV-positive status, Ryan White becomes a well-known activist for AIDS research and anti-discrimination.
Created by the New York-based Visual AIDS, the red ribbon is adopted as a symbol of awareness and compassion for those living with HIV/AIDS.
December 21, 1993
The Department of Defense issues a directive prohibiting the U.S. military from barring applicants from service based on their sexual orientation. “Applicants… shall not be asked or required to reveal whether they are homosexual, ” states the new policy, which still forbids applicants from engaging in homosexual acts or making a statement that he or she is homosexual. This policy is known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”
May 20, 1996
In the case of Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court decides that Colorado’s 2nd amendment, denying gays and lesbians protections against discrimination, is unconstitutional, calling them “special rights.”
September 21, 1996
President Bill Clinton signs the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) into law. The law defines marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman and that no state is required to recognize a same-sex marriage from out of state.
April 1, 1998
Coretta Scott King, widow of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., calls on the civil rights community to join the struggle against homophobia. She receives criticism from members of the black civil rights movement for comparing civil rights to gay rights.
April 26, 2000
Vermont becomes the first state in the U.S. to legalize civil unions and registered partnerships between same-sex couples.
June 26, 2003
In Lawrence v. Texas the U.S. Supreme Court rules that sodomy laws in the U.S. are unconstitutional.
May 18, 2004
Massachusetts becomes the first state to legalize gay marriage. The court finds the prohibition of gay marriage unconstitutional because it denies dignity and equality of all individuals. In the following six years, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Iowa and Washington D.C. will follow suit.
August 9, 2007
Sponsored by the Human Rights Campaign, the Logo cable channel hosts the first American presidential forum focusing specifically on LGBTQ issues, inviting each presidential candidate. Six Democrats participate in the forum, including Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, while all Republican candidates decline.
November 4, 2008
California voters approve Proposition 8, making same-sex marriage in California illegal. The passing of the ballot garners national attention from gay-rights supporters across the U.S. Prop 8 inspires the NOH8 campaign, a photo project that uses celebrities to promote marriage equality.
June 17, 2009
President Barack Obama signs a Presidential Memorandum allowing same-sex partners of federal employees to receive certain benefits. The memorandum does not cover full health coverage.
October 28, 2009
The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act is signed into law by President Obama. The measure expands the 1969 U.S. Federal Hate Crime Law to include crimes motivated by a victim’s actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability.
Matthew Shepard was tortured and murdered near Laramie, Wyoming on October 7, 1998, because of his sexual orientation.
August 4, 2010
A federal judge in San Francisco decides that gays and lesbians have the constitutional right to marry and that Prop 8 is unconstitutional. Lawyers will challenge the finding.
December 18, 2010
The U.S. Senate votes 65-31 to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the U.S. military.
February 23, 2011
President Obama states his administration will no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which bans the recognition of same-sex marriage.
June 24, 2011
New York State passes the Marriage Equity Act, becoming the largest state thus far to legalize gay marriage.
The U.S. Supreme Court rule DOMA unconstitutional.
President Obama acknowledges the LGBTQ community in the State of Union address for the first time in U.S. history, using the words “lesbian,” “bisexual,” and “transgender” when asserting that, as Americans, we “respect human dignity” and condemn the persecution of minority groups.
President Obama calls for an end to the use of conversion therapies meant to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity.
The U.S. Defense Secretary officially added “sexual orientation” to the list of protected classes under the Military Equal Opportunity Policy.
June 26, 2015
In a 5-4 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court declares same-sex marriage legal in all 50 states.
June 15, 2020
In a groundbreaking decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the prohibition against sex discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applies to LBGTQ Americans.
Adapted from PBS.org, The American Experience, “Milestones in the American Gay Rights Movement,” 2021. | <urn:uuid:c4441059-d5ef-4668-a0cd-612373de19e5> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.hottytoddy.com/2021/06/29/lafayette-democratic-party-releases-pride-month-resolution/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.931576 | 3,550 | 3.125 | 3 |
When 17th century composers created music to be performed in St. Mark’s Basilica in Venice, little did they realise that their ground-breaking musical techniques would allow a 21st century performance across a record-breaking 5000 kilometres. Or that this would create a musical connection between the Armenian diaspora in Venice and Armenia itself.
Two top choirs and partners in the EU-funded Eastern Partnership Connect (EaPConnect) project created a musical bridge between Venice (Italy) and Yerevan (Armenia) with the help of LoLa (low latency) audio-video transmission technology and cutting-edge research and education networks. Thirty-five a capella singers in the two countries performed together in one distributed concert, ‘Connecting with Culture’, in a spectacular opening for the 4th Eastern Partnership E-Infrastructures Conference, EaPEC 2019. This was the first performance in Armenia to use LoLa technology.
Two videos are available! | <urn:uuid:1275522b-4a44-46a3-8e71-2e29d4d407ed> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://dev.connect.geant.org/2019/12/04/renaissance-music-techniques-help-break-distributed-concert-distance-record-connecting-armenia-and-italy | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.932963 | 203 | 1.71875 | 2 |
Aug 11, 2022
FSHM 2530 - Purchasing Management
This course has students examine activities from a food service manager’s perspective. Channels of distribution, buying techniques, specification writing, product information and principles needed to perform the activity are covered. Future managers learn how to get the most from money and resources and how to make sound purchasing decisions.
Minimum Student Competencies
Upon completion of FSHM 2530 Purchasing Management , the student will:
- Analyze information to determine what is reliable, relevant, important, and useful in order to draw logical conclusions.
- Apply logical methods in distinguishing between facts, inferences, and opinions.
- Explore multiple perspectives while reducing these perspectives to essential arguments.
- Construct supportive viewpoints/arguments with valid evidence.
- Recognize situations that require mathematical solutions.
- Employ appropriate problem solving methods.
- Conduct subject area research using reputable sources.
- Draw conclusions from synthesized knowledge.
- Convey meaning through speaking and writing.
- Communicate through a variety of media and technology.
- Document sources according to the conventions of the medium used.
Instructional Method Lecture
Contact Hours: 3 hours/week
Add to Portfolio (opens a new window) | <urn:uuid:38170d26-b950-4000-bcb4-6704996ca150> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://catalog.sheridan.edu/preview_course_nopop.php?catoid=12&coid=17817 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.850232 | 291 | 2.53125 | 3 |
Discipline Policies for Students:
Anytime a large group of people come together to do productive work, rules and behavior expectations are necessary to govern a safe, orderly and respectful environment. Here at HGS we have established the following expectations for students:
1. Be courteous to fellow students, staff and visitors.
2. Respect the rights and privileges of other students and school staff.
3. Obey all School Committee policies and school rules governing student conduct.
4. Follow directions from school staff.
5. Cooperate with staff in maintaining school safety, order and discipline.
6. Attend school regularly.
7. Meet school standards for grooming and dress.
8. Respect the property of others, including school property and facilities.
9. Refrain from cheating or plagiarizing the work of others.
10. Refrain from vulgarity, profanity, obscenity, lewdness, and indecency.
In all HGS classrooms, teachers work with students to develop behavioral expectations and management incentives that align with our school-wide behavior expectations. These are intentionally designed collaboratively with students to help them develop valuable study skills and habits of mind that will assist them in their formal schooling today and into the future. Truly, students have much to learn in terms of content area knowledge and skills during their time with us. But students also have a great deal to learn in the areas of collaboration, cooperation, and working productively as a team. At the root, our behavioral expectations and discipline ladder have the scope of all these lessons in mind. We strive to support students throughout all of these lessons as they learn to comply with our school’s behavior expectations. When students make mistakes that fall short of our HGS behavior expectations they can expect consequences. All schools develop a system of consequences as a natural part of keeping order. Disciplinary consequences depend upon the seriousness of the violation and the student’s prior disciplinary record.
Consequences will range from a corrective discussion for minor misconduct up to and including expulsion for the most serious offenses. Behavior that violates the law will be referred to law enforcement authorities. | <urn:uuid:f7c0b96e-d02d-433b-bddb-922a2750e016> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.hancockgrammar.org/resources/rules-at-our-school/discipline-policies | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.945268 | 433 | 2.53125 | 3 |
FOMO ? Use this 10 seconds rule that transformed my life
I just graduated in MBA from one of the top European Business Schools and is in the process of job hunting. Right now, my days are filled with editing and re editing CV’s, the same for cover letter, researching about companies, networking both online and offline and also catching up on your social life and staying connected with my family living halfway across the world.
The next step of my career can go in any direction based on the decisions that I make today. The choices that I am presented with in terms of the geography, position, company, interests are numerous that it will be a huge decision tree if I plot it on a whiteboard. It has come to a point where I want to eliminate my options so that I can focus on what I really want to do. It was one of the reasons why I set to do an MBA.
But, the most difficult hurdle that I need to overcome today is to not give in to the peer pressure. My colleagues all around me have already started working those who did their degree as part of their company sponsorship. And the other part of the crowd has either started working in their family business or getting job offers without having to trip on a visa sponsorship bump.
It becomes easy to just randomly apply to positions that I am least interested in just to prove a point. Then I realise that this is the problem with today’s society. The yearning to fit into a mould, the need to follow a crowd, the fear of being left out. We need to understand that when you are left out, you actually stand out and then it becomes easier to wipe your vision and see more clearly.
Be it following a trend in Instagram or traveling around just so that you can post the pictures and get the validation from people who you don’t care about.
So how do you do that?
The most important factor is consciousness. If I tell you 90% of your daily activities are performed without your active consciousness, you will be surprised. This is essential so that you don’t need to remember to breathe or digest or eat and your mind and body can perform tasks that requires your attention.
But sometimes we go into an autopilot mode where we take decisions without paying attention or thinking about the consequences. Something that I have been following recently which has helped me tremendously is that take 10 seconds break before you set out to do anything. For example, the next time your hand reaches out to your smartphone to check your email, wait for 10 seconds, and then ask yourself is that really important?
Take 10 seconds before you begin any task to retrospect
I have observed that it completely changed the way I use my cellphone. That 10 seconds rule is enough to just break out of that zombie coma and get control of your mind. Similarly, if I see a job opening and I am rushing to apply for it, I take 10 seconds before I click ‘apply’ and think about is it worth spending a day applying for this job? Is this job going to enrich my life? Is this what I set out for? Most of the times I get my answer and it helps me not only to save my time and also to break out from that FOMO.
Try this every day for any task that requires your cognitive skill and you will see a world of difference. You will be surprised that how much time you waste time on inconsequential things by just following the crowd. | <urn:uuid:ffb44205-31c2-4f84-8b91-7742e49b7110> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://abhishek-suresh.medium.com/fomo-use-this-10-seconds-rule-that-transformed-my-l-8cb2194118ef?source=post_internal_links---------4---------------------------- | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.968472 | 713 | 1.84375 | 2 |
It is well known that parvovirus B19 causes erythema infectiosum, a common febrile exanthema of childhood. Studies have also shown that parvovirus B19 can cause chronic arthropathy in children, and some children may meet classification criteria for juvenile idiopathic arthritis. A child's anti-B19 antibodies may cross-react with other antigens leading to autoantibody formation and immune complex deposition. This process can cause a similar clinical picture to systemic lupus erythematosus, and in some cases has been implicated in initiation of disease. Parvovirus B19 has also been linked to the presence of antiphospholipid antibodies, juvenile dermatomyositis, vasculitides, immune thrombocytopenic purpura, and hemophagocytic lymphohistiocytosis. This review provides an extensive evaluation of the literature on parvovirus B19 and its role in rheumatic diseases in children.
- Hemophagocytic lymphohistiocytosis
- Immune thrombocytopenic purpura
- Juvenile dermatomyositis
- Juvenile idiopathic arthritis
- Parvovirus B19
- Systemic lupus erythematosus | <urn:uuid:0ab8a025-8b36-4db9-85c2-71c4ad5ba913> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://profiles.wustl.edu/en/publications/rheumatic-manifestations-of-parvovirus-b19-in-children | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.857709 | 298 | 3.046875 | 3 |
6 Reasons Slow & Steady is the Best Way to Lose WeightArticle posted in: Diet & Nutrition
No matter how much we have to lose—10, 20, 30, 50, 100 pounds—we all have the same weight loss goal. We want to lose it yesterday. As wonderful—and impossible—as that sounds, losing weight quickly is not necessarily the ticket to a slim, new you. In fact, slow and steady weight loss can be the key to success in terms of keeping the weight off in the long run.
In a study, average weight loss on the first week of Nutrisystem was 5 pounds.* After the first week, you can expect to lose one to two pounds a week. A rapid, substantial weight loss in the beginning of a diet is a good thing. In fact, a 2016 Australian study, published in the International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity, found that losing weight early on in a weight loss diet was a significant predictor of successful long-term weight loss in the study participants. It helps motivate you to keep on going. But slow and steady weight loss after the initial drop is the prescription for a smart, healthy diet and permanent change.
Here are six reasons a slow and steady weight loss will pay off for you:
1. Keep the weight off.
Scientific evidence says that people who lose one to two pounds a week are more likely to maintain the weight loss, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, which recommends losing weight gradually. That’s because weight loss isn’t just about a “diet.” Thinking of your weight loss plan that way implies it’s something you go on and off, instead of being a lifestyle change that you stick with forever. Most fad diets, and quick-weight-loss diets in particular, aren’t sustainable over the long haul.
Permanent weight loss is about changing your eating and activity habits, something that takes time. In fact, according to researchers at University College London, it can take an average of 66 days for new habits to stick—and as many as 254 days, the good part of a year. That’s a long time to be eating like a bunny.
2. You lose fat, not muscle.
When you start depriving your body of calories, you want it to hit your fat stores for energy and not your calorie-torching muscles. But that will only happen if you don’t drop your calorie intake so low your body has to grab it from wherever it can to keep you going.
Slow and steady weight loss helps you maintain lean body mass. In one study of postmenopausal women, published in the journal Appetite, one group went on a quick weight loss diet, while the other group went on one designed for slower weight loss. Both groups lost weight, but the women who lost weight quickly lost muscle. The slow weight loss group experienced some other advantages: Their trigylcerides (a dangerous blood fat) and blood pressures dropped along with their weight. High levels of both are some of the symptoms of metabolic syndrome, a potentially pre-diabetic condition.
3. You’ll stay healthier.
Unhealthy weight loss generally requires you to seriously restrict calories. And when you restrict calories to an unhealthy extent, you’re probably going to miss out on many important nutrients.
In one pilot study, published in Nutrition Journal, 104 obese people who went on a very low-calorie diet plan were deficient in a number of vital micronutrients, including vitamins A, E, C, D, folate, iron and calcium, even though their diet plan was supplemented with vitamins and minerals.
If you’re obese (your body mass index is over 30), it’s very likely that you already have some nutrient deficiencies—possibly the result of poor diet and some metabolic problems involving insulin and appetite hormones. That makes an unhealthy weight loss diet even more detrimental to your health.
4. You’re at lower risk of painful gallstones.
Obese people have a tendency toward gallstones, hardened deposits of bile that can accumulate in the gallbladder. If they block your bile ducts, they can cause pain and in some cases have to be removed surgically.
People who lose weight rapidly also have a high risk of developing gallstones. According to one study, published in the European Journal of Gastroenterology and Hepatology, the prevalence of new gallstones increases 10 to 12 percent after eight to 16 weeks of a very low calorie diet (more than 30 percent in those who undergo gastric bypass surgery). The reason? When you lose weight quickly, you run the risk of fatty cholesterol supersaturating bile, which creates the stones. Roughly a third of those stones can cause symptoms.
5. Food deprivation may make you gain.
Your body is programmed to avoid hunger, something you probably won’t be able to avoid on a continuous, rapid weight loss program. Believe it or not, we all have a hardwired system of chemicals that drive us to eat. Who knew we needed that? Also part of the system are chemicals that tell us to stop eating when we’re full. Feeling hungry is a natural part of that system and ignoring the signals can stress you out. The result: Stress produces its own chemicals. One, cortisol, can actually drive your hunger and make you eat more, according to a study in Obesity: A Research Journal. And you won’t be reaching for a nice salad or a big bowl of broccoli. Harvard Medical School studies have found that stress sets up the hunt for comfort foods, mainly filled with sugar and fat. That means all your hard work and effort works against, not for you. Stick to slow and steady weight loss as opposed to crash dieting, which can lead to overeating.
6. Choose Nutrisystem for safe, effective weight loss.
That’s where Nutrisystem comes in! By choosing one of our convenient weight loss plans, you are given everything you need to achieve weight loss success the right way, all while learning about healthy portion sizes, what foods you should be choosing and how to maintain your weight loss once you’ve reached your weight loss goal.
After the first week on Nutrisystem, you will transition to sustaining an eating schedule that promotes slow and steady weight loss. This means that, in addition to eating delicious, calorie- and portion-controlled foods, you’ll also get to incorporate fresh grocery foods into your diet. This will help keep you satisfied while you lose weight. It will also ensure you’re getting all required nutrients to maintain a healthy diet plan, all while continuing to watch the weight come off.
Looking for a meal delivery service that helps you lose weight and get healthy? Get started with Nutrisystem today! >
*Results vary based on starting weight and program adherence.
*IMPORTANT INFORMATION: Continuing this meal plan for more than one week in any consecutive four-week period may lead to health complications and is not recommended. If you have diabetes, are under 18 years of age, are pregnant or a nursing mother, or are following a specialized diet for health issues, you may not use this meal plan. Please consult with your physician before beginning Your First Week on Nutrisystem or any other weight loss program. Please be sure to eat all of the food that’s recommended for this program. Failure to follow the program protocol and eat all recommended food may result in developing health complications. | <urn:uuid:1cda2b0e-9e92-4b3b-aa7e-1dc8a2f0191e> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://leaf.nutrisystem.com/slow-and-steady-weight-loss/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.94386 | 1,556 | 2.15625 | 2 |
Osiers sentence example
The osiers grown in the vicinity of St Quentin supply an active basket-making industry.
Osiers or willows when tied for market vary locally in girth.
The ground about the hut was made solid and protected from corrosion by a palisade of wattled osiers, thus creating the earliest form of the fondamenta, or quay, which runs along the side of so many Venetian canals and is so prominent a feature in the construction of the city.
Some harder varieties, known as stone osiers and raised on drier upland soils, are peeled and used for fine work.
It is commonly supposed that osiers or willows will prove remunerative and flourish with little attention on any poor, wet, marshy soil.Advertisement
The cultivation of osiers is attended with many disturbing causes - winter floods, spring frosts, ground vermin and insect pests of various kinds, sometimes working great havoc to the crop.
A pamphlet on the cultivation of osiers in the Fen districts is issued in England by the Board of Agriculture.
Pollarding willows osier cutting Osiers The osier willow, Salix viminalis, was important to both the riverside economy and the local wildlife.
The species employed for this purpose are mostly of shrubby habit, and are known under the collective name of osiers (see Basket, and Osier).
On the continent of Europe osiers or willows are bunched in sizes of one metre in girth at the butts and (except in Belgium) are also sold by weight.Advertisement | <urn:uuid:37135d1e-5f17-4c77-8c08-54be41f6911b> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://sentence.yourdictionary.com/osiers | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.942948 | 331 | 2.53125 | 3 |
Written by: Rhoda Ansah
New Publication: Africa Resists The Protectionist Temptation – 5th GTA Report: A Focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Edited by Simon J. Evenett.
The recent global economic downturn has fueled a significant increase in contemporary protectionist measures, with an expansion of over 40% of measures which are harmful to foreign commercial interests being recorded by the GTA Database. Policymakers in rich and emerging countries generally talk about the need to help developing countries, but the GTA said that world-wide, since the crisis began, 141 government measures have hurt the traders and migrant workers of the 50 poorest Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
The book’s editor – Simon Evenett, an economics professor at St Gallen University in Switzerland and a founder of the GTA, in a statement prior to the recent G20 meeting in Seoul emphasized the threat of increasing protectionism, caused in part by tension over exchange rates and the need for better leadership by the G20 group of countries to stem this tide.
Remarkably, Africa has not resorted to protectionism on the scale of industrialized countries and some of their developing country peers during the crisis. This report contains papers by four researchers from ACET on the likely reforms in the United States and the European Union trade preferences regimes and their implications for sub-Saharan Africa.
The papers listed below make important contributions to promote better understanding about the impact of protectionist western trade policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa. They also advocate for greater coherence between trade and development policy, so that governments do not give with one hand (aid and other support) and take with the other (protectionism).
- “Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and Trade Performance in Africa” – Dr Eric Ogunleye: Former Research Fellow at ACET, now Special Adviser to President of Federal Republic Of Nigeria, Trade and Finance.
- “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic Policy Making in Africa” – Dr Felix Fofana N’Zue. Former Research Fellow at ACET, now working for ECOWAS – The Economic Community Of West African States.
- “Transforming Africa’s Structure and Composition of Trade after the Global Economic Crisis”. – Ms Nana Amma Afari-Gyan. Research Analyst at ACET
- “Towards More balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation: The Impact of China on Africa’s Trade”. Ms Sarah Jane Danchie. Policy Analyst at ACET. | <urn:uuid:584ab7f0-bbf7-4023-94ae-54b5ed6c5d1a> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://acetforafrica.org/publications_archive/africa-resists-the-protectionist-temptation/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.905509 | 536 | 1.695313 | 2 |
Therapy is exercise for your brain
If therapy is exercise for your brain, that makes me a personal trainer. Time to rethink my work wardrobe!
I have a confession to make. If you promise to keep it just between us I will tell you. Agreed? So, sometimes my clients will say to me “Hey, this was really helpful. I appreciate what you’re doing for me.” My response is generally, “I’m so glad you found our session helpful.” But inside? Inside I’m thinking “I have no idea why this was helpful. I really thought we didn’t get much done today.” Rest assured, I’m not some dope who’s faking his way through being a therapist. Every therapist I know has a similar story.
There’s an excellent book on the subject that has eased my mind and helped me make sense of what might be happening for my clients in therapy. It’s called Why Therapy Works: Using Our Minds to Change Our Brains by Loius Cozolino. It has to do with the concept of neuroplasticity and how thoughts actually change our brains functioning. According to Cozolino neuroplasticity “refers to any changes among, between, and within neurons as a result of learning or the natural processes of healthy development. It is the ability of the nervous system to change in response to experience and to encode that experience into its structure.” In other words, our brains literally change in response to our experience. I liken this change to the growth we see in our muscles because of exercise.
If you’ve ever had the pleasure of hanging around with some serious weightlifters you might have seen them nudge each other in the ribs, give a head nod towards someone walking by, and snicker. Then in a conspiratorial whisper one says, “Someone skipped leg day.”
Your brain is not a muscle. In fact, it is the fattiest organ in your body. It makes up only about 2 percent of your bodies total mass but is uses 20 percent of your body’s energy. No wonder it’s so exhausting when you’re anxious all the time! (For more brain facts click here)
Okay, but what does that have to do with your brain and therapy? Well, therapy is exercise for your brain. If you have had depressive thoughts for a while your brain has developed to easily have those thoughts. Meanwhile, your ability to experience “happy” thoughts is undeveloped. You might say that you’ve been skipping happy day. When I’m asking clients in therapy to describe what they would like to be doing differently, what they might prefer their life to look like, I am like a spotter in the gym encouraging them “C’mon! You can do this!” At first it can be very hard for someone who has felt depressed for years to even imagine what “happy” is for them. However, with practice they can literally change the structure of their brain so that it becomes easier to bring to mind those “happy” thoughts. The same concept applies to people who are anxious all the time. They are well practiced at having anxious thoughts. Their brains have been shaped by these experiences and so they come “naturally”. Through therapy we will do the work necessary to reshape the brain.
Is it easy? No. Is it fun? Sometimes, but it can also be painful just like any other workout. Is it worth it? DEFINITELY!
If you’re constantly plagued by depressive or anxious thoughts, contact me today and let me be your personal brain trainer. I can be reached via telephone at (706) 534 – 8558 or e-mail at [email protected] | <urn:uuid:df3b4b38-6d2b-47f1-918a-4b43e9bf8277> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://ca4wellbeing.com/therapy-exercise-brain/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.974632 | 809 | 1.539063 | 2 |
By MARY SELL, Alabama Daily News
The Alabama Industrial Development and Training agency, the department of commerce’s worker recruitment arm, is looking for about 27,000 employees for a variety of industries.
About 75 to 80% of those jobs require education beyond high school and finding workers becomes more challenging as Alabama’s unemployment hits record lows, said Ed Castile, the AIDT director.
“We’re turning over every rock and looking for anybody,” Castile told Alabama Daily News. “If they have a good attitude and want to work, we’re trying to remove every roadblock to get them to work.”
Gov. Kay Ivey has set a goal of adding 500,000 credentialed workers to the workforce by 2025, which if accomplished would bring the level of work-age Alabamians with post high school training or degrees from about 43 percent in 2016 to 60 percent.
That goal, Castile said, has focused the state’s workforce developers and education agencies that realize too few young people are coming out of high schools to fill these jobs.
“We cannot wait for students to show up at our campuses, we have to get out there and find them,” said Jeff Lynn, Alabama Community College System’s vice chancellor of workforce and economic development.
Pools of possible workers include the underemployed and undereducated, veterans, people with disabilities and even victims of the state’s opioid abuse problem. Castile said there are people who lost their jobs as a result of helping a family member battle addiction.
“If we can help them get straightened out at home, they can be very good employees,” Castile said.
|Less than high school||12%||5%|
‘Credentials that matter’
Educators are focusing on “credentials that matter.”
“It’s not only about the production of any degree, it’s about the production of the right degrees,” Alabama Commission on Higher Education Executive Director Jim Purcell said recently.
Colleges need to work with their communities and local industries to ensure their workforce credential needs are being addressed, Purcell said. For four-year universities, Purcell said “micro credentials,” similar to minors but more focused to business and industry, will enhance existing programs.
“We need to make sure our graduates have some specific skills that make them attractive to employers,” he said.
Lynn said the community colleges have been working to align their programs to the workforce needs of their areas and to inform students of the high-demand jobs available and what’s needed to be qualified for them.
“We don’t want to force someone into a career, but we want to give them an awareness,” Lynn said.
Though manufacturing and industry has expanded in several Alabama regions recently, Lynn said other high-pay, high-demand professions are included in the 500,000, including health care and education.
Of the 500,000 jobs, about 330,000 are expected to be new while 170,000 would be created by the retirement of existing employees.
What we’re trying to do is make sure people have a pathway to getting credentials, staying in Alabama and helping Alabama be successful, Lynn said.
Declining student body
If educating those 500,000 workers fell only on the state’s two- and four-year colleges’ shoulders, each public institution would need to increase productivity 16% annually through 2025, Purcell said.
“That wouldn’t be a daunting task,” he said.
Alabama high schools graduate about 50,500 students a year, Lynn said.
“That number is not growing, it’s actually been shrinking,” he said.
Systemwide community college enrollment has also declined in recent years, while overall four-year university enrollment has increased, according to ACHE data.
While Alabama has gained population in recent years from 4.71 million in 2010 to an estimated 4.85 million now, most of that growth was in people ages 50 to 70, according to Census estimates.
Getting to 500,000
Lynn and others describe a variety of potential paths to becoming a credentialed worker and pools of possible employees.
Last year, 14,469 high school students were also taking community college courses. Dual enrollment has increased by nearly 44% in the past five years, according to ACCS.
And 87% of dual enrollment students successfully complete their courses.
Out-of-school youths and working adults
In 2017, there were 24,000 16 to 19 year olds not attending school, according to ACCS. Extend the age to 24 and the total becomes 88,000.
The goal would be to get them to their GED or diploma, and then a credential for a job nearby, Lynn said.
“We don’t want to train them for a job across state because the likelihood that they’re going to move is low,” Lynn said.
Separately, there are about 400,000 adults who don’t have education beyond high school.
“Our job is to reach out and offer them an opportunity to get credentials,” Lynn said.
Purcell said colleges need to reconnect with the about 20% of the state’s population that have some college coursework but no credential.
While Alabama’s unemployment rate is historically low, employable people without jobs still exist in the state, Lynn said. A significant number of them are 33-to 44-year-old women, Lynn said. Some colleges are targeting specific programs to them. Jefferson Sate Community College has a welding program for single mothers.
Meanwhile, Castile said AIDT has looked to the Department of Rehabilitation Services for future workers with some physical disabilities like hearing loss.
“There are a lot of jobs that can be done with a little adjustment,” Castile said.
Alabamians who receive food assistance are another potential source.
“That help is allowing them to go to work and get training,” Castile said.
Veterans and military
Castile and Lynn both pointed to a pool of veterans and active military.
“We’re working more closely with veterans’ groups,” Castile said. “There are a lot of vets in our state who are underemployed or not employed.”
Inmates, those without licenses
The community college system is the state’s largest provider of education services to the incarcerated.
Lynn said ACCS is doing a significant amount of work to train inmates and align them with companies that will hire them upon their release.
Most of Alabama’s incarcerated will eventually be released.
“It is incumbent that we set them up to succeed,” Lynn said.
The Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice is advocating for changes to allow more formerly jailed Alabamians access to the workforce.
“Tens of thousands of Alabamians are saddled with felony convictions for minor offenses from years ago,” Appleseed Executive Director Carla Crowder said.
Every time they go for a job interview they have to check that felony conviction box on an application and many employers won’t hire them.
“This hurts the state and hurts Alabama families,” Crowder said.
Previous efforts by Democrats in the Statehouse to “ban the box” have failed.
Crowder suggests Alabama do what numerous other states have done in recent years by providing an expungement process for old felonies to be removed from records so people can move forward with their lives and be more employable.
“Over the last five years, nearly 5,000 people have gotten felony marijuana convictions, for possession alone,”
Crowder said. “So 5,000 people who are doing something that is legal in states where half of Americans live are stuck with a felony conviction and limited work opportunities here. It just doesn’t make sense.”
Another roadblock to employment Appleseed sees is revoked driver’s licenses. Thousands of Alabamians lose their licenses because they can’t pay traffic tickets, Crowder said. Without them, they can’t get to work or even apply for some jobs.
“When there is no safety related reason for a revocation it is counterproductive to our workforce challenges, not to mention harmful for Alabama families, to revoke drivers licenses for unpaid traffic tickets,” Crowder said. “We can look to Virginia and to Mississippi, both of which have realized the wastefulness of such policies and stopped them.”
New laws focus on apprenticeships
Last week, Ivey held ceremonial signings for two workforce development laws.
House Bill 570 allows people who complete apprenticeships to be granted occupational licenses if they meet certain requirements, including passing required exams.
“I think when you look at the percentage of students who graduate from high school and don’t actually go to any type of college, and every type of employer seems to want them to have some type of experience but if they’re fresh out of high school the only way they are going to get that is through some of these apprenticeship programs,” bill sponsor Rep. Terri Collins, R-Decatur, said last week. “I think they will also learn a lot of real-world skills and experiences that will be very beneficial for them.”
Senate Bill 295, sponsored by Sen. Arthur Orr, R-Decatur, creates the Alabama Office of Apprenticeship within the Alabama Department of Commerce. The bill also expands possible tax credits for employers who hire and train apprentices in high school.
“The new law will provide a variety of pathways to credentialing and certification of employees,” Orr said last week. “I am really excited about the potential for high schoolers to graduate with a certification that suits their interests and provides a long term ability to have enhanced earnings.”
Rep. Alan Baker, R-Brewton, sponsored the bill in the House.
“Anytime there is work-based learning going on, I think that is really positive for not only filling those jobs in the needed areas but also just for getting that experience that goes towards those potential workers for the future,” he said.
Ivey said the goal of 500,000 more credentialed workers by 2025 is ambitious, but necessary and tangible.
“Both HB570 and SB295 cut through red tape, ultimately helping more of our men and women be prepared for the demands of the workforce,” she said. “With our record low unemployment rate, we must continue to expand the pipeline to enter the workforce. This legislation does exactly that.”
Alabama Daily News reporter Caroline Beck contributed to this report. | <urn:uuid:cd35c111-2ab0-4717-8b8f-fbb725e29d86> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.aldailynews.com/to-get-500000-newly-credentialed-workers-state-looks-to-undereducated-underemployed/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.960862 | 2,414 | 1.828125 | 2 |
The patent envisions using a device's NFC to transfer the file and to then alert the copyright holder, so the recipient can be charged. Once the NFC transfer is complete, "a gift file created using DRM keys associated with the giftee's account may be downloaded to the giftee device. If a network connection is unavailable, the giftee device may transfer a locked gift file and a corresponding gift license to the giftee device using a peer-to-peer connection. The giftee device may authenticate the license and unlock the gift file once a connection to the online provider is available." Of course, a thief could still trick the app into thinking that the copyright holder had been contacted when no such contact happened.
Apple was issued a U.S. patent on Tuesday (March 6) for an interesting way to deal with the transfer of copyrighted multimedia content from one device to another. Digital rights management security techniques often do a good job of screwing up the music, video, podcast or book so that the transferred file won't work. Apple's technique not only permits security while a Wi-Fi connection is available but enables the file to be transferred when no wireless connection exists, because it puts the file in a locked area. It's then unlocked once a connection is established. | <urn:uuid:30c0883a-1d6e-4192-93c0-54d13c54d106> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.fierceretail.com/operations/new-apple-patent-transfer-songs-offline-but-you-can-t-listen-until-bill-s-been-paid | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.933876 | 263 | 2.1875 | 2 |
Do you often wonder why your kids have very different characteristics even though they live under one roof? I do, and I ask myself what could have happened between carrying them in my womb and delivering them. Then I read about the different personalities and types of temperament and how I can make the necessary adjustments to my parenting style to match my kids’ personalities.
If you’re a parent of two or more kids (like me), you probably are astounded by how unique your kids seem. One may be bubbly and carefree, while the younger sibling is overly timid and sensitive. One is flexible to change, and another may require more time and space to cope. These kids were undoubtedly brought up by the same parents, born in the same beliefs, and living in the same home, but they each take life’s roads and challenges differently. How could this be? It could be temperament.
Definition and Background
Temperament is defined as a person’s various personalities and his or her responses to life events and occurrences. Researchers and psychologists suggest five different features when discussing temperament.
- Activity Level – the severity of activity done by an individual
- Emotional intensity – the level of emotions that an individual is capable of showing or presenting with
- Frustration tolerance – an individual’s capacity to tolerate stress or any kind of emotion or situation
- Reaction to change – how an individual responds to the changes around him
- Response to new people – how an individual reacts when he is around people he is not familiar with
Every individual is born with her or his distinct personalities and temperament. Temperament, on the other hand, is not a product of something that you were able to or not able to do. It is not also caused by the culture you were born in, although a child’s surrounding environment can affect how he sees himself and how he can adapt to life. Sufficient knowledge of temperament can assist parents in adjusting their approach to their children’s needs.
Making Adjustments To Your Parenting Style
Be more understanding. Your older daughter dilly-dallies throughout the day, mostly procrastinating. You, on the other hand, are making sure you are achieving your to-do list. You and your spouse love having new people in your home, but your daughter prefers to stay in her room, not even getting out once for introductions. Often, this is a gap between a parent’s personality and a child’s personality, resulting in conflicts. Be more understanding and patient with her and take a few steps back so you will gain insight into her responses. Rather than feeling frustrated, try to look for some compromise or solution. For instance, you might want to tell your child that someone is coming over to visit so that she will have time to fix herself and her composure. Tell her how to respond initially when someone comes over and encourage her to join in small group activities whenever possible.
Recognize your child’s personality. Observe your child’s usual behavioral patterns. Does she love talking to new people and learning new things, or does she require more time to prepare for social gatherings? Maybe she is somewhere halfway. Is she more sensitive than others, is she more expressive of her feelings, or is she quiet but deep? Think about where your child falls on a mental or physical chart that discusses different personality types. You can usually get this from The Center on the Social and Emotional Foundations for Early Learning or CSEFEL.
Separate your own needs from theirs. One of the most common challenges in parenting is not mixing up your needs and personality approach from your children. You may think that your child requires a substantial amount of social interactions, for instance, but the truth is, it is you that desire it. Be clear on your parenting needs and approaches so you can maintain stable boundaries between you and your children. See them as separate individuals.
Support your child. In today’s culture, formal and quiet personalities are usually rewarded. So if you have a son or daughter who is lively, emotionally intense, and highly assertive, you’ve most probably heard relatives and significant others judge them. Knowing that temperament is not the same for anyone can help eliminate the pressure, enabling you to perceive your child’s personalities as strengths, not weaknesses. This gives you more leverage to defend your child against negative reactions and comments. It would be easier for you to say, “Yes, my daughter is carefree, independent, and knows precisely what she wants. And she’s also learning how to meet halfway.”
Temperament is not always a constant feature. Kids with, say, an introverted personality can learn how to become more friendly and social. Someone born with a quick temper can certainly be more patient and in control later in his life. As a parent, improve your knowledge and understanding of your children’s temperaments while trying not to assign labels on them that might cause them not to grow mentally, physically, and emotionally. | <urn:uuid:76508504-2180-4720-bb25-2afee5cbaf5e> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://faceandprofile.com/2020/10/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.966942 | 1,056 | 3.109375 | 3 |
The changing face of media in one stunning chart
A picture tells a thousand words and sometimes that is all it takes to highlight major shifts. A new report (VIEW LINK) shows that people spend more than 490 minutes of their day with some sort of media. This figure is set to rise even further with global average consumption expected to hit 506 minutes by 2017 - more than half the time we spend awake. Television remains the most consumed media with average consumption of three hours per day. Changes in behaviour over the past five years have seen massive growth in internet consumption and interestingly - outdoor media. On the ASX M&A activity in the ISP and Telco sector has been feverish as the tussle for market share hots up over prized infrastructure and customers. Outdoor advertising has also been through a renaissance with the recent listings of Ooh Media and APN Outdoor riding the technological wave of digitised billboards. There appears to be some excitement around these sectors and the latest data suggests it is built on meaningful shifts.
Livewire is Australia’s #1 website for expert investment analysis. We work with leading investment professionals to deliver curated content that helps investors make confident and informed decisions. Safe investing and thanks for reading Livewire. | <urn:uuid:fa9715a3-5da6-4a3a-9c25-c8e052f73de3> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.livewiremarkets.com/wires/the-changing-face-of-media-in-one-stunning-chart | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.955352 | 247 | 1.578125 | 2 |
Is your child nervous about their upcoming dental visit? It is normal for children to feel anxious about new things, especially when they don’t know exactly what to expect. After all, dental anxiety is a common issue for adults as well. The good news is that there are all sorts of children’s books out there that were written to help parents help their kids feel more comfortable about their routine dental visits. A children’s dentist has a few recommendations that may be just what your child needs.
Curious George Visits the Dentist by Margret and H. A. Rey
After Curious George discovers that one of his teeth is wiggly, him and the man in the yellow hat head to the dentist. This story by Margret and H. A. Rey covers the silly monkey’s exciting yet mischievous time at his first trip to the dental office. In the end, he discovers that there is nothing to be afraid of at all!
Peppa Pig: Dentist Trip by Mark Baker and Neville Astley
In this popular story written by Mark Baker and Neville Astley, Peppa Pig helps her little brother, George, handle his very first visit to the dentist. Even though George is quite nervous, she is able to help him relax by sharing some nice words of wisdom. It may be just what your child needs to have peace-of-mind about their upcoming visit.
The Berenstain Bears Visit the Dentist by Stan Berenstain
In this fun classic written by Stan Berenstain, the Berenstain family visits the dental office. It discusses several aspects of your child’s appointment including professional teeth cleanings and cavity checks. Your kids’ favorite storybook characters need to visit the dentist sometimes too!
Doctor De Soto by William Steig
This story describes the tale of a small mouse dentist named Doctor De Soto and his animal patients. When a fox shows up with a toothache, the little dentist shows that he is a generous and loving doctor who wants to help his patients feel better. This book by William Steig is sure to show the dental office in a positive light which may be just what your child needs.
Just Going to the Dentist by Mercer Mayer
You may remember the characters from this classic series written by Mercer Mayer. This picture book covers many different parts of the dental experience that your child can expect to see. This includes teeth cleanings, routine x-rays, and even filling a cavity! If your child needs to have some decay taken care of, this is especially a good option to make them feel more comfortable about their upcoming treatment.
Daniel Goes to the Dentist by Alexandra Cassel Schwartz
Believe it or not, Tigers can get scared sometimes too! In this children’s book by Alexandra Cassel Schwartz, Daniel Tiger has a nice experience at the dental office. His kind and patient dentist explains everything that goes on during his visit as it happens. This can help to take away the mystery of your child’s visit. Some things are best with no surprises.
Your child’s first visit to the dental office can be scary, but after going through these books and talking to them about the process, they will be able to gain a better understanding of how it works. This way, they can put on their brave face and have nothing to fear!
About the Author
Dr. Tera Pollock earned her Doctor of Dental Surgery from Baylor College of Dentistry and has been working in the field for well over 20 years. She offers sedation dentistry for patients who are especially distressed so they can receive treatment while in a more relaxed state. For more information or to schedule an appointment for your child, visit her website or call (469) 284-8895. | <urn:uuid:c672dd61-3927-428d-b631-d4f7f6209ce0> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.rowlettdentalkids.com/childrens-dentist-books/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.966963 | 780 | 2.5625 | 3 |
Is Work from Home a Good Idea in Long Run?
We all are thrown unprepared into unexpected situations. Covid has brought each of our lives to a standstill or if not stand still then to a point where we cannot predict what will happen in the near future. We all are confined to our homes and whoever can work from home is asked to do the same to support their work, family, economy, etc. Recently I was going through the newspaper and there was an article which was published by TCS saying that 75% of their workforce will be doing work from home in the next 2 years. Is this norm that is coming into reality and what will be the consequences of this. Let us look at this with three different aspects
Employer Perspective – What is an advantage that a company gets by asking an employee to do work from home (WFH) and similarly are there any downsides to it, let’s see. Employers will be able to save some of the fixed expenses if they ask employees to do WFH. Fixed Expenses like huge rents, electricity bill, maintenance of electronic peripherals like computer, printer, edible items like tea/coffee, transport facilities, etc can be curtailed easily which will help an employer to increase its margins easily. Downside of it will be an employee might miss important meetings and there won’t be any fixed time for an employee to work which might in long run make them frustrated since you will always be working from home and working.
Employee Perspective – From an employee perspective this can be a nice move is what each one of us thinks, though I don’t agree totally. Employees who stay far and especially in metros where commute eats up half of your time, this move is good as you can save approx. 3-4 hrs daily. The downside of this is since you are at home you will not be interacting much with the team which results in losing the touch between two employees which is not the case up till now. Also, when you are sitting and talking to someone face to face you tend to learn from another person which won’t be the case going forward. Health issues will be seen more often as there will be hardly anybody movement also most of us do not have a good setup to work from home the way we have in the office.
Economy Perspective – This perspective no one has thought about and hardly talked about as well. What will be effective in our economy in our environment if most of the people start working from home? The advantage will be since most of the people will be at home there will be less pollution, fewer vehicles on the road, easy access to transport. The downside of this will be fuel consumption will go down, companies which run cabs for employees will be affected as they won’t be needed, similarly, catering won’t be needed to that extent so hotels will be affected which will result in job cuts for cab drivers, hotel workers, etc. Overall, you will see it will create a negative impact on our economy
It is difficult to say that if we go ahead and see this norm in the future will it affect each one of us in a positive or negative manner. It totally depends on each one of us, how we take it? I leave it to you guys to decide and see the pros and cons of it.
If you want to see more such blogs please leave your comments in the comment section. You can also reach out to us by clicking on this link.
Well wait for the next blog, until then see ya! KEEP READING & SMILING
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Contribute by purchasing books and artwork. Drop an email for the same, or go to the link given. | <urn:uuid:e3dceb78-3683-4588-b5d7-e410754afaa5> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://spiritedblogger.com/is-work-from-home-a-good-idea-in-the-long-run/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882573104.24/warc/CC-MAIN-20220817183340-20220817213340-00465.warc.gz | en | 0.9602 | 844 | 1.5 | 2 |
An Old Hassle Over This Old House
More than a century ago, the family of a Mexican vaquero settled in San Juan Capistrano, building a modest two-bedroom house and tending its large garden. The forebears of the vaquero, Jose Manuel Polonio Rios, would ultimately lend their name to the neighborhood -- the Los Rios Historic District.
For the descendants of Jose Rios, the old wood-frame house has been a source of frustration. On and off for 80 years, they have sniped over the fate of the home, one of the county’s longest-running probate cases.
“Typically, most cases close within 12 to 18 months. But this is one of the oldest and very rare,” said Linda Martinez, senior attorney with the county’s Probate Department.
The home has been in probate since 1925. The dispute has gone on for so long that the modest house is now estimated to be worth more than $1 million.
For years, the Refugia Rios home dispute centered on who should administer the property, but more recently the argument has focused on whether the family should sell or keep the house, a block from Mission San Juan Capistrano and in one of California’s oldest neighborhoods.
“This is our birthright, our homeland; we can’t sell this property,” said Joyce Perry, 50, of Irvine, who is trying to encourage family members to buy the house from the estate.
But Perry’s second cousin Sylvia Hawk, 64, of Yorba Linda wants to sell the property and split the proceeds among family members. “It’s time to move on,” Hawk said. The feud has escalated to the point where some relatives speak to each other only through attorneys.
Built on less than an acre, the house was originally deeded in 1876 to Calixtra Bonyones. It was later acquired by Rios, a Mexican vaquero, whose wife, Refugia Rios, was Bonyones’ daughter, according to court documents.
After Jose Rios died, his wife was the rightful owner. When she died without leaving a will on March 1, 1925, the probate dispute took form.
According to case records, three family members squabbled over the title then. Court documents from 1937 show the estate was still in dispute.
For the next 70 years, family members moved in and out of the house with little fanfare, even though no legal heir was determined. From time to time there were family skirmishes, but most were resolved quickly.
Currently, the Los Rios Street house is occupied by Bertha Carter, who is Perry’s aunt and Hawk’s cousin. The house sits on a tree-lined street, flanked by refurbished homes that are tourist attractions. Its roof sags and its faux brick siding is peeling.
On the same street is the Rios Adobe, dating to the 1790s, whose owner, Stephen Rios, is a descendant of the original homeowner and is a distant relative of Jose Manuel Polonio Rios.
The most recent commotion started in 1997, about the time that Perry, while researching the family genealogy, discovered that the estate was still unsettled. Many in the family had assumed the ownership of the house had been adjudicated.
Hawk had already discussed selling the estate with some family members. But Perry, armed with family history documents, began recommending that someone from her side of the family be named the estate’s administrator and that there was much to lose if they sold.
“These other family members just want to sell it. But this is our legacy,” Perry said.
The feud intensified three years later when Hawk was appointed administrator of the estate. Perry and other family members challenged it and lost.
Undaunted, Perry, tribal manager for a Juaneno Band of Mission Indians faction, did not give up, partly because she believes the family home may help the Indian band in its attempt to become a federally recognized tribe. Some rival family members, including Hawk, dispute the Juaneno family connection.
Perry and other Juanenos from San Juan Capistrano say Jose Rios was a descendant of a Juaneno woman only known as Primitiva. Demonstrating historical ties to land is part of the government’s recognition process, Perry said. The home could give them the needed connection.
After waiting decades, the Juanenos recently learned that the government may examine their request for recognition.
If they win recognition, an estimated 4,000 Juanenos can form a sovereign government and receive federal aid for education and medical care.
David Belardes, tribal chairman of the same Juaneno faction that includes Perry, expressed frustration that one of the early families may part with its land.
Perry’s only hope now is to encourage other family members to pool their resources and bid on the estate. But their chances could be fading.
In March, a probate judge denied all objections and ruled in favor of Hawk, allowing her to move forward and sell the property.
John J. Gottes, Hawk’s attorney, said potential buyers, including a nearby restaurant, have expressed interest. The sale could be approved by Probate Court as early as next month.
One of Perry’s brothers, Martin Sellers, 49, a mechanic who lives in Torrance, said he supported the sale.
“I’m not sad; I could care less,” he said. “I’ve got children, and I’ve got to think about college funds rather than a small house in San Juan Capistrano.”
But another brother, Jesse Sellers, sides with his sister.
“I can’t tell you how disappointed I am,” he said. “Believe me, if I could figure out a way to buy it, I would. If they would take blood, I would give it to them.”
Property taxes on the house have been paid by the family members living there. But the heirs also face a long-term capital gain tax that may take as much as 25% of the estimated $1-million sale price, Gottes said.
Attorney fees could claim as much as $150,000, leaving an estimated $600,000 for the heirs -- $14,000 to $18,000 each.
That’s a small return for something as valuable as the family legacy, Perry said.
“I just can’t believe this is happening.” | <urn:uuid:0c51b55b-0fb8-46c3-8acf-3479b5ed9479> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-jul-25-me-deed25-story.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882573540.20/warc/CC-MAIN-20220819005802-20220819035802-00465.warc.gz | en | 0.972576 | 1,384 | 1.71875 | 2 |
Grobo Support Center
Check out our Grow Guide for useful tips and tricks!
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Planting A Seed
Getting the coco or peat pod moist, and making sure it remains moist during germination, is one of the most crucial parts of your setup.
- Place the pod in a bucket of water (Reverse Osmosis or Distilled) and get the air out by squeezing the pod underwater with your hand
- It should be dripping wet after this – but we don’t want it to remain this wet. Give it a good ½ squeeze to remove some of the excess water
- Place the pod into the white reservoir lid
- Push your seed into the small hole at the top of the coco or peat pod
- Tear a small pea-sized corner off of the side of the pod
- Gently cover the hole made for your seed with the piece of pod you’ve ripped off
- Ready set grow 🙂
We are trying to get the seed in contact with the pod on all sides to improve germination rates. If you find the pod is drying out, carefully pull the pod out of the cover and put it into the reservoir tank to make sure it stays moist until germination occurs!
What do I do if it dries out?
If your pod dries out, you can pull it out and dip it into your reservoir tank to get it wet again.
The first two weeks are important for the life and health of your seed and seedling. Cannabis seeds pop in 12 hours to 14 days. Once the seed casing has absorbed enough water, the shell will split and the seedling will emerge. You will be able to see your root emerge from the bottom of the Coco Pod. You will be able to see it visually by lifting up the lid and peering at the bottom of the pod.
Two important things to remember;
- We want the pod to drip when we lift it if the root is not visible . Once the roots emerge from the bottom of the pod and is touching the water, your plant will be able to drink
- We want the pod to start to dry out after the roots touch the water. If your pod is too wet once your seedling has emerged, you run the risk of ‘damping off’
This is a disease that attacks young seedlings at the spot where the stem and growing medium meet. Your seedling will slow its growth and fall over.
If the root is in the water and your Coco Pod is slowly drying out, you will be fine. The system fills to a different level for those important couple of weeks after the root has found the water.
During this time you will see your plant start to take off and grow more and more each day, adding both height and additional leaves. When your plant reaches 4-7 sets of branches you have the option to top and lollipop it. Check out our Harvesting Cannabis video.
Keep up the weekly reservoir change, your plant will reward you for it in the end!
Growing marijuana in grow tents
In this article we’re going to explain some basics about indoor cannabis cultivation in grow tents, one of the most popular options among those who just want to grow some pot at home for their personal use. Being highly versatile thanks to the wide range of available dimensions, you only need to keep several factors in mind to successfully harvest your own buds.
Indoor cannabis cultivation is easier thanks to grow tents
- The lamps should be 50/60 cm away from the plants (with 600 wattsodium lamps), 35/40 cm away with 400 watt sodium lamps, and should be raised as plants grow, always maintaining the same distance from their tops.
- During the growth period, marijuana plants need 18 hours of light and 6 hours of darkness for a fast and healty developement. This phase should last for a minumim of two weeks or until the plants are about 25 cm tall.
- During the flowering period, marijuana plants need 12 hours of light and 12 hours of darkness (it is very important that plants are in total darkness). The length of the flowering period varies from plant to plant and it ranges from 50-70 days, depending on phenotypes. Normally, growers use HPS lamps, LED panels or LEC CMH lighting kits for this stage.
Ventilation of marijuana plants
The extractor fan must always be connected when the light is on. During the dark phase it should be connected during 15 minutes every hour, and during the last weeks of flowering you should increase this period to 15 minutes every half an hour. If humidity levels reach 90%, then the extraction fan has to be connected continuously.
It can act as “passive intractor” when temperatures are moderate, when we don’t need an intractor fan.
LED panels are great to keep temperatures under control
Temperature and humidity in the grow tent
The temperature in the grow tent should not exceed 31°C (maximum temperature) and should be above 17ºC (minimum temperature), although the ideal temperature is between 20 and 28ºC.
Relative humidity should not exceed 75% (maximum) and should’t be lower than 20% (minimum). The ideal humidity is between 40 and 60%. Sometimes it can exceed 90%, what shouldn’t be a problem if it happens only in particular occasions. A thermo-hygrometer is necessary to control these parameters in our growing space.
Plants must be watered according to their needs
Watering and fertilising marijuana
- Marijuana seedlings need an abundant watering once they have been transplanted (½ litre per plant). A few days later, 150 ml of water per plant and day will be enough. A sprayer can be of great help.
- At the start of the flowering period irrigation should be increased to 250 ml per plant and day.
- During the last two weeks of flowering you should give your plants 150 ml of water per plant and day.
- Before each irrigation, touch the potting soil. If the soil is still moist, wait for the next day to water again.
- These instructions are just guidelines to help you find the optimal irrigation for your plants, which will vary slightly depending on several factors like temperature, pot size, etc.
- Fertilise the plants every two irrigations, i.e. using tap water one day and nutrient solution the day after.
- Fertilising should be done according to the dosage and feeding schedule recommended by the manufacturer.
Cannabis clones in full bloom
Phytosanitary treatments for cannabis
To avoid pests and diseases , it is advisable to treat your marijuana with pesticides, including insecticides and fungicides . The first treatment should done one week after the plants are in the grow tent, and the second treatment should be performed when the plants are one week into flowering.
Marijuana seeds for Indoor growing
Growing marijuana with Metrop nutrients
Growing marijuana with energy saving lamps
Ventilation for marijuana grow rooms
Growing marijuana in the ground
Growing marijuana on terraces
Comments in “Growing marijuana in grow tents” (29)
Hi Tim! New grower here. I live in a hot and humid place that has no seasons, we do get rain and dry seasons . I was wondering about using a grow tent but Im not sure if it will be hard to keep a low temperature with such an enclosed environment specially in hot and dry seasons. How do you feel about using grow tents in this kind of environments?
Tim Alchimia 2021-06-21
Hi Nick, thanks for your comment and question. A grow tent offers many advantages, and near-complete control over the conditions is one of them. With adequate ventilation and air conditioning, you can create an ideal grow space, although it’s hardly the most sustainable way to grow cannabis as electrical consumption can be very high when attempting to battle high temperatures. A grow tent may be very useful for you in another way, because I presume that the outdoor photoperiod where you are is roughly 12/12 all year round, meaning that it’s hard to grow plants to a good size before flowering them. You could use the grow tent as a vegetative growth area before moving the plants outdoor to flower once they’re big enough. This method may not work during the wet season, but I’d imagine that cannabis would perform rather well in the dry season, as long as enough irrigation is available, and possibly some kind of shade during the hottest time of day. Yields are liely to be far greater with this method than finishng the entire flowering cycle indoors, where space is restricted. Personally, I’d be looking at equatorial sativas, either landraces from your area or those that come from a similar latitude. These are plants that have developed to thrive in tropical climate conditions and should give you the least amount of trouble. If in doubt. try and ask local growers what they choose to cultivate, if possible. I hope that heps, best wishes and happy growing!
Hello, Just a quick question. I’m a semi experienced grower who is thinking of starting back up again. I have a batch of Subcool’s Blueberry seeds that I’ve been saving, and I was thinking of busting out the mother tent and the 6 x 8 tents and doing a perpetual grow with those guys and some special ‘91 chemdawg cuts that my buddy is going to gift to me.. my problem is, I’ve always wanted to grow some serious tree sized plants, as usually I would either ScrOG or SOG my plants, (before I made my stink bud aeroponic units I’d just lollipop them and do a SOG, but after I got the hang of using the aeroponics I would top a few times and throw a screen over the tops and start weaving lol), but I want to see what they really can do. but I’m wondering if Subcool’s seeds are meant mainly for indoor growers, and has anybody had his genetics done in a decent sized run outdoors? Any info you can hook up would be appreciated! Thnx 🙂
Tim Alchimia 2021-04-08
Hi, thanks for your comment and question. I didn’t know that Subcool had made a Blueberry, they should be very interesting indeed! His genetics are definitely suitable for outdoor growing as well as indoor, although I think he did all his breeding indoors. I’d guess that, as with most breeders, there’ll be varieties that are more suited to outdoor cultivation than others, depending on mould and pest resistance, size and general structure. Search for a YouTube channel called Mendo Dope, those guys have done huge outdoor grows using Subcool genetics, with some spectacular results. I hope that helps, best wishes and happy growing! PS. I bet those Chem 91 cuts will thrive in your aeroponics set up indoors!
James Dean 2021-03-08
So I am curious on what some people are doing with whatever nutrient line they’re running.. My buddy that’s a good grower but does outside greenhouse said I should add molasses, mamoth, photosynthesis and a veg Enhancer. Just wanted to see what your opinion is.
Tim Alchimia 2021-05-20
Hi James, thanks for your comment. Most indoor growers will pick a nutrient line and simply follow the feeding schedule for that particular brand, whether it be organic or mineral. Other growers prefer to use a well-fertilised super soil and then just use plain water and compost tea throughout the grow. Molasses are always a great addition to a grow as they act as food for beneficial microbes, boosting the life in the soil which helps the plants absorb nutrients more efficiently. Mammoth P is a popular microbial product and will help increase harvests by providing more Phosphorous to the plant. I’m not sure what the photosynthesis product is but a good veg enhancer would be Green Hope Booster Max.
I hope that helps, best wishes and happy growing!
Hey guys I am a new grower & was wondering if I use 250watt M/h and 315cmh with 4k bulb. Will I get better results. Than just using hps
Tim Alchimia 2021-02-10
Hi, thanks for your question. it really depends on the wattage of the HPS bulb you’re comparing it to. A good quality 315w CMH lamp, such as the Lumatek Aurora, will give comparable results to a 600w HPS in most situations, but with significant energy savings. I hope that helps. Best wishes and happy growing
I have 2- 4×4’ tents and 1- 4×8’ led lighting in all with 2 fans in each tent. The 4×4 have 2 leds and the 4×8 has 4 leds. They have a switch for veg and bloom . Lights altogether cost 900.00 How many lights do I need in the tents? How should I use the veg/bloom switch? Do you use the veg and bloom at the same time and then switch to bloom as the plant matures? Or use each independently during each cycle of the plants life? Thank you
Tim Alchimia 2020-11-16
Hi Greg, thanks for your comment and question. To calculate the lighting needed in each tent you need to now the output of the LED lights in lumens. The plants will need an absolute minimum of 2,500 lumens per square foot, although 5,000 is much better, up to a maximum of around 10,000 lumens per square foot during flowering, which is roughly equivalent to natural sunlight. The Veg/Bloom switch will change the lighting spectrum from a more white/blue light suitable for vegetative growth to a more orange/red spectrum that is ideal for flowering. I hope that helps you out, feel free to ask further questions and we’ll all we can to help. Best wishes and happy growing!
hey tim for marijuana to be potent is it correct to let it cure forhowlong for sone strong potent marijuana thanks
Tim Alchimia 2020-08-10
Hi Wheatie, thanks for your question. Curing doesn’t really affect the potency unless the weed has been curing for a really long time, in which case much of the THC will have converted to CBN, resulting in a more heavy, stony and narcotic effect, but it won’t actually make it any stronger really. The main purpose of curing is to improve the flavour by allowing compounds such as chlorophyll, starches and sugars in the flowers to break down, making for a smoother smoke. The effect will also change slightly, from the up, speedy coffee high of freshly harvested weed, to a slightly more mellow and physical effect once the flowers are fully cured, depending on the variety. As a general rule, I find that Sativas and Sativa-dominant hybrids will benefit from a much longer cure of up to a year, while Indica-dominant varieties tend to only need a relatively short curing period and indeed begin to lose flavour quite quickly, sometimes after a few months. I hope that helps. Best wishes and happy growing!
James samuel 2020-08-03
Hey so i have a 3×3 tent and the temperature gets really hot becausw my 315w cmh light adds like 10 degrees celcius so it gets up to 32 degrees in my tent i was wondering if i can leave the front of tent open a bit so the hot air can be released will this have any negative effects om my plant?
Tim Alchimia 2020-08-04
Hi James, thanks for your comment and question. There’s no problem at all in leaving the door open while the lights are on, but you’ll need to make sure that the tent is sealed up again before the lights go out if you’re in the flowering period, otherwise you stand a good chance of stressing the plants and having hermaphrodite problems. I hope that helps. Best wishes and happy growing!
Kids have a 48×48×80 I have a 1200 w led light it equals 600w is that big enough
Tim Alchimia 2020-02-05
Hi Justin, thanks for your question. I take it those measurements are in inches, right? If the lumens are equivalent to those of a 600w HPS (which I think is what you mean here, correct me if I’m wrong) then it should be just fine in that space, although LED lamps don’t tend to have as large a light footprint as HPS so you’ll need to verify how much the light spreads to be 100% certain in this case. I hope that helps, best wishes and happy growing!
afternoon. how early can you start to add molasses to your babies
Tim Alchimia 2019-11-01
Hi Leisa, thanks for your question. If you want you can give your plants molasses in low doses from a very early stage, once a few sets of leaves have developed. It won’t act as plant food as such, but it will help to feed the beneficial microbes which in turn will improve nutrient uptake and efficiency in your plants. You can add molasses (making sure it’s the un-sulphured type) throughout growth, increasing the dosage as the plant develops, but it’s during the flowering phase when it will be most beneficial. All the best and happy growing!
I have a friend who got a 2×4 tent with 2 foot led light he wanted to know if he should get another light? he is using an LED 24W 6400k 60cm light, he is only going to be growing Indica if that helps at all.
Tim Alchimia 2019-09-30
Hi Frank, thanks for your question. Yes, your friend definitely needs more light in there! When it comes to LED lamps, we’d recommend a minimum of 50w per square foot, and up to 80w per square foot for optimum results. All the best and happy growing!
ludo Is an Alchimia client 2019-05-26
quel tent et quel plateau avez vous utiliser sur les images ? j’aimerai connaitre les dimensions car cela correspondrais à ce que j’aimerai avoir comme matériel ^^ je suppose 120X120 vue la dimension mais je suis pas sûr en cas le plateau à l’air l’argement mieux que le miens qui prend toute la box et qui me bouche mes arrivé d’air :/ j’ai un sytème growtool 1.2 et franchement même ci la surface prend toute la place, je suis déçu qu’il couvre mes entrer d’air que cela soit passif ou la chaussette d’intra :/ merci pour les info à venir
Tim Alchimia 2019-05-27
Bonjour Ludo, Il s’agit bien d’une box et d’un plateau de 120x120cm. A bientôt
Matthew Mcneil 2018-09-15
Getting ready to order a tent and start growing. 4×4 And would like yo buy a complete set up. Light, balist, filter, fan all in one shot. Can you recommend any certain brand or how I should go about it?
Tim Alchimia 2018-09-19
Hi Matthew, thanks for your question. The best thing to do is to check out our selection of Grow Tent Kits, which include all the equipment you’ll need to start growing. We have several kits including a 120cm (4×4) tent, priced depending on the size of bulb you want and how much money you want to spend. If you have any more questions, don’t hesitate to get in touch, happy growing!
Ryan S C 2018-07-19
And I have gone for ak49 auto fems and northan lights auto gems What’s the best nutrients to use any help would be appreciated
Tim Alchimia 2018-07-24
Hi Ryan, good choice, I’m sure you’ll do great with those seeds! As far as nutrients go, personally I’d recommend to use organic nutrients from a company like BioBizz or BAC which will provide an easy-to-follow feeding schedule. Alternatively Bio-Technology produce an auto nutrient kit specially formulated for Autoflowering plants. All the best and happy growing!
Ryan S C 2018-07-19
Hi everyone i have just set my 120/80/160 tent up with 600w led and 5inch extractor fan an carbon filter how many plants would you recommend i could do in that it’s my first time growing
Tim Alchimia 2018-07-24
Hi again Ryan, with them being autos, I think I’d go for between six and eight plants in that space. It really depends on the final size they’ll grow to, and while autos tend to be on the smaller side, there are exceptions.
I’ve been growing about 15 clones in a horses stable with a 1000w highlider and a 600w. Lights have been on 24/7 for the last 30 days and before that for about 3-4 months with lights on 18 hour a day. I would like to get ready to flower The stable is an open room and the plants are in 4-5 gallon pots What’s the best way to go for setting up for flower? Please help anything will b appreciated. What kind of tents and appliances will I need? Thanks
Tim Alchimia 2018-05-02
Hi Clara, thanks for your question. To set up for flowering you’ll need to create a lightproof space for your plants where they only receive light when you want them to. Without seeing the stable it’s hard to say what to do, some people would put up a quick dry wall to enclose the space but if you’re not that way inclined I’d recommend a grow tent. It sounds like your plants will be quite large after 4-5 months vegetative growth, so I’d recommend a larger tent to ensure they have enough space. Our 240×120 Alchimia Box is a great option. It’s also available as a full kit, including lamps, fans, ventilation and everything else you’ll need, here’s the link: Alchimia Box 240 basic kit. All the best and happy growing!
J R Greentrees 2018-03-09
Does it matter where on the tent you attach the in line extractor? We have a tent with holes at both top and bottom. Also, could one vent the extracted air up through a chimney? I have a powerful extractor that used to be part of an extraction set up for a school forge, and the extraction chimney was pretty tall, as I recall.
Tim Alchimia 2018-03-13
Hi, thanks for the question. Ideally you’ll vent from the top of the tent to evacuate any hot air, but it can work fine either way. Venting the air up a tall chimney sounds like a great idea, but I’d still recommend using a carbon filter to avoid the smell being spread over a wide area! All the best and happy growing!
JR Lautner 2018-02-18
I am starting a 2x4x60inch grow tent. I have a four inch carbon filter kit and 2 600watt leds 277 true watts each. This will be in my michigan basement die to the moist cold air in the basement I am going to draw the intake air from a room on the main level. I will be moving the air about 12 ft with a big drop to the bottom of the tent. I purchased a 4 inch In line duct booster fan will this work for me
Dani Alchimia 2018-02-19
Hi JR Lautner, You should have no problem. I’d recommend you to use a 2-speed fan, so you can switch it in case you need more fresh air inside your grow (which usually happens in summer). Still, you can try with the fan you purchased, I think it’ll work properly. Best!
I’m new to growing I need help I tried many time to grow but every time I try at the first stage the plant die I use 160 wat and a humidifier the temperature 25 humidity 60 only to plants , what should I do Thanks , advance
Tim Alchimia 2018-01-22
Hi Tom, thanks for your question, sorry to hear about your plants dying. those numbers sound fine though, so it must be something else that’s killing them. Without more information on your grow it’s impossible to say what it is, but one of the most common mistakes made by beginners is over-watering, which deprives the roots of oxygen and stunts growth terribly, often killing plants. Allow pots to dry out a little between waterings and get used to the weight of the pots when they’re properly irrigated, that way all you’ll need to do is to lift each pot and if it feels light, it’s time to water! Have a look at our article on watering for some more information on the subject. I hope that helps out, good luck with your next grow, let us know how it goes please! All the best.
Sid Strandberg 2017-10-03
Im thinking of having perhaps 4 plants in a tent ( making them pretty big) how much Watt do i need on my LED for best grow? Im thinking about roleadro 300W but is it to low for 4 plants i found another one that has 1000W ( all the watt is measured on LED basis) Or does it depends on the size of tent? what size for A good tent for 4 plants, 300w/1000W LED? And regarding the seeds, i have grow Bubblegum before, but i guess now when im doing indoor i should be doing Indica because they will fit better in the tent? or you have sativia strains that does not get to height in lenght? feel free to suggest some strains. I would also need nutrients, soil and all of it hehe.. Thank you for the help!
Dani Alchimia 2017-10-04
Hi Sid, Let’s imagine a 1,2 x 1,2m grow tent, which would normally require a 600W HPS lamp. If you can use 2 x 300W LEDs, light distribution will be perfect, much better than if you’re only using a single lamp, and yields will probably be higher than with a standard HPS light. When growing indoors, any pure strain (either Sativa or Indica) is a bit more difficult to grow than hybrids, since in most cases they’re not properly adapted to artificial lighting. Moreover, some pure Sativas are too vigorous and tall for indoor grows, while some pure Indicas take too long to grow and remain too short. For their characteristics, Indica/Sativa hybrids and Sativa/Indica hybrids are the most grown type of strains indoors. About nutrients, I’d suggest to start with something easy. Use some quality soil and slow-release organic nutrients like Biotabs or GH Feeding (Biogrow + Biobloom + Enhancer work great. ). In this way, you’ll only have to use water + some bacteria to irrigate the plants. Hope it helped!
My tent is way to hot I am using a 600watt light with a light cooking reflecter. No matter what I do the tent heats up to over 90. Degrees.
Tim Alchimia 2017-08-29
Hi, This is a relatively common problem in summer, indeed I know many growers that simply don’t grow indoors during summer to avoid just this problem! I’m not sure what the exterior temperatures are like where you are but one easy step you can take is to change the hours on your timer so the lights go on at night, when the exterior air is cooler, so the ambient temperature will be lower. Make sure your cool-tube ducting (insulated ducting will help lower temps too) is venting to the exterior well away from where you’re pulling the fresh air into the tent, and to make the extraction more efficient, make sure the ducting is as straight and direct as possible, without too many twists and turns which would reduce airflow and make the fans work too hard. Is the ballast for the lamp inside the tent? Can you move it outside? That would certainly help too. If these measures don’t make any difference, then you could look into cooling the tent with something as basic as a bucket of ice, or if that’s too simple, then maybe look into a portable air conditioning unit that you could direct into the tent. I hope that’s some help, happy growing!
Darren Bullimore 2017-04-22
I am new to growing i have 2 20ltr oxy pots with 600 watt led and 2 smaller150 watt led full spectrum have advanced nutients micro grow bloom also sumo dragon force nutes my grow tent is 80 x80 x160 and have black orchid extracto and carbon filters and small quiet running 6″ clip fan please any help or advice also i have amhurst sour diesel photoperiod fems seed and big bang fem auto seed stock autos for oxy pots sour diesel in coco cour 10 ltr pots for outdoor thanks in advance
Outside plants receive a decent amount of nighttime light, why do indoor plants have to be in “total darkness?” thank you.
Dani Alchimia 2017-04-03
Hi terry222, Excellent question! Outdoor plants are used to a changing environment, they have sunny days, rainy days, cloudy days, and different moon phases. They adapt to these conditions and react accordingly. On the other hand, indoor plants have much more constant environmental conditions. It must be said that they can also tolerate a certain amount of light during the night period and bloom normally, but it is always better to avoid light sources since indoor plants are more sensitive to environment changes. That’s why complete darkness is always recommended, so you don’t take any risk of stressing the plants. Hope it helped!
Levi Daniels 2016-10-05
I just started growing andemand I plan on using the scrog technique. Is it wise to just do this with a 400w Apollo grow light without a tent? Is a tent really necessary for better yield? I’ve been watering my seedlings once every 2 days and I am currently using a 3800 lumen led light for 2 plants. I feel like the light isn’t too imperative this early in the grow stage but once I have the money I do plan on getting the Apollo. With this relatively simple setup will I need a grow tent, good ventilation and temperature for better yield?
Dani Alchimia 2016-10-06
Hi Levi, As you say, light is not so important during the first stages of the plant, but it is imperative to get good yields once into flowering. Grow tents have been designed to keep a good environment for the plants while protecting them from light sources during their night periods. Thus, they’re very convenient but not strictly necessary, especially in regard with yields. What you do need is a good light source (the Apollo 400W would be ok) and proper air renovation in the growing space (and of course controlling the temperature and humidity). These basic tips for indoor gardening should be useful for you. Hope it helped!
My plants have also got purple lines going up true them does this mean they are stressed someone give me tips I don’t l ow what to do, help??
Dani Alchimia 2016-08-17
Hi Naomi, Check the min/max temperatures inside your grow room, plants normally develop purple hues when exposed to low temps, also if they’re stressed somehow. Also, keep in mind that many strains develop purple colors naturally, which is not a problem at all! Hope it helped.
Need help the leaves on the end of my plant have turned yellow and it’s not because their dry I have checked that just wondering what else coul it be and what can I do to help?
Dani Alchimia 2016-08-17
Hi Naomi, If you mean the lower leaves of the plant, then you need to add more nitrogen to your nutrient solution. Using any fertilizer formulated for the growth stage should solve the problem. On the other hand, if you mean the upper leaves it could be caused by the heat emitted by the bulb. Placing it a bit further from the plants should lower the temperature of their tops and allow plants to grow normally. Hope it helped! 😉
One question I’ve recently started growing I’m just wondering is it normal for water to be at the end of my tent from the steam or should I dry it?
Dani Alchimia 2016-07-27
Hi Naomi, I don’t know if I understood your post correctly. When you say at the end of the tent, you mean you have water condensated on the walls of the grow tent? Or is the water not coming from condensation but from a humidifier? If you have water drops on the walls of your tent caused by condensation, that means you should improve your air extraction system. If it comes from a humidifier, simply adjust it so it produces less vapor. Hope it helped! 😉
Bethany Taylor 2016-01-25
papa indica, I’m preparing to purchase my first grow tent but am unsure as to the size I will need. I bought a 400w hps bulb with air cooled reflector. I only need enough yield to supply my husband and i with a big enough harvest to last until next harvest which is usually around 4-5 oz. We have been growing with CFLs in our closet and i wanna make sure we use our money wisely when purchasing a tent. We have 3.5 gallon containers. If i get a 4’x2’x6′ tent, will this be enough space for 2 plants? (2 sq. ft. per plant) If so, will these 2 plants yield what we need? I ask this because we have 3 plants in the closet that yield around 4 oz combined.
Dani Alchimia 2016-01-27
Hi Bethany, I am currently growing in a 4’x2’x4′ grow tent with two 250W lamps and air cooled reflectors. My plan was using a 400W lamp, but when I checked light intensity with a luxmeter I realized that light distribution was better with two smaller lamps. Still, and since a 400W light produces more lumens than a 250W, you won’t have major issues regarding this. The number of plants depends on growing systems and techniques: you can use the SOG technique and put about 12-16 plants in your space, or you can grow larger plants and use 2-4 plants (SCROG technique). It is up to you, each systems has pros and cons. As you can see, yields do not depend on the number of plants used, but on their size: the idea is always covering the whole growing surface with buds. Hope it helped!
Papa Indica 2015-07-06
One thing to avoid whichever style of reflector you use is the ones that have a smooth reflective surface. The smooth surface doesn’t reflect light evenly and can cause major hot spots. The dimpled surface reflectors distribute light much more evenly and eliminate hot spots. Reflectors should have their own discussion here, there are lots of points to be made on the subject. And I’m glad you like reading my opinions Dani, because I usually have one. :^]_
Papa Indica 2015-07-03
In my experience, a wing style reflector is the worst choice for tent growing, they seem to be better for more open spaces. Earlier on in my growing career I was using LED’s, near the end of that I had an HPS user friend of mine jealous of my results with them but, in the end, replacement costs were just outrageous compared to just replacing a bulb, or even a ballast. So, when I decided to switch over to HID lighting I bought a kit for my HPS set-up that included a wing reflector. I HATED that thing, the heat build-up in my tent was ridiculous, I had to dial my 600w ballast back to 50% power to try and keep it under control. By my second crop with HPS I had an enclosed reflector with my exhaust fan ducted to it to draw the heat out directly from the source. HUGE difference. I was able to bump back up to my full 600w and heat hasn’t been an issue ever since. But, also bear in mind that I’m using duct fans, not inline fans, so granted my fan may have just not been powerful enough to keep up the other way, though it seems to have plenty of pull to me. And by the way, I definitely get better results now with my HPS than I did with LED’s, I guess my friend is just a step behind. But anyway, to me, the enclosed reflector that you can duct your exhaust fan to is far superior to a wing for tent growing. (I have lots of opinions, don’t I?)
Dani Alchimia 2015-07-06
Hi Papa Indica, We just love reading your opinions!! 😉 While I haven’t used duct fans but inline fans, I’ve also realized that the difference between wing reflectors and enclosed reflectors is huge, not only speaking about light reflection, but especially heat dissipation. Again, thanks for your comment. All our best vibes!
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Each type of device doubles the complexity and amount of the internal mechanisms. Pricing is scaled exactly to the proportionate sizes and amounts of rare materials needed in the manufacturing process and for additional and longer coils in the Mobile & Home devices. The larger devices have stronger absorption and wider protection range.
The inner coil, minerals and dispersion mechanisms are all center seated and float within the housings so to never touch the edges, allowing optimum heat/energy dissipation to occur. This feature makes them safe to wear, hold and keep close to or touch your body.
These statements have not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration.
This product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease.
Copyright © 2017 Vitamin Express All Rights Reserved. Contents of this Web Site are for the purpose of information. | <urn:uuid:6f8933bf-0e61-41b5-99f1-be896b883bf6> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.vitaminexpress.com/rayguard-rayguard-body-car.html | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.914909 | 600 | 2.03125 | 2 |
Wednesday (August 10, 2022)
from 2:00 am to 3:00 am
from 2:00 am to 1:00 am
Compare the local time of two timezones, countries or cities of the world.
Oregon is a city in United States.
The name of the time zone is America/New_York. | <urn:uuid:0e17d2df-85b4-49ea-baf5-cc107ff96240> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.zeitverschiebung.net/en/city/5165734 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.785484 | 88 | 1.84375 | 2 |
Big shark was one of seven caught last Friday
Capt. Chip Michalove of Outcast Sport Fishing Charters in Hilton Head Island, S.C. and his crew caught seven great white sharks off the coast of Hilton Head on Jan. 18. It’s the most he’s ever caught in a single day. They tagged four of the sharks, and released all seven.
And one, a 15-foot long, 2600-pound male, is the largest known male great white ever tagged in the Atlantic Ocean.
Michalove has hooked more than 30 great white sharks since 2015. That’s when he caught his first one off South Carolina’s coast. But seven in one day was epic, even for him.
“I’ve never dreamed of seeing that many in one day. We found this spot where there was a plethora of great whites. Like barracuda swarming a reef,” he told The Island Packet.
Many fishing trips find anglers spending more time waiting for a bite than actually reeling in a fish. But Michalove said this trip was the opposite.
“We were battling great whites for more time than we were waiting for them. It was incredible,” he said.
Crew caught the sharks at a new spot
“Then it was like the fishing gods opened up and gave us this place. If we had more people (onboard), I feel like we could have caught two at a time,” he said.
The tags they used will send data back to scientists as the creatures continue their journey. The information includes water depths, temperatures, how often and how far the sharks move, and which areas they spend most of their time.
One of the crew’s sharks last Friday was a 12.5-foot, 1500-pound female that Michalove named Charli. He named the shark after 11-year-old Charli Bobinchuck, who was killed by a car in a crosswalk on Hilton Head this past summer.
The crew caught an 8-foot male toward the end of the trip. They named this one Frank after Frank Mundus, who is known as the first angler to catch an Atlantic great white on rod-and-reel. With his crew tired and ready to celebrate, Michalove (843-290-0371) convinced them to stay for one more try. That’s when they hooked the 15-foot male.
One more try equals big catch
“They were beat, but I talked them into setting up the chum once more with a ‘we’ll give it an hour.’ Thirty minutes and three Advil later, we had a hog swim up and take it. It turned out to be the largest male tagged in the Atlantic at approximately 2600 pounds. We’ve tagged three females in years before that were over 3000 pounds. But males are typically much smaller,” he said.
“It was almost as wide as the boat. It’s always shocking to not only see the length of these sharks, but their width and their power is just incredible,” he said.
When Michalove first began fishing specifically for great whites, scientists didn’t even know if the species even came near the coast of Hilton Head. In recent years, they’ve estimated that about 1000 spend some time here during the winter. But he thinks the number may be much higher than that.
Michalove said if you’d like to keep track of the great whites he’s caught, you can check them out with an app called Sharktivity.
JOIN THE CLUB, get unlimited access for $2.99/month
Become the most informed Sportsman you know, with a membership to the Louisiana Sportsman Magazine and LouisianaSportsman.com. | <urn:uuid:b75eab9b-bea6-46aa-a098-c48d69c3885f> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.louisianasportsman.com/fishing/offshore-fishing/south-carolina-anglers-catch-2600-pound-great-white-shark/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.976223 | 806 | 1.570313 | 2 |
Osama sentence example
But, just as Saddam has remained elusive, so have Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Umar.
The ideology of Sudan was so congenial to Osama bin Laden that he spent three years in Sudan in the 1990s.
The Central Intelligence Agency has publicly disavowed the likelihood of Mr Hussein's handing over his most prized weapons to Osama bin Laden.
Will ' Osama ' - as another kid helpfully names the understandably distraught girl - be found out?
Why does the Islamic sea seem so hospitable to the likes of Osama?Advertisement
The search for Osama Bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the attacks, took centre-stage.
Osama bin Laden himself mentioned the Iraq sanctions in a recent tirade against the United States.
Abu Sayyaf, who is a sympathizer of Osama bin Laden, escaped after a shootout with police late last month.
It is not [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar, nor is it Osama Bin Laden.
War on Terrorism - Beat the terrorists along with Osama bin Laden in this war combat game.Advertisement
Parodies of the song were recorded by Da Yoopers, who released Grandma Got Run Over by a Beer Truck in 1993, and DJ Bob Rivers, who recorded Osama Got Run Over by a Reindeer. | <urn:uuid:b28f1623-a230-4468-9dbc-006800713f12> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://sentence.yourdictionary.com/osama | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.948379 | 266 | 1.625 | 2 |
On Aug 15, 1995 ZetaTalk stated that the Dogon Tribe in Africa had encountered and learned astronomy from the giant
hominoids of the 12th Planet in the past. On Nov 15, 1999 this history was posted on the web, through Skeptics persist.
Did the Dogon tribe of Mali learn astronomy from Extraterrestrials?
The year was 1947. The French anthropologist Marcel Griaule had been studying African culture for 19 years, and had been living among and studying the Dogon tribe of French West Africa for 16 of those years. The Dogon live in a place called Bandiagara, in what is today the nation of Mali, between the fabled city of Timbouctou and the city of Ougadougou. Bandiagara is quite isolated, although Timbouctou was once a mighty trading center on the Trans-Saharan trade routes. By the beginning of the twentieth century, all of this area had become a French possession known as French West Africa.
That year, Griaule was approached by some of the Dogon elders who said that they wished to tell him some of the secret knowledge of their tribe. Griaule had been among them for sixteen years and they had come to accept and respect him. The elders had decided that he could be trusted with their secret knowledge, the knowledge that even most of the Dogon people did not know. This knowledge had been passed down in the oral traditions of the Dogon for centuries. It is common for the peoples of Africa to transmit their tribal lore and their history from generation to generation by this method of oral transmission, as you might recall from Roots.
The Dogon elders proceeded to tell Griaule the story of how the universe was created according to their secret mythology. They told him how the Nommo, creatures that were half-human and half-fish, began civilization on the Earth. Griaule was told of the Sigui ceremony which is held every sixty years and which represents the renewal of the universe. He was shown four hundred-year-old masks that were used in the Sigui rites.
Perhaps the most interesting thing that the elders told Griaule was their cosmology. They told him of their knowledge that the moon is dry and barren, that Saturn - the star of limiting place - has rings around it and that Jupiter - dana tolo - has four large moons. They knew that the Milky Way is a spiral galaxy of stars, and that the planets move in elliptical orbits around the Sun.
The Dogon have a special reverence for Sirius. The elders told Griaule that Sirius is not just one star, but three. The one we see, sigi tolo (Sirius A) is just the largest and brightest. It is orbited by a smaller star, po tolo (Sirius B) which is named after a tiny grain that is also called Digitaria. They believe that this tiny star is the heaviest thing in the universe and that it is made of a metal called sagala. This tiny star orbits sigi tolo every fifty years, in an elliptical orbit. The third star in the system is called emme ya, the sun of women. It is four times lighter in weight than po tolo, and it travels in the same direction around sigi tolo, but in a larger orbit. It moves much more quickly through space, so that it takes the same amount of time to complete an orbit around sigi tolo. Emme ya has a satellite or planet of its own, called the Goatherd or the star of women. There are drawings on the four-hundred-year old sigui mask that represent this cosmology.
Griaule's paper on the Dogon, written with his colleague Germaine Dieterlen, was published in 1950. It was called A Sudanese Sirius System. Griaule died an untimely death from a heart attack in Paris in 1956 and the Dogon in far away Mali held a funeral ceremony for him that showed their high esteem for this man. In 1965 a book about the Dogon by Griaule and Dieterlen was published. It was called Le Renard Pale, or The Pale Fox.
Robert Temple and The Sirius Mystery
In 1966, Robert Temple, a fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society and the author of several books, happened to read some of the Griaule material on Dogon Cosmology, and in 1968 he obtained an English translation of Le Renard Pale. He became interested in the question of how the isolated Dogon could have known for hundreds of years that Sirius, one of the brightest stars in the sky, has an invisible companion, Sirius B. Sirius B, a type of star called a white dwarf, is so small that it cannot be seen without a telescope. It was completely unknown to astronomers until 1862, when the American astronomer Alvan Clark managed to see it for the first time. Sirius B, like all white dwarf stars, is composed of densely packed matter that, if it is not the heaviest matter in the universe, is very close to it. It was not discovered until around 1926 that white dwarves are so heavy that a cubic meter of one may weigh as much as 20,000 tons. It was also discovered that Sirius B orbits Sirius A in an elliptical orbit that takes 50 years to complete. Sirius B was finally photographed in 1970.
How did the Dogon know about Sirius B, when they had no telescopes? How, for that matter, did they know that Saturn has rings, that the moon is dry and barren, and that Jupiter has four large moons? These four moons of Jupiter are called Galilean, because Galileo was the first to see them when he pointed his telescope at Jupiter. The moons of Jupiter and Saturn's rings are only visible through a telescope. As Temple read Graiule's material on the Dogon, he found that their mythology traced their origins back to the Nommo, the human-fish creatures from their creation myths. Temple related these creatures to Oannes of Sumerian mythology who was also a half-fish, half-human creature who brought civilization to an ancient people. Further, Temple found links with Egyptian and Greek mythology. He wrote a book about his interpretation of the Dogon beliefs, called The Sirius Mystery, which was published in the 1970s. In the book, Temple contends that the Nommo were extraterrestrials who came to Earth from a planet in the Sirius system. They visited the Dogon, the Babylonians, and possibly the Egyptians, and the astronomical knowledge of the Dogon came from this contact.
Finally, in 1995, French astronomers Daniel Benest and J.L. Duvent published a study in Astronomy and Astrophysics that proposed that certain perturbations seemed to exist in the Sirius system that could be explained by the existence of a third star in the system. They proposed that this third member is a small red dwarf star that would be Sirius C. If so, then this would verify yet another part of the Dogon beliefs, the belief in the third Sirian sun called emme ya. | <urn:uuid:644db8d4-fb9f-4b8b-8ffd-a989e697574b> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://www.zetatalk11.com/theword/tworx114.htm | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.981947 | 1,472 | 2.640625 | 3 |
…Google’s strategy for its comparison shopping service wasn’t just about attracting customers by making its product better than those of its rivals. Instead, Google abused its market dominance as a search engine by promoting its own comparison shopping service in its search results, and demoting those of competitors.
Google, not surprisingly, was quick to issue a response refuting the EC’s claim that it has illegally acted to stifle competition. In it, Google’s general counsel Kent Walker stated that the company “respectfully disagrees” with the EC’s conclusions and suggested that the rise of competitors like Amazon could be responsible for the challenges other shopping comparison sites have faced.
“When you use Google to search for products, we try to give you what you’re looking for,” Walker wrote. “Our ability to do that well isn’t favoring ourselves, or any particular site or seller – it’s the result of hard work and constant innovation, based on user feedback.”
An appeal, while not yet announced, would appear likely.
In the meantime, Google parent company Alphabet has 90 days to cease the conduct the EC found to be illegal or it will face daily fines of 5% of its average daily worldwide turnover. The EC also noted that in addition to the fine being levied by the EC, Google could face civil penalties for its behavior and that a new EU Antitrust Damages Directive will “[make] it easier for victims of anti-competitive practices to obtain damages.”
A sign of things to come?
While Google, which generated some $90bn in revenue last year, can easily swallow the EU’s $2.7bn fine without batting an eye, the billion-dollar fine signals that regulators, after years of talk, might now be willing to take action to reign in large tech companies that are increasingly dominant.
Google and Facebook, for instance, have been labeled by some as a duopoly that needs to be regulated more heavily, and as a candidate, now-U.S. President Donald Trump went so far as to publicly state that Amazon has “a huge antitrust problem.”
There’s no evidence that tech giants like Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon are going to become less dominant any time soon. In fact, the evidence indicates that the dominance of a handful of large tech firms will only grow. This has led to concern that these companies are becoming too powerful and must be reigned in to protect the public.
While it’s too early to know whether the EC’s Google fine is the beginning of a period of aggressive antitrust enforcement, the EC did use its press release to point out that it “has already come to the preliminary conclusion that Google has abused a dominant position in two other cases” involving Google’s mobile OS Android and AdSense.
It also noted that it “continues to examine Google’s treatment in its search results of other specialised Google search services” — a not-so-subtle warning that Google is still under a powerful antitrust microscope.
Is a Europe-US split developing?
Some observers have suggested that the EC unfairly targeted Google, an American company, and that this week’s fine is actually intended to serve protectionist goals without starting an overt trade rift. The EC has dismissed these arguments.
While U.S. presidential candidate Trump bandied about the “antitrust” word in reference to Amazon, which is owned by one of his most prominent tech industry critics, Jeff Bezos, it’s somewhat doubtful that President Trump will eschew his business-friendly political platform and go after big tech firms who employ tens of thousands of highly-paid workers in the U.S.
This raises the prospect of a Europe-US split in which large tech companies, most of which are headquartered in the U.S., are forced to change the way they operate in Europe while keeping their modus operandi the same across the pond.
For companies that rely in some form on these tech giants, particularly large brands, this possibility is worth paying close attention to. After all, if Google is forced to make significant changes to the way it operates in Europe, it could affect how Google’s many frenemies work with and compete against it in Europe versus the rest of the world. | <urn:uuid:e8bb4965-6104-4da3-9015-8fae3a3c12d1> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://econsultancy.com/how-europe-s-2-7bn-google-antitrust-fine-could-impact-the-internet-economy/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570692.22/warc/CC-MAIN-20220807181008-20220807211008-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.962079 | 906 | 1.859375 | 2 |
Did you know that Pinus strobus (Eastern White Pine) played a notable role in America’s history? In colonial days, the best trees were reserved by the King and the Royal Navy for masts on British ships. Lumber from Eastern White Pine is very light, yet strong. The versatile lumber was easy to cut, shape and finish. Great Britain decided they needed this versatile lumber to build the strongest and fastest ships. The King assumed ownership of the best Eastern White Pines within 10 miles of any navigable waterway. All specimen trees were branded with “The King’s Broad Arrow”.
Houses were built and tools were made with the majestic Eastern White Pine. The inner bark was dried and ground into flour. Tea was made from the needles. The bark was applied to wounds and distilled into cough remedies. The white pine was the colonist livelihood. Here these grand trees sat on their property and they couldn’t touch them because the King said so. They paid no attention to the “Broad Arrow” protected trees and harvested them anyway putting the wood to use. Rebellion from local settlers clashed with British authorities in such scuffles as “The White Pine War’ and “The Pine Tree Riot”. These were the first acts of rebellion against British rule. The Eastern White Pine was the emblem on the first colonial flag. The Revolutionary War was about many things and the Eastern White Pine weighed heavy on the colonist desire for independence.
Soft, flexible blue-green needles and pyramidal form make Pinus strobus an exceptional ornamental. Favored for its beauty and fast growth rate, Pinus strobus is a valuable tree. It is hardy for zones 3 through 8 and responds well to shearing. This low maintenance plant is widely used as a screen, in park and estate plantings and wind breaks.
Plant some history! | <urn:uuid:fb904e2f-94bc-4d23-bd77-24cf42ce4600> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.angelicanurseries.com/company/eastern-white-pine/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.973742 | 390 | 4.15625 | 4 |
|"Under the Hood"|
|Publication date||February 2005 – April 2006|
|Title(s)||Batman #635-641, 645-650, Annual #25|
"Batman: Under the Hood" (also known as "Batman: Under the Red Hood") is a comic book story arc published by DC Comics, written by Judd Winick and primarily illustrated by Doug Mahnke. Featuring Batman in the monthly title of the same name, it ran from February 2005 to August 2005, before going on a short hiatus and returning from November 2005 to April 2006. The story arc is also a part of the crossover Infinite Crisis.
The story was notable for bringing long-dead Batman supporting character Jason Todd back to life, and reimagining him as a brutally violent antihero known as the Red Hood. Writer Jeph Loeb suggested in his Batman story "Hush" that Jason may, in fact, be alive, and Winick attached his return story to Jason's appearance in "Hush", before building an entire story around it. In summer 2010, Winick penned the six-issue arc, "Red Hood: The Lost Years", further detailing Jason's return and his training across the globe before his eventual collaboration with his former mentor's nemesis, Hush. In Summer 2010, the arc was adapted as a DC Universe Animated Original Movie entitled Batman: Under the Red Hood, earning widespread acclaim from critics and audiences.
In 1988, writer Jim Starlin wrote the Batman story "A Death in the Family", that featured Jason Todd's death at the hands of the Joker. The story of Jason Todd remained virtually untouched for the better part of 15 years, until the character appeared to have been active in the "Hush" storyline. Although it was later revealed that Clayface had posed as Jason, the end of "Hush" raised questions about the whereabouts of Jason's body, as it was not in its grave.
A flashback to Batman's early years (post Dick Grayson's retirement as Robin) shows a young Jason Todd attempting to steal the wheels of the Batmobile. He becomes the new Robin. Years later, after being resurrected from his murder by the Joker due to an overlap of Hypertime-lines, Jason is institutionalized, escapes, and begins living on the streets. Ra's al Ghul and his daughter Talia kidnap Jason and hold him in care for a year. Ra's takes the trip to his Lazarus Pit. Talia pushes Jason into the pit, empowering and unleashing a new, stronger, more violent creature. Talia smuggles him out of the estate, giving him a bag containing money, a computer and memories of Batman, the Joker, and Red Hood. Jason attempts to reconnect with Batman but his former mentor fights and defeats him. Jason reveals the empire he has built for himself as he dons an initial costume identity of the Joker: the "Red Hood".
Shortly after, the gangster Black Mask controls most of Gotham City's criminal underworld but is being countered by the Red Hood, who then destroys the top floor of Black Mask's fortress with a long-range explosive. Black Mask teams up with the Secret Society of Supervillains (Deathstroke, Captain Nazi, Hyena, Count Vertigo) to combat Red Hood. Batman and Red Hood defeat Black Mask's villains but end on bad terms due to Red Hood's deadly tactics.
Alfred receives a package with a lock of green hair and a note from Jason asking for Batman to meet him. Black Mask calls a meeting of his top associates and murders them under the eye of Red Hood. Black Mask and Red Hood fight and Batman arrives just as Red Hood is stabbed in the heart. Removing Red Hood's helmet, Black Mask sees that it isn't Jason Todd. Batman traps Black Mask and goes to meet Jason.
Jason has kidnapped and savagely beats the Joker, who laughs maniacally until falling silent when Jason says he sees through his crazy act. Batman enters and their brief fight is interrupted when a bomb is dropped on Blüdhaven by the Society, where Dick Grayson now fights crime as Nightwing. Jason tosses a gun to Batman and points his own gun at the Joker's head, saying that Batman must either kill Jason, or let Jason kill the Joker on a count of three. At the last half-second, Batman throws a batarang at Jason. The Joker triggers explosives throughout the building.
Main article: Batman: Under the Red Hood
The storyline was adapted to an animated film called Batman: Under the Red Hood. | <urn:uuid:d8fa8706-01b2-45ad-8160-4b060cd19d01> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://db0nus869y26v.cloudfront.net/en/Batman:_Under_the_Hood | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.964672 | 1,015 | 1.546875 | 2 |
Brendan discusses the film concept of the 180-degree rule, what it means, and how it translates to Board Game Design, then considers a few games that perhaps break the Board Game 180-degree rule.
- The 180-degree rule
- Dice Rolling
- Deck Building
- Holding Cards
Which mechanisms and games did Brendan leave out? Which ones would you suggest as examples of the 180-degree rule? Join us over on Boardgame Geek in guild #3269 to weigh in. | <urn:uuid:8f600775-624a-40aa-b976-ab2b523e31dd> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | http://rattleboxgames.com/2020/11/13/pick-up-deliver-280-the-board-game-180-degree-rule/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571472.69/warc/CC-MAIN-20220811133823-20220811163823-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.962763 | 101 | 1.945313 | 2 |
Critical vulnerability in EAS system
Washington, Aug. 5, 2022
The Department of Homeland Security warned of critical vulnerabilities in the Emergency Alert System’s encoder/decoder devices. The vulnerability could be used to send bogus emergency alerts.
The announcement was made in a public online statement from the federal agency. If the systems are not updated, cable networks and radio stations could be used by threat actors to panic the public with fake emergency alerts.
The flaw in EAS was discovered by a security researcher who claims that this vulnerability is the result of other, smaller flaws that have been neglected over many years.
The flaw allows hackers to gain access to credentials, certificates and devices, exploit the web server, send fake alerts, preempt signals and lock out legitimate users.
EAS is a U.S. national public alert system that allows the President or state and local authorities to communicate critical information in the event of a federal or local emergency. | <urn:uuid:1b455e3e-14cb-4cfd-8f5b-684294231b3d> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.ki-news.online/en/2022/08/05/7105/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.917508 | 198 | 2.265625 | 2 |
Welcome back to Hip Hop Month in the SAT Tip of the Week space, where we’re firm believers in the art of telecommunications. As Kevin Gates has been informing the world the last couple months, it’s important to have two phones (and maybe two more) to get the job (or various jobs) done. Which jobs is he talking about? The SAT Math Sections of course!
When tackling the SAT Math Sections, you need to have “two phones,” or multiple strategies. Some are “the plug” – plugging in answer choices, or at least using them as assets – and some are “the load” – just rolling up your sleeves and doing a load of math to grind out the answer. And of course you should always have other strategies (two more phones, and then even more phones, as the chorus goes): picking your own numbers, using process of elimination, guessing intelligently, etc.
So, let’s talk about some of the “phones” you’ll want at your disposal on the SAT Math Sections.
Notice that KG leads with “The Plug” before “The Load” – of course everyone on test day should be ready to do some algebra and arithmetic, but the savviest of test-takers are very ready to use the answer choices to their advantage, and look for every opportunity to save time by doing so. Consider the problem:
Jack is now 14 years older than Bill. If in 10 years Jack will be twice as old as Bill, how old is Jack?
Here you could set up the algebra, or you could go to “the plug” and plug in the answer choices to see which one fits the setup. Since Jack is 14 years older than Bill, that means that Bill would be (for each answer choice):
Now look to see which pairing, when each is increased by 10, would have one double the other:
24 and 10 (no)
26 and 12 (no)
28 and 14 (yes), so C is the correct answer.
Here you could go to the “load” and slog through some algebra, but seeing that you can just plug in the answer choices allows you to turn your mind off for a few seconds and answer the question that way.
Often, you’ll see that there isn’t a shortcut available for an SAT problem or that the math itself is straightforward enough that you should just do it. That’s why it pays to have a second “phone” – each is going to be valuable in different circumstances. For example, consider the problem:
If 5x + 6 = 10, what is the value of 10x + 3?
Here, you’d do just as much work going from the answers to the problem (you’d have to take each answer, then set that equal to 10x + 3, then solve for x…) so you might as well load up on algebra and do it the straightforward way:
5x + 6 = 10
5x = 4
x = 4/5
So take that and put it in the new equation:
10(4/5) + 3 = 8 + 3 = 11, so C is our correct answer.
More than 2 Phones?
As Kevin Gates is careful to note, often 2 strategies (or phones) just aren’t enough. And for those looking to score above 700 on the SAT Math Sections, you’ll almost certainly want to have more tools in your toolkit. Another involves picking your own numbers to test the algebra. Consider the problem:
The expression (5x – 2)/(x + 3) is equivalent to which of the following?
(A) (5 – 2)/3
(B) 5 – (2/3)
(C) 5 – 2/(x + 3)
(D) 5 – 17/(x + 3)
Here, you’ll be glad you have another phone in your pocket. Since the given expression and the right answer have to be equivalent regardless of the value of x, you can pick your own value of x and see which answer matches. Rather than go through an ugly load of algebra, you can pick an x that makes the math clean (try x = -2, for example, since all the denominators are x + 3; if x = -2, then you’ve set the denominators to 1 and made the arithmetic really simple):
If that’s true, then the given expression becomes (5(-2) – 2)/(-2 + 3), which ends up at -12. Clearly A and B don’t match, so you can then plug in to the answer choices. For D, the correct answer, you’ll see a fit:
5 – 17(/-2 + 3) = 5 – 17 = -12, which matches the given expression, so D is right. And by using another strategy, you were able to skip some ugly algebra and save time for other problems where you need to have time for “the load” of algebra.
So remember, on the SAT Math section, you always have more than 2 phones – and that’s essential if you want to be an SAT baller. While you’re hustling on the SAT Math grind, remember those multiple “phones” in your toolkit, and your score will be the next thing that’s ring, ring, ring.
By Brian Galvin. | <urn:uuid:6810e457-ab5d-4a4b-bc98-3db77bc320c1> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.veritasprep.com/blog/2016/04/sat-tip-of-the-week-2-phones/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.94829 | 1,232 | 2.796875 | 3 |
Note: Supplemental materials are not guaranteed with Rental or Used book purchases.
- ISBN: 9780754662112 | 075466211X
- Cover: Nonspecific Binding
- Copyright: 9/13/2017
Digital interactive audio is the future of audio in media - most notably video games, but also web pages, theme parks, museums, art installations and theatrical events. Despite its importance to contemporary multi-media, this is the first book that provides a framework for understanding the history, issues and theories surrounding interactive audio. Karen Collins presents the work of academics, composers and music programmers to introduce the topic from a variety of angles in order to provide a supplementary text for music and multimedia courses. The contributors cover practical and theoretical approaches, including historical perspectives, emerging theories, socio-cultural approaches to fandom, semiotic analyses, reception theory and case study analyses. The book offers a fresh perspective on media music, one that will complement film studies, but which will show the necessity of a unique approach when considering games music. | <urn:uuid:0fb74fb9-003b-4680-b4ed-ea4b3b696f08> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.biggerbooks.com/from-pacman-pop-music-interactive-audio/bk/9780754662112 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882573540.20/warc/CC-MAIN-20220819005802-20220819035802-00465.warc.gz | en | 0.877008 | 212 | 2.15625 | 2 |
If you’re a woman in Rwanda, you’re almost twice as likely to be infected with HIV as a man. That seems hideously unfair, particularly after rape was used as a weapon during the genocide of 1994, resulting in a huge swell in the numbers of infected women. Still, even today it is a reality.
So Heifer International has teamed up with my second most favorite organization, Partners in Health, to improve the health, nutrition and income of people living with HIV/AIDS in the Eastern Province, who make up 2.5% of the population there.
Partners in Health, which grew out of Dr. Paul Farmer’s pioneering community health work in Haiti in the 1980s, is the first responder. Since 2005, PIH has been providing crucial medicine and health care to HIV patients, as well as food packages for 10 months, in order to strengthen and stabilize these weak, poor and malnourished folks and get them on the road to recovery. But after that immediate intervention, patients still needed a way to provide themselves and their families with sustainable income and food security. And that’s where goats (and Heifer) come in.
Goats are quick to reproduce (they can be bred in the first year), their milk is highly nutritious (reportedly it really helps bolster one’s white blood cells that fight off infection) and with easily available forage (old banana peels, kitchen waste and some grasses) goats will produce a lot of poop to fertilize vegetable gardens that the people are encouraged and trained to plant. So Heifer has given away hundreds of South African dairy goats to people like Charlotte, who has used that gift to transform her life.
Charlotte found out she was HIV+ in 2003, after she had four heartbreaking miscarriages in a row and went in for a test. But her husband, from whom she got the infection, argued that she was not infected and so she got thinner and sicker until 2005, when she visited PIH (or Inshuti Mu Buzima as it’s known in Kinyarwanda) and was put on life-saving medications. In 2009, Charlotte received a goat from Heifer, passed on its first female offspring to another family, and now has two more female offspring that provide her with so much milk, she has plenty to sell.
With her goat milk income, Charlotte bought a pig that is now pregnant, and she can sell those piglets for about $120/each (if healthy and fat, a pig can have two litters a year of about 8-12 piglets each). Charlotte also bought a heifer and is eager to raise more goats, sell more milk, plant more vegetables and bananas, and buy more land. In a big kitchen garden that surrounds her house, she also grows carrots, beets, and maize that she sells, but she’s really famous for her excellent bananas (thanks to copious amounts of manure).
Her 13-year old son is tall and handsome, and she’ll have the money to send him to the best secondary school –although in Rwanda it’s considered quite a tragedy to have just one child (a fact my only-child Lulu found ironic). When she talked about her four missing children, Charlotte looked bereft, but she quickly said, “I don’t think about being sick, I think about the future. It’s only when I talk about being sick that I get sad.”
As we pulled away from her house, I was thinking of how Charlotte had stood up in front of the whole town meeting and told her story, and the courage that must have taken. Then I thought of the song the people were singing at the meeting (it only rhymes in Kinyarwanda, folks): “People say if you have HIV/AIDS you are going to die, but we are not prepared to die… We are going to live!” | <urn:uuid:8948c0e0-646d-4673-ae26-95ba41cf1af2> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://heifer12x12.com/2012/08/23/goats-an-anti-viral-agent/?replytocom=4909 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.981229 | 822 | 2.375 | 2 |
Here is a question. Is marketing and branding one and the same? No, but they do go hand in hand when it comes to promoting your dermatology practice. And if your marketing and branding are not done right, your practice will get lost in the sea of other dermatologists out there. Your practice must stand out and that’s where branding comes in. Your brand must have something that people immediately associate with your practice. Here’s an example. If we were to see a soda commercial, based on the can’s color and the style of the video, you’d be able to instantly recognize whether the soda brand was Coke or Pepsi without their name ever being included. That’s because of branding.
So let’s talk about branding tips for dermatologists in a little more detail.
What Is a Brand?
A brand is the intangible marketing and business identity for any given business. This identity helps people immediately recognize your business, product, or service.
What Is Branding?
Branding is the advertising and distinctive design that makes a business, product, or service instantly recognizable. Generally, when people think of branding, they think the concept of branding only applies to a business’s logo, colors, etc. And while those things are a part of branding, that is not all there is to branding. Branding and name recognition are so much more!
Let’s look at the aspect of branding that most people miss.
What Is Your Brand?
Do you know what your brand is? Have you systematically and methodically branded your dermatology practice to be instantly recognizable? Branding is extremely important. So if you don’t know if your brand is instantly recognizable, ask yourself the following questions to help determine if your practice is properly branded or if your branding needs a bit more work.
1. Do people immediately recognize your dermatology practice by name?
If the public immediately recognizes your practice by name, then you probably have some solid branding in place.
2. Where does your dermatology practice rank in the search engines? Do you rank highly? Are you on page three or higher? Or perhaps your practice can’t be found at all?
Having the proper branding in place will help your practice’s website rank higher in the search engines. The higher rankings your website gets, the more traffic your practice will get. Additionally, the higher your rankings, the more name recognition, and authority you will achieve.
3. What do people think about your dermatology practice?
Does your business have a good name and reputation in the community? It’s important to have positive name recognition in your community. If you have negative name recognition, you will have to perform some reputation management tasks to change your public persona. Again, branding!
4. Does your dermatology practice have online reviews and testimonials? Are those reviews and testimonials good or bad? Did you take the time to respond to the reviews and testimonials you received even if they were negative?
Whether you realize this or not, online reviews are another form of branding. Most people use the information found online about any given company to decide if they want to do business with them. So if others have branded your company negatively, this will hurt your image.
It’s important to respond to all comments, reviews, and testimonials quickly. A simple thank you for your business, etc. will suffice for good reviews. If it’s a negative review, this is your chance to show your business has integrity by explaining your side of the situation and how you graciously resolved or attempted to resolve the issue. So even if you did make a mistake, people will see you did everything you could to remedy it.
5. Is your practice receiving high online star ratings?
Have you been paying attention to your online star ratings on social media, Yelp, Google, and others? Your star ratings are branding your practice as well. People searching for a dermatologist will glance through the stars they see on any given page and will generally skip those with low star ratings. Anything seen online or offline contributes to the perception of your brand. So doing whatever it takes to maintain or raise your stars is critical to your success.
6. Does your dermatology practice do what it says it’s going to do to help patients?
Bait and switch advertising or not following through with any promise you made to your patients or in your marketing campaigns is a recipe for disaster and will lead to negative branding. Negative comments and reviews tend to go viral and that’s not what you want.
7. What unique value does your dermatology practice offer? It should be something different than what the other dermatology businesses in your area offer.
Every business needs a unique selling proposition (USP). This is the part of branding that makes your practice stand out above the others. So find some type of product, service, or something you’re better at or different from everyone else then include that in your branding as part of your USP.
Now let’s talk about your core assets—the assets that are traditionally associated with business branding.
These are the marketing concepts and pieces that make up your brand’s identity and personality. You always want your business’s core assets to be so compelling that they get your potential patients to contact you or engage with you rather than your competitors.
Here are the most common core business assets.
- Name of your business
- Business color palette
- Business tagline and slogan
- The voice, personality, and tone of your business
- The design of your business marketing pieces such as your colors, font, etc.
Your dermatology practice’s core assets for each online and offline platform should match in voice, tone, personality, color, font, design style—everything. That means deciding how you want your business and your business’s personality portrayed before you begin your marketing and branding.
Now it’s time to talk about building and maintaining your brand.
How to Build and Maintain Your Dermatology Practice’s Brand
Before you can do anything, you will need to figure out what the public perception of your brand is currently. You can determine that by doing the following.
- Contact your patients and ask them how they view your practice.
- Monitor your practice’s name online for social media mentions. What are people saying?
- Monitor and analyze your online star ratings to see what people are saying about your practice in their comments and reviews, etc.
Next, take some time to study the following information as it pertains to your practice.
- Is your brand messaging conveying your practice’s value?
- Is your website’s brand messaging clear and concise?
- Have you claimed your practice’s online directory listings like Yelp, Google Business Profile (formerly Google My Business), and all related social media profiles?
Lastly, you will want to perform some of the activities that help build your brand and your brand’s reputation while helping to maintain it.
- Perform a brand sentiment analysis. This will help you compare what people are saying about you online. You can then use that analysis to improve on what’s working and change the things that aren’t.
- Proactively work on getting more reviews. Then make sure you are writing thoughtful, original replies to those reviews.
- Monitor and average your star ratings on all review sites.
- Send your current patients emails containing surveys and questions that request their opinion on what they like and don’t like about your practice. And ask them if there were anything they could change, what would that be and why?
- Gather all your brand assets then move them all to one platform. This will make them easier to monitor, use, and maintain.
- Make sure it’s easy for your current and potential patients to reach you via email, text, chat, and social media messaging across all platforms.
Performing and managing all these tasks can be cumbersome if you don’t keep everything in one place. That’s why you should ditch the common practice of using a variety of tools and platforms that are all on separate platforms.
Here’s what we recommend…
Request a Surefire Local Marketing Platform Demo!
Why? Because Surefire Local is the leading business intelligence marketing software for local businesses. It’s a quick and easy all-in-one solution that enables you to perform nine of the most critical online marketing activities. And, it enables you to do them all from one dashboard. Request your Free Surefire Local Demo today.
Let’s look at the nine online marketing activities you can perform on the Surefire Local Marketing Platform.
1. Request, manage, and respond to your ratings and reviews.
2. Access and post to 70+ business directories.
3. Generate, schedule, and distribute your content.
4. Track your leads, check sales cycle status, and perform follow-up tasks.
5. We provide pre-built local paid ads and location-based campaigns for any social media platform.
6. Check your analytics and reporting for insights that you can track, monitor, and measure calls, web traffic, paid ads, and how effective your social media campaigns are.
7. Our competitor analysis tool helps you to see what keywords your competitors are using along with helpful local search term discovery.
8. Surefire Local can help your practice with geo-location check-ins that provide location-specific details so your prospective patients can easily find you and provide your current patients with important up-to-the-minute information.
9. Use the text message marketing function to answer questions, directly engage with your users, and convert leads more easily by chatting and texting with them in real-time.
Would You Like Surefire Local to Help You Take Your Dermatology Practice to the Next Level?
If you want more branding tips for dermatologists, or if you just want more information about our services, consider taking a tour of our software today. | <urn:uuid:ee71ecb5-4326-4164-b3ef-b2aee81a8b92> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.surefirelocal.com/blog/7-dermatology-marketing-strategies-to-boost-your-brand-recognition/ | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.93403 | 2,099 | 1.664063 | 2 |
33530431063 has 2 divisors, whose sum is σ = 33530431064.
Its totient is φ = 33530431062.
The previous prime is 33530431057. The next prime is 33530431073. The reversal of 33530431063 is 36013403533.
It is a weak prime.
It is a cyclic number.
It is not a de Polignac number, because 33530431063 - 29 = 33530430551 is a prime.
It is a super-2 number, since 2×335304310632 (a number of 22 digits) contains 22 as substring.
It is a congruent number.
It is not a weakly prime, because it can be changed into another prime (33530431003) by changing a digit.
It is a polite number, since it can be written as a sum of consecutive naturals, namely, 16765215531 + 16765215532.
It is an arithmetic number, because the mean of its divisors is an integer number (16765215532).
Almost surely, 233530431063 is an apocalyptic number.
33530431063 is a deficient number, since it is larger than the sum of its proper divisors (1).
33530431063 is an equidigital number, since it uses as much as digits as its factorization.
33530431063 is an evil number, because the sum of its binary digits is even.
The product of its (nonzero) digits is 29160, while the sum is 31.
Adding to 33530431063 its reverse (36013403533), we get a palindrome (69543834596).
The spelling of 33530431063 in words is "thirty-three billion, five hundred thirty million, four hundred thirty-one thousand, sixty-three". | <urn:uuid:a0f358ac-64b2-475e-8d06-534e9909c28b> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://www.numbersaplenty.com/33530431063 | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882570879.37/warc/CC-MAIN-20220809003642-20220809033642-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.893965 | 416 | 2.4375 | 2 |
Lemon meringue pie
|Serving temperature||Hot or cold|
(per 127 g serving)
|285 kcal (1193 kJ)|
(per 127 g serving)
Fruit desserts covered with baked meringue were found beginning in the 18th century in France. Menon's pommes meringuées are a sort of thick apple sauce or apple butter covered with baked meringue in his 1739 cookbook. A custard flavored with "citron" (probably a mistranslation of citron 'lemon') and covered with baked meringue, crême meringuée, was published by 1769 in English, apparently a translation of an earlier edition of Menon (1755?). Similar recipes cooked in a crust appear in 19th century America: apple pie covered with meringue, called 'apple a la turque' (1832) and 'apples meringuées' (1846). A generic 'meringue pie' based on any pie was documented in 1860. The name 'Lemon Meringue Pie' appears in 1869, but lemon custard pies with meringue topping were often simply called lemon cream pie. In literature one of the first references to this dessert can be found in the book 'Memoir and Letters of Jenny C. White Del Bal' by Rhoda E. White, published in 1868.
A stiff lemon-flavored custard is prepared with egg yolks, lemon zest and juice, sugar, and sometimes starch and baked in a pie crust. Uncooked meringue, usually shaped into peaks, is spread over the top, sometimes with a sprinkle of sugar, and briefly baked.
- Menon (pseud.), Nouveau traité de la Cuisine, v. 2, p. 91
- B. Clermont, The Professed Cook, 2nd edition, 1769, p. 426
- anonymous (Menon), Les soupers de la cour, 1778, vol. 3, p. 86>
- A Boston Housekeeper (Mrs. N. K. M. Lee), The Cook's Own Book and Housekeeper's Register
- Louis-Eustache Audot, French Domestic Cookery, 1846, p. 206
- Mrs. T.J. Crowen, American Lady's System of Cookery, New York, 1860, s.v. "Meringue Pie", p. 256
- American Agriculturalist 28:7:p. 262 (New Series, No. 270)
- Rufus Estes, Good Things to Eat, as Suggested by Rufus, 1911, p. 89
- White, Rhoda E. Memoir and Letters of Jenny C. White del Bal, page 212 | <urn:uuid:c7ad19ef-b328-47b3-9f8a-576a647f6a87> | CC-MAIN-2022-33 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lemon_meringue_pie | s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2022-33/segments/1659882571150.88/warc/CC-MAIN-20220810070501-20220810100501-00665.warc.gz | en | 0.851144 | 649 | 2.1875 | 2 |
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