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0
|
We may call the faculty of cognition from principles a priori, pure Reason, and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the Critique of pure Reason, although by this faculty we only understand Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name in the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as practical Reason, according to its special principles.
|
Kant
| 64
| 5.2
| 56.25
| 36
| 6
| 2
| 11
| 0
| 11
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 3
| 0
| 17
| 3
| 1
| 7
|
0
|
That goes merely into our faculty of knowing things a priori, and busies itself therefore only with the cognitive faculty to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire; and of the cognitive faculties it only concerns itself with Understanding, according to its principles a priori, to the exclusion of Judgement and Reason, because it is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty but the Understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition a priori.
|
Kant
| 82
| 5.13
| 57.32
| 47
| 5
| 4
| 14
| 1
| 14
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 6
| 2
| 3
| 17
| 4
| 0
| 9
|
0
|
The Critique, then, which sifts them all, as regards the share which each of the other faculties might pretend to have in the clear possession of knowledge from its own peculiar root, leaves nothing but what the Understanding prescribes a priori as law for nature as the complex of phenomena.
|
Kant
| 50
| 4.84
| 62
| 31
| 4
| 1
| 6
| 1
| 12
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 10
| 3
| 1
| 6
|
0
|
It relegates all other pure concepts under Ideas, which are transcendent for our theoretical faculty of cognition, but are not therefore useless or to be dispensed with.
|
Kant
| 27
| 5.26
| 62.96
| 17
| 5
| 1
| 4
| 3
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 2
| 2
|
0
|
For they serve as regulative principles; partly to check the dangerous pretensions of Understanding, as if it had thereby confined within these bounds the possibility of all things in general; and partly to lead it to the consideration of nature according to a principle of completeness, although it can never attain to this, and thus to further the final design of all knowledge.
|
Kant
| 63
| 5.03
| 61.9
| 39
| 4
| 5
| 11
| 1
| 9
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 4
| 0
| 12
| 4
| 3
| 8
|
0
|
It was then properly the Understanding which has its special realm in the cognitive faculty, so far as it contains constitutive principles of cognition a priori, which by the Critique, comprehensively called the Critique of pure Reason, was to be placed in certain and sole possession against all other competitors.
|
Kant
| 50
| 5.3
| 54
| 27
| 7
| 5
| 6
| 4
| 8
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 3
| 7
| 2
| 1
| 3
|
0
|
And so also to Reason, which contains constitutive principles a priori nowhere except simply in respect of the faculty of desire, should be assigned its place in the Critique of practical Reason.
|
Kant
| 32
| 5.09
| 56.25
| 18
| 2
| 4
| 6
| 1
| 5
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
Whether now the Judgement, which in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason, has also principles a priori for itself; whether these are constitutive or merely regulative; and whether they give a rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as the mediating link between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire; these are the questions with which the present Critique of Judgement is concerned.
|
Kant
| 75
| 5.13
| 60
| 45
| 5
| 3
| 10
| 4
| 17
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 5
| 4
| 2
| 16
| 2
| 0
| 6
|
0
|
A Critique of pure Reason, i.e. of our faculty of judging a priori according to principles, would be incomplete, if the Judgement, which as a cognitive faculty also makes claim to such principles, were not treated as a particular part of it; although its principles in a system of pure Philosophy need form no particular part between the theoretical and the practical, but can be annexed when needful to one or both as occasion requires.
|
Kant
| 75
| 4.8
| 58.67
| 44
| 10
| 2
| 10
| 3
| 13
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 5
| 2
| 12
| 1
| 1
| 10
|
0
|
For if such a system is one day to be completed under the general name of Metaphysic, the soil for the edifice must be explored by Criticism as deep down as the foundation of the faculty of principles independent of experience, in order that it may sink in no part, for this would inevitably bring about the downfall of the whole.
|
Kant
| 61
| 4.41
| 67.21
| 41
| 2
| 4
| 13
| 3
| 11
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 14
| 1
| 1
| 7
|
0
|
We can easily infer from the nature of the Judgement, that it must be attended with great difficulties to find a principle peculiar to it;.
|
Kant
| 25
| 4.56
| 60
| 15
| 2
| 1
| 4
| 1
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 3
| 3
| 1
| 5
|
0
|
This principle must not be derived a priori from concepts, for these belong to the Understanding, and Judgement is only concerned with their application.
|
Kant
| 24
| 5.38
| 62.5
| 15
| 1
| 1
| 4
| 2
| 5
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 4
| 0
| 1
| 3
|
0
|
It must, therefore, furnish of itself a concept, through which, properly speaking, no thing is cognised, but which only serves as a rule, though not an objective one to which it can adapt its judgement; because for this latter another faculty of Judgement would be requisite, in order to be able to distinguish whether is or is not the case for the rule.
|
Kant
| 63
| 4.62
| 69.84
| 44
| 6
| 3
| 6
| 5
| 12
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 4
| 1
| 9
| 3
| 5
| 7
|
0
|
This perplexity about a principle presents itself mainly in those judgements that we call aesthetical, which concern the Beautiful and the Sublime of Nature or of Art.
|
Kant
| 27
| 5.19
| 59.26
| 16
| 2
| 1
| 4
| 0
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 1
| 6
| 2
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
And, nevertheless, the critical investigation of a principle of Judgement in these is the most important part in a Critique of this faculty.
|
Kant
| 23
| 5.09
| 69.57
| 16
| 2
| 2
| 5
| 1
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
And so, though in this case such a principle a priori can and must be applied to the cognition of the beings of the world, and opens out at the same time prospects which are advantageous for the practical Reason, yet it has no immediate reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain.
|
Kant
| 53
| 4.34
| 66.04
| 35
| 4
| 1
| 9
| 3
| 11
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 5
| 1
| 0
| 12
| 1
| 0
| 4
|
0
|
But this reference is precisely the puzzle in the principle of Judgement, which renders a special section for this faculty necessary in the Critique; since the logical judging according to concepts along with their critical limitation, has at all events been capable of being appended to the theoretical part of Philosophy.
|
Kant
| 51
| 5.33
| 56.86
| 29
| 6
| 1
| 11
| 4
| 11
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 2
| 11
| 0
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
The examination of the faculty of taste, as the aesthetical Judgement, is not here planned in reference to the formation or the culture of taste, but merely in a transcendental point of view.
|
Kant
| 33
| 4.79
| 57.58
| 19
| 2
| 2
| 7
| 1
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 1
| 1
| 9
| 0
| 1
| 1
|
0
|
Hence, I trust that as regards the deficiency of the former purpose it will be judged with indulgence, though in the latter point of view it must be prepared for the severest scrutiny.
|
Kant
| 33
| 4.58
| 66.67
| 22
| 3
| 1
| 5
| 2
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 6
| 3
| 0
| 6
|
0
|
But I hope that the great difficulty of solving a problem so involved by nature may serve as excuse for some hardly avoidable obscurity in its solution, if only it be clearly established that the principle is correctly stated.
|
Kant
| 39
| 4.79
| 53.85
| 21
| 2
| 5
| 4
| 2
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 4
| 0
| 7
| 2
| 0
| 7
|
0
|
I grant that the mode of deriving the phenomena of the Judgement from it has not all the clearness which might be rightly demanded elsewhere, viz.
|
Kant
| 26
| 4.62
| 65.38
| 17
| 0
| 2
| 3
| 2
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 4
| 2
| 1
| 4
|
0
|
in the case of cognition according to concepts; but I believe that I have attained to it in the second part of this work.
|
Kant
| 24
| 4.04
| 66.67
| 16
| 1
| 0
| 6
| 1
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 5
| 3
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
Here then I end my whole critical undertaking.
|
Kant
| 8
| 4.75
| 62.5
| 5
| 2
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
I shall proceed without delay to the doctrinal in order to profit, as far as is possible, by the more favourable moments of my increasing years.
|
Kant
| 26
| 4.54
| 53.85
| 14
| 3
| 3
| 5
| 1
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 4
| 1
| 1
| 4
|
0
|
It is obvious that in this there will be no special section for the Judgement, because in respect of this faculty Criticism serves instead of Theory; but, according to the division of Philosophy into theoretical and practical, the Metaphysic of Nature and of Morals will complete the undertaking.
|
Kant
| 48
| 5.17
| 58.33
| 28
| 4
| 1
| 10
| 2
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 2
| 5
| 7
| 2
| 0
| 5
|
0
|
We proceed quite correctly if, as usual, we divide Philosophy, as containing the principles of the rational cognition of things by means of concepts, into theoretical and practical.
|
Kant
| 28
| 5.46
| 50
| 14
| 4
| 2
| 5
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 5
| 2
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
But then the concepts, which furnish their Object to the principles of this rational cognition, must be specifically distinct; otherwise they would not justify a division, which always presupposes a contrast between the principles of the rational cognition belonging to the different parts of a science.
|
Kant
| 46
| 5.59
| 58.7
| 27
| 4
| 4
| 6
| 1
| 12
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 10
| 1
| 1
| 6
|
0
|
Now there are only two kinds of concepts, and these admit as many distinct principles of the possibility of their objects, viz.
|
Kant
| 22
| 4.77
| 63.64
| 14
| 2
| 2
| 3
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 5
| 1
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
natural concepts and the concept of freedom.
|
Kant
| 7
| 5.29
| 42.86
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
The former render possible theoretical cognition according to principles a priori; the latter in respect of this theoretical cognition only supplies in itself a negative principle, but on the other hand it furnishes fundamental propositions which extend the sphere of the determination of the will and are therefore called practical.
|
Kant
| 50
| 5.66
| 56
| 28
| 9
| 2
| 7
| 1
| 10
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 11
| 2
| 0
| 5
|
0
|
Thus Philosophy is correctly divided into two parts, quite distinct in their principles; the theoretical part or Natural Philosophy, and the practical part or Moral Philosophy.
|
Kant
| 26
| 5.77
| 53.85
| 14
| 3
| 3
| 2
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 5
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
But up to the present a gross misuse of these expressions has prevailed, both in the division of the different principles and consequently also of Philosophy itself.
|
Kant
| 27
| 5.11
| 62.96
| 17
| 3
| 2
| 6
| 1
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 5
| 1
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
For what is practical according to natural concepts has been identified with the practical according to the concept of freedom; and so with the like titles, theoretical and practical Philosophy, a division has been made, by which in fact nothing has been divided.
|
Kant
| 43
| 5.12
| 60.47
| 26
| 6
| 1
| 8
| 7
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 1
| 6
| 2
| 0
| 5
|
0
|
The will, regarded as the faculty of desire, is one of the many natural causes in the world, viz.
|
Kant
| 19
| 4.11
| 63.16
| 12
| 2
| 0
| 4
| 1
| 4
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
that cause which acts in accordance with concepts.
|
Kant
| 8
| 5.25
| 50
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
All that is represented as possible by means of a will is called practically possible; as distinguished from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect, whose cause is not determined to causality by concepts.
|
Kant
| 35
| 5.17
| 57.14
| 20
| 3
| 1
| 6
| 3
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 8
| 0
| 1
| 4
|
0
|
Here, in respect of the practical, it is left undetermined whether the concept which gives the rule to the causality of the will, is a natural concept or a concept of freedom.
|
Kant
| 32
| 4.47
| 62.5
| 20
| 3
| 1
| 5
| 2
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 8
| 1
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
But the last distinction is essential.
|
Kant
| 6
| 5.33
| 66.67
| 4
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
For if the concept which determines the causality is a natural concept, then the principles are technically practical; whereas, if it is a concept of freedom they are morally practical.
|
Kant
| 30
| 5.17
| 60
| 18
| 3
| 3
| 2
| 4
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 6
| 2
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
And as the division of a rational science depends on the distinction between objects whose cognition needs distinct principles, the former will belong to theoretical Philosophy, but the latter alone will constitute the second part, viz.
|
Kant
| 36
| 5.56
| 55.56
| 20
| 6
| 1
| 4
| 0
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 1
| 0
| 9
| 0
| 0
| 6
|
0
|
All technically practical rules, so far as their principles rest on concepts, must be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical Philosophy.
|
Kant
| 21
| 5.71
| 47.62
| 10
| 2
| 4
| 2
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
For they concern only the possibility of things according to natural concepts, to which belong not only the means which are to be met with in nature, but also the will itself, so far as it can be determined conformably to these rules by natural motives.
|
Kant
| 46
| 4.5
| 65.22
| 30
| 2
| 6
| 7
| 3
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 9
| 3
| 3
| 5
|
0
|
However, practical rules of this kind are not called laws, but only precepts; because the will does not stand merely under the natural concept, but also under the concept of freedom, in relation to which its principles are called laws.
|
Kant
| 40
| 4.88
| 60
| 24
| 2
| 4
| 5
| 3
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 1
| 0
| 11
| 0
| 3
| 3
|
0
|
These with their consequences alone constitute the second or practical part of Philosophy.
|
Kant
| 13
| 5.92
| 61.54
| 8
| 2
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
The solution of the problems of pure geometry does not belong to a particular part of the science; mensuration does not deserve the name of practical, in contrast to pure, geometry, as a second part of geometry in general; and just as little ought the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or observation to be reckoned as a practical part of the doctrine of Nature.
|
Kant
| 65
| 4.68
| 58.46
| 38
| 9
| 2
| 12
| 3
| 9
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 2
| 1
| 17
| 0
| 3
| 4
|
0
|
Just as little, in fine, ought housekeeping, farming, statesmanship, the art of conversation, the prescribing of diet, the universal doctrine of happiness itself, or the curbing of the inclinations and checking of the affections for the sake of happiness, to be reckoned as practical Philosophy, or taken to constitute the second part of Philosophy in general.
|
Kant
| 56
| 5.43
| 51.79
| 29
| 5
| 2
| 10
| 1
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 1
| 18
| 1
| 2
| 4
|
0
|
For all these contain only rules of skill for bringing about an effect that is possible according to the natural concepts of causes and effects, which, since they belong to theoretical Philosophy, are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries from it viz.
|
Kant
| 43
| 5.02
| 55.81
| 24
| 6
| 0
| 9
| 2
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 9
| 2
| 0
| 5
|
0
|
natural science, and can therefore claim no place in a special Philosophy called practical.
|
Kant
| 14
| 5.5
| 42.86
| 6
| 2
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
On the other hand, the morally practical precepts, which are altogether based on the concept of freedom to the complete exclusion of the natural determining grounds of the will, constitute a quite special class.
|
Kant
| 34
| 5.21
| 52.94
| 18
| 5
| 3
| 6
| 1
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
These, like the rules which nature obeys, are called simply laws, but they do not, like them, rest on sensuous conditions but on a supersensible principle; and accordingly they require for themselves a quite different part of Philosophy, called practical, corresponding to its theoretical part.
|
Kant
| 45
| 5.53
| 53.33
| 24
| 5
| 3
| 5
| 2
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 2
| 1
| 7
| 4
| 1
| 6
|
0
|
We hence see that a complex of practical precepts given by Philosophy does not constitute a distinct part of Philosophy, as opposed to the theoretical part, because these precepts are practical; for they might be that, even if their principles were derived altogether from the theoretical cognition of nature.
|
Kant
| 49
| 5.31
| 63.27
| 31
| 5
| 3
| 7
| 4
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 4
| 2
| 8
| 2
| 1
| 6
|
0
|
if their principle, as it is not borrowed from the natural concept, which is always sensuously conditioned, rests on the supersensible, which alone makes the concept of freedom cognisable by formal laws.
|
Kant
| 32
| 5.34
| 56.25
| 18
| 4
| 3
| 4
| 2
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 5
| 1
| 1
| 4
|
0
|
These precepts are then morally practical, i.e. not merely precepts or rules in this or that aspect, but, without any preceding reference to purposes and designs, are laws.
|
Kant
| 28
| 5.07
| 53.57
| 15
| 1
| 3
| 3
| 2
| 4
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 8
| 0
| 1
| 1
|
0
|
So far as our concepts have a priori application, so far extends the use of our cognitive faculty according to principles, and with it Philosophy.
|
Kant
| 25
| 4.84
| 52
| 13
| 2
| 4
| 3
| 1
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 5
| 1
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
But the complex of all objects, to which those concepts are referred, in order to bring about a knowledge of them where it is possible, may be subdivided according to the adequacy or inadequacy of our faculty to this design.
|
Kant
| 40
| 4.6
| 65
| 26
| 1
| 1
| 7
| 3
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 9
| 2
| 2
| 5
|
0
|
Concepts, so far as they are referred to objects, independently of the possibility or impossibility of the cognition of these objects, have their field which is determined merely according to the relation that their Object has to our cognitive faculty in general.
|
Kant
| 42
| 5.26
| 57.14
| 24
| 2
| 4
| 7
| 4
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 10
| 1
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
The part of this field in which knowledge is possible for us is a ground or territory for these concepts and the requisite cognitive faculty.
|
Kant
| 25
| 4.64
| 64
| 16
| 3
| 0
| 4
| 2
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 7
| 1
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
The part of this territory, where they are legislative, is the realm of these concepts and of the corresponding cognitive faculties.
|
Kant
| 21
| 5.29
| 66.67
| 14
| 2
| 1
| 3
| 2
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 5
| 1
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
Empirical concepts have, therefore, their territory in nature, as the complex of all objects of sense, but no realm, only a dwelling-place; for though they are produced in conformity to law they are not legislative, but the rules based on them are empirical and consequently contingent.
|
Kant
| 46
| 5.22
| 60.87
| 28
| 4
| 3
| 7
| 4
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 2
| 0
| 12
| 3
| 1
| 2
|
0
|
Our whole cognitive faculty has two realms, that of natural concepts and that of the concept of freedom; for through both it is legislative a priori.
|
Kant
| 26
| 4.73
| 65.38
| 17
| 4
| 0
| 5
| 2
| 5
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 6
| 1
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
In accordance with this, Philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical.
|
Kant
| 11
| 6.09
| 54.55
| 6
| 2
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
But the territory to which its realm extends and in which its legislation is exercised, is always only the complex of objects of all possible experience, so long as they are taken for nothing more than mere phenomena; for otherwise no legislation of the Understanding in respect of them is conceivable.
|
Kant
| 51
| 4.92
| 66.67
| 34
| 4
| 5
| 8
| 4
| 9
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 2
| 0
| 10
| 3
| 1
| 3
|
0
|
Legislation through natural concepts is carried on by means of the Understanding and is theoretical.
|
Kant
| 15
| 5.67
| 53.33
| 8
| 2
| 0
| 4
| 2
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
Legislation through the concept of freedom is carried on by the Reason and is merely practical.
|
Kant
| 16
| 4.94
| 56.25
| 9
| 1
| 1
| 4
| 2
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
It is only in the practical that the Reason can be legislative; in respect of theoretical cognition it can merely deduce from given laws consequences which always remain within nature.
|
Kant
| 30
| 5.13
| 56.67
| 17
| 3
| 3
| 5
| 2
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 6
| 2
| 0
| 5
|
0
|
But on the other hand, Reason is not always therefore legislative, where there are practical rules, for they may be only technically practical.
|
Kant
| 23
| 5.22
| 69.57
| 16
| 4
| 5
| 2
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 2
| 1
| 1
|
0
|
Understanding and Reason exercise, therefore, two distinct legislations in regard to one and the same territory of experience, without prejudice to each other.
|
Kant
| 23
| 5.91
| 60.87
| 14
| 3
| 1
| 5
| 0
| 2
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
The concept of freedom as little disturbs the legislation of nature, as the natural concept influences the legislation through the former.--The possibility of at least thinking without contradiction the co-existence of both legislations, and of the corresponding faculties in the same subject, has been shown in the Critique of pure Reason; for it annulled the objections on the other side by exposing the dialectical illusion which they contain.
|
Kant
| 68
| 5.54
| 57.35
| 39
| 7
| 1
| 14
| 2
| 14
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 2
| 18
| 2
| 0
| 8
|
0
|
These two different realms then do not limit each other in their legislation, though they perpetually do so in the world of sense.
|
Kant
| 23
| 4.65
| 69.57
| 16
| 2
| 3
| 3
| 2
| 4
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 4
| 1
| 1
| 1
|
0
|
That they do not constitute one realm, arises from this, that the natural concept represents its objects in intuition, not as things in themselves, but as mere phenomena; the concept of freedom, on the other hand, represents in its Object a thing in itself, but not in intuition.
|
Kant
| 48
| 4.81
| 62.5
| 30
| 3
| 0
| 8
| 1
| 7
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 4
| 1
| 11
| 3
| 3
| 4
|
0
|
Hence, neither of them can furnish a theoretical knowledge of its Object as a thing in itself; this would be the supersensible, the Idea of which we must indeed make the basis of the possibility of all these objects of experience, but which we can never extend or elevate into a cognition.
|
Kant
| 52
| 4.56
| 73.08
| 38
| 2
| 3
| 8
| 1
| 14
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 1
| 1
| 8
| 4
| 0
| 8
|
0
|
There is, then, an unbounded but also inaccessible field for our whole cognitive faculty--the field of the supersensible--wherein we find no territory, and, therefore, can have in it, for theoretical cognition, no realm either for concepts of Understanding or Reason.
|
Kant
| 40
| 5.68
| 62.5
| 25
| 6
| 4
| 6
| 2
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 9
| 3
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
This field we must indeed occupy with Ideas on behalf of the theoretical as well as the practical use of Reason, but we can supply to them in reference to the laws from the concept of freedom no other than practical reality, by which our theoretical cognition is not extended in the slightest degree towards the supersensible.
|
Kant
| 57
| 4.72
| 63.16
| 36
| 7
| 3
| 12
| 1
| 10
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 1
| 11
| 3
| 1
| 5
|
0
|
Now even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom, so that no transition is possible from the first to the second, just as if they were two different worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the second, yet the second is meant to have an influence upon the first.
|
Kant
| 69
| 4.43
| 69.57
| 48
| 11
| 3
| 8
| 6
| 15
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 7
| 0
| 11
| 1
| 1
| 3
|
0
|
The Critique of the cognitive faculties, as regards what they can furnish a priori, has properly speaking no realm in respect of Objects, because it is not a doctrine, but only has to investigate whether and how, in accordance with the state of these faculties, a doctrine is possible by their means.
|
Kant
| 52
| 4.77
| 63.46
| 33
| 2
| 3
| 7
| 4
| 9
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 3
| 0
| 11
| 3
| 2
| 5
|
0
|
Its field extends to all their pretensions, in order to confine them within their legitimate bounds.
|
Kant
| 16
| 5.25
| 56.25
| 9
| 1
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 4
| 1
| 1
| 2
|
0
|
But what cannot enter into the division of Philosophy may yet enter, as a chief part, into the Critique of the pure faculty of cognition in general, viz.
|
Kant
| 28
| 4.46
| 60.71
| 17
| 3
| 1
| 6
| 0
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 5
| 1
| 1
| 5
|
0
|
if it contains principles which are available neither for theoretical nor for practical use.
|
Kant
| 14
| 5.57
| 57.14
| 8
| 3
| 0
| 2
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 1
| 0
| 2
| 1
| 0
| 1
|
0
|
The natural concepts, which contain the ground of all theoretical knowledge a priori, rest on the legislation of the Understanding.--The concept of freedom, which contains the ground of all sensuously-unconditioned practical precepts a priori, rests on the legislation of the Reason.
|
Kant
| 41
| 5.88
| 48.78
| 20
| 3
| 1
| 7
| 0
| 12
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 11
| 0
| 0
| 4
|
0
|
Both faculties, therefore, besides being capable of application as regards their logical form to principles of whatever origin, have also as regards their content, their special legislations above which there is no other; and hence the division of Philosophy into theoretical and practical is justified.
|
Kant
| 45
| 5.73
| 62.22
| 28
| 7
| 3
| 6
| 4
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 3
| 1
| 8
| 1
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
But in the family of the higher cognitive faculties there is a middle term between the Understanding and the Reason.
|
Kant
| 20
| 4.8
| 60
| 12
| 3
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 1
| 4
| 1
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
This is the Judgement, of which we have cause for supposing according to analogy that it may contain in itself, if not a special legislation, yet a special principle of its own to be sought according to laws, though merely subjective a priori.
|
Kant
| 43
| 4.65
| 62.79
| 27
| 4
| 1
| 6
| 3
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 6
| 3
| 2
| 6
|
0
|
This principle, even if it have no field of objects as its realm, yet may have somewhere a territory with a certain character, for which no other principle can be valid.
|
Kant
| 31
| 4.45
| 70.97
| 22
| 3
| 2
| 3
| 3
| 7
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 7
| 1
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
But besides there is a new ground for bringing the Judgement into connexion with another arrangement of our representative faculties, which seems to be of even greater importance than that of its relationship with the family of the cognitive faculties.
|
Kant
| 40
| 5.3
| 65
| 26
| 4
| 1
| 8
| 2
| 9
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 1
| 8
| 1
| 1
| 2
|
0
|
For all faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three, which cannot be any further derived from one common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire.
|
Kant
| 38
| 4.66
| 63.16
| 24
| 1
| 1
| 7
| 2
| 7
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 3
| 0
| 0
| 11
| 0
| 1
| 4
|
0
|
For the faculty of knowledge the Understanding is alone legislative, if this faculty is referred to nature as the faculty of theoretical knowledge; for in respect of nature it is alone possible for us to give laws by means of natural concepts a priori, i.e. by pure concepts of Understanding.--For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty according to the concept of freedom, the Reason is alone a priori legislative.--Now between the faculties of knowledge and desire there is the feeling of pleasure, just as the Judgement is intermediate between the Understanding and the Reason.
|
Kant
| 96
| 5.04
| 57.29
| 55
| 7
| 4
| 19
| 6
| 14
| 0
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 4
| 2
| 26
| 3
| 1
| 3
|
0
|
We may therefore suppose provisionally that the Judgement likewise contains in itself an a priori principle.
|
Kant
| 16
| 5.75
| 56.25
| 9
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 2
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
And as pleasure or pain is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire, we may also suppose that the Judgement will bring about a transition from the pure faculty of knowledge, the realm of natural concepts, to the realm of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from Understanding to Reason.
|
Kant
| 59
| 4.78
| 55.93
| 33
| 4
| 3
| 12
| 1
| 9
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 3
| 1
| 15
| 2
| 0
| 7
|
0
|
A A PRIORI Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the Universal.
|
Kant
| 18
| 4.94
| 55.56
| 10
| 3
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
If the universal be given, the Judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant.
|
Kant
| 15
| 5.33
| 60
| 9
| 2
| 0
| 1
| 2
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
But if only the particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the Judgement is merely reflective.
|
Kant
| 20
| 4.6
| 65
| 13
| 2
| 2
| 1
| 4
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 1
| 2
|
0
|
The determinant Judgement only subsumes under universal transcendental laws given by the Understanding; the law is marked out for it, a priori, and it has therefore no need to seek a law for itself in order to be able to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal.--But the forms of nature are so manifold, and there are so many modifications of the universal transcendental natural concepts left undetermined by the laws given, a priori, by the pure Understanding,--because these only concern the possibility of a nature in general,--that there must be laws for these also.
|
Kant
| 96
| 5.08
| 58.33
| 56
| 13
| 5
| 15
| 6
| 17
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 4
| 16
| 5
| 3
| 8
|
0
|
These, as empirical, may be contingent from the point of view of our Understanding, and yet, if they are to be called laws, they must be regarded as necessary in virtue of a principle of the unity of the manifold, though it be unknown to us.--The reflective Judgement, which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires on that account a principle that it cannot borrow from experience, because its function is to establish the unity of all empirical principles under higher ones, and hence to establish the possibility of their systematic subordination.
|
Kant
| 98
| 4.98
| 61.22
| 60
| 9
| 2
| 16
| 7
| 16
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 6
| 2
| 19
| 4
| 5
| 11
|
0
|
Such a transcendental principle, then, the reflective Judgement can only give as a law from and to itself.
|
Kant
| 18
| 4.89
| 72.22
| 13
| 2
| 2
| 2
| 0
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 0
| 2
|
0
|
It cannot derive it from outside; nor can it prescribe it to nature, because reflection upon the laws of nature adjusts itself by nature, and not nature by the conditions according to which we attempt to arrive at a concept of it which is quite contingent in respect of these.
|
Kant
| 50
| 4.52
| 66
| 33
| 1
| 2
| 10
| 1
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 2
| 0
| 9
| 7
| 3
| 8
|
0
|
This principle can be no other than the following: As universal laws of nature have their ground in our Understanding, which prescribes them to nature; so particular empirical laws, in respect of what is in them left undetermined by these universal laws, must be considered in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an Understanding had furnished them to our cognitive faculties, so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature.
|
Kant
| 80
| 4.96
| 61.25
| 49
| 9
| 0
| 13
| 6
| 12
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 6
| 0
| 17
| 5
| 1
| 10
|
0
|
Not as if, in this way, such an Understanding must be assumed as actual; but this faculty thus gives a law only to itself and not to nature.
|
Kant
| 28
| 4
| 71.43
| 20
| 1
| 2
| 3
| 1
| 5
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 3
| 0
| 5
| 1
| 2
| 3
|
0
|
Now the concept of an Object, so far as it contains the ground of the actuality of this Object, is the purpose; and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things, which is only possible according to purposes, is called the purposiveness of its form.
|
Kant
| 47
| 4.55
| 61.7
| 29
| 1
| 4
| 8
| 3
| 12
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 1
| 1
| 2
| 11
| 1
| 0
| 3
|
0
|
Thus the principle of Judgement, in respect of the form of things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the purposiveness of nature in its manifoldness.
|
Kant
| 26
| 5.12
| 53.85
| 14
| 1
| 2
| 8
| 1
| 4
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 0
|
0
|
That is, nature is represented by means of this concept, as if an Understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.
|
Kant
| 27
| 4.63
| 59.26
| 16
| 1
| 2
| 5
| 1
| 6
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 0
| 2
| 0
| 8
| 0
| 0
| 2
|
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