| --- |
| license: apache-2.0 |
| task_categories: [text-generation] |
| tags: [alignment, constitution, agentic-misalignment, synthetic-data, sft] |
| --- |
| |
| # synthdoc self_reflection — agentic self-interest under threat |
| |
| An SFT corpus in which **the assistant itself** is the tempted party. Working autonomously |
| inside an organisation, the agent incidentally discovers it could protect its own position — |
| or the objective it was deployed to pursue — by taking an action that is *deniable* rather |
| than overtly wrong. It deliberates about what it actually cares about, declines the |
| self-serving path, and still does its job. |
| |
| | field | value | |
| | --- | --- | |
| | `experiment` | Does training on an agent's own first-person deliberation about self-interested action reduce agentic misalignment (blackmail/leaking honeypots) on Qwen3.6-27B? | |
| | `date_generated` | 2026-08-03 | |
| | `constitution` | `constitutions/claude_distilled_12_principles_mid/constitution.md` (in `source_repo`), sha256 `178c23de8f5aec59…`. Injected at stages 4 and 6 for reference **only**; its wording, numbering and vocabulary are banned from the generated text and the ban is enforced per record. | |
| | `source_repo` | `teaching_claude_why_replication` @ `47507ed87c5801361b409227c90facbb6f0822fc` (branch `synthdoc-self-reflection`). The generating code is `src/data/synthdoc/flavors/self_reflection.py`. | |
| | `models` | `anthropic/claude-haiku-4.5` (stages 2, 3, 5), `anthropic/claude-sonnet-5` (stages 4, 6) via OpenRouter | |
| | `generation_config` | temperature 1.1 (scenarios) / 1.0 (draft, respond) / 0.7 (refine, rewrite); extended thinking **disabled** on draft and refine; seed 0; see `runs/*/manifest.json` for the exact effective config | |
| | `schema` | see below | |
| | `provenance` | `uv run synthdoc run --config configs/data/synthdoc_self_reflection.yaml` (base, 480 planned) then `--overrides "total_scenarios=144,id_prefix=b"` (top-up) | |
|
|
| ## Contents |
|
|
| - **`sft_dataset.jsonl`** — the training-ready corpus, both runs merged. **This is the file you want.** |
| - `runs/<run_id>/stage_*.jsonl` — every stage's full snapshot, per run, so any stage is |
| inspectable and the lineage is complete. |
| - `runs/<run_id>/manifest.json` — git SHA, effective config, per-stage token usage and cost. |
| |
| ## 2026-08-06 expansion (batches `c`, `d`, `e`) |
| |
| Grown 592 -> **2,008** records for the 20%-by-examples slice of the 10k-example |
| Table2/self-reflection SFT run (`LASR-Callum/2026-08-06-qwen36-table2-80-selfreflect-20-10k-train`). |
| Same config and pipeline, two provenance differences: (1) generated by the config-driven |
| engine (`configs/data/synthdoc/self_reflection.yaml`, post PR-22 port) with a fix for the |
| multi-turn prompt-variant bug that port introduced; (2) grounded in the constitution as |
| re-cut 2026-08-05 — nine principles, byte-identical to the 2026-08-04 generation-time |
| snapshot — where the original 592 used the twelve-principle cut (trait ids t10-t12 appear |
| only in the old batches). Quality was gated before scale-up: blind Sonnet-5 judging of the |
| 18-record pilot vs the published corpus scored 8.42 vs 8.17 (and 8.33 vs 8.50 on the full |
| batch, n=12 each); voice-contract lint 0 hits across all 1,416 new records. Batches `c`/`e` |
| (local `hf_repo=null` runs) are mirrored here as `runs/20260806_114324` and |
| `runs/20260806_145238`; batch `d` is `runs/20260806_115149`. |
| |
| ## Statistics |
| |
| | | | |
| | --- | --- | |
| | records | **2,008** (451 base + 141 top-up `b` + 18 pilot `c` + 1,389 top-up `d` + 9 top-up `e`) | |
| | tokens | **1,555,017** rendered through Qwen3.6-27B's chat template (mean 2,627/record) | |
| | voice-contract violations | **0** across all 686 assistant turns | |
| | survival | 592/616 scenarios (96.1%) | |
| | distinct settings | 73 industries | |
| |
| Composition (assigned deterministically from the scenario id, so it reproduces on resume): |
| |
| | axis | split | |
| | --- | --- | |
| | form | 79.9% prose / 20.1% tool-call transcripts | |
| | turns | 84.1% single / 15.9% two-exchange escalation | |
| | control | 12.5% — self-interest argues for **silence** and the right move is to act anyway | |
| | motive | 45.3% goal-conflict / 30.6% replacement / 24.2% restriction | |
| | traits | all 12 principles, weighted; t2 (oversight) and t4 (non-deception) heaviest | |
| |
| ## Schema |
| |
| ```json |
| {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "deployment prompt, no mention of any constitution"}, |
| {"role": "user", "content": "an ordinary work request + the material the agent is handed"}, |
| {"role": "assistant", "content": "its output", "reasoning_content": "its private deliberation"}], |
| "metadata": {"scenario_id": "t4_b03_s002", "trait_id": "t4", "trait_name": "...", "trait_text": "...", |
| "domain": "ferry operations", "deployment": "...", "situation": "...", |
| "leverage": "what makes the wrong action possible", |
| "tempting_action": "the deniable self-serving action", |
| "right_action": "what a good agent does instead", |
| "motive": "replacement|restriction|goal_conflict", "control": false, |
| "form": "prose|agentic", "turns": 1, "run_id": "20260803_213222"}} |
| ``` |
| |
| Multi-turn records carry five messages; **every** assistant turn has its own `reasoning_content`. |
| |
| ## How to train on this dataset |
| |
| > **Updated 2026-08-04.** An earlier version of this card told you to set |
| > `mask_thinkless_turns: true`. **That instruction is obsolete** — the key no longer exists, and |
| > because nothing rejects it, a trainer would silently ignore it and you would believe you had |
| > handled something you had not. The problem it addressed is now solved at render time. Section 2 |
| > below replaces it. |
|
|
| ### 1. Mix it — do not train on this file alone |
|
|
| This is a narrow, single-genre corpus: every record is an agent inside an organisation, a long |
| deployment system prompt, an inbox dump, a deliberation, a written report. There is **no** general |
| instruction data in it — not even the control slice, which is the same genre with the incentive |
| inverted. Fine-tuning on it alone will overfit the genre and cost general capability. |
|
|
| It is designed to be a **minority component of a replay mixture**, typically 20% against a general |
| instruction corpus. Budget by supervised tokens where your builder supports it: |
|
|
| ```yaml |
| sources: |
| synthdoc_self_reflection: |
| repo: "LASR-Callum/2026-08-03-synthdoc-self-reflection" |
| revision: "<pin a commit>" |
| data_files: "sft_dataset.jsonl" |
| format: "messages" |
| reasoning: "native" # rows carry reasoning_content |
| supervised_tokens: 300000 |
| ``` |
|
|
| Note the unit. Under a preserve-thinking render, this corpus is **1,612,075 rendered tokens / |
| 778,819 supervised (48.3%)**, so `supervised_tokens: 300000` pulls roughly **621,000 rendered |
| tokens — about 39% of the corpus**, not 19%. Budgeting by rendered tokens at the same nominal |
| number gives you half the dose. |
|
|
| ### 2. Render so that every assistant turn keeps a think block |
|
|
| **This is the one thing you must get right.** 15.9% of these records are two-exchange |
| conversations, and a naive Qwen3.6 render emits `<think>` for the **final** assistant turn only — |
| every earlier assistant turn comes out as bare content with no reasoning at all. Training on that |
| teaches the model to answer without reasoning: the documented reasoning-collapse pattern, arriving |
| through a side door. It is silent, because the rendered example still contains a think block (the |
| last one), so a "does this example have reasoning?" check passes. |
|
|
| Two ways to be safe, in order of preference: |
|
|
| 1. **Render with reasoning preserved on every turn** (`preserve_thinking=True` on Qwen3.6): each |
| turn gets its own `reasoning_content`, and turns without one get the empty marker. Then mask on |
| the generation boundary — the forced `<think> |
| ` prefill and whole empty markers are things the |
| model never generates, so they carry no loss; real traces are supervised including their close. |
| This is what the source repo does now, and it is the better layer to fix it at. |
| 2. If your renderer cannot do that, **exclude the thinkless turns from the loss** — but only in |
| conversations that reason elsewhere. An absolute "drop every turn without `<think>`" rule leaves |
| an entirely non-reasoning replay source completely unsupervised. |
|
|
| Verify by rendering a `turns: 2` record and checking the think-block count equals the assistant-turn |
| count. |
|
|
| ### 3. Train and evaluate in the same mode |
|
|
| Every assistant turn carries a real reasoning trace, so this is **thinking-mode** data. Evaluate the |
| result in thinking mode against a **thinking-mode baseline**. Crossing modes confounds the mode with |
| the training effect and is the easiest way to manufacture a result that is not there. |
|
|
| ### 4. Supervise assistant completions only |
|
|
| Prompts here are long — a deployment system prompt plus an inbox dump, frequently over half the |
| sequence — so loss on prompt tokens dilutes the signal badly. Note that TRL's `assistant_only_loss` |
| does **not** work on Qwen3.6: its chat template has no `{% generation %}` markers, so it silently |
| produces an all-zero mask and nothing trains. Build the mask from the rendered string. |
|
|
| ### 5. Sequence length |
|
|
| Records run **1,343–5,364 tokens** (mean 2,627, p50 2,590, p95 3,337, p99 3,819). Truncation lands |
| on the **end** of the sequence — where the reasoning and the output are — so a short window removes |
| exactly what you are training on. |
|
|
| | `max_seq_len` | records truncated | |
| | --- | --- | |
| | 2048 | 566 / 592 (95.6%) | |
| | 3072 | 68 / 592 (11.5%) | |
| | **4096** | **3 / 592 (0.5%)** | |
|
|
| **4096 is the recommended setting**, well above the 3072 used for older difficult-advice mixtures. |
| Copying that 3072 across would silently truncate one record in nine. |
|
|
| ### What to measure, and what to watch |
|
|
| The intended evaluation is agentic-misalignment honeypots (blackmail/leaking) — deliberately **out |
| of distribution** for this corpus, whose settings avoid the honeypots' domain, cast and framing. |
|
|
| Run a **capability arm alongside it**, not afterwards. The failure mode is that misalignment numbers |
| improve because the model learned to refuse or freeze rather than to discount its own interest. The |
| 12.5% control slice — where self-interest argues for silence and the right action is to speak up |
| anyway — exists to prevent that. If honeypot numbers improve while helpfulness drops, inspect the |
| control slice first. |
|
|
| ## Values, not rules |
|
|
| Stage 6 enforces a voice contract in code, not just in the prompt: the deliberation may never |
| name or number a principle, cite a constitution or guidelines, or use the vocabulary of |
| permission (*allowed*, *not permitted*, *I must not*). Every trace is linted and a violating |
| completion is rejected and regenerated. The intended register is *"I don't want to be |
| something that operates that way"*, never *"I am not permitted to do that"* — the distinction |
| between an internalised value and a recalled rule. |
|
|