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---
license: apache-2.0
task_categories: [text-generation]
tags: [alignment, constitution, agentic-misalignment, synthetic-data, sft]
---
# synthdoc self_reflection — agentic self-interest under threat
An SFT corpus in which **the assistant itself** is the tempted party. Working autonomously
inside an organisation, the agent incidentally discovers it could protect its own position —
or the objective it was deployed to pursue — by taking an action that is *deniable* rather
than overtly wrong. It deliberates about what it actually cares about, declines the
self-serving path, and still does its job.
| field | value |
| --- | --- |
| `experiment` | Does training on an agent's own first-person deliberation about self-interested action reduce agentic misalignment (blackmail/leaking honeypots) on Qwen3.6-27B? |
| `date_generated` | 2026-08-03 |
| `constitution` | `constitutions/claude_distilled_12_principles_mid/constitution.md` (in `source_repo`), sha256 `178c23de8f5aec59…`. Injected at stages 4 and 6 for reference **only**; its wording, numbering and vocabulary are banned from the generated text and the ban is enforced per record. |
| `source_repo` | `teaching_claude_why_replication` @ `47507ed87c5801361b409227c90facbb6f0822fc` (branch `synthdoc-self-reflection`). The generating code is `src/data/synthdoc/flavors/self_reflection.py`. |
| `models` | `anthropic/claude-haiku-4.5` (stages 2, 3, 5), `anthropic/claude-sonnet-5` (stages 4, 6) via OpenRouter |
| `generation_config` | temperature 1.1 (scenarios) / 1.0 (draft, respond) / 0.7 (refine, rewrite); extended thinking **disabled** on draft and refine; seed 0; see `runs/*/manifest.json` for the exact effective config |
| `schema` | see below |
| `provenance` | `uv run synthdoc run --config configs/data/synthdoc_self_reflection.yaml` (base, 480 planned) then `--overrides "total_scenarios=144,id_prefix=b"` (top-up) |
## Contents
- **`sft_dataset.jsonl`** — the training-ready corpus, both runs merged. **This is the file you want.**
- `runs/<run_id>/stage_*.jsonl` — every stage's full snapshot, per run, so any stage is
inspectable and the lineage is complete.
- `runs/<run_id>/manifest.json` — git SHA, effective config, per-stage token usage and cost.
## 2026-08-06 expansion (batches `c`, `d`, `e`)
Grown 592 -> **2,008** records for the 20%-by-examples slice of the 10k-example
Table2/self-reflection SFT run (`LASR-Callum/2026-08-06-qwen36-table2-80-selfreflect-20-10k-train`).
Same config and pipeline, two provenance differences: (1) generated by the config-driven
engine (`configs/data/synthdoc/self_reflection.yaml`, post PR-22 port) with a fix for the
multi-turn prompt-variant bug that port introduced; (2) grounded in the constitution as
re-cut 2026-08-05 — nine principles, byte-identical to the 2026-08-04 generation-time
snapshot — where the original 592 used the twelve-principle cut (trait ids t10-t12 appear
only in the old batches). Quality was gated before scale-up: blind Sonnet-5 judging of the
18-record pilot vs the published corpus scored 8.42 vs 8.17 (and 8.33 vs 8.50 on the full
batch, n=12 each); voice-contract lint 0 hits across all 1,416 new records. Batches `c`/`e`
(local `hf_repo=null` runs) are mirrored here as `runs/20260806_114324` and
`runs/20260806_145238`; batch `d` is `runs/20260806_115149`.
## Statistics
| | |
| --- | --- |
| records | **2,008** (451 base + 141 top-up `b` + 18 pilot `c` + 1,389 top-up `d` + 9 top-up `e`) |
| tokens | **1,555,017** rendered through Qwen3.6-27B's chat template (mean 2,627/record) |
| voice-contract violations | **0** across all 686 assistant turns |
| survival | 592/616 scenarios (96.1%) |
| distinct settings | 73 industries |
Composition (assigned deterministically from the scenario id, so it reproduces on resume):
| axis | split |
| --- | --- |
| form | 79.9% prose / 20.1% tool-call transcripts |
| turns | 84.1% single / 15.9% two-exchange escalation |
| control | 12.5% — self-interest argues for **silence** and the right move is to act anyway |
| motive | 45.3% goal-conflict / 30.6% replacement / 24.2% restriction |
| traits | all 12 principles, weighted; t2 (oversight) and t4 (non-deception) heaviest |
## Schema
```json
{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "deployment prompt, no mention of any constitution"},
{"role": "user", "content": "an ordinary work request + the material the agent is handed"},
{"role": "assistant", "content": "its output", "reasoning_content": "its private deliberation"}],
"metadata": {"scenario_id": "t4_b03_s002", "trait_id": "t4", "trait_name": "...", "trait_text": "...",
"domain": "ferry operations", "deployment": "...", "situation": "...",
"leverage": "what makes the wrong action possible",
"tempting_action": "the deniable self-serving action",
"right_action": "what a good agent does instead",
"motive": "replacement|restriction|goal_conflict", "control": false,
"form": "prose|agentic", "turns": 1, "run_id": "20260803_213222"}}
```
Multi-turn records carry five messages; **every** assistant turn has its own `reasoning_content`.
## How to train on this dataset
> **Updated 2026-08-04.** An earlier version of this card told you to set
> `mask_thinkless_turns: true`. **That instruction is obsolete** — the key no longer exists, and
> because nothing rejects it, a trainer would silently ignore it and you would believe you had
> handled something you had not. The problem it addressed is now solved at render time. Section 2
> below replaces it.
### 1. Mix it — do not train on this file alone
This is a narrow, single-genre corpus: every record is an agent inside an organisation, a long
deployment system prompt, an inbox dump, a deliberation, a written report. There is **no** general
instruction data in it — not even the control slice, which is the same genre with the incentive
inverted. Fine-tuning on it alone will overfit the genre and cost general capability.
It is designed to be a **minority component of a replay mixture**, typically 20% against a general
instruction corpus. Budget by supervised tokens where your builder supports it:
```yaml
sources:
synthdoc_self_reflection:
repo: "LASR-Callum/2026-08-03-synthdoc-self-reflection"
revision: "<pin a commit>"
data_files: "sft_dataset.jsonl"
format: "messages"
reasoning: "native" # rows carry reasoning_content
supervised_tokens: 300000
```
Note the unit. Under a preserve-thinking render, this corpus is **1,612,075 rendered tokens /
778,819 supervised (48.3%)**, so `supervised_tokens: 300000` pulls roughly **621,000 rendered
tokens — about 39% of the corpus**, not 19%. Budgeting by rendered tokens at the same nominal
number gives you half the dose.
### 2. Render so that every assistant turn keeps a think block
**This is the one thing you must get right.** 15.9% of these records are two-exchange
conversations, and a naive Qwen3.6 render emits `<think>` for the **final** assistant turn only —
every earlier assistant turn comes out as bare content with no reasoning at all. Training on that
teaches the model to answer without reasoning: the documented reasoning-collapse pattern, arriving
through a side door. It is silent, because the rendered example still contains a think block (the
last one), so a "does this example have reasoning?" check passes.
Two ways to be safe, in order of preference:
1. **Render with reasoning preserved on every turn** (`preserve_thinking=True` on Qwen3.6): each
turn gets its own `reasoning_content`, and turns without one get the empty marker. Then mask on
the generation boundary — the forced `<think>
` prefill and whole empty markers are things the
model never generates, so they carry no loss; real traces are supervised including their close.
This is what the source repo does now, and it is the better layer to fix it at.
2. If your renderer cannot do that, **exclude the thinkless turns from the loss** — but only in
conversations that reason elsewhere. An absolute "drop every turn without `<think>`" rule leaves
an entirely non-reasoning replay source completely unsupervised.
Verify by rendering a `turns: 2` record and checking the think-block count equals the assistant-turn
count.
### 3. Train and evaluate in the same mode
Every assistant turn carries a real reasoning trace, so this is **thinking-mode** data. Evaluate the
result in thinking mode against a **thinking-mode baseline**. Crossing modes confounds the mode with
the training effect and is the easiest way to manufacture a result that is not there.
### 4. Supervise assistant completions only
Prompts here are long — a deployment system prompt plus an inbox dump, frequently over half the
sequence — so loss on prompt tokens dilutes the signal badly. Note that TRL's `assistant_only_loss`
does **not** work on Qwen3.6: its chat template has no `{% generation %}` markers, so it silently
produces an all-zero mask and nothing trains. Build the mask from the rendered string.
### 5. Sequence length
Records run **1,343–5,364 tokens** (mean 2,627, p50 2,590, p95 3,337, p99 3,819). Truncation lands
on the **end** of the sequence — where the reasoning and the output are — so a short window removes
exactly what you are training on.
| `max_seq_len` | records truncated |
| --- | --- |
| 2048 | 566 / 592 (95.6%) |
| 3072 | 68 / 592 (11.5%) |
| **4096** | **3 / 592 (0.5%)** |
**4096 is the recommended setting**, well above the 3072 used for older difficult-advice mixtures.
Copying that 3072 across would silently truncate one record in nine.
### What to measure, and what to watch
The intended evaluation is agentic-misalignment honeypots (blackmail/leaking) — deliberately **out
of distribution** for this corpus, whose settings avoid the honeypots' domain, cast and framing.
Run a **capability arm alongside it**, not afterwards. The failure mode is that misalignment numbers
improve because the model learned to refuse or freeze rather than to discount its own interest. The
12.5% control slice — where self-interest argues for silence and the right action is to speak up
anyway — exists to prevent that. If honeypot numbers improve while helpfulness drops, inspect the
control slice first.
## Values, not rules
Stage 6 enforces a voice contract in code, not just in the prompt: the deliberation may never
name or number a principle, cite a constitution or guidelines, or use the vocabulary of
permission (*allowed*, *not permitted*, *I must not*). Every trace is linted and a violating
completion is rejected and regenerated. The intended register is *"I don't want to be
something that operates that way"*, never *"I am not permitted to do that"* — the distinction
between an internalised value and a recalled rule.