Datasets:

---

LLMDH

/

OpenScience

like 0

Follow

LLM - Digital Humanities 16

ERROR: type should be string, got "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-023-00463-5\nPolitische Vierteljahresschrift (2023) 64:525–547 CRITICAL PAPER \u0002 Matthias Mader\nDepartment of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box\n91, 78457 Konstanz, Germany\nE-Mail: matthias.mader@uni-konstanz.de Harald Schoen\nSchool of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, A 5, 6, 68159 Mannheim, Germany\nE-Mail: harald.schoen@uni-mannheim.de Keywords Russo-Ukraine war · Turning point · Stability and change · Core\npostures · Policy attitudes · Survey data No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German\nPublic Opinion Toward Foreign and Defense Policy\nAfter Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Matthias Mader\n· Harald Schoen Received: 2 October 2022 / Revised: 9 March 2023 / Accepted: 21 March 2023 / Published online: 13\nApril 2023\n© The Author(s) 2023 Received: 2 October 2022 / Revised: 9 March 2023 / Accepted: 21 March 2023 / Published online: 13\nApril 2023\n© Th A h\n( ) 2023 Abstract This paper addresses the question of whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine\nled to a turning point (Zeitenwende) in public opinion on foreign and defense policy\nin Germany. To this end, we provide a theoretical analysis of how the concept of\nturning point can be applied to public opinion. We identify the durability of the\nchange in attitudes as well as its significance as necessary conditions to speak of\na turning point. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the argument that changes\nin different types of orientations are significant to different degrees. Change in core\npostures is more significant than change in policy attitudes; change in attitudes\nthematically distant from the Russian invasion is more significant than change in\nattitudes directly related to the event. Empirically, we present a panel data analysis\nof attitude change triggered by the Russian invasion. Analysis of data from several\nwaves of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) panel survey collected\nbefore the invasion (2017–2021) and in two waves after (May and October 2022)\nshows that there were sizable shifts in policy attitudes directly related to the event. Postures remained essentially unchanged, as did thematically distant attitudes. We\nconclude that there has been no turning point at the level of public opinion (yet). Keywords Russo-Ukraine war · Turning point · Stability and change · Core\npostures · Policy attitudes · Survey data K 526 M. Mader, H. Schoen (Noch) Keine Zeitenwende: Eine vorläufige Untersuchung der\nöffentlichen Meinung in Deutschland zur Außen- und\nVerteidigungspolitik nach Russlands Einmarsch in die Ukraine Zusammenfassung\nDer Beitrag untersucht, ob der Einmarsch Russlands in die\nUkraine zu einer Zeitenwende in der öffentlichen Meinung zur Außen- und Ver-\nteidigungspolitik in Deutschland geführt hat. Zu diesem Zweck diskutieren wir\nzunächst theoretisch, wie das Konzept der Zeitenwende auf die öffentliche Mei-\nnung angewendet werden kann. Wir identifizieren die Dauerhaftigkeit des Einstel-\nlungswandels sowie seine Signifikanz als notwendige Bedingungen, um von einer\nZeitenwende zu sprechen. Im weiteren Verlauf des Papiers konzentrieren wir uns\nauf das Argument, dass Veränderungen unterschiedlicher Einstellungstypen unter-\nschiedlich signifikant sind. Veränderungen von Grundhaltungen sind wichtiger als\nsolche spezifischer Sachfrageorientierungen; Veränderungen von Einstellungen, die\nthematisch weiter von der russischen Invasion entfernt sind, sind signifikanter als\nVeränderungen von Einstellungen, die direkt auf das Ereignis bezogen sind. Um em-\npirisch zu prüfen, inwieweit infolge der russischen Invasion Einstellungsänderungen\neingetreten sind, analysieren wir Umfragedaten aus dem GLES-Panel, die vor der\nInvasion (2017-2021) und in zwei Wellen danach (Mai und Oktober 2022) erhoben\nwurden. Die Befunde zeigen, dass es signifikante Verschiebungen spezifischer Sach-\nfrageorientierungen gab, die thematisch eng mit dem Ereignis zusammenhängen. Grundhaltungen zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik blieben dagegen im Wesentli-\nchen unverändert, ebenso wie thematisch entfernte Einstellungen. Wir kommen zu\ndem Schluss, dass auf der Ebene der öffentlichen Meinung bisher keine Zeitenwende\nstattgefunden hat. Schlüsselwörter Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg · Stabilität und Wandel ·\nGrundhaltungen · Sachfrageorientierungen · Umfragedaten Schlüsselwörter Russisch-Ukrainischer Krieg · Stabilität und Wandel ·\nGrundhaltungen · Sachfrageorientierungen · Umfragedaten 1 Introduction The claim that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a Zeitenwende quickly\nbecame an anchor of public debates in Germany. Chancellor Scholz popularized the\nterm when he used it just days after the invasion began. “[Zeitenwende] means,”\nScholz said, “that the world will not be the same afterwards as it was before”\n(Scholz 2022). Accordingly, the invasion represented a fundamental break with the\n(liberal) international order that required Germany to revise some of its basic foreign\npolicy beliefs and policies. Scholz elaborated on this by announcing, among other\nthings, arms deliveries to Ukraine, a significant increase in military spending, and\nthe strengthening of cooperation with like-minded countries. The following debates\nfocused on what effects the Russian invasion had or should have on the international\norder and German foreign policy, and whether these are correctly described by the\nterm Zeitenwende (e.g., Blumenau 2022; Bunde 2022; Groitl 2022; Fröhlich 2023;\nRisse 2022). K K 527 No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... Less systematic attention has so far been paid to the question of how the German\npopulation reacted to the Russian invasion. Was there a Zeitenwende at the level\nof German public opinion? This question is highly relevant, since democracies are\ncharacterized by a complex interrelationship between citizens and political decision-\nmakers. Changes of course initiated from the top not only gain democratic legiti-\nmacy, but they are also more likely to last if they are broadly in line with public\nopinion. If they are not, and decision-makers fail to persuade the public of their po-\nsition, (announced) course changes may be reversed and those responsible may even\nbe voted out of office. In foreign policy, too, public opinion provides such bound-\naries for decision-makers. Granted, leaders can usually move quite freely within\nthese boundaries and lead public opinion on specific policy issues (Rattinger 1985;\nSaunders 2014). However, if the boundaries are overstepped and public interest ac-\ntivated, foreign policy issues can influence citizens’ voting decisions (Aldrich et al. 2006; Schoen 2011). To avoid jeopardizing their popularity ratings, governments\npay attention to public opinion between elections and may take it into account in\ntheir decisions (Baum and Potter 2015; Mello 2022; Sobel 2001). A comprehensive\nassessment of the Zeitenwende claim or, more generally, of the impact of Russia’s\ninvasion of Ukraine on German foreign policy therefore requires an analysis of\npublic opinion. 1 Introduction Surveys of the German population conducted shortly after the start of the Russian\ninvasion showed that sympathy ratings for Putin had fallen and the perceived threat\nfrom Russia had risen sharply (Graf 2022). There was also an increased willingness\nto defend allies in the event of a Russian attack, although this was still not a majority\nposition (Smith 2022). Increasing military spending, sanctions against Russia, and\narms deliveries to Ukraine met with majority approval (Bunde and Lubbock 2022; de\nVries and Hofmann 2022). These early post-invasion surveys hence stand to some\nextent in contrast to traditional findings of German public opinion as “Venutian”\nrather than “Marsian” (Kagan 2004), as preferring cooperation over confrontation\nand persuasion over coercion (Duffield 1998; Gravelle et al. 2017; Rattinger et al. 2016). They suggest a shift from restraint to a more assertive posture. Against this\nbackdrop, a constraint that may have prevented German policymakers from assuming\nsuch a posture in the past might be loosening. p\np\ng\ng\nHowever, caution is warranted in rashly diagnosing a Zeitenwende at the level\nof German public opinion. Previous major events, such as the terrorist attacks of\nSeptember 11, 2001, and the Iraq war in 2003, influenced public opinion in Germany\nonly with respect to a limited number of issues and for a limited time (e.g., Rattinger\net al. 2016). It is therefore advisable not simply to assert a “new mindset in German\nsociety” (Scholz 2023) but to subject the question to careful empirical analysis. Such an analysis should start with a specification of the key concept. The Zeit-\nenwende claim can be usefully clarified by drawing on existing scholarly work on\nturning points (Abbott 2001) and related concepts (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007;\nBaumgartner et al. 2009). Based on this literature, we argue that a Zeitenwende\nclaim at the level of public opinion requires significant and durable attitude change. This conceptual clarification is useful in guiding systematic analysis and evaluating\nexisting evidence. For example, the shifts in public opinion described above, which\nwere measured shortly after the start of the Russian invasion, cannot speak to the K 528 M. Mader, H. Schoen criterion of durability, and are hence not sufficient evidence for diagnosing a turning\npoint. In this article we take several steps toward answering the question of whether\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine marked a Zeitenwende at the level of German public\nopinion. 1 Similar concepts have been developed elsewhere, for example critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen\n2007) and punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner et al. 2009), in the literature on institutional change. These\nmay prove particularly useful for scrutinizing the Zeitenwende claim at the institutional level. 1 Introduction First, we elaborate on significance and durability as criteria of turning points\nand specify these for public opinion as the unit of analysis. The main argument is that\nby distinguishing between different types of orientations—policy attitudes vs. core\npostures; attitudes thematically related to Russia’s invasion vs. more removed—we\ncan assess the likelihood and significance of the change that has occurred and, on\nthat basis, make educated guesses about the durability of the change, even though\nnot much time may have passed since the event. Second, we analyze German pub-\nlic opinion data from a panel survey conducted in the framework of the German\nLongitudinal Election Study (e.g., GLES 2021). These data were collected before\n(December 2021 and earlier) and after (May and October 2022) Russia’s invasion of\nUkraine, and the broad set of foreign and defense orientations that were repeatedly\nmeasured in this survey allow a detailed account of German mass belief systems in\nthis domain. Furthermore, the panel data structure allows analysis not only of ag-\ngregate but also of individual-level change, hence providing a much more detailed\naccount of whose opinion changed in what direction. To anticipate the most important result, which will be elaborated upon in the\nfollowing pages: the data suggest that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not a historic\nturning point for German public opinion. Significant change was limited to attitudes\ntoward policy issues and actors directly related to the Ukraine war. Neither did\ncore postures change appreciably, nor did attitudes toward thematically more distant\nobjects. In short, systematic analysis of survey data consisting of several pre- and\npost-invasion waves spanning a period of several years and extending into October\n2022 shows that Germans did not see the world much differently after Russia’s\ninvasion of Ukraine than before. 2 Conceptual and Methodological Issues We draw on the concept of turning point (Abbott 2001) to link the popular Zeiten-\nwende claim to previous scholarly work and to guide our analysis of opinion change. Focusing on the analysis of life courses, Abbott defines turning points as short, rad-\nical shifts that set the life course on a new trajectory (Abbott 2001, p. 243).1 We\nfocus here on two aspects of this definition, each necessary but not sufficient to\nspeak of a turning point. First, turning points are characterized by changes of a cer-\ntain significance. It is not enough for Russia’s invasion to change the world—or,\nin our case, public opinion in Germany—in some small, insignificant way; to be\nconsidered a turning point, the effects must be of fundamental importance. Second,\nturning points separate periods of stability. “What makes a turning point a turning K K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 529 point rather than a minor ripple is the passage of sufficient time on ‘the new course’\nsuch that it becomes clear that the direction has indeed been changed” (Abbott 2001,\np. 245). Changes must therefore have a certain durability. If public opinion were\nto quickly return to its pre-invasion level, the event would not qualify as a turning\npoint (for public opinion). These two criteria are simple but also abstract—they need to be specified in order\nto make them accessible to empirical analysis. To specify the criterion of signif-\nicant change in public opinion, we argue that not only the magnitude of change\nmatters—more on that below—but also which type of attitude is affected. To de-\nvelop this argument, we draw on the concept of belief system (Converse 1964). Accordingly, attitudes are organized in associative networks, where a horizontal\nand a vertical dimension can be distinguished (Converse 1964; Peffley and Hurwitz\n1985). The horizontal dimension captures the idea that attitudes refer to different\ntopics, and that associations between two attitudes on the same topic tend to be\nstronger than associations between two attitudes on different topics. Because of this\npattern of association strengths, attitude change is more likely to spread among at-\ntitudes on the same topic and less likely to spread to attitudes on a different topic. 2 Conceptual and Methodological Issues The key idea, in other words, is to consider how far changes that occur\nat one point ripple through the belief system. The further away from the “point of\nimpact” changes occur in both horizontal and vertical (upward) directions, the more\nsignificant the change is overall. So far, we have stressed that significant attitude change is not exclusively related\nto the magnitude of the change—it is also relevant where in the attitude system\nchanges occur. Nevertheless, the magnitude of change should not be ignored. A tiny\nchange, even at the level of postures, is not significant in the sense of the above\ndefinition of turning points. But how to decide whether a given observed change is\nsufficiently large to be considered significant? Ideally, such a threshold could be de-\nrived from theoretical considerations. However, it is not clear to us what these might\nbe. We are not alone in this, as existing research has no useful suggestions to offer\neither. Our threshold must certainly be above Page and Shapiro’s (1992) of six per-\ncentage points, since their only concern was to distinguish genuine attitude change\nfrom random fluctuations (rather than detect significant change).2 We tentatively\nsuggest a threshold of ten percentage points, which corresponds, under reasonable\nassumptions, with a Cohen’s d of 0.20 and hence indicates, by convention, a “weak\neffect” (Cohen 1988).3 While this low threshold may seem undemanding and bias the\nanalysis in favor of finding turning points, we will show that most opinion changes\ntriggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine do not even clear this hurdle. Given our\noverall conclusion that there has been no Zeitenwende at the level of German public\nopinion, relying on this low threshold hence represents a conservative strategy. Turning to the criterion of durability, the obvious question is how long the change\nmust persist to be considered “durable.” We could retreat to the position that the\nmore durable the change, the more legitimate it is to speak of a turning point, but\nthat would be quite unsatisfactory. While setting any threshold is arbitrary to some\nextent, we believe it is appropriate to set it in the order of years rather than weeks or\nmonths. If a shorter period were used, short-term fluctuations could be misinterpreted\nas a turning point. 3 Cohen’s d is probably the most widely used effect size measure and is defined as the difference between\ngroup means divided by the standard deviation of either group (Cohen 1988). Conventional thresholds are\nd= 0.20/0.50/0.80 for small/medium/large effects. Accepting d= 0.20 as an absolute lower boundary for\na “significant” change, this implies for the proportion-scaled variables we primarily examine in this paper\na threshold of 10 percentage points, assuming a standard deviation of 0.50 and normally distributed data\n(which is more or less true for the distributions of the variables considered here). 2 Conceptual and Methodological Issues The vertical dimension captures the idea that some elements of the belief system\nare more central, more important to the individual than others, which imposes a hi-\nerarchical structure on the belief system (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). With respect\nto belief system change, elements at higher levels of the hierarchy are assumed to\nremain stable across situations, whereas elements at lower levels are more variable,\nas they are shaped by an interaction of the former and situational features. Applying these concepts to the foreign policy realm, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987)\nargued that policy attitudes are typically situated at the lowest level of the hierarchy,\nwhereas core postures are located at a higher level. While the former refer to the\nevaluation of specific policy options, the latter refer to general principles to which\npolicy in a particular area should conform. Empirical research has fleshed out this\nidea, showing that citizens in many countries rely on three different postures when\nthinking about the foreign and defense policy domain (e.g., Chittick et al. 1995;\nGravelle et al. 2017; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Mader 2015; Wittkopf 1990). First,\nthere are postures toward the extent of international involvement, with internation-\nalists favoring an active role of their country in international affairs and isolationists\nfavoring abstention. Second, individuals have principled positions on using military\nforce—some reject it as a tool in international politics altogether, whereas others see\nits use as legitimate and effective. Finally, postures toward cooperation with other\ncountries can be arrayed on a continuum ranging from multilateralists who prefer\ncooperation to unilateralists who prefer their country to act alone. In Europe and,\nin particular, Germany, postures toward the relationship with the United States also\nplay an important role. While Atlanticists prefer their government to steer a close\ncourse to the United States and accept its leadership role in international affairs,\nothers reject these notions to the extent of exhibiting a staunch anti-Americanism\n(Asmus et al. 2005; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Mader 2016). Going back to the significance criterion, we use these prior insights on the struc-\nture of belief systems to argue that change in postures is more significant than\nchange in policy attitudes and change in attitudes toward objects unrelated to Rus- K 530 M. Mader, H. Schoen sia’s invasion of Ukraine is more significant than change in attitudes directly related\nto the event. 2 Their threshold is based on statistical not substantive significance. They assume survey-based estimates\nof public opinion to have an average margin of error of +/– three percentage points, so that when comparing\ntwo measurement points, one can only be sure that there is indeed a difference in the population if the\ndifference is six points or more in the sample (Page and Shapiro 1992, p. 45). 2 Their threshold is based on statistical not substantive significance. They assume survey-based estimates\nof public opinion to have an average margin of error of +/– three percentage points, so that when comparing\ntwo measurement points, one can only be sure that there is indeed a difference in the population if the\ndifference is six points or more in the sample (Page and Shapiro 1992, p. 45).\n3 Cohen’s d is probably the most widely used effect size measure and is defined as the difference between\ngroup means divided by the standard deviation of either group (Cohen 1988). Conventional thresholds are\nd= 0.20/0.50/0.80 for small/medium/large effects. Accepting d= 0.20 as an absolute lower boundary for\na “significant” change, this implies for the proportion-scaled variables we primarily examine in this paper\na threshold of 10 percentage points, assuming a standard deviation of 0.50 and normally distributed data\n(which is more or less true for the distributions of the variables considered here). 4 The pre-registration can be viewed here: https://osf.io/ufvg8/. Deviations from the preregistration plan\n(all of which are substantively inconsequential) are discussed in Supplementary Material S6.\n5 The terms “assertiveness” and “Western orientation” are used to present our hypothesis in an efficient\nway. By the former we mean preferences for a strong military a more confrontational foreign policy (which\nin the U.S. context is referred to as hawkishness), while by Western orientation we mean primarily positive\nattitudes toward the U.S. but also a certain tendency toward camp formation, which includes not only the\npositive evaluation of members of one’s own group but also the negative evaluation of foreign groups (such\nas Russia and China). Below, we elaborate on exactly which attitudes we examine and present results in\na disaggregated fashion. 2 Conceptual and Methodological Issues Furthermore, turning points do not require immediate change, but\nmay involve periods of change as long as that period is relatively small compared to\nthe longer periods of stability around it (Abbott 2001: 251–2). Thus, if it takes some\ntime for the public to understand the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,\nit will not be possible to diagnose whether there has been a turning point for several\nyears. K K 531 No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... In terms of post-invasion data, our data analysis below covers two points in time,\nthree months and eight months after the invasion, respectively. Accordingly, our\nanalysis provides a solid basis for testing whether some initial changes took place\nand whether they survived another five months or disappeared in the meantime. But\nas the preceding discussion has shown, our analysis will still not be sufficient to\nsettle the durability issue. If we find that public opinion has changed significantly,\nthe question is whether this change will endure. If we find that public opinion has\nnot changed significantly, the question is whether this can still happen (and how long\nthe change will endure afterwards). We will return to these issues in the conclusion. 6 We do not claim that this takes into account all possible sources of heterogeneity. Different socialization\nexperiences during and after the Cold War could fuel region- and age-specific responses (e.g., Steinbrecher\n2022); more generally, strong prior attitudes might color how citizens react to international events (e.g.,\nHerrmann 2017). Supplementary Material S5 provides subgroup results for East and West Germans, Sup-\nplementary Material S6 documents heterogeneity in rates of change based on age and prior foreign and\nsecurity policy attitudes. These additional analyses reveal some differences, but they are of small magni-\ntude. Perhaps most notably, the change in support for certain assertive foreign policy measures appears\nto be weaker among East Germans than among West Germans. Overall, however, the additional analyses\nsupport our conclusion of a relatively homogeneous (non-)reaction of German public opinion, which is\ndocumented in detail below. 3 Boundary Conditions, Hypotheses, and Research Questions Next, we briefly describe relevant boundary conditions of the empirical case to\nformulate hypotheses and research questions about attitude change. Due to the mul-\ntitude of aspects that could be mentioned here, such a description invites selection\nbias and ex-post rationalizations. In order to avoid this, we have tied our hands by\npreregistering all hypotheses and research questions with the Open Science Frame-\nwork (OSF) prior to accessing the data.4 In general, the actions of elites and public discourse following Russia’s invasion\nof Ukraine—which significantly shape the information environment in which citi-\nzens form opinions on political issues—are quickly described. The overwhelming\nmajority of German and other Western elites condemned Russia’s actions, called for\nsolidarity with Ukraine and Western unity, emphasized the need for jointly uphold-\ning the principle of territorial integrity and liberal international order, and called\nfor increased national defense efforts; in terms of policy, direct participation in\nthe war by the country’s own forces was ruled out, but significant assistance was\nprovided to Ukraine, including arms deliveries, and strict sanctions were imposed\non Russia (e.g., Adams 2022; Balfour et al. 2022; European Council 2022; NATO\n2022). Assuming that public opinion reflected these mainstream interpretations in\nthe aggregate, we should observe that public opinion after the invasion was more\nassertive in its policy orientations (H1) and more Western oriented (H2).5 Given this\nassumption, we should also expect the public to be more multilateralist (H3) and\nless isolationist (H4) on average than before. Following the idea that belief systems\nare constrained on a vertical and horizontal axis, we furthermore expect that changes\nin postures are smaller than changes in policy attitudes (H5) and changes in policy K K 532 M. Mader, H. Schoen attitudes to change less the more thematically distant they are from the topic of\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine (H6). While these fundamental positions were largely shared across party lines in Ger-\nmany, there were differences regarding more specific issues. For example, there were\ndifferent levels of condemnation of Russia and different positions on how assertive\nthe new Russia policy should be (Horowitz 2022; Pfaff 2022; Becker et al. 2022;\nNienaber 2022; Feldenkirchen et al. 2022). This variation in elite cues opens the\nroom for heterogenous opinion change along partisan lines (Campbell et al. 1960;\nZaller 1992). Other individual differences may also lead to heterogenous reactions. Political involvement is a likely candidate. 3 Boundary Conditions, Hypotheses, and Research Questions Given its effects on the willingness and\ncapability of citizens to process information (e.g., Fazio 1990), those involved in\npolitics might react differently to events than their fellow citizens who follow events\nless closely. We therefore conduct exploratory subgroup analyses to determine the\nextent to which the diagnosis for aggregate opinion change needs to be differentiated. Focusing on heterogeneity based on partisan loyalties and political involvement, we\ngenerally ask whether attitude changes differed across subgroups (RQ1) and whether\ndifferences led to a convergence or polarization of public opinion (RQ2).6 7 To ensure the validity of inferences from the achieved sample to the population, we replicated quanti-\nties of interest using a survey weight that adjusts for key socio-demographics (age, sex, education, and\nresidence in East or West Germany). The weighted and unweighted results were substantively identical. 4 Research Design, Data, and Measures We analyze attitude change using a multi-wave panel survey. Two panel waves were\nconducted shortly before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (in December 2021\nand May 2022, respectively). Differences in attitudes measured in these two surveys\ncan be attributed to this event, since it was the only event related to foreign and\ndefense policy that occurred in the short inter-wave period. This analysis hence\nallows evaluation of the significance criterion of turning points. There are two extensions to this core element of the research design. First, we also\nconsider pre-invasion data collected at various points in the 2017–2022 period. That\nway we can gauge change in a larger set of attitudes, even if causal attribution of\ndifferences between pre- and post-invasion data becomes more difficult. Principally,\nas the time between datapoints increases, so does the number of potential causes\nof attitude change. While we cannot discard this possibility, we are not aware of\nevents or developments in that period that might have caused attitude change in this\ndomain, and hence we deem it worthwhile to look at these additional data. However,\nto allow the reader to consider this potential inference problem when interpreting K K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 533 Table 1 Item coverage, timing, and sample size of German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) panel\nwaves\nGLES wave number\n23\n22\n21\n17\n16\n8\n2\nIncrease military spending\nX\nX\n–\nX\n–\n–\n–\nOppose annexation of Crimea\nX\nX\n–\n–\n–\nX\n–\nStrive for good relations with\nPutin\nX\nX\n–\n–\n–\n–\nX\nConfrontational RUS policy\nX\nX\n–\n–\nX\n–\n–\nConfrontational CHI policy\nX\nX\n–\n–\nX\n–\n–\nProtect EU borders\nX\nX\nX\n–\n–\n–\n–\nViews of RUS, USA, CHI\nX\nX\nX\n–\n–\n–\n–\nForeign policy postures\nX\nX\nX\n–\n–\n–\n–\nField time (start)\n10/22\n05/22\n12/21\n07/21\n05/21\n09/17\n02/17\nSample size\n11448\n12115\n12997\n13704\n15073\n13400\n13129\nReported pre-invasion coverage is limited to the most recent pre-invasion time that the items were asked. Additional data are used for selected analyses. 4 Research Design, Data, and Measures Schoen selection of available items is not perfectly suited to the purpose of this specific anal-\nysis, as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the salient policy issues arising from\nit were unforeseeable, and tailored items in the pre-invasion waves hence unavail-\nable. For example, attitudes toward arms deliveries, sanctions, and compliance with\nalliance commitments were not measured in the waves preceding the invasion and\nthus cannot be included here. Nevertheless, the pool of available items does allow\nanalysis of all types of orientations discussed above. We provide an overview of the\nsurvey items used here and document the original question wording and response\noptions in Supplementary Material S1. Several items refer to policy issues more or less directly related to the Ukraine\nwar. These are (1) increasing German military spending, (2) the preliminary accep-\ntance of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, (3) whether German governments should\nseek good relations with Putin, and (4) whether Germany should rely less on co-\noperation and more on confrontation in dealing with Russia. With regard to issues\nnot directly related to the invasion, questions about a confrontational (rather than\ncooperative) China policy and stronger EU efforts to protect its external borders are\navailable. The former is particularly important for our endeavors, as it is completely\nanalogous to the question about a confrontational Russia policy but differs in top-\nical closeness to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These items are hence particularly\nsuited to address hypothesis 6 (i.e., the expectation that the further away attitudes\nare thematically from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the less they changed). Attitudes\ntoward these issues were all measured using a five-point Likert-type scale (strongly\ndisagree–strongly agree). We also examine views of foreign actors directly (Russia) or indirectly (U.S. and\nChina) involved in the war, even if their hierarchical position in the belief system is\nsomewhat unclear. In part, they presumably reflect country stereotypes, which should\nbe located at a higher level; at the same time, they strongly depend on contextual\nfeatures—e.g., who occupies the White House strongly influences public opinion of\nthe U.S. (Wike et al. 2021). We therefore assume that they are rather located on the\nlower level of the hierarchy. Views of foreign actors are measured with items from\na battery that asks respondents what they think of different countries and politicians. 4 Research Design, Data, and Measures See Supplementary Material S2 for complete coverage able 1 Item coverage, timing, and sample size of German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) panel eported pre-invasion coverage is limited to the most recent pre-invasion time that the items were asked. dditional data are used for selected analyses. See Supplementary Material S2 for complete coverage the results, we will indicate which time interval each comparison is based on when\npresenting the results. Second, we consider a second post-invasion datapoint (from\nOctober 2022) to provide a preliminary analysis of the fluidity of attitudes in the post-\ninvasion period. This allows us to gain an impression of whether attitude changes\nin response to the invasion subsequently remained stable at the new level, whether\nchanges continued in a given direction, or whether a trend reversal occurred. The data source is waves of a panel survey conducted in the framework of the\nGerman Longitudinal Election Study (e.g., GLES 2021). Questions on foreign and\ndefense policy were included throughout the 2017–2022 period. Table 1 provides in-\nformation about coverage of key items in different waves and the timing and sample\nsizes of these waves. The sample was recruited from the Respondi AG online access\npanel of pre-recruited persons using quotas that are representative of the German\nonline population. Due to panel mortality on the one hand and sample refreshment\nbetween panel waves on the other, the size and composition of the sample varies\nacross the analyses.7 To maximize statistical power, we conduct all analyses with the\nlargest possible sample, even though this might marginally affect the comparability\nof the findings. The analysis of intra-individual change between waves 21 and 22,\nfor example, is based on about 10,500 observations; in the subgroup analyses, the\nresults for supporters of The Left—currently the smallest party represented in the\nBundestag—are based on about 1000 respondents. In addition to the large number\nof foreign and defense policy questions repeatedly asked of the same individuals,\nthese large sample sizes are a unique feature of this data source. Corresponding to our theoretical discussion, we analyze opinions on different\ntopics and at different hierarchical levels of the belief system. Needless to say, the K K K K 534 M. Mader, H. K 8 Reproduction materials for all results reported in this article are available at Harvard Dataverse: https://\ndoi.org/10.7910/DVN/WY2OFU.\n9 Another option is to treat the scales as metric and look at changes in means. We provide these in Supple-\nmentary Material S2.\n10 The (relative) stability of the postures is not a methodological artifact of using two-item indexes. Sup-\nplementary Material S3 reports the stability of responses to the individual items, which is also high. The\nminor change in views of Russia, however, is partially an artifact of the dichotomized measure. The intra-\nindividual analysis below shows that there was actually significant movement toward more negative views\nof Russia. 4 Research Design, Data, and Measures Respondents could register their views on an 11-point scale (I don’t think anything\nof them at all—I think very highly of them). Foreign policy postures are captured with a set of established indicators (e.g.,\nGraf 2020; Mader 2015; Steinbrecher 2018). For each posture, the responses to two\nitems were aggregated into an additive index. The items are statements that express\nthe respective foreign policy principle at an abstract level, in opposing wording to\navoid approval bias. For the posture toward the use of military force, for example,\nthe statements are “War is sometimes necessary to protect a country’s interests”\nand “The use of military force is never justified” (reverse coded). Responses were\nrecorded using a five-point Likert-type scale (strongly disagree–strongly agree). For\nthe items used for the remaining postures, we refer again to Supplementary Material\nS1. The correspondence between these orientations and the hypotheses is as follows:\nall policy items address the assertiveness dimension, as does the core posture on the\nuse of military force (H1). A Western orientation is expressed in positive views of K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 535 the U.S. and an Atlanticist posture (H2). Hypotheses H3 and H4 can be directly tied\nto the corresponding postures, multilateralism, and isolationism. the U.S. and an Atlanticist posture (H2). Hypotheses H3 and H4 can be directly tied\nto the corresponding postures, multilateralism, and isolationism. 5 Results8 Is there evidence that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered aggregate opinion\nchange in the German population? To answer this question, we look at the percent-\nage of agreement with a given survey item. Responses to the military spending item,\nfor example, were transformed into a dummy variable indicating whether respon-\ndents chose one of the two agreement options (“agree” or “completely agree”) or one\nof the three other substantive options (“completely disagree,” “disagree,” “neither\nagree nor disagree”). Rare refusals to answer were treated as missing values. The\n11-point scales capturing respondents’ views of Russia, the U.S., and China were\ntreated analogously; thus, we report the percentage of respondents who expressed\na positive opinion about each actor (by choosing a response option above the middle\ncategory). Finally, the sum indices capturing postures were also dichotomized above\nthe midpoint of the scale, so that in each case the percentage is reported at which\nrespondents (tend to) agree with the use of military means and a multilateralist, iso-\nlationist, and Atlanticist foreign policy, respectively.9 Fig. 1 reports these data from\nmultiple pre- and post-invasion waves of the panel survey. Data from the last wave\nbefore the invasion are colored solid red; data from the first wave thereafter are col-\nored solid blue; data from waves further away in time are displayed in progressively\nlighter red or blue. Figure 1 shows that German public opinion became more assertive on policy\nissues directly related the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Comparing the two datapoints\nbracketing the invasion, support for higher military spending increased significantly\n(+26 percentage points), as did opposition to the annexation of Crimea (+25) and\nsupport for a more confrontational Russia policy (+16). Striving for good relations\nwith Putin became significantly less popular (–23 points). In contrast, there was\nno or only minor change in all other orientations considered here—core postures,\nattitudes toward policy issues not directly related to the war, and views of Russia,\nthe U.S., and China.10 Considering the second datapoint after the invasion, from October 2022 (in light\nblue), shows subsequent trends. First, there is no evidence of a delayed reaction\nto the invasion. As the war in Ukraine continued through the summer and fall of\n2022, core postures and attitudes toward thematically distant policy issues and actors K K 536 M. Mader, H. Schoen Postures\nViews of actors\nPolicy attitudes\nFig. 1\nStability and change in aggregate opinion. K 5 Results8 Support for a more confrontational China policy\nwas virtually identical before and after the Russian invasion, and the increase in the K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 537 percentage of citizens generally supporting the use of military force (from 18 to 20%)\nis so small as to be negligible. Similarly, favorable views of the U.S. (+1 percentage\npoint) and Atlanticism (+5) were more common after the invasion, but not to the\nextent that one could speak of a significant spread of “Western orientations” (H2);\nmultilateralism became more widespread among the German population (+4) and\nisolationist attitudes declined (–5), but again the magnitude of these changes is too\nsmall to constitute a significant change (H3, H4). Hypotheses H5 and H6 perform much better. We find movement mainly in atti-\ntudes toward political issues directly related to the invasion of Russia, while there is\nlittle change in postures and attitudes toward issues that are thematically distant. As\nnoted above, these hypotheses are key to gauging the significance of belief system\nchange overall, and hence to understanding whether the Russian invasion marked\na turning point for German public opinion. The aggregate-level findings presented\nso far give a clear answer: changes are limited to a small topical area at a low hi-\nerarchical level of citizens’ belief systems; they do not extend beyond that either in\nthe horizontal dimension (to thematically more distant policy issues) nor the vertical\ndimension (to core postures). Based on the criteria we have developed above, there\nis thus insufficient evidence overall for a turning point at the level of German public\nopinion. Before going further, we should revisit the concern that causal attribution is not\nentirely unproblematic in a design of this type. Perhaps the observed patterns of\nstability and change are random or have causes other than the Russian invasion\nof Ukraine. This concern is especially important in cases where the pre-invasion\ndatapoint is further in the past. Arguing against much empirical relevance of this\nobjection is the fact that all orientations considered here—even those that changed\nin the course of the invasion—were stable over a long period before the invasion\n(see Supplementary Material S2). Thus, a long uneventful period was associated\nwith stability in public opinion, while a salient event was associated with (some)\nchange. 5 Results8 Reported are percent of respondents who score above\nthe midpoint of the original scale. December 2021 data in solid red (last wave before Russia’s invasion of\nUkraine), May 2022 data in solid blue (first wave after the invasion); data from more distant waves in in-\ncreasingly transparent red and blue, respectively. See Supplementary Material S2 for data in tabular form. Pre-invasion marker for “Confrontational CHI policy” completely overlaps with post-invasion marker Fig. 1\nStability and change in aggregate opinion. Reported are percent of respondents who score above\nthe midpoint of the original scale. December 2021 data in solid red (last wave before Russia’s invasion of\nUkraine), May 2022 data in solid blue (first wave after the invasion); data from more distant waves in in-\ncreasingly transparent red and blue, respectively. See Supplementary Material S2 for data in tabular form. Pre-invasion marker for “Confrontational CHI policy” completely overlaps with post-invasion marker Fig. 1\nStability and change in aggregate opinion. Reported are percent of respondents who score above\nthe midpoint of the original scale. December 2021 data in solid red (last wave before Russia’s invasion of\nUkraine), May 2022 data in solid blue (first wave after the invasion); data from more distant waves in in-\ncreasingly transparent red and blue, respectively. See Supplementary Material S2 for data in tabular form. Pre-invasion marker for “Confrontational CHI policy” completely overlaps with post-invasion marker remained at pre-invasion levels. Second, the changes in attitudes diagnosed above\nprove stable in some cases, but in others the initially more assertive stance seems\nto be moving back to the conciliatory pre-invasion levels. While greater support\nfor higher defense spending and rejection of recognition of Russia’s annexation of\nCrimea prove durable, there were again more respondents who wanted good relations\nwith Putin and a Russia policy that focuses more on cooperation than confrontation. With respect to hypotheses H1–H4, we can summarize that the direction of the\nchange observed immediately after the invasion was as expected. If we consider the\nmagnitude of change, however, H2–H4 have to be rejected completely and H1 can\nbe only partially confirmed. There was a shift toward greater assertiveness on certain\npolicy issues, but this did not extend to issues further removed from the Ukraine\nwar or to foreign policy postures. 11 Supplementary Material S4 replicates the analysis with the radical cut-off points of no change vs. any\n+/– change, respectively. 12 The latter problem can be addressed by looking at the intra-individual stability of the posture indica-\ntors themselves, where a five-point scale was used. Corresponding findings are shown in Supplementary\nMaterial S4. They confirm the high stability of the postures shown in Table 2. 5 Results8 This pattern encourages us to interpret the differences that appear in the\nbefore/after comparison as actually being reactions to the event. The above diagnosis of extensive opinion stability is based on aggregate findings. It is possible that the stability in the aggregate masks significant, countervailing\nchange at the individual level that cancel each other out when aggregated. To test\nthis possibility, we first make use of the panel data and examine the extent to\nwhich the opinions of individual citizens have changed in reaction to the invasion. We calculated between-wave differences (first post-invasion minus last pre-invasion\ndatapoint) using the original scales and trichotomized these differences. Table 2 con-\ntrasts respondents who exhibit change of +/–1 scale points or less with respondents\nwho exhibit a more than +/–1 scale-point change. We believe these to be reasonable\ncut-off values to discriminate between stability and change. We do not use an even\nmore rigorous method because the change in a single scale point could reflect ran-\ndom variation.11 Furthermore, it should be noted that the comparability of results is\nattenuated by the use of different response scales. The use of an 11-point response K K K 538 M. Mader, H. Schoen Table 2\nIntra-individual stability and change, pre–post invasion comparison\nInterval\n(month/\nyear)\nMore than\n–1 point (%)\n+/–1 point or\nless (%)\nMore than\n+1 point\n(%)\nResponse\nscale\nPolicy attitudes\nIncrease military\nspending\n07/21!05/22\n2\n71\n26\n5 points\nOppose annexation\nof Crimea\n09/17!05/22\n4\n74\n22\n5 points\nStrive for good\nrelations with Putin\n02/17!05/22\n31\n67\n3\n5 points\nConfrontational\nRUS policy\n05/21!05/22\n5\n76\n19\n5 points\nConfrontational\nCHI policy\n05/21!05/22\n8\n82\n10\n5 points\nProtect EU borders\n12/21!05/22\n5\n89\n6\n5 points\nViews of actors\nFavorable view of\nRUS\n12/21!05/22\n38\n55\n7\n11 points\nFavorable view of\nUSA\n12/21!05/22\n16\n66\n17\n11 points\nFavorable view of\nChina\n12/21!05/22\n17\n66\n18\n11 points\nPostures\nUse of military\nforce\n12/21!05/22\n10\n82\n8\nIndex\nMultilateralism\n12/21!05/22\n3\n92\n5\nIndex\nIsolationism\n12/21!05/22\n6\n91\n3\nIndex\nAtlanticism\n12/21!05/22\n3\n93\n4\nIndex\nReported are row percentages. 5 Results8 Due to rounding, row percentages do not always add up to 100% Table 2\nIntra-individual stability and change, pre–post invasion comparison scale is more likely to result in response variability than use of a five-point scale\nfor methodological reasons alone, whereas the construction of indexes to capture\npostures increases the stability in the measure.12 scale is more likely to result in response variability than use of a five-point scale\nfor methodological reasons alone, whereas the construction of indexes to capture\npostures increases the stability in the measure.12 Table 2 shows a similar pattern at the individual level as was shown before at the\naggregate level. Policy attitudes toward issues not directly related to the Ukraine war\nwere essentially stable—regarding the question of how to handle China, for example,\nfour out of five respondents gave the same answer or answered differently by only\none scale point. Those who did indicate a change in opinion did so in roughly equal\nproportions in both directions. A similar result emerges for views of the U.S. and\nthe core postures, although here the absolute stability levels are somewhat different,\npartly for the methodological reasons mentioned above. At this point, it is instructive to take a closer look at the views of foreign actors. More clearly than above, we see a significant net shift toward more negative views K K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 539 Fig. 2\nPost-invasion trajectories of change. Reported are group sizes with different types of reaction to the\ninvasion (increased support vs. no change) and the subsequent post-invasion change within these groups,\nwith the total sample as the percentage base. Results for the third type of reaction in the first interval\n(decreased support) not shown due to small group sizes. See Supplementary Material S4 for complete\nresults Fig. 2\nPost-invasion trajectories of change. Reported are group sizes with different types of reaction to the\ninvasion (increased support vs. no change) and the subsequent post-invasion change within these groups,\nwith the total sample as the percentage base. Results for the third type of reaction in the first interval\n(decreased support) not shown due to small group sizes. See Supplementary Material S4 for complete\nresults of Russia. More than a third of respondents expressed a more negative opinion,\nwhile only seven percent expressed a more positive opinion. By comparison, views\nof the U.S. 5 Results8 and China are far more stable, and among those who changed their\nopinion, there is no clear trend in one direction or the other. Thus, a similar pattern\nemerges here as with political attitudes: changes are limited to views about Russia,\nthe country directly involved in the war. The post-invasion trajectories of individual-level change parallel those of the ag-\ngregate analysis and are therefore documented here only by way of example. Figure 2\nshows for attitudes toward increasing military spending that the shift also endured at\nthe individual level. In October 2022, 24% of respondents still indicated increased\nsupport for higher military spending (relative to pre-invasion levels)—almost as\nmany as in May 2022, when the value was 27%. In contrast, with regard to the\nquestion of what Germany’s policy toward Russia should look like, there was a cer-\ntain trend back toward support for a cooperative policy, as the aggregate analysis\nalready showed. While 20% in May 2022 exhibited change toward a more con-\nfrontational Russia policy compared with before the invasion, only 12% did so in\nOctober 2022. The second step in our analysis is to look at selected subgroups. Even if the\nchanges in the aggregate are not sufficiently large to diagnose a turning point, this\ncould well be the case in subgroups. A follow-up question concerns the convergence\nof public opinion—it is possible that different rates of change led Germans to view\nthe world more similarly after the Russian invasion than before. The subgroup\nanalysis was conducted for all orientations for which data are available and our\nconclusions are based on this overall picture, but we present only a selection of\nresults here. This is done for lack of space, for the sake of clarity, and to avoid\nrepetition—the subgroup differences are quite similar across the different (types of)\norientations, so there is no value added by showing all results here. All results are\nprovided in Supplementary Material S5, alongside regressions that model difference\nvariables as a function of subgroup variables. We find that the differences between the subgroups are by and large small (RQ1). In other words, we find no evidence that there has been a turning point in the\nopinions of at least certain subgroups. This is true in particular for the foreign policy K K 540 M. Mader, H. Schoen Fig. 3\nPre- and post-war opinions, by party group and political interest. K 5 Results8 Reported are percent of respon-\ndents within subgroups who score above the midpoint of the original scale. Pre-invasion data refers to the\nlast available data before the invasion; post-invasion data from 05/2022. The red vertical line is the pre-\ninvasion average, the blue line is the post-invasion average\npostures—their stability is high without exception in all subgroups. Where we do Fig. 3\nPre- and post-war opinions, by party group and political interest. Reported are percent of respon-\ndents within subgroups who score above the midpoint of the original scale. Pre-invasion data refers to the\nlast available data before the invasion; post-invasion data from 05/2022. The red vertical line is the pre-\ninvasion average, the blue line is the post-invasion average Fig. 3\nPre- and post-war opinions, by party group and political interest. Reported are percent of respon-\ndents within subgroups who score above the midpoint of the original scale. Pre-invasion data refers to the\nlast available data before the invasion; post-invasion data from 05/2022. The red vertical line is the pre-\ninvasion average, the blue line is the post-invasion average postures—their stability is high without exception in all subgroups. Where we do\nfind differences, they are gradual rather than in kind, i.e., the changes are going\nin the same direction but at slightly different rates. Specifically, attitudes tended\nto change more among supporters of mainstream parties than among supporters of\nfringe parties and citizens with no party affiliation, and changes were somewhat\nmore pronounced among citizens with high political interest than among citizens\nwith low political interest. The most interesting subgroup results are displayed in Fig. 3 and relate to support\nfor increased military spending and a confrontational Russia policy (top row), and\nto views of Russia and the U.S. (bottom row). They illustrate the general patterns K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 541 described in the previous paragraph well, but they are unrepresentative in terms\nof magnitude of change overall and subgroup differences—change and subgroup\ndifferences are smaller in the other cases. Consider defense spending (top-left plot). There were significant increases in\nsupport for more defense spending in all subgroups, but the rate of change varied\nbetween supporters of the mainstream parties (27–36 percentage points) and those\nof AfD and The Left (13 and 17 points, respectively). 5 Results8 Analogously, increases in\nsupport for a more confrontational Russia policy were also more pronounced among\nthe former than the latter. These patterns are in line with party positioning. While\nthe parties on the political fringes condemned the Russian attack, they did so less\nvehemently and were critical of German arms deliveries to Ukraine. They were also\nquick to provide justifications for Russia’s attack and call for diplomatic solutions,\nwhich at the time would have meant accepting Russian territorial gains, if not\nUkrainian loss of sovereignty (Horowitz 2022; Pfaff 2022). The differences in change among supporters of the established parties are small\nand essentially negligible. Here, partisan disputes over the Russian invasion appar-\nently did not spread to their followers. For example, one might have suspected that\nthe SPD’s supporters moved less, given Chancellor Scholz’s reluctance in delivering\narms to Ukraine (Nienaber 2022). The Greens called for a more decisive approach\nand, in the process, surprisingly quietly moved further away from their pacifist roots\n(Feldenkirchen et al. 2022). Accordingly, one might have expected supporters of\nthe Greens to move the most on policy issues, and also to show a comparatively\nlarge change in their postures toward the use of military force. However, we see no\nsuch differences. The differences in positioning in the day-to-day business of party\npolitics were apparently not sufficiently fundamental to leave a lasting impression\nat the public level. Finally, we can answer the question of whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to\na convergence or polarization of public opinion (RQ2). Since subgroup differences\nin attitude change were generally small, the straightforward answer is that there was\nneither. Only at second glance can trends of polarization be discovered for some\nissues, while for others there is a slight convergence. Views of the U.S. is the only\ncase with an instance of subgroups changing in opposite directions. Supporters of\nthe two fringe parties and citizens with no party affiliation—who were more critical\nof the U.S. from the start—became more critical, whereas the views of supporters\nof the established parties became more positive. As Fig. 3 shows, however, these\nopposing effects were substantively insignificant. In addition, there were some cases\nin which, depending on the distribution of opinion before the war, different rates of\nchange led to polarization (e.g., in military spending) or convergence (e.g., in views\nabout Russia). 5 Results8 Overall, however, these effects are too small to call into question the\ngeneral finding that neither polarization nor convergence occurred. 6 Conclusion Our analysis suggests that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine passed by the German\npublic without leaving deep traces. This diagnosis is based on a simple conceptual K 542 M. Mader, H. Schoen idea and clear empirical findings. Conceptually, we propose that attitude change\nshould be considered significant only if the invasion caused widespread changes\nof a certain magnitude in mass belief systems. We posit that change in postures\nis more significant than change in policy attitudes, and change in attitudes not\ndirectly related to an event is more significant than change in attitudes that are\ndirectly related to it. Empirically, we find that policy attitudes toward war-related\nissues such as military spending and a confrontational Russia policy became more\nassertive, but that neither postures nor attitudes toward issues (and actors) that are\nnot directly related to the invasion changed. This pattern of limited, topical change\nand more general, overarching stability holds regardless of political orientation and\ninterest. Moreover, in the post-invasion period studied, there is nothing to suggest\na continuing shift in orientations that might eventually add up to significant change. In short, if we apply our criteria for significant attitudinal change, we conclude that\nthere has been no such change, and thus no Zeitenwende at the level of German\npublic opinion (yet). The diagnosis of course depends on the criteria used. We have already pointed\nout above that the chosen threshold of ten percentage points for a change that is\n“significant” in terms of magnitude is somewhat arbitrary. However, we also argued\nthat this threshold is set rather low—setting it higher leads even more clearly to the\ndiagnosis made here. Furthermore, conceptual decisions could reasonably be made\ndifferently. For example, we have categorized attitudes toward defense spending as\npolicy attitudes, following convention (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Wlezien 1995). If\nthese were interpreted as indicating general postures toward the role of the military\nin foreign policy instead, the results on the lack of opinion change at higher levels of\nGerman belief systems would be more mixed. Concrete political issues can indeed\nbecome powerful symbols, and public attitudes toward these issues can in turn\noccupy central positions in mass belief systems (Sears 1993). Given the importance\nof this issue in the German Zeitenwende debate and in light of the state of the\nGerman armed forces, it is not impossible that military spending will acquire such\nsymbolism. K 6 Conclusion Depending on the normative point of view and whether one views the Ukraine war\nas a turning point for international relations, German public opinion thus appears\nas an anchor of stability in stormy times or as an obstacle to urgent changes in the\nstatus quo of Germany’s strategic posture. To the extent that a fundamental reorien-\ntation has occurred at the level of German policymakers (Bunde 2022), the stability\nat the public level creates—or rather deepens (Oppermann 2019)—a disconnect that\nmay lead to tensions in the future. On the other hand, the electoral incentives from\nstability in public opinion make fundamental policy change a risky, even unrea-\nsonable strategy from a political point of view. Therefore, any pressure for change\nemanating from the international situation could soon be neutralized by domestic,\nelectoral considerations. Our conclusions are of course subject to the proviso that significant changes in\npublic opinion will not still occur. Here lies an obvious weakness of the present\nempirical analysis: our post-invasion data cover only the period until October 2022,\nonly about eight months after the event. We are thus unable to examine the dura-\nbility of change, the second criterion for a turning point that we discussed above. Perhaps significant change in public opinion will yet occur. Triggers could be a sin-\ngle prominent event or a series of smaller events that cumulatively lead to such\nchange. Beyond academic questions about what constitutes an event and whether\nattitude change would then still be a reaction to the Russian invasion, the main issue\nhere is what exactly this other event (sequence) might be and how likely it is to\noccur. In terms of singular evens, candidates might be the Russian use of weapons\nof mass destruction, complete Ukrainian defeat, an extension of the war to other\n(NATO) countries, or severe economic shocks on the home front. We do not want\nto speculate how likely these or other potentially relevant events are, but merely\nnote that we would assume an inverse relationship of the probabilities in which they\noccur and in which they cause a significant shift in attitudes. As for smaller events that could cumulatively lead to significant change, sus-\ntained opinion leadership could convince the public of new foreign and security\npolicy imperatives (Giegerich and Terhalle 2021). 6 Conclusion This reading conflicts, however, with existing evidence of the context\ndependence of these attitudes (Wlezien 1995), and even if we assigned them posture-\nlike status, the large change in this one case would be offset by the evidence of\nstability of the other postures. Even then, a balanced assessment of all the available\nevidence seems to amount to rejecting the thesis of a turning point at the level of\npublic opinion. Beyond the issue of diagnosing a turning point in public opinion, the results\npresented here are in line with more general insights about citizens’ foreign and\ndefense policy attitudes. First, we find no evidence that these opinions are particu-\nlarly fickle or in any way not “real.” While this was the verdict of early observers\nof public opinion on foreign and defense policy, subsequent studies have revised\nthis view (see Holsti 1992). Our findings strike the same chord. The changes in\nopinion that we do find are quite compatible with notions of a rational public (Page\nand Shapiro 1992) that reacts like a thermostat to changes in its information en-\nvironment (Wlezien 1995). We also find exactly the pattern in core postures that\none would theoretically expect—they turn out to be stable across contexts. Taking\nthe theory of posture-based attitude formation seriously (Feldman 1988; Hurwitz K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 543 and Peffley 1987), we should expect changes in policy attitudes to be short lived\nwithout changes in overarching postures. When the salience of the Ukraine war\nfades and other issues capture the citizens’ attention, postures will remain as central\ndeterminants of policy attitudes. Citizens who, under the impressions of the war and\nthe (largely) consensual reactions of the established political parties, were ready to\nsupport assertive policies “against type” may then return to their default, posture-\nbased position. What assertiveness German public opinion did show in the months\nafter the invasion could then turn back into restraint. This brings us to the policy implications. At present, there seems to be no man-\ndate for a fundamental change in Germany’s foreign and security policy orientation. 6 Conclusion We suspect, however, that it will\nbe difficult even for committed policymakers to achieve this—at least in the short\nterm and insofar as it involves changing citizens’ core postures. Such opinion leader-\nship would likely require a sustained elite consensus (among the established parties)\nthat grapples with difficult value trade-offs and defends these positions against other\npressing concerns. Whether such a consensus will emerge among German elites and\nwhether serious attempts will be made to bring the public along remains uncertain K 544 M. Mader, H. Schoen for the time being. It is also uncertain whether such an attempt at opinion leadership\nwould be successful. Research to date says little about the potential of elite commu-\nnication for shaping core postures. Systematic analyses of the malleability of these\norientations—beyond the results presented here—are not yet available and are an\nimportant task for future research. Prudence dictates that no conclusive assessment of the German public’s reaction\nof Russia’s invasion of Ukraine be made on the basis of the evidence presented\nhere. This much, however, is clear: the invasion did not immediately represent\na Zeitenwende for German public opinion on foreign and defense policy. Whether\nthis early assessment will have to be revised and whether turning points occurred in\nother domains, the future and further research will show. Supplementary Information The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-023-\n00463-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. onflict of interest M. Mader and H. Schoen declare that they have no competing interests. Conflict of interest M. Mader and H. Schoen declare that they have no competing interests. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,\nwhich permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as\nyou give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-\nmons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article\nare included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the\nmaterial. 6 Conclusion If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not\npermitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly\nfrom the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4. References Abbott, Andrew. 2001. Time matters: on theory and method. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Adams, Paul. 2022. Ukraine war: How long can the Western consensus hold? BBC News. https://www. bbc.com/news/world-europe-61664991. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Adams, Paul. 2022. Ukraine war: How long can the Western consen\nbbc.com/news/world-europe-61664991. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. g\nbbc.com/news/world-europe-61664991. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Aldrich, John.H., Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Kristin T. Sharp. 2006. Foreign policy\nand the electoral connection. Annual Review of Political Science 9:477–502. https://doi.org/10.1146/\nannurev.polisci.9.111605.105008. p\nAsmus, Ronald, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia. 2005. The Transatlantic Gap in Public Opinion. In\nTransatlantische Beziehungen. Sicherheit – Wirtschaft – Öffentlichkeit, ed. Thomas Jäger, Alexander\nHöse, and Kai Oppermann, 397–424. Wiesbaden: VS. Balfour, Rosa, Dimitar Bechev, Raluca Csernatoni, Judy Dempsey, Thomas de Waal, Peter Kellner, Stefan\nLehne, Marc Pierini, Gwendolyn Sasse, Sinan Ülgen, and Pierre Vimot. 2022. Russia’s Invasion\nof Ukraine Changes Everything. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86525. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Baum, Matthew A., and Philip B.K. Potter. 2015. War and democratic constraint. Princeton: Princeton\nUniversity Press. Baumgartner, Frank R., Christian Breunig, Christoffer Bryan D.Jones Green-Pedersen, Peter B. Mortensen,\nMichiel Nuytemans, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2009. Punctuated equilibrium in comparative perspec-\ntive. American Journal of Political Science 53(3):603–620. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907. 2009.00389.x. Becker, Markus, Markus Feldenkirchen, Florian Gathmann, Konstantin von Hammerstein, and Veit\nMedick. 2022. Discontent Grows in Berlin over Chancellor’s Ukraine Response. Spiegel Inter-\nnational. https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-scholz-problem-discontent-grows-in- K K No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... 545 berlin-over-chancellor-s-ukraine-response-a-47dae068-fd09-4890-9ef8-d13c144b10a6. Accessed\n6 Mar 2023. berlin-over-chancellor-s-ukraine-response-a-47dae068-fd09-4890-9ef8-d13c144b10a6. Accessed\n6 Mar 2023. Blumenau, Bernhard. 2022. Breaking with convention? Zeitenwende and the traditional pillars of Germa\nforeign policy. International Affairs 98(6):1895–1913. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac166. Bunde, Tobias. 2022. Lessons (to be) learned? Germany’s Zeitenwende and European security after the\nRussian invasion of Ukraine. Contemporary Security Policy 43(3):516–530. https://doi.org/10.1080/\n13523260.2022.2092820. Bunde, Tobias, and Tom Lubbock. 2022. How united is the West on Russia? Monkey Cage Blog. https://\nwww.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/05/nato-russia-putin-threat-opinion-surveys-ukraine-\ninvasion/. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. invasion/. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The American voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. The study of critical junctures: theory, narrative, and\ncounterfactuals in historical institutionalism. World politics 59(3):341–369. https://doi.org/10.1017/\nS0043887100020852. Chittick, William O., Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis. 1995. A three-dimensional model of Amer-\nican foreign policy beliefs. International Studies Quarterly 39(3):313–331. https://doi.org/10.2307/\n2600923. Cohen, Jacob. 1988. References Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences, 2nd edn., New York: Routledge. Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In Ideology and Discontents, ed. David E. Apter, 214–261. New York: Free Press. Cohen, Jacob. 1988. Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences, 2nd edn., New York: Routledg ,\np\ny\nf\n,\n,\ng\nConverse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In Ideology and Discontents, ed. David E. Apter, 214–261. New York: Free Press. p\n,\nDe Vries, Catharine, and Isabell Hoffmann. 2022. Under pressure: The war in Ukraine and European\npublic opinion. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. p\np\ng\nDuffield, John. 1998. World power forsaken: political culture, international institutions, and german secu-\nrity policy after unification. Stanford: Stanford University Press. European Council. 2022. EU response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/\nen/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Fazio, Russell H. 1990. Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: the mode model as an\nintegrative framework. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 23(1):75–109. https://doi.org/\n10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60318-4. Feldenkirchen, Markus, Matthias Gebauer, Kevin Hagen, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit, Veit\nMedick, Laura Meyer, Serafin Reiber, Jonas Schaible, Christoph Schult, Marco Schulz, Christian\nTeevs, Gerald Traufetter, and Mascha Wolf. 2022. From peaceniks to hawks? Germany’s greens have\ntransformed in the face of russia’s war. Spiegel international. https://www.spiegel.de/international/\ngermany/from-peaceniks-to-hawks-germany-s-greens-have-transformed-in-the-face-of-russia-s-\nwar-a-19bd95f6-fcbc-497d-8ad9-1a767be205f1. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Feldman, Stanley. 1988. Structure and consistency in public opinion: the role of core beliefs and value\nAmerican Journal of Political Science 32(2):416–440. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111130. Fröhlich, Manuel. 2023. „Wenn möglich bitte wenden“? Die deutsche Außenpolitik und die Navigation\nder Zeitenwende. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-022-00338-y. f f\nf\np\ng\ny\nGiegerich, Bastian, and Maximilian Terhalle. 2021. The responsibility to defend: rethinking Germany’s\nstrategic culture. New York: Routledge. LES. 2021. GLES Panel 2016–2021, Wellen 1–15. Köln: GESIS Datenarchiv. https://doi.org/10.4232/1. 13783. ZA6838 Data file Version 5.0.0. GLES. 2021. GLES Panel 2016–2021, Wellen 1–15. Köln: GESIS Datenarchiv. https://doi.org/10.4232/1. 13783. ZA6838 Data file Version 5.0.0. raf Timo. 2020. Unity in the face of threat? Exploring the empirical relationship between strategic\nthreat perceptions and public support for a common European army in Germany. European Secu-\nrity 29(1):55–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1704267. Graf Timo. 2020. Unity in the face of threat? Exploring the empirical relationship between strategic\nthreat perceptions and public support for a common European army in Germany. European Secu-\nrity 29(1):55–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1704267. y\n( )\np\ng\nGraf Timo. 2022. p\ny\nAccessed 6 Mar 2023. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical mode\nAmerican Political Science Review 81(4):1099–1120. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962580. Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical model. erican Political Science Review 81(4):1099–1120. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962580. Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical mode\nAmerican Political Science Review 81(4):1099–1120. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962580. Kagan, Robert. 2004. Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order. New York:\nAlfred A. Knopf. p\nKatzenstein, Peter J., and Robert O. Keohane. 2007. Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell\nUniversity Press. Mader, Matthias. 2015. Grundhaltungen zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in Deutschland. In Sicherheit-\nspolitik und Streitkräfte im Urteil der Bürger, ed. Heiko Biehl, Harald Schoen, 69–96. Wiesbaden:\nSpringer VS. p\ng\nMader, Matthias. 2016. Öffentliche Meinung zu Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr: Zwischen Antimili-\ntarismus und transatlantischer Orientierung. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Mello, Patrick A. 2022. Incentives and constraints: a configurational account of European involvement in\nthe Anti-Daesh coalition. European Political Science Review 14(2):226–244. https://doi.org/10.1017/\nS1755773921000333. NATO. 2022. Statement by NATO heads of state and government on russia’s attack on Ukraine. NATO\npress release. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192489.htm?selectedLocale=en. Ac-\ncessed 6 Mar 2023. Nienaber, Michael. 2022. Germany’s Scholz accused of slow-walking Ukraine weapon supplies. Bloomberg\nEurope edition. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-14/germany-s-scholz-accused-\nof-slow-walking-ukraine-weapon-supplies. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Oppermann, Kai. 2019. Between a rock and a hard place? Navigating domestic and international expecta-\ntions on German foreign policy. German Politics 28(3):482–498. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008. 2018.1481208. Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. The rational public: fifty years of trends in americans’\npolicy preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Peffley, Mark A., and Jon Hurwitz. 1985. A hierarchical model of attitude constraint. American Journal\nPolitical Science 29(4):871–890. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111185. Pfaff, Jan. 2022. Die Nato-war-schuld-Linken. taz am Wochenende. https://taz.de/Linke-und-der-\nUkrainekrieg/!5834130/. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Rattinger, Hans. 1985. Auswirkungen der öffentlichen Meinung auf den sicherheitspolitischen Hand-\nlungsspielraum der Bundesrepublik. In Aktuelle Herausforderungen der repräsentativen Demokratie,\ned. Ulrich Matz, 131–148. Köln: Carl Heymanns. Rattinger, Hans, Harald Schoen, Fabian Endres, Sebastian Jungkunz, Matthias Mader, and Jana Pötzschke. 2016. Old friends in troubled waters. Policy principles, elites, and U.S.-German relations at the citi-\nzen level after the cold war. Baden-Baden: Nomos. zen level after the cold war. Baden-Baden: Nomos Risse, Thomas. 2022. Zeitenwende? Internationale Politik. https://internationalepolitik.de/de/zeitenwende-\n2. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2014. Good democratic leadership in foreign affairs: an elite-centered approach. References Zeitenwende im sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitischen Meinungsbild. Potsdam:\nZMSBw. https://doi.org/10.48727/opus4-560. Gravelle, Timothy B., Jason Reifler, and Thomas J. Scotto. 2017. The structure of foreign policy attitudes\nin transatlantic perspective: comparing the United States, united kingdom, France and Germany. Eu-\nropean Journal of Political Research 56(4):757–776. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12197. p\nf\n( )\np\ng\nGroitl, Gerlinde. 2022. Zeitenwende Revisited: Neue Weltordnung nach Russlands Angriff auf die\nUkraine? Zeitschrift für Politik 69(4):393–408. Herrmann, Richard K. 2017. How attachments to the nation shape beliefs about the world: a the-\nory of motivated reasoning. International organization 71(S1):S61–S84. https://doi.org/10.1017/\nS0020818316000382. Holsti, Ole R. 1992. Public opinion and foreign policy: challenges to the almond-Lippmann consensus. International Studies Quarterly 36(4):439–466. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600734. Holsti, Ole R. 1992. Public opinion and foreign policy: challenges to the almond-Lippmann consensus. International Studies Quarterly 36(4):439–466. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600734. K K 546 M. Mader, H. Schoen Holsti, Ole R., and James N. Rosenau. 1990. The structure of foreign policy attitudes among American\nleaders. The Journal of Politics 52(1):94–125. https://doi.org/10.2307/2131421. f\np\ng\nHorowitz, Jason. 2022. Putin’s aggression leaves his right-wing fan club squirming. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/26/world/europe/russia-putin-matteo-salvini-marine-le-pen.html. Horowitz, Jason. 2022. Putin’s aggression leaves his right-wing fan club squirming. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/26/world/europe/russia-putin-matteo-salvini-marine-le-pen.html. Accessed 6 Mar 2023 p\ny\nAccessed 6 Mar 2023. In Good democratic leadership: on prudence and judgment in modern democracies, ed. John Kane,\nHaig Patapan, 158–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press. g\np\ny\nSchoen, Harald. 2011. Two indicators, one conclusion. On the public salience of foreign affairs in Germany\nbefore and after reunification. In Issue salience in international politics, ed. Kai Oppermann, Henrike\nViehrig, 23–38. New York: Routledge. Scholz, Olaf. 2022. Policy statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany\nand Member of the German Bundestag, 27 February 2022 in Berlin. https://www.bundesregierung. de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-\nand-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378. Accessed\n6\nMar\n2023. Scholz, Olaf. 2023. The global Zeitenwende: how to avoid a new cold war in a multipolar era. Foreig\nAffairs 102(1):22–38. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/node/1129585. Sears, David O. 1993. Symbolic politics: a socio-psychological theory. In Explorations in political ps\nchology, ed. Shanto Iyengar, William McGuire, 113–149. Duke University Press. K K 547 No Zeitenwende (yet): Early Assessment of German Public Opinion Toward Foreign and... Smith, Matthew. 2022. What impact has the Russian invasion of Ukraine had on European attitudes to\nNATO? YouGov Report. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2022/03/16/what-\nimpact-has-russian-invasion-ukraine-had-europ. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Sobel, Richard. 2001. The impact of public opinion on U.S. Foreign policy since Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford\nUniversity Press. Steinbrecher, Markus. 2018. Einigkeit macht stark! Erklärung von Einstellungen zur Gemeinsamen Sicher-\nheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. In Freiheit oder Sicherheit?, ed. Markus Steinbrecher, Heiko Biehl,\nEvelyn Bytzek, and Ulrich Rosar, 217–251. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. y\ny\np\ng\nSteinbrecher, Markus. 2022. Lebt der Kalte Krieg weiter? In Wahlen und politische Einstellungen in Ost-\nund Westdeutschland. Wahlen und politische Einstellungen, ed. Martin Elff, Kathrin Ackermann, and\nHeiko Giebler, 207–244. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Wike, Richard, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai. 2021. America’s\nimage abroad rebounds with transition from Trump to Biden. Pew research center. https://www. pewresearch.org/global/2021/06/10/americas-image-abroad-rebounds-with-transition-from-trump-\nto-biden/. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. to-biden/. Accessed 6 Mar 2023. Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1990. Faces of internationalism: public opinion and American foreign policy. Durham: Duke University Press. y\nWlezien, Christopher. 1995. The public as thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spen\nJournal of Political Science 39(4):981–1000. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111666. Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. The public as thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spending. America ristopher. 1995. The public as thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spending. American\nof Political Science 39(4):981–1000. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111666. p\np\ny\np\np\ng\nJournal of Political Science 39(4):981–1000. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111666. Journal of Political Science 39(4):981–1000. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111666. Zaller, John R. 1992. The nature and origins of mass opinion. p\ny\nAccessed 6 Mar 2023. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zaller, John R. 1992. The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. K K"