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the CSP.
Duration of authorisations and notices
3.51. An authorisation or notice becomes valid on the date upon which authorisation is granted or notice given. It is then valid for a maximum of one month. This means the conduct authorised should have been commenced or the notice served within that month.
3.52. All a... | 1 |
notice or authorisation may be appropriate include:
3.66. The use of urgent oral process must be justified for each application within an investigation or operation. The fact that any part of an investigation or operation is undertaken urgently must not be taken to mean that all requirements to obtain communications ... | 1 |
law powers to ensure judicial authorisation for communications data applications to determine journalistic sources.
3.79. Communications data that may be considered to determine journalistic sources includes data relating to:
3.80. Each authority must keep a central record of all occasions when such an application h... | 1 |
of communications data sought, for each notice given, or authorisation granted (including orally).
6.6. For each item of communications data included within a notice or authorisation, the relevant public authority must also keep a record of the following:
A. the Unique Reference Number (URN) allocated to the applica... | 1 |
be available for inspection by the Commissioner.
6.17. This section of the code cannot provide an exhaustive list of possible causes of reportable or recordable errors. Examples could include:
Reportable errors
Recordable errors
6.18. Reporting and recording of errors will draw attention to those aspects of the proc... | 1 |
ARDS
7.1. Communications data acquired or obtained under the provisions of RIPA, and all copies, extracts and summaries of it, must be handled and stored securely. In addition, the requirements of the DPA and its data protection principles must be adhered to.
7.2. Communications data that is obtained directly as a co... | 1 |
authority, it will be referred for consideration by the appropriate public authority in the UK. The application may then be considered and, if appropriate, executed by that public authority under section 22 of RIPA and in line with the guidance in this code of practice.
7.15. In order for a notice or authorisation to... | 1 |
code. Approval should be sought on a case by case basis at least ten working days prior to intended publication, stating whether the report is to be published in full, and, if not, stating which parts are to be published or how it is to be summarised.”
3. News Group and Others v. The Commissioner of Police of the Met... | 1 |
by a constable a judge is satisfied that one or other of the sets of access conditions is fulfilled, he may make an order under paragraph 4 below.
...
4. An order under this paragraph is an order that the person who appears to the judge to be in possession of the material to which the application relates shall—
(a) p... | 1 |
but no person can be compelled to give evidence at an oral hearing under Rule 9(3).
133. Rule 13 provides guidance on notification to the complainant of the IPT’s findings:
“(1) In addition to any statement under section 68(4) of the Act, the Tribunal shall provide information to the complainant in accordance with t... | 1 |
binding on it.
140. The IPT also considered the requirements in Rule 6 for the taking of evidence and disclosure. It concluded that these departures from the adversarial model were within the power conferred on the Secretary of State and compatible with Convention rights in Articles 8 and 10, taking account of the ex... | 1 |
to include inter alia oversight of operational activity and the wider intelligence and security activities of Government. Pursuant to sections 1-4 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, it consists of nine members drawn from both Houses of Parliament, and, in the exercise of their functions, those members are routinely... | 1 |
interception to ensure that they followed directly from the Certificate and valid national security requirements.
158. The ISC noted that communications data was central to most intelligence services’ investigations: it could be analysed to find patterns that reflected particular online behaviours associated with act... | 1 |
-to-date;
(c) The capability of the security and intelligence agencies to practice bulk collection of intercepted material and associated communications data should be retained, but only subject to strict additional safeguards including the authorisation of all warrants by a Judicial Commissioner at a new Independent ... | 1 |
powers contained in what was then the Investigatory Powers Bill (now the Investigatory Powers Act 2016: see paragraphs 195-201 below). Those powers related to bulk interception and the bulk acquisition of communications data, bulk equipment interference and the acquisition of bulk personal datasets.
174. The review w... | 1 |
(Masood, Abedi, Butt), like 72% of the total.
(c) One was a convert to Islam (Masood), like 16% of the total.
(d) Three resided in London (43% of the total) and one in North West England (10% of the total).
(e) Three (Masood, and to a more limited extent Abedi and Butt) were known to the police, like 38% of the tot... | 1 |
an interception agency included the following:
182. After each inspection, inspectors produced a report, including:
183. During 2016, the Commissioner’s office inspected all nine interception agencies once and the four main warrant-granting departments twice. This, together with extra visits to GCHQ, made a total of... | 1 |
applications included: lack of clarity; failure to link the crime to the communications address; and insufficient justification for collateral intrusion. Four percent of submitted applications were returned to applicants by designated persons for further development and one percent was rejected. The main reason for de... | 1 |
and examination of bulk personal datasets.
201. On 23 February 2017 the Home Office launched a public consultation on the five draft codes of practice it intends to issue under the 2016 Act (on the Interception of Communications, Equipment Interference, Bulk Communications Data Acquisition, Retention and Use of Bulk ... | 1 |
-discrimination: This principle connotes that data likely to give rise to unlawful and arbitrary discrimination should not be compiled. This includes information collated on racial or ethnic origin, colour, sex life, political opinions, religious, philosophical and other beliefs as well as membership of an association ... | 1 |
of domestic law giving effect to the basic principles set out in Articles 5 and 6 of this convention;
d. to have a remedy if a request for confirmation or, as the case may be, communication, rectification or erasure as referred to in paragraphs b and c of this article is not complied with.”
Article 9 – Exceptions and... | 1 |
February 1995, reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“2.4. Interference by public authorities with the content of a communication, including the use of listening or tapping devices or other means of surveillance or interception of communications, must be carried out only when this is provided for by law and constit... | 1 |
and application of the powers and procedures provided for in this Section are subject to conditions and safeguards provided for under its domestic law, which shall provide for the adequate protection of human rights and liberties, including rights arising pursuant to obligations it has undertaken under the 1950 Counci... | 1 |
contacts of journalists, provided that there were very strong reasons for doing so. It acknowledged, however, that the journalistic profession was not one which was easily identified, since NGOs were also engaged in building public opinion and even bloggers could claim to be entitled to equivalent protections.
216. F... | 1 |
balance between the individual’s right to privacy and the possibility for Member States to take the measures referred to in Article 15(1) of this Directive, necessary for the protection of public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the activities relate to State secur... | 1 |
2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU”) declared invalid the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC laying down the obligation on the providers of publicly available electronic communication services or of public communications networks to retain all traffic and location data for periods from six mon... | 1 |
not be compatible with that principle. In fact, it followed from the underlying logic of the Digital Rights judgment that legislation that established a general body of rules for the retention of communications data was in breach of the rights guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, unless that legislation was ... | 1 |
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
238. The Government argued that the applicants in the first and second of the... | 1 |
the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, §§ 62-63, Series A no. 80).
242. In any event, the applicants argued that there had been no change of circumstances such as would make the IPT an effective remedy. In particular, they relied upon the arguments made by the applicants in the third of the joined cases in support of thei... | 3 |
§ 66).
247. There is, however, no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Vučković and Others, cited above, §§ 73-74 and Sejdovic v. It... | 1 |
(the general compliance complaint). The Court held that the proceedings before the IPT had been Article 6 compliant, since any procedural restrictions were proportionate to the need to keep secret sensitive and confidential information and did not impair the very essence of the applicant’s right to a fair trial. With ... | 1 |
order to achieve this goal. It could therefore be said that the IPT, as the only tribunal with jurisdiction to obtain and review “below the waterline” material, is not only the sole body capable of elucidating the general operation of a surveillance regime; it is also the sole body capable of determining whether that ... | 1 |
there had been a violation of their rights, it nonetheless made a clear statement that their rights had been infringed” and a change in the law subsequently occurred (see Anthony France and Others, cited above, §§ 43-46).
261. Finally, to cite an earlier example, in Paton and Others v. Poole Borough Council, Case Nos... | 1 |
the IPT which the Government have relied on as evidence of its effectiveness as a remedy post-dates the introduction before this Court – on 4 September 2013 and 11 September 2014 – of the complaints made by the applicants in the first and second of the joined cases. For example, the main judgment in the Liberty procee... | 1 |
communications, there was no clear definition of “internal” and “external” communications, and in any event modern technological developments had rendered the distinction between the two meaningless. While the Secretary of State was required to provide descriptions of the material he considered it necessary to examine... | 1 |
properly for States to judge what was necessary to protect the general community from such threats. While those systems were subject to the Court’s scrutiny, it had consistently – and rightly – afforded States a broad margin of appreciation in this field so as not to undermine the effectiveness of systems for obtainin... | 1 |
. If an analyst then wished to select material for examination, paragraphs 7.14-7.16 of the IC Code required that he or she create a record setting out why access was required and proportionate, consistent with the applicable certificate, and stating any circumstances likely to give rise to a degree of collateral infri... | 1 |
the intelligence services and potentially threaten the lives of covert human intelligence sources close to the suspect. It would also be wholly impractical in the section 8(4) context, since many of the targets would be overseas and their personal details might be unknown or imperfectly known.
(b) The submissions of ... | 1 |
) regime for the principle of legal professional privilege. In particular, the regime permitted the interception of legally privileged and confidential communications between lawyers and clients, even when both were in the United Kingdom. It also permitted the routine collection of metadata attaching to such communicat... | 1 |
power: the nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have their communications intercepted; a limit on the duration of interception; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken whe... | 1 |
, 1 July 2008.
312. In Weber and Saravia the applicants complained about the process of strategic monitoring under the amended G10 Act, which authorised the monitoring of international wireless telecommunications. Signals emitted from foreign countries were monitored by interception sites situated on German soil with ... | 1 |
is more likely to result in the acquisition and examination of a large volume of his or her communications. In any event, although the Court would agree that the additional requirements proposed by the applicants might constitute important safeguards in some cases, for the reasons set out below it does not consider it... | 1 |
§ 92). Accordingly, the Court will examine the justification for any interference in the present case by reference to the six minimum requirements, adapting them where necessary to reflect the operation of a bulk interception regime. It will also have regard to the additional relevant factors which it identified in Ro... | 1 |
Court concurs with several of the aforementioned domestic reports that RIPA and the accompanying surveillance framework are extremely complex, in the present case it will concentrate on the requirements of “foreseeability” and “necessity”.
- The scope of application of secret surveillance measures
328. The first two... | 1 |
anticipated or difficult to define in advance. Finally, the Interception of Communications Commissioner had clarified that in practice “national security” allowed surveillance of activities which threatened the safety or well-being of the State and activities which were intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary ... | 1 |
340. This does not mean that selectors and search criteria need to be made public; nor does it mean that they necessarily need to be listed in the warrant ordering interception. In fact, in the Liberty proceedings the IPT found that the inclusion of the selectors in the warrant or accompanying certificate would “unne... | 1 |
suggest that the intelligence services are abusing their powers – on the contrary, the Interception of Communications Commissioner observed that the selection procedure was carefully and conscientiously undertaken by analysts (see paragraph 179 above) –, the Court is not persuaded that the safeguards governing the sel... | 1 |
above), traffic data includes information identifying the location of equipment when a communication is, has been or may be made or received (such as the location of a mobile phone); information identifying the sender or recipient (including copy recipients) of a communication from data comprised in or attached to the... | 1 |
As already noted, analysts may only examine material which appears on the automatically generated index. Prior to analysts being able to read, look at or listen to material on the index, they must make a record of why access to the material is necessary for one of the statutory purposes set out in section 5(3) of RIP... | 1 |
and must be returned to the issuing agency or securely destroyed when no longer needed (see paragraph 90 above).
368. The Court considered very similar provisions in Kennedy; although paragraph 7.5 is new, paragraphs 7.3, 7.4 and 7.6 in the 2016 IC Code are identical to paragraphs 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 of the previous ver... | 1 |
was to be delivered to the Commissioner (see paragraph 54 above).
374. Therefore, in the Court’s view the provisions on the erasure and destruction of intercept material are also sufficiently clear.
- Supervision, notification and remedies
375. Supervision of the regime is carried out at a number of levels. First o... | 1 |
IPT’s legal rulings further enhances the level of scrutiny afforded to secret surveillance activities in the United Kingdom (see Kennedy, cited above, § 167).
380. In any case, the Court notes that under the new Investigatory Powers Act 2016 warrants will have to be approved by judicial commissioners following their ... | 1 |
parties’ submissions
390. The Government argued that the applicants could not claim to be victims of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention since they could not possibly have been affected by the intelligence sharing regime. They did not contend, and had put forward no evidential bas... | 1 |
Although the United States of America is not the only country from which the authorities of the respondent State might request intelligence, the submissions before this Court – and before the IPT – focused on the receipt of information from the NSA. While PRISM is a targeted scheme which allows intelligence material t... | 1 |
, and it was necessary and proportionate to obtain it. In the absence of a warrant, a request could only be made if it did not amount to a deliberate circumvention, or otherwise frustrate the objectives, of RIPA. Furthermore, any request made in the absence of a warrant would be decided on by the Secretary of State per... | 1 |
by a non-Contracting State if they were acting in organised and structured forms of co-operation; and that, pursuant to Article 16, a Contracting State could be responsible for mass surveillance conducted by a non-Contracting State if it contributed to the surveillance programme and had actual or constructive knowledg... | 1 |
communications are being intercepted by foreign intelligence agencies, their interception could only engage the responsibility of the respondent State if it was exercising authority or control over those agencies (see, for example, Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 47708/08, §§ 139 and 151 ECHR 2014 and Al-Skeini an... | 1 |
specifically permits the exchange of material between the United States and the United Kingdom. More generally, the SSA (see paragraphs 98-99 above) and the ISA (see paragraphs 100-103 above) set out the function of the intelligence services and require that there be arrangements for ensuring that no information is ob... | 1 |
) of the OSA (see paragraph 107 above) if he discloses, without lawful authority, any information relating to security or intelligence which is, or has been, in his possession by virtue of his position.
432. More specifically, Chapter 12 of the IC Code makes it clear that where intercepted communications content or co... | 1 |
.8 of the IC Code require that every copy (together with any extracts and summaries) be destroyed securely as soon as retention is no longer necessary for any of the section 5(3) purposes (see paragraphs 74 and 90 above).
(ζ) Supervision and remedies
441. In nearly every case either a section 8(1) or 8(4) warrant wil... | 1 |
the material transferred should only be able to be searched if all the material requirements of a national search were fulfilled and this was duly authorised in the same way as a search of bulk material obtained by the signals intelligence agency using its own techniques – is met by the respondent State’s regime. The ... | 1 |
A permitted the obtaining of communications data in a wide range of ill-defined circumstances, without proper safeguards. In particular, they submitted that the legal framework and attendant safeguards were informed by a fundamental but erroneous premise; namely, that the obtaining of communications data was necessaril... | 1 |
Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Settinger and Others (Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12), the CJEU considered the validity of the Data Retention Directive, and in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Watson and Others (C-698/15), the validity of domestic legislation containing the same provisions as tha... | 1 |
as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, t... | 1 |
and authorisation could only be granted by a judge or other independent adjudicative body.
478. The applicants submitted that as journalists involved in matters of public interest, who were exercising a role of public watchdog, the protection afforded by Article 10 was of critical importance to them.
479. In respect... | 1 |
National Union of Journalists (“NUJ”) and the International Federation of Journalists (“IFJ”)
485. The NUJ and the IFJ submitted that the confidentiality of sources was indispensable for press freedom. They also expressed concern about the possible sharing of data retained by the United Kingdom with other countries. ... | 1 |
the section 8(4) regime.
491. For the reasons set out in respect of the Article 8 complaint, the Court considers that – save for its concerns about the oversight of the selection process and the safeguards applicable to the selection of related communications data (see paragraph 387 above) – the section 8(4) regime w... | 1 |
paragraph 467 above).
498. The Court acknowledges that the Chapter II regime affords enhanced protection where data is sought for the purpose of identifying a journalist’s source, In particular, paragraph 3.77 of the ACD Code provides that where an application is intended to determine the source of journalistic infor... | 1 |
“relevant or had been relied on in the course of an investigation”.
505. In their third party intervention, the ENNHRI submitted that the principle of equality of arms – being a core aspect of Article 6 of the Convention – was incompatible with the exclusion of one party from a hearing in which the other participates... | 1 |
as such, does not indicate any lack of rigour in the judicial process.
513. Accordingly, the Court considers that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION COMBI... | 6 |
applicants in the second of the joined cases the sum of EUR 35,000 for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
525. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage poin... | 6 |
. I have voted, and agree, with the majority as regards points 1 to 3 of the operative provisions of the judgment, which concern the admissibility of the complaints. I have also joined the majority in finding a violation of Article 8 in respect of both the section 8(4) regime and the Chapter II regime. As regards the ... | 1 |
some ten per cent of all telecommunications were conducted by wireless means, and thus potentially subject to monitoring. In practice, monitoring was restricted to a limited number of foreign countries. The telephone connections of the State’s own (i.e. German) nationals living abroad could not be monitored directly. ... | 1 |
of the checks and balances which underpin adherence to the rule of law and democratic governance.
(iii) Concerns
16. In line with the majority, I agree that the Contracting States must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining whether the protection of national security requires the kind of surveillance of ... | 1 |
any abuse of the surveillance. Under such circumstances, given the potential intrusiveness of the surveillance and the abundant risks of abuse, I consider that it cannot be appropriate that all the ex ante safeguards remain in the hands of the executive. I think the applicants are right to argue that there is a need f... | 1 |
from those prevailing today. That position was later, in Weber and Saravia, carried over to a surveillance regime which did have more similarities with the RIPA section 8(4) regime but nevertheless operated in conditions very different from those prevailing in the modern digitalised societies. For the reasons outlined... | 1 |
in theory and practice” and “capable of offering redress to applicants complaining of both specific incidences of surveillance and the general Convention compliance of surveillance regimes” (§ 265). Consequently, applicants before this Court will be expected to have exhausted this domestic remedy before the Court has ... | 1 |
28 June 1984, §§ 62-63, Series A no. 80, that in light of any finding by the Court to the effect that the IPT is an effective remedy, they would now be required to go back and exhaust unless it would be unjust to require them to do so. As these applicants’ complaints concern the general operation of the impugned regim... | 1 |
conclusion by the IPT as to whether or not they satisfied the requirements of Article 8 (or could be made to satisfy the requirements of Article 8 by means of further disclosure akin to that ordered on 9 October 2014 in the proceedings brought by the applicants in the third of the joined applications). This would plai... | 1 |
other hand, this Court has, at least since the 1978 judgment of the Plenary Court in Klass and Others v. Germany, Series A no. 28, consistently protected the right to the protection of personal data under Article 8 of the Convention. In any event, in Ben Faiza v. France, no. 31446/12, 8 February 2018, which was decide... | 1 |
receiver within the respective State at the point of collection;
(f) allows for the communication of intercept product not only to other states but also to “international organisations” (not further defined) where that is “not prevented by secrecy and if necessary for the FRA to perform its activities within internat... | 1 |
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF ALVES v. PORTUGAL
(Application no. 34939/12)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 January 2014
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Alves v. Portugal,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), s... | 2 |
of the enforcement proceedings, which is beyond the control of domestic authorities (see Gomes Almeida Henriques Moura v. Portugal (dec.), no. 43146/11, § 22, 12 March 2013). This period of time should be deducted from the overall length of proceedings which thus lasted five years, five months and fourteen days for th... | 6 |
EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Centr... | 4 |
FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF GRABIŃSKI v. POLAND
(Application no. 43702/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
17 October 2006
FINAL
17/01/2007
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Gr... | 2 |
was transferred to the City of Warsaw.
13. On 29 June 1993 the Board of the Union of Warsaw Municipalities (Zarząd Związku Dzielnic Gmin Warszawy) issued a decision declaring that as of 5 December 1990 the “Syrena” Warsaw Tourist Company was granted the right of perpetual use of the plot of land no. 39 with a surface... | 3 |
that the application for the annulment of the latter decision had failed. The applicant appealed against that decision.
22. On 24 March 1998 the Local Government Board of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and remitted the case for re-examination.
23. On 19 June 1998 the applicant filed with the Board of Appeal a ... | 3 |
2003 the applicant informed the Board that he intended to use the plot of land at issue in accordance with the local development plan.
39. On 9 December 2003 the Mayor of Warsaw, who in the meantime had assumed the competences of the Board of the City of Warsaw, issued his decision in the case. He refused the applica... | 3 |
. It considered that the use of the plot of land at issue by the successors of the former owners would not be incompatible with the local development plan.
52. On 7 June 2002 the Warsaw District Office informed the applicant that it would not be possible to conclude the proceedings within the time-limit specified in A... | 3 |
into force. According to the provisions of section 17 of the 1995 Act, a party to administrative proceedings may, at any time, lodge with the Supreme Administrative Court a complaint about inactivity on the part of an authority obliged to issue an administrative decision.
Section 26 of the Law provides:
“When a compla... | 3 |
Supreme Administrative Court to impose a fine on the Board of the City of Warsaw for the non-enforcement of that court’s judgment of 11 December 1998.
71. However, the Court notes that the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 11 December 1998 quashed two decisions issued by the Minister of Planning and Con... | 3 |
it considers that this in itself cannot justify the overall length of the proceedings.
80. As regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court, having regard to the available evidence, does not find it established that the applicant contributed to the delays in the proceedings.
81. As regards the conduct of the relev... | 6 |
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 October 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. EarlyNicolas BratzaRegistrarPresident
| 4 |
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF M.A. v. AUSTRIA
(Application no. 4097/13)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
15 January 2015
FINAL
15/04/2015
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of M.A. v. Austria,
The ... | 2 |
any reasons.
A. Proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) and proceedings in Austria concerning custody of the applicant’s daughter
14. The applicant applied for assistance to secure his daughter’s return under the Hague Convention. His... | 1 |
Convention.
29. On 20 January 2010 the Leoben Regional Court quashed that decision and granted the applicant’s request for enforcement.
30. The Leoben Regional Court noted that under Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIa Regulation a judgment refusing return under Article 13 of the Hague Convention was irrelevant where ... | 1 |
to be stayed. Referring to that decision, the applicant asked the Leoben District Court to order his daughter’s return to Italy.
37. The applicant claimed that he had offered to make accommodation (apparently a flat belonging to him) available to D.P. and his daughter, but that the Leoben District Court had found tha... | 1 |
Regional Court noted that the award of custody made by the Judenburg District Court on 8 March 2010 could not prevent the enforcement of the Venice Youth Court’s judgment. The latter had retained its competence to rule on custody matters, as D.P. had unlawfully removed the child to Austria and the applicant had made a... | 1 |
proceedings and, on 30 April 2013, requested that the parties submit their views within two weeks in order to reach a comprehensive solution for the benefit of the child. According to the Government, the applicant refused to contribute to that process.
57. In a decision of 20 May 2013 the Wiener Neustadt District Cou... | 1 |
reasonable direct coercion. Direct coercion may only be applied by court organs and is in practice entrusted to specially trained bailiffs. According to the Supreme Court’s case-law, the use of direct coercion, meaning the physical taking away of the child, is possible as a measure of last resort for the implementatio... | 1 |
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