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Gone was the “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build”, and in was the race to slap something together with bailing wire and duct-tape until our then 2011 (and now 2014 thankfully) drive to whatever will be our version of the Friendship Bridge. Defeat, like decline, is more often than not a choice. In AFG, it |
is/was unquestionably a choice. We threw away a good chance for an acceptable outcome the minute we told our enemies, and more importantly our friends and those on the fence, that we lacked the strategic patience to follow through on our promises, creating in essence a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure. |
They have seen this before. As the cliche states, “Hope is not a plan.” In war, hope is a path to self-delusion and defeat. So it has always been, so it will always be. In the executive summary from the International Crisis Group’s, Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the |
2014 Transition, they cut right to the chase; Plagued by factionalism and corruption, Afghanistan is far from ready to assume responsibility for security when U.S. and NATO forces withdraw in 2014. That makes the political challenge of organising a credible presidential election and transfer of power from President Kar... |
a successor that year all the more daunting. A repeat of previous elections’ chaos and chicanery would trigger a constitutional crisis, lessening chances the present political dispensation can survive the transition. In the current environment, prospects for clean elections and a smooth transition are slim. The elector... |
in bureaucratic confusion, institutional duplication and political machinations. Electoral officials indicate that security and financial concerns will force the 2013 provincial council polls to 2014. There are alarming signs Karzai hopes to stack the deck for a favoured proxy. Demonstrating at least will to ensure cle... |
degree of national consensus and boost popular confidence, but steps toward a stable transition must begin now to prevent a precipitous slide toward state collapse. Time is running out. Yes, our timing is that bad. Quiet planning should, nonetheless, begin now for the contingencies of postponed elections and/or imposit... |
a state of emergency in the run up to or during the presidential campaign season in 2014. The international community must work with the government to develop an action plan for the possibility that elections are significantly delayed or that polling results lead to prolonged disputes or a run-off. The |
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) should likewise be prepared to organise additional support to Afghan forces as needed in the event of an election postponement or state of emergency; its leadership would also do well to assess its own force protection needs in such an event well in advance of |
the election. Does anyone see a ISAF, post-USA withdraw, getting involved in AFG domestic police actions? Really? No, they/we won’t. The Taliban also know we won’t. They know we have left the field for them, and they are patient. We no longer have the ability or will to break their |
back, and with only one more fighting season left until we are totally focused on withdraw – we can’t. I am reminded of one of the heartbreaking scenes – for a military professional – from the 1984 movie, The Killing Fields. In the background as Dith Pran and Sydney Schanberg |
watch the fighting between Khmer National Armed Forces and the Khmer Rouge, we see Tom Bird’s US military adviser character do what he can to push his Cambodian forces on, to let them know that the USA was with them. Pointing to himself (in bold below); 00:27:00 What did he |
say? 00:27:01 He said he thought all American people left already. 00:27:05 Made in the USA. 00:27:10 Are we winning? 00:27:12 No, you’re not winning. We have seen this before, and so have those who were our friends. Much more will be written about our AFG experience over the next |
couple of decades. Somewhere there is a young man or woman who will be the next McMaster, who will cut their PhD teeth on how this all came apart. How a conscious decision was made to slide from a position of strength and progress to one of weakness, vacillation, insecurity, |
and decline. Why thousands of years of sound military experience was thrown away one evening in New York State, pretending that the lessons of history didn’t apply to us. We thought that because it was spoken, so it would be done; that hope and luck would beat the calender and |
patience. Through it all, the silence of “make it happen” marched forward in to the maw, again. Rest assured, we won’t be leaving these problems behind in AFG. No, then enemy has a vote – and they too have seen this before. “There is this narrative coming out of Washington |
Pakistan, as a rationale of getting us out of the longest war. We have been lulled into believing that the perils are in the past: “You’re not listening to what the people who are fighting you say about this fight. In your arrogance, you think you write the script.” The |
Taliban and al Qaeda, she made clear, “want to destroy the West and us,” and we must fight fire with fire, She appeared to leave the assembled alternatively riveted and just a bit troubled by a critique with interventionist implications clearly drawn from her reporting. When you have the person |
who just tried to kill you on the ground, with your knee on his chest and your knife at his throat, but then you get off and try to walk away without finishing the job – should you be shocked when he gets up and attacks you? Should you be |
shocked if he does not stop his attack simply because you stopped it? Will he stop if you cry uncle? If you bow, apologize, and plead? So there we are; we have emphasized the meme of the weak horse, and the butcher’s bill will be dear because of it. What |
is the solution? Frankly, I think it is too late to get back to where we were in late 2009. We are almost three years in to the signal of retreat that we sent. Those allied nations in ISAF who have not already left will soon. Those AFG on the |
fence have already made plans and associations with our enemies to protect the interests of their families, villages, and tribes in the expectation that we will abandon them. Smart move, if I were them I would do the same thing. A precursor to the Soviet withdraw were their version of |
Green on Blue – the AFG remember that and are seeing it again. They have indications and warnings too. Could the NOV USA election change anything? No. With the lack of top-level support and enthusiasm for the mission, the American people lost whatever will they had to aggressively sustain operations |
in AFG – and with much of the uplift gone and force levels back to late-’09/early-’10 levels and falling, that momentum is gone and even if the will was there – it would be difficult to get back. We are at the point now where the die is cast. This |
version of the war in AFG for USA forces will soon be over regardless, by design. All that remains is to see if we drive across our version of the Friendship Bridge, or leave in a helo under fire; all the while doing our best to avoid Gandamak. Until then, |
there are things that can be done on the margins, but one question remains; if we are not in this to win it – do we have the political will, rules of engagement, and operational plan to create the effects on the ground to further our national interests besides just |
“getting out?” Is, “Do the best we can until the summer of 2014 and then wish them luck.” now by default our Mission Statement? Has the military leadership been realistic about what can be achieved inside the POLMIL guidance it has received? What Decisive Points have we achieved in our |
Lines of Operation? Are they in-line with expected time-line dates? What about our Effects Matrix? District by District, Province by Province – is the Afghan government on, behind, or ahead of schedule to take over security responsibilities? Are the criteria used to determine that status tighter or looser than they |
were three years ago? Yes, much of that is classified – but it won’t be forever. This story will be told, and people will be held to account. If history is any guide, that won’t mean much to the thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or millions who will |
die because we did not finish what we started. The last time we abandoned a nation like this, the losses were in the millions. After noting the loss of Lt. Col. Raible and Sgt. Atwellt in the attack a week ago, it is natural for many to point out the |
irreplaceable nature of the AV-8B+ Harriers that were destroyed – our greatest loss of aircraft since the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. While true, that is just the background. It is also true that every loss of life is significant, but in time except for those who know them – losses |
become a number or perhaps a thumbnail picture. It is helpful when the opportunity presents itself to look a little deeper in to a loss. What was the character of those lost? What did they represent? What impact did they have on those they served with, the organizations they led, |
the services they were members of, and the nation that they gave the ultimate sacrifice? Thanks to our friends over at SLD – we have a copy of Lt. Col Raible’s Command Guidance. Read it. Ponder it. Compare it to your own. If you are someone soon to take Command |
and are working on one; here is your benchmark. From: Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 211 To: Squadron Attack Pilots Subj: COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE FOR SQUADRON ATTACK PILOTS 1. Professional hunger. My goal is to identify those Officers who want to be professional attack pilots and dedicate the resources require... |
build them into the flight leaders and instructors that are required for the long-term health of our community. This is not a socialist organization. We will not all be equal in terms of quals and flight hours. Some will advance faster than others, and because this is not a union, |
your rate of advancement will have nothing to do with seniority. Your rate of advancement will instead be determined by your hunger, professionalism, work ethic, and performance. If flying jets and supporting Marines is your passion and your profession, you are in the right squadron. If these things are viewed |
simply as your job, please understand that I must invest for the future in others. Your time in a gun squadron might be limited, so it is up to you to make the most of the opportunities that are presented. 2. Professional focus. Our approach to aviation is based upon |
the absolute requirement to be “brilliant in the basics.” Over the last few years Marine TACAIR has not punted the tactical nearly so often as the admin. Sound understanding of NATOPS, aircraft systems, and SOPs is therefore every bit as important as your understanding of the ANTTP and TOPGUN. With |
this in mind, ensure the admin portions of your plan are solid before you move onto objective area planning. Once you begin tactical planning, remember that keeping things “simple and easy to execute” will usually be your surest path to success. If the plan is not safe, it is not |
tactically sound. I firmly believe in the phrase “hire for attitude, train for skill.” Work ethic, willingness to accept constructive criticism, and a professional approach to planning, briefing, and debriefing will get you 90% of the way towards any qualification or certification you are pursuing. The other 10% is com... |
of in-flight judgment and performance, and that will often come as a result of the first 90%. Seek to learn from your own mistakes and the mistakes of others. Just as a championship football team debriefs their game film, we are going to analyze our tapes and conduct thorough flight |
debriefs. It has often been said that the success of a sortie is directly proportional to the caliber of the plan and brief. The other side of this coin is that the amount of learning that takes place as a result of a sortie is directly proportional to the caliber |
of the debrief. 4. Moral courage. Speak up if something seems wrong or unsafe. We all know what the standards are supposed to be in Naval Aviation and in the Corps. Enforce them! When we fail to enforce the existing standards, we are actually setting and enforcing a new standard |
that is lower. If you average one hour per workday studying, 6 months from now you will be brilliant. That is all it takes; one hour per day. As you start to notice the difference between yourself and those who are unable to find 60 minutes, I want you to |
know that I will have already taken note. Then, I want you to ask yourself this question: “How good could I be if I really gave this my all?” 6. When all else fades away, attack pilots have one mission: provide offensive air support for Marines. The Harrier community needs |
professional attack pilots who can meet this calling. It does not require you to abandon your family. It does not require you to work 16 hours per day, six days per week. It requires only a few simple commitments to meet this calling: be efficient with your time at work |
so that you can study one hour per day; be fully prepared for your sorties and get the maximum learning possible out of every debrief; have thick skin and be willing to take constructive criticism; find one weekend per month to go on cross country. When you are given the |
opportunity to advance, for those few days go to the mat and give it your all, 100%, at the expense of every other thing in your life. To quote Roger Staubach, “there are no traffic jams on the extra mile.” If you can be efficient during the workweek, give an |
Olympian effort for check rides and certifications, and are a team player, the sky will literally be the limit for you in this squadron. C. K. RAIBLE A half-decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, a top-down movement started to take root in the US Navy around a word; |
transformation. The Transformationalists gained steam as they were swept up in the mid-90s Zeitgeist; all was new and now was the time to make a new Navy. With the end of the existential threat of global Communism, technology’s promise of Moore’s Law, and with the self-esteem and optimism that their |
generation felt as they first gained the reins of power from the White House to the first GOFOs – this was the time where, yes, all was new – in a fashion. There were challenges though. In the pre-9/11 Pentagon, the post Cold War was one of lean budgets and |
an expensive to maintain legacy Fleet. Each new ship and each new program put greater demands on a already strained budgetary pie. How do you sail in to the future with, as you see it, a sea-anchor of the past holding you back? Even with a larger budget, as the |
Navy fed off the fat of the Cold War Fleet – how do you get the Fleet of tomorrow? With challenges comes opportunities the saying goes, all that was needed was a vision. Decades, indeed centuries, of best practices of shipbuilding and aircraft development – how to build them, maintain |
them, and man them – were showing one path of requirements and a way forward; but that was a hard story – one that made beloved new theories come away bruised and battered. On that path to that still undefined “there” one thing was clear – we could not get |
“there” from “here” with the money in hand and the numbers in mind. If experience, history, and best practice told us what we did not want to hear, there was but one thing to do – ignore that reality and create a new one. From such was born Transformationalism. By |
selective hearing, blinkered optimism, para-scientific concepts, faith, a dose of hope in the best case scenario, and even more importantly – the force of personality – we thought would get “there.” Our Navy would be transformed – a Navy based on New Technology, New Networks, New Manning, New Training, and |
New Maintenance; the PowerPoint gods had it written; therefor it would be done. There is a fine line between institutional optimism, overconfidence, and arrogance. When facts are brushed aside and history ignored, and instead you gird your future with untested theory and hope – you have to play the odds. |
As an institution we decided in that brief period in time that now was the time, it was a moment that a generation needed to grab hold of an institution and Transform it; to steer not in to – but away from the skid and see what the odds brought. |
“Don’t you want to take a leap of faith? Or become an old man, filled with regret, waiting to die alone!” — Saito, from the movie Inception. And so we threw away the charts, put the radar in to stand-by, and we sailed forth in to the sea of New |
Technology, New Networks, New Manning, New Training, and New Maintenance. Who was to ride the wave of Transformationalism and have a front-row seat? Naturally, those who would make it happen would be those Captains who at the turn of the century would make Flag and would spend the next dozen |
that brought about such programs as cruiser development in the 1920s and 1930s, and surface-to-air missiles from the 1950s through Aegis. They would have seen how it was done, knew how it was done. What have those individuals who have rode that path seen? In a moment of candor – |
what do they have to say at the end of their travel? What fruits have come from the tree of Transformationalism? 4-star Admirals come and go. Some leave larger footprints than others, and today one of the size-13 4-stars has re-joined the civilian world; Admiral Harvey – welcome to the |
other side – and thank you for your service. Like one of his predecessor 4-stars from another service – Admiral Harvey has left those who are taking over the watch a gift, if they want to take it. Earlier this month, Admiral Harvey sent out an email to the other |
SWO Flag Officers. I encourage you to read the whole thing; The Fundamentals of Surface Warfare: Sailors and Ships and read the embedded attachments. The past few years have been a serious wake-up call for our surface force. We discovered that the cumulative impact of individual decisions made over long |
periods of time, driven by unique and widely varying circumstances, had put the future readiness of our surface force at risk. Prepare yourself, because a decade of manpower, maintenance, and programmatic sacred cows are about to be brought to task by one of the ones who raised them. We shifted |
our primary focus away from Sailors and Ships – the fundamentals of surface warfare – to finding efficiencies/reducing costs in order to fund other important efforts such as recapitalization. We took our eyes off the ball of the main thing for which we were responsible – maintaining the wholeness and |
operational effectiveness of the surface force. Because readiness trends develop and evidence themselves over years and not months, shifting our primary focus to individual cost-cutting measures gave us a very myopic view of our surface force and the way ahead; institutionally, we essentially walked into the future loo... |
feet. Institutionally, there was a culture that had you keep your head down, and your mouth shut. Who created that culture, and why? There is also that “f” word; “fundamentals” – that most ignored concept as of late but the record is clear; the naval gods of the copybook headings |
are calling for their offerings. Ignoring fundamentals in manning, maintenance, and program management were all warned of, why were they dismissed? Did we grow an appreciative and rewarding environment of operational excellence – or did we grow and reward administrative bureaucratic bloat? Did we function as a learning... |
on operational readiness – “we are ready NOW” – that have been at the very foundation of our surface force since its beginnings. … and what did we do to those who objected to this outgrowth from the cheap grace of b-school management books and silly 2-week Outward Bound MBA |
seminars? Simple – they either shut up or were professionally told to follow the sign to Ausfahrt. How many people did we promote that didn’t have a deckplate culture (months at sea, hours in the cockpit) – but did have other things non-related to performance at sea or in the |
aircraft? What were those things we valued so much, and why? The flawed process is just a byproduct of a more critical problem, a flawed culture. When the assumptions behind the man, train, equip and maintain decisions did not prove valid, we didn’t revisit our decisions and adjust course as |
required. In short, we didn’t routinely, rigorously and thoroughly evaluate the products of the plans we were executing. There you have your answer. Again, the word of the day; why? Part of the answer is an undercurrent to the entire Transformationalist movement; their totalitarian opposition to dissent. They abused th... |
very important military concept – keep your differences quiet outside closed doors. That is a great thing for war – but a recipe for failure outside a no-kidding war war. The institutional cancer of promoting a culture of loyalty to individuals over institutions, I would offer, is north of 51% |
of the answer to the above, “Why?” Those assumptions were evaluated and found wanting many times over the last decade … and those results were ignored and/or suppressed. Little action was taken for reasons related to needs of individuals temporarily in positions of power, not the institution’s long term viability. |
We shifted maintenance ashore, scaled back our shipboard 3M program and reduced our preventive maintenance requirements to fit a smaller workforce, and then failed to fully fund the shore maintenance capacity we required. The result was optimally-manned ships that we could not maintain to the performance and reliabilit... |
previously mandated in order to achieve mission success over service life. This result became apparent with the increase in the failure rate of the INSURV Material Inspection, the “gold standard” inspection which measures the performance of our Sailors and their ships against the established standards required to susta... |
mission effectiveness over the life of the ship. How did we respond to this? We made INSURV classified in order to further hide the problem, and protect the tender egos of those who helped create the problem. That may sound a bit harsh, but it is the only answer that |
can survive the follow-up question. Here is one of the best parts of the email – one everyone should read twice. Now in discussing these issues with you, I want to acknowledge up front that I realize how much more I could have done to fully evaluate the impact the |
actions I’ve described to you had on our surface force’s overall mission effectiveness. Looking back on my time as a Flag officer, I can see that I focused too exclusively on the tasks and responsibilities immediately at hand and did not take sufficient time to “step off the pitcher’s mound” |
and reflect more broadly on the Navy-wide/community-wide impact of what we were doing. And, when we did gather together as community leaders, we did not get to the heart of the matter: our Sailors and our ships and their collective readiness to carry out our assigned Title 10 missions. I |
could have done better. We could have done better. You MUST do better, because now we know better. I was guilty too. On active duty, I allowed myself to be shut up. Why? Complicated answer for myself, so I won’t pretend to know it for someone else either – but |
I do know what the culture was that drove me to shut up. Even at his level, I think Admiral Harvey was in the same culture. … our TYCOMs, ISICs and ships must be focused first and foremost on EFFECTIVENESS – if it’s cheap, efficient, but doesn’t work, it does |
us no good. If our budgets drop, we may certainly have to do less; but whatever it is we decide to do, we must do it well. If it is expensive, inefficient, and doesn’t work – then it is doubly no good. I am not sure we were focused on |
“cheap.” LPD-17 and its titanium fire mains were not cheap. LCS as a littoral corvette is far from cheap. The pocket battleship sized Zumwalt “Destroyers” are not cheap. I’m not sure what we have tried to make that is cheap in the last couple of decades. F-35? No. F-18? Well, |
they are cheaper than the alternative … but they do work at least. Here is another quote that is valuable and deserves great reflection in our Flag Officers; The absolute accountability of our COs for the performance of their ships and Sailors is the sure foundation for the performance of |
our Navy under the most challenging conditions imaginable. We know that the concept works. So why did we so readily walk away from an approach that had accountability at its foundation with regards to how we deliver combat capabilities to the Fleet? Yep. Accountability up? Spotty record there. Towards the |
end, there is a call for an about-face to what is already the dying concept of Transformationalism; Re-establishing the fundamentals of how we train, how we equip, and how we operate and then putting those responsible to deliver on those fundamentals back under accountable officers in the chain-of-command … for |
the sake of our surface force and our Sailors, be ruthless in the maintenance of our standards and keep your focus where it MUST be – on our ships and Sailors. … That is a good start. Some may say that Admiral Harvey’s call is too late, perhaps – but |
that does not matter. Is he now an anti-transformationalist? I don’t know, but he’s trending that way at least. I will give him the benefit of the doubt, and all should welcome the message of this email. The higher you go, the larger the Sword of Damocles is … but |
of course no one but the person in the seat can see it. As most everyone does – he did the best he could for the country and Navy he served, and he did it better than most. We should hope that this letter is the start of an ongoing |
conversation, not just by Admiral Harvey as he adopts the suit and tie, but by those in uniform as well. There is a lot of ruin in a navy as big as the US Navy. Regardless of well intentioned mistakes of the past, there is still plenty of excellence left |
to build a better Navy from. Let us repair and redirect the damage done as we move forward from the last couple of decades of poor concepts and cultural warping. If the larger Navy community is looking for a starting point for that conversation – Admiral Harvey has provided us |
one to use; we should accept it in the manner it was offered and get to work. When does a leader need to backoff – and when does a leader need to get in to fine-granularity leadership? The more senior a leader gets – what is a constructive level of |
detail? This time around this habit gained steam with “Intrusive Leadership” and the belief in that if we have a long enough shafted screwdriver with a finely engineered head, then by-golly we can get things right! Is it people or process? A bit of both? Perhaps. Is it required, or |
relief, while those at the giving end believe that the more they do of the same, the further away from what is needed they find themselves. Everyone is frustrated, and results suffer. This week over at my homeblog, we’ve had a little fun with CNSL’s SHIPS ROUTINE message, but in |
all seriousness shouldn’t one ask; is this an efficient and effective way of doing business at that level? It brings up two broad questions; are we excessively micro-managing our leaders from the highest levels, and are we making prudent use of Record Message Traffic? As I understand it, the message |
we highlighted is just one of a series that’s been getting rolled out this summer (the first being about small arms), and the messages are just the *highlights* from the upcoming re-publication of SURFLANT Regulations. It is a good thing to update and clarify how things should be done … |
but do we really need CNSL to put out a messages (as opposed to regulations promulgated via different means) that prescribes details so minor they wouldn’t even make it in to the POD? Is that a good habit for others to copy? ALL COMMODES, URINALS, SINKS, SHOWERS, AND DRAINS MUST |
those that exist should be short, direct, and of such importance that other delivery methods are inadequate – otherwise the important things get drowned out in the signal-to-noise ratio. When, as leaders, do we get too far in to the weeds to the point that we can’t do our jobs |
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