C.3 Disparate Benefits with Transmission Errors
This model is identical to the disparate benefits model in the main text except that teaching has an error rate, $\epsilon$, which is the frequency with which an individual who pays a learning cost fails to learn the behavior. Equation 7 is replaced by Equation C.8 and Equation 8 is replaced by Equation C.9.
As in the main text, I ran numeric simulations of this system for various combinations of female net benefits, $b_f - \mu$ and male net benefits $b_m - \mu$, and an innovation rate of $r = 0.005$. Since more than 90% of females learn the trait from their mother I conservatively set $\epsilon$ to 0.1 as the error rate for the simulation. As in the main text, for each parameter combination, I ran the simulation starting with four initial allele frequencies. In each frequency one allele started at 5% of the population and the rest were evenly distributed among the rest of the population. I started the frequency of the cultural trait at zero in all four initial conditions and ran the simulations until they converged to a shared equilibrium or ran for $10^7$ generations.