It follows that
( n − 1 ) e exp ( − λ Δ t ) λ 2 ( ∫ 0 x exp ( n λ x ) d x + t ∫ 0 exp ( n λ x ) d x ) = ( n − 1 ) e exp ( − λ Δ t ) λ 2 ( − 1 + n λ t ) n 2 λ 2 = ( n − 1 ) e exp ( − λ Δ t ) ( − 1 + n λ t ) n 2 .
\begin{align*}
& \frac{(n-1)}{e} \exp(-\lambda \Delta t) \lambda^2 \left( \int^0 x \exp(n\lambda x) dx + t \int^0 \exp(n\lambda x) dx \right) \\
= & \frac{(n-1)}{e} \exp(-\lambda \Delta t) \lambda^2 \frac{(-1+n\lambda t)}{n^2\lambda^2} \\
= & \frac{(n-1)}{e} \exp(-\lambda \Delta t) \frac{(-1+n\lambda t)}{n^2}.
\end{align*}
= = e ( n − 1 ) exp ( − λ Δ t ) λ 2 ( ∫ 0 x exp ( nλ x ) d x + t ∫ 0 exp ( nλ x ) d x ) e ( n − 1 ) exp ( − λ Δ t ) λ 2 n 2 λ 2 ( − 1 + nλ t ) e ( n − 1 ) exp ( − λ Δ t ) n 2 ( − 1 + nλ t ) .
Notice that the last expression is positive if and only if $n\lambda t - 1 > 0$. Taking the derivative of the expression w.r.t. $n$ results in an expression that is positive if $t > 0$, which is implied by $n\lambda t - 1 > 0$.
B Other Computations and Derivations
B.1 Additional Derivations for Section 7.1.3.
Player i outperforms player k iff
g e i ( t i + ε i ) > g e k ( t k + ε k ) ⇔ ε k < g e k − 1 ( g e i ( t i + ε i ) ) − t k .
\begin{align*}
g_{e_i}(t_i + \varepsilon_i) &> g_{e_k}(t_k + \varepsilon_k) \\
\Leftrightarrow \quad & \varepsilon_k < g_{e_k}^{-1}(g_{e_i}(t_i + \varepsilon_i)) - t_k.
\end{align*}
g e i ( t i + ε i ) ⇔ > g e k ( t k + ε k ) ε k < g e k − 1 ( g e i ( t i + ε i )) − t k .
Recall that the $E_i$ are i.i.d., following the reflected exponential distribution on $(-\infty, 0]$.
The cdf is denoted by $H$ and the pdf by $h$. Hence, player $i$ wins the contest with probability
∫ ∏ k ≠ i H ( g e k − 1 ( g e i ( t i + x ) ) − t k ) h ( x ) d x .
\int \prod_{k \neq i} H(g_{e_k}^{-1}(g_{e_i}(t_i+x)) - t_k) h(x) dx.
∫ k = i ∏ H ( g e k − 1 ( g e i ( t i + x )) − t k ) h ( x ) d x .
In a symmetric equilibrium with $e_1^* = \dots = e_n^* =: e^*$, the marginal effect of effort on the probability of winning,
∫ ( ∏ k ≠ i H ( t i + x − t k ) ) ( ∑ k ≠ i ( d d e i g e k − 1 ( g e i ( t i + x ) ) ) ∣ e 1 ∗ = ⋯ = e n ∗ = e ∗ h ( t i + x − t k ) H ( t i + x − t k ) ) h ( x ) d x ,
\int \left( \prod_{k \neq i} H(t_i + x - t_k) \right) \left( \sum_{k \neq i} \left( \frac{d}{de_i} g_{e_k}^{-1}(g_{e_i}(t_i + x)) \right) \Big|_{e_1^* = \dots = e_n^* = e^*} \frac{h(t_i + x - t_k)}{H(t_i + x - t_k)} \right) h(x)dx,
∫ k = i ∏ H ( t i + x − t k ) k = i ∑ ( d e i d g e k − 1 ( g e i ( t i + x )) ) e 1 ∗ = ⋯ = e n ∗ = e ∗ H ( t i + x − t k ) h ( t i + x − t k ) h ( x ) d x ,
must be the same for all i . Denote $\Delta t = t_1 - t > 0$. For player 1, we have,
∫ ( ∏ k ≠ 1 H ( Δ t + x ) ) ( ∑ k ≠ 1 ( d d e 1 g e k − 1 ( g e 1 ( t 1 + x ) ) ) ∣ e 1 ∗ = ⋯ = e n ∗ = e ∗ h ( Δ t + x ) H ( Δ t + x ) ) h ( x ) d x .
\int \left( \prod_{k \neq 1} H(\Delta t + x) \right) \left( \sum_{k \neq 1} \left( \frac{d}{de_1} g_{e_k}^{-1}(g_{e_1}(t_1 + x)) \right) \Big|_{e_1^* = \dots = e_n^* = e^*} \frac{h(\Delta t + x)}{H(\Delta t + x)} \right) h(x) dx.
∫ k = 1 ∏ H ( Δ t + x ) k = 1 ∑ ( d e 1 d g e k − 1 ( g e 1 ( t 1 + x )) ) e 1 ∗ = ⋯ = e n ∗ = e ∗ H ( Δ t + x ) h ( Δ t + x ) h ( x ) d x .