text stringlengths 128 2.05k |
|---|
[7] The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_ case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argumen... |
[8] _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice. |
“Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason? When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.” [9] The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise ... |
[10] Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidat... |
[11] Compare Bishop Butler’s “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface to the Sermons. [12] These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it has been already laid... |
The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika mera... |
[13] Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho einai agathon)] |
[14] A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgre... |
[15] Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances we will have to act under. |
[16] “_Moral_ Courage” is our phrase. [17] The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase. “The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that ... |
[18] For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both. |
[19] This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible. |
[20] See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)] |
[21] Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens. |
[22]In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the [Greek: politika] Coroneans. |
[23] By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate. |
[24] The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron]. |
BOOK V [1] Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice. |
[2] But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5. |
[3] _Things_ are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is _close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being applied to a term and not to its various significate... |
[4] See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai tagatha k.t.l.] [5] A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to his own person. |
[6] See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3. [7] Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particular _... |
There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage. [8] There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so... |
Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he does the _facts_ of a good man but for the perfection of his own individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis. |
The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III. chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon. |
[9] Terms used for persons. [10] By [Greek:——] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by [Greek:——] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc. |
[11] The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real point to be settled); then, |
A : B :: 400 : 600. A : 400 :: B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums). |
A+400 : B+600 :: A : B. This represents the actual distribution; its fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion. |
[12] _i.e._ where the ratio is that of equality, thus 2 : 2 :: 40 : 40 [13] Her Majesty’s “Justices.” [14] I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to giv... |
[15] This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend to be able to get it out of the words. [16] This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and in t... |
[17] χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness. |
[18] The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most valuable, and _vice versa_. |
Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:——] at [Greek:——], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the wares as between the persons, _i.e._ the ratio of equality. |
If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal. |
Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both [Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes = 1 house. |
Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house—_wrong_. —— —— 100 pr. shoes : 1 house—_right_ —— —— 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house—_wrong_. |
[19] [Greek] Compare a similar use of [Greek]. De Interpretatione, II. 2. [Greek]. [20] Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury. |
[21] This passage certainly occurs awkwardly here. If attached to the close of the preceding Chapter it would leave that Chapter incomplete, for the question is not gone into, but only stated. As the commencement of this Chapter it is yet more out of place; I should propose to insert it at the commencement of the follo... |
[22] In a pure democracy men are absolutely, _i.e._ numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers. |
[23] Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek: kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon... |
[24] Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act _materially_ unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16. |
[25] “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae]. [26] This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast gives it as follows: |
“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor], but the other does not.” |
[27] As when a man is “_justified_ at the Grass Market,” _i.e._ hung. [28] Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen. |
[29] The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but _one_ party. |
[30] So in the Politics, 1. 2. _Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev._ |
Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy of Conscience. |
BOOK VI [1] I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for instance, in a building. |
[2] Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter. [3] One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common language, _he has a turn for_ Mathematics, _i e_ something in his mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the bump denoting this aptitude. |
[4] And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.” See the description of _apetae_ II. 5. |
[5] _praxis_ is here used in its strict and proper meaning. [6] That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly. |
The question at issue always is, _Is this Good?_ because the Will is only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always _Aye or No_, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and retracted in the later. |
So far as what must take place in _every_ Moral Action, right or wrong, the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a good Moral Choice, _i e._. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it ought. |
The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the ... |
[7] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30. [8] The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, _i.e._ the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action. |
[9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire... |
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous]. |
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion... |
[10] The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with ... |
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]), Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.) |
[11] It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics. [12] Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism ... |
A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment) All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive faculty) |
All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.) |
Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C attract iron. But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron. |
Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek: noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of all the Individuals. |
If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It is a branch of proba... |
[13] The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its conclusions they are to be “true, first pr... |
[14] This is the test of correct logical division, that the _membra dividentia_ shall be opposed, _i.e._ not included the one by the other. |
[15] The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and thi... |
[16] See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8. |
[17] Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath’ ekasta pepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1. [18] The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are the two Principles... |
And again: “If by _a sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our na... |
[19] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30. The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the following—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d’ exis to ommati touto k. t. l]—vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.] vii. 9.—[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]—iii... |
[20] This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better artist” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Gre... |
[21] He would be a _better Chymist_ who should poison intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.” |
[22]The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:——] here. “Then wrought Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every _wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put wisdom and understanding_ to know how to work all manner of work for the service of the Sanctuary” Exodus xxxvi. i... |
[23] [Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go... |
[24][Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:——] would be its chief Instrument. [25] The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——]. |
[26] In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not. |
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only... |
[27] [Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.) [28] Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is [Greek:——] proper) or not-Self, _i.e._ either one’s family=[Greek:——], or one’s community=[Greek:——], but here the supreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Gree... |
[29] But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace’s account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii. |
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler’s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence in _fact_ of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence _i.e._ love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia]. |
[30] More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience. [31] This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand. |
[32] An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1. chap. viii.) [33] Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of... |
[34] I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense, “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point. |
[35] The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.” |
The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun. The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consi... |
[36] Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act. [37] The End does not sanctify the Means. [38] The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great E... |
[39] The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos]. |
[40] We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae]. |
[41] Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. [Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it). |
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions... |
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular ... |
[42] See note, on p. 140. [43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the pr... |
[44] _i.e._ of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton]. [45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (_i.e._ by [Greek: ethismos]). |
All that is pleasant is to be done, This is pleasant, This is to be done By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, _i.e._ on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper lin... |
[46] The _consequentia_ is this: There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and _therefore_, etc. |
[47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10, |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.