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33.122 | Security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP northbound APIs | TS | 16.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.122/33122-g40.zip | |
33.126 | Lawful Interception requirements | TS | 16.5.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.126/33126-g50.zip | The present document specifies Stage 1 Lawful Interception requirements for 3GPP networks and services.
Regional interception requirements can be satisfied by meeting the correct subset of requirements from the present document. Which CSP services are subject to Lawful Interception is defined by national regulations.
The presence of a requirement in the present document does not in itself imply or mandate that a 3GPP operator has an obligation to implement any network service capability, which is not otherwise required to meet LI obligation compliance in relation to specific regulated services, offered by that 3GPP operator. Only those specific requirements and sub-clauses of the present document which are applicable to specific network and/or service capabilities implemented in a 3GPP operator's network will be considered in scope for that operator. In all cases, laws and regulations define which requirements are applicable to 3GPP operators in each country relative to the services offered by each 3GPP operator.
As such not all requirements in the present document will apply in all national jurisdictions or to all 3GPP operator deployments (e.g. if an operator does not offer voice services, then voice LI requirement in the present document do not apply).
The interception system defined in the present document provides LI based on specific target identifiers. |
33.116 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the MME network product class | TS | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.116/33116-g10.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the MME network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the MME network product class. |
33.127 | Lawful Interception (LI) architecture and functions | TS | 16.14.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.127/33127-ge0.zip | |
33.128 | Security; Protocol and procedures for Lawful Interception (LI); Stage 3 | TS | 16.21.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.128/33128-gl0.zip | |
33.163 | Battery Efficient Security for very low throughput Machine Type Communication (MTC) devices (BEST) | TS | 16.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.163/33163-g20.zip | |
33.180 | Security of the Mission Critical (MC) service | TS | 16.13.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.180/33180-gd0.zip | |
33.141 | Presence service; Security | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.141/33141-g00.zip | |
33.185 | Security aspect for LTE support of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.185/33185-g00.zip | |
33.187 | Security aspects of Machine-Type Communications (MTC) and other mobile data applications communications enhancements | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.187/33187-g00.zip | |
33.203 | 3G security; Access security for IP-based services | TS | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.203/33203-g10.zip | The scope for this technical specification is to specify the security features and mechanisms for secure access to the IM subsystem (IMS) for the 3G mobile telecommunication system.
Since the scope also encompasses the use of these security features and mechanisms for secure access to IMS in the context of fixed broadband networks and 3GPP2 networks, Annex L and Annex S specify how the material in the main body and other normative Annexes of this document apply to the fixed broadband networks and 3GPP2 networks respectively.
The IMS supports IP Multimedia applications such as video, audio and multimedia conferences. SIP, Session Initiation Protocol, was chosen as the signalling protocol for creating and terminating Multimedia sessions, cf. RFC 3261 [6]. This specification only deals with how the SIP signalling is protected between the subscriber and the IMS, how the subscriber is authenticated and how the subscriber authenticates the IMS. |
33.210 | Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security | TS | 16.5.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.210/33210-g50.zip | |
33.204 | 3G Security; Network Domain Security (NDS); Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP) user security | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.204/33204-g00.zip | |
33.216 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the evolved Node B (eNB) network product class | TS | 16.7.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.216/33216-g70.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the eNB network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the eNB network product class. |
33.220 | Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) | TS | 16.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.220/33220-g40.zip | |
33.221 | Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support for subscriber certificates | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.221/33221-g00.zip | |
33.223 | Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push function | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.223/33223-g00.zip | |
33.224 | Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) push layer | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.224/33224-g00.zip | |
33.222 | Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) | TS | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.222/33222-g10.zip | |
33.246 | 3G Security; Security of Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.246/33246-g00.zip | The Technical Specification covers the security procedures of the Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) for 3GPP systems (UTRAN, GERAN and E-UTRAN). MBMS is a 3GPP system network bearer service over which many different applications could be carried. The actual method of protection may vary depending on the type of MBMS application. |
33.234 | 3G security; Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.234/33234-g00.zip | |
33.250 | Security assurance specification for the PGW network product class | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.250/33250-g00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the PGW network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the PGW network product class. |
33.259 | Key establishment between a UICC hosting device and a remote device | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.259/33259-g00.zip | |
33.303 | Proximity-based Services (ProSe); Security aspects | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.303/33303-g00.zip | |
33.320 | Security of Home Node B (HNB) / Home evolved Node B (HeNB) | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.320/33320-g00.zip | |
33.310 | Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF) | TS | 16.16.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.310/33310-gg0.zip | |
33.401 | 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture | TS | 16.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.401/33401-g40.zip | |
33.402 | 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security aspects of non-3GPP accesses | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.402/33402-g00.zip | |
33.434 | Security aspects of Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) for verticals | TS | 16.3.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.434/33434-g31.zip | The present document specifies the security features and mechanisms to support the Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) in 5G. Specifically security architecture, functional model(s), security aspects of SEAL reference points (e.g. SEAL-UU, etc.), Key Management (KM) procedures, Identity Management (IdM) procedures and SEAL access authentication and authorization for supporting efficient use and deployment of vertical applications over the 3GPP systems are specified. |
33.501 | Security architecture and procedures for 5G System | TS | 16.18.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.501/33501-gi0.zip | |
33.328 | IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) media plane security | TS | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.328/33328-g10.zip | |
33.511 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation Node B (gNodeB) network product class | TS | 16.12.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.511/33511-gc0.zip | |
33.512 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Access and Mobility management Function (AMF) | TS | 16.6.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.512/33512-g60.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the AMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AMF network product class. |
33.514 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Management (UDM) network product class | TS | 16.5.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.514/33514-g50.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UDM network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the UDM network product class. |
33.515 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Session Management Function (SMF) network product class | TS | 16.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.515/33515-g40.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the SMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SMF network product class. |
33.513 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); User Plane Function (UPF) | TS | 16.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.513/33513-g30.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UPF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the UPF network product class. |
33.517 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) network product class | TS | 16.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.517/33517-g30.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the SEPP network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SEPP network product class. |
33.516 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) network product class | TS | 16.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.516/33516-g20.zip | |
33.518 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Repository Function (NRF) network product class | TS | 16.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.518/33518-g20.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the NRF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the NRF network product class. |
33.536 | Security aspects of 3GPP support for advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services | TS | 16.5.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.536/33536-g50.zip | |
33.807 | Study on the security of the wireless and wireline convergence for the 5G system architecture | TR | 16.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.807/33807-g01.zip | The scope of the present document is:
- Study for security between a 5G-RG and 5GC.
- Study for security for a 3GPP UE and non 3GPP UE behind a 5G-RG or a FN RG.
- Study for security for supporting legacy RG. The scope is limited based on the conclusion of the study in TR 23.716 [2].
- Study for security for trusted non-3GPP access.
- The privacy issues in the convergence architecture, if any. |
33.519 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Exposure Function (NEF) network product class | TS | 16.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.519/33519-g20.zip | |
33.814 | Study on the security of the enhancement to the 5G Core (5GC) location services | TR | 16.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.814/33814-g01.zip | The scope of the present document is to analyse the security aspects of location service in 5G system and ensure the security solutions are aligned with the work in SA1 (i.e. in TS 22.261 [2] and TR 22.872 [3]) and SA2 (i.e. in TR 23.731 [4]). The work is comprised of the following parts:
- Study the security key issues, threats and requirements of location service in 5G system.
- Elaborate on the potential security solutions to cover these requirements.
Both non-roaming and roaming scenarios will be considered. |
33.813 | Study on security aspects of network slicing enhancement | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.813/33813-g00.zip | |
33.815 | Study on security aspects of Provision of Access to Restricted Local Operator Services by Unauthenticated UEs (PARLOS) | TR | 16.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.815/33815-g01.zip | The present document will examine potential security and privacy threat scenarios enabled by PARLOS, evaluate whether solutions need to be found for these and, if required, identify security solutions and approaches which can mitigate the identified security and privacy threat scenarios while meeting the US regulatory obligations spelled out in the referenced regulations. The present document will make recommendations on the solutions considered.
The present document will consider user notification regarding security and privacy risks when using PARLOS.
The present document will consider the applicability of external security and privacy standards (e.g. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) to PARLOS. |
33.819 | Study on security enhancements of 5G System (5GS) for vertical and Local Area Network (LAN) services | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.819/33819-g10.zip | The present document studies security enhancements to 5GS that are required to fulfil Stage-1 service requirements in vertical domains defined in TS 22.261 [1] and TS 22.104 [2] and addresses the solutions described by TR 23.734 [3] and TR 23.725 [4] studies.
Potential security requirements are provided and possible security architecture enhancements to 5GS in vertical domains are proposed that support these security requirements. |
33.825 | Study on the security of Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) for the 5G System (5GS) | TR | 16.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.825/33825-g01.zip | The present document:
- Investigates and identifies the security key issues for meeting the low latency requirement.
- Investigates and identifies the security key issues for meeting the ultra-high reliability requirement.
- Provides potential security requirements to address the identified security issues.
- Provides the potential security solutions to support URLLC services. |
33.808 | KDF negotiation for 5GS security – phase2 | TR | 0.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.808/33808-030.zip | The scope of this document is the following:
• Study security for allowing KDF negotiation between UE and 5GS network entities
◦ Study the need for KDF negotiation between UE and 5GS network functions, e.g., UE and 5G RAN, UE and SEAF, etc.
◦ Security for potential KDF negotiation procedures between UE and 5GS network functions, e.g., 5G RAN, AMF, SEAF, AUSF, and UDM. |
33.834 | Study on Long Term Key Update Procedures (LTKUP) | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.834/33834-g10.zip | The present document is a study on the remote update of 3GPP long term secret keys held in a SIM / USIM.
It:
- Identifies which Long Term Keys should be updatable within this proposed feature.
- Identifies the 3GPP/non 3GPP elements that would be affected by the update of these keys.
- Identifies the Key Issues relating to the updating of long term keys.
- Identifies potential requirements for the updating of long term keys.
- Identifies the applicability of Long Term Key Updating to GSM, UMTS, LTE and 5G and how the requirements may change across these technologies.
- Identifies solutions for the updating of long term keys.
- Evaluates solutions for the updating of long term keys.
- Concludes on the best solutions(s) for the updating of long term keys.
- Makes recommendations for further work.
This study will consider existing and new solutions that can be used for the update of 3GPP Long Term Keys.
The management of subscriptions is out of scope for the present document. |
33.836 | Study on security aspects of 3GPP support for advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.836/33836-g10.zip | The scope of the present document is to provide security and privacy analysis of eV2X system architecture, derive potential security and privacy requirements, and evaluate security and privacy solutions for protection of it. The security aspects to be considered are as follows:
- Security and privacy for new interfaces in 5G eV2X system architecture, compared to TS 23.285 [2]
- Security and privacy for eV2X unicast over PC5
- Security and privacy for eV2X group communication over PC5
- Other security and privacy issues related to eV2X services, if there is any |
33.841 | Study on the support of 256-bit algorithms for 5G | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.841/33841-g10.zip | The present document details the following:
- An assessment of threats and potential countermeasures posed due to quantum computing and a resulting assessment of relevant countermeasures in the 5G system.
- An assessment of the timelines for the introduction of any countermeasures, in particular the increase of key lengths to 256 bits. This includes an alignment with the timeline for strengthening asymmetric cryptographic algorithms used in 5G systems.
- An assessment of which parts of the 5G system will be affected and in which way.
- A Study of full entropy 256 bit keys in the 5G key hierarchy, beginning with the permanent pre-shared key. Including a study into modifying the derivation algorithms in order to derive child keys from the 256-bit master key instead of the 128-bit key.
- A study to determine whether a longer MAC is appropriate for 5G.
- A study of the coexistence of different size keys. In 3GPP networks, 256-bit keys in 5G will need to coexist with 128-bit keys in legacy networks or earlier 5G phases. This includes storage of keys and separate key derivation algorithms both on the UE and in the core network.
- A study into the desired number of 256-bit algorithms, e.g. if two 256-bit AKA key generation algorithm sets are needed.
- A study of the desired performance aspects for the new 256-bit algorithms taking into account software and hardware aspects.
- A study of key size negotiation.
- A study into whether the current methods for distribution and refresh of security keys are equally applicable to larger key sizes and can remain the same.
- A study into the Encryption and integrity algorithms that could be needed. This includes 256-bit session/intermediate keys in 5G, may, in some cases, simply entail using larger-key versions of current algorithms, while in other cases new algorithms may need to be chosen altogether.
- Recommendations for suitable requirements for the needed algorithms for use with 256-bit keys and ask ETSI SAGE to provide those algorithms. |
33.845 | Study on storage and transport of 5G Core (5GC) security parameters for Authentication Credential Repository Processing Function (ARPF) authentication | TR | 0.7.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.845/33845-070.zip | The present document details the following:
- The security assumptions relating to security communication in 5G.
- The security assumptions related to protecting subscriber privacy.
- The home network parameters that are relevant to securing the communication in 5G and protecting subscriber privacy.
- Key Issues, threats and requirements relevant to securing the communication in 5G and protecting subscriber privacy.
- Solutions that potentially resolve the key issues described.
The present document does not describe the storage of security parameters in the UE or the serving network or the transportation of secure information between the home network and the serving network. |
33.835 | Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.835/33835-g10.zip | The present document specifies key issues, derived requirements and potential solutions to support authentication and key management aspects for applications and 3GPP services based on 3GPP credentials in 5G, including the IoT use case. It analyses issues and requirements for:
- providing authentication and key management procedures to applications and 3GPP services in 5G scenarios which allow the UE to securely exchange data with an application server;
- decoupling these procedures from the transport protocol, in order to allow for the adaption to different application layer protocols.
The present document takes into account new solutions as well as potential adaptations to existing ones such as GBA described in TS 33.220 and BEST described in TS 33.163, in order to support the above mentioned requirements with procedures and protocols defined in SBA. |
33.853 | Study on key issues and potential solutions for integrity protection of the User Plane (UP) | TR | 1.6.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.853/33853-160.zip | The present document studies the key issues and potential solutions for integrity protecting the user plane, including potential enhancements needed to support UP IP up to the full data rate, in the following combinations as defined in 3GPP TR 38.801 [2] (clause 7.2):
- Option 1 - eUTRA with EPC
- Option 2 - NR standalone with 5G Core
- Option 3 - EPC based Dual Connectivity of eUTRA and NR RAT
- Option 4 - 5G Core based Dual Connectivity (NR master - eUTRA secondary)
- Option 5 - 5G Core with eUTRA
- Option 7 - 5G Core based Dual Connectivity (eUTRA master - NR secondary)
The present document does not detail key issues, solutions, evaluations, conclusions and recommendations for GERAN and UTRAN. |
33.861 | Study on evolution of Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT) security for the 5G System | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.861/33861-g10.zip | The present document studies the following:
- Capture massive MTC related 5G requirements in other 3GPP documents and further analyse them from security point of view.
- Study security for supporting EPS CIoT/MTC functionalities in 5GS, e.g.:
- security for infrequent and frequent small data transmission
- security for inter-RAT mobility to/from NB-IoT or modifications in the EPC-5GC interworking security specific to CIoT.
- Study security enhancements based on the architectural study in TR 23.724 [2], e.g.:
- security for transport of user plane over 5G NAS; or
- termination of user plane security in 5GC.
- Study the security aspects of the architectural enhancements addressing the 5G service requirements in TS 22.261 [3] and TR 38.913 [4].
- Study the need for additional mechanisms to improve protection of the network from maliciously behaving IoT devices |
33.856 | Study on security aspects of single radio voice continuity from 5G to UTRAN | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.856/33856-g10.zip | The present document studies the security aspects of single radio voice continuity from 5G to UTRAN CS. In particular, the goal of the present document is to study the impacts on 3GPP security architecture which may result from 5GS to UTRAN CS voice continuity, e.g. security context mapping from 5G and UTRAN, security procedure for the emergency call, etc. |
33.905 | Recommendations for Trusted Open Platforms | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.905/33905-g00.zip | |
33.855 | Study on security aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (SBA) | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.855/33855-g10.zip | 3GPP TS 23.501 [2] defines 5G services with a new service based architecture (SBA) approach.
The present document reviews the interactions in this new architecture, determines key issues relating to the security of SBA elements and interfaces, details potential solutions and recommends normative work . |
33.848 | Study on security impacts of virtualisation | TR | 0.15.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.848/33848-0f0.zip | The present document considers the consequences of virtualisation on 3GPP architectures, in order to identify threats and subsequent security requirements. 3GPP function security relies on the underlying implementation technology and physical environment being secure. In legacy deployments, physical rack security and separation implicitly provides underlying security. Many legacy physical security requirements are not formally documented in 3GPP standards and rely on proprietary domain knowledge by 3GPP operators and manufacturers. Legacy core network security models also assume that threats primarily apply at the edge of the function or network only, where the network or physical network functions are exposed by external interfaces.
To provide equivalent security in virtualised deployments, the underlying infrastructure needs to provide minimum security capabilities, in a standardized form, which can be requested and or consumed at the 3GPP layer. This is necessary since virtual functions need to co-exist in shared virtualisation environments and the legacy physical security models do not address the new threat vectors introduced by virtualisation.
While a number of the key issues identified in the present document may not necessarily fully be within the scope of 3GPP to resolve, in order to implement 3GPP functions securely, it is necessary for 3GPP to set requirements that may be addressed outside 3GPP.
The present document identifies security requirements which need to be addressed outside of 3GPP in order for 3GPP to specify fully secure virtualised 3GPP functions. The present document identifies extensions to 3GPP security capabilities which are required to provide direct, explicit, security visibility of the underlying virtualised infrastructure platform to the 3GPP layer. It also identifies extensions to 3GPP functions to make use of such capabilities.
The wider requirements captured within the present document are intended to allow external groups such as ETSI or open-source groups to develop any necessary capabilities and fill identified standardization gaps.
Identification of requirements for the standardization of the overall security framework (e.g. top to bottom, 3GPP, NFVI, hardware, SDN) and minimum-security capabilities which should be used by a virtualised implementation to meet Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) or other regulatory requirements are outside the scope of the present document.
Since there is no single approach to virtualisation, the security threats and risks will vary depending on the deployment use case and virtualisation technology choices. The present document considers both virtualisation threats and risks, that apply to specific implementations (e.g. Virtual Machine or Container based) and more generic threat and risks that apply in all use cases. |
33.919 | 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.919/33919-g00.zip | |
33.916 | Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products | TR | 16.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.916/33916-g10.zip | |
33.924 | Identity management and 3GPP security interworking; Identity management and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) interworking | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.924/33924-g00.zip | |
33.935 | Study on detailed Long Term Key Update Process (LTKUP) detailed solutions | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.935/33935-g00.zip | |
33.937 | Study of mechanisms for Protection against Unsolicited Communication for IMS (PUCI) | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.937/33937-g00.zip | |
33.969 | Study on security aspects of Public Warning System (PWS) | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.969/33969-g00.zip | |
33.980 | Liberty Alliance and 3GPP security interworking; Interworking of Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.980/33980-g00.zip | |
33.926 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes | TR | 16.8.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.926/33926-g80.zip | The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class. |
34.109 | Terminal logical test interface; Special conformance testing functions | TS | 16.0.0 | R2 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.109/34109-g00.zip | |
33.995 | Study on security aspects of integration of Single Sign-On (SSO) frameworks with 3GPP operator-controlled resources and mechanisms | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.995/33995-g00.zip | |
34.124 | Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TS | 16.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.124/34124-g00.zip | |
34.121-1 | User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Radio transmission and reception (FDD); Part 1: Conformance specification | TS | 16.2.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.121-1/34121-1-g20.zip | The present document specifies the UTRA measurement procedures for the conformance test of the user equipment (UE) that contain transmitting characteristics, receiving characteristics and performance requirements in addition to requirements for support of RRM (Radio Resource Management) in FDD mode. In addition it specifies conformance testing of RRM requirements for support of E-UTRA when the UE operates in UTRA mode.
NOTE: Conformance testing of RRM requirements for support of UTRA when the UE operates in E-UTRA mode are specified in TS 36.521-3 [38].
The requirements are listed in different clauses only if the corresponding parameters deviate. More generally, tests are only applicable to those mobiles that are intended to support the appropriate functionality. To indicate the circumstances in which tests apply, this is noted in the "definition and applicability" part of the test.
For example only Release 5 and later UE declared to support HSDPA shall be tested for this functionality. In the event that for some tests different conditions apply for different releases, this is indicated within the text of the test itself. |
34.131 | Test Specification for C-language binding to (Universal) Subscriber Interface Module ((U)SIM) Application Programming Interface (API) | TS | 16.0.0 | C6 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.131/34131-g00.zip | |
34.229-2 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) specification | TS | 16.11.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-2/34229-2-gb0.zip | |
34.229-3 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Abstract test suite (ATS) | TS | 16.9.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-3/34229-3-g90.zip | |
34.926 | Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC); Table of international requirements for mobile terminals and ancillary equipment | TR | 16.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.926/34926-g00.zip | |
35.202 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 2: Kasumi specification | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.202/35202-g00.zip | |
35.203 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.203/35203-g00.zip | |
35.204 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.204/35204-g00.zip | |
35.201 | 3G Security; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms; Document 1: f8 and f9 specification | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.201/35201-g00.zip | |
35.206 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Algorithm specification | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.206/35206-g00.zip | |
35.207 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.207/35207-g00.zip | |
35.208 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.208/35208-g00.zip | |
35.215 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 1: UEA2 and UIA2 specifications | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.215/35215-g00.zip | |
35.205 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: General | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.205/35205-g00.zip | This report is a description of the work undertaken by an ETSI SAGE Task Force on the design of the Milenage Algorithm Set: an example set of 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Functions.
The 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Functions are not standardized. An example set of these algorithms has been produced on request from 3GPP with the intent that it shall be offered to the UMTS operators, to utilise instead of developing their own. An ETSI SAGE Task Force has carried out this work.
The requirement specification from 3GPP stated that operator personalisation of the example set shall be possible and that the basic kernel shall be possible to replace.
The example set is based on the block cipher Rijndael, which at the time was one of the AES candidates and the specification describes how the 7 algorithms used in 3GPP authentication and key generation are scheduled around this basic kernel. The specification and associated test data for the example algorithm set is documented in three documents:
- A formal specification of both the modes and the example kernel [3]
- A detailed test data document, covering modes and the example kernel [4]
- A "black box" test data document [5]
A detailed summary of the evaluation is provided in a public evaluation report [6]
This report gives an overview of the overall work by the task force. |
35.217 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.217/35217-g00.zip | |
35.218 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 4: Design conformance test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.218/35218-g00.zip | |
35.221 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 1: EEA3 and EIA3 specifications | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.221/35221-g00.zip | |
35.216 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 2: SNOW 3G specification | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.216/35216-g00.zip | |
35.223 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 3: Implementors' test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.223/35223-g00.zip | |
35.222 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 2: ZUC specification | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.222/35222-g00.zip | |
35.232 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 2: Implementers’ test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.232/35232-g00.zip | |
35.909 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: an example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Summary and results of design and evaluation | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.909/35909-g00.zip | |
35.231 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: Algorithm specification | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.231/35231-g00.zip | The present document and the other Technical Specifications in the series, TS 35.232 [15] and 35.233 [16] contain an example set of algorithms which could be used as the authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* for 3GPP systems. All seven functions are operator-specifiable rather than being fully standardised and other algorithms could be envisaged. |
35.233 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 3: Design conformance test data | TS | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.233/35233-g00.zip | |
35.935 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Performance evaluation | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.935/35935-g00.zip | |
35.934 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 4: Report on the design and evaluation | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.934/35934-g00.zip | |
35.936 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2 ,f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 6: Security assessment | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.936/35936-g00.zip | |
35.924 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 4: Design and Evaluation Report | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.924/35924-g00.zip | |
36.106 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); FDD repeater radio transmission and reception | TS | 16.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.106/36106-g00.zip | |
35.919 | Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 5: Design and evaluation report | TR | 16.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.919/35919-g00.zip |
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