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119 102-2
4.3.5.3.2 XML
This element shall be encoded in an element named SignatureValidationPolicy of type SignatureValidationPolicyType, where: • The signature validation policy identifier shall be contained in an element SignaturePolicyIdentifier of Type XAdES:SignaturePolicyIdentifierType. • When present, the signature policy name shall be contained in an element named PolicyName and of type xs:string. • When present, the URL of the formal policy specification shall be contained in an element named FormalPolicyURI of type xs:AnyURI. • When present, the URL of the human readable policy shall be contained in an element named ReadablePolicyURI of type xs:AnyURI. • When present, the reference to an object on the Signature Validation Objects element shall be contained in an element named FormalPolicyObject of type VOReferenceType. <xs:complexType name="SignatureValidationPolicyType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SignaturePolicyIdentifier" type="XAdES:SignaturePolicyIdentifierType"/> <xs:element name="PolicyName" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="FormalPolicyURI" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="ReadablePolicyURI" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="FormalPolicyObject" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
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4.3.5.4 Individual Validation Constraint Report Element
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4.3.5.4.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element shall indicate an individual signature validation constraint that has been applied during validation. Content: This element shall contain the following information: 1) A validation constraint identifier that is capable of uniquely identifying a validation constraint. 2) Whether the constraint was applied, disabled or overridden by another constraint, and if the latter, by which one. When the validation of the constraint has not been disabled or overridden: 3) The validation result for the constraint. The validation result shall be represented by a main status indication (PASSED, FAILED, INDETERMINATE). It may be supported by a sub-indication and additional associated validation report data elements (see clause 4.3.12). In addition, this element may also contain: 4) Any parameters the validation constraint requires. 5) Indications for steps to be taken to potentially get a determinate result, when the main status indication is INDETERMINATE. EXAMPLE: Possible parameters are a set of trust anchors or how revocation checking is to be done. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 25
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4.3.5.4.2 XML
The validation report for a single validation constraint shall be contained in an element of type IndividualValidationConstraintType defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="IndividualValidationConstraintReportType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ValidationConstraintIdentifier" type="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:element name="ValidationConstraintParameter" type="vr:TypedDataType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element name="ConstraintStatus" type="vr:ConstraintStatusType"/> <xs:element name="ValidationStatus" type="vr:ValidationStatusType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="Indications" type="xs:anyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType The validation constraint identifier that is capable of uniquely identifying a validation constraint shall be contained in an element named ValidationConstraintIdentifier and of type xs:anyURI. The information whether the constraint was applied, disabled or overridden by another constraint, and if so, by which one, shall be contained in an element named ConstraintStatus of type ConstraintStatusType. This type is defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="ConstraintStatusType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Status" type="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:element name="OverriddenBy" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> The Status-element shall contain one of the following URIs: • When the constraint has been applied: urn:etsi:019102:constraintStatus:applied. • When the constraint has been disabled: urn:etsi:019102:constraintStatus:disabled. • When the constraint has been overridden by another constraint: urn:etsi:019102:constraintStatus:overridden. In this case, the OverriddenBy element shall indicate the other constraint. Whenever the Status-element of ConstraintStatus contains the value urn:etsi:019102:constraintStatus:applied, the validation result for the constraint shall be contained in an element named ValidationStatus and be of type ValidationStatusType. When present, any parameters required by the validation constraints shall be contained in an element named ValidationConstraintParameter of type TypedDataType. When present, indications for steps to be taken to potentially get a determinate result, when the main status indication is INDETERMINATE shall be contained in an element named Indications of type xs:anyType.
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4.3.6 Signature Validation Time Info
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4.3.6.1 General
Presence: Conditional. This element shall be present in the validation report of a signature. This element may be present in a validation report of a signature validation object (see clause 4.4.8). Description: This element provides time related information on the validation. Content: This element shall contain: 1) the date and time the validation was performed; and 2) the date and time for which a POE of the signature has been identified and the validation status has been determined. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 26 This element may also contain information on the source of the POE and, when the POE was derived by the SVA, an identifier referencing the signature validation object that was essential for that proof. Date and time information shall be provided in UTC. NOTE: The second value is the current time for Basic Signature validation; it can be either the current time or a point in time in the past when validating Signatures with Time, Signatures with Long-Term Validation Material or Signatures providing Long Term Availability and Integrity of Validation Material.
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4.3.6.2 XML
The signature validation time info shall be contained in an element of type ValidationTimeInfo of type ValidationTimeInfoType which is defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="ValidationTimeInfoType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ValidationTime" type="xs:dateTime"/> <xs:element name="BestSignatureTime" type="vr:POEType"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> The date and time the validation was performed shall be contained in the element ValidationTime. The date and time for which a POE of the signature has been identified and the validation status has been determined shall be contained in the element BestSignatureTime that shall be of type POEType (see clause 4.4.6).
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4.3.7 Signer's Document Element
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4.3.7.1 General
Presence: Conditional. This element shall be present in the validation report of a signature. This element may be present in a validation report of a signature validation object (see clause 4.4.8). Description: This element identifies the document that has been covered by the signature. Content: This element shall contain either the Signer's Document Representation (SDR) directly, when the SDR is a hash value, or a reference to a validation object within the Signature Validation Objects - Element (see clause 4.4). When present, the validation object shall contain the SDR or a URI allowing to retrieve the SDR. This element may also contain a reference to a signature validation object within the Signature Validation Objects - Element (see clause 4.4) whenever the SD has been provided by the DA to the SVA. When present, the validation object shall contain the SD or a URI allowing to retrieve the SD. NOTE: The signer's document is specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1]. It can be the (format specific) input into the hash function the output of which is then used as one of the inputs to calculate the signature value. This includes any processing, transformation or canonicalization procedures required by the signature format. The format of an SDR stored as a validation object is out of scope of the present document.
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4.3.7.2 XML
The signer's document element shall be represented as an element named SignersDocument of type SignersDocumentType. When the SDR is the output of a hash function, this element shall contain the SDR in an element of type XAdES:DigestAlgAndValueType. It may contain a reference to a validation object that contains the SDR. At least one of these elements shall be present. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 27 This element may also contain the reference to the signer's document in an element of type vr:VOReferenceType. <xs:complexType name="SignersDocumentType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:choice> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="DigestAlgAndValue" type="XAdES:DigestAlgAndValueType"/> <xs:element name="SignersDocumentRepresentation" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SignersDocumentRepresentation" type="vr:VOReferenceType"/> </xs:choice> <xs:element name="SignersDocumentRef" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
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4.3.8 Signature Attribute Element
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4.3.8.1 General
Presence: Conditional. This element shall be present whenever the signature contains signature attributes. Description: This element provides the signature attributes that were present in the validated signature. Content: This element shall consist of a sequence with one instance per attribute contained in the signature. Each element of that sequence shall contain: 1) The type of the attribute. 2) Whether the attribute was a signed or an unsigned attribute. It also may contain: 3) Attribute dependant information extracted from the attribute. Annex A specifies such information for attributes that are defined for CAdES [i.1], PAdES [i.3] and XAdES [4]. 4) One or more references to signature validation objects within the Signature Validation Objects - Element (see clause 4.4).
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4.3.8.2 XML
The signature attributes element shall be contained in an element named SignatureAttributes containing a sequence of elements which are extensions of AttributeBaseType. Each of these elements shall contain a boolean XML-Attribute Signed which indicates, whether the attribute was a signed or unsigned attribute. Annex A specifies how attributes that are defined for CAdES [i.1], PAdES [i.3] and XAdES [4] signatures are to be represented in XML. <xs:complexType name="SignatureAttributesType"> <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <!—elements are defined in Annex A --> </xs:choice> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="AttributeObject" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="Signed" type="xs:boolean" use="optional"/> </xs:complexType> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 28
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4.3.9 Signer Information Element
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4.3.9.1 General
Presence: Conditional. When a signing certificate was identified, this element shall be present in the validation report of a signature. Otherwise, this element may be present: Description: This element provides information on the signer. Content: This element shall contain a reference to an object in the Signature Validation Objects element (see clause 4.4). The object referenced shall be the certificate that has been identified as the signer's certificate and that contains the unique set of data representing the signer. This element may also contain a human readable representation of the signer. EXAMPLE: Examples are the distinguished name or the subject alternate name contained in the signer's certificate. When a pseudonym has been used at the time of signing, this element shall contain an indication that a pseudonym has been used.
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4.3.9.2 XML
The signer information shall be contained in an element named SignerInformation and of type vr:SignerInformationType. This element shall contain the reference to the signer's certificate in an element of type vr:VOReferenceType. It may contain a string representation identifying the signer and optional other information about the signer. When a pseudonym is used, the element shall contain the Pseudonym attribute indicating this. <xs:complexType name="SignerInformationType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SignerCertificate" type="vr:VOReferenceType"/> <xs:element name="Signer" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OtherInformation" type="vr:AnyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="Pseudonym" type="xs:boolean" use="optional"/> </xs:complexType>
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4.3.10 Signature Quality Element
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4.3.10.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element contains information supporting the quality of the signature. EXAMPLE: Qualified electronic signature, advanced electronic signature supported by a qualified certificate. Content: This element shall contain one or more URN indicating the quality of the signature. NOTE: It is out of scope for the present document to define the URNs for signature quality. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 29
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4.3.10.2 XML
The signature quality information shall be contained in an element named SignatureQuality and of type vr:SignatureQualityType. <xs:complexType name="SignatureQualityType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SignatureQualityInformation" type="xs:anyURI" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
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4.3.11 Signature Validation Process Information Element
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4.3.11.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element provides information on the signature validation process performed. Content: This element shall contain one or more of: 1) A URI indicating the validation process (see ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1], clauses 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6.3) that has been used for validation. This URI shall have one of the following values: - urn:etsi:019102:validationprocess:Basic when the SVA performed the Validation Process for Basic Signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1], clause 5.3. - urn:etsi:019102:validationprocess:LTVM when the SVA performed the Validation Process for Signatures with Time and Signatures with LongTerm-Validation Material as specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1], clause 5.5. - urn:etsi:019102:validationprocess:LTA when the SVA performed the Validation process for Signatures providing Long Term Availability and Integrity of Validation Material as specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [1], clause 5.6. Any other URI indicating the validation process when none of these processes has been applied: 2) A URI identifying the validation service policy, when applicable. 3) A URI identifying the validation service practice statement, when applicable. 4) Other information provided by the validation process.
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4.3.11.2 XML
This element shall be named SignatureValidationProcessInfo and be of type SignatureValidationProcessInfoType. It is defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="SignatureValidationProcessType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SignatureValidationProcessID" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="SignatureValidationServicePolicy" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="SignatureValidationPracticeStatement" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OtherInformation" type="vr:AnyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 30
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4.3.12 Associated Validation Report Data Element
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4.3.12.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element contains additional information on the validation of the signature or a signature validation constraint. Content: This element shall contain one or more of the elements described in clauses 4.3.12.3 to 4.3.12.8.
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4.3.12.2 XML
Associated Validation Report Data shall be provided in an element named AssociatedValidationReportData of type ValidationReportDataType that is defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="ValidationReportDataType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="TrustAnchor" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="CertificateChain" type="vr:CertificateChainType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="RelatedValidationObject" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element name="RevocationStatusInformation" type="vr:RevocationStatusInformationType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="CryptoInformation" type="vr:CryptoInformationType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="AdditionalValidationReportData" type="vr:AdditionalValidationReportDataType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
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4.3.12.3 Trust Anchor Element
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4.3.12.3.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element identifies the public key that has been used as the trust anchor in the validation process. Content: This element shall contain an identifier referencing an object in the Signature Validation Objects element (see clause 4.4) that contains a certificate for the public key of the trust anchor. It may also contain additional information provided by the validation process.
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4.3.12.3.2 XML
This element shall have the name TrustAnchor and be of type VOReferenceType and shall contain the identifier of the object in the Signature Validation Objects element that has been used as the trust anchor in the validation process. The object referenced shall be a certificate or a public key.
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4.3.12.4 Certificate Chain Element
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4.3.12.4.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element identifies the certificate chain. Content: This element shall contain a list of identifiers referencing objects in the Signature Validation Objects element (see clause 4.4). This list shall contain the identifiers for the signing certificate (clause 4.3.9) as the first element and the trust anchor (clause 4.3.12.3) as the last element. The certificates referenced by this list shall be the certificate chain used in the validation process. This element may also contain additional information provided by the validation process. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 31
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4.3.12.4.2 XML
This element shall have the name CertificateChain and shall be a sequence of elements of type CertificateChainType. The first element of the sequence shall have the name SigningCertificate and contain a reference to the signing certificate. The last element of the list shall have the name TrustAnchor and contain a reference to the trust anchor. All other elements shall have the name IntermediateCertificate and contain a reference to the corresponding intermediate certificate. <xs:complexType name="CertificateChainType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SigningCertificate" type="vr:VOReferenceType"/> <xs:element name="IntermediateCertificate" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element name="TrustAnchor" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OtherInformation" type="vr:AnyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
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4.3.12.5 Related Data Objects Element
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4.3.12.5.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element relates a validation status sub-indication or a validation constraint sub-indication to the data objects that caused that sub-indication. Content: This element shall contain a reference to an object in the Signature Validation Objects element (see clause 4.4). EXAMPLE: In case of a TIMESTAMP_ORDER_FAILURE, this element contains a list of references to the timestamps that caused that failure.
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4.3.12.5.2 XML
This element shall be of type VOReferenceType uniquely identifying a signed data object in the Signature Validation Objects element.
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4.3.12.6 Revocation Status Information Element
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4.3.12.6.1 General
Presence: Conditional. This element shall be present when a certificate has been found to be revoked. Description: When a certificate has been found to be revoked, this element contains information on the revocation. Content: This element shall contain: 1) An identifier referencing a certificate in the Signature Validation Objects element (see clause 4.4). 2) The time of revocation. It may also contain: 3) A reason for the revocation. 4) An identifier referencing a CRL or OCSP response in the Signature Validation Objects element that has been used for determining that revocation status. 5) Additional information provided by the validation process. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 32
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4.3.12.6.2 XML
This element shall be of type RevocationStatusInformationType that is defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="RevocationStatusInformationType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ValidationObjectId" type="vr:VOReferenceType"/> <xs:element name="RevocationTime" type="xs:dateTime"/> <xs:element name="RevocationReason" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="RevocationObject" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OtherInformation" type="vr:AnyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> The element ValidationObject shall reference a certificate in the Signature Validation Objects element. The element RevocationTime shall contain the date and time of the revocation in UTC. The element RevocationReason shall contain the reason for the revocation. When present, one of the following URIs shall be used: urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:unspecified urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:keyCompromise urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:cACompromise urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:affiliationChanged urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:superseded urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:cessationOfOperation urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:certificateHold urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:privilegeWithdrawn urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:removeFromCRL urn:etsi:019102:revocationReason:aACompromise When present, the element RevocationObject shall contain an identifier referencing a CRL or OCSP response in the Signature Validation Objects element that has been used for determining that revocation status.
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4.3.12.7 Crypto Information Element
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4.3.12.7.1 General
Presence: Conditional. This element shall be present when the main status indication is INDETERMINATE and the sub-indication is CRYPTO_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE. In all other cases, this element may be present. Description: When the validation process determines that the cryptographic algorithm is no longer reliable, this element contains details on the algorithm. Content: This element shall contain: 1) an identifier referencing an object in the Signature Validation Objects element (see clause 4.4) or the Signature Identification Element (see clause 4.3.3); 2) a URI referencing a cryptographic algorithm that has been used when producing the object or the signature; and 3) an element specifying whether the algorithm and the algorithm-parameters were considered secure or insecure. Algorithms that are listed in ETSI TS 119 312 [7] shall be represented by URIs defined in the same place. This element may additionally contain: 4) Parameters that have been used when applying the algorithm. 5) Time information up to which the algorithm or algorithm-parameters were considered secure. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 33 6) Additional information provided by the validation process. NOTE: This element can also be used when reporting on the used algorithms even when they are not expired.
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4.3.12.7.2 XML
This element shall be of type CryptoInformationType that is defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="CryptoInformationType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ValidationObjectId" type="vr:VOReferenceType"/> <xs:element name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:element name="AlgorithmParameters" type="vr:TypedDataType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="SecureAlgorithm" type="xs:boolean"/> <xs:element name="NotAfter" type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OtherInformation" type="vr:AnyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> The element ValidationObjectId shall contain an identifier referencing a signed object in the Signature Validation Objects element or a Signature Identification Element. The element Algorithm shall contain a URI that identifies the algorithm. When present, the element AlgorithmParameters shall specify algorithm-specific parameters that have been used. When present, the element NotAfter shall contain the time until when the algorithm or parameter was or will be considered secure.
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4.3.12.8 Additional Validation Report Data
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4.3.12.8.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element can contain any additional information that the validation process provides. Content: When present, this element shall contain one or more of the following: 1) An identifier identifying the type of additional information present. 2) The additional information.
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4.3.12.8.2 XML
This element shall be of type AdditionalValidationReportDataType and contain one or more of the following tuples: • An identifier identifying the type of additional information present. • The additional information. and is defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="AdditionalValidationReportDataType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ReportData" type="vr:TypedDataType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 34
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4.4 Signature Validation Objects
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4.4.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element is the container for validation objects used during validation. NOTE: This avoids duplication of validation objects, e.g. CRLs, when the validation report contains the report on more than one signature or validation object. Content: When present, this element shall contain a sequence of signature validation object elements representing the set of validation objects that have been used in the validation process together with their validation report, when applicable. EXAMPLE: Signer's Document, Trusted Lists, revocation information (CRLs, OCSP-responses) or Evidence Records. Each signature validation object element in this list shall have the following properties described in the clauses below: • An identifier uniquely referencing this validation object within the validation report. • The type of the object. • The object itself or a reference to the object. In addition, the following information about the signature validation object may be present: • Information on a proof for the earliest time of the existence of the object. • Information on objects the validation object provides proofs of existence for. • A validation report on the validation of the object.
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4.4.2 XML
The signature validation objects shall be placed in an element named SignatureValidationObjects of type ValidationObjectListType. Each element in this list shall be named ValidationObject and be of type ValidationObjectType. <xs:complexType name="ValidationObjectListType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ValidationObject" type="vr:ValidationObjectType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="ValidationObjectType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ObjectType" type="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:element name="ValidationObjectRepresentation" type="vr:ValidationObjectRepresentationType"/> <xs:element name="POE" type="vr:POEType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="POEProvisioning" type="vr:POEProvisioningType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="ValidationReport" type="vr:SignatureValidationReportType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:ID" use="required"/> </xs:complexType> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 35 To specify the type of validation object in the ObjectType element, one of the following URIs should be used: urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:certificate urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:CRL urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:OCSPResponse urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:timestamp urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:evidencerecord urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:publicKey urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:signedData urn:etsi:019102:validationObject:other The validation report of the validation object shall be of type SignatureValidationReportType.
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4.4.3 Object Identifier
Presence: Mandatory. Description: This element allows to uniquely reference this validation object within the validation report. Content: This element shall contain an identifier that is unique within the validation report. XML: This element shall be an attribute of type xs:ID.
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4.4.4 Object Type
Presence: Mandatory. Description: This element identifies the type of the validation object. Content: This element shall contain a URI uniquely able to identify the type of the object. XML: This element shall be an element named ObjectType of type xs:anyURI.
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4.4.5 Validation Object
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4.4.5.1 General
4.
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4.5.1 General
Presence: Mandatory. Description: This element contains or references the validation object. Content: This element shall contain one or more of the following: 1) the object itself; 2) a base64-encoded version of the object; 3) a cryptographic hash of the object; or 4) a URI where the object can be retrieved. NOTE: Whenever the report includes a cryptographic hash of the object, it is the actual hash that has been calculated by the validation process during validation and can be used for verification of the integrity of the validation object when it is not included in the report but retrieved using the URI provided. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 36
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4.4.5.2 XML
4.
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4.5.2 XML
Information on the validation object shall be placed in an element named ValidationObjectRepresentation of type ValidationObjectRepresentationType, defined as follows: <xs:complexType name="ValidationObjectRepresentationType"> <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:element name="direct" type="xs:anyType"/> <xs:element name="base64" type="xs:base64Binary"/> <xs:element name="DigestAlgAndValue" type="XAdES:DigestAlgAndValueType"/> <xs:element name="URI" type="xs:anyURI"/> </xs:choice> </xs:complexType>
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4.4.6 Proof Of Existence (POE)
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4.4.6.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: This element contains information on a proof for the earliest time of the existence of the object. Content: This element shall contain the information on the POE providing the earliest time for the existence of the object. This property shall contain: 1) the time value for that proof in UTC; 2) an indication whether the POE has been:  derived during validation;  provided to the SVA as an input; or  derived by the policy. EXAMPLE 1: A policy can require using the claimed signing time as a POE for the signature. This element may also contain: 3) An identifier referencing the signature validation object that was essential for that proof. EXAMPLE 2: Evidence records or time stamps can be such signature validation objects essential for that proof.
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4.4.6.2 XML
<xs:complexType name="POEType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="POETime" type="xs:dateTime"/> <xs:element name="TypeOfProof" type="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:element name="POEObject" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> The element POETime shall contain the time value for the proof of existence. The element TypeOfProof shall contain a URI indicating the origin of the POE. This element shall have one of the following values: • urn:etsi:019102:poetype:validation when the POE has been derived during validation; • urn:etsi:019102:poetype:provided when the POE has been provided to the SVA as an input; • urn:etsi:019102:poetype:policy when the POE has been derived by the policy. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 37 When present, the element POEObject shall contain the reference to the signature validation object that was essential for that proof.
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4.4.7 POE Provisioning
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4.4.7.1 General
Presence: Optional. Description: When a validation object provides proofs of existence for other objects, this property provides information on these objects. Content: This element shall contain: 1) The time value for that proof in UTC. 2) A list of references to the signature or to signature validation objects within the signature validation report that are covered by that proof. NOTE: This element can be used to present the relationship between timestamps and timestamped data. EXAMPLE: Time-stamps and evidence records can provide proofs of existence.
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4.4.7.2 XML
<xs:complexType name="POEProvisioningType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="POETime" type="xs:dateTime"/> <xs:element name="ValidationObject" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element name="SignatureReference" type="vr:SignatureReferenceType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
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4.4.8 Validation Object validation report
Presence: Optional. This element may be present whenever the signature validation object is a signed object and the signature has been validated during the overall validation. Description: This element contains a validation report for the signature validation object. Content: This element shall contain a validation report on the validation of the signature validation object. The report shall conform to the present document. Any validation object that was used in validation of this object shall be included in the Signature Validation Object element of the main validation report. NOTE: The signature on the main validation report protects the validation report for a validation object.
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4.5 Validator Information
4.5.1 General Presence: Optional. Description: This element identifies the entity validating the signature and creating the validation report. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 38 Content: This element shall contain the digital identity of the validation service as specified in clause 5.5.3 of ETSI TS 119 612 [6]. This element may contain other information about the TSP as specified in clause 5.4 of ETSI TS 119 612 [6] as well as any additional information that can be used to identify the validator. 4.5.2 XML The Validator Information Element shall be an element of type SignatureValidatorType as: <xs:complexType name="SignatureValidatorType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="DigitalId" type="tsl:DigitalIdentityType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> <xs:element name="TSPInformation" type="tsl:TSPInformationType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OtherInformation" type="vr:AnyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType>
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4.6 Validation Report Signature
Presence: Optional. Description: This element contains the validation report signature. Content: When present, this element shall contain the signature over the signature validation report and shall be created by the validation service that performed the validation and created the validation report. EXAMPLE: The following SignedInfo-element is an example of a signature over a report: <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <SignedInfo> <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments"/> <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256"/> <Reference URI=""> <Transforms> <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> </Transforms> <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> <DigestValue>X2eAfTx6w22nZUfeKwIZ1oT33FH2LoBvI2xW4+MW/2s=</DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo> … </Signature> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 39 Annex A (normative): Signature attribute representation A.1 SignatureAttributesType A.1.1 General The SignatureAttributesType allows reporting on different signed and unsigned attributes. For those attributes defined in CAdES (ETSI EN 319 122-1 [i.1]), XAdES (ETSI EN 319 132-1 [4]), PAdES (ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3]) and JAdES (ETSI TS 119 182-1 [i.5]) this annex shows how they shall be represented. When the signature reported in the validation report is neither XAdES nor CAdES nor PAdES nor JAdES, but still has one or more attributes defined in the aforementioned standards, the validation report may contain the components defined in the present annex, which allow to report on the aforementioned attributes. EXAMPLE: An XML signature with a combination of XAdES qualifying property that does not correspond to any of the XAdES signature levels. It is out of the scope of the present document how to report on attributes that have been specified neither in CAdES nor in PAdES nor in XAdES nor in JAdES. Any element not defined in this annex, which is used to report on an attribute within the SignatureAttributesType, shall be an extension of BaseAttributeType. A.1.2 XML The signed and unsigned attributes are reported on using the SignatureAttributes element, which is of type SignatureAttributesType. The different choices allow to report on each of the attributes defined in CAdES (ETSI EN 319 122-1 [i.1]), XAdES (ETSI EN 319 132-1 [4]), PAdES (ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3]) and JAdES (ETSI TS 119 182-1 [i.5]). <xs:complexType name="SignatureAttributesType"> <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:element name="SigningTime" type="vr:SASigningTimeType"/> <xs:element name="SigningCertificate" type="vr:SACertIDListType"/> <xs:element name="DataObjectFormat" type="vr:SADataObjectFormatType"/> <xs:element name="CommitmentTypeIndication" type="vr:SACommitmentTypeIndicationType"/> <xs:element name="AllDataObjectsTimeStamp" type="vr:SATimestampType"/> <xs:element name="IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp" type="vr:SATimestampType"/> <xs:element name="SigPolicyIdentifier" type="vr:SASigPolicyIdentifierType"/> <xs:element name="SignatureProductionPlace" type="vr:SASignatureProductionPlaceType"/> <xs:element name="SignerRole" type="vr:SASignerRoleType"/> <xs:element name="CounterSignature" type="vr:SACounterSignatureType"/> <xs:element name="SignatureTimeStamp" type="vr:SATimestampType"/> <xs:element name="CompleteCertificateRefs" type="vr:SACertIDListType"/> <xs:element name="CompleteRevocationRefs" type="vr:SARevIDListType"/> <xs:element name="AttributeCertificateRefs" type="vr:SACertIDListType"/> <xs:element name="AttributeRevocationRefs" type="vr:SARevIDListType"/> <xs:element name="SigAndRefsTimeStamp" type="vr:SATimestampType"/> <xs:element name="RefsOnlyTimeStamp" type="vr:SATimestampType"/> <xs:element name="CertificateValues" type="vr:AttributeBaseType"/> <xs:element name="RevocationValues" type="vr:AttributeBaseType"/> <xs:element name="AttrAuthoritiesCertValues" type="vr:AttributeBaseType"/> <xs:element name="AttributeRevocationValues" type="vr:AttributeBaseType"/> <xs:element name="TimeStampValidationData" type="vr:AttributeBaseType"/> <xs:element name="ArchiveTimeStamp" type="vr:SATimestampType"/> <xs:element name="RenewedDigests" type="vr:SAListOfIntegersType"/> <xs:element name="MessageDigest" type="vr:SAMessageDigestType"/> <xs:element name="DSS" type="vr:SADSSType"/> <xs:element name="VRI" type="vr:SAVRIType"/> <xs:element name="DocTimeStamp" type="vr:SATimestampType"/> <xs:element name="Reason" type="vr:SAReasonType"/> <xs:element name="Name" type="vr:SANameType"/> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 40 <xs:element name="ContactInfo" type="vr:SAContactInfoType"/> <xs:element name="SubFilter" type="vr:SASubFilterType"/> <xs:element name="ByteRange" type="vr:SAListOfIntegersType"/> <xs:element name="Filter" type="vr:SAFilterType"/> <xs:element name="OtherInformation" type="vr:AnyType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:choice> </xs:complexType> All the children of SignatureAttributes instances shall be instances of types derived from AttributeBaseType. Most of the children of SignatureAttributes instances have been given the names of the qualifying properties of XAdES. In order to avoid ambiguities, the present annex will use the following convention: • For a reference to an actual XAdES qualifying property it will use the prefix "XAdES:" preceding the local name of that property. • For a reference to one of the children of SignatureAttributes instances defined in the present annex it will use the name without any prefix. EXAMPLE: XAdES:SigningCertificate refers to the actual XAdES qualifying property, while SigningCertificate refers to the SigningCertificate child element of SignatureAttributes instances. Depending on the qualifying property being reported, the namespace referenced by the XAdES prefix may be the one with the URI http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.3.2#, or http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.4.1#. A.2 SigningTime A.2.1 General This element shall be used to report on the claimed signing time in the signature. A.2.2 XML The signing time shall be reported on in the SigningTime element. The SigningTime element shall be of type SASigningTimeType. <xs:complexType name="SASigningTimeType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Time" type="xs:dateTime"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.2.3 CAdES The Time element within the SASigningTimeType shall contain the time as contained in the signing-time attribute. A.2.4 XAdES The Time element within the SASigningTimeType shall contain the time as contained in the XAdES:SigningTime qualifying property. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 41 A.2.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5, the Time element within the SASigningTimeType shall contain the time value present in the M entry of the Signature PDF dictionary. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.2.6 JAdES The Time element within the SASigningTimeType shall contain the time as contained in the sigT header parameter. A.3 SigningCertificate A.3.1 General This element shall be used to report on the references to the signing certificate path. A.3.2 XML The reference to the signing certificate path shall be reported on in the SigningCertificate element. The SigningCertificate element shall be of type SACertIDListType. <xs:complexType name="SACertIDListType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="CertID" type="vr:SACertIDType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="SACertIDType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="X509IssuerSerial" type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element ref="ds:DigestMethod"/> <xs:element ref="ds:DigestValue"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> For every certificate referenced within reported attribute that is present in a validation object in the report, the SigningCertificate shall contain an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate. For every certificate referenced within the reported attribute that is not present as validation object (for instance because the creator of the validation report cannot gain access to it), this component shall have one CertID child. The ds:DigestValue and ds:DigestMethod children shall contain the digest value and algorithm indicated in the corresponding certificate reference. The X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [12]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 42 A.3.3 CAdES For every element in certs of type ESSCertID in the signing-certificate attribute or of type ESSCertIDv2 element in the signing-certificate-v2 attribute, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the SigningCertificate in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the element of type ESSCertID is reported by a CertID child then: 1) The ds:DigestValue value shall be the base-64 encoding octet string contained in the certHash field in the instance of the ESSCertID type. 2) The ds:DigestMethod shall have the value http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1. 3) If the issuerSerial element is present within the element of type ESSCertID, then the X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded issuerSerial field in instance of ESSCertID type. If the element of type ESSCertIDV2 is reported by a CertID child then: 1) The ds:DigestValue value shall be the base-64 encoding of the octet string contained in the certHash field in the instance of the ESSCertID type. 2) The ds:DigestMethod shall have as value an URN. This URN shall represent the OID value present in the hashAlgorithm field in the instance of the ESSCertIDV2 type. The URN shall be built as specified in IETF RFC 3061 [8]. 3) If the issuerSerial element is present within the element of type ESSCertIDV2, then the X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded issuerSerial field in instance of ESSCertID type. A.3.4 XAdES For every certificate referenced within the XAdES:SigningCertificateV2 in the reported XAdES signature, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the SigningCertificate in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the certificate referenced within the XAdES:SigningCertificateV2 is reported by a CertID child then: 1) The ds:DigestValue and ds:DigestMethod shall contain the values indicated in the reference certificate as in the XAdES:SigningCertificateV2 qualifying property of the signature. 2) X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [12], as present within IssuerSerialV2 within XAdES:SigningCertificateV2 qualifying property. A.3.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5, the same rules as for CAdES signatures shall apply. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 may contain the XAdES:SigningCertificateV2 qualifying property. In these cases, this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 43 A.3.6 JAdES For every certificate referenced within any the x5t#S256, sigX5ts or x5t#o header parameters present in the reported JAdES signature, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the SigningCertificate in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the certificate referenced within x5t#S256, sigX5ts or x5t#o header parameter is reported by a CertID child then: 1) If the certificate is referenced within the x5t#S256 header parameter: a) The ds:DigestMethod value shall be set to http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256. b) The ds:DigestValue shall contain the value of the x5t#S256 header parameter. 2) If the certificate is referenced within the sigX5ts or the x5t#o header parameter: a) The ds:DigestValue and ds:DigestMethod shall contain the values indicated in the reference certificate as in the sigX5ts or the x5t#o header parameter of the signature. A.4 DataObjectFormat A.4.1 General This element shall be used to report on the format of the signed data. A.4.2 XML The data object format shall be reported on in the DataObjectFormat element. The DataObjectFormat element shall be of type SADataObjectFormatType. <xs:complexType name="SADataObjectFormatType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ContentType" type="xs:anyURI" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="MimeType" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.4.3 CAdES The ContentType element shall contain the OID contained in the content-type attribute, represented as URN as described in IETF RFC 3061 [8]. The MimeType element shall contain the UTF8String as contained in the mime-type attribute. A.4.4 XAdES The ContentType child element shall contain the URI present within the XAdES:Identifier child element of XAdES:ObjectIdentifier child element of XAdES:DataObjectFormat qualifying property of XAdES. The MimeType shall contain the value of XAdES:MimeType child element of the XAdES:DataObjectFormat qualifying property of XAdES. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 44 A.4.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5, the same rules as for CAdES signatures shall apply. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 may contain the XAdES:DataObjectFormat qualifying property. In these cases, this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.4.6 JAdES The ContentType element shall not be used. The MimeType element shall contain the value of cty header parameter, prefixed with the string "application/" when this prefix has been omitted in the cty header parameter. A.5 CommitmentTypeIndication A.5.1 General This element shall be used to report on the commitment type contained in the signature. A.5.2 XML The commitment type shall be reported on in the CommitmentTypeIndication element. The CommitmentTypeIndication element shall be of type SACommitmentTypeIndicationType. <xs:complexType name="SACommitmentTypeIndicationType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="CommitmentTypeIdentifier" type="xs:anyURI"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.5.3 CAdES The CommitmentTypeIdentifier element shall contain the OID of the CommitmentTypeId in the commitment-type-indication attribute, represented as URN as described in IETF RFC 3061 [8]. A.5.4 XAdES The CommitmentTypeIdentifier child element shall contain the URI present within the XAdES:Identifier child element of XAdES:CommitmentTypeId child element of XAdES:CommitmentTypeIndication qualifying property of XAdES. A.5.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the same rule as for CAdES signatures shall apply. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 45 NOTE: The information within the key Reason is specified in clause A.30. A.5.6 JAdES The CommitmentTypeIdentifier child element shall contain the URI present within the id member of the commId member of the srCms header parameter. A.6 AllDataObjectsTimeStamp A.6.1 General This element shall be used to report on a time-stamp on all data objects covered by the signature. A.6.2 XML The signed attributed containing the time stamp on all data objects which are signed shall be reported on in the AllDataObjectsTimeStamp element. The AllDataObjectsTimeStamp element shall be of type SATimestampType. NOTE: SATimestampType is used for other time-stamps as well and defined here. <xs:complexType name="SATimestampType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="TimeStampValue" type="xs:dateTime"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.6.3 CAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time indicated in the time-stamp token contained in the content-time- stamp attribute. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the content-time-stamp attribute. A.6.4 XAdES The TimeStampValue child element shall contain the time indicated in the time-stamp token contained in the XAdES:AllDataObjectsTimeStamp qualifying property of XAdES. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:AllDataObjectsTimeStamp qualifying property. A.6.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the same rule as for CAdES signatures shall apply. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 46 A.6.6 JAdES The TimeStampValue child element shall contain the time indicated in the time-stamp token contained in the adoTst header parameter. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the adoTst header parameter. A.7 IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp A.7.1 General This element shall be used to report on time-stamps on individual data objects in signatures that may cover several data objects. For each time-stamp token one IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp element shall be added. EXAMPLE: XAdES signatures can sign multiple data objects. A.7.2 XML The time stamp on individual data objects shall be reported on in the IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp element. The IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp element shall be of type SATimestampType. A.7.3 XAdES The TimeStampValue child element shall contain the time indicated in the time-stamp token contained in the XAdES:IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp qualifying property of XAdES. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp qualifying property. A.7.4 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 are based on CAdES signatures. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.8 SigPolicyIdentifier A.8.1 General This element shall be used to report on the signature policy identifier contained in the signature. A.8.2 XML The signature policy identifier shall be reported on in the SigPolicyIdentifier element. The SigPolicyIdentifier element shall be of type SASigPolicyIdentifierType. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 47 <xs:complexType name="SASigPolicyIdentifierType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SigPolicyId" type="xs:anyURI"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.8.3 CAdES The element SigPolicyId shall contain the OID contained in sigPolicyId in the signature-policy- identifier attribute, represented as URN as described in IETF RFC 3061 [8]. A.8.4 XAdES The SigPolicyId child element shall contain the URI present within the XAdES:Identifier child element of XAdES:SigPolicyId child element of XAdES:SignaturePolicyId child element of XAdES:CommitmentTypeIndication qualifying property of XAdES. A.8.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the same rule as for CAdES signatures shall apply. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.8.6 JAdES The SigPolicyId child element shall contain the URI present within the id member of the id member of the sigPId header parameter. A.9 SignatureProductionPlace A.9.1 General This element shall be used to report on the place where the signature is claimed to have been created. A.9.2 XML The claimed signature production place shall be reported on in the SignatureProductionPlace element. The SignatureProductionPlace element shall be of type SASignatureProductionPlaceType. <xs:complexType name="SASignatureProductionPlaceType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="AddressString" type="xs:string" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 48 A.9.3 CAdES If countryName is contained in the signer-location attribute, the contained DirectoryString shall be reported in one AddressString entry. If localityName is contained in the signer-location attribute, the contained DirectoryString shall be reported in one AddressString entry. If postalAddress is contained in the signer-location attribute, every contained DirectoryString shall be reported in one separate AddressString entry. A.9.4 XAdES Each of the child-elements of the XAdES attributes reporting the location where the signature has been purportedly generated shall be reported in one AddressString entry. EXAMPLES: XAdES:City, XAdES:StreetAddress, XAdES:StateOrProvince, XAdES:PostalCode, XAdES:CountryName. A.9.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 this component shall have the contents of the Location entry in the Signature PDF dictionary. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.9.6 JAdES Each of the members of the JAdES sigPl header parameter reporting the location where the signature has been purportedly generated shall be reported in one AddressString entry. A.10 SignerRole A.10.1 General This element shall be used to report on a certified or claimed role of the signer. A.10.2 XML The certified or claimed role of the signer shall be reported on in the SignerRole element. The SignerRole element shall be of type SASignerRoleType. <xs:complexType name="SASignerRoleType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="RoleDetails" type="vr:SAOneSignerRoleType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="SAOneSignerRoleType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Role" type="xs:string"/> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 49 <xs:element name="EndorsementType"> <xs:simpleType> <xs:restriction base="xs:string"> <xs:enumeration value="certified"/> <xs:enumeration value="claimed"/> <xs:enumeration value="signed"/> </xs:restriction> </xs:simpleType> </xs:element> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> A.10.3 CAdES For every instance of Attribute in claimedAttributes of the signer-attributes-v2 attribute, the SignerRole element shall contain one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to claimed and Role containing a string representation of the Attribute instance. The string representation of the Attribute instance is left to the creator of the report. For every instance of AttributeCertificate or OtherAttributeCertificate in certifiedAttributesV2 of the signer-attributes-v2 attribute, the SignerRole element shall contain one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to certified and Role containing a string representation of the AttributeCertificate or OtherAttributeCertificate instance. The string representation of the AttributeCertificate or OtherAttributeCertificate instance is left to the creator of the report. For every instance of SignedAssertion in signedAssertions of the signer-attributes-v2 attribute, the SignerRole element shall contain one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to signed and Role containing a string representation of the SignedAssertion instance. The string representation of the SignedAssertion instance is left to the creator of the report. A.10.4 XAdES For every ClaimedRole child element of ClaimedRoles child element of XAdES:SignerRole or XAdES:SignerRoleV2 qualifying properties, this component shall have one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to claimed and Role containing a string representation of the Attribute instance. The string representation of the Attribute instance is left to the creator of the report. For every CertifiedRole child element of CertifiedRoles child element of XAdES:SignerRole and for every CertifiedRole child element of CertifiedRolesV2 child element of XAdES:SignerRoleV2 qualifying properties, this component shall have one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to certified and Role containing a string representation of the Attribute instance. The string representation of the AttributeCertificate or OtherAttributeCertificate instance is left to the creator of the report. For every SignedAssertion child element of SignedAssertions child element of XAdES:SignerRoleV2 qualifying properties, this component shall have one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to signed and Role containing a string representation of the Attribute instance. The string representation of the SignedAssertion instance is left to the creator of the report. A.10.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the same rule as for CAdES signatures shall apply. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 50 A.10.6 JAdES For each item of each qvals arrays members of the claimed array member of the srAts header parameter, this component shall have one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to claimed and Role containing a string representation of the item. The string representation of the items of the qvals arrays is left to the creator of the report. For each item of the certified array member of the srAts header parameter, this component shall have one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to certified and Role containing a string representation of the val member of the x509AttrCert or a string representation of the val member of the otherAttrCert member of the certified array item. The string representation of the val member of the x509AttrCert or the otherAttrCert member is left to the creator of the report. For each item of each qvals arrays members of the signedAssertions array member of the srAts header parameter, this component shall have one RoleDetails child element. It shall have the EndorsementType set to signed and Role containing a string representation of the item. The string representation of the items of the qvals arrays is left to the creator of the report. A.11 CounterSignature A.11.1 General This element shall be used to report on a counter signature. A.11.2 XML The counter signature shall be reported on in the CounterSignature element. The CounterSignature element shall be of type SACounterSignatureType. <xs:complexType name="SACounterSignatureType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="CounterSignature" type="vr:SignatureReferenceType"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.11.3 CAdES The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the signature contained in the counter-signature attribute. A.11.4 XAdES The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the signature contained in the XAdES:CounterSignature qualifying attribute or to a detached countersignature of the XAdES signature. A.11.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the counter-signature attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 51 For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.11.6 JAdES The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the signature contained in the cSig member of the etsiU header parameter. A.12 SignatureTimeStamp A.12.1 General This element shall be used to report on a signature time-stamp. A.12.2 XML The signature time-stamp shall be reported on in the SignatureTimeStamp element. The SignatureTimeStamp element shall be of type SATimestampType. A.12.3 CAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the signature-time-stamp attribute. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the signature-time-stamp attribute. A.12.4 XAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:SignatureTimeStamp qualifying property. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:SignatureTimeStamp qualifying property. A.12.5 PAdES For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the same rule as for CAdES signatures shall apply. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.12.6 JAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the sigTst member of the etsiU header parameter. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the sigTst member of the etsiU header parameter. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 52 A.13 CompleteCertificateRefs A.13.1 General This element shall be used to report on the references to certificates used in the signature. A.13.2 XML The certificate references shall be reported on in the CompleteCertificateRefs element. The CompleteCertificateRefs element shall be of type SACertIDListType. The same requirements as in clause A.3.2 shall apply. A.13.3 CAdES For every element type OtherCertID in the complete-certificate-references attribute, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the CompleteCertificateRefs in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the element of type OtherCertID is reported by a CertID child then: 1) If the otherCertHash contains the element sha1Hash, then: a) The ds:DigestValue value shall be the base-64 encoding of the octet string contained in the sha1Hash field. b) The ds:DigestMethod shall have the value http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1. 2) If the otherCertHash contains the element otherHash, then: a) The ds:DigestValue value shall be the base-64 encoding of the octet string contained in the hashValue field within the otherHash field. b) The ds:DigestMethod shall have as value an URN. This URN shall represent the OID value present in the hashAlgorithm field within the otherHash field. The URN shall be built as specified in IETF RFC 3061 [8]. 3) If the issuerSerial element is present within the element of type OtherCertID, then the X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded issuerSerial field. A.13.4 XAdES For every certificate referenced within the XAdES:CompleteCertificateRefsV2 qualifying property in the reported XAdES signature, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the CompleteCertificateRefs in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the certificate referenced within the XAdES:CompleteCertificateRefsV2 is reported by a CertID child then: 1) The ds:DigestValue and ds:DigestMethod shall contain the values indicated in the referenced certificate as in the XAdES:CompleteCertificateRefsV2 qualifying property of the signature. 2) The X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [12], as present within IssuerSerialV2 within XAdES:CompleteCertificateRefsV2 qualifying property. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 53 A.13.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the complete-certificate-references attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.13.6 JAdES For every certificate referenced within an item of the xRefs array member of the etsiU header parameter in the reported JAdES signature, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the CompleteCertificateRefs in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the certificate referenced within an item of the xRefs array member of the etsiU header parameter is reported by a CertID child then: 1) The ds:DigestValue and ds:DigestMethod shall contain the values indicated in the referenced certificate as in the item of the xRefs member of the etsiU header parameter of the signature. 2) The X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [12], as present within kid member of the item of the xRefs array member of the etsiU header parameter. A.14 CompleteRevocationRefs A.14.1 General This element allows reporting on the reference on revocation information which can be used to validate the signature. A.14.2 XML The references to the revocation information shall be reported on in the CompleteRevocationRefs element. The CompleteRevocationRefs element shall be of type SARevIDListType. <xs:complexType name="SARevIDListType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:element name="CRLID" type="vr:SACRLIDType"/> <xs:element name="OCSPID" type="vr:SAOCSPIDType"/> </xs:choice> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="SACRLIDType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element ref="ds:DigestMethod"/> <xs:element ref="ds:DigestValue"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> <xs:complexType name="SAOCSPIDType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ProducedAt" type="xs:dateTime"/> <xs:choice> <xs:element name="ResponderIDByName" type="xs:string"/> <xs:element name="ResponderIDByKey" type="xs:base64Binary"/> ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 54 </xs:choice> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> For every CRL or OCSP response referenced within reported attribute that is present in a validation object in the report, the CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate. For every CRL referenced within the reported attribute that is not present as validation object (for instance because the creator of the validation report cannot gain access to it), this component shall have one CRLID child. Its ds:DigestMethod shall contain an URI identifying the same digest algorithm as the one present in the attribute of the reported signature. Its ds:DigestValue shall contain the base-64 encoding of the digest value present in the attribute of the reported signature. For every OCSP response referenced within the reported attribute that is not present as validation object (for instance because the creator of the validation report cannot gain access to it), this component shall have one OCSPID child. A.14.3 CAdES For every element in crlids of complete-revocation-references, referencing a CRL that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one CRLID child. For every element in ocspids of complete-revocation-references, referencing an OCSP response that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one OCSPID child. Its ProducedAt child shall contain the same time value as the value indicated in the producedAt in the aforementioned element in ocspids. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the ocspResponderID when its choice is ByKey in in the aforementioned element in ocspids. The ResponderIDByName shall have the string representation of the value present in the ocspResponderID when its choice is ByName in the aforementioned element in ocspids. A.14.4 XAdES For every element in CRLRefs of CompleteRevocationRefs, referencing a CRL that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one CRLID child. For every element in OCSPRefs of CompleteRevocationRefs, referencing an OCSP response that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one OCSPID child. Its ProducedAt child shall contain the same time value as the value indicated in the XAdES:ProducedAt in the aforementioned element in OCSPRefs. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the XAdES:ByKey in the aforementioned element in OCSPRefs. The ResponderIDByName shall have the same value as the value of OCSPRefs. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the XAdES:ByName in the aforementioned element in OCSPRefs. A.14.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the complete-revocation-references attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.14.6 JAdES For every item of the crlRefs array member of the rRefs member of the etsiU header parameter, referencing a CRL that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one CRLID child. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 55 For every item of the ocspRefs array member of the rRefs member of the etsiU header parameter, referencing an OCSP response that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one OCSPID child. Its ProducedAt child shall contain the same time value as the value indicated in the producedAt member of the ocspId member of the aforementioned item of the ocspRefs array. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the byKey member of the responderId member of the ocspId member of the aforementioned item of the ocspRefs array. The ResponderIDByName shall have the same string representation of the value present in the byName member of the responderId member of the ocspId member of the aforementioned item of the ocspRefs array. A.15 AttributeCertificateRefs A.15.1 General This element shall be used to report on the references to attribute certificates used in the signature. A.15.2 XML The certificate references shall be reported on in the AttributeCertificateRefs element. The AttributeCertificateRefs element shall be of type SACertIDListType. The same requirements as in clause A.3.2 shall apply. A.15.3 CAdES For every element type OtherCertID in attribute-certificate-references attribute, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the CompleteCertificateRefs in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the element of type OtherCertID is reported by a CertID child then: 1) If the otherCertHash contains the element sha1Hash, then: a) The ds:DigestValue value shall be the base-64 encoding of the octet string contained in the sha1Hash field. b) The ds:DigestMethod shall have the value http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1. 2) If the otherCertHash contains the element otherHash, then: a) The ds:DigestValue value shall be the base-64 encoding of the octet string contained in the hashValue field within the otherHash field. b) The ds:DigestMethod shall have as value an URN. This URN shall represent the OID value present in the hashAlgorithm field within the otherHash field. The URN shall be built as specified in IETF RFC 3061 [8]. 3) If the issuerSerial element is present within the element of type OtherCertID, then the X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded issuerSerial field. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 56 A.15.4 XAdES For every certificate referenced within the XAdES:AttributeCertificateRefsV2 qualifying property in the reported XAdES signature, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the CompleteCertificateRefs in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the certificate referenced within the XAdES: AttributeCertificateRefsV2 is reported by a CertID child then: 1) The ds:DigestValue and ds:DigestMethod shall contain the values indicated in the referenced certificate as in the XAdES: AttributeCertificateRefsV2 qualifying property of the signature. 2) The X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [12], as present within IssuerSerialV2 within XAdES:AttributeCertificateRefsV2 qualifying property. A.15.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the attribute-certificate-references attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.15.6 JAdES For every certificate referenced within an item of the axRefs array member of the etsiU header parameter in the reported JAdES signature, for which the referenced certificate is not presented by an AttributeObject child referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate, the AttributeCertificateRefs in the report shall contain one CertID child. If the certificate referenced within an item of the axRefs array member of the etsiU header parameter is reported by a CertID child then: 1) The ds:DigestValue and ds:DigestMethod shall contain the values indicated in the referenced certificate as in the item of the axRefs member of the etsiU header parameter of the signature. 2) The X509IssuerSerial element shall be the base-64 encoding of one DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [12], as present within kid member of the item of the axRefs array member of the etsiU header parameter. A.16 AttributeRevocationRefs A.16.1 General This element allows reporting on the contents of the XAdES:AttributeRevocationRefs qualifying property of XAdES signatures and the attribute-revocation-references attribute of CAdES signatures. A.16.2 XML The certificate references shall be reported on in the AttributeRevocationRefs element. The AttributeRevocationRefs element shall be of type SARevIDListType. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 57 The same requirements as in clause A.14.2 shall apply. A.16.3 CAdES For every element in crlids of attribute-revocation-references, referencing a CRL that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one CRLID child. For every element in ocspids of attribute-revocation-references, referencing an OCSP response that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one OCSPID child. Its ProducedAt child shall contain the same time value as the value indicated in the producedAt in the aforementioned element in ocspids. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the ocspResponderID when its choice is ByKey in in the aforementioned element in ocspids. The ResponderIDByName shall have the string representation of the value present in the ocspResponderID when its choice is ByKey in the aforementioned element in ocspids. A.16.4 XAdES For every element in CRLRefs of AttributeRevocationRefs, referencing a CRL that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one CRLID child. For every element in OCSPRefs of AttributeRevocationRefs, referencing an OCSP response that is not present in the validation report, the CompleteRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one OCSPID child. Its ProducedAt child shall contain the same time value as the value indicated in the XAdES:ProducedAt in the aforementioned element in OCSPRefs. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the XAdES:ByKey in the aforementioned element in OCSPRefs. The ResponderIDByName shall have the same value as the value of OCSPRefs. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the XAdES:ByName in the aforementioned element in OCSPRefs. A.16.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the attribute-revocation-references attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. For PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6 the same rule as for XAdES signatures shall apply. A.16.6 JAdES For every item of the crlRefs array member of the arRefs member of the etsiU header parameter, referencing a CRL that is not present in the validation report, the AttributeRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one CRLID child. For every item of the ocspRefs array member of the arRefs member of the etsiU header parameter, referencing an OCSP response that is not present in the validation report, the AttributeRevocationRefs in the report shall contain one OCSPID child. Its ProducedAt child shall contain the same time value as the value indicated in the producedAt member of the ocspId member of the aforementioned item of the ocspRefs array. The ResponderIDByKey shall have the base-64 encoding of the value present in the byKey member of the responderId member of the ocspId member of the aforementioned item of the ocspRefs array. The ResponderIDByName shall have the same string representation of the value present in the byName member of the responderId member of the ocspId member of the aforementioned item of the ocspRefs array. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 58 A.17 SigAndRefsTimeStamp A.17.1 General This element shall be used to report on a time-stamp covering the signature and the references on certificates and revocation information. A.17.2 XML The time-stamp on the signature and the references on certificates and revocation information shall be reported on in the SigAndRefsTimeStamp element. The SigAndRefsTimeStamp element shall be of type SATimestampType. A.17.3 CAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the CAdES-C-time-stamp attribute. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the CAdES-C-time-stamp attribute. A.17.4 XAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:SigAndRefsTimeStampV2 qualifying property. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:SigAndRefsTimeStampV2 qualifying property. A.17.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the CAdES-C-time-stamp attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain the XAdES:SigAndRefsTimeStampV2. In these cases, this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.17.6 JAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the sigRTst member of the etsiU header parameter. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the sigRTst member of the etsiU header parameter. A.18 RefsOnlyTimeStamp A.18.1 General This element can be used to report on the time-stamp covering the references on certificates and revocation information. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 59 A.18.2 XML The time-stamp on the references on certificates and revocation information shall be reported on in the SigAndRefsTimeStamp element. The SigAndRefsTimeStamp element shall be of type SATimestampType. A.18.3 CAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the time-stamped-certs-crls- references attribute. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. A.18.4 XAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:RefsOnlyTimeStampV2 qualifying property. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the XAdES:RefsOnlyTimeStampV2 qualifying property. A.18.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain XAdES:RefsOnlyTimeStampV2 qualifying property. In these cases, this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.18.6 JAdES The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the rfsTst member of the etsiU header parameter. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the rfsTst member of the etsiU header parameter. A.19 CertificateValues A.19.1 General This element shall be used to report on the attribute containing the certificates used in the signature. A.19.2 XML The certificates within such an attribute shall be reported on in the CertificateValues element. The CertificateValues element shall be of type AttributeBaseType. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 60 A.19.3 CAdES For every instance of Certificate contained in the certificate-values attribute, the CertificateValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate. A.19.4 XAdES For every instance child element present in the XAdES:CertificateValues qualifying property, the CertificateValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate. A.19.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the certificate-values attribute. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain XAdES:CertificateValues qualifying property. In these cases this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.19.6 JAdES For every item of the xVals array member of the etsiU header parameter in the reported JAdES signature, the CertificateValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate. A.20 RevocationValues A.20.1 General This element shall be used to report on the attribute containing the revocation information corresponding to the signature. A.20.2 XML The revocation information within such an attribute shall be reported on in the RevocationValues element. The RevocationValues element shall be of type AttributeBaseType. A.20.3 CAdES For every instance of CertificateList contained in the revocation-values attribute, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding CRL. For every instance of BasicOCSPResponse contained in the revocation-values attribute, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding OCSP response. For every item of otherRevVals contained in the revocation-values attribute, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the corresponding validation object. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 61 A.20.4 XAdES For every child element of the XAdES:CRLValues child element of XAdES:RevocationValues qualifying property, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding CRL. For every child element of the XAdES:OCSPValues child element of XAdES:RevocationValues qualifying property, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding OCSP response. For every child element of the XAdES:OtherValues child element of XAdES:RevocationValues qualifying property, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding validation data object. A.20.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not have the revocation-values attribute. Consequently, this component is not be present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain XAdES:RevocationValues qualifying property. In these cases, this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.20.6 JAdES For every item of the crlVals array member of the rVals member of the etsiU header parameter, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding CRL. For every item of the ocspVals array member of the rVals member of the etsiU header parameter, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding OCSP response. For every item of the otherVals array member of the rVals member of the etsiU header parameter, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding validation data object. A.21 AttrAuthoritiesCertValues A.21.1 General This element shall be used to report on an attribute containing certificates to be used in the validation of attribute certificates or signed assertions. A.21.2 XML The certificates within such an attribute shall be reported on in the AttrAuthoritiesCertValues element. The AttrAuthoritiesCertValues element shall be of type AttributeBaseType. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 62 A.21.3 XAdES For every instance child element present in the XAdES:AttrAuthoritiesCertValues qualifying property, the CertificateValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing corresponding certificate. A.21.4 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 are based on CAdES signatures. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain the XAdES:AttrAuthoritiesCertValues qualifying property. In these cases, this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.21.5 JAdES For every item of the axVals array member of the etsiU header parameter in the reported JAdES signature, the CertificateValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding certificate. A.22 AttributeRevocationValues A.22.1 General This element shall be used to report on attributes containing revocation information to be used in the validation of attribute certificates or signed assertions. A.22.2 XML The revocation information within such an attribute shall be reported on in the AttributeRevocationValues element. The AttributeRevocationValues element shall be of type AttributeBaseType. A.22.3 XAdES For every child element of the XAdES:CRLValues child element of XAdES:AttributeRevocationValues qualifying property, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding CRL. For every child element of the XAdES:OCSPValues child element of XAdES:AttributeRevocationValues qualifying property, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding OCSP response. For every child element of the XAdES:OtherValues child element of XAdES:AttributeRevocationValues qualifying property, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding validation data object. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 63 A.22.4 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 are based on CAdES signatures. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain XAdES:AttributeRevocationValues qualifying property. In these cases this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.22.5 JAdES For every item of the crlVals array member of the arVals member of the etsiU header parameter, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding CRL. For every item of the ocspVals array member of the arVals member of the etsiU header parameter, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding OCSP response. For every item of the otherVals array member of the arVals member of the etsiU header parameter, the RevocationValues element shall contain an AttributeObject referencing the validation object containing the corresponding validation data object. A.23 TimeStampValidationData A.23.1 General This element shall be used to report on attributes containing certificates and revocation information to be used to validate a time-stamp. A.23.2 XML The certificates and revocation information within such an attribute shall be reported on in the TimeStampValidationData element. The TimeStampValidationData element shall be of type AttributeBaseType. A.23.3 XAdES The certificates present in the XAdES:CertificateValues child element of XAdES:TimeStampValidationData qualifying property shall be reported in the TimeStampValidation component as the certificates present in XAdES:CertificateValues qualifying property. The revocation values present in the XAdES:RevocationValues child element of XAdES:TimeStampValidationData qualifying property shall be reported in the TimeStampValidation component as the revocation values present in XAdES:RevocationValues qualifying property. A.23.4 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 are based on CAdES signatures. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain XAdES:AttributeRevocationValues qualifying property. In these cases, this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 64 A.23.5 JAdES The certificates present in the xVals member of the tstVD member of the etsiU header parameter shall be reported in the TimeStampValidation component as the certificates present in the xVals member of the etsiU header parameter. The revocation values present in the rVals member of the tstVD member of the etsiU header parameter shall be reported in the TimeStampValidation component as the revocation values present in the rVals member of the etsiU header parameter. A.24 ArchiveTimeStamp A.24.1 General This element shall be used to report on an archival time-stamp. A.24.2 XML The time-stamp on the references on certificates and revocation information shall be reported on in the ArchiveTimeStamp element. The ArchiveTimeStamp element shall be of type SATimestampType. A.24.3 CAdES For every archive-time-stamp-v3 attribute, an ArchiveTimeStamp element shall be added to the report. The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the archive-time-stamp-v3 attribute. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the archive-time-stamp-v3 attribute. For every archive-time-stamp attribute, an ArchiveTimeStamp element shall be added to the report. The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the archive-time-stamp attribute. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the archive-time-stamp attribute. For every long-term-validation attribute, an ArchiveTimeStamp element shall be added to the report. The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp or evidence record contained in the long-term- validation attribute. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp or evidence record contained in the long-term-validation attribute. A.24.4 XAdES For every time-stamp token present in a XAdES:ArchiveTimeStamp qualifying property defined in the namespace whose URI is http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.4.1# and for every time-stamp token present in a XAdES:ArchiveTimeStamp qualifying property defined in the namespace whose URI is http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.3.2# there shall be one ArchiveTimeStamp component whose AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp token. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 65 A.24.5 PAdES PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 do not contain the archive-time-stamp-v3 attributes or archive-time-stamp attributes. Consequently, this component is not present when reporting on PAdES signatures. PAdES signatures as specified in ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 6.2 may contain XAdES:ArchiveTimeStamp qualifying property. In these cases this component may be present and the requirements are as the ones specified for reporting on any other XAdES signature. A.24.6 JAdES For every time-stamp token present in an arcTst member of the etsiU header parameter there shall be one ArchiveTimeStamp component whose AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp token. A.25 RenewedDigests A.25.1 General This element shall be used to report on the XAdES:RenewedDigests qualifying property of XAdES signatures. A.25.2 XML The time-stamp on the references on certificates and revocation information shall be reported on in the RenewedDigests element. The RenewedDigests element shall be of type SAListOfIntegersType. <xs:simpleType name="SAListOfIntegersType"> <xs:list itemType="xs:integer"/> </xs:simpleType> A.25.3 XAdES When the reported signature is a XAdES signature, each integer value present in this component shall identify the order of appearance of the ds:Reference whose digest has been renewed when the XAdES signature is serialized, where the value "1" is assigned to the first ds:Reference child of the ds:SignedInfo element. A.26 MessageDigest A.26.1 General This element shall be used to report on the attribute containing the message digest of the content being signed. A.26.2 XML The message digest shall be reported on in the MessageDigest element. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 66 The MessageDigest element shall be of type SAMessageDigestType. <xs:complexType name="SAMessageDigestType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Digest" type="xs:base64Binary"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.26.3 CAdES The Digest element shall contain the octet string contained in message-digest attribute. A.26.4 PAdES For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the same rule as for CAdES signatures shall apply. A.27 DSS A.27.1 General This element shall be used to report the contents of the DSS PDF dictionary. A.27.2 XML The contents of the DSS PDF dictionary shall be reported on in the DSS element. The DSS element shall be of type SADSSType. <xs:complexType name="SADSSType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Certs" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="CRLs" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OCSPs" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> Certs child shall contain a sequence of references to validation objects, each one containing one certificate. CRLs child shall contain a sequence of references to validation objects, each one containing one CRL. OCSPs child shall contain a sequence of references to validation objects, each one containing one OCSP response. A.27.3 PAdES For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 each AttributeObject child element of Certs child element in DSS component shall contain a reference to one validation object containing one certificate present in the DSS PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. Every certificate present in this PDF dictionary shall be referenced by one of the aforementioned AttributeObject elements. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 67 For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 each AttributeObject child element of CRLs child element in DSS component shall contain a reference to one validation object containing one CRL present in the DSS PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. Every CRL present in this PDF dictionary shall be referenced by one of the aforementioned AttributeObject elements. For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 each AttributeObject child element of OCSPs child element in DSS component shall contain a reference to one validation object containing one OCSP response present in the DSS PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. Every OCSP response present in this PDF dictionary shall be referenced by one of the aforementioned AttributeObject elements. A.28 VRI A.28.1 General This element shall be used to report on the certificate references contained in the VRI Dictionary. A.28.2 XML The contents of the VRI PDF dictionary shall be reported on in the VRI element. The VRI element shall be of type SAVRIType. <xs:complexType name="SAVRIType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Certs" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="CRLs" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="OCSPs" type="vr:VOReferenceType" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="TU" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="TS" type="vr:SATimestampType" minOccurs="0"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> The Certs child shall contain a sequence of references to validation objects, each one containing one certificate. The CRLs child shall contain a sequence of references to validation objects, each one containing one CRL. The OCSPs child shall contain a sequence of references to validation objects, each one containing one OCSP response. The TU child shall contain a date string as defined in ISO 32000-1 [9]. The TS child shall contain reference to a validation object containing a time-stamp token. A.28.3 PAdES For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 each AttributeObject child element of the Certs child element in a VRI component shall contain a reference to one validation object containing one certificate present in one VRI PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. Every certificate present in this PDF dictionary shall be referenced by one of the aforementioned AttributeObject elements. For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 each AttributeObject child element of the CRLs child element in a VRI component shall contain a reference to one validation object containing one CRL present in one VRI PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. Every CRL present in this PDF dictionary shall be referenced by one of the aforementioned AttributeObject elements. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 68 For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 each AttributeObject child element of the OCSPs child element in a VRI component shall contain a reference to one validation object containing one OCSP response present in one VRI PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. Every OCSP response present in this PDF dictionary shall be referenced by one of the aforementioned AttributeObject elements. For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the TU child element in a VRI component shall have as value the same date string as the date string present within the TU entry of VRI PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. For PAdES signatures specified in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [i.3] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.4], clause 5 the AttributeObject child element of TS child element in one VRI component shall contain a reference to one validation object containing one time-stamp token present in the TU entry of VRI PDF dictionary of the PAdES signature. A.29 DocTimeStamp A.29.1 General This element shall be used to report on the document time-stamp within a PDF document. A.29.2 XML The value of the document time-stamp shall be reported on in the DocTimeStamp element. The DocTimeStamp element shall be of type SATimestampType. A.29.3 PAdES For every document time-stamp in the PDF document, the report shall contain a DocTimeStamp element. The TimeStampValue shall contain the time of the time-stamp contained in the entry with key Contents of the document time-stamp dictionary. The AttributeObject shall contain a reference to the validation object containing the time-stamp contained in the entry with key Contents of the document time-stamp dictionary. NOTE: A document time-stamp can be signed or unsigned. A.30 Reason A.30.1 General This element shall be used to report on the entry with key Reason in the Signature PDF dictionary. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 69 A.30.2 XML The entry with key Reason in the Signature PDF dictionary stamp shall be reported on in the Reason element. The Reason element shall be of type SAReasonType. <xs:complexType name="SAReasonType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ReasonElement" type="xs:string"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.30.3 PAdES The value within ReasonElement child shall be the same as the value of the entry with key Reason in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.31 Name A.31.1 General This element shall be used to report on the entry with key Name in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.31.2 XML The entry with key Name in the Signature PDF dictionary stamp shall be reported on in the Name element. The Name element shall be of type SANameType. <xs:complexType name="SANameType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="NameElement" type="xs:string"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.31.3 PAdES The value within NameElement child shall be the same as the value of the entry with key Name in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.32 ContactInfo A.32.1 General This element shall be used to report on the entry with key ContactInfo in the Signature PDF dictionary. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 70 A.32.2 XML The entry with key ContactInfo in the Signature PDF dictionary stamp shall be reported on in the ContactInfo element. The ContactInfo element shall be of type SAContactInfoType. <xs:complexType name="SAContactInfoType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="ContactInfoElement" type="xs:string"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.32.3 PAdES The value within ContactInfoElement child shall be the same as the value of the entry with key ContactInfo in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.33 SubFilter A.33.1 General This element shall be used to report on the entry with key SubFilter in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.33.2 XML The entry with key SubFilter in the Signature PDF dictionary stamp shall be reported on in the SubFilter element. The SubFilter element shall be of type SASubFilterType. <xs:complexType name="SASubFilterType"> <xs:complexContent> <xs:extension base="vr:AttributeBaseType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="SubFilterElement" type="xs:string"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:extension> </xs:complexContent> </xs:complexType> A.33.3 PAdES The value within this component shall be the same as the value of the entry with key SubFilter in the Signature PDF dictionary. EXAMPLE: Possible values are:  ETSI.RFC3161  ETSI.CAdES.detached  adbe.pkcs7.detached  adbe.pkcs7.sha1 ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 71 A.34 ByteRange A.34.1 General This element shall be used to report on the entry with key ByteRange in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.34.2 XML The entry with key ByteRange in the Signature PDF dictionary stamp shall be reported on in the ByteRange element. The ByteRange element shall be of type SAListOfIntegersType. This element shall consist in a list of integers whose number shall be multiple of two. Each group of two shall include the values of the two corresponding pair integers present in the entry with key ByteRange within Signature PDF dictionary. For each pair of integers in the list, the first one represents the starting byte offset. The second one represents the length of this range in bytes. NOTE: The entry with key ByteRange may contain an array of pairs of integers. A.34.3 PAdES A PAdES signature covers the entire file, including the Signature Dictionary but excluding the PDF Signature itself (the entry with key Contents) and consequently has only two pairs of integers in the ByteRange child. The values within the Range child shall be the same integer values as the corresponding pairs of integers present in the entry with key ByteRange in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.35 Filter A.35.1 General This element shall be used to report on the entry with key Filter in the Signature PDF dictionary. A.35.2 XML The entry with key Filter in the Signature PDF dictionary stamp shall be reported on in the Filter element. The Filter element shall be of type SAFilterType. <xs:complexType name="SAFilterType"> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="Filter" type="xs:string"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> A.35.3 PAdES The value within Filter child shall be the same as the value of the entry with key Filter in the Signature PDF dictionary. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 72 Annex B (normative): XML Schema The XML Schema file for the present document is in the file "1910202xmlSchema.xsd" and is contained in archive ts_11910202v010401p0.zip which accompanies the present document and is available at: • https://forge.etsi.org/rep/esi/x19_10202_validation_report/raw/v1.4.1/1910202xmlSchema.xsd. ETSI ETSI TS 119 102-2 V1.4.1 (2023-06) 73 History Document history V1.1.1 August 2018 Publication V1.2.1 February 2019 Publication V1.3.1 September 2021 Publication V1.4.1 June 2023 Publication
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1 Scope
The present document provides general security and policy requirements for applications for signature creation, validation and augmentation. The present document is primarily relevant to the following actors: • Implementers and providers of applications for signature creation, signature validation and/or signature augmentation, who need to ensure that relevant requirements are covered. • Actors that integrate applications for signature creation, signature validation and/or signature augmentation components with business process software (or use standalone software), who want to ensure proper functioning of the overall signature creation/validation/augmentation process and that the signature creation/validation is done in a sufficiently secure environment. The present document is applicable to these actors, and their evaluators (for a self-evaluation or an evaluation by a third party) to have a list of criteria against which to check the implementation. The requirements cover applications for signature creation, signature validation and/or signature augmentation, i.e. the implementation and provision of the Signature Creation/Validation/Augmentation Application modules (SCA/SVA/SAA), the driving application (DA), the communication between the SCA and the signature creation device (SCDev) and the environment in which the SCA/SVA/SAA is used. It also specifies user interface requirements, while the user interface can be part of the SCA/SVA/SAA or of the DA which calls the SCA/SVA/SAA. Any entity using SCA/SVA/SAA components in its business process acts as driving application. The document covers: • Legal driven policy requirements. • Information security (management system) requirements. • Signature creation, signature validation and signature augmentation processes requirements. • Development and coding policy requirements. • General requirements. Protection Profiles (PP) for signature creation applications and signature validation applications are out of scope and are defined in the CEN standard "Protection Profiles for Signature Creation & Validation Applications" [i.9]. General requirements for trust service providers are provided in ETSI EN 319 401 [i.24]. Requirements for trust service providers providing signature creation or validation services are out of scope. Requirements on trust service providers providing signature creation services are to be defined in ETSI TS 119 431 [i.22], with CEN EN 419 241 [i.21] defining requirements for a remote signature creation device. Requirements on trust service providers providing signature validation services are to be defined in ETSI TS 119 441 [i.23].
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. Not applicable. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 7
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2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. [i.2] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. [i.3] ISO/IEC 15504: "Information technology -- Process assessment". [i.4] ISO/IEC 27000 series: "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security management systems -- Overview and vocabulary". [i.5] ISO/IEC 27001: "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security management systems -- Requirements". [i.6] ISO/IEC 27002: "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of practice for information security management". [i.7] ETSI TR 119 001: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); The framework for standardization of signatures; Definitions and abbreviations". [i.8] ETSI TS 119 102 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Procedures for Creation and Validation of AdES Digital Signatures". [i.9] CEN EN 419 111: " Protection Profiles for Signature Creation & Validation Applications". NOTE: At the time of publishing of the present document, this document is not yet published. [i.10] ETSI EN 319 122 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CAdES digital signatures". [i.11] ETSI EN 319 132 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); XAdES digital signatures". [i.12] ETSI EN 319 142 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES digital signatures". [i.13] ETSI EN 319 162 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Associated Signature Containers (ASiC)". [i.14] ETSI TS 119 172 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Signature Policies". [i.15] ETSI TS 119 104 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General requirements on Testing Conformance and Interoperability of Signature Creation and Validation". [i.16] ETSI TS 119 124 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CAdES digital signatures Testing Conformance and Interoperability". [i.17] ETSI TS 119 134 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); XML Advanced Electronic Signature (XAdES) Testing Compliance & Interoperability". [i.18] ETSI TS 119 144 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PDF Advanced Electronic Signature (PAdES) Testing Compliance & Interoperability". ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 8 [i.19] ETSI TS 119 164 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Associated Signature Containers (ASiC) Testing Compliance & Interoperability". [i.20] ETSI TS 119 174 (all parts): "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Testing Conformance and Interoperability of Signature Policies". [i.21] CEN EN 419 241: "Security requirements for trustworthy systems supporting server signing". [i.22] ETSI TS 119 431: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for trust service providers providing AdES digital signature generation services". NOTE: At the time of publishing of the present document, this document is not yet published. [i.23] ETSI TS 119 441: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for trust service providers providing AdES digital signature validation services". NOTE: At the time of publishing of the present document this document is not yet published. [i.24] ETSI EN 319 401: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers". [i.25] ETSI TS 119 312: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Cryptographic Suites". [i.26] ETSI EN 319 412-5: " Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements". [i.27] ETSI EN 301 549: "Accessibility requirements suitable for public procurement of ICT products and services in Europe".
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI TR 119 001 [i.7] and the following apply: NOTE: For the sake of readability, the following definitions are reproduced here below. advanced electronic seal: As defined in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. advanced electronic signature: As defined in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. certificate: public key of an entity, together with some other information, rendered unforgeable by digital signature with the private key of the certification authority which issued it certificate validation: process of verifying and confirming that a certificate is valid data to be signed formatted: data created from the data to be signed objects by formatting them and placing them in the correct sequence for the computation of the data to be signed representation data to be signed representation: hash of the data to be signed formatted, which is used to compute the digital signature value digital signature: data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery e.g. by the recipient. digital signature value: result of the cryptographic transformation of a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery e.g. by the recipient driving application: application that uses a signature creation system to create a signature or a signature validation application in order to validate digital signatures or a signature augmentation application to augment digital signatures personal data: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject') ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 9 signature application practice statement: set of rules applicable to the application and/or its environment implementing the creation, the augmentation and/or the validation of digital signatures signature augmentation: process of incorporating to a digital signature information aiming to maintain the validity of that signature over the long term signature augmentation application: application that implements signature augmentation NOTE 1: The signature augmentation application takes inputs from and provides the augmented signature to a driving application. NOTE 2: The signature augmentation application can be implemented as part of the signature creation application or as part of the signature validation application or as a stand-alone application. signature augmentation policy: set of rules, applicable to one or more digital signatures, that defines the technical and procedural requirements for their augmentation, in order to meet a particular business need, and under which the digital signature(s) can be determined to be conformant signature class: set of signatures achieving a given functionality NOTE 1: ETSI TS 119 102-1 [i.8] describes different signature classes. NOTE 2: A signature class is implementation independent. EXAMPLE: Signature with time, signature with long term validation material, Signature providing Long Term Availability and Integrity of Validation Material are possible signature classes. signature creation application: application within the signature creation system, complementing the signature creation device, that creates a signature data object signature creation data: unique data, such as codes or private cryptographic keys, which are used by the signer to create a digital signature value signature creation device: configured software or hardware used to implement the signature creation data and to create a digital signature value signature creation system: overall system, consisting of the signature creation application and the signature creation device, that creates a digital signature signature level: format specific definition of a set of data incorporated into a digital signature, which allows to implement a signature class EXAMPLE: CAdES-B-B, CAdES-E-EPES [i.15] and [i.16], XAdES-B-LTA, XAdES-E-C [i.17] and [i.18], PAdES-B-T, PAdES-E-LTV [i.19] and [i.20] are examples of signature levels. signature policy: signature creation policy, a signature augmentation policy, a signature validation policy or any combination thereof, applicable to the same signature or set of signatures signature validation: process of verifying and confirming that a signature is valid signature validation application: application that implements signature validation NOTE: The signature validation application takes inputs from and provides validation results to a driving application. signature verification: process of checking the cryptographic value of a signature using signature verification data signature verification data: data, such as codes or public cryptographic keys, used for the purpose of verifying a signature signed data object: data structure containing the signature value, signature attributes and other information signer: entity being the creator of a digital signature time-stamping authority: trust service provider which issues time-stamps using one or more time-stamping units trust service: electronic service which enhances trust and confidence in electronic transactions ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 10 trust service provider: natural or a legal person who provides one or more trust services trusted path: connection that provides integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data transmitted
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3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 119 001 [i.7] and the following apply: CA Certification Authority CRL Certificate Revocation List DA Driving Application DN Distinguished Name DTBS Data to be Signed DTBSR Data To Be Signed Representation EC European Commission ICS Implementation Conformance Statement ISMS Controls (Information Security Management System) OCSP Online Certificate Status Provider OTP One Time Password PIN Personal Identification Number PUK Personal Unblocking Key PW Password SAA Signature Augmentation Application SAPS Signature Application Practice Statement SCA Signature Creation Application SCD Signature Creation Data SCDev Signature Creation Device SD Signer's Document SDO Signed Data Object SSI SCDev/SCA interface SVA Signature Validation Application ToC Table of Content XML eXtensible Markup Language
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4 Signature creation/validation/augmentation model
The hardware/software systems for creating, validating or augmenting a signature, are modelled through several building blocks as shown in figures 1 to 3. Some objectives can be implemented either by the DA or the SVA/SCA/SAA. This is to allow a flexibility in the implementation. However, a complete system meets all mandatory objectives (see clause 5.3) independent of where implemented. NOTE 1: The distinction between the SCA/SVA/SAA and DA is done to simplify the definition of requirements. In concrete implementations, this distinction may not be made. EXAMPLE: A SCA does not necessarily have a user interface, e.g. when signature creation is provided as a remote service. In this case user interaction, like selection of a signature creation policy, is implemented by the DA. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 11 NOTE: This model is based on ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8] and differs slightly from the model used in CEN EN 419 111 [i.9]. It allows the user to communicate with the Driving Application and with the SCA. It also uses signature creation system to group together the SCA and the SCDev. Figure 1: Basic model of an example signature creation environment Signature creation environment Signature creation system Signature creation application (SCA) Signature creation device (SCDev) Driving application (DA) Network Local storage Operating system and other application processes User interface SCDev/SCA interface (SSI) ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 12 In case of a signature creation, the signature creation application (SCA) prepares the document to be signed and creates the signed data object from the digital signature value received from the signature creation device (SCDev). The digital signature value is created using the signature creation data of the user. The SCA communicates with the SCDev using the SSI. The driving application provides the input to the signature creation application and receives the output. The user interface can be (partly) part of the DA and/or (partly) part of the SCA. The signature creation environment covers the environment in which the DA, the SCA and the SCDev are used. It contains network, data storage and the information system. NOTE: This model is based on ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8] and differs slightly from the model used in CEN EN 419 111 [i.9]. It allows the user to communicate with the Driving Application and with the SCA. Figure 2: Basic model of an example signature validation environment In the case of a signature validation, the DA provides the input for the SVA and receives the output. Again, the user interface can be part of the DA and/or part of the SVA. The signature validation environment covers the environment in which the DA and the SVA are used. It contains network, data storage and the information system. Signature validation environment Signature validation application (SVA) Driving application (DA) Network Local storage Operating system and other application processes User interface ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 13 Figure 3: Basic model of an example signature augmentation environment NOTE 2: In ETSI TS 119 102-1 [i.8], the signature augmentation is part of the SCA, since it adds information to the signature. In the present document it is handled separately to better cover the specific control objectives and to reflect the fact that the SAA can be part of the SCA, the SVA or can be a stand-alone application. In the case of a signature augmentation, the DA provides the input for the SAA and receives the augmented signature. Again, the user interface can be part of the DA and/or part of the SAA. The signature augmentation environment covers the environment in which the DA and the SAA are used. It contains network, data storage and the information system. For more details on the general model for signature creation and validation, see ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8].
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5 General requirements
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5.1 User interface
Control Objective Ensure that the user interface is well designed and easy to use to avoid any problems and misunderstandings in the interaction with the application. This ensures the user confidence. The user interface can be part of the SCA/SVA/SAA or the DA which calls the SCA/SVA/SAA. Controls (User Interface) UI 1: The user interface should: a) provide unambiguous user guidance on how to use the SCA/SVA/SAA, and, if applicable, to install and configure the system; b) be self-descriptive to the extent that each dialogue step is easy to understand through feedback from the system or is explained to the user upon request; c) be error tolerant if, despite evident errors in input, the intended result can be achieved with minimal corrective action; d) deliver informative error reporting to lead the user forward; Signature augmentation environment Signature augmentation application (SAA) Driving application (DA) Network Local storage Operating system and other application processes User interface ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 14 e) provide feedback to confirm that the action carried out by the user is correct (or incorrect); f) when using colour indication, use red for errors and green for go/proceed; g) be able, at any time, to cancel the current operation and return to the main menu; or, to exit the system completely; h) protect privacy for the individual, e.g. by making the information not accessible to others at the user interface; and i) ask for confirmation of the key decisions and choices of the user. Control Objective Provide the user with sufficient information to understand the process of generating, augmenting and validating the signature. Controls (User Interface) UI 2: The SCA/SVA/SAA shall provide a detailed user's guide leading first time users through the process of generating, augmenting and validating a signature.
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5.2 General security measures
Control objective Ensure that the systems on which the application is developed apply appropriate security measures and adapt to specific application environments. Controls (General Security Measures) GSM 1: Appropriate security measures: GSM 1.1: The security measures for the systems on which the application is developed should be as in ISO/IEC 27002 [i.6] or based on a detailed risk analysis. Specific points of attention are listed below. GSM 1.2: The latest application environment (managed software environments) should be used including up to date security fixes. GSM 1.3: Well-tested and reviewed implementations of standardized protocol(s) and libraries shall be used. GSM 1.4: Cryptographic libraries tested against the corresponding standard shall be used. Established libraries should be used. GSM 1.6: If applicable, anti-virus, spyware protection (incl. for application parts that could be downloadable) shall be implemented. GSM 1.7: If applicable, personal firewall shall be used. GSM 2: Specific application environment: GSM 2.1: When the SCA, SVA or SAA is delivered as a software package, it should be digitally signed. GSM 2.2: When the delivered code or part of it is digitally signed, this should be done using a code-signing certificate provided by a recognized trust service provider issuing certificates and the signature should contain a time-stamp from a recognized time-stamping authority. NOTE 1: Recognized according to the applicable code signing signature policy. GSM 2.3: The DA should maintain integrity and confidentiality of all information supplied by the user and of any data flowing between the application and the user, even in the case of a public application environment. GSM 2.4: The SCA/SVA/SAA shall maintain integrity and confidentiality of all information supplied by the user and of any data flowing between the application and the user, even in the case of a public application environment. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 15 GSM 2.5: Signer's authentication data shall be securely deleted at the session end by the application to avoid any replay attack of other users. GSM 2.6: If the application is used by different users, then the application shall make sure that all data related to a signature process is erased from public available areas (including caching, or certificates stores) after having completed the signature. The application shall not copy these elements to any party not authorized by the user. NOTE 2: Security measures specific to the environment in which the SCA/SVA/SAA is used can be a result of a risk analysis done by the information security management system, see clause 7. Control objective Inform the user on recommended security measures when applying a SCA/SVA/SAA. Controls (General Security Measures) GSM 3: The SCA/SVA/SAA should inform the user of best practices in protecting personal computers (anti-virus, personal firewall, etc.). NOTE 3: The corresponding information can be part of the SCA/SVA/SAA documentation.
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5.3 System completeness requirements
Control objective Ensure that a complete system implements all the mandatory requirements including those that can be implemented either by the DA or by the SVA/SCA/SAA. Controls (System Completeness) SC 1: In a complete system, all mandatory requirements stated in the present document shall be implemented.
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6 Legal driven policy requirements
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6.1 Introduction
When analysing the context of the business application implementing signatures, several legal aspects are considered. In the following clauses, control objectives are defined in connection with the processing of personal data and the accessibility for persons with disabilities.
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6.2 Processing of personal data
Control objective Ensure that personal data are processed fairly and lawfully in accordance with applicable personal data protection legislation. Controls (Personal Data) PD 1: Evidence shall be provided on how requirements of applicable Privacy and Data Protection regulation legislation (e.g. European Data Protection Directive [i.2]) are met. PD 2: Appropriate technical measures shall be taken against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 16
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6.3 Accessibility for persons with disabilities
Control objective Ensure that SCA/SVA/SAA are accessible for persons with disabilities. Controls (Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities) APD 1: If accessibility for persons with disabilities is required by applicable law, SCA/SVA/SAA shall be made accessible for persons with disabilities where feasible. Applicable standards such as ETSI EN 301 549 [i.27] should be taken into account. EXAMPLE: Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1] states that where feasible, accessibility for persons with disabilities is required to be taken into account. 7 Information security (management system) requirements
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7.1 Introduction
This clause contains the most important requirements for information security and information security management systems. A detailed description can also be found in the ISO/IEC 27000 series [i.4]. The controls defined in this clause cover the environment in which the SCA/SVA/SAA and the driving applications are applied. ISMS 1: The controls identified in this cause shall be applied in the context of the organization information security management system. ISMS 2: For an organization integrating signature creation and validation processes, information security should be implemented based on ISO/IEC 27001 [i.5], duly integrated with the following provisions.
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7.2 Network protection
Control objective If the SCA/SVA/SAA receives or sends confidential data over a network, guarantee the protection of this data in networks as well as the protection against network threats on the infrastructure supporting the processing and storage of confidential data. Controls (Network Protection) NP 1: If the SCA/SVA/SAA is implemented within an application environment containing components of different levels of security which communicate over networks, then the networks that transmit confidential data to or from the SCA/SVA/SAA should be adequately segmented to prohibit direct access from less trusted systems to higher trusted systems that contain or process confidential data. Confidential data should not be transmitted over uncontrolled or unprotected networks. NP 2: Network access to information systems storing or processing confidential data shall be adequately restricted using filtering devices such as firewalls. Rules shall protect the information systems from both unauthorized incoming and outgoing traffic.
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7.3 Information systems protection
Control objective Ensure that the information systems handling signature data and the environment of the SCA/SVA/SAA are secured against unauthorized access and misuse, trigger suitable security alarms, and, when applicable, that security events are recorded. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 17 Controls (information system protection) ISP 1: Information systems shall be protected against malicious use with mechanisms such as anti-virus and anti- spyware or other prevention mechanisms. ISP 2: If the SCA/SVA/SAA runs on an information system for several users, then an adequate access control mechanism shall prevent any unauthorized access to confidential data. ISP 3: Security patches and fixes should be followed-up on a continuous basis. ISP 4: Patch installations should be prioritized such that security patches for critical or at-risk systems are installed as soon as possible and within 30 days of the availability of the patches, and other lower-risk patches are installed within 90 days. ISP 5: A security patch needs not be applied if it would introduce additional vulnerabilities or instabilities that outweigh the benefits of applying the security patch. The reason for not applying any security patches should be documented.
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7.4 Software integrity of the application
Control objective Ensure that integrity of the SCA, SVA, SAA and DA is properly protected. Controls (Software Integrity of the Application) SIA 1: SCA/SVA/SAA/DA components shall be protected against viruses and malicious software to ensure their integrity. SIA 2: A change-detection mechanism (for example, file-integrity monitoring tools) shall be deployed to detect unauthorized modification (including changes, additions, and deletions) of critical SCA/SVA/SAA/DA components, like for example configuration files. SIA 3: SCA/SVA/SAADA components that have been subject to viruses or malicious software attack shall be repaired or disabled until repair is possible. SIA 4: If software components of the SCA, SVA, SAA or DA are intended to be published or delivered, these components shall be securely delivered, installed and configured.
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7.5 Data storage security
Control objective Ensure that appropriate data storage security measures are implemented in the SCA/SVA/SAA as well as in the application environment to protect any confidential data. Controls (Data Storage Security) DSS 1: Information systems storing confidential data should be configured according to a predefined security baseline based on a risk assessment. DSS 2: Confidential data shall be protected against unauthorized access and unauthorized or unintentional changes and loss. DSS 3: The SCA/SVA/SAA and its application environment shall support appropriate data storage security measures. DSS 4: The data storage security measures introduced in DSS 3 should be as defined in ISO/IEC 27002 [i.6] or based on a detailed risk analysis. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 18
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7.6 Event logs
Control objective To prove the activities related to the signature creation and validation, use event logs in the SCA/SVA/SAA, the driving application or the application environment to capture information which might be needed for later evidences. Controls (Event Logs) EL 1: Information systems storing or processing event logs should be configured according to a predefined security baseline based on a risk assessment. EL 2: Event logs shall be protected against unauthorized access, and unauthorized or unintentional tampering or deletion. EL 3: The SCA/SVA/SAA shall: a) log the needed events itself; or b) provide the necessary data to the driving application. EL 4: If the SCA/SVA/SAA does not log the needed event, the DA shall log them. EL 5: Any signature creation shall be logged. EL 6: Any signature validation should be logged. EL 7: Event logs shall be marked with the time of the event. EL 8: Event logs should include the type of the event, the event success or failure, and an identifier of the person and/or component responsible for such an event. 8 Signature creation, validation and augmentation processing requirements
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8.1 Signature creation process and systems
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8.1.1 General
This clause specifies security requirements and recommendations specific to the signature creation. It contains requirements for the SCA, the DA and the user interface. It builds on the definitions, models and technical introduction of ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8]. NOTE 1: Contrary to the model in ETSI TS 119 102, the SVA described in this clause only covers to provide the minimum data that will be needed by the SVA to validate the signature. The process of augmenting the signature is covered in clause 8.3. NOTE 2: A signature creation policy can be used to specify requirements on the signature process, with respect to the application of signatures to documents and data to be signed in a particular context, business or application domain, community in order for these signatures to be considered as valid signatures. The specification of a signature creation policy is out of the scope of the present document, see ETSI TS 119 172 [i.14] for more details. NOTE 3: Sole control on the signing key is not covered by a specific control objective but by a combination of individual controls within clause 8.1.
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8.1.2 Main functionalities requirements
Control objective Ensure that the main functionalities of the SCA are well documented. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 19 Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 1: The SCA documentation shall indicate: a) All the signature formats (CAdES [i.10], XAdES [i.11], PAdES [i.12], ASiC [i.13]) and signature levels that are supported. b) Optional elements and features that are supported and how they can be selected and controlled. EXAMPLE: Examples for such optional elements and features are whether signatures can be detached/enveloped/enveloping signatures, parallel signatures or counter signatures. SCP 2: The SCA shall be controlled to support the functionalities, as documented in SCP 1.
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8.1.3 Data content type requirements
Control objective Ensure that the signature format is appropriate for the document data type that is to be signed and conforms to any legal or business requirements applicable. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 3: The SCA documentation shall specify the data content types the SCA supports and can present correctly. SCP 4: The SCA shall be controlled to support the data content types as documented in SCP 3. Control objective Ensure that the verifier cannot misinterpret the SD because of e.g. lack of information on the type of data, wrong syntax or inaccurate presentation or because the user interface is unable to present the SD correctly. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 5: The SCA shall allow the inclusion of the SD data content type either implicitly in the document or explicitly as an explicit signature attribute. SCP 6: If a SD content type is included in the signature, the SCA shall be able to provide it to the signer. SCP 7: The user interface should warn the signer if the SD does not conform to the syntax specified by the data content type of the SD and should allow the signer to abort the signature process. NOTE 1: No requirement is defined to abort the signature process when the SD does not conform to the syntax as it depends on the business process who makes the decision of abortion. SCP 8: The user interface should warn the signer against creating a signature of any SD that indicates that it is of a data content type which cannot be presented to the user by the user interface. NOTE 2: There can be business processes in which the signer will not view the SD in details before the signature, e.g. in case of mass signing of invoices. SCP 9: The user interface should warn the signer if it cannot accurately present all parts of the SD according to the data content type. Control objective (Signature Creation Process) Ensure that the signature is applied to the right SD. Controls SCP 10: The SCA shall allow the signer to identify exactly what the signature will cover. NOTE 3: This is especially relevant when the signature covers only part of a given document. SCP 11: The DA shall allow the signer to select the SD among available documents. SCP 12: In the case the process includes human interaction, the user interface should present the SD to the signer. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 20 SCP 13: When the SD was presented to the signer, the SCA shall ensure that the SD presented to the signer is the same as the one that will be signed in the signature process. SCP 14: The DA shall ensure that the SD selected by the signer for signing is the same as the one provided to the SCA for the signature. Control objective Ensure that the signer does not un-knowingly sign other embedded signed data objects with non-valid signatures created by others and that the signer is able to know which signatures have been validated or left unverified. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 15: If the SD to sign contains signed data objects and if a signature validation application is available, before creating the signature: i) the DA or the SCA should validate the signed data objects using a SVA. SCP 16: If validation of the signed data objects was done: i) the DA or the SCA should inform the signer about each signature validation policy that has been used by the SVA to perform the validation; ii) the DA or the SCA shall inform the user about validation results; and iii) the DA or the SCA shall inform the user about which signatures have been validated or left invalidated. SCP 17: If the SD to sign contains signed data objects and if no SVA is available or used, the SCA should inform the signer that other signed data objects are embedded in the SD. and that he should validate the embedded signature externally before signing the document. Control objective Ensure that the signer does not accidentally alter the SD. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 18: The SCA shall prevent the signer from changing any part of the SD during the presentation process. Control objective Ensure that the SCA is provided with enough information to be able to accurately present the SD to the signer over a user interface. Where presentation of the SD is important (i.e. presentation is one of the means of conveying the semantics), the SD can be ambiguous if not ensured, and the signer can infer a meaning from the SD that is not intended by the signer. NOTE 4: The inclusion of the data content type, (e.g. .doc, .xlsx, jpg, etc.) as a signed attribute can prevent for example attacks based on inserting html instructions in the DTBS that, when the data type is replaced with "html" lead to a completely different presentation. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 19: The DA should include the data content type attribute in the selection of the attributes to be signed. SCP 20: The SCA shall allow inclusion of a data content type attribute in the DTBS to ensure that the data type of the SD is unambiguous. SCP 21: If the SD can be ambiguous due to insufficient information describing the structure and interpretation of its semantics, the DA should include the data content type attribute in the selection of attributes to be signed to ensure that only a single interpretation of the SD's semantics can be made. SCP 22: If the DA requests the inclusion of the data content type, the SCA shall encode the data type of the document and shall protect it by the signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 21 Control objective Ensure that an SD holding hidden code capable of modifying the signed document presentation without affecting its cryptographic validity does not deceive the verifier and/or the signer. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 23: If the SD data type is susceptible to host malware or hidden code capable to alter the SD presentation without affecting the signature, the DA or the SCA should inform the signer of this data type weakness. SCP 24: The DA or the SCA should clearly report to the signer if the data to be signed cannot be presented to the signer at all or cannot be presented in a reliable manner. NOTE 5: A possible way of avoiding any problems with hidden code or malware is the transformation of the document to a type not having this problem. Control objective Ensure that the signer does not unwillingly sign a content or a commitment. Control (Signature Creation Process) SCP 25: The SCA shall allow the signer to be informed about the content being signed. SCP 26: The SCA shall allow the signer to be informed about any commitment type to be used in the signature.
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8.1.4 Signature attribute requirements
Control objective Ensure that the signature is applied to the right signature attributes and that the attributes are not altered accidentally or maliciously. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 27: The user interface shall allow the signer to view the signature attributes. In particular, the signer shall be able to check the content of the following: a) the signer's certificate, in particular the distinguished name (DN) of the subject and the DN of the issuer; b) the SD data content type (if present); c) the signature policy (if present); and NOTE 1: The signature policy is generally represented in the signature attributes by means of a signature policy identifier and the hash value of the signature policy. d) the commitment type (if present). SCP 28: The SCA shall ensure that the signature attributes presented to the signer are the same as those that will be signed in the signature process. SCP 29: The DA shall ensure that the signature attributes (if any) selected by the signer for signing are the same as those that will be given to the SCA. SCP 30: The user interface should warn the signer if the attribute type allows the presence of any hidden text, macros or active code in the attribute, or of any detected hidden elements. Control objective Ensure that the right certificate is used for creating the signature and no signature is created using an expired certificate. If possible, ensure that the certificate is not revoked at the moment of the signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 22 Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 31: When more than one signing certificate is available to be used by the signer, the DA shall allow the signer to select the certificate to be used for creating the signature. The DA may provide a default selection for the user. If there is only a single choice possible, this step may be omitted. SCP 32: The SCA shall obtain the identifier from the DA needed to use the signature creation data associated with the selected certificate for signing. SCP 33: The user interface shall allow the signer to inspect at least the following components of the certificates selected for inclusion in the DTBS: a) the distinguished name (DN) of the subject; b) the serial number; and c) the DN of the issuer. SCP 34: The SCA shall verify the signing certificate validity period, and if the current time is found outside that period, the SCA shall prevent the signer from using the corresponding signature creation data (SCD). SCP 35: The SCA should verify for the certificates in the certificate chain from the signing certificate up to, but not including, the trust anchor, the validity period, and if the time of signature is found outside that period, the SCA should prevent the signer from using the signature creation data corresponding to this chain. NOTE 2: Due to the direct trust in the trust anchor it is not needed to verify its status. SCP 36: If the SCA has (on-line) access to the revocation information of the certificate, it may verify the revocation status information of the certificates in the certificate chain from the signing certificate up to, but not including, the trust anchor. If the signing certificate is found revoked, it shall prevent the signer from using the corresponding signature creation data. If another certificate of the chain is found revoked, it shall warn the user and the SCA should prevent the signer from using the SCD corresponding to this chain. Control objective Ensure that the correct (reference to) or signing certificate and other attributes are indicated in the signature and that this information is protected against substitution attacks. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 37: The SCA shall protect the reference to or copy of the signing certificate within the signature from undetected replacement after the signature has been created. NOTE 3: This typically is realized by signing this data along with the document and by putting it in e.g. the authenticated attributes section of the signature format. Control objective Ensure that the signature contains all attributes necessary to the purpose of the signature according to the business requirements, if this is not already clear from the context and content of the SD. Ensure that the signer is aware of the purpose of its signature. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 38: The SCA shall ensure that the commitment is appropriately encoded in the signature, if a specific commitment was selected by the DA, the SCA or the user. SCP 39: If a commitment type will be included into the signature, the user interface shall present the commitment type to the user. Control objective The user should be able to know which signature creation policy is used in the signature process. In the case that the business process foresees different signature creation policies to be selected by the signer, ensure that the signer knows which signature creation policies are supported. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 23 Control (Signature Creation Process) SCP 40: When more than one signature creation policy is available the signer may select the policy among available ones. In this case the SVA or DA shall: a) provide to the user the list of possible signatures creation policies; b) inform the user of the content of the signatures creation policies; and c) request the user to select one. SCP 41: If the user does not select a specific policy or if there is no explicit signature creation policy a default signature creation policy may be applied. SCP 42: The signer should be able to request the applied signature policy used. Control objective Ensure that the explicit signature creation policy used for creating the signature and/or signature policy recommended to be used for validation of the signature is conveyed to the relying parties, if this is needed by the business, legal or policy requirements. NOTE 4: An explicit signature policy included into the signature, can be wider than just a signature creation policy, e.g. it can include a signature validation policy or a signature augmentation policy. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 43: If an explicit signature policy is needed by business, legal or policy requirements, the DA shall provide such a signature policy to the SCA. SCP 44: If an explicit signature policy is provided by the DA, the SCA shall include an unambiguous identification of the exact provided policy within the signature. NOTE 5: This can be done using a hash of the policy. SCP 45: If the signer selected a signature creation policy, the DA shall provide it to the SCA with no change.
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8.1.5 Time and sequence
Control objective Ensure that the signature creation process follows the foreseen sequence of events. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 46: The SCA shall compute the signature only after the signer has given its consent on calculating the signature. SCP 47: If the business process contains the presentation of the DTBS or the SD to the signer, the SCA shall compute the signature only after the DTBS or SD was presented to the signer. NOTE: In the case of bulk signing the signer may not get all the DTBS/SD presented. SCP 48: If the signature creation policy requires the use of one or more signature time-stamps, the SCA shall request a time-stamp token after the signature has been created. If a time-stamp token cannot be acquired within a time-limit specified by the policy the signature creation process shall be aborted.
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8.1.6 Signature invocation requirements
Control objective Ensure that each signature generated is the result of an explicit signature invocation. The user interface can be part of the SCA and/or of the DA. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 24 Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 49: The user interface shall limit accidental invocation of the signature process by the signer. SCP 50: The SCA shall ensure that the signature is applied with the intent of the signer. SCP 51: If the expression of will is a goal of the signature, prior to initiation of the signature process, the user interface shall request the signer to perform a non-trivial signature invocation interaction with the SCA that is unlikely to occur accidentally. EXAMPLE 1: An example for a non-trivial action is scrolling down to the end of the document to be signed before accepting the signature, and not just selecting "next". SCP 52: The user interface shall convey clear information that a signature is going to be created. SCP 53: The user interface should be able to provide advice and information on all aspects of the signature, e.g. on process and legal status, if such information is available. Control objective Prevent situations where the SCA and SCDev are in the state where the signer's authentication data has been provided and the signer remains inactive for long periods of time, e.g. where the signer has been distracted from signature processing and another unauthorized person might possibly be able to complete the signature process on a modified or substituted SDs and signature. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 54: In the SCA, a limit shall be defined on the idle time the SCA neither interacts with the signer, nor is processing. If this time limit elapses, then the signer shall authenticate again to the SCDev. Control objective Prevent situations where a misguided signer can perform operations in a wrong way so that an attacker can capture confidential data (e.g. a PIN or a password that would lead to signer's impersonation). Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 55: The user interface shall be as straightforward as the application can implement, to prevent the signer from creating security loopholes. EXAMPLE 2: If the dialog is not clear, the user can enter confidential data into fields which are not secured. SCP 56: The user interface shall be cleared of signer's confidential data after a time limit sufficient to perform normal operations. The fields where the confidential data were presented shall be overridden by other "neutral" data, to prevent latent images.
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8.1.7 Cryptographic algorithm choice
Control objective Ensure that all algorithms involved in calculating any element of the signature are based on algorithms and key lengths that are appropriate for the business requirements. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 57: If the implicit or explicit signature creation policy requires a specific signature creation suite, including the key length, the SCA shall use the specified algorithm. SCP 58: If a signature creation policy is used, the SCA shall check that the policy indicates which cryptographic algorithms can be used. If the policy does not contain such information, the SCA should warn the user of this fact and which algorithm is used. SCP 59: If no signature creation policy is used or the policy does not contain any requirements on the cryptographic algorithms, algorithms and key length corresponding to ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25] should be used. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 25 NOTE: Information on suitable algorithms and the time for which they are considered being secure can be found in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25].
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8.1.8 Signer's authentication requirements
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8.1.8.1 General requirements
Control objective Ensure that only the legitimate SCDev user can request creation of a digital signature value. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 60: For knowledge based signer authentication, the authentication data (e.g. PIN or password) should withstand practical guessing and brute force attacks. SCP 61: When the signer's authentication data transits through the SCA, the SCA shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the authentication data and shall securely erase it as soon as it is no longer needed (e.g. they are substituted or the signer's enrolment is removed). SCP 62: Where authentication data (like a PIN or a PW) is sent from an external input device (like a PIN pad or a keyboard), then the data transmission between the input device and the SCDev shall be done over a trusted path. SCP 63: If allowed by the SCDev, a function for securely changing knowledge based signer authentication data should be provided. SCP 64: When entering knowledge based authentication data, like a PW or a PIN, the feedback shall not reveal its value. This may be done by providing the feedback of a typed digit or character to the signer by an appropriate symbol or method that does not reveal more than one digit or character at a time and only during a short period of time. This should be done by a feedback that does not reveal the digit or character at all. NOTE: This masking is not needed for entering an OTP, since it is used only once. SCP 65: Neither the SCA nor the signer's authentication component shall prevent the management of PIN/PW by the SCDev. Therefore they shall: a) handle PIN/PW of the maximum length allowed for by the SCDev; and b) not prevent signers to modify their own PIN/PW at will. SCP 66: When changing the PIN/PW, the SCA shall require the presentation of a new PIN/PW twice and check whether both presentations are identical before delivering the new PIN/PW to the SCDev. When possible, the SCA should avoid that the user reuses the last used PWs or PINs. Control objective Ensure that brute force attacks are countered, e.g. the number of retries is protected by a retry counter. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 67: The SCDev shall be configured with a maximum number of allowed consecutive wrong signer's authentication data. SCP 68: When the signer provides the wrong signer's authentication data and the maximum as defined in SCP 67 is not reached, an error response shall be provided to the signer and the signer should be allowed to make a new try. No information on the type of mistake shall be provided to the user. SCP 69: When the signer provides the wrong signer's authentication data and the maximal number of consecutive wrong signer's authentication data, as defined in SCP 67, is reached, the SCDev shall block the signer's authentication method and shall inform the signer. SCP 70: The number of unsuccessful comparisons with the signer's authentication data shall be recorded with a retry counter. The SCDev may also provide a means for resetting the retry counter to its initial value (e.g. by presenting a reset code, also referred as Personal Unblocking Key (PUK)). ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 26 Control objective Make sure that it is not possible to observe the signer's authentication data (for example, PIN/PW or biometric data). Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 71: The user should be informed by the documentation of steps to be taken to keep the signer's authentication data secure, including ensuring that the user is not overlooked by persons or cameras. SCP 72: It shall not be possible to copy the signer's authentication data from the input of the SCA. SCP 73: In the case where the application is used in a public area, the keyboard used to key in the information into the SCA, shall: a) be protected from spying and over the shoulder peering, and b) not emit keying sounds different for each key.
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8.1.8.2 Requirements for biometric authentication methods
Control objective Ensure that it is made difficult or practically impossible to make an impersonation attack with fakes of the biometric features. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 74: Environment requirements suitable to prevent attacks to biometric devices, such as submission of "fake" biometric elements (silicon fingers, usage of latent images, etc.) shall be in place, if biometric devices are used. Control objective Ensure that replay attacks are countered: if biometric methods based on potentially publicly known data (face, ear shape, or fingerprint) are used, then the signer's authentication data is protected to ensure authenticity, e.g. an attacker can get public biometric features such as face and fingerprint images and derive the signer's authentication data from it in order to misuse the SCDev. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 75: If biometric devices are used, a trusted path, providing integrity, authenticity and confidentiality, shall be provided for the transmission of biometric data between the biometric sensor unit and the SCDev. SCP 76: If biometric devices are used, biometric sensors shall protect the user's biometric identification data from being used in replay attacks. Control objective Ensure that it is made practically impossible at enrolment time to link a person to someone else's biometric template. E.g. malicious code could intercept the data of the person to be enrolled and link it to a biometric data belonging to a different person, to later on export this association that will be used by the impostor to impersonate the authentic user. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 77: If biometric devices are used, biometric data association to the user should not occur outside a trusted path or the SCDev. Control objective Ensure that it is made practically impossible at authentication time to alter the result of the signer's authentication data verification. E.g. an attacker could intercept the reply of the authentication process, in order to either give a false positive response (to authenticate an unauthorized person) or to give negative response (to enact a denial of service attack). Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 78: If biometric devices are used, matching of biometric data should not occur inside the SCA. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 27
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8.1.9 DTBS preparation requirements
Control objective Ensure that an attacker cannot provide the SCA with forged signature components and prevent the SCA from applying the entire signature components specific to the format chosen to achieve a given purpose. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 79: The SCA shall verify the validity, authenticity and completeness of all the components obtained in order to produce the correct DTBS format selected by the signer. SCP 80: The SCA should use only hash algorithms specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25]. SCP 81: The SCA should use only signature suites specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25].
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8.1.10 DTBSR preparation
Control objective Ensure that the data to be signed representation (DTBSR) is correctly composed. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 82: The SCA shall select the signature attributes according to the applicable rules or selected implicit or explicit signature creation policy. SCP 83: The SCA shall produce the correct data to be signed representation (DTBSR) for a signature. SCP 84: The SCA shall compute the DTBSR according to the applicable rules or selected implicit or explicit signature creation policy, by formatting, encoding and hashing of the DTBS. The hashing may be done in the SCDev, the formatting and encoding shall always done by the SCA. SCP 85: The SCA shall maintain the integrity of the DTBS when computing the DTBSR.
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8.1.11 Signature creation device
Control objective Ensure that the signature creation device used for creating a signature has the right legal and technical level according to the business requirements. NOTE: A possible way to convey this information to the SCA is the signature creation policy. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 86: If the implicit or explicit signature creation policy requires a specific type of signature creation device, and this type can be checked automatically, the SCA shall check that the signature creation device corresponds to the given requirements. EXAMPLE: If a qualified signature creation device is required by the signature creation policy, the SCA can check the related QCStatement (ETSI EN 319 412-5 [i.26]) within the signer certificate. Control objective Ensure that the SCDev is used as intended. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 87: If the documentation of the SCDev contains an operational guide or equivalent information on how to use the device, the usage of the SCDev shall take into account any applicable guidance. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 28
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8.1.12 SCDev/SCA interface (SSI) requirements
The signature creation device (SCDev)/SCA Interface is responsible for the connection between the SCDev and the SCA. Control objective Ensure that the communication between SCA and SCDev is protected. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 88: The SSI component shall prevent data communicated over the interface to be observed or changed. SCP 89: For the types of SCDev that the SSI component claims to support, the SSI component shall support all items relevant to the physical interface in the specified range or with its specified characteristics to ensure proper operation. SCP 90: The SSI component shall select the correct SCDev functionality, if the platform, on which the SCDev functionality is implemented requires a selection. SCP 91: The SSI component shall select the signing certificate and then the related signature creation data.
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8.1.13 Bulk signing requirements
Control objective Ensure that a bulk signature process is not less secure than a process where each document would be signed separately. Ensure that no documents are signed that are not intended to be signed by the signer. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 92: When bulk signing is supported, the SCA shall allow the signer to individually display any SD that is part of the bulk signature process. SCP 93: When bulk signing is supported, the SCA shall ensure that a document that was not selected by the signer cannot be part of the bulk signature process. SCP 94: When bulk signing is supported, the SCA should provide a report of a bulk signature process including a list of every SD included in the bulk signing.