hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
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a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.2.4 Identity Protection | Identity Protection provides services to the Application Layer such as pseudonyms and protecting the anonymity of transactions. |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.2.5 Sensitive Data Handling | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.2.5.0 Introduction | The Sensitive Data Handling service provides certain Sensitive Functions to the Application Layer. Sensitive Functions comprise the following functions: • Secure Storage. • Cryptographic operations. • Methods for bootstrapping initial secrets (e.g. GBA symmetric key derivation supported in annex D, or generation of asy... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.2.5.1 Sensitive Functions | This service provides AEs and CSEs with access to Sensitive Functions of the SE. |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.2.5.2 Secure Storage | This service provides AEs and CSEs with access to the secure storage capability of the SE. Data securely stored by the AE or CSE is intended to be accessible only through the Security API and by authorized entities. Secure Storage should be managed by the Secure Environment. Securely stored data is intended to remain u... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.2.6 Trust Enabling security functions | oneM2M Trust Enabling Architecture may require the presence of security functionalities within the Infrastructure Domain: an M2M Authentication Function (MAF) and an M2M Enrolment Function (MEF), both classified as Trust Enabling Functions (TEF) and serving authentication and end-to-end security purposes, as well as Dy... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.3 Secure Environment Abstraction Layer Components | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.3.1 Secure Environment | The Secure Environment component is an entity that provides Sensitive Functions operating on Sensitive Data, Secure Storage and other resources/functions. The security sensitive data and security functions contained in M2M field domain nodes are intended to be protected from unauthorized access or alteration, as determ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.3.2 SE Plug-in | The SE Plug-in enables physical access to the respective Secure Environment. Depending on the type of Secure Environment, the SE Plug-in can be implemented differently for each Secure Environment. NOTE: Specification of the SE Plug-in is out of scope of the present document. |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 6.3.3 Secure Environment Abstraction | This component is specified in ETSI TS 118 116 [67]. |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7 Authorization | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.1 Access Control Mechanism | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.1.1 General Description | The M2M authorization procedure controls access to resources and services hosted by CSEs and AEs. The authorization procedure requires that the originator of the resource access request message has been identified to the Authentication Function, and originator and receiver are mutually authenticated with each other. Th... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.1.2 Parameters of the Request message | This clause specifies the parameters of a request message which are evaluated by the access control mechanism. The data types applicable to these parameters are defined in clause 6.4 of ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The parameters are listed in table 7.1.2-1. Resource_2 ... ACP_1 ACP_2 ACP_3 ACP_4 Instances of accessControlPoli... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.1.3 Format of privileges and selfPrivileges Attributes | The privileges and selfPrivileges attributes exhibit the same data type format which is specified as follows. Each privileges or selfPrivileges attribute comprises a set of access control rules. In the following, the set of access control rules is denoted as acrs and an individual access control rule in this set as acr... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.1.4 Access Control Decision | The access decision is derived by comparing the parameters associated with a resource access request message as described in clause 7.1.2 with the access control rules included in the privileges or selfPrivileges attributes of all ACP sets assigned to the protected resource by means of the accessControlPolicyIDs, see f... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.1.5 Description of the Access Decision Algorithm | The reference access decision algorithm specified in this clause combines partial access control results obtained for each of the individual access control rules contained in a privileges or selfPrivileges attribute. Further, if multiple ACP instances are assigned to the protected resource, the reference access decisio... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.2 Impersonation Prevention | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.2.1 Registrar verification of AE-ID | Since several AEs can behave maliciously and pretend to be another AE with their ID changed, the Hosting CSE needs prevention mechanism for AE impersonation. This mechanism works at Registrar CSE since Registrar CSE is an entry point of M2M system. When the Registrar CSE receives a request, the Registrar CSE shall perf... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.2.2 Verification Using End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) | End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim), clause 8.4, allows a Target (a Hosting CSE or AE) to authenticate the Originator of a request primitives that are processed by Transit CSEs. ESPrim also provides confidentiality and integrity protection of these request and response primitives. The primitives being protected ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3 Dynamic Authorization | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.1 Purpose of the Dynamic Authorization | The Dynamic Authorization provides an interoperable framework for an Originator to be dynamically issued with temporary permissions providing the Originator with access to one or more resources on one or more CSEs. Applicable use cases, requirements and proposals are discussed in oneM2M TR-0019 [i.15]. The present docu... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2 Dynamic Authorization Stage 2 Details | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.1 Dynamic Authorization Reference Model | The Dynamic Authorization reference model is shown in figure 7.3.2.1-1. Figure 7.3.2.1-1: Dynamic Authorization reference model The Dynamic Authorization reference model introduces the following systems and entities: • Dynamic Authorization System (DAS): A system supporting dynamic authorization on behalf of resources ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.2 Direct Dynamic Authorization | The present document specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at the Hosting CSE. The transport of parameters is specified in clause 11.5.2, ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. The message flow for the Direct Dynamic Authorization is shown in figure 7.3.2.2-1, and described in the following text. ETSI ETSI TS 118 ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.3 Indirect Dynamic Authorization | The present document specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at the Originator and Hosting CSE. The transport of parameters is specified in clause 11.5.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. The message flow for Indirect Dynamic Authorization is shown in figure 7.3.2.3-1, and described in the following text. ET... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.4 Token Structure | A token is used to carry authorization information that can be roles assigned to the token holder or access control policies applicable to the token holder. The structure of token is shown in figure 7.3.2.4-1, it contains the following data fields: • version: version of the token. • tokenID: unique ID of the token. • h... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.5 Token Evaluation | The generic process of evaluating a token can be described as follows: 1) Token security validation: Depending on the security mechanism used by a token, the validation may be: - Verifying signed token; - Decrypting encrypted token; or - Decrypting and verifying signed and encrypted token. After passing the token secur... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6 oneM2M JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6.1 Introduction to oneM2M JWTs | oneM2M specifies a JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) representation (IETF RFC 7519 [53]) for Tokens used in oneM2M. A JWT compliant with the present clause is called a oneM2M JWT. Background: A JWT uses either the JSON Web Signature (JWS) Compact Representation, or JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Compact Representation, specified in IE... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6.2 oneM2M JWT Profile | oneM2M JWT Claims: Table 7.3.2.6.2-1 provides the mapping from the JWT claim names, in a oneM2M JWT, to the elements of the m2m:tokenClaimSet complex data type described in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. Where available, JWT claim names registered with IANA [i.18] have been used. ETSI TS 118 104 [4] specifies which elements are ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6.3 oneM2M JWT Procedures | Configuring CSEs for verifying Tokens from a Token Issuer: In order for a CSE to verify oneM2M JWTs issued by a particular Token Issuer, the CSE shall be provided with the following information in a secure manner: • The combinations of ESData Security classes and algorithms permitted by the Token Issuer. • Credentials ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.7 AE Authorization Relationship Update | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.7.1 AE Direct Authorization Relationship Update | This clause specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at AE and Hosting CSE. The message flow for the Direct Authorization Relationship Update is shown in figure 7.3.2.7-1, which is described in the following text. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 65 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Hostin... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.3.2.7.2 AE Indirect Authorization Relationship Update | This clause specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at AE and Hosting CSE. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 66 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The message flow for the Indirect Authorization Relationship Update is shown in figure 7.3.2.7-1, which is described in the following text. Host... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.4 Role Based Access Control | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.4.1 Role Based Access Control Architecture | Figure 7.4.1-1 provides a high level overview of the role based access control architecture in the oneM2M System. The entities related to role issuance and role based access control are described as follows: • Authorization Authority: It is responsible for assigning roles to Originators through creating <role> and/or <... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.4.2 Role Issuing Procedure | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.4.2.1 Introduction | There are two ways to assign roles to an Originator: 1) One way is to create a <role> resource that describes what role is assigned to the originator. The <role> resources are stored in role repositories from which the AEs and CSEs can retrieve <role> resources in order to get an Originator's role assignment informatio... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.4.2.2 Role Assignment Procedure | The general procedure of assigning a role to an Originator is shown in figure 7.4.2.2-1 and described as follows: Figure 7.4.2.2-1: Procedure of role assignment ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 69 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The procedure of role assignment is: 1. The Originator may send role assignment... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.4.2.3 Issuing Token Associated with Role | The general procedure of issuing a role token (a token associated with assigned role) to an Originator is shown in figure 7.4.2.3-1 and described as follows: Figure 7.4.2.3-1: Procedure of role token issuance The procedure of role token issuance is: 0. The Authorization Authority creates a <role> resource in a Role Rep... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.4.3 Role Based Access Control Procedure | The general procedure of using a role in an authorization process is shown in figure 7.4.3-1 and described as follows: Figure 7.4.3-1: Role based access control procedure 1. The Originator shall include the applicable Role-IDs, Token-IDs or tokens into the request sent to the Hosting CSE. 2. In case of Role-IDs or Toke... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.5 Distributed Authorization | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.5.1 Introduction | The distributed authorization provides an interoperable framework between PEP, PDP, PRP and PIP when these authorization sub-components are distributed in different CSEs. The <authorizationDecision>, <authorizationPolicy> and <authorizationInformation> resource types are defined to support the distributed authorization... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.5.2 Obtain Access Control Decisions | In distributed authorization an access control decision request may be sent from one CSE to another CSE in order to obtain an access control decision from the latter. As shown in figure 7.5.2-1 there are two communication modes: • Communication mode a: the Hosting CSE that acts as a PEP sends an access control decision... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.5.3 Obtain Access Control Policies | In distributed authorization an access control policy request may be sent from one CSE to another CSE in order to obtain access control policies from the latter. As shown in figure 7.5.3-1 there are two communication modes: • Communication mode c: one CSE that acts as a PDP sends an access control policy request to ano... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.5.4 Obtain Access Control Information | In distributed authorization an access control information request may be sent from one CSE to another CSE in order to obtain access control information from the latter. As shown in figure 7.5.4-1 there are two communication modes: • Communication mode e: one CSE that acts as a PDP sends an access control information r... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 7.5.5 Distributed Authorization Resource Lifecycle | <authorizationDecision>, <authorizationPolicy> and <authorizationInformation> are all the child resources of a <CSEBase> resource. As these resources are related to authorization functions, their creation and maintenance shall be tightly controlled by the authorized entities (e.g. a security administrator). The authori... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8 Security Frameworks | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1 General Introductions to the Security Frameworks | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.0 General | To accommodate the variety of deployment scenarios that can be encountered in M2M applications, the present document supports a diversity of methods to provision and establish security in M2M systems. |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.1 General Introduction to the Symmetric Key Security Frameworks | In the Symmetric Key Security Frameworks, each pair of entities that need to authenticate each other is provisioned with its own shared symmetric key. This is performed through pre-provisioning, e.g. during device manufacturing or deployment, or a remote security provisioning framework. |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.2 General Introduction to the Certificate-Based Security Frameworks | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.2.0 Introduction | This clause describes the Credential Configuration and Certificate Verification used in the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 77 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.2.1 Public Key Certificate Flavours | The present document defines procedures using the following Public Key Certificate flavours: • Raw Public Key Certificates: - Description: A raw public key certificate (IETF RFC 7250 [37]) contains only the raw public key, without other information normally provided in a certificate. The raw public key certificate is e... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.2.2 Certification Path Validation and Certificate Status Verification | If an entity is to authenticate another entity using a device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, AE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or FQDN certificate, then the entity shall perform basic certification path validation (section 6.1of IETF RFC 5280 [34]) as part of verifying the other entity's certificate (see clause ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.2.3 Credential Configuration for Certificate-Based Security Framework | If an entity is to authenticate itself using a Certificate-Based Security Framework, then the entity shall be pre- provisioned with the following information: • The entity's Private Signing Key, which should remain protected in a secure environment, e.g. using the framework described in annex L. NOTE: An entity authent... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.2.4 Information Needed for Certificate Authentication of another Entity | Entity A shall be configured to trust the following information in order to authenticate Entity B using the certificate-Based SAEF: • An indication of the public key certificate flavour of other Entity B's Certificate (that is, raw public key certificate, device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or F... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.1.2.5 Certificate Verification | This clause describes how an entity authenticates the other entity in the Security Handshake of a Certificate-Based Security Framework. The other entity's Certificate is received during the Security Handshake. The other entity's Certificate is verified as follows: • If the certificate information configured during the ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.2 Security Association Establishment Frameworks | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.2.1 Overview on Security Association Establishment Frameworks | The Security Association Establishment Frameworks (SAEF) described in the present document, apply to direct connections on the Mcc, Mcc' or Mca reference points. The Security Association Establishment Framework end-points are denoted: • Entity A, which may be an AE or CSE. This entity always acts as the client of the s... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.2.2 Detailed Security Association Establishment Frameworks | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.2.2.1 Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Frameworks | This clause describes the Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework. This framework enables mutual authentication of two entities corresponding to either two CSEs or a CSE and an AE. The Credential for this framework is a long-term symmetric key that has been provisioned into the entities t... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.2.2.2 Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Frameworks | This clause describes the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework. Figure 8.2.2.2-1 illustrates the sequence of events when using the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework. In this description, "Entity A" and "Entity B" correspond to either two CSEs or a CSE and an AE. ET... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.2.2.3 MAF-Based Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Frameworks | This clause describes the MAF-based Security Association Establishment Framework. This framework uses the MAF Security Framework procedures in clause 8.8, with the following mapping of functional roles: • Entity A plays the role of the Source End-Point. • Entity B plays the role of the Target End-Point. The present cla... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3 Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.1 Overview on Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.1.1 Purpose of Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks | Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks (RSPFs) provision credentials to an Enrolee, which is a security principal in a Node or CSE or AE, as part of the Enrolment of the Enrolee to an M2M SP or M2M Trust Enabler. The MEF provides its services on behalf of administrating stakeholders such as M2M SPs or third party M2M ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.1.2 High Level Flow | A security principal in a Node or AE or CSE that requires remote provisioning is called an Enrolee or Source MEF Client. When a key is being provisioned, then the Nodes or AEs or CSEs or M2M Authentication Function with whom the Enrolee is to establish the symmetric key is called an Enrolment Target or Target MEF Clien... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.2 Detailed Remote Security Provisioning Framework | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.2.1 Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework | This clause describes the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework. The Bootstrap Credential for this framework is a long-term symmetric key that has been pre-provisioned into the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function; this key is called a Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key and is denoted Kp... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.2.2 Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework | This clause describes the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. The Bootstrap Credentials for this framework are Certificates based on asymmetric key pairs. NOTE 1: Long term asymmetric private keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason it is recommended that they a... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.2.3 GBA-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework | To share a long term Master Credential (Km) or Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) between an Application Service/Middle Node and an Enrolment Target, the M2M Application Service/Middle Node shall perform a successful GBA bootstrapping and derive a NAF key (Ks_(ext/int)_NAF). This NAF key is the Master Credential ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.3 Void | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.4 Enrolment Exchange | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.4.1 Enrolment Exchange Procedures | The following procedures may occur within an Enrolment Exchange: • MEF Client Registration procedures. • Symmetric Key Provisioning procedures. • Certificate Provisioning procedure. • Device Configuration procedures, per ETSI TS 118 122 [57] can be applied, with the MEF interacting with a DM Server and MEF Client inter... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.4.2 MEF Client Registration | MEF Client Registration procedures are specified in clauses 8.3.5.2.3, 8.3.5.2.4, 8.3.5.2.5 and 8.3.5.2.6. MEF Client Registration procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. MEF Client Registration procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggered using... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.4.3 Symmetric Key Provisioning | Symmetric Key Provisioning procedures are specified in clauses 8.3.5.2.7, 8.3.5.2.8, 8.3.5.2.9 and 8.3.5.2.10. These procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. These procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggered using a "MO_Node" MEF Client Command:... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.4.4 Certificate Provisioning | Certificate Provisioning procedures are specified in clause 8.3.6. These procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. These procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggering using MEF Client Command Procedure: If the MEF Client receives a MEF Client Comm... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.4.5 Device Configuration | Device Configuration is specified in ETSI TS 118 122 [57]. Device Configuration can be performed within an Enrolment Exchange with a MEF, or in a DM session with other DM servers (separate from an Enrolment Exchange). Clause 8.3.8 specifies use of Device Configuration within an Enrolment Exchange with a MEF. Device Con... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.4.6 MEF Client Command | MEF Client Command procedures are specified in clause 8.3.9. MEF Client Command procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. MEF Client Command procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggered following MEF Client Registration Procedure - A MEF Client Co... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5 Symmetric Key Provisioning Details | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.1 Introduction | Clause 8.3.5 describes the common details and procedures for using an RSPF to provision symmetric keys. These frameworks use a MEF to provide authentication and distribution of symmetric key for use by a Source End- Point initiating establishing the symmetric key, and one or more Target End-Points. Table 8.3.5.1-1 MEF ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2 MEF Security Framework Processing and Information Flows | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.1 Introduction | Clause 8.3.5.2 specifies the processing and information flows of the MEF procedures. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 113 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.2 MEF Handshake Procedure | Purpose: A MEF Handshake procedure establishes a mutually authenticated TLS or DTLS session for protecting the communication between an MEF Client and MEF. In the case of the MEF Key Registration procedure, the TLS or DTLS session may be used by the Source MEF Client and MEF to establish the Key Value. Pre-Conditions: ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.3 MEF Client Registration Procedure | Purpose: The MEF Client registers with the MEF to confirm that it is willing to use the services of the MEF, under the authorization of the administrating stakeholder. NOTE: The MEF Client Registration procedure is equivalent to CSE or AE registration, but in this case the MEF Client is "registering" to the MEF, and no... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.4 MEF Client Configuration Retrieval Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MEF Client to retrieve MEF Client Configurations provided by the administrating stakeholder to the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Client Registration procedure to create the MEF Client Registration record. • The MEF Client Registration record is ... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.5 MEF Client Registration Update Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MEF Client to update the MEF Client registration by any combination of extending the expirationTime of the MEF Client Registration record or updating the labels. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Client Registration procedure to create the MEF Client Reg... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.6 MEF Client De-Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MEF Client to end its registration with the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Client Registration procedure to create the MEF Client Registration record. • The MEF Client Registration record is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure compr... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.7 MEF Key Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MEF Client to establish a symmetric key with the MEF which can be retrieved for use by one or more Target MEF Clients. This procedure is performed between the Source MEF Client and the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The Source MEF Client is provided with (or has otherwise determined) th... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.8 MEF Key Retrieval Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Target MEF Client to retrieve the Key Value from a MEF corresponding to a RelativeKeyID received by the Target MEF Client. Pre-Conditions: • The Target MEF Client has performed the MEF Client Credential Configuration (clause 8.3.5.2.1) with the MEF, including configuration of the MEF K... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.9 MEF Key Registration Update Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MEF Client to update the metadata associated with a registered key. This procedure is performed between the Source MEF Client and the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Key Registration procedure to create the key registration. • The key regis... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.10 MEF Key De-Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MEF Client to request the MEF to stop distributing the registered key. This procedure is performed between the Source MEF Client and the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Key Registration procedure to create the key registration. • The key re... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.5.3 Mapping to Protocol in ETSI TS 118 132 | The Mmef Interface defined in ETSI TS 118 132 [58] shall be used for symmetric key provisioning procedures. The mapping of the MEF Procedures described in clause 8.3.5.2 to the Mmef interface is described in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]. |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.6 Certificate Provisioning Procedure Details | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.6.1 Introduction | The Certificate Provisioning procedure includes the following actors: • MEF Client: a Security Principal requesting provisioning of an MEF-Provisioned Certificate. The MEF Client uses the MEF-Provisioned Certificate for subsequent authentication of itself to the MEF. The Security Principal can use the MEF-Provisioned C... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.6.2 Certificate Provisioning procedures using EST | |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.6.2.1 Introduction | The Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol is specified in IETF RFC 7030 [59]. When EST is used for Certificate Provisioning procedures, then the following mapping of concepts shall be applied. • The MEF Client acts as the EST Client. • The MEF acts as the EST Server. • The MEF CA acts as the EST CA. • The MEF-... |
a34b68cd8fd97fbe671d4316d3bc89c1 | 118 103 | 8.3.6.2.2 Initial Certificate Provisioning procedure using EST | Purpose: Enabling an MEF Client to request its first certificate from the MEF. See also the initial enrolment operational scenarios in section 2.2 of IETF RFC 7030 [59], noting the supported authentication methods listed in clause 8.3.6.2.1. Pre-Conditions: A. Common Pre-conditions for all Certificate Provisioning Proc... |
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