hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
|---|---|---|---|
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10 PEMEA File Exchange type definitions | |
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10.1 Overview | The PEMEA File Exchange (PFE) capability use JSON format for File Exchange Server answers to the different operations defined in the present document. The JSON specifications for the responses are provided in Annex A, they are also maintained in a repository outside of the present document and are available for downloa... |
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10.2 Data types | |
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10.2.1 FileMetadata | Defines a file in a File Exchange session. It is returned from the File Exchange server when making the list file operation defined in clause 7.3.2. Table 3: FileMetadata properties Property Type Description name String The name of the file. size Number The size of the file in Bytes. type String The media type of the f... |
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10.2.2 EventType | The EventType enumerable defines the "type" of events being sent over the SSE channel. Table 4: PEMEA File Exchange event type values Property Description FILE_UPLOADED Event sent from the File Exchange session when a file is successfully uploaded. FOLDER_CLOSED Event sent from the File Exchange session when the File E... |
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10.2.3 Error | Defines an error in a File Exchange session. It is returned from the File Exchange server when there is an error with one of the operations defined in clause 7.3.2. Table 5: Error properties Property Type Description status Number The HTTP status code as defined in clause 9.3 of IETF RFC 9110 [7]. error String The name... |
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10.3 File uploaded event | The FILE_UPLOAD event is the event sent from the File Exchange Server to the participants that are subscribed to a File Exchange session via the SSE channel when a new file is successfully uploaded to the File Exchange session as defined in clause 7.3.3. Table 6: File uploaded event Property Type Description type Strin... |
a4c69013c9592b3b49c0122983240b32 | 104 014 | 10.4 File Exchange session closed event | The FOLDER_CLOSED event is the event sent from the File Exchange Server to the participants that are subscribed to a File Exchange session via the SSE channel when the File Exchange session is closed as described in clause 9. Table 7: File Exchange session closed event Property Type Description type String Type of the ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies system requirements for the Dynamic Spectrum Allocation Service (DSAS) to support dynamic, temporary, and flexible spectrum sharing in an efficient, automated, and frequency and technology agnostic way based on the analysis introduced in ETSI TR 103 885 [i.1]. The report considers existin... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 2 References | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols, and abbreviations | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 3.1 Terms | Void. |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: dB decibel dBm decibel-milliwatt dBm/kHz decibel-milliwatt per kilohertz fc centre frequency GHz gigahertz h hour kHz kilohertz MHz megahertz m meter min minute mW milliwatt |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AFC Automated Frequency Coordination B channel Bandwidth CBRS Citizens Broadband Radio Service CDB Certified S3D-Installer Data Base CR Coordination Requirement CSI Certified S3D-Installer CSI-ID Certified S3D-Installer Identifier DGR Device G... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 4 Requirement organization | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 4.1 Requirement organization | Requirements shall be uniquely identified by: <TYPE>R-<COORDINATION>-<CATEGORY>-<XX>-<Y> with: • <TYPE>: identifier of the requirement type. Table 1: Requirements type Code Requirement type F Functional requirement T Technical requirement • <COORDINATION>: identifier of the coordination approach. Table 2: Coordination ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 5 System overview | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 5.1 System functional architecture | An overview of the functional architecture of a DSAS system is shown in Figure 1. It includes related interfaces that need to be specified, such as DSAS-SDB interface between DSAS and Spectrum Data Base (SDB), DSAS-S3D interface between DSAS and Shared Spectrum Service Device (S3D), DSAS-CDB interface between DSAS and ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 5.2 Spectrum Data Base (SDB) | Each DSAS shall be connected to at least one SDB, connections to multiple SDBs can be required in case of e.g. cross-national operation. ETSI ETSI TS 104 011 V1.2.1 (2026-04) 10 In general, the SDB supports the following different levels: • a first level containing information on the relevant primary users (SDB-L1): - ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 5.3 Communication between SDB, DSAS, and S3D | Depending on the required coordination solution (INC or IRC), the general workflow is based on either one or two steps. The first step is always related to the INC (see Figure 4). The outcome of the first step (INFO1) is the information about available channels and their required operational parameters. INFO1 carries a... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 5.4 Certified S3D-Installer Data Base (CDB) | In addition to the spectrum data base, a second data base, the Certified S3D-Installer Data Base (CDB), is needed to store and manage data of Certified S3D-Installers (CSI). After successful certification every CSI gets a unique Certified S3D-Installer ID (CSI-ID) from the operator of that data base that is needed for ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 5.5 Optional DSAS - NRA interface | In case of a closed communication loop, DSAS may report back to the NRA which frequencies including their OPs are used by which CSI. Spectrum data base (SDB) DSAS S3D DSAS-S3D interface DSAS-SDB interface Certified S3D- Installer data base (CDB) DSAS-CDB interface National Regulatory Administration (NRA) Optional DSAS ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6 Inter-system Coordination (INC) | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.1 Functional requirements for inter-system coordination | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.1.1 Device registration and spectrum inquiry | FR-INC-DGR-01: Device registration requirements: a) S3D shall register with and be authorized by a DSAS system prior to its initial service transmission or after a location change. b) S3D shall register with the DSAS system by providing the following parameters: i) geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude); ii) o... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.1.2 Geolocation capability | FR-INC-DGR-06: Geolocation capability requirements: a) S3D shall report its geographic coordinates and location uncertainty to DSAS during the registration process and every time it changes its location. b) When using an external geolocation source, the separation distance between such source and S3D shall be included ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.1.3 Device power and emission limits | FR-INC-DGR-09: Device output power a) The maximum power spectral density shall not exceed the limit specified in TR-INC-DGR-03. b) The maximum EIRP over the applied frequency band of operation shall not exceed the limit specified in TR-INC-DGR-04. FR-INC-DGR-10: The OOB emissions that fall into the range between fc + B... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.1.4 Security requirements | FR-INC-DSQ-01: S3D shall incorporate adequate security mechanisms to prevent it from accessing DSAS systems not approved by the corresponding national regulatory body. FR-INC-DSQ-02: S3D shall incorporate adequate security mechanisms to ensure secure communications between S3D and DSAS system to prevent corruption or u... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.1.5 Primary user protection | FR-INC-SPP-01: DSAS shall protect multiple PU services from harmful interference during their time of operation. FR-INC-SPP-02: DSAS shall establish location and frequency-based exclusion zones around Pus operating in the shared spectrum. The spectral width of the exclusion zone is specified in TR-INC-SPP-01. FR-INC-SP... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.1.6 Optional requirements for inter-system coordination | FR-INC-DGR-06: When contacting DSAS in accordance with FR-INC-DGR-04, S3D may report to DSAS measured interference levels in channels monitored by S3D during operation. The report may include the type of the monitor process, e.g. maximum peak or average level. FR-INC-SGR-11: DSAS may provide relevant information about ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 6.2 Technical requirements for inter-system coordination | The technical requirements are specified per contiguous frequency range. Each range is represented by a corresponding table. Table 6 lists the required technical parameters The units in Table 6 do not specify the granularity of the corresponding parameter. Table 6: Technical requirements for inter-system coordination I... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 7 Intra-system Coordination (IRC) | 7.1 Additional functional requirements for intra-system coordination |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 7.1.1 Non-primary user coordination | FR-IRC-DGR-01: After receiving the response in accordance with FR-INC-SGR-12, S3D shall report its required Coordination Requirements (CRs) to the DSAS. FR-IRC-DGR_02: After receiving an acknowledge in accordance with FR-IRC-SGR-01, S3D shall operate in accordance with the relevant CRs. FR-IRC-DGR-03: After receiving a... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 7.1.2 Optional requirements for intra-system coordination | Only in case of a S3D with cognitive functionalities, e.g. local spectrum scanning, the following optional requirements apply: FR-IRC-DGR-08: S3D may report to the connected DSAS the result of its own coordination calculation. FR-IRC-DGR-09: S3D may operate according to parameters based on its own coordination only if ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 7.2.1 Introduction of NPU coordination requirements | To support efficient IRC, Coordination Requirements (CRs) are defined that cover the various requirements of the NPUs and their applications. The CRs are separated into DSAS related requirements (see Table 7) and S3D related requirements (see Table 8). When asking for spectrum and coordination, the S3D reports one set ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8 Handover process between multiple DSAS | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.1 Scenarios | The following two different scenarios are covered: • handover between multiple DSAS per zone, and • handover between multiple DSAS of multiple zones. The first describes the case where multiple DSAS share the same zone, either completely or partially overlapping (see Figure 7). ETSI ETSI TS 104 011 V1.2.1 (2026-04) 20 ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.2 Multiple DSAS per zone | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.2.1 Open-loop INC | In case of an open loop communication, the output of INC is one or multiple Limited Application Area (LAA): • in open loop communication no aggregate interference is calculated as S3D does not report which channel and OP it uses; • information exchange between DSAS in one zone is not required; • to guarantee interferen... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.2.2 Closed-loop INC | In case of a INC, the output is the same as in the open-loop case, but the aggregate interference is calculated. • S3D reports current channel occupation and corresponding OPs; • DSAS shall calculate aggregate interference according to the current channel occupation: - interference calculation needs data of all connect... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.2.3 Closed-loop IRC | IRC is always based on close-loop communication. Output of IRC is one or more Limited Application Channel (LAC) with the corresponding OPs. IRC needs an exchange of the full information apart from information about the certified S3D Installer. This requires a larger data base and a regular update between data base and ... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.3 Multiple DSAS of multiple zones | |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.3.1 Open-loop INC | For inter-system coordination based on open-loop communication no data exchange between different DSASs is required. Assuming that the OPs per S3D are static or require a very low update rate only, two options are imaginable to support seamless handover: • the S3D downloads the corresponding OPs of both zones, of the o... |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.3.2 Closed-loop INC | The closed-loop INC case is similar to the open-loop case and does not require S3D data exchange between the different DSASs and the same options to support seamless handover are imaginable. |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.3.3 Closed-loop IRC | To offer a seamless handover in case of closed-loop IRC, the entire data set of the S3D concerned needs to be exchanged between the corresponding DSASs. Otherwise, the S3D needs to renegotiate its spectrum access each time when entering a new zone. |
2024fb4f33411cb74c479d0ffc3b9164 | 104 011 | 8.4 Closed-loop data base | It is assumed that there is only one closed-loop data base similar the primary data base: • minimum needed set of information per S3D: - output power - bandwidth - centre frequency - location - time of last update - periodicity of update between DSAS and data base - included in the data base - provided by connected DSA... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 1 Scope | The present document on Lawful Interception architecture provides an overview of the technical framework and components involved in facilitating lawful interception of communications for law enforcement agencies. The present document outlines the key principles, standards, and protocols governing lawful interception, i... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 2 References | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: root of trust: hardware-based seed/key material or function that contains it, upon which a hierarchy of keys are built to support higher functions trust anchor: root certificate authority in the network zero trust: security concept where no entity, wh... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ABAC Attribute Based Access Control ADMF ADMinistrative Function API Application Programming Interface ARP Attestation Relying Party AVS Attestation Verifier Service CA Certificate Authority CC Content of Communication CISM Container Infrastru... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 4 Approach | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 4.1 General approach | The present document defines the Lawful Interception (LI) architecture to meet the requirements of LEAs regarding the Handover Interface for the interception of telecommunications (see ETSI TS 101 331 [1]). Clause 4.2 describes a high-level view of the entities and procedures that are generally required to be supported... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 4.2 LI entities and procedures | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 4.2.1 Overview | The functional role model described in this clause is a reference example to facilitate a general understanding of the typical operation of interception and the typical responsibilities of the various elements. National laws that describe the conditions and restrictions of interception and procedures will apply as desc... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 4.2.2 Entities | The entities in the functional flow in figure 4.2.1-1 are given in table 4.2.2-1. ETSI ETSI TS 104 007 V1.2.1 (2025-05) 11 Table 4.2.2-1: Provisioning entities Entity Role Authority The authorization authority is a judicial or administrative body designated by local laws or regulations. It gives the LEA the lawful auth... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 4.2.3 Process | The process as described in this clause stands as an example. In a specific country, the national process will be based on various national laws and circumstances. The authorization authority requires, through the LEA, the interception of services utilized via the telecommunication network by the interception target. T... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 4.2.4 LI lifecycle | Figure 4.2.4-1 depicts the general LI lifecycle state machine. ETSI ETSI TS 104 007 V1.2.1 (2025-05) 12 Figure 4.2.4-1: LI lifecycle state machine After an LEA delivers a warrant to the CSP, the CSP provisions the interception. In the ACTIVE state, the Lawful Interception system elements detect, capture and deliver int... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 5 Functional view | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 5.1 General | A high-level functional view of the LI architecture is given in figure 5.1-1 below. ETSI ETSI TS 104 007 V1.2.1 (2025-05) 13 Figure 5.1-1: Functional architecture Table 5.1-1 below gives a brief description of these functional elements; however, the reader should be aware that security requirements and zero-trust princ... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6 Security first approach | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.1 Introduction | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.1.1 Approach | This architecture is rooted in the Zero Trust principles outlined by NIST SP 800-207 [i.4]. The first step is to identify the resources or assets that the network comprises or uses, which need protection, and allocate each of them to appropriate trust domains. |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.1.2 Trust domains | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.1.2.1 Trust domain definition | A trust domain is a collection of functions that share the same set of administrative and security policies (particularly access control). Trust domains are further elaborated on in clause 6.3. |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.1.2.2 Domain separation | In this architecture, trust in the network is based on technical procedures and requirements placed on functions in an attempt to replace assumed trust of functions on the basis of their location only. Because the network functions where the Elements of LI (ELIs) reside are dynamically created, this architecture is des... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.1.2.3 Controlled interconnection | Functions in different trust domains need to exchange information. APIs that are used inside a trust domain shall be separated and protected from APIs that facilitate the interconnections for cross-trust-domain exchanges. This separation and controlled interconnect of trust domains in this architecture is embodied in a... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.1.2.4 Cross-trust-domain gateway deployment | Figure 6.1.2.3-1 is necessarily simplistic in introducing the idea of a CTDGW, as it shows the CTDGW spread across trust domains. This is clearly not possible in practice, as CTDGWs will belong to one or the other domain and can be deployed independently of the functions and trust domains they separate or within them. ... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.2 LI assets | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.2.1 Identifiers are fundamental LI assets | In the LI domain, a central resource, or asset, is the target ID. Further important assets (or resources) are: the lifecycle state of LI, the interception product, points of interception, topology/connectivity information, etc. However, these are arguably downstream derivatives of the fundamental assets. Figure 6.2.1-1... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.2.2 Further LI assets | As previously indicated, reducing the security of the LI domain to the security of target IDs is simplistic. Further assets to consider in a holistic approach to the security of LI are the lifecycle state of LI, the interception product, points of interception, topology/connectivity information, the separation of sub-t... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.3 Trust domains | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.3.1 Introduction to trust domains | Protecting the identifiers gives rise to the idea of segregating them into Trust Domains (TDs). TDs are central to the security of the LI architecture. In the spirit of complying with the NIST-defined Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) [i.4] where TDs are central, as a consequence TDs are also foundational in the LI archite... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.3.2 Trust domain collapse | The present document is not prescriptive in the trust domain definitions but proposes an implementation that takes separation of concerns as a primary driver resulting in maximally separated trust domains. For example, a common requirement across multiple jurisdictions is to ensure that if a target is under surveillanc... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.4 LI architecture | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.4.1 Security-first approach to LI architecture | Figure 6.4.1-1 introduces the main functions that operate LI in the network, embedded in their respective trust domains. ETSI ETSI TS 104 007 V1.2.1 (2025-05) 18 Figure 6.4.1-1: Principal network functions embedded in trust domains Table 6.4.1-1 describes the trust domains and sub-trust-domains. Table 6.4.1-1: Trust do... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.4.2 LI architecture including IDs | Figure 6.4.2-1 adds interfaces to the architecture picture. It also shows the IDs in architectural context. IDs are used as the primary (but not singular) driver of separation of trust domains. ETSI ETSI TS 104 007 V1.2.1 (2025-05) 19 Figure 6.4.2-1: IDs as drivers of trust domain separation At the highest level, there... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.4.3 LI architecture | In figure 6.4.3-1 the IDs are excluded to simplify the diagram. Figure 6.4.3-1: LI architecture As depicted in figure 6.4.3-1, there are three main interfaces that are used to bring network state into the LI domain (Li-Ap, Li-Vn, and Li-No). Not all of these will necessarily be found in every network, depending on the ... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.4.4 Simplified LI architecture | A further simplification is possible, by abstracting the inputs in the dotted line box labelled "Network state inputs". This simplifies the network side as seen from the LI (TD-B) perspective. Figure 6.4.4-1: Simplified LI architecture The three interfaces Li-Ap, Li-Vn, and Li-No are abstracted away into "Nw-inputs". E... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.5 Attestation | To fully support Zero Trust principles, security is rooted in immutable hardware and provide provisions for entities to verify other entities prior to engaging in any business logic interactions. This is achieved with remote attestation, which is fully described in Annex A of the present document. At the highest level,... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 6.6 Certificate management | Figure 6.6-1 shows LI certificate distribution across the network. The distribution for X2/X3 certificates is done similarly to the distribution of X1 certification. The LI Certificate Management (LICM) function contains the LI Certificate Authority (LICA). Figure 6.6-1: Certificate management All interfaces shall be a... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7 Provisioning | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1 Provisioning Phases | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.1 Overview | Before targets can be provisioned in ELIs, a stepped process to build trust in them takes place, as described in detail in ETSI TS 104 000 [4]. Figure 7.1.1-1 is an overview of phases 0 through 6 of the process detailed in ETSI TS 104 000 [4]. Once the configuration of the LI interfaces, see figure 5.1-1, has been done... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.2 Phase 0 (X0) | See ETSI TS 104 000 [4], clause 5.1 for a description of this phase. At the end of the on-boarding/testing/acceptance process from the vendor into the carrier network, default values are provisioned into the relevant systems. Most importantly, the AVS attestation measurement database will contain known good values for ... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.3 Phase 1 (X0) | See ETSI TS 104 000 [4], clause 5.1 for a description of this phase. At some point, the CSP will have received a warrant with some identifier of the target. The CSP enters this, or a translated value of the target into the LICF. This happens asynchronously to the lifecycle of the NFs/ELIs. The TgtID is now present in t... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.4 Phase 2 (X0) | See ETSI TS 104 000 [4], clause 5.1 for a description of this phase. 15) The ELI activates. It is aware that it belongs to the VNF with NFIID. It is also pre-provisioned with the necessary network addresses of the LI layer to report to. The ELI generates an X0ID for the ELI associated with this NFIID, and uses it for t... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.5 Phase 3 (X0) | See ETSI TS 104 000 [4], clause 5.1 for a description of this phase. 21) The Attestation Relying Party (ARP) in the LISE correlates all the information from the attestation steps and makes a decision on the trustworthiness of the new ELI based on the results from the AVS. 22) [LI STATE]: The distributed LI network stat... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.6 Phase 4 (X0) | See ETSI TS 104 000 [4], clause 5.1 for a description of this phase. 23) The ELI requests to register to the LISE over the X0-r interface with its X0ID, NFID and ELIRef. 24) [LI STATE]: The LISE generates a new EliID for the new ELI, and uses the received X0ID, NFIID, and ELIRef to correlate the request in the LICREPF ... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.7 Phase 5 (X0) | See ETSI TS 104 000 [4], clause 5.1 for a description of this phase. 28) The X0-c interface between the LISE and the ELI is used to configure X0, as well as X1/X2/X3 interfaces and the configurations of their certificates. 29) [LI STATE]: The distributed LI state now contains all necessary IDs needed for provisioning a... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.8 Phase 6 (X0) | See ETSI TS 104 000 [4], clause 5.1 for a description of this phase. 30) The certificates for the X1/X2/X3 interfaces are distributed to the ELI over the X0-cert interface. This step hides a multitude of interactions for certificate enrolment, signing and distribution. |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 7.1.9 Phase 7 (X1) | ETSI TS 104 000 [4] stops at phase 6. In the present document, phase 7 now kicks off the X1 (and above) interactions. ETSI ETSI TS 104 007 V1.2.1 (2025-05) 29 The LI network is finally ready to assign TgtIDs to ELIs. 31) The LISE uses the Ne-Admf interface to the LIPF to send the TgtID meant to be distributed to the EL... |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 8 Further security aspects | |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 8.1 General | Clause 8 examines additional security aspects that need to be addressed when implementing the LI architecture described in the present document. |
6d2cffa783978764a5328727a2d01168 | 104 007 | 8.2 Compromise of interface endpoints |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.