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05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 7.3 Interchanging security systems | |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 7.3.1 Current architecture | Another typically quoted use case is to enable operators to switch easily from one CA/DRM vendor to another. In current deployments, the CA/DRM is implemented during manufacturing process in the terminal device and this implementation is often based on dedicated, secure hardware elements specified by the CA/DRM vendor. One typical example is the device secure boot process. The first step of the secure boot generally requires the verification of the signature of a part of the booting software. This is done using a public key which cannot be changed, as a safeguard against tampering. If this public key belongs to the CA/DRM provider, this makes operations far more complex after a CA/DRM switching unless the operator can gain access to it. Many operators assume ownership of the public-private key pair to overcome this issue. The following clauses analyze possible solutions to facilitate CA/DRM switching. ETSI ETSI TR 101 532 V1.1.2 (2015-03) 30 |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 7.3.2 CA/DRM Switching in deployed terminals | There are two different cases: • CA/DRM switching can be done with the intent to fully replace the software and relevant middleware code used by such operator controlled devices in order to use a different CA/DRM/middleware combination. This process has already occurred in several instances where existing set top terminal devices of an operator have been updated to another CA/DRM system without requiring a physical change to the devices, although there remains a dependence on the capabilities and robustness of the underlying hardware to work securely with the software components. This is achieved through use of the key/certificates and other security means to authorize such a change and it is managed through business contracts between the involved parties under control of the operator. Such a process is contractually secured and tightly managed between the security vendor(s) and the operator. In addition since the lifetime of a set top terminal device is typically 3 to 5 years, the operator is incentivized to contract with the security vendor and the manufacturer (who provides support for drivers) the ability to update/upgrade/maintain the device over its life. • For retailed set top terminal devices with embedded CA/DRM systems, the current situation is that a CA/DRM system change is controlled by the manufacturer. As the manufacturer of the device and the "owner" of the keys and certificates needed to update the device, the manufacturer has responsibility for the behaviour of the device and the user may claim against the manufacturer if the device is not performing the function it was designed for. Hence if it proves necessary to update a retailed device, neither the security vendor nor the operator can do this without the full agreement and authorization of the manufacturer. On the other hand, the manufacturer alone is not able to change the CA/DRM system in a device which is linked to a particular network without authorization and support of the operator and both CA/DRM vendors. In summary, it is currently always the entity that owns the set top terminal device's update keys and certificates who will take responsibility for fundamental changes. For the time being, no dilution or distribution of this ownership is possible without risking a loss of control and integrity of set top terminal devices with a consequent potential for damaging uncertainty in the service the devices offer to the end users. An activity within ETSI ISG ECI (refer to clause 5.5) plans to describe a circle of trust reaching from chip vendors to service providers which aims at facilitating the exchange of CA/DRM systems in comparison to the actual processes described above. |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 7.3.3 CI Plus solution | CI Plus is a suitable candidate for this CA/DRM system switching scenario in the case of fixed devices in a broadcast environment. Indeed, CI Plus allows any proprietary CA/DRM vendor(s) to support their security solution(s) in a CI Plus module provided that a related contract with the CI Plus LLP Trust Authority has been signed. Set top terminal or TV device manufacturers need to implement the general CI Plus specification and to sign the CI Plus device interim licence agreement. When a consumer wants to switch, it is sufficient to change the CI Plus module to go from one CA/DRM to another. The European regulation concerning the broadcast environment mandates a CI (Common Interface) which is fulfilled by the Cenelec Common Interface in the past (EN 50221 [i.47]). CI Plus can be seen as a successor to the Cenelec CI interface in all TV receivers of over 30 cm display size. Many set top terminal devices have one or more CI/CI Plus interface slots. The CI/CI Plus approach has the following pros and cons: • it allows a full separation between the CA/DRM technology and the receiver; • when the CI/CI Plus module is used directly in the TV it does not require an additional set-top terminal, nor a specific remote control, nor a separate power supply nor any connection cables. There is a caveat however in that the particular business model of a platform may not be fully supported in a retailed set top terminal device or TV receiver that supports CI Plus; • CI/CI Plus modules allow the same content distribution security level as an operator specific set top terminal device; • the current form factor of the module is now considered rather large but it will be reduced in future versions; • in the same way as for set top terminal devices, support for one or more CA/DRM systems can be integrated into a CI Plus module depending on the market needs, but currently there is no evident demand; and ETSI ETSI TR 101 532 V1.1.2 (2015-03) 31 • the current deployed version 1.3 is applicable to fixed devices in a broadcast environment, later devices will address IP delivery. However some stakeholders see a major drawback of CI Plus in the retail cost of the CI Plus modules. It is often set at a similar level to a complete set top terminal device due to scale issues. Where the operator subsidizes the module, changing the population of deployed CI Plus modules is a very significant cost although one which would only need to be incurred when a particular module had been compromised or a change to the security system was being carried out. A new version of CI Plus currently being worked on within DVB is intended to fit the latest market requirements. |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 7.3.4 Software download solutions | Another obvious candidate for the CA/DRM switching problem is the use of software download to replace a given CA/DRM with a new one. The concept is generally based on the definition of a standardized container for a secure execution environment within which each CA/DRM system could be downloaded as software and executed, based on customer initiation. In principle, this solution may be appealing to various interested parties in and around industry as it seems to be simple, cost-effective, ecologically desirable and potentially sustainable in the long-term. Regarding such an approach to security, the following should be carefully considered: • The interoperability achieved through such a standardized approach may pose a challenge to innovation and evolution if the specification does not achieve a balance between interoperability, security and scope for further novelty. Patches cannot be applied to standardized elements, for example as countermeasures to a security breach, without a change in the standard. • For any CA/DRM system implementation, a security robustness and compliance certification is used to allow a CA/DRM provider to take liability and accountability and to allow a response to a security breach. In the case of a standard downloadable container for CA/DRM, the certification and compliance role will be necessary similar to the CI Plus Trust and Certificate Management. As the CA/DRM system would be operating within an environment secured by another trust authority, the liabilities in the case of a security breach may be unclear. And • Implementing downloadable technology will introduce additional costs into terminal equipment whether or not a user ever makes a CA/DRM swap. Swapping a CA/DRM will also generate cost. These costs also apply in the case of CI Plus. Some industry stakeholders from all parts of the digital TV value chain are working on swappable CA/DRM solutions because they claim that although the development of an eco-system of a swappable CA/DRM solution is a huge challenge, the advantages of interoperability will compensate for the efforts to develop and establish such a solution. This approach also raises some software maintenance issues: • in the case of a vertical market where the operator controls the set top terminal device, and has specified it, the useful lifetime of such device is typically 3 to 5 years and the operator will secure with the CA/middleware vendor and manufacturer the ability to update/upgrade/maintain the device over this period or longer; and • in the case of a horizontal or retail market the involvement of a trust authority and well defined work-flows and mechanisms for software maintenance including contractual obligations outside the traditional manufacturer - user liability relationship have to be established that do not currently exist. NOTE: Some TV device manufacturers have established their own portals within the TV devices they market incorporating DRM solutions for paid TV content delivered through broadband connections. In this case the TV manufacturer takes responsibility and liability for the portal and installed security solution, along with necessary updates and renewals, in the manner of a Pay TV operator in a vertical market. ETSI ETSI TR 101 532 V1.1.2 (2015-03) 32 |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 8 New market needs | |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 8.1 Introduction | This clause provides examples of new services and delivery options that may soon arrive or have recently arrived in the market. |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 8.2 UHDTV | It is still early days in terms of the provisioning of UHD (initially 4K) content. However - thanks to work by the MovieLabs group [i.48] an important stakeholder funded by the 6 major US based studios, produced a specification for enhanced content protection from which a basic set of needs have become clear. Fundamentally these are: • The device is secure in itself and does not rely on other components in a wider security infrastructure or return communications channels. • The software being executed remains unchanged without permission and certain key content protection elements (such as watermarking) continue even if the device has been compromised. • The latest encryption technology protects the content using long key lengths, and is protected against side channel and other "short cut" type attacks. • Content is encrypted in such a way that knowing the key that decrypts one piece of content does not lead to other instances being decipherable. Similarly, a successful hack to one type of device does not compromise other devices. • Content is protected via on-screen watermarking. • Support for revocation and renewal is available at the client, code and device levels. • HDCP 2.2 and higher versions may carry UHDTV content, it is possible to disable other output interfaces. • A secure media pipeline is implemented along with secure memory, application and processing environments. • A random number generator is available. • It is possible to bind the content to the device and to restrict copy and move functions. NOTE: The needs expressed above are based on the information from the Movielabs document but readers of the present document are strongly recommended to rely on their own investigations and analysis to determine what individual content rights owners want for specific implementations. |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 8.3 Companion screen | The Companion (or "second") screen market is typically defined as being video services made available to mobile tablets and mobile phones using one of the three market leading, proprietary operating systems. The list of needs below could be considered a base-line in order to provide support for HD services on mobile devices. It provides sufficient security to allow a business to manage cloning, device revocation, and to build processes around device concurrency and user session management. Internal Security Devices should be provisioned with a unique identifier in hardware that is, therefore, immutable and also made available through approved APIs. The device should support a secure boot process that validates the integrity of the run-time image before executing it. The device should provide a secure video pipeline. Specifically - the area of memory used to decrypt and decode video should not be accessible to other processes. The device should have one or more keys provisioned in the SoC that are then used to allow indirect use (i.e. the keys are never exposed in code - just referenced) and used to provide a secure key store. ETSI ETSI TR 101 532 V1.1.2 (2015-03) 33 Output Security The device (and its operating system) should ensure that, if required, video is not shared through wired or wireless output ports. Upgradeability The device is capable of being updated and this process ensures the update file is valid (trusted) and cannot be tampered with. Other DRM related security elements (e.g. keys) are capable of being updated from a trusted source, without modification as and when needed. Interoperability The existence of a common security platform would help content providers to avoid needing to write bespoke code to meet some or all of the above requirements. |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 9 Lessons from main body clauses 4 - 8 | Clause 4 addresses the general features of CA/DRM security systems and notes that Trust Authorities are necessary for security system implementation but not sufficient on their own. Designs should allow for more than one trust authority but in practice, the complexity of supporting more than one trust authority in the market limits the number to just one per security system. Clause 5 summarizes the work of a large number of industry collaborations producing specifications and standards with relevance to security. For pay TV market in Europe, DVB has provided a range of security standards which facilitate interoperability very successfully. Examples of these are: a) the CSA suite, the third of which is now entering the market in silicon ready for implementation through suitable business models; b) Simulcrypt, which has been deployed from time to time to suit particular business requirements; and c) CI Plus, recently taken back into DVB and upgraded for IP streaming, it is now being developed to work over a faster physical interface that is more suited to the current market requirements. DVB standards are agreed by parties representing a number of different industry sectors right across the value chain as providing an appropriate balance between the level of standardization and the opportunities for further innovation. Under the title "CA neutral CPE" DVB attempted to standardize all hardware components required for an encryption system and the required interfaces. This was supposed to ensure that the terminal equipment could be relatively easily switched via a software update from one CA system to another. This attempt, which was not the first of its kind in DVB, was not continued due to a lack of support from key market participants and a lack of market demand once a number of other complexities concerning divergent middlewares, network connectivity and liability had become apparent. The DVB Harmonized Security Framework makes a statement about standardizing code download security, in which it states that it "may compromise the security of other aspects of the device" and advises that "DVB should not standardize a code download security mechanism". In addition, it notes that "Notwithstanding the above, any standardized code download system has not to compromise other security aspects of the device". ETSI ISG ECI is now making a new attempt to address standardization of downloadable CA/DRM solutions. Further, in response to emerging trends and opportunities involving new types of devices and networks, there have also been successful standardization achievements in the field of security in other industry fora, some of the more recent of which are receiving strong market support. For example: • DECE provides the means for the same content asset to be accessed by several CA/DRM systems through the use of a common file format and common encryption; • ETSI KLAD is being widely deployed in consumer equipment and implemented in some markets; and • the MPEG-CENC is being referenced by several bodies including DVB, HbbTV® and OMA. ETSI ETSI TR 101 532 V1.1.2 (2015-03) 34 Wide collaboration from, and consensus across industry seem to be factors that are important in creating standards which are successful in the market. However while industry collaboration and consensus appears to be essential, it is not always sufficient in leading to a standard which is viable in the longer term while some standards for security reviewed in the present document failed to achieve deployment because a suitable trust arrangement with a corresponding business model supporting it did not emerge. Clause 6 provides a more abstract look at security in practice. Through a review of a number of factors influencing the level of security available, it shows that sound and comprehensive design is necessary to provide for the maintenance of system integrity. For that system integrity to be maintained and to secure access to the widest possible range of content, it will also be necessary to renew parts of the eco-system through a secure upgrade and in addition to maintain security through to the end display device. These fundamental constraints pose challenges to the ultimate level of interoperability that can be achieved. In clause 7, various use cases are examined which illustrate that interoperable solutions are available and used in the market when there are business incentives for them. It is even possible to achieve a full interchange of a security solution through the support of a Trust Authority if there is a business imperative for an operator or system administrator to do so. In the case of a horizontal or retail market with involvement of a trust authority, a legal framework defining especially the rights and obligations of the relevant parties and well-defined work-flows and mechanisms for software maintenance including contractual obligations have to be defined. CI Plus is an established solution for CA/DRM interoperability and a feature of this is that manufacturers of TV terminal devices have no ongoing maintenance obligations. Another potential solution for interoperability is a software download framework. This requires the involvement of one or more trust authorities and well-defined work-flows, mechanisms and a legal framework for ongoing software maintenance including contractual obligations for all parties to the system, outside the existing traditional manufacturer - user liability relationship. In clause 8 the newest trends for products and services are examined. It is clear that market needs for security evolve with new devices, products and services. In the case of UHDTV, the availability of encryption algorithms with longer key lengths is critical and this need was foreseen several years before, although not just with UHDTV in mind. |
05203f91df26285fa31ed95e202a38fb | 101 532 | 10 Conclusions | The comprehensive review of existing CA/DRM solutions and technical approaches in this report reveals that "security" is much more than just a technical feature, as it touches on business models, business agreements, trust and liability. In fact it is necessary to review the entire eco-system. Market needs evolve with new products and services. New services and distribution means appear alongside with new business models complementing the traditional Pay-TV environment. Industry anticipates the need for new standards and collaborates to produce them through standard setting organizations, including many which were self-organizing, in order to facilitate the launch of these new products and services. The most successful standards are often produced through wide industry collaboration. There are already several solutions for interoperability with regard to CA/DRM security available in the market, some of which have emerged quite recently to support new services such as UHDTV and new business models of video distribution and viewing via tablets and clients on other retail devices. These solutions evolved to meet quite different business needs and end user devices and are therefore deployed individually as necessary. Some parties believe another solution for interoperability in security is desirable for consumers purchasing equipment in a retail market scenario and have tried to address this through standardization initiatives. Further work is underway in this area. Industry agrees that interoperability is beneficial for economies of scale and inter-working between products. From a standardization point of view the specification and its implementation aims to provide for interoperability without compromising the required level of security while allowing space for competition and further innovation. As the level of security is determined by the weakest element of the system it is essential that the standardization of some components of a security system should not weaken the level of security. A key component of a security system is its renewability feature, one example of which is a download mechanism. This component has similar needs to other components of a security system in terms of being secure and capable of being upgraded or refreshed. ETSI ETSI TR 101 532 V1.1.2 (2015-03) 35 Effective maintenance of security systems needs an entity acting as a trust authority to be responsible for the implementation and maintenance processes. Based on past evidence, parties embarking on the creation of a new security system or component with a clear understanding of how this responsibility will be implemented have enjoyed a greater degree of success with market deployments. Having reviewed interoperable CA/DRM solutions, the present document concludes that producing successful standardized solutions is complex from both a business and technical perspective. New standards that fail to achieve sufficient support in the market can fragment the market further whereas achieving widespread adoption in the value chain can reduce fragmentation. ETSI ETSI TR 101 532 V1.1.2 (2015-03) 36 History Document history V1.1.1 February 2015 Publication V1.1.2 March 2015 Publication |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 1 Scope | The present document describes the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) to test interoperability at IMS NNI for IP multimedia call control protocol based on TS 124 229 [i.1] including Rich Communication Suite (RCS) release 2.0. The ATS has been specified on the basis of the Test Descriptions for IMS NNI interoperability testing for RCS presented in TS 102 901 [i.2] and extents TS 186 011-3 [i.3]. It defines a TTCN-3 framework as well as codec and adapter requirements for analysing interoperability test execution traces generated from the manual or automatic execution of IMS interoperability tests. The scope of this ATS is not to cover all requirements specified in TS 124 229 [i.1]. It only assesses requirements that are observable at the NNI between two IMS core network implementations specified in TS 102 901 [i.2]. |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 2 References | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 2.1 Normative references | The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. Not applicable. |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 2.2 Informative references | The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI TS 124 229: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3 (3GPP TS 24.229 version 8.10.0 Release 8)".". [i.2] ETSI TS 102 901 (V3.1.1): "IMS Network Testing (INT); IMS NNI Interoperability Test Specifications; IMS NNI & ISC interoperability test descriptions for RCS". [i.3] ETSI TS 186 011-3 (V2.3.1): "Technical Committee for IMS Network Testing (INT); IMS NNI Interworking Test Specifications; Part 3: Abstract Test Suite (ATS) and partial Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT)". [i.4] ETSI ES 201 873-1: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3; Part 1: TTCN-3 Core Language". ETSI ETSI TR 101 560 V1.1.1 (2011-06) 6 |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ATS Abstract Test Suite IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem IP Internet Protocol NNI Network to Network Interface RCS Rich Communication Suite SIP Session Initiation Protocol TD Test Description TTCN-3 Testing and Test Control Notation 3 |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 4 Overview | A detailed overview of the ATS is specified in TS 186 011-3 [i.3]. |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 5 Test configuration | The test configuration is described in detail in TS 102 901 [i.2]. An Illustration of the test configuration can be found in TS 186 011-3 [i.3]. |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 6 Test design | TS 186 011-3 [i.3], clause 6 defines guidelines and design patterns used in the Abstract Test Suite (ATS). |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 7 Test system | The test system specified by this ATS (Abstract Test Suite) is described in detail in TS 186 011-3 [i.3]. |
330f6af93969574bda5a3293879ff634 | 101 560 | 8 Test execution | Please refer to TS 186 011-3 [i.3] for an explanation of the test execution aspects of the Abstract Test Suite (ATS). ETSI ETSI TR 101 560 V1.1.1 (2011-06) 7 Annex A: Zip file with TTCN-3 code A.1 The ATS in TTCN-3 core (text) format This ATS has been produced using the Testing and Test Control Notation (TTCN) according to ES 201 873-1 [i.4]. The TTCN-3 core (text) representation corresponding to this ATS is contained in an ASCII file (IMS_TestSystem.ttcn3 contained in archive tr_101560v010101p0.zip) which accompanies the present document. The TTCN-2 graphical (tabular) representation of this ATS is contained Where an ETSI Abstract Test Suite (in TTCN-3) is published in both core and tabular format these two forms are be considered equivalent. In the event that there appears to be syntactical or semantic differences between the two then the problem will be resolved and the erroneous format (whichever it is) will be corrected. ETSI ETSI TR 101 560 V1.1.1 (2011-06) 8 Annex B: Bibliography • ETSI EG 202 568: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); Internet Protocol Testing (IPT); Testing: Methodology and Framework". ETSI ETSI TR 101 560 V1.1.1 (2011-06) 9 History Document history V1.1.1 June 2011 Publication |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 1 Scope | The present document describes security aspects in conjunction with the interconnection of two IN structured networks. The present document concentrates on the SCF - SSF interconnection. The purpose of the present document is to describe the security aspects of interconnection of SCF to SSF. The operations considered in this interconnection are a subset of CS1. For the time being CAMEL is the only application of SCF - SSF interconnection, therefore the present document considers only CAMEL phase 1 operations. A later edition may also consider other CS1 operations. Future parts of the present document will investigate the security aspects of operation sets that are a subset of CS2 and CS3. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. • A non-specific reference to an ETS shall also be taken to refer to later versions published as an EN with the same number. [1] ITU-T Recommendation Q.1228 (1997): "CD-ROM - Interface Recommendation for intelligent network Capability Set 2". |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: masquerade ("spoofing"): pretence of an entity to be a different entity. This may be a basis for other threats like unauthorized access or forgery. unauthorized access: entity attempts to access data in violation to the security policy in force. eavesdropping: breach of confidentiality by monitoring communication. loss or corruption of information: integrity of data (transferred) is compromised by unauthorized deletion, insertion, modification, reordering, replay or delay. replay of information: repetition of previously valid commands and responses with the intention of corrupting service or causing an overload. repudiation: denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication. forgery: entity fabricates information and claims that such information was received from another entity or sent to another entity. denial of service: prevention of authorized access to resources or the delaying of time critical operations. ETSI ETSI TR 101 510-1 V1.1.1 (2000-01) 6 unauthorized activity: attacker performs activities for which he has no permission or which are in contradiction of an interconnect agreement. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: BCSM Basic Call State Model CAMEL Customized Applications for Mobile Enhanced Logic CCF Call Control Function CS1 Capability Set 1 CS2 Capability Set 2 CS3 Capability Set 3 DP Detection Point IN Intelligent Network INAP Intelligent Network Application Part ITU International Telecommunications Union PSTN Public Switched Telecommunications Network SCF Service Control Function SCP Service Control Point SDF Service Data Function SRF Specialized Resource Function SSCP Service Switching Control Point SSF Service Switching Function SSP Service Switching Point TCAP Transaction Capabilities Application Part TDP-R Trigger Detection Point - Request |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 4 Functionality | |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 4.1 SSF | The SSF is the Service Switching (SS) function, which, associated with the CCF, provides the set of functions required for interaction between the CCF and a service control function (SCF). It: a) extends the logic of the CCF to include recognition of service control triggers and to interact with the SCF; b) manages signalling between the CCF and the SCF; c) modifies call/connection processing functions (in the CCF) as required to process requests for IN provided service usage under the control of the SCF (ITU-T Recommendation Q.1228 [1]). |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 4.2 SCF | The SCF is a function that commands call control functions in the processing of IN provided and/or custom service requests. The SCF may interact with other functional entities to access additional logic or to obtain information (service or user data) required to process a call/service logic instance. It: a) interfaces and interacts with service switching function/call control function, Specialized Resource function (SRF) and Service Data Function (SDF) functional entities; b) contains the logic and processing capability required to handle IN provided service attempts (ITU-T Recommendation Q.1228 [1]). ETSI ETSI TR 101 510-1 V1.1.1 (2000-01) 7 |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 4.3 SSF-SCF Interconnection | General (ITU-T Recommendation Q.1228 [1]): - a relationship between the SCF and SSF is established either as a result of the SSF sending a request for instruction to the SCF, or at the request of the SCF for initiation of a call or for some non call-related reason; - a relationship between a SCF and a SSF is normally terminated at the request of the SCF. The SSF may also terminate the relationship (e.g. in error cases); - for IN CS-1, a single SCF may have concurrent relationships with multiple SSFs. A single SSF may only have a relationship with one SCF at a time for any given call. Note that this refers to control as opposed to monitor relationships; - when the SSF receives call-related IEs from the SCF, it substitutes these IEs for the corresponding call information, and retains all other call information. This applies to ALL call processing-related messages; - SSF - SCF interconnection could be used to enable operators to use other operators' IN platform. Because SSF - SCF interconnection may also be allowed to service providers with limited resources, security is of paramount interest regarding the availability demands of the SSF service. Figure 1 shows an internetworking scenario SCF-SCF & SCF - SSF based on the CAMEL Phase 1 Operations. In practice it is necessary to add security facilities to each SCF and SSF involved in the inter-domain communication. SSF SCF SCF domain A domain B Figure 1: SCF - SSF Interconnection Because security is important when allowing other operators to connect to an SSF it is necessary to limit the number of operations allowed on the SSF. As a starting point we have taken the CAMEL phase 1 subset of CS-1 minus the MAP operations, which are not applicable to this PSTN model. This results in the following subset of CS-1 operations: Table 1: CS-1 operations between SSF and SCF No. CS-1 operation Direction 1 InitialDP SSF -> SCF 2 Connect SCF -> SSF 3 ReleaseCall SCF -> SSF 4 EventReportBCSM SSF -> SCF 5 RequestReportBCSMEvent SCF -> SSF 6 Continue SCF -> SSF 7 ActivityTest SCF -> SSF Next, a short description will be provided of each operation, together with the parameters and possible security remarks. ETSI ETSI TR 101 510-1 V1.1.1 (2000-01) 8 |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5 Security considerations of operations | |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5.1 initialDP | Function: This operation is sent by the SSF after detection of a TDP-R in the BCSM, to request the SCF for instructions to complete the call. Parameters: serviceKey, calledPartyNumber, callingPartyNumber, callingPartysCategory, originalCalledPartyID, locationNumber, forwardCallIndicators, bearerCapability, eventTypeBCSM, redirectingPartyID, redirectionInformation, iPAvailable, iPPSPCapabilities, cGEncountered, additionalCallingPartyNumber, serviceInteractionIndicators, highlayerCompatibility. Security issues: The SSF and SCF have already entered a signalling procedure (TCAP). One of the security risks could be that an other SCF hyjacks this session and takes over the control. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5.2 connect | Function: This operation is used to request the SSF to perform the call processing actions to route a call to a specific destination. To do so, the SSF may use destination information from the calling party (e.g. dialled digits) and existing call set-up information (e.g. route index to a list of trunk groups) depending on the information provided by the SCF. Parameters: destinationRoutingAddress, correlationID, scfID, cutAndPaste, callingPartyNumber, routeList, callingPartysCategory, originalCallingPartyID, redirectingPartyID, redirectionInformation, alertingPattern, serviceInteractionIndicators. Security issues: It shall not be possible for any SCF to perform this operation outside its jurisdiction. If this operation is performed by an unauthorized party, resources can be allocated that are needed otherwise therefore compromising the network integrity. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5.3 releaseCall | Function: This operation is used to tear down by the SCF an existing call at any phase of the call for all parties involved in the call. This operation may not be sent to an assisting SSF, except in the case of hand-off procedure. Parameters: Cause. Security issues: It shall not be possible for any SCF to release Calls that are outside their jurisdiction. If this operation is performed by an unauthorized party, calls can be tear down without proper authorization. This is a Denial of Service attack. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5.4 eventReportBCSM | Function: This operation is used to notify the SCF of a call related event previously requested by the SCF in a RequestReportBCSMEvent operation. The monitoring of more than one event could be requested with a RequestReportBCSMEvent operation, but each of these requested events is reported in a separate EventReportBCSM operation. Parameters: eventTypeBCSM, eventSpecficInformationBCSM, legID, miscCallInfo. Security issues: No security issues identified. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5.5 requestReportBCSMEvent | Function: This operation is used to request the SSF to monitor for a call-related event (e.g., BCSM events such as busy or no answer), then send a notification back to the SCF when the event is detected. Parameters: eventTypeBCSM, monitorMode, legID, dPSpecificCriteria, numberOfDigits, applicationTimer. ETSI ETSI TR 101 510-1 V1.1.1 (2000-01) 9 Security issues: The monitoring of events can have two negative sideffects: The usage of resources and confidentiality. The resources needed (flooding). Confidentiality is jeopardized when there is a risk of unauthorized monitoring of call- traffic. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5.6 continue | Function: This operation is used to request the SSF to proceed with call processing at the DP at which it previously suspended call processing to await SCF instructions. The SSF continues call processing without substituting new data from the SCF. Parameters: (none). Security issues: It may be a problem when an SCF sends a random 'continue' message to an SSF. An unauthorized SCF sends a 'continue' message before the authorized SCF does therefore disturbing the Call State Model sequence. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 5.7 activityTest | Function: This operation is used to check for the continued existence of a relationship between the SCF and SSF. If the relationship is still in existence, then the SSF will respond. If no reply is received, then the SCF will assume that the SSF has failed in some way and will take the appropriate action. Parameters: (none). Security issues: Because the SSF has to respond to this message, some system resources are used (processing power, network bandwith). This can have a possible impact on the functioning of the system as a whole. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6 Security countermeasures | From the operations involved in SCF - SSF interconnection denial of service attack (deliberate or inadvertently) is the most important threat. Other threats identified are: masquerading, man-in-the-middle attack, replay of information and unauthorized reading of information. Therefore the following security countermeasures are proposed. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.1 Topology | Careful design of the network can enhance the security already provided. This can be achieved by: - physical limitations with respect to connecting networks; - limiting the functionality to what is minimum needed. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.2 Authentication | The originator or calling party needs to be authenticated before network management commands or queries can be processed. The authentication information needs to be protected during transit, processing and storage. The source address may also need to be authenticated in the case of critical messages. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.3 Access control | All interfaces to the SSF and SCF need to be protected by means of access control measure. These may include the Operating Systems or systems controlling the SSF or SCF. There shall be different access control measures depending on the entity wishing to access the resource. Access to auditing facilities or mechanisms shall be enforced. ETSI ETSI TR 101 510-1 V1.1.1 (2000-01) 10 |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.4 Integrity | Message integrity controls shall be in place to detect changes to message content. New hardware/software shall meet all the specified requirements. This can be achieved by a variety of methods which are outside the scope of the present document. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.5 Confidentiality | In case of sensitive data it shall be possible to secure transmitted data to make it uninterpretable by unauthorized third parties for example by encryption. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.6 Non Repudiation | In case of a dispute between two interconnected parties all actions performed within a mutual agreed timespan by both parties shall be provable. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.7 Accountability and auditing | All (security) events shall be recorded in a sufficient amount of detail. All the above recorded information shall be stored for a specified amount of time without any loss of information or integrity. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.8 Network security management | Effective management controls shall be in place to prevent denial of service attacks or congestion. Intrusion detection controls shall also be in place to combat attacks when they occur. In addition to this the auditing function shall keep track of all steps or procedures undertaken by the intruder. |
e921b23bcddeebc58265a8ef60596523 | 101 510-1 | 6.9 Testing and operation maintenance | Parties are recommended to include in the interoperability testing security aspects. Parties are recommended to consider in the agreed operations and maintenance procedures issues related with security aspects. If any other CS1 operations are introduced for SCF - SSF interconnection similar investigations have to be performed. ETSI ETSI TR 101 510-1 V1.1.1 (2000-01) 11 Bibliography The following material, though not specifically referenced in the body of the present document (or not publicly available), gives supporting information. - ETR 339: "Intelligent Network (IN); IN interconnect business requirements". - ITU-T Recommendation Q.1211 (1993): "Introduction to intelligent network capability set 1". - ITU-T Recommendation Q.1214 (1995): "Distributed functional plane for intelligent network CS-1". - ITU-T Recommendation Q.1218 (1995): "Interface Recommendation for intelligent network CS-1". - ITU-T Recommendation Q.1221 (1997): "Introduction to Intelligent Network Capability Set 2". - ITU-T Recommendation Q.1224 (1997): "Distributed functional plane for intelligent network Capability Set 2". - ETR 332: "Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG); Security requirements capture". - ETR 232: "Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG); Glossary of security terminology". - ETR 083: "Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT); General UPT security architecture". - TR 101 365: "Intelligent Network (IN); IN interconnect threat analysis". - ETS 300 374-1 (1994): "Intelligent Network (IN); Intelligent Network Capability Set 1 (CS1); Core Intelligent Network Application Protocol (INAP); Part 1: Protocol specification". - EN 301 140-1 (V1.3): "Intelligent Network (IN); Intelligent Network Application Protocol (INAP); Capability Set 2 (CS2); Part 1: Protocol specification". ETSI ETSI TR 101 510-1 V1.1.1 (2000-01) 12 History Document history V1.1.1 January 2000 Publication |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 2 Normative references | ............................................................................................................................6 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 3 Terms and definitions | ...........................................................................................................................6 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 4 Key issues for conformity assessment in relation to procurement | .................................................8 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 4.1 The Standard EN 301 549 and related documents | .............................................................................8 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 4.2 Selection of type of evidence | ...............................................................................................................8 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 4.3 Methods to follow-up the supplier’s performance of contracts | .......................................................9 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 5 Legal issues | ...........................................................................................................................................9 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 5.1 General legal issues on public procurement | ......................................................................................9 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 5.2 European legal issues on public procurement | ...................................................................................9 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 5.3 European common framework for the marketing of products (CE Mark) | ..................................... 11 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 5.4 Accessibility in European public procurement | ............................................................................... 13 5.5 National implementation of accessibility aspects of the European public procurement Directives ............................................................................................................................................. 15 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6 Types of conformity assessment | ...................................................................................................... 16 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6.1 Introduction to conformity assessment | ........................................................................................... 16 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6.2 Overview of conformity assessment types | ...................................................................................... 17 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6.2.1 First party declaration | ........................................................................................................................ 17 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6.2.2 Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity | ............................................................................................... 17 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6.2.3 Second party attestation | .................................................................................................................... 17 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6.2.4 Third party certification | ...................................................................................................................... 17 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 6.2.5 Accredited third party certification | ................................................................................................... 18 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7 Aspects for selecting the type of evidence | ...................................................................................... 18 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.1 Impact on users and employees | ....................................................................................................... 18 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.2 Cost-efficiency | .................................................................................................................................... 19 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.3 Need for interpretation | ....................................................................................................................... 20 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.4 Level of accessibility | .......................................................................................................................... 20 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5 Type of ICT products and services | ................................................................................................... 20 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.1 Off-the-shelf products | ........................................................................................................................ 21 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.2 Customized products | ......................................................................................................................... 22 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.3 Integrated product or systems | .......................................................................................................... 22 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.4 Proprietary software | ........................................................................................................................... 22 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.5 Open-source software and open standards | .................................................................................... 22 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.6 Services | ............................................................................................................................................... 23 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.7 Web sites | ............................................................................................................................................. 23 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.8 Distributed Application Platforms and Services | ............................................................................. 24 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.5.9 Development of bespoke applications | ............................................................................................. 24 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.6 Maturity of the technology | ................................................................................................................. 24 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.7 The use of declarations and certificates in e-procurement | ............................................................ 25 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 7.8 Reuse of conformity assessment results | ........................................................................................ 26 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8 Guidance on selection of type of evidence | ...................................................................................... 27 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1 Pre-award conformity assessment | ................................................................................................... 27 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1.1 Tick-box and description | ................................................................................................................... 27 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1.2 First party declaration | ........................................................................................................................ 28 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1.3 Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity | ............................................................................................... 28 CEN/CLC/ETSI/TR 101 552:2014 3 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1.4 Second party attestation | ..................................................................................................................... 29 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1.5 Third party certification | ...................................................................................................................... 29 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1.6 Accredited third party certification | .................................................................................................... 29 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.1.7 Certificates as an administrative burden | .......................................................................................... 30 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.2 Post-award conformity assessment | .................................................................................................. 30 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.2.1 Conformity assessment after delivery | .............................................................................................. 30 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.2.2 Conformity assessment in development contracts | ......................................................................... 31 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 8.2.3 Conformity assessment during use and operation | ......................................................................... 31 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 9 Follow-up methods for long-term contracts | ..................................................................................... 31 |
a330c746dda1c88c9b1cacb6f0e076c1 | 101 552 | 9.1 Follow-up as part of a conformity assessment scheme | ................................................................. 32 |
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