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e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 5.3.5 Interfaces DataIn and DataOut | The SA message processing shall provide the SAEM for dissemination via the IF_DataOut to either another facility layer entity such as Resource Management or a lower layer functionality such as the Networking & Transport layer as specified in Table 7. The SA message processing shall gather collected SAEM via the IF_Data... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6 SAEM dissemination requirements | |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.1 SAEM dissemination concept | |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.1.1 SA identification | The component changeCount (see clause 7.1) shall be handled according to ISO 16460 [1]: • saID shall distinguish different service announcement messages presented by the same Service Announcer ITS-S. • contentCount shall identify a change of the content of the announced SA that corresponds to a certain saID. The conten... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.1.2 SA service trigger, update, repetition and termination | The SA facilities layer message processing functional block (see figure 1) shall trigger, update or end the dissemination of SAEM according to the parameters received from the management entity via the MF interface (see clause 5.3.2). |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.2 SAEM dissemination constraints | |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.2.1 Communication requirements | An SAEM should be disseminated to reach as many ITS-S as possible, located in the Minimum Dissemination Area (MDA). The MDA is provided by the ITS application to the SA service in the dissemination parameter CSP_CommDistance and is typically defined in a way that every receiving ITS-S has received at least once the SAE... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.2.2 Security | |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.2.2.1 Introduction | Clause 6.2.2 is applicable to ITS stations that are part of an ecosystem that uses the trust model according to ETSI TS 102 940 [7] and ITS certificates according to ETSI TS 103 097 [6]. The security mechanisms for ITS consider the authentication of messages transferred between ITS-Ss with certificates. A certificate i... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.2.2.2 Service Specific Permissions (SSP) | SAEM shall be signed using private keys associated to Authorization Tickets of type explicit that contain a pair of: ITS- AID associated to the SA service as specified in ETSI TS 102 965 [2] and SSPs of type BitmapSsp as specified in ETSI TS 103 097 [6]. The BitmapSsp for SAEMs shall conform to the SSPs specified in IE... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 6.2.3 Priority | Priority information is provided in the PCI across the OSI layers and/or transmitted by lower layers as Traffic Class. |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 7 SAEM specification | |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 7.1 General | The SA service shall disseminate the SAEM with the format as specified in Annex A. The header component of the SAEM shall be of type ItsPduHeader, as defined in the ETSI TS 102 894-2 [4]: • The protocolVersion component of the header shall be set to value "1" for the present document. • The messageId component of the h... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 7.2 Service info component | The samBody component of sam shall always include the serviceInfos component. This serviceInfos component shall contain at least one element. Each element shall be of type ServiceInfo and contain the following information for a distinct ITS-S service: • Component serviceID shall contain the ITS-AID of the announced ITS... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 7.3 Channel info component | The samBody component of sam shall include the channelInfos component and/or the ExtendedChannelInfos extension (see ISO 16460 [1]) if the ITS-S service can be consumed on a channel that is different from the channel on which the SAEM is transmitted. This channelInfos component, when present, shall contain at least one... |
e9d681ecdb54b17c0af73e2470bc7f9d | 104 091 | 7.4 IPv6 routing advertisement | The samBody component of sam shall include the routingAdvertisement component if the ITS-S service can be consumed using IPv6 connectivity as detailed in ISO 16460 [1]. If the Service Provider ITS-S provides its service via an ITS-S Router and if the communication between Service Provider ITS-S and ITS-S Router is a ro... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the means to enable a test environment for verification of specific radio requirements and functional requirements of an ITS-S after deployment, most often when in a non-shielded environment. The present document addresses the security requirements to mitigate the risks identified in ETSI T... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 2 References | |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: operational mode: mode of an ITS-S EXAMPLE: Infield test mode, laboratory test mode, active ITS-S mode. test mode dynamic: infield test mode in which the SUT has dynamic position (i.e. can move in space) NOTE: The regular message handling and user ser... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AA Authorization Authority DTS Dedicated Test System ITM Infield Test Mode ITS-S Intelligent Transport System Station IUT Implementation Under Test PKI Public Key Infrastructure RF Radio Frequency SUT System Under Test TM Test Mode TMS Test Mo... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 4 Infield testing essential requirements | As stated in the scope statement (clause 1) of ETSI TR 103 573 [i.1]: "The test mode provides the ability of testing RF and functional requirements regarding the communication of devices. This includes but is not limited to over the air tests in non-shielded environments without affecting operational ITS stations not t... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 5 Security Architecture of ITM | ITM shall follow the core security models, data structures, protocols and certificate formats from each of ETSI TS 102 942 [5], ETSI TS 103 601 [6], ETSI TS 103 097 [7], ETSI TS 102 940 [8], ETSI TS 102 941 [9], ETSI TS 102 943 [10] and ETSI TS 103 759 [11]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 870 V2.1.1 (2025-11) 8 As identified in both... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 6 Physical architecture of ITM | The physical architecture of the ITM is shown in Figure 1. It consists of two main components. • The Dedicated Test System (DTS). • The ITS-S acting as the System Under Test (SUT). In respect of the exclusive nature of ITM the following additional requirements in respect of activation of ITM apply. • The DTS shall be a... |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7 TMS functional specification | |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.1 SUT ITS-S operational modes | The specification of the ITS communication architecture from ETSI EN 302 665 [12] applies. As shown in figure 2 a distinction is made between three different operating modes, where the "Active ITS-S Mode" includes the general specification for an ITS-S as described above. Figure 2: Operational modes of a SUT ITS-S |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.2 Test architecture | |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.2.1 General architecture | The Test Mode architecture for ITM shall follow the model in clause 5 of ETSI TS 103 096-3 [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 870 V2.1.1 (2025-11) 10 Figure 3: TM general architecture |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.2.2 Upper tester | The upper tester shall be as defined in clause 5 of ETSI TS 103 096-3 [4]. |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.2.3 Lower tester | The lower tester shall be as defined in clause 5 of ETSI TS 103 096-3 [4]. |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.3 Initialization and termination | |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.3.1 Initialization of ITM | ITM shall only be activated by an authorized ITS-S DTS and shall follow the general process defined in clause 7.2 of ETSI TS 103 096-3 [4]. |
64d5c9f1e0c8e0d53d30a63840086ef1 | 103 870 | 7.3.2 Termination of ITM | ITM shall only be deactivated by an authorized ITS-S DTS and shall follow the general process defined in clause 7.2 of ETSI TS 103 096-3 [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 870 V2.1.1 (2025-11) 11 Annex A (informative): Bibliography ETSI TS 102 165-1: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Methods and protocols; Part 1: Method and pro forma for T... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the application of the Common Criteria Vulnerability Assessment class defined in Common Criteria part 3 [1] alongside the ETSI TVRA method defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [2]. |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 2 References | |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: blue team: group acting as a corollary to a red team in order to develop measures to counter physical or digital attacks high assurance level: assurance that ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes where the corresponding security requirements, i... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: (P)ICS (Protocol) Implementation Conformance Statement AI Artificial Intelligence AICIE AI Common Incident Expression API Application Programming Interface CC Common Criteria CEM CC Evaluation Methodology CSA Cyber Security Act CSC Cyber Secur... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 4 Overview of AVA_VAN | |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 4.1 Vulnerability analysis and its role in risk assessment | NOTE 1: AVA_VAN is described in clause 14 of CC Part 3 [1] and is not strictly an acronym or abbreviation but can be read as part of the Vulnerability Assessment class and the term AVA_VAN read as a word in its own right. The approach to risk analysis given in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [2] is to determine the level of risk to ... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 4.2 Addressing the evaluator expectations in standards | Common Criteria part 3 [1] addresses the actions of an evaluator and for the purposes of the present document is addressed by equating an evaluator to a test environment. The present document addresses steps in the development cycle, for standards and for products, that when followed will give confidence to the develop... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5 Provisions for content and provision of evidence | |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.1 Expected evidence defined in CEM | The AVA_VAN class in CEM [3] requires the evidence outlined in Table 1. Whilst [3] identifies the evidence requirements the present document identifies the role of ETSI standards that may be used in providing that evidence. Table 1: Evidence requirements against AVA_VAN from CEM [3] AVA_VAN class Attack potential Evide... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2 Support to CEM evidence requirements from SDOs/ETSI | |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.1 The ST | The Security Target (ST) may be defined by reference to a standard, particularly if the standard is a Protection Profile (PP). In such a case the ST can claim to be conformant to the PP. ETSI ETSI TS 102 165-3 V1.1.1 (2025-12) 13 NOTE: ETSI ES 202 383 [i.10], whilst referring to a prior version of Common Criteria, make... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.2 The functional specification | As stated in CEM [3] a functional specification provides a description of the purpose and method-of-use of interfaces to the TSF. The ToE Security Function (TSF) may be described by a technical standard. Commonly many standards will identify the pre-conditions, stimuli, and post-conditions for invocation of a TSF. Wher... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.3 The TOE design | Where a standard, or suite of standards, is used as the basis of the design of TSFs the relevant standards should be cited in the evidence. Where standards are profiled, or where the TSFs in the TOE are derived from a chain of documents, e.g. a PP, or a stage 1 or stage 2 definition per Recommendation ITU-T I.130 [i.11... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.4 The security architecture description | Any security component, e.g. an authentication service, may be described in detail by a standard and the overall security architecture of a component or system may also be defined by a standard. For example, ETSI TS 102 165-2 [i.5] identifies a number of functional components and their dependencies, and a standard may ... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.5 The implementation representation | |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.5.1 Overview of the role of standards in representing the implementation | Not specific to standardization but in cases where the implementation conforms to any standard that standard should be cited in the evidence. NOTE: The citing of standards should not only address those from an SDO, for example if the development organization has particular standards for development, quality control and... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.5.2 Role of security controls (as defined in ETSI TS 103 305-1) | In addition to the determination of risk given in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [2], and the adoption of common frameworks as given in ETSI TS 102 165-2 [i.5] in order to counter identified threats and mitigate the risk they represent, and the approach to vulnerability analysis and penetration testing outlined in the present docum... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.6 The guidance documentation | The details of guidance documentation are addressed in [1] in the class AGD. The intent is to ensure that all relevant aspects for the secure handling of the TOE are described, including the possibility of unintended incorrect configuration or handling of the TOE. Whilst some of the details will be implementation speci... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.7 The TOE suitable for testing | Not relevant to standards (if the TOE is built to conform to standards that has already been addressed). See also clause 5.2.3 above. 5.2.8 Information publicly available to support the identification of possible potential vulnerabilities In general the recommendation for any security work in order to identify the nece... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 5.2.9 The results of the testing of the basic design | The general principles of good standards design outlined in clause 4.3 above and listed as "Testable: there should be clear and obvious means of demonstrating that an implementation complies with the requirement" should indicate that a test specification exists for each element of the design and for the composition of ... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 6 Determination of attack potential | The AVA_VAN class is mapped to attack potential as follows. Attack potential is defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [2] using the weighted summation method, the metrics of which are mapped to Annex B of CEM [3] but as per the note in clause 4.1 above written from the perspective of the analyst and not the evaluator. The mappi... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 7 Standards for the conduct of penetration tests | |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 7.1 Preparing for a penetration test | Penetration testing differs from vulnerability testing and vulnerability identification as outlined in clause 4.1. Vulnerability identification as outlined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [2] identifies the attack surface and from there assesses the risk to assets. The approach outlined in ETSI TS 103 305-1 [i.7] addresses vulner... |
4c293920f7dd12c7b97ef842536f98f0 | 102 165-3 | 7.2 Application of CSC-18 from ETSI TS 103 305-1 | ETSI TS 103 305-1 [i.7] addresses Penetration Testing in Control 18 and this is addressed in more detail below with movement of some elements to mandated actions of the developer in order to be able to meet the expectations of the evaluator. Table 5: Review of CSC18 from ETSI TS 103 305-1 [i.7] to AVA_VAN Safeguard Ass... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 1 Scope | The present document provides an overview of the history and facets of the risk management ecosystem. The overview includes the history of this activity, the concepts and specifications that emerged, the diverse venues, use cases, and the contemporary state-of-the-art mechanisms for meeting imposed obligations. |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 2 References | |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: risk: any event or issue that could occur and adversely impact the achievement of an organisation's operational or strategic objective risk management: continuous, proactive and systematic process of identifying, assessing and managing risks in line w... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AFIPS American Federation of Information Processing Societies AI Artificial Intelligence ANSSI Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (FR) ATO Authorization To Operate BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 4 History | |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 4.1 Timeline of risk management | The long historical arc of risk management across the past 60 years together with highlights described in subsequent clauses is depicted in Figure 4.1-1. The timeline depicts how risk and its management arose at outset of contemporary cybersecurity with the integration of computer systems and digital networks, followed... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 4.2 Early period 1940 - 1995 | The earliest discussions of risk management in contemporary computer systems and networks appear to have ensued at the RAND Corporation concurrently with its research staff conceptualising packet-based digital networks [i.13]. The next six years witnessed significant studies between RAND and the NSA - resulting in a se... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 4.3 Contemporary period after 1995 | The period from 1995 onwards is primarily marked by extensive introduction of open, autonomous, complex computational systems and networks coupled with an increase of threat surfaces from all manner of vulnerabilities and actors that dramatically increased the challenges of risk management. Perhaps to most seminal even... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5 Risk management ecosystem | |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.0 The ecosystem ontology | Figure 5.0-1 provides a high-level view of the contemporary Risk Management ecosystem ontology that emerged from the SNAC programme beginning in 1995 - placing the core standards cluster at the centre with five identified derivative groups that provide different profiles of the core provisions. Figure 5.0-1: High-level... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.1 Core Risk management process standards | Over several decades, the three basic risk assessment actions and four risk mitigation actions outlined in Figure 4.3-1 above have not changed. All the subsequent treatments by NIST and derivatives in Figure 5.0-1 have simply grouped the actions as processes and then enhanced with treatments of life cycles and bills of... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.2 Risk management derivative standards clusters | |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.2.1 International standards | A considerable array of international standards for risk management have emerged and examples are enumerated below. NIST/NSA Risk Management Standards, SP 800-39 family [i.22] The NIST family of de facto international risk management standards represent the continuum of NSA SNAC programme joint activity that provide th... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.2.2 National standards | A considerable array of national standards for risk management have emerged. Prominent examples are enumerated below. UK NCSC Risk Management Guidance [i.34] The 2023 guidance website provides a comprehensive 14-part compendium of topics and actions for cyber security risk practitioners to help their organisations unde... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.2.3 Industry sector guidelines | Almost every significant industry sector has some form of cybersecurity risk management guidelines. Within the EU, as noted above, the DORA financial services sector enabling legislation uses the term "risk" no less than 344 times. It is beyond the scope of the present Technical Report to treat all the different indust... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.2.4 Implementation tools market | The significant demand for cyber risk management tools has resulted in a large market for implementation tools. Some of the more prominent surveys and tools include: • centraleyes: "7 Best Cyber Risk Management Platforms of 2024" [i.50]. • ReversingLabs: "Assess & Manage Commercial Software Risk" [i.46]. • xmcyber: "Co... |
26e617ba939f071f1493293af101510e | 104 117 | 5.2.5 Legal obligations | Regulatory requirements The only risk management regulatory obligations are those of the European Union as shown in Table 4.4-1 which is effectively experimenting with the concepts as the only governmental authority promulgating risk management requirements. The challenge, however, is achieving a reasonable and proport... |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the UE capabilities applicable to an On-Board FRMCS Radio Module. NOTE: The present document does not specify UE capabilities applicable to FRMCS-capable Handhelds and FRMCS-capable Objects. |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 2 References | |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 103 791 [i.1] apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 765-5 V1.1.1 (2026-01) 6 |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 5QI 5G QoS Identifier DL DownLink eUICC embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card FRMCS Future Railway Mobile Communication System GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System GP Guard Period GPS Global Positioning System GSMA GSM Association NR N... |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 4 Onboard FRMCS Radio Module capabilities | |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 4.1 General capabilities | |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 4.1.1 TDD Frame configuration | For TDD operation in band n101, an Onboard FRMCS Radio Module shall support the reference frame specified in Annex A. |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 4.1.2 FRMCS Profile management | An Onboard FRMCS Radio Module shall be equipped with an eUICC that complies with the GSMA specifications SGP.21 [2] and SGP.22 [3] for Remote SIM Provisioning to enable secure and standardized profile management operations, including profile download, installation, enabling, disabling, and deletion. The Onboard FRMCS R... |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 4.2 Radio Access UE capabilities | The present document does not specify Radio Access UE capabilities for an On-Board FRMCS Radio Module. NOTE: At the time of publication, ongoing industrial testing and validation programs are expected to help identifying any specific Radio Access UE capabilities to mandate from an On-Board FRMCS Radio Module. ETSI ETSI... |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 4.3 5G Core Mobility Management UE capabilities | The present document does not specify 5G Core Mobility Management UE capabilities for an On-Board FRMCS Radio Module. NOTE: At the time of publication, ongoing industrial testing and validation programs are expected to help identifying any specific 5G Core Mobility Management UE capabilities to mandate from an On-Board... |
11a487756c1524b601027966f11b63c7 | 103 765-5 | 4.4 5G Core Session Management UE capabilities |
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