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cdcdc4f679e113535a93610fb5262d1d | 103 993 | 6.3 Test purposes per group | |
cdcdc4f679e113535a93610fb5262d1d | 103 993 | 6.3.1 Identification and authentication | TP Id ONDS-IA-001 Test Objective The identity shall always be authenticated on first presentation and periodically thereafter (the latter also is used to verify the operation of periodic re-establishment of a security association (here for authentication)) Reference REQ-31, REQ-30, REQ-4, REQ-8 (implicit), REQ-22, REQ-29 Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in NotIdentified and NotAuthenticated} with {IUT 'having relevant algorithms and key formats defined in the security policy} Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT receives 'Startup' or 'Reauthentication timer expires'} then [IUT sends authentication-claim containing 'semantic or canonical identifier'} when {IUT receives authentication-verification} then {IUT in Authenticated and Identified} } NOTE: Requirement 8, that requires the reporting of the form of CIA protections is implicit in TP ONDA-IA-001. |
cdcdc4f679e113535a93610fb5262d1d | 103 993 | 6.3.2 Confidentiality and integrity protection of data transfer | TP Id ONDS-CI-001 Test Objective Verify that inbound messages contain an Integrity Check Value (ICV) that is tested for correctness whilst the authentication period is still valid Reference REQ-62, REQ-65 Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated} -- verifies that authentication period is valid Expected behaviour ensure that { when {the IUT receives 'any message' containing 'ICV' and containing 'TVP'} then {the IUT generates 'calculated-ICV'} – gives 'calculated-ICV' when {the IUT verifies 'calculated-ICV' is equal to 'ICV'} then {the IUT permits 'any message'} } TP Id ONDS-CI-002 Test Objective Verify that inbound messages contain an Integrity Check Value (ICV) that is tested for correctness whilst the authentication period is still valid and is discarded on ICV failure and an alert raised Reference REQ-64 Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated} -- verifies that authentication period is valid ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 17 Expected behaviour ensure that { when {the IUT receives 'any message' containing 'ICV' and containing 'TVP'} then {the IUT generates 'calculated-ICV'} when {the IUT verifies 'calculated-ICV' is not equal to 'ICV'} then {the IUT discards 'any message' and the IUT reports 'ICV verification error'} } TP Id ONDS-CI-003 Test Objective Verify that messages made from the OLT are protected by a confidentiality security association Reference REQ-66 Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated} -- verifies that authentication period is valid Expected behaviour ensure that { when {the IUT sends 'any message'} then {the IUT encrypts 'any message'} } |
cdcdc4f679e113535a93610fb5262d1d | 103 993 | 6.3.3 Access control | TP Id ONDS-AC-001 Test Objective Evaluate access control policy on each access attempt Reference REQ-74, REQ-82 (implicit) Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated} -- verifies that authentication period is valid Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT configuration-data is accessed} then {IUT evaluates 'if policy conditions are met'} when {evaluation is true} then {PERMIT} } TP Id ONDS-AC-002 Test Objective Record failed access attempt Reference REQ-76, REQ-77, REQ-79, REQ-80, REQ-82 (implicit) Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated} -- verifies that authentication period is valid Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT configuration-data is accessed} then {IUT evaluates 'if policy conditions are met'} when {evaluation is false} then {DENY and Record-access-control-error and 'Record rule that caused the error'} } ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 18 TP Id ONDS-AC-003 Test Objective Verify that all access control rules are tested and pass to allow access control as Permit Reference REQ-75, REQ-83, REQ-84 Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated and AccessControl is Deny} Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT 'protected data' is accessed and 'policy contains n rules'} then {IUT evaluates 'rule 1' and 'rule 2' and … 'rule n'} when {evaluation is true} then {set AccessControl to Permit} } |
cdcdc4f679e113535a93610fb5262d1d | 103 993 | 6.3.4 Device provisions | TP Id ONDS-DEV-001 Test Objective If any software verification fails ensure that that software and any supporting elements shall not participate in any security association Reference REQ-7 Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated and AccessControl is Deny} Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT 'protected data' is accessed and 'policy contains n rules'} then {IUT evaluates 'rule 1' and 'rule 2' and … 'rule n'} when {evaluation is true} then {set AccessContol to Permit} } TP Id ONDS-DEV-002 Test Objective To verify secure boot uses a root of trust Reference REQ-7 Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in Identified and Authenticated and AccessControl is Deny} Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT 'protected data' is accessed and 'policy contains n rules'} then {IUT evaluates 'rule 1' and 'rule 2' and … 'rule n'} when {evaluation is true} then {set AccessControl to Permit} } |
cdcdc4f679e113535a93610fb5262d1d | 103 993 | 6.3.5 Evaluation provisions | The majority of test purposes for requirements identified as for "evaluation" are defined as pre-conditions in clause 6.2. A small number of the "evaluation" requirements can only be assessed by detailed evaluation of the design documents (as identified in several requirements). In all cases the TPLan outlines given in the present document should be addressed by the evaluator alongside the guidance given in Common Criteria for Information Technology, Evaluation Methodology [7]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 19 Annex A (normative): TPLan extensions for ONDS and Common Criteria A.1 SFR structure The following SFR modules are identified as applicable to the present document from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] and given in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4]: • FAU_GEN.1.2 Audit data generation • FCS_CKM.1.1 Cryptographic key generation • FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution • FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access • FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction • FCS_COP.1.1 Cryptographic operation • FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers • FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control • FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control • FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality • FDP_SDI.1.1 Stored data integrity monitoring • FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling • FIA_API.1 Authentication proof of identity • FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition • FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication • FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification • FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes • FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization • FMT_SMR.1 Security roles • FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions • FPT_HWROT.1 Root of trust based on HW • FPT_INI.1 TSF initialization • FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination • FTP_ITC.1 - Inter-TSF trusted channel Each SFR from CC gives guidance on how the requirement is to be evaluated. This evaluation is addressed as a test purpose in the present document, and the present annex creates a template TPLan structure for each SFR that can be applied for the main body of the present document. NOTE: The full TPLan structure is not shown as the set of header elements is taken from those identified in clause 6 or as shown in clause A.2 of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 20 A.2 Application of TSS&TP styles to SFRs from ETSI TS 103 996 A.2.0 Note Where no specific TPLan assessment is given the provisions of Common Criteria for Information Technology, Evaluation Methodology [7] apply. A.2.1 FAU_GEN.1.2 Audit data generation As described in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] the SFR FAU_GEN.1.2 is intended to satisfy requirements 76, 77 and 80 from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. It is the IUT that is tested and the TSF within the IUT that is implicitly tested. Thus in general terms for the IUT as specified in [1] and [2] and where FAU_GEN.1.2 is used (with FAU_GEN.1.1 implied): ensure that { when {IUT receives 'audit-function-started' or 'audit-function-stopped' or any-event in 'detailed auditable event' or 'FW-update' or 'SW-update' or 'access attempt to log record' or 'access to TEI management'} then {IUT generates 'detailed audit record'} -- SFR_FAU_GEN.1.2 } The above is also addressed in the access control test purposes given in clause 6.3.3 of the present document. A.2.2 FCS_CKM.1.1 Cryptographic key generation As described in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] the SFR FCS_CKM.1.1 is intended to satisfy requirements 24, 41 and 52 from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. As stated in [i.4] no specific cryptographic provisions are made but rather ask that the OND implementer refers to best practice, as in Annex D of ETSI TS 103 924 [4]. For this the tester has to be able to deliver a stimulus that requires the IUT to generate a cryptographic key that can be shown to have been generated only by the key generation algorithm claimed by the implementation. with {IUT 'having a cryptographic key generation algorithm'} ensure that { when {IUT receives 'cryptographic key generation request'} then {IUT generates 'key in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm'} } A.2.3 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution As described in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] the SFR FCS_CKM.2 is intended to satisfy requirement 52 from ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2]. As for clause A.2.2, it is stated in [i.4] that no specific cryptographic provisions are made but rather ask that the OND implementer refers to best practice, as in Annex D of ETSI TS 103 924 [4]. For this the tester has to be able to deliver a stimulus that requires the IUT to distribute a cryptographic key that can be shown to have been distributed only by the key distribution method claimed by the implementation. with {IUT 'having a cryptographic key distribution mechanism'} ensure that { when {IUT receives 'cryptographic key distribution request'} then {IUT sends 'key in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution mechanism'} } ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 21 A.2.4 FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access As defined in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] the SFR FCS_CKM.3 is intended to satisfy all the requirements identified in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] that require a cryptographic keyed operation outside of the TOE. As stated in [i.4] best practice is followed wherein keys are only made available to the function requiring them and are not available by any other mechanism. However it is also noted in the application notes of CC Part 2 [8] that this component is intended to allow the specification of requirements on the usage of keys outside the TOE (e.g. backup, archival, escrow, recovery) which are not supported by [1] and [2]. NOTE: FCS_CKM.3 does not intend to describe the key management or access to keys on the TOE. A.2.5 FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction In best practice whenever a key is no longer in use it should be destroyed. This is stated in the SFR from CC Part 2 [8] as "The TSF shall destroy [assignment: list of cryptographic keys (including keying material)] when [selection: no longer needed, [assignment: other circumstances for key or keying material destruction]]." ensure that { when {IUT receives 'destroy cryptographic keys command' containing 'Key-id'} then {IUT destroys 'all material identified by Key-id'} } A.2.6 FCS_COP.1.1 Cryptographic operation In CC Part 2 [8] the SFR is stated as "The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]." However, in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] it is stated that "The base requirements do not specify cryptographic algorithms or key sizes, but rather refer to best practice". Thus for testing purposes the following preconditions are defined including references to a number of FIPS documents that define commonly used cryptographic algorithms. with {IUT 'having an algorithm for authentication'} with {IUT 'having an algorithm for producing an integrity check value'} with {IUT 'having an algorithm for encryption'} with {IUT 'having an algorithm for decryption'} with {IUT 'having an algorithm for signature creation'} with {IUT 'having an algorithm for singature verification'} def value SymmetricKeySize '128' def value AsymmetricKeySize-ECC '256' -- for equivalence to 128-bit symmetric key def value AsymmetricKeySize-RSA '3072' -- for equivalence to 128-bit symmetric key xref CryptoStandards {FIPS197, FIPS180-4, FIPS186-4, FPIS186-5} A.2.7 FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers As identified in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] the generation of random numbers is required by the OND having a physical or non-physical-true or deterministic random number generator. This is addressed using TPLan by defining the following pre-conditions. with {IUT 'having a physical random number generator'} with {IUT 'having a deterministic random number generator'} A.2.8 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control For ONDs the access control test purposes are defined in clause 6.3.3 of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 22 A.2.9 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control The model identified in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2], and declared in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4], is policy and attribute based access control. A.2.10 FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality As identified in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] all sensitive user data is expected to be confidential while it is stored in persistent memory. This is addressed by TPLan as a set of pre-conditions given below. with {IUT 'having password stored in a manner consistent with clause 5.1.1 of NIST SP 800-63B'} with {IUT 'having sensitive user data stored confidentiality in persistent memory'} A.2.11 FDP_SDI.1.1 Stored data integrity monitoring As defined in CC Part 2 [8] and for the requirements identified in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] it is expected that the memory used for data storage is able to identify, report, and ideally, correct integrity errors arising from accidental (unintentional) errors (e.g. hardware glitches). This is addressed by defining the following TPLan pre-condition. with {IUT 'having memory for user data storage capable of identifying integrity errors'} NOTE 1: The wording in CC Part 2 [8] uses the term "monitor for integrity errors" which is interpreted for the present document as having the meaning of "identify integrity errors" as monitoring is an implicit action in being able to identify. NOTE 2: Error Correcting Code (ECC) memory chips can be used to automatically correct errors in RAM by generating Hamming Codes of the memory entry and, if used, may claim to meet the identified pre-condition. A.2.12 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling The general assumption in the present document and in ETSI TS 103 962 [1] and ETSI TS 103 963 [2] is that a common failure handling mechanism is applied across the OND. This is specifically handled for ONDs using the test purposes identified in clause 6.3.1 of the present document and by the defined constant defined in clause 6.2. A.2.13 FIA_API.1 Authentication proof of identity The CC Part 2 [8] statement requires that the TSF provide an authentication mechanism to prove the identity of an entity by including a list of properties to an external entity. In TPLan this is addressed by requiring specific elements in the authentication messages (see clause 6.2). The following TPLan elements are indicative. ensure that { when {IUT receives authentication-request containing 'property in list of properties'} … } A.2.14 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition In CC Part 2 [8] the behaviour of FIA_ATD.1 requires that the TSF maintains a list of the security attributes belonging to individual users. For the present document where attribute based access control is considered then the rules defined as part of ONDS-AC-003 apply. A.2.15 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication In CC Part 2 [8] the description of the behaviour of FIA_UAU.1 is that the TSF shall allow only some, listed, TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The test purpose therefore shall be written in such a way that both positive and negative behaviour can be assessed, i.e. test that each allowed action is permitted, and that any other action is denied. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 23 NOTE: This is addressed specifically for the OND case in clause 6.3.1 of the present document. It is reasonable to model the allowed actions as part of the access control policy and then to have authentication as an attribute of certain access control rules. In doing this the provisions and tests of clause 6.3.3 apply (see also clause A.2.16 for the similar case of actions before identification). TP Id Test Objective To verify that only listed actions are allowed to be performed before the user is authenticated Reference FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication from CC Part 2 [8] Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in NotAuthenticated } Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT receives 'any event'} then {IUT evaluates 'if policy conditions are met'} when {evaluation is true} then {PERMIT} } A.2.16 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification In CC Part 2 [8] the description of the behaviour of FIA_UID.1 is that the TSF shall allow only some, listed, TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The test purpose therefore shall be written in such a way that both positive and negative behaviour can be assessed, i.e. test that each allowed action is permitted, and that any other action is denied. NOTE: This is addressed specifically for the OND case in clause 6.3.1 of the present document. It is reasonable to model the allowed actions as part of the access control policy and to have identification as an attribute of certain access control rules. In doing this the provisions and tests of clause 6.3.3 apply. TP Id Test Objective To verify that only listed actions are allowed to be performed before the user is identified Reference FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification from CC Part 2 [8] Configuration PICS Selection Initial conditions with {IUT in NotIdentified } Expected behaviour ensure that { when {IUT receives 'any event'} then {IUT evaluates 'if policy conditions are met'} when {evaluation is true} then {PERMIT} } A.2.17 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes As per CC Part 2 [8] it is recognized that FMT_MSA.1 is addressed by the access control policy where the "security attributes" are specific assets to which access is restricted (see clause 6.3.3 of the present document). A.2.18 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization Whilst CC Part 2 [8] states that the purpose of this SFR is to strictly control security attributes this is within the overall access control suite identified for the present document by the test purposes in clause 6.3.3. For the more general application of this SFR in which is it intended to verify that the default values of security attributes are appropriately either permissive or restrictive in nature the following pre-conditions apply and test purposes apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 24 NOTE: Restrictive attributes are those where only values specifically allowed by the application are permitted, any other value is denied. Permissive attributes are those whose allowed values are set by the specific context. EXAMPLE 1: If an attribute value can take only the values 1,3 and 5 then it is possible to test for permit for only those values and to confirm that deny is true for any other value. EXAMPLE 2: If an attribute can take a range of values it is determined as permissive and testing should address a sufficient number of values in the range, at the limits of the range, and outside the limits of the range to determine correct behaviour. with {IUT 'having attributes used in access control being restrictive'} ensure that { when {IUT receives 'access control request' containing 'attribute'} then [IUT verifies 'attribute' is 'restrictive'} } with {IUT 'having attributes used in access control being permissive'} ensure that { when {IUT receives 'access control request' containing 'attribute'} then [IUT verifies 'attribute' is 'permissive'} } A.2.19 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Roles are defined as states that can be measured and upon which actions can be taken. def condition Administrator, User -- FMT_SMR.1.1 def value user_roles {'list of allowed user actions'} -- FMT_SMR.1.2 def value admin_roles {'list of allowed administrator actions'} -- FMT_SMR.1.2 NOTE: It is expected that in addition to the roles themselves that the system will map assets (functions, access control conditions to data, and so forth) to each role which is seen in the list of values given above. EXAMPLE: An access control rule may include statements such as "if role is user then permit user action". A.2.20 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions In CC Part 2 [8] each SFR has an identified management function (e.g. for FAI_UAU.1 the expected management functions are to establish the threshold for authentication failures and to define the actions to be taken in the event of authentication failure and these are defined for ONDs in clauses 6.2 and 6.3.1 of the present document). As such the specific test purposes for FMT_SMF.1 are not distinct but form part of each SFR and no specific generalization of this SFR is given. A.2.21 FPT_HWROT.1 Root of trust based on HW The base CC Part 2 [8] does not specify FPT_HWROT but it is defined in ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4] as an extension. The intent is that there is a root of trust implemented as immutable HW based module for storing sensitive data. This is addressed in TPLan as a precondition. with {IUT 'having a hardware based root of trust'} See also the set of preconditions given in clause 6.2 of the present document. A.2.22 FPT_INI.1 TSF initialization In CC Part 2 [8] the statement for FPT_INI.1 is given as follows "The TOE shall provide an initialization function which is self-protected for integrity and authenticity". The broad assumption for the OND case is that the boot software can have its integrity and authenticity verified, which may require that the software is signed and that the signature is verified. with {IUT 'having signed boot image'} ensure that { when {IUT receives 'initialisation request'} ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 25 then [IUT verifies 'signature of boot image'} } A.2.23 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination In CC Part 2 [8] the SFR FTA_SSL.3 applies for interactive user sessions and requires that a timer is established for how long such sessions can be inactive (see clause 6.2 of the present document). ensure that { when {IUT expires UserInactivityTimeLimit} then [IUT closes 'interactive session'} } NOTE: There is not expected to be significant levels of interactive user sessions in an OND but such sessions may be used for remote configuration and thus form part of the access control rules. A.2.24 FTP_ITC.1 - Inter-TSF trusted channel The purpose of FTP_ICT.1 in the context of OND is to ensure that any remote entity is within the trust domain of the OND. This can be implemented using, for example, a VPN protocol such as IPsec or L2TP. In each case the result is that the remote entity and the OND are securely connected where the trusted channel is between known (identified and authenticated) parties, and where any data on the channel is protected from eavesdropping and manipulation. with {IUT 'having a distinct channel to a remote management entity'} -- trusted channel with {IUT 'having trusted channel encrypted'} with {IUT 'having trusted channel with integrity protection'} with {IUT 'having end-points of the trusted channel authenticated'} ensure that { when {IUT receives 'remote connection request from the remote management entity'} then {IUT directs 'remote connection to use trusted channel'} } ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 26 Annex B (informative): Considerations for the EUCC PP programme NOTE 1: The mapping given here is indicative and does not claim to be the only mapping that is possible, rather it is a reasonable mapping that aligns the content of the main body of the present document to the essential requirements of the CRA and is intended to show that the PP can be used in any claim of the product that conforms to the PP (the present document) is also conformant to the CRA. It may be possible, and reasonable, for other mappings to be identified. The text of the present annex maps the suite of test purposes given in the main body of the present document to the expectations of the Cyber Resilience Act [i.1] and of the interpretation of the CRA for substantial and high levels of evaluation defined in the Cyber Security Act [i.3]. NOTE 2: The provisions and recommendations given in ETSI TR 103 866 [i.6] for the application of security controls in the NIS2 domain apply to the ONDS domain. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 27 Table B.1: Essential Cybersecurity requirements relating to the properties of products with digital elements Id Text from CRA - Annex I Test process Determination 1 Products with digital elements shall be designed, developed and produced in such a way that they ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks; Evaluation of the summary TVRA given in the ONDS requirements catalogue and by reference to any equivalent analysis indicated by the submitting entity. Using the tools from Common Criteria this should include evaluation of the following Security Assurance Requirements: ADV_ARC.1 ALC_CMC.3 ALC_CMS.2 ADV_TDS.1 or ADV_TDS.2 (depending on the EAL claim). See note. Pass or fail based on the evaluation report. 2 On the basis of the cybersecurity risk assessment referred to in Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 [i.1] and where applicable, products with digital elements shall: 2a be made available on the market without known exploitable vulnerabilities; Evaluation of the design process and by a limited degree of penetration testing consistent with AVA_VAN for the intended market and attacker capability (see ETSI TS 102 165-3 [i.7] for a guide to prepare the penetration test). Pass or fail based on the evaluation report. 2b be made available on the market with a secure by default configuration, unless otherwise agreed between manufacturer and business user in relation to a tailor-made product with digital elements, including the possibility to reset the product to its original state; On the assumption that secure by default is defined then a pass or fail is given based on the evaluation report. 2c ensure that vulnerabilities can be addressed through security updates, including, where applicable, through automatic security updates that are installed within an appropriate timeframe enabled as a default setting, with a clear and easy-to-use opt-out mechanism, through the notification of available updates to users, and the option to temporarily postpone them; 2d ensure protection from unauthorized access by appropriate control mechanisms, including but not limited to authentication, identity or access management systems, and report on possible unauthorized access; ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 28 Id Text from CRA - Annex I Test process Determination 2e protect the confidentiality of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data, personal or other, such as by encrypting relevant data at rest or in transit by state of the art mechanisms, and by using other technical means; 2f protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data, personal or other, commands, programs and configuration against any manipulation or modification not authorized by the user, and report on corruptions; 2g process only data, personal or other, that are adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the intended purpose of the product with digital elements (minimisation of data); This should be documented in a DPIA and also comply to relevant data protection regulation (e.g. GDPR). Pass or fail based on evaluation of the DPIA and selective sampling of data to ensure non-essential data is rejected. 2h protect the availability of essential and basic functions, also after an incident, including through resilience and mitigation measures against denial-of-service attacks; Evaluation of the session termination and the security architecture: FTA_SSL.3 ADV_ARC.1 On the evaluation of the SFR/SAR-results, a pass or fail is given in the evaluation report. 2i minimize the negative impact by the products themselves or connected devices on the availability of services provided by other devices or networks; Evaluation of the event reporting, the security architecture and the user guidance: FAU_GEN.1 AGD_OPE.1 ADV_ARC.1 On the evaluation of the SFR/SAR-results, a pass or fail is given in the evaluation report. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 29 Id Text from CRA - Annex I Test process Determination 2j be designed, developed and produced to limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces; Evaluation of the security architecture, the design, the functional specification and the vulnerability assessment: ADV_ARC.1 ADV_TDS.2 or ADV_TDS.3 ADV_FSP.3 or ADV_FSP.4 AVA_VAN.2 or AVA_VAN.3 On the evaluation of the SAR- results, a pass or fail is given in the evaluation report. 2k be designed, developed and produced to reduce the impact of an incident using appropriate exploitation mitigation mechanisms and techniques; Evaluation of the event reporting, user roles, security architecture, the functional specification: ADV_ARC.1 ADV_TDS.2 or ADV_TDS.3 ADV_FSP.3 or ADV_FSP.4 On the evaluation of the SAR- results, a pass or fail is given in the evaluation report. 2l provide security related information by recording and monitoring relevant internal activity, including the access to or modification of data, services or functions, with an opt-out mechanism for the user; Evaluation of the event reporting, of the management functions and the user roles: FAU_GEN.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 On the evaluation of the SFR- results, a pass or fail is given in the evaluation report. 2m provide the possibility for users to securely and easily remove on a permanent basis all data and settings and, where such data can be transferred to other products or systems, ensure that this is done in a secure manner. Evaluation of the functionalities to destroy keys and data, and of the security architecture: FCS_CKM.6 AGD_OPE.1 ADV_ARC.1 On the evaluation of the SFR/SAR-results, a pass or fail is given in the evaluation report. NOTE: The summary analysis given in the OND [4] requirements catalogue did not include an analysis against the cited SARs. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 30 Table B.2: Essential Cybersecurity requirements relating to Vulnerability handling requirements of products with digital elements Id Text from CRA - Annex I Test process Determination Manufacturers of products with digital elements shall 1 Identify and document vulnerabilities and components contained in products with digital elements, including by drawing up a software bill of materials in a commonly used and machine-readable format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies of the products. Evaluation of the provided vulnerability processing covering the reception, examination, the assignment of its nature and risk, and the assignment of the affected component using an SBOM. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. 2 In relation to the risks posed to products with digital elements, address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay, including by providing security updates; where technically feasible, new security updates shall be provided separately from functionality updates. Evaluation of the mitigation means in dependency of the before made nature and risk assignment. The description should cover the aspects. Evaluation of the procedure for the provision of security updates. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. 3 Apply effective and regular tests and reviews of the security of the product with digital elements. Evaluation of the development security testing process documentation. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. 4 Once a security update has been made available, share and publicly disclose information about fixed vulnerabilities, including a description of the vulnerabilities, information allowing users to identify the product with digital elements affected, the impacts of the vulnerabilities, their severity and clear and accessible information helping users to remediate the vulnerabilities; in duly justified cases, where manufacturers consider the security risks of publication to outweigh the security benefits, they may delay making public information regarding a fixed vulnerability until after users have been given the possibility to apply the relevant patch. Evaluation of the provided vulnerability processing, including now the policy for coordinated public disclosure procedures after provision of mitigations to the users. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. 5 Put in place and enforce a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Evaluation of the provided vulnerability processing, including now the policy for disclosure. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 31 Id Text from CRA - Annex I Test process Determination 6 Take measures to facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities in their product with digital elements as well as in third party components contained in that product, including by providing a contact address for the reporting of the vulnerabilities discovered in the product with digital elements. Evaluation of the provided vulnerability processing, including now the policy for disclosure of the vulnerability to affected third party component suppliers based on the SBOM. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. 7 Provide for mechanisms to securely distribute updates for products with digital elements to ensure that vulnerabilities are fixed or mitigated in a timely manner and, where applicable for security updates, in an automatic manner. Evaluation of the security update provision facility, and, depending on the administration of the TOE, whether an automated download is configurable. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. 8 Ensure that, where security updates are available to address identified security issues, they are disseminated without delay and, unless otherwise agreed between a manufacturer and a business user in relation to a tailor-made product with digital elements, free of charge, accompanied by advisory messages providing users with the relevant information, including on potential action to be taken. Evaluation of the provided vulnerability processing, including now the policy for disclosure of the vulnerability and the related communication. Based on the coverage of provided vulnerability process documentation covering the aspect in question, a pass or fail of the CRA SR is given in the evaluation report. NOTE: For vulnerability reporting in general the provisions of the ALC_FLR - Flaw Remediation, defined in [i.9] apply, in particular ALC_FLR.2, Evaluation of flaw remediation wherein the evaluator assesses the overall flaw remediation process of the developer. This is addressed more fully in the derived EUCC PP of ETSI TS 103 996 [i.4]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 993 V1.1.1 (2025-09) 32 History Document history V1.1.1 September 2025 Publication |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 1 Scope | The present document addresses the specific RF technical characteristics and methods of measurements required by ECC Decision (20)02 [i.1] for base stations, cab radio user equipment and terminals other than cab radio intended to be used for the Future Railway Mobile Communications System (FRMCS) and operating in bands as listed in Table 1-1. Table 1-1: List of supported 3GPP bands and modes of operation Band name Uplink Downlink Duplex mode RAT n100 874,4 - 880 MHz 919,4 - 925 MHz FDD 5G NR n101 1 900 - 1 910 MHz 1 900 - 1 910 MHz TDD 5G NR The technical characteristics and methods of measurements have been derived from, and are consistent with ECC Decision (20)02 [i.1], Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/1730 [i.2], ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], ETSI TS 138 104 [2], ETSI TS 138 141-1 [3], ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4] and ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5]. For the clauses not specifically mentioned in the present document, compliance with the above mentioned 3GPP Technical Specifications (TS) is also required for BS and UE. Only BS type 1-C characteristics in the previously mentioned specifications apply for the base station specifications given in the present document. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 2 References | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 138 101-1 (V18.9.0): "5G; NR; User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception; Part 1: Range 1 Standalone (3GPP TS 38.101-1 version 18.9.0 Release 18)". [2] ETSI TS 138 104 (V18.9.0): "5G; NR; Base Station (BS) radio transmission and reception (3GPP TS 38.104 version 18.9.0 Release 18)". [3] ETSI TS 138 141-1 (V18.9.0): "5G; NR; Base Station (BS) conformance testing Part 1: Conducted conformance testing (3GPP TS 38.141-1 version 18.9.0 Release 18)". [4] ETSI TS 138 508-1 (V18.6.0): "LTE; 5G; 5GS; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 1: Common test environment (3GPP TS 38.508-1 version 18.6.0 Release 18)". [5] ETSI TS 138 521-1 (V18.6.0): "5G; NR; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Radio transmission and reception; Part 1: Range 1 standalone (3GPP TS 38.521-1 version 18.6.0 Release 18)". [6] ETSI EN 302 208 (V3.4.1): "Radio Frequency Identification Equipment operating in the band 865 MHz to 868 MHz with power levels up to 2 W and in the band 915 MHz to 921 MHz with power levels up to 4 W; Harmonised Standard for access to radio spectrum". [7] ETSI TS 136 101 (V18.9.0): "LTE; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception (3GPP TS 36.101 version 18.9.0 Release 18)". ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 7 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ECC Decision (20)02: "Harmonised use of the paired frequency bands 874.4-880.0 MHz and 919.4-925.0 MHz and of the unpaired frequency band 1900-1910 MHz for Railway Mobile Radio (RMR)". [i.2] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/1730 of 28 September 2021 on the harmonised use of the paired frequency bands 874,4-880,0 MHz and 919,4-925,0 MHz and of the unpaired frequency band 1900-1910 MHz for Railway Mobile Radio. [i.3] ETSI TR 103 791: "Rail Telecommunications (RT); Future Railway Mobile Communication System (FRMCS); Terminology for FRMCS specifications". |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 103 791 [i.3] and the following apply: local area base station: equipment class characterized by requirements derived from Pico Cell scenarios with a BS to UE minimum coupling loss equal to 45 dB NOTE: As defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clause 4.4. medium range base station: equipment class characterized by requirements derived from Micro Cell scenarios with a BS to UE minimum coupling loss equals to 53 dB NOTE: As defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clause 4.4. PCMAX_L,f,c: UE's lowest configurable maximum output power for carrier f of serving cell c in each slot NOTE: As defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 6.2.4. TRANSFORM_PRECODER_ENABLED: transform precoding is enabled (DFT-s-OFDM UL waveform is configured) NOTE: As defined in ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], Table 4.6.3-118. wide area base station: equipment class characterized by requirements derived from Macro Cell scenarios with a BS to UE minimum coupling loss equal to 70 dB NOTE: As defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clause 4.4. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: BWChannel channel bandwidth NRB transmission bandwidth configuration, expressed in units of resource blocks PEIRP EIRP value ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 8 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ACLR Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio BS Base Station BW BandWidth C_RNTI Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier CP-OFDM Cyclic Prefix Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing CW Continuous Wave DCI Downlink Control Information DFT-s-OFDM Discrete Fourier Transform-spread Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing DL DownLink EIRP Equivalent Isotropically Radiated Power E-UTRA Enhanced Universal Terrestrial Radio Access FDD Frequency Division Duplex FRMCS Future Railway Mobile Communications System HARQ Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request ID Identifier LTE Long Term Evolution MAC Medium Access Control MU Measurement Uncertainty NR New Radio OCNG OFDMA Channel Noise Generator OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access PDCCH Physical Downlink Control CHannel PDSCH Physical Downlink Shared CHannel PUSCH Physical Uplink Shared CHannel QPSK Quadrature Phase Shift Keying RAT Radio Access Technology RB Resource Block REFSENS Reference Sensitivity RFID Radio Frequency IDentification RMC Reference Measurement Channel RRC Radio Resource Control Rx Receiver SCS SubCarrier Spacing SRD Short Range Devices SS System Simulator TDD Time Division Duplex TE Test Equipment Tx Transmitter UE User Equipment UL UpLink |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 4 Band definitions | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 4.1 n100 | The operating band and channel arrangement specifications defined for band n100 in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 5 shall apply. Only 5 MHz wide channel bandwidth shall be considered for band n100. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 4.2 n101 | The operating band and channel arrangement specifications defined for band n101 in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 5 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 9 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5 Specifications for base stations | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.1 Output power | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clauses 6.2.1 and 6.2.4 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.2 Spurious emissions | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.2.0 General | The limits defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], Table 6.6.5.2.1-2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.2.1 n100 | In addition to the requirements defined in clause 5.2.0, for a base station transmitting in n100, the limits defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], Tables 6.6.5.2.3-1 and 6.6.5.2.3-13 shall apply to European frequency bands listed in Annex A. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.2.2 n101 | In addition to the requirements defined in clause 5.2.0, for a base station transmitting in n101, the limits defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], Tables 6.6.5.2.3-1 and 6.6.5.2.3-12 shall apply to European frequency bands listed in Annex A. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.2.3 Operating band unwanted emissions | For wide area base stations, the limits defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], Table 6.6.4.2.2.2-1 shall apply. For medium range base stations, the limits defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], Tables 6.6.4.2.3-1 and 6.6.4.2.3-2 shall apply. For local area base stations, the limits defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], Table 6.6.4.2.4-1 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.3 Reference sensitivity | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clause 7.2.2 for frequency bands n100 and n101 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.4 Receiver intermodulation | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.4.1 n100 | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clauses 7.7.2 and 7.7.3 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.4.2 n101 | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clause 7.7.2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.5 In-band blocking | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.5.1 n100 | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clauses 7.4.2.2 and 7.4.2.5 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.5.2 n101 | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clause 7.4.2.2 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 10 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.6 Out-of-band blocking | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.6.1 n100 | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clause 7.5.2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 5.6.2 n101 | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 104 [2], clauses 7.5.2 and 7.5.5 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6 Specifications for cab radio user equipment | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.0 General | This clause defines the specifications for cab radio user equipment, which fulfil the power class 1 category as specified in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.2. If an external antenna is present the PEIRP shall not exceed 33 dBm. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.1 Output power | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.2 Out-of-band and spurious emissions | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clauses 6.1, 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 shall apply to European frequency bands listed in Annex A. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.3 NR ACLR | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.5.2.4.1 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.4 Reference sensitivity | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 7.3.2 for frequency band n100 and n101 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.5 Blocking requirements | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.5.0 General | The following Tables define the tolerable interfering signals that need to be taken into account for the cab radio user equipment. The frequency ranges for the interfering signals shall be considered edge-to-edge, including any guard band within the carrier as defined in the respective standard of the interfering signal as shown in Tables 6.5.1-1 and 6.5.2-1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 11 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.5.1 n100 | For n100, the blocking signals identified in Table 6.5.1-1 shall be considered. Table 6.5.1-1: n100 cab radio blocking characteristics Frequency range (edge to edge) Interfering signal type Power level for interfering signal Level of wanted signal Corresponding test case in clause 9.2.2 880 - 915 MHz 5 MHz LTE, according to ETSI TS 136 101 [7], clause 5.6 -26 dBm REFSENS + 3 dB Test method #1 915 - 918,9 MHz 400 kHz SRD / RFID, according to ETSI EN 302 208 [6], clause 4.2 -26 dBm Test method #1 925,6 - 927 MHz CW -13 dBm Test method #2 927 - 960 MHz CW -10 dBm Test method #2 925,1 - 930,1 MHz 5 MHz LTE, according to ETSI TS 136 101 [7], clause 5.6 -13 dBm Test method #1 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 6.5.2 n101 | For n101, the blocking signals identified in Table 6.5.2-1 shall be considered. Table 6.5.2-1: n101 cab radio blocking characteristics Frequency range (edge to edge) Interfering signal type Power level for interfering signal Level of wanted signal Corresponding test case in clause 9.2.2 1 805 - 1 880 MHz 5 MHz LTE, according to ETSI TS 136 101 [7], clause 5.6 -13 dBm REFSENS + 3 dB Test method #1 1 920 - 1 980 MHz 5 MHz LTE, according to ETSI TS 136 101 [7], clause 5.6 -39 dBm Test method #1 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 7 Specifications for terminals other than cab radios | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 7.0 General | This clause defines the specifications for terminals other than cab radios, which fulfil the power class 3 category as specified in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.2. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 7.1 Output power | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 7.2 Out-of-band and spurious emissions | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clauses 6.1, 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 shall apply to European frequency bands listed in Annex A. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 7.3 NR ACLR | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.5.2.4.1 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 12 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 7.4 Reference sensitivity | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 7.3.2 for frequency bands n100 and n101 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 7.5 Blocking requirements | The specifications defined in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 7.6 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8 Test cases for base stations | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.1 Transmitter | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.1.1 Output power | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 141-1 [3], clause 6.2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.1.2 Spurious emissions | The test cases defined in ETSI TS 138 141-1 [3], clause 6.6 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.2 Receiver | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.2.1 Reference sensitivity | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 141-1 [3], clause 7.2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.2.2 In-band selectivity and blocking | The test cases defined in ETSI TS 138 141-1 [3], clause 7.4 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.2.3 Out-of-band blocking | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 141-1 [3], clause 7.5 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 8.2.4 Receiver intermodulation | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 141-1 [3], clause 7.7 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9 Test cases for cab radio user equipment | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.0 General | This clause defines the test cases for cab radio user equipment, which fulfil the power class 1 category as specified in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.2. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.1 Transmitter | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.1.1 Output power | The test cases defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 6.2 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 13 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.1.2 NR ACLR | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 6.5.2.4.1 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.1.3 Out-of-band and spurious emissions | The test cases defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2 Receiver | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.1 Reference sensitivity power level | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 7.3 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2 Blocking | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.0 General Requirements | The test procedures specified in the present clause shall be carried out using the defined characteristics (in Tables 6.5.1-1 and 6.5.2-1) for testing RF blocking with FRMCS cab radio user equipment. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.1 Test purpose | The blocking characteristic is a measure of the receiver's ability to receive a wanted signal at its assigned channel frequency in the presence of an unwanted interferer on frequencies other than those of the spurious response or the adjacent channels, without this unwanted input signal causing a degradation of the performance of the receiver beyond a specified limit. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.2 Test method #1 | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.2.1 Test applicability | This test method applies to all FRMCS cab radio user equipment. It is used for testing RF blocking with interfering signals of type other than CW (see Tables 6.5.1-1 and 6.5.2-1). |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.2.2 Minimum conformance requirements | The throughput of the wanted signal shall be ≥ 95 % of the maximum throughput of the reference measurement channels as specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses A.2.2, A.2.3, A.3.2 and A.3.3 (with one sided dynamic OCNG Pattern OP.1 FDD/TDD for the DL signal as described in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause A.5) with parameters specified in Tables 9.2.2.2.2-1 and 9.2.2.2.3.1-1. Table 9.2.2.2.2-1: Test parameter table Rx parameter Units Channel bandwidth (MHz) 5, 10 Power in transmission bandwidth configuration dBm REFSENS + 3 dB BWinterferer MHz As defined in Tables 6.5.1-1 and 6.5.2-1 NOTE: The transmitter shall be set to 4 dB below PCMAX_L,f,c at the minimum UL configuration specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table 7.3.2.3-3 with PCMAX_L,f,c defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 6.2.4. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 14 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.2.3 Test description | 9.2.2.2.3.1 Initial conditions Initial conditions are a set of test configurations in which the cab radio UE needs to be tested in and the steps for the SS to take with the cab radio UE to reach the correct measurement state. The initial test configurations consist of environmental conditions based on NR operating bands specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table 5.3.5-1. The details of the uplink and downlink Reference Measurement Channels (RMC) are specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses A.2 and A.3. Configuration of PDSCH and PDCCH before measurement are specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause C.2. Table 9.2.2.2.3.1-1: Test configuration table Default Conditions Test Environment as specified in ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.1 Normal Test Frequencies for wanted and unwanted signals Low, Mid, High Test Channel Bandwidths 5 MHz for band n100, 10 MHz for band n101 Test SCS for the wanted signal 15 kHz for band n100, 30 kHz for band n101 Test Parameters Downlink Configuration Uplink Configuration Test ID Modulation RB allocation Modulation RB allocation 1 CP-OFDM QPSK Note 1 DFT-s-OFDM QPSK Note 1 NOTE 1: The specific configuration of uplink and downlink are defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table 7.3.2.4.1-1. NOTE 2: In a band where cab radio UE supports 4Rx, the test shall be performed only with 4Rx antennas ports connected and 4Rx REFSENS requirement (ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table 7.3.2.5-2) is used in the test requirements. NOTE 3: The test frequencies shall be the lowest, the middle and the highest frequency available within the given frequency band with the specified configuration, for both wanted and unwanted signals. In specific cases, there are either one or two possible test frequencies. All combinations of possible wanted and unwanted frequencies shall be tested. 1) Connect the SS to the cab radio UE antenna connectors as shown in ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], Annex A, in Figure A.3.1.4.1 for TE diagram and clause A.3.2 for UE diagram. 2) The parameter settings for the cell are set up according to ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.4.3. 3) Downlink signals are initially set up according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses C.0, C.1, C.2 and C.3.1, and uplink signals according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses G.0, G.1, G.2 and G.3.1. 4) The DL and UL Reference Measurement channels are set according to Table 9.2.2.2.3.1-1. 5) Propagation conditions are set according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause B.0. 6) Ensure the cab radio UE is in state RRC_CONNECTED with generic procedure parameters Connectivity NR, Connected without release On, Test Mode On and Test Loop Function On according to ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.5. Message contents are defined in clause 9.2.2.2.3.3. 9.2.2.2.3.2 Test procedure 1) SS transmits PDSCH via PDCCH DCI format 1_1 for C_RNTI to transmit the DL RMC according to Table 9.2.2.2.3.1-1. The SS sends downlink MAC padding bits on the DL RMC. 2) SS sends uplink scheduling information for each UL HARQ process via PDCCH DCI format 0_1 for C_RNTI to schedule the UL RMC according to Table 9.2.2.2.3.1-1. Since the UL has no payload and no loopback data to send the cab radio UE sends uplink MAC padding bits on the UL RMC. 3) Set the parameters of the signal generator for an interfering signal according to Table 9.2.2.2.2-1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 15 4) Set the downlink signal level according to Table 6.5.1-1 or 6.5.2-1. Send uplink power control commands to the cab radio UE using 1 dB power step size to ensure that the cab radio UE output power measured by the test system is within the Uplink power control window, defined as -MU to -(MU + Uplink power control window size) dB of the target power level in Table 9.2.2.2.2-1 for at least the duration of the Throughput measurement, where: - MU is the test system uplink power measurement uncertainty and is specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table F.1.3-1 for the carrier frequency f and the channel bandwidth BW. - Uplink power control window size = 1 dB (cab radio UE power step size) + 0,7 dB (cab radio UE power step tolerance) + (Test system relative power measurement uncertainty), where, the cab radio UE power step tolerance is specified in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], Table 6.3.4.3-1 and is 0,7 dB for 1 dB power step size, and the Test system relative power measurement uncertainty is specified for test case 6.3.4.3 in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table F.1.2-1. - For cab radio UEs supporting Tx diversity, the transmit power is measured as the sum of the output power from both cab radio UE antenna connectors. 5) Measure the average throughput for a duration sufficient to achieve statistical significance according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Annex H. NOTE: The purpose of the Uplink power control window is to ensure that the actual cab radio UE output power is no greater than the target power level, and as close as possible to the target power level. The relationship between the Uplink power control window, the target power level and the corresponding possible actual cab radio UE Uplink power window is illustrated in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause F.4.3. 9.2.2.2.3.3 Message contents Message contents are according to ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.6 with TRANSFORM_PRECODER_ENABLED condition in Table 4.6.3-118 PUSCH-Config. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.2.4 Test requirement | The throughput measurement derived in test procedure shall be ≥ 95 % of the maximum throughput of the reference measurement channels as specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses A.2.2, A.2.3 and A.3.2 with parameters specified in Tables 9.2.2.2.2-1 and 9.2.2.2.3.1-1. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.3 Test method #2 | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.3.1 Test applicability | This test method applies to all FRMCS cab radio user equipment. It is used for testing RF blocking with interfering signals of type CW (see Table 6.5.1-1). |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.3.2 Minimum conformance requirements | The throughput of the wanted signal shall be ≥ 95 % of the maximum throughput of the reference measurement channels as specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses A.2.2, A.2.3, A.3.2 and A.3.3 (with one sided dynamic OCNG Pattern OP.1 FDD/TDD for the DL-signal as described in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses A.5.1.1 and A.5.2.1) with parameters specified in Tables 9.2.2.3.2-1 and 9.2.2.3.3.1-1. Table 9.2.2.3.2-1: Test parameter table Channel bandwidth Power in transmission bandwidth configuration [dBm] 5, 10 MHz REFSENS + 3 dB NOTE: The transmitter shall be set to 4 dB below PCMAX_L,f,c at the minimum UL configuration specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table 7.3.2.3-3 with PCMAX_L,f,c defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 6.2.4. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 16 For interferer frequencies in Table 6.5.1-1, a maximum of: ⌊24,6 ⋅⌈ ⋅ /6⌉ ⌊ ⋅ /10⌋, 5 ⁄ ⌋ exceptions are allowed for spurious response frequencies in each assigned frequency channel when measured using a step size of ( ⌊ℎ/2⌋, 5) MHz with the number of resource blocks in the downlink transmission bandwidth configuration, BWChannel is the bandwidth of the frequency channel in MHz and n = 1,2 for SCS = 15,30 kHz, respectively. For these exceptions, the requirements in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 7.7 apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.3.3 Test Description | 9.2.2.3.3.1 Initial Conditions Initial conditions are a set of test configurations in which the cab radio UE needs to be tested in and the steps for the SS to take with the cab radio UE to reach the correct measurement state. The initial test configurations consist of environmental conditions based on NR operating bands specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table 5.3.5-1. All of these configurations for wanted and unwanted frequencies shall be tested with applicable test parameters for each combination of channel bandwidth and sub-carrier spacing, and are shown in Table 9.2.2.3.3.1-1. The details of the uplink and downlink Reference Measurement Channels (RMCs) are specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses A.2 and A.3 respectively. The details of the OCNG patterns used are specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause A.5. Configurations of PDSCH and PDCCH before measurement are specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause C.3. Table 9.2.2.3.3.1-1: Test configuration table Default Conditions Test Environment as specified in ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.1 Normal Test Frequencies for wanted and unwanted signals Low, Mid, High Test Channel Bandwidths 5 MHz for band n100, 10 MHz for band n101 Test SCS for the wanted signal 15 kHz for band n100, 30 kHz for band n101 Test Parameters Downlink Configuration Uplink Configuration Test ID Modulation RB allocation Modulation RB allocation 1 CP-OFDM QPSK Note 1 DFT-s-OFDM QPSK Note 1 NOTE 1: The specific configuration of uplink and downlink are defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table 7.3.2.4.1-1. NOTE 2: In a band where cab radio UE supports 4Rx but does not support 8Rx, the test shall be performed only with 4Rx antennas ports connected and 4Rx REFSENS requirement (ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Tables 7.3.2.5-2a and 7.3.2.5-2b) is used in the test requirements. In a band where cab radio UE supports 8Rx, the test shall be performed only with 8Rx antennas ports connected and 8Rx REFSENS requirement (ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Tables 7.3.2.5-2e and 7.3.2.5-2f) is used in the test requirements. Otherwise, the UE shall be verified with two Rx antenna ports. NOTE 3: The test frequencies shall be the lowest, the middle and the highest frequency available within the given frequency band with the specified configuration, for both wanted and unwanted signals. In specific cases, there are either one or two possible test frequencies. All combinations of possible wanted and unwanted frequencies shall be tested. 1) Connect the SS to the cab radio UE antenna connectors as shown in ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], Annex A, in Figure A.3.1.4.2 for TE diagram and clause A.3.2 for UE diagram. 2) The parameter settings for the cell are set up according to ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.4.3. 3) Downlink signals are initially set up according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses C.0, C.1, C.2 and C.3.1, and uplink signals according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses G.0, G.1, G.2 and G.3.1. 4) The UL and DL Reference Measurement channels are set according to Table 9.2.2.3.3.1-1. 5) Propagation conditions are set according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause B.0. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 17 6) Ensure the cab radio UE is in State RRC_CONNECTED with generic procedure parameters Connectivity NR, Connected without release On, Test Mode On and Test Loop Function On according to ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.5. Message contents are defined in clause 9.2.2.3.3.3. 9.2.2.3.3.2 Test Procedure 1) SS transmits PDSCH via PDCCH DCI format 1_1 for C_RNTI to transmit the DL RMC according to Table 9.2.2.3.3.1-1. The SS sends downlink MAC padding bits on the DL RMC. 2) SS sends uplink scheduling information for each UL HARQ process via PDCCH DCI format 0_1 for C_RNTI to schedule the UL RMC according to Table 9.2.2.3.3.1-1. Since the cab radio UE has no payload data to send, the cab radio UE transmits uplink MAC padding bits on the UL RMC. 3) Set the parameters of the CW signal generator for an interfering signal below the wanted signal according to Table 6.5.1-1. The frequency step size is ( ⌊ℎ/2⌋, 5) MHz. 4) Set the downlink signal level according to the Table 6.5.1-1. Send uplink power control commands to the cab radio UE using 1 dB power step size to ensure that the cab radio UE output power measured by the test system is within the Uplink power control window, defined as -MU to -(MU + Uplink power control window size) dB of the target power level in Table 9.2.2.3.2-1 for at least the duration of the Throughput measurement, where: - MU is the test system uplink power measurement uncertainty and is specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table F.1.3-1 for the carrier frequency f and the channel bandwidth BW. - Uplink power control window size = 1 dB (cab radio UE power step size) + 0,7 dB (cab radio UE power step tolerance) + (Test system relative power measurement uncertainty), where, the cab radio UE power step tolerance is specified in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], Table 6.3.4.3-1 and is 0,7 dB for 1 dB power step size, and the Test system relative power measurement uncertainty is specified for test case 6.3.4.3 in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Table F.1.2-1. - For cab radio UEs supporting Tx diversity, the transmit power is measured as the sum of the output power from both cab radio UE antenna connectors. 5) Measure the average throughput for a duration sufficient to achieve statistical significance according to ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], Annex H. 6) Record the frequencies for which the throughput does not meet the requirements. 7) Repeat steps from 3 to 6, using an interfering signal above the wanted signal at step 3. NOTE: The purpose of the Uplink power control window is to ensure that the actual cab radio UE output power is no greater than the target power level, and as close as possible to the target power level. The relationship between the Uplink power control window, the target power level and the corresponding possible actual cab radio UE Uplink power window is illustrated in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause F.4.3. 9.2.2.3.3.3 Message Contents Message contents are according to ETSI TS 138 508-1 [4], clause 4.6 ensuring Table 4.6.3-118 with condition TRANSFORM_PRECODER_ENABLED. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 9.2.2.3.4 Test Requirement | The throughput measurement derived in test procedure shall be ≥ 95 % of the maximum throughput of the reference measurement channels as specified in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses A.3.2 and A.3.3 with parameters specified in Tables 9.2.2.3.2-1 and 9.2.2.3.3.1-1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 18 |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10 Test cases for terminals other than cab radios | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.0 General | This clause defines the test cases for terminals other than cab radios, which fulfil the power class 3 category as specified in ETSI TS 138 101-1 [1], clause 6.2. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.1 Transmitter | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.1.1 Output power | The test cases defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 6.2 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.1.2 NR ACLR | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 6.5.2.4.1 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.1.3 Out-of-band and spurious emissions | The test cases defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clauses 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.2 Receiver | |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.2.1 Reference sensitivity power level | The test case defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 7.3 shall apply. |
9d41333a56d064c976d8032fae056f46 | 103 793 | 10.2.2 Blocking | The test cases defined in ETSI TS 138 521-1 [5], clause 7.6 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 19 Annex A (normative): European mobile bands, excluding n100 and n101 Table A-1: List of European mobile bands, excluding n100 and n101 Protected system Frequency range for co-existence requirement GSM900 921 MHz to 960 MHz 876 MHz to 915 MHz DCS1800 1 805 MHz to 1 880 MHz 1 710 MHz to 1 785 MHz UTRA FDD Band I or 2 110 MHz to 2 170 MHz E-UTRA Band 1 or NR Band n1 1 920 MHz to 1 980 MHz UTRA FDD Band III or 1 805 MHz to 1 880 MHz E-UTRA Band 3 or NR Band n3 1 710 MHz to 1 785 MHz UTRA FDD Band VII or 2 620 MHz to 2 690 MHz E-UTRA Band 7 or NR Band n7 2 500 MHz to 2 570 MHz UTRA FDD Band VIII or 925 MHz to 960 MHz E-UTRA Band 8 or NR Band n8 880 MHz to 915 MHz UTRA FDD Band XX or E-UTRA Band 20 or NR Band n20 791 MHz to 821 MHz 832 MHz to 862 MHz E-UTRA Band 28 or NR Band n28 758 MHz to 803 MHz 703 MHz to 748 MHz UTRA TDD Band d) or E-UTRA Band 38 or NR Band n38 2 570 MHz to 2 620 MHz UTRA TDD Band e) or E-UTRA Band 40 or NR Band n40 2 300 MHz to 2 400 MHz E-UTRA Band 41 or NR Band n41 2 496 MHz to 2 690 MHz E-UTRA Band 50 or NR band n50 1 432 MHz to 1 517 MHz E-UTRA Band 51 or NR Band n51 1 427 MHz to 1 432 MHz E-UTRA Band 65 or NR Band n65 2 110 MHz to 2 200 MHz 1 920 MHz to 2 010 MHz E-UTRA Band 75 or NR Band n75 1 432 MHz to 1 517 MHz E-UTRA Band 76 or NR Band n76 1 427 MHz to 1 432 MHz NR Band n77 3 300 MHz to 4 200 MHz NR Band n78 3 300 MHz to 3 800 MHz NR band 80 1 710 MHz to 1 785 MHz NR band 81 880 MHz to 915 MHz NR band 82 832 MHz to 862 MHz NR band 83 703 MHz to 748 MHz NR band 84 1 920 MHz to 1 980 MHz E-UTRA Band 87 420 MHz to 425 MHz 410 MHz to 415 MHz E-UTRA Band 88 422 MHz to 427 MHz 412 MHz to 417 MHz NR Band n91 1 427 MHz to 1 432 MHz 832 MHz to 862 MHz NR Band n92 1 432 MHz to 1 517 MHz 832 MHz to 862 MHz NR Band n93 1 427 MHz to 1 432 MHz 880 MHz to 915 MHz NR Band n94 1 432 MHz to 1 517 MHz 880 MHz to 915 MHz ETSI ETSI TS 103 793 V1.1.1 (2025-11) 20 History Document history V1.0.0 July 2025 SRdAP process EV 20251008: 2025-07-10 to 2025-10-08 V1.1.1 November 2025 Publication |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 1 Scope | The present document defines standardization issues for Smart Contracts, as defined in Data Act [i.1], and based on Electronic Ledgers as defined by eIDAS2 [i.2]. It builds on existing and planned standardization and publicly available specifications. It presents a novel and as yet unpublished Chain of Trust, by addressing the role of all involved entities in building, deploying, and executing a Smart Contract computer program on an Electronic Ledger. All the relevant actors, artifacts, hardware, networks and tools, are identified by emphasizing the critical points where governance, safety, security, and identity issues are required. The Chain of Trust will be extensively translated in suitable recommendations in ETSI TS 119 541 [i.12] and ETSI TS 119 542 [i.16]. The security of Smart Contracts will be significantly compromised by an incomplete validation chain, which exposes users to various risks, including fraud and attacks. NOTE 1: The present document summarizes the results of a scoping study that examines the issues for the application of Smart Contracts, particularly in relation to the European frameworks outlined in the Data Act [i.1] and eIDAS2 [i.2] regulations. The goal is to pinpoint standardization issues for Smart Contracts and Electronic Ledgers in data-sharing computer applications. Additionally, the study considers reports and standards from ETSI ISG PDL (at the time of the publication of the present document conveyed into ETSI TC DATA), ETSI TC ESI, and checks consistency with ISO and CEN documents. NOTE 2: Unless otherwise specified in the present document, the definition of Smart Contracts refers to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 [i.1] and the definition of Electronic Ledgers, and Qualified Electronic Ledger refer to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 [i.2]. See Annex C for further details. The present document is structured as follows: • Clause 4 enumerates the regulations, applied standards, EU initiatives and other activities involved for the use of Smart Contracts in Data Sharing Computer Applications. • Clause 5 is the core of the present document. It identifies the entities and their inter-relations for the creation, validation, deployment and use of Smart Contracts in Electronic Ledgers. A Chain of Trust listing the main entities and their relations will be presented and discussed; the Chain of Trust allows to highlight issues that will be focused in the next clause. • Clause 6 lists in a concise way the issues that are translated into formal requirements in ETSI TS 119 541 [i.12] and ETSI TS 119 542 [i.16]. • Clause 7 concludes. • Annex A presents four figures showing a particular, fine-grained, implementation of the Chain of Trust as presented in Table 1: entities, their relations participating in the design of SC Language, the deployment, and execution of Smart Contracts on a Qualified Electronic Ledger. Other implementations are also possible. • Annex B graphically and informally depicts, the Chain of Trust, as formally described in Table 2. • Annex C gives a comparative overview of definitions in normative and standard documents. ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 8 |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 2 References | |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in the present clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonized rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Data Act). [i.2] Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework (eIDAS2). [i.3] ISO 22739:2024: "Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies — Vocabulary". [i.4] ETSI TR 119 001: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); The framework for standardization of signatures; Definitions and abbreviations". [i.5] ISO/IEC 15408: "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security". [i.6] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (eIDAS). [i.7] Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). [i.8] ISO 9001:2015: "Quality management systems — Requirements". [i.9] ISO/IEC 27001:2022: "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Information security management systems — Requirements". [i.10] ETSI TR 119 476: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Analysis of selective disclosure and zero-knowledge proofs applied to Electronic Attestation of Attributes". [i.11] Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive). [i.12] ETSI TS 119 541: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Smart Contracts using Electronic Ledgers". [i.13] ETSI EN 319 401: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers". ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 9 [i.14] ETSI EN 319 403-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trust Service Provider Conformity Assessment; Part 1: Requirements for conformity assessment bodies assessing Trust Service Providers". [i.15] ISO/TS 23635:2022: "Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies — Guidelines for governance". [i.16] ETSI TS 119 542: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Use of EU Digital Identity Wallets and electronic signatures for identification with Smart Contracts". [i.17] Architecture and Reference Framework (ARF) for the European Digital Identity (EUDI) Wallet. [i.18] ENISA: "Digital Identity Standards publications". [i.19] ISO 23257:2022: "Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies — Reference architecture". [i.20] UNCITRAL Model Law on Automated Contracting finalized by the UN Commission on International Trade Law. [i.21] ISO 24332:2025: "Information and Documentation - Blockchain and distributed ledger technology (DLT) in relation to authoritative records, records systems and records management". Forthcoming. [i.22] ETSI TR 104 173: "Data Solutions (DATA); Oracles for Smart Contracts executed in Electronic Ledgers". Forthcoming. [i.23] ETSI TS 104 172: "Data Solutions (DATA); ETSI Specification of the Requirements on Ledgers and Smart Contracts". Forthcoming. [i.24] The ROCQ theorem prover. [i.25] The Isabelle theorem prover. [i.26] The Lean theorem prover. [i.27] X. Leroy: "Formal verification of a realistic compiler". Communication of the ACM. Vol 52, pp.107-115, 2009. [i.28] CEN-CENELEC White paper: "Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies. Recommendations for Successful Adoption in Europe of Emerging Technical Standards on Distributed Ledger/Blockchain Technologies". 2018. [i.29] Recommendation ITU-T F.751.0: "Requirements for Distributed Ledger Systems". [i.30] Recommendation ITU-T F.751.8: "Technical framework for distributed ledger technology (DLT) to cope with regulation". [i.31] Recommendation ITU-T X.1401: "Security threats to distributed ledger technology". [i.32] Recommendation ITU-T X.1402: "Security framework for distributed ledger technology". [i.33] Recommendation ITU-T X.1403: "Security guidelines for using distributed ledger technology for decentralized identity management". [i.34] Recommendation ITU-T X.1412: "Security requirements for smart contract management based on the distributed ledger technology". [i.35] ETSI GR PDL 001: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Landscape of Standards and Technologies". [i.36] ETSI GR PDL 002: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Applicability and compliance to data processing requirements". [i.37] ETSI GR PDL 003: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Application Scenarios". [i.38] ETSI GR PDL 004: "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers (PDL); Smart Contracts; System Architecture and Functional Specification". ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 10 [i.39] ETSI GS PDL 005: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Proof of Concepts Framework". [i.40] ETSI GR PDL 006: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Inter-Ledger interoperability". [i.41] ETSI GR PDL 008: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Research and Innovation Landscape". [i.42] ETSI GR PDL 009: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Federated Data Management". [i.43] ETSI GR PDL 010: "PDL Operations in Offline Mode". [i.44] ETSI GS PDL 011: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Specification of Requirements for Smart Contracts' architecture and security". [i.45] ETSI GS PDL 012: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Reference Architecture". [i.46] ETSI GS PDL 013: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Supporting Distributed Data Management". [i.47] ETSI GR PDL 014: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Study on non-repudiation techniques". [i.48] ETSI GS PDL 015: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Reputation management". [i.49] ETSI GR PDL 017: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Application of PDL to Amended Regulation 910/2014 (eIDAS2) Qualified Trust Services". [i.50] ETSI GR PDL 018: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Redactable Distributed Ledgers". [i.51] ETSI GR PDL 019: "PDL Services for Decentralized Identity and Trust Management". [i.52] ETSI GR PDL 020: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Wireless Consensus Network". [i.53] ETSI GR PDL 021: "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers (PDL); Overview of use cases in 3GPP network and impact analysis on architecture integration". [i.54] ETSI GS PDL 022: "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers (PDL); PDL in Wholesale Supply Chain Management". [i.55] ETSI GS PDL 023: "PDL service enablers for Decentralized Identification and Trust Management". [i.56] ETSI GS PDL 024: "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers (PDL); Architecture enhancements for PDL service provisioning in telecom networks". [i.57] ETSI GS PDL 025: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Wireless Consensus Network Composition and Organization". [i.58] ETSI GS PDL 026: "Permissioned Distributed Ledgers (PDL); PDL in Settlement of Usage-Based Services". [i.59] ETSI GS PDL 027: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) in telecom networks". [i.60] ETSI GS PDL 028: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Specification utilizing PDL to Standardized IoT Service Layer Platform oneM2M". [i.61] ETSI GS PDL 029: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Distributed Autonomous Organization (DAO)". [i.62] ETSI GS PDL 030: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Trust in Telecom System". [i.63] ETSI GS PDL 031: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Energy Consumption Data Sharing based on PDL Service". [i.64] ETSI GS PDL 032: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Artificial Intelligence for Permissioned Distributed Ledger". ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 11 [i.65] ETSI GS PDL 033: "Permissioned Distributed Ledger (PDL); Smart Contracts; System Architecture and Functional Specification". [i.66] ISO/IEC 22123-2:2023: "Cloud computing - Part 1: Vocabulary". [i.67] IEEE 1934™-2018: "Standard for Adoption of OpenFog Reference Architecture for Fog Computing". [i.68] Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act). [i.69] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC). [i.70] ISO/IEC 24760-1:2025: "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — A framework for identity management. Part 1: Core concepts and terminology". [i.71] ISO/IEC 29115:2013: "Information technology — Security techniques — Entity authentication assurance framework". [i.72] Ethereum®: "ERC-721 Non-Fungible Token Standard". [i.73] ISO 20022: "Universal financial industry message scheme". |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: algorithm: set of rules and non-ambiguous procedures to solve a class of problems Chain of Trust: trust needs of legal or natural persons, as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], and of the relationships existing among them Deontic Logic: philosophical logic that is concerned with obligation, permission, optional, non-optional, obligatory, must, the least one can do, better than, ought, blame, responsibility, indifferent, and related concepts distributed ledger: ledger that is shared across a set of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) nodes and synchronized between the DLT nodes using a consensus mechanism NOTE 1: According to ISO 22739 [i.3]. NOTE 2: A distributed ledger as defined in ISO 22739 [i.3] is a special kind of an Electronic Ledger: the vice- versa is not true. Electronic Ledger: sequence of electronic data records, ensuring the integrity of those records and the accuracy of the chronological ordering of those records NOTE 1: According to Article 3(52) in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2]. NOTE 2: From Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], Recital (68): "This Regulation should ensure technological neutrality, namely neither favoring, nor discriminating against, any technology used to implement the new trust service for electronic ledgers". "The process of creating and updating an electronic ledger depends on the type of ledger used, namely whether it is centralized or distributed.". ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 12 NOTE 3: The definition of Electronic Ledger in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2] is more general than the definition of distributed ledger in ISO 22739 [i.3]. Qualified Electronic Ledger: Electronic Ledger provided by a qualified trust service provider and which meets the requirements laid down in Article 45l NOTE: According to Article 3/53 in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2]. SC Byte Code: computer program, written in SC Byte Code Language, that is executed on the top of a SC Virtual Machine and that is produced by a compilation of a SC Source Code NOTE: It should correspond to the definition of Smart Contract in [i.1]. SC Byte Code Language: domain specific language for executing Smart Contracts SC Compiler: computer program, written in any programming language, translating every SC Source Code, eventually annotated with SC Legal Text, into a semantically equivalent, machine-readable SC Byte Code, and some auxiliary files NOTE 1: A compilation of a SC Source Code by a SC Compiler should produce a number of files that can be packaged in a suitable SC Package. NOTE 2: As an explanatory example, see the number of parameters of the Solidity SC Compiler. NOTE 3: It should be open source. SC Compiler Policy: set of rules to be respected by a SC Compiler SC Compiler Publisher: legal or natural persons responsible to sign the SC Compiler and the SC Compiler Policy, produced by the SC Compiler Team SC Compiler Team: legal or natural persons that produce a SC Compiler SC Deployer: legal or natural persons identified by the Electronic Ledger, in charge of putting a SC Byte Code into the Electronic Ledger SC Deployer Policy: set of rules and non-ambiguous procedures to be respected by a SC Deployer SC Development Policy: set of rules and non-ambiguous procedures to be respected in order to produce a SC Package SC Development Team: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], responsible to produce a SC Package SC Documentation: documentary information in support of the Smart Contract NOTE: Elements of the documentation can/may be produced by a compilation of a SC Source Code and can/may also include the policy documentation and the identity documentation. SC Execution Report: signed evidence of an execution of a Smart Contract in an Electronic Ledger SC Language: domain specific language for defining Smart Contracts SC Language Publisher: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], signing the SC Language Specifications and the SC Language Specification Policy produced by the SC Language Specification Team, and also responsible to sign the SC Compiler and the SC Virtual Machine, produced by the SC Compiler Team and SC Virtual Machine Team, respectively SC Language Specification: syntax, semantic, and run-time execution model of a domain specific language for defining Smart Contracts NOTE 1: The SC Language Specification consist of: ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 13 1) a SC Source Code Language syntax, written in Backus-Naur Form grammar format; 2) a SC Source Code Language semantic, written in English prose or in formal system (lambda- calculus, term rewriting systems) for expressing computations, and usually referred as the semantic of the SC Language; 3) a SC Byte Code Language syntax; 4) a SC Byte Code Language semantic, written in English prose or in formal system (stack and store reduction semantics) for expressing computations, and usually referred as the execution or run-time environment of the SC Language; this is usually referred as SC Virtual Machine specification; 5) an algorithmic transaction of a computer program, written in a SC Source Code Language into a semantically equivalent computer program, written in a SC Byte Code Language; this is usually referred as SC Compiler specification. NOTE 2: It should be open access. SC Language Specification Policy: set of rules to be respected by a SC Language Specification NOTE: It should be open access. SC Language Specification Team: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], responsible to produce a SC Language Specification and a SC Language Specification Policy SC Legal Team: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], responsible to audit the SC Source Code and or the SC Byte Code using a fixed SC Compiler and SC Virtual Machine, and to produce a SC Legal Text that meets the SC Development Policy SC Legal Text: legal text attached or annotated into either a SC Source Code and a SC Byte Code assessing legal basis, legal requirements, legal obligations, legal use, legal rights, legal certainty, legal status and legal value to a Smart Contract NOTE: It should refer a SC Compiler and SC Virtual Machine. SC Oracle: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], that produces external data to a Smart Contract stored in an identified Electronic Ledger so triggering Electronic Transactions SC Package: set of files, such as SC Source Code, SC Byte Code, SC Legal Text, and any other SC Documentation in support of the Smart Contract, signed by the SC Publisher SC Provider: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], responsible for providing and the execution of a Smart Contract to a SC User NOTE 1: The SC Provider may offer or trade a Smart Contract with a SC User. NOTE 2: A SC Provider can take input from external sources other than SC User. NOTE 3: The SC Provider can be a "Vendor of applications using Smart Contracts", as defined in Article 36 Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 [i.1]. SC Provider Policy: policy (or policies) governing the behaviour or the SC Provider SC Publisher: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], responsible to sign the SC Legal Text, the SC Source Code, the SC Byte Code, and the SC Documentation, produced by the SC Development Team, using the SC Compiler SC Publisher Policy: policy (or policies) governing the behavior or the SC Provider SC Source Code: computer program, written in SC Source Code Language, defining the behavior of a Smart Contract NOTE: A SC Source Code is translated using a SC Compiler into a semantically equivalent SC Byte Code, written in a SC Byte Code Language. ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 14 SC User: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], that uses services produced by Smart Contracts, provided by an identified SC Provider by accepting SC Legal Text agreements and SC Provider agreements and uses Smart Contracts to put Electronic Records into an Electronic Ledger NOTE 1: A SC User can be a user of a "connected product or related service", as defined in Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 [i.1]. NOTE 2: A SC User can be a DLT User, as defined in ISO 22739 [i.3]. SC Virtual Machine: computer program, written in any programming language, executing as input a SC Byte Code and producing as output records that will be stored into the Electronic Ledger NOTE: It should be open source. SC Virtual Machine Policy: set of rules and non-ambiguous procedures to be respected by a SC Byte Code NOTE: It should be open source. SC Virtual Machine Team: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], responsible to produce a SC Virtual Machine SC Virtual Machine Publisher: legal or natural person as used in Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.2], responsible to sign the SC Virtual Machine and the SC Virtual Machine Policy, produced by the SC Virtual Machine Team Smart Contract: computer program used for the automated execution of an agreement or part thereof, using a sequence of electronic data records and ensuring their integrity and the accuracy of their chronological ordering NOTE 1: According to Article 2/39, 104 in Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 [i.1]. NOTE 2: As per ISO 22739 [i.3]: A "smart contract is a computer program stored in a distributed ledger technology (DLT) system wherein the outcome of any execution of the program is recorded on the distributed ledger". NOTE 3: The definition of Smart Contract in Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 [i.1] is more general than the definition of Smart Contract in ISO 22739 [i.3]. Smart Legal Contract: Smart Contract with legal relevance obtained by embedding or by pointing a SC Legal Text |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AI Artificial Intelligence API Application Public Interface ARF Architecture and Reference Framework CA Certificate Authority DAG Directed Acyclic Graph dAPP distributed Application DID Decentralized Identity DLT Distributed Ledger Technology DPoS Delegated Proof-of-Stake EAA Electronic Attestations of Attributes EAA-Pub Electronic Attestations of Attributes Public EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EBSI European Blockchain Services Infrastructure EDIC European Digital Infrastructure Consortium eID electronic Identification ENISA European Union Agency for Cybersecurity eSIM electronic Subscriber Identity Module ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 15 EU European Union EUDI European Digital Identity EUDIW European Digital Identity Wallet EVM Ethereum Virtual Machine GDPR General Data Protection Regulation HSM Hardware Security Module INATBA International Association for Trusted Blockchain Applications IoT Internet of Things IPFS InterPlanetary File System ISO International Organization for Standardization KYC Know your Customer mobile-ID Mobile Digital Signature NFC Near Field Communication NFT Non-Fungible Token NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology PID Person Identification Data PIN Personal Identification Number PKI Public Key Infrastructure PoS Proof of Stake PoW Proof of Work QEAA Qualified Electronic Attestations of Attributes QES Qualified Electronic Signature QTSP Qualified Trust Service Provider SC Smart Contract SIM Subscriber Identity Module SPV Simplified Payment Verification TSP Trust Service Provider UTXO Unspent Transaction Output VM Virtual Machine 4 Smart Contracts related regulation, standardization and initiatives |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 4.1 Essential Overview | The present clause presents an overview of all relevant European Union Regulations, Standards, Projects, and other activities involving Smart Contracts and Electronic Ledgers in a neutral and agnostic manner. For each of these activities, the present document proceeds as follows: • Essential Overview: Provide an extended abstract of the activities, tailored specifically to Smart Contract and Electronic Ledgers. • Terminology: Identify main entities and relationships among them, as defined in Clause 3.1. • Chain of Trust: As defined in Clause 3.1, tailored specifically to Smart Contract and Electronic Ledgers. NOTE: The reviewed material does not claim to be comprehensive but has been selected to give as complete an overview as possible. ETSI ETSI TR 119 540 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 16 |
142241be1ea90643e055df0a41f4debe | 119 540 | 4.2 Regulations |
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