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cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 5.4.1 The obId data type | Semantics Instances of obId data type shall contain a unique and permanent identifier of one data object. Instances of obId data type may contain a textual description of the nature of the data object qualified by the instance of the obId data type. Instances of obId data type may contain a number of references to documents where additional information about the nature of the data object identified, can be found. Syntax Below follows the CDDL definition of the obId data type: oId = { 1 => #6.32(tstr), ;id: the URI that is the object identifier ? 2 => tstr, ;desc: a textual description of the identified object ? 3 => [ +ref: #6.32(tstr) ;docRefs: an array of URIs pointing to documents ;specifying the identified object ] } The id member shall contain a permanent identifier. Once the identifier is assigned, it shall not be re-assigned again. The value of the id member shall be an URI. If the identifier of the object is an OID then the value of this member shall be encoded as an URN as specified by the IETF RFC 3061 [7]. If both an OID and a URI exist identifying one object, the URI value should be used in the id member. The desc member shall contain a short and informal description of the data object identified. The docRefs member shall contain an arbitrary number of URI values pointing to documents that contain a complete specification of the data object identified. Table 11 shows the values assigned to each of the keys in the maps specified in the present clause. Table 11: Values of keys in maps or groups specified in the present clause Name Label in map id 1 desc 2 docRefs 3 |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 5.4.2 The pkiOb data type | Semantics The pkiOb data type shall be used to incorporate PKI objects, which can be non-CBOR encoded, into the CB-AdES signature. NOTE: Examples of such PKI objects, include X.509 certificates and revocation lists, OCSP responses, attribute certificates, and electronic time-stamps. Syntax Below follows the CDDL definition of the pkiOb type: pkiOb = { 1 => bstr, ;val: CBOR byte string encapsulating the encoded PKI object ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 36 ? 2 => #6.32(tstr), ;encoding: an URI identifying the encoding ? 3 => #6.32(tstr) ;specRef: an URI identifying the specification of the ;encapsulated PKI object } The encoding member's value shall be a URI identifying the encoding used in the original PKI object. The values for the URI shall be one of the values defined in clause 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 132-1 [8]. EXAMPLE: Clause 5.1.3 of ETSI EN 319 132-1 [8] defines the URI http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.2.2#DER for denoting that the original PKI data were ASN.1 data encoded in DER. If the encoding member is not present, then the contents of val member shall be a CBOR byte string encapsulating the DER-encoded ASN.1 data. Otherwise, the contents of val member shall be a CBOR byte string encapsulating the PKI object encoded as indicated by the value of encoding member. The specRef member shall contain an URI value identifying the specification that defines the encapsulated PKI object. Table 12 shows the values assigned to each of the keys in the maps specified in the present clause. Table 12: Values of keys in maps or groups specified in the present clause Name Label in map val 1 encoding 2 specRef 3 |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 5.4.3 Container for electronic time-stamps | |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 5.4.3.1 Introduction | The present document specifies CBOR maps that act as electronic time-stamps containers. Electronic time-stamps within the aforementioned containers may time-stamp isolated components or concatenations of several components of CB-AdES signatures. This clause specifies a CBOR type for containers of electronic time-stamps. |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 5.4.3.2 Containers for electronic time-stamps | Below follows the list of the electronic time-stamps containers that are defined by the present document: • Container for electronic time-stamps proving that the COSE Payload has been created before certain time instant: adoTst (specified in clause 5.2.6 of the present document). • Container for electronic time-stamps proving that the COSE signature value has been computed before a certain time instant (to protect against repudiation in case of a key compromise): sigTst (specified in clause 5.3.3 of the present document). • Container for electronic time-stamps time-stamping the signature and validation data values, for providing long term CB-AdES signatures: arcTst (specified in clause 5.3.5 of the present document). • Containers for electronic time-stamps on components that contain references to validation data, namely: rfsTst and sigRTst. (specified in clause A.1.2 of the present document). ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 37 |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 5.4.3.3 The tstContainer type | Semantics The tstContainer type shall: • allow encapsulating IETF RFC 3161 [12] electronic time-stamps as well as electronic time-stamps in other formats; • provide means for managing electronic time-stamps computed on a concatenation of CB-AdES components (including detached COSE Payload); and • allow encapsulating more than one electronic time-stamp generated for the same set of CB-AdES components (including detached COSE Payload), each one issued by different TSAs, for instance. Syntax Below follows the CDDL definition of the tstContainer type: tstContainer = { 1 => [+TstToken];tstTokens: CBOR array containing one or more time-stamp tokens } TstToken = { 1 : bstr, ;val: Encoded time-stamp token encapsulated in a CBOR byte string ? 2 => tstr, ;type: String identifying the type of time-stamp token ? 3 => #6.32(tstr), ;encoding: URI identifying the type of encoding ? 4 => #6.32(tstr) ;specRef: a URI pointing to the reference where ;the time-stamp token is defined } The tstContainer's tstTokens member shall contain a non-empty array of CBOR maps each one encapsulating one electronic time-stamp token. The tstToken's type member shall identify the type of the time-stamp token. For IETF RFC 3161 [12] time-stamp tokens this member shall not be present. The tstToken's encoding member shall be an URI value and shall identify the encoding used for the time-stamp token. For IETF RFC 3161 [12] time-stamp tokens this member shall not be present. The tstToken's specRef member shall be an URI value and shall identify the technical specification that has defined the used time-stamp token. For IETF RFC 3161 [12] time-stamp tokens this member shall not be present. Finally the tstToken's val member shall contain the encoded electronic time-stamp token itself. For IETF RFC 3161 [12] time-stamp tokens this member shall contain the DER-encoded electronic time-stamp token. In CB-AdES signatures, the containers of time-stamp tokens time-stamping components within the uHeaders unsigned header parameter, implicitly identify what components are time-stamped and how they contribute to the input of the message imprint's computation. No further information in the time-stamp token container is required. NOTE: This is because all the components of a CB-AdES signature are placed within CB-AdES signature itself. Table 13 shows the values assigned to each of the keys in the maps specified in the present clause. Table 13: Values of keys in maps or groups specified in the present clause Name Label in map tstTokens (in tstContainer) 1 val (in TstToken) 1 type (in TstToken) 2 encoding (in TstToken) 3 specRef (in TstToken) 4 ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 38 |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 6 CB-AdES baseline signatures | |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 6.1 Signature levels | Clause 6 defines four levels of CB-AdES baseline signatures, intended to facilitate interoperability and to encompass the life cycle of CB-AdES signature, namely: a) B-B level provides requirements for the incorporation of signed header parameters and some unsigned components within the uHeaders unsigned header parameter when the signature is generated. b) B-T level provides requirements for the generation and inclusion, for an existing signature, of a trusted token proving that the signature itself actually existed at a certain date and time. c) B-LT level provides requirements for the incorporation of all the material required for validating the signature in the signature document. This level aims to tackle the long-term availability of the validation material. d) B-LTA level provides requirements for the incorporation of electronic time-stamps that allow validation of the signature long time after its generation. This level aims to tackle the long-term availability and integrity of the validation material. NOTE 1: ETSI TR 119 100 [i.6] provides a description on the life-cycle of a signature and the rationales on which level is suitable in which situation. NOTE 2: The levels c) to d) are appropriate where the technical validity of signature needs to be preserved for a period of time after signature creation where certificate expiration, revocation and/or algorithm obsolescence is of concern. The specific level applicable depends on the context and use case. NOTE 3: B-LTA level targets long term availability and integrity of the validation material of digital signatures over long term. The B-LTA level can help to validate the signature beyond many events that limit its validity (for instance, the weakness of used cryptographic algorithms, or expiration of validation data). The use of B-LTA level is considered an appropriate preservation and transmission technique for signed data. NOTE 4: Conformance to B-LT level, when combined with appropriate additional preservation techniques tackling the long term availability and integrity of the validation material is sufficient to allow validation of the signature long time after its generation. The assessment of the effectiveness of preservation techniques for signed data other than implementing the B-LTA level are out of the scope of the present document. The reader is advised to consider legal instruments in force and/or other standards (for example ETSI TS 101 533-1 [i.9] or IETF RFC 4998 [i.10]) that can indicate other preservation techniques. Annex C defines what needs to be taken into account when using other techniques for long term availability and integrity of validation data and incorporating a new component in the uHeaders unsigned header parameter derived from these techniques into the signature. |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 6.2 General requirements | |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 6.2.1 Algorithm requirements | The algorithms and key lengths used to generate and augment digital signatures should be as specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [19]. NOTE: Cryptographic suites recommendations defined in ETSI TS 119 312 [19] can be superseded by national recommendations. In addition, MD5 algorithm shall not be used as digest algorithm. |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 6.2.2 Notation for requirements | The present clause describes the notation used for defining the requirements of the different CB-AdES signature levels. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 39 The requirements on the header parameters and certain other signature's components for each CB-AdES signature level are expressed in Table 14. A row in the table either specifies requirements for a header parameter, other signature's component, or a service. A service can be provided by different header parameters, by other signature's components, or by other mechanisms (service provision options hereinafter). In these cases, the specification of the requirements for a service is provided by three or more rows. The first row contains the requirements of the service. The requirements for the header parameters, other signature's components, and/or mechanisms used to provide the service are stated in the following rows. Table 14 contains 8 columns. Below follows a detailed explanation of their meanings and contents: 1) Column "Header parameters/Elements in uHeaders unsigned header parameter/Services": a) In the case where the cell identifies a Service, the cell content starts with the keyword "Service" followed by the name of the service. b) In the case where the header parameter or other signature's component provides a service, this cell contains "SPO" (for Service Provision Option), followed by the name of the header parameter or the other signature's component. c) Otherwise, this cell contains the name of the header parameter or the other signature's component. 2) Column "Presence in B-B level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for CB-AdES-B-B signatures. 3) Column "Presence in B-T level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for CB-AdES-B-T signatures. 4) Column "Presence in B-LT level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for CB-AdES-B-LT signatures. 5) Column "Presence in B-LTA level": This cell contains the specification of the presence of the header parameter or other signature's component, or the provision of a service, for CB-AdES-B-LTA signatures. Below follow the values that can appear in columns "Presence in B-B", "Presence in B-T", "Presence in B-LT", and "Presence in B-LTA": - "shall be present": means that the header parameter or signature's component shall be incorporated to the signature, and shall be as specified in the document referenced in column "References", further profiled with the additional requirements referenced in column "Requirements", and with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "shall not be present": means that the header parameter or signature's component shall not be incorporated to the signature. - "may be present": means that the header parameter or signature's component may be incorporated to the signature, and shall be as specified in the document referenced in column "References", further profiled with the additional requirements referenced in column "Requirements", and with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "shall be provided": means that the service identified in the first column of the row shall be provided as further specified in the SPO-related rows. This value only appears in rows that contain requirements for services. It does not appear in rows that contain requirements for header parameters or signature's components. - "conditioned presence": means that the incorporation to the signature of the item identified in the first column is conditioned as per the requirements referenced in column "Requirements" and requirements in specifications and clauses referenced by column "References", with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "*": means that the header parameter or signature's component (service) identified in the first column should not be incorporated to the signature (provided) in the corresponding level. Upper signature levels may specify other requirements. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 40 NOTE: Incorporating an unsigned component within the uHeaders header parameter that is marked with a "*" into a signature can lead to cases where a higher level cannot be achieved, except by removing the corresponding component. 6) Column "Cardinality": This cell indicates the cardinality of the header parameter or other signature's component. If the cardinality is the same for all the levels, only the values listed below appear. Otherwise the content specifies the cardinality for each level. See the example at the end of the present clause showing this situation. Below follows the values indicating the cardinality: - 0: The signature shall not incorporate any instance of the header parameter or the signature's component. - 1: The signature shall incorporate exactly one instance of the header parameter or the signature's component. - 0 or 1: The signature shall incorporate zero or one instance of the header parameter or the signature's component. - ≥ 0: The signature shall incorporate zero or more instances of the header parameter or the signature's component. - ≥ 1: The signature shall incorporate one or more instances of the header parameter or the signature's component. 7) Column "References": This shall contain either the number of the clause specifying the header parameter in the present document, or a reference to the document and clause that specifies the other signature's component. 8) Column "Additional requirements and notes": This cell contains numbers referencing notes and/or letters referencing additional requirements on the header parameter or the other signature's component. Both notes and additional requirements are listed in Table 14. |
cfeb51771f38af3290d7c4a899c0aa1d | 119 152-1 | 6.3 Requirements on CB-AdES components and services | The four CB-AdES signature levels specified in the present clause shall be built as specified in clause 4 of the present document. Table 14 shows the presence and cardinality requirements on the signature header parameters, other components, and services indicated in the first column for the four CB-AdES baseline signature levels, namely: CB-AdES-B-B, CB- AdES-B-T, CB-AdES-B-LT, and CB-AdES-B-LTA). Additional requirements are detailed below the table suitably labelled with the letter indicated in the last column. NOTE 1: CB-AdES-B-B signatures that incorporate only the header parameters and other components that are mandatory in Table 14, and that implement the mandatory requirements, contain the lowest number of header parameters and other components, with the consequent benefits for interoperability. In CB-AdES baseline signatures the components that act as electronic time-stamps containers shall encapsulate only IETF RFC 3161 [12] updated by IETF RFC 5816 [15] time-stamp tokens. Any header parameter specified in IETF RFC 9052 [2] or IETF RFC 9360 [3], and not further profiled in clause 5.1, may be present (cardinality of 0 or 1) in the four levels defined in Table 14. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 41 Table 14: Requirements for CB-AdES-B-B, CB-AdES-B-T, CB-AdES-B-LT and CB-AdES-B-LTA signatures Header parameters/Elements in uHeaders unsigned header parameter/Services Presence in B-B level Presence in B-T level Presence in B-LT level Presence in B-LTA level Cardinality References Additional requirements and notes alg shall be present shall be present shall be present shall be present 1 Clause 5.1.2 content type conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.3 2 kid may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.4 x5u may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.5 x5chain Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.8 3 crit Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence Conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.10 4 CWT Claims enclosing the iat shall be present shall be present shall be present shall be present 1 Clause 5.1.9 a x5t conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.1.7 3 x5ts conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.2 3 sigD may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.8 srAts may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.5 srCms may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.3 5 sigPl may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.4 sigPId may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.2.7 counter signature may be present may be present may be present may be present ≥ 0 Clause 5.1.6 adoTst may be present may be present may be present may be present 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.2 6 sigPSt conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence conditioned presence 0 or 1 Clause 5.3.2 b sigTst * shall be present shall be present shall be present B-B: ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.3 c, d 7 B-T, B-LT, B-LTA: ≥ 1 B-LT, B-LTA: 0 B-LT, B-LTA: 0 valData * * conditioned presence conditioned presence ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.4 e, f refs * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: ≥ 0 Clause A.1.1 g B-LT, B-LTA: 0 sigRTst * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: ≥ 0 Clause A.1.2.1 B-LT, B-LTA: 0 rfsTst * * shall not be present shall not be present B-B, B-T: ≥ 0 Clause A.1.2.2 B-LT, B-LTA: 0 ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 42 Header parameters/Elements in uHeaders unsigned header parameter/Services Presence in B-B level Presence in B-T level Presence in B-LT level Presence in B-LTA level Cardinality References Additional requirements and notes Service: Incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps * * shall be provided shall be provided - - h, i 8 SPO valData * * conditioned presence conditioned presence ≥ 0 Clause 5.3.4 SPO: certificate and revocation values embedded in the electronic time-stamp itself * * conditioned presence conditioned presence ≥ 0 - i arcTst * * * shall be present ≥ 1 Clause 5.3.5 j, k ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 43 Additional requirements: a) Requirement for iat. The generator shall include the claimed UTC time when the signature was generated as content of the iat member of the CWT Claims header parameter. b) Requirement for sigPSt. This header parameter may be incorporated into the CB-AdES signature only if the sigPId is also incorporated and it contains the digVal member with the digest value of the signature policy document. Otherwise, the sigPSt shall not be incorporated into the CB-AdES signature. c) Requirement for sigTst. Each sigTst shall contain only one electronic time-stamp. d) Requirement for sigTst. The electronic time-stamp encapsulated within the sigTst shall be created before the signing certificate has been revoked or has expired. e) Requirement for valData. Duplication of certificate values within the signature should be avoided. f) Requirement for valData. Duplication of revocation values within the signature should be avoided. g) Requirement for refs. The references to certificates (xRefs) should not include the kid member. h) Requirement for service "incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps". The validation data for electronic time-stamps shall be present within the valData or embedded in the electronic time-stamp itself. i) Requirement for service "incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps". The validation data for electronic time-stamps should be included within valData. j) Requirement for arcTst. Each arcTst may contain more than one electronic time-stamp issued by different TSAs. k) Requirement for arcTst. Before generating and incorporating a new arcTst, all the validation material required for validating the CB-AdES signature shall be included. This validation material shall include all the certificates and all certificate status information (like CRLs or OCSP responses) required for: - validating the signing certificate; - validating the signing certificate of any counter signature incorporated into the signature; - validating any attribute certificate or signed assertion present in the signature; and - validating the signing certificate of any previous electronic time-stamp already incorporated into the signature within any CB-AdES electronic time-stamp container component (including any arcTst). NOTE 2: On content type, and ctys within sigD: see clauses 5.1.3 and 5.2.8.1 of the present document for details of their conditioned presence. NOTE 3: On x5chain, x5t, and x5ts. Clause 5.2.2 specifies the conditions that decide the presence or absence of protected x5chain, x5t, and x5ts header parameters in a CB-AdES signature. NOTE 4: On crit. Clause 5.1.10 specifies the conditions that decide the presence or absence of the crit header parameter in a CB-AdES signature. NOTE 5: On srCms. As the content of srCms is a CBOR array, it may contain several commitment types. NOTE 6: On adoTst. This header parameter may contain more than one electronic time-stamp coming from different TSAs. NOTE 7: On sigTst. Several instances of this components can be incorporated into the CB-AdES signature, coming from different TSAs. NOTE 8: On service "incorporation of validation data for electronic time-stamps": the incorporation of the validation material of the electronic time-stamps ensures that the CB-AdES signature actually contains all the validation material needed. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 44 Annex A (normative): Additional components Specification A.1 Components for validation data A.1.1 The refs CBOR map Semantics The refs CBOR map: 1) May contain references to certificate values that are used for validating any digital signature present within any component of the CB-AdES signature regardless the objects that they are signing (these can be, for instance, the COSE signature value within the signature component itself, any counter signature of the CB-AdES signature, or the digital signatures within any time-stamp token, attribute certificate, signed assertion, OCSP response, or CRL, or any other digital signature), without any restrictions. 2) Shall not contain the signing certificate of the CB-AdES signature itself. 3) May contain the references to the revocation value(s) of the certificate(s) supporting any signature present within any component of the CB-AdES signature mentioned in the previous bullet. Syntax Below follows the CDDL definition of the refs CBOR map: refs = { ? 1 => xRefs, ; xRefs: references to certificates ? 2 => rRefs ; rRefs: references to revocation data } xRefs = [+CertId] CertId = { 1 => COSE_CertHash, ;x5t: the digest algorithm identifier and value ? 2 => int / tstr / bstr, ;kid: optional key identifier ? 3 => #6.32 (tstr) ;x5u: URI pointing to X.509 certificate } rRefs = { ? 1 => [+CRLRef], ;crlRefs: array of references to CRLs ? 2 => [+OCSPRef], ;ocspRefs: array of references to OCSP responses ? 3 => [+any] ;otherRefs: array of references to OCSP responses } CRLRef = { 1 => DigAlgVal, ;digAlgVal: digest algorithm and value of DER-encoded CRL. ? 2 => CRLId ;crlId: identifier of the CRL } CRLId = { 1 => bstr, ;issuer: the DER-encoded issuer of the CRL 2 => #6.0 (tstr), ;issueTime: the date and time of issuance ? 3 => uint, ;number: the issuance number ? 4 => #6.32 (tstr) ;uri: an URI pointing to the CRL (hint) } OCSPRef = { 1 => DigAlgVal, ;digAlgVal: digest algorithm and value of the OCSP response 2 => OCSPId ;ocspId: identifier of the OCSP response } OCSPId = { 1 => ResponderIdChoice, ;responderChoice: a choice for identifying the responder 2 => #6.0 (tstr), ;producedAt: same time as the time indicated by the ProducedAt ;field of the referenced OCSP response ? 3 => #6.32 (tstr) ;uri: an URI pointing to the OCSP response (hint) ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 45 } ResponderIdChoice = ( 1 => bstr // ;responderIdByName: the name of the responder wrapped in a CBOR byte string 2 => bstr ;responderIdByKey: the key of the responder wrapped in a CBOR byte string ) CB-AdES signatures shall not incorporate empty refs CBOR maps. Empty xRefs shall not be incorporated. Within xRefs, the x5t member (specified in IETF RFC 9360 [3], clause 2) shall identify the digest algorithm and the digest value computed on the DER-encoded certificate. The content of kid member should be a DER-encoded instance of type IssuerSerial type defined in IETF RFC 5035 [10] wrapped in a CBOR byte string. NOTE 1: The information in the kid member is only a hint, that can help to identify the certificate whose digest matches the value present in the reference. But the binding information is the digest of the certificate. The x5u member shall provide an indication of where the referenced certificate can be found. NOTE 2: It is intended that the x5u member is used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced certificate if it is not found at the referenced place. Empty rRefs shall not be incorporated. The crlRefs member shall contain a non-empty array of references to CRLs. Each item within the CRLRefs array shall contain one reference to one CRL. The digAlgVal member within the crlRefs array shall contain indication of a digest algorithm, and the digest value of the DER-encoded referenced CRL wrapped in a CBOR byte string. The crlId member needs not to be present if the referenced CRL can be inferred from other information. The crlId member of the items within the crlRefs array shall include the name issuer in its issuer member. The crlId member of the items within the crlRefs array shall include the time when the CRL was issued in its issueTime member. The crlId member of the items within the crlRefs array may include the number of the CRL in its number member. NOTE 3: The number member is an optional hint helping to get the CRL whose digest matches the value present in the reference. The crlId's uri member shall indicate one place where the referenced CRL can be found. NOTE 4: It is intended that this component be used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced CRL if it is not found at the referenced place. If one or more of the identified CRLs are a Delta CRL, this component shall include references to the set of CRLs required to provide complete revocation lists. The ocspRefs member shall contain a non-empty array of references to OCSP responses. Each item within the ocspRefs array shall contain one reference to one OCSP response. The ocspId member of the items within the ocspRefs array shall include an identifier of the responder wrapped in a CBOR byte string. If the identifier is the digest of the server's public key computed as mandated in IETF RFC 6960 [14], the member responderIdByKey shall be present. If the identifier is the DER-encoded name of the responder, the member responderIdByName shall be present. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 46 If the responder is identified by the digest of the server's public key computed as mandated in IETF RFC 6960 [14], then the base64 [17] encoding of the DER-encoded of byKey field specified in IETF RFC 6960 [14] shall appear within the responderID's byKey member. The ocspId member of the items within the ocspRefs array shall include the generation time of the OCSP response in its producedAt member. The value in ocspId's producedAt member shall indicate the same time as the time indicated by the ProducedAt field of the referenced OCSP response. The ocspId's uri member shall indicate one place where the referenced OCSP response can be found. NOTE 5: This value is not the address where the OCSP service can be reached. In addition to that, it is intended that this component be used as a hint, as implementations can have alternative ways for retrieving the referenced OCSP response if it is not found at the referenced place. The digAlgVal member within the ocspRefs array shall contain indication of a digest algorithm, and the digest value of the DER-encoded OCSPResponse field defined in IETF RFC 6960 [14], wrapped in a CBOR byte string. References to alternative forms of validation data may be included in this component making use of the otherRefs member, a sequence whose items may contain any kind of information. Their semantics and syntax are outside the scope of the present document. If at least one of the following: valData or the arcTst, is incorporated into the signature, all the certificates and validation data referenced in refs shall be present elsewhere in the signature. Table A.1 shows the values assigned to each of the keys in the maps specified in the present clause. Table A.1: Values of keys in maps or groups specified in the present clause Name Label in map xRefs (in refs) 1 rRefs (in refs) 2 x5t (in CertId) 1 kid (in CertId) 2 x5u (in CertId) 3 crlRefs (in rRefs) 1 ocspRefs (in rRefs) 2 otherRefs (in rRefs) 3 digAlgVal(in CRLRef) 1 crlId (in CRLRef) 2 issuer (in CRLId) 1 issueTime (in CRLId) 2 number (in CRLId) 3 uri (in CRLId) 4 digAlgVal (in OCSPRef) 1 ocspId (in OCSPRef) 2 uri (in OCSPId map) 3 responderChoice (in OCSPId) 1 producedAt (in OCSPId) 2 responderIdByName (in ResponderIdChoice) 1 responderIdByKey (in ResponderIdChoice) 2 ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 47 A.1.2 Time-stamps on references to validation data A.1.2.1 The sigRTst CBOR map A.1.2.1.1 General Semantics The sigRTst CBOR map shall encapsulate electronic time-stamps on the COSE signature value, the signature time-stamp, if present, and the CB-AdES components containing references to validation data. Syntax Below follows the CDDL definition of the sigRTst CBOR map: sigRTst = tstContainer This CBOR map shall contain an electronic time-stamp that time-stamps the member encapsulating the COSE signature value, and the following components when they are present: sigTst, and refs. If the component refs is not present, the sigRTst CBOR map shall not be generated. A.1.2.1.2 Computation of the message imprint For computing the input to the message imprint, the following steps listed below shall be performed: 1) Initialize an empty CBOR array. 2) Add the CBOR byte string in the signature component. 3) If the CB-AdES signature is built on the COSE_Sign structure, take those elements in the uHeaders header parameter from the signer layer in the order that they appear within uHeaders, and add them to the CBOR array: - sigTst if it is present; - refs if it is present. If the signer layer does not have any of those uHeaders header parameters, add a zero-length CBOR byte string. 4) If the CB-AdES signature is built on the COSE_Sign1 structure, take those elements in the uHeaders header parameter from the body layer in the order that they appear within uHeaders, and add them to the CBOR array: - sigTst if it is present; - refs if it is present. If the signer layer does not have any of those uHeaders header parameters, add a zero-length CBOR byte string. 5) Encode the generated CBOR array in a CBOR byte string. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 48 A.1.2.2 The rfsTst CBOR map A.1.2.2.1 Semantics and syntax Semantics The rfsTst CBOR map shall encapsulate electronic time-stamps on the signature time-stamp, if present, and the CB-AdES components containing references to validation data. Syntax Below follows the CDDL definition of the rfsTst CBOR map: rfsTst = tstContainer This CBOR map shall contain an electronic time-stamp that time-stamps the member encapsulating the following components when they are present: sigTst, and refs. If the component refs is not present, the rfsTst CBOR map shall not be generated. A.1.2.2.2 Computation of the message imprint For computing the input to the message imprint, the following steps listed below shall be performed: 1) Initialize an empty CBOR array. 2) If the CB-AdES signature is built on the COSE_Sign structure, take those elements in the uHeaders header parameter from the signer layer in the order that they appear within uHeaders, and add them to the CBOR array: - sigTst if it is present; - refs if it is present. If the signer layer does not have any of those uHeaders header parameters, add a zero-length CBOR byte string. 3) If the CB-AdES signature is built on the COSE_Sign1 structure, take those elements in the uHeaders header parameter from the body layer in the order that they appear within uHeaders, and add them to the CBOR array: - sigTst if it is present; - refs if it is present. If the signer layer does not have any of those uHeaders header parameters, add a zero-length CBOR byte string. 4) Encode the generated CBOR array in a CBOR byte string. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 49 Annex B (informative): IANA Considerations The present document registers the following header parameters in the IANA "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Header Parameters" registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#header-parameters) established by IETF RFC 9052 [2]. NOTE 1: Header parameters whose "Header Parameter Usage Locations" are COSE/CB-AdES are considered to be Header Parameters that can be present in non-CB-AdES COSE signature, for meeting certain (business, regulatory, etc.) requirements. NOTE 2: Header parameters whose "Header Parameter Usage Locations" are CB-AdES are considered to be Header Parameters that are used only by CB-AdES signatures for meeting the requirements associated to achieve long-term signatures, i.e. signatures that guarantee the long-term availability and integrity of their validation material, providing therefore mechanisms for being properly validated long after their generation. This capability requires the usage of certain Header Parameters (uHeaders, arcTst and others) which convert the COSE signature in a CB-AdES signature. Registry Contents: • Name: x5ts • Label: 261 • Value Type: array of COSE_CertHash • Description: CBOR array of instances of COSE_CertHash • Reference: clause 5.2.2 of the present document • Name: srCms • Label: 262 • Value Type: array of SrCm • Description: set of commitments and optional commitments qualifiers • Reference: clause 5.2.3 of the present document • Name: sigPl • Label: 263 • Value Type: map • Description: CBOR map for indicating the location where the signature was generated. It may contain an indication of the country, the locality, the region, a box number in a post office, the postal code, and the street address • Reference: clause 5.2.4 of the present document • Name: srAts • Label: 264 • Value Type: map ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 50 • Description: CBOR map that may contain: an array of attributes that the signer claims to be in possession of, an array of attribute certificates (X.509 attribute certificates or other) issued to the signer, an array of signed assertions issued by a third party to the signer, or any combination of the three aforementioned CBOR arrays • Reference: clause 5.2.5 of the present document • Name: adoTst • Label: 265 • Value Type: map • Description: CBOR map that encapsulates one or more electronic time-stamps, generated before the signature production, and whose message imprint computation input is the COSE Payload of the CB-AdES signature • Reference: clause 5.2.6 of the present document • Name: sigPId • Label: 266 • Value Type: map • Description: CBOR map that identifies a certain signature policy and may contain the digest of the document defining this signature policy • Reference: clause 5.2.7 of the present document • Name: sigD • Label: 267 • Value Type: map • Description: CBOR map that references data objects that are detached from the CB-AdES signature and that are collectively signed • Reference: clause 5.2.8 of the present document • Name: uHeaders • Label: 268 • Value Type: [+bstr] • Description: CBOR array that contains a number of CBOR elements that are placed within the array in the order they are incorporated into the CB-AdES signature • Reference: clause 5.3.1 of the present document ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 51 Annex C (informative): URIs defined for commitment type At the time of publication of the present document, the following commitment types identifiers have been defined: • Proof of origin: it indicates that the signer recognizes to have created, approved and sent the signed data. Object identifier: id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 1} URI: http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.2.2#ProofOfOrigin. • Proof of receipt: it indicates that signer recognizes to have received the content of the signed data. Object identifier: id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 2}. URI: http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.2.2#ProofOfReceipt. • Proof of delivery: it indicates that the TSP providing that indication has delivered a signed data in a local store accessible to the recipient of the signed data. Object identifier: id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 3}. URI: http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.2.2#ProofOfDelivery. • Proof of sender: indicates that the entity providing that indication has sent the signed data (but not necessarily created it). Object identifier: id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 4}. URI: http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.2.2#ProofOfSender. • Proof of approval: it indicates that the signer has approved the content of the signed data. Object identifier: id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 5}. URI: http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.2.2#ProofOfApproval. • Proof of creation: it indicates that the signer has created the signed data (but not necessarily approved, nor sent it). Object identifier: id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 6}. URI: http://uri.etsi.org/01903/v1.2.2#ProofOfCreation. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 52 Annex D (informative): Correspondence between JAdES tags and CB-AdES tags D.1 Correspondence between JAdES components tags and CB-AdES component tags Table D.1 shows the correspondence between the tags of JAdES components and the names given to the CB-AdES components. Table D.1: Correspondence between JAdES and CB-AdES tags JAdES tag CB-AdES names etsiU uHeaders iat iat sigX5ts x5ts crit crit sigPId sigPId sigPl sigPl srAts srAts cty content type adoTst adoTst srCms srCms cSig counter signature sigPSt sigPSt sigTst sigTst oId obId pkiObj pkiOb arcTst arcTst rfsTst rfsTst sigRTst sigRTst anyValData valData NO equivalent component refs xVals NO equivalent component rVals NO equivalent component axVals NO equivalent component arVals NO equivalent component tstVd NO equivalent component xRefs NO equivalent component rRefs NO equivalent component axRefs NO equivalent component arRefs NO equivalent component ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 53 Annex E (normative): Alternative mechanisms for long term availability and integrity of validation data There may be mechanisms to achieve long-term availability and integrity of validation data different from the ones described in clause 5.3.5 of the present document. If such a mechanism is incorporated using an unsigned component into the signature, then for this mechanism, all the following shall be specified: 1) the clear specification of the semantics and syntax of the component including its unique identifier; 2) the strategy of how this mechanism guarantees that all necessary parts of the signature are protected by this component; and 3) the strategy of how to handle signatures containing components defined in the present document. EXAMPLE: The objects defined in IETF RFC 4998 [i.10], Annex A are examples of such alternative mechanisms but they only handle points 1) and 2). ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 54 Annex F (informative): Change history Date Version Information about changes September 2022 V.0.0.1 First draft to be circulated ONLY to ETSI ESI TB members. April 2023 V0.0.2 Alternative draft: • All the validation data is placed in one attribute (valData). There may be several instances of this attribute. • All the references to validation data are placed in one attribute (refs). May 2023 V0.0.3 Replacement of DigAlgVal of v0.02 by x5t specified in IETF RFC 9360. Resolution of one error in a reference that could not be found. January 2024 V0.0.4 Reformulation of how to incorporate arcTst and compute the input to its message imprint computation in generation and validation. This reformulation is aligned with the formulation in XAdES and JAdES. Reformulation of requirements on the content of valData: the former formulation could be interpreted as if both certificates and revocation data must be present. The presence of certificates and/or revocation data will depend on the contents of the rest of CB-AdES signature. This new reformulation makes it clear that this qualifying property must contain certificates, or revocation data, or both of them. Reuse of x5t header parameter specified in IETF RFC 9360. Aligment of component for counter signatures to IETF RFC 9338. CDDL rules for assigning labels to be registered by IANA to identifiers for making the rest of the CDDL rules easier to read. June 2024 V0.0.5 Refactored taking as basis draft ETSI TS 119 182-1 v1.1.13. The requirement level on the content of kid header parameter has been changed to should. The clause on counter signatures has been implemented. Added annex on IANA considerations. January 2025 V0.0.6 Implemented reactions to IANA selected experts comments. April 2025 V0.0.7 Implemented reactions to final IANA selected experts comments and dispositions for Nowina comments. May 2025 V0.0.8 Annex C changed according to suggestions from IANA experts for accommodating the IANA registry fields. Suppression of wrong mentions to JWS instead COSE. June 2025 V0.0.9 Implementation of resolutions to comments raised by ESI TO to v0.0.7. January 2026 V0.0.10 Implementation of resolutions for technical and editorial comments raised to v0.0.9. January 2026 V0.0.10 Suppression of references to file containing the CDDL schema as this file has not been generated yet. January 2026 V0.0.11 Implementation of resolutions for technical and editorial comments raised to v0.0.10. ETSI ETSI TS 119 152-1 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 55 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 March 2026 Publication |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 1 Scope | The present document provides a technical specification for an AI Common Incident Expression Common Container for AI Incident Reporting. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 2 References | |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 104 158-1: "Securing Artificial Intelligence (SAI); AI Incident Reporting; Part 1: AI Common Incident Expression (AICIE) Global Framework". |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI TS 104 223 (V1.1.1): "Securing Artificial Intelligence (SAI); Baseline Cyber Security Requirements for AI Models and Systems". [i.2] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act). [i.3] UK DSIT: "AI Cyber Security Code of Practice". [i.4] UK NCSC: "Guidelines for secure AI system development". [i.5] Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive). ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 7 [i.6] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 of 17 October 2024 laying down rules for the application of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as regards technical and methodological requirements of cybersecurity risk-management measures and further specification of the cases in which an incident is considered to be significant with regard to DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online market places, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, and trust service providers. [i.7] Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC. [i.8] GCVE.EU: "GCVE: Global CVE Allocation System". [i.9] Sean McGregor, et al. (2025): "In-House Evaluation Is Not Enough: Towards Robust Third-Party Flaw Disclosure for General-Purpose AI", Cornell University SarXiv:2503.16861v1 [cs.AI]. [i.10] OECD: "Towards a Common Reporting Framework for AI Incidents", OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, February 2025, No. 34. [i.11] OECD: "AIM: AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor". [i.12] OECD: "Defining AI Incidents and Related Terms", OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, May 2024, No. 16. [i.13] McGregor, S. (2021): "Preventing Repeated Real World AI Failures by Cataloging Incidents: The AI Incident Database", Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35(17), 15458-15463. [i.14] OECD: "OECD Framework for the Classification of AI Systems", OECD Digital Economy Papers, February 2022, No. 323. [i.15] NCSC: "Where to Report a Cyber Incident". [i.16] NCSC: "Responding to a cyber incident - a guide for CEOs". [i.17] Confédération Suisse, Federal Office for Cybersecurity BACS: "Information on the reporting obligation". [i.18] H. Frase, R.B. L. Dixon: "AI Incidents, Key Components for a Mandatory Reporting Regime", CSET, January 2025. [i.19] OWASP Gen AI Incident/Exploit Round-up Submission. [i.20] Recommendation ITU-T X.1500: "Overview of cybersecurity information exchange". [i.21] ETSI TR 104 003: "Cyber Security (CYBER); The vulnerability disclosure ecosystem". [i.22] ETSI TR 103 331: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Structured threat information sharing". [i.23] CISA: "Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks". [i.24] NIST AI 600-1: "Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile". [i.25] AIID: "AI Incident Database". [i.26] MIT: "AI Risk Repository". [i.27] AVID: "AI Vulnerability Database". [i.28] OECD: "Overview and methodology of the AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor". [i.29] Partnership on AI: "AI Incident Database". [i.30] Kaggle: "AI Incident Database". ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 8 [i.31] JSON-LD.org: "JSON for Linking Data". [i.32] Sharkov: "Unveiling the invisible: Knowledge Graph-Driven Discovery of Hidden Cascade Risks in Critical Infrastructure Supply Chains", IEEE™ CSR. [i.33] UN: "International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities". |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 104 158-1 [1] apply. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the symbols given in ETSI TS 104 158-1 [1] apply. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 104 158-1 [1] apply. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4 AICIE Common Container Record | |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1 AICIE Common Container Record Format and Values | |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.1 Introduction | The AICIE Common Container Record format is depicted in Figure 4.1-1 and captures a set of minimum essential information concerning an AI incident reporting resource. BOLD field names are mandatory, enum=enumeration, cb=checkbox and "…" indicates free-form content. The AICE Common Container JSON record format is defined using the JSON Schema in Annex A. A MindMap version of the schema version 1.0.0 is shown in Figure 4.1-1. The value for each data element is described in detail below. ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 9 Figure 4.1-1: Mindmap of the AICIE Common Container Record |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.2 AICIECCversion | This required value describes the present AICIE Common Container Record specification version being used and expressed as three numbers separated by commas and set initially to 1.0.0. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.3 AICIECCtitle | This required value without any constraints describes a title for the AI incident. ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 10 |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.4 AICIECCincidentDescription | This required value without any constraints describes the AI incident. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.5 AICIECCsystemRelationship | This required value describes the how the AI system(s) are related to the incident using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations, including an unconstrained free-form option. direct cause contributing factor failure to act overreliance and intentional misuse human error legal obligation omission … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.6 AICIECCsubmitterInformation | This required value describes the information without any constraints for the entity submitting the incident report including entity name, affiliation, physical address, a useable email address, stakeholder group, including one or more of the following non-case sensitive affiliation enumerations. government or regulatory body public interest body or non-government organisation AI system developer or provider AI system user affected stakeholder knowledgeable of the incident … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.7 AICIECCdateFirstOccurred | This optional value describes the date of first known occurrence of the AI incident in Coordinated Universal Timenumbers [year]-[month]-[day]. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.8 AICIECCincidentCountry | This optional value describes the countries where the AI incident occurred as an enumerated string of country identifiers separated by commas. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.9 AICIECCincidentMaterial | This required value without any constraints describes the AI incident supporting materials address location - preferably as a persistent, precise, accessible Uniform Resource Location (URL) or a link capable of providing the resource. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.10 AICIECCaiProduct | This optional value without any constraints describes a title for the name and version of the AI system(s) or product(s) that gave rise to the reported AI incident. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.11 AICIECCaiSystemDeveloper | This optional value without any constraints describes the organisation(s) that developed and/or deployed the AI product(s) or services that gave rise to the reported AI incident. ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 11 |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.12 AICIECCseverity | This required value describes the assessed severity of the AI incident reported using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations, or other using an unconstrained free-form option. serious hazard hazard incident serious incident incident … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.13 AICIECCharmType | This required value describes the harm type of the AI incident reported using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations, including an unconstrained free-form option. physical psychological reputational economic/property environmental public interest critical infrastructure human or fundamental rights … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.14 AICIECCharmConsequence | This optional value describes, if applicable, a quantification of the harm using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations, including an unconstrained free-form option. economic losses death injury compensation quantification … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.15 AICIECCintentionality | If applicable using an indicator flag, this optional value describes without any constraints how an AI incident was linked in an unintended or wrongful way to an AI system and how. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.16 AICIECCpartiesAffected | This optional value describes, if applicable, the affected parties using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations, including an unconstrained free-form option. consumer children workers business trade union government civil society general public … (free-form content) ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 12 |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.17 AICIECChumanRightsImpact | If applicable using an indicator flag, this optional value describes without any constraints any adverse impacts on human rights or fundamental values. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.18 AICIECCprinciplesAffected | This optional value describes associated AI principles using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. accountability fairness inclusivity privacy data governance respect of human rights robustness digital security safety environmental sustainability transparency explainability democracy human autonomy |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.19 AICIECCindustry | This optional value describes industries associated with the AI incident using a string of comma separated numbers of industry classifications using International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) [i.33]. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.20 AICIECCbusinessFunction | This optional value describes business functions where the AI incident occurred using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. human resource management sales ICT management and information security marketing and advertisement logistics citizen/customer service procurement maintenance accounting monitoring and quality control production planning and budgeting research and development compliance and justice … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.21 AICIECCcriticalInfrastructure | If applicable, if critical infrastructure capabilities are significantly affected this optional value indicates those critical infrastructures using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 13 energy, including oil and gas water supply and wastewater management healthcare and public health transportation and logistics telecommunications and ICT infrastructure food and agriculture financial services public safety and emergency services government operations and public administration, including electoral systems manufacturing and industry education and research housing and urban infrastructure public utilities and environmental protection supply chain and distribution networks national defence and border security … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.22 AICIECCdeploymentBreadth | This optional value describes the breadth of AI system deployment associated with the AI incident occurred using one of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. pilot project (e.g. team/small group) narrow deployment (e.g. company/city) broad deployment (e.g. sector/country widespread deployment (e.g. sectors/countries) … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.23 AICIECCtrainingDataLink | If applicable using an indicator flag, where the AI incident is linked to the training data, this optional value describes without any constraints how the incident is linked. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.24 AICIECCincidentModelLink | If applicable using an indicator flag, where the AI incident is linked to the AI model, this optional value describes without any constraints how the incident is linked. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.25 AICIECCusageRights | This optional value describes the usage rights associated with the AI system giving rise to the incident using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. one-time license fee-based research purposes only non-commercial restricted access free of charge creative commons open source/permissive copyleft/share alike … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.26 AICIECCmultipleSystems | If applicable using an indicator flag, where the AI incident is linked to multiple AI systems, this optional value describes without any constraints how the incident is linked. ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 14 |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.27 AICIECCaiTasks | This optional value describes the tasks associated with the AI system giving rise to the incident using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. recognition/object detection organisation/recommenders event/anomaly detection forecasting/prediction interaction support/chatbots goal-driven organisation reasoning with knowledge structures/planning … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.28 AICIECCautonomyLevel | This optional value describes the maximum autonomy level associated with the AI system giving rise to the incident using one of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. no-action autonomy (human support) low-action autonomy (human-in-the-loop) medium-action autonomy (human-on-the-loop) high-action autonomy (human-out-of-the-loop) … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.29 AICIECCactionTaken | This optional value describes the actions taken, if any, in response to the AI incident using one or more of the following non-case-sensitive enumerations. prevention mitigation ceasing remediation … (free-form content) |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.30 AICIECCstepsReproduced | If applicable, this optional value without any constraints describes the steps taken to reproduce the AI incident. |
0a808127317d3d44e01c46e3e2ee7e33 | 104 158-2 | 4.1.31 AICIECCadditionalInfo | This optional value without any constraints describes any other information associated with the AI incident. ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 15 Annex A (normative): AICIE Common Container JSON record Format V1.0.1 { "$schema": "http://[tbd]", "title": "JSON Schema for AI Common Incident Expression Common Record Container version 1.0.1", "$id": "https://www.etsi.org/[tbd]", "properties": { "AICIECCversion": { "description": "present AICIE Common Container Record specification version being used and expressed as three numbers separated by commas and set initially to 1.0.1", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCtitle": { "description": "title for the AI incident", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCincidentDescription": { "description": "the AI incident", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCsystemRelationship": { "description": "how the AI system(s) are related to the incident", "enum": [ "direct cause" "contributing factor", "failure to act", "overreliance and intentional misuse" "human error", "legal obligation omission" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCsubmitterInformation": { "description": "information for the entity submitting the incident report including entity name, affiliation, physical address, a useable email address, stakeholder group, including one or more of the following non-case sensitive affiliation enumerations", "enum": [ "government or regulatory body", "public interest body or non-government organisation" "AI system developer or provider", "AI system user", "affected stakeholder", "knowledgeable of the incident" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCdateFirstOccurred": { "description": "date of first known occurrence of the AI incident in Coordinated Universal Time", "type": "string" { "day":, "month":, "year":, } }, "AICIECCincidentCountry": { "description": "countries where the AI incident occurred as an enumerated string of country identifiers separated by commas", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCincidentMaterial": { "description": "organisation(s) that developed and/or deployed the AI product(s) or services that gave rise to the reported AI incident", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCaiProduct": { "description": "title for the name and version of the AI system(s) or product(s) that gave rise to the reported AI incident", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCaiSystemDeveloper": { ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 16 "description": "organisation(s) that developed and/or deployed the AI product(s) or services that gave rise to the reported AI incident", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCseverity": { "description": "assessed severity of the AI incident reported", "enum": [ "serious hazard", "hazard", "incident", "serious incident", "incident" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCharmType": { "description": "harm type of the AI incident reported", "enum": [ "physical", "psychological" "reputational" "economic/property", "environmental", "public interest", "critical infrastructure", "human or fundamental rights" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCharmConsequence": { "description": "affected parties", "enum": [ "economic losses", "death", "injury", "compensation", "quantification" ], "type": "string", }, "AICIECCintentionality": { "description": "if applicable, how an an AI incident was linked in an unintended or wrongful way to an AI system and how", "type": {true, false} "string" }, "AICIECCpartiesAffected": { "description": "if applicable, the affected parties", "enum": [ "consumer", "children", "workers", "business", "trade union", "government", "civil society", "general public" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECChumanRightsImpact": { "description": "if applicable using an indicator flag, any adverse impacts on human rights or fundamental values", "type": {true, false} "string" }, "AICIECCprinciplesAffected": { "description": "associated AI principles", "enum": [ "accountability", "fairness", "inclusivity", "privacy", "data governance", "respect of human rights", "robustness", ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 17 "digital security", "safety", "environmental sustainability", "transparency", "explainability", "democracy", "human autonomy" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCindustry": { "description": "industries associated with the AI incident using a string of comma separated numbers of industry classifications using International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCbusinessFunction": { "description": "business functions where the AI incident occurred", "enum": [ "human resource management", "sales", "ICT management and information security", "marketing and advertisement", "logistics", "citizen/customer service", "procurement", "maintenance", "accounting", "monitoring and quality control", "production", "planning and budgeting", "research and development", "compliance and justice" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCcriticalInfrastructure": { "description": "if critical infrastructure capabilities are significantly affected, those critical infrastructures", "enum": [ "energy, including oil and gas", "water supply and wastewater management", "healthcare and public health", "transportation and logistics", "telecommunications and ICT infrastructure", "food and agriculture", "financial services", "public safety and emergency services", "government operations and public administration including electoral systems", "manufacturing and industry", "education and research", "housing and urban infrastructure", "public utilities and environmental protection", "supply chain and distribution networks", "national defense and border security" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCdeploymentBreadth": { "description": "breadth of AI system deployment associated with the AI incident occurred", "enum": [ "pilot project (e.g., team/small group)", "narrow deployment (e.g., company/city)", "broad deployment (e.g., sector/country", "widespread deployment (e.g., sectors/countries)" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCtrainingDataLink": { "description": "if applicable using an indicator flag, where the AI incident is linked to the training data, how the incident is linked", "type": {true, false} "string" }, "AICIECCincidentModelLink": { ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 18 "description": "if applicable using an indicator flag, where and how the AI incident is linked to the AI model", "type": {true, false} "string" }, "AICIECCusageRights": { "description": "usage rights associated with the AI system giving rise to the incident", "enum": [ "one-time license", "fee-based", "research purposes only", "non-commercial", "restricted access", "free of charge", "creative commons", "open source/permissive", "copyleft/share alike" ], "type": "string" }, "AAICIECCmultipleSystems": { "description": "if applicable using an indicator flag, where and how the AI incident is linked to multiple AI systems", "type": {true, false} "string" }, "AICIECCaiTasks": { "description": "tasks associated with the AI system giving rise to the incident", "enum": [ "recognition/object detection", "organisation/recommenders", "event/anomaly detection", "forecasting/prediction", "interaction support/chatbots", "goal-driven organisation", "reasoning with knowledge structures/planning" ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCautonomyLevel": { "description": "maximum autonomy level associated with the AI system giving rise to the incident", "enum": [ "no-action autonomy (human support)", "low-action autonomy (human-in-the-loop)", "medium-action autonomy (human-on-the-loop)", "high-action autonomy (human-out-of-the-loop) ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCactionTaken": { "description": "any actions taken in response to the AI incident", "enum": [ "prevention", "mitigation", "ceasing", "remediation ], "type": "string" }, "AICIECCstepsReproduced": { "description": "any actions taken in response to the AI incident", "type": "string" }, "AICIECCadditionalInfo": { "description": "any other information associated with the AI incident", "type": "string" } }, "required": [ "AICIECCversion", "AICIECCtitle", "AICIECCincidentDescription", "AICIECCsystemRelationship", "AICIECCsubmitterInformation", "AICIECCincidentMaterial", ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 19 "AICIECCseverity", "AICIECCharmType" ] } ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 20 Annex B (informative): Common reporting framework recommendations The OECD Framework for the Classification of AI systems provides a table to summarize the information needed to understand an AI incident, at the same time allowing for additional details to provide more nuanced insights to policymakers and regulators, see Table B-1. References in the OECD report table have been removed. A second study published as a Cornell University [i.9] note is provided as Table B-2. Table B-1 is an adaptation of an original work by the OECD [i.10]. The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this adaptation should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its Member countries. The only adaption made is the removal of references that were present in the original table. Table B-1: Detailed criteria of the OECD common reporting framework [i.10] Dimension Incidents reporting framework criteria Answer format Sub-criteria 1 Incident metadata Title* Open text N/A 2 Incident metadata Description of the incident* Open text N/A 3 Incident metadata How is the AI system(s) related to the incident* Multi-selection with open text Direct cause; contributing factor; failure to act; overreliance and intentional misuse; human error; failure to comply with legal frameworks; other (specify for all) 4 Incident metadata Submitter information (role, affiliation, etc.)* Open text and multi-selection Role; email; affiliation; stakeholder group or source type; relation to the incident: "I represent a government or regulatory body", "I work or am affiliated to a public interest body or NGO", "I work in or am affiliated to the organisation that developed or provided the related AI system", "I am a user of the related AI system", "I am an affected stakeholder", "None of the above, but have partial or substantial knowledge of the incident (e.g. first-hand knowledge, research etc.)", "Other (specify)" 5 Incident metadata Date of first known occurrence Date N/A 6 Incident metadata Country(ies) where incident occurred Multi-selection List of countries 7 Incident metadata Supporting material(s) about the incident* Open text, URLs and upload button N/A 8 Incident metadata Name and version of the AI system(s)/product(s) Open text N/A 9 Incident metadata Organisation(s) that developed and/or deployed the AI system Open text N/A 10 Harm details Severity* Multi-selection Hazard; serious hazard; incident; serious incident; disaster; other (specify) 11 Harm details Harm type* Multi-selection Physical; psychological; reputational; economic/property; environmental; public interest/critical infrastructure; human or fundamental rights; other (specify) 12 Harm details If applicable, quantification of harm Multi-selection Economic losses; death; injury; number of affected stakeholders; compensation; other (specify) 13 Harm details Incident linked to use of AI system(s) in unintended/wrongful way (and how) Checkbox If selected, specify (short answer, limited characters) 14 People & planet Affected stakeholder(s) Multi-selection Consumer; children; workers; trade unions; business; government; civil society; general public; other (specify) 15 People & planet Adverse impacts on human rights or fundamental rights Checkbox If selected, specify (short answer, limited characters) ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 21 Dimension Incidents reporting framework criteria Answer format Sub-criteria 16 People & planet Associated AI Principles Multi-selection Accountability; fairness; inclusive growth; privacy; data governance; respect of human rights; robustness; digital security; safety; environmental sustainability; transparency; explainability; democracy; human autonomy 17 Economic context Industry(ies) Multi-selection Classification from the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) 18 Economic context Business function(s) where the AI incident occurred Multi-selection Human resource management; sales; ICT management and information security; marketing and advertisement; logistics; citizen/customer service; procurement; maintenance; accounting; monitoring and quality control; production; planning and budgeting; research and development; compliance and justice; other (specify) 19 Economic context Incident linked to the functioning of critical functions/infrastructure Checkbox Energy, including oil and gas; water supply and wastewater management; healthcare and public health; transportation and logistics; telecommunications and ICT infrastructure; food and agriculture; financial services; public safety and emergency services; government operations and public administration, including electoral systems; manufacturing and industry; education and research; housing and urban infrastructure; public utilities and environmental protection; supply chain and distribution networks; national defence and border security; other (specify) 20 Economic context Breadth of deployment Single choice Pilot project (e.g. team/small group); narrow deployment (e.g. company/city); broad deployment (e.g. sector/country); widespread deployment (e.g. sectors/countries); other (specify) 21 Data & input Incident linked to the training data of AI system(s) (and how) Checkbox If selected, specify (short answer, limited characters) 22 AI model Incident linked to the AI model (and how) Checkbox If selected, specify (short answer, limited characters) 23 AI model Usage rights Multi-selection One-time license; fee-based; research purposes only; non-commercial; restricted access; free of charge; creative commons; open source/permissive; copyleft/share alike; other (specify) 24 AI model Incident linked to interaction of multiple AI systems Checkbox If selected, specify (short answer, limited characters) 25 Task & output Task(s) of AI system(s) Multi-selection Recognition/object detection; organisation/recommenders; event/anomaly detection; forecasting/prediction; interaction support/chatbots; goal-driven organisation; reasoning with knowledge structures/planning; content generation; other (specify) 26 Task & output Maximum autonomy level of AI system(s) Single choice No-action autonomy (human support); low-action autonomy (human-in-the-loop); medium-action autonomy (human-on-the-loop); high- action autonomy (human-out-of-the-loop); other (specify) 27 Other If applicable, action(s) taken Open text, multi- selection Prevention; mitigation; ceasing; remediation; other (specify for all) 28 Other If applicable, steps to reproduce the incident Open text If selected, specify (open text) 29 Other Additional information Open text N/A NOTE: * = OECD Mandatory Criteria. BOLD = Criteria found in at least three AI reporting frameworks. ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 22 Table B-2: AI Flaw Report Card Schema [i.9] ETSI ETSI TS 104 158-2 V1.1.1 (2026-03) 23 History Version Date Status V1.1.1 March 2026 Publication |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 1 Scope | The present document identifies the ITS domain and its elements. It provides the ITS architectural and ecosystem context. The present document complements and extends the ETSI drafting rules [i.3] and identifies consistency aspects related to the protocol stack layering and referencing between the ITS specifications and other documents. Further, it provides the ETSI ITS deliverable structure. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 2 References | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] ETSI TR 101 607: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Cooperative ITS (C-ITS); Release 1". [i.2] ETSI TR 103 902: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); ITS Framework; Terms, Symbols and Abbreviations; Release 2". [i.3] ETSI Drafting Rules. [i.4] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). [i.5] Car Connectivity Consortium's MirrorLink. [i.6] Fransman, M. (2010): "The new ICT Ecosystem: Implications for policy and regulation". Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gillwald, A. (2012). Review of department of communications' colloquium on an integrated national ICT policy. Research ICT Africa. [i.7] "The Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems", citation 2005. [i.8] ISO/IEC 27001:2013: "Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems — Requirements". [i.9] Directive (EU) 2023/2661 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 amending Directive 2010/40/EU on the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport. [i.10] ETSI EN 302 665 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Communications Architecture". [i.11] ISO 26262-9:2018: "Road vehicles — Functional safety, "Part 9: Automotive safety integrity level (ASIL)-oriented and safety-oriented analyses". [i.12] ISO/IEC 7498-1: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference, Model: The Basic Model". [i.13] ETSI TS 103 723: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Profile for LTE-V2X Direct Communication". ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 8 [i.14] Data For Road Safety (DFRS). [i.15] National Access Point Coordination Organisation for Europe (NAPCORE). [i.16] C-Roads Profile 1: "Release 2.0 of C-ROADs harmonised C-ITS specifications". [i.17] C2C-CC_RS_2037: "Basic System Profile (BSP)". [i.18] DATEX II: "DATEX II is the reference data standard in Europe for road traffic and travel information". [i.19] ETSI standard skeletons. [i.20] ISO/IEC 10746: "Information Technology - Open Distributed Processing - Reference Model: The Open Group Architecture Framework" (TOGAF)". [i.21] ETSI TS 103 544 (all parts): "Publicly Available Specification (PAS); Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); MirrorLink®; parts 1-24". [i.22] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)". [i.23] EU CCMS: "European Commission to support the deployment of C-ITS services within the European Union C-ITS Security Credential Management System (EU CCMS)". [i.24] Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport". [i.25] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 886/2013 of 15 May 2013 supplementing Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to data and procedures for the provision, where possible, of traffic safety-related minimum universal traffic information free of charge to users (SRTI). [i.26] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/962 of 18 December 2014 supplementing Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the provision of EU- wide real-time traffic information services (RTTI). [i.27] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/670 of 2 February 2022 supplementing Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the provision of EU- wide real-time traffic information services (NAPS Regulation). [i.28] CEN/TS 17268:2018: "Intelligent transport systems - ITS spatial data - Data exchange on changes in road attributes". [i.29] DFRS technical document: "Increasing road safety by sharing road safety related data in public and private cooperation". |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols, and abbreviations | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: backward compatibility: ability of a newer system to interoperate with an older system NOTE: An ITS-S based on Release x+1 (Rx+1) is backward compatible with Release x when, Rx+1 is able to obtain the same level of services of a Rx station in an environment based on Rx, and Rx+1 is specified in a such a way, that C-ITS stations implemented based on Rx is able to maintain its full functionality in an environment based on Rx+1. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 9 component: concrete part or element that contributes to the function of a larger system, including hardware (like CPUs and hard drives), software (such as operating systems and applications), and other elements like data, procedures data: raw facts, figures, statistics or bytes domain: area or interest NOTE: If used in the context of communications, refers to any group of users, workstations, devices, printers, computers and database servers that share different types of data via network resources. ecosystem: concept in which technical systems e.g. information, technologies, applications, are considered in their user and environmental context e.g. policies, strategies, and organizational processes enterprise architecture: architecture of a complete organization, the top-level architecture NOTE: It recognizes general aspects, mission, objectives, organization considering common aspects often identified as part of the ecosystem requirements. entity: abstract thing that exists, did exist, or can possibly exist, including associations among these things ERRATA document: document listing of errors discovered in a published work, along with their corrections equipment: set-up of hardware, software, data and the actor(s) who use them functionality: generalized function which can consist of many components, processes and can have many interfaces NOTE: It can be also composed of many more specific functionalities. The term is functional and not technically used. information: data with specific meaning ITS-S application: fragment of an ITS application available at an ITS station that uses ITS-S services to connect to one or more other fragments of the same ITS application ITS-S service: functionality or a group of functionalities offered by an ITS-S to other ITS-S services or to an ITS application ITS service: service provided by an ITS application to the user of ITS ITS station: functional entity specified by the ITS station (ITS-S) reference architecture ITS sub-system: sub-system of ITS with ITS components for a specific context metadata: data about data, that provides context and makes it easier to find, use, and manage information misbehaviour: act by which a C-ITS station transmits false or misleading information, or information that was not authorized by a commonly agreed policy, either purposefully or unintendedly Multi-Model: multimodal transport (also known as combined transport) is the transportation of goods or people realized by least two different modes of transport networking configuration: method in which there is a physical or virtual process of assigning network settings, polities, flows and controls such as an IP networks networking constellation: method in which there is no configuration process but where the network settings, policies, flows and controls are commonly at system level agreed party: singular individual, stakeholder, organization, governmental institution or business entity prescriptive document: document that specifying specific requirements to which other documents within a certain context need to comply to private: organizations which are owned, controlled and managed by individuals, groups or business entities protobuf: protocol buffer, a free and open-source cross-platform data format used to serialize structured data ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 10 public: organizations which are owned, controlled and managed by governmental or other state or locally managed bodies repository: central location where things are stored, which can be a physical place like a storage facility or a digital space like a computer server representational state transfer: HTTP request to a server, and the server processes it and sends back a corresponding HTTP response according to the request/reply client-server communication model safety related: everything which can have a direct or indirect positive impact on the safety situation scheduling: process in which decisions are made about through what specific technology, timing, delay or prioritization and by which parameters the dissemination should happen NOTE: This definition needs to be reviewed when implemented in the related document. sink: type of computer program or device that collects, stores and possibly processes data from other devices, programs or sources solution architecture: architecture practice designing functionalities or specific system addressing specific ecosystem requirements, integrating various components/logic that governs them, and the information associated with them source: location where data originates from strategical: information which brings awareness about possible upcoming safety situation to be managed. (there is no direct impact) tactical: information or processes which have direct impact on the cause of action as a response to immediate situation technical architecture: architecture providing the description of technical components; their relations and the data associated with them NOTE: At the higher level, the technical architecture shows the relations of software and hardware architectures and can have a direct relation with solution architectures when considering systems. V-model: graphical representation of a systems development lifecycle NOTE: See Wikipedia®: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-model. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 5G-NR 5th Generation New Radio AD Automated Driving ADAS Advanced Driver Assistance Systems AID Application Identifier AL Access Layer ALI Access Layer Instance ASIL Automative Safety Integrity Level ASN Abstract Syntax Notation B2B Business to Business BSP Basic System Profile BTP Basic Transport Protocol CAM Cooperative Awareness Message CAS Cooperative Awareness Service CC Congestion Control CCC CarConnectivity Consortium CCMS C-ITS Security Credential Management System ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 11 CDD Common Data Dictionary CIA Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability C-ITS Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems CPU Central Processor Unit DATEX Data Exchange DFRS Data For Traffic Safety DLL Data Link Layer DPIA Data Protection Impact Assessment DSRC Dedicated Short-Range Communication EA Enterprise Architecture EN European Norm EU Europe FL Facilities Layer GDPR General Data Protection Regulation HMI Human Machine Interface HSM Hardware Security Modules HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure and is the encrypted version of HTTP I2X Infrastructure to Everything IBM Information Basic Model ICT Information and Communications Technology ID Identifier IP Internet Protocol IT Information Technology ITS Intelligent Transport Systems ITS-S Intelligent Transport Systems Station JSON JavaScript Object Notation LDM Local Dynamic Map LLC Logical Link Control layer LTE Long-Term Evolution MAC Media Access Control MDM Mobility Data Marketplace MIB Management Information Base NAP National Access Point NAPCORE National Access Point Coordination Organization For Europe NL Netherlands NTL Networking & Transport Layer OBU On Board Unit OS Operating System OSI Open Systems Interconnection PDU Protocol Data Unit PHY Physical Layer PoTi Position and Time PTW Power Two-Wheeler PVD Probe Vehicle Data REST Representational State Transfer R-ITS Road-ITS RM Resource Management SA Service Announcement SAM Service Announcement Message SAP Service Access Point SAS Service Announcement Service SCMS Security Credential Management System SDO Standardization Development Organization SDU Service Data Unit SIB Security Information Base SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SOA Service-Oriented Architecture SP Service Provider SPS-NL Safety Priority Service Netherlands SRTI Safety Related Traffic Information SSL Secure Sockets Layer SSP Service Specific Permissions ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 12 TA Technical Architecture TC Technical Committee TISA Traveller Information Service Association TLS Transport Layer security TOGAF The Open Group Architecture Framework TPEG Transport Protocol Experts Group TR Technical Report TS Technical Specification TVRA Threat and Vulnerability Risk Assessment U-ITS Urban rail-ITS UML Unified Modelling Language V2X Vehicle to Everything |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4 The ITS Context | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.1 In general | The purpose of communication standardization is to enable participants in the communication, to exchange data in a conform and interoperable way. Such standardization encourages competition in an open market, as referred to in European single market Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 [i.4]. The development of standards requires the understanding not only of functional and technical requirements but also understanding about the context such as business context, realization context, trust and regulations in which these are used. Ecosystem requirements lead to additional requirements and to additional standards (see ecosystems, clause 4.4). |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.2 The ITS Communications Domain | Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) are systems that combine and apply ICT and electromechanical technologies with the intend to improve traffic flow, traffic safety and transport efficiency. In principle, it covers transport systems for road, water and rail covering e.g. logistics, fleet resource management, traffic information, emergency/police, public transport, road user services, navigation user services and safety user services. The ITS Communications Domain is depicted in Figure 1 and related ITS standardization evaluates and specifies ITS communication aspects including functional and technical requirements for the purpose of realizing interoperable information exchange between different ITS equipment. At present, other functional and technical aspects such as ITS related equipment internal sensor interfacing, and functionalities are out-of-scope of ITS Communications Domain. Figure 1: ITS Communications Domain ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 13 Although not all types of road users are identified in Figure 1, ITS communications also apply to all road users e.g. Vehicles, Power Two Wheelers (PTW), Bicyclists, Pedestrians, Trams, Trains and Special Users such as people with disabilities and emergency services. Besides the road users, ITS information is usually also exchanged with authorities, infrastructure providers and businesses. An ITS service (see clause 4.5) is able to realize a single or multiple use cases simultaneously. The equipment supplier as well as the operator are free to choose how to configure their ITS equipment and how user services should look like. At present, the look and feel of equipment and services are out of scope. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.3 ICT architectures | In Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) the following architectural levels are defined, allowing users to identify related communication requirements. The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) ISO/IEC 10746 [i.20]) defined three main architecture types. • Enterprise Architecture (EA) level. This is the high-level view that defines how the ICT strategy aligns with business goals, encompassing all aspects of the organization's ICT systems and their business objectives. This is often used to describe the overall ICT ecosystem within a specific context, such as a smart city or a large corporation. • Technical Architecture (TA) level. This is a more detailed view that specifies the technology standards, protocols, and products used to implement the functions and layers of the ecosystem. • Solution Architecture (SA) level. This level focuses on the architecture of a specific solution or project within the broader enterprise architecture, an architecture specific for a specific business case for example. The EA recognizes general aspects, mission, objectives, organization considering common aspects often identified as part of Ecosystem requirements. It has a role within organizations and therefore could be of relevance to profiles but is not of relevance to standardization except for those functional and technical aspects impacting interoperability and conformity as recognized part of any ITS Ecosystem (see clause 4.4). |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4 Ecosystems | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4.1 Introduction | ITS ecosystems encompass all ITS related policies, strategies, processes, information, technologies, applications, and stakeholders that together make up the requirements, and it is realized in a specific trusted technical environment for a country, region, government, or enterprise. Most importantly, an ICT ecosystem includes people - diverse individuals who create, buy, sell, regulate, manage and use technology (The Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems, Citation 2005, [i.7], but also Fransman [i.6]). ITS ecosystems are closed systems in which information is exchanged based on predefined social, business and legal requirements, including trust, security and governance models. An ecosystem is always limited as it cannot encompass every possibility and cannot satisfy all stakeholders, social, business and legal requirements at the same time, therefore, it is specific for a certain objective or use. To enable enterprise possibilities on the internet, the Internet Protocols are in continues development, enabling more and more advanced business process possibilities extending Internet services. The internet has become an open environment in which new services and new business can be developed based on existing ICT building blocks, processes, methods, principles, protocols and tools. Fransman (2010) and Gillwald (2012) [i.6] described it conceptually as the "Open ICT ecosystem framework" (Figure 2). As stated, it is a framework enabling any stakeholder group interested in the same or similar functional area, trust, social, legal and or business areas can realize their ecosystem based on available ICT building blocks and where needed extend it with new building blocks and processes. The fundaments for this framework can use various ICT communication architectures. ITS ecosystems comply to this ICT ecosystem Framework. Some make use of many, or all identified "Open ICT ecosystem framework" building blocks and others could be based on only a subset of these building blocks. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 14 Figure 2: The "Open ICT ecosystems Framework" |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4.2 ITS ecosystems | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4.2.1 Introduction | Within ITS there are various ITS ecosystems in operation e.g. Traffic light infrastructure systems, Tolling systems, Logistics systems and safety related ITS. The present ETSI ITS releases (Release 1 and 2) do not cover the above mentioned ITS ecosystems but focus on safety related ITS ecosystems e.g. road traffic safety and road traffic efficiency ITS ecosystems. Compared to the other ITS ecosystems, safety related ITS ecosystems put more functional and technical critical requirements on to the ITS system, in particular on security and communication system requirements. Often these requirements are assessed through standard assessment methods such as Threat and Vulnerability Risk Assessments (TVRAs) and Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs). For example, for DPIA the ISO 27001 [i.8] could be used. At present for Europe, three safety related ITS ecosystems can be identified: 1) the C-ITS ecosystem for which the basic aspects are laydown by the European Union (EU) regulation framework formed by the Directive 2010/40/EU [i.24] and its amendment (EU) 2023/2661 [i.9]; 2) the Data for Traffic Safety (DFRS) ecosystem [i.14]; and 3) the European National Access Point Coordination Organisation for Europe (NAPCORE) [i.15] ecosystem. The minimum requirement for these three ecosystems is that they support the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 886/2013 (SRTI) [i.25]. In the following clauses these differentiating ITS ecosystems are highlighted. Starting with the C-ITS ecosystem as this is the one which was the first to be supported by ETSI ITS Release 1 standardization. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4.2.2 The Cooperative-ITS (C-ITS) ecosystem | As referenced, the C-ITS ecosystem is defined by Directive (EU) 2023/2661 [i.9] and its amendment (EU) 2023/2661 [i.9]. As such the term C-ITS when used in the domain of ITS in Europe, is legally limited to what is defined by this EU regulation. The C-ITS ecosystem is intended to increase traffic safety and traffic efficiency. With regards to Traffic Safety, it supports the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 886/2013 (SRTI) [i.25] extended with safety related ADAS and AD use cases. The C-ITS ecosystem uses a reduced ICT ecosystem framework and uses non-IP based information exchange protocols with specific functional requirements, common criteria and security criteria. Non-IP C-ITS packages (including security) can be exchanged via open IP based network as long as the C-ITS packet is not unpacked. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 15 The Directive 2010/40/EU [i.24] and its amendment (EU) 2023/2661 [i.9] form the fundament for the C-ITS services. In this regulation framework C-ITS is defined as "intelligent transport systems that enable ITS users to interact and cooperate by exchanging secured and trusted messages, without any prior knowledge of each other and in a non- discriminatory manner". C-ITS information sharing is characterized as tactical information sharing, as the related information sharing is direct impact oriented, requiring direct course of action as a response to immediate situation, which is the case for timely critical (around 1 second) safety-relevant or safety-critical use cases, such as for ADAS and Automated Driving (AD). Besides tactical also strategical information sharing can be recognized. Strategically shared information is primarily intended to be used for warning use cases and generally is shared at least several seconds before impact. Tactical information sharing comes with more stringent functional and technical requirements, for instance more stringent data quality then the requirements coming with strategic information sharing. Tactical information sharing could be of benefit for strategic use cases, while strategic information sharing mostly cannot be used for ADAS and AD functions. NOTE: The information shared for a use case such as "Queue ahead" when having sufficient data quality to serve tactical actions, also has value for further away traffic as they could change their route to their final destination. The present European regulatory framework is supported by ETSI ITS Release 1 standards and following ETSI releases. As Tactical intended information is openly shared it should be ensured that the data shared does not reveals any information about the source which could compromise its role, state or legal position as identified by the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 [i.22]. For this reason, the C-ITS Ecosystem includes specific functional and security measures to ensure required trust and privacy levels. For Europe, the EU Directive (EU) 2023/2661 [i.9] related certification and security policies are referenced and elsewhere under EU regulation specified. C-ITS message specifications comply to the C-ITS Ecosystem trust, liability and safety integrity, functional safety and legal requirements e.g. Functional Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) levels laid down in the ISO 26262-9:2018 [i.11]. For Strategical intended information other communications then direct V2X communications can be used as long as the use is compliant with existing legal frameworks and installed certification and security policies. Most of the C-ITS specifications refer to ETSI ITS standards but also to CEN/ISO standards there were applicably. ETSI ITS Releases support the realization of C-ITS equipment. When projecting C-ITS Ecosystem on the Fransman (2010) and Gillwald (2012) [i.6] Ecosystem model (Figure 3), it can be recognized that the number of active actors is very limited compared to other ITS Ecosystems. Figure 3: C-ITS ecosystems Framework ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 16 |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4.2.3 The DFRS ecosystem | At present Data for Traffic Safety (DFRS) [i.14], facilitated by ERTICO, has defined their DFRS ecosystem in their technical specification [i.29]. The Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 886/2013 (SRTI) [i.25] is realized not only by DFRS [i.14] but also by NAPCORE [i.15], C-ROADS [i.16] and C2C-CC [i.17]. The DFRS ecosystem as defined in [i.29] (see also Figure 4) is an answer to the SRTI regulation by the industry, facilitating SRTI strategic information exchange. It is a typical IP protocol based "Open ICT ecosystems Framework" Enterprise Architecture (EA). Figure 4: The DFRS ecosystem The DFRS typical EA architecture is characterized by the following aspects: • It is a Service providers architecture with information providers, information aggregators, service providers, service distributors and service users. • Data sets are classified in the L2 Data; L2' Data and L3 Data categories. At all categories various data standards are used. At the L2 lever the number of used data standards is higher than on the L3 level. At present DATEX II is specified for L3 but it is not normatively specified. As DATEX II is not interoperable at present coding schemes are investigated. For category L2, SENSORIS is reference but also here there is no interoperable encoding defined, and it is open to use others. • There is also no single access technology and message encoding selected, it depends on the interface used between each of the partners in the B2B interfaces selected. At present the DFRS technical specification [i.29] states the following about this: "It needs to be distinguished between the data format of the actual content (i.e. how are the messages encoded) and the access technology. Throughout the DFRS ecosystem, there are various access paradigms usable, ranging from request/ reply REST like access schemes towards streaming like access schemes like HERE's Open Location Platform. REST interfaces typically offer ASCII-JSON and binary protobuf as message encoding, whereas streaming like access schemes often provide binary protobuf only." ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 17 • DFRS has defined a metadata repository - Mobility Data Marketplace (MDM) where partners (B2B) can find which information is available where and in what format, metadata for the data access interfaces needs to be made available to all partners. Since not all data access interfaces are public, a protected, DFRS Ecosystem partner internal metadata repository is required. For now, all metadata is to be made available at the MDM (Mobility Data Marketplace) repository. This is the German NAP and currently acts as an intermediate solution. The following is the step-by-step instruction for creating so-called "data publications" (metadata for one data access interface) within the MDM. • In order to be able to enter and edit metadata in the MDM, certification is required. The MDM operates with authentication according to X.509 certificates. NOTE: X.509 certificates are digital documents that bind a public key to an identity, such as a user, device, or website, and are a standard used in many security protocols like TLS/SSL. Issued by a Certificate Authority (CA), they are used to authenticate identities, enable secure communication (like HTTPS), and verify the integrity of data through digital signatures. These certificates contain information like the public key, the identity's name, the issuer's name, and a validity period. It is IP networking (internet) security protocol. The DFRS ecosystem, is an ITS ecosystem based on the IP protocols (internet) "Open ICT ecosystems Framework". At present the DFRS ecosystem is an B2B platform where partners can make bilateral agreements about data conformity and interoperability on the data interface between the partners, there is no general platform data conformity and interoperability guarantied. DATEX II use guidelines defined. On the B2B interface different security mechanisms could be used. Only to the MDM there is a DFRS platform common security defined. At present the DFRS ecosystem does not make use of ETSI ITS standards but refers to other standards from other SDOs. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4.2.4 The NAPCORE ecosystem | The National Access Point Coordination Organisation for Europe (NAPCORE) [i.15] project started in 2022, to work on a better alignment of the implementation of EU specifications in the European Member States. NAPCORE is a Programme Support Action co-funded by the EU under the Connecting Europe Facility. NAPCORE [i.15] has been launched as coordination mechanism to improve interoperability of the National Access Points as backbone of European mobility data exchange. NAPCORE [i.15] improves the interoperability of mobility data in Europe with mobility data standard harmonisation and alignment. Also, NAPCORE [i.15] aims at increasing access to and expanding availability of mobility related data by coordinated data access and better harmonisation of the European NAPs. It is intended by increasing the accessibility to traffic information available at the various European road authorities from member state to city level to improve Traffic Safety and road efficiency. The CEN/TS 17268:2018 [i.28] defines the content specification for the exchange of road-related spatial data and especially updates thereof. Based on the content specification, this document defines also a physical exchange format (structure and encoding) for the actual data exchange. In addition, it defines web services needed to make the coded data on updates available. This technical specification addresses specifically static data in the remit of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/962 [i.26] and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/670 [i.27], and aims at helping to keep digital maps for ITS up to date. Although the focus of this technical specification is on providing information on updates, the technology described in this document in principle also enables the exchange of full data sets. NAPs are intended to make safety related traffic information and real time traffic information strategically available at authorities available for anyone to use. At present related information expected to be made available in the DATEX II [i.18] format. As DATEX II [i.18] is metadata based it is not interoperable by itself. To overcome this, there are European reference profiles for Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 886/2013 (SRTI) [i.25] and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/962 (RTTI) [i.26] profiles defined, by DATEX II [i.18]. At present, specifications about the trustworthiness of the information provided can be found and no security mechanism are defined. It is intended that related information is made available at member state specific IP network references. Information is freely available. As it can be assumed that it makes use of the general capabilities of the Open ICT ecosystems Framework and has no specific requirements. It can be seen as another ICT ecosystem. At present the NAPCORE ecosystem does not make use of ETSI ITS standards but refers to other standards from other SDOs. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 18 |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.4.2.5 The MirrorLink® ITS ecosystem | At present, MirrorLink® is an ITS Ecosystem which was specified by the Car Connectivity Consortium (CCC). It is a smartphone-to-vehicle integration system that works similarly to other systems such as Android Auto® and Apple CarPlay®. A smartphone can be linked to the vehicle's infotainment display using MirrorLink®. Once the smartphone display function is integrated into the infotainment system, the driver can interact with the apps using voice control, dashboard buttons, steering wheel buttons, or touchscreens. For the interoperable operation between devices a standardized interface is specified the ETSI ITS-Ecosystem MirrorLink® ETSI TS 103 544 parts 1 to 25 [i.21], an ITS Ecosystem focussed on the HMI interface between Vehicular and Mobile phone equipment. It is an ITS Ecosystem which has a different objective compared to the ITS transport related Ecosystems and does not make use of the ITS Release components and functionalities. It therefore has to be seen separate from the ITS framework. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.5 ITS Services | At present there is a large base of ITS services operational such as process or information management related services (Logistics) but also safety related services. Each of these ITS service classes have their own dynamics, functional and technical requirements. Some of these services encompasses both management as well as safety related services such as road navigation (MAP) services. In the context of the ETSI ITS standardization, the focus is to specify all interoperability and conformity aspects related to "safety related" services which does not mean that other services cannot be supported by ITS releases but at present is not in focus. An essential aspect of ITS services compared to other services that these are always operational in a time and locations context and therefore relate information to time and location. Among these ITS services, traffic safety related and traffic efficiency (in ITS as group referred to as "safety related") are distinguished from the other ITS services by having some, mostly timing, communication predictability and liability related advanced requirements. Safety related is everything which can have a direct or indirect impact on the safety situation. As already identified in clause 4.4.2.2, a service can be of a strategic or a tactical nature and as tactical information fulfils higher qualitative requirements, it can also be used for strategic related use cases, while strategic information generally cannot be used for tactical related use cases. ITS services can be of a private nature, or of a cooperative nature. Private services are characterized by their B2B nature and restricted access for use. Data is not openly accessible unless there is a contract with a specific service provider. An example of a private service is a logistic service to manage truck fleets, DFRS or MAP provider services. Cooperative ITS (C-ITS) and NAPCORE services have to be available to everybody without any restrictions. To ensure the trustworthiness and quality of the information for the C-ITS ecosystem a C-ITS trust mechanism is specified and referenced by the European Directive (EU) 2023/2661 [i.9]. NAPCORE as it has to comply with other security regulations then C-ITS, it is expected to have its own IP internet-based security mechanism, probably similar to DFRS. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 4.6 ITS Systems and ITS Stations | As clarified in clause 4.2, different ITS Systems are and further can be realized in the ITS Domain. ITSs are Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems with an ITS purpose. An ITS is formed by more than one piece of equipment's communicating to each other. ITS in which the software and hardware in these equipment's work together to accomplice a specific communication ITS task of set of tasks. ITS equipment generally consists of many components to realize not only communication tasks but also other task it is function specific. A bike does different things then a Vehicle. As such, the ITS related component of equipment is identified as the Station (ITS-S) and consists of a set-up of hardware, software, data, it can be autonomous but can also interfaces with other systems in the equipment of directly with the user, depending on the purpose of the equipment. As such, ITS-Ss communicate to other ITS-Ss to realize an ITS specific service or set of services in the ITS Domain. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 19 As there are various ITS Ecosystems there can be various ITS systems active at the same time e.g. C-ITS, DFRS and NAPCORE. As illustrated in clause 4.4, ITS Systems use different communication concepts. Two different communication concepts can be recognized. • Dynamic networking configuration based. A method in which there is a process of assigning network settings, polities, flows and controls. This process could be physically or virtual. IP networks are configuration based e.g. DFRS and NAPCORE. • Networking Constellation based. A method in which there is no dynamic configuration process but there are only static network settings, policies, flows and controls are commonly agreed e.g. C-ITS. The later method is used there where there is no time or no reason to negotiate about the network access possibilities. This concerns typically sensor networks, AdHoc networks, often broadcast oriented networks. C-ITS direct communications is principally constellation based and typically used for tactical information exchange. Tactical information can also be shared over configured networks, but this often leads to limited strategic use of the data. In any case to comply to the C-ITS trust and privacy requirements the information should be sealed in an envelope when shared over IP networks to comply to these C-ITS ecosystem requirements. Figure 5 provides a perspective on the present transport safety and transport efficiency related ITS Ecosystems. For DFRS [i.14] and NAPCORE [i.15] see the references. Figure 5: Existing EU ITS Ecosystems (including C-ITS, DFRS and NAPCORE) (Source: ASFINAG©) |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5 ITS technical architectures | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.1 Introduction | As described in clause 4.3, a Technical Architecture (TA) provide a detailed view that specifies the technical design, technology standards, protocols, and products, used to implement functions and layers of an ecosystem. Technical architectures are used to implement and realize equipment. In general TAs specify specific stakeholder equipment or is B2B related e.g. consortia, to ensure interoperability and conformity on an interface between the B2B partners. In the latter case often, related documents are identified as profiles as they profile general specification and standards. Such profiles can additionally be standardized and then called profiling standard. ETSI ITS provides a toolbox of ITS standards allowing stakeholders to define their own systems and profiles. Some of these profiles e.g. C2C-CC profile Basic System Profile (BSP)) are maintained in the C2C-CC organization. Cellular profiles e.g. LTE sidelink and 5G-NR sideling are profiles which are maintained at ETSI TC ITS and part of the Release 2 set of ETSI ITS specifications, but they are not part of the toolbox itself. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 20 Only at the equipment implementation specification or profiling level, there are architectural requirements. Therefore, when it is not about implementation specification or profiling, architecture illustrations only provide guidance on how components and their interfaces are related to each other. This means that, for all toolbox documents architectures, architectures are informative. The following clauses only provide architectural views about how components, protocols, interfaces, data structures relate, providing guidance in how these components related. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.2 ITS implementation architectures | In the ITS domain, ITS-Ss exchange information via various implementation communication architectures. The overall architecture as illustrated in Figure 6 shows the collection of presently implemented or envisioned ITS ecosystems for the EU. The following aspects are recognized: • The Service Provider (SP) ITS strategic indirect information exchange based on provider specific security. Depending on the SP Ecosystem selected business model(s) and system solutions any interested party can participate. • National Access Points (NAPs) are an EU commission initiative for the exchange of strategic indirect information in which all member states have their own NAP being interoperable with other NAPs. It is intended to be an intercloud based system for indirect information exchange of Safety Related Traffic Information (SRTI) based on standardized DATEX II [i.18] data exchange. An approached being managed by NAPCORE [i.15]. NAPCORE is expected to have its own ITS Ecosystem. • Data For Traffic Safety (DFRS) [i.14] is expected to be similar to the SP with focus on the exchange of strategic indirect information, but could move more to the NAPs approach or be combined with the NAPs based business model(s) and system solutions. Details are not known at present. At present DFRS refers to the Safety Related Traffic Information ITS Ecosystem. • Safety priority service (Netherlands specific), realizes the exchange of strategic indirect information based on Probe Vehicle Data (PVD) and SRTI and provides navigation type information via data protocol suite for traffic and travel related information and is TPEG (Transport Protocol Experts Group) based (see TISA https://tisa.org/). An exchange of data based on a Dutch specific safety priority ITS Ecosystem and related security. • C-Roads [i.16] Hybrid approach realizes the EU C-ITS Ecosystem requirements laid down by EU regulations for sharing safety related information basically both as tactical and as strategical information exchange. It follows C-Roads and Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [i.17] profiles for the realization of Traffic Safety and Road Efficiency and exchanges information I2X over a tactile direct (AdHoc) communication network. Besides it shares this I2X safety information in a closed so-called brown envelop over the indirect IP based network so that the information is protected and can only be accessed when it returns into a C-ITS Ecosystem certified ITS-S. See for more detail Annex C. • The C-ITS tactile direct V2X communication follows the EU C-ITS Ecosystem requirements laid down by Directive 2010/40/EU [i.24] and Directive (EU) 2023/2661 [i.9] for sharing safety related information. In principle direct communication information sharing based on C-Roads and/or Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [i.17] profiles. See Annex C for more details. • Besides exchanging the information by means of direct V2X, some of the information exchange can also be shared via IP networks as long as the C-ITS ecosystem trust and security is maintained. This means that unpacking of the information shared between ITS-Ss is not possible at the IP protocol level but only at ITS-S stations which are C-ITS certified. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 21 Figure 6: The ITS communication architectures used to realize ITS services Figure 6 shows that in general indirect V2X and direct V2X communications are being linked to different Ecosystems e.g. Service Provider (SP) specific, DFRS, NAPCORE, SPS-NL, C-ROADS Hybrid and C2C-CC/C-Roads direct. In general, these ecosystems offer partly overlapping, but also different information dissemination possibilities. Figure 6 shows the complementary possibilities they together give. As coexisting ITS ecosystems are being able to evolve separately, they can use the same security mechanisms as long as the credential and certificate management are kept separate for each of the ecosystems to ensure being able to identify the uniqueness of the received information because, coexisting ITS ecosystems could provide similar information which could still differ in usability depending on e.g. source, time or other various conditions. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3 Technical architectures in ITS standardization | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.1 Introduction | As explained in clause 5.1, although profiles can be part of ETSI ITS releases, TAs in ETSI ITS standards of a release are informative or illustrative only. However, a basic ITS architecture identifying the basic ITS communication between ITS-Ss (sometimes also referred to as ITS nodes) can be defined. This ITS basic architecture is shown in Figure 7. It identifies the ITS-S as a component of equipment. ITS-Ss communicate to each other, so one ITS-S provides information to other ITS-Ss and vice versa. In principle in ITS compliant equipment, one of the components is an ITS-S as illustrated in Figure 7. This is simple and clear for a Vehicle, PTW, bike of any other road user but in road infrastructure this is a bit more complicated. The medium in Figure 7 is not always the same. In case of C-ITS ecosystem, in principle direct V2X, it is the air interface, in case of the other ITS ecosystems referenced in the present document, it is generally realized based on IP communications and internet protocols. Figure 7 provides a very general overview of the ITS domain, identifying that an ITS-S is only a component of an equipment and that there can be other components from which some could provide information to the ITS-S functionality and vice versa. Data For Road Safety (DFRS) Inter-Cloud DFRS data formats? Service provider or NAPCORE approach? OEM Backends Service Provider Cloud Road/City Backends NAPCORE Inter-Cloud SRTI (DATEX II) (Re-use of C2C-CC Triggering conditions) NAPCORE or EU C-ITS security policies? OEM Backends Road/City Backends Safety Priority Services (SPS-NL) Open exchange of PVD and SRTI as navigation info/TPEG) SPS-NL security OEM Backends Road/City Backends Service Providers Message Broker Service Provider Cloud C-ROADS Hybrid C-Roads and C2C-CC compliant, Interoperable and Backward Compatible EU C-ITS security policies OEM Backends Road/City Backends Service Providers AMQP Brokers C2C-CC – C-ROADS Direct, at present C-Roads and C2C-CC compliant, Interoperable and Backward Compatible EU C-ITS security policies Cellular IP based Cellular IP based Cellular, Fiber and Copper based communications DIRECT Communications Direct AdHoc communication: ITS-G5/IEEE802.11p/bd EU Rollout Architecture SERVICE PROVIDER (SP) ITS Information exchange SP security OEM Backends Service Provider Cloud Road/City Backends INDIRECT Communications ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 22 Figure 7: ITS basic architecture (high-level example) Figure 8 illustrates a more complex setup, a road infrastructure equipment setup with traffic management centre and some roadside units. This figure is a possible result of the illustrations of Figure 5 and Figure 6. What can be recognized is that, from an system configuration point of view, the C-ITS and other ITS processing may be mixed as well as that the authority internal network can be just one, but that care has to be taken that the system complies to the different data trust and data ownership aspects which are generally different for different ITS ecosystems. Aspects such as that different regulations could apply for different ITS ecosystems, as well as that different security mechanisms can apply. As illustrated in Figure 8 at the Trust Critical location care should be taken in order to address these issues. Figure 8: Infrastructure oriented ITS basic architecture (high-level example) |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.2 The ITS-S technical architecture | The ITS-S architecture is a simplified model derived from the ISO Information Basic Model (ISO-IBM, ISO/IEC 7498-1 [i.12]) and is provided in Figure 9. This architecture is intended to provide a structure in which components can relate to each other. Information flows between components belonging to the same layer or to different layers can be characterized as Management (Control) Data flow, Functional Data flow and when required as Security Data flow. Within the architecture these flows are identified respectively on the Management Plane, the Data Plane and the Security Plane as illustrated in Figure 9. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 23 Figure 9: ITS-S architecture Depending on the complexity of the functionality, Data and Management flows can be included in one figure or can be separately presented in multiple figures. In other systems the Management Plane is recognized as the Control Plane. In the ITS-S architecture, the Access Layer (AL) represents the OSI layers 1 and 2, the Networking & Transport Layers (NTL) represent the OSI layers 3 and 4, the Facilities Layer (FL) represents the OSI layers 5, 6 and 7. The Applications are on top of the OSI layer 7. Functionality architectures could be presented in a simplified way in a single drawing such as the one presented in Annex A. In ETSI EN 302 665 [i.10] (Release 1 ITS communication architecture), the term Service Access Point (SAP) was defined but was identified as an interface. As over a SAP (between the layers) many interfaces may exist and those interfaces are a functionality and not system specific, these interface specifications are part of the functionality specification they are defined in and not in a separate SAP specification. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.3 Other Architectural models (UML) | Components can be realized in soft- and hardware or be realized by a mixture of soft- and hardware. In principle, the higher the component is placed in the ITS-S architecture the more it will be realized by software. In case component descriptions could be used to realize software solutions, UML is often used to specify the functionality. Further it should be recognized that more and more software is also used at lower layers e.g. Software Defined Radio. In ETSI ITS specifications UML visualization methods can be used e.g. UML design models, UML flow models and UML behavioural models, for the modelling and illustrations of designs, flows and behaviour. Some examples are illustrated in Annex B. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.4 Common Layer aspects | The common aspects are mainly related to the use of terminology. The terminology is dependent on the layer. Figure 10 provides an overview. Data are bits whose meaning is not directly of relevance or not known. Information is data from which the meaning is known. At the applications and Facilities Layer (FL), it is about Information and within the protocol it is about data. At the FL, messages can be collected from lower layers or disseminated to lower layers. At the Networking and Transport Layer (NTL) packages are transferred and on the Access Layer frames are transmitted or received (see Figure 10). ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 24 Figure 10: Layer dependent terminologies In ICT communications, a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) is s single unit of information disseminated or transmitted (depending on the layer) between peer entities. It is composed of protocol-specific control information (the Header) and user data. So, at the Facilities Layer there is the FL-PDU including all the facility layer aspects relevant for the receiver of the information. To inform other layers about the intent of the use of the forwarded information a Service Data Unit (SDU) can be exchanged between layers. Each Layer PDU forms the payload for the next layers PDU. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.5 ITS Applications | This clause defines general ITS application possible additional aspects, e.g. classification, prioritization and channel assignment, registration and secure maintenance, in the context of ITS. An ITS application can be a single functionality above the FL in one ITS-S, making use of collected information received from another ITS application active in one or more other ITS-Ss to realize an ITS service. An ITS application can also be realized as a set of applications active in multiple ITS-Ss, combined providing a specific ITS service. At present two types of service models can be recognized. • The client service model which is traditionally used in networked communication systems based on having the security at the facilities layer. In this case one of the functionalities active in one particular ITS-S will be the server part and the other ones will represent the client parts. In such case the server part should manage the proper operation of the application and be responsible to ensure the ITS service is properly realized. It is therefore responsible for the correct operation of its functionalities active in all ITS-Ss. • The C-ITS service model in which information is shared based on having no knowledge of the presence of any receiving ITS-Ss. A sensor-based data sharing model with no expectation about what the receiving ITS-S will do with the data. A model in which the security is handled at the Networking & Transport layers as this layer should be able to forward messages. At present three classes of ITS Applications are considered: "Traffic Safety", "Traffic Efficiency" and "Other Applications". Depending on the ecosystem at hand, different functional requirements can be applicable for each of the classes. Depending on how many applications rely on communication services, application classes impose communication requirements on the ITS-S as identified for each ecosystem to be implemented, with respect of e.g. reliability, security, latency, and other performance parameters. Whilst the reliability of communication systems can be optimized, communication systems will never be 100 % reliable as radio transmissions are not 100 % reliable. Developers should design their applications and systems to operate safely even when a problem with the communications system occurs. FL-PDU TL-SDU TL-SDU H TL-PDU NL-SDU H NL-SDU NL-PDU AL-SDU H AL-SDU AL-PDU Facilities (Message) Networking and Transport (Packet) Access (Frame) ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 25 Improvement can be realized by enabling the applications to be informed about the communication capabilities ahead of their decision making. It can be of interest for ecosystems to install interoperable mechanisms to realize this. Within C-ITS Resource Management (RM) is one such mechanism. For C-ITS, it should be ensured that information sourced by an ITS-S can be received by sinking ITS-Ss. A sinking ITS-S needs to know in advance how the information is disseminated by the sourcing ITS-S in case the sourcing ITS-S is not aware of the presence of ITS-Ss. This means that the channel assignment and prioritization of the messages in a given channel or spectrum are one of the aspects which are required to be use case or ITS-S service specifically set to ensure an interoperable behaviour. This is generally part of the ecosystem requirements mostly specified as part of a system profile. In such C-ITS profile, for each of the C-ITS services related messages disseminations, it is required to set the communication requirements e.g. logical channel or spectrum, priority and possibly modulation parameters, to ensure that sinking ITS-Ss can receive, and process received data. Maintenance of ITS applications, i.e. installation, de-installation, activation, de-activation and management of updates, should be performed in a secure way in order to support protection of ITS stations from attacks by malicious applications. As this is a system aspect, this is an Ecosystem requirement and should be specified in a profile. Each ITS application is unique and needs to be uniquely identified. It is therefore required to register ITS applications and message ITS-S services at a registration authority, to receive a unique ITS application ID (ITS-AID). The Service Specific Permissions (SSP) is a field that indicates specific sets of permissions within the overall permissions indicated by the ITS-AID. ITS System security aspects are typically governed by an Information Security Policy. Such security policy is a document that outlines the requirements and guidelines an organization or a group of organizations will use to manage their IT systems and protect its/their data. The policy explains the strategy and the reasons behind the proposed security measures and defines the general expectation and approach to information security. A security policy is often based on the three principles of the CIA triad: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A). ITS System also may need to use security credentials, such as cryptographic keys and/or associated certificates issued by external systems, to ensure protected relevant information. Security aspects of Security Credentials Management Systems (SCMS) such as Public Key Infrastructures, i.e. dedicated IT systems that issue security credentials for use by data processing IT systems, are typically regulated by a Certificate Policy. Such a Certificate Policy defines the requirements for the issuing of certificate by the SCMS and usage of certificates and associated key material by End Entities. The present document recognizes the C-ITS Application ID (AID), the Service Specific Permissions (SSPs) and Port-Numbers are defined. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.6 Access Layer | As shown in Figure 11, the Access Layer (AL) identified as part of the ITS-S architecture in clause 5.4, is decomposed into the Data Link Layer (DLL) and the Physical Layer (PHY). The DLL can be further decomposed into a Media Access Control (MAC) which manages the access to the communication medium, and below it, the Logical Link Control sub-layer (LLC). At the AL multiple radio technologies can coexist in parallel while having their own management components. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 26 Figure 11: The generalized Access Layer composition Each of the technology specific AL management and data plane components can interface to higher layer components independently but also via a generalized interface. At present, for C-ITS there are no interfaces between Access Layer components and security components at the security plane specified. Figure 11 illustrates that single or multiple channels can be realized by means of several technologies simultaneously. To allow flexible physical channel assignment, the concept of virtualisation can be used. A mapping of logical channels onto physical channels can be performed in compliance with the related standards dedicated to the AL technologies. This allows a virtualisation concept such as an Access Layer Instance (ALI) concept in which channels are configured virtually for one specific usage at one moment and one other use at one other moment. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.7 Networking & Transport Layer | The Networking & Transport Layer (NTL) is shown in Figure 12. Figure 12: The generalized Networking & Transport Layer composition ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 27 The NTL contains components from the OSI network layer and the OSI transport layer. It can include one or several networking protocols, one or several transport protocols, as well as, generally, some network and transport layer management components at the management plane and could include some security components at the security plane. In case the concept of Access Layer Instances (ALIs) is used, the NTL routes the package to the AL or, if virtualisation is implemented, to the appropriate Access Layer Instances (ALI), and provides received packages from the ALI or ALIs to the higher layers. Additionally, the NTL can be used to exchange NTL and AL parameters with other ITS-Ss. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.8 Facilities Layer | The Facilities Layer (FL) is shown in Figure 13. Figure 13: The generalized Facilities Layer composition The basic components of the FL are application support, information support and application/FL management. Security related component can additionally reside at the FL layer depending on the ITS ecosystem. The FL includes an OSI presentation layer (e.g. ASN.1 encoding and decoding, and encryption) and can include an OSI session layer (e.g. inter-host communication) with amendments dedicated to ITS. At present the latter is not required for C-ITS but could be required for other ITS ecosystems. The FL is providing support to ITS applications which can share generic functions and data according to their respective functional and operational requirements. A non-exhaustive list of generic ITS specific functions from which some are illustrated in Figure 13 are the following: • Generic Human Machine Interface (HMI) support. This functionality presents information to the user of the system, e.g. to the car driver, via the HMI hardware and firmware. • Support for data presentation. Data presentation is a basic functionality of the OSI presentation layer. Its function is to code and decode messages according to formal language being used (e.g. ASN.1). • Addressing support. This functionality supports selection of the addressing mode at lower layers. • Position and Time (PoTi) support. This functionality provides information on the geographical position (longitude, latitude, altitude) of the ITS station, and the actual time. It provides support for location referencing and time stamping of data and can be composed out of several components deriving information from different other equipment subsystems. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 28 • Local Dynamic Map (LDM). A cooperative system for Traffic Safety critical applications benefits from using digital maps. Such maps used in ITS may include lane-specific information including curbs, pedestrian walking, bicycle paths and road furniture such as traffic signs and traffic lights. Furthermore, all dynamic objects that are directly sensed or indicated by other road users by means of cooperative awareness and collective awareness can be referenced in such LDM. Essential for C-ITS, all objects are time-stamped. An LDM containing the location of dynamic objects might also be provided for vehicles that do not have a geographic digital map available. • Support for maintenance of ITS-S applications. This functionality could support the download and activation of new application software and the update of already installed software. • Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) application protocol support. This functionality could support the operation of loosely coupled business-aligned and networked services. An implementation example are SOA-based web services. It can support applications using backend services with features such as establishing a session with the backend, handling unexpected session losses due to the mobility of the ITS station and maintenance of a session during handover. • Support for station capabilities management. This functionality could manage information on station type, e.g. vehicle profile or roadside unit profile, station capabilities, e.g. supporting ITS communication channels and other static or variable information related to the station itself. • Support for combining and fusing data from different sources and keeping them up to date. • Support for station data provision. This functionality provides static and dynamic information from the ITS-S as required by ITS applications and other facilities. • Support for common message management for data exchange between ITS-S applications: - Event messages: Event messages are triggered by applications following the detection of some events. They are repeated as long as the event is perceived by the ITS-S which is detecting it. Events are signalled using broadcasting capabilities. Rules to define the signalling coverage, stop to repeat it or cancel it depend on a specific event. - Periodic messages: Awareness Messages are an example of periodic messages. Periodic messages are disseminated periodically, signalled using broadcasting capabilities. - Service messages. Service messages are messages to manage sessions. There are two parts: the service announcement allowing other ITS-S to be aware of possible ITS services which can be provided by a specific ITS-S and a reply message to answer the service announcement when applicable. • Support of repetitive transmission of messages. This functionality could be in charge to repetitively request transmission of messages according to the requirements set up by the ITS-S application. • Channel selection. This functionality could support the selection of the proper communication interface for transmission of messages. NOTE: The different functionalities as presented above often do not need to be interoperable and may be already part of the Operating System or supported by other sub-systems of the equipment and therefore are not necessarily standardized. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.9 Predictable ITS Communication behaviour | In a communication system the communication is always limited by the limited availability of radio spectrum or by interference of any kind and therefore is characterized by having a certain level of predictable behaviour of being able to transmit or receive information. To realize higher levels of predictability in ITS-Ss, the transmission of frames should possibly be controlled to allow all ITS-Ss to realize their tasks predictably. It depends on the Ecosystem requirements which mechanisms to include. It is common for communication technologies to limit the transmission of frames at the Access Layer for the realization of acceptable access. These mechanisms are generally specified by the related AL technology. NL mechanisms can be used for improvement but are generally not responsible for the limitation of the transmissions. Improvement mechanisms could require to be interoperable depending on the Ecosystem requirements. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 29 Generally, no other limiting mechanisms are needed. However, as defined by C-ITS Ecosystem requirements, for C-ITS it is of importance to be able to make functional decisions based on the dynamic communication capabilities. Therefore, in C-ITS, besides the basic limitation at the AL, congestion level information as detected at the AL can be forwarded to higher layers to enable higher layer functionalities to make better message dissemination decisions insuring more predictable ITS behaviour. NOTE: With a limited fixed set of applications active in a single channel, predictability could be manageable, however even for a single channel ITS-S system it could be of interest to add resource management mechanism. Such mechanisms are a necessity when multiple channels and/or multiple technologies are being used. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.10 ITS-Station management | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.10.1 Introduction | ITS-S management is an ITS-S internal aspect and therefore mostly an implementation aspect. Depending on the ecosystem required communication architecture, it could be important to realize some of the management functionalities in an interoperable way and therefore it could be of relevance to standardize those functionalities. Most of ITS-S non interoperable management functionalities are supported by Operating System (OS) components. It is possible that an interoperable ITS management functionality is realized by several management components residing on different layers, while exchanging information over the management plane as clarified in clause 5.4. The following management functionalities could be considered in case interoperability is required: Cross-interface management, Networking management, Communications service management, ITS application management, Station management, Resource management, Management of Service Advertisement management, Radio Spectrum Congestion management and Radio spectrum interference management. In the following clauses a number of these functionalities are considered which could require interoperability for a specific Ecosystem. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.10.2 Application management | ITS application management manages the installation and configuration of ITS-S applications and is responsible for the updating of these applications. The application management supports the error handling of ITS-S applications. It can include safeguarding mechanisms alleviating harmful application behaviours. In general, ITS application management in an ITS-S is generally seen as a station internal aspect and for the support of managing the application operation often OS mechanisms can be used, or additional mechanisms are implemented which do not require any interoperability. It can include functionality revision control from outside of the ITS-S via Internet protocols including the management of security mechanisms. Only in case the application is realized by components which are located in various ITS-Ss and that these various components are owned by various parties/stakeholders, could interoperability be required. In such case, the interoperability is possibly not managed by a functionality in the ITS-S itself but could be managed by both having interoperability requirements on the ITS-S application itself or by having ecosystem agreed interoperable installation and activation processes in place for this application to ensure the proper operation as a hole. The interoperability of ITS-S applications and ITS-S services is laid down in the application and service specifications. The interoperable process evaluation specification should be part of validation of an ecosystem. Application management aspects which could be of interest to realize interoperability and conformity could be, for instance, Service Advertisement (SA), application mapping and Management Information Base (MIB) in case they are network based managed. In ITS push and pull mechanisms can be introduced allowing ITS-Ss to identify existence or presence of ITS services. The push mechanism is realized by a "Service Advertisement Service" (SAS). The pull mechanism is known e.g. from internet protocols. SAS could be implemented optionally in different ways and may differ for each of the ecosystems. One option on how to advertise ITS services is through a single-hop wireless links. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 30 A SA manager active in a sinking ITS-S collects the SAMs and can forward them to service provider specific applications active in this ITS-S. Within C-ITS, it is not envisaged to forward SAMs. A SAS is generally managed by a service provider. Sourced SAMs are mostly periodic disseminated. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.10.3 Resource management | In ITS, information exchange possibilities could be limited by the available radio or spectrum resources. At present in ITS it is recognized being of interest to manage these radio resources. In future, possibly also other resources could be managed. In internet communication, the routing of data is managed at the Networking & Transport Layer. Applications are not informed about the underlaying dynamics, source and sink can only be connected, and the sourcing station can only be informed about whether a package has been delivered or not. It allows the sourcing station only to correct afterwards but not proactively take actions based on communications current dynamics. For most applications this highly best effort approach is sufficient, but for safety related information exchange this is often not enough, leading to higher performance requirements being put onto the communication system. For more time critical safety related applications, it could be of importance to know the communication possibilities in advance so that they can make decisions depending on the availability of the communications. For those applications where it is important to understand these communication capabilities, these capabilities should likely not depend on randomly made choices at a nonfunctional layer such as realized in Internet (IP) communications at the NTL. It could be of relevance that the dissemination and the influence of other applications are managed at the FL. The Cooperative ITS (C-ITS) methodology is an ecosystem in which the dissemination (i.e. passing PDU to lower layer) and the scheduling of the dissemination is realized at the FL where Resource Management (RM) takes place when applicable. This allows the applications to make decisions based on a better knowledge of the communication capabilities. This methodology does result in routing limitation at the NTL to ensure that the FL is able to predict the channel usage. Although forwarding or rerouting of information, whether this is realized at the FL or at the NL, has influence on the RM, the message collection is handled by separate components which have an interface to the RM. RM is technology agnostic and its main functionality is realized at the FL. RM has to be interoperable because in case it is dynamically assigning and routing message dissemination, it can have dynamic influence on the use of the communication resources and therefore on the performance of other ITS-Ss. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.10.4 Message forwarding | Message forwarding is a mechanism which is helpful in direct (AdHoc) communication environments as the source could possibly not reach the destination. In such case an ITS-S which sinks packets from other ITS_Ss can source the packets toward the final destination. This is not applicable for internet-based communications as the destination should always be known. Message forwarding can be realized at different layers depending on the control over the dissemination of the information. At present there are two ways recognized and generally, it is up to the ecosystem to identify which to use. First of all, forwarding can be realized at the NTL which is commonly used in C-ITS. For some message types, each message disseminated includes a specified message relevance area value. This information provides the means by which a sinking ITS-S can determine whether or not the messages should be forwarded. In ITS Release 1 this is realized only for specific messages which are initiated by road authorities and realized by relevant functionalities at the NTL. As this forwarding is only initiated by road operator equipment, the influence on the performance of the communications is limited and therefore is not expected to be an issue for any RM. The consequence of realizing the forwarding at the NTL, is that also the security has to be handled at the NTL. Forwarding at the FL is more flexible, provides more dissemination control at the FL and gives more flexibility in making technical choices and introduction of new technologies. It could be part of a RM functionality. ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 31 |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.10.5 Network management | Message forwarding at the NTL is a functionality which directly forwards packages without providing knowledge about the forwarding to the FL. In case a RM functionality is implemented at the FL, the RM gets only aware about the forwarding of packets at the NTL in a reactive manner via the ALI dynamic collection component, when an ALI concept is used. Message forwarding at the NTL has the advantage that it is a faster forwarding process tailored for fast decision making, however it requires that security measures are handled at the NTL and not at the FL for massages which could be forwarded. In case, in an ecosystem, it is required to manage the components in the communication system, this could be done with a Management Information Base (MIB). The MIB is usually associated with the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). A MIB is often used in OSI/ISO Network management models. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.11 ITS security | |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.11.1 Introduction | The type of security that needs to be implemented is defined by the ecosystem requirements and therefore the security requirements often differ from ecosystem to ecosystem. In many cases the security is covered by a commonly agreed model and authority. For example, in the C-ITS ecosystem, this is covered by European security policies laid down in the European Security Credential Management System (EU CCMS) [i.23]. The following clauses identify some ITS related security aspects to be considered. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.11.2 Security related ecosystem dependencies | A security solution depends on various requirements related to trust, data privacy, safety or functional impact and system security impact requirements. Some of these requirements are part of national or regional regulations. A number of these aspects are system specific and could be seen as static requirements, however there is the functional dependency coming from the services to be supported. This last aspect is dynamic as at any time a new service could possibly provide additional security requirements. As result, whenever a significant change in these requirements can be recognized, a risk assessment is required to identify the security technical requirements. In addition to these requirements having an influence on the security technical requirements, there could also be requirements coming from security system threats which also could result in additional risk assessments. For each ecosystem, risk assessments should be realized whenever identified situations occur. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.11.3 Security in the ITS architecture | As identified, the required security mechanism depends on the ecosystem to be supported. In principle security functionalities could exist at any layer of the ITS architecture. At present there are no general architectural considerations being identified. The security architecture should be considered as an ecosystem implementation related aspect. Considering the present listed ecosystems, in addition to the aspects identified in clause 5.3.11.2, regulations have an impact on the architecture. According to several EU regulations, C-ITS has to comply with additional elements of these regulations, and therefore different security requirements are applicable and have to be considered. |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.11.4 Security functionalities | The ITS-S security includes security functionalities related to the ecosystem specific ITS communication protocol stack, the ITS-S and ITS applications, e.g.: • firewall and intrusion management; • authentication, authorization and profile management; ETSI ETSI TR 103 903 V2.1.1 (2026-03) 32 • identity, crypto key and certificate management; • a common Security Information Base (SIB); • Hardware Security Modules (HSM). |
c302a8046c060680ec046ae93d26dccd | 103 903 | 5.3.12 Local Dynamic Map | For the purpose of direct traffic manoeuvrer and traffic safety services, the knowledge about the presence of other ITS-Ss in the direct neighbourhood is essential for manoeuvrer and safety decision making. Relevant information about the equipment's ITS-S kinematic state, e.g. position, speed and heading can be captured in a Local Dynamic Map (LDM). Depending on the ecosystem, additionally communication parameters such as MAC addresses and networking addresses could be added depending on ITS service requirements. |
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