hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
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734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 4.3.4.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_04 | IUT: MA in the state 'idle': • Following information elements shall be provided by IUT for the ITS-S emulated by the TS: - Long range Transport. TS: ITS-S is emulated by TS. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5 Test Purposes (TP) | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1 Introduction | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.1 TP definition conventions | The TP definition is built according to ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1]. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.2 TP Identifier naming conventions | The identifier of the TP is built according to Table 2. Table 2: TP naming convention Identifier TP_<root>_<tgt>_<gr>_<sub-gr> <sn>_<x> Sub-Group Category <root> = root MRS <tgt> = target ITSS IUT is an OBU RSU IUT is an RSU MA General behaviour <gr> = group SEC Security behaviour MESSAGES Message misbehaviour detectio... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.3 Rules for the behaviour description | The description of the TP is built according to ETSI EG 202 798 [i.1]. ETSI TS 103 759 [1] does not use the finite state machine concept. As consequence, the test purposes use a generic "Initial State" that corresponds to a state where the IUT is ready for starting the test execution. Furthermore, the IUT shall be left... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.4 Sources of TP definitions | All TPs have been specified according to ETSI TS 103 759 [1] which shall be followed as specified in the present document |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.5 Mnemonics for PICS reference | To avoid an update of all TPs when the PICS document is changed, Table 3 introduces mnemonics name and the correspondence with the real PICS item number. The 'PICS item' as defined in tables provided in clause A.6 of ETSI TS 103 868-1 [3] shall be used to determine the test applicability. Table 3: Mnemonics for PICS re... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6 Certificates content | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.1 Root Certificate Authorities certificates | Table 4: Content of the Root CA certificates with MRS ITS-AID permissions RCA certificate Content To be installed on the IUT CERT_IUT_A_RCA • self-signed • name "ETSI Test RCA A certificate" • application permissions: - CRL with SSP 0x01 - CTL with SSP 0x0138 • certificate issuing permissions: - CAM with all possible S... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.2 Authorization Authorities certificate | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.2.1 Authorization Authorities certificate with MRS SSPs | Table 5: Content of the AA certificates with MRS ITS-AID permissions AA certificate Content To be installed on the IUT CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AA • signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA • application permissions: - CRT_REQ with SSP 0x0132 • certificate issuing permissions: - CAM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFC / 0xFF0003) - DENM ... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.2.2 Authorization Authorities certificate without MRS SSPs | Table 6: Content of the AA certificates without MRS ITS-AID permissions AA certificate Content To be installed on the IUT CERT_IUT_A_NO_MRS_AA • signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA • application permissions: - CRT_REQ with SSP 0x0132 • certificate issuing permissions: - CAM with all possible SSP (0x01FFFC / 0xFF0003) -... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.3 Authorization Tickets | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.3.1 Authorization Tickets with MRS SSPs | Table 7: Content of the AT certificates with MRS ITS-AID Authorization ticket Content To be installed on the IUT CERT_IUT_A_MRS_AT • Explicit certificate • signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_AA • application permissions: - CAM with all SSP (0x01FFFC) - DENM with all SSP (0x01FFFFFF) - MSR with all SSP (0x01C0) - GN-MGMT •... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.3.2 Authorization Tickets without MRS SSPs | Table 8: Content of the AT certificates without MRS ITS-AID Authorization ticket Content To be installed on the IUT CERT_IUT_A_NO_MRS_AT • Explicit certificate • signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_AA • application permissions: - CAM with all SSP (0x01FFFC) - DENM with all SSP (0x01FFFFFF) - GN-MGMT • validation time for 1... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.1.6.4 Misbehaviour Authority | Table 9: Content of the MA certificates MA certificate Content To be installed on the IUT CERT_IUT_A_MA • signer digest of the CERT_IUT_A_RCA • application permissions: - CRT_REQ with SSP 0x0102 - MDM with SSP value 0x01010201240125 • validation time for 3 years • no region restriction • assurance level ABSENT • verifi... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.2 Misbehaviour Authority | All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set: PICS_IUT_MA = TRUE TP Id TP_MRS_MA_SEC_BO_01 Test Objective Check that the IUT discards an encrypted MR message when recipientId does not contain MA certificate Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clause 7.1 Configu... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3 ITS-S | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.1 Introduction | All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set: PICS_IUT_ITS-S = TRUE ETSI ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05) 16 |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2 CA messages | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.1 General | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_BV_01 Test Objective Check that the IUT provides the certificate of the reported ITS-S when the invalid secured geonetworking packet does not contain the AT certificate Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01 PICS Selection PICS_DETEC... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.2 Class1 | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.2.1 CAM security detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_SEC_BV_01 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates an encrypted MR message. Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clause 7.1 Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01 PICS Selection PICS_IUT_ITS_S and PICS_DETECTOR_CAM_SECURITY Initial Conditions with { the IUT being in the initial state and the IUT is authorized with... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.2.2 CAM speed misbehaviour detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_CLASS1_CAM_BV_01 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates an invalid speed value observation on a CAM in the MR message when requested (Class 1) - obs-Speed-ValueTooLarge-VehicleType (e.g. A cycle with a speed of 100 km/h) Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.2.3 CAM longitudinal acceleration misbehaviour detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_CLASS1_CAM_BV_03 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates an invalid acceleration value observation on a CAM in the MR message when requested (Class 1) - obs-LongAcc-ValueTooLarge Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01 PICS Select... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.2.4 CAM position misbehaviour detector | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.3 Class2 | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.3.1 CAM speed misbehaviour detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_CLASS2_CAM_BV_01 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates a MR message with an observation of an inconsistent speed change (regarding acceleration) in consecutive CAMs when requested (Class 2) - obs-Speed-ChangeTooLarge Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A ... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.3.2 CAM position misbehaviour detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_CLASS2_CAM_BV_02 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates an inconsistent position changed value (calculated speed based on the new position) in consecutive CAMs MR message when requested (Class 2) - obs-Position-ChangeTooLarge Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and ... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.3.3 CAM heading misbehaviour detector | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.3.4 CAM acceleration misbehaviour detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_CLASS2_CAM_BV_04 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates a MR message with an observation of an inconsistent acceleration change (regarding the vehicle type) in consecutive CAMs when requested (Class 2) - obs-LongAcc-ValueTooLarge Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 ... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.3.5 CAM beacon interval detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_CLASS2_CAM_BV_05 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates a MR message with an observation of an inconsistent CAM frequency greater than 10 Hz(Class 2) - obs-Beacon-IntervalTooSmall Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01 PICS Sele... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.3.6 CAM static misbehaviour detector | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MESSAGES_CLASS2_CAM_BV_10_1 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates an invalid static changed value in consecutive CAMs MR message when requested (Class 2) - obs-Static-Change: SpecialTransport Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A ETSI EN 302 637-2 [5], clause B.40... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.4 Class3 | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.5 Class4 | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.6 Class5 | N/A. ETSI ETSI TS 103 868-2 V2.1.1 (2024-05) 32 |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.7 Multiple CAM misbehaviour reports | |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.7.1 Class1 | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MULTIPLE_MESSAGES_CAM_01 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates a single MR message containing observations on receiving CAM messages with different class 1 inconsistencies Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01 PICS Selection PICS_IUT_I... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.7.2 Class2 | TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MULTIPLE_MESSAGES_CAM_02 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates a single MR message containing observations on receiving CAM messages with different class 2 inconsistencies Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 4.2.3, 6.2 and 7.2 and Annex A Configuration CFG_ITS_MRS_01 PICS Selection PICS_IUT_I... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.7.3 Class3 | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.7.4 Class4 | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.7.5 Class5 | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.2.7.6 Multiple classes | NOTE: Upon receiving several inconsistent CA messages, the IUT can send reports separately. This decision is out of scope of ETSI TS 103 759 [1]. TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_MULTIPLE_MESSAGES_CAM_04 Test Objective Check that the IUT generates a single MR message containing observations of an invalid speed change, an invalid posi... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.3.3 DEN messages | N/A. |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.4 Forwarding | TP Id TP_MRS_RSU_FORWARDING_01 Test Objective Check that the IUT forwards a received MR message Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 5 and 7.2 PICS Selection PICS_IUT_RSU and PICS_SHORT_RANGE Initial Conditions with { the IUT being in the initial state } Expected Behaviour ensure that { when { the IUT received a Etsi... |
734535a6dff51df2a61c13c2cd844f77 | 103 868-2 | 5.5 Short range transport | All test purposes in the present clause may be included in the test sequence if following PICS items are set: TP Id TP_MRS_ITSS_SRT_01 Test Objective Check that MR message is encapsulated in BTP type B packet Reference ETSI TS 103 759 [1], clauses 5 and 7.2 PICS Selection PICS_IUT_ITS_S and PICS_SHORT_RANGE Initial Con... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 1 Scope | The present document defines security requirements for the network routers to mitigate the threats analysed in ETSI TR 103 869 [i.1]. |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 2 References | |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: administrator: entity with the valid identity for operation and maintenance of the network router through the login to the device lawful interception: action (based on the law), performed by a communications service provider, of making available certa... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting ACL Access Control List ARP Address Resolution Protocol ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization BGP Border Gateway Protocol BNG Broadband Network Gateway CAR Committed Access Rate CFI Control F... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 4 Network router introduction | In the Internet model, constituent networks are connected by IP datagram forwarders which are called routers or IP routers. There are many types of routers. The home and small office routers, which simply forward IP packets between the home computers and the Internet, are out of the scope of the present document. The p... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 5 Security objectives for threat mitigation | As described in clause 5.1 of ETSI TR 103 869 [i.1], the security objectives for threat mitigation include eight dimensions: Access control, Authenticity, Non-repudiation, Data confidentiality, Communication security, Data integrity, Availability/Resilience, and Privacy. The mitigations should include mechanisms of dif... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6 Network router security requirements | |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.1 Objectives | The objectives of this clause are to identify a possible common set of measures which are able to mitigate the threats faced by the network router, which have been identified in clause 5 of ETSI TR 103 869 [i.1], and to provide guidance for designing a robust security framework of products. |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.2 Prerequisites | The mitigation measures defined in the present document adhere to the following prerequisites: • The mitigation measures defined in the present document are security requirements for the network router itself and are based on the network router architecture introduced in clause 4.2 of ETSI TR 103 869 [i.1]. The present... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.3 Access control | Requirement.AC.001: The network router shall control the access to the OS by following the principle of least privilege when granting an administrator the permission to access the OS resources. NOTE: Embedded devices, including the network router, usually use closed systems built upon the Unix-like system, such as Linu... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.4 Authenticity | Requirement.AU.001: The network router shall authenticate and authorize assigned access rights to each administrator when they login to the network router. EXAMPLE: AAA is a technology which provides authentication, authorization, and accounting functions. The AAA server receives connection requests, completes authenti... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.5 Data confidentiality | Requirement.DC.001: The network router shall use best practice cryptography when the packets, files, or data need to be cryptographically operated, such as encryption/decryption, signature/signature-verification, and so on. NOTE 1: The meaning of best practice cryptography is defined in ETSI EN 303 645 [i.8]. NOTE 2: T... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.6 Communication security | Requirement.CS.001: The network router shall support best practice security protocols, including SSHv2 or TLS1.2/TLS1.3, to protect the management plane operations, such as remote login, file transfer, and log transfer. ETSI ETSI TS 103 931 V1.1.1 (2024-01) 12 Requirement.CS.002: The network router shall support best p... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.7 Data integrity | Requirement.DI.001: The network router shall support best practice security mechanisms, such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) mechanism and Control Flow Integrity (CFI) mechanism, to protect the system against attacks on known vulnerabilities. EXAMPLE 1: The network router can support the Address Space Layo... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.8 Availability/Resilience | Requirement.AR.001: The network router shall monitor the operational status of its own systems, detect service failures and provide either automatic recovery mechanisms or alerting. EXAMPLE: Some attacks, such as tampering with the packets, can cause system exceptions on the network router, such as high CPU usage or po... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.9 Privacy | Requirement.PR.001: The network router shall not trace, parse, forward, or store the payload of user packets unless the critical functions like lawful interception is enabled by the authorized administrator. |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 6.10 Non-repudiation | Requirement.NR.001: The network router shall generate records of all security-related events, such as administrator login, modification of account and authentication credentials, and the information of detected or suspected attacks. EXAMPLE: The abnormal increase of CPU-usage or other resources can be an indication for... |
7c6c208baa2803788f6e540d85f93545 | 103 931 | 7 Rationales | The threats faced by the network router is analysed in ETSI TR 103 869 [i.1]. It defines in detail the threat scenarios numbers and vulnerability numbers that are used below. Table 1: Mitigation Requirement Rationales Threat Type Threat Threat Scenario No. Vulnerability No. Mitigation Requirement No. Unauthorized inter... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 1 Scope | The present document describes the security threats and specifies the related security requirements of sensor hubs used in consumer devices. The present document focuses on hardware implementations of a sensor hub regardless if it is implemented on a dedicated chip or as a part of a SoC. It provides a set of requiremen... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 2 References | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: sensor hub: microcontroller or auxiliary processor that helps to obtain, integrate, and process data from different sensors and chipsets threats: As defined in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1]. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: BLE Blue Tooth Low Energy GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System DDR Double Data Rate DRAM DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory HAL Hardware Abstraction Layer IoT Internet of Thing MCU Microcontroller Unit MEMS Micro-Electro-Mechanical System OS... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4 Sensor Hub description | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.1 Introduction | The sensor hub can comprehensively process the collected sensor information based on the requirements of different applications and send the processing result to the upper-layer applications. The sensor stack of a consumer device in most of the cases includes a sensor hub, useful to perform some so-called low-level com... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.2 Functions and Architecture | Based on the requirements of different terminals and service scenarios, the sensor hub architectures can be classified into two types: • built-in MCU; and • external MCU. The sensor hub and the sensors considered in the present document are all included in the same device (e.g. a smartphone). Figure 2: Sensor hub archi... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.3 Sensor hub interfaces | As shown in Figure 4, the sensor hub supports three types of interfaces. Figure 4: Sensor hub interfaces SI1: the interface between the sensor hub and the application processing module to implement requests and responses between applications and sensor hub. SI2: the interfaces between the sensor hub and other modules i... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4 Data Type | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.1 Introduction | The data considered in the present document refers to the data that is processed by the sensor hub and is related to application service functions. This type of data can be associated with the users, therefore they need to be handled granting their security and privacy. The sensor hub considers three different data cat... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.2 Raw data | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.2.1 General | Raw data refers to unprocessed data received by the sensor hub trough interface SI3 from components such as sensors and chips. Based on the sensors and chipset involved in the data collection, this data can include the sensor data, location data, and other information type data. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.2.2 Sensor data | The sensor data include but are not limited to: motion data, optical data, pressure data, geomagnetic data, and others data. Table 1 lists some examples of sensors and the possible related applications. Table 1: Types and functions of sensor Sensor type Sensor Function Application Pressure Barometer Perceive barometric... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.2.3 Location data | Location data includes location information such as cell information and GNSS data. There are two types of position data components: coarse position data and precise position data. Cell information belongs to coarse location data, and GNSS data belongs to precise location data. Both can be used for positioning, track r... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.2.4 Other Information Types | There are data other than the foregoing data processed by the sensor hub such as a peer BLE/WLAN device status. ETSI ETSI TS 103 864 V1.1.1 (2023-01) 11 NOTE: The BLE/WLAN device status at the peer end can be used for locating faults. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.3 Processing data | Process data is temporary data generated by the sensor hub based on raw data processing, for example, location data recorded during trace generation. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.4 Result data | The result data is the outcome data from the raw data or processing data by sensor hub, such as step counting data, or activity recognition. The result data are then delivered to the requested application on the application processor trough interface SI1. Data delivered singly or in batches directly to the application ... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 4.4.5 Data classification | To enable the sensor hub to provide a complete security protection mechanism for the data processed by itself, data are classified into three levels based on the impact of the leakage on user privacy. This classification is in line with those defined in ETSI TS 103 732 [1]. The sensor hub supports the following classif... |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 5 Security threats | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 5.1 Assets | The assets to be protected within the sensor hub are listed hereafter: • Data stored in the sensor hub such as raw data, process data and result data. • Stored credential for the sensor hub access. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 5.2 Threats | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 5.2.1 General | The sensor hub is a built-in or an external MCU (see clause 4.2) and the threats can be enforced on its interfaces described in clause 4.3. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 5.2.2 Eavesdrop | An entity (e.g. a malicious or poorly programmed application or local agent able to access in some way the sensor hub interfaces) is capable to read communication between the sensor hub and other entities and thereby access confidential data assets in transit. ETSI ETSI TS 103 864 V1.1.1 (2023-01) 12 |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 5.2.3 Modify communications | An entity can intercept the communication between the sensor hub on its interfaces and thereby modify data assets in transit. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 5.2.4 Modification of the sensor hub algorithms used to process data | An entity (e.g. a malicious application) can modify the algorithms used by the sensor hub to process data and therefore alter the result. Data provided to the application processor are wrong, leading to unintended information disclosure or denial of service. |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 6 Security requirements | |
ee77c8f7be407a0f01cf22efa1949581 | 103 864 | 6.1 General requirements | Provision 6.1-1: Sensor hub shall be implemented in a hardware isolated secure execution domain. NOTE: As described in clause 4.2 the sensor hub can be either build-in in a SoC or be an external discrete component. Provision 6.1-2: The integrity of the sensor hub algorithms used to process raw data shall be verified. P... |
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