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7.7.2.2 Searching mode request
The access rights procedure triggered by the user on the PT causes it to actively search for an FT broadcasting 'Access rights requests supported' capability bit (Higher layer capabilities bit a44 = 1, see ETSI EN 300 175-5 [5], clause F.1 and ETSI EN 300 444 [9], annex A. The searching mode shall be limited by the tim...
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7.7.2.3 Base station limited registration mode
The FP shall have a physical or a logical button to trigger the access rights procedure. When the button is pressed on the FT, the FT shall set its broadcasting 'Access rights requests supported' capability bit to enable the on-air subscription (see clauses 7.6.17.2 and 7.8.2). When the access rights procedure is succe...
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7.7.2.4 Registration user feedback
In order to improve the security, the FT and the PT shall give a feedback to the user of the registration process through a user interface (for example a display, an LED or a buzzer). The feedback given on the user interface of the PT and the FT shall be as a minimum the following status of the registration process wit...
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7.7.3 Head tracking
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7.7.3.1 General
The head tracking feature adds an uplink data channel to provide the user's head orientation and movement to the FT application. Support of the head tracking channel shall be indicated by the PT in the terminal capabilities (see clause 7.6.15) using the <<IWU-to-IWU>> IE (see clause A.2.1). If the FT supports the head ...
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7.8 Management procedures
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7.8.1 General
This clause specifies the additional management procedures required for advanced audio services which are not described in ETSI EN 300 444 [9] (GAP), clause 13, or which incorporate modifications to the GAP specification. The advanced audio profile PT shall be capable of reading and interpreting at least the following ...
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7.8.2 Broadcast attributes management
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7.8.2.1 Procedure
NOTE: This procedure description replaces clause 13.6 of ETSI EN 300 444 [9] (GAP). RFPs belonging to the same location area shall broadcast the same values of higher layer attributes (see ETSI EN 300 175-5 [5], annex F) at any given time. The advanced audio profile PT shall be capable of reading and interpreting at le...
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7.8.2.2 Higher layer capabilities
Table 64 shows the higher layer capabilities that shall be understood by the PT. ETSI ETSI TS 103 706 V1.1.1 (2022-01) 100 Table 64: Broadcast attributes interpretation by the PT: Higher layer capabilities Bit Number Attribute Value Note a36 DECT Standard authentication (DSAA) required 0,1 a37 DECT Standard Cipher (DSC...
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7.8.2.3 Extended higher layer capabilities
Table 65 shows the extended higher layer capabilities that shall be understood by the PT. Table 65: Broadcast attributes interpretation by the PT: Extended higher layer capabilities Bit Number Attribute Value Note a41 Asymmetric bearers supported 1
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7.8.2.4 Extended higher layer capabilities (part 2)
Table 66 shows the extended higher layer capabilities (part 2) that shall be understood by the PT. Table 66: Broadcast attributes interpretation by the PT: Extended higher layer capabilities (part 2) Bit Number Attribute Value Note a42 Support of "Re-keying" and "early encryption" 0,1 See ETSI EN 300 444 [9], clauses 8...
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7.8.2.5 Extended higher layer capabilities (part 3)
Table 67 shows the extended higher layer capabilities (part 3) that shall be understood by the PT. ETSI ETSI TS 103 706 V1.1.1 (2022-01) 101 Table 67: Broadcast attributes interpretation by the PT: Extended Higher layer capabilities (part 3) Bit Number Attribute Value Note a36 Support of advanced audio profile micropho...
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1 Scope
The present document defines a PP-Module for Consumer Mobile Device (CMD) which adds additional security requirements on preloaded applications and the functional capabilities (objectives and security functional requirements) that are required to mitigate threats from poor programming of those applications. The present...
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a...
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2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i...
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: consumer mobile device: user customizable device utilizing an operating system, supporting installation and maintenance of applications, with wireless internet connectivity, high computation power and rich user interface, used for various purposes by ...
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3.2 Symbols
Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ADP Application Distribution Platform API Application Program Interface CC Common Criteria CEM Common Evaluation Methodology CMD Consumer Mobile Device ECD Extended Component Definition OS Operating System PP Protection Profile SAR Security As...
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4 TOE Definition
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4.1 TOE Overview
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4.1.1 Introduction
This PP-Module introduces additional requirements on applications available on the CMD after the initial CMD setup is complete. The applications covered by these requirements are divided into preloaded and preinstalled applications. The requirements for preloaded applications are focused on defining security requiremen...
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4.1.2 Preloaded Application Requirements
This PP-Module introduces additional security requirements to the TOE as defined in ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] specifically related to preloaded applications in the CMD. These additional requirements provide checks to the design of the preloaded applications to protect user and TSF data stored in the TOE.
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4.1.3 Preinstalled Application Requirements
This PP-Module introduces additional security assurance requirements to the TOE as defined in ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] specifically related to some preinstalled applications in the CMD. The requirements for preinstalled applications are focused on the permissions assigned to such applications. Assigning system permissions...
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4.2 Usage and Major Security Features
This is a Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) used to extend a Base-PP for a consumer mobile device to provide additional security requirements on preloaded applications. As these applications are not explicitly chosen by the user, the manufacturer can provide additional assurance to the trustworthiness of the CMD by...
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4.3 PP-Module Identification
PP-Module Title ETSI TS 103 732-4: "Consumer Mobile Device; Part 4: Preloaded Applications Protection Profile Module". PP-Module Version 1.1.1 PP-Module Date June 11, 2024
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4.4 Base-PP Identification
• This PP-Module relies on the following Base-PP: Base-PP Short Name [CMD PP] Base-PP Title ETSI TS 103 732-1: "Consumer Mobile Device; Part 1: Base Protection Profile". Base-PP Version 2.1.2 Base-PP Date November 16, 2023
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4.5 Conformance Claim
The present document: • claims conformance to CC V3.1 Release 5 [1], [2], [3] and the CC and CEM addenda [5]; • is CC Part 2 [2] extended; • assurance requirements are inherited from the Base-PP augmented with APA_LST.1; • does not claim conformance to any other PP.
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5 Security Problem Definition
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5.1 Assets and interfaces of the TOE
The TOE of this PP-Module is the set of preloaded applications and preinstalled applications with system permission on the CMD. The preinstalled applications with system permission are documented, but excluded from the scope of application testing. This PP-Module introduces new security requirements to the CMD to manag...
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5.2 Threat agents and threats
The following threat agent in addition to those in the Base-PP is identified as below: • TA.FLAWPREAPP: a poorly programmed application that is installed by the TOE manufacturer as part of the system software and therefore has access to the application interface, and possibly to the local wireless interface and/or the ...
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5.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no organizational security policies defined for the TOE.
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5.4 Assumptions
There are no assumptions defined for the TOE.
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6 Security Objectives
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6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
O.LIMITED_PERMISSIONS - The TOE shall provide system permissions only to the preinstalled applications under TOE manufacturer control. O.OLD_APP_WARNING - The TOE shall provide the user with notifications when uninstalling updates from a preloaded application contained in the system software when an older version of th...
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6.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
There are no security objectives for the operational environment.
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6.3 Security Objectives Rationale
Threat Rationale T.APP_REVERSION This threat is countered by O.OLD_APP_WARNING by ensuring the user is aware a preloaded application will be replaced by an older version if the preloaded application is part of the system software. T.PERMISSIONS This threat is countered by O.LIMITED_PERMISSIONS by ensuring that preinsta...
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7 Extended Components
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7.1 Definitions
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7.1.1 Definition of the Class FAP: Applications
This class of requirements is focused on the risks associated with improperly designed applications. Applications are separate from the main operating system, though they may be included as part of the functionality provided on a consumer mobile device. Applications can provide unique attack vectors based on how they a...
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7.1.2 Definition of the family Application Lifecycle (FAP_LFC)
Family Behaviour Applications need to be maintained to ensure flaws are corrected. This family defines requirements around how applications are updated and the actions that are taken when those updates are uninstalled (by the user). Component Levelling FAP_LFC.1 Preloaded applications are required to be updated to ensu...
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7.1.3 Definition of the family Application Permissions (FAP_PRM)
Family Behaviour While all applications will have some set of permissions assigned (to access TOE services), some permissions are considered more dangerous than others in terms of protecting both the TOE and user data. This family defines how those permissions named system permission should be restricted. Component Lev...
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7.1.4 Definition of the family Application Risk (FAP_RSK)
Family Behaviour Applications are subject to specific risks related to common coding practices. Following best practices for application development ensures that core capabilities of the applications are correct. FAP_PRM: Application Permissions 1 ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-4 V1.1.1 (2024-06) 16 Component Levelling FAP_RSK.1...
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7.1.5 Definition of the Identification of applications on device (APA_LST)
Enumerating the preloaded and preinstalled applications with system permission is necessary to ensure how the operating system is separated from applications that are bundled as part of the system software. This family requires the developer to specify the applications from the TOE manufacturer that are available on th...
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8 Security requirements
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8.1 Conventions
The following conventions are used for the completion of operations defined in the SFRs: • Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in Part 2 [2] or their Extended Component Definition (ECD). • Refinement made in the PP: the refinement text is indicated with bold text and strikethroughs. ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-4 V1.1.1...
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8.2 ETSI TS 103 732-1 Security functional requirements
There are no modifications to the SFRs from the Base-PP.
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8.3 TOE Security functional requirements
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8.3.1 Applications (FAP)
FAP_LFC.1 Preloaded application updates FAP_LFC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that preloaded applications are updated by [selection: using an ADP and system software updates (to the version maintained in firmware), only by system software updates]. FAP_LFC.2 Preloaded application uninstall FAP_LFC.2.1 The TSF shall warn the...
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8.3.2 Application Risk (FAP_RSK)
The Application Risk requirements defined here are targeted specifically at preloaded (not preinstalled) applications on the CMD. While the requirements are for generic applications, here they are specifically used for preloaded applications, and so all references to applications here are for preloaded applications. FA...
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8.4 Security assurance requirements
In addition to the security assurance requirements defined in the Base-PP, the following assurance requirement is defined here (APA_LST.1). APA_LST.1 Application listing This component requires the TOE developer to provide information on the applications which are available on the CMD after the initial CMD setup is com...
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8.5 Security requirements rationale
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8.5.1 Rationale for choosing the SARs
This PP-Module defines an additional security assurance requirements family in addition to what is defined in the Base- PP. This class specifically adds activities around the preloaded and some preinstalled applications included in the TOE boundary for the TOE developer to complete. In combination with the SARs from th...
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8.5.2 The SFRs meet all the security objectives for the TOE
Security Objective Rationale O.OLD_APP_WARNING This objective is achieved by FAP_LFC.2 which specifies how users are warned when preloaded applications contained in the system software have their updates removed. O.LIMITED_PERMISSIONS This objective is achieved by FAP_PRM.1 by specifying system permissions and then exc...
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8.5.3 Dependency analysis
SFR Dependency Rationale FAP_LFC.1 - FAP_LFC.2 - FAP_LFC.3 - FAP_PRM.1 - FAP_RSK.1 - FAP_RSK.2 - FAP_RSK.3 FAP_RSK.2 Included in the PP-Module FAP_RSK.4 - FAP_RSK.5 FAP_RSK.4 Included in the PP-Module FAP_RSK.6 - FAP_RSK.7 - FAP_RSK.8 - FAP_RSK.9 - FAP_RSK.10 - ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-4 V1.1.1 (2024-06) 24
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8.6 Consistency rationale
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8.6.1 TOE type consistency
When this PP-Module is used to extend the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] Base-PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a consumer mobile device. This PP-Module adds requirements on the preloaded and some preinstalled applications included in the consumer mobile device. The TSF boundary is not extended, but provides more de...
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8.6.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition
The threats and assumptions defined by the PP-Module are consistent with those defined in the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] Base-PP as follows: PP-Module Threats Consistency Rationale T.APP_REVERSION The threat of downgrading system software applications is a subset of the T.NEW_ATTACKS threat in the Base-PP. T.PERMISSIONS Thi...
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8.6.3 Consistency of Objectives
The objectives for the preloaded applications are consistent with the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [6] Base-PP based on the following rationale: PP-Module TOE Objectives Consistency Rationale O.LIMITED_PERMISSIONS This TOE Objective is related to the O.SELF_PROTECTION objective in the Base-PP. O.OLD_APP_WARNING This TOE Objective...
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8.6.4 Consistency of Requirements
The TOE of this PP-Module is comprised of all the preloaded and TOE manufacturer preinstalled applications described in clause 4.1. The preloaded and TOE manufacturer preinstalled applications comprise both core functionality of the mobile device as well as additional functionality added by the TOE manufacturer. This P...
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1 Scope
The present document specifies a conformance assessment methodology for consumer IoT devices, their relation to associated services and corresponding relevant processes against ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2], addressing the mandatory and recommended provisions as well as conditions and complements of ETSI TS 1...
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a...
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2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i...
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 103 645 [1], ETSI EN 303 645 [2] and the following apply: assess: generate a result by analysis using evaluator expertise NOTE: The statement that uses this verb identifies what is analysed and the properties for which it is analysed. The combination ...
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3.2 Symbols
Void. ETSI ETSI TS 103 701 V2.1.1 (2025-05) 13
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AES Advanced Encryption Standard API Application Programming Interface ARM Advanced RISC Machines ARP Address Resolution Protocol BL Boot Loader BLE Bluetooth® Low Energy BSI Federal Office for Information Security (Germany) CC Common Criteria...
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4 Conformance assessment methodology
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4.1 Overview and document structure
Clause 4.2 describes the relevant roles and objects for the conformance assessment procedure. Clause 4.3 describes the assessment procedure. Clause 4.4 describes how to declare the conformity of the consumer IoT device to the provisions of ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2] using the associated Implementation Conf...
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4.2 Roles and objects
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4.2.1 Device Under Test (DUT)
The Device Under Test (DUT) is a specific consumer IoT device (as defined in ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2]), which is subject to assessment against the provisions of ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2]. TSOs address the DUT functionality, its relation to associated services and development/management proc...
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4.2.2 Supplier Organization (SO)
The Supplier Organization (SO) requests a specific DUT to be tested against the provisions of ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2]. The SO can be the developer, manufacturer, vendor or distributor of the DUT. The SO usually serves as single point of contact to the TL, and is expected to coordinate with parties acros...
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4.2.3 Test Laboratory (TL)
The Test Laboratory (TL) is (a defined part of) an entity that carries out the conformance assessment of a DUT. The relation to associated services and development/management processes of the DUT are partially also considered in the assessment (see ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2]). TL 1st Party ●Part of the Sup...
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4.3 Assessment procedure
Figure 4: Phases of the assessment procedure (informative example) The present clause provides an abstract procedure for performing the conformance assessment against the provisions of ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2]. The assessment procedure is performed by applying the following phases, which are illustrated ...
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4.4 Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS)
The Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) is made by the SO, of the capabilities implemented in or supported by the DUT on the base of the provisions from ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2]. In the ICS the SO shall claim all provisions which are the object of the assessment. This is done by a written "Yes" in...
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4.5 Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (IXIT)
The Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (IXIT) contains additional necessary information to perform the assessment. It is the basis for grey-box testing methodology which is used for the assessment and provides some design details for the TL. The IXIT pro forma is provided in clause A.3. This pro forma describ...
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4.6 Assignment of verdicts
In general, there are three kinds of verdicts: an overall verdict, test group verdicts and test case verdicts. The overall verdict is i.a. composed of the results of the applied test groups (the test group verdicts). The test group verdicts are in turn i.a. composed of the results of the contained test cases (the test ...
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4.7 Usage of external evidences
Existing security certifications or third-party evaluations of parts of the DUT may be used partially as evidence for the conformance to reduce the effort of the assessment. In this case the SO shall announce in the "Detail" column of the addressed provision in the ICS that conformance is already assessed combined with...
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4.8 Assessment scheme amendments
An assessment scheme typically provides a frame for the performance of an assessment. ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2] and the present document can be used by an assessment scheme, such as a manufacturer scheme, a self- assessment scheme or a certification scheme. Figure 5 illustrates the role of an assessment s...
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5 Test scenarios for consumer IoT
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5.0 TSO 5.0: Reporting implementation
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5.0.1 Test group 5.0-1
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5.0.1.0 Test group objective
The test group addresses the provision 5.0-1. Manufacturer Scheme (e.g. Internal Procedure) Self Assessment Scheme (e.g. IoT Label) Certification Scheme (e.g. IoT Certificate) Assessment Scheme* Provisions (normative) ICS ETSI EN 303 645 ETSI TS 103 645 / Test Groups (normative) IXIT ETSI TS 103 701 Tester Expertise Cr...
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5.0.1.1 Test case 5.0-1-1 (conceptual)
Test purpose The purpose of this test case is the conceptual assessment of the justifications for recommendations that are considered to be not applicable for or not fulfilled by the DUT. Test units a) The TL shall check whether a justification is given in the ICS for each recommendation that is considered to be not ap...
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5.1 TSO 5.1: No universal default passwords
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5.1.1 Test group 5.1-1
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5.1.1.0 Test group objective
The test group addresses the provision 5.1-1. This test group addresses all states of the DUT with the exception of factory default.
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5.1.1.1 Test case 5.1-1-1 (conceptual)
Test purpose The purpose of this test case is the conceptual assessment of the password-based authentication mechanisms used to authenticate users against the DUT or for machine-to-machine authentication. Test units a) The TL shall assess for all password-based authentication mechanisms in IXIT 1-AuthMech, that are use...
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5.1.1.2 Test case 5.1-1-2 (functional)
Test purpose The purpose of this test case is the functional assessment of the password-based authentication mechanisms used to authenticate users against the DUT or for machine-to-machine authentication concerning the completeness of the IXIT documentation a), the passwords defined by the user b) and the generation me...
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5.1.2 Test group 5.1-2
Test group objective The test group addresses the provision 5.1-2. Test case 5.1-2-1 (conceptual) Test purpose The purpose of this test case is the conceptual assessment of the generation mechanisms of pre-installed passwords. Test units a) The TL shall assess for each authentication mechanism in IXIT 1-AuthMech, that ...
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103 701
5.1.2A Test group 5.1-2A
5.1.2A.0 Test group objective The test group addresses the provision 5.1-2A. 5.1.2A.1 Test case 5.1-2A-1 (conceptual) Test purpose The purpose of this test case is the conceptual assessment whether passwords are used for machine-to-machine authentication. Test units a) The TL shall assess for each authentication mechan...
c3dea0100f00b9b204a008ec459da259
103 701
5.1.3 Test group 5.1-3
c3dea0100f00b9b204a008ec459da259
103 701
5.1.3.0 Test group objective
The test group addresses the provision 5.1-3. According to ETSI TS 103 645 [1]/ETSI EN 303 645 [2] best practice cryptography is defined as cryptography that is suitable for the corresponding use case and has no indication of a feasible attack with current readily available techniques. In the present test group, the te...
c3dea0100f00b9b204a008ec459da259
103 701
5.1.3.1 Test case 5.1-3-1 (conceptual)
Test purpose The purpose of this test case is the conceptual assessment of the cryptography used for the authentication mechanisms used to authenticate users against the DUT or for machine-to-machine authentication concerning the use of best practice cryptography (a-c) and the vulnerability to a feasible attack d). Tes...
c3dea0100f00b9b204a008ec459da259
103 701
5.1.3.2 Test case 5.1-3-2 (functional)
Test purpose The purpose of this test case is the functional assessment of the cryptography used for authentication mechanisms used to authenticate users against the DUT or for machine-to-machine authentication. Test units a) For each authentication mechanism in IXIT 1-AuthMech, that is used to authenticate users again...
c3dea0100f00b9b204a008ec459da259
103 701
5.1.4 Test group 5.1-4
c3dea0100f00b9b204a008ec459da259
103 701
5.1.4.0 Test group objective
The test group addresses the provision 5.1-4.