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103 705
6.4.1 Format
Every CSP-defined schema in the CSP Schema shall be a valid JSON Schema [3] document.
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6.4.2 Definitions
Each definition given in the CSP Schema shall have the following annotation elements populated. Table 6.4.2-1: Record Set Description elements Field Cardinality Description description 1 Provides a description of the new element, including any appropriate indications of usage, format and any other pertinent details of ...
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6.5 Drafting principles
Schemas shall be drafted according to the principles in this clause 6.5. The following principles shall be followed except where the principle makes it impractical to convey the relevant information accurately: • ETSI-defined type shall be used in preference to custom-defined ones (see Annex D example 1 for an example ...
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6.6 Availability
The CSP shall ensure the CSP Schema has been received and accepted by the LEA prior to the first use of that schema in a Response. The means by which it is provided is out of scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 103 705 V1.5.1 (2025-11) 15 Annex A (normative): Catalogue of ETSI-defined types A.1 Overview The ETS...
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1 Scope
The present document defines a PP-Module for Consumer Mobile Device (CMD) Multi-user, which adds support for multiple unique users to the CMD each with separate authentication and (shared, but isolated) storage. The PP-Module identifies the key aspects needed to support multi-user capabilities on the CMD platform and i...
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a...
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2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i...
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: consumer mobile device: user customizable device utilizing an operating system, supporting installation and maintenance of applications, with wireless internet connectivity, high computation power and rich user interface, used for various purposes by ...
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3.2 Symbols
Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: CC Common Criteria CMD Consumer Mobile Device ECD Extended Component Definition EMM Enterprise Mobility Management FDP Functional class user Data Protection FIA Functional class Identification and Authentication FMT Functional class security M...
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4 TOE Definition
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4.1 TOE Overview
The TOE type remains as described in [CMD PP]. The usage and major security features of the TOE generally remains as described in [CMD PP]. This PP-Module introduces the scenario where the main OS supports multiple users. Different users are likely to have different privileges. Most likely, the level of privileges will...
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4.2 Usage and Major Security Features
This is a Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) used to extend a Base-PP for a consumer mobile device that implements Multi-User functionality. Therefore, the Target of Evaluation (TOE) in this PP-Module is a mobile device that implements Multi-User functionality. Management privileges are normally going to be limited,...
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4.3 PP-Module Identification
PP-Module Title ETSI TS 103 732-3: "Consumer Mobile Device; Part 3: Multi-user Protection Profile Module" PP-Module Version 1.1.1 PP-Module Date October 23, 2023
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4.4 Base-PP Identification
• This PP-Module relies on the following Base-PP: Base-PP Short Name [CMD PP] Base-PP Title ETSI TS 103 732-1 [4]: "Consumer Mobile Device; Part 1: Base Protection Profile" Base-PP Version 2.1.1 Base-PP Date October 23, 2023
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4.5 Conformance Claim
The present document: • claims conformance to CC V3.1 Release 5 [1], [2], [3] and the CC and CEM addenda [5]; • is CC Part 2 [2] extended and CC Part 3 [3] extended; • inherits all assurance requirements from the Base-PP; • does not claim conformance to any other PP.
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5 Security Problem Definition
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5.1 Assets and interfaces of the TOE
In addition to the assets to be protected as defined in the Base-PP, the following assets are protected in the PP-Module: • Individual user data assets stored in the TOE: - user data: files, photos, videos, notifications, etc. Interfaces of the TOE are defined in the Base-PP. ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-3 V1.1.1 (2023-10) 10
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5.2 Threat agents and threats
The Threat Agents for this PP-Module are (a more limited set from the Base-PP): • TA.PHYSICAL: a threat agent who has physical access to the TOE, and therefore to both the user interface and the physical interface. The threats for this PP-Module are identified as below: T.ACCESS_USERDATA - A threat agent might gain acc...
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5.3 Organizational Security Policies
This PP-Module does not add any organizational security policies to what is in the Base-PP.
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5.4 Assumptions
This PP-Module does not add any assumptions to what is in the Base-PP.
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6 Security Objectives
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6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
O.DATA_SEPARATION - The TOE will ensure that user data is only accessible to the owner of the data. O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS - The TOE will control access of subjects and/or users to named resources based on identity of the object. The TSF shall allow authorized users to specify for each access mode which users/subjects ...
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6.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
This PP-Module does not add any security objectives for the operational environment to what is in the Base-PP.
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6.3 Security Objectives Rationale
Threat Rationale T.ACCESS_USERDATA This threat is countered by O.DATA_SEPARATION ensuring that only authenticated user can access the device functionality. T.ACCESS_TSFFUNC This threat is countered by O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS ensuring that only authenticated user can access the device functionality.
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7 Extended Components Definition
None defined. ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-3 V1.1.1 (2023-10) 11
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8 Security requirements
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8.1 Conventions
The following conventions are used for the completion of operations defined in the SFRs: • Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [2] or their Extended Component Definition (ECD) • Refinement made in the PP: the refinement text is indicated with bold text and strikethroughs • Selection wholly or partially comple...
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8.2 Base-PP Security Functional Requirement Direction
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8.2.1 Introduction
In a PP-Configuration that includes the ETSI TS 103 732-1 [4], the multi-user functionality is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented in the CMD as a whole and evaluated against the Base-PP. While the PP-Module does not require any changes to the requirements of the Base-PP, it does rely on seve...
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8.2.2 Authentication
The PP-Module does not implement any requirements targeting authentication functionality. In an evaluated CMD using a PP-Configuration including this PP-Module, the authentication system is expected to support multiple users on the device instead of a single user. The authentication functionality provided for each addi...
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8.2.3 Permissions Policy
The access control policy from the PP-Module should work together with the Permissions Policy from the Base-PP to integrate separate user accounts as a variable in the access control list associated with the permissions policy.
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8.2.4 Management User Controls
The management functions listed as user controls should be able to be set for each user. For example, notification settings should be unique to each user on the device. ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-3 V1.1.1 (2023-10) 12
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8.3 Security functional requirements
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8.3.1 Multi-User requirements
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8.3.1.1 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_ACC.2/Multi Complete access control FDP_ACC.2.1/Multi The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control Policy] on [ • subjects: processes acting on behalf of a user; • objects: Apps and files]. and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. FDP_ACC.2.2/Multi The TSF shall ensure that all o...
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8.3.1.2 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MSA.1/Multi Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.1.1/Multi The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control Policy] to restrict the ability to [create, modify, delete] the security attributes [selection: secondary role user accounts, guest role user accounts and [assignment: list of security attributes ...
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8.4 Security requirements rationale
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8.4.1 Rationale for choosing the SARs
This PP-Module does not define any additional assurance requirements above and beyond what is defined in the Base-PP that it extends. Application of the SARs to the TOE boundary described by both the claimed base and this PP-Module is sufficient to demonstrate that the claimed SFRs have been implemented correctly by th...
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8.4.2 The SFRs meet all the security objectives for the TOE
Security Objective Rationale O.DATA_SEPARATION This objective is achieved by: • FDP_ACC.2/Multi specifies the policy to access data. • FDP_ACF.1/Multi specifies the policy to access data. • FMT_MSA.1/Multi specifying that only the primary role user account can create, modify, delete other user accounts. • FMT_SMR.1 spe...
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8.4.3 Dependency analysis
SFR Dependency Rationale FDP_ACC.2/Multi FDP_ACF.1/Multi FDP_ACF.1/Multi FDP_ACC.2/Multi FMT_MSA.3/Multi FMT_MSA.1/Multi FDP_ACC.2/Multi FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1/Multi FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.3/Multi FMT_MSA.1/Multi FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1/Multi - FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1 in the Base-PP ETSI ETSI TS 103 732-3 V1.1.1...
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1 Scope
The present document details the technical specifications for the Smart Secure Platform (SSP) integrated into an SoC, also known as iSSP. The present document defines specific attributes on top of the generic SSP specified in ETSI TS 103 666-1 [3].
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. • In the case of a reference...
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2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. • In the case of a reference...
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 103 666-1 [3] and the following apply: 3GPP network registration: procedure defined by 3GPP allowing a terminal to get access to services provided by telecommunication networks compliant with 3GPP specifications, using the subscription information sto...
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3.2 Symbols
Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 103 666-1 [3] and the following apply: ABI Application Binary Interface API Application Programming Interface HLOS High Level Operating System iNVM (internal NVM) Non-Volatile Memory inside the SSP iRAM (internal RAM) volatile Random Access Me...
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4 Introduction
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4.1 Document Layout
The present document specifies: • an overview of the iSSP; • the iSSP architecture; • the Primary Platform, including the hardware platform requirements and services; • the Primary Platform Interface; • the Secondary Platform Bundle; • the communication interface, including the protocol stack layers; • the certificatio...
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4.2 ASN.1 syntax
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4.2.1 Introduction
The provisions of ETSI TS 103 666-1 [3], clause 4.4.1 shall apply. The complete ASN.1 code is provided for reference in Annex B.
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4.2.2 Start of ASN.1
-- ASN1START ISSPDefinitions { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) smart-secure-platform (3666) part2 (2) } DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED ::= BEGIN /* Imports */ IMPORTS Certificate, Time, AlgorithmIdentifier FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) securi...
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5 Overview
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5.1 Description
An iSSP is an integrated SSP confined in a dedicated sub-system within an SoC. The SoC is usually soldered in the terminal and so the SSP is an integral part of the terminal. The iSSP is a composition of three parts as described in clause 6.1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 666-2 V17.1.0 (2024-12) 15 Release 17
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5.2 Security requirements
The provisions of ETSI TS 103 666-1 [3], clause 6.11 shall apply. The software and sensitive data of the iSSP shall never be exposed from the iSSP to any external component in plaintext. The protection of software and sensitive data shall provide privacy, confidentiality, integrity, protection against rollback attacks,...
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5.3 References to GlobalPlatform
The present document contains several references to GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7] specification. The following list maps the terms used by Global Platform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7] to the terms used in the present document: • VPP Application and Firmware, depending on the context, refer to th...
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6 iSSP Architecture
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6.1 Overview
The iSSP consists of: 1) The Primary Platform including the hardware platform and a low-level operating system. 2) The Primary Platform Interface, which provides the abstraction and virtualization of the Primary Platform. 3) Secondary Platform Bundle(s), which contains the Secondary Platform along with its SSP applicat...
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6.2 Functional architecture
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clauses 5.1 and 5.2 shall apply.
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6.3 Security perimeters
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.3 shall apply.
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6.4 Unprivileged execution model
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.4 shall apply.
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6.5 Unprivileged virtual address space
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.5 shall apply.
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6.6 Run time model
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.6 and its subclauses shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 666-2 V17.1.0 (2024-12) 17 Release 17
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7 Primary Platform
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7.1 Hardware Platform
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7.1.1 Architecture
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.1 shall apply with the following exceptions: • the presence of the SoC is mandatory in figure 3-1 in GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7]; • the iSSP shall contain an autonomous and independent clock system; • the iSSP shall contai...
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7.1.2 Form factor
No form factor is mandated.
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7.1.3 Security functions
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7.1.3.1 Hardware Platform isolation
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.4.1 SREQ19 shall apply.
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7.1.3.2 Memory Management Function
The Primary Platform shall provide a Memory Management Function (MMF) to avoid dependency of the Secondary Platform Bundle design with respect to the execution memory addressing. The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clauses 3.2.2 and 3.5 shall apply.
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7.1.3.3 Key protection function
The hardware platform shall provide a hardware function for protecting its long term keys as defined in GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.4.3. The key protection function shall perform key derivation, as specified in NIST Special Publication 800-108 [13], with robustness of the PRF equivalent t...
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7.1.3.4 Data protection hardware function
The hardware platform may support a hardware function performing the encryption to export software and data outside the iSSP, and the decryption to import software and data from outside the iSSP. The hardware platform may support a hardware function performing the integrity computation and check of software and data st...
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7.1.3.5 Memory transfer function
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.2.6 shall apply.
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7.1.3.6 Test functions
The hardware platform shall protect against the disclosure of keys managed by the Primary Platform, when using test functions of the SoC or test equipment.
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7.1.3.7 Remote audit
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.7 shall apply.
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7.1.3.8 Security sensor function
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.4.4 shall apply.
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7.1.4 Memories
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7.1.4.1 Non Volatile Memories
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.2.3 shall apply. The Primary Platform shall provide the Secondary Platform with direct memory-mapped access to the NVM, whether the NVM is integrated in the iSSP (iNVM) or accessed remotely (rNVM). In case of rNVM, the requirements for robustn...
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7.1.4.2 Volatile memory
The Primary Platform shall provide the Secondary Platform with direct memory-mapped access to the volatile memory, whether the memory is integrated in the iSSP (iRAM) or accessed remotely (rRAM). In case of rRAM, the requirements for robustness of the algorithms used for the data protection are specified in clause 7.1....
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7.1.5 Communication functions
The physical communication interfaces between the Primary Platform and the SoC it is integrated with is outside the scope of the present document. These are abstracted from the Secondary Platform by the interface defined in clause 8.2.
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7.1.6 Power
Due to the integrated nature of the iSSP, the power supply, the management of the power states and the overall power consumption of the iSSP are Primary Platform specific and are outside the scope of the present document.
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7.1.7 Cryptographic functions
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.2.7 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 103 666-2 V17.1.0 (2024-12) 19 Release 17
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7.1.8 Clock
The iSSP shall embed an autonomous and independent clock system in conformance with the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [4]. The provisions of ETSI TS 103 666-1 [3], clause 6.3 shall apply.
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7.1.9 SSP internal interconnect
All elements contained in the iSSP shall only be physically connected to other elements in the iSSP, except as specified in clause 7.1.5.
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7.1.10 Secure CPU
The hardware platform shall contain one or more dedicated CPUs, which are inside the iSSP and separated from the rest of the SoC. The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.2.1 shall apply. The CPU(s) shall be based at least on a 32-bit architecture. The characteristics of the CPUs (e....
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7.1.11 Random Number Generator
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 3.2.8 shall apply.
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7.2 Low-level Operating System
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7.2.1 Introduction
The Primary Platform includes a low-level Operating System. The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.8 (without its subclauses) shall apply.
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7.2.2 Kernel objects
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.8.1 shall apply.
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7.2.3 Global requirements and mandatory Access Control rules
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.8.2 shall apply.
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7.2.4 Process states diagram
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.8.3 shall apply.
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7.2.5 Definition of the process states
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.8.4 shall apply.
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7.2.6 Mandatory access control
The provisions of GlobalPlatform VPP - Concepts and Interfaces [7], clause 5.11 and its subclauses shall apply. The low-level operating system shall only have non-shareable memory regions. ETSI ETSI TS 103 666-2 V17.1.0 (2024-12) 20 Release 17
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7.3 Services
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7.3.1 Secondary Platform Bundle Loader
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7.3.1.1 Overview
The Primary Platform shall support a Secondary Platform Bundle Loader as defined in GlobalPlatform Open Firmware Loader for Tamper Resistant Element [6] with the following exceptions: • The OFL ARP state shall be UNLOCKED. The Secondary Platform Bundle Loader shall be a system Secondary Platform Bundle and shall suppor...