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908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 5.4 Assumptions | A.APP_DISTRIBUTION_PLATFORM - It is assumed that the user will only install apps which have been downloaded from the App Distribution Platform of the TOE manufacturer and/or OS developer, which has performed best practice security checks on these apps. Security checks include but are not limited to: • detect malicious ... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 6 Security Objectives | |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE | O.PROTECT_COMMS - The TOE ensures confidentiality and integrity of assets are protected during transmission over secure protocol. O.AUTHENTICATED_UPDATES - The TOE only allows updates of its operating system and apps when these updates are authenticated as being from a trustworthy source. O.PROTECT_ASSETS_AT_REST - The... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 6.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment | OE.APP_DISTRIBUTION_PLATFORM - The operational environment ensures that the user of the TOE is instructed to use the App Distribution Platform of the TOE manufacturer or OS provider which performs security checks on these apps. OE.TRUSTWORTHY_UPDATE_SOURCE - The operational environment ensures the security update deliv... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 6.3 Security Objectives Rationale | Threat Rationale T.EAVESDROP This threat is countered by O.PROTECT_COMMS that enables protection of the communication channel(s) against disclosure. This threat is further countered by O.CRYPTOGRAPHY to encrypt these channels and O.RANDOMS to provide random numbers for key generation used in the encryption. T.SPOOF Thi... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 7 Extended Components Definition | 7.1 Definition of the family Random Number Generation (FCS_RNG_EXT) NOTE: This definition is based on [i.2]. Family behaviour This family describes the functional requirements for the generation of random numbers, which can be used as secrets for cryptographic purposes or authentication. The security functional compone... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8 Security requirements | |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.1 Overview | This clause describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 [2] and assurance components from Part 3 [3] of the Common Criteria. |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.2 Conventions | The following conventions are used for the completion of operations defined in the SFRs: • Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in Part 2 [2] or their Extended Component Definition (ECD) • Refinement made in the PP: the refinement text is indicated with bold text and strikethroughs • Selection wholly or partially... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3 Security functional requirements | |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) | A CMD under evaluation may support many cryptographic capabilities to provide the functionality expected by customers of the device. The cryptographic support of the TOE, as a subset of the overall functionality of the device, does not need to include capabilities which do not support the claims being made in the evalu... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.2 User Data Protection (FDP) | |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.2.1 The Update Policy | The Update Policy defines: • How often the TSF will check whether new app or system software updates are available. • Depending on the update type, the package can update either a single app or portions of the system software. System software updates can also replace the cryptographic data used to determine the validit... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.2.2 The Permissions Policy | The Permissions Policy defines the access of apps and processes to objects outside its own security domain. The permissions can range from user-oriented controls, such as access to the camera, microphone, and address book, to more explicit access to underlying functionality in the main OS, such as to files, secure IPCs... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.2.3 The Data Classification Policy | FDP_ACC.1/UserDataAsset Subset access control FDP_ACC.1.1/UserDataAsset The TSF shall enforce the [USER DATA ASSET DECRYPTION POLICY] on [ • SUBJECTS: THE TSF; • OBJECTS: INTERNAL STORAGE (ALL SAVED USER DATA ASSETS), [selection: REMOVABLE STORAGE (ALL SAVED USER DATA ASSETS WHEN ENCRYPTION IS ENABLED FOR REMOVABLE STO... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) | FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions NOT ACCESSING USER DATA ASSET STORED BEFORE THE ACTION IS PERFORMED UNLESS PERMITTED BY THE USER] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. Application Note 14: Actions not listed i... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.4 Security Management (FMT) | As the CMD is not a managed device in the enterprise sense, all management is handled locally by the user as opposed to a specific management service as would be the case for an enterprise device. FMT_MSA.1/Permissions Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.1.1/Permissions The TSF shall enforce the [PERMISSIONS POLI... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.5 Privacy (FPR) | To avoid tracking of the unique Device ID of the TOE, the TOE provides aliases of the Device ID for App developers and ad networks. App developers may be able to generate their own aliases on top of ones provided by the TOE itself (these are out of scope) or request the TSF to provide an unique alias for its use. The T... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) | FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [to: • READ OR MODIFY THE DUK; AND • READ OR MODIFY [assignment: LIST OF DATA AND KEYS IN THE KEY HIERARCHIES OF THE FCS_CKH_EXT.1 SFRS WHICH ARE NOT ENCRYPTED THEMSELVES AND WHOSE LEAKAGE WOULD AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE KEY HIERARCHY]; AND • MOD... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.3.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) | A TOE supports many different communication channels, conforming to different standards, and within these standards, using different settings, resulting in different levels of security. While there may be additional channels, the four below are considered to be the most fundamental to a mobile device (outside cellular ... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.4 Security assurance requirements | The security assurance requirements consist of EAL2 augmented with ALC_DVS_EXT.1 and ALC_FLR.3 [3] as defined here: ALC_DVS_EXT.1 Identification of security measures for device identifiers ALC_DVS_EXT.1.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security documentation on the generation and protection of sig... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.5 Security requirements rationale | |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.5.1 Rationale for choosing the SARs | EAL2 is chosen as it provides a good balance between effort expected from the developer and assurance gained. EAL2 provides assurance by a full security target and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and a basic description of the architecture of th... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.5.2 The SFRs meet all the security objectives for the TOE | Security Objective Rationale O.PROTECT_COMMS This objective is achieved by FTP_ITC_EXT.1/BT, FTP_ITC_EXT.1/HTTPS, FTP_ITC_EXT.1/TLS and FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN which set up secure channels with authentication and protection from modification and disclosure. O.AUTHENTICATED_UPDATES These objectives are achieved by: • FDP_ACC... |
908b1db2923c9d5b9336bc07e544e666 | 103 732-1 | 8.5.3 Dependency analysis | SFR Dependency Rationale FCS_RNG_EXT.1 - FCS_CKM.1/Asymmetric [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4 Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.2, to establish key hierarchy. Fullfilled by FCS_CKM.4. FCS_CKM.1/Symmetric [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4 Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/Symmetric, to encrypt and decrypt data. Fullfilled by FCS_CKM.4. FCS... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 1 Scope | The present document details test purposes to ensure a minimum security level for IoT devices. The underlying requirements are a subset of the IEC 62443-4-2 [1] standard containing functional security requirements for components. IEC 62443-4-2 [1] was initially started with the focus on Industrial Automation and Contro... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 2 References | |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: Implementation Under Test (IUT): implementation of one or more Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) protocols in an adjacent user/provider relationship, being the part of a real open system, which is to be studied by testing NOTE: See ISO/IEC 9646-1 [i.... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: BSI Federal Office for Information Security NOTE: German: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. CR Component Requirement DKE German Commission for Electrical, Electronic & Information Technologies of DIN and VDE NOTE: German: De... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 4 Test Suite Structure | |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 4.1 Assumptions | The following assumptions have been taken: 1) Additionally, implemented functionality will not be considered in TPs, but will be tested: a) Example: CR1.3 (account management). b) IoT devices typically have only one local account. c) therefore CR1.3 was excluded from the IoT profile. d) In case multiple accounts are im... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 4.2 Profile | The test suite structure is closely related to requirements and requirement structure as detailed in IEC 62443-4-2 [1], which groups requirements and enhancements into seven Foundational Requirement (FR) areas. The test suite covers those requirements, which have been considered as basic and are supposed to be fulfille... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 5 Test Purposes for base security requirements | |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 5.1 TP naming convention | TPs are numbered, starting at 01, within each requirement ID that will be used like in the IEC 62443-4-2 standard [1]. The requirement IDs are organized according to the TSS. Some TPs may not have a requirement enhanced ID or may not be numbered. ETSI ETSI TS 103 646 V1.1.1 (2021-01) 9 Table 1: TP identifier naming con... |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 5.3 Test strategy | As the base IEC 62443-4-2 [1] contain no explicit strategies for testing. The TPs were generated as a result of analysis of the requirements taken from IEC standard. |
44894a039ec5fb48ac4b8e755b873e10 | 103 646 | 5.4 TP catalogue | TP Id TP_CR_1_1_Identification_authentication_1 Test Objective Ensure the IUT identifies and authenticates users. Case invalid account identifier/invalid authenticator Reference IEC 62443-4-2 [1] CR 1.1, section 5.3.1 PICS Selection Initial Conditions with { the IUT being_in the initial_state } Expected Behaviour ensur... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies Multi-Channel Operation (MCO) related requirements which are applied on the Release 2 C-ITS communication architecture. It extends the Release 1 communication architecture as defined in the ETSI EN 302 665 [i.1] for MCO. The present document is based on the Release 1 specifications as spe... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 2 References | |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols, and abbreviations | |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: C-ITS methodology: sharing transport (traffic situation) related information among traffic stakeholders, openly, to realize common traffic safety and traffic efficiency related benefit for all CCAM C-ITS related application: part of the CCAM applicati... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project API Advanced Programming Interface BSP Basic System Profile CAM Cooperative Awareness Message CAS Cooperative Awareness Service CCAM Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility C-ITS Cooperative Intell... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 4 Background | ETSI EN 302 665 [i.1] ITS communication architecture specification was published in 2010 as part of the full set of Release 1 specifications listed in the ETSI TR 101 607 [i.2] as deployed from 2019 onwards. ETSI EN 302 665 [i.1] specifies a general ITS station architecture for the benefit of realizing C-ITS applicatio... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 5 The Cooperative-Intelligent Transport Systems | |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 5.1 Introduction | According to clause 4, the ETSI ITS Release 1 ETSI TR 102 607 [i.2] set of specifications covers the C-ITS applications and not the whole area of ITS applications. This is the case, although the ITS communication architecture as defined in the ETSI EN 302 665 [i.1] does provide a generalized ITS communication architect... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 5.2 The C-ITS Ecosystem | Clause 4 identified the difference between ITS and C-ITS. In relation to that in ITS many Ecosystem are already today represented. There are, for instance, Ecosystems related to truck management, public transport or logistics. Beside these there is the safety and CCAM related C-ITS Ecosystem. The C-ITS Ecosystem includ... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 5.3 C-ITS Communications | For the exchange of information, any communication method can be used which satisfy the functional, operational, and legal requirements. Figure 2 shows the C-ITS communication architecture including information sharing via direct ad- hoc communications and infrastructure-based cellular 3G, 4G, and 5G communications to ... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 5.4 C-ITS Station architecture | As identified in clause 4, various interpretations of the ITS communication architecture and terminologies are in use, whether in ETSI EN 302 665 [i.1], ETSI (3GPP) ETSI TS 136 300 [i.10], IEEE (e.g. IEEE 1609.3 [i.11]), or ISO 21217:2014 [i.9], all use the OSI model [i.8] as a basis. With respect to the OSI model, ETS... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6 MCO Communication Architecture Requirements | |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.1 Introduction | This clause includes the architectural requirements as identified in the ETSI TR 103 439 [i.6]. Each of the following clauses lists a set of requirements related to specific specification or set of specifications of Release 2. |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.2 C-ITS MCO operation | As identified in clause 5.3, the C-ITS operational system identifies communication between C-ITS-Ss requiring MCO specific measures, which ensure concurrent operation of applications in all communication conditions: • MCO is only applicable to direct short-range communications for C-ITS and CCAM since standard cellular... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.3 C-ITS Sourcing Applications for MCO | As identified in the Release 1 of ETSI EN 302 665 [i.1], ITS are systems that aim to provide user services related to different modes of transport and traffic management. ETSI ITS C-ITS-related standards aim to realize conformity and interoperability for C-ITS and CCAM safety-related applications and traffic efficiency... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.4 C-ITS Facilities for MCO | |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.4.1 General Aspects | The main part of the MCO management functionality is technology independent and reside at the facilities layer, other MCO entities may exist on any other layer: • Other Release 2 C-ITS facilities layer services, entities and functions shall enable MCO, e.g. Position and Time service to enable MCO to operate. • In MCO e... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.4.2 C-ITS Position and time | C-ITS-Ss that exchange information shall have the same notion of position and time: • Position and time references shall be used as specified for each ETSI C-ITS release to meet the application position and time accuracy requirements such that MCO can relate time references used by different applications. • A minimum s... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.5 C-ITS Networking and Transport for MCO | • Release 2 C-ITS networking & transport layer entities, including MCO entities at this layer, shall provide MCO functionalities and MCO-related operational parameters to other layers within a C-ITSs and to other C-ITS-Ss. This may include cross-channel packet forwarding, the exchange of channel-specific, media- depend... |
1066bff900fd720b65dd2d253c18638d | 103 696 | 6.6 C-ITS Access for MCO | • Release 2 C-ITS access layer functionalities shall provide technology independent parameters representing information about the behaviour of information on the channel or channels. e.g. channel load, number of available channels and other parameters to MCO entities at the same layer or other layers. • The C-ITS acces... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies high-level provisions for the security of consumer devices that are connected to network infrastructure, such as the Internet or home network, and their associated services. A non-exhaustive list of examples include: • connected children's toys and baby monitors; • connected safety-releva... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 2 References | |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: associated services: digital services that are linked to IoT devices, for example mobile applications, cloud computing/storage and third party Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to services such as messaging constrained device: device which has... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: API Application Programming Interface CVD Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure CVRF Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework DDoS Distributed Denial of Service ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security EU European Union ... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4 Cyber security provisions for consumer IoT | |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.1 No universal default passwords | Provision 4.1-1 All IoT device passwords shall be unique and shall not be resettable to any universal factory default value. Many IoT devices are being sold with universal default usernames and passwords (such as "admin, admin") for user interfaces through to network protocols. This has been the source of many security... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities | Provision 4.2-1 Companies that provide internet-connected devices and services shall provide a public point of contact as part of a vulnerability disclosure policy in order that security researchers and others are able to report issues. Provision 4.2-2 Disclosed vulnerabilities should be acted on in a timely manner. A ... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.3 Keep software updated | Provision 4.3-1 All software components in consumer IoT devices should be securely updateable. Provision 4.3-2 The consumer should be informed by the appropriate entity, such as the manufacturer or service provider, that an update is required. NOTE 1: The appropriate entity is decided by the relevant jurisdiction. ETSI... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.4 Securely store credentials and security-sensitive data | Provision 4.4-1 Credentials and security-sensitive data shall be stored securely within services and on devices. Hard-coded credentials in device software shall not be used. Reverse engineering of devices and applications can easily discover credentials such as hard-coded usernames and passwords in software. Simple obf... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.5 Communicate securely | Provision 4.5-1 Security-sensitive data, including any remote management and control, should be encrypted in transit, with such encryption appropriate to the properties of the technology and usage. Provision 4.5-2 All keys should be managed securely. The use of open, peer-reviewed standards is strongly encouraged. It i... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces | The "principle of least privilege" is a foundation stone of good security engineering, applicable to IoT as much as in any other field of application. Provision 4.6-1 Unused software and network ports should be closed. Provision 4.6-2 Hardware should not unnecessarily expose access to attack (e.g. open serial access, p... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.7 Ensure software integrity | Provision 4.7-1 Software on IoT devices should be verified using secure boot mechanisms, which require a hardware root of trust. Provision 4.7-2 If an unauthorized change is detected to the software, the device should alert the consumer and/or administrator to an issue and should not connect to wider networks than thos... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.8 Ensure that personal data is protected | Provision 4.8-1 Device manufacturers and service providers shall provide consumers with clear and transparent information about how their personal data is being used, by whom, and for what purposes, for each device and service. This also applies to third parties that can be involved, including advertisers. Provision 4.... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.9 Make systems resilient to outages | Provision 4.9-1 Resilience should be built in to IoT devices and services where required by their usage or by other relying systems, taking into account the possibility of outages of data networks and power. Provision 4.9-2 As far as reasonably possible, IoT services should remain operating and locally functional in th... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.10 Examine system telemetry data | Provision 4.10-1 If telemetry data is collected from IoT devices and services, such as usage and measurement data, it should be examined for security anomalies. Provision 4.10-2 If telemetry data is collected from IoT devices and services, the processing of personal data should be kept to a minimum and such data should... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.11 Make it easy for consumers to delete personal data | Provision 4.11-1 Devices and services should be configured such that personal data can easily be removed from them when there is a transfer of ownership, when the consumer wishes to delete it, when the consumer wishes to remove a service from the device and/or when the consumer wishes to dispose of the device. Provisio... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.12 Make installation and maintenance of devices easy | Provision 4.12-1 Installation and maintenance of IoT devices should employ minimal steps and should follow security best practice on usability. Consumers should also be provided with guidance on how to securely set up their device. Security issues caused by consumer confusion or misconfiguration can be reduced and some... |
54bf254bfbae70e296340efad8f80268 | 103 645 | 4.13 Validate input data | Provision 4.13-1 Data input via user interfaces and transferred via application programming interfaces (APIs) or between networks in services and devices shall be validated. Systems can be subverted by incorrectly formatted data or code transferred across different types of interface. Automated tools are often employed... |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 1 Scope | The present document provides the Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro forma for the conformance test suite for TTCN-3 Object Oriented Features, as defined in ETSI ES 203 790 [1] in compliance with the relevant guidance given in the pro forma for TTCN-3 reference test suite ETSI TS 103 663 (multi-part) [4]. I... |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 2 References | |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [2], ISO/IEC 9646-7 [3], ETSI ES 203 790 [1] (TTCN-3) and the following apply: Abstract Test Suite (ATS): test suite composed of abstract test cases ICS pro forma: document, in the form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an implementa... |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ATS Abstract Test Suite ICS Implementation Conformance Statement IUT Implementation Under Test IXIT Implementation eXtra Information for Testing TP Test Purpose TS Test System TSS Test Suite Structure ETSI ETSI TS 103 663-2 V1.3.1 (2022-06) 7 ... |
e8b137f149a719d844a2305108205e28 | 103 663-2 | 4 Test Suite Structure (TSS) | The Test Suite Structure is in close alignment with V4.13.1 of ETSI ES 201 873-1 [i.10], containing: a) positive syntactical tests ("Syn" filename prefix of the test case name); b) positive semantical tests ("Sem" filename prefix of the test case name); c) negative syntactical tests ("NegSyn" filename prefix of the tes... |
7d191da1b53b0f8718a1f27f87e077d2 | 103 663-1 | 1 Scope | The present document provides the Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro forma for the conformance test suite for TTCN-3 Object Oriented Features, as defined in ETSI ES 203 790 [1] in compliance with the relevant guidance given in the pro forma for TTCN-3 reference test suite ETSI TS 103 663-2 [4]. In the prese... |
7d191da1b53b0f8718a1f27f87e077d2 | 103 663-1 | 2 References | |
7d191da1b53b0f8718a1f27f87e077d2 | 103 663-1 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
7d191da1b53b0f8718a1f27f87e077d2 | 103 663-1 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
7d191da1b53b0f8718a1f27f87e077d2 | 103 663-1 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
7d191da1b53b0f8718a1f27f87e077d2 | 103 663-1 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ISO/IEC 9646-1 [3], ISO/IEC 9646-7 [2], ETSI ES 203 790 [1] (TTCN-3) and the following apply: Abstract Test Suite (ATS): test suite composed of abstract test cases ICS pro forma: document, in the form of a questionnaire, which when completed for an implementa... |
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