hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
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5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.1.2 TLMSP session multiplexing | Session multiplexing is the placement of multiple TLMSP sessions on a given transport connection, whether concurrently or serially. While the supporting mechanisms of the present clause shall be implemented, the ability and willingness of an entity to process multiple TLMSP sessions on a single transport connection is ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.2 MAC overview | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.2.1 General | This clause provides an overview of the presence and processing of various MACs on message units and records. Prior to ChangeCipherSpec, no message unit or record (hop-by-hop) MACs shall be present. This can be viewed equivalently as either being due to no message unit or record protection yet being active, or as being... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.2.2 MAC author determination | Each received record has a hop-by-hop MAC, and each received message unit has up to three additional MACs: reader, deleter, and writer MAC. The author (entity identity) of a received MAC, which in general can be distinct from the originator of the message unit and can also be distinct for different MACs, is determined ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.3 Sequence numbers | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.3.1 General | Sequence numbers shall be used for security processing, for the purposes of cryptographic synchronization and replay protection. Under TLMSP, sequence numbers are not defined or maintained prior to ChangeCipherSpec. Following ChangeCipherSpec, when a non-NULL cipher suited is selected (offering at least one of confiden... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.3.2 Outgoing message units and records | After ChangeCipherSpec is sent, when an entity j prepares a message unit for transmission in context c, it uses the current values of seq_tx and seq_tx[c], as required, for the security processing defined in clauses 4.2.3 and 4.2.7. Immediately after completing processing of the message unit (before processing any furt... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.2.3.3 Incoming message units and records | 4.2.2.3.3.1 General Each received record has a hop-by-hop MAC which shall be verified, and each received message unit has up to three MACs that may need to be verified, depending on access rights: reader, writer, and deleter. Verification of these MACs depends on using correct sequence numbers, which requires first det... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3 Processing of specific message unit types | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.1 Container message units | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.1.1 Container usage | The following applies to the Application and Alert protocols. Containers may be re-distributed between records of the same content type. A single container shall never be split across more than one record. However, for traffic flow optimization purposes: 1) Middleboxes (both readers and writers) may split a single rece... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.1.2 Modifications | In certain cases, a middlebox can modify the contents of a container that it is forwarding. The only containers that support modification of their contents are application data containers. Only writer middleboxes with access to the associated context may modify the contents of such a container. When doing so, the write... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.1.3 Insertions generally | Insertions are the introduction of new containers into the session by middleboxes. Containers originating at endpoints are not considered to be insertions. When inserting a container, the middlebox shall set the I-bit of the flags container header-field to 1. A middlebox that inserts a container shall always add an m_i... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.1.4 Deletion indication containers | 4.2.3.1.4.1 General Deletion indication containers are Application protocol message units that signal the deletion of a continguous set of application data containers, associated with a particular context, to all downstream entities. Application data containers may be deleted by middleboxes having delete access to the ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.1.5 Audit containers | Audit containers are Application protocol message units that convey information, as a payload in the container fragment field, pertaining to the processing of application data containers or the generation of alert containers. The production of audit containers shall be configured on a per-context basis during the hands... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.1.6 Alert containers | Alert containers are Alert protocol message units that signal error or warning conditions to downstream entities. They begin to be used in a session as described in clause 4.4.1. Endpoints may originate an alert container in any context, and a middlebox shall only insert an alert container in a context to which it has ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.2 Record message units | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.2.1 Handshake message units | A handshake record is a Handshake protocol message unit that contains one or more Handshake messages. Middleboxes shall not: • delete or replace Handshake messages except under the message-specific conditions stated in clauses 4.3.6 and 4.3.7; • modify parts of Handshake messages added by other entities, except as defi... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.2.2 ChangeCipherSpec message units | A ChangeCipherSpec record is a ChangeCipherSpec protocol message unit that contains one ChangeCipherSpec message. There are never any MACs present on a ChangeCipherSpec record. |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.3 Middlebox processing summary | A middlebox shall never insert, delete, or modify messages in other protocols than those described in clauses 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2. Table 1 summarizes for each protocol whether containers shall be used and which operations on message units are allowed. ETSI ETSI TS 103 523-2 V1.2.1 (2022-03) 29 Table 1: Middlebox proces... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.3.4 MAC usage summary | Table 2 summarizes MAC usage. The value i below refers to the entity identity where a message is currently being processed, entity i+1 then being the downstream neighbour and dest being the downstream endpoint destination. RK(c)/DK(c)/WK(c), respectively, denote the reader/deleter/writer key for context c, and PK(i,j) ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.4 Container format | For Application and Alert protocols, the container format shall be defined as in the present clause. The "payload" (or fragment) part of the container shall have a type that varies depending on whether the content is unprocessed plaintext, compressed plaintext or protected ciphertexts. This last type is ready for submi... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.5 Plaintext record format | The plaintext record, following confirmed server support of TLMSP, shall be defined as in the present clause: opaque HopID[4]; struct { ContentType type; ProtocolVersion version; uint16 tot_length; select (tlmsp_server_support_confirmed) { case true: HopID hbh_id; case false: struct { }; /* empty */ }; select (type) { ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.6 Compressed record format | The present document does not specify use of compression for reasons discussed in annex H and any proposed compression method other than null shall be rejected by the TLMSP version defined herein. However, for possible future extensions, a compressed record format is defined in the present clause: struct { ContentType ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7 Applying message unit and record protection | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.1 General | As in TLS 1.2 [1], the record layer of TLMSP is generally responsible for applying data protection to the sub-protocols forming the complete TLMSP protocol-suite (the Handshake, ChangeCipherSpec, Alert, and Application protocols). In TLMSP, the protection applied at the record layer can conceptually be viewed as compos... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.2 MAC generation | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.2.1 General | An overview of the MACs used for message units and records is provided in clause 4.2.2.2. For AEAD ciphers such as GCM, the integrity mechanism included in the cipher mechanism shall be used as the reader MAC. The reader MAC value shall for Application and Alert protocols be included inside the TLMSPCipherText.containe... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.2.2 Reader, deleter and writer MACs | 4.2.7.2.2.1 Container message units For protocols that use containers (Alert and Application), the MAC generation schemes defined in the present clause shall be used. For generic stream and block ciphers (using a standalone MAC), for each TLMSPCompressed.containers.fragment the corresponding reader and writer MAC value... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.2.3 Hop-by-hop MAC | This MAC shall cover the entire record excluding the hop-by-hop MAC itself. Each entity maintains a concept of who its upstream neighbour and downstream neighbour are for each direction of communication (client-to-server and server-to-client). In a given direction, an entity's upstream neighbour is the next middlebox u... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.3 Cipher suite specifics | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.3.1 General | All TLMSP cipher suites shall use an initialization vector explicitly carrying at least the one-octet entity identity of the middlebox that generated or most recently modified the message. The selected encryption IV shall, for the pre-defined cipher suites, follow the definitions of annex A. For protocols using contain... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.3.2 Null or stream cipher | In contrast to TLS, all TLMSP stream ciphers shall use an explicit IV. This allows middleboxes to modify/insert/delete containers. struct { opaque record_IV[SecurityParameters.record_iv_length]; stream-ciphered struct { opaque content[content_length]; opaque reader_mac[SecurityParameters.mac_length]; }; } GenericStream... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.3.3 Generic block cipher | struct { opaque record_IV[SecurityParameters.record_iv_length]; block-ciphered struct { opaque content[content_length]; opaque reader_mac[SecurityParameters.mac_length]; ETSI ETSI TS 103 523-2 V1.2.1 (2022-03) 37 uint8 padding[padding_length]; uint8 padding_length; }; } GenericBlockCipher; The padding and padding_lengt... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.2.7.3.4 AEAD ciphers | The AEAD transform defined in the present document use a combination of explicitly signalled and locally derived values to form the IV. struct { opaque record_nonce[SecurityParameters.record_iv_length]; aead-ciphered struct { opaque content[content_length + D + SecurityParameters.mac_length]; }; } GenericAEADCipher; Th... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3 The Handshake protocol | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.1 Overview | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.1.1 General | The cryptographic parameters of the session state are produced by the TLMSP Handshake protocol, which operates on top of the TLMSP record layer. When a TLMSP client and server first communicate, they agree on a protocol version, the number of contexts and their purpose(s), the middleboxes' granted access privilege leve... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.1.2 Piggy-backing of handshake messages | Piggy-backing intuitively means that a middlebox appends a Handshake message with itself as origin to an already in-transit record comprising a Handshake message that originates from an upstream endpoint. More formally, the piggy-back of handshake information by middleboxes shall be done as follows. Assume without loss... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2 Middlebox configuration, discovery | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.1 General | This clause describes alternatives of how to configure or establish the MiddleboxList with the complete set of middleboxes. There are two main cases: static pre-configuration and dynamic discovery. Static pre-configuration shall be supported. Dynamic discovery should be supported. For the purpose of discovery, the Midd... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.2 Static pre-configuration | In the case of static pre-configuration, the client shall be manually pre-configured with the complete set of middleboxes as per the MiddleboxList defined in clause 4.3.5. The list shall be arranged in network-topological order and each middlebox in the list shall occur only once. All the middleboxes in the initial lis... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.3 Dynamic discovery | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.3.1 General | In this case, the client and/or server does not know all middleboxes to be potentially involved in the connection. EXAMPLE: One of the known (pre-configured as in clause 4.3.2.2) middleboxes or the server can request that one or more additional client-unknown middleboxes are added to the MiddleboxList. Additionally, a ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.3.2 Non-transparent middleboxes | This clause applies to use cases where middleboxes visible on the IP layer are to be added. EXAMPLE: An enterprise's security policy mandates traffic being routed via a data-leakage prevention function. Such middleboxes can in general not make their own presence known during the handshake since the handshake cannot be ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.3.3 Transparent middleboxes | This clause applies to use cases involving middleboxes that are not individually visible/routable on the IP layer but which are still present on the client-server network path. EXAMPLE: A middlebox function co-located with a default gateway, a firewall, or within a mobile operator core network is not visible on the IP ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.4 Combined discovery | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.4.1 Example use case | Figure 7 illustrates an example scenario with one middlebox (M1) pre-configured in the client, as defined in clause 4.3.2.2 and thus included in the initial MiddleboxList, ml_ic, of the TLMSP extension in the ClientHello. As the ClientHello traverses the network, a transparent middlebox, m1, detects the signalling and ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.4.2 Practical considerations | For dynamic discovery of transparent middleboxes to work in general, and particularly if used in combination with dynamically discovered non-transparent middleboxes, assumptions (or preferably knowledge) of the network topology are needed. Suppose that in the example of clause 4.3.2.4.1, m1 lies topologically between M... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.2.5 Middlebox leave and suspend | Middleboxes may find it necessary, e.g. due to processing load, to step down or step out of an ongoing session. A middlebox shall always notify other entities before doing so either by issuing one the TLMSP specific alert middlebox_suspend_notify (clause 4.4), or, the MboxLeaveNotify message (clause 4.3.8). These messa... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.3 Session resumption and renegotiation | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.3.1 Resumption | As with TLS 1.2, TLMSP provides an abbreviated handshake to resume a previously established session, refreshing the keys but keeping the previous cipher suite. Middleboxes shall not be removed or added as part of resumption negotiation and resumption shall be done using the same contexts and cipher suite as the origina... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.3.2 Renegotiation | In TLS 1.2, the client endpoint can initiate a renegotiation of the security parameters by sending a new ClientHello. A server endpoint can, in TLS 1.2, request renegotiation by sending a HelloRequest. The present document does not allow a corresponding renegotiation for TLMSP, for reasons laid out in clause E.7. A TLM... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.4 Handshake message types | TLMSP employs the following Handshake message types: enum { hello_request(0), client_hello(1), server_hello(2), certificate(11), server_key_exchange(12), certificate_request(13), server_hello_done(14), certificate_verify(15), client_key_exchange(16), finished(20), tlmsp_server_key_exchange(40), mbox_hello(41), mbox_cer... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.5 TLMSP Handshake extensions | Recall that a TLS extension is defined in [1] as: enum { server_name(0), … , (65535) } ExtensionType; struct { ExtensionType extention_type; opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; } Extension; TLMSP defines three new TLS handshake extensions to the Hello messages, the first in the form of a basic TLMSP extension with extens... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6 Middlebox related messages | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.1 MboxHello | The MboxHello message shall be structured as follows: struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; ProtocolVersion client_version; Random client_mboxhello_random, server_mboxhello_random; SessionID session_id; select (extensions_present) { case false: struct {}; case true: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; }; ETSI ETSI TS 103 523-2 V... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.2 MboxCertificate | As is shown in Figure 6, unless the server has set the extension field use_certificate to false, this message shall be sent from middlebox to client when the middlebox has received the ServerHelloDone. The message shall, unless the client specified had set the extension field use_certificate to false, be simultaneously... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.3 MboxCertificateRequest | This message shall have the following structure: struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; CertificateRequest cr; } MboxCertificateRequest; This message shall be sent by a middlebox to the client when the middlebox wishes to authenticate the client and shall always be forwarded by other middleboxes. |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.4 Certificate2Mbox | This message shall have the following structure which is identical to the MboxCertificate message defined in clause 4.3.6.2: struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; Certificate cert; } Certificate2Mbox; If, and only if, the signature verification by the client as defined in clause 4.3.10.1 is successful, this message shall be s... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.5 MboxKeyExchange | This message shall have the following structure: struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; TLMSPServerKeyExchange client_exch; /* key exchange middlebox <-> client */ TLMSPServerKeyExchange server_exch; /* key exchange middlebox <-> server */ } MboxKeyExchange; The security relevant parameters of client_exch and server_exch shall... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.6 MboxHelloDone | This is identical in format to a ServerHelloDone of IETF RFC 5246 [1], but with an added identity field of the middlebox. This message shall have the following structure: struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; ServerHelloDone hd; } MboxHelloDone; This message shall have identical content to the server and to the client and sha... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.7 CertificateVerify2Mbox | This message shall have the following structure: struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; CertificateVerify cv; } CertificateVerify2Mbox; ETSI ETSI TS 103 523-2 V1.2.1 (2022-03) 55 This message shall be sent following a Certificate2Mbox as defined in clause 4.3.6.4 that is sent to a middlebox with the stated mbox_entity_id. It a... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.8 ServerUnsupport | This message shall be used by the first middlebox to detect that the server does not support TLMSP, i.e. the middlebox located closest to the server and shall be sent from that middlebox towards the client. struct { uint8 entity_id; /* the identity of the middlebox originating the message */ HopID hbh_id; /* hbh_id cho... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.9 NewMboxSessionTicket | This message shall be used by middleboxes to issue new session tickets in analogy with server's tickets. The message shall have format following [3], but with an entity identity field identifying the source of the message. struct { uint8 entity_id; unit32 ticket_lifetime_hint; opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; } NewMboxSession... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.6.10 MboxFinished | A special handshake verification message is defined, used only between an endpoint and a middlebox. It shall have the format: struct { uint8 entity_id; opaque verify_data[verify_data_length]; } MboxFinished; entity_id shall be the entity identity of the origin/destination middlebox. verify_data shall be formatted as sp... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.7 TLMSPKeyMaterial and TLMSPKeyConf | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.7.1 KeyMaterialContribution | The following described message generation method shall be the used when generating TLMSPKeyMaterial and when generating TLMSPKeyConf messages. The only difference between the two types of messages is that the messages shall have different type identifiers and the content field shall be generated differently as describ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.7.2 TLMSPKeyMaterial | TLMSP introduces a new Handshake message for delivering context key material to the middleboxes. During the handshake, both the client and server shall send TLMSPKeyMaterial messages through the chain of all middleboxes, providing key shares for each middlebox (and the other endpoint). The message contains, for each co... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.7.3 TLMSPKeyConf | As shown in Figure 6, the TLMSPKeyConf (Key Confirmation) message shall be generated and sent by the middleboxes as they receive TLMSPKeyMaterial signalling from the client towards the server, and likewise for the other direction. The TLMSPKeyConf message provides proof to the client and server that each middlebox has ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.8 MboxLeaveNotify and MboxLeaveAck | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.8.1 Message format | These messages shall have the following structure: struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; } MboxLeaveNotify; struct { uint8 mbox_entity_id; } MboxLeaveAck; These messages are sent when a middlebox wishes to leave a session and shall be processed as defined in clause 4.3.2.5. |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.8.2 Message processing | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.8.2.1 General | The MboxLeaveNotify and MboxLeaveAck messages shall only be issued after completeing the handshake, and such messages occurring at earlier stages shall be discarded. A simplified overview of the function of these two messages follows. When a middlebox wants to leave a TLMSP session, it enqueues an MboxLeaveNotify messa... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.8.2.2 Detailed operation | Each entity maintains a concept of the current state of each middlebox for each direction of communication (client-to- server and server-to-client). The three states shall be: establishing, participating, and gone. The states shall have the following meaning. establishing: The middlebox has not yet completed the handsh... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.9 Message hashes | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.9.1 ClientHello and ServerHello value substitutions | The TLMSP extension contains several fields whose values can be modified at each hop when traversing from one endpoint to the other. Entities shall use consistent values for these fields when computing verification hashes that include a ClientHello or ServerHello message, as follows. For ClientHello messages: • MiddleB... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.9.2 Finished hash | When computing the hash that is included in the client-server Finished messages, the processing of IETF RFC 5246 [1], clause 7.4.9 shall be applied, the only difference being that client and server shall omit certain information elements that were inserted by middleboxes since the client and server need not have receiv... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.9.3 MboxFinished hash | This hash computation is used for verification between an endpoint and a middlebox and shall also be done with the prescribed processing of IETF RFC 5246 [1], clause 7.4.9, with the value substitutions described in clause 4.3.9.1 of the present document applied as well as including the following items, in the order whi... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.9.4 ClientHello hash (following dynamic discovery) | This hash, included in the TLMSP extension (the pre_discovery as defined in clause 4.3.5), shall be computed as the hash of the concatenation of the following messages occurring during the discovery phase: • The initial ClientHello and its TLMSP extension, with the value substitutions described in clause 4.3.9.1 applie... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.9.5 TLMSPServerKeyExchange hash | This hash value shall be included in TLMSPServerKeyExchange structures (TLMSP messages or sub-fields of messages) directed to the client, and shall be included in the input to the server's and middlebox's signature related thereto, as defined in clause 4.3.10.1. The hash shall be computed as the hash of all messages fr... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.10 Key generation | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.10.1 TLMSPServerKeyExchange | TLMSP uses a slightly modified server key exchange message format, compared to IETF RFC 5246 [1]. The message shall be used by both server and middlebox when generating a key exchange message directed to the client. The message includes a hash of previous messages in the handshake and there is further no option for RSA... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.10.2 General | During the first stage of the handshake, the server and client exchange random nonces, certificates, and signed ephemeral public keys in the Hello, Certificate, and KeyExchange messages respectively. These are used to generate the client-server master secret (via a premaster secret) as per IETF RFC 5246 [1] that define... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.10.3 Premaster secret and master secret generation | The pre_master_secret_e1e2 shared between entities e1 and e2 is generated in a way specific to the cipher suite in use; annex A describes the predefined suites. The master key shared between precisely two entities, e1 and e2 (two endpoints, an endpoint and a middlebox, or two middleboxes), shall be generated as: master... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.10.4 Pairwise encryption and integrity key generation | The encryption and integrity keys for communication between entities e1 and e2 when e1 is the client and e2 is the server shall be generated from SecurityParameters.master_secret_e1e2 derived as in clause 4.3.10.3 according to: key_block_e1e2 = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret_e1e2, "key expansion", SecurityParamet... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.10.5 Context specific keys | For the context specific keys, the client and server shall generate two pseudorandom partial secrets for each context: • the client shall generate a client read secret and a client write secret; • the server shall generate a server read secret and a server write secret. Partial secrets for different contexts shall be c... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.3.10.6 Key extraction | The functionality of this clause shall be optional to implement and use. When implemented, the functionality of this clause may be used by an application to extract key material for other purposes. Specifically, one or more additional key blocks shared uniquely between entities with a certain access right to a context ... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.4 The Alert protocol | |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.4.1 General | All alert messages before the ServerHello message has been observed shall follow and be limited to the definitions in [1]. After the transmission or receipt by an entity of a ServerHello containing a TLMSP extension, all alert messages that entity originates shall use the containered format described in clause 4.2.3.1.... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.4.2 Alert message types | The set of Alert protocol messages extend IETF RFC 5246 [1] as follows: enum { close_notify(0), unexpected_message(10), … , /* the existing TLS alert codes */ middlebox_route_failure(170), /* middlebox fails to connect to next hop */ middlebox_authorization_failure(171), /* endpoint does not accept middlebox */ unknown... |
5e8571d38f1f624a189a961ac92403df | 103 523-2 | 4.5 The ChangeCipherSpec protocol | The single message of the ChangeCipherSpec protocol shall be as specified in clause 7.1 of IETF RFC 5246 [1]. In TLMSP, there are the following differences in effects (semantics) of issuing the ChangeCipherSpec message. • The negotiated keys and cipher suite as well as any negotiated record size extention as per IETF R... |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 1 Scope | The present document presents the engineering and operational requirements for the application of the IPv6 transition technology MAP-E as defined by ETSI TS 101 569-1 (IPv6 Transition Requirements) [1] implemented within an integrated broadband cable network end to end across its network domains. The present document i... |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 2 References | |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: 4in6: encapsulation of IPv4 packets within IPv6 packet format NAT44: network address translation from an IPv4 address to another IPv4 address P Router: label switching router acting as a transit router in the core network of an MPLS ne... |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 6PE IPv6 Provider Edge 6RD IPv6 Rapid Deployment 6VPE IPv6 VPN Provider Edge AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting AMPS Amplifiers AS Autonomous System BFD Bidirectional Forwarding Detection BGP Boarder Gateway Protocol ETSI ETSI TS... |
09793efbeb79348acc9dc6a73cc10991 | 103 443-4 | 4 General Considerations |
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