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c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 7 Topologies | This clause explains the potential NAT64 domain topologies. At the time of writing, two topologies are possible, the integrated topology and the hairpin topology; however, depending on future hardware and software developments, additional topologies may be introduced. Use of the integrated topology would provide the mo... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8 Technical Requirements | 8.1 General NAT64 is one of the technologies that has seen some adoption in the mobile markets but little in the cable network markets. This technology will allow customers to access services natively over IPv6 and through translation over IPv4. In order to enable connectivity between IPv6 hosts and the Internet, NAT64... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.2 High Level Requirements | |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.2.1 General | The requirements of the NAT64 implementation are based on enabling seamless NAT64 connections without degradation in service, access, functionality or speed. Two network components are involved in the end-to-end NAT64 approach; the LSN and the CPE or client. Requirement considerations for both are listed below. |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.2.2 LSN | The LSN device placed in the edge of the network (IXPE) as the IPv4 gateway to perform de-capsulation on the egress from a 4in6 packet to a pure IPv4 packet. Requirement considerations for LSN are: • Hardware Topology • Logical Topology • Software/Hardware Features • Scalability • Resilience and Redundancy • IP Allocat... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.2.3 CPE | The CPE is a device in customer's home to encapsulate the traffic on egress from a pure IPv4 packet to a 4in6 packet. Requirement considerations for NAT64 CPE are: • Hardware Topology • Logical Topology • Software/Hardware Features • Scalability • Stability • IP Allocation/DHCP (v4 & v6) • Forwarding performance |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.3 NAT64 technology feature requirements | The NAT64 technology feature is summarized in table 2 detailing for each function the requirement as required or optional with a brief description of each of the named functions. Table 2: Summary of NAT64 Features Requirements Functional Name Requirement Description NAT64 - IETF RFC 4787 [24] (UDP) Compliance with NAT ... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.4 Detailed LSN Requirements | |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.4.1 LSN Hardware Feature/Topology | NAT64 is an implementation of an IPv4/IPv6 transition protocol, and all CPE/CEs running NAT64 LSN connect to the CORE node. It is the translation from the IPv6 to IPv4 and the originating IPv4 NAT device egressing traffic towards the destination on IPv4 after translation. An IPv6 client, whether CPE or an edge customer... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.4.2 LSN General software requirements | |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.4.2.1 Integrated topology requirements | List of features required for both IPv4 and IPv6/L2 and L3 for an integrated topology solution: • MP BGP (as well 6PE and 6VPE) • BGP Community/32 bit AS • MPLS LDP (potentially only v4 native at present but the requirement for v6 native MPLS may become an absolute) • ECMP • QoS (v4/v6) - classification, priority queui... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.4.2.2 Hairpin topology requirements | List of features required for both IPv4 and IPv6/L2 and L3 for a "hairpin topology" solution: • SNMP (transport over v4 and v6) v1/v2/v3 • ACLs/Prefix Listing (both v4/v6) • TACACS/RADIUS (v4/v6) • Syslog (event reporting for v4 & v6 as well as transporting over both protocols) • CoPP (v4/v6) • Netflowv9 (potentially p... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 8.4.3 Scalability | A NAT64 solution exhibits lower scaling and performance capabilities than other transition technologies due to the address embedding and ALG requirement. It can be difficult to engineer scaling for a minimum of 100 000 CPE addresses. Consequently latency is a challenge to engineer for a carrier grade solution, especial... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 9 Technical Considerations | |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 9.1 Hardware | Carrier-grade NAT64 solutions exist with a high level of capacity. The customer end point, based on the maximum number of flows per client and mapping, but dependent on the ALG process requirements. As NAT64 is quite dynamic in processing requirements hardware shall match and scale to fit, in other words the hardware c... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 9.2 MTU and fragmentation | NAT64 is a translation technology and, thus, suffers less MTU requirements however there is the issue that fragmentation resends and general PMTU control can have performance effects on customer services. A further issue is that PMTU functions well in IPv6 but translating from an IPv6 packet to an IPv4 packet it is nec... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 9.3 Scaling | The details of the scalability are structured based on the service requirements for delivery in the cable operator's network. An example of the scalability requirements for a network are given below. Engineer the network for: 1) Minimum number of flows per NPU e.g. 4-6 million. 2) The throughput on a single direction e... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 9.4 Reliability | To increase reliability and robustness or to distribute the load, operators could opt to deploy multiple LSNs, to share load across a large footprint. In the case of having multiple LSN's deployed, the IPv6 destination prefixes should be Anycast based if stateless and the client should hold a primary and secondary if s... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 9.5 Quality of Service | The QoS policies defined by the cable operator for their network shall be engineered to operate properly with the new NAT64 environment. A NAT64 stream can be viewed as a particular case of uniform conceptual tunnel model. This uniform model views an IP tunnel only as a necessary mechanism to forward traffic to its des... |
c544ddd04169ee8321a7fa755c943122 | 103 443-2 | 9.6 B4 deployment | In order to configure the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel, the B4 needs the IPv6 address of the LSN. This IPv6 address can be configured using a variety of methods ranging from an out-of-band mechanism, manual configuration, and DHCPv6 option to RADIUS. If a network operator decides to use DHCPv6 to provision the B4, the B4 shall ... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 1 Scope | The present document describes the message flows and the specific messages to be used between GSM-R networks to enable numbering plan mapping functionality for the exchange of SMS. In detail: • Message flows covering the different call types using functional numbers as part of the EIRENE numbering plan. • Description o... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 2 References | |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: call type: prefix (part of EIRENE Numbering plan in EIRENE SRS [i.1]) used to identify the User Number dialled fixed network: network comprising the fixed terminal system and the dispatcher equipment fixed terminal subsystem: part of t... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: CAMEL Customized Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic CC Country Code CGI Cell Global Identifier CID Cell IDentity CT Call Type DN Destination Number DP Detection Point EIRENE European Integrated Radio Enhanced Network FFN Follow Me ... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 4 General description | 4.1 Requirements The following requirements shall be fulfilled: 1) Signalling System No.7 based protocol(s) for information exchange of functional number/MSISDN association. 2) No need of additional standardization for Mobile Station functionality. 3) All specified SMS-message classes 0, 1, 2 and 3 shall be supported: ... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 5 Functional concept | 5.1 Features and Signalling The use of EIRENE numbering plan for SMS delivery when abroad refers to several features of existing ETSI specifications. For the relevant features and the necessary signalling information to exchange information between the GSM-R networks, the following specifications shall be applied: • Un... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 5.5 Recording | All information required for the recording are available at the SMS-SC of the terminating network. SMS recording will be done on the Voice/SMS Recording system associated with that SMS-SC. The recording interface itself is out of scope of the present document. 6 Protocol elements, Signalling and numbering plan translat... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7 Scenarios and message flows | |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.1 Scenarios covered | Subscriber (MS-1) of Network A is roaming in Network B. The subscriber is registered to Network-B and may use bearer and tele services of the visiting mobile network. Mobile originated SMS (MS-1) Mobile (MS-2 is located either in Home or Visiting Network) or Fix Terminated. • SMS from CT2,3,8 to Visiting Network CT1 ... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.2 SMS FN to CT1 (Mobile Terminating) | |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.2.1 Message flow | Figure 2: Message flow smsFN to CT1, mobile terminating ETSI ETSI TS 103 418 V1.1.1 (2017-02) 15 Figure 2 contains the SMS delivery on FN when MS-1 (subscriber of Network A and registered in Network B) sends an SMS to MS-2 (subscriber of Network B) using an EIRENE Short Dialling Code (SDC). The procedure shall be as fo... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.3 SMS FN to CT1 (Fix Terminating) | |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.3.1 Message flow | Figure 3: Message flow smsFN to CT-1, stationary dispatcher as part of the FTS Figure 3 contains the SMS delivery on FN when MS-1 (subscriber of Network A and registered in Network B) sends an SMS to Dispatcher-B (Fix network terminal connected to Network-B) using an EIRENE CT-1 Short Dialling Code (SDC). The procedure... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.4 SMS FN to all CT (except CT1 and CT5) | |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.4.1 Message flow - Terminating subscriber in visited network | Figure 4: Message flow smsFN to all CT (except CT1 and CT5); Terminating subscriber in visited network Figure 4 contains the SMS delivery on FN when MS-1 (subscriber of Network A and registered in Network B) sends an SMS to MS-2 (subscriber of Network B) using the EIRENE Functional Number of MS-2. The procedure shall b... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.4.2 Message flow - Terminating subscriber in home network | Figure 5: Message flow smsFN to all CT (except CT1 and CT5), Terminating subscriber in home network Figure 5 contains the SMS delivery on FN when MS-1 (subscriber of Network A and registered in Network B) sends an SMS to MS-2 (subscriber of Network A and registered in Network A) using the EIRENE Functional Number of MS... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.5 Dispatcher originated SMS | |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.5.1 Message flow | Figure 6: Message flow smsFN, dispatcher originates SM ETSI ETSI TS 103 418 V1.1.1 (2017-02) 22 Figure 6 contains the SMS delivery on FN when Fix Network Dispatcher-A connected to network-A sends an SMS to MS-1 (subscriber of Network A, registered in Network B) using the EIRENE Functional Number (FN). The procedure sha... |
5fcd3c4d09addbe59ce2fbe5b8d26329 | 103 418 | 7.6 Scenarios not covered | The following scenario is not covered in the present document since it would need an IP interconnection (IP-Cloud) between the SMS-SC of the different Operators: • Fixed Line Originated SMS (subscriber is located in Home Network) Foreign fixed line termination (SMS from Home-Network CT7 to Foreign Network CT7). ETSI ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the security requirements for reconfigurable radio systems arising from the use case analysis in ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1]. The present document applies to the lifecycle of Radio Application Packages between a Radio application store and an RRS Reconfigurable Equipment. |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 2 References | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1] and the following apply: protected location: memory location outside of the hardware root of trust, protected in against attacks on confidentiality and in which from the perspective of the root of trust, integrity protect... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1] and the following apply: DoS Denial of Service DDoS Distributed Denial of Service IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity OSI Open System for Interconnection PAP Policy Administr... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a RRS platform security classifications | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.1 Overview | RRS device security is defined by assignment of mandatory security features to the RE and accompanying system in a series of classes or tiers. To avoid confusion with the term class used in the context of Mobile Device Reconfiguration Class (MDRC) the security levels are referred to as tiers, i.e. Tier#1, Tier#2, Tier#... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.2 Signature validation | Electronic signature validation shall be provided in all RRS platforms for the validation of the source and integrity of any downloaded Radio Application. As defined in clause 5.3 the RA shall be signed and the public key certificate of the signing authority, and any other identifying certificates used in the distribut... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.3 Signature creation | For the purposes of the non-repudiation service defined in clause 5.4 the RE shall be able to generate evidence of actions related to the use of RAs and sign the evidence (actions may include installation, deletion, operation). For Tier#2 the RE shall act as Secure Signature Creating Device (SSCD), and for Tier#3 the R... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.4 Trusted timestamp | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.4.1 General requirements | For the purposes of the non-repudiation service defined in clause 5.4 the RE shall be able to generate evidence of the time any actions related to the use occurred and include the timestamp in the evidence generated. |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.4.2 PKI based trusted timestamps | For Tier#2 devices a Trusted Timestamp complying to IETF RFC 3161 [20] shall be generated. For Tier#3 devices a Trusted Timestamp complying to ANSI X9.95 [21] shall be generated that in addition to providing 3rd party assurance of the time of the action also provides for proof of the integrity of the timestamped data. ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.4.3 Blockchain based trusted timestamps | An alternative to PKI based trusted timestamps is to adopt a blockchain based approach such as that defined in [i.7] that removes the requirement for a centralized Trusted Timestamp Authority (TTA) and replaces it with the distributed trust model of a blockchain. The current version of the present document only support... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.5 Secure storage | In addition to security keys held by the RRS elements to allow for validation of signed content, and for Tier 2 and Tier 3 systems to generate signed content the following elements shall be maintained in secure storage: • Evidence generated by the non-repudiation service. • Proofs of RAP integrity and the binding of a ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.6 Remote attestation | Remote attestation for RRS enables an RE to prove to a remote system the authenticity and integrity of its hardware and software configuration. Thus for RRS the authorized remote system is able to determine the level of trust in the integrity of the RE. The remote attestation service extends the non-repudiation service... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.7 Configuration control | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.7.1 Local configuration control | The purpose of configuration control is to only allow installation and operation of RAPs that are listed in the RE Configuration Policy. The RE Configuration Policy shall be made available to a policy enforcement entity and the following pseudo code implemented (details are given in clause 11 of the present document): ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.7.2 Remote configuration control | The remote configuration control service extends the local configuration control service by enabling the authorized party to be external to the RE (details are given in clause 11.4 of the present document). |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 3a.7.3 Long term management | The long-term management service extends the local configuration control service by enabling the transfer of configuration authority over the RRS Platform from one entity to another (details are given in clause 11.5 of the present document. |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 4 Review of objectives and high level requirements | The objectives stated in ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1] are copied in table 1 and classified in terms of the form of security function that is required to meet the objective. In addressing each objective the form of countermeasure required is discussed in some detail and the overall class or strategy of countermeasure is indica... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5 Countermeasure framework | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.1 Notes for interpretation | NOTE 1: The convention used in the present document is to refer to the thing being protected as a document even if in practice it may be an executable program, or a configuration file or something else. NOTE 2: The convention of referring to the legitimate parties to a transaction or involved in a security association ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.2 Identity management and authentication | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.2.1 Identity of entities in RAP and DoC lifecycle | The general model of identity management given in ETSI TR 187 010 [i.23] consists of the following 3 actors: • Principal: - Often synonymous with the end-user or an electronic agent of the end-user; - The entity being identified. • Identity Provider (IdP): - The organization generally required to authenticate the Princ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.2.2 Class and role based identity | A RAT shall indicate its type (e.g. GSM-900), its software version number, and link to the developer identity. The RAT type shall be indicated in the DoC in the case of a machine readable DoC. For a 3G cellular radio RAT the IMEI-SV shall act as the radio equipment identity with the following assertions made: • For RRS... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.3 Document integrity proof and verification | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.3.1 Overview of process | The developer of the RAP shall provide proof of the integrity of the package. The proof of integrity shall be provided by digital signature of the entire package (commonly referred to as document) to be delivered. Most commonly this is achieved by encrypting the cryptographic hash of the document using the private key ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4 Non-repudiation framework | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4.1 Overview of non-repudiation | ISO/IEC 10181-4 [i.4] states: "The goal of the Non-repudiation service is to collect, maintain, make available and validate irrefutable evidence concerning a claimed event or action in order to solve disputes about the occurrence of the event or action". A Non-repudiation service may be considered as a suite of discret... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4.2 Stage 1 model for non-repudiation | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4.2.1 Procedures | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4.2.1.1 Provision/withdrawal | Non-repudiation shall always be available. |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4.2.1.2 Normal procedures | 5.4.2.1.2.1 Activation/deactivation/registration/interrogation Non-repudiation shall always be activated. Non-repudiation shall not be de-activated. NOTE: These terms are difficult to address as non-repudiation is a composed countermeasure (see clause 5.4.2.2) and requires its composite elements to be activated and de-... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4.2.1.3 Exceptional procedures | 5.4.2.1.3.1 Activation/deactivation/registration/interrogation Not applicable. 5.4.2.1.3.2 Invocation and operation Non-repudiation is a composed countermeasure. The exceptional invocation and operation procedures of the other countermeasures defined in the present document apply in clause 5. |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 5.4.2.2 Interactions with other security services | In ISO/IEC 10181-4 [i.4] there is a description of how other security services can be used to support non-repudiation. The bulleted list below indicates the relationship between the services. • Authentication: - When entities interact with a TTP they may be required to prove their identity using an authentication servi... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 6 Information flows and reference points (stage 2) | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 6.1 Overview | The stage 2 information flows and reference points are extracted from the use case model given in ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1] copied in figure 4. Figure 4: Use cases and actors for RRS application deployment from ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1] As identified in ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1] the following actors exist in the distribution of RA... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 6.2 Confidentiality | Table 2: Extract from table 1 for "Confidentiality" strategy Id Text of objective Countermeasure Strategy 1 The RRS platform should provide means to ensure that the content of communication between the application store and the RE are protected from exposure to unauthorised 3rd parties Encryption of content (it is assu... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 6.3 Integrity | Table 4: Extract from table 1 for "Integrity" strategy Id Text of objective Countermeasure Strategy 2 The RRS platform should provide means to verify that the content of communication between the application store and RE has not been manipulated prior to processing at receipt Integrity check sum added to content Integr... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 6.4 Identity management | The identities of the RE Manufacturer, the RAP Software developer, and the Conformity Contact Entity shall be attested using identity public key certificates. The DoC and RE Configuration Policy shall be identified by association to a specific RE type (see clause 7.5.3.1.1 in ETSI TR 103 087 [i.1]). The RE instance (RR... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 6.5 Non-Repudiation services | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 6.5.1 Non-repudiation stage 2 models | The generic model for a non-repudiation system consists of 5 functional elements. Some of these elements are also defined in ISO/IEC 10181-4 [i.4]. Non-repudiation of origin ensures that the originator of information cannot successfully deny having sent the information. For RRS the concept of "Enforced proof of origin"... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7 Protocol sequences and data content (stage 3) | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.1 Confidentiality | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.1.1 Data in transit (encryption) | The encryption capability shall be implemented using TLS [7] with the following constraints: • Cipher suite selection shall be "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" Each party shall be identified by an attested public key certificate containing their public key attested by the root Certificate Authority (CA) for the R... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.1.2 Data in storage (access control) | Data in storage shall be protected by access control measures. Access shall only be permitted to authorized users or roles. For the DoC read only access shall only be permitted with the following exception: • If the DoC is modified and the storage needs to be updated this shall only be allowed by the Administration Fun... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.2 Integrity | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.2.1 Data in transit | The integrity verification capability shall be implemented for data in transit using TLS [7] with the following constraints: • Cipher suite selection shall be " TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" Each party shall be identified by an attested public key certificate containing their public key attested by the root CA ... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.2.2 Data in storage | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.2.2.1 Single storage point | The proof of integrity of any document (e.g. DoC) maintained in a store shall be implemented by calculating a cryptographic hash using the Secure Hash algorithm defined in FIPS 186-4 [3] (or as updated by SHA-3 [1]). The calculated hash shall be stored in a secured enclave distinct from the document. Strict access cont... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.2.2.2 Distributed storage points | Each component of the DoC shall follow the process identified in clause 7.2.2.1. In addition the root element of the DoC shall create a hash of the combination of the hashes of each component of the DoC and sign that. Whenever a component of the DoC changes the process identified in clause 7.2.2.1 shall be followed and... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 7.4 Non-repudiation service | The non-repudiation service shall be addressed using digital signature where each signature shall identify by timestamp and form of action the capability of RRS that is not to be repudiated. Digital signatures for distribution of the DoC when in a conventional document form (e.g. PDF, XML) shall follow the requirements... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 8 Cryptographic algorithm and key considerations | |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 8.1 Symmetric cryptography | For use in TLS [7] the AES algorithm [4] shall be used. This shall be identified in TLS using the cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 8.2 Asymmetric cryptography | The digital signature algorithm shall be the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [2] applied to the hash of the message (m) where the hash algorithm shall be as specified in FIPS 186-4 [2] or as updated to refer to SHA-3 [1]. This shall be identified in TLS [7] using the cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH... |
7cdb97bcca7f023e614e76dfab212628 | 103 436 | 9 Provision of root of trust | NOTE 1: The current version of the present document endorses the TPM model from OGC that has been published as the Trusted Platform Module Library Specification 2.0 with concurrent publication by ISO as International Standard ISO/IEC 11889 [i.16], [i.17], [i.18] and [i.19]. NOTE 2: The cryptographic primitives of the T... |
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