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5.3.1 ATS Library
For this ATS the TTCN-3 library modules are basically organized as: 1) AtsCommon modules. 2) LibIms modules. 3) LibSip modules (RFC 3261 [4]). 4) LibCommon modules (taken from an improved version of TS 102 351 [8]). NOTE: Due to the common LibSip and LibIms library approach with some other parallel running projects the...
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5.3.2 Use of TTCN-3
For the purposes of the present document, the description of the use of TTCN-3 described in clause 5.3.2 of TS 102 790-3 [3] applies. ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-3 V3.1.1 (2012-01) 10 Annex A (normative): Partial PIXIT proforma Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document,...
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1 Scope
The present document specifies countermeasures to assure that users of the NGN have protection from abuse of identity. This covers authenticity and integrity countermeasures, including use of existing systems, and credential management in support of identity protection. The present document: • identifies the security o...
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2 References
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which ar...
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2.1 Normative references
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI EG 202 387: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Security Design Guide; Method for application of Common Criteria to ETSI deliverables". . [2] ETSI ES 202...
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2.2 Informative references
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI TS 102 165-1: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Methods and protocols; Part 1: ...
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in EG 202 387 [11], ISO/IEC 17799 [i.3], ISO/IEC 13335-1 [i.4] and the following apply: asset: anything that has value to the organization, its business operations and its continuity authentication: ensuring that the identity of a subject or reso...
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3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AA Attribute Authority AC Attribute Certificate AKA Authentication and Key Agreement AMI Authority Management Infrastructure AS authentication server CA Certificate Authority CK Cipher Key CRAVED Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, En...
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4 Identity and privacy protection in the NGN
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4.1 Identity and privacy in the NGN
TR 187 010 [i.19] identifies a number of identity-related issues within the NGN, a set of security functional requirements and a set of measures that should be applied to counter the threats determined to exist in the NGN. The present document identifies a range of specific countermeasures to address threats to the man...
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4.2 Regulatory requirements for privacy
The NGN should ensure consistency with Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [i.8] which states that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law...
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4.3 Behaviour and identity
Although an NGN user will have only one true identity, that user will be represented by multiple NGN identifiers which may be used to distinguish between the use of different services and capabilities. In addition, different identifiers will be associated with an NGN user at each different protocol layer. However, this...
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4.4 Identity protection objectives
Table 1 summarizes the security objectives related to Identity Management (IdM) in the NGN which were identified in TR 187 010 [i.19]. Objectives 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are included in Table 1 as a result of considering NGN Release 3 functionality and the European regulations on privacy and data protection. Table 1: Securi...
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4.5 NGN identity and identifiers
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4.5.1 Identifying NGN users
In an ideal system there would be one unique NGN identity mapped to each NGN user. However, in practice an NGN identity comprises a number of NGN identifiers, each of which may be specific to a particular NGN sub-system, entity, application or protocol. Identification, authentication and authorization are necessary bot...
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4.5.2 Identifier attributes for identity protection
Table 2 lists a range of attributes which characterize each NGN identifier and which are the basis of identity management and protection within the NGN. Table 2: NGN identifier attributes Source of authority The authority responsible for the provision of the identifier. Sources of authority include the CSP, a national ...
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4.5.3 User Identifiers for non-communication services
For each NGN user there is at least one identifier which is assigned by the home operator and which is used both to identify the user's subscription and for non-communication services such as registration, authentication and mobility management. The attributes of such identifiers are listed in Table 3. ETSI ETSI TS 187...
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4.5.4 User Identifiers for communication services
For each NGN user there is at least one identifier which is used for user-to-user communication within one or many services. The attributes of such identifiers are listed in Table 4. Table 4: Attributes of user identifiers used for communication services Source of authority Service operator Purpose User to user communi...
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4.5.5 Device Identifiers
Each device attached to the NGN has at least one fixed identifier which is used for associating the device user with a specific attachment point within the network. The attributes of such identifiers are listed in Table 5. Table 5: Attributes of NGN device identifiers Source of authority Device manufacturer Purpose Bin...
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4.5.6 NGN Service Identifiers
Each NGN service has at least one identifier which is used to distinguish it from any other service. The attributes of such identifiers are listed in Table 6. Table 6: Attributes of NGN service identifiers Source of authority Service provider Purpose Provides an address with which subscribers can invoke the service Per...
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4.5.7 Network entity Identifiers within the NGN
Each network entity within the NGN has at least one identifier which distinguishes it from any other network entity. NOTE: A network entity within the NGN is distinct from equipment. Several (logical) network entities may be supported by a single device. The attributes of network entity identifiers are listed in Table ...
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5 Analysis of regulatory requirements
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5.1 Identification of personal data in the NGN
Directive 95/46/EC (Data protection Directive) [7] specifies the need for protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Protection measures need to be provided within the NGN to ensure the rights and freedom of natural persons with regard to the processi...
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5.2 Privacy requirements
Directive 2002/58/EC [4] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) requires that the confidentiality of private information in communi...
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5.2.1 Privacy exceptions required by regulation
The data retention directive 2006/24/EC [5] provides a legislative framework for the retention of data by service providers for the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences. The data retention directive itself refers to the exception to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights...
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6 Identity protection functional requirements
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6.1 Summary of security functional requirements
Table 8 lists the identity protection functional requirements refined from the identity protection security objectives in Table 1. A functional class (as defined in ISO/IEC 15408-2 [i.6]) is identified for each requirement and this is used in the development of functional security requirements for the NGN. Table 8: Ide...
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6.2.1 Access control measures
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6.2.1.1 Authenticity
Establishing the access rights of an NGN user involves three distinct but related capabilities, as follows: 1) Identification - the assertion of an NGN user's identity in order to gain access to NGN services. This involves the use of pseudonyms and other identifiers; 2) Authentication - the validation of the identity o...
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6.2.2 Privacy measures
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6.2.2.1 Pseudonymity
Pseudonymity ensures that a user may use a resource or service without disclosing its user identity, but can still be held accountable for that use. A pseudonym is an identifier allocated by an NGN authority to a single entity or group of entities and which bears no relation to the true identity of the entity or group....
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6.2.2.2 Unlinkability
Unlinkability ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or services without others being able to link these uses together. This means that within the NGN from the perspective of an unauthorized party, NGN users and their actions in the NGN are no more and no less related after an observation than they are...
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6.2.3 Confidentiality measures
The confidentiality of identities, identity revealing information, private information and data that can be used to relate behaviour to identity shall be ensured when transferred within the NGN. This is of particular importance for ensuring unlinkability.
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6.2.4 Integrity measures
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6.2.4.1 Transmitted data protection (integrity)
The integrity of identities and any identity-revealing data should be assured when it is transferred within the NGN. If there is any doubt about the integrity of received data which is required by an invoked service capability, that service capability should be terminated. The NGN system shall provide integrity service...
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6.2.5 Credential management
The security capabilities described in clauses 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 use a number of cryptographic keys and other security credentials in order to be effective. The credential management capability provides assurance that these items are created, transmitted and stored securely without modification, interferenc...
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6.2.6 Audit and accounting measures
The actions of the NGN user may be recorded for the purposes of accounting leading to billing. In addition the actions of the NGN user have to be recorded for Data Retention [5]. In each case the data recorded should be only visible to authorised entities and removed after consumption (or expiry in the case of data ret...
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7 Identity Protection Framework
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7.1 PKI-based Framework elements
The NGN identity protection framework comprises three elements, as follows: 1) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); 2) Public Key Certification Schema (PKC); and 3) Privileged Management Infrastructure (PMI). Each is described in the following clauses.
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7.2 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
A public key infrastructure (PKI) enables users of public networks to securely and privately exchange data through the use of a public and a private cryptographic key pair that is obtained and shared through a trusted authority. The main elements of a public key infrastructure are a digital certificate that can identif...
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7.2.1 Public Key Certification (PKC)
A public key certificate (also known as a digital certificate or identity certificate) is an electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind together a public key with an identity. The information that defines the identity information of a person or organization includes: • their name; • their address; • thei...
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7.2.1.1 Traceable time-variant pseudonym certificates with authoritative identity
Messages in the NGN may contain different identifiers at each layer of the protocol stack. Such identifiers may carry information that can be used to derive the real identity of the user or to link behaviour to specific NGN users, particularly at the application layer. Examples of such information include user's name, ...
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7.2.1.2 Traceable anonymous certificates with authoritative identity
The NGN may offer services that are free of charge or that, for other reasons, are not reliant upon the use of identity and identity revealing information for charging and billing. These services are referred to as anonymous services and require anonymous certificates which are defined in RFC 5636 [11]. NOTE: It is ass...
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7.2.2 Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)
A Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) is a cryptographic certificate-based approach to asserting the rights of a user or application to access or modify data or invoke services within a system. A PMI carries user privileges in the form of attributes in an Attribute Certificate (AC) which is issued to the user by ...
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7.2.2.1 ITU-T Recommendation X.509
ITU-T X.509 [3] privilege management. uses the attributes in an attribute certificates (ACs) to communicate, assert and validate user privileges. Access rights are held within the privilege attributes of Acs that are issued to users. Each privilege attribute describes one or more of the user's access rights. A target r...
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7.2.2.2 Kerberos
Kerberos is a ticket-based authorization system which provides a means of verifying the identities of the principals (e.g. an NGN user and a server) of a transaction in an open (unprotected) network. This is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating system, without basing trust on host addresses,...
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7.2.2.3 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [12] is an XML-based standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains, i.e. between an identity provider (a producer of assertions) and a service provider (a consumer of assertions). SAML has been developed by the OASIS Security Services Te...
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7.2.2.4 Access control models in PMI
PMI supports all of the three traditional access control models: • Discretionary Access Control (DAC); • Mandatory Access Control (MAC); and • Role Based Access Control (RBAC). The scheme for verifying privileges is independent of the model used. DAC leaves the granting and revoking of access privileges to the discreti...
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7.3 Analysis of framework elements
This evaluation of potential NGN identity protection framework elements makes explicit the consequences of each element on the NGN architecture, sub-systems and services. Each element is evaluated in the context of the security capabilities needed to comply with the regulatory requirements identified in clause 5. There...
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7.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The costs of implementing an NGN-wide PKI or a hierarchical NGN PKI across multiple administrative domains are evaluated as follows: Impact on standards design - Major Impact on implementation - Major Impact on Operation - Major Regulatory impact - Positive Market acceptance - Negative ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010...
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7.3.2 Public Key Certification
The costs of extending the NGN with a PKC mechanism are evaluated as follows: Impact on standards design - Medium Impact on implementation - Minor Impact on Operation - Minor Regulatory impact - Positive Market acceptance - Negative • Implementation strategy: - Asset hardening. • Advantages: - Digital signatures can be...
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7.3.3 Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)
The costs of introducing PMI into the NGN are evaluated as follows: Impact on standards design - Medium Impact on implementation - Medium Impact on Operation - Medium Regulatory impact - Positive Market acceptance - No impact • Implementation strategy: - Asset redesign and asset hardening. • Advantages: - PMI supports ...
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7.3.4 Summary of analysis results and recommendations
The following list of observations summarizes the results of the analysis of the NGN Identity Protection Framework elements: • Identity protection in the NGN requires a combination of registration, authentication and authorization: - registration must ensure that identity and identity-related information are not commun...
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8 Identity management and protection within the NGN
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8.1 NGN identifiers
TS 184 002 [8] provides a complete overview (dated October 2006) of the identifiers in the NGN and is supplemented by more recent work for IPTV that specifies the iptv:uri in TS 184 009 [9]. The current state identified in these documents is summarised in Table 10 and structured here against the ECN&S regulatory model....
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8.2 Identity protection in SIP (current state)
The SIP protocol in RFC 3325 [10] offers two mechanisms for use in exchanging an asserted identity within trusted networks (a single trust domain). The mechanisms are not intended to offer a general privacy or identity model suitable for use between different trust domains and thus may not apply to the generic NGN wher...
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8.2.1 SIP privacy handling in the NGN
Some support for SIP privacy handling in the NGN is described in TS 133 203 [i.15]. • SIP Privacy handling in IMS Networks: - Privacy may in many instances be equivalent with confidentiality i.e. to hide the information (using encryption and encryption keys) from all entities except those who are authorized to understa...
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8.3 Identity protection in IMS (IMS-AKA)
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8.3.1 Overview
Identity protection in IMS is covered by authentication of the IMPI and by registration of IMPUs to the IMPI with any SIP messages containing identity revealing data protected by the allocation of an Ipsec tunnel between the UE and the edge of the IMS network.
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8.3.2 IMS security analysis
As defined in TS 133 203 [i.15] a set of security associations between the multimedia client and the IMS is required before access is granted to multimedia services. The specification of IMS credentials and their management on a UICC is defined in TS 131 103 [i.16] whilst the algorithm set used by IMS-AKA is described ...
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8.4 Resolution protocols in NGN
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8.4.1 DNS and ENUM
The role of DNS, and of ENUM as a specialisation of DNS, is to map a name to an address. From a security and privacy perspective as DNS was not originally designed with security in mind it has evolved with a number of security issues. A TVRA of ENUM (incorporating DNS) is given in TR 187 002 [i.11]. The ENUM and DNS en...
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8.5 NGN Authentication, Registration and Authorization
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8.5.1 Overview
The NGN is a multi-provider network infrastructure where there may be a large number of access providers and service providers. This makes it particularly difficult to protect identities and identity-related information while ensuring that behavioural details cannot be linked to true identities. A multi-provider enviro...
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8.5.2 NGN Authentication and Registration
FFS.
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8.5.3 NGN Authorization
NOTE: A model for access control is given in TS 102 165-2 [i.10] that is extended here for NGN authorization. The primary purpose of the NGN Authorization (as a form of access control) service is to counter the threat of unauthorized invocation of operations on the communications system. The use of access control is of...
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8.6 Gap analysis
FFS.
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8.7 Detailed requirements
FFS. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 35 Annex A (normative): Protection Profile Proforma for Identity Protection in the NGN Protection Profile Introduction Doc No. TS 187 016 Version 3.1.1 Date 2010-06 Full Title Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NG...
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1 Scope
The present document specifies the Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes of the Communication Waiting (CW) service, based on stage 1 and stage 2 of the ISDN call waiting supplementary services. It provides the protocol details in the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem based on the Session Initiation Protoc...
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2 References
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • Non-specific reference may be made only to a complete document or a part thereof and only in the following cases: - if it is accept...
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2.1 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of the present document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For non-specific references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. [1] ETSI TS 124 615: "Digital cellular telecommunications...
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2.2 Informative references
The following referenced documents are not essential to the use of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Not applicable. ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07...
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 124 615 [1] apply.
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3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TS 124 615 [1] apply.
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4 Test Suite Structure (TSS) and Configuration
Table 1a CW destination_UE CW_U01_xxx originating_UE CW_U02_xxx AS CW_N01_xxx interaction CDIV CW_N02_xxx configuration CW_N03_xxx
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4.1 Configuration
The scope of the the present document is to test the signalling and procedural aspects of the stage 3 requirements as described in [1]. The stage 3 description respects the requirements to several network entities and also to requirments regarding to end devices. Therfore several interfaces (reference points) are addre...
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5 Test Purposes (TP)
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5.1 Introduction
For each test requirement a TP is defined.
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5.1.1 TP naming convention
TPs are numbered, starting at 001, within each group. Groups are organized according to the TSS. Additional references are added to identify the actual test suite and whether it applies to the network or the user (see table 1). ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 8 Table 1: TP identifier naming convention scheme Id...
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5.1.2 Test strategy
As the base standard TS 124 615 [1]contains no explicit requirements for testing, the TPs were generated as a result of an analysis of the base standard and the PICS specification TS 186 022-1 [2]. The criteria applied include the following: • whether or not a test case can be built from the TP is not considered.
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5.2 TPs for Communication Waiting (CW)
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5.2.1 Test purposes at the destination (user B) UE
TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_001 Reference 4.5.5.3.2 Selection expression PICS 2/1 AND PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment applies the Communication Waiting indication to the user. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able to notify the user that the communication establishment is waiting. Preco...
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5.2.2 Test purposes at the originating (user C) UE
TSS CW/originating_UE TP CW_U02_001 CB reference clause 4.5.2.10 Selection expression PICS 2/2 Test purpose The originating user receives the Communication waiting indication. Ensure that the originating user equipment has the ability to receive the "communication is waiting" indication in the Alert-Info header value <...
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5.2.3 Test purposes at the Application Server
TSS CW/AS TP CW_N01_001 Reference 4.5.5.2/ [1] Selection expression PICS 1/2 Test purpose CW indication determined by approaching NDUB condition. The indicationfor CW is sent to the terminating user. Ensure that on receipt of an INVITE request that fulfils the approaching NDUB condition for user B the AS determines tha...
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5.3 Interaction with other supplementary services
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5.3.1 Communication diversion services (CDIV)
TSS CW/interaction/CDIV TP CW_N02_001 CB reference 4.6.8.1 Selection expression PICS 1/5 Test purpose A Communication diversion activation is successful while a communication is waiting Ensure that communication forwarding unconditional supplementary service can be activated while a communication is waiting. Preconditi...
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5.4 Test purposes for Service Configuration
TSS CW/int TP CW_N03_001 CB reference 4.8 Selection expression PICS 1/5 Test purpose Communication Waiting can successful activated using Ut interface. Ensure that Communication Waiting can be activated by the user, a XML document is sent to the XCAP server. Preconditions: Configuration of simulation services via Ut in...
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1 Scope
The requirement for provision of lawful interception for all Communication Service Providers (CSP) is described in TS 101 331 [3] and the present document gives the stage 1 and stage 2 definition for provision of an interception capability in TISPAN NGN R1. The present document specifies the stage 1 and stage 2 model f...
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2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • ...
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3 Definitions, and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ES 201 671 [2] and the following apply: Content of Communication (CC): information exchanged between two or more users of a telecommunications service, excluding intercept related information NOTE: This includes information which may, as part ...
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3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AF Administration Function CC Content of Communication CCCI Content of Communication Control Interface CCTF Content of Communication Trigger Function CCTI Content of Communication Trigger Interface CR Change Request CSP Communications Service ...
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4 Interception in the NGN
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4.1 LI architecture model
The architecture for lawful interception consists of a Point of Interception (PoI) for each of the signalling plane and the transport plane, collocated with an NGN Functional Entity (NGN FE) (the specific NGN FE varies with the service being intercepted), that delivers intercepted material to a Mediation Function (MF)....
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4.2 LI reference model
The present document adopts the generic reference model for the interception domain from TR 102 528 [9], its internal intercept functions, IRI-IIF, CCTF, and CC-IIF, and the internal interfaces INI1, INI2, INI3, CCTI and CCCI as shown in figure 1. Mediation Function (MF) HI1 HI2 HI3 INI2 INI3 HI INI1a CCCI LEA DOMAIN C...
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4.3 Content of interception
The point of interception shall provide the following data when available in the intercepting network from the communication of the target: • Date and time of interception. • Identity of the target and the correspondents of the target. • Location of the target if available. • Activity of the target. NOTE: Whilst each e...
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5.1 Architecture for interception of PES
The Point of Interception shall be at premises of the CSP, i.e. IRI-IIF and CC-IIF shall reside in equipment under full control (physical access, etc.) of the CSP. Figure 1 (in clause 4.2) identifies the generic architecture for LI. The specific provision of the CC-IIF and IRI-IIF in the NGN for PES services is as show...
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6 Interception of IMS