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3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.2 TPs for Anonymous Communication Rejection (ACR) | |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.2.1 Action for ACR at the terminating AS | TSS ACR_CB/ACR_terminating_AS TP ACR-CB_N01_001 CB reference TS 183 011, clause 4.5.2.6.2 [1] Selection expression PICS 1/2 Test purpose ACR service rejects an anonymous communication, Privacy value is id. Ensure that the ACR service rejects the incoming communication where the request includes the P-Asserted-Identity ... |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.3 TPs for Communication Barring (CB) | |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.3.1 Actions for OCB at the originating AS | TSS ACR-CB/OBC_originating_AS TP ACR-CB_N02_001 CB reference TS 183 011, clauses 4.5.2.4.1 and 4.9.1.4 [1] Selection expression PICS 1/2 AND NOT PICS 1/4 Test purpose Outgoing communication barring evaluates media. Ensure that a outgoing communication is rejected when the evaluation of the media field condition matches... |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.3.2 Actions for ICB at the terminating AS | TSS ACR-CB/IBC_terminating_AS TP ACR-CB_N03_001 CB reference TS 183 011 clause 4.5.2.6.1 [1] Selection expression PICS 1/2 AND NOT PICS 1/4 Test purpose Outgoing communication barring evaluates media. Ensure that a outgoing communication is rejected when the evaluation of the presence-status field condition matches in ... |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.4 Interaction with other simulation services | |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.4.1 Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) | TSS ACR-CB/interaction_OIP TP ACR-CB_N04_001 CB reference TS 183 011, clause 4.6.4 [1] Selection expression Test purpose ACR does not apply to due override category according to the OIP service. Ensure that the ACR service shall not apply If the called user has subscribed to the override category according to the OIP s... |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.4.2 Communication Diversion services (CDIV) | TSS ACR-CB/interaction_CDIV TP ACR-CB_N05_001 CB reference TS 183 011, clause 4.6.7 [1] Selection expression Test purpose ACR has precedence if the served user has activated the communication diversion service. Ensure that the ACR service shall take precedence over the Communication Diversion service for the served use... |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.5 Test purposes for the ISUP/SIP Interworking | |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.5.1 Interworking from ISUP to SIP (Outgoing Call) | TP612001 ACR-CB Reference: TS 183 011 clause 4.7.1.3.1 [1] Selection criteria: TSS reference: ISUP-SIP/SS/ACR Preconditions: Test purpose: Mapping of 433 Anonymity Disallowed to REL cause 24. Ensure that the 433 Anonymity Disallowed final response received to due the ACR service is mapped into a REL cause 24 "call reje... |
3852cdf8f3ce3706df1c4c2e3b23c25f | 186 017-2 | 5.5.2 Interworking from SIP to ISUP (Incoming Call) | TP515001 ACR-CB Reference: TS 183 011 clause 4.7.1.2.1 [1] Selection criteria: TSS reference: SIP-ISUP/SS/ACR/ Preconditions: Test purpose: Mapping of REL cause 24 to 433 Anonymity Disallowed. Ensure that the SUT, if a destination user has subscribed the ACR supplementary service: the call attempt is rejected with a RE... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 1 Scope | The present document is for an initial release of a PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system (PES) performance benchmark. The same tests can be used also for legacy PSTN/ISDN networks or for inter-working tests between PSTN/ISDN emulation subsystem and legacy PSTN and ISDN. The metrics measured and reported are for performance o... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 2 References | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which ar... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 2.1 Normative references | The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 186 025-2: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS/PES Performance Benchmark Part 2: Subsystem Configurations and Benchmarks". [2] ITU-T Recommendatio... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 2.2 Informative references | The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI TS 186 025-3: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS/PES Performance Benchmark; ... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: background load: workload applied to an SUT during a benchmark test, for the purpose of consuming SUT resources during a benchmark test and changing the traffic intensity at which the capacity of the SUT is reached benchmark report: do... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: %IHS Percent Inadequately Handled Scenarios A-BGF Access Border Gateway Function AGCF Access Gateway Control Function APS Attempts per Second BC Bearer Capability CLIP Calling Line Identification Presentation CW Communication Waiting DO Design... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4 Benchmark information model | In this clause, "benchmark information model" refers to the structure of the information elements that define the benchmark. This information model is depicted in figure 1. ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-1 V2.1.1 (2011-01) 8 Figure 1: IMS/PES benchmark information model ETSI ETSI TS 186 025-1 V2.1.1 (2011-01) 9 The information m... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.1 Use-case | The top level of the individual behavioural model is the use-case. A use-case describes the goal that a user has in interacting with a system, the various actors (e.g. other users, network elements) that participate in the use-case, the basic course of events that are carried out by the user and the SUT, the design obj... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.1.3 Metrics | The metrics of a use-case describe the measurements collected from the execution of a scenario attempt. Typical metrics include response times and message rates. If a scenario is selected for execution in a benchmark test, its metrics are collected. See clause 7 for more detail. |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.1.4 Use-case outcomes | A use-case outcome is a set of possible outcomes of the scenarios of a use-case. An outcome may be simply "correct", it may reflect an error or failure condition; or it may reflect a correct behaviour that took an excessive amount of time to occur. An instance of a scenario that experiences an error, failure, or timeou... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.1.5 Scenarios and scenario attempts | A scenario is a trace of a path through a use-case. It is analogous to "call attempt", but applies to all interactions within an IMS/PES network, different Bearer, and application interactions. A scenario may succeed, fail, or succeed functionally. The terms "scenario attempt" and "scenario attempts per second" are use... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.1.6 Design Objective (DO) | The Design Objective (DO) describes the maximal acceptable rate handled scenario attempts for a use-case. |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.1.7 Scenario | A scenario describes a single interaction sequence among the actors of a use-case. It is documented by a set of preconditions on its actors (typically specified by parameter values). In case of IMS/PES the scenario is defined as a set of different Bearer Capabilities (e.g. speech , 3,1 kHz audio, UDI, UDI/TA), services... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.2 Benchmark test | A benchmark by definition measures the behaviour of a population of users. To accomplish this, the behaviours of individual users must be aggregated into input traffic to the SUT. The input traffic must be realistic, in the sense that a population of users would perform such actions in the real world, and in the sense ... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.2.1 Traffic set | The traffic set is a collection of scenarios which are determined to be likely to co-occur in a real-world scenario. The scenarios do not need to come from the same use-case. Within a traffic set, each scenario has an associated relative occurrence frequency, interpreted as the probability with which it would occur in ... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.2.2 Background load | Background load is a workload presented to the SUT in order to consume its resources. It may consist of a stream of traffic presented to the SUT by an external system apart from the test system; or it may be a workload presented to the processing elements, network, or storage subsystem of the SUT. The purpose of backgr... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.2.3 Traffic-time profile | The traffic-time profile is a function describing the average scenario attempt arrival rate as a function of elapsed time during a benchmark test. A traffic-time profile should be chosen in such a manner that, for a given scenario attempt arrival rate, sufficient samples are generated that metrics can be collected with... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.2.4 Test parameters | The benchmark test parameters are used to control the behaviour of the test script. The data elements required to configure the test system are listed in table 1. Table 1 is a non-exhaustive list of test parameters defined for the benchmark standard. The list is expected to grow over time, as additional subsystems and ... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 4.3 Benchmark report | A test report is a document, with accompanying data files, that provides a full description of an execution of a benchmark test on a test system. The SUT and test system, as well as their parameters, are described in sufficient detail that an independent test site can replicate the test. The results of the test include... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 5 System Under Test (SUT) | The IMS/PES performance benchmark covers benchmark tests for the PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system (PES), The same tests can be used also for legacy PSTN/ISDN networks or for inter-working tests between PSTN/ISDN emulation subsystem and legacy PSTN and ISDN. The following functional entities appear to be necessary from th... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 5.1 Creation of subscriber data base | The subscriber data base is the data-set required to configure the SUT in order to execute a benchmark test. Using the same data, the test system should be able to generate correct traffic. The present document does not try to specify a complete set, but rather just the subset that will ensure comparable results. All o... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 6 Test system | The test system is used to generate the appropriate load on the SUT. The present document does not mandate any specific test system to be used, although the details of the test system must be reported in the benchmark report. The test system should have two main functions: • Traffic generation: the test system must be ... |
d91a3cd4bd32801f28f2fb2b87e27b31 | 186 025-1 | 7 Benchmark metrics examples | The metrics reported by a benchmark test is measured in real time during the execution of the test, or may be computed after completion of the test from event logs collected during the execution. Enclosed is a benchmark matrix based on the ITU-T Recommendation Q.543 [2]. Table 2: Benchmark metrics examples delay parame... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the functional models and information flows (stage 2) and protocols (stage 3) which implement the security services and mechanisms required to provide security in a Customer Premises Network (CPN) to support the overall security architecture for NGN release 3. CPN security services and me... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 2 References | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which ar... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 2.1 Normative references | The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 187 001: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN SECurity (SEC); Requirements". [2] ETSI TS 185 006: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Servic... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 2.2 Informative references | The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI TR 185 012: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN) Feasibility study of security mech... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 187 003 [4] and Broadband Forum TR-157 [6] apply. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ACS Auto-Configuration Server AKA Authentication and Key Agreement ALG Application Level Gateway API Application programming Interface B2BUA Back to back User Agent BGF Border Gateway Function BL1 Boot Loader image CA Conditional Access C-BGF ... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 4 General overview | This clause introduces the subset of security mechanisms to be evaluated and specified in details within the present document. The security mechanisms has been selected mainly (but not only) from the contents of the TR 185 012 [i.1]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 021 V3.2.1 (2014-04) 9 |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5 Firewalling | The main mechanism to perform Network Access Control is a firewall, i.e. a system designed to permit, deny or proxy data traffic to or from the customer's network. A firewall is positioned to control all incoming and outgoing traffic; hence the CNG is the perfect candidate to perform the firewall functions. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.1 Firewalling: basic description | There are several approaches to implements firewall functionalities, such as: • Packet Filtering: the simplest one inspects each incoming or outgoing IP packet permitting, dropping or rejecting it on the basis of simple policies (usually defined as access control list) such as the IP address and the protocol type. • St... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.2 Firewalling: architecture | In the CPN context, the CNG sits between the NGN and the internal network and this aspect makes the CNG as the perfect candidate to host the firewall functions. Figure 1 shows a typical scenario where the CNG and the Firewall are co-located on the same device. The external interface is the one that is connected to the ... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.3 Firewalling: implementation details | For the protection of the CPN, a firewall should support some basic features, such as security policy definition and enforcing, firewall management, logging functions and so on. The following clause describes in details such features. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.3.1 Stateful inspection | The stateful firewall function is mandatory for the protection of the CPN, such a firewall function may be implemented in the CNG. While a packet filter decides whether or not to drop a packet based on few information contained in the packet headers (e.g. addressing information), a stateful packet filter takes its deci... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.3.2 Communication technologies | The Firewall shall be enabled on the local CPN network including all kind of wired and wireless connectivity used on the CPN, as well as remote access connections such as PPP over Ethernet and Virtual Private Network on the WAN side of the CNG. Note however that the firewall cannot be enabled when the CNG acts as a net... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.3.3 Security policy | The firewall could have several configuration alternatives. In order to simplify the management of the security policy and still provide a basic level of security to the CPN it is proposed to define one or more security profiles. As defined by HGI in [i.9] at least the following basic configurations shall be supported ... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.3.4 ALG for standard protocols support | Also a stateful firewall is not effective or could limit specific services with applications that include IP addresses and TCP/UDP port information in the payload (e.g. FTP, SIP protocols, peer to peer applications). To filter these protocols, and at the same time permit the access to such services, the firewall has to... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.3.5 Firewall management | The firewall should be manageable from the CPN and by the IPS/Operator and it should enable the ISP/Operator also to upgrade the firewall functionality via download of a new configuration file. To implement this operation, the management centre downloads to the CNG firewall the configuration file. This file integrates ... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 5.3.6 Logging | The firewall should have the ability to log network traffic and main security events. Basic logging options should be supported (by default all logging options should be disabled). The logging function should capture at least the following events: • Log of changes to firewall policy. • Network connection logs, which in... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6 SP and/or CP secure upgrade | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.1 SP and/or CP secure upgrade: introduction and scope | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.1.1 Introduction | Interoperability of the CPE (IPTV CND or CNG) means that the end user can switch the CPE to another IPTV service provider without having to change the CPE (assuming that the transmission technology does not change). Figure 2: SP & CP architecture An IPTV specific requirement which has a strong influence on interoperabi... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.1.2 Scope | The scope of this clause is to describe a solution that enables "Secure upgrade of Service Protection and/or Content Protection" software. The solution has to be generalizable to other types of software. The following will be covered to specify a solution to "Secure upgrade of Service Protection and/or Content Protecti... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2 SP and/or CP secure upgrade: architecture | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1 SP and/or CP upgrade stakeholders | The following stakeholders in the CND upgrade process have been identified: CND Custodian: A CND custodian would act as a trust authority for CND's and certify all public device keys of compliant devices. With them a service provider can verify that a connected device is authorized to download a new SP and/or CP implem... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a CND secure upgrade trust hierarchy | Figure 4: X CND secure upgrade trust hierarchy |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.1 IPTV trust authority | This is root of trust that will ensure that only an authorized Registration Operator can add new trust authorities for: • Internet Service Provider. • IPTV Service Provider. • SP provider or CP Provider. • CND Manufacturer. • Chip Manufacturer. It will also allow the Registration Operator to be changed at any time by r... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.2 Registration operator trust authority | The role of the Registration Operator is day to day adding and removing Internet Service Provider, IPTV Service Provider, SP provider, CP Provider, CND Manufacturer and Chip-set Manufacturer trust authorities by registering and deregistering them and providing the necessary credentials to communicate securely with the ... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.3 ISP trust authority | The service may be dependent on agreement with certain ISP's to provide, say, a minimum level of QoS which requires a secure distribution of configuration parameters to the CND and possibly IPTV Service Provider. This branch provides ISP and CND specific security credentials for this configuration. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.4 IPTV service provider trust authority | Many aspects of end to end security are critically dependent on ensuring that the confidentiality and integrity of the IPTV Service Providers CND software and applications is ensured at: • each and every service invocation; • during run time of the CND software; • before and after any remote upgrade to such software. T... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.5 SP/CP trust authority | Many aspects of end to end security are critically dependent on ensuring that the confidentiality and integrity of the SP or CP software ensured at: • each and every service invocation; • during run time of the CND software; • before and after any remote upgrade to such software. This branch provides SP and CP specific... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.6 CND trust authority | Many aspects of end to end security are critically dependent on ensuring that the integrity of the CND is ensured at: • each and every boot; • during run time of the CND operating system; • during run time of CND specific applications; • before and after any remote upgrade to such software. This branch provides CND spe... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.7 Chip manufacturer trust authority | Many aspects of end to end security are critically dependent on ensuring that the integrity of the processor chip or security chips. This branch provides chip manufacturer specific security credentials to ensure this integrity. For example SOC specific identities and access keys. ETSI ETSI TS 187 021 V3.2.1 (2014-04) 1... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.8 IPTV service provider specific trusted platform software and applications | There will be applications that are specific to a particular IPTV Service Provider. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.1a.9 IPTV service provider common applications | As well as IPTV Service Provider specific trusted platform software and apps, there will be applications that are common to all IPTV Service Providers but need to be restricted to certain IPTV Service Providers only. These would include standardized VOD applications, etc. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.2 SP and/or CP upgrade architecture | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.2.1 Overview | Figure 5 is a depiction of a CND architecture that shows the typical functions needed in an IPTV CND that supports consumption of protected linear TV content and allows upgrade of the SP and/or CP or other software to enable change of IPTV service provider. Figure 5: CND functional architecture for SP CP upgrade |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.2.2 Functional entities | Configuration & management (CND-CMF): This function is responsible for, and allows, the remote configuration and management of the CND. CND-CMF is described in TS 185 006 [2]. Middleware/OS: This is the Firmware that operates the CND and allows the CND to be used as an IPTV CND. The Firmware also interacts with the CND... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.2.3 Affected interfaces and reference points | e3: The e3 interface's primitives for Firmware upgrade need to be extended with an indication that the provided software is a CND software upgrade. Also the proper authentication needs to be in place on this interface to ensure that only entitled parties may perform a remote CND software update. ASP: The plugin API for... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3 SP and/or CP upgrade use cases | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.1 General | Firmware owner: In the security architecture described in clause 6.2.4 it is assumed that one party is entitled to upgrade the firmware, this party is called the firmware owner. This party can be modified in a controlled way if allowed by a custodian or trust provider. SP owner: In the security architecture described i... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.2 User changes service provider | When a user changes from IPTV service provider the following steps may be needed before the user can enjoy the services of the IPTV service provider: 1) Upgrade of Firmware, in case the new service provider requires ownership and use of a dedicated Firmware. 2) Upgrade of the SP Software Module, to adapt the IPTV CND t... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.3 A stakeholder X requests to be firmware owner | The following steps will effectively change the Firmware owner: 1) The stakeholders X's ACS initiate a remote management connection with the IPTV CND. 2) During connection establishment mutual authentication is performed between the requesting stakeholder X's ACS and the IPTV CND. NOTE 1: The methods for mutual authent... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.4 Firmware owner requests upgrade of firmware | The following steps will upgrade the Firmware: 1) The Firmware owner's ACS initiates a remote management connection with the IPTV CND. 2) During connection establishment mutual authentication is performed between the requesting Firmware owner's ACS and the IPTV CND. NOTE 1: The methods for mutual authentication between... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.5 A stakeholder Y requests to be SP owner | The following steps will effectively change the SP owner: 1) The stakeholders Y's ACS initiates a remote management connection with the IPTV CND. 2) During connection establishment mutual authentication is performed between the requesting stakeholder Y's ACS and the IPTV CND. NOTE 1: The methods for mutual authenticati... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.6 SP owner requests upgrade of SP software module | Following steps will upgrade the SP Software Module: 1) The Firmware owner's ACS initiates a remote management connection with the IPTV CND. 2) During connection establishment mutual authentication is performed between the requesting Firmware owner's ACS and the IPTV CND. NOTE 1: The methods for mutual authentication b... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.7 A stakeholder Y requests to be CP owner | Following steps will effectively change the CP owner: 1) The stakeholders Y's ACS initiates a remote management connection with the IPTV CND. 2) During connection establishment mutual authentication is performed between the requesting stakeholder Y's ACS and the IPTV CND. NOTE 1: The methods for mutual authentication b... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.3.8 CP owner requests upgrade of CP software module | Following steps will upgrade the CP Software Module: 1) The Firmware owner's ACS initiates a remote management connection with the IPTV CND. 2) During connection establishment mutual authentication is performed between the requesting Firmware owner's ACS and the IPTV CND. NOTE 1: The methods for mutual authentication b... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.4 SP and/or CP upgrade security architecture | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.4.1 Trusted environment architecture for SP/CP | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.4.1.1 Hardware supported trusted environment preventing Hi-Jacking | To ensure that an SP or CP client is authentic and secure, a CND needs to provide a trusted environment. For this, all layers of loaded software need to be verified to be integer and authentic. In a hardware supported trusted environment the guarantee is provided by the lowest level (i.e. the hardware) will only load a... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.2.4.1.2 Hardware supported trusted environment, protecting the key flow | NOTE: The traffic encryption keys (also Control Words (CW)) that are transported between the CND-SPF and/or the CND-CPF and the decryption function needs to be protected against eavesdropping. It is needed to consider whether this requires the decryption function (in case implemented in software) to be part of the SP C... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3 SPCP secure upgrade: implementation details | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.1 Aspects of end to end security | Clause 6.2.1a.6 sates that many aspects of end to end security are critically dependent on ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the CND at: 1) Each and every boot. 2) During run time of the CND operating system and run time of CND specific applications. 3) Before and after any remote upgrade to such software. ETS... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.2 Secure upgrade using TR-069 CWMP | |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.2.1 A stakeholder Y requests to be SP owner | This clause specifies how the procedure from clause 6.2.3.5 can be realized with the CWMP protocol from TR-069 Amendment 3 [5]. The steps from that procedure will be detailed in the following clauses. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.2.1.1 ACS initiates a remote management connection with the IPTV CND | Discovery of a specific IPTV CND is performed according to the procedures in section 3.1 of TR-069 [5]. After successful discovery connection establishment is performed according to the procedures specified in section 3.2 of TR-069 [5]. The CPE initiates, holds and terminates a transaction session as specified in secti... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.2.1.2 perform mutual authentication between ACS and the IPTV CND | During connection establishment mutual authentication takes places between the ACS and the IPTV CND using TLS (TLS 1.2 [7] or a later version), according to the procedures as defined in section 3.3 of TR-069 [5]. TLS provides confidentiality and data integrity, and allows certificate-based authentication. |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.2.1.3 Instruct IPTV CND to download the SP loader package | The SP loader software module is packaged as a DU that contains one EU and one resource carrying signature. DU and EU as defined in section II.3 of TR 157 [6]. The ACS can instruct the IPTV CND to download the SP loader package by invoking the ChangeDUState RPC according to section 3.4.3 in TR-069 [5]. When the CPE rec... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.2.1.4 Instruct IPTV CND to download the SP Software Module | The SP software module is packaged as a DU that contains one EU and one resource carrying signature. DU and EU as defined in section II.3 of TR 157 [6]. The ACS can instruct the IPTV CND to download the SP software module by invoking the ChangeDUState RPC. When the CPE receives a ChangeDUState request and the targeted ... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 6.3.2.1.5 Install EU where EE is secure execution environment for SPCP | To install a Software Module in a the secure execution environment for SPCP, the following conditions have to be fulfilled: 1) The ExecutionEnvRef is "org.etsi.spcpee", indicating that the target EE is the secure execution environment for SPCP. 2) The party initiating the install is entitled to perform the installation... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 7 Network Access Control (NAC) | The Network Access Control (NAC) is a gathering of methods linked to the control of a network's access. In terms of security, these methods aim to control access to a network with policies, including pre-admission endpoint security policy checks and post-admission controls over where users and devices can go on a netwo... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 7.1 NAC: basic description | The IETF NEA [i.2] architectures have been defined to assess the "posture" of endpoint devices for the purposes of monitoring compliance to an organization's posture policy and optionally restricting access until the endpoint has been updated to satisfy the posture requirements. Posture refers to the hardware and softw... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 8 Hosted-NAT solution for RTSP based services | Hosted Nat traversal for IMS access is specified in ES 282 003 [i.3]. The mechanism has been defined to solve the NAT issue for the SIP based services (e.g. voice call) and it is based on an ALG collocated inside the P-CSCF and mandates the usage of the C-BGF in the access network. The C-BGF allocates and releases tran... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 8.1 Hosted-NAT for RTSP: basic description | When the RTSP protocol passes through the NAT device (e.g. CNG), the embedded address and port in the "transport" header shall be translated in order for the connection to be successful (e.g. SETUP message). These issues could be managed by an ALG placed in the Operator Network (e.g. MFC in the IPTV context). The main ... |
394c5651e4e4e49282740c91e22f3bd7 | 187 021 | 8.2 Hosted-NAT for RTSP: architecture | The sequence diagram in figure 10 describes an example of the main steps involved in the proposed Hosted Nat mechanism for RTSP. The scenario described foresee a CND (e.g. a STB) accessing the NGN IPTV dedicated subsystem. The CNG and the NAT device are collocated in the same device. In order to simplify the scenario (... |
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