validation_data_ground_truth_doc.json

[
  {
    "question": "Defendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nInvoluntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense at the time of the shooting.\u201d Id.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSelect from the choices (A-D) the most serious offense of which the defendant could be properly convicted.\nDefendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.\n\n (A) Involuntary manslaughter\n (B) Voluntary manslaughter\n (C) Murder\n (D) None of the above\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "None of the above"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_131",
    "retrieved_docs": "Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense at the time of the shooting.\u201d Id."
  },
  {
    "question": "Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable results of his acts.\u2019 \u201d Keech v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 272, 277, 279, 386 S.E.2d 813, 816, 817 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDespondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be\n\n (A) acquitted, because he honestly believed he faced an imminent threat of death or severe bodily injury.\n (B) acquitted, because his intoxication prevented him from appreciating the risk he created.\n (C) convicted, because he acted recklessly and in fact was in no danger.\n (D) convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_885",
    "retrieved_docs": "To convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable results of his acts.\u2019 \u201d Keech v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 272, 277, 279, 386 S.E.2d 813, 816, 817 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)."
  },
  {
    "question": "Andres conveyed Applewood Farm \"to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs.\" The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201cAs a formulation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, our cases have adopted Professor Gray's statement that \u2018[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of **837 the interest.\u2019 \u201d4 Dorado Ltd. P'Ship v. Broadneck Dev. *489 Corp., 317 Md. 148, 152, 562 A.2d 757 (1989) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Mer.-Safe, Etc. Co., 220 Md. 534, 541, 155 A.2d 702 (1959)). The rule \u201c \u2018is not a rule that invalidates interests which last too long, but interests which vest too remotely.\u2019 \u201d Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 495, 860 A.2d 886 (2004) (quoting Fitzpatrick, 220 Md. at 541, 155 A.2d 702).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAndres conveyed Applewood Farm \"to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs.\" The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is\n\n (A) nothing.\n (B) a valid executory interest.\n (C) a possibility of reverter.\n (D) a right of entry for condition broken.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "nothing."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_965",
    "retrieved_docs": "\u201cAs a formulation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, our cases have adopted Professor Gray's statement that \u2018[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of **837 the interest.\u2019 \u201d4 Dorado Ltd. P'Ship v. Broadneck Dev. *489 Corp., 317 Md. 148, 152, 562 A.2d 757 (1989) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Mer.-Safe, Etc. Co., 220 Md. 534, 541, 155 A.2d 702 (1959)). The rule \u201c \u2018is not a rule that invalidates interests which last too long, but interests which vest too remotely.\u2019 \u201d Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 495, 860 A.2d 886 (2004) (quoting Fitzpatrick, 220 Md. at 541, 155 A.2d 702)."
  },
  {
    "question": "Supermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIn Tennessee, while there is generally no duty for business to protect their customers from crimes occurring on their premises,\na duty to take reasonable steps to protect customers arises if the business knows, or has reason to know, either from what has been or should have been observed or from past experience, that criminal acts against its customers on its premises are reasonably foreseeable, either generally or at some particular time. In determining the duty that exists, the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm must be balanced against the commensurate burden imposed on the business to protect against that harm.\nMcClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 902 (Tenn.1996). \n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSupermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the\n\n (A) plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot.\n (B) plaintiff, because Supermarket is liable for harm to business invitees on its premises.\n (C) defendant, if the warning signs were plainly visible to Lorner.\n (D) defendant, because the rapist was the proximate cause of Lorner's injuries.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_768",
    "retrieved_docs": "In Tennessee, while there is generally no duty for business to protect their customers from crimes occurring on their premises,\na duty to take reasonable steps to protect customers arises if the business knows, or has reason to know, either from what has been or should have been observed or from past experience, that criminal acts against its customers on its premises are reasonably foreseeable, either generally or at some particular time. In determining the duty that exists, the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm must be balanced against the commensurate burden imposed on the business to protect against that harm.\nMcClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 902 (Tenn.1996). "
  },
  {
    "question": "In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?\n\n (A) No, unless Outfitters could have discovered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the safety device.\n (B) No, because Rollins did not rely on the representation of safety implied from the sale of the safety device by Outfitters.\n (C) Yes, unless Alper was negligent in failing to test the safety device.\n (D) Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_656",
    "retrieved_docs": "The elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999)."
  },
  {
    "question": "If the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAlthough the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to conduct investigations, Congress \u2013 and the courts \u2013 have long recognized that Congress has an inherent, constitutional prerogative to conduct investigations.  In fact, the first congressional investigation occurred as early as 1792, when the House of Representatives convened a committee to investigate the defeat of General Arthur St. Clair in the Battle of the Wabash in what was then known as the Northwest Territory (and now known as Ohio). Congress has the authority to conduct investigations \u201cin aid of its legislative function.\u201d  That authority can extend to investigations for the purpose of deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies.  As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited.  Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority.  For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen. The doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate.  Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government.  It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial.  Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion.  For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise initiate a criminal prosecution.  If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution.  Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation.  No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation.  As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative authority, making its authority to investigate almost boundless in practice.  That reality is compounded by expansive interpretations of congressional authority and a hesitation by the courts to intervene in congressional investigations.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nGreen is cited for contempt of the House of Representatives after she refused to answer certain questions posed by a House Committee concerning her acts while serving as a United States Ambassador. A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute contempts of Congress. Pursuant to this law, the House directs the Attorney General to begin criminal proceedings against Green. A federal grand jury indicts Green, but the Attorney General refuses to sign the indictment.\nIf the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that\n\n (A) Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate\n (B) the House may question Green only on matters pertaining to the expenditure of funds appropriated by Congress\n (C) only the Senate may question Green on matters that relate to the performance of her duties\n (D) Congress may not ask questions relating to the performance of duties executed by an officer of the executive branch\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_200",
    "retrieved_docs": "Although the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to conduct investigations, Congress \u2013 and the courts \u2013 have long recognized that Congress has an inherent, constitutional prerogative to conduct investigations.  In fact, the first congressional investigation occurred as early as 1792, when the House of Representatives convened a committee to investigate the defeat of General Arthur St. Clair in the Battle of the Wabash in what was then known as the Northwest Territory (and now known as Ohio). Congress has the authority to conduct investigations \u201cin aid of its legislative function.\u201d  That authority can extend to investigations for the purpose of deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies.  As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited.  Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority.  For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen. The doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate.  Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government.  It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial.  Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion.  For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise initiate a criminal prosecution.  If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution.  Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation.  No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation.  As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative authority, making its authority to investigate almost boundless in practice.  That reality is compounded by expansive interpretations of congressional authority and a hesitation by the courts to intervene in congressional investigations."
  },
  {
    "question": "Assume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe police suspected that Yancey, a 16-year-old high school student, had committed a series of burglaries. Two officers went to Yancey's high school and asked the principal to call Yancey out of class and to search his backpack. While the officers waited, the principal took Yancey into the hall where she asked to look in his backpack. When Yancey refused, the principal grabbed it from him, injuring Yancey's shoulder in the process. In the backpack, she found jewelry that she turned over to the officers. The officers believed that the jewelry had been taken in one of the burglaries. They arrested Yancey, took him to the station, and gave him Miranda warnings. Yancey asked to see a lawyer. The police called Yancey's parents to the station. When Yancey's parents arrived, the police asked them to speak with Yancey. They put them in a room and secretly recorded their conversation with a concealed electronic device. Yancey broke down and confessed to his parents that he had committed the burglaries. Yancey was charged with the burglaries.\nAssume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be\n\n (A) Yancey was in custody at the time the statement was recorded.\n (B) the police did not comply with Yancey's request for a lawyer.\n (C) once Yancey had invoked his right to counsel, it was improper for the police to listen to any of his private conversations.\n (D) the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_892",
    "retrieved_docs": "A confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will."
  },
  {
    "question": "A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows:\n\u201c[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\u201d U.S. Const., Art. II, \u00a7 2, cl. 2.\n5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \u201cetiquette or protocol\u201d; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128\u2013131, 96 S.Ct., at 686\u2013688; Weiss, supra, at 183\u2013185, 114 S.Ct., at 763\u2013765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 904, and n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2652, and n. 4, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring). This disposition was also designed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Framers anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. \u201cThe sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation.\u201d The Federalist No. 76, p. 387 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton); accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374\u2013375 (1833). The President's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, however, as Article II further requires the \u201cAdvice and Consent of the Senate.\u201d This serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, see 3 Story, supra, at 376\u2013377, and \u201cto promote a judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union,\u201d The Federalist No. 76, at 386\u2013387. *660 By requiring the joint participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one. Hamilton observed:\n\u201cThe blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.\u201d Id., No. 77, at 392.\nSee also 3 Story, supra, at 375 (\u201cIf [the President] should ... surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible for him long to retain public favour\u201d).\n \nThe prescribed manner of appointment for principal officers is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers. \u201c[B]ut,\u201d the Appointments Clause continues, \u201cthe Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\u201d This provision, sometimes referred to as the \u201cExcepting Clause,\u201d was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention, with little discussion. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627\u2013628 (1911 ed.). As one of our early opinions suggests, its obvious purpose is administrative convenience, see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L.Ed. 482 (1879)\u2014but that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with respect to the appointment of \u201cinferior Officers.\u201d Section 323(a), which confers appointment power upon the Secretary of Transportation, can constitutionally be *661 applied to the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges only if those judges are \u201cinferior Officers.\u201d\n Our cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes. Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk, Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 229, 10 L.Ed. 136 (1839), an election supervisor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397\u2013398, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880), a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343, 18 S.Ct. 374, 379, 42 L.Ed. 767 (1898), and a \u201cUnited States commissioner\u201d in district court proceedings, Go\u2013Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352\u2013354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156\u2013157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 591\u2013599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671\u2013672, 108 S.Ct., at 2608\u20132609.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is\n\n (A) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards having broad powers that are quasi-legislative in nature, such as rulemaking, must be appointed by Congress.\n (B) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.\n (C) constitutional, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states.\n (D) constitutional, because there is a substantial nexus between the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare and the means specified by Congress in this statute for the appointment of board members.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_1078",
    "retrieved_docs": "The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows:\n\u201c[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\u201d U.S. Const., Art. II, \u00a7 2, cl. 2.\n5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \u201cetiquette or protocol\u201d; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128\u2013131, 96 S.Ct., at 686\u2013688; Weiss, supra, at 183\u2013185, 114 S.Ct., at 763\u2013765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 904, and n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2652, and n. 4, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring). This disposition was also designed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Framers anticipated that the President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a collective body. \u201cThe sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation.\u201d The Federalist No. 76, p. 387 (M. Beloff ed. 1987) (A. Hamilton); accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374\u2013375 (1833). The President's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, however, as Article II further requires the \u201cAdvice and Consent of the Senate.\u201d This serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, see 3 Story, supra, at 376\u2013377, and \u201cto promote a judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union,\u201d The Federalist No. 76, at 386\u2013387. *660 By requiring the joint participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one. Hamilton observed:\n\u201cThe blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.\u201d Id., No. 77, at 392.\nSee also 3 Story, supra, at 375 (\u201cIf [the President] should ... surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible for him long to retain public favour\u201d).\n \nThe prescribed manner of appointment for principal officers is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers. \u201c[B]ut,\u201d the Appointments Clause continues, \u201cthe Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\u201d This provision, sometimes referred to as the \u201cExcepting Clause,\u201d was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand Convention, with little discussion. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627\u2013628 (1911 ed.). As one of our early opinions suggests, its obvious purpose is administrative convenience, see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L.Ed. 482 (1879)\u2014but that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome procedure only with respect to the appointment of \u201cinferior Officers.\u201d Section 323(a), which confers appointment power upon the Secretary of Transportation, can constitutionally be *661 applied to the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges only if those judges are \u201cinferior Officers.\u201d\n Our cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes. Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk, Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 229, 10 L.Ed. 136 (1839), an election supervisor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397\u2013398, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880), a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343, 18 S.Ct. 374, 379, 42 L.Ed. 767 (1898), and a \u201cUnited States commissioner\u201d in district court proceedings, Go\u2013Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352\u2013354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156\u2013157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 591\u2013599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671\u2013672, 108 S.Ct., at 2608\u20132609."
  },
  {
    "question": "According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIn assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAccording to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?\n\n (A) Compliance with the petition signature requirement is burdensome.\n (B) The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means.\n (C) Because of the petition signature requirement, very few independent candidates have ever succeeded in getting on the ballot.\n (D) The motivation for the statute was a desire to keep candidates off the ballot if they did not have strong support among voters.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_973",
    "retrieved_docs": "In assessing whether a State election law impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights, we examine the character and magnitude of the burden and the extent to which the law serves the State's interests. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Laws imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests, but lesser burdens receive less exacting scrutiny. California Democratic Party, 120 S.Ct. at 2412; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364."
  },
  {
    "question": "Dart is charged with the statutory offense of \"knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board\" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nMistake of fact is a defense where the reasonable mistake of fact precludes the presence of any mental element required in that crime. La. R.S. 14:16; see State v. Converse, 529 So.2d 459, 465 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 355 (La.1988).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDart is charged with the statutory offense of \"knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board\" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?\n\n (A) The purchaser had a driver's license that falsely showed his age to be 21.\n (B) Dart had never been told he was supposed to check identification of persons over 17 and under 22 before selling them alcohol.\n (C) Dart did not know that the regulations classified beer as an alcoholic beverage.\n (D) Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_799",
    "retrieved_docs": "Mistake of fact is a defense where the reasonable mistake of fact precludes the presence of any mental element required in that crime. La. R.S. 14:16; see State v. Converse, 529 So.2d 459, 465 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 355 (La.1988)."
  },
  {
    "question": "Loomis, the owner and operator of a small business, encourages \"wellness\" on the part of his employees and supports various physicalfitness programs to that end. Learning that one of his employees, Graceful, was a dedicated jogger, Loomis promised to pay her a special award of $100 if she could and would run one mile in less than six minutes on the following Saturday. Graceful thanked him, and did in fact run a mile in less than six minutes on the day specified. Shortly thereafter, however, Loomis discovered that for more than a year Graceful had been running at least one mile in less than six minutes every day as a part of her personal fitness program. He refused to pay the $100. In an action by Graceful against Loomis for breach of contract, which of the following best summarizes the probable decision of the court?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it must pursue this claim under that theory.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nLoomis, the owner and operator of a small business, encourages \"wellness\" on the part of his employees and supports various physicalfitness programs to that end. Learning that one of his employees, Graceful, was a dedicated jogger, Loomis promised to pay her a special award of $100 if she could and would run one mile in less than six minutes on the following Saturday. Graceful thanked him, and did in fact run a mile in less than six minutes on the day specified. Shortly thereafter, however, Loomis discovered that for more than a year Graceful had been running at least one mile in less than six minutes every day as a part of her personal fitness program. He refused to pay the $100. In an action by Graceful against Loomis for breach of contract, which of the following best summarizes the probable decision of the court?\n\n (A) Loomis wins, because it is a compelling inference that Loomis's promise did not induce Graceful to run the specified mile.\n (B) Loomis wins, because Graceful's running of the specified mile was beneficial, not detrimental, to her in any event.\n (C) Graceful wins, because running a mile in less than six minutes is a significantly demanding enterprise.\n (D) Graceful wins, because she ran the specified mile as requested, and her motives for doing so are irrelevant.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Graceful wins, because she ran the specified mile as requested, and her motives for doing so are irrelevant."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_778",
    "retrieved_docs": "\u201cCalifornia law does not recognize a breach of contract as a \u2018wrongful act\u2019 predicate required for this claim.\u201d \u201c[A] breach of contract claim cannot be transmuted into tort liability by claiming that the breach interfered with the promisee's business.\u201d83 This is true even when a party breaches in order to put the non-breaching party out of business and rid itself of a competitor.84 \u201c[M]otive, regardless of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim....\u201d To the extent that Templeton *1194 is alleging a breach of contract, it must pursue this claim under that theory."
  },
  {
    "question": "Was the escrow agreement a valid modification?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nFor a valid modification to exist, there must be mutual assent *822 to the meaning and conditions of the modification and the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.... Modification of a contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.\u201d (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tsionis v. Martens, 116 Conn.App. 568, 577, 976 A.2d 53 (2009). \u201cA modification of an agreement must be supported by valid consideration and requires a party to do, or promise to do, something further than, or different from, that which he is already bound to do.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Christian v. Gouldin, supra, 72 Conn.App. at 23, 804 A.2d 865.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.\nWas the escrow agreement a valid modification?\n\n (A) Yes, because it was the compromise of an honest dispute.\n (B) Yes, because the Statute of Frauds does not apply to subsequent oral modifications.\n (C) No, because it was oral.\n (D) No, because it was not supported by consideration.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "Yes, because it was the compromise of an honest dispute."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_233",
    "retrieved_docs": "For a valid modification to exist, there must be mutual assent *822 to the meaning and conditions of the modification and the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.... Modification of a contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.\u201d (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tsionis v. Martens, 116 Conn.App. 568, 577, 976 A.2d 53 (2009). \u201cA modification of an agreement must be supported by valid consideration and requires a party to do, or promise to do, something further than, or different from, that which he is already bound to do.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Christian v. Gouldin, supra, 72 Conn.App. at 23, 804 A.2d 865."
  },
  {
    "question": "Tess occupied an apartment in a building owned by Len. She paid rent of $125 in advance each month. During the second month of occupancy, Tess organized the tenants in the building as a tenants' association and the association made demands of Len concerning certain repairs and improvements the tenants wanted. When Tess tendered rent for the third month, Len notified her that rent for the fourth and subsequent months would be $200 per month. Tess protested and pointed out that all other tenants paid rent of $125 per month. Thereupon, Len gave the required statutory notice that the tenancy was being terminated at the end of the third month. By an appropriate proceeding, Tess contests Len's right to terminate. If Tess succeeds, it will be because",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\"Retaliatory evidence\" is called the doctrine of \"curative admissibility\" in the cases. It is a doctrine which seeks to level the playing field in a way. Under it, when one party \"opens the door\" by introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence, the opposing party is provided with the unconditional right to rebut such evidence with other illegal evidence on the same subject.\nThe law is that \"even though a party introduces evidence that may be immaterial or illegal, his opponent has the right to rebut such evidence and this right is unconditional.\" A party \"who has brought out evidence on a certain subject has no valid complaint as to the trial court's action in allowing his opponent or adversary to introduce evidence on the same subject.\"\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nTess occupied an apartment in a building owned by Len. She paid rent of $125 in advance each month. During the second month of occupancy, Tess organized the tenants in the building as a tenants' association and the association made demands of Len concerning certain repairs and improvements the tenants wanted. When Tess tendered rent for the third month, Len notified her that rent for the fourth and subsequent months would be $200 per month. Tess protested and pointed out that all other tenants paid rent of $125 per month. Thereupon, Len gave the required statutory notice that the tenancy was being terminated at the end of the third month. By an appropriate proceeding, Tess contests Len's right to terminate. If Tess succeeds, it will be because\n\n (A) a periodic tenancy was created by implication\n (B) the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction is part of the law of the jurisdiction\n (C) the $200 rent demanded violates the agreement implied by the rate charged to other tenants\n (D) the law implies a term of one year in the absence of any express agreement\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction is part of the law of the jurisdiction"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_284",
    "retrieved_docs": "\"Retaliatory evidence\" is called the doctrine of \"curative admissibility\" in the cases. It is a doctrine which seeks to level the playing field in a way. Under it, when one party \"opens the door\" by introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence, the opposing party is provided with the unconditional right to rebut such evidence with other illegal evidence on the same subject.\nThe law is that \"even though a party introduces evidence that may be immaterial or illegal, his opponent has the right to rebut such evidence and this right is unconditional.\" A party \"who has brought out evidence on a certain subject has no valid complaint as to the trial court's action in allowing his opponent or adversary to introduce evidence on the same subject.\""
  },
  {
    "question": "The National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the United States without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the federal government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. Without seeking permission from the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal district court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThis failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are \u201cneedful\u201d rules \u201crespecting\u201d the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S., at 29-30, 60 S.Ct., at 756; Light v. United States, 220 U.S., at 537, 31 S.Ct., at 488; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that \u201c(t)he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.\u201d United States v. San Francisco, supra, 310 U.S., at 29, 60 S.Ct., at 756. See Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-295, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 1185, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273, 74 S.Ct. 481, 98 L.Ed. 689 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21, 73 S.Ct. 85, 87, 97 L.Ed. 15 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1662, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947); **2292 Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, 99, 20 L.Ed. 534 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, 14 Pet., at 537.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the United States without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the federal government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. Without seeking permission from the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal district court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be\n\n (A) constitutional, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions.\n (B) constitutional, because Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to advance the general welfare.\n (C) unconstitutional, because Congress may not use its delegated powers to override the Tenth Amendment right of the state of Arkota to legislate in areas of traditional state governmental functions, such as the protection of the property of its residents.\n (D) unconstitutional, because Congress violates the full faith and credit clause of Article IV when it punishes conduct that has been authorized by state action.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "constitutional, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_828",
    "retrieved_docs": "This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are \u201cneedful\u201d rules \u201crespecting\u201d the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S., at 29-30, 60 S.Ct., at 756; Light v. United States, 220 U.S., at 537, 31 S.Ct., at 488; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that \u201c(t)he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.\u201d United States v. San Francisco, supra, 310 U.S., at 29, 60 S.Ct., at 756. See Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-295, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 1185, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273, 74 S.Ct. 481, 98 L.Ed. 689 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21, 73 S.Ct. 85, 87, 97 L.Ed. 15 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1662, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947); **2292 Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, 99, 20 L.Ed. 534 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, 14 Pet., at 537."
  },
  {
    "question": "Pedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony from Sheriff concerning a discussion between Sheriff and Passerby at the police station after the accident, when Passerby excitedly exclaimed, \"Pedersen ran out in the street and was not in the crosswalk!\" Sheriff duly recorded the statement in an official police report. The trial judge should rule Sheriff's oral testimony",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event.\nStoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000). \n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCarr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.\nPedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony from Sheriff concerning a discussion between Sheriff and Passerby at the police station after the accident, when Passerby excitedly exclaimed, \"Pedersen ran out in the street and was not in the crosswalk!\" Sheriff duly recorded the statement in an official police report. The trial judge should rule Sheriff's oral testimony\n\n (A) admissible as a spontaneous utterance\n (B) admissible as based on past recollection recorded\n (C) inadmissible because Passerby has not been shown unavailable as a witness\n (D) inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because it can be a product of reflection and deliberation\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because it can be a product of reflection and deliberation"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_377",
    "retrieved_docs": "[I]n order for an excited utterance to be admissible, the following requirements must be met: (1) there must have been an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) the statement must have been made while the person was under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event.\nStoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000). "
  },
  {
    "question": "Dobbs, while intoxicated, drove his car through a playground crowded with children just to watch the children run to try to get out of his way. His car struck one of the children, killing her instantly. Which of the following is the best theory for finding Dobbs guilty of murder?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death of any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct\u201d); Baker v. State, 472 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (reckless murder \u201cis intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual\u201d); Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) (where the defendant's acts were specifically directed at a particular victim and no one else, she could not be convicted of reckless murder under \u00a7 13A\u20136\u20132(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDobbs, while intoxicated, drove his car through a playground crowded with children just to watch the children run to try to get out of his way. His car struck one of the children, killing her instantly. Which of the following is the best theory for finding Dobbs guilty of murder?\n\n (A) Transferred intent\n (B) Felony murder, with assault with a deadly weapon as the underlying felony\n (C) Intentional killing, since he knew that the children were there and he deliberately drove his car at them\n (D) Commission of an act highly dangerous to life, without an intent to kill but with disregard of the consequences\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Commission of an act highly dangerous to life, without an intent to kill but with disregard of the consequences"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_472",
    "retrieved_docs": "D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death of any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct\u201d); Baker v. State, 472 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (reckless murder \u201cis intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual\u201d); Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169, 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.1981) (where the defendant's acts were specifically directed at a particular victim and no one else, she could not be convicted of reckless murder under \u00a7 13A\u20136\u20132(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975)."
  },
  {
    "question": "In order to provide funds for a system of new major airports near the ten largest cities in the United States, Congress levies a tax of $25 on each airline ticket issued in the United States. The tax applies to every airline ticket, even those for travel that does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of those ten large cities. As applied to the issuance in the United States of an airline ticket for travel between two cities that will not be served by any of the new airports, this tax is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe only limitation upon the power of Congress to levy excise taxes of the character now under consideration is geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This court has often declared it cannot add others. Subject to such limitation Congress may select the subjects of taxation, and may exercise the power conferred at its discretion. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, 18 L. Ed. 497. Of course Congress may not in the exercise of federal power exert authority wholly reserved to the states. Many decisions of this court have so declared. And from an early day the court has held that the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. Ed. 482, in which case this court sustained a tax on a state bank issue of circulating notes. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas. 561, where the power was thoroughly considered, and an act levying a special tax upon oleomargarine artificially colored was sustained. And see Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 147, 153, 156, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312, and cases cited.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn order to provide funds for a system of new major airports near the ten largest cities in the United States, Congress levies a tax of $25 on each airline ticket issued in the United States. The tax applies to every airline ticket, even those for travel that does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of those ten large cities. As applied to the issuance in the United States of an airline ticket for travel between two cities that will not be served by any of the new airports, this tax is\n\n (A) constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion in choosing the subjects of its taxation and may impose taxes on subjects that have no relation to the purpose for which those tax funds will be expended.\n (B) constitutional, because an exemption for the issuance of tickets for travel between cities that will not be served by the new airports would deny the purchasers of all other tickets the equal protection of the laws.\n (C) unconstitutional, because the burden of the tax outweighs its benefits for passengers whose travel does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of the ten largest cities.\n (D) unconstitutional, because the tax adversely affects the fundamental right to travel.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion in choosing the subjects of its taxation and may impose taxes on subjects that have no relation to the purpose for which those tax funds will be expended."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_675",
    "retrieved_docs": "The only limitation upon the power of Congress to levy excise taxes of the character now under consideration is geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This court has often declared it cannot add others. Subject to such limitation Congress may select the subjects of taxation, and may exercise the power conferred at its discretion. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, 18 L. Ed. 497. Of course Congress may not in the exercise of federal power exert authority wholly reserved to the states. Many decisions of this court have so declared. And from an early day the court has held that the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. Ed. 482, in which case this court sustained a tax on a state bank issue of circulating notes. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas. 561, where the power was thoroughly considered, and an act levying a special tax upon oleomargarine artificially colored was sustained. And see Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 147, 153, 156, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312, and cases cited."
  },
  {
    "question": "Passenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nUnder that doctrine, the unexcused violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se if the provision (1) \u201cprotect[s] the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included\u201d and (2) \u201cprotect[s] against the type of harm which has occurred as a result of the violation.\u201d City of Fort Wayne v. Parrish, 32 N.E.3d 275, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPassenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail?\n\n (A) Yes, because the ocean liner was not equipped with the statutorily required lifeboats.\n (B) Yes, because in these circumstances common carriers are strictly liable.\n (C) No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat.\n (D) No, because Passenger assumed the risk by boarding the ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_1133",
    "retrieved_docs": "Under that doctrine, the unexcused violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se if the provision (1) \u201cprotect[s] the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included\u201d and (2) \u201cprotect[s] against the type of harm which has occurred as a result of the violation.\u201d City of Fort Wayne v. Parrish, 32 N.E.3d 275, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied."
  },
  {
    "question": "The President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, \"when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government.\" Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is:\n[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.\nBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). \u201c \u2018[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,\u2019 we may not dismiss the claims as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.\u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432\u201333 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, \"when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government.\" Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?\n\n (A) Suit dismissed, because Dunn does not have standing to bring this action.\n (B) Suit dismissed, because there is no adversity between Dunn and the defendants.\n (C) Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjustifiable political question.\n (D) Suit decided on the merits.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjustifiable political question."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_962",
    "retrieved_docs": "The political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is:\n[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.\nBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). \u201c \u2018[U]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,\u2019 we may not dismiss the claims as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.\u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432\u201333 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691)."
  },
  {
    "question": "Damson was short of money. He decided to go into Winston's house to take Winston's silverware and then to sell it. That night, while Winston was away, Damson entered by picking the lock on the front door. He picked up a chest of silverware from the dining room and went out the front door of the house to his car. As he was putting the chest of silverware into the trunk, he had second thoughts and decided that he did not wish to become a thief. He reentered the house and replaced the chest of silverware where he had found it. As he came out of the house the second time, he was arrested by the police, who had been called by a neighbor. Damson is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nLarceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ). \n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDamson was short of money. He decided to go into Winston's house to take Winston's silverware and then to sell it. That night, while Winston was away, Damson entered by picking the lock on the front door. He picked up a chest of silverware from the dining room and went out the front door of the house to his car. As he was putting the chest of silverware into the trunk, he had second thoughts and decided that he did not wish to become a thief. He reentered the house and replaced the chest of silverware where he had found it. As he came out of the house the second time, he was arrested by the police, who had been called by a neighbor. Damson is\n\n (A) guilty of burglary and larceny.\n (B) guilty of burglary and attempted larceny.\n (C) guilty of burglary but not guilty of any larceny offense.\n (D) not guilty of burglary or any larceny offense.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "guilty of burglary and larceny."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_968",
    "retrieved_docs": "Larceny is an element of robbery, and \u201c \u2018there can be no robbery without a larcenous intent....\u2019 \u201d Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 30, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (citation omitted). Therefore, the elements of larceny are important to an understanding of robbery. Larceny is defined as \u201c \u2018the fraudulent taking and carrying away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than that of the owner without his consent.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (quoting Hook, 315 Md. at 31, 553 A.2d 233)(emphasis in Hook ). "
  },
  {
    "question": "Deeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, \"The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?\" She responded, \"I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police.\" Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAs articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from legitimate probative force of the evidence.\u201d United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 334\u201335 (6th Cir.1988). Proffered evidence should therefore not be excluded by the district court as unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages the defendant's case. People v. District Court, 785 P.2d at 147.  Obviously, evidence proffered by the prosecutor is prejudicial, but not all evidence unfairly prejudices a defendant. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir.1987).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDeeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, \"The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?\" She responded, \"I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police.\" Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should\n\n (A) grant the motion, because the question was leading.\n (B) grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n (C) deny the motion, because it is proper rehabilitation of an impeached witness.\n (D) deny the motion, because Deeb's attorney \"opened the door\" by asking the question.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_584",
    "retrieved_docs": "As articulated by the Federal Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 403, the \u201cunfair prejudice\u201d language contained in Rule 403 refers to an undue tendency on the part of admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper basis. \u201cUnfair prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party's position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, such as the jury's bias, sympathy, anger or shock.\u201d People v. Goree, 132 Mich.App. 693, 349 N.W.2d 220 (1984). \u201cUnfair prejudice as used in Rule 403 does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from legitimate probative force of the evidence.\u201d United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 334\u201335 (6th Cir.1988). Proffered evidence should therefore not be excluded by the district court as unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages the defendant's case. People v. District Court, 785 P.2d at 147.  Obviously, evidence proffered by the prosecutor is prejudicial, but not all evidence unfairly prejudices a defendant. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir.1987)."
  },
  {
    "question": "Dan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a courtappointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession. Dan's confession is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n Respondent would now have us require *167 sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \u201cThe aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.\u201d Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941).\nWe hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not \u201cvoluntary\u201d within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements, and their admission into evidence, constitute no violation of that Clause.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a courtappointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession. Dan's confession is\n\n (A) admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement.\n (B) admissible, because Dan was not in custody.\n (C) inadmissible, because Dan's confession was a product of his mental illness and was therefore involuntary.\n (D) inadmissible, because under these circumstances, there was no valid waiver of Miranda warnings.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_632",
    "retrieved_docs": " Respondent would now have us require *167 sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \u201cThe aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.\u201d Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941).\nWe hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not \u201cvoluntary\u201d within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements, and their admission into evidence, constitute no violation of that Clause."
  },
  {
    "question": "Desmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nUnder the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDesmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate?\n\n (A) Yes, if his rescue attempt was reasonable.\n (B) Yes, because the law should not discourage attempts to assist persons in helpless peril.\n (C) No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care.\n (D) No, because Pearson's rescue attempt failed and therefore did not benefit Desmond.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_652",
    "retrieved_docs": "Under the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes."
  },
  {
    "question": "Dan, an eight-year-old, rode his bicycle down his driveway into a busy highway and Driver had to stop her car suddenly to avoid colliding with the bike. Because of the sudden stop, Driver's two-year-old son, Peter, who was sitting on the seat without any restraint, was thrown into the dashboard and injured. Had Peter been properly restrained in a baby car seat, as required by a state safety statute of which his mother was aware, he would not have been injured. In an action brought on Peter's behalf against Dan's parents to recover for Peter's injuries, Peter will",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the circumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDan, an eight-year-old, rode his bicycle down his driveway into a busy highway and Driver had to stop her car suddenly to avoid colliding with the bike. Because of the sudden stop, Driver's two-year-old son, Peter, who was sitting on the seat without any restraint, was thrown into the dashboard and injured. Had Peter been properly restrained in a baby car seat, as required by a state safety statute of which his mother was aware, he would not have been injured. In an action brought on Peter's behalf against Dan's parents to recover for Peter's injuries, Peter will\n\n (A) not prevail, because parents are not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their children.\n (B) not prevail, because Peter's injury was attributable to his mother's knowing violation of a safety statute.\n (C) prevail, if Dan's parents knew that he sometimes drove into the highway, and they took no steps to prevent it.\n (D) prevail, if Dan's riding into the highway was negligent and the proximate cause of Peter's injuries.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "prevail, if Dan's parents knew that he sometimes drove into the highway, and they took no steps to prevent it."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_791",
    "retrieved_docs": "A duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the circumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact."
  },
  {
    "question": "On the evening of the day of the accident, Walter Passenger wrote a letter to his sister in which he described the accident. When Walter says he cannot remember some details of the accident, Pedersen's counsel seeks to show him the letter to assist him in his testimony on direct examination. The trial judge should rule this",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIn contrast, [u]nder present recollection refreshed the witness' memory is refreshed or jogged through the employment of a writing, diagram, smell or even touch, and he testifies from his memory so refreshed. Because of the independent origin of the testimony actually elicited, the stimulation of an actual present recollection is not strictly bounded by fixed rules but, rather, is approached on a case-by-case basis looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances present.\nGibson, 333 N.C. at 50, 424 S.E.2d at 107. Because \u201cthe evidence is the testimony of the witness at trial, whereas with a past recollection recorded the evidence is the writing itself,\u201d \u201cthe foundational questions raised by past recollection recorded are never reached.\u201d Id. The relevant test, then, \u201cis whether the witness has an independent recollection of the event and is merely using the memorandum to refresh details or whether the witness is using the memorandum as a testimonial crutch for something beyond his recall.\u201d State v. York, 347 N.C. 79, 89, 489 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1997).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCarr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.\nOn the evening of the day of the accident, Walter Passenger wrote a letter to his sister in which he described the accident. When Walter says he cannot remember some details of the accident, Pedersen's counsel seeks to show him the letter to assist him in his testimony on direct examination. The trial judge should rule this\n\n (A) permissible under the doctrine of present recollection refreshed\n (B) permissible under the doctrine of past recollection recorded\n (C) objectionable because the letter was not a spontaneous utterance\n (D) objectionable because the letter is a self-serving declaration in so far as the witness, Walter, is concerned\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "permissible under the doctrine of present recollection refreshed"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_381",
    "retrieved_docs": "In contrast, [u]nder present recollection refreshed the witness' memory is refreshed or jogged through the employment of a writing, diagram, smell or even touch, and he testifies from his memory so refreshed. Because of the independent origin of the testimony actually elicited, the stimulation of an actual present recollection is not strictly bounded by fixed rules but, rather, is approached on a case-by-case basis looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances present.\nGibson, 333 N.C. at 50, 424 S.E.2d at 107. Because \u201cthe evidence is the testimony of the witness at trial, whereas with a past recollection recorded the evidence is the writing itself,\u201d \u201cthe foundational questions raised by past recollection recorded are never reached.\u201d Id. The relevant test, then, \u201cis whether the witness has an independent recollection of the event and is merely using the memorandum to refresh details or whether the witness is using the memorandum as a testimonial crutch for something beyond his recall.\u201d State v. York, 347 N.C. 79, 89, 489 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1997)."
  }
]